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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b7ab55 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #52915 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52915) diff --git a/old/52915-0.txt b/old/52915-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 69c8a2b..0000000 --- a/old/52915-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13491 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Will to Power, Book III and IV, by -Friedrich Nietzsche - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: The Will to Power, Book III and IV - An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values - -Author: Friedrich Nietzsche - -Editor: Oscar Levy - -Translator: Anthony M. Ludovici - -Release Date: August 28, 2016 [EBook #52915] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WILL TO POWER, BOOK III AND IV *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe Free Literature (back online -soon in an extended version, alo linking to free sources -for education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational -materials,...) (Images generously made available by the -Internet Archive.) - - - - - -THE - -WILL TO POWER - -_AN ATTEMPTED_ - -_TRANSVALUATION OF ALL VALUES_ - -By - -FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE - - -TRANSLATED BY - -ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI - - -VOL. II - -BOOKS III AND IV - -T.N. FOULIS - -13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET - -EDINBURGH: AND LONDON - -1913 - - - - -CONTENTS OF VOL. II. - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE - -THIRD BOOK. THE PRINCIPLES OF A NEW VALUATION. - -I. THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE-- - -_(a)_ The Method of Investigation -_(b)_ The Starting-Point of Epistemology -_(c)_ The Belief in the "Ego." Subject -_(d)_ Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity -_(e)_ The Origin of Reason and Logic -_(f)_ Consciousness -_(g)_ Judgment. True--False -_(h)_ Against Causality -_(i)_ The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance -_(k)_ The Metaphysical Need -_(l)_ The Biological Value of Knowledge -_(m)_ Science - -II. THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE-- - -1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World -2. The Will to Power as Life-- -_(a)_ The Organic Process -_(b)_ Man -3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations - -III. THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLIFIED IN - -SOCIETY AND IN THE INDIVIDUAL - -1. Society and the State -2. The Individual - -IV. THE WILL TO POWER IN ART - -FOURTH BOOK. DISCIPLINE AND BREEDING. - -I. THE ORDER OF RANK-- - -1. The Doctrine of the Order of Rank -2. The Strong and the Weak -3. The Noble Man -4. The Lords of the Earth -5. The Great Man -6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future - -II. DIONYSUS - -III. ETERNAL RECURRENCE - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. - - -For the history of the text constituting this volume I would refer -readers to my preface to _The Will to Power,_ Books I, and II., where -they will also find a brief explanation of the actual title of the -complete work. - -In the two books before us Nietzsche boldly carries his principle -still further into the various departments of human life, and does not -shrink from showing its application even to science, to art, and to -metaphysics. - -Throughout Part I. of the Third Book we find him going to great pains -to impress the fact upon us that science is as arbitrary as art in -its mode of procedure, and that the knowledge of the scientist is but -the outcome of his inexorable will to power interpreting facts in the -terms of the self-preservative conditions of the particular order of -human beings to which he belongs. In Aphorisms 515 and 516, which are -typical of almost all the thought expressed in Part I., Nietzsche says -distinctly: "The object is not 'to know,' but to schematise,--to impose -as much regularity and form upon chaos as our practical needs require." - -Unfamiliarity, constant change, and the inability to reckon with -possibilities, are sources of great danger: hence, everything _must_ -be explained, assimilated, and rendered capable of calculation, if -Nature is to be mastered and controlled. - -Schemes for interpreting earthly phenomena must be devised which, -though they do not require to be absolute or irrefutable, must -yet favour the maintenance of the kind of men that devises them. -Interpretation thus becomes all important, and facts sink down to -the rank of raw material which must first be given some shape (some -sense--always anthropocentric) before they can become serviceable. - -Even the development of reason and logic Nietzsche consistently shows -to be but a spiritual development of the physiological function -of digestion which compels an organism to make things "like" (to -"assimilate") before it can absorb them (Aph. 510). And seeing that he -denies that hunger can be a first motive (Aphs. 651-656), and proceeds -to show that it is the amœba's will to power which makes it extend its -pseudopodia in search of what it can appropriate, and that, once the -appropriated matter is enveloped, it is a process of making _similar_ -which constitutes the process of absorption, reason itself is by -inference acknowledged to be merely a form of the same fundamental will. - -An interesting and certainly inevitable outcome of Nietzsche's argument -appears in Aph. 516, where he declares that even our inability to deny -and affirm one and the same thing is not in the least necessary, _but -only a sign of inability._ - -The whole argument of Part I. tends to draw science ever nearer and -nearer to art (except, of course, in those cases in which science -happens to consist merely of an ascertainment of facts), and to prove -that the one like the other is no more than a means of gaining some -foothold upon the slippery soil of a world that is for ever in flux. - -In the rush and pell-mell of Becoming, some milestones must be fixed -for the purposes of human orientation. In the