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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..68afc69 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #52914 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52914) diff --git a/old/52914-0.txt b/old/52914-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index cd83d6d..0000000 --- a/old/52914-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11721 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's The Will to Power, Book I and II, by Friedrich Nietzsche - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: The Will to Power, Book I and II - An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values - -Author: Friedrich Nietzsche - -Editor: Oscar Levy - -Translator: Anthony M. Ludovici - -Release Date: August 28, 2016 [EBook #52914] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WILL TO POWER, BOOK I AND II *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (back online -soon in an extended version, alo linking to free sources -for education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational -materials,...) (Images generously made available by the -Internet Archive.) - - - - - -THE WILL TO POWER - -AN ATTEMPTED TRANSVALUATION OF ALL VALUES - - -BY - -FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE - - -TRANSLATED BY - -ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI - - -VOL. I - -BOOKS I AND II - - -The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche - -The First Complete and Authorised English Translation - -Edited by Dr Oscar Levy - -Volume Fourteen - -T.N. FOULIS - -13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET - -EDINBURGH: AND LONDON - - -1914 - - - - -CONTENTS OF VOL. I. - - PREFACE 1 - - FIRST BOOK. EUROPEAN NIHILISM. A PLAN - - I. NIHILISM-- - - 1. Nihilism as an Outcome of the Valuations and Interpretations of - Existence which have prevailed hitherto - 2. Further Causes of Nihilism - 3. The Nihilistic Movement as an Expression of Decadence - 4. The Crisis: Nihilism and the Idea of Recurrence - - II. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM-- - - _(a)_ Modern Gloominess - _(b)_ The Last Centuries - _(c)_ Signs of Increasing Strength - - SECOND BOOK. A CRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED - HITHERTO. - - I. CRITICISM OF RELIGION-- - - 1. Concerning the Origin of Religions - 2. Concerning the History of Christianity - 3. Christian Ideals - - II. A CRITICISM OF MORALITY-- - - 1. The Origin of Moral Valuations - 2. The Herd - 3. General Observations concerning Morality - 4. How Virtue is made to Dominate - 5. The Moral Ideal-- - - _A._ A Criticism of Ideals - _B._ A Criticism of the "Good Man," of the Saint, etc. - _C._ Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities - _D._ A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating - - 6. Concluding Remarks concerning the Criticism of Morality - - III. CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY-- - - 1. General Remarks - 2. A Criticism of Greek Philosophy - 3. The Truths and Errors of Philosophers - 4. Concluding Remarks in the Criticism of Philosophy - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. - - -In the volume before us we have the first two books of what was to be -Nietzsche's greatest theoretical and philosophical prose work. The -reception given to _Thus Spake Zarathustra_ had been so unsatisfactory, -and misunderstandings relative to its teaching had become so general, -that, within a year of the publication of the first part of that -famous philosophical poem, Nietzsche was already beginning to see -the necessity of bringing his doctrines before the public in a more -definite and unmistakable form. During the years that followed--that is -to say, between 1883 and 1886--this plan was matured, and although we -have no warrant, save his sister's own word and the internal evidence -at our disposal, for classing _Beyond Good and Evil_ (published 1886) -among the contributions to Nietzsche's grand and final philosophical -scheme, "The Will to Power," it is now impossible to separate it -entirely from his chief work as we would naturally separate _The Birth -of Tragedy,_ the _Thoughts out of Season,_ the volumes entitled _Human, -all-too-Human, The Dawn of Day,_ and _Joyful Wisdom._ - -_Beyond Good and Evil,_ then, together with its sequel, _The Genealogy -of Morals,_ and the two little volumes, _The Twilight of the Idols_ -and the _Antichrist_ (published in 1889 and 1894 respectively), must -be regarded as forming part of the general plan of which _The Will to -Power_ was to be the _opus magnum._ - -Unfortunately, _The Will to Power_ was never completed by its author. -The text from which this translation was made is a posthumous -publication, and it suffers from all the disadvantages that a book -must suffer from which has been arranged and ordered by foster hands. -When those who were responsible for its publication undertook the task -of preparing it for the press, it was very little more than a vast -collection of notes and rough drafts, set down by Nietzsche from time -to time, as the material for his chief work; and, as any liberty taken -with the original manuscript, save that of putting it in order, would -probably have resulted in adding or excluding what the author would -on no account have added or excluded himself, it follows that in some -few cases the paragraphs are no more than hasty memoranda of passing -thoughts, which Nietzsche must have had the intention of elaborating -at some future time. In these cases the translation follows the German -as closely as possible, and the free use even of a conjunction has in -certain cases been avoided, for fear lest the meaning might be in the -slightest degree modified. It were well, therefore, if the reader could -bear these facts in mind whenever he is struck by a certain clumsiness, -either of expression or disposition, in the course of reading this -translation. - -It may be said that, from the day when Nietzsche first recognised the -necessity of making a more unequivocal appeal to his public than -the _Zarathustra_ had been, that is to say, from the spring of 1883, -his work in respect of _The Will to Power_ suffered no interruption -whatsoever, and that it was his chief preoccupation from that period -until his breakdown in 1889. - -That this span of six years was none too long for the task he had -undertaken, will be gathered from the fact that, in the great work he -had planned, he actually set out to show that the life-principle, "Will -to Power," was the prime motor of all living organisms. - -To do this he appeals both to the animal world and to human society, -with its subdivisions, religion, art, morality, politics, etc. etc., -and in each of these he seeks to demonstrate the activity of the -principle which he held to be the essential factor of all existence. - -Frau Foerster-Nietzsche tells us that the notion that "The Will to -Power" was the fundamental principle of all life, first occurred to her -brother in the year 1870, at the seat of war, while he was serving as -a volunteer in a German army ambulance. On one occasion, at the close -of a very heavy day with the wounded, he happened to enter a small -town which lay on one of the chief military roads. He was wandering -through it in a leisurely fashion when, suddenly, as he turned the -corner of a street that was protected on either side by lofty stone -walls, he heard a roaring noise, as of thunder, which seemed to come -from the immediate neighbourhood. He hurried forward a step or two, and -what should he see, but a magnificent cavalry regiment--gloriously -expressive of the courage and exuberant strength of a people--ride -past him like a luminous stormcloud. The thundering din waxed louder -and louder, and lo and behold! his own beloved regiment of field -artillery dashed forward at full speed, out of the mist of motes, and -sped westward amid an uproar of clattering chains and galloping steeds. -A minute or two elapsed, and then a column of infantry appeared, -advancing at the double--the men's eyes were aflame, their feet struck -the hard road like mighty hammer-strokes, and their accoutrements -glistened through the haze. While this procession passed before him, -on its way to war and perhaps to death,--so wonderful in its vital -strength and formidable courage, and so perfectly symbolic of a race -that _will_ conquer and prevail, or perish in the attempt,--Nietzsche -was struck with the thought that the highest will to live could not -find its expression in a miserable "struggle for existence," but in -a will to war, a Will to Power, a will to overpower! This is said to -be the history of his first conception of that principle which is at -the root of all his philosophy, and twelve years later, in _Thus Spake -Zarathustra,_ we find him expounding it thus:-- - -"Wherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to Power; and even -in the will of the servant found I the will to be master. - -"Only where there is life, is there also will: not, however, Will to -Life, but--so teach I thee--Will to Power! - -"Much is reckoned higher than life itself by the living one; but out of -the very reckoning speaketh--the Will to Power!" - -And three years later still, in _Beyond Good and Evil,_ we read the -following passage:-- - -"Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the -instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic -being. A living thing seeks above all to _discharge_ its strength--life -itself is _Will to Power_; self-preservation is only one of the -indirect and most frequent results thereof." - -But in this volume, and the one that is to follow, we shall find -Nietzsche more mature, more sober, and perhaps more profound than -in the works above mentioned. All the loves and hates by which we -know him, we shall come across again in this work; but here he seems -to stand more above them than he had done heretofore; having once -enunciated his ideals vehemently and emphatically, he now discusses -them with a certain grim humour, with more thoroughness and detail, and -he gives even his enemies a quiet and respectful hearing. His tolerant -attitude to Christianity on pages 8-9, 107, 323, for instance, is -a case in point, and his definite description of what we are to -understand by his pity (p. 293) leaves us in no doubt as to the calm -determination of this work. Book One will not seem so well arranged -or so well worked out as Book Two; the former being more sketchy and -more speculative than the latter. Be this as it may, it contains deeply -interesting things, inasmuch as it attempts to trace the elements of -Nihilism--as the outcome of Christian values--in all the institutions -of the present day. - -In the Second Book Herbert Spencer comes in for a number of telling -blows, and not the least of these is to be found on page 237, where, -although his name is not mentioned, it is obviously implied. Here -Nietzsche definitely disclaims all ideas of an individualistic -morality, and carefully states that _his_ philosophy aims at _a new -order of rank._ - -It will seem to some that morality is dealt with somewhat cavalierly -throughout the two books; but, in this respect, it should not be -forgotten that Nietzsche not only made a firm stand in favour of -exceptional men, but that he also believed that any morality is nothing -more than a mere system of valuations which are determined by the -conditions in which a given species lives. Hence his words on page 107: -"Beyond Good and Evil,--certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional -and strict preservation of herd-morality"; and on page 323: "Suppose -the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try -and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, -and sacrifice! _Self-contempt on the part of the weak_ would be the -result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their -kind. And would this be _desirable_?--should we really like a world -in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the -_plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was lacking?" - -It is obvious from this passage that Nietzsche only objected to the -influence of herd-morality outside the herd--that is to say, among -exceptional and higher men who may be wrecked by it. Whereas most other -philosophers before him had been the "Altruist" of the lower strata of -humanity, Nietzsche may aptly be called the Altruist of the exceptions, -of the particular lucky cases among men. For such "varieties," he -thought, the morality of Christianity had done all it could do, and -though he in no way wished to underrate the value it had sometimes -been to them in the past, he saw that at present, in any case, it -might prove a great danger. With Goethe, therefore, he believed that -"Hypotheses are only the pieces of scaffolding which are erected round -a building during the course of its construction, and which are taken -away as soon as the edifice is completed. To the workman, they are -indispensable; but he must be careful not to confound the scaffolding -with the building."[1] - -It is deeply to be deplored that Nietzsche was never able to complete -his life-work. The fragments of it collected in volumes i. and ii. of -_The Will to Power_ are sufficiently remarkable to convey some idea of -what the whole work would have been if only its author had been able to -arrange and complete it according to his original design. - -It is to be hoped that we are too sensible nowadays to allow our -sensibilities to be shocked by serious and well-meditated criticism, -even of the most cherished among our institutions, and an honest and -sincere reformer ought no longer to find us prejudiced--to the extent -of deafness--against him, more particularly when he comes forward with -a gospel--"The Will to Power"--which is, above all, a test of our power -to will. - - ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI. - - -[Footnote 1: _Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen_ (Weimar Edition, i. -II, p. 132).] - - - - -PREFACE. - - -1. - -Concerning great things one should either be silent or one should speak -loftily:--loftily--that is to say, cynically and innocently. - - -2. - -What I am now going to relate is the history of the next two centuries. -I shall describe what will happen, what must necessarily happen: -_the triumph of Nihilism._ This history can be written already; for -necessity itself is at work in bringing it about. This future is -already proclaimed by a hundred different omens; as a destiny it -announces its advent everywhere, for this music of to-morrow all ears -are already pricked. The whole of our culture in Europe has long -been writhing in an agony of suspense which increases from decade -to decade as if in expectation of a catastrophe: restless, violent, -helter-skelter, like a torrent that will _reach its bourne,_ and -refuses to reflect--yea, that even dreads reflection. - - -3. - -On the other hand, the present writer has done little else, hitherto, -than _reflect and meditate,_ like an instinctive philosopher and -anchorite, who found his advantage in isolation--in remaining outside, -in patience, procrastination, and lagging behind; like a weighing and -testing spirit who has already lost his way in every labyrinth of -the future; like a prophetic bird-spirit that _looks backwards_ when -it would announce what is to come; like the first perfect European -Nihilist, who, however, has already outlived Nihilism in his own -soul--who has out-grown, overcome, and dismissed it. - - -4. - -For the reader must not misunderstand the meaning of the title which -has been given to this Evangel of the Future. "_The Will to Power: -An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values_"--with this formula a -_counter-movement_ finds expression, in regard to both a principle and -a mission; a movement which in some remote future will supersede this -perfect Nihilism; but which nevertheless regards it as a _necessary -step,_ both logically and psychologically, towards its own advent, -and which positively cannot come, except _on top of_ and _out of_ it. -For, why is the triumph of Nihilism _inevitable_ now? Because the -very values current amongst us to-day will arrive at their logical -conclusion in Nihilism,--because Nihilism is the only possible outcome -of our greatest values and ideals,--because we must first experience -Nihilism before we can realise what the actual worth of these "values" -was.... Sooner or later we shall be in need of _new values._ - - - - -FIRST BOOK. - -EUROPEAN NIHILISM. - - -I. - - -A PLAN. - - -1. Nihilism is at our door: whence comes this most gruesome of all -guests to us?--To begin with, it is a mistake to point to "social -evils," "physiological degeneration," or even to corruption as a cause -of Nihilism. This is the most straightforward and most sympathetic age -that ever was. Evil, whether spiritual, physical, or intellectual, is, -in itself, quite unable to introduce Nihilism, _i.e.,_ the absolute -repudiation of worth, purpose, desirability. These evils allow of yet -other and quite different explanations. But there is one _very definite -explanation_ of the phenomena: Nihilism harbours in the heart of -Christian morals. - - -2. The downfall of Christianity,--through its morality (which is -insuperable), which finally turns against the Christian God Himself -(the sense of truth, highly developed through Christianity, ultimately -revolts against the falsehood and fictitiousness of all Christian -interpretations of the world and its history. The recoil-stroke of -"God is Truth" in the fanatical Belief, is: "All is false." Buddhism -of _action_....). - - -3. Doubt in morality is the decisive factor. The downfall of the -_moral_ interpretation of the universe, which loses its _raison -d'être_ once it has tried to take flight to a Beyond, meets its -end in Nihilism. "Nothing has any purpose" (the inconsistency of -one explanation of the world, to which men have devoted untold -energy,--gives rise to the suspicion that all explanations may perhaps -be false). The Buddhistic feature: a yearning for nonentity (Indian -Buddhism has no fundamentally moral development at the back of it; that -is why Nihilism in its case means only morality not overcome; existence -is regarded as a punishment and conceived as an error; error is thus -held to be punishment--a moral valuation). Philosophical attempts to -overcome the "moral God" (Hegel, _Pantheism_). The vanquishing of -popular ideals: the wizard, the saint, the bard. Antagonism of "true" -and "beautiful" and "good." - - -4. Against "purposelessness" on the one hand, against moral valuations -on the other: how far has all science and philosophy been cultivated -heretofore under the influence of moral judgments? And have we not got -the additional factor--the enmity of science, into the bargain? Or the -prejudice against science? Criticism of Spinoza. Christian valuations -everywhere present as remnants in socialistic and positivistic systems. -_A criticism of Christian_ morality is altogether lacking. - - -5. The Nihilistic consequences of present natural science (along -with its attempts to escape into a Beyond). Out of its practice there -finally _arises_ a certain self-annihilation, an antagonistic attitude -towards itself--a sort of anti-scientificality. Since Copernicus man -has been rolling away from the centre towards _x_. - - -6. The Nihilistic consequences of the political and politico-economical -way of thinking, where all principles at length become tainted with the -atmosphere of the platform: the breath of mediocrity, insignificance, -dishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchy, etc. Punishment. Everywhere -the _deliverer_ is missing, either as a class or as a single man--the -justifier. - - -7. Nihilistic consequences of history and of the "practical historian," -_i.e.,_ the romanticist. The attitude of art is quite unoriginal in -modern life. Its gloominess. Goethe's so-called Olympian State. - - -8. Art and the preparation of Nihilism. Romanticism (the conclusion of -Wagner's _Ring of the Nibelung_). - - - - -NIHILISM. - - -1. NIHILISM AS AN OUTCOME OF THE VALUATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF -EXISTENCE WHICH HAVE PREVAILED HERETOFORE. - - -2. - -What does Nihilism mean?--_That the highest values are losing their -value._ There is no bourne. There is no answer to the question: "to -what purpose?" - - -3. - -Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the -light of the highest values already discovered; it also includes the -_view_ that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of -transcendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either -divine or morality incarnate. - -This view is a result of fully developed "truthfulness": therefore a -consequence of the belief in morality. - - -4. - -What _advantages_ did the Christian hypothesis of morality offer? - -(1) It bestowed an intrinsic value upon men, which contrasted with -their apparent insignificance and subordination to chance in the -eternal flux of becoming and perishing. - -(2) It served the purpose of God's advocates, inasmuch as it granted -the world a certain _perfection_ despite its sorrow and evil--it also -granted the world that proverbial "freedom": evil seemed full of -_meaning_. - -(3) It assumed that man could have a _knowledge_ of absolute values, -and thus granted him _adequate perception_ for the most important -things. - -(4) It prevented man from despising himself as man, from turning -against life, and from being driven to despair by knowledge: it was a -self-preservative measure. - -In short: Morality was the great _antidote_ against practical and -theoretical Nihilism. - - -5. - -But among the forces reared by morality, there was _truthfulness_: -this in the end turns against morality, exposes the _teleology_ of the -latter, its interestedness, and now the _recognition_ of this lie so -long incorporated, from which we despaired of ever freeing ourselves, -acts just like a stimulus. We perceive certain needs in ourselves, -implanted during the long dynasty of the moral interpretation of life, -which now seem to us to be needs of untruth: on the other hand, those -very needs represent the highest values owing to which we are able to -endure life. We have _ceased_ from attaching any worth to what we -know, and we _dare_ not attach any more worth to that with which we -would fain deceive ourselves--from this antagonism there results a -process of dissolution. - - -6. - -This is the _antinomy_: In so far as we believe in morality, we condemn -existence. - - -7. - -The highest values in the service of which man ought to live, more -particularly when they oppressed and constrained him most--these -_social values, owing to their tone-strengthening_ tendencies, -were built over men's heads as though they were the will of God or -"reality," or the actual world, or even a hope of a world to come. -Now that the lowly origin of these values has become known, the -whole universe seems to have been transvalued and to have lost its -significance--but this is only an intermediate stage. - - -8. - -The consequence of _Nihilism_ (disbelief in all values) as a result -of a moral valuation:--_We have grown to dislike egotism_ (even -though we have realised the impossibility of altruism);--_we have -grown to dislike what is most necessary_ (although we have recognised -the impossibility of a _liberum arbitrium_ and of an "intelligible -freedom"[1]). We perceive that we do not reach the spheres in which we -have set our values--at the same time those other spheres in which we -live have _not_ thereby gained _one iota_ in value. On the contrary, we -are _tired,_ because we have lost the main incentive to live. "All in -vain hitherto!" - - -9. - -"Pessimism as a preparatory state to Nihilism." - - -10. - -A. Pessimism viewed as strength--_in what respect?_ In the energy of -its logic, as anarchy, Nihilism, and analysis. - -B. Pessimism regarded as collapse--_in what sense?_ In the sense of -its being a softening influence, a sort of cosmopolitan befingering, a -"tout comprendre," and historical spirit. - -_Critical tension_: extremes make their appearance and become dominant. - - -11. - -_The logic of Pessimism leads finally to Nihilism: what is the force at -work?_--The notion that _there are no values,_ and _no purpose_: the -recognition of the part that moral valuations have played in all other -lofty values. - -Result: _moral valuations are condemnations, negations; morality is the -abdication of the will to live...._ - - -[Footnote 1: This is a Kantian term. Kant recognised two kinds of -Freedom--the practical and the transcendental kind. The first belongs -to the phenomenal, the second to the intelligible world.--TRANSLATOR'S -NOTE.] - - -12. - - -THE COLLAPSE OF COSMOPOLITAN VALUES. - - -_A._ - -Nihilism will have to manifest itself as a _psychological condition, -first_ when we have sought in all that has happened a purpose which -is not there: so that the seeker will ultimately lose courage. -Nihilism is therefore the coming into consciousness of the long -_waste_ of strength, the pain of "futility," uncertainty, the lack -of an opportunity to recover in some way, or to attain to a state of -peace concerning anything--shame in one's own presence, as if one -had _cheated_ oneself too long.... The purpose above-mentioned might -have been achieved: in the form of a "realisation" of a most high -canon of morality in all worldly phenomena, the moral order of the -universe; or in the form of the increase of love and harmony in the -traffic of humanity; or in the nearer approach to a general condition -of happiness; or even in the march towards general nonentity--any sort -of goal always constitutes a purpose. The common factor to all these -appearances is that something will be _attained,_ through the process -itself: and now we perceive that Becoming has been aiming at _nothing,_ -and has achieved nothing. Hence the disillusionment in regard to a -so-called _purpose in existence,_ as a cause of Nihilism; whether this -be in respect of a very definite purpose, or generalised into the -recognition that all the hypotheses are false which have hitherto been -offered as to the object of life, and which relate to the whole of -"Evolution" (man _no longer_ an assistant in, let alone the culmination -of, the evolutionary process). - -Nihilism will manifest itself as a psychological condition, in the -second place, when man has fixed a totality, a systematisation, even an -organisation in and behind all phenomena, so that the soul thirsting -for respect and admiration will wallow in the general idea of a highest -ruling and administrative power (if it be the soul of a logician, -the sequence of consequences and perfect reasoning will suffice to -conciliate everything). A kind of unity, some form of "monism":' -and as a result of this belief man becomes obsessed by a feeling of -profound relativity and dependence in the presence of an All which -is infinitely superior to him, a sort of divinity. "The general good -exacts the surrender of the individual ..." but lo, there is no such -general good! At bottom, man loses the belief in his own worth when no -infinitely precious entity manifests itself through him--that is to -say, he conceived such an All, _in order to be able to believe in his -own worth._ - -Nihilism, as a psychological condition, has yet a third and last form. -Admitting these two _points of view_: that no purpose can be assigned -to Becoming, and that no great entity rules behind all Becoming, in -which the individual may completely lose himself as in an element of -superior value; there still remains the _subterfuge_ which would -consist in condemning this whole world of Becoming as an illusion, -and in discovering a world which would lie beyond it, and would be a -_real_ world. The moment, however, that man perceives that this world -has been devised only for the purpose of meeting certain psychological -needs, and that he has no right whatsoever to it, the final form of -Nihilism comes into being, which comprises _a denial of a metaphysical -world,_ and which forbids itself all belief in a _real_ world. From -this standpoint, the reality of Becoming is the only reality that -is admitted: all bypaths to back-worlds and false godheads are -abandoned--but _this world is no longer endured, although no one wishes -to disown it._ - -What has actually happened? The feeling of worthlessness was realised -when it was understood that neither the notion of "_Purpose_" nor -that of "_Unity_" nor that of "_Truth_" could be made to interpret -the general character of existence. Nothing is achieved or obtained -thereby; the unity which intervenes in the multiplicity of events is -entirely lacking: the character of existence is not "true," it is -_false_; there is certainly no longer any reason to believe in a _real_ -world. In short, the categories, "Purpose," "Unity," "Being," by means -of which we had lent some worth to life, we have once more divorced -from it--and the world now appears _worthless_ to us.... - -_B._ - -Admitting that we have recognised the impossibility of _interpreting_ -world by means of these three categories, and that from this -standpoint the world begins to be worthless to us; we must ask -ourselves whence we derived our belief in these three categories. -Let us see if it is possible to refuse to believe in them. If we can -_deprive them of their value,_ the proof that they cannot be applied to -the world, is no longer a sufficient reason for _depriving that world -of its value_. - -Result: _The belief_ in the categories of reason[2] is the cause -of Nihilism--we have measured the worth of the world according to -categories _which can only be applied to a purely fictitious world._ - -Conclusion: All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend -the world some worth, from our point of view, and with which we have -therefore _deprived it of all worth_ (once these values have been -shown to be inapplicable)--all these values, are, psychologically, -the results of certain views of utility, established for the purpose -of maintaining and increasing the dominion of certain communities: -but falsely projected into the nature of things. It is always man's -_exaggerated ingenuousness_ to regard himself as the sense and measure -of all things. - - -[Footnote 2: This probably refers to Kant's celebrated table of -twelve categories. The four classes, quantity, quality, relation, and -modality, are each provided with three categories.--TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.] - - -13. - -Nihilism represents an intermediary pathological condition (the vast -generalisation, the conclusion that there _is no purpose_ in anything, -is pathological): whether it be that the productive forces are not -yet strong enough--or that _decadence_ still hesitates and has not yet -discovered its expedients. - -_The conditions of this hypothesis_:--That there is _no truth_; that -there is no absolute state of affairs--no "thing-in-itself." _This -alone is Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind._ It finds that the -value of things consists precisely in the fact that these values are -_not_ real and never have been real, but that they are only a symptom -of strength on the part of the _valuer,_ a simplification serving the -_purposes of existence._ - - -14. - -_Values and their modification_ are related to the _growth of power of -the valuer._ - -The measure of _disbelief_ and of the "freedom of spirit" which is -tolerated, viewed as an _expression of the growth of power._ - -"Nihilism" viewed as the ideal of the _highest spiritual power,_ of the -over-rich life, partly destructive, partly ironical. - - -15. - -What is _belief_? How is a belief born? All belief assumes that -_something is true._ - -The extremest form of Nihilism would mean that _all_ belief--all -assumption of truth--is false: because no real world is at hand. -It were therefore: only an _appearance seen in perspective,_ whose -origin must be found in us (seeing that we are constantly in need of a -narrower, a shortened, and simplified world). - -This should be realised, that the extent to which we can, in our heart -of hearts, acknowledge appearance, and the necessity of falsehood, -without going to rack and ruin, is the _measure of strength._ - -In this respect, Nihilism, in that it is the _negation_ of a real world -and of Being, might be _a divine view of the world._ - - -16. - -If we are disillusioned, we have not become so in regard to life, -but owing to the fact that our eyes have been opened to all kinds -of "desiderata." With mocking anger we survey that which is called -"_Ideal_": we despise ourselves only because we are unable at every -moment of our lives to quell that absurd emotion which is called -"Idealism." This _pampering_ by means of ideals is stronger than the -anger of the _disillusioned one._ - - -17. - -_To what extent does Schopenhauerian Nihilism continue to be the result -of the same ideal as that which gave rise to Christian Theism?_ The -amount of certainty concerning the most exalted desiderata, the highest -values and the greatest degree of perfection, was so great, that the -philosophers started out from it as if it had been an _a priori_ and -_absolute fact_: "God" at the head, as the _given quantity_--Truth. "To -become like God," "to be absorbed into the Divine Being"--these were -for centuries the most ingenuous and most convincing desiderata (but -that which convinces is not necessarily true on that account: it is -_nothing more nor less than convincing._ An observation for donkeys). - -The granting of a _personal-reality_ to this accretion of ideals -has been unlearned: people have become atheistic. But has the ideal -actually been abandoned? The latest metaphysicians, as a matter of -fact, still seek their true "reality" in it--the "thing-in-itself" -beside which everything else is merely appearance. Their dogma is, that -because our world of appearance is so obviously _not_ the expression -of that ideal, it therefore cannot be "true"--and at bottom does not -even lead back to that metaphysical world as cause. The unconditioned, -in so far as it stands for that highest degree of perfection, cannot -possibly be the reason of all the conditioned. Schopenhauer, who -desired it otherwise, was obliged to imagine this metaphysical basis as -the antithesis to the ideal, as "an evil, blind will": thus it could -be "that which appears," that which manifests itself in the world of -appearance. But even so, he did not give up that ideal absolute--he -circumvented it.... - -(Kant seems to have needed the hypothesis of "intelligible freedom,"[3] -in order to relieve the _ens perfectum_ of the responsibility of having -contrived this world as it is, in short, in order to explain evil: -scandalous logic for a philosopher!). - - -[Footnote 3: See Note on p. 11.] - - -18. - -_The most general sign of modern times_: in his own estimation, man has -lost an infinite amount of _dignity._ For a long time he was the centre -and tragic hero of life in general; then he endeavoured to demonstrate -at least his relationship to the most essential and in itself most -valuable side of life--as all metaphysicians do, who wish to hold fast -to the _dignity of man,_ in their belief that moral values are cardinal -values. He who has let God go, clings all the more strongly to the -belief in morality. - - -19. - -Every purely _moral_ valuation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic) -_terminates in Nihilism_: Europe must expect the same thing! It is -supposed that one can get along with a morality bereft of a religious -background; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is opened. There -is nothing in religion which compels us to regard ourselves as valuing -creatures. - - -20. - -The question which Nihilism puts, namely, "to what purpose?" is the -outcome of a habit, hitherto, to regard the purpose as something fixed, -given and exacted _from outside_--that is to say, by some supernatural -authority. Once the belief in this has been unlearned, the force of an -old habit leads to the search after _another_ authority, which would -_know how to speak unconditionally,_ and could _point to_ goals and -missions. The authority of the _conscience_ now takes the first place -(the more _morality_ is emancipated from theology, the more imperative -does it become) as a compensation for the _personal authority._ Or -the authority of _reason._ Or the _gregarious instinct_ (the herd). -Or history with its _immanent_ spirit, which has its goal in itself, -and to which one can _abandon oneself._ One would like to _evade_ the -_will,_ as also the _willing_ of a goal and the risk of setting oneself -a goal. One would like to get rid of the responsibility (_Fatalism_ -would be accepted). Finally: Happiness and with a dash of humbug, the -_happiness of the greatest number._ - -It is said:-- - -(1) A definite goal is quite unnecessary. - -(2) Such a goal cannot possibly be foreseen. Precisely now, when _will_ -in its _fullest strength_ were _necessary,_ it is in the _weakest_ -and most _pusillanimous_ condition. _Absolute mistrust concerning the -organising power_ of the will. - - -21. - -_The perfect Nihilist._--The Nihilist's eye _idealises in an ugly -sense,_ and is inconstant to what it remembers: it allows its -recollections to go astray and to fade, it does not protect them from -that cadaverous coloration with which weakness dyes all that is distant -and past. And what it does not do for itself it fails to do for the -whole of mankind as well--that is to say, it allows it to drop. - - -22. - -Nihilism. It may be _two things_:-- - -A. Nihilism as a sign of _enhanced spiritual strength_: active Nihilism. - -B. Nihilism as a sign of the _collapse_ and _decline_ of spiritual -_strength_: passive Nihilism. - - -23. - -Nihilism, a _normal_ condition. - -It may be a sign of _strength_; spiritual vigour may have increased to -such an extent that the _goals_ toward which man has marched _hitherto_ -(the "convictions," articles of faith) are no longer suited to it -(for a faith generally expresses the exigencies of the _conditions of -existence,_ a submission to the authority of an order of things which -_conduces_ to the _prosperity,_ the _growth_ and _power_ of a living -creature ...); on the other hand, a sign of _insufficient_ strength, to -fix a goal, a "wherefore," and a faith for itself. - -It reaches its _maximum_ of relative strength, as a powerful -_destructive_ force, in the form of _active Nihilism._ - -Its opposite would be _weary_ Nihilism, which no longer attacks: its -most renowned form being Buddhism: as _passive_ Nihilism, a sign of -weakness: spiritual strength may be fatigued, _exhausted,_ so that the -goals and values which have prevailed _hitherto_ are no longer suited -to it and are no longer believed in--so that the synthesis of values -and goals (upon which every strong culture stands) decomposes, and -the different values contend with one another: _Disintegration,_ then -everything which is relieving, which heals, becalms, or stupefies, -steps into the foreground under the cover of various _disguises,_ -either religious, moral, political or æsthetic, etc. - - -24. - -Nihilism is not only a meditating over the "in vain!"--not only the -belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts -one's shoulder to the plough; _one destroys._ This, if you will, is -illogical; but the Nihilist does not believe in the necessity of being -logical.... It is the condition of strong minds and wills; and to these -it is impossible to be satisfied with the negation of judgment: the -_negation by deeds_ proceeds from their nature. Annihilation by the -reasoning faculty seconds annihilation by the hand. - - -25. - -_Concerning the genesis of the Nihilist._ The courage of all one really -_knows_ comes but late in life. It is only quite recently that I have -acknowledged to myself that heretofore I have been a Nihilist from top -to toe. The energy and thoroughness with which I marched forward as a -Nihilist deceived me concerning this fundamental principle. When one is -progressing towards a goal it seems impossible that "aimlessness _per -se_" should be one's fundamental article of faith. - - -26. - -_The Pessimism of strong natures._ The "wherefore" after a terrible -struggle, even after victory. That something may exist which is a -hundred times _more important_ than the question, whether we feel well -or unwell, is the fundamental instinct of all strong natures--and -consequently too, whether the _others_ feel well or unwell. In short, -that we have a purpose, for which we would not even hesitate to -_sacrifice men,_ run all risks, and bend our backs to the worst: _this -is the great passion_. - - - -2. FURTHER CAUSES OF NIHILISM. - - -27. - -_The causes of Nihilism_: (1) _The higher species is lacking, i.e.,_ -the species whose inexhaustible fruitfulness and power would uphold our -belief in Man (think only of what is owed to Napoleon--almost all the -higher hopes of this century). - -(2) _The inferior species_ ("herd," "ass," "society") is forgetting -modesty, and inflates its needs into _cosmic_ and _metaphysical_ -values. In this way all life is _vulgarised_: for inasmuch as the -_mass_ of mankind rules, it tyrannises over the _exceptions,_ so that -these lose their belief in themselves and become _Nihilists._ - -All attempts to _conceive of a new species_ come to nothing -("romanticism," the artist, the philosopher; against Carlyle's attempt -to lend them the highest moral values). - -The result is that higher types are _resisted_. - -_The downfall and insecurity of all higher types._ The struggle against -genius ("popular poetry," etc.). Sympathy with the lowly and the -suffering as a _standard_ for the _elevation of the soul_. - -The _philosopher is lacking,_ the interpreter of deeds, and not alone -he who poetises them. - - -28. - -_Imperfect_ Nihilism--its forms: we are now surrounded by them. - -All attempts made to escape Nihilism, which do not consist in -transvaluing the values that have prevailed hitherto, only make the -matter worse; they complicate the problem. - - -29. - -_The varieties of self-stupefaction._ In one's heart of hearts, not to -know, whither? Emptiness. The attempt to rise superior to it all by -means of emotional intoxication: emotional intoxication in the form of -music, in the form of cruelty in the tragic joy over the ruin of the -noblest, and in the form of blind, gushing enthusiasm over individual -_men_ or distinct _periods_ (in the form of hatred, etc.). The attempt -to work blindly, like a scientific instrument; to keep an eye on the -many small joys, like an investigator, for instance (modesty towards -oneself); the mysticism of the voluptuous _joy_ of eternal emptiness; -art "for art's sake" ("le fait"), "immaculate investigation," in the -form of narcotics against the disgust of oneself; any kind of incessant -work, _any_ kind of small foolish fanaticism; the medley of all -means, illness as the result of general profligacy (dissipation kills -pleasure). - -(1) As a result, feeble will-power. - -(2) Excessive pride and the humiliation of petty weakness felt as a -contrast. - - -30. - -The time is coming when we shall have to pay for having been -_Christians_ for two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium -which enables us to live--for a long while we shall not know in what -direction we are travelling. We are hurling ourselves headlong into the -_opposite_ valuations, with that degree of energy which could only have -been engendered in man by an _overvaluation_ of himself. - -Now, everything is false from the root, words and nothing but words, -confused, feeble, or over-strained. - -_(a)_ There is a seeking after a sort of earthly solution of the -problem of life, but in the same sense as that of the _final triumph_ -of truth, love, justice (socialism: "equality of persons"). - -_(b)_ There is also an attempt to hold fast to the _moral ideal_ (with -altruism, self-sacrifice, and the denial of the will, in the front -rank). - -_(c)_ There is even an attempt to hold fast to a "Beyond": were it -only as an antilogical _x_; but it is forthwith interpreted in such a -way that a kind of metaphysical solace, after the old style, may be -derived from it. - -_(d)_ There is an attempt to read the phenomena of life in such a -way as to arrive _at the divine guidance of old,_ with its powers -of rewarding, punishing, educating, and of generally conducing to a -something _better_ in the order of things. - -_(e)_ People once more believe in good and evil; so that the victory of -the good and the annihilation of the evil is regarded as a _duty_ (this -is English, and is typical of that blockhead, John Stuart Mill). - -(f) The contempt felt for "naturalness," for the desires and for the -ego: the attempt to regard even the highest intellectuality of art as a -result of an impersonal and disinterested attitude. - -(g) The Church is still allowed to meddle in all the essential -occurrences and incidents in the life of the individual, with a view to -consecrating it and giving it a _loftier_ meaning: we still have the -"Christian State" and the "Christian marriage." - - -31. - -There have been more thoughtful and more destructively thoughtful[4] -times than ours: times like those in which Buddha appeared, for -instance, in which the people themselves, after centuries of sectarian -quarrels, had sunk so deeply into the abyss of philosophical dogmas, -as, from time to time, European people have done in regard to the fine -points of religious dogma. "Literature" and the press would be the last -things to seduce one to any high opinion of the spirit of our times: -the millions of Spiritists, and a Christianity with gymnastic exercises -of that ghastly ugliness which is characteristic of all English -inventions, throw more light on the subject. - -European _Pessimism_ is still in its infancy--a fact which argues -against it: it has not yet attained to that prodigious and yearning -fixity of sight to which it attained in India once upon a time, and -in which nonentity is reflected; there is still too much of the -"ready-made," and not enough of the "evolved" in its constitution, too -much learned and poetic Pessimism; I mean that a good deal of it has -been discovered, invented, and "created," but not caused. - - -[Footnote 4: _zerdachtere_.] - - -32. - -Criticism of the Pessimism which has prevailed hitherto. The want of -the eudæmonological standpoint, as a last abbreviation of the question: -what is the _purpose_ of it all? The reduction of gloom. - -_Our_ Pessimism: the world has not the value which we believed it to -have,--our faith itself has so increased our instinct for research that -we are _compelled_ to say this to-day. In the first place, it seems of -less value: _at first it is felt_ to be of less value,--only in this -sense are we pessimists,--that is to say, with the will to acknowledge -this transvaluation without reserve, and no longer, as heretofore, to -deceive ourselves and chant the old old story. - -It is precisely in this way that we find the pathos which urges us to -seek for _new values._ In short: the world might have far more value -than we thought--we must get behind the _naïveté of our ideals,_ for -it is possible that, in our conscious effort to give it the highest -interpretation, we have not bestowed even a moderately just value upon -it. - -What has been _deified_? The valuing instinct inside the _community_ -(that which enabled it to survive). - -What has been _calumniated_? That which has tended to separate higher -men from their inferiors, the instincts which cleave gulfs and build -barriers. - - -33. - -Causes effecting the _rise of Pessimism_:-- - -(1) The most powerful instincts and those which promised most for the -future have hitherto been _calumniated,_ so that life has a curse upon -it. - -(2) The growing bravery and the more daring mistrust on the part of man -have led him to discover the fact that _these instincts cannot be -cut adrift from life,_ and thus he turns to embrace life. - -(3) Only the most _mediocre,_ who are not _conscious_ of this conflict, -prosper; the higher species fail, and as an example of degeneration -tend to dispose all hearts against them--on the other hand, there is -some indignation caused by the mediocre positing themselves as the end -and meaning of all things. No one can any longer reply to the question: -"Why?" - -(4) Belittlement, susceptibility to pain, unrest, haste, and confusion -are steadily increasing--the materialisation of all these tendencies, -which is called "civilisation," becomes every day more simple, with -the result that, in the face of the monstrous machine, the individual -_despairs_ and _surrenders._ - - -34. - -Modern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessness only of the -_modern_ world, not of the world and existence as such. - - -35. - -The "preponderance of _pain over pleasure"_ or the reverse (Hedonism); -both of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism.... - -For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the -phenomenon pleasure or pain. - -But only a man who no longer dares to posit a will, a purpose, and a -final goal can speak in this way--according to every healthy type of -man, the worth of life is certainly not measured by the standard of -these secondary things. And a _preponderance_ of pain would be possible -and, _in spite of it,_ a mighty will, a _saying of yea_ to life, and a -holding of this preponderance for necessary. - -"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation"; "what is the good of -tears?"--this is a feeble and sentimental attitude of mind. "_Un -monstre gai vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux._" - - -36. - -The philosophie Nihilist is convinced that all phenomena are without -sense and are in vain, and that there ought to be no such thing as -Being without sense and in vain. But whence comes this "There ought -not to be?"--whence this "sense" and _this standard_? At bottom the -Nihilist supposes that the sight of such a desolate, useless Being is -_unsatisfying_ to the philosopher, and fills him with desolation and -despair. This aspect of the case is opposed to our subtle sensibilities -as a philosopher. It leads to the absurd conclusion that the character -of existence _must perforce afford pleasure to the philosopher_ if it -is to have any right to subsist. - -Now it is easy to understand that happiness and unhappiness, within -the phenomena of this world, can only serve the purpose of _means_: -the question yet remaining to be answered is, whether it _will -ever be possible_ for us to perceive the "object" and "purpose" of -life--whether the problem of purposelessness or the reverse is not -quite beyond our ken. - - -37. - -The development of _Nihilism out of Pessimism._ The denaturalisation -of _Values._ Scholasticism of values. The values isolated, idealistic, -instead of ruling and leading action, turn _against_ it and condemn it. - -Opposites introduced in the place of natural gradations and ranks. -Hatred of the order of rank. Opposites are compatible with a plebeian -age, because they are more easy to grasp. - -The _rejected_ world is opposed to an artificially constructed "true -and valuable" one. At last we discover out of what material the "true" -world was built; all that remains, now, is the rejected world, and to -the account of our reasons for _rejecting it we place our greatest -disillusionment._ - -At this point _Nihilism_ is reached; the directing values have been -retained--nothing more! - -This gives rise to _the problem of strength and weakness_:-- - -(1) The weak fall to pieces upon it; - -(2) The strong destroy what does not fall to pieces of its own accord; - -(3) The strongest overcome the directing values. - -_The whole condition of affairs produces the tragic age._ - - - - -3. THE NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT AS AN EXPRESSION OF DECADENCE. - - -38. - -Just lately an accidental and in every way inappropriate term has been -very much misused: everywhere people are speaking of "_Pessimism_," -and there is a fight around the question (to which some replies must be -forthcoming): which is right--Pessimism or Optimism? - -People have not yet seen what is so terribly-obvious--namely, that -Pessimism is not a problem but a _symptom,_--that the term ought to be -replaced by "Nihilism,"--that the question, "to be or not to be," is -itself an illness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy. - -The Nihilistic movement is only an expression of physiological -decadence. - - -39. - -_To be understood_:--That every kind of decline and tendency to -sickness has incessantly been at work in helping to create general -evaluations: that in those valuations which now dominate, decadence -has even begun to preponderate, that we have not only to combat the -conditions which present misery and degeneration have brought into -being; but that all decadence, previous to that of our own times, has -been transmitted and has therefore remained an _active force_ amongst -us. A universal departure of this kind, on the part of man, from -his fundamental instincts, such universal decadence of the valuing -judgment, is the note of interrogation _par excellence,_ the real -riddle, which the animal "man" sets to all philosophers. - - -40. - -_The notion "decadence":--Decay, decline,_ and _waste,_ are, _per se,_ -in no way open to objection; they are the natural consequences of life -and vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to -life as advance or progress is: we are not in a position which enables -us to _suppress_ it. On the contrary, reason _would have it retain its -rights._ - -It is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists to argue that -circumstances and social combinations could be devised which would put -an end to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.... But -that is tantamount to condemning _Life_ ... a society is not at liberty -to remain young. And even in its prime it must bring forth ordure and -decaying matter. The more energetically and daringly it advances, the -richer will it be in failures and in deformities, and the nearer it -will be to its fall. Age is not deferred by means of institutions. Nor -is illness. Nor is vice. - - -41. - -Fundamental aspect of the nature of decadence: _what has heretofore -been regarded as its causes are its effects._ - -In this way, the whole perspective _of the problems of morality_ is -altered. - -All the struggle of morals against vice, luxury, crime, and even -against illness, seems a _naïveté,_ a superfluous effort: there is no -such thing as "_improvement_" (a word against _repentance_). - -Decadence itself is not a thing _that can be withstood_: it is -absolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and all peoples. That -which must be withstood, and by all means in our power, is the -spreading of the contagion among the sound parts of the organism. - -Is that done? The very _reverse_ is done. It is precisely on this -account that one makes a stand on behalf of _humanity._ - -How do the _highest values_ created hitherto stand in relation to this -fundamental question in _biology_? Philosophy, religion, morality, art, -etc. - -(The remedy: militarism, for instance, from Napoleon onwards, who -regarded civilisation as his natural enemy.) - - -42. - -All those things which heretofore have been regarded as the _causes of -degeneration,_ are really its effects. - -But those things also which have been regarded as the _remedies_ of -degeneration are only _palliatives_ of certain effects thereof: the -"cured" are _types of the degenerate._ - -_The results of decadence_: vice--viciousness; illness--sickliness; -crime--criminality; celibacy--sterility; hysteria--the weakness of the -will; alcoholism; pessimism, anarchy; debauchery (also of the spirit). -The calumniators, underminers, sceptics, and destroyers. - - -43. - -Concerning the notion "decadence." (1) Scepticism is a result of -decadence: just as spiritual debauchery is. - -(2) Moral corruption is a result of decadence (the weakness of the will -and the need of strong stimulants). - -(3) Remedies, whether psychological or moral, do not alter the march -of decadence, they do not arrest anything; physiologically they do not -count. - -A peep into the _enormous futility_ of these pretentious "reactions"; -they are forms of anæsthetising oneself against certain fatal -symptoms resulting from the prevailing condition of things; they do -not eradicate the morbid element; they are often heroic attempts to -cancel the decadent man, to allow only a minimum of his _deleterious -influence_ to survive. - -(4) Nihilism is not a cause, but only the _rationale_ of decadence. - -(5) The "good" and the "bad" are no more than two types of decadence: -they come together in all its fundamental phenomena. - -(6) The _social problem_ is a result of _decadence._ - -(7) Illnesses, more particularly those attacking the nerves and the -head, are signs that the _defensive_ strength of strong nature is -lacking; a proof of this is that irritability which causes pleasure and -pain to be regarded as problems of the first order. - - -44. - -_The most common types of decadence_: (1) In the belief that they are -remedies, cures are chosen which only precipitate exhaustion;--this is -the case with Christianity (to point to the most egregious example of -mistaken instinct);--this is also the case with "progress." - -(2) The _power of resisting_ stimuli is on the wane--chance rules -supreme: events are inflated and drawn out until they appear monstrous -... a suppression of the "personality," a disintegration of the -will; in this regard we may mention a whole class of morality, the -altruistic, that which is incessantly preaching pity, and whose most -essential feature is the weakness of the personality, so that it _rings -in unison,_ and, like an over-sensitive string, does not cease from -vibrating ... extreme irritability.... - -(3) Cause and effect are confounded: decadence is not understood as -physiological, and its results are taken to be the causes of the -general indisposition:--this applies to all religious morality. - -(4) A state of affairs is desired in which suffering shall cease; -life is actually considered the cause of all ills--_unconscious_ and -insensitive states (sleep and syncope) are held in incomparably higher -esteem than the conscious states; hence a _method_ of life. - - -45. - -Concerning the hygiene of the "weak." All that is done in weakness ends -in failure. Moral: do nothing. The worst of it is, that precisely the -strength required in order to stop action, and to cease from reacting, -is most seriously diseased under the influence of weakness: that one -never reacts more promptly or more blindly than when one should not -react at all. - -The strength of a character is shown by the ability to delay and -postpone reaction: a certain ἀδιαφορία is just as proper to it, as -involuntariness in recoiling, suddenness and lack of restraint in -"action," are proper to weakness. The will is weak: and the recipe -for preventing foolish acts would be: to have a strong will and to do -nothing--contradiction. A sort of self-destruction, the instinct of -self-preservation is compromised.... _The weak man injures himself_.... -That is the decadent _type_. - -As a matter of fact, we meet with a vast amount of thought concerning -the means wherewith _impassibility_ may be induced. To this extent, the -instincts are on the right scent; for to do nothing is more useful than -to do something.... - -All the practices of private orders, of solitary philosophers, and of -fakirs, are suggested by a correct consideration of the fact, that a -certain kind of man is most _useful to himself_ when he hinders his own -action as much as possible. - -_Relieving measures_: absolute obedience, mechanical activity, total -isolation from men and things that might exact immediate decisions and -actions. - - -46. - -_Weakness of Will_: this is a fable that can lead astray. For there -is no will, consequently neither a strong nor a weak one. The -multiplicity and disintegration of the instincts, the want of system in -their relationship, constitute what is known as a "weak will"; their -co-ordination, under the government of one individual among them, -results in a "strong will"--in the first case vacillation and a lack -of equilibrium is noticeable: in the second, precision and definite -direction. - - -47. - -That which is inherited is not illness, but a _predisposition to -illness_: a lack of the powers of resistance against injurious external -influences, etc. etc, broken powers of resistance; expressed morally: -resignation and humility in the presence of the enemy. - -I have often wondered whether it would not be possible to class all the -highest values of the philosophies, moralities, and religions which -have been devised hitherto, with the values of the feeble, the _insane_ -and the _neurasthenic_ in a milder form, they present the same evils. - -The value of all morbid conditions consists in the fact that they -magnify certain normal phenomena which are difficult to discern in -normal conditions.... - -_Health_ and _illness_ are not essentially different, as the ancient -doctors believed and as a few practitioners still believe to-day. They -cannot be imagined as two distinct principles or entities which fight -for the living organism and make it their battlefield. That is nonsense -and mere idle gossip, which no longer holds water. As a matter of -fact, there is only a difference of degree between these two living -conditions: exaggeration, want of proportion, want of harmony among the -normal phenomena, constitute the morbid state (Claude Bernard). - -Just as "evil" may be regarded as exaggeration, discord, and want of -proportion, so can "good" be regarded as a sort of protective diet -against the danger of exaggeration, discord, and want of proportion. - -_Hereditary weakness_ as a _dominant_ feeling: the cause of the -prevailing values. - -_N.B._--Weakness is in demand--why?... mostly because people cannot be -anything else than weak. - -_Weakening considered a duty_: The weakening of the desires, of the -feelings of pleasure and of pain, of the will to power, of the will -to pride, to property and to more property; weakening in the form of -humility; weakening in the form of a belief; weakening in the form -of repugnance and shame in the presence of all that is natural--in -the form of a denial of life, in the form of illness and chronic -feebleness; weakening in the form of a refusal to take revenge, to -offer resistance, to become an enemy, and to show anger. - -_Blunders_ in the treatment: there is no attempt at combating weakness -by means of any fortifying system; but by a sort of justification -consisting of moralising; _i.e.,_ by means of _interpretation._ - -Two totally different conditions are _confused_: for instance, the -_repose of strength,_ which is essentially abstinence from reaction -(the prototype of the gods whom nothing moves), and the _peace of -exhaustion,_ rigidity to the point of anæsthesia. All these philosophic -and ascetic modes of procedure aspire to the second state, but actually -pretend to attain to the first ... for they ascribe to the condition -they have reached the attributes that would be in keeping only with a -divine state. - - -48. - -_The most dangerous misunderstanding._--There is one concept which -apparently allows of no confusion or ambiguity, and that is the concept -_exhaustion._ Exhaustion may be acquired or inherited--in any case it -alters the aspect and _value of things._ - -Unlike him who involuntarily _gives_ of the superabundance which he -both feels and represents, to the things about him, and who sees them -fuller, mightier, and more pregnant with promises,--who, in fact, _can_ -bestow,--the exhausted one belittles and disfigures everything he -sees--he impoverishes its worth: he is detrimental.... - -No mistake seems possible in this matter: and yet history discloses the -terrible fact, that the exhausted have always been _confounded_ with -those with the most abundant resources, and the latter with the most -detrimental. - -The pauper in vitality, the feeble one, impoverishes even life: the -wealthy man, in vital powers, enriches it. The first is the parasite of -the second: the second is a bestower of his abundance. How is confusion -possible? - -When he who was exhausted came forth with the bearing of a very -active and energetic man (when degeneration implied a certain excess -of spiritual and nervous discharge), he was _mistaken_ for the wealthy -man. He inspired terror. The cult of the madman is also always the cult -of him who is rich in vitality, and who is a powerful man. The fanatic, -the one possessed, the religious epileptic, all eccentric creatures -have been regarded as the highest types of power: as divine. - -This kind of strength which inspires terror seemed to be, above all, -divine: this was the starting-point of authority; here _wisdom_ -was interpreted, hearkened to, and sought. Out of this there was -developed, everywhere almost, a _will_ to "deify," _i.e.,_ to a typical -degeneration of spirit, body, and nerves: an attempt to discover the -road to this higher form of being. To make oneself ill or mad, to -provoke the symptoms of serious disorder--was called getting stronger, -becoming more superhuman, more terrible and more wise. People thought -they would thus attain to such wealth of power, that they would be able -to _dispense_ it. Wheresoever there have been prayers, some one has -been sought who had something to give away. - -What led astray, here, was the experience of intoxication. This -increases the feeling of power to the highest degree, therefore, to the -mind of the ingenuous, it is _power._ On the highest altar of power -_the most intoxicated man_ must stand, the ecstatic. (There are two -causes of _intoxication_: superabundant life, and a condition of morbid -nutrition of the brain.) - - -49. - -_Acquired,_ not inherited exhaustion: (1) inadequate _nourishment,_ -often the result of ignorance concerning diet, as, for instance, in the -case of scholars; (2) erotic precocity: the damnation more especially -of the youth of France--Parisian youths, above all, who are already -dirtied and ruined when they step out of their _lycées_ into the world, -and who cannot break the chains of despicable tendencies; ironical and -scornful towards themselves--galley-slaves despite all their refinement -(moreover, in the majority of cases, already a symptom of racial and -family decadence, as all hypersensitiveness is; and examples of the -infection of environment: to be influenced by one's environment is -also a sign of decadence); (3) alcoholism, not the instinct but the -habit, foolish imitation, the cowardly or vain adaptation to a ruling -fashion. What a blessing a Jew is among Germans! See the obtuseness, -the flaxen head, the blue eye, and the lack of intellect in the face, -the language, and the bearing; the lazy habit of stretching the limbs, -and the need of repose among Germans--a need which is not the result of -overwork, but of the disgusting excitation and over-excitation caused -by alcohol. - - -50. - -_A theory of exhaustion._--Vice, the insane (also artists), the -criminals, the anarchists--these are not the _oppressed_ classes, but -_the outcasts_ of the community of all classes hitherto. - -Seeing that all our classes are permeated by these elements, we have -grasped the fact that _modern society_ is not a "society" or a "body," -but a diseased agglomeration of Chandala,--a society which no longer -has the strength even to _excrete_. - -To what extent living together for centuries has very much deepened -_sickliness_: - - modern virtue } - modern intellect} as forms of disease. - modern science } - - -51. - -_The state of corruption._--The interrelation of all forms of -corruption should be understood, and the Christian form (Pascal as -the type), as also the socialistic and communistic (a result of the -Christian), should not be overlooked (from the standpoint of natural -science, the _highest_ conception of society according to socialists, -is the lowest in the order of rank among societies); the "Beyond" ---corruption: as though outside the real world of Becoming there were a -world of Being. - -Here there must be no compromise, but selection, annihilation, and -war--the Christian Nihilistic standard of value must be withdrawn from -all things and attacked beneath every disguise ... for instance, from -modern _sociology, music,_ and _Pessimism_ (all forms of the Christian -ideal of values). - -Either one thing _or_ the other is true--that is to say, tending to -elevate the type man.... - -The priest, the shepherd of souls, should be looked upon as a form -of life which must be suppressed. All education, hitherto, has been -helpless, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the contradiction -of values. - -Either one thing _or_ the other is true--that is to say, tending to -elevate the type man.... - -The priest, the shepherd of souls, should be looked upon as a form -of life which must be suppressed. All education, hitherto, has been -helpless, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the contradiction -of values. - - -52. - -If Nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is not therefore -immoral: the growth of physiological and moral evils in the human -race, is rather the _result_ of _morbid and unnatural morality._ The -sensitiveness of the majority of men is both morbid and unnatural. - -Why is it that mankind is corrupt in a moral and physiological respect? -The body degenerates if one organ is _unsound._ The _right of altruism_ -cannot be traced to physiology, neither can the right to help and -to the equality of fate: these are all premiums for degenerates and -failures. - -There can be no _solidarity_ in a society containing unfruitful, -unproductive, and destructive members, who, by the bye, are bound to -have offspring even more degenerate than they are themselves. - - -53. - -Decadence exercises a profound and perfectly unconscious influence, -even over the ideals of science: all our sociology is a proof of this -proposition, and it has yet to be reproached with the fact that -it has only the experience of _society in the process of decay,_ -and inevitably takes its own decaying instincts as the basis of -sociological judgment. - -The _declining_ vitality of modern Europe formulates its social ideals -in its decaying instincts: and these ideals are all so like those of -_old and effete_ races, that they might be mistaken for one another. - -The _gregarious instinct,_ then,--now a sovereign power,--is something -totally different from the instinct of an _aristocratic society_: and -the value of the sum depends upon the value of the units constituting -it.... The whole of our sociology knows no other instinct than that -of the herd, _i.e.,_ of a _multitude of mere ciphers_--of which every -cipher has "equal rights," and where it is a virtue to be----naught.... - -The valuation with which the various forms of society are judged to-day -is absolutely the same with that which assigns a higher place to peace -than to war: but this principle is contrary to the teaching of biology, -and is itself a mere outcome of decadent life. Life is a result of war, -society is a means to war.... Mr. Herbert Spencer was a decadent in -biology, as also in morality (he regarded the triumph of altruism as a -desideratum!!!). - - -54. - -After thousands of years of error and confusion, it is my good fortune -to have rediscovered the road which leads to a Yea and to a Nay. - -I teach people to say Nay in the face of all that makes for weakness -and exhaustion. - -I teach people to say Yea in the face of all that makes for strength, -that preserves strength, and justifies the feeling of strength. - -Up to the present, neither the one nor the other has been taught; but -rather virtue, disinterestedness, pity, and even the negation of life. -All these are values proceeding from exhausted people. - -After having pondered over the physiology of exhaustion for some time, -I was led to the question: to what extent the judgments of exhausted -people had percolated into the world of values. - -The result at which I arrived was as startling as it could possibly -be--even for one like myself who was already at home in many a strange -world: I found that all prevailing values--that is to say, all those -which had gained ascendancy over humanity, or at least over its tamer -portions, could be traced back to the judgment of exhausted people. - -Under the cover of the holiest names, I found the most destructive -tendencies; people had actually given the name "God" to all that -renders weak, teaches weakness, and infects with weakness.... I found -that the "good man" was a form of self-affirmation on the part of -decadence. - -That virtue which Schopenhauer still proclaimed as superior to all, -and as the most fundamental of all virtues; even that same pity I -recognised as more dangerous than any vice. Deliberately to thwart -the law of selection among species, and their natural means of purging -their stock of degenerate members--this, up to my time, had been the -greatest of all virtues.... - -One should do honour to the _fatality_ which says to the feeble: -"perish!" - -The opposing of this fatality, the botching of mankind and the allowing -of it to putrefy, was given the name "God" One shall not take the name -of the Lord one's God in vain.... - -The race is corrupted--not by its vices, but by its ignorance: it is -corrupted because it has not recognised exhaustion as exhaustion: -physiological misunderstandings are the cause of all evil. - -Virtue is our greatest misunderstanding. - -Problem: how were the exhausted able to make the laws of values? In -other words, how did they who are the last, come to power?... How did -the instincts of the animal man ever get to stand on their heads?... - - - - -4. THE CRISIS: NIHILISM AND THE IDEA OF RECURRENCE. - - -55. - -Extreme positions are not relieved by more moderate ones, but by -extreme _opposite_ positions. And thus the belief in the utter -immorality of nature, and in the absence of all purpose and sense, are -psychologically necessary attitudes when the belief in God and in an -essentially moral order of things is no longer tenable. - -Nihilism now appears, _not_ because the sorrows of existence are -greater than they were formerly, but because, in a general way, people -have grown suspicious of the "meaning" which might be given to evil and -even to existence. One interpretation has been overthrown: but since it -was held to be _the_ interpretation, it seems as though there were no -meaning in existence at all, as though everything were in vain. - -*** - -It yet remains to be shown that this "in vain!" is the character -of present Nihilism. The mistrust of our former valuations has -increased to such an extent that it has led to the question: "are -not all 'values' merely allurements prolonging the duration of the -comedy, without, however, bringing the unravelling any closer?" The -"long period of time" which has culminated in an "in vain," without -either goal or purpose, is the _most paralysing_ of thoughts, more -particularly when one sees that one is duped without, however, being -able to resist being duped. - -*** - -Let us imagine this thought in its worst form: existence, as it is, -without either a purpose or a goal, but inevitably recurring, without -an end in nonentity: "_Eternal Recurrence._" - -This is the extremest form of Nihilism: nothing (purposelessness) -eternal! - -European form of Buddhism: the energy of knowledge and of strength -drives us to such a belief. It is the most _scientific_ of all -hypotheses. We deny final purposes. If existence had a final purpose it -would have reached it. - -*** - -It should be understood that what is being aimed at, here, is a -contradiction of Pantheism: for "everything perfect, divine, eternal," -_also_ leads _to the belief in Eternal Recurrence._ Question: has this -pantheistic and affirmative attitude to all things also been made -possible by morality? At bottom only the moral God has been overcome. -Is there any sense in imagining a God "beyond good and evil"? Would -Pantheism in _this_ sense be possible? Do we withdraw the idea of -purpose from the process, and affirm the process notwithstanding? -This were so if, within that process, something were _attained_ every -moment--and always the same thing. Spinoza won an affirmative position -of this sort, in the sense that every moment, according to him, has -a logical necessity: and he triumphed by means of his fundamentally -logical instinct over a like conformation of the world. - -*** - -But his case is exceptional. If every _fundamental trait of character,_ -which lies beneath every act, and which finds expression in every -act, were recognised by the individual as _his_ fundamental trait of -character, this individual would be driven to regard every moment of -his existence in general, triumphantly as good. It would simply be -necessary for that fundamental trait of character to be felt in oneself -as something good, valuable, and pleasurable. - -*** - -Now, in the case of those men and classes of men who were treated -with violence and oppressed by their fellows, _morality_ saved life -from despair and from the leap into nonentity:. for impotence in -relation to mankind and _not_ in relation to Nature is what generates -the most desperate bitterness towards existence. Morality treated the -powerful, the violent, and the "masters" in general, as enemies against -whom the common man must be protected--_that is to say, emboldened, -strengthened._ Morality has therefore always taught the most profound -_hatred_ and _contempt_ of the fundamental trait of character of all -rulers--_i.e., their Will to Power._ To suppress, to deny, and to -decompose this morality, would mean to regard this most thoroughly -detested instinct with the reverse of the old feeling and valuation. -If the sufferer and the oppressed man were _to lose his belief_ in his -right to contemn the Will to Power, his position would be desperate. -This would be so if the trait above-mentioned were essential to life, -in which case it would follow that even that will to morality was only -a cloak to this "Will to Power," as are also even that hatred and -contempt. The oppressed man would then perceive that he stands _on -the same platform_ with the oppressor, and that he has no individual -privilege, nor any _higher rank_ than the latter. - -*** - -On the _contrary_! There is nothing on earth which can have any value, -if it have not a modicum of power--granted, of course, that life itself -is the Will to Power. Morality protected the _botched_ and _bungled_ -against Nihilism, in that it gave every one of them infinite worth, -metaphysical worth, and classed them altogether in one order which did -not correspond with that of worldly power and order of rank: it taught -submission, humility, etc. _Admitting that the belief in this morality -be destroyed,_ the botched and the bungled would no longer have any -comfort, and would perish. - - - -This _perishing_ seems like _self-annihilation,_ like an instinctive -selection of that which must be destroyed. The _symptoms_ of this -self-destruction of the botched and the bungled: self-vivisection, -poisoning, intoxication, romanticism, and, above all, the instinctive -constraint to acts whereby the powerful are made into _mortal -enemies_ (training, so to speak, one's own hangmen), _the will to -destruction_ as the will of a still deeper instinct--of the instinct of -self-destruction, of the Will to Nonentity. - -*** - -Nihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled in order to be -destroyed, that, having been deprived of morality, they no longer have -any reason to "resign themselves," that they take up their stand on the -territory of the opposite principle, and _will also exercise power_ -themselves, by compelling the powerful to become their hangmen. This -is the European form of Buddhism, that _active negation,_ after all -existence has lost its meaning. - -*** - -It must not be supposed that "poverty" has grown more acute, on the -contrary! "God, morality, resignation" were remedies in the very -deepest stages of misery: _active_ Nihilism made its appearance in -circumstances which were relatively much more favourable. The fact, -alone, that morality is regarded as overcome, presupposes a certain -degree of intellectual culture; while this very culture, for its part, -bears evidence to a certain relative well-being. A certain intellectual -fatigue, brought on by the long struggle concerning philosophical -opinions, and carried to hopeless scepticism _against_ philosophy, -shows moreover that the level of these Nihilists is by no means a -low one. Only think of the conditions in which Buddha appeared! The -teaching of the eternal recurrence would have learned principles to -go upon (just as Buddha's teaching, for instance, had the notion of -causality, etc.). - -*** - -What do we mean to-day by the words "botched and bungled"? In the -first place, they are used _physiologically_ and not politically. The -unhealthiest kind of man all over Europe (in all classes) is the soil -out of which Nihilism grows: this species of man will regard eternal -recurrence as damnation--once he is bitten by the thought, he can no -longer recoil before any action. He would not extirpate passively, -but would cause everything to be extirpated which is meaningless -and without a goal to this extent; although it is only a spasm, or -sort of blind rage in the presence of the fact that everything has -existed again and again for an eternity--even this period of Nihilism -and destruction. The value of such a _crisis_ is that it _purifies,_ -that it unites similar elements, and makes them mutually destructive, -that it assigns common duties to men of opposite persuasions, and -brings the weaker and more uncertain among them to the light, thus -taking the first step towards a new _order of rank_ among forces -from the standpoint of health: recognising commanders as commanders, -subordinates as subordinates. Naturally irrespective of all the present -forms of society. - -*** - -What class of men will prove they are strongest in this new order of -things? The most moderate--they who do not _require_ any extreme forms -of belief, they who not only admit of, but actually like, a certain -modicum of chance and nonsense; they who can think of man with a very -moderate view of his value, without becoming weak and small on that -account; the most rich in health, who are able to withstand a maximum -amount of sorrow, and who are therefore not so very much afraid of -sorrow--men who are _certain of their power,_ and who represent with -conscious pride the state of strength to which man has attained. - -*** - -How could such a man think of Eternal Recurrence? - - -56. - -_The Periods of European Nihilism._ - -_The Period of Obscurity_: all kinds of groping measures devised to -preserve old institutions and not to arrest the progress of new ones. - -_The Period of Light_: men see that old and new are fundamental -contraries; that the old values are born of descending life, and that -the new ones are born of ascending life--_that all old ideals_ are -unfriendly to life (born of decadence and determining it, however -much they may be decked out in the Sunday finery of morality). We -_understand_ the old, but are far from being sufficiently strong for -the new. - -_The Periods of the Three Great Passions_: contempt, pity, destruction. - -_The Periods of Catastrophes_: the rise of a teaching which will sift -mankind ... which drives the weak to some decision and the strong also. - - - - -II. - - -CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM. - - -_(a)_ MODERN GLOOMINESS. - - -57. - -My friends, we had a hard time as youths; we even suffered from -youth itself as though it were a serious disease. This is owing to -the age in which we were born--an age of enormous internal decay and -disintegration which, with all its weakness and even with the best of -its strength, is opposed to the spirit of youth. Disintegration--that -is to say, uncertainty--is peculiar to this age: nothing stands on -solid ground or on a sound faith. People live for the morrow, because -the day-after-to-morrow is doubtful. All our road is slippery and -dangerous, while the ice which still bears us has grown unconscionably -thin: we all feel the mild and gruesome breath of the thaw-wind--soon, -where we are walking, no one will any longer _be able_ to stand! - - -58. - -If this is not an age of decay and of diminishing vitality, it is at -least one of indiscriminate and arbitrary experimentalising--and it is -probable that out of an excess of abortive experiments there has grown -this general impression, as of decay: and perhaps decay itself. - - -59. - -_Concerning the history of modern gloominess._ - -The state-nomads (officials, etc.): "homeless"--. - -The break-up of the family. - -The "good man" as a symptom of exhaustion. - -Justice as Will to Power (Rearing). - -Lewdness and neurosis. - -Black music: whither has real music gone? - -The anarchist. - -Contempt of man, loathing. - -Most profound distinction: whether hunger or satiety is creative? The -first creates the _Ideals of Romanticism._ - -Northern unnaturalness. - -The need of Alcohol: the "need" of the working classes. - -Philosophical Nihilism. - - -60. - -The slow advance and rise of the middle and lower classes (including -the lower kind of spirit and body), which was already well under way -before the French Revolution, and would have made the same progress -forward without the latter,--in short, then, the preponderance of the -herd over all herdsmen and bell-wethers,--brings in its train:-- - -(1) Gloominess of spirit (the juxtaposition of a stoical and a -frivolous _appearance_ of happiness, peculiar to noble cultures, is on -the decline; much suffering is allowed to be _seen_ and _heard_ which -formerly was borne in concealment); - -(2) Moral hypocrisy (a way of _distinguishing_ oneself through -morality, but by means of the values of the herd: pity, solicitude, -moderation; and not by means of those virtues which are recognised and -honoured outside the herd's sphere of power); - -(3) A _really_ large amount of sympathy with both pain and joy (a -feeling of pleasure resulting from being herded together, which is -peculiar to all gregarious animals--"public spirit," "patriotism," -everything, in fact, which is apart from the individual). - - -61. - -Our age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to mitigate distress, to -honour it, and to wage war in advance with unpleasant possibilities, is -an age of the _poor._ Our "_rich people_"--_they_ are the poorest! The -real _purpose_ of all wealth has been forgotten. - - -62. - -_Criticism of modern man_:--"the good man," but corrupted and misled by -bad institutions (tyrants and priests);--reason elevated to a position -of authority;--history is regarded as the surmounting of errors;--the -future is regarded as progress;--the Christian state ("God of the -armies");--Christian sexual intercourse (as marriage);--the realm of -"justice" (the cult of "mankind");--"freedom." - -The _romantic_ attitudes of the modern man;--the noble man -(Byron, Victor Hugo, George Sand);--taking the part of the -oppressed and the bungled and the botched: motto for historians and -romancers;--the Stoics of duty;--disinterestedness regarded as art -and as knowledge;--altruism as the most mendacious form of egoism -(utilitarianism), the most sentimental form of egoism. - -All this savours of the eighteenth century. But it had other -qualities which were not inherited, namely, a certain _insouciance,_ -cheerfulness, elegance, spiritual clearness. The spiritual tempo has -altered; the pleasure which was begotten by spiritual refinement and -clearness has given room to the pleasure of colour, harmony, mass, -reality, etc. etc. Sensuality in spiritual things. In short, it is the -eighteenth century of Rousseau. - - -63. - -Taken all in all, a considerable amount of _humanity_ has been attained -by our men of to-day. That we feel this is in itself a proof of the -fact that we have become so sensitive in regard to small cases of -distress, that we somewhat unjustly overlook what has been achieved. - -Here we must make allowances for the fact that a great deal of -decadence is rife, and that, through such eyes, our world _must appear_ -bad and wretched. But these eyes have always seen in the same way, in -all ages. - -(1) A certain hypersensitiveness, even in morality. - -(2) The quantum of bitterness and gloominess, which pessimism bears -with it in its judgments--both together have helped to bring about the -preponderance of the other and _opposite_ point of view, that things -are not well with our morality. - -The fact of credit, of the commerce of the world, and the means of -traffic--are expressions of an extraordinarily mild _trustfulness_ in -men.... To that may also be added-- - -(3) The deliverance of science from moral and religious prejudices: a -very good sign, though for the most part misunderstood. - -In my own way, I am attempting a justification of history. - - -64. - -_The second appearance of Buddhism._--Its precursory signs: the -increase of pity. Spiritual exhaustion. The reduction of all -problems to the question of pleasure and pain. The glory of war -which calls forth a counter-stroke. Just as the sharp demarcation of -nations generates a counter-movement in the form of the most hearty -"Fraternity." The fact that it is impossible for religion to carry on -its work any longer with dogma and fables. - -The _catastrophe of Nihilism_ will put an end to all this Buddhistic -culture. - - -65. - -That which is most sorely afflicted to-day is the instinct and will of -_tradition_: all institutions which owe their origin to this instinct, -are opposed to the tastes of the age.... At bottom, nothing is thought -or done which is not calculated to tear up this spirit of tradition -by the roots. Tradition is looked upon as a fatality; it is studied -and acknowledged (in the form of "heredity"), but people will not have -anything to do with it. The extension of one will over long periods -of time, the selection of conditions and valuations which make it -possible to dispose of centuries in advance--this, precisely, is what -is most utterly anti-modern. From which it follows, that disorganising -principles give our age its specific character. - - -66. - -"Be simple"--a demand which, when made to us complicated and -incomprehensible triers of the heart and reins, is a simple -absurdity.... Be natural: but even if we are unnatural--what then? - - -67. - -The means employed in former times in order to arrive at _similarly -constituted_ and lasting types, throughout long generations: entailed -property and the respect of parents (the origin of the faith in gods -and heroes as ancestors). - -Now, the _subdivision of property_ belongs to the opposite tendency. -The centralisation of an enormous number of, different interests in one -soul: which, _to that end,_ must be very strong and mutable. - - -68. - -Why does everything become _mummery._--The modern man is lacking in -unfailing instinct (instinct being understood here to mean that which -is the outcome of a _long period of activity in the same occupation_ on -the part of one family of men); the incapability of producing anything -perfect, is simply the result of this lack of instinct: one individual -alone cannot make up for the schooling his ancestors should have -transmitted to him. - -What a morality or book of law creates: that deep instinct which -renders _automatism_ and perfection possible in life and in work. - -But now we have reached the opposite point; yes, we wanted to reach -it--the most extreme consciousness, through introspection on the part -of man and of history: and thus we are practically most distant from -perfection in Being, doing, and willing: our desires--even our will -to knowledge--shows how prodigiously decadent we are. We are striving -after the very reverse of what _strong races_ and _strong natures_ will -have--understanding is an _end_.... - -That Science is possible in the way in which it is practised to-day, -proves that all elementary instincts, _the instincts which ward off -danger and protect life,_ are no longer active. We no longer save, we -are merely spending the capital of our forefathers, even in the way in -which we _pursue knowledge_. - - -69. - -_Nihilistic trait_. - -_(a)_ In the _natural sciences_ ("purposelessness"), causality, -mechanism, "conformity to law," an interval, a remnant. - -_(b)_ Likewise in _politics_: the individual lacks the belief in his -own right, innocence; falsehood rules supreme, as also the worship of -the moment. - -_(d)_ Likewise in _political economy_: the abolition of slavery: the -lack of a redeeming class, and of _one who justifies_--the rise of -anarchy. "Education"? - -_(d)_ Likewise in _history_: fatalism, Darwinism; the last attempts at -reconciling reason and Godliness fail. Sentimentality in regard to the -past: biographies can no longer be endured! (Phenomenalism even here: -character regarded as a mask; there are no facts.) - -_(e)_ Likewise in _Art_: romanticism and its _counter-stroke_ -(repugnance towards romantic ideals and lies). The latter, morally, -as a sense of greatest truthfulness, but pessimistic. Pure "artists" -(indifference as to the "subject"). (The psychology of the -father-confessor and puritanical psychology--two forms of psychological -romanticism: but also their counter-stroke, the attempt to maintain a -purely artistic attitude towards "men"--but even in this respect no one -dares to make the _opposite_ valuation.) - - -70. - -_Against_ the teaching of the influence of _environment_ and external -causes: the power coming from inside is infinitely _superior_; -much that appears like influence acting from without is merely the -subjection of environment to this inner power. - -Precisely the same environment may be used and interpreted in opposite -ways: there are no facts. A genius is _not_ explained by such theories -concerning origins. - - -71. - -"_Modernity_" regarded in the light of nutrition and digestion. - -Sensitiveness is infinitely more acute (beneath moral vestments: the -increase of pity), the abundance of different impressions is greater -than ever. The _cosmopolitanism_ of articles of diet, of literature, -newspapers, forms, tastes, and even landscapes. The speed of this -affluence is _prestissimo_; impressions are wiped out, and people -instinctively guard against assimilating anything or against taking -anything _seriously_ and "digesting" it; the result is a weakening of -the powers of digestion. There begin a sort of _adaptation_ to this -accumulation of impressions. Man unlearns the art of _doing,_ and -_all he does is to react_ to stimuli coming from his environment. _He -spends his strength,_ partly in the process of _assimilation,_ partly -in _defending himself,_ and again partly in _responding to stimuli. -Profound enfeeblement of spontaneity_:--the historian, the critic, the -analyst, the interpreter, the observer, the collector, the reader,--all -reactive talents,--_all_ science! - -Artificial _modification_ of one's own nature in order to make it -resemble a "mirror"; one is interested, but only epidermally: this -is systematic coolness, equilibrium, a steady _low_ temperature, -just beneath the thin surface on which warmth, movement, "storm," and -undulations play. - -Opposition of _external_ mobility to a certain _dead heaviness and -fatigue_. - - -72. - -Where must our modern world be classed--under exhaustion or under -increasing strength? Its multiformity and lack of repose are brought -about by the highest form of _consciousness._ - - -73. - -Overwork, curiosity and sympathy--our _modern vices._ - - -74. - -A contribution to the characterisation of "_Modernity._"--Exaggerated -development of intermediate forms; the decay of types; the break-up of -tradition, schools; the predominance of the instincts (philosophically -prepared: the unconscious has the greater value) after the appearance -of the _enfeeblement of will power_ and of the will to an end _and_ to -the means thereto. - - -75. - -A capable artisan or scholar cuts a good figure if he have his pride -in his art, and looks pleasantly and contentedly upon life. On the -other hand, there is no sight more wretched than that of a cobbler or -a schoolmaster who, with the air of a martyr, gives one to understand -that he was really born for something better. There is nothing better -than what is good! and that is: to have a certain kind of capacity and -to use it. This is _virtù_ in the Italian style of the Renaissance. - -Nowadays, when the state has a nonsensically oversized belly, in all -fields and branches of work there are "representatives" over and above -the real workman: for instance, in addition to the scholars, there -are the journalists; in addition to the suffering masses, there is a -crowd of jabbering and bragging ne'er-do-wells who "represent" that -suffering--not to speak of the professional politicians who, though -quite satisfied with their lot, stand up in Parliament and, with -strong lungs, "represent" grievances. Our modern life is extremely -_expensive,_ thanks to the host of middlemen that infest it; whereas -in the city of antiquity, and in many a city of Spain and Italy -to-day, where there is an echo of the ancient spirit, the man himself -comes forward and will have nothing to do with a representative or an -intermediary in the modern style--except perhaps to kick him hence! - - -76. - -The pre-eminence of the _merchant_ and the _middleman,_ even in the -most intellectual spheres: the journalist, the "representative," the -historian (as an intermediary between the past and the present), the -exotic and cosmopolitan, the middleman between natural science and -philosophy, the semi-theologians. - - -77. - -The men I have regarded with the most loathing, heretofore, are the -parasites of intellect: they are to be found everywhere, already, in -our modern Europe, and as a matter of fact their conscience is as light -as it possibly can be. They may be a little turbid, and savour somewhat -of Pessimism, but in the main they are voracious, dirty, dirtying, -stealthy, insinuating, light-fingered gentry, scabby--and as innocent -as all small sinners and microbes are. They live at the expense of -those who have intellect and who distribute it liberally: they know -that it is peculiar to the rich mind to live in a disinterested -fashion, without taking too much petty thought for the morrow, and -to distribute its wealth prodigally. For intellect is a bad domestic -economist, and pays no heed whatever to the fact that everything lives -on it and devours it. - - - -78. - -MODERN MUMMERY - -The motleyness of modern men and its charm Essentially a mask and a -sign of boredom. - -The journalist. - -The political man (in the "national swindle"). - -Mummery in the arts:-- - - The lack of honesty in preparing and schooling oneself for - them (Fromentin); - - The Romanticists (their lack of philosophy and science and - their excess in literature); - - The novelists (Walter Scott, but also the monsters of the - _Nibelung,_ with their inordinately nervous music); - - The lyricists. - -"Scientifically." - -Virtuosos (Jews). - -The popular ideals are overcome, but not yet _in the presence of the -people_: - -The saint, the sage, the prophet. - - -79. - -_The want of discipline in the modern spirit_ concealed beneath all -kinds of moral finery.--The show-words are: Toleration (for the -"incapacity of saying yes or no"); _la largeur de sympathie_ (= a -third of indifference, a third of curiosity, and a third of morbid -susceptibility); "objectivity" (the lack of personality and of -will, and the inability to "love"); "freedom" in regard to the rule -(Romanticism); "truth" as opposed to falsehood and lying (Naturalism); -the "scientific spirit" (the "human document": or, in plain English, -the serial story which means "addition"--instead of "composition"); -"passion" in the place of disorder and intemperance; "depth" in the -place of confusion and the pell-mell of symbols. - - -80. - -_Concerning the criticism of big words._--I am full of mistrust and -malice towards what is called "ideal": this is my _Pessimism,_ that -I have recognised to what extent "sublime sentiments" are a source of -evil--that is to say, a belittling and depreciating of man. - -Every time "progress" is expected to result from an ideal, -disappointment invariably follows; the triumph of an ideal has always -been a _retrograde movement_. - -Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, -philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words are -only valuable in a struggle, as banners: not as realities, but as -_show-words,_ for something quite different (yea, even quite opposed to -what they mean!). - - -81. - -The kind of man is known who has fallen in love with the sentence -"_tout comprendre à est tout pardonner"_ It is the weak and, above all, -the disillusioned: if there is something to pardon in everything, there -is also something to contemn! It is the philosophy of disappointment, -which here swathes itself so humanly in pity, and gazes out so sweetly. - -They are Romanticists, whose faith has gone to pot: now they at least -wish to look on and see how everything vanishes and fades. They call it -_l'art pour l'art,_ "objectivity," etc. - - -82. - -_The main symptoms of Pessimism_:--Dinners at Magny's; Russian -Pessimism (Tolstoy, Dostoiewsky); æsthetic Pessimism, _l'art pour -l'art,_ "description" (the romantic and the anti-romantic Pessimism); -Pessimism in the theory of knowledge (Schopenhauer: phenomenalism); -anarchical Pessimism; the "religion of pity," Buddhistic preparation; -the Pessimism of culture (exoticness, cosmopolitanism); moral -Pessimism, myself. - - -83. - -"_Without the Christian Faith_" said Pascal, "you would yourselves -be like nature and history, _un monstre et un chaos._" We fulfilled -this prophecy: once the weak and optimistic eighteenth century had -_embellished_ and _rationalised_ man. - -_Schopenhauer_ and _Pascal._--I none essential point, Schopenhauer is -the first who _takes up Pascal's_ movement again: _un monstre et un -chaos,_ consequently something that must be negatived ... history, -nature, and man himself! - -"_Our inability to know the truth_ is the result of our _corruption,_ -of our moral _decay_" says Pascal. And Schopenhauer says essentially -the same. "The more profound the corruption of reason is, the -more necessary is the doctrine of salvation"--or, putting it into -Schopenhauerian phraseology, negation. - - -84. - -_Schopenhauer as an epigone_ (state of affairs before the -Revolution):--Pity, sensuality, art, weakness of will, Catholicism -of the most intellectual desires--that is, at bottom, the good old -eighteenth century. - -_Schopenhauer's_ fundamental misunderstanding of the _will_ (just -as though passion, instinct, and desire were the essential factors -of will) is typical: the depreciation of the will to the extent of -mistaking it altogether. Likewise the hatred of willing: the attempt at -seeing something superior--yea, even superiority itself, and that which -really matters, in non-willing, in the "subject-being _without_ aim or -intention." Great symptom of _fatigue or of the weakness of will_: for -this, in reality, is what treats the passions as master, and directs -them as to the way and to the measure.... - - -85. - -The undignified attempt has been made to regard Wagner and Schopenhauer -as types of the mentally unsound: an infinitely more essential -understanding of the matter would have been gained if the exact -decadent type which each of them represents had been scientifically and -accurately defined. - - -86. - -In my opinion, Henrik Ibsen has become very German. With all his -robust idealism and "Will to Truth," he never dared to ring himself -free from moral-illusionism which says "freedom," and will not admit, -even to itself, what freedom is: the second stage in the metamorphosis -of the "Will to Power" in him who lacks it. In the first stage, one -demands justice at the hands of those who have power. In the second, -one speaks of "freedom," that is to say, one wishes to "shake oneself -free" from those who have power. In the third stage, one speaks of -"equal rights"--that is to say, so long as one is not a predominant -personality one wishes to prevent one's competitors from growing in -power. - - -87. - -The Decline of _Protestantism_: theoretically and historically -understood as a half-measure. Undeniable predominance of Catholicism -to-day: Protestant feeling is so dead that the strongest -_anti-Protestant_ movements (Wagner's _Parsifal,_ for instance) are no -longer regarded as such. The whole of the more elevated intellectuality -in France is _Catholic_ in instinct; Bismarck recognised that there was -no longer any such thing as Protestantism. - - -88. - -Protestantism, that spiritually unclean and tiresome form of decadence, -in which Christianity has known how to survive in the mediocre North, -is something incomplete and complexly valuable for knowledge, in so far -as it was able to bring experiences of different kinds and origins into -the same heads. - - -89. - -What has the German spirit not made out of Christianity! And, to refer -to Protestantism again, how much beer is there not still in Protestant -Christianity! Can a crasser, more indolent, and more lounging form -of Christian belief be imagined, than that of the average German -Protestant?... It is indeed a very humble Christianity. I call it -the Homœopathy of Christianity! I am reminded that, to-day, there -also exists a less humble sort of Protestantism; it is taught by -royal chaplains and anti-Semitic speculators: but nobody has ever -maintained that any "spirit" "hovers" over these waters. It is merely -a less respectable form of Christian faith, not by any means a more -comprehensible one. - - -90. - -_Progress._--Let us be on our guard lest we deceive ourselves! Time -flies forward apace,--we would fain believe that everything flies -forward with it,--that evolution is an advancing development.... That -is the appearance of things which deceives the most circumspect. But -the nineteenth century shows no advance whatever on the sixteenth: -and the German spirit of 1888 is an example of a backward movement -when compared with that of 1788.... Mankind does not advance, it does -not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a -huge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed, -while an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic, -co-ordination, and responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the -fact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement?--that the -German Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism?--that -the Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organisation of society -on a large scale?... Man is not an example of progress as compared with -animals: the tender son of culture is an abortion compared with the -Arab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a more successful type--that is -to say, richer in sustaining power than the European. - - -_(b)_ THE LAST CENTURIES. - - -91. - -Gloominess and pessimistic influence necessarily follow in the wake of -enlightenment. Towards 1770 a falling-off in cheerfulness was already -noticeable; women, with that very feminine instinct which always -defends virtue, believed that immorality was the cause of it. Galiani -hit the bull's eye: he quotes Voltaire's verse: - - "Un monstre gai vaut mieux - Qu'un sentimental ennuyeux." - -If now I maintain that I am ahead, by a century or two of -enlightenment, of Voltaire and Galiani--who was much more profound, how -deeply must I have sunk into gloominess! This is also true, and betimes -I somewhat reluctantly manifested some caution in regard to the German -and Christian narrowness and inconsistency of Schopenhauerian or, worse -still, Leopardian Pessimism, and sought the most characteristic form -(Asia). But, in order to endure that extreme Pessimism (which here and -there peeps out of my _Birth of Tragedy),_ to live alone "without God -or morality," I was compelled to invent a counter-prop for myself. -Perhaps I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone -surfers so excruciatingly that he was _compelled_ to invent laughter. -The unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as might have been -expected, the most cheerful. - - -92. - -In regard to German culture, I have always had a feeling as of -_decline._ The fact that I learned to know a declining form of culture -has often made me _unfair_ towards the whole phenomenon of European -culture. The Germans always follow at some distance behind: they always -go to the root of things, for instance:-- - -Dependance upon foreigners; _Kant_--Rousseau, the sensualists, Hume, -Swedenborg. - -_Schopenhauer_--the Indians and Romanticism, Voltaire. - -_Wagner_--the French cult of the ugly and of grand opera, _Paris,_ and -the flight into _primitive barbarism_ (the marriage of brother and -sister). - -The law of the _laggard_ (the provinces go to Paris, Germany goes to -France). - -How is it that precisely _Germans discovered the Greek_ (the more an -instinct is developed, the more it is _tempted_ to run for once into -its opposite). - -Music is the last breath of every culture. - - -93. - -_Renaissance and Reformation._--What does the Renaissance prove? That -the reign of the "individual" can be only a short one. The output -is too great; there is not even the possibility of husbanding or of -capitalising forces, and exhaustion sets in step by step. These are -times when everything is _squandered,_ when even the strength itself -with which one collects, capitalises, and heaps riches upon riches, -_is squandered._ Even the opponents of such movements are driven to -preposterous extremes in the dissipation of their strength: and they -too are very soon exhausted, used up, and completely sapped. - -In the Reformation we are face to face with a wild and plebeian -counterpart of the Italian Renaissance, generated by similar impulses, -except that the former, in the backward and still vulgar North, had to -assume a religious form--there the concept of a higher life had not yet -been divorced from that of a religious one. - -Even the Reformation was a movement for individual liberty; "every one -his own priest" is really no more than a formula for _libertinage._ -As a matter of fact, the words "Evangelical freedom" would have -sufficed--and all instincts which had reasons for remaining concealed -broke out like wild hounds, the most brutal needs suddenly acquired the -courage to show themselves, everything seemed justified ... men refused -to specify the kind of freedom they had aimed at, they preferred to -shut their eyes. But the fact that their eyes were closed and that -their lips were moistened with gushing orations, did not prevent their -hands from being ready to snatch at whatever there was to snatch at, -that the belly became the god of the "free gospel," and that all lusts -of revenge and of hatred were indulged with insatiable fury. - -This lasted for a while: then exhaustion supervened, just as it -had done in Southern Europe; and again here, it was a low form of -exhaustion, a sort of general _ruere in servitium_.... Then the -_disreputable_ century of Germany dawned. - - -94. - -_Chivalry_--the position won by power: its gradual break-up (and -partial transference to broader and more bourgeois spheres). In the -case of Larochefoucauld we find a knowledge of the actual impulses of a -noble temperament--together with the gloomy Christian estimate of these -impulses. - -The _protraction of Christianity_ through the _French Revolution._ The -seducer is Rousseau; he once again liberates woman, who thenceforward -is always represented as ever more interesting--_suffering._ Then come -the slaves and Mrs. Beecher-Stowe. Then the poor and the workmen. -Then the vicious and the sick--all this is drawn into the foreground -(even for the purpose of disposing people in favour of the genius, -it has been customary for five hundred years to press him forward as -the great sufferer!). Then comes the cursing of all voluptuousness -(Baudelaire and Schopenhauer), the most decided conviction that the -lust of power is the greatest vice; absolute certainty that morality -and disinterestedness are identical things; that the "happiness of all" -is a goal worth striving after (_i.e.,_ Christ's Kingdom of Heaven). -We are on the best road to it: the Kingdom of Heaven of the poor in -spirit has begun.--Intermediate stages: the bourgeois (as a result of -the _nouveau riche_) and the workman (as a result of the machine). - -Greek and French culture of the time of Louis XIV. compared. A decided -belief in oneself. A leisure-class which makes things hard for itself -and exercises a great deal of self-control. The power of form, the will -to form _oneself._ "Happiness" acknowledged as a purpose. Much strength -and energy _behind_ all formality of manners. Pleasure at the sight of -a life that is _seemingly so easy._ The _Greeks_ seemed like _children_ -to the French. - - -95. - -_The Three Centuries._ - -Their different kinds of _sensitiveness_ may perhaps be best expressed -as follows:-- - -_Aristocracy_: Descartes, the reign of _reason,_ evidence showing the -sovereignty of the _will_. - -_Feminism_: Rousseau, the reign of _feeling,_ evidence showing the -sovereignty of the senses; all lies. - -_Animalism_: Schopenhauer, the reign of _passion,_ evidence showing the -sovereignty of animality, more honest, but gloomy. - -The seventeenth century is _aristocratic,_ all for order, haughty -towards everything animal, severe in regard to the heart, "austere," -and even free from sentiment, "non-German," averse to all that is -burlesque and natural, generalising and maintaining an attitude of -sovereignty towards the past for it believes in itself. At bottom it -partakes very much of the beast of prey, and practises asceticism in -order to remain master. It is the century of strength of will, as also -that of strong passion. - -The eighteenth century is dominated by _woman,_ it is gushing, -spiritual, and flat; but with intellect at the service of aspirations -and of the heart, it is a libertine in the pleasures of intellect, -undermining all authorities; emotionally intoxicated, cheerful, clear, -humane, and sociable, false to itself and at bottom very rascally.... - -The nineteenth century is more _animal,_ more subterranean, hateful, -realistic, plebeian, and on that very account "better," "more honest," -more submissive to "reality" of what kind soever, and _truer_; but -weak of will, sad, obscurely exacting and fatalistic. It has no -feeling of timidity or reverence, either in the presence of "reason" -or the "heart"; thoroughly convinced of the dominion of the desires -(Schopenhauer said "Will," but nothing is more characteristic of his -philosophy than that it entirely lacks all actual _willing_). Even -morality is reduced to an instinct ("Pity"). - -Auguste Comte is _the continuation of the_ eighteenth _century_ (the -dominion of the heart over the head, sensuality in the theory of -knowledge, altruistic exaltation). - -The fact that _science_ has become as sovereign as it is to-day, proves -how the nineteenth century has _emancipated itself_ from the dominion -of _ideals._ A certain absence of "needs" and wishes makes our -scientific curiosity and rigour possible--this is our kind of virtue. - -Romanticism is the _counterstroke_ of the eighteenth century; a sort of -accumulated longing for its grand style of exaltation (as a matter of -fact, largely mingled with mummery and self-deception: the desire was -to represent _strong nature_ and _strong passion_). - -The nineteenth century instinctively goes in search of _theories_ -by means of which it may feel its _fatalistic, submission to the -empire of facts_ justified. Hegel's success against sentimentality -and romantic idealism was already a sign of its fatalistic trend of -thought, in its belief that superior reason belongs to the triumphant -side, and in its justification of the actual "state" (in the place of -"humanity," etc.).--Schopenhauer: we are something foolish, and at the -best self-suppressive. The success of determinism, the genealogical -derivation of _obligations_ which were formerly held to be absolute, -the teaching of environment and adaptation, the reduction of will to -a process of reflex movement, the denial of the will as a "working -cause"; finally--a real process of re-christening: so little will -is observed that the word itself becomes _available_ for another -purpose. Further theories: the teaching of _objectivity,_ "will-less" -contemplation, as the only road to truth, _as also_ to _beauty_ (also -the belief in "genius," in order to have _the right to be submissive_); -mechanism, the determinable rigidity of the mechanical process; -so-called "Naturalism," the elimination of the choosing, directing, -interpreting subject, on principle. - -Kant, with his "practical reason," with his _moral fanaticism,_ is -quite eighteenth century style; still completely outside the historical -movement, without any notion whatsoever of the reality of his time, for -instance, revolution; he is not affected by Greek philosophy; he is a -phantasist of the notion of duty, a sensualist with a hidden leaning to -dogmatic pampering. - -_The return to Kant_ in our century means a _return to the eighteenth -century,_ people desire to create themselves a right to the _old ideas_ -and to the old exaltation--hence a theory of knowledge which "describes -limits," that is to say, which admits _of the option of fixing a Beyond -to the domain of reason._ - -_Hegel's_ way of thinking is not so very far removed from that of -Goethe: see the latter on the subject of Spinoza, for instance. -The will to deify the All and Life, in order to find both _peace_ -and _happiness_ in contemplating them: Hegel looks for reason -everywhere--in the presence of reason man may be _submissive_ and -resigned. In Goethe we find a kind of _fatalism_ which is almost -_joyous_ and _confiding,_ which neither revolts nor weakens, which -strives to make a totality out of itself, in the belief that only in -totality does everything seem good and justified, and find itself -resolved. - - -96. - -The period of _rationalism_--followed by a period of _sentimentality._ -To what extent does Schopenhauer come under "sentimentality"? (Hegel -under intellectuality?) - - -97. - -The seventeenth century _suffers_ from _humanity_ as from a _host -of contradictions_ ("_l'amas de contradictions_" that we are); it -endeavours to discover man, to _co-ordinate him,_ to excavate him: -whereas the eighteenth century tries to forget what is known of man's -nature, in order to adapt him to its Utopia. "Superficial, soft, -humane"--gushes over "humanity." - -The seventeenth century tries to banish all traces of the individual -in order that the artist's work may resemble life as much as possible. -The eighteenth century strives _to create interest in the author_ by -means of the work. The seventeenth century seeks art in art, a piece of -culture; the eighteenth uses art in its propaganda for political and -social reforms. - -"Utopia," the "ideal man," the deification of Nature, the vanity of -making one's own personality the centre of interest, subordination to -the propaganda of _social ideas,_ charlatanism--all this we derive from -the eighteenth century. - -The style of the seventeenth century: _propre exact et libre._ - -The strong individual who is self-sufficient, or who appeals -ardently to God--and that obtrusiveness and indiscretion of modern -authors--these things are _opposites._ "Showing-oneself-off"--what a -contrast to the Scholars of Port-Royal! - -Alfieri had a sense for the _grand style._ - -The hate of the _burlesque_ (that which lacks dignity), _the lack of a -sense of Nature_ belongs to the seventeenth century. - - -98. - -_Against Rousseau.--Alas!_ man is no longer sufficiently evil; -Rousseau's opponents, who say that "man is a beast of prey," are -unfortunately wrong. Not the corruption of man, but the softening and -moralising of him is the curse. In the sphere which Rousseau attacked -most violently, the _relatively_ strongest and most successful type of -man was still to be found (the type which still possessed the great -passions intact: Will to Power, Will to Pleasure, the Will and Ability -to Command). The man of the eighteenth century must be compared with -the man of the Renaissance (also with the man of the seventeenth -century in France) if the matter is to be understood at all: Rousseau -is a symptom of self-contempt and of inflamed vanity--both signs that -the dominating will is lacking: he moralises and seeks the _cause_ of -his own misery after the style of a revengeful man in the _ruling_ -classes. - - -99. - -_Voltaire--Rousseau._--A state of nature is terrible; man is a beast of -prey: our civilisation is an extraordinary _triumph_ over this beast of -prey in nature--this was _Voltaires_ conclusion. He was conscious of -the mildness, the refinements, the intellectual joys of the civilised -state; he despised obtuseness, even in the form of virtue, and the lack -of delicacy even in ascetics and monks. - -The _moral depravity_ of man seemed to pre-occupy _Rousseau_; the words -"unjust," "cruel," are the best possible for the purpose of exciting -the instincts of the oppressed, who otherwise find themselves under -the ban of the _vetitum_ and of disgrace; _so that their conscience -is opposed to their indulging any insurrectional desires._ These -emancipators seek one thing above all: to give their party the great -accents and attitudes of _higher Nature_. - - -100. - -_Rousseau_; the rule founded on sentiment; Nature as the source of -justice; man perfects himself in proportion as he approaches _Nature_ -(according to Voltaire, in proportion _as he leaves Nature behind_). -The very same periods seem to the one to demonstrate the progress of -_humanity_ and, to the other, the increase of injustice and inequality. - -Voltaire, who still understood _umanità_ in the sense of the -Renaissance, as also _virtù_ (as "higher culture"), fights for the -cause of the "_honnêtes gens_" "_la bonne compagnie_" taste, science, -arts, and even for the cause of progress and civilisation. - -_The flare-up occurred towards 1760_: On the one hand the citizen -of Geneva, on the other _le seigneur de Ferney._ It is only from -that moment and henceforward that Voltaire was the man of his age, -the philosopher, the representative of Toleration and of Disbelief -(theretofore he had been merely _un bel esprit_). His envy and hatred -of Rousseau's success forced him upwards. - -"_Pour 'la canaille' un dieu rémunérateur et vengeur_"--Voltaire. - -The criticism of both standpoints in regard to the _value of -civilisation._ To Voltaire nothing seems finer than the _social -invention_: there is no higher goal than to uphold and perfect it. -_L'honnêteté_ consists precisely in respecting social usage; virtue -in a certain obedience towards various necessary "prejudices" which -favour the maintenance of society. _Missionary of Culture,_ aristocrat, -representative of the triumphant and ruling classes and their values. -But Rousseau remained a _plebeian,_ even as _hommes de lettres,_ this -was _preposterous_; his shameless contempt for everything that was not -himself. - -The _morbid feature_ in Rousseau is the one which happens to have been -most admired and _imitated._ (Lord Byron resembled him somewhat, he -too screwed himself up to sublime attitudes and to revengeful rage--a -sign of vulgarity; later on, when Venice restored his equilibrium, -he understood what _alleviates most_ and does the _most good ... -l'insouciance_.) - -In spite of his antecedents, Rousseau is proud of himself; but he is -incensed if he is reminded of his origin.... - -In Rousseau there was undoubtedly some brain trouble; in Voltaire--rare -health and lightsomeness. _The revengefulness of the sick_; his -periods of insanity as also those of his contempt of man, and of his -mistrust. - -Rousseau's defence of _Providence_ (against Voltaire's Pessimism): -he _had need of_ God in order to be able to curse society and -civilisation; everything must be good _per se,_ because God had created -it; man _alone has corrupted man._ The "good man" as a man of Nature -was pure fantasy; but with the dogma of God's authorship he became -something probable and even not devoid of foundation. - -_Romanticism_ à la _Rousseau_: passion ("the sovereign right of -passion"); "naturalness"; the fascination of madness (foolishness -reckoned as greatness); the senseless vanity of the weak; the -revengefulness of the masses elevated to the position of _justice_ -("in politics, for one hundred years, the leader has always been this -invalid"). - - -101. - -_Kant_: makes the scepticism of Englishmen, in regard to the theory of -knowledge, _possible_ for Germans. - -(1) By enlisting in its cause the interest of the German's religious -and moral needs: just as the new academicians used scepticism for the -same reasons, as a preparation for Platonism (_vide_ Augustine); just -as Pascal even used _moral_ scepticism in order to provoke (to justify) -the need of belief; - -(2) By complicating and entangling it with scholastic flourishes in -view of making it more acceptable to the German's scientific taste in -form (for Locke and Hume, alone, were too illuminating, too clear--that -is to say, judged according to the German valuing instinct, "too -superficial"). - -_Kant_: a poor psychologist and mediocre judge of human nature, made -hopeless mistakes in regard to great historical values (the French -Revolution); a moral fanatic _à la_ Rousseau; with a subterranean -current of Christian values; a thorough dogmatist, but bored to -extinction by this tendency, to the extent of wishing to tyrannise -over it, but quickly tired, even of 'scepticism; and not yet affected -by any cosmopolitan thought or antique beauty ... a _dawdler_ and a -_go-between,_ not at all original (like _Leibnitz,_ something between -mechanism and spiritualism; like _Goethe,_ something between the taste -of the eighteenth century and that of the "historical sense" [which -_is_ essentially a sense of exoticism]; like _German music,_ between -French and Italian music; like Charles the Great, who mediated and -built bridges between the Roman Empire and Nationalism--a dawdler _par -excellence_). - - -102. - -In what respect have the _Christian_ centuries with their Pessimism -been _stronger_ centuries than the eighteenth--and how do they -correspond with the _tragic_ age of the Greeks? - -The nineteenth century _versus_ the eighteenth. How was it an -heir?--how was it a step backwards from the latter? (more lacking in -"spirit" and in taste)--how did it show an advance on the latter? -(more gloomy, more realistic, _stronger_). - - -103. - -How can we _explain_ the fact that we feel something in common with the -_Campagna romana?_ And the high mountain chain? - -Chateaubriand in a letter to M. de Fontanes in 1803 writes his first -impression of the _Campagna romana._ - -The President de Brosses says of the _Campagna romana_: "Il fallait -que Romulus fût ivre quand il songea à bâtir une ville dans un terrain -aussi laid." - -Even Delacroix would have nothing to do with Rome, it frightened him. -He loved Venice, just as Shakespeare, Byron, and Georges Sand did. -Théophile Gautier's and Richard Wagner's dislike of Rome must not be -forgotten. - -Lamartine has the language for Sorrento and Posilippo. - -Victor Hugo raves about Spain, "parce que aucune autre nation n'a -moins emprunté à l'antiquité, parce qu'elle n'a subi aucune influence -classique." - - -104. - -The _two great attempts_ that were made to overcome the eighteenth -century: - -_Napoleon,_ in that he called man, the soldier, and the great struggle -for power, to life again, and conceived Europe as a political power. - -_Goethe,_ in that he imagined a European culture which would consist -of the whole heritage of what humanity had _attained to_ up to his time. - -German culture in this century inspires mistrust--the music of the -period lacks that complete element which liberates and binds as well, -to wit--Goethe. - -The pre-eminence of _music_ in the romanticists of 1830 and 1840. -Delacroix. Ingres--a passionate musician (admired Gluck, Haydn, -Beethoven, Mozart), said to his pupils in Rome: "Si je pouvais vous -rendre tous musiciens, vous y gagneriez comme peintres"--likewise -Horace Vernet, who was particularly fond of Don Juan (as Mendelssohn -assures us, 1831); Stendhal, too, who says of himself: "Combien de -lieues ne ferais-je pas à pied, et à combien de jours de prison ne me -soumetterais-je pas pour entendre _Don Juan ou le Matrimonio segreto_; -et je ne sais pour quelle autre chose je ferais cet effort." He was -then fifty-six years old. - -The borrowed forms, for instance: Brahms as a typical "Epigone," -likewise Mendelssohn's cultured Protestantism (a former "soul" is -turned into poetry posthumously ...) - ---the moral and poetical substitutions in Wagner, who used _one_ art as -a stop-gap to make up for what another lacked. - ---the "historical sense," inspiration derived from poems, sagas. - ---that characteristic transformation of which G. Flaubert is the most -striking example among Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most striking -example among Germans, shows how the romantic belief in love and the -future changes into a longing for nonentity in 1830-50. - - -106. - -How is it that German music reaches its culminating point in the age of -German romanticism? How is it that German music lacks Goethe? On the -other hand, how much Schiller, or more exactly, how much "Thekla"[5] is -there not in Beethoven! - -Schumann has Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffman, Tieck, in him. -Richard Wagner has Freischütz, Hoffmann, Grimm, the romantic Saga, -the mystic Catholicism of instinct, symbolism, "the free-spiritedness -of passion" (Rousseau's intention). The _Flying Dutchman_ savours of -France, where _le ténébreux_ (1830) was the type of the seducer. - -_The cult of music,_ the revolutionary romanticism of form. Wagner -_synthesises_ German and French romanticism. - - -[Footnote 5: Thekla is the sentimental heroine in Schiller's -_Wallenstein._--TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.] - - -107. - -From the point of view only of his value to Germany and to German -culture, Richard Wagner is still a great problem, perhaps a German -misfortune: in any case, however, a fatality. But what does it -matter? Is he not very much more than a German event? It also -seems to me that to no country on earth is he less related than to -Germany; nothing was prepared there for his advent; his whole type -is simply strange amongst Germans; there he stands in their midst, -wonderful, misunderstood, incomprehensible. But people carefully avoid -acknowledging this: they are too kind, too square-headed--too German -for that. "Credo quia absurdus est": thus did the German spirit wish -it to be, in this case too--hence it is content meanwhile to believe -everything Richard Wagner wanted to have believed about himself. In all -ages the spirit of Germany has been deficient in subtlety and divining -powers concerning psychological matters. Now that it happens to be -under the high pressure of patriotic nonsense and self-adoration, it is -visibly growing thicker and coarser: how could it therefore be equal to -the problem of Wagner! - - -108. - -The Germans _are_ not yet anything, but they are _becoming_ something; -that is why they have not yet any culture;--that is why they cannot -yet have any culture!--They are not yet anything: that means they are -all kinds of things. They are _becoming_ something: that means that -they will one day cease from being all kinds of things. The latter is -at bottom only a wish, scarcely a hope yet. Fortunately it is a wish -with which one can live, a question of will, of work, of discipline, a -question of training, as also of resentment, of longing, of privation, -of discomfort,--yea, even of bitterness,--in short, we Germans _will_ -get something out of ourselves, something that has not yet been wanted -of us--we want something _more_! - -That this "German, as he is not as yet"--has a right to something -better than the present German "culture"; that all who wish to -become something better, must wax angry when they perceive a sort of -contentment, an impudent "setting-oneself-at-ease," or "a process of -self-censing," in this quarter: that is my second principle, in regard -to which my opinions have not yet changed. - - - -_(c)_ SIGNS OF INCREASING STRENGTH. - - - -109. - -First Principle: everything that characterises modern men savours of -decay: but side by side with the prevailing sickness there are signs of -a strength and powerfulness of soul which are still untried. _The same -causes which tend to promote the belittling of men,_ also force _the -stronger and rarer individuals upwards to greatness._ - - -110. - -_General survey: the ambiguous_ character of our _modern -world_--precisely the same symptoms might at the same time be -indicative of either _decline_ or _strength._ And the signs of strength -and of emancipation dearly bought, might in view of traditional -(or _hereditary_) appreciations concerned with the feelings, be -_misunderstood_ as indications of weakness. In short, _feeling,_ as a -_means of fixing valuations,_ is not _on a level with the times._ - -_Generalised_: Every valuation is always _backward_; it is merely the -expression of the conditions which favoured survival and growth in a -much earlier age: it struggles against new conditions of existence -out of which it did not arise, and which it therefore necessarily -misunderstands: it hinders, and excites suspicion against, all that is -new. - - -111. - -_The problem of the nineteenth century._--To discover whether its -strong and weak side belong to each other. Whether they have been cut -from one and the same piece. Whether the variety of its ideals and -their contradictions are conditioned by a higher purpose: whether -they are something higher.--For it might be _the prerequisite of -greatness,_ that growth should take place amid such violent tension. -Dissatisfaction, Nihilism, _might be a good sign._ - - -112. - -_General survey._--As a matter of fact, all abundant growth involves a -concomitant process of _crumbling to bits_ and _decay_: suffering and -the symptoms of decline _belong_ to ages of enormous progress; every -fruitful and powerful movement of mankind has always _brought about_ -a concurrent Nihilistic movement. Under certain circumstances, the -appearance of _the extremest_ form of Pessimism and actual _Nihilism_ -might be the sign of a process of incisive and most essential growth, -and of mankind's transit into completely new conditions of existence. -_This is what I have understood._ - - -113. - -_A._ - -Starting out with a thoroughly courageous _appreciation_ of our men of -to-day:--we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by appearance: this -mankind is much less effective, but it gives quite different pledges -of _lasting strength,_ its tempo is slower, but the rhythm itself is -richer. _Healthiness_ is increasing, the real conditions of a healthy -body are on the point of being known, and will gradually be created, -"asceticism" is regarded with irony. The fear of extremes, a certain -confidence in the "right way," no raving: a periodical self-habituation -to narrower values (such as "mother-land," "science," etc.). - -This whole picture, however, would still be _ambiguous_: it might be a -movement either of _increase_ or _decline_ in Life. - -_B._ - -The belief in "progress"--in lower spheres of intelligence, appears as -increasing life: but this is self-deception; - - in higher spheres of intelligence it is a sign of - _declining_ life. - -Description of the symptoms. - -The unity of the aspect: uncertainty in regard to the standard of -valuation. - -Fear of a general "in vain." - -Nihilism. - - -114. - -As a matter of fact, we are no longer so urgently in need of an -antidote against the first Nihilism: Life is no longer so uncertain, -accidental, and senseless in modern Europe. All such tremendous -_exaggeration_ of the value of men, of the value of evil, etc., are -not so necessary now; we can endure a considerable diminution of this -value, we may grant a great deal of nonsense and accident: the _power_ -man has acquired now allows of a _lowering_ of the means of discipline, -of which the strongest was the moral interpretation of the universe. -The hypothesis "God" is much too extreme. - - -115. - -If anything shows that our _humanisation_ is a genuine sign of -_progress,_ it is the fact that we no longer require excessive -contraries, that we no longer require contraries at all.... - -We may love the senses; for we have spiritualised them in every way and -made them artistic; - -We have a right to all things which hitherto have been most -_calumniated._ - - -116. - -_The reversal of the order of rank._--Those pious counterfeiters--the -priests--are becoming Chandala in our midst:--they occupy the -position of the charlatan, of the quack, of the counterfeiter, of the -sorcerer: we regard them as corrupters of the will, as the great -slanderers and vindictive enemies of Life, and as the _rebels_ among -the bungled and the botched. We have made our middle class out of our -servant-caste--the Sudra--that is to say, our people or the body which -wields the political power. - -On the other hand, the Chandala of former times is paramount: the -_blasphemers,_ the _immoralists,_ the independents of all kinds, the -artists, the Jews, the minstrels--and, at bottom, all _disreputable_ -classes are in the van. - -We have elevated ourselves to _honourable_ thoughts,--even more, we -determine what honour is on earth,--"nobility." ... All of us to-day -are _advocates of life._--We _Immoralists_ are to-day the _strongest_ -power: the other great powers are in need of us ... we re-create the -world in our own image. - -We have transferred the label "Chandala" to the _priests,_ the -_backworldsmen,_ and to the deformed _Christian society_ which has -become associated with these people, together with creatures of like -origin, the pessimists, Nihilists, romanticists of pity, criminals, and -men of vicious habits--the whole sphere in which the idea of "God" is -that of _Saviour...._ - -We are proud of being no longer obliged to be liars, slanderers, and -detractors of Life.... - - -117. - -_The advance_ of the nineteenth century upon the eighteenth (at bottom -we _good Europeans_ are carrying on a war against the eighteenth -century): - -(1) "The return to Nature" is getting to be understood, ever more -definitely, in a way which is quite the reverse of that in which -Rousseau used the phrase--_away from idylls and operas!_ - -(2) Ever more decided, more anti-idealistic, more objective, more -fearless, more industrious, more temperate, more suspicious of sudden -changes, _anti-revolutionary_; - -(3) The question of _bodily health_ is being pressed ever more -decidedly in front of the health of "the soul": the latter is regarded -as a condition brought about by the former, and bodily health is -believed to be, at least, the prerequisite to spiritual health. - - -118. - -If anything at all has been achieved, it is a more innocent attitude -towards the senses, a happier, more favourable demeanour in regard -to sensuality, resembling rather the position taken up by Goethe; a -prouder feeling has also been developed in knowledge, and the "reine -Thor"[6] meets with little faith. - - -[Footnote 6: This is a reference to Wagner's _Parsifal._ The character -as is well known, is written to represent a son of heart's affliction, -and a child of wisdom--humble, guileless, loving, pure, and a -fool.--TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.] - - -119. - -We "_objective people._"--It is not "pity" that opens up the way for -_us_ to all that is most remote and most strange in life and culture; -but our accessibility and ingenuousness, which precisely does not -"pity," but rather takes pleasure in hundreds of things which formerly -caused pain (which in former days either outraged or moved us, or in -the presence of which we were either hostile or indifferent). Pain in -all its various phases is now interesting to us: on that account we are -certainly _not_ the more pitiful, even though the sight of pain may -shake us to our foundations and move us to tears: and we are absolutely -not inclined to be more helpful in view thereof. - -In this _deliberate_ desire to look on at all pain and error, we have -grown stronger and more powerful than in the eighteenth century; it -is a proof of our increase of strength (we have _drawn closer_ to the -seventeenth and sixteenth centuries). But it is a profound mistake -to regard our "romanticism" as a proof of our "beautified souls." We -want _stronger_ sensations than all _coarser_ ages and classes have -wanted. (This fact must not be confounded with the needs of neurotics -and decadents; in their case, of course, there is a craving for pepper ---even for cruelty.) - -We are all seeking conditions _which are emancipated from_ the -bourgeois, and to a greater degree from the priestly, notion of -morality (every book which savours at all of priestdom and theology -gives us the impression of pitiful _niaiserie_ and mental indigence). -"Good company," in fact, finds everything insipid which is not -forbidden and considered compromising in bourgeois circles; and the -case is the same with books, music, politics, and opinions on women. - - -120. - -_The simplification of man in the nineteenth century_ (The eighteenth -century was that of elegance, subtlety, and generous feeling).