torrent of evolutionary -changes pillars must be made to stand, to which man can for a space -hold tight and collect his senses. Science, like art, accomplishes this -for us, and it is our will to power which "creates the impression of -Being out of Becoming" (Aph. 517). - -According to this standpoint, then, consciousness is also but a weapon -in the service of the will to power, and it extends or contracts -according to our needs (Aph. 524). It might disappear altogether (Aph. -523), or, on the other hand, it might increase and make our life more -complicated than it already is. But we should guard against making -it the Absolute behind Becoming, simply because it happens to be the -highest and most recent evolutionary form (Aph. 709). If we had done -this with each newly acquired characteristic, sight itself, which is a -relatively recent development, would also have required to have been -deified. - -Pantheism, Theism, Unitarianism--in fact all religions in which a -_conscious_ god is worshipped, are thus aptly classed by Nietzsche -as the result of man's desire to elevate that which is but a new and -wonderful instrument of his will to power, to the chief place in the -imaginary world beyond (eternal soul), and to make it even the deity -itself (God Omniscient). - -With the question of Truth we find Nietzsche quite as ready to uphold -his thesis as with all other questions. He frankly declares that "the -criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power" -(Aph. 534), and thus stands in diametrical opposition to Spencer, who -makes constraint or inability the criterion of truth. (See _Principles -of Psychology,_ new edition, chapter ix.... "the unconceivableness of -its negation is the ultimate test of the truth of a proposition.") - -However paradoxical Nietzsche's view may seem, we shall find that -it is actually substantiated by experience; for the activity of our -senses certainly convinces us more or less according to the degree to -which it is provoked. Thus, if we walked for long round a completely -dark room, and everything yielded, however slightly, to our touch, we -should remain quite unconvinced that we were in a room at all, more -particularly if--to suppose a still more impossible case--the floor -yielded too. What provokes great activity in the bulbs of our fingers, -then, likewise generates the sensation of truth. - -From this Nietzsche proceeds to argue that what provokes the strongest -sentiments in ourselves is also true to us, and, from the standpoint of -thought, "that which gives thought the greatest sensation of strength" -(Aph. 533). - -The provocation of intense emotion, and therefore the provocation -of that state in which the body is above the normal in power, thus -becomes the index to truth; and it is a very remarkable thing that two -prominent English thinkers should, at the very end of their careers, -have practically admitted this, despite the fact that all their -philosophical productions had been based upon a completely different -belief. I refer, of course, to Spencer and Buckle, who both upheld the -view that in a system of thought the emotional factor is of the highest -importance. - -It follows from all this, that lies and false doctrines may quite -conceivably prove to be even more preservative to species than truth -itself, and although this is a view we have already encountered in the -opening aphorisms of _Beyond Good and Evil,_ in Aph, 538 this volume -we find it further elucidated by Nietzsche's useful demonstration -of the fact that "the easier way of thinking always triumphs over -the more difficult way"; and that logic, inasmuch as it facilitated -classification and orderly thought, ultimately "got to act like truths." - -Before leaving Part I., with which it would be impossible to deal in -full, a word or two ought to be said in regard to Nietzsche's views -concerning the belief in "cause and effect." In the _Genealogy of -Morals_ (1st Essay, Aph. 13), we have already read a forecast of our -author's more elaborate opinions on this question, and the aphorism -in question might be read with advantage in conjunction with the -discussion on the subject found in this book (Aphs. 545-555). - -The whole of Nietzsche's criticism, however, resolves itself into -this, that the doctrine of causality begins with an unnecessary -duplication of all that happens. Language, and its origin among a -people uneducated in thoughts and concepts, is at the root of this -scientific superstition, and Nietzsche traces its evolution from the -primeval and savage desire always to find a "doer" behind every deed: -to find some one who is responsible and who, being known, thus modifies -the unfamiliarity of the deed which requires explaining. "The so-called -instinct of causality [of which Kant speaks with so much assurance] is -nothing more than the fear of the unfamiliar." - -In Aph. 585 (A), we have a very coherent and therefore valuable -exposition of much that may still seem obscure in Nietzsche's -standpoint, and we might almost regard this aphorism as the key to -the epistemology of the Will to Power. When we find the "will to -truth" defined merely as "the longing for a stable world," we are in -possession of the very leitmotiv of Nietzsche's thought throughout Part -I., and most of what follows is clearly but an elaboration of this -thought. - -In Part II. Nietzsche reveals himself as utterly opposed to all -mechanistic and materialistic interpretations of the Universe. He -exalts the spirit and repudiates the idea that mere pressure from -without--naked environment--is to be held responsible (and often -guilty!) for all that materialistic science would lay at its door. -Darwin again comes in for a good deal of sharp criticism; and, to those -who are familiar with the nature of Nietzsche's disagreement with this -naturalist, such aphorisms as Nos. 643, 647, 649, 651, 684, 685, will -be of special interest. There is one question of great moment, which -all Nietzsche's perfectly sincere and profoundly serious deprecation -of the Darwinian standpoint ought to bring home to all Englishmen who -have perhaps too eagerly endorsed