--Not -"return to nature"; for no natural humanity has ever existed yet. -Scholastic, unnatural, and antinatural values are the rule and the -beginning; man only reaches Nature after a long struggle--he never -turns his "back" to her.... To be natural means, to dare to be as -immoral as Nature is. - -We are coarser, more direct, richer in irony towards generous feelings, -even when we are beneath them. - -Our _haute volée,_ the society consisting of our rich and leisured -men, is more natural: people hunt each other, the love of the sexes -is a kind of sport in which marriage is both a charm and an obstacle; -people entertain each other and live for the sake of pleasure; bodily -advantages stand in the first rank, and curiosity and daring are the -rule. - -Our attitude towards _knowledge_ is more natural; we are innocent -in our absolute spiritual debauchery, we hate pathetic and hieratic -manners, we delight in that which is most strictly prohibited, we -should scarcely recognise any interest in knowledge if we were bored in -acquiring it. - -Our attitude to _morality_ is also more natural. Principles have become -a laughing-stock; no one dares to speak of his "duty," unless in irony. -But a helpful, benevolent disposition is highly valued. (Morality is -located in _instinct_ and the rest is despised. Besides this there are -few points of honour.) - -Our attitude to _politics_ is more natural: we see problems of power, -of the quantum of power, against another quantum. We do not believe in -a right that does not proceed from a power which is able to uphold it. -We regard all rights as conquests. - -Our valuation of _great men and things_ is more natural: we regard -passion as a privilege; we can conceive of nothing great which does not -involve a great crime; all greatness is associated in our minds with a -certain standing-beyond-the-pale in morality. - -Our attitude to _Nature_ is more natural: we no longer love her for her -"innocence," her "reason," her "beauty," we have made her beautifully -devilish and "foolish." But instead of despising her on that account, -since then we have felt more closely related to her and more familiar -in her presence. She does _not_ aspire to virtue: we therefore respect -her. - -Our attitude towards _Art_ is more natural: we do not exact beautiful, -empty lies, etc., from her; brutal positivism reigns supreme, and it -ascertains things with perfect calm. - -In short: there are signs showing that the European of the nineteenth -century is less ashamed of his instincts; he has gone a long way -towards acknowledging his unconditional naturalness and immorality, -_without bitterness_: on the contrary, he is strong enough to endure -this point of view alone. - -To some ears this will sound as though _corruption_ had made strides: -and certain it is that man has not drawn nearer to the "Nature" -which Rousseau speaks about, but has gone one step farther in the -civilisation before which Rousseau _stood in horror._ We have grown -_stronger,_ we have drawn nearer to the seventeenth century, more -particularly to the taste which reigned towards its close (Dancourt, Le -Sage, Renard). - - -121. - -_Culture_ versus _Civilisation._--The culminating stages of culture -and civilisation lie apart: one must not be led astray as regards the -fundamental antagonism existing between culture and civilisation. -From the moral standpoint, great periods in the history of culture -have always been periods of corruption; while on the other hand, -those periods in which man was deliberately and compulsorily _tamed_ -("civilisation") have always been periods of intolerance towards the -most intellectual and most audacious natures. Civilisation desires -something different from what culture strives after: their aims may -perhaps be opposed.... - - -122. - -_What I warn people against_: confounding the instincts of decadence -with those of _humanity_; - -Confounding the _dissolving means_ of civilisation _and those which -necessarily promote decadence,_ with _culture_; - -Confounding _debauchery,_ and the principle, "laisser aller," with the -_Will to Power_ (the latter is the exact reverse of the former). - - -123. - -The unsolved problems which I set anew: the _problem of civilisation,_ -the struggle between Rousseau and Voltaire about the year 1760. Man -becomes deeper, more mistrustful, more "immoral," stronger, more -self-confident--and therefore "_more natural_"; that is "progress." -In this way, by a process of division of labour, the more evil strata -and the milder and tamer strata of society get separated: so that _the -general facts_ are not visible at first sight.... It is a sign of -_strength,_ and of the self-control and fascination of the strong, that -these stronger strata possess the arts in order to make their greater -powers for evil felt as something "_higher_" As soon as there is -"progress" there is a transvaluation of the strengthened factors into -the "good." - - -124. - -Man must have the _courage_ of his natural instincts restored to him.-- - -_The poor opinion_ he has of himself must be destroyed (_not_ in the -sense of the individual, but in the sense of the _natural_ man ...)-- - -The _contradictions_ in things must be eradicated, after it has been -well understood that we were responsible for them-- - -_Social idiosyncrasies_ must be stamped out of existence (guilt, -punishment, justice, honesty, freedom, love, etc. etc.)-- - -An advance towards "_naturalness_": in all political questions, even -in the relations between parties, even in merchants', workmen's, or -contractors' parties, only _questions_ of _power_ come into play:-- -"what one _can_ do" is the first question, what one ought to do is only -a secondary consideration. - - -125. - -Socialism--or the _tyranny_ of the meanest and the most -brainless,--that is to say, the superficial, the envious, and the -mummers, brought to its zenith,--is, as a matter, of fact, the logical -conclusion of "modern ideas" and their latent anarchy: but in the -genial atmosphere of democratic well-being the capacity for forming -resolutions or even for coming _to an end_ at all, is paralysed. Men -follow--but no longer their reason. That is why socialism is on the -whole a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing more amusing -than to observe the discord between the poisonous and desperate faces -of present-day socialists--and what wretched and nonsensical feelings -does not their style reveal to us!--and the childish lamblike happiness -of their hopes and desires. Nevertheless, in many places in Europe, -there may be violent hand-to-hand struggles and irruptions on their -account: the coming century is likely to be convulsed in more than -one spot, and the Paris Commune, which finds defenders and advocates -even in Germany, will seem to have been but a slight indigestion -compared with what is to come. Be this as it may, there will always -be too many people of property for socialism ever to signify anything -more than an attack of illness: and these people of property are like -one man with one faith, "one must possess something in order _to -be_ some one." This, however, is the oldest and most wholesome of -all instincts; I should add: "one must desire more than one has in -order to _become_ more." For this is the teaching which life itself -preaches to all living things: the morality of Development. To have -and to wish to have more, in a word, _Growth_--that is life itself. -In the teaching of socialism "a will to the denial of life" is but -poorly concealed: botched men and races they must be who have devised -a teaching of this sort. In fact, I even wish a few experiments might -be made to show that in a socialistic society, life denies itself, -and itself cuts away its own roots. The earth is big enough and man -is still unexhausted enough for a practical lesson of this sort and -_demonstratio ad absurdum_--even if it were accomplished only by a vast -expenditure of lives--to seem worth while to me. Still, Socialism, -like a restless mole beneath the foundations of a society wallowing in -stupidity, will be able to achieve something useful and salutary: it -delays "Peace on Earth" and the whole process of character-softening of -the democratic herding animal; it forces the European to have an extra -supply of intellect,--that is to say, craft and caution, and prevents -his entirely abandoning the manly and warlike qualities,--it also saves -Europe awhile from the _marasmus femininus_ which is threatening it. - - -126. - -The most favourable obstacles and remedies of modernity: - -(1) Compulsory _military service_ with real wars in which all joking is -laid aside. - -(2) _National_ thick-headedness (which simplifies and concentrates). - -(3) Improved _nutrition_ (meat). - -(4) Increasing _cleanliness_ and wholesomeness in the home. - -(5) The predominance of _physiology_ over theology, morality, -economics, and politics. - -(6) Military discipline in the exaction and the practice of one's -"duty" (it is no longer customary to praise). - - -127. - -I am delighted at the military development of Europe, also at the inner -anarchical conditions: the period of quietude and "Chinadom" which -Galiani prophesied for this century is now over. Personal and _manly_ -capacity, bodily capacity recovers its value, valuations are becoming -more physical, nutrition consists ever more and more of flesh. Fine -men have once more become possible. Bloodless sneaks (with mandarins -at their head, as Comte imagined them) are now a matter of the past. -The savage in every one of us is _acknowledged,_ even the wild animal. -_Precisely on that account,_ philosophers will have a better chance. ---Kant is a scarecrow! - - -128. - -I have not yet _seen_ any reasons to feel discouraged. He who acquires -and preserves a _strong will,_ together with a broad mind, has a more -favourable chance now than ever he had. For the _plasticity_ of man has -become exceedingly great in democratic Europe: men who learn easily, -who readily adapt themselves, are the rule: the gregarious animal of -a high order of intelligence is prepared. He who would command finds -those who _must_ obey: I have Napoleon and Bismarck in mind, for -instance. The struggle against strong and unintelligent wills, which -forms the surest obstacle in one's way, is really insignificant Who -would not be able to knock down these "objective" gentlemen with weak -wills, such as Ranke and Renan! - - -129. - -_Spiritual enlightenment_ is an unfailing means of making men -uncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour and support; in -short, of developing the herding instincts in them. That is why all -great artist-rulers, hitherto (Confucius in China, the Roman Empire, -Napoleon, Popedom--at a time when they had the courage of their -worldliness and frankly pursued power) in whom the ruling instincts, -that had prevailed until their time, culminated, also made use of the -spiritual enlightenment--or at least allowed it to be supreme (after -the style of the Popes of the Renaissance). The self-deception of -the masses on this point, in every democracy for instance, is of the -greatest possible value: all that makes men smaller and more amenable -is pursued under the title "progress." - - -130. - -The highest equity and mildness as a condition of _weakness_ (the New -Testament and the early Christian community--manifesting itself in the -form of utter foolishness in the Englishmen, Darwin and Wallace). Your -equity, ye higher men, drives you to universal suffrage, etc.; your -"humanity" urges you to be milder towards crime and stupidity. In the -_end_ you will thus help stupidity and harmlessness to conquer. - -_Outwardly_: Ages of terrible wars, insurrections, explosions. -_Inwardly_: ever more and more weakness among men; _events_ take the -_form of excitants._ The Parisian as the type of the European extreme. - -_Consequences_: (1) Savages (at first, of course, in conformity with -the culture that has reigned hitherto); (2) _Sovereign individuals_ -(where _powerful_ barbarous _masses_ and emancipation from all that -has been, are crossed). The age of greatest stupidity, brutality, and -wretchedness in the masses, and _in the highest individuals._ - - -131. - -An incalculable number of higher individuals now perish: but he who -_escapes their fate_ is as strong as the devil. In this respect we are -reminded of the conditions which prevailed in the Renaissance. - - -132. - -How are _Good Europeans_ such as ourselves distinguished from the -patriots? In the first place, we are atheists and immoralists, but we -take care to support the religions and the morality which we associate -with the gregarious instinct: for by means of them, an order of men is, -so to speak, being prepared, which must at some time or other fall into -our hands, which must actually _crave_ for our hands. - -Beyond Good and Evil,--certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional -and strict preservation of herd-morality. - -We reserve ourselves the right to several kinds of philosophy which it -is necessary to learn: under certain circumstances, the pessimistic -kind as a hammer; a European Buddhism might perhaps be indispensable. - -We should probably support the development and the maturation of -democratic tendencies; for it conduces to weakness of will: in -"Socialism" we recognise a thorn which prevents smug ease. - -Attitude towards the people.. Our prejudices; we pay attention to the -results of cross-breeding. - -Detached, well-to-do, strong: irony concerning the "press" and its -culture. Our care: that scientific men should not become journalists. -We mistrust any form of culture that tolerates news-paper reading or -writing. - -We make our accidental positions (as Goethe and Stendhal did), our -experiences, a foreground, and we lay stress upon them, so that we -may deceive concerning our backgrounds. We ourselves _wait_ and -avoid putting our heart into them. They serve us as refuges, such as -a wanderer might require and use--but we avoid feeling at home in -them. We are ahead of our fellows in that we have had a _disciplina -voluntatis._ All strength is directed to the _development of the will,_ -an art which allows us to wear masks, an art of understanding _beyond_ -the passions (also "super-European" thought at times). - -This is our preparation before becoming the law-givers of the future -and the lords of the earth; if not we, at least our children. Caution -where marriage is concerned. - - -133. - -_The twentieth century._--The Abbé Galiani says somewhere: "_La -prévoyance est la cause des guerres actuelles de l'Europe. Si l'on -voulait se donner la peine de ne rien prévoir, tout le monde serait -tranquille, et je ne crois pas qu'on serait plus malheureux parce qu'on -ne ferait pas la guerre._" As I in no way share the unwarlike views of -my deceased friend Galiani, I have no fear whatever of saying something -beforehand with the view of conjuring in some way the cause of wars. - -A condition of excessive _consciousness,_ after the worst of -earthquakes: with new questions. - - -134. - -It is the time of the _great noon, of the most appalling -enlightenment_: my particular kind of _Pessimism_: the great -starting-point. - -(1) Fundamental contradiction between civilisation and the elevation of -man. - -(2) Moral valuations regarded as a history of lies and the art of -calumny in the service of the Will to Power (of the will of the _herd,_ -which rises against stronger men). - -(3) The conditions which determine every elevation in culture (the -facilitation of a _selection_ being made at the cost of a crowd) are -the _conditions_ of all growth. - -(4). _The multiformity_ of the world as a question of _strength,_ -which sees all things in the _perspective of their growth._ The moral -Christian values to be regarded as the insurrection and mendacity of -slaves (in comparison with the aristocratic values of the _ancient -world). _ - - - - -SECOND BOOK. - -CRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED HITHERTO. - - - -I. - - -CRITICISM OF RELIGION. - - -All the beauty and sublimity with which we have invested real and -imagined things, I will show to be the property and product of man, and -this should be his most beautiful apology. Man as a poet, as a thinker, -as a god, as love, as power. Oh, the regal liberality with which he -has lavished gifts upon things in order _to impoverish_ himself and -make himself feel wretched! Hitherto, this has been his greatest -disinterestedness, that he admired and worshipped, and knew how to -conceal from himself that _he_ it was who had created what he admired. - - - -1. CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIONS. - - -135. - -_The origin of religion._--Just as the illiterate man of to-day -believes that his wrath is the cause of his being angry, that his -mind is the cause of his thinking, that his soul is the cause of -his feeling, in short, just as a mass of psychological entities -are still unthinkingly postulated as causes; so, in a still more -primitive age, the same phenomena were interpreted by man by means of -personal entities. Those conditions of his soul which seemed strange, -overwhelming, and rapturous, he regarded as obsessions and bewitching -influences emanating from the power of some personality. (Thus the -Christian, the most puerile and backward man of this age, traces hope, -peace, and the feeling of deliverance to a psychological inspiration -on the part of God: being by nature a sufferer and a creature in need -of repose, states of happiness, peace, and resignation, perforce seem -strange to him, and seem to need some explanation.) Among intelligent, -strong, and vigorous races, the epileptic is mostly the cause of a -belief in the existence of some _foreign power_; but all such examples -of apparent subjection--as, for instance, the bearing of the exalted -man, of the poet, of the great criminal, or the passions, love and -revenge--lead to the invention of supernatural powers. A condition is -made concrete by being identified with a personality, and when this -condition overtakes anybody, it is ascribed to that personality. In -other words: in the psychological concept of God, a certain state of -the soul is personified as a cause in order to appear as an effect. - -The psychological logic is as follows: when the _feeling of power_ -suddenly seizes and overwhelms a man,--and this takes place in the -case of all the great passions,--a doubt arises in him concerning his -own person: he dare not think himself the cause of this astonishing -sensation--and thus he posits a _stronger_ person, a Godhead as its -cause. In short, the origin of religion lies in the extreme feelings -of power, which, being _strange,_ take men by surprise: and just -as the sick man, who feels one of his limbs unaccountably heavy, -concludes that another man must be sitting on it, so the ingenuous -_homo religiosus,_ divides himself up into _several people._ Religion -is an example of the "_altération de la personalité._" A sort of _fear_ -and _sensation of terror_ in one's own presence.... But also a feeling -of inordinate _rapture_ and _exaltation._ Among sick people, the -_sensation of health_ suffices to awaken a belief in the proximity of -God. - - -136. - -_Rudimentary psychology of the religious man:--_All changes are -effects; all effects are effects of will (the notion of "Nature" -and of "natural law," is lacking); all effects presuppose an agent. -Rudimentary psychology: one is only a cause oneself, when one knows -that one has willed something. - -Result: States of power impute to man the feeling that he is _not_ the -cause of them, that he is not _responsible_ for them: they come without -being willed to do so--consequently we cannot be their originators: -will that is not free (that is to say, the knowledge of a change in our -condition which we have not helped to bring about) requires a _strong_ -will. - -_Consequence of this rudimentary psychology_: Man has never dared to -credit _himself_ with his strong and startling moods, he has always -conceived them as "passive," as "imposed upon him from outside": -Religion is the offshoot of a _doubt_ concerning the entity of the -person, an _altération_ of the personality: in so far as everything -great and strong in man was considered _superhuman_ and _foreign,_ man -belittled himself,--he laid the two sides, the very pitiable and weak -side, and the very strong and startling side apart, in two spheres, and -called the one "Man" and the other "God." - -And he has continued to act on these lines; during the period of the -_moral idiosyncrasy_ he did not interpret his lofty and sublime moral -states as "proceeding from his own will" or as the "work" of the -person. Even the Christian himself divides his personality into two -parts, the one a mean and weak fiction which he calls man, and the -other which he calls God (Deliverer and Saviour). - -Religion has lowered the concept "man"; its ultimate conclusion is -that all goodness, greatness, and truth are superhuman, and are only -obtainable by the grace of God. - - -137. - -One way of raising man out of his self-abasement, which brought about -the decline of the point of view that classed all lofty and strong -states of the soul, as strange, was the theory of relationship. These -lofty and strong states of the soul could at least be interpreted as -the influence of our _forebears_; we belonged to each other, we were -irrevocably joined; we grew in our own esteem, by acting according to -the example of a model known to us all. - -There is an attempt on the part of noble families to associate religion -with their own feelings of self-respect. Poets and seers do the same -thing; they feel proud that they have been worthy,--that they have been -_selected_ for such association,--they esteem it an honour, not to be -considered at all as individuals, but as mere mouthpieces (Homer). - -Man gradually takes possession of the highest and proudest states of -his soul, as also of his acts and his works. Formerly it was believed -that one paid oneself the greatest honour by denying one's own -responsibility for the highest deeds one accomplished, and by ascribing -them to--God. The will which was not free, appeared to be that which -imparted a higher value to a deed: in those days a god was postulated -as the author of the deed. - - -138. - -Priests are the actors of something which is supernatural, either in -the way of ideals, gods, or saviours, and they have to make people -believe in them; in this they find their calling, this is the purpose -of their instincts; in order to make it as credible as possible, they -have to exert themselves to the utmost extent in the art of posing; -their actor's sagacity must, above all, aim at giving them _a clean -conscience,_ by means of which, alone, it is possible to persuade -effectively. - - -139. - -The priest wishes to make it an understood thing, that he is the -_highest type_ of man, that he rules,--even over those who wield the -power,--that he is indispensable and unassailable,--that he is the -_strongest power_ in the community, not by any means to be replaced or -undervalued. - -_Means thereto_: he alone is cultured; he alone is the _man of virtue_; -he alone has _sovereign power over himself_: he alone is, in a certain -sense, God, and ultimately goes back to the Godhead; he alone is the -middleman between God and _others_; the Godhead administers punishment -to every one who puts the priest at a disadvantage, or who thinks in -opposition to him. - -_Means thereto: Truth_ exists. There is only one way of attaining to -it, and that is to become a priest. Everything good, which relates -either to order, nature, or tradition, is to be traced to the wisdom -of the priests. The Holy Book is their work. The whole of nature is -only a fulfilment of the maxims which it contains. No other _source of -goodness_ exists than the priests. Every other kind of perfection, even -the _warrior's,_ is different in rank from that of the priests. - -_Consequence_: If the priest is to be the _highest_ type, then the -_degrees_ which lead to his _virtues_ must be the degrees of value -among men. _Study, emancipation from material things, inactivity, -impassibility, absence of passion, solemnity_;--the opposite of all -this is found in the _lowest_ type of man. - -The priest has taught a kind of morality which conduced to his being -considered the _highest type_ of man. He conceives a _type_ which -is the _reverse_ of his own: the Chandala. By making _these_ as -contemptible as possible, some strength is lent to the _order of -castes._ The priest's excessive fear of _sensuality_ also implies that -the latter is the most serious threat to the _order of castes_ (that is -to say, _order_ in general).... Every "free tendency" _in puncto puncti -overthrows_ the laws of marriage. - - -140. - -The _philosopher_ considered as the development of the _priestly_ -type:--He has the heritage of the priest in his blood; even as a rival -he is compelled to fight with the same weapons as the priest of his -time;--he aspires to the _highest authority._ - -What is it that bestows _authority_ upon men who have no physical power -to wield (no army, no arms at all ...)? How do such men gain authority -_over_ those who are in possession of material power, and who represent -authority? (Philosophers enter the lists against princes, victorious -conquerors, and wise statesmen.) - -They can do it only by establishing the belief that they are in -possession of a power which is higher and stronger--_God._ Nothing is -strong enough: every one is in _need_ of the mediation and the services -of priests. They establish themselves as indispensable _intercessors._ -The conditions of their existence are: (1) That people believe in the -absolute superiority of their god, in fact believe in _their god_'; -(2) that there is no other access, no direct access to god, save -through them. The _second_ condition alone gives rise to the concept -"heterodoxy"; the _first_ to the concept "disbelievers" (that is to -say, he who believes in another god). - - -141. - -_A Criticism of the Holy Lie._--That a lie is allowed in pursuit -of holy ends 'is a principle which belongs to the theory of all -priestcraft, and the object of this inquiry is to discover to what -extent it belongs to its practice. - -But philosophers, too, whenever they intend taking over the leadership -of mankind, with the ulterior motives of priests in their minds, have -never failed to arrogate to themselves the right to lie: Plato above -all. But the most elaborate of lies is the double lie, developed -by the typically Arian philosophers of the Vedanta: two systems, -contradicting each other in all their main points, but interchangeable, -complementary, and mutually expletory, when educational ends were in -question. The lie of the one has to create a condition in which the -truth of the other can alone become _intelligible...._ - -How _far_ does the holy lie of priests and philosophers go?--The -question here is, what hypotheses do they advance in regard to -education, and what are the dogmas they are compelled to _invent_ in -order to do justice to these hypotheses? - -First: they must have power, authority, and absolute credibility on -their side. - -Secondly: they must have the direction of the whole of Nature, so that -everything affecting the individual seems to be determined by their law. - -Thirdly: their domain of power must be very extensive, in order that -its control may escape the notice of those they subject: they must know -the penal code of the life beyond--of the life "after death,"--and, of -course, the means whereby the road to blessedness may be discovered. -They have to put the notion of a natural course of things out of sight, -but as they are intelligent and thoughtful people, they are able to -_promise_ a host of effects, which they naturally say are conditioned -by prayer or by the strict observance of their law. They can, moreover, -_prescribe_ a large number of things which are exceedingly reasonable ---only they must not point to experience or empiricism as the source -of this wisdom, but to revelation or to the fruits of the "most severe -exercises of penance." - -The _holy lie,_ therefore, applies principally to the _purpose_ of -an action (the natural purpose, reason, is made to vanish: a moral -purpose, the observance of some law, a service to God, seems to be the -purpose): to the _consequence_ of an action (the natural consequence -is interpreted as something supernatural, and, in order to be on -surer ground, other incontrollable and supernatural consequences are -foretold). - -In this way the concepts _good_ and _evil_ are created, and seem -quite divorced from the natural concepts: "useful," "harmful," -"life-promoting," "life-retarding,"--indeed, inasmuch as _another_ -life is imagined, the former concepts may even be _antagonistic_ to -Nature's concepts of good and evil. In this way, the proverbial concept -"conscience" is created: an inner voice, which, though it makes itself -heard in regard to every action, does not measure the worth of that -action according to its results, but according to its conformity or -non-conformity to the "law." - -The holy lie therefore invented: (1) a _god_ who _punishes_ and -_rewards,_ who recognises and carefully observes the law-book of the -priests, and who is particular about sending them into the world as -his mouthpieces and plenipotentiaries; (2) an _After Life,_ in which, -alone, the great penal machine is supposed to be active--to this end -the _immortality of the soul_ was invented; (3) a _conscience in -man,_ understood as the knowledge that good and evil are permanent -values--that God himself speaks through it, whenever its counsels are -in conformity with priestly precepts; (4) _Morality_ as the denial of -all natural processes, as the subjection of all phenomena to a moral -order, as the interpretation of all phenomena as the effects of a moral -order of things (that is to say, the concept of punishment and reward), -as the only power and only creator of all transformations; (5) _Truths_ -given, revealed, and identical with the teaching of the priests: as the -condition to all salvation and happiness in this and the next world. - -_In short_: what is the price paid for the _improvement_ supposed -to be due to morality?--The unhinging of _reason,_ the reduction of -all motives to fear and hope (punishment and reward); _dependence_ -upon the tutelage of priests, and upon a formulary exactitude -which is supposed to express a divine will; the implantation of -a "conscience" which establishes a false science in the place of -experience and experiment: as though all one had to do or had not -to do were predetermined--a kind of contraction of the seeking and -striving spirit;--_in short_: the worst _mutilation_ of man that can be -imagined, and it is pretended that "the good man" is the result. - -Practically speaking, all reason, the whole heritage of intelligence, -subtlety, and caution, the first condition of the priestly canon, is -arbitrarily reduced, when it is too late, to a simple _mechanical_ -process: conformity with the law becomes a purpose in itself, it is the -highest purpose; _Life no longer contains any problems_;--the whole -conception of the world is polluted by the notion of _punishment_; ---Life itself, owing to the fact that the _priests life_ is upheld as -the _non plus ultra_ of perfection, is transformed into a denial and -pollution of life;--the concept "God" represents an aversion to Life, -and even a criticism and a contemning of it. Truth is transformed in -the mind, into _priestly_ prevarication; the striving after truth, into -the _study of the Scriptures,_ into the way to _become a theologian._ - - -142. - -_A criticism of the Law-Book of Manu._--The whole book is founded upon -the holy lie. Was it the well-being of humanity that inspired the whole -of this system? Was this kind of man, who believes in the _interested_ -nature of every action, interested or not interested in the success -of this system? The desire to improve mankind--whence comes the -inspiration to this feeling? Whence is the concept improvement taken? - -We find a class of men, _the sacerdotal class,_ who consider themselves -the standard pattern, the highest example and most perfect expression -of the type man. The notion of "improving" mankind, to this class of -men, means to make mankind like themselves. They believe in their own -superiority, they _will_ be superior in practice: the cause of the holy -lie is _The Will to Power...._ - -Establishment of the dominion: to this end, ideas which place a _non -plus ultra_ of power with the priesthood are made to prevail. Power -acquired by lying was the result of the recognition of the fact that it -was not already possessed physically, in a military form.... Lying as a -supplement to power--this is a new concept of "truth." - -It is a mistake to presuppose _unconscious_ and _innocent_ development -in this quarter--a sort of self-deception. Fanatics are not the -discoverers of such exhaustive systems of oppression.... Cold-blooded -reflection must have been at work here; the same sort of reflection -which Plato showed when he worked out his "State"--"One must desire the -means when one desires the end." Concerning this political maxim, all -legislators have always been quite clear. - -We possess the classical model, and it is specifically Arian: we -can therefore hold the most gifted and most reflective type of man -responsible for the most systematic lie that has ever been told.... -Everywhere almost the lie was copied, and thus _Avian influence_ -corrupted the world.... - - -143. - -Much is said to-day about the _Semitic_ spirit of the _New Testament_: -but the thing referred to is merely priestcraft,--and in the purest -example of an Arian law-book, in Manu, this kind of "Semitic -spirit"--that is to say, _Sacerdotalism,_ is worse than anywhere else. - -The development of the Jewish hierarchy is _not_ original: they learnt -the scheme in Babylon--it is Arian. When, later on, the same thing -became dominant in Europe, under the preponderance of Germanic blood, -this was in conformity to the spirit of the _ruling race_: a striking -case of atavism. The Germanic middle ages aimed at a revival of the -_Arian order of castes_. - -Mohammedanism in its turn learned from Christianity the use of a -"Beyond" as an instrument of punishment. - -The scheme of a _permanent community,_ with priests at its -head--this oldest product of Asia's great culture in the domain of -organisation--_naturally_ provoked reflection and imitation in every -way.--Plato is an example of this, but above all, the Egyptians. - - -144. - -_Moralities_ and _religions_ are the principal means by which one can -modify men into whatever one likes; provided one is possessed of an -overflow of creative power, and can cause one's will to prevail over -long periods of time. - - -145. - -If one wish to see an _affirmative_ Arian religion which is the product -of a _ruling_ class, one should read the law-book of Manu. (The -deification of the feeling of power in the Brahmin: it is interesting -to note that it originated in the warrior-caste, and was later -transferred to the priests.) - -If one wish to see an _affirmative_ religion of the Semitic order, -which is the product of the _ruling_ class, one should read the Koran -or the earlier portions of the Old Testament. (_Mohammedanism,_ as a -religion for men, has profound contempt for the sentimentality and -prevarication of Christianity, ... which, according to Mohammedans, is -a woman's religion.) - -If one wish to see a _negative_ religion of the Semitic order, which is -the product of the _oppressed_ class, one should read the New Testament -(which, according to Indian and Arian points of view, is a religion for -the Chandala). - -If one wish to see a _negative_ Arian religion, which is the product of -the _ruling_ classes, one should study Buddhism. - -It is quite in the nature of things that we have no Arian religion -which is the product of the _oppressed_ classes; for that would have -been a contradiction: a race of masters is either paramount or else it -goes to the dogs. - - -146. - -Religion, _per se,_ has nothing to do with morality; yet both offshoots -of the Jewish religion are _essentially_ moral religions--which -prescribe the rules of living, and procure obedience to their -principles by means of rewards and punishment. - - -147. - -_Paganism--Christianity.--Paganism_ is that which says yea to all -that is natural, it is innocence in being natural, "naturalness." -_Christianity_ is that which says no to all that is natural, it is a -certain lack of dignity in being natural; hostility to Nature. - -"Innocent":--Petronius is innocent, for instance. Beside this happy -man a Christian is absolutely devoid of innocence. But since even -the _Christian_ status is ultimately only a natural condition, the -term "Christian" soon begins to mean the _counterfeiting of the -psychological interpretation._ - - -148. - -The Christian priest is from the root a mortal enemy of sensuality: one -cannot imagine a greater contrast to his attitude than the guileless, -slightly awed, and solemn attitude, which the religious rites of the -most honourable women in Athens maintained in the presence of the -symbol of sex. In all non-ascetic religions the procreative act is -_the_ secret _per se_: a sort of symbol of perfection and of the -designs of the future: re-birth, immortality. - - -149. - -Our belief in ourselves is the greatest fetter, the most telling spur, -and the _strongest pinion._ Christianity ought to have elevated the -innocence of man to the position of an article of belief--men would -then have become gods: in those days believing was still possible. - - -150. - -The egregious _lie_ of history: as if it were the _corruption_ of -Paganism that opened the road to Christianity. As a matter of fact, it -was the enfeeblement and _moralisation_ of the man of antiquity. The -new interpretation of natural functions, which made them appear like -_vices,_ had already gone before! - - -151. - -Religions are ultimately wrecked by the belief in morality. The idea of -the Christian moral God becomes untenable,--hence "Atheism,"--as though -there could be no other god. - -_Culture_ is likewise wrecked by the belief in morality. For when the -necessary and only possible conditions of its growth are revealed, -nobody _will_ any longer countenance it (Buddhism). - - -152. - -_The physiology of Nihilistic religions._--All in all, the _Nihilistic_ -religions are _systematised histories of sickness_ described in -religious and moral terminology. - -In pagan cultures it is around the interpretation of the great annual -cycles that the religious cult turns; in Christianity it is around a -cycle of _paralytic phenomena._ - - -153. - -This _Nihilistic_ religion gathers together all the _decadent elements_ -and things of like order which it can find in antiquity, viz.:-- - -_(a)_ The _weak_ and the _botched_ (the refuse of the ancient world, -and that of which it rid itself with most violence). - -_(b)_ Those who are _morally obsessed_ and _anti-pagan._ - -_(c)_ Those who are _weary of politics_ and indifferent (the _blasé_ -Romans), the _denationalised,_ who know not what they are. - -_(d)_ Those who are tired of themselves--who are happy to be party to a -subterranean conspiracy. - - -154. - -_Buddha_ versus _Christ._--Among the Nihilistic religions, Christianity -and _Buddhism_ may always be sharply distinguished. _Buddhism_ is the -expression of a _fine evening,_ perfectly sweet and mild--it is a sort -of gratitude towards all that lies hidden, including that which it -entirely lacks, viz., bitterness, disillusionment, and resentment. -Finally it possesses lofty intellectual love; it has got over all -the subtlety of philosophical contradictions, and is even resting -after it, though it is precisely from that source that it derives its -intellectual glory and its glow as of a sunset (it originated in the -higher classes). - -_Christianity_ is a degenerative movement, consisting of all kinds -of decaying and excremental elements: it is _not_ the expression of -the downfall of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration of all -the morbid elements which are mutually attractive and which gravitate -to one another.... It is therefore _not_ a national religion, _not_ -determined by race: it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; it -consists of a foundation of resentment against all that is successful -and dominant: it is in need of a symbol which represents the damnation -of everything successful and dominant. It is opposed to every form of -_intellectual_ movement, to all philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for -idiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect. Resentment against those -who are gifted, learned, intellectually independent: in all these it -suspects the element of success and domination. - - -155. - -In Buddhism this thought prevails: "All passions, everything which -creates emotions and leads to blood, is a call to action"--to this -extent alone are its believers _warned_ against evil. For action has -no sense, it merely binds one to existence. All existence, however, has -no sense. Evil is interpreted as that which leads to irrationalism: -to the affirmation of means whose end is denied. A road to nonentity -is the desideratum, _hence all_ emotional impulses are regarded with -horror. For instance: "On no account seek after revenge! Be the enemy -of no one!"--The Hedonism of the weary finds its highest expression -here. Nothing is more utterly foreign to Buddhism than the Jewish -fanaticism of St. Paul: nothing could be more contrary to its instinct -than the tension, fire, and unrest of the religious man, and, above -all, that form of sensuality which sanctifies Christianity with the -name "Love." Moreover, it is the cultured and very intellectual classes -who find blessedness in Buddhism: a race wearied and besotted by -centuries of philosophical quarrels, but not _beneath all culture_ as -those classes were from which Christianity sprang.... In the Buddhistic -ideal, there is essentially an emancipation from good and evil: a -very subtle suggestion of a Beyond to all morality is thought out -in its teaching, and this Beyond is supposed to be compatible with -perfection,--the condition being, that even good actions are only -needed _pro tem.,_ merely as a means,--that is to say, in order to be -free from _all_ action. - - -156. - -_How very curious_ it is to see a _Nihilistic_ religion such as -Christianity, sprung from, and in keeping with, a decrepit and worn-out -people, who have outlived all strong instincts, being transferred step -by step to another environment--that is to say, to a land of young -people, _who have not yet lived at all._ The joy of the final chapter, -of the fold and of the evening, preached to barbarians and Germans! -How thoroughly all of it must first have been barbarised, Germanised! -To those who had dreamed of a _Walhalla_: who found happiness only in -war!--A _super_national religion preached in the midst of chaos, where -_no nations yet existed even._ - - -157. - -The only way to refute priests and religions is this: to show that -their errors are no longer _beneficent_--that they are rather harmful; -in short, that their own "proof of power" no longer holds good.... - - - -2. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY. - - - -158. - -Christianity as an _historical reality_ should not be confounded with -that one root which its name recalls. The _other_ roots, from which it -has sprung, are by far the more important. It is an unprecedented abuse -of names to identify such manifestations of decay and such abortions as -the "Christian Church," "Christian belief," and "Christian life," with -that Holy Name. What did Christ _deny_?--Everything which to-day is -called Christian. - - -159. - -The whole of the Christian _creed_--all Christian "truth," is idle -falsehood and deception, and is precisely the reverse of that which was -at the bottom of the first Christian movement. - -All that which in the _ecclesiastical_ sense is Christian, is just -exactly what is most radically _anti-Christian_: crowds of things and -people appear instead of symbols, history takes the place of eternal -facts, it is all forms, rites, and dogmas instead of a "practice" of -life. To be really Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent to -dogmas, cults, priests, church, and theology. - -The practice of Christianity is no more an impossible phantasy than the -practice of Buddhism is: it is merely a means to happiness. - - -160. - -Jesus goes straight to the point, the "Kingdom of Heaven" in the heart, -and He does _not_ find the means in duty to the Jewish Church; He -even regards the reality of Judaism (its need to maintain itself) as -nothing; He is concerned purely with the _inner_ man. - -Neither does He make anything of all the coarse forms relating to man's -intercourse with God: He is opposed to the whole of the teaching of -repentance and atonement; He points out how man ought to live in order -to feel himself "deified," and how futile it is on his part to hope to -live properly by showing repentance and contrition for his sins. "Sin -is of no account" is practically his chief standpoint. - -Sin, repentance, forgiveness,--all this does not belong to Christianity -... it is Judaism or Paganism which has become mixed up with Christ's -teaching. - - -161. - -The _Kingdom of Heaven_ is a state of the heart (of children it is -written, "for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven"): it has nothing to -do with superterrestrial things. The Kingdom of God "cometh," not -chronologically or historically, not on a certain day in the calendar; -it is not something which one day appears and was not previously there; -it is a "change of feeling in the individual," it is something which -may come at any time and which may be absent at any time.... - - -162. - -_The thief on the cross_;--When the criminal himself, who endures a -painful death, declares: "the way this Jesus suffers and dies, without -a murmur of revolt or enmity, graciously and resignedly, is the only -right way," he assents to the gospel; and by this very fact _he is in -Paradise...._ - - -163. - -Jesus bids us:--not to resist, either by deeds or in our heart, him who -ill-treats us; - -He bids us admit of no grounds for separating ourselves from our wives; - -He bids us make no distinction between foreigners and -fellow-countrymen, strangers and familiars; - -He bids us show anger to no one, and treat no one with contempt;--give -alms secretly; not to desire to become rich;--not to swear;--not to -stand in judgment;--become reconciled with our enemies and forgive -offences;--not to worship in public. - -"Blessedness" is nothing promised: it is here, with us, if we only wish -to live and act in a particular way. - - -164. - -_Subsequent Additions_;--The whole of the prophet- and -thaumaturgist-attitudes and the bad temper; while the conjuring-up of a -supreme tribunal of justice is an abominable corruption (see Mark vi. -11: "And whosoever shall not receive you.... Verily I say unto you, It -shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha," etc.). The "fig tree" -(Matt. xxi. 18, 19): "Now in the morning as he returned into the city, -he hungered. And when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came to it, and -found nothing thereon, but leaves only, and said unto it, Let no fruit -grow on thee henceforward for ever. And presently the fig tree withered -away." - - -165. - -The teaching of rewards and punishments has become mixed up with -Christianity in a way which is quite absurd; everything is thereby -spoilt. In the same way, the practice of the first _ecclesia -militans,_ of the Apostle Paul and his attitude, is put forward as if -it had been _commanded_ or predetermined. - -The subsequent glorification of the actual _life_ and _teaching_ of the -first Christians: as if everything had been _prescribed beforehand_ and -had been only a matter of _following_ directions----And as for the -_fulfilment of scriptural prophecies_: how much of all that is more -than forgery and cooking? - - -166. - -Jesus opposed a real life, a life in truth, to ordinary life: nothing -could have been more foreign to His mind than the somewhat heavy -nonsense of an "eternal Peter,"--of the eternal duration of a single -person. Precisely what He combats is the exaggerated importance of the -"person": how can He wish to immortalise it? - -He likewise combats the hierarchy within the community; He never -promises a certain proportion of reward for a certain proportion of -deserts: how can He have meant to teach the doctrine of punishment and -reward in a Beyond? - - -167. - -Christianity is an ingenuous attempt at bringing about a _Buddhistic -movement in favour of peace,_ sprung from the very heart of the -resenting masses ... but transformed by _Paul_ into a mysterious -pagan cult, which was ultimately able to accord with the whole of -_State organisation_ ... and which carries on war, condemns, tortures, -conjures, and hates. - -Paul bases his teaching upon the need of mystery felt by the great -masses capable of religious emotions: he seeks a _victim,_ a bloody -phantasmagoria, which may be equal to a contest with the images of -a secret cult: God on the cross, the drinking of blood, the _unio -mystica_ with the "victim." - -He seeks the prolongation of life after death (the blessed and atoned -after-life of the individual soul) which he puts in causal relation -with the _victim_ already referred to (according to the type of -Dionysos, Mithras, Osiris). - -He feels the necessity of bringing notions of _guilt_ and _sin_ -into the foreground, _not_ a new practice of life (as Jesus Himself -demonstrated and taught), but a new cult, a new belief, a belief in a -miraculous metamorphosis ("Salvation" through belief). - -He understood the _great needs of the pagan worlds_ and he gave quite -an absolutely arbitrary picture of those two plain facts, Christ's life -and death. He gave the whole a new accent, altering the equilibrium -everywhere ... he was one of the most active destroyers of primitive -Christianity. - -The attempt made on the life of _priests and theologians_ culminated, -thanks to Paul, in a new priesthood and theology--a _ruling_ caste and -a _Church._ - -The attempt made to suppress the fussy importance of the "person," -culminated in the belief in the eternal "personality" (and in the -anxiety concerning "eternal salvation" ...), and in the most -paradoxical exaggeration of individual egoism. - -This is the humorous side of the question--tragic humour: Paul again -set up on a large scale precisely what Jesus had overthrown by His -life. At last, when the Church edifice was complete, it even sanctioned -the _existence_ of the _State._ - - -168. - -The Church is precisely that against which Jesus inveighed--and against -which He taught His disciples to fight. - - -169. - -A God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection -after death--all these things are the counterfeit coins of real -Christianity, for which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be held -responsible. - -The _life which must serve as an example_ consists in love and -humility; in the abundance of hearty emotion which does not even -exclude the lowliest; in the formal renunciation of all desire of -making its rights felt; in conquest, in the sense of triumph over -oneself; in the belief in salvation in this world, despite all sorrow, -opposition, and death; in forgiveness and the absence of anger and -contempt; in the absence of a desire to be rewarded; in the refusal -to be bound to anybody; abandonment to all that is most spiritual and -intellectual;--in fact, a very proud life controlled by the will of a -servile and poor life. - -Once the Church had allowed itself to take over _all the Christian -practice,_ and had formally sanctioned the State,--that kind of life -which Jesus combats and condemns,--it was obliged to lay the sense -of Christianity in other things than early Christian ideals--that is -to say, in the _faith_ in incredible things, in the ceremonial of -prayers, worship, feasts, etc. etc. The notions "sin," "forgiveness," -"punishment," "reward"--everything, in fact, which had nothing in -common with, and was quite _absent_ from, primitive Christianity, now -comes into the foreground. - -An appalling stew of Greek philosophy and Judaism; asceticism; -continual judgments and condemnations; the order of rank, etc. - - -170. - -Christianity has, from the first, always transformed the symbolical -into crude realities: - -(1) The antitheses "true life" and "false life" were misunderstood and -changed into "life here" and "life beyond." - -(2) The notion "eternal life," as opposed to the personal life which is -ephemeral, is translated into "personal immortality"; - -(3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing the same food and -drink, after the Hebrew-Arabian manner, is interpreted as the "miracle -of transubstantiation." - -(4) "Resurrection" which was intended to mean the entrance to the -"true life," in the sense of being intellectually "born again," becomes -an historical contingency, supposed to take place at some moment after -death; - -(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the "Son of God,"--that is to -say, the life-relationship between man and God,--becomes the "second -person of the Trinity," and thus the filial relationship of every -man--even the lowest--to God, is _done away with_; - -(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there is no other way -to this filial relationship to God, save through the _practice of life_ -taught by Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that there is a -miraculous way of _atoning_ for all _sin_; though not through our own -endeavours, but by means of Christ: - -For all these purposes, "Christ on the Cross" had to be interpreted -afresh. The _death_ itself would certainly not be the principal feature -of the event ... it was only another sign pointing to the way in -which one should behave towards the authorities and the laws of the -world--_that one was not to defend oneself--this was the exemplary -life._ - - -171. - -Concerning the psychology of _Paul._--The important fact is Christ's -death. This remains to be _explained ..._. That there may be truth or -error in an explanation never entered these people's heads: one day a -sublime possibility strikes them, "His death _might_ mean so and so" ---and it forthwith _becomes_ so and so. An hypothesis is proved by the -sublime _ardour_ it lends to its discoverer.... - -"The proof of strength": _i.e.,_ a thought is demonstrated by its -_effects_ ("by their fruits," as the Bible ingenuously says); that -which fires enthusiasm must be _true,_--what one loses one's blood for -must be _true--_ - -In every department of this world of thought, the sudden feeling of -power which an idea imparts to him who is responsible for it, is -placed to the _credit_ of that idea:--and as there seems no other way -of honouring an idea than by calling it true, the first epithet it is -honoured with is the word _true._ ... How could it have any effect -otherwise? It was imagined by some power: if that power were not -real, it could not be the cause of anything.... The thought is then -understood as _inspired_: the effect it causes has something of the -violent nature of a demoniacal influence-- - -A thought which a decadent like Paul could not resist and to which he -completely yields, is thus "proved" _true_!!! - -All these holy epileptics and visionaries did not possess a thousandth -part of the honesty in self-criticism with which a philologist, -nowadays, reads a text, or tests the truth of an historical event.... -Beside us, such people were moral cretins. - - -172. - -It matters little _whether a thing be true,_ provided it be -_effective_: total _absence of intellectual uprightness._ Everything -is good, whether it be lying, slander, or shameless "cooking," provided -it serve to heighten the degree of heat to the point at which people -"believe." - -We are face to face with an actual school for the teaching of _the -means wherewith_ men are _seduced_ to a belief: we see systematic -_contempt_ for those spheres whence contradiction might come (that -is to say, for reason, philosophy, wisdom, doubt, and caution); a -shameless praising and glorification of the teaching, with continual -references to the fact that it was God who presented us with it--that -the apostle signifies nothing--that no criticism is brooked, but -only faith, acceptance; that it is the greatest blessing and favour -to receive such a doctrine of salvation; that the state in which one -should receive it, ought to be one of the profoundest thankfulness and -humility.... - -The resentment which the lowly feel against all those in high places, -is continually turned to account: the fact that this teaching is -revealed to them as the reverse of the wisdom of the world, against -the power of the world, seduces them to it. This teaching convinces -the outcasts and the botched of all sorts and conditions; it promises -blessedness, advantages, and privileges to the most insignificant and -most humble men; it fanaticises the poor, the small, and the foolish, -and fills them with insane vanity, as though _they_ were the meaning -and salt of the earth. - -Again, I say, all this cannot be sufficiently contemned, we spare -ourselves a criticism of the teaching; it is sufficient to take -note of the means it uses in order to be aware of the nature of the -phenomenon one is examining. It identified itself with _virtue,_ -it appropriated the whole of the _fascinating power of virtue,_ -shamelessly, for its own purposes ... it availed itself of the power of -paradox, and of the need, manifested by old civilisation, for pepper -and absurdity; it amazed and revolted at the same time; it provoked -persecutions and ill-treatment. - -It is the same kind of _well-thought-out meanness_ with which the -Jewish priesthood established their power and built up their Church.... - -One must be able to discern: (1) that warmth of passion "love" (resting -on a base of ardent sensuality); (2) the thoroughly _ignoble character_ -of Christianity:--the continual exaggeration and verbosity;--the lack -of cool intellectuality and irony;--the unmilitary character of all its -instincts;--the priestly prejudices against manly pride, sensuality, -the sciences, the arts. - - -173. - -_Paul_: seeks power _against_ ruling Judaism,--his attempt is too -weak.... Transvaluation of the notion "Jew": the "race" is put aside: -but that means denying the very basis of the whole structure. The -"martyr," the "fanatic," the value of all _strong_ belief. Christianity -is the _form of decay_ of the old world, after the latter's collapse, -and it is characterised by the fact that it brings all the most sickly -and unhealthy elements and needs to the top. - -_Consequently other_ instincts had to step into the foreground, in -order to _constitute_ an entity, a power able to stand alone--in short, -a condition of tense sorrow was necessary, like that out of which the -Jews had derived their _instinct of self-preservation...._ - -The persecution of Christians was invaluable for this purpose. - -Unity in the face of danger; the conversion of the masses becomes the -only means of putting an end to the persecution of the individual. (The -notion "conversion" is therefore made as elastic as possible.) - - -174. - -The _Christian Judaic_ life: here resentment did not prevail. The -great persecutions alone could have driven out the passions to that -extent--as also the _ardour of love_ and _hate._ - -When the creatures a man most loves are sacrificed before his eyes for -the sake of his faith, that man becomes _aggressive_; the triumph of -Christianity is due to its persecutors. - -_Asceticism_ is not specifically Christian: this is what Schopenhauer -misunderstood. It only shoots up in Christianity, wherever it would -have existed without that religion. - -Melancholy Christianity, the torture and torment of the conscience, -also only a peculiarity of a particular soil, where Christian values -have taken root: it is not Christianity properly speaking. Christianity -has absorbed all the different kinds of diseases which grow from morbid -soil: one could refute it at one blow by showing that it did not know -how to resist any contagion. But _that_ precisely is the essential -feature of it. Christianity is a type of decadence. - - -175. - -The reality on which Christianity was able to build up its power -consisted of the small dispersed _Jewish families,_ with their warmth, -tenderness, and peculiar readiness to help, which, to the whole of the -Roman Empire, was perhaps the most incomprehensible and least familiar -of their characteristics; they were also united by their pride at -being a "chosen people," concealed beneath a cloak of humility, and by -their secret denial of all that was uppermost and that possessed power -and splendour, although there was no shade of envy in their denial. -_To have recognised this as a power,_ to have regarded this _blessed_ -state as communicable, seductive, and infectious even where pagans -were concerned--this constituted Paul's genius: to use up the treasure -of latent energy and cautious happiness for the purposes of "a Jewish -Church of free confession," and to avail himself of all the Jewish -experience, their propaganda, and their expertness in _the preservation -of a community_ under a foreign power--this is what he conceived to -be his duty. He it was who discovered that absolutely unpolitical and -isolated body of _paltry people,_ and their art of asserting themselves -and pushing themselves to the front, by means of a host of acquired -virtues which are made to represent the only forms of virtue ("the -self-preservative measure and weapon of success of a certain class of -man"). - -The principle of _love_ comes from the small community of Jewish -people: a _very passionate_ soul glows here, beneath the ashes of -humility and wretchedness: it is neither Greek, Indian, nor German. The -song in praise of love which Paul wrote is not Christian; it is the -Jewish flare of that eternal flame which is Semitic. If Christianity -has done anything essentially new in a psychological sense, it is this, -that it has _increased the temperature of the soul_ among those cooler -and more noble races who were at one time at the head of affairs; -it discovered that the most wretched life could be made rich and -invaluable, by means of an elevation of the temperature of the soul.... - -It is easily understood that a transfer of this sort could _not_ -take place among the ruling classes: the Jews and Christians were at -a disadvantage owing to their bad manners--spiritual strength and -passion, when accompanied by bad manners, only provoke loathing (I -become aware of these bad manners while reading the New Testament). It -was necessary to be related both in baseness and sorrow with this type -of lower manhood in order to feel anything attractive in him.... The -attitude a man maintains towards the New Testament is a test of the -amount of taste he may have for the classics (see Tacitus); he who is -not revolted by it, he who does not feel honestly and deeply that he is -in the presence of a sort of _fœda superstitio_ when reading it, and -who does not draw his hand back so as not to soil his fingers--such a -man does not know what is classical. A man must feel about "the cross" -as Goethe did.[1] - - -[Footnote 1: - -Vieles kann ich ertragen. Die meisten beschwerlichen Dinge -Duld' ich mit ruhigem Mut, wie es ein Gott mir gebeut. -Wenige sind mir jedoch wie Gift und Schlange zuwider; -Viere: Rauch des Tabaks, Wanzen, und Knoblauch und -Goethe's _Venetian Epigrams,_ No. 67. - -Much can I bear. Things the most irksome -I endure with such patience as comes from a god. -Four things, however, repulse me like venom:--Tobacco -smoke, garlic, bugs, and the cross. - -(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.) -] - - -176. - -_The reaction of paltry people_:--Love provides the feeling of highest -power. It should be understood to what extent, not man in general, but -only a certain kind of man is speaking here. - -"We are godly in love, we shall be 'the children of God'; God loves us -and wants nothing from us save love"; that is to say: all morality, -obedience, and action, do not produce the same feeling of power and -freedom as love does;--a man does nothing wicked from sheer love, but -he does much more than if he were prompted by obedience and virtue -alone. - -Here is the happiness of the herd, the communal feeling in big things -as in small, the living sentiment of unity felt as the _sum of the -feeling of life._ Helping, caring for, and being useful, constantly -kindle the feeling of power; visible success, the expression of -pleasure, emphasise the feeling of power; pride is not lacking either, -it is felt in the form of the community, the House of God, and the -"chosen people." - -As a matter of fact, man has once more experienced an "_altération" of -his personality_: this time he called his feeling of love--God. The -awakening of such a feeling must be pictured; it is a sort of ecstasy, -a strange language, a "Gospel"--it was this newness which did not -allow man to attribute love to himself--he thought it was God leading -him on and taking shape in his heart. "God descends among men," one's -neighbour is transfigured and becomes a God (in so far as he provokes -the sentiment of love), _Jesus is the neighbour,_ the moment He is -transfigured in thought into a God, and into a cause _provoking the -feeling of power._ - - -177. - -Believers are aware that they owe an infinite amount to Christianity, -and therefore conclude that its Founder must have been a man of the -first rank.... This conclusion is false, but it is typical of the -reverents. Regarded objectively, it is, _in the first place,_ just -possible that they are mistaken concerning the extent of their debt to -Christianity: a man's convictions prove nothing concerning the thing -he is convinced about, and in religions they are more likely to give -rise to suspicions.... Secondly, it is possible that the debt owing -to Christianity is not due to its Founder at all, but to the whole -structure, the whole thing--to the Church, etc. The notion "Founder" -is so very equivocal, that it may stand even for the accidental -cause of a movement: the person of the Founder has been inflated in -proportion as the Church has grown: but even this process of veneration -allows of the conclusion that, at one time or other, this Founder was -something exceedingly insecure and doubtful--in the beginning.... Let -any one think of the _free and easy way_ in which Paul treats the -problem of the personality of Jesus, how he almost juggles with it: -some one who died, who was seen after His death,--some one whom the -Jews delivered up to death--all this was only the theme--_Paul_ wrote -the music to it. - - -178. - -The founder of a religion _may_ be quite insignificant--a wax vesta and -no _more_! - - -179. - -_Concerning the psychological problem of Christianity.--The driving -forces are_: resentment, popular insurrection, the revolt of the -bungled and the botched. (In Buddhism it is different: it is not _born_ -of _resentment._ It rather combats resentment because the latter leads -to _action_!) - -This party, which stands for freedom, understands that the _abandonment -of antagonism in thought and deed_ is a condition of distinction and -preservation. Here lies the psychological difficulty which has stood in -the way of Christianity being understood: the force which created it, -urges to a struggle against itself. - -Only as a party standing _for peace_ and _innocence_ can this -insurrectionary movement hope to be successful: it must conquer by -means of excessive mildness, sweetness, softness, and its instincts -are aware of this. The _feat_ was to deny and condemn the force, of -which man is the expression, and to press the reverse of that force -continually to the fore, by word and deed. - - -180. - -_The pretence of youthfulness._--It is a mistake to imagine that, -with Christianity, an ingenuous and youthful people rose against an -old culture; the story goes that it was out of the lowest levels of -society, where Christianity flourished and shot its roots, that the -more profound source of life gushed forth afresh: but nothing can -be understood of the psychology of Christianity, if it be supposed -that it was the expression of revived youth among a people, or of -the resuscitated strength of a race. It is rather a typical form -of decadence, of moral-softening and of hysteria, amid a general -hotch-potch of races and people that had lost all aims and had grown -weary and sick. The wonderful company which gathered round this -master-seducer of the populace, would not be at all out of place in a -Russian novel: all the diseases of the nerves seem to give one another -a rendezvous in this crowd--the absence of a known duty, the feeling -that everything is nearing its end, that nothing is any longer worth -while, and that contentment lies in _dolce far niente_. - -The power and certainty of the future in the Jew's instinct, its -monstrous will for life and for power, lies in its ruling classes; the -people who upheld primitive Christianity are best distinguished by this -_exhausted condition_ of their instincts. On the one hand, they are -sick of everything; on the other, they are content with each other, -with themselves and for themselves. - - -181. - -Christianity regarded as _emancipated Judaism_ (just as a nobility -which is both racial and indigenous ultimately emancipates itself from -these conditions, and _goes in search of_ kindred elements....). - -(1) As a Church (community) on the territory of the State, as an -unpolitical institution. - -(2) As life, breeding, practice, art of living. - -(3) As a _religion of sin_ (sin committed against _God, being the -only recognised kind,_ and the only cause of all suffering), with a -universal cure for it. There is no sin save against God; what is done -against men, man shall not sit in judgment upon, nor call to account, -except in the name of God. At the same time, all commandments (love): -everything is associated with God, and all acts are performed according -to God's will. Beneath this arrangement there lies exceptional -intelligence (a very narrow life, such as that led by the Esquimaux, -can only be endured by most peaceful and indulgent people: the -Judæo-Christian dogma turns against sin in favour of the "sinner"). - - -182. - -The Jewish priesthood understood how to present everything it claimed -to be right as a _divine precept,_ as an act of obedience to God, and -also to introduce all those things which conduced to _preserve Israel_ -and were the _conditions_ of its existence (for instance: the large -number of "_works_": circumcision and the cult of sacrifices, as the -very pivot of the national conscience), not as Nature, but as God. - -_This process continued; within the very heart_ of Judaism, where the -need of these "works" was not felt (that is to say, as a means of -keeping a race distinct), a priestly sort of man was pictured, whose -bearing towards the aristocracy was like that of "noble nature"; a -sacerdotalism of the soul, which now, in order to throw its opposite -into strong relief, attaches value, not to the "dutiful acts" -themselves, but to the sentiment.... - -At bottom, the problem was once again, how to make a certain kind of -soul _prevail_: it was also _a popular insurrection in the midst of -a priestly people_--a pietistic movement coming from below (sinners, -publicans, women, and children). Jesus of Nazareth was the symbol of -their sect. And again, in order to believe in themselves, they were in -need of a _theological transfiguration_: they require nothing less than -"the Son of God" in order to create a belief for themselves. And just -as the priesthood had falsified the whole history of Israel, another -attempt was made, here, to _alter and falsify_ the whole history of -mankind in such a way as to make Christianity seem like the most -important event it contained. This movement could have originated only -upon the soil of Judaism, the main feature of which was the confounding -of _guilt with sorrow_ and the reduction of all _sin_ to _sin against -God._ Of all this, Christianity is the _second degree of power._ - - -183. - -The symbolism of Christianity is based upon that of _Judaism,_ which -had already transfigured all reality (history, Nature) into a holy and -artificial unreality--which refused to recognise real history, and -which showed no more interest in a natural course of things. - - -184. - -The Jews made the attempt to prevail, after two of their castes--the -warrior and the agricultural castes, had disappeared from their midst. - -In this sense they are the "castrated people": they have their priests -and then--their Chandala.... - -How easily a disturbance occurs among them--an insurrection of their -Chandala. This was the origin of _Christianity._ - -Owing to the fact that they had no knowledge of warriors except as -their masters, they introduced enmity towards the nobles, the men -of honour, pride, and power, and the _ruling_ classes, into their -religion: they are pessimists from _indignation...._ - -Thus they created a very important and novel position: the priests in -the van of the Chandala--against the _noble classes...._ - -Christianity was the logical conclusion of this movement: even in the -Jewish priesthood, it still scented the existence of the caste, of the -privileged and noble minority--_it therefore did away with priests._ - -Christ is the unit of the Chandala who removes the priest ... the -Chandala who redeems himself.... - -That is why the _French_ Revolution is the lineal descendant and the -continuator of _Christianity--_ it is characterised by an instinct of -hate towards castes, nobles, and the last privileges. - - -185. - -The "_Christian Ideal_" put on the stage with Jewish astuteness--these -are the fundamental _psychological forces_ of its "nature":-- - -Revolt against the ruling spiritual powers; - -The attempt to make those virtues which facilitate the _happiness of -the lowly,_ a standard of all values--in fact, to call _God_ that which -is no more than the self-preservative instinct of that class of man -possessed of least vitality; - -Obedience and absolute _abstention_ from war and resistance, justified -by this ideal; - -The love of one another as a result of the love of God. - -_The trick_: The _denial_ of all _natural mobilia,_ and their -transference to the spiritual world beyond ... the exploitation of -_virtue_ and its _veneration_ for wholly interested motives, gradual -_denial_ of virtue in everything that is not Christian. - - -186. - -The _profound contempt_ with which the Christian was treated by -the noble people of antiquity, is of the same order as the present -instinctive aversion to Jews: it is the hatred which free and -self-respecting classes feel towards those _who wish to creep -in secretly,_ and who combine an awkward bearing with foolish -self-sufficiency. - -The New Testament is the gospel of a completely _ignoble_ species of -man; its pretensions to highest values--_yea, to all_ values, is, as a -matter of fact, revolting--even nowadays. - - -187. - -How little the subject matters! It is the spirit which gives the thing -life! What a quantity of stuffy and sick-room air there is in all that -chatter about "redemption," "love," "blessedness," "faith," "truth," -"eternal life"! Let any one look into a really pagan book and compare -the two; for instance, in Petronius, nothing at all is done, said, -desired, and valued, which, according to a bigoted Christian estimate, -is not sin, or even deadly sin. And yet how happy one feels with the -purer air, the superior intellectuality, the quicker pace, and the -free overflowing strength which is certain of the future! In the whole -of the New Testament there is not one _bouffonnerie_: but that fact -alone would suffice to refute any book.... - - -188. - -The _profound lack of dignity_ with which all life, which is not -Christian, is condemned: it does not suffice them to think meanly of -their actual opponents, they cannot do with less than a general slander -of everything that is not _themselves...._ An abject and crafty soul is -in the most perfect harmony with the arrogance of piety, as witness the -early Christians. - -The _future_: they see that _they are heavily paid for it.... Theirs is -the muddiest kind of spirit that exists._ The whole of Christ's life is -so arranged as to confirm the prophecies of the Scriptures: He behaves -in such wise _in order that_ they may be right.... - - -189. - -The deceptive interpretation of the words, the doings, and the -condition of _dying people_; the natural fear of death, for instance, -is systematically confounded with the supposed fear of what is to -happen "after death." ... - - -190. - -The _Christians_ have done exactly what the Jews did before them. -They introduced what they conceived to be an innovation and a thing -necessary to self-preservation into their Master's teaching, and wove -His life into it They likewise credited Him with all the wisdom of a -maker of proverbs--_in short,_ they represented their everyday life and -activity as an act of obedience, and thus sanctified their propaganda. - -What it all depends upon, may be gathered from Paul: it is _not much._ -What remains is the development of a type of saint, out of the values -which these people regarded as saintly. - -The whole of the "doctrine of miracles," including the resurrection, is -the result of self-glorification on the part of the community, which -ascribed to its Master those qualities it ascribed to itself, but in a -higher degree (or, better still, it derived its strength from Him....) - - -191. - -The Christians have never led the life which Jesus commanded them to -lead, and the impudent fable of the "justification by faith," and its -unique and transcendental significance, is only the result of the -Church's lack of courage and will in acknowledging those "_works_" -which Jesus commanded. - -The Buddhist behaves differently from the non-Buddhist; but _the -Christian behaves as all the rest of the world does,_ and possesses a -Christianity of ceremonies and _states of the soul._ - -The profound and contemptible falsehood of Christianity in Europe makes -us deserve the contempt of the Arabs, Hindoos, and Chinese.... - -Let any one listen to the words of the first German statesman, -concerning that which has preoccupied Europe for the last forty years. - - -192. - -"_Faith_" or "_works_"?--But that the "works," the habit of particular -works may engender a certain _set of values or thoughts,_ is just as -natural as it would be unnatural for "works" to proceed from mere -valuations. Man must practise, _not_ how to strengthen feelings of -value, but how to strengthen action: first of all, one must be able -_to do something...._ Luther's Christian Dilettantism. Faith is an -asses' bridge. The background consists of a profound conviction on -the part of Luther and his peers, that they are enabled to accomplish -Christian "works," a personal fact, disguised under an extreme doubt -as to whether _all_ action is not sin and devil's work, so that the -worth of life depends upon isolated and highly-strained conditions of -_inactivity_ (prayer, effusion, etc.).--Ultimately, Luther would be -right: the instincts which are expressed by the whole bearing of the -reformers are the most brutal that exist. Only in _turning absolutely -away_ from themselves, and in becoming absorbed in the _opposite_ of -themselves, only by means of an _illusion_ ("faith") was existence -endurable to them. - - -193. - -"What was to be done in order to believe?"--an absurd question. That -which is wrong with Christianity is, that it does none of the things -that Christ _commanded._ - -It is a mean life, but _seen_ through the eye of contempt. - - -194. - -The entrance into the _real_ life--_a man saves his own life by living -the life of the multitude._ - - -195. - -Christianity has become something fundamentally different from what -its Founder wished it to be. It is the great _anti-pagan movement_ of -antiquity, formulated with the use of the life, teaching, and "words" -of the Founder of Christianity, but interpreted quite _arbitrarily,_ -according to a scheme embodying _profoundly different needs_: -translated into the language of all the _subterranean religions_ then -existing. - -It is the rise of Pessimism (whereas Jesus wished to bring the peace -and the happiness of the lambs): and moreover the Pessimism of the -weak, of the inferior, of the suffering, and of the oppressed. - -Its mortal enemies are (1) _Power,_ whether in the form of character, -intellect, or taste, and "worldliness"; (2) the "good cheer" of -classical times, the noble levity and scepticism, hard pride, eccentric -dissipation, and cold frugality of the sage, Greek refinement in -manners, words, and form. Its mortal enemy is as much the _Roman_ as -the _Greek._ - -The attempt on the part of _anti-paganism_ to establish itself on -a philosophical basis, and to make its tenets possible: it shows a -taste for the ambiguous figures of antique culture, and above all for -Plato, who was, more than any other, an anti-Hellene and Semite in -instinct.... It also shows a taste for Stoicism, which is essentially -the work of Semites ("dignity" is regarded as severity, law; virtue -is held to be greatness, self-responsibility, authority, greatest -sovereignty over oneself--this is Semitic.) The Stoic is an Arabian -sheik wrapped in Greek togas and notions. - - -196. - -Christianity only resumes the fight which had already been begun -against the _classical_ ideal and _noble_ religion. - -As a matter of fact, the whole process of _transformation_ is only -an adaptation to the needs and to the level of intelligence of -_religious_ masses then existing:--those masses which believed in -Isis, Mithras, Dionysos, and the "great mother," and which demanded -the following things of a religion: (1) hopes of a beyond, (2) the -bloody phantasmagoria of animal sacrifice (the mystery), (3) holy -legend and the redeeming _deed,_ (4) asceticism, denial of the -world, superstitious "purification," (5) a hierarchy as a part of -the community. In short, Christianity everywhere fitted the already -prevailing and increasing _anti-pagan tendency_--those cults which -Epicurus combated,--or more exactly, those _religions proper to the -lower herd, women, slaves, and ignoble classes._ - -The misunderstandings are therefore the following:-- - -(1) The immortality of the individual; - -(2) The assumed existence of _another_ world; - -(3) The absurd notion of punishment and expiation in the heart of the -interpretation of existence; - -(4) The profanation of the divine nature of man, instead of its -accentuation, and the construction of a very profound chasm, which -can only be crossed by the help of a miracle or by means of the most -thorough self-contempt; - -(5) The whole world of corrupted imagination and morbid passion, -instead of a simple and loving life of action, instead of Buddhistic -happiness attainable on earth; - -(6) An ecclesiastical order with a priesthood, theology, cults, and -sacraments; in short, everything that Jesus of Nazareth _combated_; - -(7) The _miraculous_ in everything and everybody, superstition too: -while precisely the trait which distinguished Judaism and primitive -Christianity was their _repugnance to_ miracles and their relative -_rationalism._ - - -197. - -_The psychological pre-requisites:--Ignorance_ and _lack of -culture,_--the sort of ignorance which has unlearned every kind of -shame: let any one imagine those impudent saints in the heart of -Athens; - -The _Jewish instinct of a chosen people_: they appropriate _all the -virtues,_ without further ado, as their own, and regard the rest of -the world as their opposite; this is a profound sign of _spiritual -depravity_; - -_The total lack of real aims_ and real _duties,_ for which other -virtues are required than those of the bigot--_the State undertook -this work for them_: and the impudent people still behaved as though -they had no need of the State. "Except ye become as little children" ---oh, how far we are from this psychological ingenuousness! - - -198. - -The Founder of Christianity had to pay dearly for having directed His -teaching at the lowest classes of Jewish society and intelligence. They -understood Him only according to the limitations of their own spirit. -... It was a disgrace to concoct a history of salvation, a personal -God, a personal Saviour, a personal immortality, and to have retained -all the meanness of the "person," and of the "history" of a doctrine -which denies the reality of all that is personal and historical. - -The legend of salvation takes the place of the symbolic "now" and "all -time," of the symbolic "here" and "everywhere"; and miracles appear -instead of the psychological symbol. - - -199. - -Nothing is less innocent than the New Testament. The soil from which it -sprang is known. - -These people, possessed of an inflexible will to assert themselves, and -who, once they had lost all natural hold on life, and had long existed -without any right to existence, still knew how to prevail by means of -hypotheses which were as unnatural as they were imaginary (calling -themselves the chosen people, the community of saints, the people of -the promised land, and the "Church"): these people made use of their -_pia fraus_ with such skill, and with such "clean consciences," that -one cannot be too cautious when they preach morality. When Jews step -forward as the personification of innocence, the danger must be great. -While reading the New Testament a man should have his small fund of -intelligence, mistrust, and wickedness constantly at hand. - -People of the lowest origin, partly mob, outcasts not only from good -society, but also from respectable society; grown away from the -_atmosphere_ of culture, and free from discipline; ignorant, without -even a suspicion of the fact that conscience can also rule in spiritual -matters; in a word--the Jews: an instinctively crafty people, able to -create an advantage, a means of _seduction_ out of every conceivable -hypothesis of superstition, even out of ignorance itself. - - -200. - -I regard Christianity as the most fatal and seductive lie that has ever -yet existed--as the greatest and most _impious lie_: I can discern the -last sprouts and branches of its ideal beneath every form of disguise, -I decline to enter into any compromise or false position in reference -to it--I urge people to declare open war with it. - -The _morality of paltry people_ as the measure of all things: this is -the most repugnant kind of degeneracy that civilisation has ever yet -brought into existence. And this _kind of ideal_ is hanging still, -under the name of "God," over men's heads!! - - -201. - -However modest one's demands may be concerning intellectual -cleanliness, when one touches the New Testament one cannot help -experiencing a sort of inexpressible feeling of discomfort; for the -unbounded cheek with which the least qualified people will have their -say in its pages, in regard to the greatest problems of existence, -and claim to sit in judgment on such matters, exceeds all limits. The -impudent levity with which the most unwieldy problems are spoken of -here (life, the world, God, the purpose of life), as if they were not -problems at all, but the most simple things which these little bigots -_know all about_!!! - - -202. - -This was the most fatal form of insanity that has ever yet existed on -earth:--when these little lying abortions of bigotry begin laying claim -to the words "God," "last judgment," "truth," "love," "wisdom," "Holy -Spirit," and thereby distinguishing themselves from the rest of the -world; when such men begin to transvalue values to suit themselves, as -though they were the sense, the salt, the standard, and the measure of -all things; then all that one should do is this: build lunatic asylums -for their incarceration. To _persecute_ them was an egregious act of -antique folly: this was taking them too seriously; it was making them -serious. - -The whole fatality was made possible by the fact that a similar form -of megalomania was already _in existence,_ the _Jewish_ form (once -the gulf separating the Jews from the Christian-Jews was bridged, the -Christian-Jews _were compelled_ to employ those self-preservative -measures afresh which were discovered by the Jewish instinct, for -their own self-preservation, after having accentuated them); and again -through the fact that Greek moral philosophy had done everything that -could be done to prepare the way for moral-fanaticism, even among -Greeks and Romans, and to render it palatable.... Plato, the great -importer of corruption, who was the first who refused to see Nature -in morality, and who had already deprived the Greek gods of all their -worth by his notion "_good_" was already tainted with _Jewish bigotry_ -(in Egypt?). - - -203. - -These small virtues of gregarious animals do not by any means lead -to "eternal life": to put them on the stage in such a way, and to -use them for one's own purpose is perhaps very smart; but to him who -keeps his eyes open, even here, it remains, in spite of all, the most -ludicrous performance. A man by no means deserves privileges, either on -earth or in heaven, because he happens to have attained to perfection -in the art of behaving like a good-natured little sheep; at best, he -only remains a dear, absurd little ram with horns--provided, of course, -he does not burst with vanity or excite indignation by assuming the -airs of a supreme judge. - -What a terrible glow of false colouring here floods the meanest -virtues--as though they were the reflection of divine qualities! - -The _natural_ purpose and utility of every virtue is systematically -_hushed up_; it can only be valuable in the light of a _divine_ command -or model, or in the light of the good which belongs to a beyond or a -spiritual world. (This is magnificent!--As if it were a question of the -_salvation of the soul_: but it was a means of making things bearable -here with as many beautiful sentiments as possible.) - - -204. - -The _law,_ which is the fundamentally realistic formula of certain -self-preservative measures of a community, forbids certain actions -that have a definite tendency to jeopardise the welfare of that -community: it does _not_ forbid the attitude of mind which gives rise -to these actions--for in the pursuit of other ends the community -requires these forbidden actions, namely, when it is a matter of -opposing its _enemies._ The moral idealist now steps forward and says: -"God sees into men's hearts: the action itself counts for nothing; -the reprehensible attitude of mind from which it proceeds must be -extirpated ..." In normal conditions men laugh at such things; it is -only in exceptional cases, when a community lives _quite_ beyond the -need of waging war in order to maintain itself, that an ear is lent to -such things. Any attitude of mind is abandoned, the utility of which -cannot be conceived. - -This was the case, for example, when Buddha appeared among a people -that was both peaceable and afflicted with great intellectual weariness. - -This was also the case in regard to the first Christian community (as -also the Jewish), the primary condition of which was the absolutely -_unpolitical_ Jewish society. Christianity could grow only upon the -soil of Judaism--that is to say, among a people that had already -renounced the political life, and which led a sort of parasitic -existence within the Roman sphere of government, Christianity goes a -step _farther_: it allows men to "emasculate" themselves even more; the -circumstances actually favour their doing so.--_Nature_ is _expelled_ -from morality when it is said, "Love ye your enemies": for _Nature's_ -injunction, "Ye shall _love_ your neighbour and _hate_ your enemy," -has now become senseless in the law (in instinct); now, even _the love -a man feels for his neighbour_ must first be based upon something (_a -sort of love of God_). _God_ is introduced everywhere, and _utility_ -is withdrawn; the natural _origin_ of morality is denied everywhere: -the _veneration of Nature,_ which lies in _acknowledging a natural -morality,_ is _destroyed_ to the roots.... - -Whence comes the _seductive charm_ of this emasculate ideal of man? Why -are we not _disgusted_ by it, just as we are disgusted at the thought -of a eunuch?... The answer is obvious: it is not the voice of the -eunuch that revolts us, despite the cruel mutilation of which it is the -result; for, as a matter of fact, it has grown sweeter.... And owing to -the very fact that the "male organ" has been amputated from virtue, its -voice now has a feminine ring, which, formerly, was not to be discerned. - -On the other hand, we have only to think of the terrible hardness, -dangers, and accidents to which a life of manly virtues leads--the -life of a Corsican, even at the present day, or that of a heathen Arab -(which resembles the Corsican's life even to the smallest detail: -the Arab's songs might have been written by Corsicans)--in order to -perceive how the most robust type of man was fascinated and moved by -the voluptuous ring of this "goodness" and "purity." ... A pastoral -melody ... an idyll ... the "good man": such things have most effect in -ages when tragedy is abroad. - -*** - -With this, we have realised to what extent the "idealist" (the ideal -eunuch) also proceeds from a definite reality and is not merely a -visionary.... He has perceived precisely that, for his kind of reality, -a brutal injunction of the sort which prohibits certain actions has no -sense (because the instinct which would urge him to these actions is -_weakened,_ thanks to a long need of practice, and of compulsion to -practise). The castrator formulates a host of new self-preservative -measures for a perfectly definite species of men: in this sense he is -a realist. The _means_ to which he has recourse for establishing his -legislation, are the same as those of ancient legislators: he appeals -to all authorities, to "God," and he exploits the notions "guilt and -punishment"--that is to say, he avails himself of the whole of the -older ideal, but interprets it differently; for instance: punishment is -given a place in the inner self (it is called the pang of conscience). - -In practice this kind of man _meets with his end_ the moment the -exceptional conditions favouring his existence cease to prevail--a sort -of insular happiness, like that of Tahiti, and of the little Jews in -the Roman provinces. Their only _natural_ foe is the soil from which -they spring: they must wage war against that, and once more give their -_offensive_ and _defensive_ passions rope in order to be equal to -it: their opponents are the adherents of the old ideal (this kind of -hostility is shown on a grand scale by Paul in relation to Judaism, and -by Luther in relation to the priestly ascetic ideal). The mildest form -of this antagonism is certainly that of the first Buddhists; perhaps -nothing has given rise to so much work, as the enfeeblement and -discouragement of the feeling of _antagonism._ The struggle against -resentment almost seems the Buddhist's first duty; thus only is his -_peace_ of soul secured. To isolate oneself without bitterness, this -presupposes the existence of a surprisingly mild and sweet order of -men,--saints.... - -*** - -The _Astuteness of moral castration._--How is war waged against -the virile passions and valuations? No violent physical means are -available; the war must therefore be one of ruses, spells, and lies--in -short, a "spiritual war." - -First recipe: One appropriates virtue in general, and makes it the main -feature of one's ideal; the older ideal is denied and declared to be -_the reverse of all ideals._ Slander has to be carried to a fine art -for this purpose. - -Second recipe: A type of man is set up as a general _standard_; and -this is projected into all things, behind all things, and behind the -destiny of all things--as God. - -Third recipe: The opponents of one's ideal are declared to be the -opponents of God; one arrogates to oneself a _right_ to great pathos, -to power, and a right to curse and to bless. - -Fourth recipe: All suffering, all gruesome, terrible, and fatal things -are declared to be the results of opposition to _ones_ ideal--all -suffering is _punishment_ even in the case of one's adherents (except -it be a trial, etc.). - -Fifth recipe: One goes so far as to regard Nature as the reverse of -one's ideal, and the lengthy sojourn amid natural conditions is -considered a great trial of patience--a sort of martyrdom; one studies -contempt, both in one's attitudes and one's looks towards all "natural -things." - -Sixth recipe: The triumph of anti-naturalism and ideal castration, -the triumph of the world of the pure, good, sinless, and blessed, is -projected into the future as the consummation, the finale, the great -hope, and the "Coming of the Kingdom of God." - -I hope that one may still be allowed to _laugh_ at this artificial -hoisting up of a small species of man to the position of an absolute -standard of all things? - - -205. - -What I do not at all like in Jesus of Nazareth and His Apostle Paul, -is that they _stuffed so much into the heads of paltry people,_ as -if their modest virtues were worth so much ado. We have had to pay -dearly for it all; for they brought the most valuable qualities of both -virtue and man into ill repute; they set the guilty conscience and the -self-respect of noble souls at loggerheads, and they led the _braver, -more magnanimous, more daring, and more excessive_ tendencies of strong -souls astray--even to self-destruction. - - -206. - -In the New Testament, and especially in the Gospels, I discern -absolutely no sign of a "_Divine_" voice: but rather an _indirect -form_ of the most subterranean fury, both in slander and -destructiveness--one of the most dishonest forms of hatred. It lacks -_all_ knowledge of the qualities of a _higher nature._ It makes an -impudent abuse of all kinds of plausibilities, and the whole stock of -proverbs is used up and foisted upon one in its pages. Was it necessary -to make a _God_ come in order to appeal to those publicans and to say -to them, etc. etc.? - -Nothing could be more vulgar than this struggle with the _Pharisees,_ -carried on with a host of absurd and unpractical moral pretences; the -mob, of course, has always been entertained by such feats. Fancy the -reproach of "hypocrisy!" coming from those lips! Nothing could be more -vulgar than this treatment of one's opponents--a most insidious sign of -nobility or its _reverse...._ - - -207. - -Primitive Christianity is the _abolition_ of the _State_: it prohibits -oaths, military service, courts of justice, self-defence or the defence -of a community, and denies the difference between fellow-countrymen and -strangers, as also the _order of castes._ - -_Christs example_; He does not withstand those who ill-treat Him; He -does not defend Himself; He does more, He "offers the left cheek" -(to the demand: "Tell us whether thou be the Christ?" He replies: -"Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of -power, and coming in the clouds of heaven"). He forbids His disciples -to defend Him; He calls attention to the fact that He could get help -if He wished to, but _will_ not. - -Christianity also means the _abolition of society,_ it prizes -everything that society despises, its very growth takes place among the -outcasts, the condemned, and the leprous of all kinds, as also among -"publicans," "sinners," prostitutes, and the most foolish of men (the -"fisher folk "); it despises the rich, the scholarly, the noble, the -virtuous, and the "punctilious." ... - - -208. - -The war against the noble and the powerful, as it is waged in the New -Testament, is reminiscent of Reynard the Fox and his methods: but -_plus_ the Christian unction and the more absolute refusal to recognise -one's own craftiness. - - -209. - -The Gospel is the announcement that the road to happiness lies open for -the lowly and the poor--that all one has to do is to emancipate one's -self from all institutions, traditions, and the tutelage of the higher -classes. Thus Christianity is no more than the _typical teaching of -Socialists._ - -Property, acquisitions, mother-country, status and rank, tribunals, -the police, the State, the Church, Education, Art, militarism: all -these are so many obstacles in the way of happiness, so many mistakes, -snares, and devil's artifices, on which the Gospel passes sentence--all -this is typical of socialistic doctrines. - -Behind all this there is the outburst, the explosion, of a -concentrated loathing of the "masters,"--the instinct which discerns -the happiness of freedom after such long oppression.... (Mostly a -symptom of the fact that the inferior classes have been treated too -humanely, that their tongues already taste a joy which is forbidden -them.... It is not hunger that provokes revolutions, but the fact that -the mob have contracted an appetite _en mangeant...._) - - -210. - -Let the _New Testament only be read as a book of seduction_: in it -virtue is appropriated, with the idea that public opinion is best -won with it,--and as a matter of fact it is a very modest kind of -_virtue,_ which recognises only the ideal gregarious animal and nothing -more (including, of course, the herdsmen): a puny, soft, benevolent, -helpful, and gushingly-satisfied kind of virtue which to the outside -world is quite devoid of pretensions,--and which separates the "world" -entirely from itself. The _crassest arrogance_ which fancies that the -destiny of man turns around it, and it alone, and that on the one side -the community of believers represents what is right, and on the other -the world represents what is false and eternally to be reproved and -rejected. The most _imbecile hatred_ of all things in power, which, -however, never goes so far as to touch these things. A kind of _inner -detachment_ which, outwardly, leaves everything as it was (servitude -and slavery; and knowing how to convert _everything_ into a means of -serving God and virtue). - - -211. - -Christianity is possible as the _most private_ form of life; it -presupposes the existence of a narrow, isolated, and absolutely -unpolitical society--it belongs to the conventicle. On the other hand, -a "Christian _State_," "Christian politics," are pieces of downright -impudence; they are lies, like, for instance, a Christian leadership -of an army, which in the end regards "the God of hosts" as chief of -the staff. Even the Papacy has never been able to carry on politics -in a Christian way...; and when Reformers indulge in politics, as -Luther did, it is well known that they are just as ardent followers of -Machiavelli as any other immoralists or tyrants. - - -212. - -Christianity is still possible at any moment. It is not bound to any -one of the impudent dogmas that have adorned themselves with its name: -it needs neither the teaching of the _personal God,_ nor of _sin,_ -nor of _immortality,_ nor of _redemption,_ nor of _faith_; it has -absolutely no need whatever of metaphysics, and it needs asceticism and -Christian "natural science" still less. Christianity is a _method of -life,_ not a system of belief. It tells us how we should behave, not -what we should believe. - -He who says to-day: "I refuse to be a soldier," "I care not for -tribunals," "I lay no claim to the services of the police," "I will -not do anything that disturbs the peace within me: and if I must -suffer on that account, nothing can so well maintain my inward peace as -suffering"--such a man would be a Christian. - - -213. - -_Concerning the history of Christianity._--Continual change of -environment: Christian teaching is thus continually changing its -_centre of gravity._ The favouring of _low_ and _paltry_ people.... -The development of _Caritas...._ The type "Christian" gradually -adopts everything that it originally rejected (_and in the rejection -of which it asserted its right to exist_). The Christian becomes a -citizen, a soldier, a judge, a workman, a merchant, a scholar, a -theologian, a priest, a philosopher, a farmer, an artist, a patriot, -a politician, a prince ... he re-enters all those _departments of -active life_ which he had forsworn (he defends himself, he establishes -tribunals, he punishes, he swears, he differentiates between people -and people, he contemns, and he shows anger). The whole life of the -Christian is ultimately exactly that life _from which Christ preached -deliverance...._ The Church is just as much a factor in the _triumph_ -of the Antichrist, as the modern State and modern Nationalism.... The -Church is the barbarisation of Christianity. - - -214. - -Among the powers that have mastered _Christianity_ are: Judaism -(_Paul_); Platonism (Augustine); The cult of mystery (the teaching of -salvation, the emblem of the "cross"); Asceticism (hostility towards -"Nature," "Reason," the "senses,"--the Orient ...). - - -215. - -Christianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious morality: under the -power of the most complete misapprehensions and self-deceptions. -Democracy is a more natural form of it, and less sown with falsehood. -It is a fact that the oppressed, the low, and whole mob of slaves and -half-castes, _will prevail._ - -First step: they make themselves free--they detach themselves, at -first in fancy only; they recognise each other; they make themselves -paramount. - -Second step: they enter the lists, they demand acknowledgment, equal -rights, "Justice." - -Third step: they demand privileges (they draw the representatives of -power over to their side). - -Fourth step: they _alone_ want all power, and they _have_ it. - -There are _three elements_ in Christianity which must be distinguished: -_(a)_ the oppressed of all kinds, _(b)_ the mediocre of all kinds, -_(c)_ the dissatisfied and diseased of all kinds. The _first_ struggle -against the politically noble and their ideal; the second contend with -the exceptions and those who are in any way privileged (mentally or -physically); the third oppose the _natural instinct_ of the happy and -the sound. - -Whenever a triumph is achieved, the second element steps to the fore; -for then Christianity has won over the sound and happy to its side -(as warriors in its cause), likewise the powerful (interested to this -extent in the conquest of the crowd)--and now it is the _gregarious -instinct,_ that _mediocre nature_ which is valuable in every respect, -that now gets its highest sanction through Christianity. This mediocre -nature ultimately becomes so conscious of itself (gains such courage -in regard to its own opinions), that it arrogates to itself even -_political power_.... - -Democracy is Christianity _made natural_: a sort of "return to Nature," -once Christianity, owing to extreme anti-naturalness, might have been -overcome by the opposite valuation. Result: the aristocratic ideal -begins to _lose its natural character_ ("the higher man," "noble," -"artist," "passion," "knowledge"; Romanticism as the cult of the -exceptional, genius, etc. etc.). - - -216. - -_When the "masters" may also become Christians._--It is of the nature -of a _community_ (race, family, herd, tribe) to regard all those -conditions and aspirations which favour its survival, as in themselves -_valuable_; for instance: obedience, mutual assistance, respect, -moderation, pity--as also, to _suppress_ everything that happens to -stand in the way of the above. - -It is likewise of the nature of the _rulers_ (whether they are -individuals or classes) to patronise and applaud those virtues which -make their subjects _amenable_ and _submissive_--conditions and -passions which may be utterly different from their own. - -The _gregarious instinct_ and the _instinct of the rulers_ sometimes -_agree_ in approving of a certain number of qualities and -conditions,--but for different reasons: the first do so out of direct -egoism, the second out of indirect egoism. - -_The submission to Christianity on the part of master races_ is -essentially the result of the conviction that Christianity is a -_religion for the herd,_ that it teaches obedience: in short, that -Christians are more easily ruled than non-Christians. With a hint of -this nature, the Pope, even nowadays, recommends Christian propaganda -to the ruling Sovereign of China. - -It should also be added that the seductive power of the Christian ideal -works most strongly upon natures that love danger, adventure, and -contrasts; that love everything _that entails a risk,_ and wherewith a -_non plus ultra_ of powerful feeling may be attained. In this respect, -one has only to think of Saint Theresa, surrounded by the heroic -instincts of her brothers:--Christianity appears in those circumstances -as a dissipation of the will, as strength of will, as a will that is -Quixotic. - - - -3. CHRISTIAN IDEALS. - - -217. - -War against the _Christian ideal,_ against the doctrine of -"blessedness" and "salvation" as the aims of life, against the -supremacy of the fools, of the pure in heart, of the suffering and of -the botched! - -When and where has any man, _of any note at all,_ resembled the -Christian ideal?--at least in the eyes of those who are psychologists -and triers of the heart and reins. Look at all Plutarch's heroes! - - -218. - -_Our claim to superiority_: we live in an age of _Comparisons_; we -are able to calculate as men have never yet calculated; in every way -we are history become self-conscious. We enjoy things in a different -way; we suffer in a different way: our instinctive activity is the -comparison of an enormous variety of things. We understand everything; -we experience everything, we no longer have a hostile feeling left -within us. However disastrous the results may be to ourselves, our -plunging and almost lustful inquisitiveness, attacks, unabashed, the -most dangerous of subjects.... - -"Everything is good"--it gives us pain to say "nay" to anything. We -suffer when we feel that we are sufficiently foolish to make a definite -stand against anything.... At bottom, it is we scholars who to-day are -fulfilling Christ's teaching most thoroughly. - - -219. - -We cannot suppress a certain irony when we contemplate those who think -they have overcome Christianity by means of modern natural science. -Christian values are by no means overcome by such people. "Christ on -the cross" is still the most sublime symbol--even now.... - - -220. - -The two great Nihilistic movements are: _(a)_ Buddhism, _(b)_ -Christianity. The latter has only just about reached a state of -culture in which it can fulfil its original object,--it has found its -_level,_--and now it can manifest itself _without disguise_..... - - -221. - -We have _re-established_ the Christian ideal, it now only remains _to -determine_ its value. - -(1) Which values does it _deny_? What does _the ideal that opposes it_ -stand for?--Pride, pathos of distance, great responsibility, exuberant -spirits, splendid animalism, the instincts of war and of conquest; -the deification of passion, revenge, cunning, anger, voluptuousness, -adventure, knowledge--the _noble ideal_ is denied: the beauty, wisdom, -power, pomp, and awfulness of the type man: the man who postulates -aims, the "future" man (here Christianity presents itself as the -_logical result_ of _Judaism_). - -(2) _Can it be realised?_--Yes, of course, when the climatic conditions -are favourable--as in the case of the Indian ideal. Both neglect the -factor _work._--It separates a creature from a people, a state, a -civilised community, and jurisdiction; it rejects education, wisdom, -the cultivation of good manners, acquisition and commerce; it cuts -adrift everything which is of use and value to men--by means of an -idiosyncrasy of sentiment it _isolates_ a man. It is non-political, -anti-national, neither aggressive nor defensive,--and only possible -within a strictly-ordered State or state of society, which allows these -_holy parasites_ to flourish at the cost of their neighbours..... - -(3) It has now become the will to be _happy_--and nothing else! -"Blessedness" stands for something self-evident, that no longer -requires any justification--everything else (the way to live and let -live) is only a means to an end.... - -But what follows is the result of a _low order of thought,_ the fear of -pain, of defilement, of corruption, is great enough to provide ample -grounds for allowing everything to go to the dogs.... This is a _poor_ -way of thinking, and is the sign of an exhausted race; we _must_ not -allow ourselves to be deceived. ("Become as little children." Natures -_of the same order_: Francis of Assisi, neurotic, epileptic, visionary, -like Jesus.) - - -222. - -The _higher_ man distinguishes himself from the _lower_ by his -fearlessness and his readiness to challenge misfortune: it is a -sign of _degeneration_ when eudemonistic values begin to prevail -(physiological fatigue and enfeeblement of will-power). Christianity, -with its prospect of "blessedness," is the typical attitude of mind of -a suffering and impoverished species of man. Abundant strength will be -active, will suffer, and will go under: to it the bigotry of Christian -salvation is bad music and hieratic posing and vexation. - - -223. - -_Poverty, humility, and chastity_ are dangerous and slanderous ideals; -but like poisons, which are useful cures in the case of certain -diseases, they were also necessary in the time of the Roman Empire. - -All ideals are dangerous: because they lower and brand realities; they -are all poisons, but occasionally indispensable as cures. - - -224. - -God created man, happy, idle, innocent, and immortal: our actual life -is a false, decadent, and sinful existence, a punishment.... Suffering, -struggle, work, and death are raised as objections against life, they -make life questionable, unnatural--something that must cease, and for -which one not only requires but also _has_--remedies! - -Since the time of Adam, man has been in an abnormal state: God -Himself delivered up His Son for Adam's sin, in order to put an end -to the abnormal condition of things: the natural character of life -is a _curse_; to those who believe in Him, Christ restores normal -life: He makes them happy, idle, and innocent. But the world did not -become fruitful without labour; women do not bear children without -pain; illness has not ceased: believers are served just as badly as -unbelievers in this respect. All that has happened is, that man is -delivered from _death_ and _sin--_two assertions which allow of no -verification, and which are therefore emphasised by the Church with -more than usual heartiness. "He is free from sin,"--not owing to -his own efforts, not owing to a vigorous struggle on his part, but -_redeemed by the death of the Saviour,_--consequently, perfectly -innocent and paradisaical. - -_Actual_ life is nothing more than an illusion (that is to say, a -deception, an insanity). The whole of struggling, fighting, and -real existence--so full of light and shade, is only bad and false: -everybody's duty is to be _delivered_ from it. - -"Man, innocent, idle, immortal, and happy"--this concept, which is -the object of the "most supreme desires," must be criticised before -anything else. Why should guilt, work, death, and pain (_and,_ from -the Christian point of view, also _knowledge_ ...) be _contrary_ to -all supreme desires?--The lazy Christian notions: "blessedness," -"innocence," "immortality." - - -225. - -The eccentric concept "holiness" does not exist--"God" and "man" have -not been divorced from each other. "Miracles" do not exist--such -spheres do not exist: the only one to be considered is the -"intellectual" (that is to say, the symbolically-psychological). As -decadence: a counterpart to "Epicureanism." ... Paradise according to -Greek notions was only "Epicurus' Garden." - -A life of this sort lacks a purpose: it _strives after_ nothing;--a -form of the "Epicurean gods"--there is no longer any reason to aim at -anything,--not even at having children:--everything has been done. - - -226. - -They despised the body: they did not reckon with it: nay, more--they -treated it as an enemy. It was their delirium to think that a man -could carry a "beautiful soul" about in a body that was a cadaverous -abortion.... In order to inoculate others with this insanity they -had to present the concept "beautiful soul" in a different way, and -to transvalue the natural value, until, at last, a pale, sickly, -idiotically exalted creature, something angelic, some extreme -perfection and transfiguration was declared to be the higher man. - - -227. - -Ignorance in matters psychological.--The Christian has no nervous -system;--contempt for, and deliberate and wilful turning away from, the -demands of the body, and the _naked_ body; it is assumed that all this -is in keeping with man's nature, and _must perforce work the ultimate -good of the soul_;--all functions of the body are systematically -reduced to moral values; illness itself is regarded as determined by -morality, it is held to be the result of sin, or it is a trial or a -state of salvation, through which man becomes more perfect than he -could become in a state of health (Pascal's idea); under certain -circumstances, there are wilful attempts at inducing illness. - - -228. - -What in sooth is this struggle "against Nature" on the part of the -Christian? We shall not, of course, let ourselves be deceived by -his words and explanations. It is Nature against something which is -also Nature. With many, it is fear; with others, it is loathing; -with yet others, it is the sign of a certain intellectuality, the -love of a bloodless and passionless ideal; and in the case of the -most superior men, it is love of an abstract Nature--these try to -live up to their ideal. It is easily understood that humiliation in -the place of self-esteem, anxious cautiousness towards the passions, -emancipation from the usual duties (whereby, a higher notion of rank is -created), the incitement to constant war on behalf of enormous issues, -habituation to effusiveness of feelings--all this goes to constitute -a type: in such a type the _hypersensitiveness_ of a perishing body -preponderates; but the nervousness and the inspirations it engenders -are _interpreted_ differently. The _taste_ of this kind of creature -tends either (1) to subtilise, (2) to indulge in bombastic eloquence, -or (3) to go in for extreme feelings. The natural inclinations _do_ -get satisfied, but they are interpreted in a new way; for instance, -as "justification before God," "the feeling of redemption through -grace," every undeniable _feeling of pleasure_ becomes (interpreted -in this way!) pride, voluptuousness, etc. General problem: what will -become of the man who slanders and practically denies and belittles -what is natural? As a matter of fact, the Christian is an example of -exaggerated self-control: in order to tame his passions, he seems to -find it necessary to extirpate or crucify them. - - -229. - -Man did not know himself physiologically throughout the ages his -history covers; he does not even know himself now. The knowledge, for -instance, that man has a nervous system (but no "soul") is still the -privilege of the most educated people. But man is not satisfied, in -this respect, to say he does not know. A man must be very superior to -be able to say: "I do not know this,"--that is to say, to be able to -admit his ignorance. - -Suppose he is in pain or in a good mood, he never questions that he -can find the reason of either condition if only he seeks.... In truth, -he cannot find the reason; for he does not even suspect where it -lies.... What happens?... He takes the _result_ of his condition for -its _cause_; for instance, if he should undertake some work (really -undertaken because his good mood gave him the courage to do so) and -carry it through successfully: behold, the work itself is the _reason_ -of his good mood.... As a matter of fact, his success was determined by -the same cause as that which brought about his good mood--that is to -say, the happy co-ordination of physiological powers and functions. - -He feels bad: _consequently_ he cannot overcome a care, a scruple, -or an attitude of self-criticism.... He really fancies that his -disagreeable condition is the result of his scruple, of his "sin," or -of his "self-criticism." - -But after profound exhaustion and prostration, a state of recovery sets -in. "How is it possible that I can feel so free, so happy? It is a -miracle; only a God could have effected this change."--Conclusion: "He -has forgiven my sin." ... - -From this follow certain practices: in order to provoke feelings of -sinfulness and to prepare the way for crushed spirits it is necessary -to induce a condition of morbidity and nervousness in the body. The -methods of doing this are well known. Of course, nobody suspects -the causal logic of the fact: the _maceration_ of the _flesh_ is -interpreted religiously, it seems like an end in itself, whereas it -is no more than a _means_ of bringing about that morbid state of -indigestion which is known as repentance (the "fixed idea" of sin, the -hypnotising of the hen by-means of the chalk-line "sin"). - -The mishandling of the body prepares the ground for the required range -of "guilty feelings"--that is to say, for that general state of pain -which _demands an explanation...._ - -On the other hand, the _method_ of "salvation" may also develop -from the above: every dissipation of the feelings, whether prayers, -movements, attitudes, or oaths, has been provoked, and exhaustion -follows; very often it is acute, or it appears in the form of -epilepsy. And behind this condition of deep somnolence there come signs -of recovery--or, in religious parlance, "Salvation." - - -230. - -Formerly, the conditions and results of _physiological exhaustion_ were -considered more important than healthy conditions and their results, -and this was owing to the suddenness, fearfulness, and mysteriousness -of the former. Men were terrified by themselves, and postulated the -existence of a _higher_ world. People have ascribed the origin of the -idea of two worlds--one this side of the grave and the other beyond -it--to sleep and dreams, to shadows, to night, and to the fear of -Nature: but the symptoms of physiological exhaustion should, above all, -have been considered. - -Ancient religions have quite special methods of disciplining the -pious into states of exhaustion, in which they _must_ experience such -things.... The idea was, that one entered into a new order of things, -where everything ceases to be known.--The _semblance_ of a higher -power.... - -231. - -Sleep is the result of every kind of exhaustion; exhaustion follows -upon all excessive excitement.... - -In all pessimistic religions and philosophies there is a yearning for -sleep; the very notion "sleep" is deified and worshipped. - -In this case the exhaustion is racial; sleep regarded psychologically -is only a symbol of a much deeper and longer _compulsion to rest.... -In praxi_ it is death which rules here in the seductive image of its -brother sleep.... - - -232. - -The whole of the Christian training in repentance and redemption may -be regarded as a _folie circulaire_ arbitrarily produced; though, -of course, it can be produced only in people who are predisposed to -it--that is to say, who have morbid tendencies in their constitutions. - - -233. - -_Against remorse and its purely psychical treatment._--To be unable -to have done with an experience is already a sign of decadence. -This reopening of old wounds, this wallowing in self-contempt and -depression, is an additional form of disease; no "salvation of the -soul" ever results from it, but only a new kind of spiritual illness.... - -These "conditions of salvation" of which the Christian is conscious are -merely variations of the same diseased state--the interpretation of an -attack of epilepsy by means of a particular formula which is provided, -_not_ by science, but by religious mania. - -When a man is ill his very _goodness_ is sickly.... By far the -greatest portion of the psychical apparatus which Christianity has -used, is now classed among the various forms of hysteria and epilepsy. - -The whole process of spiritual healing must be remodelled on a -physiological basis: the "sting of conscience" as such is an obstacle -in the way of recovery--as soon as possible the attempt must be made -to counterbalance everything by means of new actions, so that there -may be an escape from the morbidness of _self-torture...._ The purely -psychical practices of the Church and of the various sects should be -decried as dangerous to the health. No invalid is ever cured by prayers -or by the exorcising of evil spirits: the states of "repose" which -follow upon such methods of treatment, by no means inspire confidence, -in the psychological sense.... - -A man is _healthy_ when he can laugh at the seriousness and ardour with -which he has allowed himself to be _hypnotised_ to any extent by any -detail in his life--when his remorse seems to him like the action of a -dog biting a stone--when he is ashamed of his repentance. - -The purely psychological and religious practices, which have existed -hitherto, only led to an _alteration in the symptoms_: according to -them a man had recovered when he bowed before the cross, and swore -that in future he would be a good man.... But a criminal, who, with -a certain gloomy seriousness cleaves to his fate and refuses to -malign his deed once it is done, has more _spiritual health...._ -The criminals with whom Dostoiewsky associated in prison, were all, -without exception, unbroken natures,--are they not a hundred times more -valuable than a "broken-spirited" Christian? - -(For the treatment of pangs of conscience I recommend Mitchell's -Treatment.[2]) - - -[Footnote 2: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--In _The New Sydenham Society's Lexicon -of Medicine and the Allied Sciences,_ the following description of -Mitchell's treatment is to be found: "A method of treating cases of -neurasthenia and hysteria ... by removal from home, rest in bed, -massage twice a day, electrical excitation of the muscles, and -excessive feeding, at first with milk."] - - -234. - -A _pang of conscience_ in a man is a sign that his character is not -yet equal to his _deed._ There is such a thing as a pang of conscience -after _good deeds_: in this case it is their unfamiliarity, their -incompatibility with an old environment. - - -235. - -_Against remorse._--I do not like this form of cowardice in regard to -one's own actions, one must not leave one's self in the lurch under -the pressure of sudden shame or distress. Extreme pride is much more -fitting here. What is the good of it all in the end! No deed gets -undone because it is regretted, no more than because it is "forgiven" -or "expiated." A man must be a theologian in order to believe in -a power that erases faults: we immoralists prefer to disbelieve -in "faults." We believe that all deeds, of what kind soever, are -identically the same at root; just as deeds which turn _against_ us -may be useful from an economical point of view, and even _generally -desirable._ In certain individual cases, we admit that we might well -have been _spared_ a given action; the circumstances alone predisposed -us in its favour. Which of us, if _favoured_ by circumstances, would -not already have committed every possible crime?... That is why one -should never say: "Thou shouldst never have done such and such a -thing," but only: "How strange it is that I have not done such and -such a thing hundreds of times already!"--As a matter of fact, only -a very small number of acts are _typical_ acts and real epitomes of -a personality, and seeing what a small number of people really are -personalities, a single act very rarely _characterises_ a man. Acts -are mostly dictated by circumstances; they are superficial or merely -reflex movements performed in response to a stimulus, long before the -depths of our beings are affected or consulted in the matter. A fit of -temper, a gesture, a blow with a knife: how little of the individual -resides in these acts!--A deed very often brings a sort of stupor or -feeling of constraint in its wake: so that the agent feels almost -spellbound at its recollection, or as though he _belonged to it,_ -and were not an independent creature. This mental disorder, which is -a form of hypnotism, must be resisted at all costs: surely a single -deed, whatever it be, when it is compared with all one has done, is -_nothing,_ and may be deducted from the sum without making the account -wrong. The unfair interest which society manifests in controlling the -whole of our lives in one direction, as though the very purpose of its -existence were to cultivate a certain individual act, should not infect -the man of action: but unfortunately this happens almost continually. -The reason of this is, that every deed, if followed by unexpected -consequences, leads to a certain mental disturbance, no matter whether -the consequences be good or bad. Behold a lover who has been given a -promise, or a poet while he is receiving applause from an audience: -as far as _intellectual torpor_ is concerned, these men are in no way -different from the anarchist who is suddenly confronted by a detective -bearing a search warrant. - -There are some acts which are _unworthy_ of us: acts which, if they -were regarded as typical, would set us down as belonging to a lower -class of man. The one fault that has to be avoided here, is to regard -them as typical. There is another kind of act of which _we_ are -unworthy: exceptional acts, born of a particular abundance of happiness -and health; they are the highest waves of our spring tides, driven to -an unusual height by a storm--an accident: such acts and "deeds" are -also not typical. An artist should never be judged according to the -measure of his works. - - -236. - -A. In proportion as Christianity seems necessary to-day, man is still -wild and fatal.... - -B. In another sense, it is not necessary, but extremely dangerous, -though it is captivating and seductive, because it corresponds with -the _morbid_ character of whole classes and types of modern humanity, -... they simply follow their inclinations when they aspire to -Christianity--they are decadents of all kinds. - -A and B must be kept very sharply apart. In the _case of A,_ -Christianity is a cure, or at least a taming process (under certain -circumstances it serves the purpose of making people ill: and this is -sometimes useful as a means of subduing savage and brutal natures). -In the _case of B,_ it is a symptom of illness itself, it renders the -state of decadence _more acute_; in this case it stands opposed to -a _corroborating_ system of treatment, it is the invalid's instinct -standing _against_ that which would be most salutary to him. - - -237. - -On one side there are the _serious,_ the _dignified,_ and _reflective_ -people: and on the other the barbarous, the unclean, and the -irresponsible beasts: it is merely a question of _taming animals_--and -in this case the tamer must be hard, terrible, and awe-inspiring, at -least to his beasts. - -All essential requirements must be imposed upon the unruly creatures -with almost brutal distinctness--that is to say, magnified a thousand -times. - -Even the fulfilment of the requirement must be presented in the -coarsest way possible, so that it may command respect, as in the case -of the spiritualisation of the Brahmins. _The struggle with the rabble -and the herd._ If any degree of tameness and order has been reached, -the chasm separating these _purified_ and _regenerated_ people from the -terrible _remainder_ must have been bridged.... - -This chasm is a means of increasing self-respect in higher castes, -and of confirming their belief in _that_ which they represent--hence -the _Chandala._ Contempt and its excess are perfectly correct -psychologically--that is to say, magnified a hundred times, so that it -may at least be felt. - - -238. - -The struggle against _brutal_ instincts is quite different from -the struggle against _morbid_ instincts; it may even be a means -of overcoming brutality by making the brutes _ill._ The psychical -treatment practised by Christianity is often nothing more than the -process of converting a brute into a sick and _therefore_ tame animal. - -The struggle against raw and savage natures must be a struggle with -weapons which are able to affect such natures: _superstitions_ and such -means are therefore indispensable and essential. - -239. - -Our age, in a certain sense, is _mature_ (that is to say, decadent), -just as Buddha's was.... That is why a sort of Christianity is possible -without all the absurd dogmas (the most repulsive offshoots of ancient -hybridism). - - -240. - -Supposing it were impossible to disprove Christianity, Pascal thinks, -in view of the _terrible_ possibility that it may be true, that it is -in the highest degree prudent to be a Christian. As a proof of how -much Christianity has lost of its terrible nature, to-day we find that -other attempt to justify it, which consists in asserting, that even if -it were a mistake, it nevertheless provides the greatest advantages -and pleasures for its adherents throughout their lives:--it therefore -seems that this belief should be upheld owing to the peace and quiet -it ensures--not owing to the terror of a threatening possibility, but -rather out of fear of a life that has lost its charm. This hedonistic -turn of thought, which uses happiness as a proof, is a symptom of -decline: it takes the place of the proof resulting from power or from -that which to the Christian mind is most terrible--namely, _fear._ With -this new interpretation, Christianity is, as a matter of fact, nearing -its stage of exhaustion. People are satisfied with a Christianity which -is an _opiate,_ because they no longer have the strength to seek, to -struggle, to dare, to stand alone, nor to take up Pascal's position and -to share that gloomily brooding self-contempt, that belief in human -unworthiness, and that anxiety which believes that it "may be damned." -But a Christianity the chief object of which is to soothe diseased -nerves, does _not require_ the terrible solution consisting of a "God -on the cross"; that is why Buddhism is secretly gaining ground all -over Europe. - - -241. - -The humour of European culture: people regard one thing as true, but do -_the other._ For instance, what is the use of all the art of reading -and criticising, if the ecclesiastical interpretation of the Bible, -whether according to Catholics or Protestants, is still upheld! - - -242. - -No one is sufficiently aware of the barbarity of the notions among -which we Europeans still live. To think that men have been able to -believe that the "Salvation of the soul" depended upon a book!... And I -am told that this is still believed. - -What is the good of all scientific education, all criticism and all -hermeneutics, if such nonsense as the Church's interpretation of the -Bible has not yet turned the colours of our bodies permanently into the -red of shame? - - -243. - -_Subject for reflection_: To what extent does the fatal belief in -"Divine Providence"--the most _paralysing_ belief for both the hand -and the understanding that has ever existed--continue to prevail; -to what extent have the Christian hypothesis and interpretation of -Life continued their lives under the cover of terms like "Nature," -"Progress," "perfectionment," "Darwinism," or beneath the superstition -that there is a certain relation between happiness and virtue, -unhappiness and sin? That absurd _belief_ in the course of things, in -"Life" and in the "instinct of Life"; that foolish _resignation_ which -arises from the notion that if only every one did his duty _all_ would -go well--all this sort of thing can only have a meaning if one assumes -that there is a direction of things _sub specie boni._ Even _fatalism,_ -our present form of philosophical sensibility, is the result of a -_long_ belief in Divine Providence, an unconscious result: as though it -were nothing to do with us how everything goes! (As though we _might_ -let things take their own course; the individual being only a _modus_ -of the absolute reality.) - - -244. - -It is the height of psychological falsity on the part of man to imagine -a being according to his own petty standard, who is a beginning, a -"thing-in-itself," and who appears to him good, wise, mighty, and -precious; for thus he suppresses in thoughts _all the causality_ -by means of which every kind of goodness, wisdom, and power comes -into existence and has value. In short, elements of the most recent -and most conditional origin were regarded not as evolved, but as -spontaneously generated and "things-in-themselves," and perhaps as -the cause of all things.... Experience teaches us that, in every case -in which a man has means elevated the interests of the species above -those of the individual. Its real _historical_ effect, its fatal -effect, remains precisely the _increase of egotism,_ of individual -egotism, to excess (to the extreme which consists in the belief in -individual immortality). The individual was made so important and so -absolute, by means of Christian values, that he could no longer be -_sacrificed,_ despite the fact that the species can only be maintained -by human sacrifices. All "souls" became _equal_ before God: but this -is the most pernicious of all valuations! If one regards individuals -as equals, the demands of the species are ignored, and a process is -initiated which ultimately leads to its ruin. Christianity is the -_reverse of the_ principle of _selection._ If the degenerate and sick -man ("the Christian") is to be of the same value as the healthy man -("the pagan"), or if he is even to be valued higher than the latter, -as Pascal's view of health and sickness would have us value him, the -natural course of evolution is thwarted and the _unnatural_ becomes -law.... In practice this general love of mankind is nothing more -than deliberately favouring all the suffering, the botched, and the -degenerate: it is this love that has reduced and weakened the power, -responsibility, and lofty duty of sacrificing men. According to the -scheme of Christian values, all that remained was the alternative -of self-sacrifice, but this _vestige_ of human sacrifice, which -Christianity conceded and even recommended, has no meaning when -regarded in the light of rearing a whole species. The prosperity of the -species is by no means affected by the sacrifice of one individual -(whether in the monastic and ascetic manner, or by means of crosses, -stakes, and scaffolds, as the "martyrs" of error). What the species -requires is the suppression of the physiologically botched, the -weak and the degenerate: but it was precisely to these people that -Christianity appealed as a _preservative_ force, it simply strengthened -that natural and very strong instinct of all the weak which bids them -protect, maintain, and mutually support each other. What is Christian -"virtue" and "love of men," if not precisely this mutual assistance -with a view to survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting of -selection? What is Christian altruism, if it is not the mob-egotism of -the weak which divines that, if everybody looks after everybody else, -every individual will be preserved for a longer period of time?... He -who does not consider this attitude of mind as _immoral,_ as a crime -against life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also shares -their instincts.... Genuine love of mankind exacts sacrifice for -the good of the species--it is hard, full of self-control, because -it needs human sacrifices. And this pseudo-humanity which is called -Christianity, would fain establish the rule that nobody should be -sacrificed. - - -247. - -Nothing could be more useful and deserves more promotion than -systematic _Nihilism in action._--As I understand the phenomena of -Christianity and pessimism, this is what they say: "We are ripe for -nonentity, for us it is reasonable not to be." This hint from "reason" -in this case, is simply the voice of _selective Nature._ - -On the other hand, what deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is -the ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like -_Christianity,_--or rather like the _Church,_--which, instead of -recommending death and self-destruction, actually protects all the -botched and bungled, and encourages them to propagate their kind. - -Problem: with what kind of means could one lead up to a severe form of -really contagious Nihilism--a Nihilism which would teach and practise -voluntary death with scientific conscientiousness (and not the feeble -continuation of a vegetative sort of life with false hopes of a life -after death)? - -Christianity cannot be sufficiently condemned for having depreciated -the _value_ of a great _cleansing_ Nihilistic movement (like the one -which was probably in the process of formation), by its teaching of -the immortality of the private individual, as also by the hopes of -resurrection which it held out: that is to say, by dissuading people -from performing the _deed of Nihilism_ which is suicide.... In the -latter's place it puts lingering suicide, and gradually a puny, meagre, -but durable life; gradually a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre -life, etc. - - -248. - -_Christian moral quackery._--Pity and contempt succeed each other at -short intervals, and at the sight of them I feel as indignant as if I -were in the presence of the most despicable crime. Here error is made -a duty--a virtue, misapprehension has become a knack, the destructive -instinct is systematised under the name of "redemption"; here every -operation becomes a wound, an amputation of those very organs whose -energy would be the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the -best of cases no cure is effected; all that is done is to exchange one -set of evil symptoms for another set.... And this pernicious nonsense, -this systematised profanation and castration of life, passes for -holy and sacred; to be in its service, to be an instrument of this -art of healing--that is to say, to be a priest, is to be rendered -distinguished, reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have been -the Author of this supreme art of healing; redemption is only possible -as a revelation, as an act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the -Creator Himself. - -Proposition I.: Spiritual healthiness is regarded as morbid, and -creates suspicion.... - -Proposition II.: The prerequisites of a strong, exuberant life--strong -desires and passions--are reckoned as objections against strong and -exuberant life. - -Proposition III.: Everything which threatens danger to man, and which -can overcome and ruin him, is evil--and should be torn root and branch -from his soul. - -Proposition IV.: Man converted into a weak creature, inoffensive to -himself and others, crushed by humility and modesty, and conscious of -his weakness,--in fact, the "sinner,"--this is the desirable type, and -one which one can _produce_ by means of a little spiritual surgery.... - - -249. - -What is it I protest against? That people should regard this paltry and -peaceful mediocrity, this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing -of the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength, as something -high, or possibly as the standard of all things. - -_Bacon of Verulam_ says: _Infimarum virtutum apud vulgus laus est, -mediarum admiratio, supremarum sensus nullus._ Christianity as a -religion, however, belongs to the _vulgus_: it has no feeling for the -highest kind of _virtus_. - - -250. - -Let us see what the "genuine Christian" does of all the things which -his instincts forbid him to do:--he covers beauty, pride, riches, -self-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion and -_mud_--in short, _all culture_: his object is to deprive the latter of -its _clean conscience._ - - -251. - -The attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto, have been not only timid -but false. So long as Christian morality was not felt to be a _capital -crime against Life,_ its apologists had a good time. The question -concerning the mere "truth" of Christianity--whether in regard to the -existence of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin, not to -speak of its astronomy and natural science--is quite beside the point -so long as no inquiry is made into the value of Christian _morality._ -Are Christian morals _worth anything,_ or are they a profanation and an -outrage, despite all the arts of holiness and seduction with which they -are enforced? The question concerning the truth of the religion may be -met by all sorts of subterfuges; and the most fervent believers can, -in the end, avail themselves of the logic used by their opponents, in -order to create a right for their side to assert that certain things -are irrefutable--that is to say, they _transcend_ the means employed -to refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is called "Kantian -Criticism"). - - -252. - -Christianity should never be forgiven for having ruined such men as -Pascal. This is precisely what should be combated in Christianity, -namely, that it has the will to break the spirit of the strongest -and noblest natures. One should take no rest until this thing is -utterly destroyed:--the ideal of mankind which Christianity advances, -the demands it makes upon men, and its "Nay" and "Yea" relative to -humanity. The whole of the remaining absurdities, that is to say, -Christian fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and principles, -and Christian theology, do not concern us; they might be a thousand -times more absurd and we should not raise a finger to destroy them. -But what we do stand up against, is that ideal which, thanks to its -morbid beauty and feminine seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and -slanderous eloquence, appeals to all the cowardices and vanities of -wearied souls,--and the strongest have their moments of fatigue,--as -though all that which seems most useful and desirable at such -moments--that is to say, confidence, artlessness, modesty, patience, -love of one's like, resignation, submission to God, and a sort of -self-surrender--were useful and desirable _per se_; as though the puny, -modest abortion which in these creatures takes the place of a soul, -this virtuous, mediocre animal and sheep of the flock--which deigns to -call itself man, were not only to take precedence of the stronger, more -evil, more passionate, more defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who -by virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a hundred times more -dangers than the former, but were actually to stand as an ideal for man -in general, as a goal, a measure--the highest desideratum. The creation -of _this_ ideal was the most appalling temptation that had ever -been put in the way of mankind; for, with it, the stronger and more -successful exceptions, the lucky cases among men, in which the will -to power and to growth leads the whole species "man" one step farther -forward, this type was threatened with disaster. By means of the values -of this ideal, the growth of such higher men would be checked at the -root. For these men, owing to their superior demands and duties, -readily accept a more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is a -case of an increase in the costs of the undertaking coinciding with -a greater chance of failure). What is it we combat in Christianity? -That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at -exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting -their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it -knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with -disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, -against themselves--until the strong perish through their excessive -self-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome way of perishing, of -which _Pascal_ is the most famous example. - - - - -II. - - -A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. - - -1. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS. - - -253. - -This is an attempt at investigating morality without being affected by -its charm, and not without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling -beauty of its attitudes and looks. A world which we can admire, which -is in keeping with our capacity for worship--which is continually -_demonstrating_ itself--in small things or in large: this is the -Christian standpoint which is common to us all. - -But owing to an increase in our astuteness, in our mistrust, and in our -scientific spirit (also through a more developed instinct for truth, -which again is due to Christian influence), this interpretation has -grown ever less and less tenable for us. - -The craftiest of subterfuges: Kantian criticism. The intellect not -only denies itself every right to interpret things in that way, but -also to reject the interpretation once it has been made. People are -satisfied with a _greater_ demand upon their credulity and faith, with -a renunciation of all right to reason concerning the proof of their -creed, with an intangible and superior "Ideal" (God) as a stop-gap. - -The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece -of romanticism and reaction, and at the same time a symptom of -the historical sense of a new _power_: "Spirit" itself is the -"self-revealing and self-realising ideal": we believe that in the -"process of, development" an ever greater proportion of this ideal is -being manifested--thus the ideal is being realised, faith is vested in -the _future_ into which all its noble needs are projected and in which -they are being worshipped. - -In short:-- - -(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be demonstrated by us (the -concealed meaning behind the whole of the epistemological movement); - -(2) God may be demonstrated, but as something evolving, and we are -part of it, as our pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed -meaning behind the historical movement). - -It should be observed that criticism is _never_ levelled at the ideal -itself, but only at the problem which gives rise to a controversy -concerning the ideal--that is to say, why it has not yet been realised, -or why it is not demonstrable in small things as in great. - -*** - -It makes all the difference: whether a man recognises this state of -distress as such owing to a passion or to a yearning in himself, or -whether it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by -straining his thinking powers and his historical imagination to the -utmost. - -Away from the religious and philosophical points of view we find the -same phenomena. Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises -the origin of moral valuations, though it believes in them just as -much as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could -remain when the sanctioning _deity_ is no longer present! The belief in -a "Beyond" is absolutely necessary, if the faith in morality is to be -maintained.) - -_Fundamental problem_: whence comes this almighty power of _Faith? -Whence this faith in morality?_ (It is betrayed by the fact that even -the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of -it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. "Self-preservation": -the Darwinian prospect of a reconciliation of the altruistic and -egotistic principles.) - - -254. - -An inquiry into the _origin of our moral valuations_ and tables of -law has absolutely nothing to do with the _criticism_ of them, though -people persist in believing it has; the two matters lie quite apart, -notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge of the _pudenda origo_ -of a valuation does diminish its prestige, and prepares the way to a -critical attitude and spirit towards it. - -What is the actual worth of our valuations and tables of moral laws? -_What is the outcome of their dominion?_ For whom? In relation to -what?--answer: for Life. But _what is Life?_ A new and more definite -concept of what "Life" is, becomes necessary here. My formula of this -concept is: Life is Will to Power. - -_What is the meaning of the very act of valuing?_ Does it point back to -another, metaphysical world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed, -who lived in a period which _preceded_ the great historical movement.) -In short: _what is its origin?_ Or had it no human "origin"?--Answer: -moral valuations are a sort of explanation, they constitute a method -of interpreting. Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite -physiological conditions, as also of a definite spiritual level of -ruling judgments. _What is it that interprets?_--Our passions. - - -255 - -All virtues should be looked upon as physiological _conditions_: the -principal organic functions, more particularly, should be considered -necessary and good. All virtues are really refined _passions_ and -elevated physiological conditions. - -Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the developments of -sexual relations,--justice as the development of the passion for -revenge,--virtue as the love of resistance, the will to power,--honour -as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of an equally powerful, force. - - -256. - -Under "Morality" I understand a system of valuations which is in -relation with the conditions of a creature's life. - - -257. - -Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye shall know them by -their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and -from it I learn the _Soil_ out of which it grew." - - -258. - -I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a -language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity -or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of -preservation and growth, are betrayed--a mode of interpretation equal -in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar -to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for -instance, youth or decay, etc.). - -Applying this principle to the morality of Christian Europe more -particularly, we find that our moral values are signs of decline, of a -disbelief in _Life,_ and of a preparation for pessimism. - -My leading doctrine is this: _there are no moral phenomena, but only a -moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation -itself lies beyond the pale of morality._ - -What is the meaning of the fact that we have imagined a -_contradiction_ in existence? This is of paramount importance: behind -all other valuations those moral valuations stand commandingly. -Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then -measure? And then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc.??? - - -259. - -A point of view: in all valuations there is a definite purpose: -the _preservation_ of an individual, a community, a race, a state, -a church, a belief, or a culture.--Thanks to the fact that people -_forget_ that all valuing has a purpose, one and the same man may swarm -with a host of contradictory valuations, and _therefore with a host of -contradictory impulses._ This is the _expression of disease in man_ as -opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer -certain definite purposes. - -This creature full of contradictions, however, has in his being a grand -method of acquiring knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates -himself _to Justice_--that is to say, to the ascertaining of principles -_beyond the valuations good and evil._ - -The wisest man would thus be the _richest in contradictions,_ he would -also be gifted with mental antennæ wherewith he could understand all -kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all -the chords in his being would ring in _splendid unison_--the rarest of -_accidents_ even in us! A sort of planetary movement. - - -260. - -"To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves -a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm, -"pleasant or painful," their basis? - -But in an incalculable number of cases we first of all _make_ a thing -painful, by investing it with a valuation. - -The compass of moral valuations: they play a part in almost every -mental impression. To us the world is _coloured_ by them. - -We have imagined the purpose and value of all things: owing to this -we possess an enormous fund of _latent power,_ but the study of -_comparative_ values teaches us that values which were actually opposed -to each other have been held in high esteem, and that there have been -_many_ tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth -anything _per se_). - -The analysis of individual tables of laws revealed the fact that they -were framed (often very badly) as the _conditions of existence_ for -limited groups of people, to ensure their maintenance. - -Upon examining modern men, we found that there are a large number -of _very different_ values to hand, and that they no longer contain -any creative power--the fundamental principle: "the condition of -existence" is now quite divorced from the moral values. It is much -more superfluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an _arbitrary_ -matter. Chaos. - -Who creates _the goal_ which stands above mankind kind and above the -individual? Formerly morality was a _preservative_ measure: but nobody -wants to _preserve_ any longer, there is nothing to preserve. Thus we -are reduced to an _experimental morality,_ each must _postulate_ a goal -for himself. - - -261. - -What is the _criterion_ of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness, -(2) its universal acceptation, etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races -must be studied and observed, and, in each case, the criterion must be -discovered, as also the thing it expresses: a belief such as: "This -particular attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of -our existence." Immoral means "that which brings about ruin." Now all -societies in which these principles were discovered have met with their -ruin: a few of these principles have been used and used again, because -every newly established community required them; this was the case, for -instance, with "Thou shalt not steal." In ages when people could not be -expected to show any marked social instinct (as, for instance, in the -age of the Roman Empire) the latter was, religiously speaking, directed -towards the idea of "spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical -parlance, towards "the greatest happiness." For even the philosophers -of Greece did not feel any more for their πολις. - - -262. - -_The necessity of false values._--A judgment may be refuted when it is -shown that it was conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is -not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than -they can alter astigmatism in a man's eyes. - -The need of their _existence_ must be understood: they are the _result_ -of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning. - - -263. - -To _see_ and _reveal_ the problem of morality seems to me to be the new -task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by -moral philosophies heretofore. - - -264. - -How false and deceptive men have always been concerning the fundamental -facts of their inner world! Here to have no eye; here to hold one's -tongue, and here to open one's mouth. - - -265. - -There seems to be no knowledge or consciousness of the many -_revolutions_ that have taken place in moral judgments, and of -the number of times that "evil" has really and seriously been -christened "good" and _vice versa._ I myself pointed to one of these -transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte."[3] Even -conscience has changed its sphere: formerly there was such a thing as -a gregarious pang of conscience. - - -[Footnote 3: The morality of custom.] - - -266. - -A. _Morality_ as the work of _Immorality._ - -1. In order that moral values may attain to _supremacy,_ a host of -immoral forces and passions must assist them. - -2. The establishment of moral values is the work of immoral passions -and considerations. - -B. _Morality as the work of error._ - -C. _'Morality gradually contradicts itself._ Requital--Truthfulness, -Doubt, έποχή, Judging. The "Immorality" of _belief_ in morality. - -The steps:-- - -1. Absolute dominion of morality: all biological phenomena measured and -_judged_ according to its values. - -2. The attempt to identify Life with morality (symptom of awakened -scepticism: morality must no longer be regarded as the opposite of -Life); many means are sought--even a transcendental one. - -3. The _opposition of Life_ and _Morality._ Morality condemned and -sentenced by Life. - -D. To what extent was morality _dangerous_ to Life? - -_(a)_ It depreciated the joy of living and the gratitude felt towards -Life, etc. - -_(b)_ It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life. - -_(c)_ It checked the knowledge of Life. - -_(d)_ It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the -highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself. - -E. Contra-account: the _usefulness_ of morality to Life. - -(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it -may be a process of uniting dispersed members: it is useful as an agent -in the production of the man who is a "_tool_." - -(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger -threatening man from the direction of his passions: it is useful to -"_mediocre people_." - -(3) Morality may be a preservative measure resisting the life-poisoning -influences of profound sorrow and bitterness: it is useful to the -"_sufferers_." - -(4) Morality may be a preservative measure opposed to the terrible -outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "_lowly_." - -267. - -It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and -"wrong" in a definite, narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance -in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one";[4]--that is to say, to -do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit -of which a community exists.--Let us not think meanly of what a few -thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds. - - -[Footnote 4: "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand."] - - -268. - -Two types of morality must not be confounded: the morality with which -the instinct that has remained healthy defends itself from incipient -decadence, and the other morality by means of which this decadence -asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards. - -The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyrannical _(Stoicism_ itself -was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the -other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it has the women and -"beautiful feelings" on its side (Primitive Christianity was an example -of this morality). - - -269. - -I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a -phenomenon--also as a _riddle._ Moral phenomena have preoccupied me -like riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question: -why _should_ my neighbour's welfare be of greater value to me than -my own? and why is it that my neighbour himself _should_ value his -welfare differently from the way in which I value it--that is to say, -why should precisely _my_ welfare be paramount in his mind? What is -the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by -philosophers themselves? - -The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs -for a fellow-creature, higher than the one he performs for himself, -and that the same fellow-creature should do so too (that only those -acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to -the neighbour and for his welfare) has its reasons--namely, as the -result of the social instinct which rests upon the valuation, that -single individuals are of little importance although collectively -their importance is very great. This, of course, presupposes that they -constitute a _community_ with one feeling and one conscience pervading -the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for keeping one's eyes in -a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a -view of one's self impossible. - -My idea: goals are wanting, and _these must be individuals._ We see the -general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool. -Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets--is not every one he sees -a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all? - - -270. - -How is it possible that a man can respect himself _only_ in regard -to moral values, that he subordinates and despises everything in -favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation, etc.? as, -for instance, Henri Fréd. Amiel. What is the meaning of the _moral -idiosyncrasy_?--I mean this both in the psychological and physiological -sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which -_other_ great qualities are not wanting; and even in the case of -Schopenhauer, who obviously valued what he did not and _could_ not have -...--is it not the result of a merely mechanical _moral interpretation_ -of real states of pain and displeasure? is it not a particular form -of _sensibility_ which does _not_ happen to _understand_ the cause -of its many unpleasurable feelings, but _thinks to explain them with -moral hypotheses?_ In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and -_strength_ always appears under the optics of a "clean conscience," -flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness -of salvation.... Thus the _moral idiosyncratist_ has (1) _either_ -acquired his real worth in approximating to the virtuous type of -society: "the good fellow," "_the upright man_"--a sort of medium -state of high respectability: _mediocre_ in all his abilities, -but honest, conscientious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his -aspirations; (2) _or,_ he imagines he has acquired that worth, simply -because he cannot otherwise understand all his states--he is unknown to -himself; he therefore interprets himself in this fashion.--Morality is -the only _scheme of interpretation_ by means of which this type of man -can tolerate himself:--is it a form of vanity? - - -271. - -_The predominance of moral values._--The consequence of this -predominance: the corruption of psychology, etc.; the fatality which -is associated with it everywhere. What is the _meaning_ of this -predominance? What does it point to? - -To a certain _greater urgency_ of saying nay or yea definitely in -this domain. All sorts of _imperatives_ have been used in order to -make moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed:--they have -been enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear -to be instinctive, like inner commands. They are the expression of -_society's preservative measures,_ for they are felt to be almost -_beyond question._ The practice--that is to say, the _utility_ of being -agreed concerning superior values, has attained in this respect to -a sort of sanction. We observe that every care is taken to paralyse -reflection and criticism in this department--look at Kant's attitude! -not to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to prosecute -"research" in these matters. - - -272. - -_My desire_ is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and -to ascribe to moral differentiations but the value of _perspective_; to -show that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same -as that which is immoral, and was only made possible, according to -the law of all moral development--that is to say, by means of immoral -artifices and with a view to immoral ends--just as all that which -has been decried as immoral is, from the standpoint of economics, -both superior and essential; and how development leading to a greater -abundance of life necessarily Involves _progress_ in the realm _of -immorality_. "Truth," that is the extent to which we _allow_ ourselves -to comprehend _this_ fact. - - -273. - -But do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we require a great deal of -morality, in order to be immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a -parable:-- - -A physiologist interested in a certain illness, and an invalid who -wishes to be cured of that same illness, have not the same interests. -Let us suppose that the illness happens to be morality,--for morality -is an illness,--and that we Europeans are the invalid: what an amount -of subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans -were, at once, our own inquisitive spectators and the physiologist -above-mentioned! Should we under these circumstances earnestly desire -to rid ourselves of morality? Should we want to? This is of course -irrespective of the question whether we should be _able_ to do -so--whether we can be _cured_ at all? - - - - -2. THE HERD. - - - -274. - -_Whose will to power is morality?_--The _common factor_ of all European -history since the time of _Socrates_ is the attempt to make the _moral -values_ dominate all other values, in order that they should not be -only the leader and judge of life, but also: (1) knowledge, (2) Art, -(3) political and social aspirations. "Amelioration" regarded as the -only duty, everything else used as a _means_ thereto (or as a force -distributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore -to be opposed and annihilated ...).--A similar movement to be observed -_in China_ and _India._ - -What is the meaning of this _will to power on the part of moral -values,_ which has played such a part in the world's prodigious -evolutions? - -_Answer:--Three powers lie concealed behind it_; (1) The instinct -of the _herd_ opposed to the strong and the independent; (2) the -instinct of all _sufferers_ and all _abortions_ opposed to the happy -and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the mediocre opposed to -the exceptions.--_Enormous advantage of this movement,_ despite the -cruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped it along -(for the history of the _struggle of morality with the fundamental -instincts of life_ is in itself the greatest piece of immorality that -has ever yet been witnessed on earth ...). - - -275. - - -The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which -constitutes our daily life, and to which we have become accustomed -throughout the ages--our eye does not seem focussed for such things: -at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is -concerned. - -"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows"; he who thinks -in this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself. - -"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the sexual impulse, cannot fathom -itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts -are--on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge! - -The problem of "equality," in the face of the fact that we all thirst -for distinction: here, on the contrary, we should demand of ourselves -what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and obviously insane; -but--it is felt to be holy and of a higher order. The fact that it is -opposed to common sense is not even noticed. - -Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as -are also the attempt to obey morality implicitly, and the belief that -one should be every one's equal in its presence. - -The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be -distinguished, as are also the complete renunciation of individual -valuations and the severe exaction from every one of the same -sacrifice. "The value of an action is once and for all _fixed_: every -individual must submit to this valuation." - -We see: an authority speaks--who speaks?--We must condone it in human -pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for -he wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of it. -Thus--God speaks! - -God was necessary as an unconditional sanction which has no superior, -as a "Categorical Imperator": or, in so far as people believed in the -authority of reason, what was needed was a "unitarian metaphysics" by -means of which this view could be made logical. - -Now, admitting that faith in God is dead: the question arises once -more: "who speaks?" My answer, which I take from biology and not from -metaphysics, is: "the _gregarious instinct speaks._" This is what -desires to be master: hence its "thou shalt!"--it will allow the -individual to exist only as a part of a whole, only in favour of the -whole, it hates those who detach themselves from everything--it turns -the hatred of all individuals against him. - - -276. - -The whole of the morality of Europe is based upon the values _which -are useful to the herd_: the sorrow of all higher and exceptional men -is explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from -others reaches their consciousness in the form of a feeling of their -own smallness and egregiousness. It is the _virtues_ of modern men -which are the causes of pessimistic gloominess; the mediocre, like the -herd, are not troubled much with questions or with conscience--they -are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are -noted examples.) - -_The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it -is condemned._ - - -277. - -The morality of _truthfulness_ in the herd. "Thou shalt be -recognisable, thou shalt express thy inner nature by means of clear -and constant signs--otherwise thou art dangerous: and supposing -thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst -thing for the herd. We despise the secretive and those whom we -cannot identify.--_Consequently_ thou must regard thyself as -recognisable, thou mayest not remain _concealed_ from thyself, thou -mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever _changing_." -Thus, the insistence upon truthfulness has as its main object the -_recognisability_ and the _stability_ of the individual. As a matter -of fact, it is the object of education to make each gregarious -unit believe in a certain _definite dogma_ concerning the nature -of man: education _first creates this dogma_ and thereupon exacts -"truthfulness." - - -278. - -Within the confines of a herd or of a community--that is to say, _inter -pares,_ the _over-estimation_ of truthfulness is very reasonable. A -man must not allow himself to be deceived--and _consequently_ he -adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one!--a -sort of mutual obligation among equals! In his dealings with the -outside world caution and danger demand that he should _be on his guard -against deception_: the first psychological condition of this attitude -would mean that he is also on his guard against _his own people._ -Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness. - - -279. - -_A criticism of the virtues of the herd._--Inertia is active: (1) -In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and -observation necessary. (2) In veneration, where the gulf that -separates power is great and submission necessary: then, so that -fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while -the difference in power is interpreted as a difference of value: -and thus the relationship to the powerful _no longer has anything -revolting in it._ (3) In the sense of truth. What is truth? Truth -is that explanation of things which causes us the smallest amount -of mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely fatiguing). -(4) In sympathy. It is a relief to know one's self on the same level -with all, to feel as all feel, and to _accept_ a belief which is -already current; it is something passive beside the activity which -appropriates and continually carries into practice the most individual -rights of valuation (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In -impartiality and coolness of judgment: people scout the strain of being -moved, and prefer to be detached and "objective." (6) In uprightness: -people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to _create_ -a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of -commanding--it is better to submit than to rebel. (7) In toleration: -the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment. - - -280. - -The instinct of the herd values the _juste milieu_ and the _average_ -as the highest and most precious of all things: the spot where the -majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In this -way it is the opponent of all order of rank; it regards a climb from -the level to the heights in the same light as a descent from the -majority to the minority. The herd regards the _exception,_ whether -it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is -antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with -the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the -fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsmen, and -watchmen--in fact, to become their _head-servants_: thus they convert -a danger into a thing which is useful. In the middle, fear ceases: -here a man is alone with nothing; here there is not much room even for -misunderstandings; here there is equality; here a man's individual -existence is not felt as a reproach, but as the _right_ existence; -here contentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only towards the -exceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner. - - -281. - -If, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain -regulations for, ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of -course, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of "existence," nor -a certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and -development of this "existence" and "attitude of mind." But then the -idealist of virtue, the _moralist,_ comes along and says: "God sees -into the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain -acts: ye are not any better on that account!" Answer: Mr. Longears -and Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite -satisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not _harm_ -one another--and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take -a particular direction--that is to say, when they are against our -own interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same -actions are directed against the enemies of our community--against -you, for instance--we are at a loss to know how to pay them sufficient -honour. We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the -fullest extent. Did we share that "god-fearing" radicalism which your -holy craziness recommends, if we were green-horns enough to condemn -the source of those forbidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and the -"attitude of mind" which recommends them, that would mean condemning -our very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite--an attitude -of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By -our decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and -venting itself in a useless way--we are prudent when we prescribe -such laws for ourselves; we are also _moral_ in so doing.... Have -you no idea--however vague--what sacrifices it has cost us, how much -self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to -exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even -feel as if we could devour each other.... But the "communal spirit" is -master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of -morality? - - -282. - -_The weakness of the gregarious animal_ gives rise to a morality -which is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the -decadent man: they understand each other; they _associate_ with each -other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of -the herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid -characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is -incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a "leader"--the -priests understand this.... The state is not subtle, not secret -enough; the art of "directing consciences" slips its grasp. How is the -gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest? - - -283. - -_The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit_: -the revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the -proud, and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of -pride, of happiness: "There is no such thing as merit," "The danger is -enormous: it is right that one _should_ tremble and feel ill at ease," -"Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural--even -'reason'" (all that is antinatural is elevated to the highest place). - -It is again the _priests_ who exploit this condition, and who win the -"people" over to themselves. "The sinner" over whom there is more joy -in heaven than over "the just person." This is the struggle against -"paganism" (the pang of conscience, a measure for disturbing the -harmony of the soul). - -_The hatred of the mediocre_ for the _exceptions,_ and of the herd for -its independent members. (Custom actually regarded as "morality.") The -revulsion of feeling _against_ "egotism": that only is worth anything -which is done "for another." "We are all equal";--against the love of -dominion, against "dominion" in general;--against privilege;--against -sectarians, free-spirits, and sceptics;--against philosophy (a -force opposing mechanical and automatic instincts); in philosophers -themselves--"the categorical imperative," the essential nature of -morality, "general and universal." - - -284. - -The qualities and tendencies which are _praised_: peacefulness, equity, -moderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, -honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resignation, -pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, -generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, -good nature, industry. - -We must ascertain to what extent _such qualities_ are conditioned -as means to the attainment of certain desires and _ends_ (often an -"_evil_" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance, -_intellectuality_): or as the expressions of certain states of -need--that is to say, as _preservative measures_ (as in the case of -citizens, slaves, women, etc.). - -In short, every one of them is not _considered "good" for its own -sake,_ but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed -either by "society" or by the "herd," as a means to the ends of the -latter, as necessary for their preservation and enhancement, and also -as the result of an actual _gregarious instinct_ in the individual; -these qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is -_fundamentally different_ from these _states of virtue._ For the herd -is _antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless_ to the outside world; it is -full of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc. - -In the "herdsman" this _antagonism_ comes to the _fore_ he must have -qualities which are _the reverse of_ those possessed by the herd. - -The mortal enmity of the herd towards all _order of rank_: its -instinct is in favour of the _leveller_ (Christ). Towards all _strong -individuals (the sovereigns)_ it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, -arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, -deceitful, envious, revengeful. - - -285. - -My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one -type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say, -against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and -against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the -herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They -have no creative power. - -The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the just -man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the -great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal -security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies -the gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment -on the part of the "comfortable" ones rigs itself out in the most -beautiful words--and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe, -however, the _hatred of the herd_ for all truthful men. - - -286. - -Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the moral -imperative in his breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he -shows thereby that he belongs to the _herd._ When a man is conscious -of the opposite feelings,--that is to say, when he sees his danger and -his undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions,--then he does not -belong to the herd. - - -287. - -My philosophy aims at a new _order of rank: not_ at an individualistic -morality.[5] The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but -not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally -different valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones -or the beasts of prey, etc. - - -[Footnote 5: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE--Here is a broad distinction between -Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.] - - - -3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MORALITY. - - -288. - -_Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing human pride._--The -"Free-Will" theory is anti-religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow -the right upon man to regard himself as the _cause_ of his highest -states and actions: it is a form of the growing _feeling of pride._ - -Man feels his power his "happiness"; as they say: there must be a will -behind these states--otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is -an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the -necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness: -if the will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, -a sensation of power may be interpreted as its result. This is a -_merely psychological point of view,_ based upon the false assumption -that nothing belongs to us which we have not consciously willed. The -whole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous -psychological rule that the will is the only cause, and that one must -have been aware of having willed in order to be able to regard _one's -self_ as a cause. - -_Then comes the counter-movement_--that of the moral-philosophers. -These men still labour under the delusion that a man is responsible -only for what he has willed. The value of man is then made a _moral -value_: thus morality becomes a _causa prima_; for this there must be -some kind of principle in man, and "free will" is posited as _prima -causa._ The _arrière pensée_ is always this: If man is not a _causa -prima_ through his will, he must be irresponsible,--therefore he -does not come within the jurisdiction of morals,--virtue or vice is -automatic and mechanical.... - -In short: in order that man may respect himself he must be capable of -becoming evil. - - -289. - -_Theatricalness_ regarded as the result of "Free Will" morality. It -is a step in the _development of the feeling of power itself_ to -believe one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's -perfection) and to have _willed_ them.... - -(Criticism: all perfect action is precisely unconscious and not -deliberate; consciousness is often the expression of an imperfect -and often morbid constitution. _Personal perfection regarded as -determined by will, as an act of consciousness,_ as reason with -dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-contradiction.... Any -degree of consciousness renders perfection _impossible._ ... A form of -_theatricalness_.) - - - -290. - -The _moral hypothesis,_ designed with a view to _justifying God,_ -said: evil must be voluntary (simply in order that the _voluntariness -of goodness_ might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering -have an _object which is salvation_. - -The notion "guilt" was considered as something which had no -connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the -notion "punishment" was held to be an educating and beneficent act, -consequently an act proceeding from a _good_ God. - -The absolute dominion of moral valuations _over_ all others: nobody -doubted that God could not be evil and could do no harm--that is to -say, perfection was understood merely as _moral_ perfection. - - -291. - -How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has -preceded it in consciousness! And morality has been measured in the -light of this supposition, as also criminality.... - -The value of an action must be judged by its results, say the -utilitarians: to measure it according to its origin involves the -impossibility of _knowing_ that origin. - -But do we know its results? Five stages ahead, perhaps. Who can tell -what an action provokes and sets in motion? As a stimulus? As the spark -which fires a powder-magazine? Utilitarians are simpletons.... And -finally, they would first of all have to know _what_ is useful; here -also their sight can travel only over five stages or so.... They have -no notion of the great economy which cannot dispense with evil. - -We do not know the origin or the results: has an action, then, any -value? - -We have yet the action itself to consider: the states of consciousness -that accompany it, the yea or nay which follows upon its performance: -does the value of an action lie in the subjective states which -accompany it? (In that case, the value of music would be measured -according to the pleasure or displeasure which it occasions in us ... -which it gives to the _composer._ ...) Obviously feelings of value -must accompany it, a sensation of power, restraint, or impotence--for -instance, freedom or lightsomeness. Or, putting the question -differently: could the value of an action be reduced to physiological -terms? could it be the expression of completely free or constrained -life?--Maybe its _biological_ value is expressed in this way.... - -If, then, an action can be judged neither in the light of its origin, -nor its results, nor its accompaniments in consciousness, then its -value must be _x_ unknown.... - - -292. - -It amounts to a _denaturalisation of morality,_ to _separate_ an action -from a man; to direct hatred or contempt against "sin"; to believe that -there are actions which are good or bad in themselves. - -The _re-establishment of_ "_Nature_": an action in itself is quite -devoid of value; the whole question is this: who performed it? One and -the same "crime" may, in one case, be the greatest privilege, in the -other infamy. As a matter of fact, it is the selfishness of the judges -which interprets an action (in regard to its author) according as to -whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or in relation to its -degree of likeness or unlikeness to them). - - -293. - -The concept "reprehensible action" presents us with some difficulties. -Nothing in all that happens can be reprehensible in itself: _one would -not dare to eliminate it completely_; for everything is so bound up -with everything else, that to exclude one part would mean to exclude -the whole. - -A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a reprehensible world as -a whole.... - -And even then, in a reprehensible world even reprehending would be -reprehensible.... And the consequence of an attitude of mind that -condemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in -practice.... If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part -of it is of equal value, is eternal and necessary.--In all correlations -of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that -is expressed is a certain point of view, peculiar to the interests of -a certain type of living organism: everything that lives says _yea_ by -the very fact of its existence. - - -294. - -_Criticism of the subjective feelings of value.--_Conscience. Formerly -people argued: conscience condemns this action, therefore this action -is reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience condemns an -action because that action has been condemned for a long period of -time: all conscience does is to imitate. It does not create values. -That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was -_not_ conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) -its consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the feeling of -well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the -artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing.... Self-contentment -proves no more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than its -absence can prove anything against the value of the thing which fails -to give rise to it. We are far too ignorant to be able to judge of the -value of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability to regard -things objectively. Even when we condemn an action, we do not do so -as judges, but as adversaries.... When noble sentiments accompany an -action, they prove nothing in its favour: an artist may present us -with an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of -the most exalted pathos during its production. It were wiser to regard -these sentiments as misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our -power, away from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, and the -result often is that we make _fools_ of ourselves ... they actually -make fools of us. - - -295. - -We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two -thousand years: in these two practices lie perhaps our longest efforts -at becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we have -affiliated natural propensities with a heavy conscience. - -An attempt to produce an entirely opposite state of affairs would be -possible: that is to say, to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all -sympathy with things which are opposed to the senses, the intellect, -and nature--in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which -were all anti-worldly), with a heavy conscience. - - -296. - -The great _crimes_ in _psychology_:-- - -(1) That all _pain_ and _unhappiness_ should have been falsified by -being associated with what is wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of -its innocence.) - -(2) That all _strong emotions_ (wantonness, voluptuousness, triumph, -pride, audacity, knowledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were -branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious. - -(3) That _feelings of weakness,_ inner acts of cowardice, lack of -personal courage, should have decked themselves in the most beautiful -words, and have been taught as desirable in the highest degree. - -(4) That _greatness_ in man should have been given the meaning of -disinterestedness, self-sacrifice for another's good, for other people; -that even in the scientist and the artist, the _elimination of the -individual personality_ is presented as the cause of the greatest -knowledge and ability. - -(5) That _love_ should have been twisted round to mean submission -(and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or -of bestowal, resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the -wealth of a given personality. Only the _wholest_ people can love; the -disinterested ones, the "objective" ones, are the worst lovers (just -ask the girls!). This principle also applies to the love of God or of -the "home country": a man must be able to rely absolutely upon himself. -(Egotism may be regarded as the _pre-eminence of the ego,_ altruism as -the _pre-eminence of others_.) - -(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of seduction); -the passions regarded as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless. - -_The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,_ a sort of -_barricade_ built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the -botched and bungled, the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of -it, against the _strong_ (and finally _destroying_ them in their growth -...); on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which these -classes are best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in honour -by them. Let anyone examine the Jewish priesthood. - - -297. - -_The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature_ through moral -transcendence: The value of disinterestedness, the cult of altruism; -the belief in a reward in the play of natural consequences; the belief -in "goodness" and in genius itself, as if the one, like the other, -were the _result of disinterestedness_; the continuation of the -Church's sanction of the life of the citizen; the absolutely deliberate -misunderstanding of history (as a means of educating up to morality) -or pessimism in the attitude taken up towards history (the latter -is just as much a result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that -_pseudo-justification_ of history, that refusal to see history as the -pessimist _sees_ it). - - -298. - -"_Morality for its own sake_"--this is an important step in the -denaturalisation of morals: in itself it appears as a final value. In -this phase religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for -instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise goes through a phase in -which it _separates itself from_ religion, and in which no God is -"moral" enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal.... This is -how the case stands at present. - -"_Art for Art's sake_": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by -this means a false contrast is lent to things--it culminates in the -slander of reality ("idealising" _into the hateful_). When an ideal -is severed from reality, the latter is debased, impoverished, and -calumniated. _"Beauty for Beauty's sake," "Truth for Truth's sake," -"Goodness for Goodness' sake"_--these are three forms of the evil eye -for reality. - -_Art, knowledge, and morality_ are _means_: instead of recognising a -life-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the -_opposite of Life_--with "_God_"--they have also been regarded as -revelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires through -them.... - -"_Beautiful_" and "_ugly_," "_true_" and "_false_," "_good_" and -"_evil_"--these things are _distinctions_ and _antagonisms_ which -betray the preservative and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily -of man alone, but of all stable and enduring organisms which take up a -definite stand against their opponents. The _war_ which thus ensues is -the essential factor: it is a means of _separating_ things, _leading to -stronger_ isolation.... - - -299. - -_Moral naturalism_: The tracing back of apparently independent and -supernatural values to their real "nature"--that is to say, to -_natural immorality,_ to natural "utility," etc. - -Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these observations by the term -_moral naturalism_: my object is to re-translate the moral values which -have apparently become independent and _unnatural_ into their real -nature--that is to say, into their natural "_immorality_." - -_N.B._--Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its natural basis. The case is -the same in regard to _the moral law which has been made sovereign,_ -emancipated from its real _feature_ (until it is almost the _opposite_ -of Nature). - -The stages in the _denaturalisation of morality_ (or so-called -"_Idealisation_"):-- - -First it is a road to individual happiness, - -then it is the result of knowledge, - -then it is a Categorical Imperative, - -then it is a way to Salvation, - -then it is a denial of the will to live. - -(The gradual progress of the _hostility_ of morality to _Life_.) - - -300. - -The suppressed and effaced _Heresy_ in morality.--Concepts: paganism, -master-morality, _virtù_. - - -301. - -_My problem_: What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as -also from its own morality? Intellectual harm, etc. - - -302. - -Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to -which they alone have a right--as routinary values? Many species -of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to -disappear, nothing would be lacking on earth. A man should be enough of -a philosopher to admire even this "nothing" (_Nil admirari_). - - -303. - -Man, a small species of very excitable animals, -which--fortunately--has its time. Life in general on earth is a -matter of a moment, an incident, an exception that has no consequence, -something which is of no importance whatever to the general character -of the earth; the earth itself is, like every star, a hiatus between -two nonentities, an event without a plan, without reason, will, or -self-consciousness--the worst kind of necessity--_foolish_ necessity.... -Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity whispers -to our hearts, "All this must be false because it is revolting.... -Could not all this be appearance? And man in spite of all, to use -Kant's words"---- - - - -4. HOW VIRTUE IS MADE TO DOMINATE. - - -304. - -_Concerning the ideal of the moralist._--In this treatise we wish to -speak of the great _politics_ of virtue. We wrote it for the use of -all those who are interested, not so much in the process of becoming -virtuous as in that of making others virtuous--in how virtue _is made -to dominate._ I even intend to prove that in order to desire this -one thing--the dominion of virtue--the other must be systematically -avoided; that is to say, one must renounce all hopes of becoming -virtuous. This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a -sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even greater sacrifices!... -And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these, -indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to -be revealed for the first time in this treatise: that the _dominion of -virtue_ is absolutely attainable _only by the use of the same means_ -which are employed in the attainment of any other dominion, in any case -not _by_ means of virtue itself.... - -As I have already said, this treatise deals with the politics of -virtue: it postulates an ideal of these politics; it describes it as it -ought to be, if anything at all can be perfect on this earth. Now, no -philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is -in politics; it is, of course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism -which is _pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans -toute son âpreté,_ is superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can -never be achieved by man--the most he can do is to approximate it. -Even in this narrower kind of politics--in the politics of virtue--the -ideal never seems to have been realised. Plato, too, only bordered -upon it. Granted that one have eyes for concealed things, one can -discover, even in the most guileless and most conscious _moralists_ -(and this is indeed the name of these moral politicians and of the -founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing that they too paid -their tribute to human weakness. _They all aspired_ to virtue on their -own account--at least in their moments of weariness; and this is the -leading and most capital error on the part of any moralist--whose duty -it is to be an _immoralist in deeds._ That he must not exactly _appear -to be the latter,_ is another matter. Or rather it is _not_ another -matter: systematic self-denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: -dissimulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of, the moralist's -canon and of his self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain -to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from morality _and from -truth_ when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for -the sake of making _morality dominate_--that is the canon. Moralists -are in need of the _attitudes of virtue,_ as also of the attitudes of -truth; their error begins when they _yield_ to virtue, when they lose -control of virtue, when they themselves become _moral_ or _true._ A -great moralist is, among other things, necessarily a great actor; his -only danger is that his pose may unconsciously become a second nature, -just like his ideal, which is to keep his _esse_ and his _operari_ -apart in a divine way; everything he does must be done _sub specie -boni_--a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal! A _divine_ ideal! And, as -a matter of fact, they say that the moralist thus imitates a model -which is no less than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in -deeds that exists, but who nevertheless understands how to remain what -He _is,_ the _good_ God.... - - -305. - -The dominion of virtue is not established by means of virtue itself; -with virtue itself, one renounces power, one loses the Will to Power. - - -306. - -The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same "immoral" means as -any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice. - - -307. - -He who knows the way fame originates will be suspicious even of the -fame virtue enjoys. - - -308. - -Morality is just as "immoral" as any other thing on earth; morality is -in itself a form of immorality. - -The great _relief_ which this conviction brings. The contradiction -between things disappears, the unity of all phenomena is _saved----_ - - -309. - -There are some who actually go in search of what is immoral. When they -say: "this is wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with -or altered. On the other hand, I do not rest until I am quite clear -concerning the _immorality_ of any particular thing which happens to -come under my notice. When I discover it, I recover my equanimity. - - -310. - - -A. _The ways which lead to power_: the presentation of the new virtue -under the name of an _old_ one,--the awakening of "interest" concerning -it ("happiness" declared to be its reward, and _vice versâ_),--artistic -slandering of all that stands in its way,--the exploitation of -advantages and accidents with the view of glorifying it,--the -conversion of its adherents into fanatics by means of sacrifices and -separations,--symbolism _on a grand scale_. - -B. _Power attained_: (1) Means of constraint of virtue; (2) seductive -means of virtue; (3) the (court) etiquette of virtue. - - -311. - - -_By what means does a virtue attain to power?--_With precisely the -same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of -opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of -their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, _by means of -acts of general "immorality."_ - -How does a _desire_ behave towards itself in order to become a -_virtue_?--A process of rechristening; systematic denial of its -intentions; practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with -established and recognised virtues; ostentatious enmity towards its -adversaries. If possible, too, the protection of sacred powers must be -purchased; people must also be intoxicated and fired with enthusiasm; -idealistic humbug must be used, and a party must be won, which _either_ -triumphs _or_ perishes--one must be _unconscious and naïf_. - - -312. - -Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that -we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love -of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of -mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; -the disease of the _nervus sympathicus,_ for instance, is eulogised as -Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc. - - -313. - -We should begin to entertain doubts concerning a man if we heard that -he required reasons in order to remain respectable: we should, in any -case, certainly avoid his society. The little word "for" in certain -cases may be compromising; sometimes a single "for" is enough to -refute one. If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-such -an aspirant for virtue was in need of _bad_ reasons in order to remain -respectable, it would not conduce to increasing our respect for him. -But he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You -disturb my morality, with your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you -cannot believe in my _bad reasons,_--that is to say, in my God, in a -disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc.,--you put obstacles in the way -of my virtue.... Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent the -_moralisation of the masses_." - - -314. - -Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning -the highest values, are _judgments emanating from our muscles._ - - -315. - -_Morality in the valuation of races and classes.--_In view of the fact -that the _passions_ and _fundamental instincts_ in every race and class -express the means which enable the latter to preserve themselves (or at -least the means which have enabled them to live for the longest period -of time), to call them "virtuous" practically means: - -That they change their character, shed their skins, and blot out their -past. - -It means that they should cease from differentiating themselves from -others. - -It means that they are getting to resemble each other in their needs -and aspirations--or, more exactly, _that they are declining...._ - -It means that the will to one kind of morality is merely the _tyranny_ -of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality, -over other species: it means a process of annihilation or general -levelling in favour of the prevailing species (whether it be to -render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the -"Abolition of Slavery"--a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in -truth, the _annihilation_ of a fundamentally different species (the -undermining of its values and its happiness). - -The qualities which constitute the strength of an _opposing race_ or -class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has: -for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered -and rechristened). - -When a man or a people harm us, their action constitutes an objection -against them: but from their point of view we are desirable, because we -are such as can be useful to them. - -The insistence upon spreading "humaneness" (which guilelessly starts -out with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula "What -is human") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a certain definite -type of man strives to attain to power: or, more precisely, a very -particular kind of instinct--the _gregarious instinct._ "The equality -of men": this is what lies _concealed_ behind the tendency of _making_ -ever more and more men _alike_ as men. - -_The "interested nature" of the morality of ordinary people._ (The -trick was to elevate the great passions for power and property to the -positions of protectors of virtue.) - -To what extent do all kinds of _business men_ and money-grabbers--all -those who give and take credit--find it _necessary_ to promote the -levelling of all characters and notions of value? the _commerce and the -exchange of the world_ leads to, and almost purchases, virtue. - -The _State_ exercises the same influence, as does also any sort of -ruling power at the head of officials and soldiers; _science_ acts in -the same way, in order that it may work in security and economise its -forces. And the _priesthood_ does the same. - -Communal morality is thus promoted here, because it is advantageous; -and, in order to make it triumph, war and violence are waged against -immorality--with what "right"? Without any right whatsoever; but in -accordance with the instinct of self-preservation. The same classes -avail themselves of immorality when it serves their purpose to do so. - - -316. - -Observe the hypocritical colour which all _civil institutions_ are -painted, just as if they were _the offshoots of morality_--for -instance: marriage, work, calling, patriotism, the family, order, -and rights. But as they were all established in favour of the _most -mediocre_ type of man, to protect him from exceptions and the need of -exceptions, one must not be surprised to find them sown with lies. - - -317. - -_Virtue_ must be defended against its preachers: they are its worst -enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal _for all_; they divest -virtue of the charm which consists in its rareness, its inimitableness, -its exceptional and non-average character--that is to say, of its -_aristocratic charm._ A stand must also be made against those -embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and are satisfied to -hear them ring hollow: what ingenuousness--to _demand_ great and rare -things, and then to declare, with anger and contempt of one's fellows, -that they do not exist!--It is obvious, for instance, that a _marriage_ -is worth only as much as those are worth whom it joins--that is to say, -that on the whole it is something wretched and indecent: no priest or -registrar can make anything else of it. - -_Virtue_[6] has all the instincts of the average man against it: it is -not profitable, it is not prudent, and it isolates. It is related to -passion, and not very accessible to reason; it spoils the character, -the head, and the senses--always, of course, subject to the medium -standard of men; it provokes hostility towards order, and towards the -_lies_ which are concealed beneath all order, all institutions, and -all reality--when seen in the light of its pernicious influence upon -_others,_ it is _the worst of vices_. - -I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being -recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue -everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does _not suffer_ -from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of -perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim -itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as -judge because it is always a _personal_ virtue; (6) it does precisely -what is generally _forbidden_: virtue as I understand it is the actual -_vetitum_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise -virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--_virtù_--free from all -moralic acid.... - - -[Footnote 6: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Virtue is used here, of course, in the -sense of "the excellence of man," not in the sense of the Christian -negative virtue.] - - -318. - -In the first place[7] Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you have no superiority -over us; we should like to make you take _modesty_ a little more to -heart: it is wretched personal interests and prudence which suggest -your virtue to you. And if you had more strength and courage in your -bodies you would not lower yourselves thus to the level of virtuous -nonentities. You make what you can of yourselves: partly what you are -obliged to make,--that is to say, what your circumstances force you -to _make,_--partly what suits your pleasure and seems useful to you. -But if you do only what is in keeping with your inclinations, or -what necessity exacts from you, or what is useful to you, you ought -_neither to praise yourselves nor let others praise you_!... One is -a _thoroughly puny kind of man_ when one is _only_ virtuous: nothing -should mislead you in this regard! Men who have to be considered at -all, were never such donkeys of virtue: their inmost instinct, that -which determined their quantum of power, did not find its reckoning -thus: whereas with your minimum amount of power nothing can seem more -full of wisdom to you than virtue. But the _multitude_ are on your -side: and because you _tyrannise_ over us, we shall fight you.... - - -[Footnote 7: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Here Nietzsche returns to Christian -virtue which is negative and moral.] - - -319. - -A _virtuous man_ is of a lower species because, in the first place, -he has no "personality," but acquires his value by conforming with a -certain human scheme which has been once and for ever fixed. He has no -independent value: he may be compared; he has his equals, he _must_ not -be an individual. - -Reckoning up the qualities of the _good_ man, why is it they appear -pleasant to us? Because they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to -caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to severity: our laziness, -our good nature, and our levity, have a _good time._ This, our _feeling -of well-being,_ is _what we project into_ the good man in the form of a -_quality,_ in the form of a _valuable possession._ - - -320. - -Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a venerable form of -stupidity: who could blame you for it? And this form of virtue has not -been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest peasant-simplicity, which -is possible, however, in all classes of society, and which one cannot -meet with anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks to-day -that everything is in good hands--that is to say, in "God's hands": and -when it supports this proposition with that same modest assurance as -that with which it would assert that two and two are four, we others -naturally refrain from contradiction. - -Why disturb _this_ pure foolery? Why darken it with our cares -concerning man, people, goals, the future? Even if we wished to -do so, we shouldn't succeed. _In_ all things these people see the -reflection of their own venerable stupidity and goodness (in them the -old God--_deus myops--_ still lives); we others see something else in -everything: our problematic nature, our contradictions, our deeper, -more painful, and more suspicious wisdom. - - -321. - -He who finds a particular virtue an easy matter, ultimately laughs at -it. Seriousness cannot be maintained once virtue is attained. As soon -as a man has reached virtue, he jumps out of it--whither? Into devilry. - -Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tendencies and impulses have -become! What an amount of inquisitiveness torments them! They are all -fishhooks of knowledge! - - -322. - -The idea is to associate vice with something so terrible that at -last one is obliged to run away from it in order to be rid of its -associations. This is the well-known case of Tannhäuser. Tannhäuser, -brought to his wits' end by Wagnerian music, cannot endure life any -longer even in the company of Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue begins to -have a charm for him; a Thuringian virgin goes up in price, and what -is even worse still, he shows a liking for Wolfram von Eschenbach's -melody.... - - -323. - -_The Patrons of Virtue._--Lust of property, lust of power, laziness, -simplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is -why it stands so securely. - - -324. - -_Virtue_ is no longer believed in; its powers of attraction are dead; -what is needed is some one who will once more bring it into the market -in the form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of dissipation. It -exacts too much extravagance and narrow-mindedness from its believers -to allow of conscience not being against it to-day. Certainly, for -people, without either consciences or scruples, this may constitute -its new charm: it is now what it has never been before--a vice. - - -325. - -Virtue is still the most expensive vice: _let_ it remain so! - - -326. - -Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as they are allowed to -rule over one as authorities and laws coming from outside, and not as -qualities one develops one's self. The latter is the only right way; -they should be the most personal means of defence and most individual -needs--the determining factors of precisely _our_ existence and growth, -which we recognise and acknowledge independently of the question -whether others grow with us with the help of the same or of different -principles. This view of the danger of the virtue which is understood -as impersonal and _objective_ also holds good of modesty: through -modesty many of the choicest intellects perish. The morality of modesty -is the worst possible softening influence for those souls for which it -is pre-eminently necessary that they become _hard_ betimes. - - -327. - -The domain of morality must be reduced and limited step by step; the -names of the instincts which are really active in this sphere must be -drawn into the light of day and honoured, after they have lain all -this time in the concealment of hypocritical names of virtue. Out of -respect for one's "honesty," which makes itself heard ever more and -more imperiously, one ought to unlearn the shame which makes one deny -and "explain away" all natural instincts. The extent to which one can -dispense with virtue is the measure of one's strength; and a height may -be imagined where the notion "virtue" is understood in such a way as -to be reminiscent of _virtù_--the virtue of the Renaissance--free from -moralic acid. But for the moment--how remote this ideal seems! - -_The reduction of the domain of morality_ is a sign of its progress. -Wherever, hitherto, thought has not been guided by causality, thinking -has taken a _moral_ turn. - - -328. - -After all, what have I achieved? Let us not close our eyes to this -wonderful result: I have lent new _charms_ to virtue--it now affects -one in the same way as something _forbidden._ It has our most subtle -honesty against it, it is salted in the "_cum grano salis_" of the -scientific pang of conscience. It savours of antiquity and of old -fashion, and thus it is at last beginning to draw refined people and -to make them inquisitive--in short, it affects us like a vice. Only -after we have once recognised that everything consists of lies and -appearance, shall we have again earned the right to uphold this most -beautiful of all fictions--virtue. There will then remain no further -reason to deprive ourselves of it: only when we have shown virtue to -be a _form of immorality_ do we again _justify it,_--it then becomes -classified, and likened, in its fundamental features, to the profound -and general immorality of all existence, of which it is then shown to -be a part. It appears as a form of luxury of the first order, the most -arrogant, the dearest, and rarest form of vice. We have robbed it of -its grimaces and divested it of its drapery; we have delivered it from -the importunate familiarity of the crowd; we have deprived it of its -ridiculous rigidity, its empty expression, its stiff false hair, and -its hieratic muscles. - - -329. - -And is it supposed that I have thereby done any harm to virtue?... Just -as little as anarchists do to princes. Only since they have been shot -at, have they once more sat securely on their thrones.... For thus -it has always been and will ever be: one cannot do a thing a better -service than to persecute it and to run it to earth.... This--I have -done. - - - -5. THE MORAL IDEAL. - - -A. _A Criticism of Ideals._ - - - -330. - -It were the thing to begin this criticism in suchwise as to do away -with the word "_Ideal_": a criticism of _desiderata._ - - -331. - -Only the fewest amongst us are aware of what is involved, from the -standpoint of _desirability,_ in every "thus should it be, but it -is not," or even "thus it ought to have been": such expressions of -opinion involve a condemnation of the whole course of events. For -there is nothing quite isolated in the world: the smallest thing bears -the largest on its back; on thy small injustice the whole nature of -the future depends; the whole is condemned by every criticism which -is directed at the smallest part of it. Now granting that the moral -norm--even as Kant understood it--is never completely fulfilled, and -remains like a sort of Beyond hanging over reality without ever falling -down to it; then morality would contain in itself a judgment concerning -the whole, which would still, however, allow of the question: _whence -does it get the right thereto?_ How does the part come to acquire this -judicial position relative to the whole? And if, as some have declared, -this moral condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, reality, is -an ineradicable instinct, is it not possible that this instinct may -perhaps belong to the ineradicable stupidities and immodesties of our -species?--But in saying this, we are doing precisely what we deprecate; -the point of view of desirability and of unauthorised fault-finding -is part and parcel of the whole character of worldly phenomena just -as every injustice and imperfection is--it is our very notion of -"perfection" which is never gratified. Every instinct which desires -to be indulged gives expression to its dissatisfaction with the -present state of things: how? Is the whole perhaps made up of a host -of dissatisfied parts, which all have desiderata in their heads? Is -the "course of things" perhaps "the road hence? the road leading away -from reality "--that is to say, eternal dissatisfaction in itself? Is -the conception of desiderata perhaps the essential motive-power of all -things? Is it--_deus_? - -*** - -It seems to me of the utmost importance that we should rid ourselves -of the notion of _the_ whole, of an entity, and of any kind of power -or form of the unconditioned. For we shall never be able to resist the -temptation of regarding it as the supreme being, and of christening -it "God." The "All" must be subdivided; we must unlearn our respect -for it, and reappropriate that which we have lent the unknown and an -imaginary entity, for the purposes of our neighbour and ourselves. -Whereas, for instance, Kant said: "Two things remain for ever worthy -of honour" (at the close of his _Practical Reason_)--to-day we should -prefer to say: "Digestion is more worthy of honour." The concept, -"the All," will always give rise to the old problems, "How is evil -possible?" etc. Therefore, _there is no "All",_ there _is no_ great -_sensorium_ or _inventarium_ or power-magazine. - - -332. - -A man as he _ought_ to be: this sounds to me in just as bad taste as: -"A tree as it ought to be." - - -333. - -Ethics: or the "philosophy of desirability."--"Things _ought_ to be -otherwise," "things _ought_ to become different": dissatisfaction -would thus seem the heart of ethics. - -One could find a way out of it, first, by selecting only those states -in which one is free from emotion; secondly, by grasping the insolence -and stupidity of the attitude of mind: for to desire that something -should be otherwise than it is, means to desire that _everything_ -should be different--it involves a damaging criticism of the whole. -_But life itself consists in such desiring!_ - -To ascertain _what exists, how it exists_ seems an ever so much higher -and more serious matter than every "thus should it be," because the -latter, as a piece of human criticism and arrogance, appears to be -condemned as ludicrous from the start. It expresses a need which would -fain have the organisation of the world correspond with our human -well-being, and which directs the will as much as possible towards the -accomplishment of that relationship. - -On the other hand, this desire, "thus it ought to be," has only called -forth that other desire, "_what exists?_" The desire of knowing what -exists, is already a consequence of the question, "how? is it possible? -Why precisely so?" Our wonder at the disagreement between our desires -and the course of the world has led to our learning to know the -course of the world. Perhaps the matter stands differently: maybe the -expression, "thus it ought to be," is merely the utterance of our -desire to overcome the world---- - - -334. - -To-day when every attempt at determining how man should be--is -received with some irony, when we adhere to the notion that in spite -of all one only _becomes_ what one _is_(in spite of all--that is to -say, education, instruction, environment, accident, and disaster), -in the matter of morality we have learnt, in a very peculiar way, -how to _reverse_ the relation of cause and effect. Nothing perhaps -distinguishes us more than this from the ancient believers in morality. -We no longer say, for instance, "Vice is the cause of a man's -physical ruin," and we no longer say, "A man prospers with virtue -because it brings a long life and happiness." Our minds to-day are -much more inclined to the belief that vice and virtue are not causes -but only _effects._ A man becomes a respectable member of society -because he _was_ a respectable man from the start--that is to say, -because he was born in possession of good instincts and prosperous -propensities.... Should a man enter the world poor, and the son of -parents who are neither economical nor thrifty, he is insusceptible -of being improved--that is to say, he is only fit for the prison or -the madhouse.... To-day we are no longer able to separate moral from -physical degeneration: the former is merely a complicated symptom of -the latter; a man is necessarily bad just as he is necessarily ill.... -Bad: this word here stands for a certain _lack of capacity_ which is -related physiologically with the degenerating type--for instance, a -weak will, an uncertain and many-sided personality, the inability to -resist reacting to a stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain -constraint resulting from every suggestion proceeding from another's -will. Vice is not a cause; it is an _effect._ ... Vice is a somewhat -arbitrary-epitome of certain effects resulting from physiological -degeneracy. A general proposition such as that which Christianity -teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were -justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But -this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers -and prevails, the proposition holds good: for then the existence of an -unhealthy soil--of a degenerate territory--is demonstrated. - - -335. - -It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how -he understands the art of fighting his way, of enduring, of turning -circumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents; -but when he is seen in the light of his _desires,_ he is the most -absurd of all animals. It is just as if he required a playground -for his cowardice, his laziness, his feebleness, his sweetness, his -submissiveness, where he recovers from his strong virile virtues. Just -look at man's "_desiderata_" and his "ideals." Man, when he _desires, -_ tries to recover from that which is eternally valuable in him, from -his deeds; and then he rushes into nonentity, absurdity, valuelessness, -childishness. The intellectual indigence and lack of inventive power of -this resourceful and inventive animal is simply terrible. The "ideal" -is at the same time the penalty man pays for the enormous expenditure -which he has to defray in all real and pressing duties.--Should reality -cease to prevail, there follow dreams, fatigue, weakness: an "ideal" -might even be regarded as a form of dream, fatigue, or weakness. The -strongest and the most impotent men become alike when this condition -overtakes them: they _deify_ the cessation of work, of war, of -passions, of suspense, of contrasts, of "reality "--in short, of the -struggle for knowledge and of the _trouble_ of acquiring it. - -"Innocence" to them is idealised stultification; "blessedness" is -idealised idleness; "love," the ideal state of the gregarious animal -that will no longer have an enemy. And thus everything that lowers and -belittles man is elevated to an _ideal_. - - -336. - -A desire _magnifies_ the thing desired; and by not being realised it -grows--the _greatest ideas_ are those which have been created by the -strongest and longest desiring. Things grow _ever more valuable_ in our -estimation, the more our desire for them increases: if "moral values" -have become the highest values, it simply shows that the moral ideal -is the one which has been _realised least_ (and thus it _represented -the Beyond to all suffering,_ as a road to _blessedness_). Man, -with ever-increasing ardour, has only been embracing _clouds_: and -ultimately called his desperation and impotence "God." - - -337. - -Think of the _naïveté_ of all ultimate "desiderata"--when the -"wherefore" of man remains unknown. - - -338. - -What is the counterfeit coinage of morality? First of all we should -know what "good and evil" mean. That is as good as wishing to know why -man is here, and what his goal or his destiny is. And that means that -one would fain know that man actually _has_ a goal or a destiny. - -The very obscure and arbitrary notion that humanity has a general -duty to perform, and that, as a whole, it is striving towards a -goal, is still in its infancy. Perhaps we shall once more be rid -of it before it becomes a "fixed idea." ... But humanity does not -constitute a whole: it is an indissoluble multiplicity of ascending -and descending organisms--it knows no such thing as a state of youth -followed by _maturity_ and then age. But its strata lie confused and -superimposed--and in a few thousand years there may be even younger -types of men than we can point out to-day. Decadence, on the other -hand, belongs to all periods of human history: everywhere there is -refuse and decaying matter, such things are in themselves vital -processes; for withering and decaying elements must be eliminated. - -Under the empire of Christian prejudice _this question was never put -at all_: the purpose of life seemed to lie in the salvation of the -individual soul; the question whether humanity might last for a long or -a short time was not considered. The best Christians longed for the end -to come as soon as possible;--concerning the needs of the individual, -_there seemed to be no doubt whatsoever._ ... The duty of every -individual for the present was identical with what it would be in any -sort of future for the man of the future: the value, the purpose, the -limit of values was for ever fixed, unconditioned, eternal, one with -God.... What deviated from this eternal type was impious, diabolic, -criminal. - -The centre of gravity of all values for each soul lay in that soul -itself: salvation or damnation! The salvation of the _immortal_ soul! -The most extreme form of _personalisation...._ For each soul there -was only one kind of perfection; only one ideal, only one road to -salvation.... The most extreme form of the principle of _equal rights,_ -associated with an optical magnification of individual importance to -the point of megalomania.... Nothing but insanely important souls, -revolving round their own axes with unspeakable terror.... - -*** - -Nobody believes in these assumed airs of importance any longer -to-day: and we have sifted our wisdom through the sieve of contempt. -Nevertheless the _optical habit_ survives, which would fain measure the -value of man by his proximity to a certain _ideal maw._ at bottom the -personalisation view is upheld as firmly as that of the _equality of -rights as regards the ideal._ In short: people _seem to think that they -know_ what _the ultimate desideratum_ is in regard to the ideal man.... - -But this belief is merely the result of the exceedingly _detrimental -influence_ of the Christian ideal, as anybody can discover for himself -every time he carefully examines the "ideal type." In the first place, -it is believed that the approach to a given "type" is desirable; -_secondly,_ that this particular type is known; _thirdly,_ that every -deviation from this type is a retrograde movement, a stemming of the -spirit of progress, a loss of power and might in man.... To dream of a -state of affairs in which this _perfect_ man will be in the majority: -our friends the Socialists and even Messrs. the Utilitarians have not -reached a higher level than this. In this way an _aim_ seems to have -crept into the _evolution_ of man: at any rate the belief in a certain -_progress towards an ideal_ is the only shape in which an _aim_ is -conceived in the history of mankind to-day. In short: the coming of the -"_Kingdom of God_" has been placed in the future, and has been given an -earthly, a human meaning--but on the whole the faith in the _old_ ideal -is still maintained.... - - -340. - -_The more concealed forms of the cult of Christian, moral ideals._--The -_insipid and cowardly notion "Nature"_ invented by Nature-enthusiasts -(without any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the implacable, -and the cynical element in even "the most beautiful" aspects), is -only a sort of attempt at _reading_ the moral and Christian notion of -"humanity" into Nature;--Rousseau's concept of Nature, for instance, -which took for granted that "Nature" meant freedom, goodness, -innocence, equity, justice, and _Idylls,_ was nothing more at bottom -than the cult of Christian morality. We should collect passages from -the poets in order to see _what_ they admired, in lofty mountains, for -instance. What Goethe had to do with them--why he admired Spinoza. -Absolute _ignorance_ concerning the reasons of this _cult...._ - -The _insipid and cowardly concept "Man"_ à la Comte and Stuart -Mill, is at times the subject of a cult.... This is only the -Christian moral ideal again under another name.... Refer also to the -freethinkers--Guyau for example. - -The _insipid and cowardly concept "Art"_ which is held to mean sympathy -with all suffering and with everything botched and bungled (the same -thing happens to _history,_ cf. Thierry): again it is the cult of the -Christian moral ideal. - -And now, as to the whole _socialistic ideal_: it is nothing but a -blockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal. - - -341. - -_The origin of the ideal._ The examination of the soil out of which it -grows. - -_A._ Starting out from those "æsthetic" mental states during which the -world seems rounder, fuller, and _more perfect_: we have the pagan -ideal with its dominating spirit of self-affirmation (_people give of -their abundance_). The highest type: the _classical_ ideal--regarded -as an expression of the successful nature of _all_ the more important -instincts. In this classical ideal we find _the grand style_ as the -highest style. An expression of the "will to power" itself. The -instinct which is most feared _dares to acknowledge itself._ - -_B._ Starting out from the mental states in which the world seemed -emptier, paler, and thinner, when "spiritualisation" and the absence -of sensuality assume the rank of perfection, and when all that is -brutal, animal, direct, and proximate is avoided (_people calculate -and select_): the "sage," "the angel"; priestliness = virginity = -ignorance, are the physiological ideals of such idealists: the _anæmic_ -ideal. Under certain circumstances this anæmic ideal may be the ideal -of such natures as _represent_ paganism (thus Goethe sees his "saint" -in Spinoza). - -_C._ Starting out from those mental states in which the world seemed -more absurd, more evil, poorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot -even be imagined or desired in it (_people deny and annihilate_); -the projection of the ideal into the sphere of the anti-natural, -anti-actual, anti-logical; the state of him who judges thus (the -"impoverishment" of the world as a result of suffering: _people take, -they no longer bestow_): the _anti-natural ideal._ - -(The _Christian ideal_ is a _transitional form_ between the second -and the third, now inclining more towards the former type, and anon -inclining towards the latter.) - -_The three ideals: A._ Either a _strengthening_ of Life (_paganism,_) -or _B._ an _impoverishment_ of Life (_anæmia_), or _C._ a _denial_ of -Life (_anti-naturalism_). The state of beatitude in _A._ is the feeling -of extreme abundance; in _B._ it is reached by the most fastidious -selectiveness; in _C._ it is the contempt and the destruction of Life. - - -342. - -_A._ The _consistent_ type understands that even evil must not be -hated, must not be resisted, and that it is not allowable to make war -against one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept the pain -which such behaviour brings in its train; that one lives entirely in -positive feelings; that one takes the side of one's opponents in word -and deed; that by means of a superfœtation of peaceful, kindly, -conciliatory, helpful, and loving states, one impoverishes the soil of -the other states, ... that one is in need of unremitting _practice._ -What is achieved thereby?--The Buddhistic type, or the _perfect_ cow. - -This point of view is possible only where no moral fanaticism -prevails--that is to say, when evil is not hated on its own account, -but because it opens the road to conditions which are painful (unrest, -work, care, complications, dependence). - -This is the Buddhistic point of view: there is no hatred of sin, the -concept "sin," in fact, is entirely lacking. - -_B._ The _inconsistent_ type. War is waged against evil--there is a -belief that war waged _for Goodness' sake_ does not involve the same -moral results or affect character in the same way as war generally -does (and owing to which tendencies it is detested as _evil)._ As a -matter of fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is much -more profoundly pernicious than any sort of personal hostility; and -generally, it is "the person" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the -position of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc.). The attitude of -hostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be -bad in us, or hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented -and most anxious state of mind: thus "miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and -transcendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became _desirable_. -... The Christian type: or the _perfect bigot_. - -_C._ The _stoical_ type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability, -peace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active--profound -quiet, the defensive state, the fortress, the mistrust of war--firmness -of principles; the unity of _knowledge_ and _will_; great self-respect. -The type of the anchorite. _The perfect blockhead._ - - -343. - -An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours -to further its purpose _(a)_ by laying claim to a _spurious_ origin; -_(b)_ by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals -already existing; _(c)_ by means of the thrill produced by mystery, -as though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; _(d)_ by -the slander of its opponents' ideals; _(e)_ by a lying teaching of -the advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness, -spiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty -God, etc.--Contributions to the psychology of the idealists: Carlyle, -Schiller, Michelet. - -Supposing all the means of defence and protection, by means of which an -ideal survives, are discovered, is it thereby _refuted_? It has merely -availed itself of the means of which everything lives and grows--they -are all "immoral." - -My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life -are lying beneath the _ban of morality_: morality is the life-denying -instinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated. - - -344. - -To _avoid_ knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The -idealist: a creature who has reasons for remaining in the dark -concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark -concerning these reasons also. - - -345. - -_The tendency of moral evolution._--Every one's desire is that there -should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means -of which he himself succeeds. Thus the _fundamental tendency_ of the -_weak_ and _mediocre_ of all times, has been to _enfeeble the strong -and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this -process_ was the _moral principle._ The attitude of the strong towards -the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become -bad bywords. - -The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against -the extraordinary, of the weak against the strong: meets with one -of its finest interruptions in the fact that the rare, the refined, -the more exacting, present themselves as the weak, and repudiate the -coarser weapons of power. - - -346. - -(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge of all philosophers -is dictated to them by their moral "truths," and is only seemingly -independent. - -(2) The "Moral Truths," "thus shall things be done," are mere states -of consciousness of an instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus -are things done by us." The "ideal" is supposed to re-establish and -strengthen an instinct; it flatters man to feel he can obey when he is -only an automaton. - - -347. - -_Morality as a means of seduction._--"Nature is good; for a wise -and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the -'corruption of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are -responsible--they must be wiped out": this is Rousseau's logic (compare -with _Pascals_ logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin). - -Refer also to _Luther's_ logic, which is similar. In both cases a -pretext is sought for the introduction of an insatiable lust of revenge -as a _moral and religious_ duty. The hatred directed against the ruling -classes tries to _sanctify_ itself ... (the "sinfulness of Israel" is -the basis of the priest's powerful position). - -Compare this with _Pauls_ logic, which is similar. It is always under -the cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the -cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In the case of _Christ_ -the rejoicings of the people appear as the cause of His crucifixion. -It was an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the -anti-Semitic movement we find the same trick: the opponent is overcome -with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as _retributive -Justice._ - - -348. - -_The incidents of the fight_: the fighter tries to transform his -opponent into the _exact opposite_ of himself--imaginatively, of -course. He tries to believe in himself to such an extent that he may -have the courage necessary for the "good Cause" (as if he were the -_good Cause_); as if reason, taste, and virtue were being assailed -by his opponents.... The belief of which he is most in need, as the -strongest means of defence and attack, _is the belief in himself,_ -which, however, knows how to misinterpret itself as a belief in -God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory, but -only understands victory for the sake of victory--for God's sake. -Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in -a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "_Good taste, good -judgment, and virtue are ours._" War urges people to this _exaggerated -self-esteem_.... - - -349. - -Whatever kind of _eccentric ideal_ one may have (whether as -a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German -Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being _the_ -ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature. -One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it, -and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind. - -How is it, that in spite of this obvious fact, the majority of -idealists indulge in propaganda for their ideal, just as if they had -no right to it unless the _majority_ acquiesce therein?--For instance, -all those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim -the right to study Latin and mathematics. What is it urges them to do -this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the -herd: they fight for the "emancipation of woman," because they are best -able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it -under the cover of a _charitable movement,_ under the banner bearing -the device "For others." - -The _cleverness_ of idealists consists in their persistently posing -as the missionaries and "representatives" of an ideal: they thus -"beautify" themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in -disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real heroism consists, _not_ -in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and -disinterestedness, but in _not fighting at all_.... "I am thus; I will -be thus--and you can go to the devil!" - - -350. - -_Every_ ideal assumes _love, hate, reverence,_ and _contempt._ Either -positive feeling is the _primum mobile,_ or negative feeling is. -_Hatred_ and _contempt_ are the _primum mobile_ in all the ideals which -proceed from resentment. - -B. _A Criticism of the "Good Man" of the Saint, etc._ - - -351. - -The "_good man_" Or, hemiplegia of virtue.--In the opinion of every -strong and natural man, love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness -and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong to each other. A -man is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil, -because otherwise he would not know how to be good. Whence comes -the morbidness and ideological unnaturalness which repudiates these -compounds--which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest -of all things? Whence this hemiplegia of virtue, the invention of the -good man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those instincts -which enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to -insist upon revenge.... This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to that -dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God, -Spirit, Man); in the first are found all the positive, in the second -all the negative forces, intentions, and states. This method of valuing -thus believes itself to be "idealistic"; it never doubts that in its -concept of the "good man," it has found the highest desideratum. When -aspiring to its zenith it fancies a state in which all evil is wiped -out, and in which only good creatures have actually remained over. -It does not therefore regard the mutual dependence of the opposites -good and evil as proved. On the contrary, the latter ought to vanish, -and the former should remain. The first has a right to exist, the -second ought not _to be with us at all...._ What, as a matter of fact, -is the reason of this desire? In all ages, and particularly in the -Christian age, much labour has been spent in trying to reduce men -to this one-sided activity: and even to-day, among those who have -been deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who -desire precisely the same thing with their "humanisation" generally, -or with their "Will of God," or with their "Salvation of the Soul." -The principal injunction behind all these things is, that man should -no longer do anything evil, that he should under no circumstances be -harmful or _desire_ harm. The way to arrive at this state of affairs is -to amputate all hostile tendencies, to suppress all the instincts of -resentment, and to establish "spiritual peace" as a chronic disease. - -This attitude of mind, in which a certain type of man is bred, -starts out with this absurd hypothesis: good and evil are postulated -as realities which are in a state of mutual contradiction (not as -complementary values, which they are), people are advised to take the -side of the good, and it is insisted upon that a good man resists -and forswears evil until every trace of it is uprooted--_but with -this valuation Life is actually denied,_ for in all its instincts -Life has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts, -this valuation dreams rather of returning to the wholeness, oneness, -and strengthfulness of Life: it actually believes that a state of -blessedness will be reached when the inner anarchy and state of unrest -which result from these opposed impulses is brought to an end.--It is -possible that no more dangerous ideology, no greater mischief _in the -science of psychology,_ has ever yet existed, as this will to good: the -most repugnant type of man has been reared, the man who is _not free,_ -the bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a bigot could one -tread the path which leads to God, and that only a bigot's life could -be a godly life. - -And even here, Life is still in the right--Life that knows not how to -separate Yea from Nay: what is the good of declaring with all one's -might that war is an evil, that one must harm no one, that one must -not act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is -impossible to do otherwise! The good man who has renounced all evil, -and who is afflicted according to his desire with the hemiplegia of -virtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making -enemies, or from saying "nay" and doing "nay." The Christian, for -instance, hates "sin"!--and what on earth is there which he does -not call "sin"! It is precisely because of his belief in a moral -antagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown -so full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally. -The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the -continual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in -the end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he -ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical, -that Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an -act of grace (that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands -alone). In short: _he denies Life,_ he sees how "good," as the highest -value, _condemns_ Life.... And thus his ideology concerning good and -evil ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease. -Therefore he is obliged to conceive _another_ life!... - - -352. - -Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood -to consist in the ability to _harm_ as well as to _help._ This is the -case with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and -well-constituted races. - -The dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal.... In this way -morality becomes the poisoner of life. - - -353. - -_A criticism of the good man._--Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice, -humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience--is it really supposed -that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand -for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that -qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked -at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these -qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they -lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to -lead)? - -I naturally do not wish to imply that there is any opposition between -the _ego_ and the _alter_ in the judgment: the question is, whether -it is the _results_ of these qualities, either in regard to him who -possesses them or in regard to environment, society, "humanity," which -lend them their value; or whether they have a value in themselves.... -In other words: is it _utility_ which bids men condemn, combat, and -deny the opposite qualities (duplicity, falseness, perversity, lack -of self-confidence, inhumanity)? Is the essence of such qualities -condemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it -_desirable_ that there should exist no men at all possessed of such -qualities? _In any case, this is believed_.... But here lies the error, -the shortsightedness, the monocularity of _narrow egoism._ - -Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in -which the whole advantage would be on the side of the just--so that -all those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and -would slowly become extinct? - -At bottom, this is a question of taste and of _æsthetics_: should we -desire the most honourable types of men--that is to say, the greatest -bores--alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright, -the good-natured, the straightforward, and the "blockheads"? - -If one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number -constituting the "others," even the just man himself ceases from having -a right to exist,--he is, in fact, no longer necessary,--and in this -way it is seen that coarse utility alone could have elevated such an -_insufferable_ virtue to a place of honour. - -Desirability may lie precisely on the other side. It might be better -to create conditions in which the "just man" would be reduced to -the humble position of a "useful instrument"--an "ideal gregarious -animal," or at best a herdsman: in short, conditions in which he would -no longer stand in the highest sphere, which requires _other qualities_. - - -354. - -_The "good man" as a tyrant--_Mankind has always repeated the same -error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the -_measure_ and standard of life;--instead of seeking the standard in -the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, -it takes the _preservative measures_ of a very definite kind of life, -and uses them to exclude all other kinds of life, and even to criticise -Life itself and to select from among its forms. That is to say, man -ultimately forgets that measures are a means to an end, and gets to -like them for themselves: they take the place of a goal in his mind, -and even become the standard of goals to him--that is to say, _a given -species of man_ regards his means of existence as the only legitimate -means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as "truth," -"goodness," "perfection": the given species, in fact, begins to -_tyrannise._ ... It is a _form of faith,_ of instinct, when a certain -species of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned, -when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate, -any species of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as -it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights, and no longer desires to be -master. - - -355. - -"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong -enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker. - -* * * - -"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb. - - -356. - -Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that -men were?--that _good men_ were? But such men I can only conceive as -slaves, the slaves of the future. - - -357. - -_The metamorphoses of slavery_; its disguise in the cloak of religion; -its transfiguration through morality. - - -358. - -_The ideal slave_ (the "good man").--He who cannot regard himself -as a "purpose," and who cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, -instinctively honours the morality of _unselfishness._ Everything urges -him to this morality: his prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And -even faith is a form of self-denial. - -*** - -_Atavism_: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for -once. - -*** - -Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many -_obstacles_ in the way of _sovereign sentiments,_ of great _ingenuity,_ -of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self. - -*** - -It is not a question of _going ahead_ (to that end all that is required -is to be at best a herdsman, that is to say, the prime need of the -herd), it is rather a matter of _getting along alone,_ of _being able -to be another._ - - -359. - -We must realise _all_ that has been accumulated as the result of -the highest moral _idealism_: how almost _all other values_ have -crystallised round it. This shows that it has been desired for _a very -long time_ and with the _strongest passions_--and that it has not yet -been attained: otherwise it would have _disappointed_ everybody (that -is to say, it would have been followed by a more moderate valuation). - -The _saint_ as the _most powerful type_ of man: _this_ ideal it is -which has elevated the value of moral perfection so high. One would -think that the whole of science had been engaged in proving that the -_moral_ man is the most _powerful_ and most godly.--The conquest of the -senses and the passions--everything inspired _terror_;--the unnatural -seemed to the spectators to be _supernatural_ and _transcendental...._ - - -360. - -Francis of Assisi: amorous and popular, a poet who combats the order -of rank among souls, in favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual -hierarchy--"all alike before God." - -Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish man, the saint, the sage, -the just man. O Marcus Aurelius! - - -361. - -I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with -what is closely _I_ related to it), not because I want to annihilate -it, but only to put an end to its _tyranny_ and clear the way for -other _ideals,_ for _more robust_ ideals.... The _continuance_ of the -Christian ideal belongs to the most desirable of desiderata: if only -for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their stand beside it and -perhaps above it--they must have opponents, and strong ones too, in -order to grow _strong_ themselves. That is why we immoralists require -the _power_ of _morality,_ our instinct of self-preservation insists -upon our opponents maintaining their strength--all it requires is to -_become master of them_. - - - -C. _Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities_. - - -362. - -Egoism and its problem! The Christian gloominess of La Rochefoucauld, -who saw egoism in everything, and imagined that he had therefore -_reduced_ the worth of things and virtues! In opposition to him, -I first of all tried to show that nothing else _could_ exist save -egoism,--that in those men whose _ego_ is weak and thin, the power to -love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers are such owing to the -strength of their _ego,_--that love is an expression of egoism, etc. -As a matter of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those -who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a -pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine -the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would -assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the -cause of universal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of -men. - - -363. - -Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest regards his habits as -more important than his advantage. - - -364. - -Egoism! But no one has yet asked: _what_ is the _ego_ like? Everybody -is rather inclined to see all _egos_ alike. This is the result of the -slave theory, of _universal suffrage,_ and of "equality." - - -365. - -The behaviour of a higher man is the result of a very complex set of -motives: any word such as "pity" _betrays_ nothing of this complexity. -The most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other -relative to me?"--Thus the valuing spirit is continually active. - - -366. - -To think that the history of all moral phenomena may be simplified, as -Schopenhauer thought,--that is to say, that _pity_ is to be found at -the root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,--is -to be guilty of a degree of nonsense and ingenuousness worthy only -of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has -miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which -the Germans, from Herder to Hegel, have undergone. - - -367. - -_My "pity."_--This is a feeling for which I can find no adequate -term: I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious -capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what power -and what tasteless problems fit for back-woodsmen! (At a time when the -brave and light-hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible -in France!) Or when I see some one standing below where he might have -stood, thanks to the development of a set of perfectly senseless -accidents. Or even when, with the thought of man's destiny in my mind, -I contemplate with horror and contempt the whole system of modern -European politics, which is creating the circumstances and weaving -the fabric of the _whole_ future of mankind. Yes, to what could not -"mankind" attain, if----! This is my "pity"; despite the fact that no -sufferer yet exists with whom I sympathise in this way. - - -368. - -Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to -the health, "it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in -the world." If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and -not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon -maxims, but upon emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an -infection. - - -369. - -There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and -does not exceed them--consequently, the "allowable," the "morally -indifferent" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all. - -"One is continually promoting the interests of one's '_ego_' at the -cost of other people "; "Living consists in living at the cost of -others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step -towards truth to himself. - - -370. - -The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the _ego_ of which every one -speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all. - - -371. - -Our "ego"--which is _not_ one with the unitary controlling force of our -beings!--is really only an imagined synthesis; therefore there can _be_ -no "_egoistic_" _actions_. - - -372. - -Since all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent a -standpoint as far as they are concerned. Every instinct, when it is -active, sacrifices strength and other instincts into the bargain: in -the end it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of everything -owing to the waste it would bring about. Thus: that which is -"unegoistic," self-sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular ---it is common to all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare -of the whole _ego_ (_because they simply do not think!_), they act -counter to our interests, against the _ego_: and often _for_ the -_ego--_innocent in both cases! - - -373. - -_The origin of moral values._--Selfishness has as much value as the -physiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents -the whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach, -something that begins at his birth. If he represent the _ascent_ of the -line of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern -about his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be -extreme. (It is the concern about the promise of the future in him -which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right -to egoism.) If he represent _descending_ development, decay, chronic -sickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have -him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the -well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to _suppress egoism_ -(for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, -and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and -pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A -morality and a religion of "love," the _curbing_ of the self-affirming -spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, -and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within -the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: -for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of -envy,--feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the -botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of -obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and -of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and -individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, -the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross." - -The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of -a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon -examination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth -much," simply a psychological valuation; more plainly still: it is -the feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting -impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation -gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes, -into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or -moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify -itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" -hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner -tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of -power and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner -rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay -when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the -bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate -condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: -when, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are -conscious that their existence is something for which some one must -be _guilty,_ they are very closely related to the Christian, who also -believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched -constitution when he has found some one whom he can hold _responsible_ -for it. The instinct of _revenge_ and _resentment_ appears in both -cases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure, -as is also the favour shown to _altruistic_ theory and practice. The -_hatred of egoism,_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the -Christian), or another's (as in the case of the Socialists), thus -appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and -also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct -of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of -co-operation and unity.... At bottom, as I have already suggested, -the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, -rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is -still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the -botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of -egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological -circumstances. - -When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," -"rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his -inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he -also finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take -jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his -pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, -condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even except himself. -But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are -in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find -relief in slander. - - -374. - -Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to -_caricatures,_--at least in its own imagination,--as also to -starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our -"_criminal._" In the midst of the Roman and aristocratic order of -values, the _Jew_ was reduced to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. -Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while among pious -people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among -immoralists it is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in _my_ books -becomes a caricature. - - -375. - -All the instincts and forces which morality praises, seem to me to -be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for -instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the -service of the will to power. - - -376. - -The _turning of_ man's _nature inwards._ The process of turning a -nature inwards arises when, owing to the establishment of peace and -society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting themselves -outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with -the imagination. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence -is reverted, "it steps backwards"; in the thirst for knowledge there -lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the powers -of dissimulation and falsehood find their scope; the instincts are thus -transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc. - - -377. - -_Falsity._--Every _sovereign instinct_ makes the others its -instruments, its retainers and its sycophants: it never allows itself -to be called by its more hateful name: and it brooks no terms of praise -in which it cannot _indirectly_ find its share. Around every sovereign -instinct all praise and blame in general crystallises into a rigorous -form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is _one_ of the causes of -falsity. - -_Every_ instinct _which aspires to dominion,_ but which finds itself -under a yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the -_most generally accepted_ values to strengthen it and to support its -self-esteem, and this explains why _as a rule_ it dares to come forward -under the name of the "master" it is combating and from whom it would -be free (for instance, under the domination of Christian values, the -desires of the flesh and of power act in this way). This is the _other_ -cause of falsity. - -In both cases _complete ingenuousness_ reigns: the falseness _never_ -even occurs to the mind of those concerned. It is the sign of a -_broken_ instinct when man sees the motive force and its "expression" -("the mask") as separate things--it is a sign of inner contradiction -and is much less formidable. Absolute _innocence_ in bearing, word, -and passion, a "good conscience" in falseness, and the certainty -wherewith all the grandest and most pompous words and attitudes are -appropriated--all these things are necessary for victory. - -In the _other case_: that is to say, when _extreme clearsightedness_ -is present, the genius of the _actor_ is needful as well as tremendous -discipline in self-control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why -priests are the cleverest and _most conscious_ hypocrites; and then -come princes, in whom their position in life and their antecedents -account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists -come third, and women fourth. - -_The fundamental thought_: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and -the _will_ is directed so inexorably against perfect self-knowledge -and accurate self-classification, that one is _very probably right in -supposing that Truth_ and _the will to truth_ are perhaps something -quite different and only _disguises._ (The need of _faith_ is the -greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness.) - - -378. - -"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood": people insist upon truthfulness. But -the acknowledgment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be lied -to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the -reality of this popular "truthfulness." There is too much or too little -being said continually: to insist upon people's _exposing themselves_ -with every word they say, is a piece of naïveté. - -People say what they think, they are "truthful"; but _only under -certain circumstances_: that is to say, provided they be _understood_ -(_inter pares_), and understood with good will into the bargain (_once -more inter pares_). One conceals one's self in the presence of the -_unfamiliar_: and he who would attain to something, says what he would -fain have people think about him, but _not_ what he thinks. ("The -powerful man is always a liar.") - - -379. - -The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism concealed beneath an artful -abuse of moral values:-- - -_(a)_ Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity. - -_(b)_ The _most impersonal intellect_ ("the philosopher") can know the -_truth_, "the true essence and nature of things." - -_(c)_ Genius, _great men_ are _great,_ because they do not strive -to further their own interests: the _value_ of man _increases_ in -proportion as he effaces himself. - -_(d)_ Art as the work of the "_pure free-willed subject_"; -misunderstanding of "objectivity." - -_(e)_ Happiness as the object of life: _virtue_ as a means to an end. - -The pessimistic condemnation of life by Schopenhauer is a _moral_ one. -Transference of the gregarious standards into the realm of metaphysics. - -The "individual" lacks sense, he must therefore have his origin in "the -thing in itself" (and the significance of his existence must be shown -to be "error"); parents are only an "accidental cause."--The mistake -on the part of science in considering the individual as the result of -all past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is now becoming -known. - - -380. - -1. Systematic _falsification of history,_ so that it may present a -proof of the moral valuation: - -_(a)_ The decline of a people and corruption. _(b)_ The rise of a -people and virtue. _(c)_ The zenith of a people ("its culture") -regarded as the result of high moral excellence. - -2. Systematic falsification of _great men, great creators,_ and _great -periods._ The desire is to make _faith_ that which distinguishes great -men: whereas carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immorality," -the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to greatness (Cæsar, Frederick -the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe). -The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed. - - -381. - -A great _lie_ in history; as if the _corruption of the Church were the -cause_ of the Reformation! This was only the pretext and self-deception -of the agitators--very strong needs were making themselves felt, the -brutality of which sorely required a spiritual dressing. - - -382. - -Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the _emancipation_ -from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral -prejudices which is coincident with the emancipation of a great mind; -he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully -contrived to set up the only moral value he honoured--self-effacement, -as the one _condition_ of highest intellectual activity: "objective" -contemplation. "Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the -withdrawal of the _will_.... - -Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a _fundamentally different -valuation._ Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will, -of morality and immorality, _I know nothing about at all._ The moral is -a lower kind of animal than the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he -is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type of his own. He -is a copy; at the best, a good copy--the standard of his worth lies -_without_ him. I value a man according to the _quantum of power and -fullness of his will_: not according to the enfeeblement and moribund -state thereof. I consider that a philosophy which _teaches_ the denial -of will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test the _power_ of -a _will_ according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the -amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its -own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with -the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one -day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been. - -The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive -at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what -the good man already _does_ instinctively.... He denies that there can -be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a _non plus -ultra.._.. Here intellectuality is placed much lower than goodness; its -highest value (as art, for instance) would be to lead up to, and to -advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predominance of _moral -values._ - -Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise _Kant_: there was nothing -Greek in Kant; he was quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in -regard to the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see Goethe's -words concerning the radically evil element in human nature[8]). -_Saintliness_ also lurked somewhere in his soul.... I require a -criticism of the saintly type. - -Hegel's value: "Passion." - -Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal -save that of the mediocre man. - -Fundamental instinct of all philosophers, historians, and -psychologists: everything of _value_ in mankind, art, history, science, -religion, and technology must be shown to be _morally valuable_ and -_morally conditioned,_ in its aim, means, and result. Everything is -seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's -question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow better?"--a -funny question, for the reverse is _obvious,_ and is a fact which -speaks _in favour_ of civilisation. - - -[Footnote 8: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--This is doubtless a reference to a -passage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on 7th June 1793, -from the camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which the following -words occur:--"_Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen -Mantel, nachdem er ein langes Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von -mancherlei sudelhaften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem -Schandfleck des radikalen Bösen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen -herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu küssen?--_("Kant, on the other hand, -after he had tried throughout his life to keep his philosophical cloak -unsoiled by foul prejudices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the -disreputable stain of the 'radical evil' in human nature, in order that -Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem.") From this passage -it will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view of Kant; -namely, that he was a Christian in disguise.] - - -383. - -_Religious morality.--_Passion, great desire; the passion for power, -love, revenge, and property: the moralists wish to uproot and -exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out -of it. - -The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they -are evil and ought to be condemned. Man must wring himself free from -them, otherwise he cannot be a _good_ man.... - -This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it -out." In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity," -the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His -disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be -only the loss of a particular member, but the actual castration of the -whole of the man's character.... And the same applies to the moral -mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, -sues for their extirpation. Its conclusion always is: only the -emasculated man is a good man. - -Instead of making use of and of _economising_ the great sources of -passion, those torrents of the soul which are often so dangerous, -overwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted and most -corrupted of mental attitudes--would fain make them _dry up._ - - -384. - -_Conquest over the passions?_--No, not if this is to mean their -enfeeblement and annihilation. _They must be enlisted in our service_: -and to this end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good deal (not -as individuals, but as communities, races, etc.). At length we should -trust them enough to restore their freedom to them: they love us like -good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie. - - -385. - -_Intolerance on the part of morality_ is a sign of man's _weakness_: -he is frightened of his own "immorality," he must _deny_ his strongest -_instincts,_ because he does not yet know how to use them. Thus the -most fruitful quarters of the globe remain uncultivated longest: the -power is lacking that might become master here.... - - -386. - -There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous -fine weather would be a desirable thing: they still believe to-day -in _rebus moralibus,_ that the "good man" alone and nothing else than -the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's -evolution will be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that -it is only to that end that all efforts should be directed). This is -in the highest degree an _uneconomical_ thought; as we have already -suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity, and it is nothing more -than the expression of the _agreeableness_ which the "good man" creates -(he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, he gives what one -is able to take). - -With a more educated eye one learns to desire exactly the reverse--that -is to say, an ever greater _dominion of evil,_ man's gradual -emancipation from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the -growth of power around the greatest forces of Nature, and the ability -to enlist the passions in one's service. - - -387. - -The whole idea of the hierarchy of the _passions_: as if the only right -and normal thing were to be led by _reason_--whereas the passions are -abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as their end -is concerned, nothing more than _desires for pleasure...._ - -Passion is deprived of its dignity (1) as if it only manifested -itself in an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the -_motive force_, (2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high -purpose--merely at pleasure.... - -The misinterpretation of passion and _reason,_ as if the latter were -an independent entity, and not a state of relationship between all -the various passions and desires; and as though every passion did not -possess its quantum of reason.... - - -388. - -How it was that, under the pressure of the dominion of an ascetic -and _self-effacing morality,_ it was precisely the passions--love, -goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were -necessarily misunderstood? - -It is the _richness of a personality,_ the fullness of it, its power -to flow over and to bestow, its instinctive feeling of ease, and its -affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love and great -sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism -as surely as do the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner -certainty that one has a right to everything. The _opposite_ views, -according to the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and if -one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing to -give, and it is perfectly useless to stretch out one's hand either to -protect or to support others.... - -How was it possible to _transform_ these instincts to such an extent -that man could feel that to be of value which is directed against -himself, so that he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the -psychological baseness and falseness which hitherto has laid down the -law in the Church and in Church-infected philosophy! - -If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do is to hate himself. As -a matter of fact, he ought not to regard even his fellows otherwise -than he does himself; the love of man requires a justification, and it -is found in the fact that _God commanded it._--From this it follows -that all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) appear to him -to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he re-acquires a right to -them only after having _denied_ them as an obedient worshipper of God. -... Pascal, the admirable _logician_ of Christianity, _went as far as -this_! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make -one's self loved," seemed Christian to him. - - -389. - -Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal") -makes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The "egoists.") - -The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in Europe (Pascal, -La Rochefoucauld)--inner enfeeblement, discouragement, and -self-consumption of the non-gregarious man. - -The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being -the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, Nature converted into an -instrument). - -Pangs of conscience associated with all that is self-glorifying and -original: thus follows the unhappiness--the _gloominess_ of the world -from the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men! - -Gregarious consciousness and timorousness transferred to philosophy and -religion. - -Let us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish -action out of consideration! - - -390. - -My ultimate conclusion is, that the _real_ man represents a much -higher value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever -existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have -been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular -kind of man has sought to establish _his_ measures of preservation -and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this -kind which has been made to dominate has _reduced_ man's worth, his -strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre -intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he -reveals a _desire_; that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been -developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely -to the "desirable," _worth of man_; that, up to the present, ideals -have really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the -poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have _seduced -men to yearn for nonentity_.... - - - -D. _A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating._ - - -391. - -The standard _according_ to which the value of moral valuations is to -be determined. - -The fundamental fact _that has been overlooked_: The contradiction -between "becoming more moral" and the elevation and the strengthening -of the type man. - -_Homo natura_: The "will to power." - - -392. - -Moral values regarded as _values of appearance_ and compared with -_physiological_ values. - - -393. - -Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde: the last of the -"desiderata" concerning men, for instance, have never been regarded as -problems by philosophers. They always postulate the "_improvement_" -of man, quite guilelessly, as though by means of some intuition they -had been helped over the note of interrogation following the question, -_why_ necessarily "_improve!_" To what extent is it _desirable_ that -man should be more _virtuous,_ or more _intelligent,_ or _happier!_ -Granting that nobody yet _knows_ the "wherefore?" of mankind, all -such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one -of them--who knows?--perhaps one is frustrating the other. Is an -increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and -insight? _Dubito_: only too often shall I have occasion to show that -the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the strict sense of the -word, not always been opposed to happiness hitherto? And again, does it -not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation as a necessary -means? And if the aim were to arrive at the _highest insight,_ would -it not therefore be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in -happiness, and to choose danger, adventure, mistrust, and seduction as -a road to enlightenment?... And suppose one will have happiness; maybe -one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit." - - -394. - -The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called _moral improvement._ - -We do not believe that one man can be another if he is not that -other already--that is to say, if he is not, as often happens, an -accretion of personalities or at least of parts of persons. In this -case it is possible to draw another set of actions from him into the -foreground, and to drive back "the older man." ... The man's aspect -is altered, but _not_ his actual nature.... It is but the merest -_factum brutum_ that any one should cease from performing certain -actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations. -Neither does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing -a certain action is entirely arrested, nor that the reasons for -that action are dissipated. He whose destiny and abilities make him -a criminal never unlearns anything, but is continually adding to his -store of knowledge: and long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on -his talent.... Certainly, as far as society is concerned, the only -interesting fact is that some one has ceased from performing certain -actions; and to this end society will often raise a man out of those -circumstances which make him _able_ to perform those actions: this -is obviously a wiser course than that of trying to break his destiny -and his particular nature. The Church,--which has done nothing except -to take the place of, and to appropriate, the philosophic treasures -of antiquity,--starting out from another standpoint and wishing to -secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul, believes in the expiatory -power of punishment, as also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: -both of which supposed processes are deceptions due to religious -prejudice--punishment expiates nothing, forgiveness obliterates -nothing; what is done cannot be undone. Because some one forgets -something it by no means proves that something has been wiped out.... -An action leads to certain consequences, both among men and away from -men, and it matters not whether it has met with punishment, or whether -it has been "expiated," "forgiven," or "obliterated," it matters not -even if the Church meanwhile canonises the man who performed it. The -Church believes in things that do not exist, it believes in "Souls"; it -believes in "influences" that do not exist--in divine influences; it -believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual -salvation: in all things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with -signs, attitudes, words, to which it lends an arbitrary interpretation. -It possesses a method of counterfeit psychology which is thought out -quite systematically. - - -395. - -"Illness makes men better," this famous assumption which is to be met -with in all ages, and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as in -the mouth and maw of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of -discovering whether there is any truth in it, one might be allowed to -ask whether there is not perhaps a fundamental relationship between -morality and illness? Regarded as a whole, could not the "improvement -of mankind"--that is to say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, -and taming which the European has undergone within the last two -centuries--be regarded as the result of a long course of secret and -ghastly suffering, failure, abstinence, and grief? Has illness made -"Europeans" "better"? Or, put into other words, is not our modern -soft-hearted European morality, which could be likened to that of the -Chinese, perhaps an expression of physiological _deterioration_?... -It cannot be denied, for instance, that wherever history shows us -"man" in a state of particular glory and power, his type is always -dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares little for humanity; -and perhaps, in those cases in which _it seems otherwise,_ all that -was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the -surface in psychological matters, in order even in them to discover the -general proposition: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful, and -enterprising a man may feel, the more immoral he will be as well." A -terrible thought, to which one should on no account give way. Provided, -however, that one take a few steps forward with this thought, how -wondrous does the future then appear! What will then be paid for more -dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing which we are all trying -to promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving, -and the increased "civilisation" of man? Nothing would then be more -expensive than virtue: for by means of it the world would ultimately -be turned into a hospital: and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, -"everybody must be everybody else's nurse." Then we should certainly -have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired! But how little -"joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton -spirits, daring, and danger! So few "actions" which would make life on -earth worth living! Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not all the -_great_ things and deeds which have remained fresh in the memory of -men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been _immoral_ in the -deepest sense of the word?... - - -396. - -The priests--and with them the half-priests or philosophers of all -ages--have always called that doctrine true, the educating influence -of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--that is to say, -tended to "improve." In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian -empiric and miracle-worker who, because he had tried a certain poison -as a cure, declared it to be no poison. "By their fruits ye shall know -them"--that is to say, "by our truths." This has been the reasoning -of priests until this day. They have squandered their sagacity, with -results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof -of power" (or the proof "by the fruits ") pre-eminent and even supreme -arbiter over all other forms of proof. "That which makes good must -be good; that which is good cannot lie"--these are their inexorable -conclusions--"that which bears good fruit must consequently be true; -there is no other criterion of truth." ... - -But to the extent to which "improving" acts as an argument, -deteriorating must also act as a refutation. The error can be shown to -be an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a false -step, a vice can refute.... This indecent form of opposition, which -comes from below and behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died -out either. Priests, as psychologists, never discovered anything more -interesting than spying out the secret vices of their adversaries--they -prove Christianity by looking about for the world's filth. They apply -this principle more particularly to the greatest on earth, to the -geniuses: readers will remember how Goethe has been attacked on every -conceivable occasion in Germany (Klopstock and Herder were among the -first to give a "good example" in this respect--birds of a feather -flock together). - - -397. - -One must be very immoral in order to _make people moral by deeds._ The -moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he -who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for -anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist. - -Morality is a menagerie; it assumes that iron bars may be more useful -than freedom, even for the creatures it imprisons; it also assumes that -there are animal-tamers about who do not shrink from terrible means, -and who are acquainted with the use of red-hot iron. This terrible -species, which enters into a struggle with the wild animal, is called -"priests." - -*** - -Man, incarcerated in an iron cage of errors, has become a caricature -of man; he is sick, emaciated, ill-disposed towards himself, filled -with a loathing of the impulses of life, filled with a mistrust of -all that is beautiful and happy in life--in fact, he is a wandering -monument of misery. How shall we ever succeed in vindicating this -phenomenon--this artificial, arbitrary, and _recent_ miscarriage--the -sinner--which the priests have bred on their territory? - -*** - -In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two _biological_ -notions in its place: the _taming_ of the wild beasts, and the _rearing -of a particular species._ - -The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to -"_improve_" ... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a -lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a -rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even -the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his -species. But he is less harmful.... - - -398. - -What I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is:-- - -_(a)_ That there is no worse confusion than that which confounds -_rearing_ and _taming_: and these two things have always been -confused.... Rearing, as I understand it, is a means of husbanding -the enormous powers of humanity in such a way that whole generations -may build upon the foundations laid by their progenitors--not only -outwardly, but inwardly, organically, developing from the already -existing stem and growing _stronger_.... - -_(b)_ That there is an exceptional danger in believing that mankind as -a whole is developing and growing stronger, if individuals are seen -to grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity--mankind--is -an abstract thing: the object of _rearing,_ even in regard to the most -individual cases, can only be the _strong_ man (the man who has no -breeding is weak, dissipated, and unstable). - - - -6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE CRITICISM OF MORALITY. - - -399. - -These are the things I demand of you--however badly they may sound in -your ears: that you subject moral valuations themselves to criticism. -That you should put a stop to your instinctive moral impulse--which in -this case demands submission and not criticism--with the question: "why -precisely submission?" That this yearning for a "why?"--for a criticism -of morality should not only be your present form of morality, but the -sublimest of all moralities, and an honour to the age you live in. That -your honesty, your will, may give an account of itself, and not deceive -you: "why not?"--Before what tribunal? - - -400. - -The three _postulates_:-- - - All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the "vulgar - man"). - - All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the - physiologically botched). - - All that is of average worth is high (the protest of the - herd, of the "mediocre"). - -Thus in the _history of morality_ a _will to power_ finds expression, -by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and -the botched, those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre, -attempt to make those valuations prevail which favour _their_ existence. - -From a biological standpoint, therefore, the phenomenon Morality is of -a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed -at the _cost_ of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, -the well-constituted and _beautiful_ natures, the independent and -privileged classes in all respects. - -Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's -endeavours to arrive at a _higher type._ Its effects are: mistrust of -life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral), ---hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are -felt to be opposed to the higher instincts),--Degeneration and -self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them -that the conflict becomes _conscious._ - - -401. - -_Which values have been paramount hitherto?_ - -Morality as the leading value in all phases of philosophy (even with -the Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a "true world" must exist -somewhere. - -What is it that here determines the highest value? What, in sooth, -is morality? The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and -the disinherited who _take their revenge_ in this way and play the -_masters_.... - -Historical proof: philosophers have always been decadents and always in -the pay of Nihilistic religions. - -The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The -introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral. - -General aspect: the values that have been highest hitherto have been a -special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular -instance of _immorality._ - -*** - -Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed. - -1. How was this actually _possible!_ Question: why did life and -physiological well-constitutedness succumb everywhere? Why was there no -affirmative philosophy, no affirmative religion? - - The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion. - Dionysos _versus_ the Christ. The Renaissance. Art. - -2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and -the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger.... - -_General view of history_; Is man an _exception_ in the history of life -on this account?--An objection to _Darwinism._ The means wherewith -the weak succeed in ruling have become: instincts, "humanity," -"institutions." ... - -3. The proof of this rule on the part of the weak is to be found in -our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our -_science._ - -*** - -The _instincts of decadence_ have become master of the _instincts of -ascending_ life.... The _will to nonentity_ has prevailed over the -_will to life_! - -Is this _true_? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and -of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre?--is it -not perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere -slackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even -more dangerous? - -Suppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing: -let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, -suffering, and sacrifice! _Self-contempt on the part of the weak_ would -be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate -their kind. And would this be _desirable_?--should we really like a -world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, -the _plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was -lacking?[9] ... - -We have seen two "wills to power" at war _(in this special case we -had a principle_: that of agreeing with the one that has hitherto -succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto -triumphed): we have recognised the "real world" as a "_world of lies_" -and morality as a _form of immorality._ We do _not_ say "the stronger -is wrong." - -We have understood _what_ it is that has determined the highest values -hitherto, and _why_ the latter should have prevailed over the opposite -value: it was numerically the _stronger_. - -If we now purify _the opposite value_ of the infection, the -half-heartedness, _and the degeneration,_ with which we identify it, we -restore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid. - - -[Footnote 9: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--We realise here the great difference -between Nietzsche and those who draw premature conclusions from -Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in -Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as -the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to -resist and to overthrow _was their supremacy, their excessive power._ -He felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need -of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of -Christian values.] - - -402. - -_Morality,_ a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and -expedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its -supporters. - - -403. - -One ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where -one is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the _disciplinary -school of moral error._--When one judges life morally, it _disgusts_ -one. - -Neither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for -instance, "Nature is cruel." It is precisely when one perceives _that -there is no such central controlling and responsible force that one is -relieved!_ - - _Evolution of man._ A. He tried to attain to a certain power - over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in - order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and - "wild animals.") - - B. If power over Nature has been attained, this power can - be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a - self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle. - - -404. - -Morality may be regarded as the _illusion of a species,_ fostered with -the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future, -and seemingly granting him such a very great value, that with that -_self-consciousness_ he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides -of his nature, and find it difficult to be pleased with himself. - -We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done -hitherto: _but now it is no more than a burden_ which may prove fatal. -_Morality itself_ in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality. - - -405. - -To what extent is the _self-destruction of morality_ still a sign of -its own strength? We Europeans have within us the blood of those who -were ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality frightfully -seriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time, -sacrificed to it. On the other hand, our intellectual subtlety has -been reached essentially through the vivisection of our consciences. -We do not yet know the "whither" towards which we are urging our -steps, now that we have departed from the soil of our forebears. But -it was on this very soil that we acquired the strength which is now -driving us from our homes in search of adventure, and it is thanks -to that strength that we are now in mid-sea, surrounded by untried -possibilities and things undiscovered--we can no longer choose, we must -be conquerors, now that we have no land in which we feel at home and -in which we would fain "survive." A concealed "_yea_" is driving us -forward, and it is stronger than all our "nays." Even our _strength_ no -longer bears with us in the old swampy land: we venture out into the -open, we attempt the task. The world is still rich and undiscovered, -and even to perish were better than to be half-men or poisonous men. -Our very strength itself urges us to take to the sea; there where all -suns have hitherto sunk we know of a new world.... - - - - -III. - -CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. - - -1. GENERAL REMARKS. - - - -406. - -Let us rid ourselves of a few superstitions which heretofore have been -fashionable among philosophers! - - -407. - -Philosophers are prejudiced _against_ appearance, change, pain, death, -the things of the body, the senses, fate, bondage, and all that which -has no purpose. - -In the first place, they believe in: absolute knowledge, (2) in -knowledge for its own sake, - -(3) in virtue and happiness as necessarily related, - -(4) in the recognisability of men's acts. They are led by instinctive -determinations of values, in which _former_ cultures are reflected -(more dangerous cultures too). - - -408. - -What have philosophers _lacked_! (1) A sense of history, (2) a -knowledge of physiology, (3) a goal in the future.--The ability to -criticise without irony or moral condemnation. - - -409. - -Philosophers have had (1) from times immemorial a wonderful capacity -for the _contradictio in adjecto,_ (2) they have always trusted -concepts as unconditionally as they have mistrusted the senses: it -never seems to have occurred to them that notions and words are our -inheritance of past ages in which thinking was neither very clear nor -very exact. - -What seems to dawn upon philosophers last of all: that they must -no longer allow themselves to be presented with concepts already -conceived, nor must they merely purify and polish up those concepts; -but they must first _make_ them, _create_ them, themselves, and -then present them and get people to accept them. Up to the present, -people have trusted their concepts generally, as if they had been a -wonderful _dowry_ from some kind of wonderland: but they constitute -the inheritance of our most remote, most foolish, and most intelligent -forefathers. This _piety_ towards that _which already exists in us_ -is perhaps related to the _moral element in science._ What we needed -above all is absolute scepticism towards all traditional concepts (like -that which a certain philosopher may already have possessed--and he was -Plato, of course: for he taught _the reverse_). - - -410. - -Profoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of the theory of knowledge, -I liked to look now out of this window, now out of that, though I took -good care not to become finally fixed anywhere, indeed I should have -thought it dangerous to have done so--though finally: is it within the -range of probabilities for an instrument to criticise its own fitness? -What I noticed more particularly was, that no scientific scepticism or -dogmatism has ever arisen quite free from all _arrières pensées_--that -it has only a secondary value as soon as the motive lying immediately -behind it is discovered. - -Fundamental aspect: Kant's, Hegel's, Schopenhauer's, the sceptical and -epochistical, the historifying and the pessimistic attitudes--all have -a _moral_ origin. I have found no one who has dared to _criticise the -moral valuations,_ and I soon turned my back upon the meagre attempts -that have been made to describe the evolution of these feelings (by -English and German Darwinians). - -How can Spinoza's position, his denial and repudiation of the moral -values, be explained? (It was the result of his Theodicy!) - - -411. - -_Morality regarded as the highest form of protection._--Our world is -_either_ the work and expression (the _modus_) of God, in which case -it must be _in the highest degree perfect_ (Leibnitz's conclusion -...),--and no one doubted that he knew what perfection must be -like,--and then all evil can only be _apparent_ (Spinoza is _more -radical,_ he says this of good and evil), or it must be a part of God's -high purpose (a consequence of a particularly great mark of favour -on God's part, who thus allows man to choose between good and evil: -the privilege of being no automaton; "freedom," with the ever-present -danger of making a mistake and of choosing wrongly.... See Simplicius, -for instance, in the commentary to Epictetus). - -_Or_ our world is imperfect; evil and guilt are real, determined, and -are absolutely inherent to its being; in that case it cannot be the -_real_ world: consequently knowledge can only be a way of denying -the world, for the latter is error which may be recognised as such. -This is Schopenhauer's opinion, based upon Kantian first principles. -Pascal was still more desperate: he thought that even knowledge must be -corrupt and false--that _revelation_ is a necessity if only in order to -recognise that the world should be denied.... - - -412. - -Owing to our habit of believing in unconditional authorities, we have -grown to feel a profound need for them: indeed, this feeling is so -strong that, even in an age of criticism such as Kant's was, it showed -itself to be superior to the need for criticism, and, in a certain -sense, was able to subject the whole work of critical acumen, and to -convert it to its own use. It proved its superiority once more in -the generation which followed, and which, owing to its historical -instincts, naturally felt itself drawn to a relative view of all -authority, when it converted even the Hegelian philosophy of evolution -(history rechristened and called philosophy) to its own use, and -represented history as being the self-revelation and self-surpassing -of moral ideas. Since Plato, philosophy has lain under the dominion of -morality. Even in Plato's predecessors, moral interpretations play a -most important rôle (Anaximander declares that all things are made to -perish as a punishment for their departure from pure being; Heraclitus -thinks that the regularity of phenomena is a proof of the morally -correct character of evolution in general). - - -413. - -The progress of philosophy has been hindered most seriously hitherto -through the influence of moral _arrières-pensées._ - - -414. - -In all ages, "fine feelings" have been regarded as arguments, "heaving -breasts" have been the bellows of godliness, convictions have been the -"criteria" of truth, and the need of opposition has been the note of -interrogation affixed to wisdom. This falseness and fraud permeates -the whole history of philosophy. But for a few respected sceptics, -no instinct for intellectual Uprightness is to be found anywhere. -Finally, _Kant_ guilelessly sought to make this thinker's corruption -scientific by means of his concept, "_practical reason_". He expressly -invented a reason which, in certain cases, would allow one _not_ to -bother about reason--that is to say, in cases where the heart's desire, -morality, or "duty" are the motive power. - - -415. - -_Hegel_: his popular side, the doctrine of war and of great men. Right -is on the side of the victorious: he (the victorious man) stands for -the progress of mankind. His is an attempt at proving the dominion of -morality by means of history. - -Kant: a kingdom of moral values withdrawn from us, invisible, real. - -Hegel: a demonstrable process of evolution, the actualisation of the -kingdom of morality. - -We shall not allow ourselves to be deceived either in Kant's or Hegel's -way:--We no longer _believe,_ as they did, in morality, and therefore -have no philosophies to found with the view of justifying morality. -Criticism and history have no charm for us _in this_ respect: what is -their charm, then? - - -416. - -The importance of German philosophy (_Hegel,_) the thinking out of a -kind of _pantheism_ which would not reckon evil, error, and suffering -as arguments against godliness. _This grand initiative_ was misused -by the powers that were (State, etc.) to sanction the rights of the -people that happened to be paramount. - -_Schopenhauer_ appears as a stubborn opponent of this idea; he is a -moral man who, in order to keep in the right concerning his moral -valuation, finally becomes a _denier of the world._ Ultimately he -becomes a "mystic." - -I myself have sought an _æsthetic_ justification of the ugliness in -this world. I regarded the desire for beauty and for the persistence -of certain forms as a temporary preservative and recuperative measure: -what seemed to me to be fundamentally associated with pain, however, -was the eternal lust of creating and the _eternal compulsion to -destroy._ - -We call things ugly when we look at them with the desire of attributing -some sense, some _new_ sense, to what has become senseless: it is the -accumulated power of the creator which compels him to regard what has -existed hitherto as no longer acceptable, botched, worthy of being -suppressed--ugly! - - -417. - -_My first solution of the problem: Dionysian wisdom. The joy in the -destruction of the most noble thing,_ and at the sight of its gradual -undoing, regarded as the joy over what is _coming and what lies in the -future,_ which triumphs over _actual things, however good they may -be._ Dionysian: temporary identification with the principle of life -(voluptuousness of the martyr included). - -_My innovations._ The Development of Pessimism: intellectual -pessimism; _moral_ criticism, the dissolution of the last comfort. -Knowledge, a sign of _decay,_ veils by means of an illusion all strong -action; isolated culture is unfair and therefore strong. - -(1) My _fight_ against decay and the increasing weakness of -personality. I sought a new _centrum._ - -(2) The impossibility of this endeavour is _recognised._ - -(3) _I therefore travelled farther along the road of dissolution--and -along it I found new sources of strength for individuals._ We _must -be destroyers_!--I perceived that the state of _dissolution is one -in which individual beings are able to arrive at a kind of perfection -not possible hitherto, it is an image and isolated example of life -in general._ To the paralysing feeling of general dissolution and -imperfection, I opposed the _Eternal Recurrence._ - - -418. - -People naturally seek the picture of life in _that_ philosophy which -makes them most cheerful--that is to say, in that philosophy which -gives the highest sense of freedom to _their strongest instinct._ This -is probably the case with me. - - -419. - -German philosophy, as a whole,--Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, to -mention the greatest,--is the most out-and-out _form of romanticism_ -and home-sickness that has ever yet existed: it is a yearning for the -best that has ever been known on earth. One is at home nowhere; that -which is ultimately yearned after is a place where one can somehow -feel at home; because one has been at home there before, and that -place is the _Greek_ world! But it is precisely in that direction -that airbridges are broken down_--save,_ of course, the rainbow -of concepts! And the latter lead everywhere, to all the homes and -"fatherlands" that ever existed for Greek souls! Certainly, one must be -very light and thin in order to cross these bridges! But what happiness -lies even in this desire for spirituality, almost for ghostliness! -With it, how far one is from the "press and bustle" and the mechanical -boorishness of the natural sciences, how far from the vulgar din -of "modern ideas"! One wants to get back to the Greeks _via_ the -Fathers of the Church, from North to South, from formulæ to forms; the -passage out of antiquity--Christianity--is still a source of joy as a -means of access to antiquity, as a portion of the old world itself, -as a glistening mosaic of ancient concepts and ancient valuations. -Arabesques, scroll-work, rococo of scholastic abstractions--always -better, that is to say, finer and more slender, than the peasant and -plebeian reality of Northern Europe, and still a protest on the part -of higher intellectuality against the peasant war and insurrection -of the mob which have become master of the intellectual taste of -Northern Europe, and which had its leader in a man as great and -unintellectual as Luther:--in this respect German philosophy belongs -to the Counter-Reformation, it might even be looked upon as related -to the Renaissance, or at least to the will to Renaissance, the will -to get ahead with the discovery of antiquity, with the excavation of -ancient philosophy, and above all of pre-Socratic philosophy--the -most thoroughly dilapidated of all Greek temples! Possibly, in à few -hundred years, people will be of the opinion that all German philosophy -derived its dignity from this fact, that step by step it attempted -to reclaim the soil of antiquity, and that therefore all demands for -"originality" must appear both petty and foolish when compared with -Germany's higher claim to having refastened the bonds which seemed for -ever rent--the bonds which bound us to the Greeks, the highest type -of "men" ever evolved hitherto. To-day we are once more approaching -all the fundamental principles of the cosmogony which the Greek mind -in Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and -Anaxagoras, was responsible for. Day by day we are growing more -_Greek_; at first, as is only natural, the change remains confined to -concepts and valuations, and we hover around like Greasing spirits: but -it is to be hoped that some day our _body_ will also be involved! Here -lies (and has always lain) my hope for the German nation. - - -420. - -I do not wish to convert anybody to philosophy: it is both necessary -and perhaps desirable that the philosopher should be a _rare_ -plant. Nothing is more repugnant to me than the scholarly praise of -philosophy which is to be found in Seneca and Cicero. Philosophy -has not much in common with virtue. I trust I may be allowed to say -that even the scientific man is a fundamentally different person -from the philosopher. What I most desire is, that the genuine notion -"philosopher" should not completely perish in Germany. There are so -many incomplete creatures in Germany already who would fain conceal -their ineptitude beneath such noble names. - - -421. - -I must _set up the highest ideal of a philosopher._ Learning is not -everything! The scholar is the sheep in the kingdom of learning; he -studies because he is told to do so, and because others have done so -before him. - - -422. - -The superstition concerning _philosophers_: They are confounded with -men _of science._ As if the value of things were inherent in them -and required only to be held on to tightly! To what extent are their -researches carried on under the influence of values which already -prevail (their hatred of appearance of the body, etc.)? Schopenhauer -concerning morality (scorn of Utilitarianism). Ultimately the confusion -goes so far that Darwinism is regarded as philosophy, and thus at the -present day power has gone over to the men of _science._ Even Frenchmen -like Taine prosecute research, or mean to prosecute research, -_without_ being already in possession of a standard of valuation. -Prostration before "facts" of a kind of cult. As a matter of fact, they -_destroy_ the existing valuations. - -The _explanation_ of this misunderstanding. The man who is able to -command is a rare phenomenon; he misinterprets himself. What one -_wants_ to do, above all, is to disclaim all authority and to attribute -it to _circumstances._ In Germany the critic's estimations belong to -the history of awakening _manhood._ Lessing, etc. (Napoleon concerning -Goethe). As a matter of fact, the movement is again made retrograde -owing to German romanticism: and the _fame_ of German philosophy -relies upon it as if it dissipated the danger of scepticism and could -_demonstrate faith._ Both tendencies culminate in Hegel: at bottom, -what he did was to generalise the fact of German criticism and the -fact of German romanticism,--a kind of dialectical fatalism, but to -the honour of intellectuality, with the actual submission of the -philosopher to reality. _The critic prepares the way_: that is all! - -With Schopenhauer the philosopher's mission dawns; it is felt that -the object is to determine _values_; still under the dominion of -eudemonism. The ideal of Pessimism. - - -423. - -_Theory and practice._--This is a pernicious distinction, as if there -were an _instinct of knowledge,_ which, without inquiring into the -utility or harmfulness of a thing, blindly charged at the truth; and -then that, apart from this instinct, there were the whole world of -_practical_ interests. - -In contradiction of this, I try to show what instincts are active -behind all these _pure_ theorists,--and how the latter, as a whole, -under the dominion of their instincts, fatally make for something -which _to their minds_ is "truth," to their minds and _only_ to their -minds. The struggle between systems, together with the struggle between -epistemological scruples, is one which involves very special instincts -(forms of vitality, of decline, of classes, of races, etc.). - -The so-called _thirst for knowledge_ may be traced to the _lust of -appropriation_ and of _conquest_: in obedience to this lust the -senses, memory, and the instincts, etc., were developed. The quickest -possible reduction of the phenomena, economy, the accumulation of spoil -from the world of knowledge (_i.e._ that portion of the world which has -been appropriated and made manageable).... - -Morality is therefore such a curious science, because it is in the -highest degree _practical_: the purely scientific position, scientific -uprightness, is thus immediately abandoned, as soon as morality calls -for replies to its questions. Morality says: I _require_ certain -answers--reasons, arguments; scruples may come afterwards, or they may -not come at all. - -"How must one act?" If one considers that one is dealing with a -supremely evolved type--a type which has been "dealt with" for -countless thousands of years, and in which everything has become -instinct, expediency, automatism, fatality, the _urgency_ of this moral -question seems rather funny. - -"How must one act?" Morality has always been a subject of -misunderstanding: as a matter of fact, a certain species, which was -constituted to act in a certain way, wished to justify itself by -_making_ its norm paramount. - -"How must one act?" this is not a cause, but an _effect._ Morality -follows, the ideal comes first.... - -On the other hand, the appearance of moral scruples (or in other -words, _the coming to consciousness of the values_ which guide action) -betray a certain _morbidness_; strong ages and people do not ponder -over their rights, nor over the principles of action, over instinct or -over reason. _Consciousness_ is a sign that the real morality--that -is to say, the certainty of instinct which leads to a definite -course of action--is going to the dogs.... Every time a new _world -of consciousness_ is created, the moralists are signs of a lesion, -of impoverishment and of disorganisation. Those who are _deeply -instinctive_ fear bandying words over duties: among them are found -pyrrhonic opponents of dialectics and of knowableness in general.... A -virtue is _refuted_ with a "for." ... - -_Thesis_: The appearance of moralists belongs to periods when morality -is declining. - -_Thesis_: The moralist is a dissipator of moral instincts, however much -he may appear to be their restorer. - -_Thesis_: That which really prompts the action of a moralist is not a -moral instinct, but the _instincts of decadence,_ translated into the -forms of morality (he regards the growing uncertainty of the instincts -as _corruption_). - -_Thesis_: The _instincts of decadence_ which, thanks to moralists, wish -to become master of the instinctive morality of stronger races and -ages, are:-- - -(1) The instincts of the weak and of the botched; - -(2) The instincts of the exceptions, of the anchorites, of the -unhinged, of the abortions of quality or of the reverse; - -(3) The instincts of the habitually suffering, who require a noble -interpretation of their condition, and who therefore require to be as -poor physiologists as possible. - - -424. - -The humbug of the _scientific spirit._--One should not affect the -spirit of science, when the time to be scientific is not yet at -hand; but even the genuine investigator has to abandon vanity, and -has to affect a certain kind of method which is not yet seasonable. -Neither should we falsify things and thoughts, which we have arrived -at differently, by means of a false arrangement of deduction and -dialectics. It is thus that Kant in his "morality" falsifies his -inner tendency to psychology; a more modern example of the same thing -is Herbert Spencer's _Ethics._ A man should neither conceal nor -misrepresent the _facts_ concerning the way in which he conceived his -thoughts. The deepest and most inexhaustible books will certainly -always have something of the aphoristic and impetuous character of -Pascal's _Pensées_. The motive forces and valuations have lain long -below the surface; that which comes uppermost is their effect. - -I guard against all the humbug of a false scientific spirit:-- - -(1) In respect of the manner of _demonstration,_ if it does not -correspond to the genesis of the thoughts; - -(2) In respect of the demands for _methods_ which, at a given period in -science, may be quite impossible; - -(3) In respect of the demand for _objectivity_ for cold impersonal -treatment, where, as in the case of all valuations, we describe -ourselves and our intimate experiences in a couple of words. There -are ludicrous forms of vanity, as, for instance, Sainte-Beuve's. He -actually worried himself all his life because he had shown some warmth -or passion either "_pro_" or "con," and he would fein have lied that -fact out of his life. - - -425. - -"Objectivity" in the philosopher: moral indifference in regard to one's -self, blindness in regard to either favourable or fetal circumstances. -Unscrupulousness in the use of dangerous means; perversity and -complexity of character considered as an advantage and exploited. - -My profound indifference to myself: I refuse to derive any advantage -from my knowledge, nor do I wish to escape any disadvantages which it -may entail.--I include among these disadvantages that which is called -the _perversion_ of character; this prospect is beside the point: I use -my character, but I try neither to understand it nor to change it--the -personal calculation of virtue has not entered my head once. It strikes -me that one closes the doors of knowledge as soon as one becomes -interested in one's own personal case--or even in the "Salvation of -one's soul"!... One should not take one's morality too seriously, nor -should one forfeit a modest right to the opposite of morality.... - -A sort of _heritage of morality_ is perhaps presupposed here: one -feels that one can be lavish with it and fling a great deal of it out -of the window without materially reducing one's means. One is never -tempted to admire "beautiful souls," one always knows one's self to be -their superior. The monsters of virtue should be met with inner scorn; -_déniaiser la vertu_--Oh, the joy of it! - -One should revolve round one's self, have no desire to be "better" or -"anything else" at all than one is. One should be too interested to -omit throwing the tentacles or meshes of every morality out to things. - - -426. - -Concerning the psychology of _philosophers._ They should be -psychologists--this was possible only from the nineteenth century -onwards--and no longer little Jack Homers, who see three or four -feet in front of them, and are almost satisfied to burrow inside -themselves. We psychologists of the future are not very intent on -self-contemplation: we regard it almost as a sign of degeneration when -an instrument endeavours "to know itself":[10] we are instruments of -knowledge and we would fain possess all the precision and ingenuousness -of an instrument--consequently we may not analyse or "know" ourselves. -The first sign of a great psychologist's self-preservative instinct: -he never goes in search of himself, he has no eye, no interest, no -inquisitiveness where he himself is concerned.... The great egoism -of our dominating will insists on our completely shutting our eyes to -ourselves, and on our appearing "impersonal," "disinterested"!--Oh to -what a ridiculous degree we are the reverse of this! - -We are no Pascals, we are not particularly interested in the -"Salvation of the soul," in our own happiness, and in our own -virtue.--We have neither enough time nor enough curiosity to be so -concerned with ourselves. Regarded more deeply, the case is again -different, we thoroughly mistrust all men who thus contemplate their -own navels: because introspection seems to us a degenerate form of -the psychologist's genius, as a note of interrogation affixed to the -psychologist's instinct: just as a painter's eye is degenerate which is -actuated by the _will_ to see for the sake of seeing. - - -[Footnote 10: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Goethe invariably inveighed against -the "gnoti seauton" of the Socratic school; he was of the opinion that -an animal which tries to see its inner self must be sick.] - - - - -2. A CRITICISM OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. - - -427. - -The apparition of Greek philosophers since the time of Socrates is a -symptom of decadence; the anti-Hellenic instincts become paramount. - -The "_Sophist_" is still quite Hellenic--as are also Anaxagoras, -Democritus, and the great Ionians; but only as transitional forms. The -_polis_ loses its faith in the unity of its culture, in its rights of -dominion over every other _polis...._ Cultures, that is to say, "the -gods," are exchanged, and thus the belief in the exclusive prerogative -of the _deus autochthonus_ is lost. Good and Evil of whatever origin -get mixed: the boundaries separating good from evil gradually -_vanish...._ This is the "Sophist." ... - -On the other hand, the "philosopher" is the _reactionary_: he insists -upon the _old_ virtues. He sees the reason of decay in the decay of -institutions: he therefore wishes to revive _old_ institutions;--he -sees decay in the decline of authority: he therefore endeavours to -find _new_ authorities (he travels abroad, explores foreign literature -and exotic religions....);--he will reinstate the _ideal polis,_ after -the concept "polis" has become superannuated (just, as the Jews kept -themselves together as a "people" after they had fallen into slavery). -They become interested in all tyrants: their desire is to re-establish -virtue with "_force majeure_". - -Gradually everything _genuinely Hellenic_ is held responsible for -the state of _decay_ (and Plato is just as ungrateful to Pericles, -Homer, tragedy, and rhetoric as the prophets are to David and -Saul). _The downfall of Greece is conceived as an objection to the -fundamental principles of Hellenic culture: the profound error of -philosophers_--Conclusion: the Greek world perishes. The cause thereof: -Homer, mythology, ancient morality, etc. - -The anti-Hellenic development of philosophers' valuations:--the -Egyptian influence ("Life after death" made into law....);--the Semitic -influence (the "dignity of the sage," the "Sheik");--the Pythagorean -influence, the subterranean cults, Silence, means of terrorisation -consisting of appeals to a "Beyond," _mathematics_: the religious -valuation consisting of a sort of intimacy with a cosmic entity;--the -sacerdotal, ascetic, and transcendental influences;--the _dialectical_ -influence,--I am of opinion that even Plato already betrays revolting -and pedantic meticulousness in his concepts!--Decline of good -intellectual taste: the hateful noisiness of every kind of direct -dialectics seems no longer to be felt. - -The _two_ decadent tendencies and extremes run side by side: (a) the -luxuriant and more charming kind of decadence which shows a love of -pomp and art, and (b) the gloomy kind, with its religious and moral -pathos, its stoical self-hardening tendency, its Platonic denial of the -senses, and its preparation of the soil for the coming of Christianity. - - -428. - -To what extent psychologists have been corrupted by the moral -idiosyncrasy!--Not one of the ancient philosophers had the courage to -advance the theory of the non-free will (that is to say, the theory -that denies morality);--not one had the courage to identify the typical -feature of happiness, of every kind of happiness "pleasure"), with the -will to power: for the pleasure of power was considered immoral;--not -one had the courage to regard virtue as a _result of immorality_ (as a -result of a will to power) in the service of a species (or of a race, -or of a _polis_); for the will to power was considered immoral. - -In the whole of moral evolution, there is no sign of truth: all -the conceptual elements which come into play are fictions; all the -psychological tenets are false; all the forms of logic employed in this -department of prevarication are sophisms. The chief feature of all -moral philosophers is their total lack of intellectual cleanliness and -self-control: they regard "fine feelings" as arguments: their heaving -breasts seem to them the bellows of godliness.... Moral philosophy is -the most suspicious period in the history of the human intellect. - -The first great example: in the name of morality and under its -patronage, a great wrong was committed, which as a matter of fact was -in every respect an act of decadence. Sufficient stress cannot be laid -upon this fact, that the great Greek philosophers not only represented -the decadence of _every kind of Greek ability_, but also made it -_contagious_.... This "virtue" made wholly abstract was the highest -form of seduction; to make oneself abstract means to turn one's back on -the world. - -The moment is a very remarkable one: the Sophists are within sight -of the first _criticism of morality,_ the first _knowledge_ of -morality:--they classify the majority of moral valuations (in view -of their dependence upon local conditions) together;--they lead one -to understand that every form of morality is capable of being upheld -dialectically: that is to say, they guessed that all the fundamental -principles of a morality must be _sophistical_--a proposition which -was afterwards proved in the grandest possible style by the ancient -philosophers from Plato onwards (up to Kant);--they postulate the -primary truth that there is no such thing as a "moral _per se_," a -"good _per se_," and that it is madness to talk of "truth" in this -respect. - -Wherever was _intellectual uprightness_ to be found in those days? - -The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown out of all the Greek -instincts; it belongs to the culture of the age of Pericles as -necessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Heraclitus, -Democritus, and in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it -finds expression in the elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance. -And--it has ultimately shown itself to be right: every step in the -science of epistemology and morality has _confirmed the attitude_ of -the Sophists.... Our modern attitude of mind is, to a great extent, -Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean ... to say that it is -_Protagorean_ is even sufficient: because Protagoras was in himself a -synthesis of the two men Heraclitus and Democritus. - -(_Plato_: a _great Cagliostro,_--let us think of how Epicurus judged -him; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend, judged him----Is Plato's integrity by -any chance beyond question?... But we at least know what he wished to -have _taught_ as absolute truth--namely, things which were to him not -even relative truths: the separate and immortal life of "souls.") - - -429. - -The _Sophists_ are nothing more, nor less than realists: they elevate -all the values and practices which are common property to the rank of -values--they have the courage, peculiar to all strong intellects, -which consists in _knowing_ their immorality.... - -Is it to be supposed that these small Greek independent republics, -so filled with rage and envy that they would fain have devoured each -other, were led by principles of humanity and honesty? Is Thucydides -by any chance reproached with the words he puts into the mouths of -the Athenian ambassadors when they were treating with the Melii anent -the question of destruction or submission? Only the most perfect -Tartuffes could have been able to speak of virtue in the midst of that -dreadful strain--or if not Tartuffes, at least _detached philosophers,_ -anchorites, exiles, and fleers from reality.... All of them, people -who denied things in order to be able to exist. - -The Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and Plato adopted the cause -of virtue and justice, they were _Jews_ or I know not what. _Grote's_ -tactics in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would like to -raise them to the rank of men of honour and moralisers--but it was -their honour not to indulge in any humbug with grand words and virtues. - - -430. - -The great reasonableness underlying all moral education lay in the fact -that it always attempted to attain to _the certainty of an instinct_: -so that neither good intentions nor good means, as such, first required -to enter consciousness. Just as the soldier learns his exercises, so -should man learn how to act in life. In truth this unconsciousness -belongs to every kind of perfection: even the mathematician carries out -his calculations unconsciously.... - -What, then, does Socrates' _reaction_ mean, which recommended -dialectics as the way to virtue, and which was charmed when morality -was unable to justify itself logically? But this is precisely what -proves its _superiority_--without unconsciousness _it is worth nothing_! - -In reality it means _the dissolution of Greek instincts,_ when -_demonstrability_ is posited as the first condition of personal -excellence in virtue. All these great "men of virtue" and of words are -themselves types of dissolution. - -In practice, it means that moral judgments have been torn from the -conditions among which they grew and in which alone they had some -sense, from their Greek and Græco-political soil, in order to be -_denaturalised_ under the cover of being _made sublime._ The great -concepts "good" and "just" are divorced from the first principles of -which they form a part, and, as "ideas" _become free,_ degenerate -into subjects for discussion. A certain truth is sought behind them; -they are regarded as entities or as symbols of entities: a world is -_invented_ where they are "at home," and from which they are supposed -to hail. - -_In short_: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in Plato.... And then it -was necessary to invent the _perfectly abstract_ man also:--good, just, -wise, and a dialectician to boot--in short, the _scarecrow_ of the -ancient philosopher: a plant without any soil whatsoever; a human race -devoid of all definite ruling instincts; a virtue which "justifies" -itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd "individual" _per se_! the -highest form of _Artificiality...._ - -Briefly, the denaturalisation of moral values resulted in the creation -of a degenerate _type of man_--"the good man," "the happy man," -"the wise man."--Socrates represents a moment of the most _profound -perversity_ in the history of values. - - -431. - -_Socrates._--This veering round of Greek taste in favour of dialectics -is a great question. What really happened then? Socrates, the -_roturier_ who was responsible for it, was thus able to triumph over -a more noble taste, the taste of _the noble_:--the mob gets the upper -hand along with dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners -were repudiated in good society; they were regarded as indecent; the -youths were Warned against them. What was the purpose of this display -of reasons? Why demonstrate? Against others one could use authority. -One commanded, and that sufficed. Among friends, _inter pares,_ there -was tradition--_also_ a form of authority: and last but not least, -one understood each other. There was no room found for dialectics. -Besides, all such modes of presenting reasons were distrusted. All -honest things do not carry their reasons in their hands in such -fashion. It is indecent to show all the five fingers at the same time. -That which can be "demonstrated" is little worth. The instinct of -every party-speaker tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and -carries little conviction. Nothing is more easily wiped away than the -effect of a dialectician. It can only be a _last defence._ One must -be in an extremity; it is necessary to have to _extort_ one's rights; -otherwise one makes no use of dialectics. That is why the Jews were -dialecticians, Reynard the Fox was a dialectician, and so was Socrates. -As a dialectician a person has a merciless instrument in his hand: -he can play the tyrant with it; he compromises when he conquers. The -dialectician leaves it to his opponent to demonstrate that he is not an -idiot; he is made furious and helpless, while the dialectician himself -remains calm and still possessed of his triumphant reasoning powers--he -_paralyses_ his opponent's intellect.--The dialectician's irony is a -form of mob-revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the cold -knife-cuts of the syllogism.... - -In Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality and wild fancies, the -charm of concepts was so great, that he involuntarily honoured and -deified the concept as a form of ideal. _Dialectical intoxication_: as -the consciousness of being able to exercise control over one's self by -means of it--as an instrument of the Will to Power. - - -432. - -_The problem of Socrates._--The two antitheses: the _tragic_ and the -_Socratic_ spirits--measured according to the law of Life. - -To what extent is the Socratic spirit a decadent phenomenon? to what -extent are robust health and power still revealed by the whole attitude -of the scientific man, his dialectics, his ability, and his severity? -(the health of the _plebeian_; whose malice, _esprit frondeur,_ -whose astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in check by his -_cleverness_; the whole type is "ugly"). - -_Uglification_: self-derision, dialectical dryness, intelligence in -the form of a _tyrant_ against the "tyrant" (instinct). Everything in -Socrates is exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature; he is a buffoon -with the blood of Voltaire in his veins. - -He discovers a new form of _agon_; he is the first fencing-master in -the superior classed of Athens; he stands for nothing else than the -_highest form of cleverness_: he calls it "virtue" (he regarded it as a -means of _salvation_; he did not choose to be _clever,_ cleverness was -_de rigueur_); the proper thing is to control one's self in suchwise -that one enters into a struggle _not_ with passions but with reasons -as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem--the unravelment of the errors -of passion);--it is desirable to discover how every one may be caught -once he is goaded into a passion, and to know how illogically passion -proceeds; self-mockery is practised in order to injure the very roots -of the _feelings of resentment._ - -It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic states form a part of -the Socratic problem: its association of reason, virtue, and happiness. -With this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things it succeeded -_in charming_ the world: ancient philosophy could not rid itself of -this doctrine.... - -Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of science: the -idiosyncrasy of considering one's self a problem. Acoustic -hallucinations in Socrates: morbid element. When the intellect is -rich and independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying itself -with morality. How is it that Socrates is a _moral-maniac_?--Every -"practical" philosophy immediately steps into the foreground in times -of distress. When morality and religion become the chief interests of a -community, they are signs of a state of distress. - - -433. - -Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as weapons against the_ -wildness of the instincts_. The latter must be dangerous and must -threaten ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by developing -_intelligence_ to this degree of tyranny. In order to make a _tyrant_ -of intelligence the instincts must first have proved themselves -tyrants. This is the problem. It was a very timely one in those days. -Reason became virtue--virtue equalled happiness. - -_Solution_: Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact -of their inner experiences as Socrates does; five feet from excess, -from anarchy and from dissolution--all decadent men. They regard him -as a doctor: Logic as will to power, as will to control self, as will -to "happiness." The wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a -_sign of decadence_, as is also the superfœtation of logic and clear -reasoning in him. Both are abnormities, each belongs to the other. -Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this concern about "happiness" -(_i.e._ about the "salvation of the soul"; _i.e. to feel that one's -condition is a danger_). Its fanatical interest in "happiness" shows -the pathological condition of the subconscious self: it was a vital -interest. The _alternative_ which faced them all was: to be reasonable -or to perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows that they felt -they were in danger. - - -434. - -_Why everything resolved itself into mummery.--_Rudimentary -psychology, which only considered the _conscious_ lapses of men (as -causes), which regarded "consciousness" as an attribute of the soul, -and which sought a will behind every action (_i.e._ an intention), -could only answer "_Happiness_" to the question: "_What does man -desire?_" (it was impossible to answer "Power," because that would have -been _immoral)_;--consequently behind all men's actions there is the -intention of attaining to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if man -as a matter of fact does not attain to happiness, why is it? Because he -mistakes the means thereto.--_What is the unfailing means of acquiring -happiness?_ Answer: _virtue._--Why virtue? Because virtue is supreme -rationalness, and rationalness makes mistakes in the choice of means -impossible: virtue in the form of _reason_ is the way to happiness. -Dialectics is the constant occupation of virtue, because it does away -with passion and intellectual cloudiness. - -As a matter of fact, man does _not_ desire "happiness." Pleasure is -a sensation of power: if the passions are excluded, those states of -the mind are also excluded which afford the greatest sensation of -power and therefore of pleasure. The highest rationalism is a state of -cool clearness, which is very far from being able to bring about that -feeling of power which every kind of _exaltation_ involves.... - -The ancient philosophers combat everything that intoxicates and -exalts--everything that impairs the perfect coolness and impartiality -of the mind.... They were consistent with their first false principle: -that consciousness was the _highest,_ the _supreme_ state of mind, the -prerequisite of perfection--whereas the reverse is true.... - -Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as it has been willed or -conscious. The philosophers of antiquity _were the greatest duffers_ -in practice, "because they condemned themselves" theoretically -to _dufferdom,_.... In practice everything resolved itself into -theatricalness: and he who saw through it, as Pyrrho did, for instance, -thought as everybody did--that is to say, that in goodness and -uprightness "paltry people" were far superior to philosophers. - -All the deeper natures of antiquity were disgusted at the _philosophers -of virtue_; all people saw in them was brawlers and actors. (This was -the judgment passed on _Plato_ by _Epicurus_ and _Pyrrho_.) - -_Result_: In practical life, in patience, goodness, and mutual -assistance, paltry people were above them:--this is something like the -judgment Dostoiewsky or Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more -philosophical in practice, they are more courageous in their way of -dealing with the exigencies of life.... - - -435. - -_A criticism of the philosopher._--Philosophers and moralists merely -deceive themselves when they imagine that they escape from decadence -by _opposing_ it. That lies beyond their wills: and however little they -may be aware of the fact, it is generally discovered, subsequently that -they were among the most powerful promoters of decadence. - -Let us examine the philosophers of Greece--Plato, for instance. He -it was who separated the instincts from the polis, from the love of -contest, from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the mysteries, -and the belief in tradition and in ancestors.... He was the seducer of -the nobles: he himself seduces through the _roturier_ Socrates.... He -denied all the first principles of the "noble Greek" of sterling worth; -he made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with the tyrants, -dabbled in politics for the future, and was the example of a man whose -_instincts_ were the example of a man whose _instincts_ were most -perfectly separated from _tradition._ He is profound and passionate in -everything that is _anti-Hellenic_.... - -One after the other, these great philosophers represent the _typical_ -forms of decadence: the moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, -nihilism, (ἀδιαφορία), cynicism, hardening principles, hedonism, and -reaction. - -The question of "happiness," of "virtue," and of the "salvation of the -soul," is the expression of _physiological contradictoriness_ in these -declining natures: their instincts lack all _balance_ and _purpose._ - - -436. - -To what extent do dialectics and the faith in reason rest upon _moral_ -prejudices? With Plato we are as the temporary inhabitants of an -intelligible world of goodness, still in possession of a bequest from -former times: divine dialectics taking its root in goodness leads to -everything good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead "backwards"). -Even Descartes had a notion of the fact that, according to a thoroughly -Christian and moral attitude of mind, which includes a belief in a -_good_ God as the Creator of all things, the truthfulness of God -_guarantees_ the judgments of our senses for us. But for this religious -sanction and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence should -we obtain our right to trust in existence? That thinking must be a -measure of reality,--that what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot -_exist,_--is a coarse _non plus ultra_ of a moral blind confidence -(in the essential principle of truth at the root of all things); this -in itself is a mad assumption which our experience contradicts every -minute. We cannot think of anything precisely as it is.... - - -437. - -The real _philosophers of Greece_ are those which came before Socrates -(with Socrates something changes). They are all distinguished men, -they take their stand away from the people and from usage; they have -travelled; they are earnest to the point of sombreness, their eyes -are calm, and they are not unacquainted with the business of state and -diplomacy. They anticipated all the great concepts which coming sages -were to have concerning things in general: they themselves represented -these concepts, they made systems out of themselves. Nothing run give a -higher idea of Greek intellect than this sudden fruitfulness in types, -than this involuntary completeness in the drawing up of all the great -possibilities of the philosophical ideal. I can see only one original -figure in those that came afterwards: a late arrival but necessarily -the last--_Pyrrho_ the nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the -influences which had become ascendant in the mean-time the Socratic -school, Plato, and the artistic optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes -back to Democritus _via_ Protagoras....) - -*** - -Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly among the humble. Devoid of -pride. To live in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what every -one believes. To be on one's guard against science and intellect, and -against everything that _puffs one out._ ... To be simply patient -in the extreme, careless and mild;--_ὰπάθεια_ or, better still, -πραῢτης. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid the tumult of the -Schools; born alter his time; weary; an example of the protest of -weariness against the eagerness of dialecticians; the incredulity of -the tired man in regard to the importance of everything. He had seen -_Alexander_; he had seen the _Indian penitents._ To such late-arrivals -and creatures of great subtlety, everything lowly, poor, and idiotic, -is seductive. It narcoticises: it gives them relaxation (Pascal). -On the other hand, they mix with the crowd, and get confounded -with the rest. These weary creatures need warmth.... To overcome -contradiction; to do away with contests; to have no will to excel in -any way; to deny the _Greek_ instincts (Pyrrho lived with his sister, -who was a midwife.) To rig out wisdom in such a way that it no longer -distinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty; to perform -the lowest offices, and to go to market and sell sucking-pigs.... -Sweetness, clearness, indifference; no need of virtues that require -attitudes; to be equal to all even in virtue: final conquest of one's -self, final indifference. - -Pyrrho and Epicurus;--two forms of Greek decadence; they are related -in their hatred of dialectics and all _theatrical_ virtues. These -two things together were then called philosophy; Pyrrho and Epicurus -intentionally held that which they loved in low esteem; they chose -common and even contemptible names for it, and they represented a state -in which one is neither ill, healthy, lively, nor dead.... Epicurus was -more _naïf,_ more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more experience of -the world, had travelled more, and was more nihilistic. His life was a -protest against the great _doctrine of Identity_ (Happiness = Virtue = -Knowledge). The proper way of living is not promoted by science: wisdom -does not make "wise." ... The proper way of living does not desire -happiness, it turns away from happiness.... - - -438. - -The war against the "old faith," as Epicurus waged it, was, strictly -speaking, a struggle against _pre-existing_ Christianity--the struggle -against a world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified throughout -with feelings of guilt, and grown old and sick. - -Not the "moral corruption" of antiquity, but precisely its _moral -infectedness_ was the prerequisite which enabled Christianity to become -its master. Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed paganism by -transvaluing its values and poisoning its innocence. We ought at last -to understand that what was then destroyed was _higher_ than what -prevailed! Christianity grew on the soil of psychological corruption, -and could only take root in rotten ground. - - -439. - -Science: as a disciplinary measure or as an instinct--I see a decline -of the instincts in Greek philosophers: otherwise they could not have -been guilty of the profound error of regarding the conscious state -as the more valuable state. The intensity of consciousness stands in -the inverse ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmission. -Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view, which is always the sign of -weakened instincts. - -We must, in sooth, seek _perfect life_ there where it is least -conscious (that is to say, there where it is least aware of its logic, -its reasons, its means, its intentions, and its _utility)._ The return -to the facts of _common sense,_ the facts of the common man and of -"paltry people." _Honesty and intelligence_ stored up for generations -of people who are quite unconscious of their principles, and who -even have some fear of principles. It is not reasonable to desire a -_reasoning virtue._ ... A philosopher is compromised by such a desire. - - -440. - -When morality--that is to say, refinement, prudence, bravery, and -equity--have been stored up in the same way, thanks to the moral -efforts of a whole succession of generations, the collective power of -this hoard of virtue projects its rays even into that sphere where -honesty is most seldom present--the sphere of _intellect._ When a -thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a state of ill-ease in -the organism; something new has got to be found, the organism is not -satisfied or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and it is -hypersensitive--precisely all this is consciousness.... - -Gennius lies in the instincts; goodness does too. One only acts -perfectly when one acts instinctively. Even from the moral point of -view all thinking which is conscious is merely a process of groping, -and in the majority of cases an attack on morality. Scientific honesty -is always sacrificed when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try -the experiment: put the wisest man in the balance, and then let him -discourse upon morality.... - -It could also be proved that the whole of a man's _conscious_ thinking -shows a much lower standard of morality than the thoughts of the same -man would show if they were led by his _instincts._ - - -441. - -The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all the Socratic schools, -proceeds from the profound instinct that man _is_ not made _better_ -when he is shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based upon -reason.... This in the end is the niggardly fact, it was the agonal -instinct in all these born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify -their _personal abilities_ as the _highest of all qualities,_ and to -represent every other form of goodness as conditioned by them. The -_anti-scientific_ spirit of all this "philosophy": it _will never admit -that it is not right._ - - -442. - -This is extraordinary. From its very earliest beginnings, Greek -philosophy carries on a struggle against science with the weapons of -a theory of knowledge, especially of scepticism; and why is this? It -is always in favour of _morality...._ (Physicists and medical men -are hated.) Socrates, Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics, -Epicurus and Pyrrho--a general onslaught upon knowledge in favour -of _morality...._ (Hatred of dialectics also.) There is still a -problem to be solved: they approach sophistry in order to be rid of -science. On the other hand, the physicists are subjected to such an -extent that, among their first principles, they include the theory of -truth and of real being: for instance, the atom, the four elements -(_juxtaposition_ of being, in order to explain its multiformity and its -transformations). Contempt of _objectivity_ in interests is taught: -return to practical interest, and to the personal utility of all -knowledge.... - -The struggle against science is directed at: (1) its pathos -(objectivity); (2) its means (that is to say, at its utility); (3) its -results (which are considered childish). It is the same struggle which -is taken up later on by the _Church_ in the name of piety: the Church -inherited the whole arsenal of antiquity for her war with science. The -theory of knowledge played the same part in the affair as it did in -Kant's or the Indians' case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled -with it, a free hand is wanted for the "purpose" that is envisaged. - -Against what powers are they actually defending themselves? Against -dutifulness, against obedience to law, against the compulsion of going -hand in hand--I believe this is what is called _Freedom...._ - -This is how decadence manifests itself: the instinct of solidarity is -so degenerate that solidarity itself gets to be regarded as _tyranny_: -no authority or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer desires to -fall in with the rank and file, and to adopt its ignobly slow pace. The -slow movement which is the tempo of science is generally hated, as are -also the scientific man's indifference in regard to getting on, his -long breath, and his impersonal attitude. - - -443. - -At bottom, morality is _hostile_ to science: Socrates was so already -too--and the reason is, that science considers certain things important -which have no relation whatsoever to "good" and "evil," and which -therefore reduce the gravity of our feelings concerning "good" and -"evil." What morality requires is that the whole of a man should serve -it with all his power: it considers it waste on the part of a creature -that _can ill afford waste,_ when a man earnestly troubles his head -about stars or plants. That is why science very quickly declined -in Greece, once Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the -disease of morality. The mental attitudes reached by a Democritus, a -Hippocrates, and a Thucydides, have not been reached a second time.-- - - -444. - -The problem of the _philosopher_ and of the _scientific_ man.--The -influence of age; depressing habits (sedentary study _à la_ Kant; -over-work; inadequate nourishment of the brain; reading). A more -essential question still: is it not already perhaps a _symptom_ of -decadence when thinking tends to establish _generalities_? - -_Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the will_ (to be able -to remain as detached as possible ...). This presupposes a tremendous -adiaphora in regard to the strong passions: a kind of isolation, an -exceptional position, opposition to the normal passions. - -Type: desertion of _home-country_ emigrants go ever greater distances -afield; growing exoticism; the voice of the old imperative dies -away;--and the continual question "whither?" ("happiness") is a sign -of _emancipation_ from forms of organisation, a sign of breaking loose -from everything. - -Problem: is the man of _science_ more of a decadent symptom than the -philosopher?--as a _whole_ scientific man is not, cut loose from -everything, only a part of his being is consecrated exclusively to the -service of knowledge and disciplined to maintain a special attitude and -point of view; in his department he is in need of _all_ the virtues -of a strong race, of robust health, of great severity, manliness and -intelligence. He is rather a symptom of the great multiformity of -culture than of the effeteness of the latter. The decadent scholar -is a _bad_ scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has always been -reckoned hitherto as the typical philosopher. - - -445. - -Among philosophers, nothing is more rare than _intellectual -uprightness_: they perhaps say the very reverse, and even believe it. -But the prerequisite of all their work is, that they can only admit -of certain truths; they know what they _have_ to prove; and the fact -that they must be agreed as to these "truths" is almost what makes them -recognise one another as philosophers. There are, for instance, the -truths of morality. But belief in morality is not a proof of morality: -there are cases--and the philosopher's case is one in point--when a -belief of this sort is simply a piece of _immorality_. - - -446. - -_What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher?_--He teaches that -the qualities which he happens to possess are the only qualities that -exist, that they are indispensable to those who wish to attain to the -"highest good" (for instance, dialectics with Plato). He would have -all men raise themselves, _gradatim,_ to _his_ type as the highest. He -despises what is generally esteemed--by him a gulf is cleft between -the highest _priestly_ values and the values of the _world._ He knows -what is true, who God is, what every one's goal should be, and the way -thereto.... The typical philosopher is thus an absolute dogmatist;--if -he _requires_ scepticism at all it is only in order to be able to speak -dogmatically of his _principal purpose_. - - -447. - -When the philosopher is confronted with his rival--science, for -instance, he becomes a sceptic; then he appropriates a _form of -knowledge_ which he denies to the man of science; he goes hand in -hand with the priest so that he may not be suspected of atheism or -materialism; he considers an attack made upon himself as an attack -upon morals, religion, virtue, and order--he knows how to bring his -opponents into ill repute by calling them "seducers" and "underminers": -then he marches shoulder to shoulder with power. - -The philosopher at war with other philosophers:--he does his best -to compel them to appear like anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of -authority. In short, when he fights, he fights exactly like a priest -and like the priesthood. - - - - -3. THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF PHILOSOPHERS. - - - -448. - -Philosophy defined by Kant: "_The science of the limitations of -reason_"!! - - -449. - -According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art of discovering truth. On -the other hand, the Epicurians, who availed themselves of Aristotle's -_sensual_ theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical opposition to the -search for truth: "Philosophy is the art of _Life._" - - -450. - -_The three great naïvetés:--_ - -Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if ...); - -Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if ...); - -Knowledge as a means to the "denial of Life"--inasmuch as it leads to -disappointment--(as if ...). - - -451. - -As if there were a "truth" which one could by some means approach! - - -452. - -Error and ignorance are fatal.--The assumption that _truth has been -found_ and that ignorance and error are at an end, constitutes one -of the most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted that it be -generally accepted, it paralyses the will to test, to investigate, -to be cautious, and to gather experience: it may even be regarded as -criminal--that is to say, as a _doubt_ concerning truth.... - -"Truth" is therefore more fatal than error and ignorance, because it -paralyses the forces which lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The -passion for _idleness_ now stands up for "truth" ("Thought is pain -and misery!"), as also do order, rule, the joy of possession, the -pride of wisdom--in fact, _vanity._--it is easier to _obey_ than to -_examine_; it is more gratifying to think "I possess the truth," than -to see only darkness in all directions; ... but, above all, it is -reassuring, it lends confidence, and alleviates life--it "improves" -the character inasmuch as it _reduces mistrust._" Spiritual peace," "a -quiet conscience"--these things are inventions which are only possible -provided "_Truth be found._"--"By their fruits ye shall know them." ... -"Truth" is the truth because it makes men _better...._ The process goes -on: all goodness and all success is placed to the credit of "truth." - -This is the _proof by success_: the happiness, contentment, and the -welfare of a community or of an individual, are now understood to be -the _result of the belief in morality_.... Conversely: _failure_ is -ascribed to a _lack_ of faith. - - -453. - -The causes of error lie just as much in the _good_ as in the _bad will_ -of man:--in an incalculable number of cases he conceals reality from -himself, he falsifies it, so that he may not suffer from his good or -bad will. God, for instance, is considered the shaper of man's destiny; -he interprets his little lot as though everything were intentionally -sent to him for the salvation of his soul,--this act of ignorance in -"philology," which to a more subtle intellect would seem unclean and -false, is done, in the majority of cases, with perfect _good faith._ -Goodwill, "noble feelings," and "lofty states of the soul" are just as -underhand and deceptive in the means they use as are the passions love, -hatred, and revenge, which morality has repudiated and declared to be -egotistic. - -Errors are what mankind has had to pay for most dearly: and taking them -all in all, the errors which have resulted from goodwill are those -which have wrought the most harm. The illusion which makes people -happy is more harmful than the illusion which is immediately followed -by evil results: the latter increases keenness and mistrust, and -purifies, the understanding; the former merely narcoticises.... - -Fine feelings and noble impulses ought, speaking physiologically, to be -classified with the narcotics: their abuse is followed by precisely the -same results as the abuse of any other opiate--_weak nerves_. - - -454. - -Error is the most expensive luxury that man can indulge in: and if the -error happen to be a physiological one, it is fatal to life. What has -mankind paid for most dearly hitherto? For its "truths ": for every one -of these were errors _in physiologicis>_.... - - -455. - -Psychological _confusions_: the _desire for belief_ is confounded with -the "will to truth" (for instance, in Carlyle). But the _desire for -disbelief_ has also been confounded with the "will to truth" (a need of -ridding one's self of a belief for a hundred reasons: in order to carry -one's point against certain "believers"). _What is it that inspires -Sceptics?_ The hatred of dogmatists--or a need of repose, weariness as -in Pyrrho's case. - -The _advantages_ which were expected to come from truth, were the -advantages resulting from a belief in _it_: for, in itself, truth could -have been thoroughly painful, harmful, and even fatal. Likewise truth -was combated only on account of the advantages which a victory over it -would provide--for instance, emancipation from the yoke of the ruling -powers. - -The method of truth was _not_ based upon motives of truthfulness, but -upon _motives of power, upon the desire to be superior._ - -_How is_ truth _proved_? By means of the feeling of increased -power,--by means of utility,--by means of indispensability,--_in short, -by means of its advantages_ (that is to say, hypotheses concerning what -truth should be like in order that it may be embraced by us). But this -involves _prejudice_: it is a sign that _truth_ does not enter the -question at all.... - -What is the meaning of the "will to truth," for instance in the -Goncourts? and in the _naturalists_?--A criticism of "objectivity." - -Why should we know: why should we not prefer to be deceived?... -But what was needed was always belief--and _not_ truth.... Belief -is created by means which are quite _opposed_ to the method of -investigation: _it even depends upon the exclusion of the latter._ - - -456. - -A certain degree of faith suffices to-day to give us an _objection_ -to what is believed--it does more, it makes us question the spiritual -healthiness of the believer. - - -457. - -_Martyrs._--To combat anything that is based upon reverence, opponents -must be possessed of both daring and recklessness, and be hindered -by no scruples.... Now, if one considers that for thousands of -years man has sanctified as truths only those things which were in -reality errors, and that he has branded any criticism of them with -the hall-mark of badness, one will have to acknowledge, however -reluctantly, that a goodly amount of _immoral deeds_ were necessary in -order to give the initiative to an attack--I mean to _reason...._ That -these immoralists have always posed as the "martyrs of truth" should -be forgiven them: the truth of the matter is that they did not stand -up and deny owing to an instinct for truth; but because of a love of -dissolution, criminal scepticism, and the love of adventure. In other -cases it is personal rancour which drives them into the province of -problems--they only combat certain points of view in order to be -able to carry their point against certain people. But, above all, it -is revenge which has become scientifically useful--the revenge of the -oppressed, those who, thanks to the truth that happens to be ruling, -have been pressed aside and even smothered.... - -Truth, that is to say the scientific method, was grasped and favoured -by such as recognised that it was a useful weapon of war--an instrument -of _destruction_.... - -In order to be honoured as opponents, they were moreover obliged -to use an apparatus similar to that used by those whom they were -attacking: they therefore brandished the concept "truth" as absolutely -as their adversaries did--they became fanatics at least in their -poses, because no other pose could be expected to be taken seriously. -What still remained to be done was left to persecution, to passion, -and the uncertainty of the persecuted--hatred waxed great, and the -first impulse began to die away and to leave the field entirely to -science. Ultimately all of them wanted to be right in the same absurd -way as their opponents.... The word "conviction," "faith," the pride -of martyrdom--these things are most unfavourable to knowledge. The -adversaries of truth finally adopt the whole subjective manner of -deciding about truth,--that is to say, by means of poses, sacrifices, -and heroic resolutions,--and thus _prolong_ the _dominion_ of the -anti-scientific method. As martyrs they compromise their very own deed. - - -458. - -_The dangerous distinction between "theoretical" and "practical"_ in -Kant for instance, but also in the ancient philosophers:--they behave -as if pure intellectuality presented them with the problems of science -and metaphysics;--they behave as if practice should be judged by a -measure of its own, whatever the judgment of theory may be. - -Against the first tendency I set up my _psychology of philosophers_: -their strangest calculations and "intellectuality" are still but the -last pallid impress of a physiological fact; spontaneity is absolutely -lacking in them, everything is instinct, everything is intended to -follow a certain direction from the first.... - -Against the second tendency I put my question: whether we know another -method of acting correctly, besides that of thinking correctly; -the last case _is_ action, the first presupposes thought Are we -possessed of a means whereby we can judge of the value of a method -of life differently from the value of a theory: through induction or -comparison?... Guileless people imagine that in this respect we are -better equipped, we know what is "good"--and the philosophers are -content to repeat this view. We conclude that some sort of _faith_ is -at work in this matter, and nothing more.... - -"Men must act; _consequently_ rules of conduct are necessary"--this is -what even the ancient Sceptics thought. The _urgent need_ of a definite -decision in this department of knowledge is used as an argument in -favour of regarding something as _true_!... - -"Men must not act"--said their more consistent brothers, the Buddhists, -and then thought out a mode of conduct which would deliver man from the -yoke of action.... - -To adapt one's self, to live as the "_common man_" lives, and to regard -as right and proper what _he_ regards as right: this is _submission_ to -the _gregarious instinct._ One must carry one's courage and severity -so far as to learn to consider such submission a _disgrace._ One should -not live according to two standards!... One should not separate theory -and practice!... - - -459. - -Of all that which was formerly held to be true, not one word is to be -credited. Everything which was formerly disdained as unholy, forbidden, -contemptible, and fatal--all these flowers now bloom on the most -charming paths of truth. - -The whole of this old morality concerns us no longer: it contains not -one idea which is still worthy of respect. We have outlived it--we -are no longer sufficiently coarse and guileless to be forced to allow -ourselves to be lied to in this way.... In more polite language: we are -too virtuous for it.... And if truth in the old sense were "true" only -because the old morality said "yea" to it, and _had a right_ to say -"yea" to it: it follows that no truth of the past can any longer be of -use to us.... Our _criterion_ of truth is /certainly not morality: we -_refute_ an assertion when we show that it is dependent upon morality -and is inspired by noble feelings. - - -460. - -All these values are empirical and conditioned. But he who believes -in them and who honours them, _refuses_ to acknowledge this aspect of -them. All philosophers believe in these values, and one form their -reverence takes is the endeavour to make _a priori truths_ out of them. -The falsifying nature of _reverence_.... - -Reverence is the supreme test of intellectual _honesty,_ but in the -whole history of philosophy there is no such thing as intellectual -honesty,--but the "love of goodness ..." - -On the one hand, there is an absolute _lack of method_ in testing the -value of these values; _secondly,_ there is a general disinclination -either to test them or to regard them as conditioned at all.--All -_anti-scientific_ instincts assembled round moral values in order to -_keep science out_ of this department.... - - - -4. CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY. - - - -461. - -_Why philosophers are slanderers._--The artful and blind hostility -of philosophers towards the _senses_--what an amount of _mob_ and -_middle-class_ qualities lie in all this hatred! - -The crowd always believes that an abuse of which it feels the harmful -results, constitutes an _objection_ to the thing which happens to be -abused: all insurrectionary movements against principles, whether in -politics or agriculture, always follow a line of argument suggested by -this ulterior motive: the abuse must be shown to be necessary to, and, -inherent in, the principle. - -It is a _woeful_ history: mankind looks for a principle, from the -standpoint of which he will be able to contemn man--he invents a world -in order to be able to slander and throw mud at this world: as a matter -of fact, he snatches every time at nothing, and construes this nothing -as "God," as "Truth," and, in any case, as judge and detractor of -_this_ existence.... - -If one should require a proof of how deeply and thoroughly the actually -_barbarous_ needs of man, even in his present state of tameness and -"civilisation," still seek gratification, one should contemplate the -"leitmotifs" of the whole of the evolution of philosophy:--a sort -of revenge upon reality, a surreptitious process of destroying the -values by means of which men live, a _dissatisfied_ soul to which -the conditions of discipline is one of torture, and which takes a -particular pleasure in morbidly severing all the bonds that bind it to -such a condition. - -The history of philosophy is the story of a _secret and mad hatred_ -of the prerequisities of Life, of the feelings which make for the -real values of Life, and of all partisanship in favour of Life. -Philosophers have never hesitated to affirm a fanciful world, provided -it contradicted this world, and furnished them with a weapon wherewith -they could calumniate this world. Up to the present, philosophy has -been the _grand school of slander_: and its power has been so great, -that even to-day our science, which pretends to be the advocate of -Life, has _accepted_ the fundamental position of slander, and treats -this world as "appearance," and this chain of causes as though it were -only phenomenal. What is the hatred which is active here? - -I fear that it is still the _Circe of philosophers--_Morality, which -plays them the trick of compelling them to be ever slanderers.... They -believed in moral "truths," in these they thought they had found the -highest values; what alternative had they left, save that of denying -existence ever more emphatically the more they got to know about it?... -For this life is _immoral...._ And it is based upon immoral first -principles: and morality says _nay_ to Life. - -Let us suppress the real world: and in order to do this, we must first -suppress the highest values current hitherto--morals.... It is enough -to show that morality itself _is immoral,_ in the same sense as that in -which immorality has been condemned heretofore. If an end be thus made -to the tyranny of the former values, if we have suppressed the "real -world," a _new order of values_ must follow of its own accord. - -The world of appearance and the world _of lies_: this constitutes the -contradiction. The latter hitherto has been the "real world," "truth," -"God." This is the one which we still have to suppress. - -The _logic of my conception_: - -(1) _Morality as the highest value_ (it is master of _all_ the phases -of philosophy, even of the Sceptics). _Result_: this world is no good, -it is not the "real world." - -(2) _What_ is it that determines the highest value here? What, in -sooth, is morality?--It is the instinct of _decadence_; it is the -means whereby the exhausted and the degenerate _revenge themselves._ -_Historical_ proof: philosophers have always been decadents ... in the -service of _nihilistic_ religions. - -(3) It is the instinct of decadence coming to the fore as _will to -power._ Proof: the absolute _immorality_ of the means employed by -morality throughout its history. - -General aspect: the values which have been highest hitherto constitute -a specific case of the will to power; morality itself is a specific -case of immorality. - - -462. - -_The principal innovations_: Instead of "moral values," nothing but -_naturalistic values._ Naturalisation of morality. - -In the place of "sociology," a _doctrine of the forms of dominion._ - -In the place of "society," the _complex whole of culture,_ which is -_my_ chief interest (whether in its entirety or in parts). - -In the place of the "theory of knowledge," a _doctrine which laid down -the value of the passions_ (to this a hierarchy of the passions would -belong: the passions _transfigured_; their _superior rank,_ their -"_spirituality_"). - -In the place of "metaphysics" and religion, the doctrine of _Eternal -Recurrence_ (this being regarded as a means to the breeding and -selection of men). - - -463. - -My precursors: Schopenhauer. To what extent I deepened pessimism, and -first brought its full meaning within my grasp, by means of its most -extreme opposite. - -Likewise: the higher Europeans, the pioneers of _great politics._ - -Likewise: the Greeks and their genesis. - - -464. - -I have named those who were unconsciously my workers and precursors. -But in what direction may I turn with any hope of finding my particular -kind of philosophers themselves, or at least _my yearning for new -philosophers_? In that direction, alone, where a _noble_ attitude of -mind prevails, an attitude of mind which believes in slavery and in -manifold orders of rank, as the prerequisites of any high degree of -culture. In that direction, alone, where a _creative_ attitude of -mind prevails, an attitude of mind which does not regard the world -of happiness and repose, the "Sabbath of Sabbaths" as an end to be -desired, and which, even in peace, honours the means which lead to new -wars; an attitude of mind which would prescribe laws for the future, -which for the sake of the future would treat everything that exists -to-day with harshness and even tyranny; a daring and "immoral" attitude -of mind, which would wish to see both the good and the evil qualities -in man developed to their fullest extent, because it would feel itself -able to put each in its right place--that is to say, in that place in -which each would need the other. But what prospect has he of finding -what he seeks, who goes in search of philosophers to-day? Is it not -probable that, even with the best Diogenes-lantern in his hand, he will -wander about by night and day in vain? This age is possessed of the -_opposite_ instincts. What it wants, above all, is comfort; secondly, -it wants publicity and the deafening din of actors' voices, the big -drum which appeals to its Bank-Holiday tastes; thirdly, that every -one should lie on his belly in utter subjection before the greatest -of all lies--which is "the equality of men"--and should honour only -those virtues which _make men equal and place them in equal positions._ -But in this way, the rise of the philosopher, as I understand him, is -made completely impossible--despite the fact that many may regard the -present tendencies as rather favourable to his advent. As a matter of -fact, the whole world mourns, to-day, the hard times that philosophers -_used_ to have, hemmed in between the fear of the stake, a guilty -conscience, and the presumptuous wisdom of the Fathers of the Church: -but the truth is, that precisely these conditions were _ever so much -more favourable_ to the education of a mighty, extensive, subtle, -rash, and daring intellect than the conditions prevailing to-day. At -present another kind of intellect, the intellect of the demagogue, of -the actor, and perhaps of the beaver- and ant-like scholar too, finds -the best possible conditions for its development. But even for artists -of a superior calibre the conditions are already far from favourable: -for does not every one of them, almost, perish owing to his want of -discipline? They are no longer tyrannised over by an outside power--by -the tables of absolute values enforced by a Church or by a monarch: -and thus they no longer learn to develop their "inner tyrant," their -_will._ And what holds good of artists also holds good, to a greater -and more fatal degree, of philosophers. Where, then, are free spirits -to be found to-day? Let any one show me a free spirit to-day! - - -465. - -Under "Spiritual freedom" I understand something very definite: it is -a state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and -other disciples of "truth" in one's severity towards one's self, in -one's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say -nay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers -that have appeared heretofore as _contemptible libertines_ hiding -behind the petticoats of the female "Truth." - -END OF VOL. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: The Will to Power, Book I and II - An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values - -Author: Friedrich Nietzsche - -Editor: Oscar Levy - -Translator: Anthony M. Ludovici - -Release Date: August 28, 2016 [EBook #52914] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WILL TO POWER, BOOK I AND II *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (back online -soon in an extended version, alo linking to free sources -for education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational -materials,...) (Images generously made available by the -Internet Archive.) - - - - - - -</pre> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> -<h1>THE WILL TO POWER</h1> - -<h2>AN ATTEMPTED TRANSVALUATION OF ALL VALUES</h2> - - -<h3>BY</h3> - -<h2>FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE</h2> - - -<h4>TRANSLATED BY</h4> - -<h4>ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI</h4> - - -<h4>VOL. I</h4> - -<h4>BOOKS I AND II</h4> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 175px;"> -<img src="images/ill_niet.jpg" width="175" alt="" /> -</div> -<h4>The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche</h4> - -<h5>The First Complete and Authorised English Translation</h5> - -<h4>Edited by Dr Oscar Levy</h4> - -<h4>Volume Fourteen</h4> - -<h5>T.N. FOULIS</h5> - -<h5>13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET</h5> - -<h5>EDINBURGH: AND LONDON</h5> - - -<h5>1914</h5> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h4>CONTENTS OF VOL. I.</h4> - - -<p> -PREFACE <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_1"> 1</a></span><br /> -<br /> -FIRST BOOK. EUROPEAN NIHILISM.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">A Plan</span> <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_5"> 5</a></span><br /> -<br /> -I. <span class="smcap">Nihilism—</span><br /> -<br /> -1. Nihilism as an Outcome of the Valuations and Interpretations<br /> -of Existence which have prevailed hitherto <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_8"> 8</a></span><br /> -2. Further Causes of Nihilism <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_23"> 23</a></span><br /> -3. The Nihilistic Movement as an Expression of Decadence <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_31"> 31</a></span><br /> -4. The Crisis: Nihilism and the Idea of Recurrence <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_47"> 47</a></span><br /> -<br /> -II. <span class="smcap">Concerning the History of European Nihilism—</span><br /> -<br /> -<i>(a)</i> Modern Gloominess <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_55"> 55</a></span><br /> -<i>(b)</i> The Last Centuries <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_73"> 73</a></span><br /> -<i>(c)</i> Signs of Increasing Strength <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_91"> 91</a></span><br /> -<br /> -SECOND BOOK. A CRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 5%;">THAT HAVE PREVAILED HITHERTO.</span><br /> -<br /> -I. <span class="smcap">Criticism of Religion—</span><br /> -<br /> -1. Concerning the Origin of Religions <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_113">113</a></span><br /> -2. Concerning the History of Christianity <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_132">132</a></span><br /> -3. Christian Ideals <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_179">179</a></span><br /> -<br /> -II. <span class="smcap">A Criticism of Morality—</span><br /> -<br /> -1. The Origin of Moral Valuations <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_210">210</a></span><br /> -2. The Herd <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_226">226</a></span><br /> -3. General Observations concerning Morality <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_237">237</a></span><br /> -4. How Virtue is made to Dominate <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_248">248</a></span><br /> -5. The Moral Ideal—<br /> -<i>A.</i> A Criticism of Ideals <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_264">264</a></span><br /> -<i>B.</i> A Criticism of the "Good Man," of the Saint, etc. <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_282">282</a></span><br /> -<i>C.</i> Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_291">291</a></span><br /> -<i>D.</i> A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_312">312</a></span><br /> -6. Concluding Remarks concerning the Criticism of Morality <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_320">320</a></span><br /> -<br /> -III. <span class="smcap">Criticism of Philosophy—</span><br /> -<br /> -1. General Remarks <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_327">327</a></span><br /> -2. A Criticism of Greek Philosophy <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_345">345</a></span><br /> -3. The Truths and Errors of Philosophers <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_369">369</a></span><br /> -4. Concluding Remarks in the Criticism of Philosophy <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_378">378</a></span><br /> -</p> - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h4><a name="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE" id="TRANSLATORS_PREFACE">TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.</a></h4> - - -<p>In the volume before us we have the first two books of what was to be -Nietzsche's greatest theoretical and philosophical prose work. The -reception given to <i>Thus Spake Zarathustra</i> had been so unsatisfactory, -and misunderstandings relative to its teaching had become so general, -that, within a year of the publication of the first part of that -famous philosophical poem, Nietzsche was already beginning to see -the necessity of bringing his doctrines before the public in a more -definite and unmistakable form. During the years that followed—that is -to say, between 1883 and 1886—this plan was matured, and although we -have no warrant, save his sister's own word and the internal evidence -at our disposal, for classing <i>Beyond Good and Evil</i> (published 1886) -among the contributions to Nietzsche's grand and final philosophical -scheme, "The Will to Power," it is now impossible to separate it -entirely from his chief work as we would naturally separate <i>The Birth -of Tragedy,</i> the <i>Thoughts out of Season,</i> the volumes entitled <i>Human, -all-too-Human, The Dawn of Day,</i> and <i>Joyful Wisdom.</i></p> - -<p><i>Beyond Good and Evil,</i> then, together with its sequel, <i>The Genealogy -of Morals,</i> and the two little volumes, <i>The Twilight of the Idols</i> -and the <i>Antichrist</i> (published in 1889 and 1894 respectively), must -be regarded as forming part of the general plan of which <i>The Will to -Power</i> was to be the <i>opus magnum.</i></p> - -<p>Unfortunately, <i>The Will to Power</i> was never completed by its author. -The text from which this translation was made is a posthumous -publication, and it suffers from all the disadvantages that a book -must suffer from which has been arranged and ordered by foster hands. -When those who were responsible for its publication undertook the task -of preparing it for the press, it was very little more than a vast -collection of notes and rough drafts, set down by Nietzsche from time -to time, as the material for his chief work; and, as any liberty taken -with the original manuscript, save that of putting it in order, would -probably have resulted in adding or excluding what the author would -on no account have added or excluded himself, it follows that in some -few cases the paragraphs are no more than hasty memoranda of passing -thoughts, which Nietzsche must have had the intention of elaborating -at some future time. In these cases the translation follows the German -as closely as possible, and the free use even of a conjunction has in -certain cases been avoided, for fear lest the meaning might be in the -slightest degree modified. It were well, therefore, if the reader could -bear these facts in mind whenever he is struck by a certain clumsiness, -either of expression or disposition, in the course of reading this -translation.</p> - -<p>It may be said that, from the day when Nietzsche first recognised the -necessity of making a more unequivocal appeal to his public than -the <i>Zarathustra</i> had been, that is to say, from the spring of 1883, -his work in respect of <i>The Will to Power</i> suffered no interruption -whatsoever, and that it was his chief preoccupation from that period -until his breakdown in 1889.</p> - -<p>That this span of six years was none too long for the task he had -undertaken, will be gathered from the fact that, in the great work he -had planned, he actually set out to show that the life-principle, "Will -to Power," was the prime motor of all living organisms.</p> - -<p>To do this he appeals both to the animal world and to human society, -with its subdivisions, religion, art, morality, politics, etc. etc., -and in each of these he seeks to demonstrate the activity of the -principle which he held to be the essential factor of all existence.</p> - -<p>Frau Foerster-Nietzsche tells us that the notion that "The Will to -Power" was the fundamental principle of all life, first occurred to her -brother in the year 1870, at the seat of war, while he was serving as -a volunteer in a German army ambulance. On one occasion, at the close -of a very heavy day with the wounded, he happened to enter a small -town which lay on one of the chief military roads. He was wandering -through it in a leisurely fashion when, suddenly, as he turned the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span>corner of a street that was protected on either side by lofty stone -walls, he heard a roaring noise, as of thunder, which seemed to come -from the immediate neighbourhood. He hurried forward a step or two, and -what should he see, but a magnificent cavalry regiment—gloriously -expressive of the courage and exuberant strength of a people—ride -past him like a luminous stormcloud. The thundering din waxed louder -and louder, and lo and behold! his own beloved regiment of field -artillery dashed forward at full speed, out of the mist of motes, and -sped westward amid an uproar of clattering chains and galloping steeds. -A minute or two elapsed, and then a column of infantry appeared, -advancing at the double—the men's eyes were aflame, their feet struck -the hard road like mighty hammer-strokes, and their accoutrements -glistened through the haze. While this procession passed before him, -on its way to war and perhaps to death,—so wonderful in its vital -strength and formidable courage, and so perfectly symbolic of a race -that <i>will</i> conquer and prevail, or perish in the attempt,—Nietzsche -was struck with the thought that the highest will to live could not -find its expression in a miserable "struggle for existence," but in -a will to war, a Will to Power, a will to overpower! This is said to -be the history of his first conception of that principle which is at -the root of all his philosophy, and twelve years later, in <i>Thus Spake -Zarathustra,</i> we find him expounding it thus:—</p> - -<p>"Wherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to Power; and even -in the will of the servant found I the will to be master.</p> - -<p>"Only where there is life, is there also will: not, however, Will to -Life, but—so teach I thee—Will to Power!</p> - -<p>"Much is reckoned higher than life itself by the living one; but out of -the very reckoning speaketh—the Will to Power!"</p> - -<p>And three years later still, in <i>Beyond Good and Evil,</i> we read the -following passage:—</p> - -<p>"Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the -instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic -being. A living thing seeks above all to <i>discharge</i> its strength—life -itself is <i>Will to Power</i>; self-preservation is only one of the -indirect and most frequent results thereof."</p> - -<p>But in this volume, and the one that is to follow, we shall find -Nietzsche more mature, more sober, and perhaps more profound than -in the works above mentioned. All the loves and hates by which we -know him, we shall come across again in this work; but here he seems -to stand more above them than he had done heretofore; having once<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[Pg ii]</a></span> -enunciated his ideals vehemently and emphatically, he now discusses -them with a certain grim humour, with more thoroughness and detail, and -he gives even his enemies a quiet and respectful hearing. His tolerant -attitude to Christianity on pages 8-9, 107, 323, for instance, is -a case in point, and his definite description of what we are to -understand by his pity (p. 293) leaves us in no doubt as to the calm -determination of this work. Book One will not seem so well arranged -or so well worked out as Book Two; the former being more sketchy and -more speculative than the latter. Be this as it may, it contains deeply -interesting things, inasmuch as it attempts to trace the elements of -Nihilism—as the outcome of Christian values—in all the institutions -of the present day.</p> - -<p>In the Second Book Herbert Spencer comes in for a number of telling -blows, and not the least of these is to be found on page 237, where, -although his name is not mentioned, it is obviously implied. Here -Nietzsche definitely disclaims all ideas of an individualistic -morality, and carefully states that <i>his</i> philosophy aims at <i>a new -order of rank.</i></p> - -<p>It will seem to some that morality is dealt with somewhat cavalierly -throughout the two books; but, in this respect, it should not be -forgotten that Nietzsche not only made a firm stand in favour of -exceptional men, but that he also believed that any morality is nothing -more than a mere system of valuations which are determined by the -conditions in which a given species lives. Hence his words on page 107: -"Beyond Good and Evil,—certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional -and strict preservation of herd-morality"; and on page 323: "Suppose -the <i>strong</i> were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try -and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, -and sacrifice! <i>Self-contempt on the part of the weak</i> would be the -result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their -kind. And would this be <i>desirable</i>?—should we really like a world -in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span> -<i>plasticity</i>—in fact, the whole influence of the weak—was lacking?"</p> - -<p>It is obvious from this passage that Nietzsche only objected to the -influence of herd-morality outside the herd—that is to say, among -exceptional and higher men who may be wrecked by it. Whereas most other -philosophers before him had been the "Altruist" of the lower strata of -humanity, Nietzsche may aptly be called the Altruist of the exceptions, -of the particular lucky cases among men. For such "varieties," he -thought, the morality of Christianity had done all it could do, and -though he in no way wished to underrate the value it had sometimes -been to them in the past, he saw that at present, in any case, it -might prove a great danger. With Goethe, therefore, he believed that -"Hypotheses are only the pieces of scaffolding which are erected round -a building during the course of its construction, and which are taken -away as soon as the edifice is completed. To the workman, they are -indispensable; but he must be careful not to confound the scaffolding -with the building."<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>It is deeply to be deplored that Nietzsche was never able to complete -his life-work. The fragments of it collected in volumes i. and ii. of -<i>The Will to Power</i> are sufficiently remarkable to convey some idea of -what the whole work would have been if only its author had been able to -arrange and complete it according to his original design.</p> - -<p>It is to be hoped that we are too sensible nowadays to allow our -sensibilities to be shocked by serious and well-meditated criticism, -even of the most cherished among our institutions, and an honest and -sincere reformer ought no longer to find us prejudiced—to the extent -of deafness—against him, more particularly when he comes forward with -a gospel—"The Will to Power"—which is, above all, a test of our power -to will.</p> - - -<p style="margin-left: 75%; font-size: 0.8em;">ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen</i> (Weimar Edition, i. -II, p. 132).</p></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - -<h4><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE">PREFACE.</a></h4> - - -<p class="parnum">1.</p> - -<p>Concerning great things one should either be silent or one should speak -loftily:—loftily—that is to say, cynically and innocently.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">2.</p> - -<p>What I am now going to relate is the history of the next two centuries. -I shall describe what will happen, what must necessarily happen: -<i>the triumph of Nihilism.</i> This history can be written already; for -necessity itself is at work in bringing it about. This future is -already proclaimed by a hundred different omens; as a destiny it -announces its advent everywhere, for this music of to-morrow all ears -are already pricked. The whole of our culture in Europe has long -been writhing in an agony of suspense which increases from decade -to decade as if in expectation of a catastrophe: restless, violent, -helter-skelter, like a torrent that will <i>reach its bourne,</i> and -refuses to reflect—yea, that even dreads reflection.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">3.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the present writer has done little else, hitherto, -than <i>reflect and meditate,</i> like<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> an instinctive philosopher and -anchorite, who found his advantage in isolation—in remaining outside, -in patience, procrastination, and lagging behind; like a weighing and -testing spirit who has already lost his way in every labyrinth of -the future; like a prophetic bird-spirit that <i>looks backwards</i> when -it would announce what is to come; like the first perfect European -Nihilist, who, however, has already outlived Nihilism in his own -soul—who has out-grown, overcome, and dismissed it.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">4.</p> - -<p>For the reader must not misunderstand the meaning of the title which -has been given to this Evangel of the Future. "<i>The Will to Power: -An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values</i>"—with this formula a -<i>counter-movement</i> finds expression, in regard to both a principle and -a mission; a movement which in some remote future will supersede this -perfect Nihilism; but which nevertheless regards it as a <i>necessary -step,</i> both logically and psychologically, towards its own advent, -and which positively cannot come, except <i>on top of</i> and <i>out of</i> it. -For, why is the triumph of Nihilism <i>inevitable</i> now? Because the -very values current amongst us to-day will arrive at their logical -conclusion in Nihilism,—because Nihilism is the only possible outcome -of our greatest values and ideals,—because we must first experience -Nihilism before we can realise what the actual worth of these "values" -was.... Sooner or later we shall be in need of <i>new values.</i></p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span></p> -<h4><a name="FIRST_BOOK" id="FIRST_BOOK">FIRST BOOK.</a></h4> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span></p> -<h3>EUROPEAN NIHILISM.</h3> - - - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<h4><a name="I" id="I">I.</a></h4> - - -<h4>A PLAN.</h4> - - -<p>1. Nihilism is at our door: whence comes this most gruesome of all -guests to us?—To begin with, it is a mistake to point to "social -evils," "physiological degeneration," or even to corruption as a cause -of Nihilism. This is the most straightforward and most sympathetic age -that ever was. Evil, whether spiritual, physical, or intellectual, is, -in itself, quite unable to introduce Nihilism, <i>i.e.,</i> the absolute -repudiation of worth, purpose, desirability. These evils allow of yet -other and quite different explanations. But there is one <i>very definite -explanation</i> of the phenomena: Nihilism harbours in the heart of -Christian morals.</p> - - -<p>2. The downfall of Christianity,—through its morality (which is -insuperable), which finally turns against the Christian God Himself -(the sense of truth, highly developed through Christianity, ultimately -revolts against the falsehood and fictitiousness of all Christian -interpretations of the world and its history. The recoil-stroke of -"God <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span>is Truth" in the fanatical Belief, is: "All is false." Buddhism -of <i>action</i>....).</p> - - -<p>3. Doubt in morality is the decisive factor. The downfall of the -<i>moral</i> interpretation of the universe, which loses its <i>raison -d'être</i> once it has tried to take flight to a Beyond, meets its -end in Nihilism. "Nothing has any purpose" (the inconsistency of -one explanation of the world, to which men have devoted untold -energy,—gives rise to the suspicion that all explanations may perhaps -be false). The Buddhistic feature: a yearning for nonentity (Indian -Buddhism has no fundamentally moral development at the back of it; that -is why Nihilism in its case means only morality not overcome; existence -is regarded as a punishment and conceived as an error; error is thus -held to be punishment—a moral valuation). Philosophical attempts to -overcome the "moral God" (Hegel, <i>Pantheism</i>). The vanquishing of -popular ideals: the wizard, the saint, the bard. Antagonism of "true" -and "beautiful" and "good."</p> - - -<p>4. Against "purposelessness" on the one hand, against moral valuations -on the other: how far has all science and philosophy been cultivated -heretofore under the influence of moral judgments? And have we not got -the additional factor—the enmity of science, into the bargain? Or the -prejudice against science? Criticism of Spinoza. Christian valuations -everywhere present as remnants in socialistic and positivistic systems. -<i>A criticism of Christian</i> morality is altogether lacking.</p> - - -<p>5. The Nihilistic consequences of present natural <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span>science (along -with its attempts to escape into a Beyond). Out of its practice there -finally <i>arises</i> a certain self-annihilation, an antagonistic attitude -towards itself—a sort of anti-scientificality. Since Copernicus man -has been rolling away from the centre towards <i>x</i>.</p> - - -<p>6. The Nihilistic consequences of the political and politico-economical -way of thinking, where all principles at length become tainted with the -atmosphere of the platform: the breath of mediocrity, insignificance, -dishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchy, etc. Punishment. Everywhere -the <i>deliverer</i> is missing, either as a class or as a single man—the -justifier.</p> - - -<p>7. Nihilistic consequences of history and of the "practical historian," -<i>i.e.,</i> the romanticist. The attitude of art is quite unoriginal in -modern life. Its gloominess. Goethe's so-called Olympian State.</p> - - -<p>8. Art and the preparation of Nihilism. Romanticism (the conclusion of -Wagner's <i>Ring of the Nibelung</i>).</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span></p> -<h4>I.</h4> - -<p class="title2"><a name="NIHILISM" id="NIHILISM">NIHILISM.</a></p> - - - -<hr class="r5" /> - - -<p class="title">1. Nihilism As an Outcome of the Valuations and Interpretations of -Existence Which Have Prevailed Heretofore.</p> - - - -<p class="parnum">2.</p> - -<p>What does Nihilism mean?—<i>That the highest values are losing their -value.</i> There is no bourne. There is no answer to the question: "to -what purpose?"</p> - - -<p class="parnum">3.</p> - -<p>Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the -light of the highest values already discovered; it also includes the -<i>view</i> that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of -transcendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either -divine or morality incarnate.</p> - -<p>This view is a result of fully developed "truthfulness": therefore a -consequence of the belief in morality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">4.</p> - -<p>What <i>advantages</i> did the Christian hypothesis of morality offer?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span>(1) It bestowed an intrinsic value upon men, which contrasted with -their apparent insignificance and subordination to chance in the -eternal flux of becoming and perishing.</p> - -<p>(2) It served the purpose of God's advocates, inasmuch as it granted -the world a certain <i>perfection</i> despite its sorrow and evil—it also -granted the world that proverbial "freedom": evil seemed full of -<i>meaning</i>.</p> - -<p>(3) It assumed that man could have a <i>knowledge</i> of absolute values, -and thus granted him <i>adequate perception</i> for the most important -things.</p> - -<p>(4) It prevented man from despising himself as man, from turning -against life, and from being driven to despair by knowledge: it was a -self-preservative measure.</p> - - - -<p>In short: Morality was the great <i>antidote</i> against practical and -theoretical Nihilism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">5.</p> - -<p>But among the forces reared by morality, there was <i>truthfulness</i>: -this in the end turns against morality, exposes the <i>teleology</i> of the -latter, its interestedness, and now the <i>recognition</i> of this lie so -long incorporated, from which we despaired of ever freeing ourselves, -acts just like a stimulus. We perceive certain needs in ourselves, -implanted during the long dynasty of the moral interpretation of life, -which now seem to us to be needs of untruth: on the other hand, those -very needs represent the highest values owing to which we are able to -endure life. We have <i>ceased</i> from <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span>attaching any worth to what we -know, and we <i>dare</i> not attach any more worth to that with which we -would fain deceive ourselves—from this antagonism there results a -process of dissolution.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">6.</p> - -<p>This is the <i>antinomy</i>: In so far as we believe in morality, we condemn -existence.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">7.</p> - -<p>The highest values in the service of which man ought to live, more -particularly when they oppressed and constrained him most—these -<i>social values, owing to their tone-strengthening</i> tendencies, -were built over men's heads as though they were the will of God or -"reality," or the actual world, or even a hope of a world to come. -Now that the lowly origin of these values has become known, the -whole universe seems to have been transvalued and to have lost its -significance—but this is only an intermediate stage.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">8.</p> - -<p>The consequence of <i>Nihilism</i> (disbelief in all values) as a result -of a moral valuation:—<i>We have grown to dislike egotism</i> (even -though we have realised the impossibility of altruism);—<i>we have -grown to dislike what is most necessary</i> (although we have recognised -the impossibility of a <i>liberum <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span>arbitrium</i> and of an "intelligible -freedom"<a name="FNanchor_1_2" id="FNanchor_1_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_2" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>). We perceive that we do not reach the spheres in which we -have set our values—at the same time those other spheres in which we -live have <i>not</i> thereby gained <i>one iota</i> in value. On the contrary, we -are <i>tired,</i> because we have lost the main incentive to live. "All in -vain hitherto!"</p> - - -<p class="parnum">9.</p> - -<p>"Pessimism as a preparatory state to Nihilism."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">10.</p> - -<p>A. Pessimism viewed as strength—<i>in what respect?</i> In the energy of -its logic, as anarchy, Nihilism, and analysis.</p> - -<p>B. Pessimism regarded as collapse—<i>in what sense?</i> In the sense of -its being a softening influence, a sort of cosmopolitan befingering, a -"tout comprendre," and historical spirit.</p> - -<p><i>Critical tension</i>: extremes make their appearance and become dominant.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">11.</p> - -<p><i>The logic of Pessimism leads finally to Nihilism: what is the force at -work?</i>—The notion that <i>there are no values,</i> and <i>no purpose</i>: the -recognition of the part that moral valuations have played in all other -lofty values.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> -Result: <i>moral valuations are condemnations, negations; morality is the -abdication of the will to live....</i></p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_2" id="Footnote_1_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_2"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> This is a Kantian term. Kant recognised two kinds of -Freedom—the practical and the transcendental kind. The first belongs -to the phenomenal, the second to the intelligible world.—<span style="font-size: 0.9em;">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.</span></p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">12.</p> - - -<p class="title">The Collapse of Cosmopolitan Values.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>A.</i></p> - -<p>Nihilism will have to manifest itself as a <i>psychological condition, -first</i> when we have sought in all that has happened a purpose which -is not there: so that the seeker will ultimately lose courage. -Nihilism is therefore the coming into consciousness of the long -<i>waste</i> of strength, the pain of "futility," uncertainty, the lack -of an opportunity to recover in some way, or to attain to a state of -peace concerning anything—shame in one's own presence, as if one -had <i>cheated</i> oneself too long.... The purpose above-mentioned might -have been achieved: in the form of a "realisation" of a most high -canon of morality in all worldly phenomena, the moral order of the -universe; or in the form of the increase of love and harmony in the -traffic of humanity; or in the nearer approach to a general condition -of happiness; or even in the march towards general nonentity—any sort -of goal always constitutes a purpose. The common factor to all these -appearances is that something will be <i>attained,</i> through the process -itself: and now we perceive that Becoming has been aiming at <i>nothing,</i> -and has achieved nothing. Hence the disillusionment in regard to a -so-called <i>purpose in existence,</i> as a cause of Nihilism; whether this -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span>be in respect of a very definite purpose, or generalised into the -recognition that all the hypotheses are false which have hitherto been -offered as to the object of life, and which relate to the whole of -"Evolution" (man <i>no longer</i> an assistant in, let alone the culmination -of, the evolutionary process).</p> - -<p>Nihilism will manifest itself as a psychological condition, in the -second place, when man has fixed a totality, a systematisation, even an -organisation in and behind all phenomena, so that the soul thirsting -for respect and admiration will wallow in the general idea of a highest -ruling and administrative power (if it be the soul of a logician, -the sequence of consequences and perfect reasoning will suffice to -conciliate everything). A kind of unity, some form of "monism":' -and as a result of this belief man becomes obsessed by a feeling of -profound relativity and dependence in the presence of an All which -is infinitely superior to him, a sort of divinity. "The general good -exacts the surrender of the individual ..." but lo, there is no such -general good! At bottom, man loses the belief in his own worth when no -infinitely precious entity manifests itself through him—that is to -say, he conceived such an All, <i>in order to be able to believe in his -own worth.</i></p> - -<p>Nihilism, as a psychological condition, has yet a third and last form. -Admitting these two <i>points of view</i>: that no purpose can be assigned -to Becoming, and that no great entity rules behind all Becoming, in -which the individual may completely lose himself as in an element of -superior value; there still remains the <i>subterfuge</i> which would -consist <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>in condemning this whole world of Becoming as an illusion, -and in discovering a world which would lie beyond it, and would be a -<i>real</i> world. The moment, however, that man perceives that this world -has been devised only for the purpose of meeting certain psychological -needs, and that he has no right whatsoever to it, the final form of -Nihilism comes into being, which comprises <i>a denial of a metaphysical -world,</i> and which forbids itself all belief in a <i>real</i> world. From -this standpoint, the reality of Becoming is the only reality that -is admitted: all bypaths to back-worlds and false godheads are -abandoned—but <i>this world is no longer endured, although no one wishes -to disown it.</i></p> - -<p>What has actually happened? The feeling of worthlessness was realised -when it was understood that neither the notion of "<i>Purpose</i>" nor -that of "<i>Unity</i>" nor that of "<i>Truth</i>" could be made to interpret -the general character of existence. Nothing is achieved or obtained -thereby; the unity which intervenes in the multiplicity of events is -entirely lacking: the character of existence is not "true," it is -<i>false</i>; there is certainly no longer any reason to believe in a <i>real</i> -world. In short, the categories, "Purpose," "Unity," "Being," by means -of which we had lent some worth to life, we have once more divorced -from it—and the world now appears <i>worthless</i> to us....</p> - -<p class="center"><i>B.</i></p> - -<p>Admitting that we have recognised the impossibility of <i>interpreting</i> -world by means of these <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span>three categories, and that from this -standpoint the world begins to be worthless to us; we must ask -ourselves whence we derived our belief in these three categories. -Let us see if it is possible to refuse to believe in them. If we can -<i>deprive them of their value,</i> the proof that they cannot be applied to -the world, is no longer a sufficient reason for <i>depriving that world -of its value</i>.</p> - -<p>Result: <i>The belief</i> in the categories of reason<a name="FNanchor_2_3" id="FNanchor_2_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_3" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> is the cause -of Nihilism—we have measured the worth of the world according to -categories <i>which can only be applied to a purely fictitious world.</i></p> - -<p>Conclusion: All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend -the world some worth, from our point of view, and with which we have -therefore <i>deprived it of all worth</i> (once these values have been -shown to be inapplicable)—all these values, are, psychologically, -the results of certain views of utility, established for the purpose -of maintaining and increasing the dominion of certain communities: -but falsely projected into the nature of things. It is always man's -<i>exaggerated ingenuousness</i> to regard himself as the sense and measure -of all things.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_3" id="Footnote_2_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_3"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> This probably refers to Kant's celebrated table of -twelve categories. The four classes, quantity, quality, relation, and -modality, are each provided with three categories.—<span style="font-size: 0.9em;">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.</span></p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">13.</p> - -<p>Nihilism represents an intermediary pathological condition (the vast -generalisation, the conclusion that there <i>is no purpose</i> in anything, -is pathological): <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span>whether it be that the productive forces are not -yet strong enough—or that <i>decadence</i> still hesitates and has not yet -discovered its expedients.</p> - -<p><i>The conditions of this hypothesis</i>:—That there is <i>no truth</i>; that -there is no absolute state of affairs—no "thing-in-itself." <i>This -alone is Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind.</i> It finds that the -value of things consists precisely in the fact that these values are -<i>not</i> real and never have been real, but that they are only a symptom -of strength on the part of the <i>valuer,</i> a simplification serving the -<i>purposes of existence.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">14.</p> - -<p><i>Values and their modification</i> are related to the <i>growth of power of -the valuer.</i></p> - -<p>The measure of <i>disbelief</i> and of the "freedom of spirit" which is -tolerated, viewed as an <i>expression of the growth of power.