the conclusions of their own British -school of organic evolution, and that is, to what extent were Malthus, -and afterwards his disciple Darwin, perhaps influenced in their -analysis of nature by preconceived notions drawn from the state of -high pressure which prevailed in the thickly-populated and industrial -country in which they both lived? - -It is difficult to defend Darwin from the fundamental attack which -Nietzsche directs at the very root of his teaching, and which turns -upon the question of the motive of all Life's struggle. To assume -that the motive is always a "struggle for existence" presupposes the -constant presence of two conditions--want and over-population,--an -assumption which is absolutely non-proven, and it likewise lends a -peculiarly ignoble and cowardly colouring to the whole of organic life, -which not only remains unsubstantiated in fact, but which the struggle -for power completely escapes. In Part III., which, throughout, is -pretty plain sailing, Aphorism 786 contains perhaps the most important -statements. Here morality is shown to be merely an instrument, but this -time it is the instrument of the gregarious will to power. In the last -paragraph of this aphorism Nietzsche shows himself quite antagonistic -to Determinism, because of its intimate relation to, and its origin in, -a mechanistic interpretation of the Universe. But we should always -remember that, inasmuch as Nietzsche would distribute beliefs, just as -others distribute bounties--that is to say, according to the needs of -those whom he has in view, we must never take for granted that a belief -which he deprecates for one class of man ought necessarily, according -to him, to be denied another class. - -Hard as it undoubtedly is to bear this in mind, we should remember that -his appeal is almost without interruption made to higher men, and that -doctrines and creeds which he condemns for them he would necessarily -exalt in the case of people who were differently situated and otherwise -constituted. Christianity is a case in point (see _Will to Power,_ vol. -i. Aph. 132). - -We now come to Part IV., which is possibly the most important part of -all, seeing that it treats of those questions which may be regarded as -Nietzsche's most constant concern from the time when he wrote his first -book. - -The world as we now see and know it, with all that it contains which is -beautiful, indifferent, or ugly, from a human standpoint, is, according -to Nietzsche, the creation of our own valuing minds. Perhaps only a few -people have had a hand in shaping this world of values. Maybe their -number could be counted on the fingers of two hands; but still, what -Nietzsche insists upon is, that it is human in its origin. Our whole -outlook, everything that gives us joy or pain, must at one time or -other have been valued for us, and in persisting in these valuations -we, as the acclimatised herd, are indebted to our artists, to our -higher men, to all those in history, who at some time or other have -dared to stand up and to declare emphatically that _this_ was ugly and -that _that_ was beautiful, and to fight, and if necessary to die, for -their opinion. - -Religion, morality, and philosophy, while they all aim at so-called -universal Truth, tend to depreciate the value of life in the eyes of -exceptional men. Though they establish the "beautiful" for the general -stock, and in that way enhance the value of life for that stock, -they contradict higher men's values, and, by so doing, destroy their -innocent faith in the world. For the problem here is not, what value is -true?--but, what value is most conducive to the highest form of human -life on earth? - -Nietzsche would fain throw all the burden of valuing upon the Dionysian -artist him who speaks about this world out of the love and plenitude -of power that is in his own breast, him who, from the very health that -is within him, cannot look out upon life without transfiguring it, -hallowing it, blessing it, and making it appear better, bigger, and -more beautiful. And, in this view, Nietzsche is quite consistent; for, -if we must accept his conclusion that our values are determined for us -by our higher men, then it becomes of the highest importance that these -valuers should be so constituted that their values may be a boon and -not a bane to the rest of humanity. - -Alas! only too often, and especially in the nineteenth century, have -men who lacked this Dionysian spirit stood up and valued the world; and -it is against these that Nietzsche protests. It is the bad air they -have spread which he would fain dispel. - -An to what art means to the artist himself, apart from its actual -effect on the world, Nietzsche would say that it is a manner of -discharging his will to power. The artist tries to stamp his opinion -of what is desirable, and of what is beautiful or ugly, upon his -contemporaries and the future; it is in this valuing that his impulse -to prevail finds its highest expression. Hence the instinctive economy -of artists in sex matters--that is to say, in precisely that quarter -whither other men go when their impulse to prevail urges them to -action. Nietzsche did not of course deny the sensual nature of artists -(Aph. 815); all he wished to make plain was this, that an artist who -was not moderate, _in eroticis,_ while engaged upon his task, was open -to the strongest suspicion. - -In the Fourth Book Nietzsche is really at his very best. Here, while -discussing questions such as "The Order of Rank," he is so thoroughly -in his exclusive sphere, that practically every line, even if it were -isolated and taken bodily from the context, would bear the unmistakable -character of its author. The thought expressed in Aphorism 871 reveals -a standpoint as new as it is necessary. So used have we become to the -practice of writing and legislating for a mass, that we have forgotten -the rule that prevails even in our own navy--that the speed of a fleet -is measured by its slowest vessel. - -On the same principle, seeing that all our philosophies and moralities -have hitherto been directed at a mass and at a mob, we find that their -elevation must of necessity be decided by the lowest of mankind. Thus -all passions are banned, because base men do not know how to enlist -them in their service. Men who are masters of themselves and of others, -men who understand the management and privilege of passion, become the -most despised of creatures in such systems of thought, because they are -confounded with the vicious and licentious; and the speed of mankind's -elevation thus gets to be determined by humanity's slowest vessels. - -Aphorisms 881, 882, 886 fully elucidate the above considerations, while -in 912, 916, 943, and 951 we have plans of a constructive teaching -which the remainder of Part I. elaborates. - -And now, following Nietzsche carefully through Part II. (Dionysus), -what is the inevitable conclusion of all we have read? This analysis -of the world's collective values and their ascription to a certain -"will to power" may now seem to many but an exhaustive attempt at a new -system of nomenclature, and little else. As a matter or fact it is very -much more than this. By mean? of it Nietzsche wishes to show mankind -how much has lain, and how much still lies, in man's power By laying -his finger on everything and declaring to man that it was human will -that created it. Nietzsche wished to give man the courage of this will, -and a clean conscience in exercising it. For it was precisely this very -will to power which had been most hated and most maligned by everybody -up to Nietzsche's time. - -Long enough, prompted by the fear of attributing any one of his -happiest thoughts to this hated fundamental will, had man ascribed -all his valuations and all his most sublime inspirations to something -outside himself,--whether this something were a God, a principle, or -the concept Truth. But Nietzsche's desire was to show man how human, -all too human, have been the values that have appeared heretofore; -he wished to prove, that to the rare sculptors of values, the world, -despite its past, is still an open field of yielding clay, and in -pointing to what the will to power has done until now, Nietzsche -suggests to these coming sculptors what might still be done, provided -they fear nothing, and have that innocence and that profound faith in -the fundamental will which others hitherto have had in God, Natural -Laws, Truth, and other euphemistic fictions. - -The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, to which Nietzsche attached so much -importance that it may be regarded almost as the inspiration which led -to his great work, _Thus Spake Zarathustra,_ ought to be understood -in the light of a purely disciplinary and chastening creed. In one of -his posthumous works we find Nietzsche saying: "The question which -thou shalt have to answer before every deed that thou doest;--is this -such a deed as I am prepared to perform an incalculable number of -times,--is the best ballast." Thus it is obvious that, feeling the need -of something in his teaching which would replace the metaphysics of -former beliefs, he applied the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence to this -end. Seeing, however, that even among Nietzscheans themselves there -is considerable doubt concerning the actual value of the doctrine as -a ruling belief, it does not seem necessary to enter here into the -scientific justification which he claims for it. Suffice it to say -that, as knowledge stands at present, the statement that the world will -recur eternally in small things as in great, is still a somewhat daring -conjecture--a conjecture, however, which would have been entirely -warrantable if its disciplinary value had been commensurate with its -daring. - - ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI. - - - - -THIRD BOOK. - -THE PRINCIPLES OF A NEW VALUATION. - - - - -I. - - -THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE. - - -(a) The Method of Investigation. - - -466. - -The distinguishing feature of our nineteenth century is not the triumph -of _science,_ but the triumph of the scientific _method_ over science. - - -467. - -_The history of scientific methods_ was regarded by Auguste Comte -almost as philosophy itself. - - -468. - -The great _Methodologists:_ Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Auguste Comte. - - -469. - -The most valuable knowledge is always discovered last: but the most -valuable knowledge consists of _methods._ - -All methods, all the hypotheses on which the science of our day -depends, were treated with the profoundest contempt for centuries: -on their account a man used to be banished from the society of -_respectable_ people--he was held to be an "_enemy of God,_" a reviler -of the highest ideal, a madman. - -We had the whole _pathos_ of mankind against us,--our notion of what -"truth" ought to be, of what the service of truth ought to be, our -objectivity, our method, our calm, cautious and distrustful manner were -altogether _despicable...._ At bottom, that which has kept men back -most, is an æsthetic taste: they believed in the picturesque effect of -truth; what they demanded of the scientist was, that he should make a -strong appeal to their imagination. - -From the above, it would almost seem as if the very _reverse_ had been -achieved, as if a sudden _jump_ had been made: as a matter of fact, the -schooling which the moral hyperboles afforded, gradually prepared the -way for that _milder form of pathos_ which at last became incarnate in -the scientific man.... - -_Conscientiousness in small things,_ the self-control of the religious -man, was a preparatory school for the scientific character, as was -also, in a very pre-eminent sense, the attitude of mind which makes a -man _take problems seriously,_ irrespective of what personal advantage -he may derive from them.... - - - - -_(b)_ The Starting-point of Epistemology. - - -470. - -Profound disinclination to halt once and for all at any collective view -of the world. The charm of the opposite point of view: the refusal to -relinquish the stimulus residing in the enigmatical. - - -471. - -The hypothesis that, at bottom, things proceed in such a moral fashion -that _human reason must be right,_ is a mere piece of good-natured -and simple-minded trustfulness, the result of the belief in Divine -truthfulness--God regarded as the Creator of all things.--These -concepts are our inheritance from a former existence in a Beyond. - - -472. - -The contradiction of the so-called "facts of consciousness." -Observation a thousand times more difficult, error is perhaps the -absolute _condition_ of observation. - - -473. - -The intellect cannot criticise itself, simply because it can be -compared with no other kind of intellect, and also because its ability -to know would only reveal itself in the presence of "actual reality"; -that is to say, because, in order to criticise the intellect, we should -have to be higher creatures with "absolute knowledge." This would -presuppose the existence of _something,_ a "thing-in-itself," apart -from all the perspective kinds of observation and senso-spiritual -perception. But the psychological origin of the belief in _things,_ -forbids our speaking of "things in themselves." - - -474. - -The idea that a sort of adequate relation exists between _subject_ and -_object,_ that the object is something which _when seen from inside_ -would be a subject, is a well-meant invention which, I believe, has -seen its best days. The measure of that which we are conscious of, is -perforce entirely dependent upon the coarse utility of the function of -consciousness: how could this little garret-prospect of consciousness -warrant our asserting anything in regard to "subject" and "object," -which would bear any relation to reality! - - -475. - -Criticism of modern philosophy: erroneous starting-point, as if there -were such things as "facts of consciousness"--and no _phenomenalism_ in -_introspection._ - - -476. - -"Consciousness"--to what extent is the idea which is thought of, the -idea of will, or the idea of a feeling (_which is known by us alone_), -quite superficial? Our _inner_ world is also "appearance." - - -477. - -I am convinced of the phenomenalism of the _inner_ world also: -everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and completely -adjusted, simplified, schematised, interpreted, the _actual_ process -of inner "perception," the _relation of causes_ between thoughts, -feelings, desires, between subject and object, is absolutely concealed -from us, and may be purely imaginary. This "_inner_ world of -appearance" is treated with precisely the same forms and procedures as -the "outer" world. We never come across a single "fact": pleasure and -pain are more recently evolved intellectual phenomena.... - -Causality evades us; to assume the existence of an immediate causal -relation between thoughts, as Logic does, is the result of the coarsest -and most clumsy observation. There are _all sorts of passions_ that may -intervene between two thoughts: but the interaction is too rapid--that -is why we _fail to recognise_ them, that is why we actually _deny_ -their existence.... - -"Thinking," as the epistemologists understand _\r_ it, never takes -place at all: it is an absolutely gratuitous fabrication, arrived at -by selecting one element from the process and by eliminating all the -rest--an artificial adjustment for the purpose of the understanding.... - -The "mind," _something that thinks_: at times, even, "the mind absolute -and pure"--this concept is an evolved and second result of false -introspection, which believes in "thinking": in the first place an act -is imagined here which does not really occur at all, _i.e._ "thinking"; -and, _secondly,_ a subject-substratum is imagined in which every -process of this thinking has its origin, and nothing else--that is to -say, _both the action and the agent are fanciful._ - - -478. - -Phenomenalism must not be sought in the wrong quarter: nothing is more -phenomenal, or, to be more precise, nothing is so much _deception,_ as -this inner world, which we observe with the "inner sense." - -Our belief that the will is a cause was so great, that, according to -our personal experiences in general, we projected a cause into all -phenomena (_i.e._ a certain motive is posited as the cause of all -phenomena). - -We believe that the thoughts which follow one upon the other in our -minds are linked by some sort of causal relation: the logician, more -especially, who actually speaks of a host of facts which have never -once been seen in reality, has grown accustomed to the prejudice that -thoughts _are the cause_ of thoughts. - -We believe--and even our philosophers believe it still--that pleasure -and pain are the causes of reactions, that the very purpose of pleasure -and pain is to occasion reactions. For hundreds of years, pleasure and -pain have been represented as the _motives_ for every action. Upon -reflection, however, we are bound to concede that everything would have -proceeded in exactly the same way, according to precisely the same -sequence of cause and effect, if the states "pleasure" and "pain" had -been entirely absent; and that we are simply deceived when we believe -that they actually cause anything:--they are the _attendant phenomena,_ -and they have quite a different purpose from that of provoking -reactions; they are in themselves effects involved in the process of -reaction which takes place. - -_In short:_ Everything that becomes conscious is a final phenomenon, a -conclusion--and is the cause of nothing; all succession of phenomena -in consciousness is absolutely atomistic.--And we tried to understand -the universe from the _opposite_ point of view--as if nothing were -effective or real, save thinking, feeling, willing! ... - - -479. - -_The phenomenalism of the "inner world!" A chronological inversion -takes place,_ so that the cause reaches consciousness as the -effect.