</i></p> - -<p>"Nihilism" viewed as the ideal of the <i>highest spiritual power,</i> of the -over-rich life, partly destructive, partly ironical.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">15.</p> - -<p>What is <i>belief</i>? How is a belief born? All belief assumes that -<i>something is true.</i></p> - -<p>The extremest form of Nihilism would mean that <i>all</i> belief—all -assumption of truth—is false: because no real world is at hand. -It were therefore: only an <i>appearance seen in perspective,</i> whose -origin must be found in us (seeing that we are constantly in need of a -narrower, a shortened, and simplified world).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span>This should be realised, that the extent to which we can, in our heart -of hearts, acknowledge appearance, and the necessity of falsehood, -without going to rack and ruin, is the <i>measure of strength.</i></p> - -<p>In this respect, Nihilism, in that it is the <i>negation</i> of a real world -and of Being, might be <i>a divine view of the world.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">16.</p> - -<p>If we are disillusioned, we have not become so in regard to life, -but owing to the fact that our eyes have been opened to all kinds -of "desiderata." With mocking anger we survey that which is called -"<i>Ideal</i>": we despise ourselves only because we are unable at every -moment of our lives to quell that absurd emotion which is called -"Idealism." This <i>pampering</i> by means of ideals is stronger than the -anger of the <i>disillusioned one.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">17.</p> - -<p><i>To what extent does Schopenhauerian Nihilism continue to be the result -of the same ideal as that which gave rise to Christian Theism?</i> The -amount of certainty concerning the most exalted desiderata, the highest -values and the greatest degree of perfection, was so great, that the -philosophers started out from it as if it had been an <i>a priori</i> and -<i>absolute fact</i>: "God" at the head, as the <i>given quantity</i>—Truth. "To -become like God," "to be absorbed into the Divine Being"—<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span>these were -for centuries the most ingenuous and most convincing desiderata (but -that which convinces is not necessarily true on that account: it is -<i>nothing more nor less than convincing.</i> An observation for donkeys).</p> - -<p>The granting of a <i>personal-reality</i> to this accretion of ideals -has been unlearned: people have become atheistic. But has the ideal -actually been abandoned? The latest metaphysicians, as a matter of -fact, still seek their true "reality" in it—the "thing-in-itself" -beside which everything else is merely appearance. Their dogma is, that -because our world of appearance is so obviously <i>not</i> the expression -of that ideal, it therefore cannot be "true"—and at bottom does not -even lead back to that metaphysical world as cause. The unconditioned, -in so far as it stands for that highest degree of perfection, cannot -possibly be the reason of all the conditioned. Schopenhauer, who -desired it otherwise, was obliged to imagine this metaphysical basis as -the antithesis to the ideal, as "an evil, blind will": thus it could -be "that which appears," that which manifests itself in the world of -appearance. But even so, he did not give up that ideal absolute—he -circumvented it....</p> - -<p>(Kant seems to have needed the hypothesis of "intelligible freedom,"<a name="FNanchor_3_4" id="FNanchor_3_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_4" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -in order to relieve the <i>ens perfectum</i> of the responsibility of having -contrived this world as it is, in short, in order to explain evil: -scandalous logic for a philosopher!).</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_4" id="Footnote_3_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_4"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See Note on p. 11.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">18.</p> - -<p><i>The most general sign of modern times</i>: in his own estimation, man has -lost an infinite amount of <i>dignity.</i> For a long time he was the centre -and tragic hero of life in general; then he endeavoured to demonstrate -at least his relationship to the most essential and in itself most -valuable side of life—as all metaphysicians do, who wish to hold fast -to the <i>dignity of man,</i> in their belief that moral values are cardinal -values. He who has let God go, clings all the more strongly to the -belief in morality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">19.</p> - -<p>Every purely <i>moral</i> valuation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic) -<i>terminates in Nihilism</i>: Europe must expect the same thing! It is -supposed that one can get along with a morality bereft of a religious -background; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is opened. There -is nothing in religion which compels us to regard ourselves as valuing -creatures.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">20.</p> - -<p>The question which Nihilism puts, namely, "to what purpose?" is the -outcome of a habit, hitherto, to regard the purpose as something fixed, -given and exacted <i>from outside</i>—that is to say, by some supernatural -authority. Once the belief in this has been unlearned, the force of an -old habit leads to the search after <i>another</i> authority, which would -<i>know how to speak unconditionally,</i> and could <i>point to</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span>goals and -missions. The authority of the <i>conscience</i> now takes the first place -(the more <i>morality</i> is emancipated from theology, the more imperative -does it become) as a compensation for the <i>personal authority.</i> Or -the authority of <i>reason.</i> Or the <i>gregarious instinct</i> (the herd). -Or history with its <i>immanent</i> spirit, which has its goal in itself, -and to which one can <i>abandon oneself.</i> One would like to <i>evade</i> the -<i>will,</i> as also the <i>willing</i> of a goal and the risk of setting oneself -a goal. One would like to get rid of the responsibility (<i>Fatalism</i> -would be accepted). Finally: Happiness and with a dash of humbug, the -<i>happiness of the greatest number.</i></p> - -<p>It is said:—</p> - -<p>(1) A definite goal is quite unnecessary.</p> - -<p>(2) Such a goal cannot possibly be foreseen. Precisely now, when <i>will</i> -in its <i>fullest strength</i> were <i>necessary,</i> it is in the <i>weakest</i> -and most <i>pusillanimous</i> condition. <i>Absolute mistrust concerning the -organising power</i> of the will.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">21.</p> - -<p><i>The perfect Nihilist.</i>—The Nihilist's eye <i>idealises in an ugly -sense,</i> and is inconstant to what it remembers: it allows its -recollections to go astray and to fade, it does not protect them from -that cadaverous coloration with which weakness dyes all that is distant -and past. And what it does not do for itself it fails to do for the -whole of mankind as well—that is to say, it allows it to drop.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">22.</p> - -<p>Nihilism. It may be <i>two things</i>:—</p> - -<p>A. Nihilism as a sign of <i>enhanced spiritual strength</i>: active Nihilism.</p> - -<p>B. Nihilism as a sign of the <i>collapse</i> and <i>decline</i> of spiritual -<i>strength</i>: passive Nihilism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">23.</p> - -<p>Nihilism, a <i>normal</i> condition.</p> - -<p>It may be a sign of <i>strength</i>; spiritual vigour may have increased to -such an extent that the <i>goals</i> toward which man has marched <i>hitherto</i> -(the "convictions," articles of faith) are no longer suited to it -(for a faith generally expresses the exigencies of the <i>conditions of -existence,</i> a submission to the authority of an order of things which -<i>conduces</i> to the <i>prosperity,</i> the <i>growth</i> and <i>power</i> of a living -creature ...); on the other hand, a sign of <i>insufficient</i> strength, to -fix a goal, a "wherefore," and a faith for itself.</p> - -<p>It reaches its <i>maximum</i> of relative strength, as a powerful -<i>destructive</i> force, in the form of <i>active Nihilism.</i></p> - -<p>Its opposite would be <i>weary</i> Nihilism, which no longer attacks: its -most renowned form being Buddhism: as <i>passive</i> Nihilism, a sign of -weakness: spiritual strength may be fatigued, <i>exhausted,</i> so that the -goals and values which have prevailed <i>hitherto</i> are no longer suited -to it and are no longer believed in—so that the synthesis of values -and goals (upon which every strong culture stands) <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span>decomposes, and -the different values contend with one another: <i>Disintegration,</i> then -everything which is relieving, which heals, becalms, or stupefies, -steps into the foreground under the cover of various <i>disguises,</i> -either religious, moral, political or æsthetic, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">24.</p> - -<p>Nihilism is not only a meditating over the "in vain!"—not only the -belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts -one's shoulder to the plough; <i>one destroys.</i> This, if you will, is -illogical; but the Nihilist does not believe in the necessity of being -logical.... It is the condition of strong minds and wills; and to these -it is impossible to be satisfied with the negation of judgment: the -<i>negation by deeds</i> proceeds from their nature. Annihilation by the -reasoning faculty seconds annihilation by the hand.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">25.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the genesis of the Nihilist.</i> The courage of all one really -<i>knows</i> comes but late in life. It is only quite recently that I have -acknowledged to myself that heretofore I have been a Nihilist from top -to toe. The energy and thoroughness with which I marched forward as a -Nihilist deceived me concerning this fundamental principle. When one is -progressing towards a goal it seems impossible that "aimlessness <i>per -se</i>" should be one's fundamental article of faith.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">26.</p> - -<p><i>The Pessimism of strong natures.</i> The "wherefore" after a terrible -struggle, even after victory. That something may exist which is a -hundred times <i>more important</i> than the question, whether we feel well -or unwell, is the fundamental instinct of all strong natures—and -consequently too, whether the <i>others</i> feel well or unwell. In short, -that we have a purpose, for which we would not even hesitate to -<i>sacrifice men,</i> run all risks, and bend our backs to the worst: <i>this -is the great passion</i>.</p> - - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">2. Further Causes of Nihilism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">27.</p> - -<p><i>The causes of Nihilism</i>: (1) <i>The higher species is lacking, i.e.,</i> -the species whose inexhaustible fruitfulness and power would uphold our -belief in Man (think only of what is owed to Napoleon—almost all the -higher hopes of this century).</p> - -<p>(2) <i>The inferior species</i> ("herd," "ass," "society") is forgetting -modesty, and inflates its needs into <i>cosmic</i> and <i>metaphysical</i> -values. In this way all life is <i>vulgarised</i>: for inasmuch as the -<i>mass</i> of mankind rules, it tyrannises over the <i>exceptions,</i> so that -these lose their belief in themselves and become <i>Nihilists.</i></p> - -<p>All attempts to <i>conceive of a new species</i> come to nothing -("romanticism," the artist, the philosopher; against Carlyle's attempt -to lend them the highest moral values).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> -The result is that higher types are <i>resisted</i>.</p> - -<p><i>The downfall and insecurity of all higher types.</i> The struggle against -genius ("popular poetry," etc.). Sympathy with the lowly and the -suffering as a <i>standard</i> for the <i>elevation of the soul</i>.</p> - -<p>The <i>philosopher is lacking,</i> the interpreter of deeds, and not alone -he who poetises them.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">28.</p> - -<p><i>Imperfect</i> Nihilism—its forms: we are now surrounded by them.</p> - -<p>All attempts made to escape Nihilism, which do not consist in -transvaluing the values that have prevailed hitherto, only make the -matter worse; they complicate the problem.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">29.</p> - -<p><i>The varieties of self-stupefaction.</i> In one's heart of hearts, not to -know, whither? Emptiness. The attempt to rise superior to it all by -means of emotional intoxication: emotional intoxication in the form of -music, in the form of cruelty in the tragic joy over the ruin of the -noblest, and in the form of blind, gushing enthusiasm over individual -<i>men</i> or distinct <i>periods</i> (in the form of hatred, etc.). The attempt -to work blindly, like a scientific instrument; to keep an eye on the -many small joys, like an investigator, for instance (modesty towards -oneself); the mysticism of the voluptuous <i>joy</i> of eternal emptiness; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span>art "for art's sake" ("le fait"), "immaculate investigation," in the -form of narcotics against the disgust of oneself; any kind of incessant -work, <i>any</i> kind of small foolish fanaticism; the medley of all -means, illness as the result of general profligacy (dissipation kills -pleasure).</p> - -<p>(1) As a result, feeble will-power.</p> - -<p>(2) Excessive pride and the humiliation of petty weakness felt as a -contrast.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">30.</p> - -<p>The time is coming when we shall have to pay for having been -<i>Christians</i> for two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium -which enables us to live—for a long while we shall not know in what -direction we are travelling. We are hurling ourselves headlong into the -<i>opposite</i> valuations, with that degree of energy which could only have -been engendered in man by an <i>overvaluation</i> of himself.</p> - -<p>Now, everything is false from the root, words and nothing but words, -confused, feeble, or over-strained.</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> There is a seeking after a sort of earthly solution of the -problem of life, but in the same sense as that of the <i>final triumph</i> -of truth, love, justice (socialism: "equality of persons").</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> There is also an attempt to hold fast to the <i>moral ideal</i> (with -altruism, self-sacrifice, and the denial of the will, in the front -rank).</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> There is even an attempt to hold fast to a "Beyond": were it -only as an antilogical <i>x</i>; but it is forthwith interpreted in such a -way that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span>a kind of metaphysical solace, after the old style, may be -derived from it.</p> - -<p><i>(d)</i> There is an attempt to read the phenomena of life in such a -way as to arrive <i>at the divine guidance of old,</i> with its powers -of rewarding, punishing, educating, and of generally conducing to a -something <i>better</i> in the order of things.</p> - -<p><i>(e)</i> People once more believe in good and evil; so that the victory of -the good and the annihilation of the evil is regarded as a <i>duty</i> (this -is English, and is typical of that blockhead, John Stuart Mill).</p> - -<p>(f) The contempt felt for "naturalness," for the desires and for the -ego: the attempt to regard even the highest intellectuality of art as a -result of an impersonal and disinterested attitude.</p> - -<p>(g) The Church is still allowed to meddle in all the essential -occurrences and incidents in the life of the individual, with a view to -consecrating it and giving it a <i>loftier</i> meaning: we still have the -"Christian State" and the "Christian marriage."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">31.</p> - -<p>There have been more thoughtful and more destructively thoughtful<a name="FNanchor_4_5" id="FNanchor_4_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_5" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -times than ours: times like those in which Buddha appeared, for -instance, in which the people themselves, after centuries of sectarian -quarrels, had sunk so deeply into the abyss of philosophical dogmas, -as, from time to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span>time, European people have done in regard to the fine -points of religious dogma. "Literature" and the press would be the last -things to seduce one to any high opinion of the spirit of our times: -the millions of Spiritists, and a Christianity with gymnastic exercises -of that ghastly ugliness which is characteristic of all English -inventions, throw more light on the subject.</p> - -<p>European <i>Pessimism</i> is still in its infancy—a fact which argues -against it: it has not yet attained to that prodigious and yearning -fixity of sight to which it attained in India once upon a time, and -in which nonentity is reflected; there is still too much of the -"ready-made," and not enough of the "evolved" in its constitution, too -much learned and poetic Pessimism; I mean that a good deal of it has -been discovered, invented, and "created," but not caused.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_5" id="Footnote_4_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_5"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>zerdachtere</i>.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">32.</p> - -<p>Criticism of the Pessimism which has prevailed hitherto. The want of -the eudæmonological standpoint, as a last abbreviation of the question: -what is the <i>purpose</i> of it all? The reduction of gloom.</p> - -<p><i>Our</i> Pessimism: the world has not the value which we believed it to -have,—our faith itself has so increased our instinct for research that -we are <i>compelled</i> to say this to-day. In the first place, it seems of -less value: <i>at first it is felt</i> to be of less value,—only in this -sense are we pessimists,—that is to say, with the will to acknowledge -this <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>transvaluation without reserve, and no longer, as heretofore, to -deceive ourselves and chant the old old story.</p> - -<p>It is precisely in this way that we find the pathos which urges us to -seek for <i>new values.</i> In short: the world might have far more value -than we thought—we must get behind the <i>naïveté of our ideals,</i> for -it is possible that, in our conscious effort to give it the highest -interpretation, we have not bestowed even a moderately just value upon -it.</p> - -<p>What has been <i>deified</i>? The valuing instinct inside the <i>community</i> -(that which enabled it to survive).</p> - -<p>What has been <i>calumniated</i>? That which has tended to separate higher -men from their inferiors, the instincts which cleave gulfs and build -barriers.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">33.</p> - -<p>Causes effecting the <i>rise of Pessimism</i>:—</p> - -<p>(1) The most powerful instincts and those which promised most for the -future have hitherto been <i>calumniated,</i> so that life has a curse upon -it.</p> - -<p>(2) The growing bravery and the more daring mistrust on the part of man -have led him to discover the fact that <i>these instincts cannot be -cut adrift from life,</i> and thus he turns to embrace life.</p> - -<p>(3) Only the most <i>mediocre,</i> who are not <i>conscious</i> of this conflict, -prosper; the higher species fail, and as an example of degeneration -tend to dispose all hearts against them—on the other hand, there is -some indignation caused by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span>the mediocre positing themselves as the end -and meaning of all things. No one can any longer reply to the question: -"Why?"</p> - -<p>(4) Belittlement, susceptibility to pain, unrest, haste, and confusion -are steadily increasing—the materialisation of all these tendencies, -which is called "civilisation," becomes every day more simple, with -the result that, in the face of the monstrous machine, the individual -<i>despairs</i> and <i>surrenders.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">34.</p> - -<p>Modern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessness only of the -<i>modern</i> world, not of the world and existence as such.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">35.</p> - -<p>The "preponderance of <i>pain over pleasure"</i> or the reverse (Hedonism); -both of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism....</p> - -<p>For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the -phenomenon pleasure or pain.</p> - -<p>But only a man who no longer dares to posit a will, a purpose, and a -final goal can speak in this way—according to every healthy type of -man, the worth of life is certainly not measured by the standard of -these secondary things. And a <i>preponderance</i> of pain would be possible -and, <i>in spite of it,</i> a mighty will, a <i>saying of yea</i> to life, and a -holding of this preponderance for necessary.</p> - -<p>"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation"; "what is the good of -tears?"—this is a feeble and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span>sentimental attitude of mind. "<i>Un -monstre gai vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux.</i>"</p> - - -<p class="parnum">36.</p> - -<p>The philosophie Nihilist is convinced that all phenomena are without -sense and are in vain, and that there ought to be no such thing as -Being without sense and in vain. But whence comes this "There ought -not to be?"—whence this "sense" and <i>this standard</i>? At bottom the -Nihilist supposes that the sight of such a desolate, useless Being is -<i>unsatisfying</i> to the philosopher, and fills him with desolation and -despair. This aspect of the case is opposed to our subtle sensibilities -as a philosopher. It leads to the absurd conclusion that the character -of existence <i>must perforce afford pleasure to the philosopher</i> if it -is to have any right to subsist.</p> - -<p>Now it is easy to understand that happiness and unhappiness, within -the phenomena of this world, can only serve the purpose of <i>means</i>: -the question yet remaining to be answered is, whether it <i>will -ever be possible</i> for us to perceive the "object" and "purpose" of -life—whether the problem of purposelessness or the reverse is not -quite beyond our ken.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">37.</p> - -<p>The development of <i>Nihilism out of Pessimism.</i> The denaturalisation -of <i>Values.</i> Scholasticism of values. The values isolated, idealistic, -instead <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span>of ruling and leading action, turn <i>against</i> it and condemn it.</p> - -<p>Opposites introduced in the place of natural gradations and ranks. -Hatred of the order of rank. Opposites are compatible with a plebeian -age, because they are more easy to grasp.</p> - -<p>The <i>rejected</i> world is opposed to an artificially constructed "true -and valuable" one. At last we discover out of what material the "true" -world was built; all that remains, now, is the rejected world, and to -the account of our reasons for <i>rejecting it we place our greatest -disillusionment.</i></p> - -<p>At this point <i>Nihilism</i> is reached; the directing values have been -retained—nothing more!</p> - -<p>This gives rise to <i>the problem of strength and weakness</i>:—</p> - -<p>(1) The weak fall to pieces upon it;</p> - -<p>(2) The strong destroy what does not fall to pieces of its own accord;</p> - -<p>(3) The strongest overcome the directing values.</p> - -<p><i>The whole condition of affairs produces the tragic age.</i></p> - -<hr /> -<p class="title">3. The Nihilistic Movement As an Expression of Decadence.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">38.</p> - -<p>Just lately an accidental and in every way inappropriate term has been -very much misused: everywhere people are speaking of "<i>Pessimism</i>," -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> -and there is a fight around the question (to which some replies must be -forthcoming): which is right—Pessimism or Optimism?</p> - -<p>People have not yet seen what is so terribly-obvious—namely, that -Pessimism is not a problem but a <i>symptom,</i>—that the term ought to be -replaced by "Nihilism,"—that the question, "to be or not to be," is -itself an illness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy.</p> - -<p>The Nihilistic movement is only an expression of physiological -decadence.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">39.</p> - -<p><i>To be understood</i>:—That every kind of decline and tendency to -sickness has incessantly been at work in helping to create general -evaluations: that in those valuations which now dominate, decadence -has even begun to preponderate, that we have not only to combat the -conditions which present misery and degeneration have brought into -being; but that all decadence, previous to that of our own times, has -been transmitted and has therefore remained an <i>active force</i> amongst -us. A universal departure of this kind, on the part of man, from -his fundamental instincts, such universal decadence of the valuing -judgment, is the note of interrogation <i>par excellence,</i> the real -riddle, which the animal "man" sets to all philosophers.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">40.</p> - -<p><i>The notion "decadence":—Decay, decline,</i> and <i>waste,</i> are, <i>per se,</i> -in no way open to objection;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>they are the natural consequences of life -and vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to -life as advance or progress is: we are not in a position which enables -us to <i>suppress</i> it. On the contrary, reason <i>would have it retain its -rights.</i></p> - -<p>It is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists to argue that -circumstances and social combinations could be devised which would put -an end to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.... But -that is tantamount to condemning <i>Life</i> ... a society is not at liberty -to remain young. And even in its prime it must bring forth ordure and -decaying matter. The more energetically and daringly it advances, the -richer will it be in failures and in deformities, and the nearer it -will be to its fall. Age is not deferred by means of institutions. Nor -is illness. Nor is vice.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">41.</p> - -<p>Fundamental aspect of the nature of decadence: <i>what has heretofore -been regarded as its causes are its effects.</i></p> - -<p>In this way, the whole perspective <i>of the problems of morality</i> is -altered.</p> - -<p>All the struggle of morals against vice, luxury, crime, and even -against illness, seems a <i>naïveté,</i> a superfluous effort: there is no -such thing as "<i>improvement</i>" (a word against <i>repentance</i>).</p> - -<p>Decadence itself is not a thing <i>that can be withstood</i>: it is -absolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and all peoples. That -which must be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span>withstood, and by all means in our power, is the -spreading of the contagion among the sound parts of the organism.</p> - -<p>Is that done? The very <i>reverse</i> is done. It is precisely on this -account that one makes a stand on behalf of <i>humanity.</i></p> - -<p>How do the <i>highest values</i> created hitherto stand in relation to this -fundamental question in <i>biology</i>? Philosophy, religion, morality, art, -etc.</p> - -<p>(The remedy: militarism, for instance, from Napoleon onwards, who -regarded civilisation as his natural enemy.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">42.</p> - -<p>All those things which heretofore have been regarded as the <i>causes of -degeneration,</i> are really its effects.</p> - -<p>But those things also which have been regarded as the <i>remedies</i> of -degeneration are only <i>palliatives</i> of certain effects thereof: the -"cured" are <i>types of the degenerate.</i></p> - -<p><i>The results of decadence</i>: vice—viciousness; illness—sickliness; -crime—criminality; celibacy—sterility; hysteria—the weakness of the -will; alcoholism; pessimism, anarchy; debauchery (also of the spirit). -The calumniators, underminers, sceptics, and destroyers.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">43.</p> - -<p>Concerning the notion "decadence." (1) Scepticism is a result of -decadence: just as spiritual debauchery is.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> -(2) Moral corruption is a result of decadence (the weakness of the will -and the need of strong stimulants).</p> - -<p>(3) Remedies, whether psychological or moral, do not alter the march -of decadence, they do not arrest anything; physiologically they do not -count.</p> - -<p>A peep into the <i>enormous futility</i> of these pretentious "reactions"; -they are forms of anæsthetising oneself against certain fatal -symptoms resulting from the prevailing condition of things; they do -not eradicate the morbid element; they are often heroic attempts to -cancel the decadent man, to allow only a minimum of his <i>deleterious -influence</i> to survive.</p> - -<p>(4) Nihilism is not a cause, but only the <i>rationale</i> of decadence.</p> - -<p>(5) The "good" and the "bad" are no more than two types of decadence: -they come together in all its fundamental phenomena.</p> - -<p>(6) The <i>social problem</i> is a result of <i>decadence.</i></p> - -<p>(7) Illnesses, more particularly those attacking the nerves and the -head, are signs that the <i>defensive</i> strength of strong nature is -lacking; a proof of this is that irritability which causes pleasure and -pain to be regarded as problems of the first order.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">44.</p> - -<p><i>The most common types of decadence</i>: (1) In the belief that they are -remedies, cures are chosen which only precipitate exhaustion;—this is -the case with Christianity (to point to the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span>most egregious example of -mistaken instinct);—this is also the case with "progress."</p> - -<p>(2) The <i>power of resisting</i> stimuli is on the wane—chance rules -supreme: events are inflated and drawn out until they appear monstrous -... a suppression of the "personality," a disintegration of the -will; in this regard we may mention a whole class of morality, the -altruistic, that which is incessantly preaching pity, and whose most -essential feature is the weakness of the personality, so that it <i>rings -in unison,</i> and, like an over-sensitive string, does not cease from -vibrating ... extreme irritability....</p> - -<p>(3) Cause and effect are confounded: decadence is not understood as -physiological, and its results are taken to be the causes of the -general indisposition:—this applies to all religious morality.</p> - -<p>(4) A state of affairs is desired in which suffering shall cease; -life is actually considered the cause of all ills—<i>unconscious</i> and -insensitive states (sleep and syncope) are held in incomparably higher -esteem than the conscious states; hence a <i>method</i> of life.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">45.</p> - -<p>Concerning the hygiene of the "weak." All that is done in weakness ends -in failure. Moral: do nothing. The worst of it is, that precisely the -strength required in order to stop action, and to cease from reacting, -is most seriously diseased under the influence of weakness: that one -never <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span>reacts more promptly or more blindly than when one should not -react at all.</p> - -<p>The strength of a character is shown by the ability to delay and -postpone reaction: a certain ἀδιαφορία is just as proper to it, as -involuntariness in recoiling, suddenness and lack of restraint in -"action," are proper to weakness. The will is weak: and the recipe -for preventing foolish acts would be: to have a strong will and to do -nothing—contradiction. A sort of self-destruction, the instinct of -self-preservation is compromised.... <i>The weak man injures himself</i>.... -That is the decadent <i>type</i>.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, we meet with a vast amount of thought concerning -the means wherewith <i>impassibility</i> may be induced. To this extent, the -instincts are on the right scent; for to do nothing is more useful than -to do something....</p> - -<p>All the practices of private orders, of solitary philosophers, and of -fakirs, are suggested by a correct consideration of the fact, that a -certain kind of man is most <i>useful to himself</i> when he hinders his own -action as much as possible.</p> - -<p><i>Relieving measures</i>: absolute obedience, mechanical activity, total -isolation from men and things that might exact immediate decisions and -actions.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">46.</p> - -<p><i>Weakness of Will</i>: this is a fable that can lead astray. For there -is no will, consequently neither a strong nor a weak one. The -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> -multiplicity and disintegration of the instincts, the want of system in -their relationship, constitute what is known as a "weak will"; their -co-ordination, under the government of one individual among them, -results in a "strong will"—in the first case vacillation and a lack -of equilibrium is noticeable: in the second, precision and definite -direction.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">47.</p> - -<p>That which is inherited is not illness, but a <i>predisposition to -illness</i>: a lack of the powers of resistance against injurious external -influences, etc. etc, broken powers of resistance; expressed morally: -resignation and humility in the presence of the enemy.</p> - -<p>I have often wondered whether it would not be possible to class all the -highest values of the philosophies, moralities, and religions which -have been devised hitherto, with the values of the feeble, the <i>insane</i> -and the <i>neurasthenic</i> in a milder form, they present the same evils.</p> - -<p>The value of all morbid conditions consists in the fact that they -magnify certain normal phenomena which are difficult to discern in -normal conditions....</p> - -<p><i>Health</i> and <i>illness</i> are not essentially different, as the ancient -doctors believed and as a few practitioners still believe to-day. They -cannot be imagined as two distinct principles or entities which fight -for the living organism and make it their battlefield. That is nonsense -and mere idle gossip, which no longer holds water. As a matter of -fact, there is only a difference of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>degree between these two living -conditions: exaggeration, want of proportion, want of harmony among the -normal phenomena, constitute the morbid state (Claude Bernard).</p> - -<p>Just as "evil" may be regarded as exaggeration, discord, and want of -proportion, so can "good" be regarded as a sort of protective diet -against the danger of exaggeration, discord, and want of proportion.</p> - -<p><i>Hereditary weakness</i> as a <i>dominant</i> feeling: the cause of the -prevailing values.</p> - -<p><i>N.B.</i>—Weakness is in demand—why?... mostly because people cannot be -anything else than weak.</p> - -<p><i>Weakening considered a duty</i>: The weakening of the desires, of the -feelings of pleasure and of pain, of the will to power, of the will -to pride, to property and to more property; weakening in the form of -humility; weakening in the form of a belief; weakening in the form -of repugnance and shame in the presence of all that is natural—in -the form of a denial of life, in the form of illness and chronic -feebleness; weakening in the form of a refusal to take revenge, to -offer resistance, to become an enemy, and to show anger.</p> - -<p><i>Blunders</i> in the treatment: there is no attempt at combating weakness -by means of any fortifying system; but by a sort of justification -consisting of moralising; <i>i.e.,</i> by means of <i>interpretation.</i></p> - -<p>Two totally different conditions are <i>confused</i>: for instance, the -<i>repose of strength,</i> which is essentially abstinence from reaction -(the prototype of the gods whom nothing moves), and the <i>peace of -exhaustion,</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> rigidity to the point of anæsthesia. All these philosophic -and ascetic modes of procedure aspire to the second state, but actually -pretend to attain to the first ... for they ascribe to the condition -they have reached the attributes that would be in keeping only with a -divine state.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">48.</p> - -<p><i>The most dangerous misunderstanding.</i>—There is one concept which -apparently allows of no confusion or ambiguity, and that is the concept -<i>exhaustion.</i> Exhaustion may be acquired or inherited—in any case it -alters the aspect and <i>value of things.</i></p> - -<p>Unlike him who involuntarily <i>gives</i> of the superabundance which he -both feels and represents, to the things about him, and who sees them -fuller, mightier, and more pregnant with promises,—who, in fact, <i>can</i> -bestow,—the exhausted one belittles and disfigures everything he -sees—he impoverishes its worth: he is detrimental....</p> - -<p>No mistake seems possible in this matter: and yet history discloses the -terrible fact, that the exhausted have always been <i>confounded</i> with -those with the most abundant resources, and the latter with the most -detrimental.</p> - -<p>The pauper in vitality, the feeble one, impoverishes even life: the -wealthy man, in vital powers, enriches it. The first is the parasite of -the second: the second is a bestower of his abundance. How is confusion -possible?</p> - -<p>When he who was exhausted came forth with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span>the bearing of a very -active and energetic man (when degeneration implied a certain excess -of spiritual and nervous discharge), he was <i>mistaken</i> for the wealthy -man. He inspired terror. The cult of the madman is also always the cult -of him who is rich in vitality, and who is a powerful man. The fanatic, -the one possessed, the religious epileptic, all eccentric creatures -have been regarded as the highest types of power: as divine.</p> - -<p>This kind of strength which inspires terror seemed to be, above all, -divine: this was the starting-point of authority; here <i>wisdom</i> -was interpreted, hearkened to, and sought. Out of this there was -developed, everywhere almost, a <i>will</i> to "deify," <i>i.e.,</i> to a typical -degeneration of spirit, body, and nerves: an attempt to discover the -road to this higher form of being. To make oneself ill or mad, to -provoke the symptoms of serious disorder—was called getting stronger, -becoming more superhuman, more terrible and more wise. People thought -they would thus attain to such wealth of power, that they would be able -to <i>dispense</i> it. Wheresoever there have been prayers, some one has -been sought who had something to give away.</p> - -<p>What led astray, here, was the experience of intoxication. This -increases the feeling of power to the highest degree, therefore, to the -mind of the ingenuous, it is <i>power.</i> On the highest altar of power -<i>the most intoxicated man</i> must stand, the ecstatic. (There are two -causes of <i>intoxication</i>: superabundant life, and a condition of morbid -nutrition of the brain.)</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">49.</p> - -<p><i>Acquired,</i> not inherited exhaustion: (1) inadequate <i>nourishment,</i> -often the result of ignorance concerning diet, as, for instance, in the -case of scholars; (2) erotic precocity: the damnation more especially -of the youth of France—Parisian youths, above all, who are already -dirtied and ruined when they step out of their <i>lycées</i> into the world, -and who cannot break the chains of despicable tendencies; ironical and -scornful towards themselves—galley-slaves despite all their refinement -(moreover, in the majority of cases, already a symptom of racial and -family decadence, as all hypersensitiveness is; and examples of the -infection of environment: to be influenced by one's environment is -also a sign of decadence); (3) alcoholism, not the instinct but the -habit, foolish imitation, the cowardly or vain adaptation to a ruling -fashion. What a blessing a Jew is among Germans! See the obtuseness, -the flaxen head, the blue eye, and the lack of intellect in the face, -the language, and the bearing; the lazy habit of stretching the limbs, -and the need of repose among Germans—a need which is not the result of -overwork, but of the disgusting excitation and over-excitation caused -by alcohol.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">50.</p> - -<p><i>A theory of exhaustion.</i>—Vice, the insane (also artists), the -criminals, the anarchists—these are <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span>not the <i>oppressed</i> classes, but -<i>the outcasts</i> of the community of all classes hitherto.</p> - -<p>Seeing that all our classes are permeated by these elements, we have -grasped the fact that <i>modern society</i> is not a "society" or a "body," -but a diseased agglomeration of Chandala,—a society which no longer -has the strength even to <i>excrete</i>.</p> - -<p>To what extent living together for centuries has very much deepened -<i>sickliness</i>:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -modern virtuee }<br /> -modern intellect } as forms of disease.<br /> -modern science }<br /> -</p> - - -<p class="parnum">51.</p> - -<p><i>The state of corruption.</i>—The interrelation of all forms of -corruption should be understood, and the Christian form (Pascal as -the type), as also the socialistic and communistic (a result of the -Christian), should not be overlooked (from the standpoint of natural -science, the <i>highest</i> conception of society according to socialists, -is the lowest in the order of rank among societies); the "Beyond" -—corruption: as though outside the real world of Becoming there were a -world of Being.</p> - -<p>Here there must be no compromise, but selection, annihilation, and -war—the Christian Nihilistic standard of value must be withdrawn from -all things and attacked beneath every disguise ... for instance, from -modern <i>sociology, music,</i> and <i>Pessimism</i> (all forms of the Christian -ideal of values).</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p> -<p>Either one thing <i>or</i> the other is true—that is to say, tending to -elevate the type man....</p> - -<p>The priest, the shepherd of souls, should be looked upon as a form -of life which must be suppressed. All education, hitherto, has been -helpless, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the contradiction -of values.</p> - -<p>Either one thing <i>or</i> the other is true—that is to say, tending to -elevate the type man....</p> - -<p>The priest, the shepherd of souls, should be looked upon as a form -of life which must be suppressed. All education, hitherto, has been -helpless, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the contradiction -of values.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">52.</p> - -<p>If Nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is not therefore -immoral: the growth of physiological and moral evils in the human -race, is rather the <i>result</i> of <i>morbid and unnatural morality.</i> The -sensitiveness of the majority of men is both morbid and unnatural.</p> - -<p>Why is it that mankind is corrupt in a moral and physiological respect? -The body degenerates if one organ is <i>unsound.</i> The <i>right of altruism</i> -cannot be traced to physiology, neither can the right to help and -to the equality of fate: these are all premiums for degenerates and -failures.</p> - -<p>There can be no <i>solidarity</i> in a society containing unfruitful, -unproductive, and destructive members, who, by the bye, are bound to -have offspring even more degenerate than they are themselves.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">53.</p> - -<p>Decadence exercises a profound and perfectly unconscious influence, -even over the ideals of science: all our sociology is a proof of this -proposition, and it has yet to be reproached with the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span>fact that -it has only the experience of <i>society in the process of decay,</i> -and inevitably takes its own decaying instincts as the basis of -sociological judgment.</p> - -<p>The <i>declining</i> vitality of modern Europe formulates its social ideals -in its decaying instincts: and these ideals are all so like those of -<i>old and effete</i> races, that they might be mistaken for one another.</p> - -<p>The <i>gregarious instinct,</i> then,—now a sovereign power,—is something -totally different from the instinct of an <i>aristocratic society</i>: and -the value of the sum depends upon the value of the units constituting -it.... The whole of our sociology knows no other instinct than that -of the herd, <i>i.e.,</i> of a <i>multitude of mere ciphers</i>—of which every -cipher has "equal rights," and where it is a virtue to be——naught....</p> - -<p>The valuation with which the various forms of society are judged to-day -is absolutely the same with that which assigns a higher place to peace -than to war: but this principle is contrary to the teaching of biology, -and is itself a mere outcome of decadent life. Life is a result of war, -society is a means to war.... Mr. Herbert Spencer was a decadent in -biology, as also in morality (he regarded the triumph of altruism as a -desideratum!!!).</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<p class="parnum">54.</p> - -<p>After thousands of years of error and confusion, it is my good fortune -to have rediscovered the road which leads to a Yea and to a Nay.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> -I teach people to say Nay in the face of all that makes for weakness -and exhaustion.</p> - -<p>I teach people to say Yea in the face of all that makes for strength, -that preserves strength, and justifies the feeling of strength.</p> - -<p>Up to the present, neither the one nor the other has been taught; but -rather virtue, disinterestedness, pity, and even the negation of life. -All these are values proceeding from exhausted people.</p> - -<p>After having pondered over the physiology of exhaustion for some time, -I was led to the question: to what extent the judgments of exhausted -people had percolated into the world of values.</p> - -<p>The result at which I arrived was as startling as it could possibly -be—even for one like myself who was already at home in many a strange -world: I found that all prevailing values—that is to say, all those -which had gained ascendancy over humanity, or at least over its tamer -portions, could be traced back to the judgment of exhausted people.</p> - -<p>Under the cover of the holiest names, I found the most destructive -tendencies; people had actually given the name "God" to all that -renders weak, teaches weakness, and infects with weakness.... I found -that the "good man" was a form of self-affirmation on the part of -decadence.</p> - -<p>That virtue which Schopenhauer still proclaimed as superior to all, -and as the most fundamental of all virtues; even that same pity I -recognised as more dangerous than any vice. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span>Deliberately to thwart -the law of selection among species, and their natural means of purging -their stock of degenerate members—this, up to my time, had been the -greatest of all virtues....</p> - -<p>One should do honour to the <i>fatality</i> which says to the feeble: -"perish!"</p> - -<p>The opposing of this fatality, the botching of mankind and the allowing -of it to putrefy, was given the name "God" One shall not take the name -of the Lord one's God in vain....</p> - -<p>The race is corrupted—not by its vices, but by its ignorance: it is -corrupted because it has not recognised exhaustion as exhaustion: -physiological misunderstandings are the cause of all evil.</p> - -<p>Virtue is our greatest misunderstanding.</p> - -<p>Problem: how were the exhausted able to make the laws of values? In -other words, how did they who are the last, come to power?... How did -the instincts of the animal man ever get to stand on their heads?...</p> - - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">4. The Crisis: Nihilism and the Idea of Recurrence.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">55.</p> - -<p>Extreme positions are not relieved by more moderate ones, but by -extreme <i>opposite</i> positions. And thus the belief in the utter -immorality of nature, and in the absence of all purpose and sense, are -psychologically necessary attitudes when the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span>belief in God and in an -essentially moral order of things is no longer tenable.</p> - -<p>Nihilism now appears, <i>not</i> because the sorrows of existence are -greater than they were formerly, but because, in a general way, people -have grown suspicious of the "meaning" which might be given to evil and -even to existence. One interpretation has been overthrown: but since it -was held to be <i>the</i> interpretation, it seems as though there were no -meaning in existence at all, as though everything were in vain.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>It yet remains to be shown that this "in vain!" is the character -of present Nihilism. The mistrust of our former valuations has -increased to such an extent that it has led to the question: "are -not all 'values' merely allurements prolonging the duration of the -comedy, without, however, bringing the unravelling any closer?" The -"long period of time" which has culminated in an "in vain," without -either goal or purpose, is the <i>most paralysing</i> of thoughts, more -particularly when one sees that one is duped without, however, being -able to resist being duped.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Let us imagine this thought in its worst form: existence, as it is, -without either a purpose or a goal, but inevitably recurring, without -an end in nonentity: "<i>Eternal Recurrence.</i>"</p> - -<p>This is the extremest form of Nihilism: nothing (purposelessness) -eternal!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> -European form of Buddhism: the energy of knowledge and of strength -drives us to such a belief. It is the most <i>scientific</i> of all -hypotheses. We deny final purposes. If existence had a final purpose it -would have reached it.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>It should be understood that what is being aimed at, here, is a -contradiction of Pantheism: for "everything perfect, divine, eternal," -<i>also</i> leads <i>to the belief in Eternal Recurrence.</i> Question: has this -pantheistic and affirmative attitude to all things also been made -possible by morality? At bottom only the moral God has been overcome. -Is there any sense in imagining a God "beyond good and evil"? Would -Pantheism in <i>this</i> sense be possible? Do we withdraw the idea of -purpose from the process, and affirm the process notwithstanding? -This were so if, within that process, something were <i>attained</i> every -moment—and always the same thing. Spinoza won an affirmative position -of this sort, in the sense that every moment, according to him, has -a logical necessity: and he triumphed by means of his fundamentally -logical instinct over a like conformation of the world.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>But his case is exceptional. If every <i>fundamental trait of character,</i> -which lies beneath every act, and which finds expression in every -act, were recognised by the individual as <i>his</i> fundamental <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span>trait of -character, this individual would be driven to regard every moment of -his existence in general, triumphantly as good. It would simply be -necessary for that fundamental trait of character to be felt in oneself -as something good, valuable, and pleasurable.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Now, in the case of those men and classes of men who were treated -with violence and oppressed by their fellows, <i>morality</i> saved life -from despair and from the leap into nonentity:. for impotence in -relation to mankind and <i>not</i> in relation to Nature is what generates -the most desperate bitterness towards existence. Morality treated the -powerful, the violent, and the "masters" in general, as enemies against -whom the common man must be protected—<i>that is to say, emboldened, -strengthened.</i> Morality has therefore always taught the most profound -<i>hatred</i> and <i>contempt</i> of the fundamental trait of character of all -rulers—<i>i.e., their Will to Power.</i> To suppress, to deny, and to -decompose this morality, would mean to regard this most thoroughly -detested instinct with the reverse of the old feeling and valuation. -If the sufferer and the oppressed man were <i>to lose his belief</i> in his -right to contemn the Will to Power, his position would be desperate. -This would be so if the trait above-mentioned were essential to life, -in which case it would follow that even that will to morality was only -a cloak to this "Will to Power," as are also even that hatred and -contempt. The oppressed man would then <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>perceive that he stands <i>on -the same platform</i> with the oppressor, and that he has no individual -privilege, nor any <i>higher rank</i> than the latter.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>On the <i>contrary</i>! There is nothing on earth which can have any value, -if it have not a modicum of power—granted, of course, that life itself -is the Will to Power. Morality protected the <i>botched</i> and <i>bungled</i> -against Nihilism, in that it gave every one of them infinite worth, -metaphysical worth, and classed them altogether in one order which did -not correspond with that of worldly power and order of rank: it taught -submission, humility, etc. <i>Admitting that the belief in this morality -be destroyed,</i> the botched and the bungled would no longer have any -comfort, and would perish.</p> - - -<p>This <i>perishing</i> seems like <i>self-annihilation,</i> like an instinctive -selection of that which must be destroyed. The <i>symptoms</i> of this -self-destruction of the botched and the bungled: self-vivisection, -poisoning, intoxication, romanticism, and, above all, the instinctive -constraint to acts whereby the powerful are made into <i>mortal -enemies</i> (training, so to speak, one's own hangmen), <i>the will to -destruction</i> as the will of a still deeper instinct—of the instinct of -self-destruction, of the Will to Nonentity.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Nihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span>in order to be -destroyed, that, having been deprived of morality, they no longer have -any reason to "resign themselves," that they take up their stand on the -territory of the opposite principle, and <i>will also exercise power</i> -themselves, by compelling the powerful to become their hangmen. This -is the European form of Buddhism, that <i>active negation,</i> after all -existence has lost its meaning.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>It must not be supposed that "poverty" has grown more acute, on the -contrary! "God, morality, resignation" were remedies in the very -deepest stages of misery: <i>active</i> Nihilism made its appearance in -circumstances which were relatively much more favourable. The fact, -alone, that morality is regarded as overcome, presupposes a certain -degree of intellectual culture; while this very culture, for its part, -bears evidence to a certain relative well-being. A certain intellectual -fatigue, brought on by the long struggle concerning philosophical -opinions, and carried to hopeless scepticism <i>against</i> philosophy, -shows moreover that the level of these Nihilists is by no means a -low one. Only think of the conditions in which Buddha appeared! The -teaching of the eternal recurrence would have learned principles to -go upon (just as Buddha's teaching, for instance, had the notion of -causality, etc.).</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>What do we mean to-day by the words "botched and bungled"? In the -first place, they are used <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span><i>physiologically</i> and not politically. The -unhealthiest kind of man all over Europe (in all classes) is the soil -out of which Nihilism grows: this species of man will regard eternal -recurrence as damnation—once he is bitten by the thought, he can no -longer recoil before any action. He would not extirpate passively, -but would cause everything to be extirpated which is meaningless -and without a goal to this extent; although it is only a spasm, or -sort of blind rage in the presence of the fact that everything has -existed again and again for an eternity—even this period of Nihilism -and destruction. The value of such a <i>crisis</i> is that it <i>purifies,</i> -that it unites similar elements, and makes them mutually destructive, -that it assigns common duties to men of opposite persuasions, and -brings the weaker and more uncertain among them to the light, thus -taking the first step towards a new <i>order of rank</i> among forces -from the standpoint of health: recognising commanders as commanders, -subordinates as subordinates. Naturally irrespective of all the present -forms of society.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>What class of men will prove they are strongest in this new order of -things? The most moderate—they who do not <i>require</i> any extreme forms -of belief, they who not only admit of, but actually like, a certain -modicum of chance and nonsense; they who can think of man with a very -moderate view of his value, without becoming weak and small on that -account; the most rich in health, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span>who are able to withstand a maximum -amount of sorrow, and who are therefore not so very much afraid of -sorrow—men who are <i>certain of their power,</i> and who represent with -conscious pride the state of strength to which man has attained.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>How could such a man think of Eternal Recurrence?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">56.</p> - -<p><i>The Periods of European Nihilism.</i></p> - -<p><i>The Period of Obscurity</i>: all kinds of groping measures devised to -preserve old institutions and not to arrest the progress of new ones.</p> - -<p><i>The Period of Light</i>: men see that old and new are fundamental -contraries; that the old values are born of descending life, and that -the new ones are born of ascending life—<i>that all old ideals</i> are -unfriendly to life (born of decadence and determining it, however -much they may be decked out in the Sunday finery of morality). We -<i>understand</i> the old, but are far from being sufficiently strong for -the new.</p> - -<p><i>The Periods of the Three Great Passions</i>: contempt, pity, destruction.</p> - -<p><i>The Periods of Catastrophes</i>: the rise of a teaching which will sift -mankind ... which drives the weak to some decision and the strong also.</p> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span></p> -<hr class="chap" /> -<p class="title2"><a name="II" id="II">II.</a></p> - - -<p class="title2">CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<p class="title"><i>(a)</i> Modern Gloominess.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">57.</p> - -<p>My friends, we had a hard time as youths; we even suffered from -youth itself as though it were a serious disease. This is owing to -the age in which we were born—an age of enormous internal decay and -disintegration which, with all its weakness and even with the best of -its strength, is opposed to the spirit of youth. Disintegration—that -is to say, uncertainty—is peculiar to this age: nothing stands on -solid ground or on a sound faith. People live for the morrow, because -the day-after-to-morrow is doubtful. All our road is slippery and -dangerous, while the ice which still bears us has grown unconscionably -thin: we all feel the mild and gruesome breath of the thaw-wind—soon, -where we are walking, no one will any longer <i>be able</i> to stand!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">58.</p> - -<p>If this is not an age of decay and of diminishing vitality, it is at -least one of indiscriminate and arbitrary experimentalising—and it is -probable that out of an excess of abortive experiments there <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span>has grown -this general impression, as of decay: and perhaps decay itself.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">59.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the history of modern gloominess.</i></p> - -<p>The state-nomads (officials, etc.): "homeless"—.</p> - -<p>The break-up of the family.</p> - -<p>The "good man" as a symptom of exhaustion.</p> - -<p>Justice as Will to Power (Rearing).</p> - -<p>Lewdness and neurosis.</p> - -<p>Black music: whither has real music gone?</p> - -<p>The anarchist.</p> - -<p>Contempt of man, loathing.</p> - -<p>Most profound distinction: whether hunger or satiety is creative? The -first creates the <i>Ideals of Romanticism.</i></p> - -<p>Northern unnaturalness.</p> - -<p>The need of Alcohol: the "need" of the working classes.</p> - -<p>Philosophical Nihilism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">60.</p> - -<p>The slow advance and rise of the middle and lower classes (including -the lower kind of spirit and body), which was already well under way -before the French Revolution, and would have made the same progress -forward without the latter,—in short, then, the preponderance of the -herd over all herdsmen and bell-wethers,—brings in its train:—</p> - -<p>(1) Gloominess of spirit (the juxtaposition of a stoical and a -frivolous <i>appearance</i> of happiness, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span>peculiar to noble cultures, is on -the decline; much suffering is allowed to be <i>seen</i> and <i>heard</i> which -formerly was borne in concealment);</p> - -<p>(2) Moral hypocrisy (a way of <i>distinguishing</i> oneself through -morality, but by means of the values of the herd: pity, solicitude, -moderation; and not by means of those virtues which are recognised and -honoured outside the herd's sphere of power);</p> - -<p>(3) A <i>really</i> large amount of sympathy with both pain and joy (a -feeling of pleasure resulting from being herded together, which is -peculiar to all gregarious animals—"public spirit," "patriotism," -everything, in fact, which is apart from the individual).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">61.</p> - -<p>Our age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to mitigate distress, to -honour it, and to wage war in advance with unpleasant possibilities, is -an age of the <i>poor.</i> Our "<i>rich people</i>"—<i>they</i> are the poorest! The -real <i>purpose</i> of all wealth has been forgotten.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">62.</p> - -<p><i>Criticism of modern man</i>:—"the good man," but corrupted and misled by -bad institutions (tyrants and priests);—reason elevated to a position -of authority;—history is regarded as the surmounting of errors;—the -future is regarded as progress;—the Christian state ("God of the -armies");—Christian sexual intercourse (as marriage);—the realm of -"justice" (the cult of "mankind");—"freedom."</p> - -<p>The <i>romantic</i> attitudes of the modern man;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span>—the noble man -(Byron, Victor Hugo, George Sand);—taking the part of the -oppressed and the bungled and the botched: motto for historians and -romancers;—the Stoics of duty;—disinterestedness regarded as art -and as knowledge;—altruism as the most mendacious form of egoism -(utilitarianism), the most sentimental form of egoism.</p> - -<p>All this savours of the eighteenth century. But it had other -qualities which were not inherited, namely, a certain <i>insouciance,</i> -cheerfulness, elegance, spiritual clearness. The spiritual tempo has -altered; the pleasure which was begotten by spiritual refinement and -clearness has given room to the pleasure of colour, harmony, mass, -reality, etc. etc. Sensuality in spiritual things. In short, it is the -eighteenth century of Rousseau.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">63.</p> - -<p>Taken all in all, a considerable amount of <i>humanity</i> has been attained -by our men of to-day. That we feel this is in itself a proof of the -fact that we have become so sensitive in regard to small cases of -distress, that we somewhat unjustly overlook what has been achieved.</p> - -<p>Here we must make allowances for the fact that a great deal of -decadence is rife, and that, through such eyes, our world <i>must appear</i> -bad and wretched. But these eyes have always seen in the same way, in -all ages.</p> - -<p>(1) A certain hypersensitiveness, even in morality.</p> - -<p>(2) The quantum of bitterness and gloominess, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>which pessimism bears -with it in its judgments—both together have helped to bring about the -preponderance of the other and <i>opposite</i> point of view, that things -are not well with our morality.</p> - -<p>The fact of credit, of the commerce of the world, and the means of -traffic—are expressions of an extraordinarily mild <i>trustfulness</i> in -men.... To that may also be added—</p> - -<p>(3) The deliverance of science from moral and religious prejudices: a -very good sign, though for the most part misunderstood.</p> - -<p>In my own way, I am attempting a justification of history.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">64.</p> - -<p><i>The second appearance of Buddhism.</i>—Its precursory signs: the -increase of pity. Spiritual exhaustion. The reduction of all -problems to the question of pleasure and pain. The glory of war -which calls forth a counter-stroke. Just as the sharp demarcation of -nations generates a counter-movement in the form of the most hearty -"Fraternity." The fact that it is impossible for religion to carry on -its work any longer with dogma and fables.</p> - -<p>The <i>catastrophe of Nihilism</i> will put an end to all this Buddhistic -culture.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">65.</p> - -<p>That which is most sorely afflicted to-day is the instinct and will of -<i>tradition</i>: all institutions which owe their origin to this instinct, -are opposed <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span>to the tastes of the age.... At bottom, nothing is thought -or done which is not calculated to tear up this spirit of tradition -by the roots. Tradition is looked upon as a fatality; it is studied -and acknowledged (in the form of "heredity"), but people will not have -anything to do with it. The extension of one will over long periods -of time, the selection of conditions and valuations which make it -possible to dispose of centuries in advance—this, precisely, is what -is most utterly anti-modern. From which it follows, that disorganising -principles give our age its specific character.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">66.</p> - -<p>"Be simple"—a demand which, when made to us complicated and -incomprehensible triers of the heart and reins, is a simple -absurdity.... Be natural: but even if we are unnatural—what then?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">67.</p> - -<p>The means employed in former times in order to arrive at <i>similarly -constituted</i> and lasting types, throughout long generations: entailed -property and the respect of parents (the origin of the faith in gods -and heroes as ancestors).</p> - -<p>Now, the <i>subdivision of property</i> belongs to the opposite tendency. -The centralisation of an enormous number of, different interests in one -soul: which, <i>to that end,</i> must be very strong and mutable.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">68.</p> - -<p>Why does everything become <i>mummery.</i>—The modern man is lacking in -unfailing instinct (instinct being understood here to mean that which -is the outcome of a <i>long period of activity in the same occupation</i> on -the part of one family of men); the incapability of producing anything -perfect, is simply the result of this lack of instinct: one individual -alone cannot make up for the schooling his ancestors should have -transmitted to him.</p> - -<p>What a morality or book of law creates: that deep instinct which -renders <i>automatism</i> and perfection possible in life and in work.</p> - -<p>But now we have reached the opposite point; yes, we wanted to reach -it—the most extreme consciousness, through introspection on the part -of man and of history: and thus we are practically most distant from -perfection in Being, doing, and willing: our desires—even our will -to knowledge—shows how prodigiously decadent we are. We are striving -after the very reverse of what <i>strong races</i> and <i>strong natures</i> will -have—understanding is an <i>end</i>....</p> - -<p>That Science is possible in the way in which it is practised to-day, -proves that all elementary instincts, <i>the instincts which ward off -danger and protect life,</i> are no longer active. We no longer save, we -are merely spending the capital of our forefathers, even in the way in -which we <i>pursue knowledge</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">69.</p> - -<p><i>Nihilistic trait</i>.</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> In the <i>natural sciences</i> ("purposelessness"), <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span>causality, -mechanism, "conformity to law," an interval, a remnant.</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> Likewise in <i>politics</i>: the individual lacks the belief in his -own right, innocence; falsehood rules supreme, as also the worship of -the moment.</p> - -<p><i>(d)</i> Likewise in <i>political economy</i>: the abolition of slavery: the -lack of a redeeming class, and of <i>one who justifies</i>—the rise of -anarchy. "Education"?</p> - -<p><i>(d)</i> Likewise in <i>history</i>: fatalism, Darwinism; the last attempts at -reconciling reason and Godliness fail. Sentimentality in regard to the -past: biographies can no longer be endured! (Phenomenalism even here: -character regarded as a mask; there are no facts.)</p> - -<p><i>(e)</i> Likewise in <i>Art</i>: romanticism and its <i>counter-stroke</i> -(repugnance towards romantic ideals and lies). The latter, morally, -as a sense of greatest truthfulness, but pessimistic. Pure "artists" -(indifference as to the "subject"). (The psychology of the -father-confessor and puritanical psychology—two forms of psychological -romanticism: but also their counter-stroke, the attempt to maintain a -purely artistic attitude towards "men"—but even in this respect no one -dares to make the <i>opposite</i> valuation.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">70.</p> - -<p><i>Against</i> the teaching of the influence of <i>environment</i> and external -causes: the power coming from inside is infinitely <i>superior</i>; -much that appears like influence acting from without is merely the -subjection of environment to this inner power.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> -Precisely the same environment may be used and interpreted in opposite -ways: there are no facts. A genius is <i>not</i> explained by such theories -concerning origins.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">71.</p> - -<p>"<i>Modernity</i>" regarded in the light of nutrition and digestion.</p> - -<p>Sensitiveness is infinitely more acute (beneath moral vestments: the -increase of pity), the abundance of different impressions is greater -than ever. The <i>cosmopolitanism</i> of articles of diet, of literature, -newspapers, forms, tastes, and even landscapes. The speed of this -affluence is <i>prestissimo</i>; impressions are wiped out, and people -instinctively guard against assimilating anything or against taking -anything <i>seriously</i> and "digesting" it; the result is a weakening of -the powers of digestion. There begin a sort of <i>adaptation</i> to this -accumulation of impressions. Man unlearns the art of <i>doing,</i> and -<i>all he does is to react</i> to stimuli coming from his environment. <i>He -spends his strength,</i> partly in the process of <i>assimilation,</i> partly -in <i>defending himself,</i> and again partly in <i>responding to stimuli. -Profound enfeeblement of spontaneity</i>:—the historian, the critic, the -analyst, the interpreter, the observer, the collector, the reader,—all -reactive talents,—<i>all</i> science!</p> - -<p>Artificial <i>modification</i> of one's own nature in order to make it -resemble a "mirror"; one is interested, but only epidermally: this -is systematic coolness, equilibrium, a steady <i>low</i> temperature, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> -just beneath the thin surface on which warmth, movement, "storm," and -undulations play.</p> - -<p>Opposition of <i>external</i> mobility to a certain <i>dead heaviness and -fatigue</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">72.</p> - -<p>Where must our modern world be classed—under exhaustion or under -increasing strength? Its multiformity and lack of repose are brought -about by the highest form of <i>consciousness.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">73.</p> - -<p>Overwork, curiosity and sympathy—our <i>modern vices.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">74.</p> - -<p>A contribution to the characterisation of "<i>Modernity.</i>"—Exaggerated -development of intermediate forms; the decay of types; the break-up of -tradition, schools; the predominance of the instincts (philosophically -prepared: the unconscious has the greater value) after the appearance -of the <i>enfeeblement of will power</i> and of the will to an end <i>and</i> to -the means thereto.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">75.</p> - -<p>A capable artisan or scholar cuts a good figure if he have his pride -in his art, and looks pleasantly and contentedly upon life. On the -other hand, there is no sight more wretched than that of a cobbler or -a schoolmaster who, with the air of a martyr, gives one to understand -that he was really <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span>born for something better. There is nothing better -than what is good! and that is: to have a certain kind of capacity and -to use it. This is <i>virtù</i> in the Italian style of the Renaissance.</p> - -<p>Nowadays, when the state has a nonsensically oversized belly, in all -fields and branches of work there are "representatives" over and above -the real workman: for instance, in addition to the scholars, there -are the journalists; in addition to the suffering masses, there is a -crowd of jabbering and bragging ne'er-do-wells who "represent" that -suffering—not to speak of the professional politicians who, though -quite satisfied with their lot, stand up in Parliament and, with -strong lungs, "represent" grievances. Our modern life is extremely -<i>expensive,</i> thanks to the host of middlemen that infest it; whereas -in the city of antiquity, and in many a city of Spain and Italy -to-day, where there is an echo of the ancient spirit, the man himself -comes forward and will have nothing to do with a representative or an -intermediary in the modern style—except perhaps to kick him hence!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">76.</p> - -<p>The pre-eminence of the <i>merchant</i> and the <i>middleman,</i> even in the -most intellectual spheres: the journalist, the "representative," the -historian (as an intermediary between the past and the present), the -exotic and cosmopolitan, the middleman between natural science and -philosophy, the semi-theologians.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">77.</p> - -<p>The men I have regarded with the most loathing, heretofore, are the -parasites of intellect: they are to be found everywhere, already, in -our modern Europe, and as a matter of fact their conscience is as light -as it possibly can be. They may be a little turbid, and savour somewhat -of Pessimism, but in the main they are voracious, dirty, dirtying, -stealthy, insinuating, light-fingered gentry, scabby—and as innocent -as all small sinners and microbes are. They live at the expense of -those who have intellect and who distribute it liberally: they know -that it is peculiar to the rich mind to live in a disinterested -fashion, without taking too much petty thought for the morrow, and -to distribute its wealth prodigally. For intellect is a bad domestic -economist, and pays no heed whatever to the fact that everything lives -on it and devours it.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">78.</p> - -<p class="title">Modern Mummery</p> - -<p>The motleyness of modern men and its charm Essentially a mask and a -sign of boredom.</p> - -<p>The journalist.</p> - -<p>The political man (in the "national swindle").</p> - -<p>Mummery in the arts:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The lack of honesty in preparing and schooling oneself for -them (Fromentin);</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> -The Romanticists (their lack of philosophy and science and -their excess in literature);</p> - -<p>The novelists (Walter Scott, but also the monsters of the -<i>Nibelung,</i> with their inordinately nervous music);</p> - -<p>The lyricists.</p></blockquote> - -<p>"Scientifically."</p> - -<p>Virtuosos (Jews).</p> - -<p>The popular ideals are overcome, but not yet <i>in the presence of the -people</i>:</p> - -<p>The saint, the sage, the prophet.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">79.</p> - -<p><i>The want of discipline in the modern spirit</i> concealed beneath all -kinds of moral finery.—The show-words are: Toleration (for the -"incapacity of saying yes or no"); <i>la largeur de sympathie</i> (= a -third of indifference, a third of curiosity, and a third of morbid -susceptibility); "objectivity" (the lack of personality and of -will, and the inability to "love"); "freedom" in regard to the rule -(Romanticism); "truth" as opposed to falsehood and lying (Naturalism); -the "scientific spirit" (the "human document": or, in plain English, -the serial story which means "addition"—instead of "composition"); -"passion" in the place of disorder and intemperance; "depth" in the -place of confusion and the pell-mell of symbols.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">80.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the criticism of big words.</i>—I am full of mistrust and -malice towards what is called <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span>"ideal": this is my <i>Pessimism,</i> that -I have recognised to what extent "sublime sentiments" are a source of -evil—that is to say, a belittling and depreciating of man.</p> - -<p>Every time "progress" is expected to result from an ideal, -disappointment invariably follows; the triumph of an ideal has always -been a <i>retrograde movement</i>.</p> - -<p>Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, -philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words are -only valuable in a struggle, as banners: not as realities, but as -<i>show-words,</i> for something quite different (yea, even quite opposed to -what they mean!).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">81.</p> - -<p>The kind of man is known who has fallen in love with the sentence -"<i>tout comprendre à est tout pardonner"</i> It is the weak and, above all, -the disillusioned: if there is something to pardon in everything, there -is also something to contemn! It is the philosophy of disappointment, -which here swathes itself so humanly in pity, and gazes out so sweetly.</p> - -<p>They are Romanticists, whose faith has gone to pot: now they at least -wish to look on and see how everything vanishes and fades. They call it -<i>l'art pour l'art,</i> "objectivity," etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">82.</p> - -<p><i>The main symptoms of Pessimism</i>:—Dinners at Magny's; Russian -Pessimism (Tolstoy, Dostoiewsky); <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span>æsthetic Pessimism, <i>l'art pour -l'art,</i> "description" (the romantic and the anti-romantic Pessimism); -Pessimism in the theory of knowledge (Schopenhauer: phenomenalism); -anarchical Pessimism; the "religion of pity," Buddhistic preparation; -the Pessimism of culture (exoticness, cosmopolitanism); moral -Pessimism, myself.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">83.</p> - -<p>"<i>Without the Christian Faith</i>" said Pascal, "you would yourselves -be like nature and history, <i>un monstre et un chaos.</i>" We fulfilled -this prophecy: once the weak and optimistic eighteenth century had -<i>embellished</i> and <i>rationalised</i> man.</p> - -<p><i>Schopenhauer</i> and <i>Pascal.</i>—I none essential point, Schopenhauer is -the first who <i>takes up Pascal's</i> movement again: <i>un monstre et un -chaos,</i> consequently something that must be negatived ... history, -nature, and man himself!</p> - -<p>"<i>Our inability to know the truth</i> is the result of our <i>corruption,</i> -of our moral <i>decay</i>" says Pascal. And Schopenhauer says essentially -the same. "The more profound the corruption of reason is, the -more necessary is the doctrine of salvation"—or, putting it into -Schopenhauerian phraseology, negation.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">84.</p> - -<p><i>Schopenhauer as an epigone</i> (state of affairs before the -Revolution):—Pity, sensuality, art, weakness of will, Catholicism -of the most intellectual desires—that is, at bottom, the good old -eighteenth century.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> -<i>Schopenhauer's</i> fundamental misunderstanding of the <i>will</i> (just -as though passion, instinct, and desire were the essential factors -of will) is typical: the depreciation of the will to the extent of -mistaking it altogether. Likewise the hatred of willing: the attempt at -seeing something superior—yea, even superiority itself, and that which -really matters, in non-willing, in the "subject-being <i>without</i> aim or -intention." Great symptom of <i>fatigue or of the weakness of will</i>: for -this, in reality, is what treats the passions as master, and directs -them as to the way and to the measure....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">85.</p> - -<p>The undignified attempt has been made to regard Wagner and Schopenhauer -as types of the mentally unsound: an infinitely more essential -understanding of the matter would have been gained if the exact -decadent type which each of them represents had been scientifically and -accurately defined.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">86.</p> - -<p>In my opinion, Henrik Ibsen has become very German. With all his -robust idealism and "Will to Truth," he never dared to ring himself -free from moral-illusionism which says "freedom," and will not admit, -even to itself, what freedom is: the second stage in the metamorphosis -of the "Will to Power" in him who lacks it. In the first stage, one -demands justice at the hands of those who have power. In the second, -one speaks of "freedom," <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span>that is to say, one wishes to "shake oneself -free" from those who have power. In the third stage, one speaks of -"equal rights"—that is to say, so long as one is not a predominant -personality one wishes to prevent one's competitors from growing in -power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">87.</p> - -<p>The Decline of <i>Protestantism</i>: theoretically and historically -understood as a half-measure. Undeniable predominance of Catholicism -to-day: Protestant feeling is so dead that the strongest -<i>anti-Protestant</i> movements (Wagner's <i>Parsifal,</i> for instance) are no -longer regarded as such. The whole of the more elevated intellectuality -in France is <i>Catholic</i> in instinct; Bismarck recognised that there was -no longer any such thing as Protestantism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">88.</p> - -<p>Protestantism, that spiritually unclean and tiresome form of decadence, -in which Christianity has known how to survive in the mediocre North, -is something incomplete and complexly valuable for knowledge, in so far -as it was able to bring experiences of different kinds and origins into -the same heads.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">89.</p> - -<p>What has the German spirit not made out of Christianity! And, to refer -to Protestantism again, how much beer is there not still in Protestant -Christianity! Can a crasser, more indolent, and more lounging form -of Christian belief <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>be imagined, than that of the average German -Protestant?... It is indeed a very humble Christianity. I call it -the Homœopathy of Christianity! I am reminded that, to-day, there -also exists a less humble sort of Protestantism; it is taught by -royal chaplains and anti-Semitic speculators: but nobody has ever -maintained that any "spirit" "hovers" over these waters. It is merely -a less respectable form of Christian faith, not by any means a more -comprehensible one.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">90.</p> - -<p><i>Progress.</i>—Let us be on our guard lest we deceive ourselves! Time -flies forward apace,—we would fain believe that everything flies -forward with it,—that evolution is an advancing development.... That -is the appearance of things which deceives the most circumspect. But -the nineteenth century shows no advance whatever on the sixteenth: -and the German spirit of 1888 is an example of a backward movement -when compared with that of 1788.... Mankind does not advance, it does -not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a -huge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed, -while an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic, -co-ordination, and responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the -fact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement?—that the -German Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism?—that -the Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organisation <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span>of society -on a large scale?... Man is not an example of progress as compared with -animals: the tender son of culture is an abortion compared with the -Arab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a more successful type—that is -to say, richer in sustaining power than the European.</p> - -<hr /> -<p class="title"><i>(b)</i> The Last Centuries.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">91.</p> - -<p>Gloominess and pessimistic influence necessarily follow in the wake of -enlightenment. Towards 1770 a falling-off in cheerfulness was already -noticeable; women, with that very feminine instinct which always -defends virtue, believed that immorality was the cause of it. Galiani -hit the bull's eye: he quotes Voltaire's verse:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -"Un monstre gai vaut mieux<br /> -Qu'un sentimental ennuyeux."<br /> -</p> - -<p>If now I maintain that I am ahead, by a century or two of -enlightenment, of Voltaire and Galiani—who was much more profound, how -deeply must I have sunk into gloominess! This is also true, and betimes -I somewhat reluctantly manifested some caution in regard to the German -and Christian narrowness and inconsistency of Schopenhauerian or, worse -still, Leopardian Pessimism, and sought the most characteristic form -(Asia). But, in order to endure that extreme Pessimism (which here and -there peeps out of my <i>Birth of Tragedy),</i> to live alone "without God -or morality," <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span>I was compelled to invent a counter-prop for myself. -Perhaps I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone -surfers so excruciatingly that he was <i>compelled</i> to invent laughter. -The unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as might have been -expected, the most cheerful.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">92.</p> - -<p>In regard to German culture, I have always had a feeling as of -<i>decline.</i> The fact that I learned to know a declining form of culture -has often made me <i>unfair</i> towards the whole phenomenon of European -culture. The Germans always follow at some distance behind: they always -go to the root of things, for instance:—</p> - -<p>Dependance upon foreigners; <i>Kant</i>—Rousseau, the sensualists, Hume, -Swedenborg.</p> - -<p><i>Schopenhauer</i>—the Indians and Romanticism, Voltaire.</p> - -<p><i>Wagner</i>—the French cult of the ugly and of grand opera, <i>Paris,</i> and -the flight into <i>primitive barbarism</i> (the marriage of brother and -sister).</p> - -<p>The law of the <i>laggard</i> (the provinces go to Paris, Germany goes to -France).</p> - -<p>How is it that precisely <i>Germans discovered the Greek</i> (the more an -instinct is developed, the more it is <i>tempted</i> to run for once into -its opposite).</p> - -<p>Music is the last breath of every culture.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">93.</p> - -<p><i>Renaissance and Reformation.</i>—What does the Renaissance prove? That -the reign of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span>"individual" can be only a short one. The output -is too great; there is not even the possibility of husbanding or of -capitalising forces, and exhaustion sets in step by step. These are -times when everything is <i>squandered,</i> when even the strength itself -with which one collects, capitalises, and heaps riches upon riches, -<i>is squandered.</i> Even the opponents of such movements are driven to -preposterous extremes in the dissipation of their strength: and they -too are very soon exhausted, used up, and completely sapped.</p> - -<p>In the Reformation we are face to face with a wild and plebeian -counterpart of the Italian Renaissance, generated by similar impulses, -except that the former, in the backward and still vulgar North, had to -assume a religious form—there the concept of a higher life had not yet -been divorced from that of a religious one.</p> - -<p>Even the Reformation was a movement for individual liberty; "every one -his own priest" is really no more than a formula for <i>libertinage.</i> -As a matter of fact, the words "Evangelical freedom" would have -sufficed—and all instincts which had reasons for remaining concealed -broke out like wild hounds, the most brutal needs suddenly acquired the -courage to show themselves, everything seemed justified ... men refused -to specify the kind of freedom they had aimed at, they preferred to -shut their eyes. But the fact that their eyes were closed and that -their lips were moistened with gushing orations, did not prevent their -hands from being ready to snatch at whatever there was to snatch at, -that the belly became the god of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>"free gospel," and that all lusts -of revenge and of hatred were indulged with insatiable fury.</p> - -<p>This lasted for a while: then exhaustion supervened, just as it -had done in Southern Europe; and again here, it was a low form of -exhaustion, a sort of general <i>ruere in servitium</i>.... Then the -<i>disreputable</i> century of Germany dawned.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">94.</p> - -<p><i>Chivalry</i>—the position won by power: its gradual break-up (and -partial transference to broader and more bourgeois spheres). In the -case of Larochefoucauld we find a knowledge of the actual impulses of a -noble temperament—together with the gloomy Christian estimate of these -impulses.</p> - -<p>The <i>protraction of Christianity</i> through the <i>French Revolution.</i> The -seducer is Rousseau; he once again liberates woman, who thenceforward -is always represented as ever more interesting—<i>suffering.</i> Then come -the slaves and Mrs. Beecher-Stowe. Then the poor and the workmen. -Then the vicious and the sick—all this is drawn into the foreground -(even for the purpose of disposing people in favour of the genius, -it has been customary for five hundred years to press him forward as -the great sufferer!). Then comes the cursing of all voluptuousness -(Baudelaire and Schopenhauer), the most decided conviction that the -lust of power is the greatest vice; absolute certainty that morality -and disinterestedness are identical things; that the "happiness of all" -is a goal worth <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span>striving after (<i>i.e.,</i> Christ's Kingdom of Heaven). -We are on the best road to it: the Kingdom of Heaven of the poor in -spirit has begun.—Intermediate stages: the bourgeois (as a result of -the <i>nouveau riche</i>) and the workman (as a result of the machine).</p> - -<p>Greek and French culture of the time of Louis XIV. compared. A decided -belief in oneself. A leisure-class which makes things hard for itself -and exercises a great deal of self-control. The power of form, the will -to form <i>oneself.</i> "Happiness" acknowledged as a purpose. Much strength -and energy <i>behind</i> all formality of manners. Pleasure at the sight of -a life that is <i>seemingly so easy.</i> The <i>Greeks</i> seemed like <i>children</i> -to the French.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">95.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>The Three Centuries.</i></p> - -<p>Their different kinds of <i>sensitiveness</i> may perhaps be best expressed -as follows:—</p> - -<p><i>Aristocracy</i>: Descartes, the reign of <i>reason,</i> evidence showing the -sovereignty of the <i>will</i>.</p> - -<p><i>Feminism</i>: Rousseau, the reign of <i>feeling,</i> evidence showing the -sovereignty of the senses; all lies.</p> - -<p><i>Animalism</i>: Schopenhauer, the reign of <i>passion,</i> evidence showing the -sovereignty of animality, more honest, but gloomy.</p> - -<p>The seventeenth century is <i>aristocratic,</i> all for order, haughty -towards everything animal, severe in regard to the heart, "austere," -and even free from sentiment, "non-German," averse to all that is -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> -burlesque and natural, generalising and maintaining an attitude of -sovereignty towards the past for it believes in itself. At bottom it -partakes very much of the beast of prey, and practises asceticism in -order to remain master. It is the century of strength of will, as also -that of strong passion.</p> - -<p>The eighteenth century is dominated by <i>woman,</i> it is gushing, -spiritual, and flat; but with intellect at the service of aspirations -and of the heart, it is a libertine in the pleasures of intellect, -undermining all authorities; emotionally intoxicated, cheerful, clear, -humane, and sociable, false to itself and at bottom very rascally....</p> - -<p>The nineteenth century is more <i>animal,</i> more subterranean, hateful, -realistic, plebeian, and on that very account "better," "more honest," -more submissive to "reality" of what kind soever, and <i>truer</i>; but -weak of will, sad, obscurely exacting and fatalistic. It has no -feeling of timidity or reverence, either in the presence of "reason" -or the "heart"; thoroughly convinced of the dominion of the desires -(Schopenhauer said "Will," but nothing is more characteristic of his -philosophy than that it entirely lacks all actual <i>willing</i>). Even -morality is reduced to an instinct ("Pity").</p> - -<p>Auguste Comte is <i>the continuation of the</i> eighteenth <i>century</i> (the -dominion of the heart over the head, sensuality in the theory of -knowledge, altruistic exaltation).</p> - -<p>The fact that <i>science</i> has become as sovereign as it is to-day, proves -how the nineteenth century has <i>emancipated itself</i> from the dominion -of <i>ideals.</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>A certain absence of "needs" and wishes makes our -scientific curiosity and rigour possible—this is our kind of virtue.</p> - -<p>Romanticism is the <i>counterstroke</i> of the eighteenth century; a sort of -accumulated longing for its grand style of exaltation (as a matter of -fact, largely mingled with mummery and self-deception: the desire was -to represent <i>strong nature</i> and <i>strong passion</i>).</p> - -<p>The nineteenth century instinctively goes in search of <i>theories</i> -by means of which it may feel its <i>fatalistic, submission to the -empire of facts</i> justified. Hegel's success against sentimentality -and romantic idealism was already a sign of its fatalistic trend of -thought, in its belief that superior reason belongs to the triumphant -side, and in its justification of the actual "state" (in the place of -"humanity," etc.).—Schopenhauer: we are something foolish, and at the -best self-suppressive. The success of determinism, the genealogical -derivation of <i>obligations</i> which were formerly held to be absolute, -the teaching of environment and adaptation, the reduction of will to -a process of reflex movement, the denial of the will as a "working -cause"; finally—a real process of re-christening: so little will -is observed that the word itself becomes <i>available</i> for another -purpose. Further theories: the teaching of <i>objectivity,</i> "will-less" -contemplation, as the only road to truth, <i>as also</i> to <i>beauty</i> (also -the belief in "genius," in order to have <i>the right to be submissive</i>); -mechanism, the determinable rigidity of the mechanical process; -so-called "Naturalism," <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span>the elimination of the choosing, directing, -interpreting subject, on principle.</p> - -<p>Kant, with his "practical reason," with his <i>moral fanaticism,</i> is -quite eighteenth century style; still completely outside the historical -movement, without any notion whatsoever of the reality of his time, for -instance, revolution; he is not affected by Greek philosophy; he is a -phantasist of the notion of duty, a sensualist with a hidden leaning to -dogmatic pampering.</p> - -<p><i>The return to Kant</i> in our century means a <i>return to the eighteenth -century,</i> people desire to create themselves a right to the <i>old ideas</i> -and to the old exaltation—hence a theory of knowledge which "describes -limits," that is to say, which admits <i>of the option of fixing a Beyond -to the domain of reason.</i></p> - -<p><i>Hegel's</i> way of thinking is not so very far removed from that of -Goethe: see the latter on the subject of Spinoza, for instance. -The will to deify the All and Life, in order to find both <i>peace</i> -and <i>happiness</i> in contemplating them: Hegel looks for reason -everywhere—in the presence of reason man may be <i>submissive</i> and -resigned. In Goethe we find a kind of <i>fatalism</i> which is almost -<i>joyous</i> and <i>confiding,</i> which neither revolts nor weakens, which -strives to make a totality out of itself, in the belief that only in -totality does everything seem good and justified, and find itself -resolved.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">96.</p> - -<p>The period of <i>rationalism</i>—followed by a period of <i>sentimentality.</i> -To what extent does <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span>Schopenhauer come under "sentimentality"? (Hegel -under intellectuality?)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">97.</p> - -<p>The seventeenth century <i>suffers</i> from <i>humanity</i> as from a <i>host -of contradictions</i> ("<i>l'amas de contradictions</i>" that we are); it -endeavours to discover man, to <i>co-ordinate him,</i> to excavate him: -whereas the eighteenth century tries to forget what is known of man's -nature, in order to adapt him to its Utopia. "Superficial, soft, -humane"—gushes over "humanity."</p> - -<p>The seventeenth century tries to banish all traces of the individual -in order that the artist's work may resemble life as much as possible. -The eighteenth century strives <i>to create interest in the author</i> by -means of the work. The seventeenth century seeks art in art, a piece of -culture; the eighteenth uses art in its propaganda for political and -social reforms.</p> - -<p>"Utopia," the "ideal man," the deification of Nature, the vanity of -making one's own personality the centre of interest, subordination to -the propaganda of <i>social ideas,</i> charlatanism—all this we derive from -the eighteenth century.</p> - -<p>The style of the seventeenth century: <i>propre exact et libre.</i></p> - -<p>The strong individual who is self-sufficient, or who appeals -ardently to God—and that obtrusiveness and indiscretion of modern -authors—these things are <i>opposites.</i> "Showing-oneself-off"—what a -contrast to the Scholars of Port-Royal!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> -Alfieri had a sense for the <i>grand style.</i></p> - -<p>The hate of the <i>burlesque</i> (that which lacks dignity), <i>the lack of a -sense of Nature</i> belongs to the seventeenth century.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">98.</p> - -<p><i>Against Rousseau.—Alas!</i> man is no longer sufficiently evil; -Rousseau's opponents, who say that "man is a beast of prey," are -unfortunately wrong. Not the corruption of man, but the softening and -moralising of him is the curse. In the sphere which Rousseau attacked -most violently, the <i>relatively</i> strongest and most successful type of -man was still to be found (the type which still possessed the great -passions intact: Will to Power, Will to Pleasure, the Will and Ability -to Command). The man of the eighteenth century must be compared with -the man of the Renaissance (also with the man of the seventeenth -century in France) if the matter is to be understood at all: Rousseau -is a symptom of self-contempt and of inflamed vanity—both signs that -the dominating will is lacking: he moralises and seeks the <i>cause</i> of -his own misery after the style of a revengeful man in the <i>ruling</i> -classes.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">99.</p> - -<p><i>Voltaire—Rousseau.</i>—A state of nature is terrible; man is a beast of -prey: our civilisation is an extraordinary <i>triumph</i> over this beast of -prey in nature—this was <i>Voltaires</i> conclusion. He was conscious of -the mildness, the refinements, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span>the intellectual joys of the civilised -state; he despised obtuseness, even in the form of virtue, and the lack -of delicacy even in ascetics and monks.</p> - -<p>The <i>moral depravity</i> of man seemed to pre-occupy <i>Rousseau</i>; the words -"unjust," "cruel," are the best possible for the purpose of exciting -the instincts of the oppressed, who otherwise find themselves under -the ban of the <i>vetitum</i> and of disgrace; <i>so that their conscience -is opposed to their indulging any insurrectional desires.</i> These -emancipators seek one thing above all: to give their party the great -accents and attitudes of <i>higher Nature</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">100.</p> - -<p><i>Rousseau</i>; the rule founded on sentiment; Nature as the source of -justice; man perfects himself in proportion as he approaches <i>Nature</i> -(according to Voltaire, in proportion <i>as he leaves Nature behind</i>). -The very same periods seem to the one to demonstrate the progress of -<i>humanity</i> and, to the other, the increase of injustice and inequality.</p> - -<p>Voltaire, who still understood <i>umanità</i> in the sense of the -Renaissance, as also <i>virtù</i> (as "higher culture"), fights for the -cause of the "<i>honnêtes gens</i>" "<i>la bonne compagnie</i>" taste, science, -arts, and even for the cause of progress and civilisation.</p> - -<p><i>The flare-up occurred towards 1760</i>: On the one hand the citizen -of Geneva, on the other <i>le seigneur de Ferney.</i> It is only from -that moment and henceforward that Voltaire was the man of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span>his age, -the philosopher, the representative of Toleration and of Disbelief -(theretofore he had been merely <i>un bel esprit</i>). His envy and hatred -of Rousseau's success forced him upwards.</p> - -<p>"<i>Pour 'la canaille' un dieu rémunérateur et vengeur</i>"—Voltaire.</p> - -<p>The criticism of both standpoints in regard to the <i>value of -civilisation.</i> To Voltaire nothing seems finer than the <i>social -invention</i>: there is no higher goal than to uphold and perfect it. -<i>L'honnêteté</i> consists precisely in respecting social usage; virtue -in a certain obedience towards various necessary "prejudices" which -favour the maintenance of society. <i>Missionary of Culture,</i> aristocrat, -representative of the triumphant and ruling classes and their values. -But Rousseau remained a <i>plebeian,</i> even as <i>hommes de lettres,</i> this -was <i>preposterous</i>; his shameless contempt for everything that was not -himself.</p> - -<p>The <i>morbid feature</i> in Rousseau is the one which happens to have been -most admired and <i>imitated.</i> (Lord Byron resembled him somewhat, he -too screwed himself up to sublime attitudes and to revengeful rage—a -sign of vulgarity; later on, when Venice restored his equilibrium, -he understood what <i>alleviates most</i> and does the <i>most good ... -l'insouciance</i>.)</p> - -<p>In spite of his antecedents, Rousseau is proud of himself; but he is -incensed if he is reminded of his origin....</p> - -<p>In Rousseau there was undoubtedly some brain trouble; in Voltaire—rare -health and lightsomeness. <i>The revengefulness of the sick</i>; his -periods <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span>of insanity as also those of his contempt of man, and of his -mistrust.</p> - -<p>Rousseau's defence of <i>Providence</i> (against Voltaire's Pessimism): -he <i>had need of</i> God in order to be able to curse society and -civilisation; everything must be good <i>per se,</i> because God had created -it; man <i>alone has corrupted man.</i> The "good man" as a man of Nature -was pure fantasy; but with the dogma of God's authorship he became -something probable and even not devoid of foundation.</p> - -<p><i>Romanticism</i> à la <i>Rousseau</i>: passion ("the sovereign right of -passion"); "naturalness"; the fascination of madness (foolishness -reckoned as greatness); the senseless vanity of the weak; the -revengefulness of the masses elevated to the position of <i>justice</i> -("in politics, for one hundred years, the leader has always been this -invalid").</p> - - -<p class="parnum">101.</p> - -<p><i>Kant</i>: makes the scepticism of Englishmen, in regard to the theory of -knowledge, <i>possible</i> for Germans.</p> - -<p>(1) By enlisting in its cause the interest of the German's religious -and moral needs: just as the new academicians used scepticism for the -same reasons, as a preparation for Platonism (<i>vide</i> Augustine); just -as Pascal even used <i>moral</i> scepticism in order to provoke (to justify) -the need of belief;</p> - -<p>(2) By complicating and entangling it with scholastic flourishes in -view of making it more <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span>acceptable to the German's scientific taste in -form (for Locke and Hume, alone, were too illuminating, too clear—that -is to say, judged according to the German valuing instinct, "too -superficial").</p> - -<p><i>Kant</i>: a poor psychologist and mediocre judge of human nature, made -hopeless mistakes in regard to great historical values (the French -Revolution); a moral fanatic <i>à la</i> Rousseau; with a subterranean -current of Christian values; a thorough dogmatist, but bored to -extinction by this tendency, to the extent of wishing to tyrannise -over it, but quickly tired, even of 'scepticism; and not yet affected -by any cosmopolitan thought or antique beauty ... a <i>dawdler</i> and a -<i>go-between,</i> not at all original (like <i>Leibnitz,</i> something between -mechanism and spiritualism; like <i>Goethe,</i> something between the taste -of the eighteenth century and that of the "historical sense" [which -<i>is</i> essentially a sense of exoticism]; like <i>German music,</i> between -French and Italian music; like Charles the Great, who mediated and -built bridges between the Roman Empire and Nationalism—a dawdler <i>par -excellence</i>).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">102.</p> - -<p>In what respect have the <i>Christian</i> centuries with their Pessimism -been <i>stronger</i> centuries than the eighteenth—and how do they -correspond with the <i>tragic</i> age of the Greeks?</p> - -<p>The nineteenth century <i>versus</i> the eighteenth. How was it an -heir?—how was it a step backwards from the latter? (more lacking in -"spirit" and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span>in taste)—how did it show an advance on the latter? -(more gloomy, more realistic, <i>stronger</i>).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">103.</p> - -<p>How can we <i>explain</i> the fact that we feel something in common with the -<i>Campagna romana?</i> And the high mountain chain?</p> - -<p>Chateaubriand in a letter to M. de Fontanes in 1803 writes his first -impression of the <i>Campagna romana.</i></p> - -<p>The President de Brosses says of the <i>Campagna romana</i>: "Il fallait -que Romulus fût ivre quand il songea à bâtir une ville dans un terrain -aussi laid."</p> - -<p>Even Delacroix would have nothing to do with Rome, it frightened him. -He loved Venice, just as Shakespeare, Byron, and Georges Sand did. -Théophile Gautier's and Richard Wagner's dislike of Rome must not be -forgotten.</p> - -<p>Lamartine has the language for Sorrento and Posilippo.</p> - -<p>Victor Hugo raves about Spain, "parce que aucune autre nation n'a -moins emprunté à l'antiquité, parce qu'elle n'a subi aucune influence -classique."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">104.</p> - -<p>The <i>two great attempts</i> that were made to overcome the eighteenth -century:</p> - -<p><i>Napoleon,</i> in that he called man, the soldier, and the great struggle -for power, to life again, and conceived Europe as a political power.</p> - -<p><i>Goethe,</i> in that he imagined a European culture <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span>which would consist -of the whole heritage of what humanity had <i>attained to</i> up to his time.</p> - - -<p>German culture in this century inspires mistrust—the music of the -period lacks that complete element which liberates and binds as well, -to wit—Goethe.</p> - -<p>The pre-eminence of <i>music</i> in the romanticists of 1830 and 1840. -Delacroix. Ingres—a passionate musician (admired Gluck, Haydn, -Beethoven, Mozart), said to his pupils in Rome: "Si je pouvais vous -rendre tous musiciens, vous y gagneriez comme peintres"—likewise -Horace Vernet, who was particularly fond of Don Juan (as Mendelssohn -assures us, 1831); Stendhal, too, who says of himself: "Combien de -lieues ne ferais-je pas à pied, et à combien de jours de prison ne me -soumetterais-je pas pour entendre <i>Don Juan ou le Matrimonio segreto</i>; -et je ne sais pour quelle autre chose je ferais cet effort." He was -then fifty-six years old.</p> - -<p>The borrowed forms, for instance: Brahms as a typical "Epigone," -likewise Mendelssohn's cultured Protestantism (a former "soul" is -turned into poetry posthumously ...)</p> - -<p>—the moral and poetical substitutions in Wagner, who used <i>one</i> art as -a stop-gap to make up for what another lacked.</p> - -<p>—the "historical sense," inspiration derived from poems, sagas.</p> - -<p>—that characteristic transformation of which G. Flaubert is the most -striking example among Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most striking -example among Germans, shows how the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span>romantic belief in love and the -future changes into a longing for nonentity in 1830-50.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">106.</p> - -<p>How is it that German music reaches its culminating point in the age of -German romanticism? How is it that German music lacks Goethe? On the -other hand, how much Schiller, or more exactly, how much "Thekla"<a name="FNanchor_5_6" id="FNanchor_5_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_6" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> is -there not in Beethoven!</p> - -<p>Schumann has Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffman, Tieck, in him. -Richard Wagner has Freischütz, Hoffmann, Grimm, the romantic Saga, -the mystic Catholicism of instinct, symbolism, "the free-spiritedness -of passion" (Rousseau's intention). The <i>Flying Dutchman</i> savours of -France, where <i>le ténébreux</i> (1830) was the type of the seducer.</p> - -<p><i>The cult of music,</i> the revolutionary romanticism of form. Wagner -<i>synthesises</i> German and French romanticism.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_6" id="Footnote_5_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_6"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Thekla is the sentimental heroine in Schiller's -<i>Wallenstein.</i>—<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.</span></p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">107.</p> - -<p>From the point of view only of his value to Germany and to German -culture, Richard Wagner is still a great problem, perhaps a German -misfortune: in any case, however, a fatality. But what does it -matter? Is he not very much more than a German event? It also -seems to me that to no country on earth is he less related than to -Germany; nothing was prepared there for <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span>his advent; his whole type -is simply strange amongst Germans; there he stands in their midst, -wonderful, misunderstood, incomprehensible. But people carefully avoid -acknowledging this: they are too kind, too square-headed—too German -for that. "Credo quia absurdus est": thus did the German spirit wish -it to be, in this case too—hence it is content meanwhile to believe -everything Richard Wagner wanted to have believed about himself. In all -ages the spirit of Germany has been deficient in subtlety and divining -powers concerning psychological matters. Now that it happens to be -under the high pressure of patriotic nonsense and self-adoration, it is -visibly growing thicker and coarser: how could it therefore be equal to -the problem of Wagner!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">108.</p> - -<p>The Germans <i>are</i> not yet anything, but they are <i>becoming</i> something; -that is why they have not yet any culture;—that is why they cannot -yet have any culture!—They are not yet anything: that means they are -all kinds of things. They are <i>becoming</i> something: that means that -they will one day cease from being all kinds of things. The latter is -at bottom only a wish, scarcely a hope yet. Fortunately it is a wish -with which one can live, a question of will, of work, of discipline, a -question of training, as also of resentment, of longing, of privation, -of discomfort,—yea, even of bitterness,—in short, we Germans <i>will</i> -get something out of ourselves, something that has not yet been wanted -of us—we want something <i>more</i>!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> -That this "German, as he is not as yet"—has a right to something -better than the present German "culture"; that all who wish to -become something better, must wax angry when they perceive a sort of -contentment, an impudent "setting-oneself-at-ease," or "a process of -self-censing," in this quarter: that is my second principle, in regard -to which my opinions have not yet changed.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title"><i>(c)</i> Signs of Increasing Strength.</p> - - - -<p class="parnum">109.</p> - -<p>First Principle: everything that characterises modern men savours of -decay: but side by side with the prevailing sickness there are signs of -a strength and powerfulness of soul which are still untried. <i>The same -causes which tend to promote the belittling of men,</i> also force <i>the -stronger and rarer individuals upwards to greatness.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">110.</p> - -<p><i>General survey: the ambiguous</i> character of our <i>modern -world</i>—precisely the same symptoms might at the same time be -indicative of either <i>decline</i> or <i>strength.</i> And the signs of strength -and of emancipation dearly bought, might in view of traditional -(or <i>hereditary</i>) appreciations concerned with the feelings, be -<i>misunderstood</i> as indications of weakness. In short, <i>feeling,</i> as a -<i>means of fixing valuations,</i> is not <i>on a level with the times.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> -<i>Generalised</i>: Every valuation is always <i>backward</i>; it is merely the -expression of the conditions which favoured survival and growth in a -much earlier age: it struggles against new conditions of existence -out of which it did not arise, and which it therefore necessarily -misunderstands: it hinders, and excites suspicion against, all that is -new.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">111.</p> - -<p><i>The problem of the nineteenth century.</i>—To discover whether its -strong and weak side belong to each other. Whether they have been cut -from one and the same piece. Whether the variety of its ideals and -their contradictions are conditioned by a higher purpose: whether -they are something higher.—For it might be <i>the prerequisite of -greatness,</i> that growth should take place amid such violent tension. -Dissatisfaction, Nihilism, <i>might be a good sign.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">112.</p> - -<p><i>General survey.</i>—As a matter of fact, all abundant growth involves a -concomitant process of <i>crumbling to bits</i> and <i>decay</i>: suffering and -the symptoms of decline <i>belong</i> to ages of enormous progress; every -fruitful and powerful movement of mankind has always <i>brought about</i> -a concurrent Nihilistic movement. Under certain circumstances, the -appearance of <i>the extremest</i> form of Pessimism and actual <i>Nihilism</i> -might be the sign of a process of incisive and most essential growth, -and of mankind's transit into completely new conditions of existence. -<i>This is what I have understood.</i></p> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">113.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>A.</i></p> - -<p>Starting out with a thoroughly courageous <i>appreciation</i> of our men of -to-day:—we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by appearance: this -mankind is much less effective, but it gives quite different pledges -of <i>lasting strength,</i> its tempo is slower, but the rhythm itself is -richer. <i>Healthiness</i> is increasing, the real conditions of a healthy -body are on the point of being known, and will gradually be created, -"asceticism" is regarded with irony. The fear of extremes, a certain -confidence in the "right way," no raving: a periodical self-habituation -to narrower values (such as "mother-land," "science," etc.).</p> - -<p>This whole picture, however, would still be <i>ambiguous</i>: it might be a -movement either of <i>increase</i> or <i>decline</i> in Life.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>B.</i></p> - -<p>The belief in "progress"—in lower spheres of intelligence, appears as -increasing life: but this is self-deception;</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>in higher spheres of intelligence it is a sign of -<i>declining</i> life.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Description of the symptoms.</p> - -<p>The unity of the aspect: uncertainty in regard to the standard of -valuation.</p> - -<p>Fear of a general "in vain."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span></p> - -<p>Nihilism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">114.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, we are no longer so urgently in need of an -antidote against the first Nihilism: Life is no longer so uncertain, -accidental, and senseless in modern Europe. All such tremendous -<i>exaggeration</i> of the value of men, of the value of evil, etc., are -not so necessary now; we can endure a considerable diminution of this -value, we may grant a great deal of nonsense and accident: the <i>power</i> -man has acquired now allows of a <i>lowering</i> of the means of discipline, -of which the strongest was the moral interpretation of the universe. -The hypothesis "God" is much too extreme.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">115.</p> - -<p>If anything shows that our <i>humanisation</i> is a genuine sign of -<i>progress,</i> it is the fact that we no longer require excessive -contraries, that we no longer require contraries at all....</p> - -<p>We may love the senses; for we have spiritualised them in every way and -made them artistic;</p> - -<p>We have a right to all things which hitherto have been most -<i>calumniated.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">116.</p> - -<p><i>The reversal of the order of rank.</i>—Those pious counterfeiters—the -priests—are becoming Chandala in our midst:—they occupy the -position of the charlatan, of the quack, of the counterfeiter, of the -sorcerer: we regard them as corrupters of the will, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span>as the great -slanderers and vindictive enemies of Life, and as the <i>rebels</i> among -the bungled and the botched. We have made our middle class out of our -servant-caste—the Sudra—that is to say, our people or the body which -wields the political power.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the Chandala of former times is paramount: the -<i>blasphemers,</i> the <i>immoralists,</i> the independents of all kinds, the -artists, the Jews, the minstrels—and, at bottom, all <i>disreputable</i> -classes are in the van.</p> - -<p>We have elevated ourselves to <i>honourable</i> thoughts,—even more, we -determine what honour is on earth,—"nobility." ... All of us to-day -are <i>advocates of life.</i>—We <i>Immoralists</i> are to-day the <i>strongest</i> -power: the other great powers are in need of us ... we re-create the -world in our own image.</p> - -<p>We have transferred the label "Chandala" to the <i>priests,</i> the -<i>backworldsmen,</i> and to the deformed <i>Christian society</i> which has -become associated with these people, together with creatures of like -origin, the pessimists, Nihilists, romanticists of pity, criminals, and -men of vicious habits—the whole sphere in which the idea of "God" is -that of <i>Saviour....</i></p> - -<p>We are proud of being no longer obliged to be liars, slanderers, and -detractors of Life....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">117.</p> - -<p><i>The advance</i> of the nineteenth century upon the eighteenth (at bottom -we <i>good Europeans</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span>are carrying on a war against the eighteenth -century):</p> - -<p>(1) "The return to Nature" is getting to be understood, ever more -definitely, in a way which is quite the reverse of that in which -Rousseau used the phrase—<i>away from idylls and operas!</i></p> - -<p>(2) Ever more decided, more anti-idealistic, more objective, more -fearless, more industrious, more temperate, more suspicious of sudden -changes, <i>anti-revolutionary</i>;</p> - -<p>(3) The question of <i>bodily health</i> is being pressed ever more -decidedly in front of the health of "the soul": the latter is regarded -as a condition brought about by the former, and bodily health is -believed to be, at least, the prerequisite to spiritual health.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">118.</p> - -<p>If anything at all has been achieved, it is a more innocent attitude -towards the senses, a happier, more favourable demeanour in regard -to sensuality, resembling rather the position taken up by Goethe; a -prouder feeling has also been developed in knowledge, and the "reine -Thor"<a name="FNanchor_6_7" id="FNanchor_6_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_7" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> meets with little faith.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_7" id="Footnote_6_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_7"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> This is a reference to Wagner's <i>Parsifal.</i> The character -as is well known, is written to represent a son of heart's affliction, -and a child of wisdom—humble, guileless, loving, pure, and a -fool.—<span style="font-size: 0.9em;">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.</span></p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">119.</p> - -<p>We "<i>objective people.</i>"—It is not "pity" that opens up the way for -<i>us</i> to all that is most remote and most strange in life and culture; -but our <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span>accessibility and ingenuousness, which precisely does not -"pity," but rather takes pleasure in hundreds of things which formerly -caused pain (which in former days either outraged or moved us, or in -the presence of which we were either hostile or indifferent). Pain in -all its various phases is now interesting to us: on that account we are -certainly <i>not</i> the more pitiful, even though the sight of pain may -shake us to our foundations and move us to tears: and we are absolutely -not inclined to be more helpful in view thereof.</p> - -<p>In this <i>deliberate</i> desire to look on at all pain and error, we have -grown stronger and more powerful than in the eighteenth century; it -is a proof of our increase of strength (we have <i>drawn closer</i> to the -seventeenth and sixteenth centuries). But it is a profound mistake -to regard our "romanticism" as a proof of our "beautified souls." We -want <i>stronger</i> sensations than all <i>coarser</i> ages and classes have -wanted. (This fact must not be confounded with the needs of neurotics -and decadents; in their case, of course, there is a craving for pepper -—even for cruelty.)</p> - -<p>We are all seeking conditions <i>which are emancipated from</i> the -bourgeois, and to a greater degree from the priestly, notion of -morality (every book which savours at all of priestdom and theology -gives us the impression of pitiful <i>niaiserie</i> and mental indigence). -"Good company," in fact, finds everything insipid which is not -forbidden and considered compromising in bourgeois circles; and the -case is the same with books, music, politics, and opinions on women.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">120.</p> - -<p><i>The simplification of man in the nineteenth century</i> (The eighteenth -century was that of elegance, subtlety, and generous feeling).—Not -"return to nature"; for no natural humanity has ever existed yet. -Scholastic, unnatural, and antinatural values are the rule and the -beginning; man only reaches Nature after a long struggle—he never -turns his "back" to her.... To be natural means, to dare to be as -immoral as Nature is.</p> - -<p>We are coarser, more direct, richer in irony towards generous feelings, -even when we are beneath them.</p> - -<p>Our <i>haute volée,</i> the society consisting of our rich and leisured -men, is more natural: people hunt each other, the love of the sexes -is a kind of sport in which marriage is both a charm and an obstacle; -people entertain each other and live for the sake of pleasure; bodily -advantages stand in the first rank, and curiosity and daring are the -rule.</p> - -<p>Our attitude towards <i>knowledge</i> is more natural; we are innocent -in our absolute spiritual debauchery, we hate pathetic and hieratic -manners, we delight in that which is most strictly prohibited, we -should scarcely recognise any interest in knowledge if we were bored in -acquiring it.</p> - -<p>Our attitude to <i>morality</i> is also more natural. Principles have become -a laughing-stock; no one dares to speak of his "duty," unless in irony. -But a helpful, benevolent disposition is highly valued. (Morality is -located in <i>instinct</i> and the rest is <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span>despised. Besides this there are -few points of honour.)</p> - -<p>Our attitude to <i>politics</i> is more natural: we see problems of power, -of the quantum of power, against another quantum. We do not believe in -a right that does not proceed from a power which is able to uphold it. -We regard all rights as conquests.</p> - -<p>Our valuation of <i>great men and things</i> is more natural: we regard -passion as a privilege; we can conceive of nothing great which does not -involve a great crime; all greatness is associated in our minds with a -certain standing-beyond-the-pale in morality.</p> - -<p>Our attitude to <i>Nature</i> is more natural: we no longer love her for her -"innocence," her "reason," her "beauty," we have made her beautifully -devilish and "foolish." But instead of despising her on that account, -since then we have felt more closely related to her and more familiar -in her presence. She does <i>not</i> aspire to virtue: we therefore respect -her.</p> - -<p>Our attitude towards <i>Art</i> is more natural: we do not exact beautiful, -empty lies, etc., from her; brutal positivism reigns supreme, and it -ascertains things with perfect calm.</p> - -<p>In short: there are signs showing that the European of the nineteenth -century is less ashamed of his instincts; he has gone a long way -towards acknowledging his unconditional naturalness and immorality, -<i>without bitterness</i>: on the contrary, he is strong enough to endure -this point of view alone.</p> - -<p>To some ears this will sound as though <i>corruption</i> had made strides: -and certain it is that man has not drawn nearer to the "Nature" -which Rousseau <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span>speaks about, but has gone one step farther in the -civilisation before which Rousseau <i>stood in horror.</i> We have grown -<i>stronger,</i> we have drawn nearer to the seventeenth century, more -particularly to the taste which reigned towards its close (Dancourt, Le -Sage, Renard).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">121.</p> - -<p><i>Culture</i> versus <i>Civilisation.</i>—The culminating stages of culture -and civilisation lie apart: one must not be led astray as regards the -fundamental antagonism existing between culture and civilisation. -From the moral standpoint, great periods in the history of culture -have always been periods of corruption; while on the other hand, -those periods in which man was deliberately and compulsorily <i>tamed</i> -("civilisation") have always been periods of intolerance towards the -most intellectual and most audacious natures. Civilisation desires -something different from what culture strives after: their aims may -perhaps be opposed....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">122.</p> - -<p><i>What I warn people against</i>: confounding the instincts of decadence -with those of <i>humanity</i>;</p> - -<p>Confounding the <i>dissolving means</i> of civilisation <i>and those which -necessarily promote decadence,</i> with <i>culture</i>;</p> - -<p>Confounding <i>debauchery,</i> and the principle, "laisser aller," with the -<i>Will to Power</i> (the latter is the exact reverse of the former).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">123.</p> - -<p>The unsolved problems which I set anew: the <i>problem of civilisation,</i> -the struggle between Rousseau and Voltaire about the year 1760. Man -becomes deeper, more mistrustful, more "immoral," stronger, more -self-confident—and therefore "<i>more natural</i>"; that is "progress." -In this way, by a process of division of labour, the more evil strata -and the milder and tamer strata of society get separated: so that <i>the -general facts</i> are not visible at first sight.... It is a sign of -<i>strength,</i> and of the self-control and fascination of the strong, that -these stronger strata possess the arts in order to make their greater -powers for evil felt as something "<i>higher</i>" As soon as there is -"progress" there is a transvaluation of the strengthened factors into -the "good."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">124.</p> - -<p>Man must have the <i>courage</i> of his natural instincts restored to him.—</p> - -<p><i>The poor opinion</i> he has of himself must be destroyed (<i>not</i> in the -sense of the individual, but in the sense of the <i>natural</i> man ...)—</p> - -<p>The <i>contradictions</i> in things must be eradicated, after it has been -well understood that we were responsible for them—</p> - -<p><i>Social idiosyncrasies</i> must be stamped out of existence (guilt, -punishment, justice, honesty, freedom, love, etc. etc.)—</p> - -<p>An advance towards "<i>naturalness</i>": in all political questions, even -in the relations between parties, even in merchants', workmen's, or -contractors' <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span>parties, only <i>questions</i> of <i>power</i> come into play:— -"what one <i>can</i> do" is the first question, what one ought to do is only -a secondary consideration.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">125.</p> - -<p>Socialism—or the <i>tyranny</i> of the meanest and the most -brainless,—that is to say, the superficial, the envious, and the -mummers, brought to its zenith,—is, as a matter, of fact, the logical -conclusion of "modern ideas" and their latent anarchy: but in the -genial atmosphere of democratic well-being the capacity for forming -resolutions or even for coming <i>to an end</i> at all, is paralysed. Men -follow—but no longer their reason. That is why socialism is on the -whole a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing more amusing -than to observe the discord between the poisonous and desperate faces -of present-day socialists—and what wretched and nonsensical feelings -does not their style reveal to us!—and the childish lamblike happiness -of their hopes and desires. Nevertheless, in many places in Europe, -there may be violent hand-to-hand struggles and irruptions on their -account: the coming century is likely to be convulsed in more than -one spot, and the Paris Commune, which finds defenders and advocates -even in Germany, will seem to have been but a slight indigestion -compared with what is to come. Be this as it may, there will always -be too many people of property for socialism ever to signify anything -more than an attack of illness: and these people of property are like -one man with one faith, "one must possess something in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span>order <i>to -be</i> some one." This, however, is the oldest and most wholesome of -all instincts; I should add: "one must desire more than one has in -order to <i>become</i> more." For this is the teaching which life itself -preaches to all living things: the morality of Development. To have -and to wish to have more, in a word, <i>Growth</i>—that is life itself. -In the teaching of socialism "a will to the denial of life" is but -poorly concealed: botched men and races they must be who have devised -a teaching of this sort. In fact, I even wish a few experiments might -be made to show that in a socialistic society, life denies itself, -and itself cuts away its own roots. The earth is big enough and man -is still unexhausted enough for a practical lesson of this sort and -<i>demonstratio ad absurdum</i>—even if it were accomplished only by a vast -expenditure of lives—to seem worth while to me. Still, Socialism, -like a restless mole beneath the foundations of a society wallowing in -stupidity, will be able to achieve something useful and salutary: it -delays "Peace on Earth" and the whole process of character-softening of -the democratic herding animal; it forces the European to have an extra -supply of intellect,—that is to say, craft and caution, and prevents -his entirely abandoning the manly and warlike qualities,—it also saves -Europe awhile from the <i>marasmus femininus</i> which is threatening it.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">126.</p> - -<p>The most favourable obstacles and remedies of modernity:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> -(1) Compulsory <i>military service</i> with real wars in which all joking is -laid aside.</p> - -<p>(2) <i>National</i> thick-headedness (which simplifies and concentrates).</p> - -<p>(3) Improved <i>nutrition</i> (meat).</p> - -<p>(4) Increasing <i>cleanliness</i> and wholesomeness in the home.</p> - -<p>(5) The predominance of <i>physiology</i> over theology, morality, -economics, and politics.</p> - -<p>(6) Military discipline in the exaction and the practice of one's -"duty" (it is no longer customary to praise).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">127.</p> - - - -<p>I am delighted at the military development of Europe, also at the inner -anarchical conditions: the period of quietude and "Chinadom" which -Galiani prophesied for this century is now over. Personal and <i>manly</i> -capacity, bodily capacity recovers its value, valuations are becoming -more physical, nutrition consists ever more and more of flesh. Fine -men have once more become possible. Bloodless sneaks (with mandarins -at their head, as Comte imagined them) are now a matter of the past. -The savage in every one of us is <i>acknowledged,</i> even the wild animal. -<i>Precisely on that account,</i> philosophers will have a better chance. -—Kant is a scarecrow!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">128.</p> - -<p>I have not yet <i>seen</i> any reasons to feel discouraged. He who acquires -and preserves a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span><i>strong will,</i> together with a broad mind, has a more -favourable chance now than ever he had. For the <i>plasticity</i> of man has -become exceedingly great in democratic Europe: men who learn easily, -who readily adapt themselves, are the rule: the gregarious animal of -a high order of intelligence is prepared. He who would command finds -those who <i>must</i> obey: I have Napoleon and Bismarck in mind, for -instance. The struggle against strong and unintelligent wills, which -forms the surest obstacle in one's way, is really insignificant Who -would not be able to knock down these "objective" gentlemen with weak -wills, such as Ranke and Renan!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">129.</p> - -<p><i>Spiritual enlightenment</i> is an unfailing means of making men -uncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour and support; in -short, of developing the herding instincts in them. That is why all -great artist-rulers, hitherto (Confucius in China, the Roman Empire, -Napoleon, Popedom—at a time when they had the courage of their -worldliness and frankly pursued power) in whom the ruling instincts, -that had prevailed until their time, culminated, also made use of the -spiritual enlightenment—or at least allowed it to be supreme (after -the style of the Popes of the Renaissance). The self-deception of -the masses on this point, in every democracy for instance, is of the -greatest possible value: all that makes men smaller and more amenable -is pursued under the title "progress."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">130.</p> - -<p>The highest equity and mildness as a condition of <i>weakness</i> (the New -Testament and the early Christian community—manifesting itself in the -form of utter foolishness in the Englishmen, Darwin and Wallace). Your -equity, ye higher men, drives you to universal suffrage, etc.; your -"humanity" urges you to be milder towards crime and stupidity. In the -<i>end</i> you will thus help stupidity and harmlessness to conquer.</p> - -<p><i>Outwardly</i>: Ages of terrible wars, insurrections, explosions. -<i>Inwardly</i>: ever more and more weakness among men; <i>events</i> take the -<i>form of excitants.</i> The Parisian as the type of the European extreme.</p> - -<p><i>Consequences</i>: (1) Savages (at first, of course, in conformity with -the culture that has reigned hitherto); (2) <i>Sovereign individuals</i> -(where <i>powerful</i> barbarous <i>masses</i> and emancipation from all that -has been, are crossed). The age of greatest stupidity, brutality, and -wretchedness in the masses, and <i>in the highest individuals.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">131.</p> - -<p>An incalculable number of higher individuals now perish: but he who -<i>escapes their fate</i> is as strong as the devil. In this respect we are -reminded of the conditions which prevailed in the Renaissance.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">132.</p> - -<p>How are <i>Good Europeans</i> such as ourselves distinguished from the -patriots? In the first place, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span>we are atheists and immoralists, but we -take care to support the religions and the morality which we associate -with the gregarious instinct: for by means of them, an order of men is, -so to speak, being prepared, which must at some time or other fall into -our hands, which must actually <i>crave</i> for our hands.</p> - -<p>Beyond Good and Evil,—certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional -and strict preservation of herd-morality.</p> - -<p>We reserve ourselves the right to several kinds of philosophy which it -is necessary to learn: under certain circumstances, the pessimistic -kind as a hammer; a European Buddhism might perhaps be indispensable.</p> - -<p>We should probably support the development and the maturation of -democratic tendencies; for it conduces to weakness of will: in -"Socialism" we recognise a thorn which prevents smug ease.