--We know that pain is projected into a certain part of the -body although it is not really situated there; we have learnt that all -sensations which were ingenuously supposed to be conditioned by the -outer world are, as a matter of fact, conditioned by the inner world: -that the real action of the outer world never takes place in a way of -which we can become conscious.... That fragment of the outer world of -which we become conscious, is born after the effect produced by the -outer world has been recorded, and is subsequently interpreted as the -"cause" of that effect.... - -In the phenomenalism of the "inner world," the chronological order -of cause and effect is inverted. The fundamental fact of "inner -experience" is, that the cause is imagined after the effect has been -recorded.... The same holds good of the sequence of thoughts: we seek -for the reason of a thought, before it has reached our consciousness; -and then the reason reaches consciousness first, whereupon follows -its effect. All our dreams are the interpretation of our collective -feelings with the view of discovering the possible causes of the -latter; and the process is such that a condition only becomes -conscious, when the supposed causal link has reached consciousness.[1] - -The whole of "inner experience" is founded on this: that a cause is -sought and imagined which accounts for a certain irritation in our -nerve-centres, and that it is only the cause which is found in this way -which reaches consciousness; this cause may have absolutely nothing to -do with the real cause--it is a sort of groping assisted by former -"inner experiences," that is to say, by memory. The memory, however, -retains the habit of old interpretations,--that is to say, of erroneous -causality,--so that "inner experience" comprises in itself all the -results of former erroneous fabrications of causes. Our "outside -world," as we conceive it every instant, is indissolubly bound up with -the old error of cause: we interpret by means of the schematism of -"the thing," etc. - - -"Inner experience" only enters consciousness when it has found a -language which the individual can _understand_--that is to say, a -translation of a certain condition into conditions with which he is -_familiar;_ "understand" means simply this: to be able to express -something new in the terms of something old or familiar. For instance, -"I feel unwell"--a judgment of this sort presupposes a _very great and -recent neutrality on the part of the observer:_ the simple man always -says, "This and that make me feel unwell,"--he begins to be clear -concerning his indisposition only after he has discovered a reason for -it.... This is what I call _a lack of philological_ knowledge; to be -able to read a text, _as such,_ without reading an interpretation into -it, is the latest form of "inner experience,"--it is perhaps a barely -possible form.... - - -[Footnote 1: When in our dream we hear a bell ringing, or a tapping at -our door, we scarcely ever wake before having already accounted for the -sound, in the terms of the dream-world we were in.--TR.] - - -480. - -There are no such things as "mind," reason, thought, consciousness, -soul, will, or truth: they all belong to fiction, and can serve no -purpose. It is not a question of "subject and object," but of a -particular species of animal which can prosper only by means of a -certain _exactness,_ or, better still, _regularity_ in recording its -perceptions (in order that experience may be capitalised).... - -Knowledge works as an _instrument_ of power. It is therefore obvious -that it increases with each advance of power.... - -The purpose of knowledge: in this case, as in the case of "good" or -"beautiful," the concept must be regarded strictly and narrowly from an -anthropocentric and biological standpoint. In order that a particular -species may maintain and increase its power, its conception of reality -must contain enough which is calculable and constant to allow of its -formulating a scheme of conduct. _The utility of preservation_--and -_not_ some abstract or theoretical need to eschew deception--stands as -the motive force behind the development of the organs of knowledge; ... -they evolve in such a way that their observations may suffice for our -preservation. In other words, the _measure_ of the desire for knowledge -depends upon the extent to which _the Will to Power_ grows in a certain -species: a species gets a grasp of a given amount of reality, _in order -to master it, in order to enlist that amount in its service._ - - - -(c) The Belief in the "Ego." Subject. - - -481. - -In opposition to Positivism, which halts at phenomena and says, -"These are only _facts_ and nothing more," I would say: No, -facts are precisely what is lacking, all that exists consists of -_interpretations._ We cannot establish any fact "in itself": it -may even be nonsense to desire to do such a thing. "Everything is -_subjective,_" ye say: but that in itself is _interpretation._ The -subject is nothing given, but something superimposed by fancy, -something introduced behind.--Is it necessary to set an interpreter -behind the interpretation already to hand? Even that would be fantasy, -hypothesis. - -To the extent to which knowledge has any sense at all, the world is -knowable: but it may be interpreted _differently,_ it has not one sense -behind it, but hundreds of senses.--"Perspectivity." - -It is our needs that _interpret the world_; our instincts and their -impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power; -each has its point of view, which it would fain impose upon all the -other instincts as their norm. - - -482. - -Where our ignorance really begins, at that point from which we can see -no further, we set a word; for instance, the word "I," the word "do," -the word "suffer"--these concepts may be the horizon lines of our -knowledge, but they are not "truths." - - -483. - -Owing to the phenomenon "thought," the ego is taken for granted; but -up to the present everybody believed, like the people, that there -was something unconditionally certain in the notion "I think," and -that by analogy with our understanding of all other causal reactions -this "I" was the given _cause_ of the thinking. However customary -and indispensable this fiction may have become now, this fact proves -nothing against the imaginary nature of its origin; it might be a -life-preserving belief and _still_ be _false._ - - -484. - -"Something is thought, therefore there is something that thinks": this -is what Descartes' argument amounts to. But this is tantamount to -considering our belief in the notion "_substance_" as an "_a priori_" -truth:--that there must be something "that thinks" when we think, is -merely a formulation of a grammatical custom which sets an agent to -every action. In short, a metaphysico-logical postulate is already put -forward here--and it is not merely _an ascertainment of fact...._ On -Descartes' lines nothing absolutely certain is attained, but only the -fact of a very powerful faith. - -If the proposition be reduced to "Something is thought, therefore there -are thoughts," the result is mere tautology; and precisely the one -factor which is in question, the "_reality_ of thought," is not touched -upon,--so that, in this form, the apparitional character of thought -cannot be denied. What Descartes _wanted_ to prove was, that thought -not only had _apparent reality,_ but absolute reality. - - -485. - -The concept _substance_ is an outcome of the concept _subject,_ and not -conversely! If we surrender the concept soul, the subject, the very -conditions for the concept "substance" are lacking. _Degrees of Being_ -are obtained, but Being is lost. - -Criticism of "_reality_": what does a _"plus or minus of reality"_ lead -to, the gradation of Being in which we believe? - -The degree of our feeling of _life_ and _power_ (the logic and -relationship of past life) presents us with the measure of "Being," -"reality," "non-appearance." - -_Subject i_ this is the term we apply to our belief in an _entity_ -underlying all the different moments of the most intense sensations -of reality; we regard this belief as the effect of a cause,--and we -believe in our belief to such an extent that, on its account alone, -we imagine "truth," "reality," "substantiality."--a "Subject" is the -fiction which would fain make us believe that several similar states -were the effect of one substratum: but we it was who first _created_ -the "similarity" of these states; the similising and adjusting of them -is the _fact--not_ their similarity (on the contrary, this ought rather -to be denied). - - -486. - -One would have to know what _Being_ is, in order to be able to -_decide_ whether this or that is real (for instance, "the facts of -consciousness"); it would also be necessary to know what _certainty_ -and _knowledge_ are, and so forth.--But, as we do _not_ know these -things, a criticism of the faculty of knowledge is nonsensical: how is -it possible for an instrument to criticise itself, when it is itself -that exercises the critical faculty. It cannot even define itself! - - -487. - -Should not all philosophy ultimately disclose the first principles on -which the reasoning processes depend?--that is to say, our _belief_ -in the "ego" as a substance, as the only reality according to which, -alone, we are able to ascribe reality to things? The oldest realism -at length comes to light, simultaneously with man's recognition of -the fact that his whole religious history is no more than a history -of soul-superstitions. _Here there is a barrier;_ our very thinking, -itself, involves that belief (with its distinctions--substance, -accident, action, agent, etc.); to abandon it would mean to cease from -being able to think. - -But that a belief, however useful it may be for the preservation of a -species, has nothing to do with the truth, may be seen from the fact -that we _must_ believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling -ourselves compelled to regard them as absolute realities. - - -488. - -_The psychological origin of our belief in reason.--_The ideas -"reality," "Being," are derived from our _subject-_feeling. - -"Subject," interpreted through ourselves so that the ego may stand as -substance, as the cause of action, as the _agent._ - -The metaphysico-logical postulates, the belief in substance, accident, -attribute, etc. etc., draws its convincing character from our habit of -regarding all our actions as the result of our will: so that the ego, -as substance, does not vanish in the multiplicity of changes.--_But -there is no such thing as will._ We have no categories which allow -us to separate a "world as thing-in-itself," from "a world of -appearance." All our _categories of reason_ have a sensual origin: they -are deductions from the empirical world. "The soul," "the ego"--the -history of these concepts shows that here, also, the oldest distinction -("_spiritus_," "life") obtains.... - -If there is nothing material, then there can be nothing immaterial. The -concept no longer _means_ anything. - -No subject-"atoms." The sphere of a subject _increasing_ or -_diminishing_ unremittingly, the centre of the system continually -_displacing_ itself, in the event of the system no longer being able -to organise the appropriated mass, it divides into two. On the other -hand, it is able, without destroying it, to transform a weaker subject -into one of its own functionaries, and, to a certain extent, to compose -a new entity with it. Not a "substance," but rather something which in -itself strives after greater strength; and which wishes to "preserve" -itself only indirectly (it wishes to _surpass_ itself). - - -489. - -Everything that reaches consciousness as an entity is already -enormously complicated: we never have anything more than the _semblance -of an entity._ - -The phenomenon of the _body_ is the richer, more distinct, and more -tangible phenomenon: it should be methodically drawn to the front, and -no mention should be made of its ultimate significance. - - -490. - -The assumption of a _single subject_ is perhaps not necessary, it -may be equally permissible to assume a plurality of subjects, whose -interaction and struggle lie at the bottom of our thought and our -consciousness in general. A sort of _aristocracy_ of "cells" in which -the ruling power is vested? Of course an aristocracy of equals, who are -accustomed to ruling co-operatively, and understand how to command? - -_My hypotheses_. The subject as a plurality. Pain intellectual and -dependent upon the judgment harmful, projected. The effect always -"unconscious": the inferred and imagined cause is projected, it -_follows_ the event. Pleasure is a form of pain. The only kind of power -that exists is of the same nature as the power of will: a commanding -of other subjects which thereupon alter themselves. The unremitting -transientness and volatility of the subject. "Mortal soul." _Number_ as -perspective form. - - -491. - -The belief in the body is more fundamental than the belief in the soul: -the latter arose from the unscientific observation of the agonies -of the body. (Something which leaves it. The belief in the _truth of -dreams_) - - -492. - -The body and physiology the starting-point: why?