</p> - -<p>Attitude towards the people.. Our prejudices; we pay attention to the -results of cross-breeding.</p> - -<p>Detached, well-to-do, strong: irony concerning the "press" and its -culture. Our care: that scientific men should not become journalists. -We mistrust any form of culture that tolerates news-paper reading or -writing.</p> - -<p>We make our accidental positions (as Goethe and Stendhal did), our -experiences, a foreground, and we lay stress upon them, so that we -may deceive concerning our backgrounds. We ourselves <i>wait</i> and -avoid putting our heart into them. They serve us as refuges, such as -a wanderer might require and use—but we avoid feeling at home in -them. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span>We are ahead of our fellows in that we have had a <i>disciplina -voluntatis.</i> All strength is directed to the <i>development of the will,</i> -an art which allows us to wear masks, an art of understanding <i>beyond</i> -the passions (also "super-European" thought at times).</p> - -<p>This is our preparation before becoming the law-givers of the future -and the lords of the earth; if not we, at least our children. Caution -where marriage is concerned.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">133.</p> - -<p><i>The twentieth century.</i>—The Abbé Galiani says somewhere: "<i>La -prévoyance est la cause des guerres actuelles de l'Europe. Si l'on -voulait se donner la peine de ne rien prévoir, tout le monde serait -tranquille, et je ne crois pas qu'on serait plus malheureux parce qu'on -ne ferait pas la guerre.</i>" As I in no way share the unwarlike views of -my deceased friend Galiani, I have no fear whatever of saying something -beforehand with the view of conjuring in some way the cause of wars.</p> - -<p>A condition of excessive <i>consciousness,</i> after the worst of -earthquakes: with new questions.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">134.</p> - -<p>It is the time of the <i>great noon, of the most appalling -enlightenment</i>: my particular kind of <i>Pessimism</i>: the great -starting-point.</p> - -<p>(1) Fundamental contradiction between civilisation and the elevation of -man.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> -(2) Moral valuations regarded as a history of lies and the art of -calumny in the service of the Will to Power (of the will of the <i>herd,</i> -which rises against stronger men).</p> - -<p>(3) The conditions which determine every elevation in culture (the -facilitation of a <i>selection</i> being made at the cost of a crowd) are -the <i>conditions</i> of all growth.</p> - -<p>(4). <i>The multiformity</i> of the world as a question of <i>strength,</i> -which sees all things in the <i>perspective of their growth.</i> The moral -Christian values to be regarded as the insurrection and mendacity of -slaves (in comparison with the aristocratic values of the <i>ancient -world). </i></p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span></p> -<h4><a name="SECOND_BOOK" id="SECOND_BOOK">SECOND BOOK.</a></h4> - -<h3>CRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED HITHERTO.</h3> - - - -<hr class="tb" /> -<p class="title2">I.</p> - - -<p class="title2">CRITICISM OF RELIGION.</p> - - -<p>All the beauty and sublimity with which we have invested real and -imagined things, I will show to be the property and product of man, and -this should be his most beautiful apology. Man as a poet, as a thinker, -as a god, as love, as power. Oh, the regal liberality with which he -has lavished gifts upon things in order <i>to impoverish</i> himself and -make himself feel wretched! Hitherto, this has been his greatest -disinterestedness, that he admired and worshipped, and knew how to -conceal from himself that <i>he</i> it was who had created what he admired.</p> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span></p> -<hr /> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span></p> -<p class="title">1. Concerning the Origin of Religions.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">135.</p> - -<p><i>The origin of religion.</i>—Just as the illiterate man of to-day -believes that his wrath is the cause of his being angry, that his -mind is the cause of his thinking, that his soul is the cause of -his feeling, in short, just as a mass of psychological entities -are still unthinkingly postulated as causes; <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span>so, in a still more -primitive age, the same phenomena were interpreted by man by means of -personal entities. Those conditions of his soul which seemed strange, -overwhelming, and rapturous, he regarded as obsessions and bewitching -influences emanating from the power of some personality. (Thus the -Christian, the most puerile and backward man of this age, traces hope, -peace, and the feeling of deliverance to a psychological inspiration -on the part of God: being by nature a sufferer and a creature in need -of repose, states of happiness, peace, and resignation, perforce seem -strange to him, and seem to need some explanation.) Among intelligent, -strong, and vigorous races, the epileptic is mostly the cause of a -belief in the existence of some <i>foreign power</i>; but all such examples -of apparent subjection—as, for instance, the bearing of the exalted -man, of the poet, of the great criminal, or the passions, love and -revenge—lead to the invention of supernatural powers. A condition is -made concrete by being identified with a personality, and when this -condition overtakes anybody, it is ascribed to that personality. In -other words: in the psychological concept of God, a certain state of -the soul is personified as a cause in order to appear as an effect.</p> - -<p>The psychological logic is as follows: when the <i>feeling of power</i> -suddenly seizes and overwhelms a man,—and this takes place in the -case of all the great passions,—a doubt arises in him concerning his -own person: he dare not think himself the cause of this astonishing -sensation—and thus <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span>he posits a <i>stronger</i> person, a Godhead as its -cause. In short, the origin of religion lies in the extreme feelings -of power, which, being <i>strange,</i> take men by surprise: and just -as the sick man, who feels one of his limbs unaccountably heavy, -concludes that another man must be sitting on it, so the ingenuous -<i>homo religiosus,</i> divides himself up into <i>several people.</i> Religion -is an example of the "<i>altération de la personalité.</i>" A sort of <i>fear</i> -and <i>sensation of terror</i> in one's own presence.... But also a feeling -of inordinate <i>rapture</i> and <i>exaltation.</i> Among sick people, the -<i>sensation of health</i> suffices to awaken a belief in the proximity of -God.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">136.</p> - -<p><i>Rudimentary psychology of the religious man:—</i>All changes are -effects; all effects are effects of will (the notion of "Nature" -and of "natural law," is lacking); all effects presuppose an agent. -Rudimentary psychology: one is only a cause oneself, when one knows -that one has willed something.</p> - -<p>Result: States of power impute to man the feeling that he is <i>not</i> the -cause of them, that he is not <i>responsible</i> for them: they come without -being willed to do so—consequently we cannot be their originators: -will that is not free (that is to say, the knowledge of a change in our -condition which we have not helped to bring about) requires a <i>strong</i> -will.</p> - -<p><i>Consequence of this rudimentary psychology</i>: Man has never dared to -credit <i>himself</i> with his <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span>strong and startling moods, he has always -conceived them as "passive," as "imposed upon him from outside": -Religion is the offshoot of a <i>doubt</i> concerning the entity of the -person, an <i>altération</i> of the personality: in so far as everything -great and strong in man was considered <i>superhuman</i> and <i>foreign,</i> man -belittled himself,—he laid the two sides, the very pitiable and weak -side, and the very strong and startling side apart, in two spheres, and -called the one "Man" and the other "God."</p> - -<p>And he has continued to act on these lines; during the period of the -<i>moral idiosyncrasy</i> he did not interpret his lofty and sublime moral -states as "proceeding from his own will" or as the "work" of the -person. Even the Christian himself divides his personality into two -parts, the one a mean and weak fiction which he calls man, and the -other which he calls God (Deliverer and Saviour).</p> - -<p>Religion has lowered the concept "man"; its ultimate conclusion is -that all goodness, greatness, and truth are superhuman, and are only -obtainable by the grace of God.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">137.</p> - -<p>One way of raising man out of his self-abasement, which brought about -the decline of the point of view that classed all lofty and strong -states of the soul, as strange, was the theory of relationship. These -lofty and strong states of the soul could at least be interpreted as -the influence of our <i>forebears</i>; we belonged to each other, we were -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> -irrevocably joined; we grew in our own esteem, by acting according to -the example of a model known to us all.</p> - -<p>There is an attempt on the part of noble families to associate religion -with their own feelings of self-respect. Poets and seers do the same -thing; they feel proud that they have been worthy,—that they have been -<i>selected</i> for such association,—they esteem it an honour, not to be -considered at all as individuals, but as mere mouthpieces (Homer).</p> - -<p>Man gradually takes possession of the highest and proudest states of -his soul, as also of his acts and his works. Formerly it was believed -that one paid oneself the greatest honour by denying one's own -responsibility for the highest deeds one accomplished, and by ascribing -them to—God. The will which was not free, appeared to be that which -imparted a higher value to a deed: in those days a god was postulated -as the author of the deed.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">138.</p> - -<p>Priests are the actors of something which is supernatural, either in -the way of ideals, gods, or saviours, and they have to make people -believe in them; in this they find their calling, this is the purpose -of their instincts; in order to make it as credible as possible, they -have to exert themselves to the utmost extent in the art of posing; -their actor's sagacity must, above all, aim at giving them <i>a clean -conscience,</i> by means of which, alone, it is possible to persuade -effectively.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">139.</p> - -<p>The priest wishes to make it an understood thing, that he is the -<i>highest type</i> of man, that he rules,—even over those who wield the -power,—that he is indispensable and unassailable,—that he is the -<i>strongest power</i> in the community, not by any means to be replaced or -undervalued.</p> - -<p><i>Means thereto</i>: he alone is cultured; he alone is the <i>man of virtue</i>; -he alone has <i>sovereign power over himself</i>: he alone is, in a certain -sense, God, and ultimately goes back to the Godhead; he alone is the -middleman between God and <i>others</i>; the Godhead administers punishment -to every one who puts the priest at a disadvantage, or who thinks in -opposition to him.</p> - -<p><i>Means thereto: Truth</i> exists. There is only one way of attaining to -it, and that is to become a priest. Everything good, which relates -either to order, nature, or tradition, is to be traced to the wisdom -of the priests. The Holy Book is their work. The whole of nature is -only a fulfilment of the maxims which it contains. No other <i>source of -goodness</i> exists than the priests. Every other kind of perfection, even -the <i>warrior's,</i> is different in rank from that of the priests.</p> - -<p><i>Consequence</i>: If the priest is to be the <i>highest</i> type, then the -<i>degrees</i> which lead to his <i>virtues</i> must be the degrees of value -among men. <i>Study, emancipation from material things, inactivity, -impassibility, absence of passion, solemnity</i>;—the opposite of all -this is found in the <i>lowest</i> type of man.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> -The priest has taught a kind of morality which conduced to his being -considered the <i>highest type</i> of man. He conceives a <i>type</i> which -is the <i>reverse</i> of his own: the Chandala. By making <i>these</i> as -contemptible as possible, some strength is lent to the <i>order of -castes.</i> The priest's excessive fear of <i>sensuality</i> also implies that -the latter is the most serious threat to the <i>order of castes</i> (that is -to say, <i>order</i> in general).... Every "free tendency" <i>in puncto puncti -overthrows</i> the laws of marriage.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">140.</p> - -<p>The <i>philosopher</i> considered as the development of the <i>priestly</i> -type:—He has the heritage of the priest in his blood; even as a rival -he is compelled to fight with the same weapons as the priest of his -time;—he aspires to the <i>highest authority.</i></p> - -<p>What is it that bestows <i>authority</i> upon men who have no physical power -to wield (no army, no arms at all ...)? How do such men gain authority -<i>over</i> those who are in possession of material power, and who represent -authority? (Philosophers enter the lists against princes, victorious -conquerors, and wise statesmen.)</p> - -<p>They can do it only by establishing the belief that they are in -possession of a power which is higher and stronger—<i>God.</i> Nothing is -strong enough: every one is in <i>need</i> of the mediation and the services -of priests. They establish themselves as indispensable <i>intercessors.</i> -The conditions of their existence are: (1) That people believe in the -absolute superiority of their god, in fact believe <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span>in <i>their god</i>; -(2) that there is no other access, no direct access to god, save -through them. The <i>second</i> condition alone gives rise to the concept -"heterodoxy"; the <i>first</i> to the concept "disbelievers" (that is to -say, he who believes in another god).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">141.</p> - -<p><i>A Criticism of the Holy Lie.</i>—That a lie is allowed in pursuit -of holy ends 'is a principle which belongs to the theory of all -priestcraft, and the object of this inquiry is to discover to what -extent it belongs to its practice.</p> - -<p>But philosophers, too, whenever they intend taking over the leadership -of mankind, with the ulterior motives of priests in their minds, have -never failed to arrogate to themselves the right to lie: Plato above -all. But the most elaborate of lies is the double lie, developed -by the typically Arian philosophers of the Vedanta: two systems, -contradicting each other in all their main points, but interchangeable, -complementary, and mutually expletory, when educational ends were in -question. The lie of the one has to create a condition in which the -truth of the other can alone become <i>intelligible....</i></p> - -<p>How <i>far</i> does the holy lie of priests and philosophers go?—The -question here is, what hypotheses do they advance in regard to -education, and what are the dogmas they are compelled to <i>invent</i> in -order to do justice to these hypotheses?</p> - -<p>First: they must have power, authority, and absolute credibility on -their side.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> -Secondly: they must have the direction of the whole of Nature, so that -everything affecting the individual seems to be determined by their law.</p> - -<p>Thirdly: their domain of power must be very extensive, in order that -its control may escape the notice of those they subject: they must know -the penal code of the life beyond—of the life "after death,"—and, of -course, the means whereby the road to blessedness may be discovered. -They have to put the notion of a natural course of things out of sight, -but as they are intelligent and thoughtful people, they are able to -<i>promise</i> a host of effects, which they naturally say are conditioned -by prayer or by the strict observance of their law. They can, moreover, -<i>prescribe</i> a large number of things which are exceedingly reasonable -—only they must not point to experience or empiricism as the source -of this wisdom, but to revelation or to the fruits of the "most severe -exercises of penance."</p> - -<p>The <i>holy lie,</i> therefore, applies principally to the <i>purpose</i> of -an action (the natural purpose, reason, is made to vanish: a moral -purpose, the observance of some law, a service to God, seems to be the -purpose): to the <i>consequence</i> of an action (the natural consequence -is interpreted as something supernatural, and, in order to be on -surer ground, other incontrollable and supernatural consequences are -foretold).</p> - -<p>In this way the concepts <i>good</i> and <i>evil</i> are created, and seem -quite divorced from the natural concepts: "useful," "harmful," -"life-promoting," "life-retarding,"—indeed, inasmuch as <i>another</i> -life <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span>is imagined, the former concepts may even be <i>antagonistic</i> to -Nature's concepts of good and evil. In this way, the proverbial concept -"conscience" is created: an inner voice, which, though it makes itself -heard in regard to every action, does not measure the worth of that -action according to its results, but according to its conformity or -non-conformity to the "law."</p> - -<p>The holy lie therefore invented: (1) a <i>god</i> who <i>punishes</i> and -<i>rewards,</i> who recognises and carefully observes the law-book of the -priests, and who is particular about sending them into the world as -his mouthpieces and plenipotentiaries; (2) an <i>After Life,</i> in which, -alone, the great penal machine is supposed to be active—to this end -the <i>immortality of the soul</i> was invented; (3) a <i>conscience in -man,</i> understood as the knowledge that good and evil are permanent -values—that God himself speaks through it, whenever its counsels are -in conformity with priestly precepts; (4) <i>Morality</i> as the denial of -all natural processes, as the subjection of all phenomena to a moral -order, as the interpretation of all phenomena as the effects of a moral -order of things (that is to say, the concept of punishment and reward), -as the only power and only creator of all transformations; (5) <i>Truths</i> -given, revealed, and identical with the teaching of the priests: as the -condition to all salvation and happiness in this and the next world.</p> - -<p><i>In short</i>: what is the price paid for the <i>improvement</i> supposed -to be due to morality?—The unhinging of <i>reason,</i> the reduction of -all motives to fear and hope (punishment and reward); <i>dependence</i> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> -upon the tutelage of priests, and upon a formulary exactitude -which is supposed to express a divine will; the implantation of -a "conscience" which establishes a false science in the place of -experience and experiment: as though all one had to do or had not -to do were predetermined—a kind of contraction of the seeking and -striving spirit;—<i>in short</i>: the worst <i>mutilation</i> of man that can be -imagined, and it is pretended that "the good man" is the result.</p> - -<p>Practically speaking, all reason, the whole heritage of intelligence, -subtlety, and caution, the first condition of the priestly canon, is -arbitrarily reduced, when it is too late, to a simple <i>mechanical</i> -process: conformity with the law becomes a purpose in itself, it is the -highest purpose; <i>Life no longer contains any problems</i>;—the whole -conception of the world is polluted by the notion of <i>punishment</i>; -—Life itself, owing to the fact that the <i>priests life</i> is upheld as -the <i>non plus ultra</i> of perfection, is transformed into a denial and -pollution of life;—the concept "God" represents an aversion to Life, -and even a criticism and a contemning of it. Truth is transformed in -the mind, into <i>priestly</i> prevarication; the striving after truth, into -the <i>study of the Scriptures,</i> into the way to <i>become a theologian.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">142.</p> - -<p><i>A criticism of the Law-Book of Manu.</i>—The whole book is founded upon -the holy lie. Was it the well-being of humanity that inspired the whole -of this system? Was this kind of man, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span>who believes in the <i>interested</i> -nature of every action, interested or not interested in the success -of this system? The desire to improve mankind—whence comes the -inspiration to this feeling? Whence is the concept improvement taken?</p> - -<p>We find a class of men, <i>the sacerdotal class,</i> who consider themselves -the standard pattern, the highest example and most perfect expression -of the type man. The notion of "improving" mankind, to this class of -men, means to make mankind like themselves. They believe in their own -superiority, they <i>will</i> be superior in practice: the cause of the holy -lie is <i>The Will to Power....</i></p> - -<p>Establishment of the dominion: to this end, ideas which place a <i>non -plus ultra</i> of power with the priesthood are made to prevail. Power -acquired by lying was the result of the recognition of the fact that it -was not already possessed physically, in a military form.... Lying as a -supplement to power—this is a new concept of "truth."</p> - -<p>It is a mistake to presuppose <i>unconscious</i> and <i>innocent</i> development -in this quarter—a sort of self-deception. Fanatics are not the -discoverers of such exhaustive systems of oppression.... Cold-blooded -reflection must have been at work here; the same sort of reflection -which Plato showed when he worked out his "State"—"One must desire the -means when one desires the end." Concerning this political maxim, all -legislators have always been quite clear.</p> - -<p>We possess the classical model, and it is specifically Arian: we -can therefore hold the most<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span>gifted and most reflective type of man -responsible for the most systematic lie that has ever been told.... -Everywhere almost the lie was copied, and thus <i>Avian influence</i> -corrupted the world....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">143.</p> - -<p>Much is said to-day about the <i>Semitic</i> spirit of the <i>New Testament</i>: -but the thing referred to is merely priestcraft,—and in the purest -example of an Arian law-book, in Manu, this kind of "Semitic -spirit"—that is to say, <i>Sacerdotalism,</i> is worse than anywhere else.</p> - -<p>The development of the Jewish hierarchy is <i>not</i> original: they learnt -the scheme in Babylon—it is Arian. When, later on, the same thing -became dominant in Europe, under the preponderance of Germanic blood, -this was in conformity to the spirit of the <i>ruling race</i>: a striking -case of atavism. The Germanic middle ages aimed at a revival of the -<i>Arian order of castes</i>.</p> - -<p>Mohammedanism in its turn learned from Christianity the use of a -"Beyond" as an instrument of punishment.</p> - -<p>The scheme of a <i>permanent community,</i> with priests at its -head—this oldest product of Asia's great culture in the domain of -organisation—<i>naturally</i> provoked reflection and imitation in every -way.—Plato is an example of this, but above all, the Egyptians.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">144.</p> - -<p><i>Moralities</i> and <i>religions</i> are the principal means by which one can -modify men into whatever one <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span>; provided one is possessed of an -overflow of creative power, and can cause one's will to prevail over -long periods of time.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">145.</p> - -<p>If one wish to see an <i>affirmative</i> Arian religion which is the product -of a <i>ruling</i> class, one should read the law-book of Manu. (The -deification of the feeling of power in the Brahmin: it is interesting -to note that it originated in the warrior-caste, and was later -transferred to the priests.)</p> - -<p>If one wish to see an <i>affirmative</i> religion of the Semitic order, -which is the product of the <i>ruling</i> class, one should read the Koran -or the earlier portions of the Old Testament. (<i>Mohammedanism,</i> as a -religion for men, has profound contempt for the sentimentality and -prevarication of Christianity, ... which, according to Mohammedans, is -a woman's religion.)</p> - -<p>If one wish to see a <i>negative</i> religion of the Semitic order, which is -the product of the <i>oppressed</i> class, one should read the New Testament -(which, according to Indian and Arian points of view, is a religion for -the Chandala).</p> - -<p>If one wish to see a <i>negative</i> Arian religion, which is the product of -the <i>ruling</i> classes, one should study Buddhism.</p> - -<p>It is quite in the nature of things that we have no Arian religion -which is the product of the <i>oppressed</i> classes; for that would have -been a contradiction: a race of masters is either paramount or else it -goes to the dogs.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span></p> - -<p class="parnum">146.</p> - -<p>Religion, <i>per se,</i> has nothing to do with morality; yet both offshoots -of the Jewish religion are <i>essentially</i> moral religions—which -prescribe the rules of living, and procure obedience to their -principles by means of rewards and punishment.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">147.</p> - -<p><i>Paganism—Christianity.—Paganism</i> is that which says yea to all -that is natural, it is innocence in being natural, "naturalness." -<i>Christianity</i> is that which says no to all that is natural, it is a -certain lack of dignity in being natural; hostility to Nature.</p> - -<p>"Innocent":—Petronius is innocent, for instance. Beside this happy -man a Christian is absolutely devoid of innocence. But since even -the <i>Christian</i> status is ultimately only a natural condition, the -term "Christian" soon begins to mean the <i>counterfeiting of the -psychological interpretation.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">148.</p> - -<p>The Christian priest is from the root a mortal enemy of sensuality: one -cannot imagine a greater contrast to his attitude than the guileless, -slightly awed, and solemn attitude, which the religious rites of the -most honourable women in Athens maintained in the presence of the -symbol of s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span>ex. In all non-ascetic religions the procreative act is -<i>the</i> secret <i>per se</i>: a sort of symbol of perfection and of the -designs of the future: re-birth, immortality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">149.</p> - -<p>Our belief in ourselves is the greatest fetter, the most telling spur, -and the <i>strongest pinion.</i> Christianity ought to have elevated the -innocence of man to the position of an article of belief—men would -then have become gods: in those days believing was still possible.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">150.</p> - -<p>The egregious <i>lie</i> of history: as if it were the <i>corruption</i> of -Paganism that opened the road to Christianity. As a matter of fact, it -was the enfeeblement and <i>moralisation</i> of the man of antiquity. The -new interpretation of natural functions, which made them appear like -<i>vices,</i> had already gone before!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">151.</p> - -<p>Religions are ultimately wrecked by the belief in morality. The idea of -the Christian moral God becomes untenable,—hence "Atheism,"—as though -there could be no other god.</p> - -<p><i>Culture</i> is likewise wrecked by the belief in morality. For when the -necessary and only possible conditions of its growth are revealed, -nobody <i>will</i> any longer countenance it (Buddhism).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">152.</p> - -<p><i>The physiology of Nihilistic religions.</i>—All in all, the <i>Nihilistic</i> -religions are <i>systematised histories of sickness</i> described in -religious and moral terminology.</p> - -<p>In pagan cultures it is around the interpretation of the great annual -cycles that the religious cult turns; in Christianity it is around a -cycle of <i>paralytic phenomena.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">153.</p> - -<p>This <i>Nihilistic</i> religion gathers together all the <i>decadent elements</i> -and things of like order which it can find in antiquity, viz.:—</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> The <i>weak</i> and the <i>botched</i> (the refuse of the ancient world, -and that of which it rid itself with most violence).</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> Those who are <i>morally obsessed</i> and <i>anti-pagan.</i></p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> Those who are <i>weary of politics</i> and indifferent (the <i>blasé</i> -Romans), the <i>denationalised,</i> who know not what they are.</p> - - - -<p><i>(d)</i> Those who are tired of themselves—who are happy to be party to a -subterranean conspiracy.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">154.</p> - -<p><i>Buddha</i> versus <i>Christ.</i>—Among the Nihilistic religions, Christianity -and <i>Buddhism</i> may always be sharply distinguished. <i>Buddhism</i> is the -expression of a <i>fine evening,</i> perfectly sweet and mild—it is a sort -of gratitude towards all that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span>lies hidden, including that which it -entirely lacks, viz., bitterness, disillusionment, and resentment. -Finally it possesses lofty intellectual love; it has got over all -the subtlety of philosophical contradictions, and is even resting -after it, though it is precisely from that source that it derives its -intellectual glory and its glow as of a sunset (it originated in the -higher classes).</p> - -<p><i>Christianity</i> is a degenerative movement, consisting of all kinds -of decaying and excremental elements: it is <i>not</i> the expression of -the downfall of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration of all -the morbid elements which are mutually attractive and which gravitate -to one another.... It is therefore <i>not</i> a national religion, <i>not</i> -determined by race: it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; it -consists of a foundation of resentment against all that is successful -and dominant: it is in need of a symbol which represents the damnation -of everything successful and dominant. It is opposed to every form of -<i>intellectual</i> movement, to all philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for -idiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect. Resentment against those -who are gifted, learned, intellectually independent: in all these it -suspects the element of success and domination.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">155.</p> - -<p>In Buddhism this thought prevails: "All passions, everything which -creates emotions and leads to blood, is a call to action"—to this -extent alone are its believers <i>warned</i> against evil. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span>For action has -no sense, it merely binds one to existence. All existence, however, has -no sense. Evil is interpreted as that which leads to irrationalism: -to the affirmation of means whose end is denied. A road to nonentity -is the desideratum, <i>hence all</i> emotional impulses are regarded with -horror. For instance: "On no account seek after revenge! Be the enemy -of no one!"—The Hedonism of the weary finds its highest expression -here. Nothing is more utterly foreign to Buddhism than the Jewish -fanaticism of St. Paul: nothing could be more contrary to its instinct -than the tension, fire, and unrest of the religious man, and, above -all, that form of sensuality which sanctifies Christianity with the -name "Love." Moreover, it is the cultured and very intellectual classes -who find blessedness in Buddhism: a race wearied and besotted by -centuries of philosophical quarrels, but not <i>beneath all culture</i> as -those classes were from which Christianity sprang.... In the Buddhistic -ideal, there is essentially an emancipation from good and evil: a -very subtle suggestion of a Beyond to all morality is thought out -in its teaching, and this Beyond is supposed to be compatible with -perfection,—the condition being, that even good actions are only -needed <i>pro tem.,</i> merely as a means,—that is to say, in order to be -free from <i>all</i> action.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">156.</p> - -<p><i>How very curious</i> it is to see a <i>Nihilistic</i> religion such as -Christianity, sprung from, and in keeping with, a decrepit and worn-out -people, who have <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span>outlived all strong instincts, being transferred step -by step to another environment—that is to say, to a land of young -people, <i>who have not yet lived at all.</i> The joy of the final chapter, -of the fold and of the evening, preached to barbarians and Germans! -How thoroughly all of it must first have been barbarised, Germanised! -To those who had dreamed of a <i>Walhalla</i>: who found happiness only in -war!—A <i>super</i>national religion preached in the midst of chaos, where -<i>no nations yet existed even.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">157.</p> - -<p>The only way to refute priests and religions is this: to show that -their errors are no longer <i>beneficent</i>—that they are rather harmful; -in short, that their own "proof of power" no longer holds good....</p> - - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">2. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY.</p> - -<p class="parnum">158.</p> - -<p>Christianity as an <i>historical reality</i> should not be confounded with -that one root which its name recalls. The <i>other</i> roots, from which it -has sprung, are by far the more important. It is an unprecedented abuse -of names to identify such manifestations of decay and such abortions as -the "Christian Church," "Christian belief," and "Christian life," with -that Holy Name. What did Christ <i>deny</i>?—Everything which to-day is -called Christian.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">159.</p> - -<p>The whole of the Christian <i>creed</i>—all Christian "truth," is idle -falsehood and deception, and is precisely the reverse of that which was -at the bottom of the first Christian movement.</p> - -<p>All that which in the <i>ecclesiastical</i> sense is Christian, is just -exactly what is most radically <i>anti-Christian</i>: crowds of things and -people appear instead of symbols, history takes the place of eternal -facts, it is all forms, rites, and dogmas instead of a "practice" of -life. To be really Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent to -dogmas, cults, priests, church, and theology.</p> - -<p>The practice of Christianity is no more an impossible phantasy than the -practice of Buddhism is: it is merely a means to happiness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">160.</p> - -<p>Jesus goes straight to the point, the "Kingdom of Heaven" in the heart, -and He does <i>not</i> find the means in duty to the Jewish Church; He -even regards the reality of Judaism (its need to maintain itself) as -nothing; He is concerned purely with the <i>inner</i> man.</p> - -<p>Neither does He make anything of all the coarse forms relating to man's -intercourse with God: He is opposed to the whole of the teaching of -repentance and atonement; He points out how man ought to live in order -to feel himself "deified," and how futile it is on his part to hope to -live properly by showing repentance and contrition <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span>for his sins. "Sin -is of no account" is practically his chief standpoint.</p> - -<p>Sin, repentance, forgiveness,—all this does not belong to Christianity -... it is Judaism or Paganism which has become mixed up with Christ's -teaching.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">161.</p> - -<p>The <i>Kingdom of Heaven</i> is a state of the heart (of children it is -written, "for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven"): it has nothing to -do with superterrestrial things. The Kingdom of God "cometh," not -chronologically or historically, not on a certain day in the calendar; -it is not something which one day appears and was not previously there; -it is a "change of feeling in the individual," it is something which -may come at any time and which may be absent at any time....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">162.</p> - -<p><i>The thief on the cross</i>;—When the criminal himself, who endures a -painful death, declares: "the way this Jesus suffers and dies, without -a murmur of revolt or enmity, graciously and resignedly, is the only -right way," he assents to the gospel; and by this very fact <i>he is in -Paradise....</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">163.</p> - -<p>Jesus bids us:—not to resist, either by deeds or in our heart, him who -ill-treats us;</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> -He bids us admit of no grounds for separating ourselves from our wives;</p> - -<p>He bids us make no distinction between foreigners and -fellow-countrymen, strangers and familiars;</p> - -<p>He bids us show anger to no one, and treat no one with contempt;—give -alms secretly; not to desire to become rich;—not to swear;—not to -stand in judgment;—become reconciled with our enemies and forgive -offences;—not to worship in public.</p> - -<p>"Blessedness" is nothing promised: it is here, with us, if we only wish -to live and act in a particular way.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">164.</p> - -<p><i>Subsequent Additions</i>;—The whole of the prophet- and -thaumaturgist-attitudes and the bad temper; while the conjuring-up of a -supreme tribunal of justice is an abominable corruption (see Mark vi. -11: "And whosoever shall not receive you.... Verily I say unto you, It -shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha," etc.). The "fig tree" -(Matt. xxi. 18, 19): "Now in the morning as he returned into the city, -he hungered. And when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came to it, and -found nothing thereon, but leaves only, and said unto it, Let no fruit -grow on thee henceforward for ever. And presently the fig tree withered -away."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">165.</p> - -<p>The teaching of rewards and punishments has become mixed up with -Christianity in a way which is quite absurd; everything is thereby -spoilt. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span>In the same way, the practice of the first <i>ecclesia -militans,</i> of the Apostle Paul and his attitude, is put forward as if -it had been <i>commanded</i> or predetermined.</p> - -<p>The subsequent glorification of the actual <i>life</i> and <i>teaching</i> of the -first Christians: as if everything had been <i>prescribed beforehand</i> and -had been only a matter of <i>following</i> directions——And as for the -<i>fulfilment of scriptural prophecies</i>: how much of all that is more -than forgery and cooking?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">166.</p> - -<p>Jesus opposed a real life, a life in truth, to ordinary life: nothing -could have been more foreign to His mind than the somewhat heavy -nonsense of an "eternal Peter,"—of the eternal duration of a single -person. Precisely what He combats is the exaggerated importance of the -"person": how can He wish to immortalise it?</p> - -<p>He likewise combats the hierarchy within the community; He never -promises a certain proportion of reward for a certain proportion of -deserts: how can He have meant to teach the doctrine of punishment and -reward in a Beyond?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">167.</p> - -<p>Christianity is an ingenuous attempt at bringing about a <i>Buddhistic -movement in favour of peace,</i> sprung from the very heart of the -resenting masses ... but transformed by <i>Paul</i> into a mysterious -pagan cult, which was ultimately able to accord <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span>with the whole of -<i>State organisation</i> ... and which carries on war, condemns, tortures, -conjures, and hates.</p> - -<p>Paul bases his teaching upon the need of mystery felt by the great -masses capable of religious emotions: he seeks a <i>victim,</i> a bloody -phantasmagoria, which may be equal to a contest with the images of -a secret cult: God on the cross, the drinking of blood, the <i>unio -mystica</i> with the "victim."</p> - -<p>He seeks the prolongation of life after death (the blessed and atoned -after-life of the individual soul) which he puts in causal relation -with the <i>victim</i> already referred to (according to the type of -Dionysos, Mithras, Osiris).</p> - -<p>He feels the necessity of bringing notions of <i>guilt</i> and <i>sin</i> -into the foreground, <i>not</i> a new practice of life (as Jesus Himself -demonstrated and taught), but a new cult, a new belief, a belief in a -miraculous metamorphosis ("Salvation" through belief).</p> - -<p>He understood the <i>great needs of the pagan worlds</i> and he gave quite -an absolutely arbitrary picture of those two plain facts, Christ's life -and death. He gave the whole a new accent, altering the equilibrium -everywhere ... he was one of the most active destroyers of primitive -Christianity.</p> - -<p>The attempt made on the life of <i>priests and theologians</i> culminated, -thanks to Paul, in a new priesthood and theology—a <i>ruling</i> caste and -a <i>Church.</i></p> - -<p>The attempt made to suppress the fussy importance of the "person," -culminated in the belief in the eternal "personality" (and in the -anxiety concerning "eternal salvation" ...), and in the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span>most -paradoxical exaggeration of individual egoism.</p> - -<p>This is the humorous side of the question—tragic humour: Paul again -set up on a large scale precisely what Jesus had overthrown by His -life. At last, when the Church edifice was complete, it even sanctioned -the <i>existence</i> of the <i>State.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">168.</p> - -<p>The Church is precisely that against which Jesus inveighed—and against -which He taught His disciples to fight.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">169.</p> - -<p>A God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection -after death—all these things are the counterfeit coins of real -Christianity, for which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be held -responsible.</p> - -<p>The <i>life which must serve as an example</i> consists in love and -humility; in the abundance of hearty emotion which does not even -exclude the lowliest; in the formal renunciation of all desire of -making its rights felt; in conquest, in the sense of triumph over -oneself; in the belief in salvation in this world, despite all sorrow, -opposition, and death; in forgiveness and the absence of anger and -contempt; in the absence of a desire to be rewarded; in the refusal -to be bound to anybody; abandonment to all that is most spiritual and -intellectual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span>;—in fact, a very proud life controlled by the will of a -servile and poor life.</p> - -<p>Once the Church had allowed itself to take over <i>all the Christian -practice,</i> and had formally sanctioned the State,—that kind of life -which Jesus combats and condemns,—it was obliged to lay the sense -of Christianity in other things than early Christian ideals—that is -to say, in the <i>faith</i> in incredible things, in the ceremonial of -prayers, worship, feasts, etc. etc. The notions "sin," "forgiveness," -"punishment," "reward"—everything, in fact, which had nothing in -common with, and was quite <i>absent</i> from, primitive Christianity, now -comes into the foreground.</p> - -<p>An appalling stew of Greek philosophy and Judaism; asceticism; -continual judgments and condemnations; the order of rank, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">170.</p> - -<p>Christianity has, from the first, always transformed the symbolical -into crude realities:</p> - -<p>(1) The antitheses "true life" and "false life" were misunderstood and -changed into "life here" and "life beyond."</p> - -<p>(2) The notion "eternal life," as opposed to the personal life which is -ephemeral, is translated into "personal immortality";</p> - -<p>(3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing the same food and -drink, after the Hebrew-Arabian manner, is interpreted as the "miracle -of transubstantiation."</p> - -<p>(4) "Resurrection" which was intended to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span>mean the entrance to the -"true life," in the sense of being intellectually "born again," becomes -an historical contingency, supposed to take place at some moment after -death;</p> - -<p>(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the "Son of God,"—that is to -say, the life-relationship between man and God,—becomes the "second -person of the Trinity," and thus the filial relationship of every -man—even the lowest—to God, is <i>done away with</i>;</p> - -<p>(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there is no other way -to this filial relationship to God, save through the <i>practice of life</i> -taught by Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that there is a -miraculous way of <i>atoning</i> for all <i>sin</i>; though not through our own -endeavours, but by means of Christ:</p> - - - -<p>For all these purposes, "Christ on the Cross" had to be interpreted -afresh. The <i>death</i> itself would certainly not be the principal feature -of the event ... it was only another sign pointing to the way in -which one should behave towards the authorities and the laws of the -world—<i>that one was not to defend oneself—this was the exemplary -life.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">171.</p> - -<p>Concerning the psychology of <i>Paul.</i>—The important fact is Christ's -death. This remains to be <i>explained ...</i>. That there may be truth or -error in an explanation never entered these people's heads: one day a -sublime possibility strikes them, "His death <i>might</i> mean so and so" -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> -—and it forthwith <i>becomes</i> so and so. An hypothesis is proved by the -sublime <i>ardour</i> it lends to its discoverer....</p> - -<p>"The proof of strength": <i>i.e.,</i> a thought is demonstrated by its -<i>effects</i> ("by their fruits," as the Bible ingenuously says); that -which fires enthusiasm must be <i>true,</i>—what one loses one's blood for -must be <i>true—</i></p> - -<p>In every department of this world of thought, the sudden feeling of -power which an idea imparts to him who is responsible for it, is -placed to the <i>credit</i> of that idea:—and as there seems no other way -of honouring an idea than by calling it true, the first epithet it is -honoured with is the word <i>true.</i> ... How could it have any effect -otherwise? It was imagined by some power: if that power were not -real, it could not be the cause of anything.... The thought is then -understood as <i>inspired</i>: the effect it causes has something of the -violent nature of a demoniacal influence—</p> - -<p>A thought which a decadent like Paul could not resist and to which he -completely yields, is thus "proved" <i>true</i>!!!</p> - -<p>All these holy epileptics and visionaries did not possess a thousandth -part of the honesty in self-criticism with which a philologist, -nowadays, reads a text, or tests the truth of an historical event.... -Beside us, such people were moral cretins.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">172.</p> - -<p>It matters little <i>whether a thing be true,</i> provided it be -<i>effective</i>: total <i>absence of intellectual uprightness.</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span>Everything -is good, whether it be lying, slander, or shameless "cooking," provided -it serve to heighten the degree of heat to the point at which people -"believe."</p> - -<p>We are face to face with an actual school for the teaching of <i>the -means wherewith</i> men are <i>seduced</i> to a belief: we see systematic -<i>contempt</i> for those spheres whence contradiction might come (that -is to say, for reason, philosophy, wisdom, doubt, and caution); a -shameless praising and glorification of the teaching, with continual -references to the fact that it was God who presented us with it—that -the apostle signifies nothing—that no criticism is brooked, but -only faith, acceptance; that it is the greatest blessing and favour -to receive such a doctrine of salvation; that the state in which one -should receive it, ought to be one of the profoundest thankfulness and -humility....</p> - -<p>The resentment which the lowly feel against all those in high places, -is continually turned to account: the fact that this teaching is -revealed to them as the reverse of the wisdom of the world, against -the power of the world, seduces them to it. This teaching convinces -the outcasts and the botched of all sorts and conditions; it promises -blessedness, advantages, and privileges to the most insignificant and -most humble men; it fanaticises the poor, the small, and the foolish, -and fills them with insane vanity, as though <i>they</i> were the meaning -and salt of the earth.</p> - -<p>Again, I say, all this cannot be sufficiently contemned, we spare -ourselves a criticism of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span>teaching; it is sufficient to take -note of the means it uses in order to be aware of the nature of the -phenomenon one is examining. It identified itself with <i>virtue,</i> -it appropriated the whole of the <i>fascinating power of virtue,</i> -shamelessly, for its own purposes ... it availed itself of the power of -paradox, and of the need, manifested by old civilisation, for pepper -and absurdity; it amazed and revolted at the same time; it provoked -persecutions and ill-treatment.</p> - -<p>It is the same kind of <i>well-thought-out meanness</i> with which the -Jewish priesthood established their power and built up their Church....</p> - -<p>One must be able to discern: (1) that warmth of passion "love" (resting -on a base of ardent sensuality); (2) the thoroughly <i>ignoble character</i> -of Christianity:—the continual exaggeration and verbosity;—the lack -of cool intellectuality and irony;—the unmilitary character of all its -instincts;—the priestly prejudices against manly pride, sensuality, -the sciences, the arts.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">173.</p> - - -<p><i>Paul</i>: seeks power <i>against</i> ruling Judaism,—his attempt is too -weak.... Transvaluation of the notion "Jew": the "race" is put aside: -but that means denying the very basis of the whole structure. The -"martyr," the "fanatic," the value of all <i>strong</i> belief. Christianity -is the <i>form of decay</i> of the old world, after the latter's collapse, -and it is characterised by the fact that it brings all the most sickly -and unhealthy elements and needs to the top.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span></p> -<p><i>Consequently other</i> instincts had to step into the foreground, in -order to <i>constitute</i> an entity, a power able to stand alone—in short, -a condition of tense sorrow was necessary, like that out of which the -Jews had derived their <i>instinct of self-preservation....</i></p> - -<p>The persecution of Christians was invaluable for this purpose.</p> - -<p>Unity in the face of danger; the conversion of the masses becomes the -only means of putting an end to the persecution of the individual. (The -notion "conversion" is therefore made as elastic as possible.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">174.</p> - -<p>The <i>Christian Judaic</i> life: here resentment did not prevail. The -great persecutions alone could have driven out the passions to that -extent—as also the <i>ardour of love</i> and <i>hate.</i></p> - -<p>When the creatures a man most loves are sacrificed before his eyes for -the sake of his faith, that man becomes <i>aggressive</i>; the triumph of -Christianity is due to its persecutors.</p> - -<p><i>Asceticism</i> is not specifically Christian: this is what Schopenhauer -misunderstood. It only shoots up in Christianity, wherever it would -have existed without that religion.</p> - -<p>Melancholy Christianity, the torture and torment of the conscience, -also only a peculiarity of a particular soil, where Christian values -have taken root: it is not Christianity properly speaking. Christianity -has absorbed all the different kinds of diseases which grow from morbid -soil: one could <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span>refute it at one blow by showing that it did not know -how to resist any contagion. But <i>that</i> precisely is the essential -feature of it. Christianity is a type of decadence.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">175.</p> - -<p>The reality on which Christianity was able to build up its power -consisted of the small dispersed <i>Jewish families,</i> with their warmth, -tenderness, and peculiar readiness to help, which, to the whole of the -Roman Empire, was perhaps the most incomprehensible and least familiar -of their characteristics; they were also united by their pride at -being a "chosen people," concealed beneath a cloak of humility, and by -their secret denial of all that was uppermost and that possessed power -and splendour, although there was no shade of envy in their denial. -<i>To have recognised this as a power,</i> to have regarded this <i>blessed</i> -state as communicable, seductive, and infectious even where pagans -were concerned—this constituted Paul's genius: to use up the treasure -of latent energy and cautious happiness for the purposes of "a Jewish -Church of free confession," and to avail himself of all the Jewish -experience, their propaganda, and their expertness in <i>the preservation -of a community</i> under a foreign power—this is what he conceived to -be his duty. He it was who discovered that absolutely unpolitical and -isolated body of <i>paltry people,</i> and their art of asserting themselves -and pushing themselves to the front, by means of a host of acquired -virtues which are <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span>made to represent the only forms of virtue ("the -self-preservative measure and weapon of success of a certain class of -man").</p> - -<p>The principle of <i>love</i> comes from the small community of Jewish -people: a <i>very passionate</i> soul glows here, beneath the ashes of -humility and wretchedness: it is neither Greek, Indian, nor German. The -song in praise of love which Paul wrote is not Christian; it is the -Jewish flare of that eternal flame which is Semitic. If Christianity -has done anything essentially new in a psychological sense, it is this, -that it has <i>increased the temperature of the soul</i> among those cooler -and more noble races who were at one time at the head of affairs; -it discovered that the most wretched life could be made rich and -invaluable, by means of an elevation of the temperature of the soul....</p> - -<p>It is easily understood that a transfer of this sort could <i>not</i> -take place among the ruling classes: the Jews and Christians were at -a disadvantage owing to their bad manners—spiritual strength and -passion, when accompanied by bad manners, only provoke loathing (I -become aware of these bad manners while reading the New Testament). It -was necessary to be related both in baseness and sorrow with this type -of lower manhood in order to feel anything attractive in him.... The -attitude a man maintains towards the New Testament is a test of the -amount of taste he may have for the classics (see Tacitus); he who is -not revolted by it, he who does not feel honestly and deeply that he is -in the presence of a sort of <i>fœda superstitio</i> when reading it, and -who does not draw <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span>his hand back so as not to soil his fingers—such a -man does not know what is classical. A man must feel about "the cross" -as Goethe did.<a name="FNanchor_1_8" id="FNanchor_1_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_8" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_8" id="Footnote_1_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_8"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> - - -Vieles kann ich ertragen. Die meisten beschwerlichen Dinge<br /> -Duld' ich mit ruhigem Mut, wie es ein Gott mir gebeut.<br /> -Wenige sind mir jedoch wie Gift und Schlange zuwider;<br /> -Viere: Rauch des Tabaks, Wanzen, und Knoblauch und<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 20%;">Goethe's <i>Venetian Epigrams,</i> No. 67.</span><br /> -</p> -<p> -Much can I bear. Things the most irksome<br /> -I endure with such patience as comes from a god.<br /> -Four things, however, repulse me like venom:—Tobacco<br /> -smoke, garlic, bugs, and the cross.<br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.9em; margin-left: 40%;"> -(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.)</span><br /> -</p> -</div> - - -<p class="parnum">176.</p> - -<p><i>The reaction of paltry people</i>:—Love provides the feeling of highest -power. It should be understood to what extent, not man in general, but -only a certain kind of man is speaking here.</p> - -<p>"We are godly in love, we shall be 'the children of God'; God loves us -and wants nothing from us save love"; that is to say: all morality, -obedience, and action, do not produce the same feeling of power and -freedom as love does;—a man does nothing wicked from sheer love, but -he does much more than if he were prompted by obedience and virtue -alone.</p> - -<p>Here is the happiness of the herd, the communal feeling in big things -as in small, the living sentiment of unity felt as the <i>sum of the -feeling of life.</i> Helping, caring for, and being useful, constantly -kindle the feeling of power; visible success, the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span>expression of -pleasure, emphasise the feeling of power; pride is not lacking either, -it is felt in the form of the community, the House of God, and the -"chosen people."</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, man has once more experienced an "<i>altération" of -his personality</i>: this time he called his feeling of love—God. The -awakening of such a feeling must be pictured; it is a sort of ecstasy, -a strange language, a "Gospel"—it was this newness which did not -allow man to attribute love to himself—he thought it was God leading -him on and taking shape in his heart. "God descends among men," one's -neighbour is transfigured and becomes a God (in so far as he provokes -the sentiment of love), <i>Jesus is the neighbour,</i> the moment He is -transfigured in thought into a God, and into a cause <i>provoking the -feeling of power.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">177.</p> - -<p>Believers are aware that they owe an infinite amount to Christianity, -and therefore conclude that its Founder must have been a man of the -first rank.... This conclusion is false, but it is typical of the -reverents. Regarded objectively, it is, <i>in the first place,</i> just -possible that they are mistaken concerning the extent of their debt to -Christianity: a man's convictions prove nothing concerning the thing -he is convinced about, and in religions they are more likely to give -rise to suspicions.... Secondly, it is possible that the debt owing -to Christianity is not due to its Founder at all, but to the whole -structure, the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span>whole thing—to the Church, etc. The notion "Founder" -is so very equivocal, that it may stand even for the accidental -cause of a movement: the person of the Founder has been inflated in -proportion as the Church has grown: but even this process of veneration -allows of the conclusion that, at one time or other, this Founder was -something exceedingly insecure and doubtful—in the beginning.... Let -any one think of the <i>free and easy way</i> in which Paul treats the -problem of the personality of Jesus, how he almost juggles with it: -some one who died, who was seen after His death,—some one whom the -Jews delivered up to death—all this was only the theme—<i>Paul</i> wrote -the music to it.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">178.</p> - -<p>The founder of a religion <i>may</i> be quite insignificant—a wax vesta and -no <i>more</i>!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">179.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the psychological problem of Christianity.—The driving -forces are</i>: resentment, popular insurrection, the revolt of the -bungled and the botched. (In Buddhism it is different: it is not <i>born</i> -of <i>resentment.</i> It rather combats resentment because the latter leads -to <i>action</i>!)</p> - -<p>This party, which stands for freedom, understands that the <i>abandonment -of antagonism in thought and deed</i> is a condition of distinction and -preservation. Here lies the psychological difficulty which has stood in -the way of Christianity being <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span>understood: the force which created it, -urges to a struggle against itself.</p> - -<p>Only as a party standing <i>for peace</i> and <i>innocence</i> can this -insurrectionary movement hope to be successful: it must conquer by -means of excessive mildness, sweetness, softness, and its instincts -are aware of this. The <i>feat</i> was to deny and condemn the force, of -which man is the expression, and to press the reverse of that force -continually to the fore, by word and deed.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">180.</p> - -<p><i>The pretence of youthfulness.</i>—It is a mistake to imagine that, -with Christianity, an ingenuous and youthful people rose against an -old culture; the story goes that it was out of the lowest levels of -society, where Christianity flourished and shot its roots, that the -more profound source of life gushed forth afresh: but nothing can -be understood of the psychology of Christianity, if it be supposed -that it was the expression of revived youth among a people, or of -the resuscitated strength of a race. It is rather a typical form -of decadence, of moral-softening and of hysteria, amid a general -hotch-potch of races and people that had lost all aims and had grown -weary and sick. The wonderful company which gathered round this -master-seducer of the populace, would not be at all out of place in a -Russian novel: all the diseases of the nerves seem to give one another -a rendezvous in this crowd—the absence of a known duty, the feeling -that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span>everything is nearing its end, that nothing is any longer worth -while, and that contentment lies in <i>dolce far niente</i>.</p> - -<p>The power and certainty of the future in the Jew's instinct, its -monstrous will for life and for power, lies in its ruling classes; the -people who upheld primitive Christianity are best distinguished by this -<i>exhausted condition</i> of their instincts. On the one hand, they are -sick of everything; on the other, they are content with each other, -with themselves and for themselves.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">181.</p> - -<p>Christianity regarded as <i>emancipated Judaism</i> (just as a nobility -which is both racial and indigenous ultimately emancipates itself from -these conditions, and <i>goes in search of</i> kindred elements....).</p> - -<p>(1) As a Church (community) on the territory of the State, as an -unpolitical institution.</p> - -<p>(2) As life, breeding, practice, art of living.</p> - -<p>(3) As a <i>religion of sin</i> (sin committed against <i>God, being the -only recognised kind,</i> and the only cause of all suffering), with a -universal cure for it. There is no sin save against God; what is done -against men, man shall not sit in judgment upon, nor call to account, -except in the name of God. At the same time, all commandments (love): -everything is associated with God, and all acts are performed according -to God's will. Beneath this arrangement there lies exceptional -intelligence (a very narrow life, such as that led by the Esquimaux, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> -can only be endured by most peaceful and indulgent people: the -Judæo-Christian dogma turns against sin in favour of the "sinner").</p> - - -<p class="parnum">182.</p> - -<p>The Jewish priesthood understood how to present everything it claimed -to be right as a <i>divine precept,</i> as an act of obedience to God, and -also to introduce all those things which conduced to <i>preserve Israel</i> -and were the <i>conditions</i> of its existence (for instance: the large -number of "<i>works</i>": circumcision and the cult of sacrifices, as the -very pivot of the national conscience), not as Nature, but as God.</p> - -<p><i>This process continued; within the very heart</i> of Judaism, where the -need of these "works" was not felt (that is to say, as a means of -keeping a race distinct), a priestly sort of man was pictured, whose -bearing towards the aristocracy was like that of "noble nature"; a -sacerdotalism of the soul, which now, in order to throw its opposite -into strong relief, attaches value, not to the "dutiful acts" -themselves, but to the sentiment....</p> - -<p>At bottom, the problem was once again, how to make a certain kind of -soul <i>prevail</i>: it was also <i>a popular insurrection in the midst of -a priestly people</i>—a pietistic movement coming from below (sinners, -publicans, women, and children). Jesus of Nazareth was the symbol of -their sect. And again, in order to believe in themselves, they were in -need of a <i>theological transfiguration</i>: they require nothing less than -"the Son of God" in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span>order to create a belief for themselves. And just -as the priesthood had falsified the whole history of Israel, another -attempt was made, here, to <i>alter and falsify</i> the whole history of -mankind in such a way as to make Christianity seem like the most -important event it contained. This movement could have originated only -upon the soil of Judaism, the main feature of which was the confounding -of <i>guilt with sorrow</i> and the reduction of all <i>sin</i> to <i>sin against -God.</i> Of all this, Christianity is the <i>second degree of power.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">183.</p> - -<p>The symbolism of Christianity is based upon that of <i>Judaism,</i> which -had already transfigured all reality (history, Nature) into a holy and -artificial unreality—which refused to recognise real history, and -which showed no more interest in a natural course of things.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">184.</p> - -<p>The Jews made the attempt to prevail, after two of their castes—the -warrior and the agricultural castes, had disappeared from their midst.</p> - -<p>In this sense they are the "castrated people": they have their priests -and then—their Chandala....</p> - -<p>How easily a disturbance occurs among them—an insurrection of their -Chandala. This was the origin of <i>Christianity.</i></p> - -<p>Owing to the fact that they had no knowledge of warriors except as -their masters, they introduced <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span>enmity towards the nobles, the men -of honour, pride, and power, and the <i>ruling</i> classes, into their -religion: they are pessimists from <i>indignation....</i></p> - -<p>Thus they created a very important and novel position: the priests in -the van of the Chandala—against the <i>noble classes....</i></p> - -<p>Christianity was the logical conclusion of this movement: even in the -Jewish priesthood, it still scented the existence of the caste, of the -privileged and noble minority—<i>it therefore did away with priests.</i></p> - -<p>Christ is the unit of the Chandala who removes the priest ... the -Chandala who redeems himself....</p> - -<p>That is why the <i>French</i> Revolution is the lineal descendant and the -continuator of <i>Christianity—</i> it is characterised by an instinct of -hate towards castes, nobles, and the last privileges.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">185.</p> - -<p>The "<i>Christian Ideal</i>" put on the stage with Jewish astuteness—these -are the fundamental <i>psychological forces</i> of its "nature":—</p> - -<p>Revolt against the ruling spiritual powers;</p> - -<p>The attempt to make those virtues which facilitate the <i>happiness of -the lowly,</i> a standard of all values—in fact, to call <i>God</i> that which -is no more than the self-preservative instinct of that class of man -possessed of least vitality;</p> - -<p>Obedience and absolute <i>abstention</i> from war and resistance, justified -by this ideal;</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> -The love of one another as a result of the love of God.</p> - -<p><i>The trick</i>: The <i>denial</i> of all <i>natural mobilia,</i> and their -transference to the spiritual world beyond ... the exploitation of -<i>virtue</i> and its <i>veneration</i> for wholly interested motives, gradual -<i>denial</i> of virtue in everything that is not Christian.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">186.</p> - -<p>The <i>profound contempt</i> with which the Christian was treated by -the noble people of antiquity, is of the same order as the present -instinctive aversion to Jews: it is the hatred which free and -self-respecting classes feel towards those <i>who wish to creep -in secretly,</i> and who combine an awkward bearing with foolish -self-sufficiency.</p> - -<p>The New Testament is the gospel of a completely <i>ignoble</i> species of -man; its pretensions to highest values—<i>yea, to all</i> values, is, as a -matter of fact, revolting—even nowadays.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">187.</p> - -<p>How little the subject matters! It is the spirit which gives the thing -life! What a quantity of stuffy and sick-room air there is in all that -chatter about "redemption," "love," "blessedness," "faith," "truth," -"eternal life"! Let any one look into a really pagan book and compare -the two; for instance, in Petronius, nothing at all is done, said, -desired, and valued, which, according to a bigoted Christian estimate, -is not sin, or even deadly sin. And yet how happy one feels with the -purer air, the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span>superior intellectuality, the quicker pace, and the -free overflowing strength which is certain of the future! In the whole -of the New Testament there is not one <i>bouffonnerie</i>: but that fact -alone would suffice to refute any book....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">188.</p> - -<p>The <i>profound lack of dignity</i> with which all life, which is not -Christian, is condemned: it does not suffice them to think meanly of -their actual opponents, they cannot do with less than a general slander -of everything that is not <i>themselves....</i> An abject and crafty soul is -in the most perfect harmony with the arrogance of piety, as witness the -early Christians.</p> - -<p>The <i>future</i>: they see that <i>they are heavily paid for it.... Theirs is -the muddiest kind of spirit that exists.</i> The whole of Christ's life is -so arranged as to confirm the prophecies of the Scriptures: He behaves -in such wise <i>in order that</i> they may be right....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">189.</p> - -<p>The deceptive interpretation of the words, the doings, and the -condition of <i>dying people</i>; the natural fear of death, for instance, -is systematically confounded with the supposed fear of what is to -happen "after death." ...</p> - - -<p class="parnum">190.</p> - -<p>The <i>Christians</i> have done exactly what the Jews did before them. -They introduced what they <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span>conceived to be an innovation and a thing -necessary to self-preservation into their Master's teaching, and wove -His life into it They likewise credited Him with all the wisdom of a -maker of proverbs—<i>in short,</i> they represented their everyday life and -activity as an act of obedience, and thus sanctified their propaganda.</p> - -<p>What it all depends upon, may be gathered from Paul: it is <i>not much.</i> -What remains is the development of a type of saint, out of the values -which these people regarded as saintly.</p> - -<p>The whole of the "doctrine of miracles," including the resurrection, is -the result of self-glorification on the part of the community, which -ascribed to its Master those qualities it ascribed to itself, but in a -higher degree (or, better still, it derived its strength from Him....)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">191.</p> - -<p>The Christians have never led the life which Jesus commanded them to -lead, and the impudent fable of the "justification by faith," and its -unique and transcendental significance, is only the result of the -Church's lack of courage and will in acknowledging those "<i>works</i>" -which Jesus commanded.</p> - -<p>The Buddhist behaves differently from the non-Buddhist; but <i>the -Christian behaves as all the rest of the world does,</i> and possesses a -Christianity of ceremonies and <i>states of the soul.</i></p> - -<p>The profound and contemptible falsehood of Christianity in Europe makes -us deserve the contempt of the Arabs, Hindoos, and Chinese....</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> -Let any one listen to the words of the first German statesman, -concerning that which has preoccupied Europe for the last forty years.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">192.</p> - -<p>"<i>Faith</i>" or "<i>works</i>"?—But that the "works," the habit of particular -works may engender a certain <i>set of values or thoughts,</i> is just as -natural as it would be unnatural for "works" to proceed from mere -valuations. Man must practise, <i>not</i> how to strengthen feelings of -value, but how to strengthen action: first of all, one must be able -<i>to do something....</i> Luther's Christian Dilettantism. Faith is an -asses' bridge. The background consists of a profound conviction on -the part of Luther and his peers, that they are enabled to accomplish -Christian "works," a personal fact, disguised under an extreme doubt -as to whether <i>all</i> action is not sin and devil's work, so that the -worth of life depends upon isolated and highly-strained conditions of -<i>inactivity</i> (prayer, effusion, etc.).—Ultimately, Luther would be -right: the instincts which are expressed by the whole bearing of the -reformers are the most brutal that exist. Only in <i>turning absolutely -away</i> from themselves, and in becoming absorbed in the <i>opposite</i> of -themselves, only by means of an <i>illusion</i> ("faith") was existence -endurable to them.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">193.</p> - -<p>"What was to be done in order to believe?"—an absurd question. That -which is wrong with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span>Christianity is, that it does none of the things -that Christ <i>commanded.</i></p> - -<p>It is a mean life, but <i>seen</i> through the eye of contempt.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">194.</p> - -<p>The entrance into the <i>real</i> life—<i>a man saves his own life by living -the life of the multitude.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">195.</p> - -<p>Christianity has become something fundamentally different from what -its Founder wished it to be. It is the great <i>anti-pagan movement</i> of -antiquity, formulated with the use of the life, teaching, and "words" -of the Founder of Christianity, but interpreted quite <i>arbitrarily,</i> -according to a scheme embodying <i>profoundly different needs</i>: -translated into the language of all the <i>subterranean religions</i> then -existing.</p> - -<p>It is the rise of Pessimism (whereas Jesus wished to bring the peace -and the happiness of the lambs): and moreover the Pessimism of the -weak, of the inferior, of the suffering, and of the oppressed.</p> - -<p>Its mortal enemies are (1) <i>Power,</i> whether in the form of character, -intellect, or taste, and "worldliness"; (2) the "good cheer" of -classical times, the noble levity and scepticism, hard pride, eccentric -dissipation, and cold frugality of the sage, Greek refinement in -manners, words, and form. Its mortal enemy is as much the <i>Roman</i> as -the <i>Greek.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> -The attempt on the part of <i>anti-paganism</i> to establish itself on -a philosophical basis, and to make its tenets possible: it shows a -taste for the ambiguous figures of antique culture, and above all for -Plato, who was, more than any other, an anti-Hellene and Semite in -instinct.... It also shows a taste for Stoicism, which is essentially -the work of Semites ("dignity" is regarded as severity, law; virtue -is held to be greatness, self-responsibility, authority, greatest -sovereignty over oneself—this is Semitic.) The Stoic is an Arabian -sheik wrapped in Greek togas and notions.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">196.</p> - -<p>Christianity only resumes the fight which had already been begun -against the <i>classical</i> ideal and <i>noble</i> religion.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, the whole process of <i>transformation</i> is only -an adaptation to the needs and to the level of intelligence of -<i>religious</i> masses then existing:—those masses which believed in -Isis, Mithras, Dionysos, and the "great mother," and which demanded -the following things of a religion: (1) hopes of a beyond, (2) the -bloody phantasmagoria of animal sacrifice (the mystery), (3) holy -legend and the redeeming <i>deed,</i> (4) asceticism, denial of the -world, superstitious "purification," (5) a hierarchy as a part of -the community. In short, Christianity everywhere fitted the already -prevailing and increasing <i>anti-pagan tendency</i>—those cults which -Epicurus combated,—or more exactly, those <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span><i>religions proper to the -lower herd, women, slaves, and ignoble classes.</i></p> - -<p>The misunderstandings are therefore the following:—</p> - -<p>(1) The immortality of the individual;</p> - -<p>(2) The assumed existence of <i>another</i> world;</p> - -<p>(3) The absurd notion of punishment and expiation in the heart of the -interpretation of existence;</p> - -<p>(4) The profanation of the divine nature of man, instead of its -accentuation, and the construction of a very profound chasm, which -can only be crossed by the help of a miracle or by means of the most -thorough self-contempt;</p> - -<p>(5) The whole world of corrupted imagination and morbid passion, -instead of a simple and loving life of action, instead of Buddhistic -happiness attainable on earth;</p> - -<p>(6) An ecclesiastical order with a priesthood, theology, cults, and -sacraments; in short, everything that Jesus of Nazareth <i>combated</i>;</p> - -<p>(7) The <i>miraculous</i> in everything and everybody, superstition too: -while precisely the trait which distinguished Judaism and primitive -Christianity was their <i>repugnance to</i> miracles and their relative -<i>rationalism.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">197.</p> - -<p><i>The psychological pre-requisites:—Ignorance</i> and <i>lack of -culture,</i>—the sort of ignorance which has unlearned every kind of -shame: let any one imagine those impudent saints in the heart of -Athens;</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> -The <i>Jewish instinct of a chosen people</i>: they appropriate <i>all the -virtues,</i> without further ado, as their own, and regard the rest of -the world as their opposite; this is a profound sign of <i>spiritual -depravity</i>;</p> - -<p><i>The total lack of real aims</i> and real <i>duties,</i> for which other -virtues are required than those of the bigot—<i>the State undertook -this work for them</i>: and the impudent people still behaved as though -they had no need of the State. "Except ye become as little children" -—oh, how far we are from this psychological ingenuousness!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">198.</p> - -<p>The Founder of Christianity had to pay dearly for having directed His -teaching at the lowest classes of Jewish society and intelligence. They -understood Him only according to the limitations of their own spirit. -... It was a disgrace to concoct a history of salvation, a personal -God, a personal Saviour, a personal immortality, and to have retained -all the meanness of the "person," and of the "history" of a doctrine -which denies the reality of all that is personal and historical.</p> - -<p>The legend of salvation takes the place of the symbolic "now" and "all -time," of the symbolic "here" and "everywhere"; and miracles appear -instead of the psychological symbol.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">199.</p> - -<p>Nothing is less innocent than the New Testament. The soil from which it -sprang is known.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> -These people, possessed of an inflexible will to assert themselves, and -who, once they had lost all natural hold on life, and had long existed -without any right to existence, still knew how to prevail by means of -hypotheses which were as unnatural as they were imaginary (calling -themselves the chosen people, the community of saints, the people of -the promised land, and the "Church"): these people made use of their -<i>pia fraus</i> with such skill, and with such "clean consciences," that -one cannot be too cautious when they preach morality. When Jews step -forward as the personification of innocence, the danger must be great. -While reading the New Testament a man should have his small fund of -intelligence, mistrust, and wickedness constantly at hand.</p> - -<p>People of the lowest origin, partly mob, outcasts not only from good -society, but also from respectable society; grown away from the -<i>atmosphere</i> of culture, and free from discipline; ignorant, without -even a suspicion of the fact that conscience can also rule in spiritual -matters; in a word—the Jews: an instinctively crafty people, able to -create an advantage, a means of <i>seduction</i> out of every conceivable -hypothesis of superstition, even out of ignorance itself.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">200.</p> - -<p>I regard Christianity as the most fatal and seductive lie that has ever -yet existed—as the greatest and most <i>impious lie</i>: I can discern the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span>last sprouts and branches of its ideal beneath every form of disguise, -I decline to enter into any compromise or false position in reference -to it—I urge people to declare open war with it.</p> - -<p>The <i>morality of paltry people</i> as the measure of all things: this is -the most repugnant kind of degeneracy that civilisation has ever yet -brought into existence. And this <i>kind of ideal</i> is hanging still, -under the name of "God," over men's heads!!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">201.</p> - -<p>However modest one's demands may be concerning intellectual -cleanliness, when one touches the New Testament one cannot help -experiencing a sort of inexpressible feeling of discomfort; for the -unbounded cheek with which the least qualified people will have their -say in its pages, in regard to the greatest problems of existence, -and claim to sit in judgment on such matters, exceeds all limits. The -impudent levity with which the most unwieldy problems are spoken of -here (life, the world, God, the purpose of life), as if they were not -problems at all, but the most simple things which these little bigots -<i>know all about</i>!!!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">202.</p> - -<p>This was the most fatal form of insanity that has ever yet existed on -earth:—when these little lying abortions of bigotry begin laying claim -to the words "God," "last judgment," "truth," <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span>"love," "wisdom," "Holy -Spirit," and thereby distinguishing themselves from the rest of the -world; when such men begin to transvalue values to suit themselves, as -though they were the sense, the salt, the standard, and the measure of -all things; then all that one should do is this: build lunatic asylums -for their incarceration. To <i>persecute</i> them was an egregious act of -antique folly: this was taking them too seriously; it was making them -serious.</p> - -<p>The whole fatality was made possible by the fact that a similar form -of megalomania was already <i>in existence,</i> the <i>Jewish</i> form (once -the gulf separating the Jews from the Christian-Jews was bridged, the -Christian-Jews <i>were compelled</i> to employ those self-preservative -measures afresh which were discovered by the Jewish instinct, for -their own self-preservation, after having accentuated them); and again -through the fact that Greek moral philosophy had done everything that -could be done to prepare the way for moral-fanaticism, even among -Greeks and Romans, and to render it palatable.... Plato, the great -importer of corruption, who was the first who refused to see Nature -in morality, and who had already deprived the Greek gods of all their -worth by his notion "<i>good</i>" was already tainted with <i>Jewish bigotry</i> -(in Egypt?).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">203.</p> - -<p>These small virtues of gregarious animals do not by any means lead -to "eternal life": to put <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span>them on the stage in such a way, and to -use them for one's own purpose is perhaps very smart; but to him who -keeps his eyes open, even here, it remains, in spite of all, the most -ludicrous performance. A man by no means deserves privileges, either on -earth or in heaven, because he happens to have attained to perfection -in the art of behaving like a good-natured little sheep; at best, he -only remains a dear, absurd little ram with horns—provided, of course, -he does not burst with vanity or excite indignation by assuming the -airs of a supreme judge.</p> - -<p>What a terrible glow of false colouring here floods the meanest -virtues—as though they were the reflection of divine qualities!</p> - -<p>The <i>natural</i> purpose and utility of every virtue is systematically -<i>hushed up</i>; it can only be valuable in the light of a <i>divine</i> command -or model, or in the light of the good which belongs to a beyond or a -spiritual world. (This is magnificent!—As if it were a question of the -<i>salvation of the soul</i>: but it was a means of making things bearable -here with as many beautiful sentiments as possible.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">204.</p> - -<p>The <i>law,</i> which is the fundamentally realistic formula of certain -self-preservative measures of a community, forbids certain actions -that have a definite tendency to jeopardise the welfare of that -community: it does <i>not</i> forbid the attitude of mind which gives rise -to these actions—for in the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span>pursuit of other ends the community -requires these forbidden actions, namely, when it is a matter of -opposing its <i>enemies.</i> The moral idealist now steps forward and says: -"God sees into men's hearts: the action itself counts for nothing; -the reprehensible attitude of mind from which it proceeds must be -extirpated ..." In normal conditions men laugh at such things; it is -only in exceptional cases, when a community lives <i>quite</i> beyond the -need of waging war in order to maintain itself, that an ear is lent to -such things. Any attitude of mind is abandoned, the utility of which -cannot be conceived.</p> - -<p>This was the case, for example, when Buddha appeared among a people -that was both peaceable and afflicted with great intellectual weariness.</p> - -<p>This was also the case in regard to the first Christian community (as -also the Jewish), the primary condition of which was the absolutely -<i>unpolitical</i> Jewish society. Christianity could grow only upon the -soil of Judaism—that is to say, among a people that had already -renounced the political life, and which led a sort of parasitic -existence within the Roman sphere of government, Christianity goes a -step <i>farther</i>: it allows men to "emasculate" themselves even more; the -circumstances actually favour their doing so.—<i>Nature</i> is <i>expelled</i> -from morality when it is said, "Love ye your enemies": for <i>Nature's</i> -injunction, "Ye shall <i>love</i> your neighbour and <i>hate</i> your enemy," -has now become senseless in the law (in instinct); now, even <i>the love -a man feels for his neighbour</i> must first be based upon something (<i>a -sort of love <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span>of God</i>). <i>God</i> is introduced everywhere, and <i>utility</i> -is withdrawn; the natural <i>origin</i> of morality is denied everywhere: -the <i>veneration of Nature,</i> which lies in <i>acknowledging a natural -morality,</i> is <i>destroyed</i> to the roots....</p> - -<p>Whence comes the <i>seductive charm</i> of this emasculate ideal of man? Why -are we not <i>disgusted</i> by it, just as we are disgusted at the thought -of a eunuch?... The answer is obvious: it is not the voice of the -eunuch that revolts us, despite the cruel mutilation of which it is the -result; for, as a matter of fact, it has grown sweeter.... And owing to -the very fact that the "male organ" has been amputated from virtue, its -voice now has a feminine ring, which, formerly, was not to be discerned.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, we have only to think of the terrible hardness, -dangers, and accidents to which a life of manly virtues leads—the -life of a Corsican, even at the present day, or that of a heathen Arab -(which resembles the Corsican's life even to the smallest detail: -the Arab's songs might have been written by Corsicans)—in order to -perceive how the most robust type of man was fascinated and moved by -the voluptuous ring of this "goodness" and "purity." ... A pastoral -melody ... an idyll ... the "good man": such things have most effect in -ages when tragedy is abroad.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>With this, we have realised to what extent the "idealist" (the ideal -eunuch) also proceeds from a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span>definite reality and is not merely a -visionary.... He has perceived precisely that, for his kind of reality, -a brutal injunction of the sort which prohibits certain actions has no -sense (because the instinct which would urge him to these actions is -<i>weakened,</i> thanks to a long need of practice, and of compulsion to -practise). The castrator formulates a host of new self-preservative -measures for a perfectly definite species of men: in this sense he is -a realist. The <i>means</i> to which he has recourse for establishing his -legislation, are the same as those of ancient legislators: he appeals -to all authorities, to "God," and he exploits the notions "guilt and -punishment"—that is to say, he avails himself of the whole of the -older ideal, but interprets it differently; for instance: punishment is -given a place in the inner self (it is called the pang of conscience).</p> - -<p>In practice this kind of man <i>meets with his end</i> the moment the -exceptional conditions favouring his existence cease to prevail—a sort -of insular happiness, like that of Tahiti, and of the little Jews in -the Roman provinces. Their only <i>natural</i> foe is the soil from which -they spring: they must wage war against that, and once more give their -<i>offensive</i> and <i>defensive</i> passions rope in order to be equal to -it: their opponents are the adherents of the old ideal (this kind of -hostility is shown on a grand scale by Paul in relation to Judaism, and -by Luther in relation to the priestly ascetic ideal). The mildest form -of this antagonism is certainly that of the first Buddhists; perhaps -nothing has given rise to so much work, as the enfeeblement and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> -discouragement of the feeling of <i>antagonism.</i> The struggle against -resentment almost seems the Buddhist's first duty; thus only is his -<i>peace</i> of soul secured. To isolate oneself without bitterness, this -presupposes the existence of a surprisingly mild and sweet order of -men,—saints....</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>The <i>Astuteness of moral castration.</i>—How is war waged against -the virile passions and valuations? No violent physical means are -available; the war must therefore be one of ruses, spells, and lies—in -short, a "spiritual war."</p> - -<p>First recipe: One appropriates virtue in general, and makes it the main -feature of one's ideal; the older ideal is denied and declared to be -<i>the reverse of all ideals.</i> Slander has to be carried to a fine art -for this purpose.</p> - -<p>Second recipe: A type of man is set up as a general <i>standard</i>; and -this is projected into all things, behind all things, and behind the -destiny of all things—as God.</p> - -<p>Third recipe: The opponents of one's ideal are declared to be the -opponents of God; one arrogates to oneself a <i>right</i> to great pathos, -to power, and a right to curse and to bless.</p> - -<p>Fourth recipe: All suffering, all gruesome, terrible, and fatal things -are declared to be the results of opposition to <i>ones</i> ideal—all -suffering is <i>punishment</i> even in the case of one's adherents (except -it be a trial, etc.).</p> - -<p>Fifth recipe: One goes so far as to regard Nature as the reverse of -one's ideal, and the lengthy <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span>sojourn amid natural conditions is -considered a great trial of patience—a sort of martyrdom; one studies -contempt, both in one's attitudes and one's looks towards all "natural -things."</p> - -<p>Sixth recipe: The triumph of anti-naturalism and ideal castration, -the triumph of the world of the pure, good, sinless, and blessed, is -projected into the future as the consummation, the finale, the great -hope, and the "Coming of the Kingdom of God."</p> - -<p>I hope that one may still be allowed to <i>laugh</i> at this artificial -hoisting up of a small species of man to the position of an absolute -standard of all things?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">205.</p> - -<p>What I do not at all like in Jesus of Nazareth and His Apostle Paul, -is that they <i>stuffed so much into the heads of paltry people,</i> as -if their modest virtues were worth so much ado. We have had to pay -dearly for it all; for they brought the most valuable qualities of both -virtue and man into ill repute; they set the guilty conscience and the -self-respect of noble souls at loggerheads, and they led the <i>braver, -more magnanimous, more daring, and more excessive</i> tendencies of strong -souls astray—even to self-destruction.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">206.</p> - -<p>In the New Testament, and especially in the Gospels, I discern -absolutely no sign of a "<i>Divine</i>" voice: but rather an <i>indirect -form</i> of the most <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span>subterranean fury, both in slander and -destructiveness—one of the most dishonest forms of hatred. It lacks -<i>all</i> knowledge of the qualities of a <i>higher nature.</i> It makes an -impudent abuse of all kinds of plausibilities, and the whole stock of -proverbs is used up and foisted upon one in its pages. Was it necessary -to make a <i>God</i> come in order to appeal to those publicans and to say -to them, etc. etc.?</p> - -<p>Nothing could be more vulgar than this struggle with the <i>Pharisees,</i> -carried on with a host of absurd and unpractical moral pretences; the -mob, of course, has always been entertained by such feats. Fancy the -reproach of "hypocrisy!" coming from those lips! Nothing could be more -vulgar than this treatment of one's opponents—a most insidious sign of -nobility or its <i>reverse....</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">207.</p> - -<p>Primitive Christianity is the <i>abolition</i> of the <i>State</i>: it prohibits -oaths, military service, courts of justice, self-defence or the defence -of a community, and denies the difference between fellow-countrymen and -strangers, as also the <i>order of castes.</i></p> - -<p><i>Christs example</i>; He does not withstand those who ill-treat Him; He -does not defend Himself; He does more, He "offers the left cheek" -(to the demand: "Tell us whether thou be the Christ?" He replies: -"Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of -power, and coming in the clouds of heaven"). He forbids His disciples -to defend Him; He calls attention to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span>the fact that He could get help -if He wished to, but <i>will</i> not.</p> - -<p>Christianity also means the <i>abolition of society,</i> it prizes -everything that society despises, its very growth takes place among the -outcasts, the condemned, and the leprous of all kinds, as also among -"publicans," "sinners," prostitutes, and the most foolish of men (the -"fisher folk "); it despises the rich, the scholarly, the noble, the -virtuous, and the "punctilious." ...</p> - - -<p class="parnum">208.</p> - -<p>The war against the noble and the powerful, as it is waged in the New -Testament, is reminiscent of Reynard the Fox and his methods: but -<i>plus</i> the Christian unction and the more absolute refusal to recognise -one's own craftiness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">209.</p> - -<p>The Gospel is the announcement that the road to happiness lies open for -the lowly and the poor—that all one has to do is to emancipate one's -self from all institutions, traditions, and the tutelage of the higher -classes. Thus Christianity is no more than the <i>typical teaching of -Socialists.</i></p> - -<p>Property, acquisitions, mother-country, status and rank, tribunals, -the police, the State, the Church, Education, Art, militarism: all -these are so many obstacles in the way of happiness, so many mistakes, -snares, and devil's artifices, on which the Gospel passes sentence—all -this is typical of socialistic doctrines.</p> - -<p>Behind all this there is the outburst, the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span>explosion, of a -concentrated loathing of the "masters,"—the instinct which discerns -the happiness of freedom after such long oppression.... (Mostly a -symptom of the fact that the inferior classes have been treated too -humanely, that their tongues already taste a joy which is forbidden -them.... It is not hunger that provokes revolutions, but the fact that -the mob have contracted an appetite <i>en mangeant....</i>)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">210.</p> - -<p>Let the <i>New Testament only be read as a book of seduction</i>: in it -virtue is appropriated, with the idea that public opinion is best -won with it,—and as a matter of fact it is a very modest kind of -<i>virtue,</i> which recognises only the ideal gregarious animal and nothing -more (including, of course, the herdsmen): a puny, soft, benevolent, -helpful, and gushingly-satisfied kind of virtue which to the outside -world is quite devoid of pretensions,—and which separates the "world" -entirely from itself. The <i>crassest arrogance</i> which fancies that the -destiny of man turns around it, and it alone, and that on the one side -the community of believers represents what is right, and on the other -the world represents what is false and eternally to be reproved and -rejected. The most <i>imbecile hatred</i> of all things in power, which, -however, never goes so far as to touch these things. A kind of <i>inner -detachment</i> which, outwardly, leaves everything as it was (servitude -and slavery; and knowing how to convert <i>everything</i> into a means of -serving God and virtue).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">211.</p> - -<p>Christianity is possible as the <i>most private</i> form of life; it -presupposes the existence of a narrow, isolated, and absolutely -unpolitical society—it belongs to the conventicle. On the other hand, -a "Christian <i>State</i>," "Christian politics," are pieces of downright -impudence; they are lies, like, for instance, a Christian leadership -of an army, which in the end regards "the God of hosts" as chief of -the staff. Even the Papacy has never been able to carry on politics -in a Christian way...; and when Reformers indulge in politics, as -Luther did, it is well known that they are just as ardent followers of -Machiavelli as any other immoralists or tyrants.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">212.</p> - -<p>Christianity is still possible at any moment. It is not bound to any -one of the impudent dogmas that have adorned themselves with its name: -it needs neither the teaching of the <i>personal God,</i> nor of <i>sin,</i> -nor of <i>immortality,</i> nor of <i>redemption,</i> nor of <i>faith</i>; it has -absolutely no need whatever of metaphysics, and it needs asceticism and -Christian "natural science" still less. Christianity is a <i>method of -life,</i> not a system of belief. It tells us how we should behave, not -what we should believe.</p> - -<p>He who says to-day: "I refuse to be a soldier," "I care not for -tribunals," "I lay no claim to the services of the police," "I will -not do anything that disturbs the peace within me: <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span>and if I must -suffer on that account, nothing can so well maintain my inward peace as -suffering"—such a man would be a Christian.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">213.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the history of Christianity.</i>—Continual change of -environment: Christian teaching is thus continually changing its -<i>centre of gravity.</i> The favouring of <i>low</i> and <i>paltry</i> people.... -The development of <i>Caritas....</i> The type "Christian" gradually -adopts everything that it originally rejected (<i>and in the rejection -of which it asserted its right to exist</i>). The Christian becomes a -citizen, a soldier, a judge, a workman, a merchant, a scholar, a -theologian, a priest, a philosopher, a farmer, an artist, a patriot, -a politician, a prince ... he re-enters all those <i>departments of -active life</i> which he had forsworn (he defends himself, he establishes -tribunals, he punishes, he swears, he differentiates between people -and people, he contemns, and he shows anger). The whole life of the -Christian is ultimately exactly that life <i>from which Christ preached -deliverance....</i> The Church is just as much a factor in the <i>triumph</i> -of the Antichrist, as the modern State and modern Nationalism.... The -Church is the barbarisation of Christianity.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">214.</p> - -<p>Among the powers that have mastered <i>Christianity</i> are: Judaism -(<i>Paul</i>); Platonism (Augustine); The cult of mystery (the teaching of -salvation, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span>the emblem of the "cross"); Asceticism (hostility towards -"Nature," "Reason," the "senses,"—the Orient ...).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">215.</p> - -<p>Christianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious morality: under the -power of the most complete misapprehensions and self-deceptions. -Democracy is a more natural form of it, and less sown with falsehood. -It is a fact that the oppressed, the low, and whole mob of slaves and -half-castes, <i>will prevail.</i></p> - -<p>First step: they make themselves free—they detach themselves, at -first in fancy only; they recognise each other; they make themselves -paramount.</p> - -<p>Second step: they enter the lists, they demand acknowledgment, equal -rights, "Justice."</p> - -<p>Third step: they demand privileges (they draw the representatives of -power over to their side).</p> - -<p>Fourth step: they <i>alone</i> want all power, and they <i>have</i> it.</p> - -<p>There are <i>three elements</i> in Christianity which must be distinguished: -<i>(a)</i> the oppressed of all kinds, <i>(b)</i> the mediocre of all kinds, -<i>(c)</i> the dissatisfied and diseased of all kinds. The <i>first</i> struggle -against the politically noble and their ideal; the second contend with -the exceptions and those who are in any way privileged (mentally or -physically); the third oppose the <i>natural instinct</i> of the happy and -the sound.</p> - -<p>Whenever a triumph is achieved, the second <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span>element steps to the fore; -for then Christianity has won over the sound and happy to its side -(as warriors in its cause), likewise the powerful (interested to this -extent in the conquest of the crowd)—and now it is the <i>gregarious -instinct,</i> that <i>mediocre nature</i> which is valuable in every respect, -that now gets its highest sanction through Christianity. This mediocre -nature ultimately becomes so conscious of itself (gains such courage -in regard to its own opinions), that it arrogates to itself even -<i>political power</i>....</p> - -<p>Democracy is Christianity <i>made natural</i>: a sort of "return to Nature," -once Christianity, owing to extreme anti-naturalness, might have been -overcome by the opposite valuation. Result: the aristocratic ideal -begins to <i>lose its natural character</i> ("the higher man," "noble," -"artist," "passion," "knowledge"; Romanticism as the cult of the -exceptional, genius, etc. etc.).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">216.</p> - -<p><i>When the "masters" may also become Christians.</i>—It is of the nature -of a <i>community</i> (race, family, herd, tribe) to regard all those -conditions and aspirations which favour its survival, as in themselves -<i>valuable</i>; for instance: obedience, mutual assistance, respect, -moderation, pity—as also, to <i>suppress</i> everything that happens to -stand in the way of the above.</p> - -<p>It is likewise of the nature of the <i>rulers</i> (whether they are -individuals or classes) to patronise and applaud those virtues which -make <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span>their subjects <i>amenable</i> and <i>submissive</i>—conditions and -passions which may be utterly different from their own.</p> - -<p>The <i>gregarious instinct</i> and the <i>instinct of the rulers</i> sometimes -<i>agree</i> in approving of a certain number of qualities and -conditions,—but for different reasons: the first do so out of direct -egoism, the second out of indirect egoism.</p> - -<p><i>The submission to Christianity on the part of master races</i> is -essentially the result of the conviction that Christianity is a -<i>religion for the herd,</i> that it teaches obedience: in short, that -Christians are more easily ruled than non-Christians. With a hint of -this nature, the Pope, even nowadays, recommends Christian propaganda -to the ruling Sovereign of China.</p> - -<p>It should also be added that the seductive power of the Christian ideal -works most strongly upon natures that love danger, adventure, and -contrasts; that love everything <i>that entails a risk,</i> and wherewith a -<i>non plus ultra</i> of powerful feeling may be attained. In this respect, -one has only to think of Saint Theresa, surrounded by the heroic -instincts of her brothers:—Christianity appears in those circumstances -as a dissipation of the will, as strength of will, as a will that is -Quixotic.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">3. Christian Ideals.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">217.</p> - -<p>War against the <i>Christian ideal,</i> against the doctrine of -"blessedness" and "salvation" as the aims of life, against the -supremacy of the fools, of the pure in heart, of the suffering and of -the botched!</p> - -<p>When and where has any man, <i>of any note at all,</i> resembled the -Christian ideal?—at least in the eyes of those who are psychologists -and triers of the heart and reins. Look at all Plutarch's heroes!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">218.</p> - -<p><i>Our claim to superiority</i>: we live in an age of <i>Comparisons</i>; we -are able to calculate as men have never yet calculated; in every way -we are history become self-conscious. We enjoy things in a different -way; we suffer in a different way: our instinctive activity is the -comparison of an enormous variety of things. We understand everything; -we experience everything, we no longer have a hostile feeling left -within us. However disastrous the results may be to ourselves, our -plunging and almost lustful inquisitiveness, attacks, unabashed, the -most dangerous of subjects....</p> - -<p>"Everything is good"—it gives us pain to say "nay" to anything. We -suffer when we feel that we are sufficiently foolish to make a definite -stand against anything.... At bottom, it is we scholars who to-day are -fulfilling Christ's teaching most thoroughly.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">219.</p> - -<p>We cannot suppress a certain irony when we contemplate those who think -they have overcome Christianity by means of modern natural science. -Christian values are by no means overcome by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span>such people. "Christ on -the cross" is still the most sublime symbol—even now....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">220.</p> - -<p>The two great Nihilistic movements are: <i>(a)</i> Buddhism, <i>(b)</i> -Christianity. The latter has only just about reached a state of -culture in which it can fulfil its original object,—it has found its -<i>level,</i>—and now it can manifest itself <i>without disguise</i>.....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">221.</p> - -<p>We have <i>re-established</i> the Christian ideal, it now only remains <i>to -determine</i> its value.</p> - -<p>(1) Which values does it <i>deny</i>? What does <i>the ideal that opposes it</i> -stand for?—Pride, pathos of distance, great responsibility, exuberant -spirits, splendid animalism, the instincts of war and of conquest; -the deification of passion, revenge, cunning, anger, voluptuousness, -adventure, knowledge—the <i>noble ideal</i> is denied: the beauty, wisdom, -power, pomp, and awfulness of the type man: the man who postulates -aims, the "future" man (here Christianity presents itself as the -<i>logical result</i> of <i>Judaism</i>).</p> - -<p>(2) <i>Can it be realised?</i>—Yes, of course, when the climatic conditions -are favourable—as in the case of the Indian ideal. Both neglect the -factor <i>work.</i>—It separates a creature from a people, a state, a -civilised community, and jurisdiction; it rejects education, wisdom, -the cultivation of good manners, acquisition and commerce; it cuts -adrift <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span>everything which is of use and value to men—by means of an -idiosyncrasy of sentiment it <i>isolates</i> a man. It is non-political, -anti-national, neither aggressive nor defensive,—and only possible -within a strictly-ordered State or state of society, which allows these -<i>holy parasites</i> to flourish at the cost of their neighbours.....</p> - -<p>(3) It has now become the will to be <i>happy</i>—and nothing else! -"Blessedness" stands for something self-evident, that no longer -requires any justification—everything else (the way to live and let -live) is only a means to an end....</p> - -<p>But what follows is the result of a <i>low order of thought,</i> the fear of -pain, of defilement, of corruption, is great enough to provide ample -grounds for allowing everything to go to the dogs.... This is a <i>poor</i> -way of thinking, and is the sign of an exhausted race; we <i>must</i> not -allow ourselves to be deceived. ("Become as little children." Natures -<i>of the same order</i>: Francis of Assisi, neurotic, epileptic, visionary, -like Jesus.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">222.</p> - -<p>The <i>higher</i> man distinguishes himself from the <i>lower</i> by his -fearlessness and his readiness to challenge misfortune: it is a -sign of <i>degeneration</i> when eudemonistic values begin to prevail -(physiological fatigue and enfeeblement of will-power). Christianity, -with its prospect of "blessedness," is the typical attitude of mind of -a suffering and impoverished species of man. Abundant strength will be -active, will suffer, and will go under: to it <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span>the bigotry of Christian -salvation is bad music and hieratic posing and vexation.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">223.</p> - -<p><i>Poverty, humility, and chastity</i> are dangerous and slanderous ideals; -but like poisons, which are useful cures in the case of certain -diseases, they were also necessary in the time of the Roman Empire.</p> - -<p>All ideals are dangerous: because they lower and brand realities; they -are all poisons, but occasionally indispensable as cures.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">224.</p> - -<p>God created man, happy, idle, innocent, and immortal: our actual life -is a false, decadent, and sinful existence, a punishment.... Suffering, -struggle, work, and death are raised as objections against life, they -make life questionable, unnatural—something that must cease, and for -which one not only requires but also <i>has</i>—remedies!</p> - -<p>Since the time of Adam, man has been in an abnormal state: God -Himself delivered up His Son for Adam's sin, in order to put an end -to the abnormal condition of things: the natural character of life -is a <i>curse</i>; to those who believe in Him, Christ restores normal -life: He makes them happy, idle, and innocent. But the world did not -become fruitful without labour; women do not bear children without -pain; illness has not ceased: believers are served just as badly as -unbelievers in this respect. All that has happened <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span>is, that man is -delivered from <i>death</i> and <i>sin—</i>two assertions which allow of no -verification, and which are therefore emphasised by the Church with -more than usual heartiness. "He is free from sin,"—not owing to -his own efforts, not owing to a vigorous struggle on his part, but -<i>redeemed by the death of the Saviour,</i>—consequently, perfectly -innocent and paradisaical.</p> - -<p><i>Actual</i> life is nothing more than an illusion (that is to say, a -deception, an insanity). The whole of struggling, fighting, and -real existence—so full of light and shade, is only bad and false: -everybody's duty is to be <i>delivered</i> from it.</p> - -<p>"Man, innocent, idle, immortal, and happy"—this concept, which is -the object of the "most supreme desires," must be criticised before -anything else. Why should guilt, work, death, and pain (<i>and,</i> from -the Christian point of view, also <i>knowledge</i> ...) be <i>contrary</i> to -all supreme desires?—The lazy Christian notions: "blessedness," -"innocence," "immortality."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">225.</p> - -<p>The eccentric concept "holiness" does not exist—"God" and "man" have -not been divorced from each other. "Miracles" do not exist—such -spheres do not exist: the only one to be considered is the -"intellectual" (that is to say, the symbolically-psychological). As -decadence: a counterpart to "Epicureanism." ... Paradise according to -Greek notions was only "Epicurus' Garden."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> -A life of this sort lacks a purpose: it <i>strives after</i> nothing;—a -form of the "Epicurean gods"—there is no longer any reason to aim at -anything,—not even at having children:—everything has been done.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">226.</p> - -<p>They despised the body: they did not reckon with it: nay, more—they -treated it as an enemy. It was their delirium to think that a man -could carry a "beautiful soul" about in a body that was a cadaverous -abortion.... In order to inoculate others with this insanity they -had to present the concept "beautiful soul" in a different way, and -to transvalue the natural value, until, at last, a pale, sickly, -idiotically exalted creature, something angelic, some extreme -perfection and transfiguration was declared to be the higher man.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">227.</p> - -<p>Ignorance in matters psychological.—The Christian has no nervous -system;—contempt for, and deliberate and wilful turning away from, the -demands of the body, and the <i>naked</i> body; it is assumed that all this -is in keeping with man's nature, and <i>must perforce work the ultimate -good of the soul</i>;—all functions of the body are systematically -reduced to moral values; illness itself is regarded as determined by -morality, it is held to be the result of sin, or it is a trial or a -state of salvation, through which man becomes more perfect than he -could become in a state <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span>of health (Pascal's idea); under certain -circumstances, there are wilful attempts at inducing illness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">228.</p> - -<p>What in sooth is this struggle "against Nature" on the part of the -Christian? We shall not, of course, let ourselves be deceived by -his words and explanations. It is Nature against something which is -also Nature. With many, it is fear; with others, it is loathing; -with yet others, it is the sign of a certain intellectuality, the -love of a bloodless and passionless ideal; and in the case of the -most superior men, it is love of an abstract Nature—these try to -live up to their ideal. It is easily understood that humiliation in -the place of self-esteem, anxious cautiousness towards the passions, -emancipation from the usual duties (whereby, a higher notion of rank is -created), the incitement to constant war on behalf of enormous issues, -habituation to effusiveness of feelings—all this goes to constitute -a type: in such a type the <i>hypersensitiveness</i> of a perishing body -preponderates; but the nervousness and the inspirations it engenders -are <i>interpreted</i> differently. The <i>taste</i> of this kind of creature -tends either (1) to subtilise, (2) to indulge in bombastic eloquence, -or (3) to go in for extreme feelings. The natural inclinations <i>do</i> -get satisfied, but they are interpreted in a new way; for instance, -as "justification before God," "the feeling of redemption through -grace," every undeniable <i>feeling of pleasure</i> becomes (interpreted -in this way!) pride, voluptuousness, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span>etc. General problem: what will -become of the man who slanders and practically denies and belittles -what is natural? As a matter of fact, the Christian is an example of -exaggerated self-control: in order to tame his passions, he seems to -find it necessary to extirpate or crucify them.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">229.</p> - -<p>Man did not know himself physiologically throughout the ages his -history covers; he does not even know himself now. The knowledge, for -instance, that man has a nervous system (but no "soul") is still the -privilege of the most educated people. But man is not satisfied, in -this respect, to say he does not know. A man must be very superior to -be able to say: "I do not know this,"—that is to say, to be able to -admit his ignorance.</p> - -<p>Suppose he is in pain or in a good mood, he never questions that he -can find the reason of either condition if only he seeks.... In truth, -he cannot find the reason; for he does not even suspect where it -lies.... What happens?... He takes the <i>result</i> of his condition for -its <i>cause</i>; for instance, if he should undertake some work (really -undertaken because his good mood gave him the courage to do so) and -carry it through successfully: behold, the work itself is the <i>reason</i> -of his good mood.... As a matter of fact, his success was determined by -the same cause as that which brought about his good mood—that is to -say, the happy co-ordination of physiological powers and functions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> -He feels bad: <i>consequently</i> he cannot overcome a care, a scruple, -or an attitude of self-criticism.... He really fancies that his -disagreeable condition is the result of his scruple, of his "sin," or -of his "self-criticism."</p> - -<p>But after profound exhaustion and prostration, a state of recovery sets -in. "How is it possible that I can feel so free, so happy? It is a -miracle; only a God could have effected this change."—Conclusion: "He -has forgiven my sin." ...</p> - -<p>From this follow certain practices: in order to provoke feelings of -sinfulness and to prepare the way for crushed spirits it is necessary -to induce a condition of morbidity and nervousness in the body. The -methods of doing this are well known. Of course, nobody suspects -the causal logic of the fact: the <i>maceration</i> of the <i>flesh</i> is -interpreted religiously, it seems like an end in itself, whereas it -is no more than a <i>means</i> of bringing about that morbid state of -indigestion which is known as repentance (the "fixed idea" of sin, the -hypnotising of the hen by-means of the chalk-line "sin").</p> - -<p>The mishandling of the body prepares the ground for the required range -of "guilty feelings"—that is to say, for that general state of pain -which <i>demands an explanation....</i></p> - -<p>On the other hand, the <i>method</i> of "salvation" may also develop -from the above: every dissipation of the feelings, whether prayers, -movements, attitudes, or oaths, has been provoked, and exhaustion -follows; very often it is acute, or it <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span>appears in the form of -epilepsy. And behind this condition of deep somnolence there come signs -of recovery—or, in religious parlance, "Salvation."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">230.</p> - -<p>Formerly, the conditions and results of <i>physiological exhaustion</i> were -considered more important than healthy conditions and their results, -and this was owing to the suddenness, fearfulness, and mysteriousness -of the former. Men were terrified by themselves, and postulated the -existence of a <i>higher</i> world. People have ascribed the origin of the -idea of two worlds—one this side of the grave and the other beyond -it—to sleep and dreams, to shadows, to night, and to the fear of -Nature: but the symptoms of physiological exhaustion should, above all, -have been considered.</p> - -<p>Ancient religions have quite special methods of disciplining the -pious into states of exhaustion, in which they <i>must</i> experience such -things.... The idea was, that one entered into a new order of things, -where everything ceases to be known.—The <i>semblance</i> of a higher -power....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">231.</p> - -<p>Sleep is the result of every kind of exhaustion; exhaustion follows -upon all excessive excitement....</p> - -<p>In all pessimistic religions and philosophies there is a yearning for -sleep; the very notion "sleep" is deified and worshipped.</p> - -<p>In this case the exhaustion is racial; sleep <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span>regarded psychologically -is only a symbol of a much deeper and longer <i>compulsion to rest.... -In praxi</i> it is death which rules here in the seductive image of its -brother sleep....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">232.</p> - -<p>The whole of the Christian training in repentance and redemption may -be regarded as a <i>folie circulaire</i> arbitrarily produced; though, -of course, it can be produced only in people who are predisposed to -it—that is to say, who have morbid tendencies in their constitutions.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">233.</p> - -<p><i>Against remorse and its purely psychical treatment.</i>—To be unable -to have done with an experience is already a sign of decadence. -This reopening of old wounds, this wallowing in self-contempt and -depression, is an additional form of disease; no "salvation of the -soul" ever results from it, but only a new kind of spiritual illness....</p> - -<p>These "conditions of salvation" of which the Christian is conscious are -merely variations of the same diseased state—the interpretation of an -attack of epilepsy by means of a particular formula which is provided, -<i>not</i> by science, but by religious mania.</p> - -<p>When a man is ill his very <i>goodness</i> is sickly.... By far the -greatest portion of the psychical apparatus which Christianity has -used, is now classed among the various forms of hysteria and epilepsy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> -The whole process of spiritual healing must be remodelled on a -physiological basis: the "sting of conscience" as such is an obstacle -in the way of recovery—as soon as possible the attempt must be made -to counterbalance everything by means of new actions, so that there -may be an escape from the morbidness of <i>self-torture....</i> The purely -psychical practices of the Church and of the various sects should be -decried as dangerous to the health. No invalid is ever cured by prayers -or by the exorcising of evil spirits: the states of "repose" which -follow upon such methods of treatment, by no means inspire confidence, -in the psychological sense....</p> - - - -<p>A man is <i>healthy</i> when he can laugh at the seriousness and ardour with -which he has allowed himself to be <i>hypnotised</i> to any extent by any -detail in his life—when his remorse seems to him like the action of a -dog biting a stone—when he is ashamed of his repentance.</p> - -<p>The purely psychological and religious practices, which have existed -hitherto, only led to an <i>alteration in the symptoms</i>: according to -them a man had recovered when he bowed before the cross, and swore -that in future he would be a good man.... But a criminal, who, with -a certain gloomy seriousness cleaves to his fate and refuses to -malign his deed once it is done, has more <i>spiritual health....</i> -The criminals with whom Dostoiewsky associated in prison, were all, -without exception, unbroken natures,—are they not a hundred times more -valuable than a "broken-spirited" Christian?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> -(For the treatment of pangs of conscience I recommend Mitchell's -Treatment.<a name="FNanchor_2_9" id="FNanchor_2_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_9" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>)</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_9" id="Footnote_2_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_9"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <span style="font-size: 0.9em;">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.</span>—In <i>The New Sydenham Society's Lexicon -of Medicine and the Allied Sciences,</i> the following description of -Mitchell's treatment is to be found: "A method of treating cases of -neurasthenia and hysteria ... by removal from home, rest in bed, -massage twice a day, electrical excitation of the muscles, and -excessive feeding, at first with milk."</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">234.</p> - -<p>A <i>pang of conscience</i> in a man is a sign that his character is not -yet equal to his <i>deed.</i> There is such a thing as a pang of conscience -after <i>good deeds</i>: in this case it is their unfamiliarity, their -incompatibility with an old environment.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">235.</p> - -<p><i>Against remorse.</i>—I do not like this form of cowardice in regard to -one's own actions, one must not leave one's self in the lurch under -the pressure of sudden shame or distress. Extreme pride is much more -fitting here. What is the good of it all in the end! No deed gets -undone because it is regretted, no more than because it is "forgiven" -or "expiated." A man must be a theologian in order to believe in -a power that erases faults: we immoralists prefer to disbelieve -in "faults." We believe that all deeds, of what kind soever, are -identically the same at root; just as deeds which turn <i>against</i> us -may <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span>be useful from an economical point of view, and even <i>generally -desirable.</i> In certain individual cases, we admit that we might well -have been <i>spared</i> a given action; the circumstances alone predisposed -us in its favour. Which of us, if <i>favoured</i> by circumstances, would -not already have committed every possible crime?... That is why one -should never say: "Thou shouldst never have done such and such a -thing," but only: "How strange it is that I have not done such and -such a thing hundreds of times already!"—As a matter of fact, only -a very small number of acts are <i>typical</i> acts and real epitomes of -a personality, and seeing what a small number of people really are -personalities, a single act very rarely <i>characterises</i> a man. Acts -are mostly dictated by circumstances; they are superficial or merely -reflex movements performed in response to a stimulus, long before the -depths of our beings are affected or consulted in the matter. A fit of -temper, a gesture, a blow with a knife: how little of the individual -resides in these acts!—A deed very often brings a sort of stupor or -feeling of constraint in its wake: so that the agent feels almost -spellbound at its recollection, or as though he <i>belonged to it,</i> -and were not an independent creature. This mental disorder, which is -a form of hypnotism, must be resisted at all costs: surely a single -deed, whatever it be, when it is compared with all one has done, is -<i>nothing,</i> and may be deducted from the sum without making the account -wrong. The unfair interest which society manifests in controlling the -whole of our lives <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span>in one direction, as though the very purpose of its -existence were to cultivate a certain individual act, should not infect -the man of action: but unfortunately this happens almost continually. -The reason of this is, that every deed, if followed by unexpected -consequences, leads to a certain mental disturbance, no matter whether -the consequences be good or bad. Behold a lover who has been given a -promise, or a poet while he is receiving applause from an audience: -as far as <i>intellectual torpor</i> is concerned, these men are in no way -different from the anarchist who is suddenly confronted by a detective -bearing a search warrant.</p> - -<p>There are some acts which are <i>unworthy</i> of us: acts which, if they -were regarded as typical, would set us down as belonging to a lower -class of man. The one fault that has to be avoided here, is to regard -them as typical. There is another kind of act of which <i>we</i> are -unworthy: exceptional acts, born of a particular abundance of happiness -and health; they are the highest waves of our spring tides, driven to -an unusual height by a storm—an accident: such acts and "deeds" are -also not typical. An artist should never be judged according to the -measure of his works.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">236.</p> - -<p>A. In proportion as Christianity seems necessary to-day, man is still -wild and fatal....</p> - -<p>B. In another sense, it is not necessary, but extremely dangerous, -though it is captivating and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span>seductive, because it corresponds with -the <i>morbid</i> character of whole classes and types of modern humanity, -... they simply follow their inclinations when they aspire to -Christianity—they are decadents of all kinds.</p> - -<p>A and B must be kept very sharply apart. In the <i>case of A,</i> -Christianity is a cure, or at least a taming process (under certain -circumstances it serves the purpose of making people ill: and this is -sometimes useful as a means of subduing savage and brutal natures). -In the <i>case of B,</i> it is a symptom of illness itself, it renders the -state of decadence <i>more acute</i>; in this case it stands opposed to -a <i>corroborating</i> system of treatment, it is the invalid's instinct -standing <i>against</i> that which would be most salutary to him.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">237.</p> - -<p>On one side there are the <i>serious,</i> the <i>dignified,</i> and <i>reflective</i> -people: and on the other the barbarous, the unclean, and the -irresponsible beasts: it is merely a question of <i>taming animals</i>—and -in this case the tamer must be hard, terrible, and awe-inspiring, at -least to his beasts.</p> - -<p>All essential requirements must be imposed upon the unruly creatures -with almost brutal distinctness—that is to say, magnified a thousand -times.</p> - -<p>Even the fulfilment of the requirement must be presented in the -coarsest way possible, so that it may command respect, as in the case -of the spiritualisation of the Brahmins.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span></p> -<p><i>The struggle with the rabble -and the herd.</i> If any degree of tameness and order has been reached, -the chasm separating these <i>purified</i> and <i>regenerated</i> people from the -terrible <i>remainder</i> must have been bridged....</p> - -<p>This chasm is a means of increasing self-respect in higher castes, -and of confirming their belief in <i>that</i> which they represent—hence -the <i>Chandala.</i> Contempt and its excess are perfectly correct -psychologically—that is to say, magnified a hundred times, so that it -may at least be felt.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">238.</p> - -<p>The struggle against <i>brutal</i> instincts is quite different from -the struggle against <i>morbid</i> instincts; it may even be a means -of overcoming brutality by making the brutes <i>ill.</i> The psychical -treatment practised by Christianity is often nothing more than the -process of converting a brute into a sick and <i>therefore</i> tame animal.</p> - -<p>The struggle against raw and savage natures must be a struggle with -weapons which are able to affect such natures: <i>superstitions</i> and such -means are therefore indispensable and essential.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">239.</p> - -<p>Our age, in a certain sense, is <i>mature</i> (that is to say, decadent), -just as Buddha's was.... That is why a sort of Christianity is possible -without all the absurd dogmas (the most repulsive offshoots of ancient -hybridism).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">240.</p> - -<p>Supposing it were impossible to disprove Christianity, Pascal thinks, -in view of the <i>terrible</i> possibility that it may be true, that it is -in the highest degree prudent to be a Christian. As a proof of how -much Christianity has lost of its terrible nature, to-day we find that -other attempt to justify it, which consists in asserting, that even if -it were a mistake, it nevertheless provides the greatest advantages -and pleasures for its adherents throughout their lives:—it therefore -seems that this belief should be upheld owing to the peace and quiet -it ensures—not owing to the terror of a threatening possibility, but -rather out of fear of a life that has lost its charm. This hedonistic -turn of thought, which uses happiness as a proof, is a symptom of -decline: it takes the place of the proof resulting from power or from -that which to the Christian mind is most terrible—namely, <i>fear.</i> With -this new interpretation, Christianity is, as a matter of fact, nearing -its stage of exhaustion. People are satisfied with a Christianity which -is an <i>opiate,</i> because they no longer have the strength to seek, to -struggle, to dare, to stand alone, nor to take up Pascal's position and -to share that gloomily brooding self-contempt, that belief in human -unworthiness, and that anxiety which believes that it "may be damned." -But a Christianity the chief object of which is to soothe diseased -nerves, does <i>not require</i> the terrible solution consisting of a "God -on the cross"; that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span>is why Buddhism is secretly gaining ground all -over Europe.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">241.</p> - -<p>The humour of European culture: people regard one thing as true, but do -<i>the other.</i> For instance, what is the use of all the art of reading -and criticising, if the ecclesiastical interpretation of the Bible, -whether according to Catholics or Protestants, is still upheld!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">242.</p> - -<p>No one is sufficiently aware of the barbarity of the notions among -which we Europeans still live. To think that men have been able to -believe that the "Salvation of the soul" depended upon a book!... And I -am told that this is still believed.</p> - - - -<p>What is the good of all scientific education, all criticism and all -hermeneutics, if such nonsense as the Church's interpretation of the -Bible has not yet turned the colours of our bodies permanently into the -red of shame?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">243.</p> - -<p><i>Subject for reflection</i>: To what extent does the fatal belief in -"Divine Providence"—the most <i>paralysing</i> belief for both the hand -and the understanding that has ever existed—continue to prevail; -to what extent have the Christian hypothesis and interpretation of -Life continued their lives <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span>under the cover of terms like "Nature," -"Progress," "perfectionment," "Darwinism," or beneath the superstition -that there is a certain relation between happiness and virtue, -unhappiness and sin? That absurd <i>belief</i> in the course of things, in -"Life" and in the "instinct of Life"; that foolish <i>resignation</i> which -arises from the notion that if only every one did his duty <i>all</i> would -go well—all this sort of thing can only have a meaning if one assumes -that there is a direction of things <i>sub specie boni.</i> Even <i>fatalism,</i> -our present form of philosophical sensibility, is the result of a -<i>long</i> belief in Divine Providence, an unconscious result: as though it -were nothing to do with us how everything goes! (As though we <i>might</i> -let things take their own course; the individual being only a <i>modus</i> -of the absolute reality.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">244.</p> - -<p>It is the height of psychological falsity on the part of man to imagine -a being according to his own petty standard, who is a beginning, a -"thing-in-itself," and who appears to him good, wise, mighty, and -precious; for thus he suppresses in thoughts <i>all the causality</i> -by means of which every kind of goodness, wisdom, and power comes -into existence and has value. In short, elements of the most recent -and most conditional origin were regarded not as evolved, but as -spontaneously generated and "things-in-themselves," and perhaps as -the cause of all things.... Experience teaches us that, in every -case in which a man has <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span>elevated himself to any great extent -above the average of his fellows, every high degree of <i>power</i> always -involves a corresponding degree of <i>freedom</i> from Good and Evil as also -from "true" and "false," and cannot take into account what goodness -dictates: the same holds good of a high degree of wisdom—in this case -goodness is just as much suppressed as truthfulness, justice, virtue, -and other popular whims in valuations. In fact, is it not obvious that -every high degree of goodness itself presupposes a certain intellectual -myopia and obtuseness? as also an inability to distinguish at a great -distance between true and false, useful and harmful?—not to mention -the fact that a high degree of power in the hands of the highest -goodness might lead to the most baleful consequences ("the suppression -of evil"). In sooth it is enough to perceive with what aspirations the -"God of Love" inspires His believers: they ruin mankind for the benefit -of "good men." In practice, this same God has shown Himself to be a God -of the most <i>acute myopia, devilry</i>, and <i>impotence</i>, in the face of -the actual arrangement of the universe, and from this the value of His -conception may be estimated. - -Knowledge and wisdom can have no value in themselves, any more than -goodness can: the goal they are striving after must be known first, for -then only can their value or worthlessness be judged—<i>a goal might be</i> -imagined which would make excessive wisdom a great disadvantage (if, -for instance, complete deception were a prerequisite to the enhancement -of life; likewise, if goodness <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span>were able to paralyse and -depress the main springs of the great passions)....</p> - -<p>Taking our human life as it is, it cannot be denied that all "truth," -"goodness," "holiness," and "Godliness" in the Christian sense, have -hitherto shown themselves to be great dangers—even now mankind is in -danger of perishing owing to an ideal which is hostile to life.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">245.</p> - -<p>Let any one think of the <i>loss</i> which all human institutions suffer, -when a divine and transcendental, <i>higher sphere</i> is postulated which -must first sanction these institutions! By recognising their worth -in this sanction alone (as in the case of marriage, for instance) -<i>their natural dignity is reduced</i>, and under certain circumstances -<i>denied</i>.... Nature is spitefully misjudged in the same ratio as the -anti-natural notion of a God is held in honour. "Nature" then comes to -mean no more than "contemptible," "bad." ...</p> - -<p>The fatal nature of a belief in God as the <i>reality of the highest -moral qualities</i>: through it, all real values were denied and -systematically regarded as <i>valueless</i>. Thus <i>Anti-Nature</i> ascended -the throne. With relentless logic the last step was reached, and this -was the absolute demand to <i>deny Nature.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">246.</p> - -<p>By pressing the doctrine of disinterestedness and love into the -foreground, Christianity by no <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span>means elevated the interests -of the species above those of the individual. Its real <i>historical</i> -effect, its fatal effect, remains precisely the <i>increase of egotism,</i> -of individual egotism, to excess (to the extreme which consists in -the belief in individual immortality). The individual was made so -important and so absolute, by means of Christian values, that he could -no longer be <i>sacrificed,</i> despite the fact that the species can -only be maintained by human sacrifices. All "souls" became <i>equal</i> -before God: but this is the most pernicious of all valuations! If -one regards individuals as equals, the demands of the species are -ignored, and a process is initiated which ultimately leads to its -ruin. Christianity is the <i>reverse of the</i> principle of <i>selection.</i> -If the degenerate and sick man ("the Christian") is to be of the same -value as the healthy man ("the pagan"), or if he is even to be valued -higher than the latter, as Pascal's view of health and sickness would -have us value him, the natural course of evolution is thwarted and the -<i>unnatural</i> becomes law.... In practice this general love of mankind -is nothing more than deliberately favouring all the suffering, the -botched, and the degenerate: it is this love that has reduced and -weakened the power, responsibility, and lofty duty of sacrificing -men. According to the scheme of Christian values, all that remained -was the alternative of self-sacrifice, but this <i>vestige</i> of human -sacrifice, which Christianity conceded and even recommended, has no -meaning when regarded in the light of rearing a whole species. The -prosperity of the species is by no means affected by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span>the sacrifice of -one individual (whether in the monastic and ascetic manner, or by means -of crosses, stakes, and scaffolds, as the "martyrs" of error). What the -species requires is the suppression of the physiologically botched, -the weak and the degenerate: but it was precisely to these people that -Christianity appealed as a <i>preservative</i> force, it simply strengthened -that natural and very strong instinct of all the weak which bids them -protect, maintain, and mutually support each other. What is Christian -"virtue" and "love of men," if not precisely this mutual assistance -with a view to survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting of -selection? What is Christian altruism, if it is not the mob-egotism of -the weak which divines that, if everybody looks after everybody else, -every individual will be preserved for a longer period of time?... He -who does not consider this attitude of mind as <i>immoral,</i> as a crime -against life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also shares -their instincts.... Genuine love of mankind exacts sacrifice for -the good of the species—it is hard, full of self-control, because -it needs human sacrifices. And this pseudo-humanity which is called -Christianity, would fain establish the rule that nobody should be -sacrificed.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">247.</p> - -<p>Nothing could be more useful and deserves more promotion than -systematic <i>Nihilism in action.</i>—As I understand the phenomena of -Christianity and pessimism, this is what they say: "We <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span>are ripe for -nonentity, for us it is reasonable not to be." This hint from "reason" -in this case, is simply the voice of <i>selective Nature.</i></p> - -<p>On the other hand, what deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is -the ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like -<i>Christianity,</i>—or rather like the <i>Church,</i>—which, instead of -recommending death and self-destruction, actually protects all the -botched and bungled, and encourages them to propagate their kind.</p> - -<p>Problem: with what kind of means could one lead up to a severe form of -really contagious Nihilism—a Nihilism which would teach and practise -voluntary death with scientific conscientiousness (and not the feeble -continuation of a vegetative sort of life with false hopes of a life -after death)?</p> - -<p>Christianity cannot be sufficiently condemned for having depreciated -the <i>value</i> of a great <i>cleansing</i> Nihilistic movement (like the one -which was probably in the process of formation), by its teaching of -the immortality of the private individual, as also by the hopes of -resurrection which it held out: that is to say, by dissuading people -from performing the <i>deed of Nihilism</i> which is suicide.... In the -latter's place it puts lingering suicide, and gradually a puny, meagre, -but durable life; gradually a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre -life, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">248.</p> - -<p><i>Christian moral quackery.</i>—Pity and contempt succeed each other at -short intervals, and at the sight of them I feel as indignant as if I -were in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span>the presence of the most despicable crime. Here error is made -a duty—a virtue, misapprehension has become a knack, the destructive -instinct is systematised under the name of "redemption"; here every -operation becomes a wound, an amputation of those very organs whose -energy would be the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the -best of cases no cure is effected; all that is done is to exchange one -set of evil symptoms for another set.... And this pernicious nonsense, -this systematised profanation and castration of life, passes for -holy and sacred; to be in its service, to be an instrument of this -art of healing—that is to say, to be a priest, is to be rendered -distinguished, reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have been -the Author of this supreme art of healing; redemption is only possible -as a revelation, as an act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the -Creator Himself.</p> - -<p>Proposition I.: Spiritual healthiness is regarded as morbid, and -creates suspicion....</p> - -<p>Proposition II.: The prerequisites of a strong, exuberant life—strong -desires and passions—are reckoned as objections against strong and -exuberant life.</p> - -<p>Proposition III.: Everything which threatens danger to man, and which -can overcome and ruin him, is evil—and should be torn root and branch -from his soul.</p> - -<p>Proposition IV.: Man converted into a weak creature, inoffensive to -himself and others, crushed by humility and modesty, and conscious of -his weakness,—in fact, the "sinner,"—this is the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span>desirable type, and -one which one can <i>produce</i> by means of a little spiritual surgery....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">249.</p> - -<p>What is it I protest against? That people should regard this paltry and -peaceful mediocrity, this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing -of the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength, as something -high, or possibly as the standard of all things.</p> - -<p><i>Bacon of Verulam</i> says: <i>Infimarum virtutum apud vulgus laus est, -mediarum admiratio, supremarum sensus nullus.</i> Christianity as a -religion, however, belongs to the <i>vulgus</i>: it has no feeling for the -highest kind of <i>virtus</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">250.</p> - -<p>Let us see what the "genuine Christian" does of all the things which -his instincts forbid him to do:—he covers beauty, pride, riches, -self-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion and -<i>mud</i>—in short, <i>all culture</i>: his object is to deprive the latter of -its <i>clean conscience.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">251.</p> - -<p>The attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto, have been not only timid -but false. So long as Christian morality was not felt to be a <i>capital -crime against Life,</i> its <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span>apologists had a good time. The question -concerning the mere "truth" of Christianity—whether in regard to the -existence of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin, not to -speak of its astronomy and natural science—is quite beside the point -so long as no inquiry is made into the value of Christian <i>morality.</i> -Are Christian morals <i>worth anything,</i> or are they a profanation and an -outrage, despite all the arts of holiness and seduction with which they -are enforced? The question concerning the truth of the religion may be -met by all sorts of subterfuges; and the most fervent believers can, -in the end, avail themselves of the logic used by their opponents, in -order to create a right for their side to assert that certain things -are irrefutable—that is to say, they <i>transcend</i> the means employed -to refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is called "Kantian -Criticism").</p> - - -<p class="parnum">252.</p> - -<p>Christianity should never be forgiven for having ruined such men as -Pascal. This is precisely what should be combated in Christianity, -namely, that it has the will to break the spirit of the strongest -and noblest natures. One should take no rest until this thing is -utterly destroyed:—the ideal of mankind which Christianity advances, -the demands it makes upon men, and its "Nay" and "Yea" relative to -humanity. The whole of the remaining absurdities, that is to say, -Christian fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and principles, -and Christian theology, do not concern us; they might be a thousand -times more absurd <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span>and we should not raise a finger to destroy them. -But what we do stand up against, is that ideal which, thanks to its -morbid beauty and feminine seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and -slanderous eloquence, appeals to all the cowardices and vanities of -wearied souls,—and the strongest have their moments of fatigue,—as -though all that which seems most useful and desirable at such -moments—that is to say, confidence, artlessness, modesty, patience, -love of one's like, resignation, submission to God, and a sort of -self-surrender—were useful and desirable <i>per se</i>; as though the puny, -modest abortion which in these creatures takes the place of a soul, -this virtuous, mediocre animal and sheep of the flock—which deigns to -call itself man, were not only to take precedence of the stronger, more -evil, more passionate, more defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who -by virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a hundred times more -dangers than the former, but were actually to stand as an ideal for man -in general, as a goal, a measure—the highest desideratum. The creation -of <i>this</i> ideal was the most appalling temptation that had ever -been put in the way of mankind; for, with it, the stronger and more -successful exceptions, the lucky cases among men, in which the will -to power and to growth leads the whole species "man" one step farther -forward, this type was threatened with disaster. By means of the values -of this ideal, the growth of such higher men would be checked at the -root. For these men, owing to their superior demands and duties, -readily accept a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span>more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is a -case of an increase in the costs of the undertaking coinciding with -a greater chance of failure). What is it we combat in Christianity? -That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at -exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting -their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it -knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with -disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, -against themselves—until the strong perish through their excessive -self-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome way of perishing, of -which <i>Pascal</i> is the most famous example.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span></p> -<h4>II.</h4> - - -<p class="title2">A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.</p> - -<hr /> -<p class="title">1. The Origin of Moral Valuations.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">253.</p> - -<p>This is an attempt at investigating morality without being affected by -its charm, and not without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling -beauty of its attitudes and looks. A world which we can admire, which -is in keeping with our capacity for worship—which is continually -<i>demonstrating</i> itself—in small things or in large: this is the -Christian standpoint which is common to us all.</p> - -<p>But owing to an increase in our astuteness, in our mistrust, and in our -scientific spirit (also through a more developed instinct for truth, -which again is due to Christian influence), this interpretation has -grown ever less and less tenable for us.</p> - -<p>The craftiest of subterfuges: Kantian criticism. The intellect not -only denies itself every right to interpret things in that way, but -also to reject the interpretation once it has been made. People are -satisfied with a <i>greater</i> demand upon their credulity and faith, with -a renunciation of all <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span>right to reason concerning the proof of their -creed, with an intangible and superior "Ideal" (God) as a stop-gap.</p> - -<p>The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece -of romanticism and reaction, and at the same time a symptom of -the historical sense of a new <i>power</i>: "Spirit" itself is the -"self-revealing and self-realising ideal": we believe that in the -"process of, development" an ever greater proportion of this ideal is -being manifested—thus the ideal is being realised, faith is vested in -the <i>future</i> into which all its noble needs are projected and in which -they are being worshipped.</p> - -<p>In short:—</p> - -<p>(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be demonstrated by us (the -concealed meaning behind the whole of the epistemological movement);</p> - -<p>(2) God may be demonstrated, but as something evolving, and we are -part of it, as our pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed -meaning behind the historical movement).</p> - -<p>It should be observed that criticism is <i>never</i> levelled at the ideal -itself, but only at the problem which gives rise to a controversy -concerning the ideal—that is to say, why it has not yet been realised, -or why it is not demonstrable in small things as in great.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>It makes all the difference: whether a man recognises this state of -distress as such owing to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span>a passion or to a yearning in himself, or -whether it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by -straining his thinking powers and his historical imagination to the -utmost.</p> - -<p>Away from the religious and philosophical points of view we find the -same phenomena. Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises -the origin of moral valuations, though it believes in them just as -much as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could -remain when the sanctioning <i>deity</i> is no longer present! The belief in -a "Beyond" is absolutely necessary, if the faith in morality is to be -maintained.)</p> - -<p><i>Fundamental problem</i>: whence comes this almighty power of <i>Faith? -Whence this faith in morality?</i> (It is betrayed by the fact that even -the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of -it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. "Self-preservation": -the Darwinian prospect of a reconciliation of the altruistic and -egotistic principles.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">254.</p> - -<p>An inquiry into the <i>origin of our moral valuations</i> and tables of -law has absolutely nothing to do with the <i>criticism</i> of them, though -people persist in believing it has; the two matters lie quite apart, -notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge of the <i>pudenda origo</i> -of a valuation does diminish its prestige, and prepares the way to a -critical attitude and spirit towards it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> -What is the actual worth of our valuations and tables of moral laws? -<i>What is the outcome of their dominion?</i> For whom? In relation to -what?—answer: for Life. But <i>what is Life?</i> A new and more definite -concept of what "Life" is, becomes necessary here. My formula of this -concept is: Life is Will to Power.</p> - -<p><i>What is the meaning of the very act of valuing?</i> Does it point back to -another, metaphysical world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed, -who lived in a period which <i>preceded</i> the great historical movement.) -In short: <i>what is its origin?</i> Or had it no human "origin"?—Answer: -moral valuations are a sort of explanation, they constitute a method -of interpreting. Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite -physiological conditions, as also of a definite spiritual level of -ruling judgments. <i>What is it that interprets?</i>—Our passions.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">255.</p> - -<p>All virtues should be looked upon as physiological <i>conditions</i>: the -principal organic functions, more particularly, should be considered -necessary and good. All virtues are really refined <i>passions</i> and -elevated physiological conditions.</p> - -<p>Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the developments of -sexual relations,—justice as the development of the passion for -revenge,—virtue as the love of resistance, the will to power,—honour -as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of an equally powerful, force.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">256.</p> - -<p>Under "Morality" I understand a system of valuations which is in -relation with the conditions of a creature's life.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">257.</p> - -<p>Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye shall know them by -their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and -from it I learn the <i>Soil</i> out of which it grew."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">258.</p> - -<p>I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a -language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity -or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of -preservation and growth, are betrayed—a mode of interpretation equal -in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar -to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for -instance, youth or decay, etc.).</p> - -<p>Applying this principle to the morality of Christian Europe more -particularly, we find that our moral values are signs of decline, of a -disbelief in <i>Life,</i> and of a preparation for pessimism.</p> - -<p>My leading doctrine is this: <i>there are no moral phenomena, but only a -moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation -itself lies beyond the pale of morality.</i></p> - -<p>What is the meaning of the fact that we have <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span>imagined a -<i>contradiction</i> in existence? This is of paramount importance: behind -all other valuations those moral valuations stand commandingly. -Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then -measure? And then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc.???</p> - - -<p class="parnum">259.</p> - -<p>A point of view: in all valuations there is a definite purpose: -the <i>preservation</i> of an individual, a community, a race, a state, -a church, a belief, or a culture.—Thanks to the fact that people -<i>forget</i> that all valuing has a purpose, one and the same man may swarm -with a host of contradictory valuations, and <i>therefore with a host of -contradictory impulses.</i> This is the <i>expression of disease in man</i> as -opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer -certain definite purposes.</p> - -<p>This creature full of contradictions, however, has in his being a grand -method of acquiring knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates -himself <i>to Justice</i>—that is to say, to the ascertaining of principles -<i>beyond the valuations good and evil.</i></p> - -<p>The wisest man would thus be the <i>richest in contradictions,</i> he would -also be gifted with mental antennæ wherewith he could understand all -kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all -the chords in his being would ring in <i>splendid unison</i>—the rarest of -<i>accidents</i> even in us! A sort of planetary movement.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">260.</p> - -<p>"To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves -a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm, -"pleasant or painful," their basis?</p> - -<p>But in an incalculable number of cases we first of all <i>make</i> a thing -painful, by investing it with a valuation.</p> - -<p>The compass of moral valuations: they play a part in almost every -mental impression. To us the world is <i>coloured</i> by them.</p> - -<p>We have imagined the purpose and value of all things: owing to this -we possess an enormous fund of <i>latent power,</i> but the study of -<i>comparative</i> values teaches us that values which were actually opposed -to each other have been held in high esteem, and that there have been -<i>many</i> tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth -anything <i>per se</i>).</p> - -<p>The analysis of individual tables of laws revealed the fact that they -were framed (often very badly) as the <i>conditions of existence</i> for -limited groups of people, to ensure their maintenance.</p> - -<p>Upon examining modern men, we found that there are a large number -of <i>very different</i> values to hand, and that they no longer contain -any creative power—the fundamental principle: "the condition of -existence" is now quite divorced from the moral values. It is much -more superfluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an <i>arbitrary</i> -matter. Chaos.</p> - -<p>Who creates <i>the goal</i> which stands above mankind <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span>kind and above the -individual? Formerly morality was a <i>preservative</i> measure: but nobody -wants to <i>preserve</i> any longer, there is nothing to preserve. Thus we -are reduced to an <i>experimental morality,</i> each must <i>postulate</i> a goal -for himself.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">261.</p> - -<p>What is the <i>criterion</i> of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness, -(2) its universal acceptation, etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races -must be studied and observed, and, in each case, the criterion must be -discovered, as also the thing it expresses: a belief such as: "This -particular attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of -our existence." Immoral means "that which brings about ruin." Now all -societies in which these principles were discovered have met with their -ruin: a few of these principles have been used and used again, because -every newly established community required them; this was the case, for -instance, with "Thou shalt not steal." In ages when people could not be -expected to show any marked social instinct (as, for instance, in the -age of the Roman Empire) the latter was, religiously speaking, directed -towards the idea of "spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical -parlance, towards "the greatest happiness." For even the philosophers -of Greece did not feel any more for their πολις.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">262.</p> - -<p><i>The necessity of false values.</i>—A judgment may be refuted when it is -shown that it was <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span>conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is -not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than -they can alter astigmatism in a man's eyes.</p> - -<p>The need of their <i>existence</i> must be understood: they are the <i>result</i> -of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">263.</p> - -<p>To <i>see</i> and <i>reveal</i> the problem of morality seems to me to be the new -task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by -moral philosophies heretofore.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">264.</p> - -<p>How false and deceptive men have always been concerning the fundamental -facts of their inner world! Here to have no eye; here to hold one's -tongue, and here to open one's mouth.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">265.</p> - -<p>There seems to be no knowledge or consciousness of the many -<i>revolutions</i> that have taken place in moral judgments, and of -the number of times that "evil" has really and seriously been -christened "good" and <i>vice versa.</i> I myself pointed to one of these -transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte."<a name="FNanchor_3_10" id="FNanchor_3_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_10" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Even -conscience <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span>has changed its sphere: formerly there was such a thing as -a gregarious pang of conscience.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_10" id="Footnote_3_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_10"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The morality of custom.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">266.</p> - -<p>A. <i>Morality</i> as the work of <i>Immorality.</i></p> - -<p>1. In order that moral values may attain to <i>supremacy,</i> a host of -immoral forces and passions must assist them.</p> - -<p>2. The establishment of moral values is the work of immoral passions -and considerations.</p> - -<p>B. <i>Morality as the work of error.</i></p> - -<p>C. <i>Morality gradually contradicts itself.</i> Requital—Truthfulness, -Doubt, έποχή, Judging. The "Immorality" of <i>belief</i> in morality.</p> - -<p>The steps:—</p> - -<p>1. Absolute dominion of morality: all biological phenomena measured and -<i>judged</i> according to its values.</p> - -<p>2. The attempt to identify Life with morality (symptom of awakened -scepticism: morality must no longer be regarded as the opposite of -Life); many means are sought—even a transcendental one.</p> - -<p>3. The <i>opposition of Life</i> and <i>Morality.</i> Morality condemned and -sentenced by Life.</p> - -<p>D. To what extent was morality <i>dangerous</i> to Life?</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> It depreciated the joy of living and the gratitude felt towards -Life, etc.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> -<i>(b)</i> It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> It checked the knowledge of Life.</p> - -<p><i>(d)</i> It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the -highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.</p> - -<p>E. Contra-account: the <i>usefulness</i> of morality to Life.</p> - -<p>(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it -may be a process of uniting dispersed members: it is useful as an agent -in the production of the man who is a "<i>tool</i>."</p> - -<p>(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger -threatening man from the direction of his passions: it is useful to -"<i>mediocre people</i>."</p> - -<p>(3) Morality may be a preservative measure resisting the life-poisoning -influences of profound sorrow and bitterness: it is useful to the -"<i>sufferers</i>."</p> - -<p>(4) Morality may be a preservative measure opposed to the terrible -outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "<i>lowly</i>."</p> - -<p class="parnum">267.</p> - -<p>It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and -"wrong" in a definite, narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance -in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one";<a name="FNanchor_4_11" id="FNanchor_4_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_11" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>—that is to say, to -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span>do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit -of which a community exists.—Let us not think meanly of what a few -thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_11" id="Footnote_4_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_11"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand."</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">268.</p> - -<p>Two types of morality must not be confounded: the morality with which -the instinct that has remained healthy defends itself from incipient -decadence, and the other morality by means of which this decadence -asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.</p> - -<p>The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyrannical <i>(Stoicism</i> itself -was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the -other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it has the women and -"beautiful feelings" on its side (Primitive Christianity was an example -of this morality).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">269.</p> - -<p>I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a -phenomenon—also as a <i>riddle.</i> Moral phenomena have preoccupied me -like riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question: -why <i>should</i> my neighbour's welfare be of greater value to me than -my own? and why is it that my neighbour himself <i>should</i> value his -welfare differently from the way in which <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span>I value it—that is to say, -why should precisely <i>my</i> welfare be paramount in his mind? What is -the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by -philosophers themselves?</p> - -<p>The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs -for a fellow-creature, higher than the one he performs for himself, -and that the same fellow-creature should do so too (that only those -acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to -the neighbour and for his welfare) has its reasons—namely, as the -result of the social instinct which rests upon the valuation, that -single individuals are of little importance although collectively -their importance is very great. This, of course, presupposes that they -constitute a <i>community</i> with one feeling and one conscience pervading -the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for keeping one's eyes in -a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a -view of one's self impossible.</p> - -<p>My idea: goals are wanting, and <i>these must be individuals.</i> We see the -general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool. -Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets—is not every one he sees -a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">270.</p> - -<p>How is it possible that a man can respect himself <i>only</i> in regard -to moral values, that he <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span>subordinates and despises everything in -favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation, etc.? as, -for instance, Henri Fréd. Amiel. What is the meaning of the <i>moral -idiosyncrasy</i>?—I mean this both in the psychological and physiological -sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which -<i>other</i> great qualities are not wanting; and even in the case of -Schopenhauer, who obviously valued what he did not and <i>could</i> not have -...—is it not the result of a merely mechanical <i>moral interpretation</i> -of real states of pain and displeasure? is it not a particular form -of <i>sensibility</i> which does <i>not</i> happen to <i>understand</i> the cause -of its many unpleasurable feelings, but <i>thinks to explain them with -moral hypotheses?</i> In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and -<i>strength</i> always appears under the optics of a "clean conscience," -flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness -of salvation.... Thus the <i>moral idiosyncratist</i> has (1) <i>either</i> -acquired his real worth in approximating to the virtuous type of -society: "the good fellow," "<i>the upright man</i>"—a sort of medium -state of high respectability: <i>mediocre</i> in all his abilities, -but honest, conscientious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his -aspirations; (2) <i>or,</i> he imagines he has acquired that worth, simply -because he cannot otherwise understand all his states—he is unknown to -himself; he therefore interprets himself in this fashion.—Morality is -the only <i>scheme of interpretation</i> by means of which this type of man -can tolerate himself:—is it a form of vanity?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">271.</p> - -<p><i>The predominance of moral values.</i>—The consequence of this -predominance: the corruption of psychology, etc.; the fatality which -is associated with it everywhere. What is the <i>meaning</i> of this -predominance? What does it point to?</p> - -<p>To a certain <i>greater urgency</i> of saying nay or yea definitely in -this domain. All sorts of <i>imperatives</i> have been used in order to -make moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed:—they have -been enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear -to be instinctive, like inner commands. They are the expression of -<i>society's preservative measures,</i> for they are felt to be almost -<i>beyond question.</i> The practice—that is to say, the <i>utility</i> of being -agreed concerning superior values, has attained in this respect to -a sort of sanction. We observe that every care is taken to paralyse -reflection and criticism in this department—look at Kant's attitude! -not to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to prosecute -"research" in these matters.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">272.</p> - -<p><i>My desire</i> is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and -to ascribe to moral differentiations but the value of <i>perspective</i>; to -show that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same -as that which is immoral, and was only <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span>made possible, according to -the law of all moral development—that is to say, by means of immoral -artifices and with a view to immoral ends—just as all that which -has been decried as immoral is, from the standpoint of economics, -both superior and essential; and how development leading to a greater -abundance of life necessarily Involves <i>progress</i> in the realm <i>of -immorality</i>. "Truth," that is the extent to which we <i>allow</i> ourselves -to comprehend <i>this</i> fact.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">273.</p> - -<p>But do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we require a great deal of -morality, in order to be immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a -parable:—</p> - -<p>A physiologist interested in a certain illness, and an invalid who -wishes to be cured of that same illness, have not the same interests. -Let us suppose that the illness happens to be morality,—for morality -is an illness,—and that we Europeans are the invalid: what an amount -of subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans -were, at once, our own inquisitive spectators and the physiologist -above-mentioned! Should we under these circumstances earnestly desire -to rid ourselves of morality? Should we want to? This is of course -irrespective of the question whether we should be <i>able</i> to do -so—whether we can be <i>cured</i> at all?</p> - - - -<hr /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span></p> -<p class="title">2. The Herd.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">274.</p> - -<p><i>Whose will to power is morality?</i>—The <i>common factor</i> of all European -history since the time of <i>Socrates</i> is the attempt to make the <i>moral -values</i> dominate all other values, in order that they should not be -only the leader and judge of life, but also: (1) knowledge, (2) Art, -(3) political and social aspirations. "Amelioration" regarded as the -only duty, everything else used as a <i>means</i> thereto (or as a force -distributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore -to be opposed and annihilated ...).—A similar movement to be observed -<i>in China</i> and <i>India.</i></p> - -<p>What is the meaning of this <i>will to power on the part of moral -values,</i> which has played such a part in the world's prodigious -evolutions?</p> - -<p><i>Answer:—Three powers lie concealed behind it</i>; (1) The instinct -of the <i>herd</i> opposed to the strong and the independent; (2) the -instinct of all <i>sufferers</i> and all <i>abortions</i> opposed to the happy -and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the mediocre opposed to -the exceptions.—<i>Enormous advantage of this movement,</i> despite the -cruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped it along -(for the history of the <i>struggle of morality with the fundamental -instincts of life</i> is in itself the greatest piece of immorality that -has ever yet been witnessed on earth ...).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">275.</p> - - -<p>The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which -constitutes our daily life, and to which we have become accustomed -throughout the ages—our eye does not seem focussed for such things: -at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is -concerned.</p> - -<p>"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows"; he who thinks -in this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself.</p> - -<p>"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the sexual impulse, cannot fathom -itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts -are—on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge!</p> - -<p>The problem of "equality," in the face of the fact that we all thirst -for distinction: here, on the contrary, we should demand of ourselves -what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and obviously insane; -but—it is felt to be holy and of a higher order. The fact that it is -opposed to common sense is not even noticed.</p> - -<p>Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as -are also the attempt to obey morality implicitly, and the belief that -one should be every one's equal in its presence.</p> - -<p>The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be -distinguished, as are also the complete renunciation of individual -valuations and the severe exaction from every one of the same -sacrifice. "The value of an action is once <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span>and for all <i>fixed</i>: every -individual must submit to this valuation."</p> - -<p>We see: an authority speaks—who speaks?—We must condone it in human -pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for -he wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of it. -Thus—God speaks!</p> - -<p>God was necessary as an unconditional sanction which has no superior, -as a "Categorical Imperator": or, in so far as people believed in the -authority of reason, what was needed was a "unitarian metaphysics" by -means of which this view could be made logical.</p> - -<p>Now, admitting that faith in God is dead: the question arises once -more: "who speaks?" My answer, which I take from biology and not from -metaphysics, is: "the <i>gregarious instinct speaks.</i>" This is what -desires to be master: hence its "thou shalt!"—it will allow the -individual to exist only as a part of a whole, only in favour of the -whole, it hates those who detach themselves from everything—it turns -the hatred of all individuals against him.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">276.</p> - -<p>The whole of the morality of Europe is based upon the values <i>which -are useful to the herd</i>: the sorrow of all higher and exceptional men -is explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from -others reaches their consciousness in the form of a feeling of their -own smallness and egregiousness. It is the <i>virtues</i> of modern men -which are the causes of pessimistic <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span>gloominess; the mediocre, like the -herd, are not troubled much with questions or with conscience—they -are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are -noted examples.)</p> - -<p><i>The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it -is condemned.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">277.</p> - -<p>The morality of <i>truthfulness</i> in the herd. "Thou shalt be -recognisable, thou shalt express thy inner nature by means of clear -and constant signs—otherwise thou art dangerous: and supposing -thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst -thing for the herd. We despise the secretive and those whom we -cannot identify.—<i>Consequently</i> thou must regard thyself as -recognisable, thou mayest not remain <i>concealed</i> from thyself, thou -mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever <i>changing</i>." -Thus, the insistence upon truthfulness has as its main object the -<i>recognisability</i> and the <i>stability</i> of the individual. As a matter -of fact, it is the object of education to make each gregarious -unit believe in a certain <i>definite dogma</i> concerning the nature -of man: education <i>first creates this dogma</i> and thereupon exacts -"truthfulness."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">278.</p> - -<p>Within the confines of a herd or of a community—that is to say, <i>inter -pares,</i> the <i>over-estimation</i> of truthfulness is very reasonable. A -man <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span>must not allow himself to be deceived—and <i>consequently</i> he -adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one!—a -sort of mutual obligation among equals! In his dealings with the -outside world caution and danger demand that he should <i>be on his guard -against deception</i>: the first psychological condition of this attitude -would mean that he is also on his guard against <i>his own people.</i> -Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">279.</p> - -<p><i>A criticism of the virtues of the herd.</i>—Inertia is active: (1) -In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and -observation necessary. (2) In veneration, where the gulf that -separates power is great and submission necessary: then, so that -fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while -the difference in power is interpreted as a difference of value: -and thus the relationship to the powerful <i>no longer has anything -revolting in it.</i> (3) In the sense of truth. What is truth? Truth -is that explanation of things which causes us the smallest amount -of mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely fatiguing). -(4) In sympathy. It is a relief to know one's self on the same level -with all, to feel as all feel, and to <i>accept</i> a belief which is -already current; it is something passive beside the activity which -appropriates and continually carries into practice the most individual -rights of valuation (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> -impartiality and coolness of judgment: people scout the strain of being -moved, and prefer to be detached and "objective." (6) In uprightness: -people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to <i>create</i> -a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of -commanding—it is better to submit than to rebel. (7) In toleration: -the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">280.</p> - -<p>The instinct of the herd values the <i>juste milieu</i> and the <i>average</i> -as the highest and most precious of all things: the spot where the -majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In this -way it is the opponent of all order of rank; it regards a climb from -the level to the heights in the same light as a descent from the -majority to the minority. The herd regards the <i>exception,</i> whether -it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is -antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with -the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the -fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsmen, and -watchmen—in fact, to become their <i>head-servants</i>: thus they convert -a danger into a thing which is useful. In the middle, fear ceases: -here a man is alone with nothing; here there is not much room even for -misunderstandings; here there is equality; here a man's individual -existence is not felt as a reproach, but as the <i>right</i> existence; -here <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span>contentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only towards the -exceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">281.</p> - - - -<p>If, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain -regulations for, ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of -course, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of "existence," nor -a certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and -development of this "existence" and "attitude of mind." But then the -idealist of virtue, the <i>moralist,</i> comes along and says: "God sees -into the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain -acts: ye are not any better on that account!" Answer: Mr. Longears -and Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite -satisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not <i>harm</i> -one another—and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take -a particular direction—that is to say, when they are against our -own interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same -actions are directed against the enemies of our community—against -you, for instance—we are at a loss to know how to pay them sufficient -honour. We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the -fullest extent. Did we share that "god-fearing" radicalism which your -holy craziness recommends, if we were green-horns enough to condemn -the source of those forbidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and the -"attitude of mind" which recommends them, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span>that would mean condemning -our very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite—an attitude -of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By -our decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and -venting itself in a useless way—we are prudent when we prescribe -such laws for ourselves; we are also <i>moral</i> in so doing.... Have -you no idea—however vague—what sacrifices it has cost us, how much -self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to -exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even -feel as if we could devour each other.... But the "communal spirit" is -master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of -morality?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">282.</p> - -<p><i>The weakness of the gregarious animal</i> gives rise to a morality -which is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the -decadent man: they understand each other; they <i>associate</i> with each -other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of -the herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid -characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is -incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a "leader"—the -priests understand this.... The state is not subtle, not secret -enough; the art of "directing consciences" slips its grasp. How is the -gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">283.</p> - -<p><i>The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit</i>: -the revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the -proud, and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of -pride, of happiness: "There is no such thing as merit," "The danger is -enormous: it is right that one <i>should</i> tremble and feel ill at ease," -"Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural—even -'reason'" (all that is antinatural is elevated to the highest place).</p> - -<p>It is again the <i>priests</i> who exploit this condition, and who win the -"people" over to themselves. "The sinner" over whom there is more joy -in heaven than over "the just person." This is the struggle against -"paganism" (the pang of conscience, a measure for disturbing the -harmony of the soul).</p> - -<p><i>The hatred of the mediocre</i> for the <i>exceptions,</i> and of the herd for -its independent members. (Custom actually regarded as "morality.") The -revulsion of feeling <i>against</i> "egotism": that only is worth anything -which is done "for another." "We are all equal";—against the love of -dominion, against "dominion" in general;—against privilege;—against -sectarians, free-spirits, and sceptics;—against philosophy (a -force opposing mechanical and automatic instincts); in philosophers -themselves—"the categorical imperative," the essential nature of -morality, "general and universal."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">284.</p> - -<p>The qualities and tendencies which are <i>praised</i>: peacefulness, equity, -moderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, -honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resignation, -pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, -generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, -good nature, industry.</p> - -<p>We must ascertain to what extent <i>such qualities</i> are conditioned -as means to the attainment of certain desires and <i>ends</i> (often an -"<i>evil</i>" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance, -<i>intellectuality</i>): or as the expressions of certain states of -need—that is to say, as <i>preservative measures</i> (as in the case of -citizens, slaves, women, etc.).</p> - -<p>In short, every one of them is not <i>considered "good" for its own -sake,</i> but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed -either by "society" or by the "herd," as a means to the ends of the -latter, as necessary for their preservation and enhancement, and also -as the result of an actual <i>gregarious instinct</i> in the individual; -these qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is -<i>fundamentally different</i> from these <i>states of virtue.</i> For the herd -is <i>antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless</i> to the outside world; it is -full of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.</p> - -<p>In the "herdsman" this <i>antagonism</i> comes to the <i>fore</i> he must have -qualities which are <i>the reverse of</i> those possessed by the herd.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> -The mortal enmity of the herd towards all <i>order of rank</i>: its -instinct is in favour of the <i>leveller</i> (Christ). Towards all <i>strong -individuals (the sovereigns)</i> it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, -arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, -deceitful, envious, revengeful.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">285.</p> - -<p>My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one -type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides—that is to say, -against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and -against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the -herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They -have no creative power.</p> - -<p>The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the just -man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the -great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal -security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies -the gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment -on the part of the "comfortable" ones rigs itself out in the most -beautiful words—and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe, -however, the <i>hatred of the herd</i> for all truthful men.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">286.</p> - -<p>Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the moral -imperative in his <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span>breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he -shows thereby that he belongs to the <i>herd.</i> When a man is conscious -of the opposite feelings,—that is to say, when he sees his danger and -his undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions,—then he does not -belong to the herd.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">287.</p> - -<p>My philosophy aims at a new <i>order of rank: not</i> at an individualistic -morality.<a name="FNanchor_5_12" id="FNanchor_5_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_12" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd—but -not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally -different valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones -or the beasts of prey, etc.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_12" id="Footnote_5_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_12"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <span style="font-size: 0.9em;"> TRANSLATOR'S NOTE</span>—Here is a broad distinction between -Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<p class="title">3. General Observations Concerning Morality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">288.</p> - -<p><i>Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing human pride.</i>—The -"Free-Will" theory is anti-religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow -the right upon man to regard himself as the <i>cause</i> of his highest -states and actions: it is a form of the growing <i>feeling of pride.</i></p> - -<p>Man feels his power his "happiness"; as they say: there must be a will -behind these states<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span>—otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is -an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the -necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness: -if the will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, -a sensation of power may be interpreted as its result. This is a -<i>merely psychological point of view,</i> based upon the false assumption -that nothing belongs to us which we have not consciously willed. The -whole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous -psychological rule that the will is the only cause, and that one must -have been aware of having willed in order to be able to regard <i>one's -self</i> as a cause.</p> - -<p><i>Then comes the counter-movement</i>—that of the moral-philosophers. -These men still labour under the delusion that a man is responsible -only for what he has willed. The value of man is then made a <i>moral -value</i>: thus morality becomes a <i>causa prima</i>; for this there must be -some kind of principle in man, and "free will" is posited as <i>prima -causa.</i> The <i>arrière pensée</i> is always this: If man is not a <i>causa -prima</i> through his will, he must be irresponsible,—therefore he -does not come within the jurisdiction of morals,—virtue or vice is -automatic and mechanical....</p> - -<p>In short: in order that man may respect himself he must be capable of -becoming evil.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">289.</p> - -<p><i>Theatricalness</i> regarded as the result of "Free Will" morality. It -is a step in the <i>development <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span>of the feeling of power itself</i> to -believe one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's -perfection) and to have <i>willed</i> them....</p> - -<p>(Criticism: all perfect action is precisely unconscious and not -deliberate; consciousness is often the expression of an imperfect -and often morbid constitution. <i>Personal perfection regarded as -determined by will, as an act of consciousness,</i> as reason with -dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-contradiction.... Any -degree of consciousness renders perfection <i>impossible.</i> ... A form of -<i>theatricalness</i>.)</p> - - - -<p class="parnum">290.</p> - -<p>The <i>moral hypothesis,</i> designed with a view to <i>justifying God,</i> -said: evil must be voluntary (simply in order that the <i>voluntariness -of goodness</i> might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering -have an <i>object which is salvation</i>.</p> - -<p>The notion "guilt" was considered as something which had no -connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the -notion "punishment" was held to be an educating and beneficent act, -consequently an act proceeding from a <i>good</i> God.</p> - -<p>The absolute dominion of moral valuations <i>over</i> all others: nobody -doubted that God could not be evil and could do no harm—that is to -say, perfection was understood merely as <i>moral</i> perfection.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">291.</p> - -<p>How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has -preceded it in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span>consciousness! And morality has been measured in the -light of this supposition, as also criminality....</p> - -<p>The value of an action must be judged by its results, say the -utilitarians: to measure it according to its origin involves the -impossibility of <i>knowing</i> that origin.</p> - -<p>But do we know its results? Five stages ahead, perhaps. Who can tell -what an action provokes and sets in motion? As a stimulus? As the spark -which fires a powder-magazine? Utilitarians are simpletons.... And -finally, they would first of all have to know <i>what</i> is useful; here -also their sight can travel only over five stages or so.... They have -no notion of the great economy which cannot dispense with evil.</p> - -<p>We do not know the origin or the results: has an action, then, any -value?</p> - -<p>We have yet the action itself to consider: the states of consciousness -that accompany it, the yea or nay which follows upon its performance: -does the value of an action lie in the subjective states which -accompany it? (In that case, the value of music would be measured -according to the pleasure or displeasure which it occasions in us ... -which it gives to the <i>composer.</i> ...) Obviously feelings of value -must accompany it, a sensation of power, restraint, or impotence—for -instance, freedom or lightsomeness. Or, putting the question -differently: could the value of an action be reduced to physiological -terms? could it be the expression of completely free or constrained -life?—Maybe its <i>biological</i> value is expressed in this way....</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> -If, then, an action can be judged neither in the light of its origin, -nor its results, nor its accompaniments in consciousness, then its -value must be <i>x</i> unknown....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">292.</p> - -<p>It amounts to a <i>denaturalisation of morality,</i> to <i>separate</i> an action -from a man; to direct hatred or contempt against "sin"; to believe that -there are actions which are good or bad in themselves.</p> - -<p>The <i>re-establishment of</i> "<i>Nature</i>": an action in itself is quite -devoid of value; the whole question is this: who performed it? One and -the same "crime" may, in one case, be the greatest privilege, in the -other infamy. As a matter of fact, it is the selfishness of the judges -which interprets an action (in regard to its author) according as to -whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or in relation to its -degree of likeness or unlikeness to them).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">293.</p> - -<p>The concept "reprehensible action" presents us with some difficulties. -Nothing in all that happens can be reprehensible in itself: <i>one would -not dare to eliminate it completely</i>; for everything is so bound up -with everything else, that to exclude one part would mean to exclude -the whole.</p> - -<p>A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a reprehensible world as -a whole....</p> - -<p>And even then, in a reprehensible world even reprehending would be -reprehensible.... And the consequence of an attitude of mind that -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> -condemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in -practice.... If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part -of it is of equal value, is eternal and necessary.—In all correlations -of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that -is expressed is a certain point of view, peculiar to the interests of -a certain type of living organism: everything that lives says <i>yea</i> by -the very fact of its existence.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">294.</p> - -<p><i>Criticism of the subjective feelings of value.—</i>Conscience. Formerly -people argued: conscience condemns this action, therefore this action -is reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience condemns an -action because that action has been condemned for a long period of -time: all conscience does is to imitate. It does not create values. -That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was -<i>not</i> conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) -its consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the feeling of -well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the -artist's joy over his work—it proves nothing.... Self-contentment -proves no more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than its -absence can prove anything against the value of the thing which fails -to give rise to it. We are far too ignorant to be able to judge of the -value of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability to regard -things objectively. Even when we condemn an action, we do not do so -as judges, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span>but as adversaries.... When noble sentiments accompany an -action, they prove nothing in its favour: an artist may present us -with an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of -the most exalted pathos during its production. It were wiser to regard -these sentiments as misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our -power, away from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, and the -result often is that we make <i>fools</i> of ourselves ... they actually -make fools of us.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">295.</p> - -<p>We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two -thousand years: in these two practices lie perhaps our longest efforts -at becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we have -affiliated natural propensities with a heavy conscience.</p> - -<p>An attempt to produce an entirely opposite state of affairs would be -possible: that is to say, to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all -sympathy with things which are opposed to the senses, the intellect, -and nature—in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which -were all anti-worldly), with a heavy conscience.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">296.</p> - -<p>The great <i>crimes</i> in <i>psychology</i>:—</p> - -<p>(1) That all <i>pain</i> and <i>unhappiness</i> should have been falsified by -being associated with what is wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of -its innocence.)</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> -(2) That all <i>strong emotions</i> (wantonness, voluptuousness, triumph, -pride, audacity, knowledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were -branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.</p> - -<p>(3) That <i>feelings of weakness,</i> inner acts of cowardice, lack of -personal courage, should have decked themselves in the most beautiful -words, and have been taught as desirable in the highest degree.</p> - -<p>(4) That <i>greatness</i> in man should have been given the meaning of -disinterestedness, self-sacrifice for another's good, for other people; -that even in the scientist and the artist, the <i>elimination of the -individual personality</i> is presented as the cause of the greatest -knowledge and ability.</p> - -<p>(5) That <i>love</i> should have been twisted round to mean submission -(and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or -of bestowal, resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the -wealth of a given personality. Only the <i>wholest</i> people can love; the -disinterested ones, the "objective" ones, are the worst lovers (just -ask the girls!). This principle also applies to the love of God or of -the "home country": a man must be able to rely absolutely upon himself. -(Egotism may be regarded as the <i>pre-eminence of the ego,</i> altruism as -the <i>pre-eminence of others</i>.)</p> - -<p>(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of seduction); -the passions regarded as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless.</p> - -<p><i>The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,</i> a sort of -<i>barricade</i> built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the -botched and bungled, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span>the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of -it, against the <i>strong</i> (and finally <i>destroying</i> them in their growth -...); on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which these -classes are best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in honour -by them. Let anyone examine the Jewish priesthood.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">297.</p> - -<p><i>The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature</i> through moral -transcendence: The value of disinterestedness, the cult of altruism; -the belief in a reward in the play of natural consequences; the belief -in "goodness" and in genius itself, as if the one, like the other, -were the <i>result of disinterestedness</i>; the continuation of the -Church's sanction of the life of the citizen; the absolutely deliberate -misunderstanding of history (as a means of educating up to morality) -or pessimism in the attitude taken up towards history (the latter -is just as much a result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that -<i>pseudo-justification</i> of history, that refusal to see history as the -pessimist <i>sees</i> it).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">298.</p> - -<p>"<i>Morality for its own sake</i>"—this is an important step in the -denaturalisation of morals: in itself it appears as a final value. In -this phase religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for -instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise goes through a phase in -which it <i>separates itself from</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span>religion, and in which no God is -"moral" enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal.... This is -how the case stands at present.</p> - -<p>"<i>Art for Art's sake</i>": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by -this means a false contrast is lent to things—it culminates in the -slander of reality ("idealising" <i>into the hateful</i>). When an ideal -is severed from reality, the latter is debased, impoverished, and -calumniated. <i>"Beauty for Beauty's sake," "Truth for Truth's sake," -"Goodness for Goodness' sake"</i>—these are three forms of the evil eye -for reality.</p> - -<p><i>Art, knowledge, and morality</i> are <i>means</i>: instead of recognising a -life-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the -<i>opposite of Life</i>—with "<i>God</i>"—they have also been regarded as -revelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires through -them....</p> - -<p>"<i>Beautiful</i>" and "<i>ugly</i>," "<i>true</i>" and "<i>false</i>," "<i>good</i>" and -"<i>evil</i>"—these things are <i>distinctions</i> and <i>antagonisms</i> which -betray the preservative and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily -of man alone, but of all stable and enduring organisms which take up a -definite stand against their opponents. The <i>war</i> which thus ensues is -the essential factor: it is a means of <i>separating</i> things, <i>leading to -stronger</i> isolation....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">299.</p> - -<p><i>Moral naturalism</i>: The tracing back of apparently independent and -supernatural values to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span>their real "nature"—that is to say, to -<i>natural immorality,</i> to natural "utility," etc.</p> - -<p>Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these observations by the term -<i>moral naturalism</i>: my object is to re-translate the moral values which -have apparently become independent and <i>unnatural</i> into their real -nature—that is to say, into their natural "<i>immorality</i>."</p> - -<p><i>N.B.</i>—Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its natural basis. The case is -the same in regard to <i>the moral law which has been made sovereign,</i> -emancipated from its real <i>feature</i> (until it is almost the <i>opposite</i> -of Nature).</p> - -<p>The stages in the <i>denaturalisation of morality</i> (or so-called -"<i>Idealisation</i>"):—</p> - -<p>First it is a road to individual happiness,</p> - -<p>then it is the result of knowledge,</p> - -<p>then it is a Categorical Imperative,</p> - -<p>then it is a way to Salvation,</p> - -<p>then it is a denial of the will to live.</p> - -<p>(The gradual progress of the <i>hostility</i> of morality to <i>Life</i>.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">300.</p> - -<p>The suppressed and effaced <i>Heresy</i> in morality.—Concepts: paganism, -master-morality, <i>virtù</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">301.</p> - -<p><i>My problem</i>: What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as -also from its own morality? Intellectual harm, etc.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">302.</p> - -<p>Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to -which they alone have a right—as routinary values? Many species -of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to -disappear, nothing would be lacking on earth. A man should be enough of -a philosopher to admire even this "nothing" (<i>Nil admirari</i>).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">303.</p> - -<p>Man, a small species of very excitable animals, -which—fortunately—has its time. Life in general on earth is a -matter of a moment, an incident, an exception that has no consequence, -something which is of no importance whatever to the general character -of the earth; the earth itself is, like every star, a hiatus between -two nonentities, an event without a plan, without reason, will, or -self-consciousness—the worst kind of necessity—<i>foolish</i> necessity.... -Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity whispers -to our hearts, "All this must be false because it is revolting.... -Could not all this be appearance? And man in spite of all, to use -Kant's words"——</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">4. How Virtue Is Made to Dominate.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">304.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the ideal of the moralist.</i>—In this treatise we wish to -speak of the great <i>politics</i> of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span>virtue. We wrote it for the use of -all those who are interested, not so much in the process of becoming -virtuous as in that of making others virtuous—in how virtue <i>is made -to dominate.</i> I even intend to prove that in order to desire this -one thing—the dominion of virtue—the other must be systematically -avoided; that is to say, one must renounce all hopes of becoming -virtuous. This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a -sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even greater sacrifices!... -And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these, -indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to -be revealed for the first time in this treatise: that the <i>dominion of -virtue</i> is absolutely attainable <i>only by the use of the same means</i> -which are employed in the attainment of any other dominion, in any case -not <i>by</i> means of virtue itself....</p> - -<p>As I have already said, this treatise deals with the politics of -virtue: it postulates an ideal of these politics; it describes it as it -ought to be, if anything at all can be perfect on this earth. Now, no -philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is -in politics; it is, of course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism -which is <i>pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans -toute son âpreté,</i> is superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can -never be achieved by man—the most he can do is to approximate it. -Even in this narrower kind of politics—in the politics of virtue—the -ideal never seems to have been realised. Plato, too, only bordered -upon it. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span>Granted that one have eyes for concealed things, one can -discover, even in the most guileless and most conscious <i>moralists</i> -(and this is indeed the name of these moral politicians and of the -founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing that they too paid -their tribute to human weakness. <i>They all aspired</i> to virtue on their -own account—at least in their moments of weariness; and this is the -leading and most capital error on the part of any moralist—whose duty -it is to be an <i>immoralist in deeds.</i> That he must not exactly <i>appear -to be the latter,</i> is another matter. Or rather it is <i>not</i> another -matter: systematic self-denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: -dissimulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of, the moralist's -canon and of his self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain -to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from morality <i>and from -truth</i> when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for -the sake of making <i>morality dominate</i>—that is the canon. Moralists -are in need of the <i>attitudes of virtue,</i> as also of the attitudes of -truth; their error begins when they <i>yield</i> to virtue, when they lose -control of virtue, when they themselves become <i>moral</i> or <i>true.</i> A -great moralist is, among other things, necessarily a great actor; his -only danger is that his pose may unconsciously become a second nature, -just like his ideal, which is to keep his <i>esse</i> and his <i>operari</i> -apart in a divine way; everything he does must be done <i>sub specie -boni</i>—a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal! A <i>divine</i> ideal! And, as -a matter of fact, they say that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span>the moralist thus imitates a model -which is no less than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in -deeds that exists, but who nevertheless understands how to remain what -He <i>is,</i> the <i>good</i> God....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">305.</p> - -<p>The dominion of virtue is not established by means of virtue itself; -with virtue itself, one renounces power, one loses the Will to Power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">306.</p> - -<p>The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same "immoral" means as -any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">307.</p> - -<p>He who knows the way fame originates will be suspicious even of the -fame virtue enjoys.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">308.</p> - -<p>Morality is just as "immoral" as any other thing on earth; morality is -in itself a form of immorality.</p> - -<p>The great <i>relief</i> which this conviction brings. The contradiction -between things disappears, the unity of all phenomena is <i>saved——</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">309.</p> - -<p>There are some who actually go in search of what is immoral. When they -say: "this is <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span>wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with -or altered. On the other hand, I do not rest until I am quite clear -concerning the <i>immorality</i> of any particular thing which happens to -come under my notice. When I discover it, I recover my equanimity.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">310.</p> - - -<p>A. <i>The ways which lead to power</i>: the presentation of the new virtue -under the name of an <i>old</i> one,—the awakening of "interest" concerning -it ("happiness" declared to be its reward, and <i>vice versâ</i>),—artistic -slandering of all that stands in its way,—the exploitation of -advantages and accidents with the view of glorifying it,—the -conversion of its adherents into fanatics by means of sacrifices and -separations,—symbolism <i>on a grand scale</i>.</p> - -<p>B. <i>Power attained</i>: (1) Means of constraint of virtue; (2) seductive -means of virtue; (3) the (court) etiquette of virtue.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">311.</p> - - -<p><i>By what means does a virtue attain to power?—</i>With precisely the -same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of -opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of -their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, <i>by means of -acts of general "immorality."</i></p> - -<p>How does a <i>desire</i> behave towards itself in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span>order to become a -<i>virtue</i>?—A process of rechristening; systematic denial of its -intentions; practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with -established and recognised virtues; ostentatious enmity towards its -adversaries. If possible, too, the protection of sacred powers must be -purchased; people must also be intoxicated and fired with enthusiasm; -idealistic humbug must be used, and a party must be won, which <i>either</i> -triumphs <i>or</i> perishes—one must be <i>unconscious and naïf</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">312.</p> - -<p>Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that -we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love -of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of -mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; -the disease of the <i>nervus sympathicus,</i> for instance, is eulogised as -Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">313.</p> - -<p>We should begin to entertain doubts concerning a man if we heard that -he required reasons in order to remain respectable: we should, in any -case, certainly avoid his society. The little word "for" in certain -cases may be compromising; sometimes a single "for" is enough to -refute one. If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-such -an aspirant for virtue was in need of <i>bad</i> reasons in order to remain -respectable, it would not <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span>conduce to increasing our respect for him. -But he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You -disturb my morality, with your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you -cannot believe in my <i>bad reasons,</i>—that is to say, in my God, in a -disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc.,—you put obstacles in the way -of my virtue.... Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent the -<i>moralisation of the masses</i>."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">314.</p> - -<p>Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning -the highest values, are <i>judgments emanating from our muscles.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">315.</p> - -<p><i>Morality in the valuation of races and classes.—</i>In view of the fact -that the <i>passions</i> and <i>fundamental instincts</i> in every race and class -express the means which enable the latter to preserve themselves (or at -least the means which have enabled them to live for the longest period -of time), to call them "virtuous" practically means:</p> - -<p>That they change their character, shed their skins, and blot out their -past.</p> - -<p>It means that they should cease from differentiating themselves from -others.</p> - -<p>It means that they are getting to resemble each other in their needs -and aspirations—or, more exactly, <i>that they are declining....</i></p> - -<p>It means that the will to one kind of morality <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span>is merely the <i>tyranny</i> -of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality, -over other species: it means a process of annihilation or general -levelling in favour of the prevailing species (whether it be to -render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the -"Abolition of Slavery"—a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in -truth, the <i>annihilation</i> of a fundamentally different species (the -undermining of its values and its happiness).</p> - -<p>The qualities which constitute the strength of an <i>opposing race</i> or -class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has: -for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered -and rechristened).</p> - -<p>When a man or a people harm us, their action constitutes an objection -against them: but from their point of view we are desirable, because we -are such as can be useful to them.</p> - -<p>The insistence upon spreading "humaneness" (which guilelessly starts -out with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula "What -is human") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a certain definite -type of man strives to attain to power: or, more precisely, a very -particular kind of instinct—the <i>gregarious instinct.</i> "The equality -of men": this is what lies <i>concealed</i> behind the tendency of <i>making</i> -ever more and more men <i>alike</i> as men.</p> - -<p><i>The "interested nature" of the morality of ordinary people.</i> (The -trick was to elevate the great passions for power and property to the -positions of protectors of virtue.)</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> -To what extent do all kinds of <i>business men</i> and money-grabbers—all -those who give and take credit—find it <i>necessary</i> to promote the -levelling of all characters and notions of value? the <i>commerce and the -exchange of the world</i> leads to, and almost purchases, virtue.</p> - -<p>The <i>State</i> exercises the same influence, as does also any sort of -ruling power at the head of officials and soldiers; <i>science</i> acts in -the same way, in order that it may work in security and economise its -forces. And the <i>priesthood</i> does the same.</p> - -<p>Communal morality is thus promoted here, because it is advantageous; -and, in order to make it triumph, war and violence are waged against -immorality—with what "right"? Without any right whatsoever; but in -accordance with the instinct of self-preservation. The same classes -avail themselves of immorality when it serves their purpose to do so.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">316.</p> - -<p>Observe the hypocritical colour which all <i>civil institutions</i> are -painted, just as if they were <i>the offshoots of morality</i>—for -instance: marriage, work, calling, patriotism, the family, order, -and rights. But as they were all established in favour of the <i>most -mediocre</i> type of man, to protect him from exceptions and the need of -exceptions, one must not be surprised to find them sown with lies.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">317.</p> - -<p><i>Virtue</i> must be defended against its preachers: they are its worst -enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal <i>for all</i>; they divest -virtue of the charm which consists in its rareness, its inimitableness, -its exceptional and non-average character—that is to say, of its -<i>aristocratic charm.</i> A stand must also be made against those -embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and are satisfied to -hear them ring hollow: what ingenuousness—to <i>demand</i> great and rare -things, and then to declare, with anger and contempt of one's fellows, -that they do not exist!—It is obvious, for instance, that a <i>marriage</i> -is worth only as much as those are worth whom it joins—that is to say, -that on the whole it is something wretched and indecent: no priest or -registrar can make anything else of it.</p> - -<p><i>Virtue</i><a name="FNanchor_6_13" id="FNanchor_6_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_13" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> has all the instincts of the average man against it: it is -not profitable, it is not prudent, and it isolates. It is related to -passion, and not very accessible to reason; it spoils the character, -the head, and the senses—always, of course, subject to the medium -standard of men; it provokes hostility towards order, and towards the -<i>lies</i> which are concealed beneath all order, all institutions, and -all reality—when seen in the light of its pernicious influence upon -<i>others,</i> it is <i>the worst of vices</i>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> -I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being -recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue -everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does <i>not suffer</i> -from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of -perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim -itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as -judge because it is always a <i>personal</i> virtue; (6) it does precisely -what is generally <i>forbidden</i>: virtue as I understand it is the actual -<i>vetitum</i> within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise -virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style—<i>virtù</i>—free from all -moralic acid....</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_13" id="Footnote_6_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_13"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <span style="font-size: 0.9em;">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.</span>—Virtue is used here, of course, in the -sense of "the excellence of man," not in the sense of the Christian -negative virtue.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">318.</p> - -<p>In the first place<a name="FNanchor_7_14" id="FNanchor_7_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_14" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you have no superiority -over us; we should like to make you take <i>modesty</i> a little more to -heart: it is wretched personal interests and prudence which suggest -your virtue to you. And if you had more strength and courage in your -bodies you would not lower yourselves thus to the level of virtuous -nonentities. You make what you can of yourselves: partly what you are -obliged to make,—that is to say, what your circumstances force you -to <i>make,</i>—partly what suits your pleasure and seems useful to you. -But if you do only what is in keeping with your inclinations, or -what necessity exacts from you,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 260]</a></span>59 or what is useful to you, you ought -<i>neither to praise yourselves nor let others praise you</i>!... One is -a <i>thoroughly puny kind of man</i> when one is <i>only</i> virtuous: nothing -should mislead you in this regard! Men who have to be considered at -all, were never such donkeys of virtue: their inmost instinct, that -which determined their quantum of power, did not find its reckoning -thus: whereas with your minimum amount of power nothing can seem more -full of wisdom to you than virtue. But the <i>multitude</i> are on your -side: and because you <i>tyrannise</i> over us, we shall fight you....</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_14" id="Footnote_7_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_14"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <span style="font-size: 0.9em;">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.</span>—Here Nietzsche returns to Christian -virtue which is negative and moral.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">319.</p> - -<p>A <i>virtuous man</i> is of a lower species because, in the first place, -he has no "personality," but acquires his value by conforming with a -certain human scheme which has been once and for ever fixed. He has no -independent value: he may be compared; he has his equals, he <i>must</i> not -be an individual.</p> - -<p>Reckoning up the qualities of the <i>good</i> man, why is it they appear -pleasant to us? Because they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to -caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to severity: our laziness, -our good nature, and our levity, have a <i>good time.</i> This, our <i>feeling -of well-being,</i> is <i>what we project into</i> the good man in the form of a -<i>quality,</i> in the form of a <i>valuable possession.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">320.</p> - -<p>Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a venerable form of -stupidity: who could blame you for it? And this form of virtue has not -been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest peasant-simplicity, which -is possible, however, in all classes of society, and which one cannot -meet with anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks to-day -that everything is in good hands—that is to say, in "God's hands": and -when it supports this proposition with that same modest assurance as -that with which it would assert that two and two are four, we others -naturally refrain from contradiction.</p> - -<p>Why disturb <i>this</i> pure foolery? Why darken it with our cares -concerning man, people, goals, the future? Even if we wished to -do so, we shouldn't succeed. <i>In</i> all things these people see the -reflection of their own venerable stupidity and goodness (in them the -old God—<i>deus myops—</i> still lives); we others see something else in -everything: our problematic nature, our contradictions, our deeper, -more painful, and more suspicious wisdom.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">321.</p> - -<p>He who finds a particular virtue an easy matter, ultimately laughs at -it. Seriousness cannot be maintained once virtue is attained. As soon -as a man has reached virtue, he jumps out of it—whither? Into devilry.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tendencies <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span>and impulses have -become! What an amount of inquisitiveness torments them! They are all -fishhooks of knowledge!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">322.</p> - -<p>The idea is to associate vice with something so terrible that at -last one is obliged to run away from it in order to be rid of its -associations. This is the well-known case of Tannhäuser. Tannhäuser, -brought to his wits' end by Wagnerian music, cannot endure life any -longer even in the company of Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue begins to -have a charm for him; a Thuringian virgin goes up in price, and what -is even worse still, he shows a liking for Wolfram von Eschenbach's -melody....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">323.</p> - -<p><i>The Patrons of Virtue.</i>—Lust of property, lust of power, laziness, -simplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is -why it stands so securely.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">324.</p> - -<p><i>Virtue</i> is no longer believed in; its powers of attraction are dead; -what is needed is some one who will once more bring it into the market -in the form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of dissipation. It -exacts too much extravagance and narrow-mindedness from its believers -to allow of conscience not being against it to-day. Certainly, for -people, without either consciences or scruples, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span>this may constitute -its new charm: it is now what it has never been before—a vice.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">325.</p> - -<p>Virtue is still the most expensive vice: <i>let</i> it remain so!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">326.</p> - -<p>Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as they are allowed to -rule over one as authorities and laws coming from outside, and not as -qualities one develops one's self. The latter is the only right way; -they should be the most personal means of defence and most individual -needs—the determining factors of precisely <i>our</i> existence and growth, -which we recognise and acknowledge independently of the question -whether others grow with us with the help of the same or of different -principles. This view of the danger of the virtue which is understood -as impersonal and <i>objective</i> also holds good of modesty: through -modesty many of the choicest intellects perish. The morality of modesty -is the worst possible softening influence for those souls for which it -is pre-eminently necessary that they become <i>hard</i> betimes.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">327.</p> - -<p>The domain of morality must be reduced and limited step by step; the -names of the instincts which are really active in this sphere must be -drawn into the light of day and honoured, after <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> have lain all -this time in the concealment of hypocritical names of virtue. Out of -respect for one's "honesty," which makes itself heard ever more and -more imperiously, one ought to unlearn the shame which makes one deny -and "explain away" all natural instincts. The extent to which one can -dispense with virtue is the measure of one's strength; and a height may -be imagined where the notion "virtue" is understood in such a way as -to be reminiscent of <i>virtù</i>—the virtue of the Renaissance—free from -moralic acid. But for the moment—how remote this ideal seems!</p> - -<p><i>The reduction of the domain of morality</i> is a sign of its progress. -Wherever, hitherto, thought has not been guided by causality, thinking -has taken a <i>moral</i> turn.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">328.</p> - -<p>After all, what have I achieved? Let us not close our eyes to this -wonderful result: I have lent new <i>charms</i> to virtue—it now affects -one in the same way as something <i>forbidden.</i> It has our most subtle -honesty against it, it is salted in the "<i>cum grano salis</i>" of the -scientific pang of conscience. It savours of antiquity and of old -fashion, and thus it is at last beginning to draw refined people and -to make them inquisitive—in short, it affects us like a vice. Only -after we have once recognised that everything consists of lies and -appearance, shall we have again earned the right to uphold this most -beautiful of all fictions—virtue. There will then remain no further -reason to deprive ourselves of it: only when we have shown <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span>virtue to -be a <i>form of immorality</i> do we again <i>justify it,</i>—it then becomes -classified, and likened, in its fundamental features, to the profound -and general immorality of all existence, of which it is then shown to -be a part. It appears as a form of luxury of the first order, the most -arrogant, the dearest, and rarest form of vice. We have robbed it of -its grimaces and divested it of its drapery; we have delivered it from -the importunate familiarity of the crowd; we have deprived it of its -ridiculous rigidity, its empty expression, its stiff false hair, and -its hieratic muscles.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">329.</p> - -<p>And is it supposed that I have thereby done any harm to virtue?... Just -as little as anarchists do to princes. Only since they have been shot -at, have they once more sat securely on their thrones.... For thus -it has always been and will ever be: one cannot do a thing a better -service than to persecute it and to run it to earth.... This—I have -done.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">5. The Moral Ideal.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<p class="center">A. <i>A Criticism of Ideals.</i></p> - - - -<p class="parnum">330.</p> - -<p>It were the thing to begin this criticism in suchwise as to do away -with the word "<i>Ideal</i>": a criticism of <i>desiderata.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">331.</p> - -<p>Only the fewest amongst us are aware of what is involved, from the -standpoint of <i>desirability,</i> in every "thus should it be, but it -is not," or even "thus it ought to have been": such expressions of -opinion involve a condemnation of the whole course of events. For -there is nothing quite isolated in the world: the smallest thing bears -the largest on its back; on thy small injustice the whole nature of -the future depends; the whole is condemned by every criticism which -is directed at the smallest part of it. Now granting that the moral -norm—even as Kant understood it—is never completely fulfilled, and -remains like a sort of Beyond hanging over reality without ever falling -down to it; then morality would contain in itself a judgment concerning -the whole, which would still, however, allow of the question: <i>whence -does it get the right thereto?</i> How does the part come to acquire this -judicial position relative to the whole? And if, as some have declared, -this moral condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, reality, is -an ineradicable instinct, is it not possible that this instinct may -perhaps belong to the ineradicable stupidities and immodesties of our -species?—But in saying this, we are doing precisely what we deprecate; -the point of view of desirability and of unauthorised fault-finding -is part and parcel of the whole character of worldly phenomena just -as every injustice and imperfection is—it is our very notion of -"perfection" which is never gratified. Every instinct which desires -to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span>be indulged gives expression to its dissatisfaction with the -present state of things: how? Is the whole perhaps made up of a host -of dissatisfied parts, which all have desiderata in their heads? Is -the "course of things" perhaps "the road hence? the road leading away -from reality "—that is to say, eternal dissatisfaction in itself? Is -the conception of desiderata perhaps the essential motive-power of all -things? Is it—<i>deus</i>?</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>It seems to me of the utmost importance that we should rid ourselves -of the notion of <i>the</i> whole, of an entity, and of any kind of power -or form of the unconditioned. For we shall never be able to resist the -temptation of regarding it as the supreme being, and of christening -it "God." The "All" must be subdivided; we must unlearn our respect -for it, and reappropriate that which we have lent the unknown and an -imaginary entity, for the purposes of our neighbour and ourselves. -Whereas, for instance, Kant said: "Two things remain for ever worthy -of honour" (at the close of his <i>Practical Reason</i>)—to-day we should -prefer to say: "Digestion is more worthy of honour." The concept, -"the All," will always give rise to the old problems, "How is evil -possible?" etc. Therefore, <i>there is no "All",</i> there <i>is no</i> great -<i>sensorium</i> or <i>inventarium</i> or power-magazine.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">332.</p> - -<p>A man as he <i>ought</i> to be: this sounds to me in just as bad taste as: -"A tree as it ought to be."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">333.</p> - -<p>Ethics: or the "philosophy of desirability."—"Things <i>ought</i> to be -otherwise," "things <i>ought</i> to become different": dissatisfaction -would thus seem the heart of ethics.</p> - -<p>One could find a way out of it, first, by selecting only those states -in which one is free from emotion; secondly, by grasping the insolence -and stupidity of the attitude of mind: for to desire that something -should be otherwise than it is, means to desire that <i>everything</i> -should be different—it involves a damaging criticism of the whole. -<i>But life itself consists in such desiring!</i></p> - -<p>To ascertain <i>what exists, how it exists</i> seems an ever so much higher -and more serious matter than every "thus should it be," because the -latter, as a piece of human criticism and arrogance, appears to be -condemned as ludicrous from the start. It expresses a need which would -fain have the organisation of the world correspond with our human -well-being, and which directs the will as much as possible towards the -accomplishment of that relationship.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, this desire, "thus it ought to be," has only called -forth that other desire, "<i>what exists?</i>" The desire of knowing what -exists, is already a consequence of the question, "how? is it possible? -Why precisely so?" Our wonder at the disagreement between our desires -and the course of the world has led to our learning to know the -course of the world. Perhaps the matter stands differently: maybe the -expression, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span>"thus it ought to be," is merely the utterance of our -desire to overcome the world——</p> - - -<p class="parnum">334.</p> - -<p>To-day when every attempt at determining how man should be—is -received with some irony, when we adhere to the notion that in spite -of all one only <i>becomes</i> what one <i>is</i>(in spite of all—that is to -say, education, instruction, environment, accident, and disaster), -in the matter of morality we have learnt, in a very peculiar way, -how to <i>reverse</i> the relation of cause and effect. Nothing perhaps -distinguishes us more than this from the ancient believers in morality. -We no longer say, for instance, "Vice is the cause of a man's -physical ruin," and we no longer say, "A man prospers with virtue -because it brings a long life and happiness." Our minds to-day are -much more inclined to the belief that vice and virtue are not causes -but only <i>effects.</i> A man becomes a respectable member of society -because he <i>was</i> a respectable man from the start—that is to say, -because he was born in possession of good instincts and prosperous -propensities.... Should a man enter the world poor, and the son of -parents who are neither economical nor thrifty, he is insusceptible -of being improved—that is to say, he is only fit for the prison or -the madhouse.... To-day we are no longer able to separate moral from -physical degeneration: the former is merely a complicated symptom of -the latter; a man is necessarily bad just as he is necessarily ill.... -Bad: this word here stands <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span>for a certain <i>lack of capacity</i> which is -related physiologically with the degenerating type—for instance, a -weak will, an uncertain and many-sided personality, the inability to -resist reacting to a stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain -constraint resulting from every suggestion proceeding from another's -will. Vice is not a cause; it is an <i>effect.</i> ... Vice is a somewhat -arbitrary-epitome of certain effects resulting from physiological -degeneracy. A general proposition such as that which Christianity -teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were -justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But -this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers -and prevails, the proposition holds good: for then the existence of an -unhealthy soil—of a degenerate territory—is demonstrated.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">335.</p> - -<p>It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how -he understands the art of fighting his way, of enduring, of turning -circumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents; -but when he is seen in the light of his <i>desires,</i> he is the most -absurd of all animals. It is just as if he required a playground -for his cowardice, his laziness, his feebleness, his sweetness, his -submissiveness, where he recovers from his strong virile virtues. Just -look at man's "<i>desiderata</i>" and his "ideals." Man, when he <i>desires, -</i> tries to recover from that which is <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span>eternally valuable in him, from -his deeds; and then he rushes into nonentity, absurdity, valuelessness, -childishness. The intellectual indigence and lack of inventive power of -this resourceful and inventive animal is simply terrible. The "ideal" -is at the same time the penalty man pays for the enormous expenditure -which he has to defray in all real and pressing duties.—Should reality -cease to prevail, there follow dreams, fatigue, weakness: an "ideal" -might even be regarded as a form of dream, fatigue, or weakness. The -strongest and the most impotent men become alike when this condition -overtakes them: they <i>deify</i> the cessation of work, of war, of -passions, of suspense, of contrasts, of "reality "—in short, of the -struggle for knowledge and of the <i>trouble</i> of acquiring it.</p> - -<p>"Innocence" to them is idealised stultification; "blessedness" is -idealised idleness; "love," the ideal state of the gregarious animal -that will no longer have an enemy. And thus everything that lowers and -belittles man is elevated to an <i>ideal</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">336.</p> - -<p>A desire <i>magnifies</i> the thing desired; and by not being realised it -grows—the <i>greatest ideas</i> are those which have been created by the -strongest and longest desiring. Things grow <i>ever more valuable</i> in our -estimation, the more our desire for them increases: if "moral values" -have become the highest values, it simply shows that the moral ideal -is the one which has been <i>realised least</i> (and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span>thus it <i>represented -the Beyond to all suffering,</i> as a road to <i>blessedness</i>). Man, -with ever-increasing ardour, has only been embracing <i>clouds</i>: and -ultimately called his desperation and impotence "God."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">337.</p> - -<p>Think of the <i>naïveté</i> of all ultimate "desiderata"—when the -"wherefore" of man remains unknown.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">338.</p> - -<p>What is the counterfeit coinage of morality? First of all we should -know what "good and evil" mean. That is as good as wishing to know why -man is here, and what his goal or his destiny is. And that means that -one would fain know that man actually <i>has</i> a goal or a destiny.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">339.</p> - -<p>The very obscure and arbitrary notion that humanity has a general -duty to perform, and that, as a whole, it is striving towards a -goal, is still in its infancy. Perhaps we shall once more be rid -of it before it becomes a "fixed idea." ... But humanity does not -constitute a whole: it is an indissoluble multiplicity of ascending -and descending organisms—it knows no such thing as a state of youth -followed by <i>maturity</i> and then age. But its strata lie confused and -superimposed—and in a few thousand years <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span>there may be even younger -types of men than we can point out to-day. Decadence, on the other -hand, belongs to all periods of human history: everywhere there is -refuse and decaying matter, such things are in themselves vital -processes; for withering and decaying elements must be eliminated.</p> - -<p>Under the empire of Christian prejudice <i>this question was never put -at all</i>: the purpose of life seemed to lie in the salvation of the -individual soul; the question whether humanity might last for a long or -a short time was not considered. The best Christians longed for the end -to come as soon as possible;—concerning the needs of the individual, -<i>there seemed to be no doubt whatsoever.</i> ... The duty of every -individual for the present was identical with what it would be in any -sort of future for the man of the future: the value, the purpose, the -limit of values was for ever fixed, unconditioned, eternal, one with -God.... What deviated from this eternal type was impious, diabolic, -criminal.</p> - -<p>The centre of gravity of all values for each soul lay in that soul -itself: salvation or damnation! The salvation of the <i>immortal</i> soul! -The most extreme form of <i>personalisation....</i> For each soul there -was only one kind of perfection; only one ideal, only one road to -salvation.... The most extreme form of the principle of <i>equal rights,</i> -associated with an optical magnification of individual importance to -the point of megalomania <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span>... Nothing but insanely important souls, -revolving round their own axes with unspeakable terror....</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Nobody believes in these assumed airs of importance any longer -to-day: and we have sifted our wisdom through the sieve of contempt. -Nevertheless the <i>optical habit</i> survives, which would fain measure the -value of man by his proximity to a certain <i>ideal maw.</i> at bottom the -personalisation view is upheld as firmly as that of the <i>equality of -rights as regards the ideal.</i> In short: people <i>seem to think that they -know</i> what <i>the ultimate desideratum</i> is in regard to the ideal man....</p> - -<p>But this belief is merely the result of the exceedingly <i>detrimental -influence</i> of the Christian ideal, as anybody can discover for himself -every time he carefully examines the "ideal type." In the first place, -it is believed that the approach to a given "type" is desirable; -<i>secondly,</i> that this particular type is known; <i>thirdly,</i> that every -deviation from this type is a retrograde movement, a stemming of the -spirit of progress, a loss of power and might in man.... To dream of a -state of affairs in which this <i>perfect</i> man will be in the majority: -our friends the Socialists and even Messrs. the Utilitarians have not -reached a higher level than this. In this way an <i>aim</i> seems to have -crept into the <i>evolution</i> of man: at any rate the belief in a certain -<i>progress towards an ideal</i> is the only shape in which an <i>aim</i> is -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> -conceived in the history of mankind to-day. In short: the coming of the -"<i>Kingdom of God</i>" has been placed in the future, and has been given an -earthly, a human meaning—but on the whole the faith in the <i>old</i> ideal -is still maintained....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">340.</p> - -<p><i>The more concealed forms of the cult of Christian, moral ideals.</i>—The -<i>insipid and cowardly notion "Nature"</i> invented by Nature-enthusiasts -(without any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the implacable, -and the cynical element in even "the most beautiful" aspects), is -only a sort of attempt at <i>reading</i> the moral and Christian notion of -"humanity" into Nature;—Rousseau's concept of Nature, for instance, -which took for granted that "Nature" meant freedom, goodness, -innocence, equity, justice, and <i>Idylls,</i> was nothing more at bottom -than the cult of Christian morality. We should collect passages from -the poets in order to see <i>what</i> they admired, in lofty mountains, for -instance. What Goethe had to do with them—why he admired Spinoza. -Absolute <i>ignorance</i> concerning the reasons of this <i>cult....</i></p> - -<p>The <i>insipid and cowardly concept "Man"</i> à la Comte and Stuart -Mill, is at times the subject of a cult.... This is only the -Christian moral ideal again under another name.... Refer also to the -freethinkers—Guyau for example.</p> - -<p>The <i>insipid and cowardly concept "Art"</i> which is held to mean sympathy -with all suffering and with everything botched and bungled (the same -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> -thing happens to <i>history,</i> cf. Thierry): again it is the cult of the -Christian moral ideal.</p> - -<p>And now, as to the whole <i>socialistic ideal</i>: it is nothing but a -blockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">341.</p> - -<p><i>The origin of the ideal.</i> The examination of the soil out of which it -grows.</p> - -<p><i>A.</i> Starting out from those "æsthetic" mental states during which the -world seems rounder, fuller, and <i>more perfect</i>: we have the pagan -ideal with its dominating spirit of self-affirmation (<i>people give of -their abundance</i>). The highest type: the <i>classical</i> ideal—regarded -as an expression of the successful nature of <i>all</i> the more important -instincts. In this classical ideal we find <i>the grand style</i> as the -highest style. An expression of the "will to power" itself. The -instinct which is most feared <i>dares to acknowledge itself.</i></p> - -<p><i>B.</i> Starting out from the mental states in which the world seemed -emptier, paler, and thinner, when "spiritualisation" and the absence -of sensuality assume the rank of perfection, and when all that is -brutal, animal, direct, and proximate is avoided (<i>people calculate -and select</i>): the "sage," "the angel"; priestliness = virginity = -ignorance, are the physiological ideals of such idealists: the <i>anæmic</i> -ideal. Under certain circumstances this anæmic ideal may be the ideal -of such natures as <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span><i>represent</i> paganism (thus Goethe sees his "saint" -in Spinoza).</p> - -<p><i>C.</i> Starting out from those mental states in which the world seemed -more absurd, more evil, poorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot -even be imagined or desired in it (<i>people deny and annihilate</i>); -the projection of the ideal into the sphere of the anti-natural, -anti-actual, anti-logical; the state of him who judges thus (the -"impoverishment" of the world as a result of suffering: <i>people take, -they no longer bestow</i>): the <i>anti-natural ideal.</i></p> - -<p>(The <i>Christian ideal</i> is a <i>transitional form</i> between the second -and the third, now inclining more towards the former type, and anon -inclining towards the latter.)</p> - -<p><i>The three ideals: A.</i> Either a <i>strengthening</i> of Life (<i>paganism,</i>) -or <i>B.</i> an <i>impoverishment</i> of Life (<i>anæmia</i>), or <i>C.</i> a <i>denial</i> of -Life (<i>anti-naturalism</i>). The state of beatitude in <i>A.</i> is the feeling -of extreme abundance; in <i>B.</i> it is reached by the most fastidious -selectiveness; in <i>C.</i> it is the contempt and the destruction of Life.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">342.</p> - -<p><i>A.</i> The <i>consistent</i> type understands that even evil must not be -hated, must not be resisted, and that it is not allowable to make war -against one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept the pain -which such behaviour brings in its train; that one lives entirely in -positive feelings; that one takes the side of one's opponents in word -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> -and deed; that by means of a superfœtation of peaceful, kindly, -conciliatory, helpful, and loving states, one impoverishes the soil of -the other states, ... that one is in need of unremitting <i>practice.</i> -What is achieved thereby?—The Buddhistic type, or the <i>perfect</i> cow.</p> - -<p>This point of view is possible only where no moral fanaticism -prevails—that is to say, when evil is not hated on its own account, -but because it opens the road to conditions which are painful (unrest, -work, care, complications, dependence).</p> - -<p>This is the Buddhistic point of view: there is no hatred of sin, the -concept "sin," in fact, is entirely lacking.</p> - -<p><i>B.</i> The <i>inconsistent</i> type. War is waged against evil—there is a -belief that war waged <i>for Goodness' sake</i> does not involve the same -moral results or affect character in the same way as war generally -does (and owing to which tendencies it is detested as <i>evil).</i> As a -matter of fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is much -more profoundly pernicious than any sort of personal hostility; and -generally, it is "the person" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the -position of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc.). The attitude of -hostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be -bad in us, or hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented -and most anxious state of mind: thus "miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and -transcendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became <i>desirable</i>. -... The Christian type: or the <i>perfect bigot</i>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> -<i>C.</i> The <i>stoical</i> type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability, -peace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active—profound -quiet, the defensive state, the fortress, the mistrust of war—firmness -of principles; the unity of <i>knowledge</i> and <i>will</i>; great self-respect. -The type of the anchorite. <i>The perfect blockhead.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">343.</p> - -<p>An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours -to further its purpose <i>(a)</i> by laying claim to a <i>spurious</i> origin; -<i>(b)</i> by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals -already existing; <i>(c)</i> by means of the thrill produced by mystery, -as though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; <i>(d)</i> by -the slander of its opponents' ideals; <i>(e)</i> by a lying teaching of -the advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness, -spiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty -God, etc.—Contributions to the psychology of the idealists: Carlyle, -Schiller, Michelet.</p> - -<p>Supposing all the means of defence and protection, by means of which an -ideal survives, are discovered, is it thereby <i>refuted</i>? It has merely -availed itself of the means of which everything lives and grows—they -are all "immoral."</p> - -<p>My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life -are lying beneath the <i>ban of morality</i>: morality is the life-denying -instinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">344.</p> - -<p>To <i>avoid</i> knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The -idealist: a creature who has reasons for remaining in the dark -concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark -concerning these reasons also.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">345.</p> - -<p><i>The tendency of moral evolution.</i>—Every one's desire is that there -should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means -of which he himself succeeds. Thus the <i>fundamental tendency</i> of the -<i>weak</i> and <i>mediocre</i> of all times, has been to <i>enfeeble the strong -and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this -process</i> was the <i>moral principle.</i> The attitude of the strong towards -the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become -bad bywords.</p> - -<p>The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against -the extraordinary, of the weak against the strong: meets with one -of its finest interruptions in the fact that the rare, the refined, -the more exacting, present themselves as the weak, and repudiate the -coarser weapons of power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">346.</p> - -<p>(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge of all philosophers -is dictated to them by their moral "truths," and is only seemingly -independent.</p> - -<p>(2) The "Moral Truths," "thus shall things be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span>done," are mere states -of consciousness of an instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus -are things done by us." The "ideal" is supposed to re-establish and -strengthen an instinct; it flatters man to feel he can obey when he is -only an automaton.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">347.</p> - -<p><i>Morality as a means of seduction.</i>—"Nature is good; for a wise -and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the -'corruption of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are -responsible—they must be wiped out": this is Rousseau's logic (compare -with <i>Pascals</i> logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin).</p> - -<p>Refer also to <i>Luther's</i> logic, which is similar. In both cases a -pretext is sought for the introduction of an insatiable lust of revenge -as a <i>moral and religious</i> duty. The hatred directed against the ruling -classes tries to <i>sanctify</i> itself ... (the "sinfulness of Israel" is -the basis of the priest's powerful position).</p> - -<p>Compare this with <i>Pauls</i> logic, which is similar. It is always under -the cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the -cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In the case of <i>Christ</i> -the rejoicings of the people appear as the cause of His crucifixion. -It was an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the -anti-Semitic movement we find the same trick: the opponent is overcome -with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as <i>retributive -Justice.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">348.</p> - -<p><i>The incidents of the fight</i>: the fighter tries to transform his -opponent into the <i>exact opposite</i> of himself—imaginatively, of -course. He tries to believe in himself to such an extent that he may -have the courage necessary for the "good Cause" (as if he were the -<i>good Cause</i>); as if reason, taste, and virtue were being assailed -by his opponents.... The belief of which he is most in need, as the -strongest means of defence and attack, <i>is the belief in himself,</i> -which, however, knows how to misinterpret itself as a belief in -1God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory, but -only understands victory for the sake of victory—for God's sake. -Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in -a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "<i>Good taste, good -judgment, and virtue are ours.</i>" War urges people to this <i>exaggerated -self-esteem</i>....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">349.</p> - -<p>Whatever kind of <i>eccentric ideal</i> one may have (whether as -a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German -Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being <i>the</i> -ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature. -One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it, -and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind.</p> - -<p>How is it, that in spite of this obvious fact, the majority of -idealists indulge in propaganda for <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span>their ideal, just as if they had -no right to it unless the <i>majority</i> acquiesce therein?—For instance, -all those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim -the right to study Latin and mathematics. What is it urges them to do -this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the -herd: they fight for the "emancipation of woman," because they are best -able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it -under the cover of a <i>charitable movement,</i> under the banner bearing -the device "For others."</p> - -<p>The <i>cleverness</i> of idealists consists in their persistently posing -as the missionaries and "representatives" of an ideal: they thus -"beautify" themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in -disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real heroism consists, <i>not</i> -in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and -disinterestedness, but in <i>not fighting at all</i>.... "I am thus; I will -be thus—and you can go to the devil!"</p> - - -<p class="parnum">350.</p> - -<p><i>Every</i> ideal assumes <i>love, hate, reverence,</i> and <i>contempt.</i> Either -positive feeling is the<i>primum mobile,</i> or negative feeling is. -<i>Hatred</i> and <i>contempt</i> are the <i>primum mobile</i> in all the ideals which -proceed from resentment.</p> - -<hr /> -<p class="center">B. <i>A Criticism of the "Good Man" of the Saint, etc.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">351.</p> - -<p>The "<i>good man</i>" Or, hemiplegia of virtue.—In the opinion of every -strong and natural man, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span>love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness -and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong to each other. A -man is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil, -because otherwise he would not know how to be good. Whence comes -the morbidness and ideological unnaturalness which repudiates these -compounds—which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest -of all things? Whence this hemiplegia of virtue, the invention of the -good man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those instincts -which enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to -insist upon revenge.... This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to that -dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God, -Spirit, Man); in the first are found all the positive, in the second -all the negative forces, intentions, and states. This method of valuing -thus believes itself to be "idealistic"; it never doubts that in its -concept of the "good man," it has found the highest desideratum. When -aspiring to its zenith it fancies a state in which all evil is wiped -out, and in which only good creatures have actually remained over. -It does not therefore regard the mutual dependence of the opposites -good and evil as proved. On the contrary, the latter ought to vanish, -and the former should remain. The first has a right to exist, the -second ought not <i>to be with us at all....</i> What, as a matter of fact, -is the reason of this desire? In all ages, and particularly in the -Christian age, much labour has been spent in trying to reduce men -to this one-sided activity: <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span>and even to-day, among those who have -been deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who -desire precisely the same thing with their "humanisation" generally, -or with their "Will of God," or with their "Salvation of the Soul." -The principal injunction behind all these things is, that man should -no longer do anything evil, that he should under no circumstances be -harmful or <i>desire</i> harm. The way to arrive at this state of affairs is -to amputate all hostile tendencies, to suppress all the instincts of -resentment, and to establish "spiritual peace" as a chronic disease.</p> - -<p>This attitude of mind, in which a certain type of man is bred, -starts out with this absurd hypothesis: good and evil are postulated -as realities which are in a state of mutual contradiction (not as -complementary values, which they are), people are advised to take the -side of the good, and it is insisted upon that a good man resists -and forswears evil until every trace of it is uprooted—<i>but with -this valuation Life is actually denied,</i> for in all its instincts -Life has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts, -this valuation dreams rather of returning to the wholeness, oneness, -and strengthfulness of Life: it actually believes that a state of -blessedness will be reached when the inner anarchy and state of unrest -which result from these opposed impulses is brought to an end.—It is -possible that no more dangerous ideology, no greater mischief <i>in the -science of psychology,</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span>has ever yet existed, as this will to good: the -most repugnant type of man has been reared, the man who is <i>not free,</i> -the bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a bigot could one -tread the path which leads to God, and that only a bigot's life could -be a godly life.</p> - -<p>And even here, Life is still in the right—Life that knows not how to -separate Yea from Nay: what is the good of declaring with all one's -might that war is an evil, that one must harm no one, that one must -not act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is -impossible to do otherwise! The good man who has renounced all evil, -and who is afflicted according to his desire with the hemiplegia of -virtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making -enemies, or from saying "nay" and doing "nay." The Christian, for -instance, hates "sin"!—and what on earth is there which he does -not call "sin"! It is precisely because of his belief in a moral -antagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown -so full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally. -The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the -continual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in -the end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he -ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical, -that Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an -act of grace (that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands -alone). In short: <i>he denies Life,</i> he sees how "good," as the highest -value, <i>condemns</i> Life.... And thus his ideology concerning good and -evil <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span>ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease. -Therefore he is obliged to conceive <i>another</i> life!...</p> - - -<p class="parnum">352.</p> - -<p>Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood -to consist in the ability to <i>harm</i> as well as to <i>help.</i> This is the -case with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and -well-constituted races.</p> - -<p>The dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal.... In this way -morality becomes the poisoner of life.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">353.</p> - -<p><i>A criticism of the good man.</i>—Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice, -humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience—is it really supposed -that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand -for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that -qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked -at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these -qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they -lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to -lead)?</p> - -<p>I naturally do not wish to imply that there is any opposition between -the <i>ego</i> and the <i>alter</i> in the judgment: the question is, whether -it is the <i>results</i> of these qualities, either in regard to him who -possesses them or in regard to environment, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span>society, "humanity," which -lend them their value; or whether they have a value in themselves.... -In other words: is it <i>utility</i> which bids men condemn, combat, and -deny the opposite qualities (duplicity, falseness, perversity, lack -of self-confidence, inhumanity)? Is the essence of such qualities -condemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it -<i>desirable</i> that there should exist no men at all possessed of such -qualities? <i>In any case, this is believed</i>.... But here lies the error, -the shortsightedness, the monocularity of <i>narrow egoism.</i></p> - -<p>Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in -which the whole advantage would be on the side of the just—so that -all those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and -would slowly become extinct?</p> - -<p>At bottom, this is a question of taste and of <i>æsthetics</i>: should we -desire the most honourable types of men—that is to say, the greatest -bores—alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright, -the good-natured, the straightforward, and the "blockheads"?</p> - -<p>If one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number -constituting the "others," even the just man himself ceases from having -a right to exist,—he is, in fact, no longer necessary,—and in this -way it is seen that coarse utility alone could have elevated such an -<i>insufferable</i> virtue to a place of honour.</p> - -<p>Desirability may lie precisely on the other side. It might be better -to create conditions in which the "just man" would be reduced to -the humble <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span>position of a "useful instrument"—an "ideal gregarious -animal," or at best a herdsman: in short, conditions in which he would -no longer stand in the highest sphere, which requires <i>other qualities</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">354.</p> - -<p><i>The "good man" as a tyrant—</i>Mankind has always repeated the same -error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the -<i>measure</i> and standard of life;—instead of seeking the standard in -the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, -it takes the <i>preservative measures</i> of a very definite kind of life, -and uses them to exclude all other kinds of life, and even to criticise -Life itself and to select from among its forms. That is to say, man -ultimately forgets that measures are a means to an end, and gets to -like them for themselves: they take the place of a goal in his mind, -and even become the standard of goals to him—that is to say, <i>a given -species of man</i> regards his means of existence as the only legitimate -means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as "truth," -"goodness," "perfection": the given species, in fact, begins to -<i>tyrannise.</i> ... It is a <i>form of faith,</i> of instinct, when a certain -species of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned, -when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate, -any species of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as -it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights, and no longer desires to be -master.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">355.</p> - -<p>"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong -enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">356.</p> - -<p>Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that -men were?—that <i>good men</i> were? But such men I can only conceive as -slaves, the slaves of the future.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">357.</p> - -<p><i>The metamorphoses of slavery</i>; its disguise in the cloak of religion; -its transfiguration through morality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">358.</p> - -<p><i>The ideal slave</i> (the "good man").—He who cannot regard himself -as a "purpose," and who cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, -instinctively honours the morality of <i>unselfishness.</i> Everything urges -him to this morality: his prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And -even faith is a form of self-denial.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p><i>Atavism</i>: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for -once.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span></p> -<p>Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many -<i>obstacles</i> in the way of <i>sovereign sentiments,</i> of great <i>ingenuity,</i> -of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>It is not a question of <i>going ahead</i> (to that end all that is required -is to be at best a herdsman, that is to say, the prime need of the -herd), it is rather a matter of <i>getting along alone,</i> of <i>being able -to be another.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">359.</p> - -<p>We must realise <i>all</i> that has been accumulated as the result of -the highest moral <i>idealism</i>: how almost <i>all other values</i> have -crystallised round it. This shows that it has been desired for <i>a very -long time</i> and with the <i>strongest passions</i>—and that it has not yet -been attained: otherwise it would have <i>disappointed</i> everybody (that -is to say, it would have been followed by a more moderate valuation).</p> - -<p>The <i>saint</i> as the <i>most powerful type</i> of man: <i>this</i> ideal it is -which has elevated the value of moral perfection so high. One would -think that the whole of science had been engaged in proving that the -<i>moral</i> man is the most <i>powerful</i> and most godly.—The conquest of the -senses and the passions—everything inspired <i>terror</i>;—the unnatural -seemed to the spectators to be <i>supernatural</i> and <i>transcendental....</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">360.</p> - -<p>Francis of Assisi: amorous and popular, a poet who combats the order -of rank among souls, in favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual -hierarchy—"all alike before God."</p> - -<p>Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish man, the saint, the sage, -the just man. O Marcus Aurelius!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">361.</p> - -<p>I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with -what is closely <i>I</i> related to it), not because I want to annihilate -it, but only to put an end to its <i>tyranny</i> and clear the way for -other <i>ideals,</i> for <i>more robust</i> ideals.... The <i>continuance</i> of the -Christian ideal belongs to the most desirable of desiderata: if only -for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their stand beside it and -perhaps above it—they must have opponents, and strong ones too, in -order to grow <i>strong</i> themselves. That is why we immoralists require -the <i>power</i> of <i>morality,</i> our instinct of self-preservation insists -upon our opponents maintaining their strength—all it requires is to -<i>become master of them</i>.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="center">C. <i>Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">362.</p> - -<p>Egoism and its problem! The Christian gloominess of La Rochefoucauld, -who saw egoism <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span>in everything, and imagined that he had therefore -<i>reduced</i> the worth of things and virtues! In opposition to him, -I first of all tried to show that nothing else <i>could</i> exist save -egoism,—that in those men whose <i>ego</i> is weak and thin, the power to -love also grows weak,—that the greatest lovers are such owing to the -strength of their <i>ego,</i>—that love is an expression of egoism, etc. -As a matter of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those -who find it useful, whom it helps—in fact, the herd; it fosters a -pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine -the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would -assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the -cause of universal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of -men.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">363.</p> - -<p>Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest regards his habits as -more important than his advantage.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">364.</p> - -<p>Egoism! But no one has yet asked: <i>what</i> is the <i>ego</i> like? Everybody -is rather inclined to see all <i>egos</i> alike. This is the result of the -slave theory, of <i>universal suffrage,</i> and of "equality."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">365.</p> - -<p>The behaviour of a higher man is the result of a very complex set of -motives: any word such as "pity" <i>betrays</i> nothing of this complexity. -The <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span>most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other -relative to me?"—Thus the valuing spirit is continually active.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">366.</p> - -<p>To think that the history of all moral phenomena may be simplified, as -Schopenhauer thought,—that is to say, that <i>pity</i> is to be found at -the root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,—is -to be guilty of a degree of nonsense and ingenuousness worthy only -of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has -miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which -the Germans, from Herder to Hegel, have undergone.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">367.</p> - -<p><i>My "pity."</i>—This is a feeling for which I can find no adequate -term: I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious -capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what power -and what tasteless problems fit for back-woodsmen! (At a time when the -brave and light-hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible -in France!) Or when I see some one standing below where he might have -stood, thanks to the development of a set of perfectly senseless -accidents. Or even when, with the thought of man's destiny in my mind, -I contemplate with horror and contempt the whole system of modern -European politics, which is creating the circumstances <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span>and weaving -the fabric of the <i>whole</i> future of mankind. Yes, to what could not -"mankind" attain, if——! This is my "pity"; despite the fact that no -sufferer yet exists with whom I sympathise in this way.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">368.</p> - -<p>Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to -the health, "it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in -the world." If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and -not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon -maxims, but upon emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an -infection.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">369.</p> - -<p>There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and -does not exceed them—consequently, the "allowable," the "morally -indifferent" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.</p> - -<p>"One is continually promoting the interests of one's '<i>ego</i>' at the -cost of other people "; "Living consists in living at the cost of -others"—he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step -towards truth to himself.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">370.</p> - -<p>The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the <i>ego</i> of which every one -speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">371.</p> - -<p>Our "ego"—which is <i>not</i> one with the unitary controlling force of our -beings!—is really only an imagined synthesis; therefore there can <i>be</i> -no "<i>egoistic</i>" <i>actions</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">372.</p> - -<p>Since all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent a -standpoint as far as they are concerned. Every instinct, when it is -active, sacrifices strength and other instincts into the bargain: in -the end it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of everything -owing to the waste it would bring about. Thus: that which is -"unegoistic," self-sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular -—it is common to all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare -of the whole <i>ego</i> (<i>because they simply do not think!</i>), they act -counter to our interests, against the <i>ego</i>: and often <i>for</i> the -<i>ego—</i>innocent in both cases!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">373.</p> - -<p><i>The origin of moral values.</i>—Selfishness has as much value as the -physiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents -the whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach, -something that begins at his birth. If he represent the <i>ascent</i> of the -line of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern -about his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be -extreme. (It is the concern about the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span>promise of the future in him -which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right -to egoism.) If he represent <i>descending</i> development, decay, chronic -sickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have -him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the -well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to <i>suppress egoism</i> -(for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, -and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and -pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A -morality and a religion of "love," the <i>curbing</i> of the self-affirming -spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, -and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within -the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: -for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of -envy,—feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the -botched,—and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of -obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and -of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and -individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, -the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross."</p> - -<p>The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of -a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon -examination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth -much," simply a psychological valuation; more plainly still: it is -the feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> -impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation -gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes, -into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or -moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify -itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" -hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner -tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of -power and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner -rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay -when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the -bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate -condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: -when, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are -conscious that their existence is something for which some one must -be <i>guilty,</i> they are very closely related to the Christian, who also -believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched -constitution when he has found some one whom he can hold <i>responsible</i> -for it. The instinct of <i>revenge</i> and <i>resentment</i> appears in both -cases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure, -as is also the favour shown to <i>altruistic</i> theory and practice. The -<i>hatred of egoism,</i> whether it be one's own (as in the case of the -Christian), or another's (as in the case of the Socialists), thus -appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and -also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct -of the suffering, in the form <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span>of an increase in their feelings of -co-operation and unity.... At bottom, as I have already suggested, -the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, -rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is -still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the -botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of -egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological -circumstances.</p> - -<p>When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," -"rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his -inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he -also finds pleasure in crying;—if he were more at ease he would take -jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his -pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, -condemns, and slanders the "world"—and does not even except himself. -But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are -in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find -relief in slander.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">374.</p> - -<p>Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to -<i>caricatures,</i>—at least in its own imagination,—as also to -starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our -"<i>criminal.</i>" In the midst of the Roman and aristocratic order of -values, the <i>Jew</i> was reduced <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span>to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. -Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while among pious -people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among -immoralists it is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in <i>my</i> books -becomes a caricature.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">375.</p> - -<p>All the instincts and forces which morality praises, seem to me to -be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for -instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the -service of the will to power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">376.</p> - -<p>The <i>turning of</i> man's <i>nature inwards.</i> The process of turning a -nature inwards arises when, owing to the establishment of peace and -society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting themselves -outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with -the imagination. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence -is reverted, "it steps backwards"; in the thirst for knowledge there -lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the powers -of dissimulation and falsehood find their scope; the instincts are thus -transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">377.</p> - -<p><i>Falsity.</i>—Every <i>sovereign instinct</i> makes the others its -instruments, its retainers and its sycophants: <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span>it never allows itself -to be called by its more hateful name: and it brooks no terms of praise -in which it cannot <i>indirectly</i> find its share. Around every sovereign -instinct all praise and blame in general crystallises into a rigorous -form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is <i>one</i> of the causes of -falsity.</p> - -<p><i>Every</i> instinct <i>which aspires to dominion,</i> but which finds itself -under a yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the -<i>most generally accepted</i> values to strengthen it and to support its -self-esteem, and this explains why <i>as a rule</i> it dares to come forward -under the name of the "master" it is combating and from whom it would -be free (for instance, under the domination of Christian values, the -desires of the flesh and of power act in this way). This is the <i>other</i> -cause of falsity.</p> - -<p>In both cases <i>complete ingenuousness</i> reigns: the falseness <i>never</i> -even occurs to the mind of those concerned. It is the sign of a -<i>broken</i> instinct when man sees the motive force and its "expression" -("the mask") as separate things—it is a sign of inner contradiction -and is much less formidable. Absolute <i>innocence</i> in bearing, word, -and passion, a "good conscience" in falseness, and the certainty -wherewith all the grandest and most pompous words and attitudes are -appropriated—all these things are necessary for victory.</p> - -<p>In the <i>other case</i>: that is to say, when <i>extreme clearsightedness</i> -is present, the genius of the <i>actor</i> is needful as well as tremendous -discipline in self-control, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span>if victory is to be achieved. That is why -priests are the cleverest and <i>most conscious</i> hypocrites; and then -come princes, in whom their position in life and their antecedents -account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists -come third, and women fourth.</p> - -<p><i>The fundamental thought</i>: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and -the <i>will</i> is directed so inexorably against perfect self-knowledge -and accurate self-classification, that one is <i>very probably right in -supposing that Truth</i> and <i>the will to truth</i> are perhaps something -quite different and only <i>disguises.</i> (The need of <i>faith</i> is the -greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">378.</p> - -<p>"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood": people insist upon truthfulness. But -the acknowledgment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be lied -to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the -reality of this popular "truthfulness." There is too much or too little -being said continually: to insist upon people's <i>exposing themselves</i> -with every word they say, is a piece of naïveté.</p> - -<p>People say what they think, they are "truthful"; but <i>only under -certain circumstances</i>: that is to say, provided they be <i>understood</i> -(<i>inter pares</i>), and understood with good will into the bargain (<i>once -more inter pares</i>). One conceals one's self in the presence of the -<i>unfamiliar</i>: and he who would attain to something, says what he would -fain have <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span>people think about him, but <i>not</i> what he thinks. ("The -powerful man is always a liar.")**</p> - - -<p class="parnum">379.</p> - -<p>The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism concealed beneath an artful -abuse of moral values:—</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> The <i>most impersonal intellect</i> ("the philosopher") can know the -<i>truth</i>, "the true essence and nature of things."</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> Genius, <i>great men</i> are <i>great,</i> because they do not strive -to further their own interests: the <i>value</i> of man <i>increases</i> in -proportion as he effaces himself.</p> - -<p><i>(d)</i> Art as the work of the "<i>pure free-willed subject</i>"; -misunderstanding of "objectivity."</p> - -<p><i>(e)</i> Happiness as the object of life: <i>virtue</i> as a means to an end.</p> - -<p>The pessimistic condemnation of life by Schopenhauer is a <i>moral</i> one. -Transference of the gregarious standards into the realm of metaphysics.</p> - -<p>The "individual" lacks sense, he must therefore have his origin in "the -thing in itself" (and the significance of his existence must be shown -to be "error"); parents are only an "accidental cause."—The mistake -on the part of science in considering the individual as the result of -all past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is now becoming -known.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">380.</p> - -<p>1. Systematic <i>falsification of history,</i> so that it may present a -proof of the moral valuation:</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> The decline of a people and corruption. <i>(b)</i> The rise of a -people and virtue. <i>(c)</i> The zenith of a people ("its culture") -regarded as the result of high moral excellence.</p> - -<p>2. Systematic falsification of <i>great men, great creators,</i> and <i>great -periods.</i> The desire is to make <i>faith</i> that which distinguishes great -men: whereas carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immorality," -the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to greatness (Cæsar, Frederick -the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe). -The principal fact—their "free will"—is always suppressed.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">381.</p> - -<p>A great <i>lie</i> in history; as if the <i>corruption of the Church were the -cause</i> of the Reformation! This was only the pretext and self-deception -of the agitators—very strong needs were making themselves felt, the -brutality of which sorely required a spiritual dressing.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">382.</p> - -<p>Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the <i>emancipation</i> -from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral -prejudices which is coincident with the emancipation <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span>of a great mind; -he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully -contrived to set up the only moral value he honoured—self-effacement, -as the one <i>condition</i> of highest intellectual activity: "objective" -contemplation. "Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the -withdrawal of the <i>will</i>....</p> - -<p>Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a <i>fundamentally different -valuation.</i> Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will, -of morality and immorality, <i>I know nothing about at all.</i> The moral is -a lower kind of animal than the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed—he -is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type of his own. He -is a copy; at the best, a good copy—the standard of his worth lies -<i>without</i> him. I value a man according to the <i>quantum of power and -fullness of his will</i>: not according to the enfeeblement and moribund -state thereof. I consider that a philosophy which <i>teaches</i> the denial -of will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test the <i>power</i> of -a <i>will</i> according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the -amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its -own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with -the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one -day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.</p> - -<p>The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive -at the knowledge that all is to no purpose—in short, to recognise what -the good man already <i>does</i> instinctively.... <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span>He denies that there can -be higher states of intellectuality—he regards his view as a <i>non plus -ultra..</i>.. Here intellectuality is placed much lower than goodness; its -highest value (as art, for instance) would be to lead up to, and to -advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predominance of <i>moral -values.</i></p> - -<p>Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise <i>Kant</i>: there was nothing -Greek in Kant; he was quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in -regard to the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see Goethe's -words concerning the radically evil element in human nature<a name="FNanchor_8_15" id="FNanchor_8_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_15" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>). -<i>Saintliness</i> also lurked somewhere in his soul.... I require a -criticism of the saintly type.</p> - -<p>Hegel's value: "Passion."</p> - -<p>Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal -save that of the mediocre man.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> -Fundamental instinct of all philosophers, historians, and -psychologists: everything of <i>value</i> in mankind, art, history, science, -religion, and technology must be shown to be <i>morally valuable</i> and -<i>morally conditioned,</i> in its aim, means, and result. Everything is -seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's -question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow better?"—a -funny question, for the reverse is <i>obvious,</i> and is a fact which -speaks <i>in favour</i> of civilisation.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_15" id="Footnote_8_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_15"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <span style="font-size: 0.9em;">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE</span>.—This is doubtless a reference to a -passage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on 7th June 1793, -from the camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which the following -words occur:—"<i>Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen -Mantel, nachdem er ein langes Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von -mancherlei sudelhaften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem -Schandfleck des radikalen Bösen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen -herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu küssen?—</i>("Kant, on the other hand, -after he had tried throughout his life to keep his philosophical cloak -unsoiled by foul prejudices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the -disreputable stain of the 'radical evil' in human nature, in order that -Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem.") From this passage -it will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view of Kant; -namely, that he was a Christian in disguise.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">383.</p> - -<p><i>Religious morality.—</i>Passion, great desire; the passion for power, -love, revenge, and property: the moralists wish to uproot and -exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out -of it.</p> - -<p>The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster—therefore, they -are evil and ought to be condemned. Man must wring himself free from -them, otherwise he cannot be a <i>good</i> man....</p> - -<p>This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it -out." In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity," -the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His -disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be -only the loss of a particular member, but the actual castration of the -whole of the man's character.... And the same applies to the moral -mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, -sues for <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span>their extirpation. Its conclusion always is: only the -emasculated man is a good man.</p> - -<p>Instead of making use of and of <i>economising</i> the great sources of -passion, those torrents of the soul which are often so dangerous, -overwhelming, and impetuous, morality—this most shortsighted and most -corrupted of mental attitudes—would fain make them <i>dry up.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">384.</p> - -<p><i>Conquest over the passions?</i>—No, not if this is to mean their -enfeeblement and annihilation. <i>They must be enlisted in our service</i>: -and to this end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good deal (not -as individuals, but as communities, races, etc.). At length we should -trust them enough to restore their freedom to them: they love us like -good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">385.</p> - -<p><i>Intolerance on the part of morality</i> is a sign of man's <i>weakness</i>: -he is frightened of his own "immorality," he must <i>deny</i> his strongest -<i>instincts,</i> because he does not yet know how to use them. Thus the -most fruitful quarters of the globe remain uncultivated longest: the -power is lacking that might become master here....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">386.</p> - -<p>There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous -fine weather would be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span>a desirable thing: they still believe to-day -in <i>rebus moralibus,</i> that the "good man" alone and nothing else than -the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's -evolution will be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that -it is only to that end that all efforts should be directed). This is -in the highest degree an <i>uneconomical</i> thought; as we have already -suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity, and it is nothing more -than the expression of the <i>agreeableness</i> which the "good man" creates -(he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, he gives what one -is able to take).</p> - -<p>With a more educated eye one learns to desire exactly the reverse—that -is to say, an ever greater <i>dominion of evil,</i> man's gradual -emancipation from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the -growth of power around the greatest forces of Nature, and the ability -to enlist the passions in one's service.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">387.</p> - -<p>The whole idea of the hierarchy of the <i>passions</i>: as if the only right -and normal thing were to be led by <i>reason</i>—whereas the passions are -abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as their end -is concerned, nothing more than <i>desires for pleasure....</i></p> - -<p>Passion is deprived of its dignity (1) as if it only manifested -itself in an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the -<i>motive force</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span>(2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high -purpose—merely at pleasure....</p> - -<p>The misinterpretation of passion and <i>reason,</i> as if the latter were -an independent entity, and not a state of relationship between all -the various passions and desires; and as though every passion did not -possess its quantum of reason....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">388.</p> - -<p>How it was that, under the pressure of the dominion of an ascetic -and <i>self-effacing morality,</i> it was precisely the passions—love, -goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were -necessarily misunderstood?</p> - -<p>It is the <i>richness of a personality,</i> the fullness of it, its power -to flow over and to bestow, its instinctive feeling of ease, and its -affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love and great -sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism -as surely as do the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner -certainty that one has a right to everything. The <i>opposite</i> views, -according to the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and if -one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing to -give, and it is perfectly useless to stretch out one's hand either to -protect or to support others....</p> - -<p>How was it possible to <i>transform</i> these instincts to such an extent -that man could feel that to be of value which is directed against -himself, so that he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> -psychological baseness and falseness which hitherto has laid down the -law in the Church and in Church-infected philosophy!</p> - -<p>If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do is to hate himself. As -a matter of fact, he ought not to regard even his fellows otherwise -than he does himself; the love of man requires a justification, and it -is found in the fact that <i>God commanded it.</i>—From this it follows -that all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) appear to him -to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he re-acquires a right to -them only after having <i>denied</i> them as an obedient worshipper of God. -... Pascal, the admirable <i>logician</i> of Christianity, <i>went as far as -this</i>! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make -one's self loved," seemed Christian to him.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">389.</p> - -<p>Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal") -makes us pay. (Its enemies are—well? The "egoists.")</p> - -<p>The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in Europe (Pascal, -La Rochefoucauld)—inner enfeeblement, discouragement, and -self-consumption of the non-gregarious man.</p> - -<p>The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being -the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, Nature converted into an -instrument).</p> - -<p>Pangs of conscience associated with all that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span>is self-glorifying and -original: thus follows the unhappiness—the <i>gloominess</i> of the world -from the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men!</p> - -<p>Gregarious consciousness and timorousness transferred to philosophy and -religion.</p> - -<p>Let us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish -action out of consideration!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">390.</p> - -<p>My ultimate conclusion is, that the <i>real</i> man represents a much -higher value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever -existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have -been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular -kind of man has sought to establish <i>his</i> measures of preservation -and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this -kind which has been made to dominate has <i>reduced</i> man's worth, his -strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre -intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he -reveals a <i>desire</i>; that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been -developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely -to the "desirable," <i>worth of man</i>; that, up to the present, ideals -have really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the -poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have <i>seduced -men to yearn for nonentity</i>....</p> - -<hr /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span></p> -<p class="center">D. <i>A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating.</i></p> - -<p class="parnum">391.</p> - -<p>The standard <i>according</i> to which the value of moral valuations is to -be determined.</p> - -<p>The fundamental fact <i>that has been overlooked</i>: The contradiction -between "becoming more moral" and the elevation and the strengthening -of the type man.</p> - -<p><i>Homo natura</i>: The "will to power."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">392.</p> - -<p>Moral values regarded as <i>values of appearance</i> and compared with -<i>physiological</i> values.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">393.</p> - -<p>Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde: the last of the -"desiderata" concerning men, for instance, have never been regarded as -problems by philosophers. They always postulate the "<i>improvement</i>" -of man, quite guilelessly, as though by means of some intuition they -had been helped over the note of interrogation following the question, -<i>why</i> necessarily "<i>improve!</i>" To what extent is it <i>desirable</i> that -man should be more <i>virtuous,</i> or more <i>intelligent,</i> or <i>happier!</i> -Granting that nobody yet <i>knows</i> the "wherefore?" of mankind, all -such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one -of them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span>—who knows?—perhaps one is frustrating the other. Is an -increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and -insight? <i>Dubito</i>: only too often shall I have occasion to show that -the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the strict sense of the -word, not always been opposed to happiness hitherto? And again, does it -not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation as a necessary -means? And if the aim were to arrive at the <i>highest insight,</i> would -it not therefore be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in -happiness, and to choose danger, adventure, mistrust, and seduction as -a road to enlightenment?... And suppose one will have happiness; maybe -one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">394.</p> - - - -<p>The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called <i>moral improvement.</i></p> - -<p>We do not believe that one man can be another if he is not that -other already—that is to say, if he is not, as often happens, an -accretion of personalities or at least of parts of persons. In this -case it is possible to draw another set of actions from him into the -foreground, and to drive back "the older man." ... The man's aspect -is altered, but <i>not</i> his actual nature.... It is but the merest -<i>factum brutum</i> that any one should cease from performing certain -actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations. -Neither does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing -a certain action is entirely arrested, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span>nor that the reasons for -that action are dissipated. He whose destiny and abilities make him -a criminal never unlearns anything, but is continually adding to his -store of knowledge: and long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on -his talent.... Certainly, as far as society is concerned, the only -interesting fact is that some one has ceased from performing certain -actions; and to this end society will often raise a man out of those -circumstances which make him <i>able</i> to perform those actions: this -is obviously a wiser course than that of trying to break his destiny -and his particular nature. The Church,—which has done nothing except -to take the place of, and to appropriate, the philosophic treasures -of antiquity,—starting out from another standpoint and wishing to -secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul, believes in the expiatory -power of punishment, as also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: -both of which supposed processes are deceptions due to religious -prejudice—punishment expiates nothing, forgiveness obliterates -nothing; what is done cannot be undone. Because some one forgets -something it by no means proves that something has been wiped out.... -An action leads to certain consequences, both among men and away from -men, and it matters not whether it has met with punishment, or whether -it has been "expiated," "forgiven," or "obliterated," it matters not -even if the Church meanwhile canonises the man who performed it. The -Church believes in things that do not exist, it believes in "Souls"; it -believes in "influences" that do not exist—in divine <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span>influences; it -believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual -salvation: in all things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with -signs, attitudes, words, to which it lends an arbitrary interpretation. -It possesses a method of counterfeit psychology which is thought out -quite systematically.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">395.</p> - -<p>"Illness makes men better," this famous assumption which is to be met -with in all ages, and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as in -the mouth and maw of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of -discovering whether there is any truth in it, one might be allowed to -ask whether there is not perhaps a fundamental relationship between -morality and illness? Regarded as a whole, could not the "improvement -of mankind"—that is to say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, -and taming which the European has undergone within the last two -centuries—be regarded as the result of a long course of secret and -ghastly suffering, failure, abstinence, and grief? Has illness made -"Europeans" "better"? Or, put into other words, is not our modern -soft-hearted European morality, which could be likened to that of the -Chinese, perhaps an expression of physiological <i>deterioration</i>?... -It cannot be denied, for instance, that wherever history shows us -"man" in a state of particular glory and power, his type is always -dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span>little for humanity; -and perhaps, in those cases in which <i>it seems otherwise,</i> all that -was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the -surface in psychological matters, in order even in them to discover the -general proposition: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful, and -enterprising a man may feel, the more immoral he will be as well." A -terrible thought, to which one should on no account give way. Provided, -however, that one take a few steps forward with this thought, how -wondrous does the future then appear! What will then be paid for more -dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing which we are all trying -to promote, by all means in our power—the humanising, the improving, -and the increased "civilisation" of man? Nothing would then be more -expensive than virtue: for by means of it the world would ultimately -be turned into a hospital: and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, -"everybody must be everybody else's nurse." Then we should certainly -have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired! But how little -"joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton -spirits, daring, and danger! So few "actions" which would make life on -earth worth living! Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not all the -<i>great</i> things and deeds which have remained fresh in the memory of -men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been <i>immoral</i> in the -deepest sense of the word?...</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">396.</p> - -<p>The priests—and with them the half-priests or philosophers of all -ages—have always called that doctrine true, the educating influence -of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so—that is to say, -tended to "improve." In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian -empiric and miracle-worker who, because he had tried a certain poison -as a cure, declared it to be no poison. "By their fruits ye shall know -them"—that is to say, "by our truths." This has been the reasoning -of priests until this day. They have squandered their sagacity, with -results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof -of power" (or the proof "by the fruits ") pre-eminent and even supreme -arbiter over all other forms of proof. "That which makes good must -be good; that which is good cannot lie"—these are their inexorable -conclusions—"that which bears good fruit must consequently be true; -there is no other criterion of truth." ...</p> - -<p>But to the extent to which "improving" acts as an argument, -deteriorating must also act as a refutation. The error can be shown to -be an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a false -step, a vice can refute.... This indecent form of opposition, which -comes from below and behind—the doglike kind of attack, has not died -out either. Priests, as psychologists, never discovered anything more -interesting than spying out the secret vices of their adversaries—they -prove Christianity by looking about for the world's <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span>filth. They apply -this principle more particularly to the greatest on earth, to the -geniuses: readers will remember how Goethe has been attacked on every -conceivable occasion in Germany (Klopstock and Herder were among the -first to give a "good example" in this respect—birds of a feather -flock together).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">397.</p> - -<p>One must be very immoral in order to <i>make people moral by deeds.</i> The -moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he -who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for -anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist.</p> - -<p>Morality is a menagerie; it assumes that iron bars may be more useful -than freedom, even for the creatures it imprisons; it also assumes that -there are animal-tamers about who do not shrink from terrible means, -and who are acquainted with the use of red-hot iron. This terrible -species, which enters into a struggle with the wild animal, is called -"priests."</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Man, incarcerated in an iron cage of errors, has become a caricature -of man; he is sick, emaciated, ill-disposed towards himself, filled -with a loathing of the impulses of life, filled with a mistrust of -all that is beautiful and happy in life—in fact, he is a wandering -monument of misery. How shall we ever succeed in vindicating this -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> -phenomenon—this artificial, arbitrary, and <i>recent</i> miscarriage—the -sinner—which the priests have bred on their territory?</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two <i>biological</i> -notions in its place: the <i>taming</i> of the wild beasts, and the <i>rearing -of a particular species.</i></p> - -<p>The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to -"<i>improve</i>" ... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a -lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a -rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even -the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his -species. But he is less harmful....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">398.</p> - -<p>What I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is:—</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> That there is no worse confusion than that which confounds -<i>rearing</i> and <i>taming</i>: and these two things have always been -confused.... Rearing, as I understand it, is a means of husbanding -the enormous powers of humanity in such a way that whole generations -may build upon the foundations laid by their progenitors—not only -outwardly, but inwardly, organically, developing from the already -existing stem and growing <i>stronger</i>....</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> That there is an exceptional danger in believing that mankind as -a whole is developing <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span>and growing stronger, if individuals are seen -to grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity—mankind—is -an abstract thing: the object of <i>rearing,</i> even in regard to the most -individual cases, can only be the <i>strong</i> man (the man who has no -breeding is weak, dissipated, and unstable).</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">6. Concluding Remarks Concerning the Criticism of Morality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">399.</p> - -<p>These are the things I demand of you—however badly they may sound in -your ears: that you subject moral valuations themselves to criticism. -That you should put a stop to your instinctive moral impulse—which in -this case demands submission and not criticism—with the question: "why -precisely submission?" That this yearning for a "why?"—for a criticism -of morality should not only be your present form of morality, but the -sublimest of all moralities, and an honour to the age you live in. That -your honesty, your will, may give an account of itself, and not deceive -you: "why not?"—Before what tribunal?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">400.</p> - -<p>The three <i>postulates</i>:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the "vulgar -man").</p> - -<p>All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the -physiologically botched).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> -All that is of average worth is high (the protest of the -herd, of the "mediocre").</p></blockquote> - -<p>Thus in the <i>history of morality</i> a <i>will to power</i> finds expression, -by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and -the botched, those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre, -attempt to make those valuations prevail which favour <i>their</i> existence.</p> - -<p>From a biological standpoint, therefore, the phenomenon Morality is of -a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed -at the <i>cost</i> of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, -the well-constituted and <i>beautiful</i> natures, the independent and -privileged classes in all respects.</p> - -<p>Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's -endeavours to arrive at a <i>higher type.</i> Its effects are: mistrust of -life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral), -—hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are -felt to be opposed to the higher instincts),—Degeneration and -self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them -that the conflict becomes <i>conscious.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">401.</p> - -<p><i>Which values have been paramount hitherto?</i></p> - -<p>Morality as the leading value in all phases of philosophy (even with -the Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a "true world" must exist -somewhere.</p> - -<p>What is it that here determines the highest <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span>value? What, in sooth, -is morality? The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and -the disinherited who <i>take their revenge</i> in this way and play the -<i>masters</i>....</p> - -<p>Historical proof: philosophers have always been decadents and always in -the pay of Nihilistic religions.</p> - -<p>The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The -introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral.</p> - -<p>General aspect: the values that have been highest hitherto have been a -special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular -instance of <i>immorality.</i></p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.</p> - -<p>1. How was this actually <i>possible!</i> Question: why did life and -physiological well-constitutedness succumb everywhere? Why was there no -affirmative philosophy, no affirmative religion?</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion. -Dionysos <i>versus</i> the Christ. The Renaissance. Art.</p></blockquote> - -<p>2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and -the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger....</p> - -<p><i>General view of history</i>; Is man an <i>exception</i> in the history of life -on this account?—An objection to <i>Darwinism.</i> The means wherewith -the weak succeed in ruling have become: instincts, "humanity," -"institutions." ...</p> - -<p>3. The proof of this rule on the part of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span>weak is to be found in -our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our -<i>science.</i></p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>The <i>instincts of decadence</i> have become master of the <i>instincts of -ascending</i> life.... The <i>will to nonentity</i> has prevailed over the -<i>will to life</i>!</p> - -<p>Is this <i>true</i>? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and -of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre?—is it -not perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere -slackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even -more dangerous?</p> - -<p>Suppose the <i>strong</i> were masters in all respects, even in valuing: -let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, -suffering, and sacrifice! <i>Self-contempt on the part of the weak</i> would -be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate -their kind. And would this be <i>desirable</i>?—should we really like a -world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, -the <i>plasticity</i>—in fact, the whole influence of the weak—was -lacking?<a name="FNanchor_9_16" id="FNanchor_9_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_16" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> ...</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> -We have seen two "wills to power" at war <i>(in this special case we -had a principle</i>: that of agreeing with the one that has hitherto -succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto -triumphed): we have recognised the "real world" as a "<i>world of lies</i>" -and morality as a <i>form of immorality.</i> We do <i>not</i> say "the stronger -is wrong."</p> - -<p>We have understood <i>what</i> it is that has determined the highest values -hitherto, and <i>why</i> the latter should have prevailed over the opposite -value: it was numerically the <i>stronger</i>.</p> - -<p>If we now purify <i>the opposite value</i> of the infection, the -half-heartedness, <i>and the degeneration,</i> with which we identify it, we -restore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_16" id="Footnote_9_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_16"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—We realise here the great difference -between Nietzsche and those who draw premature conclusions from -Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in -Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as -the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to -resist and to overthrow <i>was their supremacy, their excessive power.</i> -He felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need -of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of -Christian values.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">402.</p> - -<p><i>Morality,</i> a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and -expedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its -supporters.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">403.</p> - -<p>One ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where -one is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the <i>disciplinary -school of moral error.</i>—When one judges life morally, it <i>disgusts</i> -one.</p> - -<p>Neither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for -instance, "Nature is cruel." It is precisely when one <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span>perceives <i>that -there is no such central controlling and responsible force that one is -relieved!</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>Evolution of man.</i> A. He tried to attain to a certain power -over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in -order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and -"wild animals.")</p> - -<p>B. If power over Nature has been attained, this power can -be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a -self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.</p></blockquote> - - -<p class="parnum">404.</p> - -<p>Morality may be regarded as the <i>illusion of a species,</i> fostered with -the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future, -and seemingly granting him such a very great value, that with that -<i>self-consciousness</i> he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides -of his nature, and find it difficult to be pleased with himself.</p> - -<p>We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done -hitherto: <i>but now it is no more than a burden</i> which may prove fatal. -<i>Morality itself</i> in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">405.</p> - -<p>To what extent is the <i>self-destruction of morality</i> still a sign of -its own strength? We Europeans have within us the blood of those who -were ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span>frightfully -seriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time, -sacrificed to it. On the other hand, our intellectual subtlety has -been reached essentially through the vivisection of our consciences. -We do not yet know the "whither" towards which we are urging our -steps, now that we have departed from the soil of our forebears. But -it was on this very soil that we acquired the strength which is now -driving us from our homes in search of adventure, and it is thanks -to that strength that we are now in mid-sea, surrounded by untried -possibilities and things undiscovered—we can no longer choose, we must -be conquerors, now that we have no land in which we feel at home and -in which we would fain "survive." A concealed "<i>yea</i>" is driving us -forward, and it is stronger than all our "nays." Even our <i>strength</i> no -longer bears with us in the old swampy land: we venture out into the -open, we attempt the task. The world is still rich and undiscovered, -and even to perish were better than to be half-men or poisonous men. -Our very strength itself urges us to take to the sea; there where all -suns have hitherto sunk we know of a new world....</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span></p> -<p class="title2">III.</p> - -<p class="title2">CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.</p> - -<hr /> -<p class="title">1. General Remarks.</p> - - - -<p class="parnum">406.</p> - -<p>Let us rid ourselves of a few superstitions which heretofore have been -fashionable among philosophers!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">407.</p> - -<p>Philosophers are prejudiced <i>against</i> appearance, change, pain, death, -the things of the body, the senses, fate, bondage, and all that which -has no purpose.</p> - -<p>In the first place, they believe in: absolute knowledge, (2) in -knowledge for its own sake,</p> - -<p>(3) in virtue and happiness as necessarily related,</p> - -<p>(4) in the recognisability of men's acts. They are led by instinctive -determinations of values, in which <i>former</i> cultures are reflected -(more dangerous cultures too).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">408.</p> - -<p>What have philosophers <i>lacked</i>! (1) A sense of history, (2) a -knowledge of physiology, (3) a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span>goal in the future.—The ability to -criticise without irony or moral condemnation.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">409.</p> - -<p>Philosophers have had (1) from times immemorial a wonderful capacity -for the <i>contradictio in adjecto,</i> (2) they have always trusted -concepts as unconditionally as they have mistrusted the senses: it -never seems to have occurred to them that notions and words are our -inheritance of past ages in which thinking was neither very clear nor -very exact.</p> - -<p>What seems to dawn upon philosophers last of all: that they must -no longer allow themselves to be presented with concepts already -conceived, nor must they merely purify and polish up those concepts; -but they must first <i>make</i> them, <i>create</i> them, themselves, and -then present them and get people to accept them. Up to the present, -people have trusted their concepts generally, as if they had been a -wonderful <i>dowry</i> from some kind of wonderland: but they constitute -the inheritance of our most remote, most foolish, and most intelligent -forefathers. This <i>piety</i> towards that <i>which already exists in us</i> -is perhaps related to the <i>moral element in science.</i> What we needed -above all is absolute scepticism towards all traditional concepts (like -that which a certain philosopher may already have possessed—and he was -Plato, of course: for he taught <i>the reverse</i>).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">410.</p> - -<p>Profoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of the theory of knowledge, -I liked to look now out of this window, now out of that, though I took -good care not to become finally fixed anywhere, indeed I should have -thought it dangerous to have done so—though finally: is it within the -range of probabilities for an instrument to criticise its own fitness? -What I noticed more particularly was, that no scientific scepticism or -dogmatism has ever arisen quite free from all <i>arrières pensées</i>—that -it has only a secondary value as soon as the motive lying immediately -behind it is discovered.</p> - -<p>Fundamental aspect: Kant's, Hegel's, Schopenhauer's, the sceptical and -epochistical, the historifying and the pessimistic attitudes—all have -a <i>moral</i> origin. I have found no one who has dared to <i>criticise the -moral valuations,</i> and I soon turned my back upon the meagre attempts -that have been made to describe the evolution of these feelings (by -English and German Darwinians).</p> - -<p>How can Spinoza's position, his denial and repudiation of the moral -values, be explained? (It was the result of his Theodicy!)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">411.</p> - -<p><i>Morality regarded as the highest form of protection.</i>—Our world is -<i>either</i> the work and expression (the <i>modus</i>) of God, in which case -it must be <i>in the highest degree perfect</i> (Leibnitz's <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span>conclusion -...),—and no one doubted that he knew what perfection must be -like,—and then all evil can only be <i>apparent</i> (Spinoza is <i>more -radical,</i> he says this of good and evil), or it must be a part of God's -high purpose (a consequence of a particularly great mark of favour -on God's part, who thus allows man to choose between good and evil: -the privilege of being no automaton; "freedom," with the ever-present -danger of making a mistake and of choosing wrongly.... See Simplicius, -for instance, in the commentary to Epictetus).</p> - -<p><i>Or</i> our world is imperfect; evil and guilt are real, determined, and -are absolutely inherent to its being; in that case it cannot be the -<i>real</i> world: consequently knowledge can only be a way of denying -the world, for the latter is error which may be recognised as such. -This is Schopenhauer's opinion, based upon Kantian first principles. -Pascal was still more desperate: he thought that even knowledge must be -corrupt and false—that <i>revelation</i> is a necessity if only in order to -recognise that the world should be denied....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">412.</p> - -<p>Owing to our habit of believing in unconditional authorities, we have -grown to feel a profound need for them: indeed, this feeling is so -strong that, even in an age of criticism such as Kant's was, it showed -itself to be superior to the need for criticism, and, in a certain -sense, was able to subject the whole work of critical acumen, and to -convert it to its own use. It proved its <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span>superiority once more in -the generation which followed, and which, owing to its historical -instincts, naturally felt itself drawn to a relative view of all -authority, when it converted even the Hegelian philosophy of evolution -(history rechristened and called philosophy) to its own use, and -represented history as being the self-revelation and self-surpassing -of moral ideas. Since Plato, philosophy has lain under the dominion of -morality. Even in Plato's predecessors, moral interpretations play a -most important rôle (Anaximander declares that all things are made to -perish as a punishment for their departure from pure being; Heraclitus -thinks that the regularity of phenomena is a proof of the morally -correct character of evolution in general).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">413.</p> - -<p>The progress of philosophy has been hindered most seriously hitherto -through the influence of moral <i>arrières-pensées.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">414.</p> - -<p>In all ages, "fine feelings" have been regarded as arguments, "heaving -breasts" have been the bellows of godliness, convictions have been the -"criteria" of truth, and the need of opposition has been the note of -interrogation affixed to wisdom. This falseness and fraud permeates -the whole history of philosophy. But for a few respected sceptics, -no instinct for intellectual Uprightness is to be found anywhere. -Finally, <i>Kant</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span>guilelessly sought to make this thinker's corruption -scientific by means of his concept, "<i>practical reason</i>". He expressly -invented a reason which, in certain cases, would allow one <i>not</i> to -bother about reason—that is to say, in cases where the heart's desire, -morality, or "duty" are the motive power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">415.</p> - -<p><i>Hegel</i>: his popular side, the doctrine of war and of great men. Right -is on the side of the victorious: he (the victorious man) stands for -the progress of mankind. His is an attempt at proving the dominion of -morality by means of history.</p> - -<p>Kant: a kingdom of moral values withdrawn from us, invisible, real.</p> - -<p>Hegel: a demonstrable process of evolution, the actualisation of the -kingdom of morality.</p> - -<p>We shall not allow ourselves to be deceived either in Kant's or Hegel's -way:—We no longer <i>believe,</i> as they did, in morality, and therefore -have no philosophies to found with the view of justifying morality. -Criticism and history have no charm for us <i>in this</i> respect: what is -their charm, then?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">416.</p> - -<p>The importance of German philosophy (<i>Hegel,</i>) the thinking out of a -kind of <i>pantheism</i> which would not reckon evil, error, and suffering -as arguments against godliness. <i>This grand initiative</i> was misused -by the powers that were (State, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span>etc.) to sanction the rights of the -people that happened to be paramount.</p> - -<p><i>Schopenhauer</i> appears as a stubborn opponent of this idea; he is a -moral man who, in order to keep in the right concerning his moral -valuation, finally becomes a <i>denier of the world.</i> Ultimately he -becomes a "mystic."</p> - -<p>I myself have sought an <i>æsthetic</i> justification of the ugliness in -this world. I regarded the desire for beauty and for the persistence -of certain forms as a temporary preservative and recuperative measure: -what seemed to me to be fundamentally associated with pain, however, -was the eternal lust of creating and the <i>eternal compulsion to -destroy.</i></p> - -<p>We call things ugly when we look at them with the desire of attributing -some sense, some <i>new</i> sense, to what has become senseless: it is the -accumulated power of the creator which compels him to regard what has -existed hitherto as no longer acceptable, botched, worthy of being -suppressed—ugly!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">417.</p> - -<p><i>My first solution of the problem: Dionysian wisdom. The joy in the -destruction of the most noble thing,</i> and at the sight of its gradual -undoing, regarded as the joy over what is <i>coming and what lies in the -future,</i> which triumphs over <i>actual things, however good they may -be.</i> Dionysian: temporary identification with the principle of life -(voluptuousness of the martyr included).</p> - -<p><i>My innovations.</i> The Development of Pessimism: <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span>intellectual -pessimism; <i>moral</i> criticism, the dissolution of the last comfort. -Knowledge, a sign of <i>decay,</i> veils by means of an illusion all strong -action; isolated culture is unfair and therefore strong.</p> - -<p>(1) My <i>fight</i> against decay and the increasing weakness of -personality. I sought a new <i>centrum.</i></p> - -<p>(2) The impossibility of this endeavour is <i>recognised.</i></p> - -<p>(3) <i>I therefore travelled farther along the road of dissolution—and -along it I found new sources of strength for individuals.</i> We <i>must -be destroyers</i>!—I perceived that the state of <i>dissolution is one -in which individual beings are able to arrive at a kind of perfection -not possible hitherto, it is an image and isolated example of life -in general.</i> To the paralysing feeling of general dissolution and -imperfection, I opposed the <i>Eternal Recurrence.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">418.</p> - -<p>People naturally seek the picture of life in <i>that</i> philosophy which -makes them most cheerful—that is to say, in that philosophy which -gives the highest sense of freedom to <i>their strongest instinct.</i> This -is probably the case with me.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">419.</p> - -<p>German philosophy, as a whole,—Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, to -mention the greatest,—is the most out-and-out <i>form of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span>romanticism</i> -and home-sickness that has ever yet existed: it is a yearning for the -best that has ever been known on earth. One is at home nowhere; that -which is ultimately yearned after is a place where one can somehow -feel at home; because one has been at home there before, and that -place is the <i>Greek</i> world! But it is precisely in that direction -that airbridges are broken down<i>—save,</i> of course, the rainbow -of concepts! And the latter lead everywhere, to all the homes and -"fatherlands" that ever existed for Greek souls! Certainly, one must be -very light and thin in order to cross these bridges! But what happiness -lies even in this desire for spirituality, almost for ghostliness! -With it, how far one is from the "press and bustle" and the mechanical -boorishness of the natural sciences, how far from the vulgar din -of "modern ideas"! One wants to get back to the Greeks <i>via</i> the -Fathers of the Church, from North to South, from formulæ to forms; the -passage out of antiquity—Christianity—is still a source of joy as a -means of access to antiquity, as a portion of the old world itself, -as a glistening mosaic of ancient concepts and ancient valuations. -Arabesques, scroll-work, rococo of scholastic abstractions—always -better, that is to say, finer and more slender, than the peasant and -plebeian reality of Northern Europe, and still a protest on the part -of higher intellectuality against the peasant war and insurrection -of the mob which have become master of the intellectual taste of -Northern Europe, and which had its leader in a man as great and -unintellectual as Luther:—in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span>this respect German philosophy belongs -to the Counter-Reformation, it might even be looked upon as related -to the Renaissance, or at least to the will to Renaissance, the will -to get ahead with the discovery of antiquity, with the excavation of -ancient philosophy, and above all of pre-Socratic philosophy—the -most thoroughly dilapidated of all Greek temples! Possibly, in à few -hundred years, people will be of the opinion that all German philosophy -derived its dignity from this fact, that step by step it attempted -to reclaim the soil of antiquity, and that therefore all demands for -"originality" must appear both petty and foolish when compared with -Germany's higher claim to having refastened the bonds which seemed for -ever rent—the bonds which bound us to the Greeks, the highest type -of "men" ever evolved hitherto. To-day we are once more approaching -all the fundamental principles of the cosmogony which the Greek mind -in Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and -Anaxagoras, was responsible for. Day by day we are growing more -<i>Greek</i>; at first, as is only natural, the change remains confined to -concepts and valuations, and we hover around like Greasing spirits: but -it is to be hoped that some day our <i>body</i> will also be involved! Here -lies (and has always lain) my hope for the German nation.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">420.</p> - -<p>I do not wish to convert anybody to philosophy: it is both necessary -and perhaps desirable that the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span>philosopher should be a <i>rare</i> -plant. Nothing is more repugnant to me than the scholarly praise of -philosophy which is to be found in Seneca and Cicero. Philosophy -has not much in common with virtue. I trust I may be allowed to say -that even the scientific man is a fundamentally different person -from the philosopher. What I most desire is, that the genuine notion -"philosopher" should not completely perish in Germany. There are so -many incomplete creatures in Germany already who would fain conceal -their ineptitude beneath such noble names.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">421.</p> - -<p>I must <i>set up the highest ideal of a philosopher.</i> Learning is not -everything! The scholar is the sheep in the kingdom of learning; he -studies because he is told to do so, and because others have done so -before him.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">422.</p> - -<p>The superstition concerning <i>philosophers</i>: They are confounded with -men <i>of science.</i> As if the value of things were inherent in them -and required only to be held on to tightly! To what extent are their -researches carried on under the influence of values which already -prevail (their hatred of appearance of the body, etc.)? Schopenhauer -concerning morality (scorn of Utilitarianism). Ultimately the confusion -goes so far that Darwinism is regarded as philosophy, and thus at the -present day power has gone over to the men of <i>science.</i> Even Frenchmen -like Taine prosecute <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span>research, or mean to prosecute research, -<i>without</i> being already in possession of a standard of valuation. -Prostration before "facts" of a kind of cult. As a matter of fact, they -<i>destroy</i> the existing valuations.</p> - -<p>The <i>explanation</i> of this misunderstanding. The man who is able to -command is a rare phenomenon; he misinterprets himself. What one -<i>wants</i> to do, above all, is to disclaim all authority and to attribute -it to <i>circumstances.</i> In Germany the critic's estimations belong to -the history of awakening <i>manhood.</i> Lessing, etc. (Napoleon concerning -Goethe). As a matter of fact, the movement is again made retrograde -owing to German romanticism: and the <i>fame</i> of German philosophy -relies upon it as if it dissipated the danger of scepticism and could -<i>demonstrate faith.</i> Both tendencies culminate in Hegel: at bottom, -what he did was to generalise the fact of German criticism and the -fact of German romanticism,—a kind of dialectical fatalism, but to -the honour of intellectuality, with the actual submission of the -philosopher to reality. <i>The critic prepares the way</i>: that is all!</p> - -<p>With Schopenhauer the philosopher's mission dawns; it is felt that -the object is to determine <i>values</i>; still under the dominion of -eudemonism. The ideal of Pessimism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">423.</p> - -<p><i>Theory and practice.</i>—This is a pernicious distinction, as if there -were an <i>instinct of knowledge,</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span>which, without inquiring into the -utility or harmfulness of a thing, blindly charged at the truth; and -then that, apart from this instinct, there were the whole world of -<i>practical</i> interests.</p> - -<p>In contradiction of this, I try to show what instincts are active -behind all these <i>pure</i> theorists,—and how the latter, as a whole, -under the dominion of their instincts, fatally make for something -which <i>to their minds</i> is "truth," to their minds and <i>only</i> to their -minds. The struggle between systems, together with the struggle between -epistemological scruples, is one which involves very special instincts -(forms of vitality, of decline, of classes, of races, etc.).</p> - -<p>The so-called <i>thirst for knowledge</i> may be traced to the <i>lust of -appropriation</i> and of <i>conquest</i>: in obedience to this lust the -senses, memory, and the instincts, etc., were developed. The quickest -possible reduction of the phenomena, economy, the accumulation of spoil -from the world of knowledge (<i>i.e.</i> that portion of the world which has -been appropriated and made manageable)....</p> - -<p>Morality is therefore such a curious science, because it is in the -highest degree <i>practical</i>: the purely scientific position, scientific -uprightness, is thus immediately abandoned, as soon as morality calls -for replies to its questions. Morality says: I <i>require</i> certain -answers—reasons, arguments; scruples may come afterwards, or they may -not come at all.</p> - -<p>"How must one act?" If one considers that one is dealing with a -supremely evolved type—a type which has been "dealt with" for -countless thousands of years, and in which everything has become -instinct, expediency, automatism, fatality, the <i>urgency</i> of this moral -question seems rather funny.</p> - -<p>"How must one act?" Morality has always been a subject of -misunderstanding: as a matter of fact, a certain species, which was -constituted to act in a certain way, wished to justify itself by -<i>making</i> its norm paramount.</p> - -<p>"How must one act?" this is not a cause, but an <i>effect.</i> Morality -follows, the ideal comes first....</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the appearance of moral scruples (or in other -words, <i>the coming to consciousness of the values</i> which guide action) -betray a certain <i>morbidness</i>; strong ages and people do not ponder -over their rights, nor over the principles of action, over instinct or -over reason. <i>Consciousness</i> is a sign that the real morality—that -is to say, the certainty of instinct which leads to a definite -course of action—is going to the dogs.... Every time a new <i>world -of consciousness</i> is created, the moralists are signs of a lesion, -of impoverishment and of disorganisation. Those who are <i>deeply -instinctive</i> fear bandying words over duties: among them are found -pyrrhonic opponents of dialectics and of knowableness in general.... A -virtue is <i>refuted</i> with a "for." ...</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> -<i>Thesis</i>: The appearance of moralists belongs to periods when morality -is declining.</p> - -<p><i>Thesis</i>: The moralist is a dissipator of moral instincts, however much -he may appear to be their restorer.</p> - -<p><i>Thesis</i>: That which really prompts the action of a moralist is not a -moral instinct, but the <i>instincts of decadence,</i> translated into the -forms of morality (he regards the growing uncertainty of the instincts -as <i>corruption</i>).</p> - -<p><i>Thesis</i>: The <i>instincts of decadence</i> which, thanks to moralists, wish -to become master of the instinctive morality of stronger races and -ages, are:—</p> - -<p>(1) The instincts of the weak and of the botched;</p> - -<p>(2) The instincts of the exceptions, of the anchorites, of the -unhinged, of the abortions of quality or of the reverse;</p> - -<p>(3) The instincts of the habitually suffering, who require a noble -interpretation of their condition, and who therefore require to be as -poor physiologists as possible.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<p class="parnum">424.</p> - -<p>The humbug of the <i>scientific spirit.</i>—One should not affect the -spirit of science, when the time to be scientific is not yet at -hand; but even the genuine investigator has to abandon vanity, and -has to affect a certain kind of method which is not yet seasonable. -Neither should we falsify things and thoughts, which we have arrived -at differently, by means of a false arrangement of deduction and -dialectics. It is thus that Kant in his "morality" falsifies his -inner tendency to psychology; a more modern example of the same thing -is Herbert Spencer's <i>Ethics.</i> A man should neither conceal nor -misrepresent the <i>facts</i> concerning the way in which he conceived his -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> -thoughts. The deepest and most inexhaustible books will certainly -always have something of the aphoristic and impetuous character of -Pascal's <i>Pensées</i>. The motive forces and valuations have lain long -below the surface; that which comes uppermost is their effect.</p> - -<p>I guard against all the humbug of a false scientific spirit:—</p> - -<p>(1) In respect of the manner of <i>demonstration,</i> if it does not -correspond to the genesis of the thoughts;</p> - -<p>(2) In respect of the demands for <i>methods</i> which, at a given period in -science, may be quite impossible;</p> - -<p>(3) In respect of the demand for <i>objectivity</i> for cold impersonal -treatment, where, as in the case of all valuations, we describe -ourselves and our intimate experiences in a couple of words. There -are ludicrous forms of vanity, as, for instance, Sainte-Beuve's. He -actually worried himself all his life because he had shown some warmth -or passion either "<i>pro</i>" or "con," and he would fein have lied that -fact out of his life.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">425.</p> - -<p>"Objectivity" in the philosopher: moral indifference in regard to one's -self, blindness in regard to either favourable or fetal circumstances. -Unscrupulousness in the use of dangerous means; perversity and -complexity of character considered as an advantage and exploited.</p> - -<p>My profound indifference to myself: I refuse <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span>to derive any advantage -from my knowledge, nor do I wish to escape any disadvantages which it -may entail.—I include among these disadvantages that which is called -the <i>perversion</i> of character; this prospect is beside the point: I use -my character, but I try neither to understand it nor to change it—the -personal calculation of virtue has not entered my head once. It strikes -me that one closes the doors of knowledge as soon as one becomes -interested in one's own personal case—or even in the "Salvation of -one's soul"!... One should not take one's morality too seriously, nor -should one forfeit a modest right to the opposite of morality....</p> - -<p>A sort of <i>heritage of morality</i> is perhaps presupposed here: one -feels that one can be lavish with it and fling a great deal of it out -of the window without materially reducing one's means. One is never -tempted to admire "beautiful souls," one always knows one's self to be -their superior. The monsters of virtue should be met with inner scorn; -<i>déniaiser la vertu</i>—Oh, the joy of it!</p> - -<p>One should revolve round one's self, have no desire to be "better" or -"anything else" at all than one is. One should be too interested to -omit throwing the tentacles or meshes of every morality out to things.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">426.</p> - -<p>Concerning the psychology of <i>philosophers.</i> They should be -psychologists—this was possible only from the nineteenth century -onwards—and no longer little Jack Homers, who see three or four -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> -feet in front of them, and are almost satisfied to burrow inside -themselves. We psychologists of the future are not very intent on -self-contemplation: we regard it almost as a sign of degeneration when -an instrument endeavours "to know itself":<a name="FNanchor_10_17" id="FNanchor_10_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_17" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> we are instruments of -knowledge and we would fain possess all the precision and ingenuousness -of an instrument—consequently we may not analyse or "know" ourselves. -The first sign of a great psychologist's self-preservative instinct: -he never goes in search of himself, he has no eye, no interest, no -inquisitiveness where he himself is concerned.... The great egoism -of our dominating will insists on our completely shutting our eyes to -ourselves, and on our appearing "impersonal," "disinterested"!—Oh to -what a ridiculous degree we are the reverse of this!</p> - -<p>We are no Pascals, we are not particularly interested in the -"Salvation of the soul," in our own happiness, and in our own -virtue.—We have neither enough time nor enough curiosity to be so -concerned with ourselves. Regarded more deeply, the case is again -different, we thoroughly mistrust all men who thus contemplate their -own navels: because introspection seems to us a degenerate form of -the psychologist's genius, as a note of interrogation affixed to the -psychologist's instinct: just as a painter's eye is degenerate which is -actuated by the <i>will</i> to see for the sake of seeing.</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_17" id="Footnote_10_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_17"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <span style="font-size: 0.9em;">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.</span>—Goethe invariably inveighed against -the "gnoti seauton" of the Socratic school; he was of the opinion that -an animal which tries to see its inner self must be sick.</p></div> - - -<hr /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span></p> -<p class="title">2. A Criticism of Greek Philosophy.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">427.</p> - -<p>The apparition of Greek philosophers since the time of Socrates is a -symptom of decadence; the anti-Hellenic instincts become paramount.</p> - -<p>The "<i>Sophist</i>" is still quite Hellenic—as are also Anaxagoras, -Democritus, and the great Ionians; but only as transitional forms. The -<i>polis</i> loses its faith in the unity of its culture, in its rights of -dominion over every other <i>polis....</i> Cultures, that is to say, "the -gods," are exchanged, and thus the belief in the exclusive prerogative -of the <i>deus autochthonus</i> is lost. Good and Evil of whatever origin -get mixed: the boundaries separating good from evil gradually -<i>vanish....</i> This is the "Sophist." ...</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the "philosopher" is the <i>reactionary</i>: he insists -upon the <i>old</i> virtues. He sees the reason of decay in the decay of -institutions: he therefore wishes to revive <i>old</i> institutions;—he -sees decay in the decline of authority: he therefore endeavours to -find <i>new</i> authorities (he travels abroad, explores foreign literature -and exotic religions....);—he will reinstate the <i>ideal polis,</i> after -the concept "polis" has become superannuated (just, as the Jews kept -themselves together as a "people" after they had fallen into slavery). -They become interested in all tyrants: their desire is to re-establish -virtue with "<i>force majeure</i>".</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> -Gradually everything <i>genuinely Hellenic</i> is held responsible for -the state of <i>decay</i> (and Plato is just as ungrateful to Pericles, -Homer, tragedy, and rhetoric as the prophets are to David and -Saul). <i>The downfall of Greece is conceived as an objection to the -fundamental principles of Hellenic culture: the profound error of -philosophers</i>—Conclusion: the Greek world perishes. The cause thereof: -Homer, mythology, ancient morality, etc.</p> - -<p>The anti-Hellenic development of philosophers' valuations:—the -Egyptian influence ("Life after death" made into law....);—the Semitic -influence (the "dignity of the sage," the "Sheik");—the Pythagorean -influence, the subterranean cults, Silence, means of terrorisation -consisting of appeals to a "Beyond," <i>mathematics</i>: the religious -valuation consisting of a sort of intimacy with a cosmic entity;—the -sacerdotal, ascetic, and transcendental influences;—the <i>dialectical</i> -influence,—I am of opinion that even Plato already betrays revolting -and pedantic meticulousness in his concepts!—Decline of good -intellectual taste: the hateful noisiness of every kind of direct -dialectics seems no longer to be felt.</p> - -<p>The <i>two</i> decadent tendencies and extremes run side by side: (a) the -luxuriant and more charming kind of decadence which shows a love of -pomp and art, and (b) the gloomy kind, with its religious and moral -pathos, its stoical self-hardening tendency, its Platonic denial of the -senses, and its preparation of the soil for the coming of Christianity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">428.</p> - -<p>To what extent psychologists have been corrupted by the moral -idiosyncrasy!—Not one of the ancient philosophers had the courage to -advance the theory of the non-free will (that is to say, the theory -that denies morality);—not one had the courage to identify the typical -feature of happiness, of every kind of happiness **("pleasure"), with the -will to power: for the pleasure of power was considered immoral;—not -one had the courage to regard virtue as a <i>result of immorality</i> (as a -result of a will to power) in the service of a species (or of a race, -or of a <i>polis</i>); for the will to power was considered immoral.</p> - -<p>In the whole of moral evolution, there is no sign of truth: all -the conceptual elements which come into play are fictions; all the -psychological tenets are false; all the forms of logic employed in this -department of prevarication are sophisms. The chief feature of all -moral philosophers is their total lack of intellectual cleanliness and -self-control: they regard "fine feelings" as arguments: their heaving -breasts seem to them the bellows of godliness.... Moral philosophy is -the most suspicious period in the history of the human intellect.</p> - -<p>The first great example: in the name of morality and under its -patronage, a great wrong was committed, which as a matter of fact was -in every respect an act of decadence. Sufficient stress cannot be laid -upon this fact, that the great Greek philosophers not only represented -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> -the decadence of <i>every kind of Greek ability</i>, but also made it -<i>contagious</i>.... This "virtue" made wholly abstract was the highest -form of seduction; to make oneself abstract means to turn one's back on -the world.</p> - -<p>The moment is a very remarkable one: the Sophists are within sight -of the first <i>criticism of morality,</i> the first <i>knowledge</i> of -morality:—they classify the majority of moral valuations (in view -of their dependence upon local conditions) together;—they lead one -to understand that every form of morality is capable of being upheld -dialectically: that is to say, they guessed that all the fundamental -principles of a morality must be <i>sophistical</i>—a proposition which -was afterwards proved in the grandest possible style by the ancient -philosophers from Plato onwards (up to Kant);—they postulate the -primary truth that there is no such thing as a "moral <i>per se</i>," a -"good <i>per se</i>," and that it is madness to talk of "truth" in this -respect.</p> - -<p>Wherever was <i>intellectual uprightness</i> to be found in those days?</p> - -<p>The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown out of all the Greek -instincts; it belongs to the culture of the age of Pericles as -necessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Heraclitus, -Democritus, and in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it -finds expression in the elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance. -And—it has ultimately shown itself to be right: every step in the -science of epistemology and morality has <i>confirmed the attitude</i> of -the Sophists.... Our <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span>modern attitude of mind is, to a great extent, -Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean ... to say that it is -<i>Protagorean</i> is even sufficient: because Protagoras was in himself a -synthesis of the two men Heraclitus and Democritus.</p> - -<p>(<i>Plato</i>: a <i>great Cagliostro,</i>—let us think of how Epicurus judged -him; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend, judged him——Is Plato's integrity by -any chance beyond question?... But we at least know what he wished to -have <i>taught</i> as absolute truth—namely, things which were to him not -even relative truths: the separate and immortal life of "souls.")</p> - - -<p class="parnum">429.</p> - -<p>The <i>Sophists</i> are nothing more, nor less than realists: they elevate -all the values and practices which are common property to the rank of -values—they have the courage, peculiar to all strong intellects, -which consists in <i>knowing</i> their immorality....</p> - -<p>Is it to be supposed that these small Greek independent republics, -so filled with rage and envy that they would fain have devoured each -other, were led by principles of humanity and honesty? Is Thucydides -by any chance reproached with the words he puts into the mouths of -the Athenian ambassadors when they were treating with the Melii anent -the question of destruction or submission? Only the most perfect -Tartuffes could have been able to speak of virtue in the midst of that -dreadful strain—or if not Tartuffes, at least <i>detached philosophers,</i> -anchorites, exiles, and fleers <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span>from reality.... All of them, people -who denied things in order to be able to exist.</p> - -<p>The Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and Plato adopted the cause -of virtue and justice, they were <i>Jews</i> or I know not what. <i>Grote's</i> -tactics in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would like to -raise them to the rank of men of honour and moralisers—but it was -their honour not to indulge in any humbug with grand words and virtues.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">430.</p> - -<p>The great reasonableness underlying all moral education lay in the fact -that it always attempted to attain to <i>the certainty of an instinct</i>: -so that neither good intentions nor good means, as such, first required -to enter consciousness. Just as the soldier learns his exercises, so -should man learn how to act in life. In truth this unconsciousness -belongs to every kind of perfection: even the mathematician carries out -his calculations unconsciously....</p> - -<p>What, then, does Socrates' <i>reaction</i> mean, which recommended -dialectics as the way to virtue, and which was charmed when morality -was unable to justify itself logically? But this is precisely what -proves its <i>superiority</i>—without unconsciousness <i>it is worth nothing</i>!</p> - -<p>In reality it means <i>the dissolution of Greek instincts,</i> when -<i>demonstrability</i> is posited as the first condition of personal -excellence in virtue. All these great "men of virtue" and of words are -themselves types of dissolution.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> -In practice, it means that moral judgments have been torn from the -conditions among which they grew and in which alone they had some -sense, from their Greek and Græco-political soil, in order to be -<i>denaturalised</i> under the cover of being <i>made sublime.</i> The great -concepts "good" and "just" are divorced from the first principles of -which they form a part, and, as "ideas" <i>become free,</i> degenerate -into subjects for discussion. A certain truth is sought behind them; -they are regarded as entities or as symbols of entities: a world is -<i>invented</i> where they are "at home," and from which they are supposed -to hail.</p> - -<p><i>In short</i>: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in Plato.... And then it -was necessary to invent the <i>perfectly abstract</i> man also:—good, just, -wise, and a dialectician to boot—in short, the <i>scarecrow</i> of the -ancient philosopher: a plant without any soil whatsoever; a human race -devoid of all definite ruling instincts; a virtue which "justifies" -itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd "individual" <i>per se</i>! the -highest form of <i>Artificiality....</i></p> - -<p>Briefly, the denaturalisation of moral values resulted in the creation -of a degenerate <i>type of man</i>—"the good man," "the happy man," -"the wise man."—Socrates represents a moment of the most <i>profound -perversity</i> in the history of values.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">431.</p> - -<p><i>Socrates.</i>—This veering round of Greek taste in favour of dialectics -is a great question. What <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span>really happened then? Socrates, the -<i>roturier</i> who was responsible for it, was thus able to triumph over -a more noble taste, the taste of <i>the noble</i>:—the mob gets the upper -hand along with dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners -were repudiated in good society; they were regarded as indecent; the -youths were Warned against them. What was the purpose of this display -of reasons? Why demonstrate? Against others one could use authority. -One commanded, and that sufficed. Among friends, <i>inter pares,</i> there -was tradition—<i>also</i> a form of authority: and last but not least, -one understood each other. There was no room found for dialectics. -Besides, all such modes of presenting reasons were distrusted. All -honest things do not carry their reasons in their hands in such -fashion. It is indecent to show all the five fingers at the same time. -That which can be "demonstrated" is little worth. The instinct of -every party-speaker tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and -carries little conviction. Nothing is more easily wiped away than the -effect of a dialectician. It can only be a <i>last defence.</i> One must -be in an extremity; it is necessary to have to <i>extort</i> one's rights; -otherwise one makes no use of dialectics. That is why the Jews were -dialecticians, Reynard the Fox was a dialectician, and so was Socrates. -As a dialectician a person has a merciless instrument in his hand: -he can play the tyrant with it; he compromises when he conquers. The -dialectician leaves it to his opponent to demonstrate that he is not an -idiot; he is made furious <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span>and helpless, while the dialectician himself -remains calm and still possessed of his triumphant reasoning powers—he -<i>paralyses</i> his opponent's intellect.—The dialectician's irony is a -form of mob-revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the cold -knife-cuts of the syllogism....</p> - -<p>In Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality and wild fancies, the -charm of concepts was so great, that he involuntarily honoured and -deified the concept as a form of ideal. <i>Dialectical intoxication</i>: as -the consciousness of being able to exercise control over one's self by -means of it—as an instrument of the Will to Power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">432.</p> - -<p><i>The problem of Socrates.</i>—The two antitheses: the <i>tragic</i> and the -<i>Socratic</i> spirits—measured according to the law of Life.</p> - -<p>To what extent is the Socratic spirit a decadent phenomenon? to what -extent are robust health and power still revealed by the whole attitude -of the scientific man, his dialectics, his ability, and his severity? -(the health of the <i>plebeian</i>; whose malice, <i>esprit frondeur,</i> -whose astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in check by his -<i>cleverness</i>; the whole type is "ugly").</p> - -<p><i>Uglification</i>: self-derision, dialectical dryness, intelligence in -the form of a <i>tyrant</i> against the "tyrant" (instinct). Everything in -Socrates is exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature; he is a buffoon -with the blood of Voltaire in his veins. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> -He discovers a new form of <i>agon</i>; he is the first fencing-master in -the superior classed of Athens; he stands for nothing else than the -<i>highest form of cleverness</i>: he calls it "virtue" (he regarded it as a -means of <i>salvation</i>; he did not choose to be <i>clever,</i> cleverness was -<i>de rigueur</i>); the proper thing is to control one's self in suchwise -that one enters into a struggle <i>not</i> with passions but with reasons -as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem—the unravelment of the errors -of passion);—it is desirable to discover how every one may be caught -once he is goaded into a passion, and to know how illogically passion -proceeds; self-mockery is practised in order to injure the very roots -of the <i>feelings of resentment.</i></p> - -<p>It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic states form a part of -the Socratic problem: its association of reason, virtue, and happiness. -With this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things it succeeded -<i>in charming</i> the world: ancient philosophy could not rid itself of -this doctrine....</p> - -<p>Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of science: the -idiosyncrasy of considering one's self a problem. Acoustic -hallucinations in Socrates: morbid element. When the intellect is -rich and independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying itself -with morality. How is it that Socrates is a <i>moral-maniac</i>?—Every -"practical" philosophy immediately steps into the foreground in times -of distress. When morality and religion become the chief interests of a -community, they are signs of a state of distress.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">433.</p> - -<p>Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as weapons against the<i> -wildness of the instincts</i>. The latter must be dangerous and must -threaten ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by developing -<i>intelligence</i> to this degree of tyranny. In order to make a <i>tyrant</i> -of intelligence the instincts must first have proved themselves -tyrants. This is the problem. It was a very timely one in those days. -Reason became virtue—virtue equalled happiness.</p> - -<p><i>Solution</i>: Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact -of their inner experiences as Socrates does; five feet from excess, -from anarchy and from dissolution—all decadent men. They regard him -as a doctor: Logic as will to power, as will to control self, as will -to "happiness." The wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a -<i>sign of decadence</i>, as is also the superfœtation of logic and clear -reasoning in him. Both are abnormities, each belongs to the other. -Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this concern about "happiness" -(<i>i.e.</i> about the "salvation of the soul"; <i>i.e. to feel that one's -condition is a danger</i>). Its fanatical interest in "happiness" shows -the pathological condition of the subconscious self: it was a vital -interest. The <i>alternative</i> which faced them all was: to be reasonable -or to perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows that they felt -they were in danger.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">434.</p> - -<p><i>Why everything resolved itself into mummery.—</i>Rudimentary -psychology, which only considered the <i>conscious</i> lapses of men (as -causes), which regarded "consciousness" as an attribute of the soul, -and which sought a will behind every action (<i>i.e.</i> an intention), -could only answer "<i>Happiness</i>" to the question: "<i>What does man -desire?</i>" (it was impossible to answer "Power," because that would have -been <i>immoral)</i>;—consequently behind all men's actions there is the -intention of attaining to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if man -as a matter of fact does not attain to happiness, why is it? Because he -mistakes the means thereto.—<i>What is the unfailing means of acquiring -happiness?</i> Answer: <i>virtue.</i>—Why virtue? Because virtue is supreme -rationalness, and rationalness makes mistakes in the choice of means -impossible: virtue in the form of <i>reason</i> is the way to happiness. -Dialectics is the constant occupation of virtue, because it does away -with passion and intellectual cloudiness.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, man does <i>not</i> desire "happiness." Pleasure is -a sensation of power: if the passions are excluded, those states of -the mind are also excluded which afford the greatest sensation of -power and therefore of pleasure. The highest rationalism is a state of -cool clearness, which is very far from being able to bring about that -feeling of power which every kind of <i>exaltation</i> involves....</p> - -<p>The ancient philosophers combat everything <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span>that intoxicates and -exalts—everything that impairs the perfect coolness and impartiality -of the mind.... They were consistent with their first false principle: -that consciousness was the <i>highest,</i> the <i>supreme</i> state of mind, the -prerequisite of perfection—whereas the reverse is true....</p> - -<p>Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as it has been willed or -conscious. The philosophers of antiquity <i>were the greatest duffers</i> -in practice, "because they condemned themselves" theoretically -to <i>dufferdom,</i>.... In practice everything resolved itself into -theatricalness: and he who saw through it, as Pyrrho did, for instance, -thought as everybody did—that is to say, that in goodness and -uprightness "paltry people" were far superior to philosophers.</p> - -<p>All the deeper natures of antiquity were disgusted at the <i>philosophers -of virtue</i>; all people saw in them was brawlers and actors. (This was -the judgment passed on <i>Plato</i> by <i>Epicurus</i> and <i>Pyrrho</i>.)</p> - -<p><i>Result</i>: In practical life, in patience, goodness, and mutual -assistance, paltry people were above them:—this is something like the -judgment Dostoiewsky or Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more -philosophical in practice, they are more courageous in their way of -dealing with the exigencies of life....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">435.</p> - -<p><i>A criticism of the philosopher.</i>—Philosophers and moralists merely -deceive themselves when they <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span>imagine that they escape from decadence -by <i>opposing</i> it. That lies beyond their wills: and however little they -may be aware of the fact, it is generally discovered, subsequently that -they were among the most powerful promoters of decadence.</p> - -<p>Let us examine the philosophers of Greece—Plato, for instance. He -it was who separated the instincts from the polis, from the love of -contest, from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the mysteries, -and the belief in tradition and in ancestors.... He was the seducer of -the nobles: he himself seduces through the <i>roturier</i> Socrates.... He -denied all the first principles of the "noble Greek" of sterling worth; -he made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with the tyrants, -dabbled in politics for the future, and was the example of a man whose -<i>instincts</i> were the example of a man whose <i>instincts</i> were most -perfectly separated from <i>tradition.</i> He is profound and passionate in -everything that is <i>anti-Hellenic</i>....</p> - -<p>One after the other, these great philosophers represent the <i>typical</i> -forms of decadence: the moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, -nihilism, (ἀδιαφορία), cynicism, hardening principles, hedonism, and -reaction.</p> - -<p>The question of "happiness," of "virtue," and of the "salvation of the -soul," is the expression of <i>physiological contradictoriness</i> in these -declining natures: their instincts lack all <i>balance</i> and <i>purpose.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">436.</p> - -<p>To what extent do dialectics and the faith in reason rest upon <i>moral</i> -prejudices? With Plato we are as the temporary inhabitants of an -intelligible world of goodness, still in possession of a bequest from -former times: divine dialectics taking its root in goodness leads to -everything good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead "backwards"). -Even Descartes had a notion of the fact that, according to a thoroughly -Christian and moral attitude of mind, which includes a belief in a -<i>good</i> God as the Creator of all things, the truthfulness of God -<i>guarantees</i> the judgments of our senses for us. But for this religious -sanction and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence should -we obtain our right to trust in existence? That thinking must be a -measure of reality,—that what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot -<i>exist,</i>—is a coarse <i>non plus ultra</i> of a moral blind confidence -(in the essential principle of truth at the root of all things); this -in itself is a mad assumption which our experience contradicts every -minute. We cannot think of anything precisely as it is....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">437.</p> - -<p>The real <i>philosophers of Greece</i> are those which came before Socrates -(with Socrates something changes). They are all distinguished men, -they take their stand away from the people and from usage; they have -travelled; they are earnest <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span>to the point of sombreness, their eyes -are calm, and they are not unacquainted with the business of state and -diplomacy. They anticipated all the great concepts which coming sages -were to have concerning things in general: they themselves represented -these concepts, they made systems out of themselves. Nothing run give a -higher idea of Greek intellect than this sudden fruitfulness in types, -than this involuntary completeness in the drawing up of all the great -possibilities of the philosophical ideal. I can see only one original -figure in those that came afterwards: a late arrival but necessarily -the last—<i>Pyrrho</i> the nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the -influences which had become ascendant in the mean-time the Socratic -school, Plato, and the artistic optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes -back to Democritus <i>via</i> Protagoras....)</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly among the humble. Devoid of -pride. To live in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what every -one believes. To be on one's guard against science and intellect, and -against everything that <i>puffs one out.</i> ... To be simply patient -in the extreme, careless and mild;—<i>ὰπάθεια</i> or, better still, -πραῢτης. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid the tumult of the -Schools; born alter his time; weary; an example of the protest of -weariness against the eagerness of dialecticians; the incredulity of -the tired man in regard <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 3611]</a></span>to the importance of everything. He had seen -<i>Alexander</i>; he had seen the <i>Indian penitents.</i> To such late-arrivals -and creatures of great subtlety, everything lowly, poor, and idiotic, -is seductive. It narcoticises: it gives them relaxation (Pascal). -On the other hand, they mix with the crowd, and get confounded -with the rest. These weary creatures need warmth.... To overcome -contradiction; to do away with contests; to have no will to excel in -any way; to deny the <i>Greek</i> instincts (Pyrrho lived with his sister, -who was a midwife.) To rig out wisdom in such a way that it no longer -distinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty; to perform -the lowest offices, and to go to market and sell sucking-pigs.... -Sweetness, clearness, indifference; no need of virtues that require -attitudes; to be equal to all even in virtue: final conquest of one's -self, final indifference.</p> - -<p>Pyrrho and Epicurus;—two forms of Greek decadence; they are related -in their hatred of dialectics and all <i>theatrical</i> virtues. These -two things together were then called philosophy; Pyrrho and Epicurus -intentionally held that which they loved in low esteem; they chose -common and even contemptible names for it, and they represented a state -in which one is neither ill, healthy, lively, nor dead.... Epicurus was -more <i>naïf,</i> more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more experience of -the world, had travelled more, and was more nihilistic. His life was a -protest against the great <i>doctrine of Identity</i> (Happiness = Virtue = -Knowledge). The proper way of living is not promoted by science: wisdom -does not make <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span>"wise." ... The proper way of living does not desire -happiness, it turns away from happiness....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">438.</p> - -<p>The war against the "old faith," as Epicurus waged it, was, strictly -speaking, a struggle against <i>pre-existing</i> Christianity—the struggle -against a world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified throughout -with feelings of guilt, and grown old and sick.</p> - -<p>Not the "moral corruption" of antiquity, but precisely its <i>moral -infectedness</i> was the prerequisite which enabled Christianity to become -its master. Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed paganism by -transvaluing its values and poisoning its innocence. We ought at last -to understand that what was then destroyed was <i>higher</i> than what -prevailed! Christianity grew on the soil of psychological corruption, -and could only take root in rotten ground.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">439.</p> - -<p>Science: as a disciplinary measure or as an instinct—I see a decline -of the instincts in Greek philosophers: otherwise they could not have -been guilty of the profound error of regarding the conscious state -as the more valuable state. The intensity of consciousness stands in -the inverse ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmission. -Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view, which is always the sign of -weakened instincts.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> -We must, in sooth, seek <i>perfect life</i> there where it is least -conscious (that is to say, there where it is least aware of its logic, -its reasons, its means, its intentions, and its <i>utility).</i> The return -to the facts of <i>common sense,</i> the facts of the common man and of -"paltry people." <i>Honesty and intelligence</i> stored up for generations -of people who are quite unconscious of their principles, and who -even have some fear of principles. It is not reasonable to desire a -<i>reasoning virtue.</i> ... A philosopher is compromised by such a desire.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">440.</p> - -<p>When morality—that is to say, refinement, prudence, bravery, and -equity—have been stored up in the same way, thanks to the moral -efforts of a whole succession of generations, the collective power of -this hoard of virtue projects its rays even into that sphere where -honesty is most seldom present—the sphere of <i>intellect.</i> When a -thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a state of ill-ease in -the organism; something new has got to be found, the organism is not -satisfied or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and it is -hypersensitive—precisely all this is consciousness....</p> - -<p>Gennius lies in the instincts; goodness does too. One only acts -perfectly when one acts instinctively. Even from the moral point of -view all thinking which is conscious is merely a process of groping, -and in the majority of cases an attack on morality. Scientific honesty -is always sacrificed <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span>when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try -the experiment: put the wisest man in the balance, and then let him -discourse upon morality....</p> - -<p>It could also be proved that the whole of a man's <i>conscious</i> thinking -shows a much lower standard of morality than the thoughts of the same -man would show if they were led by his <i>instincts.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">441.</p> - -<p>The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all the Socratic schools, -proceeds from the profound instinct that man <i>is</i> not made <i>better</i> -when he is shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based upon -reason.... This in the end is the niggardly fact, it was the agonal -instinct in all these born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify -their <i>personal abilities</i> as the <i>highest of all qualities,</i> and to -represent every other form of goodness as conditioned by them. The -<i>anti-scientific</i> spirit of all this "philosophy": it <i>will never admit -that it is not right.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">442.</p> - -<p>This is extraordinary. From its very earliest beginnings, Greek -philosophy carries on a struggle against science with the weapons of -a theory of knowledge, especially of scepticism; and why is this? It -is always in favour of <i>morality....</i> (Physicists and medical men -are hated.) Socrates, Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics, -Epicurus and Pyrrho—a general onslaught upon <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span>knowledge in favour -of <i>morality....</i> (Hatred of dialectics also.) There is still a -problem to be solved: they approach sophistry in order to be rid of -science. On the other hand, the physicists are subjected to such an -extent that, among their first principles, they include the theory of -truth and of real being: for instance, the atom, the four elements -(<i>juxtaposition</i> of being, in order to explain its multiformity and its -transformations). Contempt of <i>objectivity</i> in interests is taught: -return to practical interest, and to the personal utility of all -knowledge....</p> - -<p>The struggle against science is directed at: (1) its pathos -(objectivity); (2) its means (that is to say, at its utility); (3) its -results (which are considered childish). It is the same struggle which -is taken up later on by the <i>Church</i> in the name of piety: the Church -inherited the whole arsenal of antiquity for her war with science. The -theory of knowledge played the same part in the affair as it did in -Kant's or the Indians' case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled -with it, a free hand is wanted for the "purpose" that is envisaged.</p> - -<p>Against what powers are they actually defending themselves? Against -dutifulness, against obedience to law, against the compulsion of going -hand in hand—I believe this is what is called <i>Freedom....</i></p> - -<p>This is how decadence manifests itself: the instinct of solidarity is -so degenerate that solidarity itself gets to be regarded as <i>tyranny</i>: -no authority or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span>desires to -fall in with the rank and file, and to adopt its ignobly slow pace. The -slow movement which is the tempo of science is generally hated, as are -also the scientific man's indifference in regard to getting on, his -long breath, and his impersonal attitude.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">443.</p> - -<p>At bottom, morality is <i>hostile</i> to science: Socrates was so already -too—and the reason is, that science considers certain things important -which have no relation whatsoever to "good" and "evil," and which -therefore reduce the gravity of our feelings concerning "good" and -"evil." What morality requires is that the whole of a man should serve -it with all his power: it considers it waste on the part of a creature -that <i>can ill afford waste,</i> when a man earnestly troubles his head -about stars or plants. That is why science very quickly declined -in Greece, once Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the -disease of morality. The mental attitudes reached by a Democritus, a -Hippocrates, and a Thucydides, have not been reached a second time.—</p> - - -<p class="parnum">444.</p> - -<p>The problem of the <i>philosopher</i> and of the <i>scientific</i> man.—The -influence of age; depressing habits (sedentary study <i>à la</i> Kant; -over-work; inadequate nourishment of the brain; reading). A more -essential question still: is it not already perhaps a <i>symptom</i> of -decadence when thinking tends to establish <i>generalities</i>?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> -<i>Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the will</i> (to be able -to remain as detached as possible ...). This presupposes a tremendous -adiaphora in regard to the strong passions: a kind of isolation, an -exceptional position, opposition to the normal passions.</p> - -<p>Type: desertion of <i>home-country</i> emigrants go ever greater distances -afield; growing exoticism; the voice of the old imperative dies -away;—and the continual question "whither?" ("happiness") is a sign -of <i>emancipation</i> from forms of organisation, a sign of breaking loose -from everything.</p> - -<p>Problem: is the man of <i>science</i> more of a decadent symptom than the -philosopher?—as a <i>whole</i> scientific man is not, cut loose from -everything, only a part of his being is consecrated exclusively to the -service of knowledge and disciplined to maintain a special attitude and -point of view; in his department he is in need of <i>all</i> the virtues -of a strong race, of robust health, of great severity, manliness and -intelligence. He is rather a symptom of the great multiformity of -culture than of the effeteness of the latter. The decadent scholar -is a <i>bad</i> scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has always been -reckoned hitherto as the typical philosopher.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">445.</p> - -<p>Among philosophers, nothing is more rare than <i>intellectual -uprightness</i>: they perhaps say the very reverse, and even believe it. -But the prerequisite of all their work is, that they can only admit -of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span>certain truths; they know what they <i>have</i> to prove; and the fact -that they must be agreed as to these "truths" is almost what makes them -recognise one another as philosophers. There are, for instance, the -truths of morality. But belief in morality is not a proof of morality: -there are cases—and the philosopher's case is one in point—when a -belief of this sort is simply a piece of <i>immorality</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">446.</p> - -<p><i>What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher?</i>—He teaches that -the qualities which he happens to possess are the only qualities that -exist, that they are indispensable to those who wish to attain to the -"highest good" (for instance, dialectics with Plato). He would have -all men raise themselves, <i>gradatim,</i> to <i>his</i> type as the highest. He -despises what is generally esteemed—by him a gulf is cleft between -the highest <i>priestly</i> values and the values of the <i>world.</i> He knows -what is true, who God is, what every one's goal should be, and the way -thereto.... The typical philosopher is thus an absolute dogmatist;—if -he <i>requires</i> scepticism at all it is only in order to be able to speak -dogmatically of his <i>principal purpose</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">447.</p> - -<p>When the philosopher is confronted with his rival—science, for -instance, he becomes a sceptic; then he appropriates a <i>form of -knowledge</i> which he denies to the man of science; he goes hand in -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> -hand with the priest so that he may not be suspected of atheism or -materialism; he considers an attack made upon himself as an attack -upon morals, religion, virtue, and order—he knows how to bring his -opponents into ill repute by calling them "seducers" and "underminers": -then he marches shoulder to shoulder with power.</p> - -<p>The philosopher at war with other philosophers:—he does his best -to compel them to appear like anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of -authority. In short, when he fights, he fights exactly like a priest -and like the priesthood.</p> - - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">3. The Truths and Errors of Philosophers.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">448.</p> - -<p>Philosophy defined by Kant: "<i>The science of the limitations of -reason</i>"!!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">449.</p> - -<p>According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art of discovering truth. On -the other hand, the Epicurians, who availed themselves of Aristotle's -<i>sensual</i> theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical opposition to the -search for truth: "Philosophy is the art of <i>Life.</i>"</p> - - -<p class="parnum">450.</p> - -<p><i>The three great naïvetés:—</i></p> - -<p>Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if ...);</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span></p> -<p>Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if ...);</p> - -<p>Knowledge as a means to the "denial of Life"—inasmuch as it leads to -disappointment—(as if ...).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">451.</p> - -<p>As if there were a "truth" which one could by some means approach!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">452.</p> - -<p>Error and ignorance are fatal.—The assumption that <i>truth has been -found</i> and that ignorance and error are at an end, constitutes one -of the most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted that it be -generally accepted, it paralyses the will to test, to investigate, -to be cautious, and to gather experience: it may even be regarded as -criminal—that is to say, as a <i>doubt</i> concerning truth....</p> - -<p>"Truth" is therefore more fatal than error and ignorance, because it -paralyses the forces which lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The -passion for <i>idleness</i> now stands up for "truth" ("Thought is pain -and misery!"), as also do order, rule, the joy of possession, the -pride of wisdom—in fact, <i>vanity.</i>—it is easier to <i>obey</i> than to -<i>examine</i>; it is more gratifying to think "I possess the truth," than -to see only darkness in all directions; ... but, above all, it is -reassuring, it lends confidence, and alleviates life—it "improves" -the character inasmuch as it <i>reduces mistrust.</i>" Spiritual peace," "a -quiet conscience"—these things <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span>are inventions which are only possible -provided "<i>Truth be found.</i>"—"By their fruits ye shall know them." ... -"Truth" is the truth because it makes men <i>better....</i> The process goes -on: all goodness and all success is placed to the credit of "truth."</p> - -<p>This is the <i>proof by success</i>: the happiness, contentment, and the -welfare of a community or of an individual, are now understood to be -the <i>result of the belief in morality</i>.... Conversely: <i>failure</i> is -ascribed to a <i>lack</i> of faith.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">453.</p> - -<p>The causes of error lie just as much in the <i>good</i> as in the <i>bad will</i> -of man:—in an incalculable number of cases he conceals reality from -himself, he falsifies it, so that he may not suffer from his good or -bad will. God, for instance, is considered the shaper of man's destiny; -he interprets his little lot as though everything were intentionally -sent to him for the salvation of his soul,—this act of ignorance in -"philology," which to a more subtle intellect would seem unclean and -false, is done, in the majority of cases, with perfect <i>good faith.</i> -Goodwill, "noble feelings," and "lofty states of the soul" are just as -underhand and deceptive in the means they use as are the passions love, -hatred, and revenge, which morality has repudiated and declared to be -egotistic.</p> - -<p>Errors are what mankind has had to pay for most dearly: and taking them -all in all, the errors which have resulted from goodwill are those -which <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span>have wrought the most harm. The illusion which makes people -happy is more harmful than the illusion which is immediately followed -by evil results: the latter increases keenness and mistrust, and -purifies, the understanding; the former merely narcoticises....</p> - -<p>Fine feelings and noble impulses ought, speaking physiologically, to be -classified with the narcotics: their abuse is followed by precisely the -same results as the abuse of any other opiate—<i>weak nerves</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">454.</p> - -<p>Error is the most expensive luxury that man can indulge in: and if the -error happen to be a physiological one, it is fatal to life. What has -mankind paid for most dearly hitherto? For its "truths ": for every one -of these were errors <i>in physiologicis></i>....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">455.</p> - -<p>Psychological <i>confusions</i>: the <i>desire for belief</i> is confounded with -the "will to truth" (for instance, in Carlyle). But the <i>desire for -disbelief</i> has also been confounded with the "will to truth" (a need of -ridding one's self of a belief for a hundred reasons: in order to carry -one's point against certain "believers"). <i>What is it that inspires -Sceptics?</i> The hatred of dogmatists—or a need of repose, weariness as -in Pyrrho's case.</p> - -<p>The <i>advantages</i> which were expected to come from truth, were the -advantages resulting from a belief in <i>it</i>: for, in itself, truth could -have been <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span>thoroughly painful, harmful, and even fatal. Likewise truth -was combated only on account of the advantages which a victory over it -would provide—for instance, emancipation from the yoke of the ruling -powers.</p> - -<p>The method of truth was <i>not</i> based upon motives of truthfulness, but -upon <i>motives of power, upon the desire to be superior.</i></p> - -<p><i>How is</i> truth <i>proved</i>? By means of the feeling of increased -power,—by means of utility,—by means of indispensability,—<i>in short, -by means of its advantages</i> (that is to say, hypotheses concerning what -truth should be like in order that it may be embraced by us). But this -involves <i>prejudice</i>: it is a sign that <i>truth</i> does not enter the -question at all....</p> - -<p>What is the meaning of the "will to truth," for instance in the -Goncourts? and in the <i>naturalists</i>?—A criticism of "objectivity."</p> - -<p>Why should we know: why should we not prefer to be deceived?... -But what was needed was always belief—and <i>not</i> truth.... Belief -is created by means which are quite <i>opposed</i> to the method of -investigation: <i>it even depends upon the exclusion of the latter.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">456.</p> - -<p>A certain degree of faith suffices to-day to give us an <i>objection</i> -to what is believed—it does more, it makes us question the spiritual -healthiness of the believer.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">457.</p> - -<p><i>Martyrs.</i>—To combat anything that is based upon reverence, opponents -must be possessed of both daring and recklessness, and be hindered -by no scruples.... Now, if one considers that for thousands of -years man has sanctified as truths only those things which were in -reality errors, and that he has branded any criticism of them with -the hall-mark of badness, one will have to acknowledge, however -reluctantly, that a goodly amount of <i>immoral deeds</i> were necessary in -order to give the initiative to an attack—I mean to <i>reason....</i> That -these immoralists have always posed as the "martyrs of truth" should -be forgiven them: the truth of the matter is that they did not stand -up and deny owing to an instinct for truth; but because of a love of -dissolution, criminal scepticism, and the love of adventure. In other -cases it is personal rancour which drives them into the province of -problems—they only combat certain points of view in order to be -able to carry their point against certain people. But, above all, it -is revenge which has become scientifically useful—the revenge of the -oppressed, those who, thanks to the truth that happens to be ruling, -have been pressed aside and even smothered....</p> - -<p>Truth, that is to say the scientific method, was grasped and favoured -by such as recognised that it was a useful weapon of war—an instrument -of <i>destruction</i>....</p> - -<p>In order to be honoured as opponents, they <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span>were moreover obliged -to use an apparatus similar to that used by those whom they were -attacking: they therefore brandished the concept "truth" as absolutely -as their adversaries did—they became fanatics at least in their -poses, because no other pose could be expected to be taken seriously. -What still remained to be done was left to persecution, to passion, -and the uncertainty of the persecuted—hatred waxed great, and the -first impulse began to die away and to leave the field entirely to -science. Ultimately all of them wanted to be right in the same absurd -way as their opponents.... The word "conviction," "faith," the pride -of martyrdom—these things are most unfavourable to knowledge. The -adversaries of truth finally adopt the whole subjective manner of -deciding about truth,—that is to say, by means of poses, sacrifices, -and heroic resolutions,—and thus <i>prolong</i> the <i>dominion</i> of the -anti-scientific method. As martyrs they compromise their very own deed.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">458.</p> - -<p><i>The dangerous distinction between "theoretical" and "practical"</i> in -Kant for instance, but also in the ancient philosophers:—they behave -as if pure intellectuality presented them with the problems of science -and metaphysics;—they behave as if practice should be judged by a -measure of its own, whatever the judgment of theory may be.</p> - -<p>Against the first tendency I set up my <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span><i>psychology of philosophers</i>: -their strangest calculations and "intellectuality" are still but the -last pallid impress of a physiological fact; spontaneity is absolutely -lacking in them, everything is instinct, everything is intended to -follow a certain direction from the first....</p> - -<p>Against the second tendency I put my question: whether we know another -method of acting correctly, besides that of thinking correctly; -the last case <i>is</i> action, the first presupposes thought Are we -possessed of a means whereby we can judge of the value of a method -of life differently from the value of a theory: through induction or -comparison?... Guileless people imagine that in this respect we are -better equipped, we know what is "good"—and the philosophers are -content to repeat this view. We conclude that some sort of <i>faith</i> is -at work in this matter, and nothing more....</p> - -<p>"Men must act; <i>consequently</i> rules of conduct are necessary"—this is -what even the ancient Sceptics thought. The <i>urgent need</i> of a definite -decision in this department of knowledge is used as an argument in -favour of regarding something as <i>true</i>!...</p> - -<p>"Men must not act"—said their more consistent brothers, the Buddhists, -and then thought out a mode of conduct which would deliver man from the -yoke of action....</p> - -<p>To adapt one's self, to live as the "<i>common man</i>" lives, and to regard -as right and proper what <i>he</i> regards as right: this is <i>submission</i> to -the <i>gregarious instinct.</i> One must carry one's courage <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span>and severity -so far as to learn to consider such submission a <i>disgrace.</i> One should -not live according to two standards!... One should not separate theory -and practice!...</p> - - -<p class="parnum">459.</p> - -<p>Of all that which was formerly held to be true, not one word is to be -credited. Everything which was formerly disdained as unholy, forbidden, -contemptible, and fatal—all these flowers now bloom on the most -charming paths of truth.</p> - -<p>The whole of this old morality concerns us no longer: it contains not -one idea which is still worthy of respect. We have outlived it—we -are no longer sufficiently coarse and guileless to be forced to allow -ourselves to be lied to in this way.... In more polite language: we are -too virtuous for it.... And if truth in the old sense were "true" only -because the old morality said "yea" to it, and <i>had a right</i> to say -"yea" to it: it follows that no truth of the past can any longer be of -use to us.... Our <i>criterion</i> of truth is /certainly not morality: we -<i>refute</i> an assertion when we show that it is dependent upon morality -and is inspired by noble feelings.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">460.</p> - -<p>All these values are empirical and conditioned. But he who believes -in them and who honours them, <i>refuses</i> to acknowledge this aspect of -them. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span>All philosophers believe in these values, and one form their -reverence takes is the endeavour to make <i>a priori truths</i> out of them. -The falsifying nature of <i>reverence</i>....</p> - -<p>Reverence is the supreme test of intellectual <i>honesty,</i> but in the -whole history of philosophy there is no such thing as intellectual -honesty,—but the "love of goodness ..."</p> - -<p>On the one hand, there is an absolute <i>lack of method</i> in testing the -value of these values; <i>secondly,</i> there is a general disinclination -either to test them or to regard them as conditioned at all.—All -<i>anti-scientific</i> instincts assembled round moral values in order to -<i>keep science out</i> of this department....</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">4. Concluding Remarks in the Criticism of Philosophy.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">461.</p> - - -<p><i>Why philosophers are slanderers.</i>—The artful and blind hostility -of philosophers towards the <i>senses</i>—what an amount of <i>mob</i> and -<i>middle-class</i> qualities lie in all this hatred!</p> - -<p>The crowd always believes that an abuse of which it feels the harmful -results, constitutes an <i>objection</i> to the thing which happens to be -abused: all insurrectionary movements against principles, whether in -politics or agriculture, always follow a line of argument suggested by -this ulterior motive: the abuse must be shown to be necessary to, and, -inherent in, the principle.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> -It is a <i>woeful</i> history: mankind looks for a principle, from the -standpoint of which he will be able to contemn man—he invents a world -in order to be able to slander and throw mud at this world: as a matter -of fact, he snatches every time at nothing, and construes this nothing -as "God," as "Truth," and, in any case, as judge and detractor of -<i>this</i> existence....</p> - -<p>If one should require a proof of how deeply and thoroughly the actually -<i>barbarous</i> needs of man, even in his present state of tameness and -"civilisation," still seek gratification, one should contemplate the -"leitmotifs" of the whole of the evolution of philosophy:—a sort -of revenge upon reality, a surreptitious process of destroying the -values by means of which men live, a <i>dissatisfied</i> soul to which -the conditions of discipline is one of torture, and which takes a -particular pleasure in morbidly severing all the bonds that bind it to -such a condition.</p> - -<p>The history of philosophy is the story of a <i>secret and mad hatred</i> -of the prerequisities of Life, of the feelings which make for the -real values of Life, and of all partisanship in favour of Life. -Philosophers have never hesitated to affirm a fanciful world, provided -it contradicted this world, and furnished them with a weapon wherewith -they could calumniate this world. Up to the present, philosophy has -been the <i>grand school of slander</i>: and its power has been so great, -that even to-day our science, which pretends to be the advocate of -Life, has <i>accepted</i> the fundamental position of slander, and treats -this world as <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span>"appearance," and this chain of causes as though it were -only phenomenal. What is the hatred which is active here?</p> - -<p>I fear that it is still the <i>Circe of philosophers—</i>Morality, which -plays them the trick of compelling them to be ever slanderers.... They -believed in moral "truths," in these they thought they had found the -highest values; what alternative had they left, save that of denying -existence ever more emphatically the more they got to know about it?... -For this life is <i>immoral....</i> And it is based upon immoral first -principles: and morality says <i>nay</i> to Life.</p> - -<p>Let us suppress the real world: and in order to do this, we must first -suppress the highest values current hitherto—morals.... It is enough -to show that morality itself <i>is immoral,</i> in the same sense as that in -which immorality has been condemned heretofore. If an end be thus made -to the tyranny of the former values, if we have suppressed the "real -world," a <i>new order of values</i> must follow of its own accord.</p> - -<p>The world of appearance and the world <i>of lies</i>: this constitutes the -contradiction. The latter hitherto has been the "real world," "truth," -"God." This is the one which we still have to suppress.</p> - -<p>The <i>logic of my conception</i>:</p> - -<p>(1) <i>Morality as the highest value</i> (it is master of <i>all</i> the phases -of philosophy, even of the Sceptics). <i>Result</i>: this world is no good, -it is not the "real world."</p> - -<p>(2) <i>What</i> is it that determines the highest value here? What, in -sooth, is morality?—It is <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span>the instinct of <i>decadence</i>; it is the -means whereby the exhausted and the degenerate <i>revenge themselves.</i> -<i>Historical</i> proof: philosophers have always been decadents ... in the -service of <i>nihilistic</i> religions.</p> - -<p>(3) It is the instinct of decadence coming to the fore as <i>will to -power.</i> Proof: the absolute <i>immorality</i> of the means employed by -morality throughout its history.</p> - -<p>General aspect: the values which have been highest hitherto constitute -a specific case of the will to power; morality itself is a specific -case of immorality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">462.</p> - -<p><i>The principal innovations</i>: Instead of "moral values," nothing but -<i>naturalistic values.</i> Naturalisation of morality.</p> - -<p>In the place of "sociology," a <i>doctrine of the forms of dominion.</i></p> - -<p>In the place of "society," the <i>complex whole of culture,</i> which is -<i>my</i> chief interest (whether in its entirety or in parts).</p> - -<p>In the place of the "theory of knowledge," a <i>doctrine which laid down -the value of the passions</i> (to this a hierarchy of the passions would -belong: the passions <i>transfigured</i>; their <i>superior rank,</i> their -"<i>spirituality</i>").</p> - -<p>In the place of "metaphysics" and religion, the doctrine of <i>Eternal -Recurrence</i> (this being regarded as a means to the breeding and -selection of men).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span></p> -<p class="parnum">463.</p> - -<p>My precursors: Schopenhauer. To what extent I deepened pessimism, and -first brought its full meaning within my grasp, by means of its most -extreme opposite.</p> - -<p>Likewise: the higher Europeans, the pioneers of <i>great politics.</i></p> - -<p>Likewise: the Greeks and their genesis.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">464.</p> - -<p>I have named those who were unconsciously my workers and precursors. -But in what direction may I turn with any hope of finding my particular -kind of philosophers themselves, or at least <i>my yearning for new -philosophers</i>? In that direction, alone, where a <i>noble</i> attitude of -mind prevails, an attitude of mind which believes in slavery and in -manifold orders of rank, as the prerequisites of any high degree of -culture. In that direction, alone, where a <i>creative</i> attitude of -mind prevails, an attitude of mind which does not regard the world -of happiness and repose, the "Sabbath of Sabbaths" as an end to be -desired, and which, even in peace, honours the means which lead to new -wars; an attitude of mind which would prescribe laws for the future, -which for the sake of the future would treat everything that exists -to-day with harshness and even tyranny; a daring and "immoral" attitude -of mind, which would wish to see both the good and the evil qualities -in man developed to their fullest extent, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span>because it would feel itself -able to put each in its right place—that is to say, in that place in -which each would need the other. But what prospect has he of finding -what he seeks, who goes in search of philosophers to-day? Is it not -probable that, even with the best Diogenes-lantern in his hand, he will -wander about by night and day in vain? This age is possessed of the -<i>opposite</i> instincts. What it wants, above all, is comfort; secondly, -it wants publicity and the deafening din of actors' voices, the big -drum which appeals to its Bank-Holiday tastes; thirdly, that every -one should lie on his belly in utter subjection before the greatest -of all lies—which is "the equality of men"—and should honour only -those virtues which <i>make men equal and place them in equal positions.</i> -But in this way, the rise of the philosopher, as I understand him, is -made completely impossible—despite the fact that many may regard the -present tendencies as rather favourable to his advent. As a matter of -fact, the whole world mourns, to-day, the hard times that philosophers -<i>used</i> to have, hemmed in between the fear of the stake, a guilty -conscience, and the presumptuous wisdom of the Fathers of the Church: -but the truth is, that precisely these conditions were <i>ever so much -more favourable</i> to the education of a mighty, extensive, subtle, -rash, and daring intellect than the conditions prevailing to-day. At -present another kind of intellect, the intellect of the demagogue, of -the actor, and perhaps of the beaver- and ant-like scholar too, finds -the best possible conditions for its development. But even <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span>for artists -of a superior calibre the conditions are already far from favourable: -for does not every one of them, almost, perish owing to his want of -discipline? They are no longer tyrannised over by an outside power—by -the tables of absolute values enforced by a Church or by a -monarch: and thus they no longer learn to develop their "inner tyrant," -their <i>will.</i> And what holds good of artists also holds good, to a -greater and more fatal degree, of philosophers. Where, then, are free -spirits to be found to-day? Let any one show me a free spirit to-day!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">465.</p> - -<p>Under "Spiritual freedom" I understand something very definite: it is -a state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and -other disciples of "truth" in one's severity towards one's self, in -one's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say -nay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers -that have appeared heretofore as <i>contemptible libertines</i> hiding -behind the petticoats of the female "Truth."</p> - -<h4>END OF VOL. 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