--We obtain a correct -image of the nature of our subject-entity, that is to say, as a -number of regents at the head of a community (not as "souls" or as -"life-forces") as also of the dependence of these regents upon their -subjects, and upon the conditions of a hierarchy, and of the division -of labour, as the means ensuring the existence of the part and the -whole. We also obtain a correct image of the way in which the living -entities continually come into being and expire, and we see how -eternity cannot belong to the "subject"; we realise that the struggle -finds expression in obeying as well as in commanding, and that a -fluctuating definition of the limits of power is a factor of life. The -comparative _ignorance_ in which the ruler is kept, of the individual -performances and even disturbances taking place in the community, -also belong to the conditions under which government may be carried -on. In short, we obtain a valuation even of _want-of-knowledge,_ -of seeing-things-generally-as-a-whole, of simplification, of -falsification, and of perspective. What is most important, however, -is, that we regard the ruler and his subjects as of the _same kind,_ -all feeling, willing, thinking--and that wherever we see or suspect -movement in a body, we conclude that there is co-operative-subjective -and invisible life. Movement as a symbol for the eye; it denotes that -something has been felt, willed, thought. - -The danger of directly questioning the subject _concerning_ the -subject, and all spiritual self-reflection, consists in this, that it -might be a necessary condition of its activity to interpret itself -_erroneously._ That is why we appeal to the body and lay the evidence -of sharpened senses aside: or we try and see whether the subjects -themselves cannot enter into communication with us. - - - -_(d)_ Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity. - - -493. - -_Truth is that kind of error_ without which a certain species of living -being cannot exist. The value for _Life_ is ultimately decisive. - - -494. - -It is unlikely that our "knowledge" extends farther than is exactly -necessary for our self-preservation. Morphology shows us how the -senses and the nerves as well as the brain evolve in proportion as the -difficulties of acquiring sustenance increase. - - -495. - -If the morality of "Thou shalt not lie" be refuted, the sense for truth -will then have to justify itself before another tribunal--as a means -to the preservation of man, _as Will to Power._ - -Likewise our love of the beautiful: it is also the _creative will._ -Both senses stand side by side; the sense of truth is the means -wherewith the power is appropriated to adjust things according to one's -taste. The love of adjusting and reforming--a primeval love! We can -only _take cognisance_ of a world which we ourselves have _made._ - - -496. - -Concerning the multifariousness of knowledge. The tracing of _its_ -relation to many other things (or the relation of kind)--how should -"knowledge" be of another? The way to know and to investigate is in -itself among the conditions of life; that is why the conclusion that -there could be no other kind of intellect (for ourselves) than the kind -which serves the purpose of our preservation is an excessively hasty -one: this _actual_ condition may be only an accidental, not in the -least an essential; one. - -Our apparatus for acquiring knowledge is not adjusted for knowledge. - - -497. - -_The most strongly credited a priori "truths" are, to my mind, mere -assumptions pending further investigation_; for instance, the law -of causation is a belief so thoroughly acquired by practice and so -completely assimilated, that to disbelieve in it would mean the ruin of -our kind. But is it therefore true? What an extraordinary conclusion! -As if truth were proved by the mere fact that man survives! - - -498. - -To what extent is our _intellect_ also a result of the conditions of -life?--We should not have it did we not _need_ to have it, and we -should not have it _as_ we have it, if we did not need it _as_ we need -it--that is to say, if we could live otherwise. - - -499. - -Thinking in a primitive (inorganic) state is to _persevere in forms,_ -as in the case of the crystal.--In _our_ thought, the _essential -factor_ is the harmonising of the new material with the old schemes (= -Procrustes' bed), the _assimilation_ of the unfamiliar. - - -500. - -The perception of the senses projected outwards: "inwards" and -"outwards"--does the _body_ command here? - -The same equalising and ordering power which rules in the idioplasma, -also rules in the incorporation of the outer world: our sensual -perceptions are already the _result_ of this process of _adaptation_ -and _harmonisation_ in regard to _all_ the past in us; they do not -follow directly upon the "impression." - - -501. - -All thought, judgment, perception, regarded as an act of _comparing_[2] -has as a first condition the act of _equalising,_ and earlier still the -act of _"making equal."_ The process of making equal is the same as the -assimilation by the amœba of the nutritive matter it appropriates. - -"Memory" late, in so far as the equalising instinct appears to have -been _subdued_: the difference is preserved. Memory--a process of -classification and collocation; active--who? - -[Footnote 2: The German word _vergleichen,_ meaning "to compare," -contains the root "equal" _(gleich)_ which cannot be rendered in -English. TR.] - - -502. - -In regard to the _memory,_ we must unlearn a great deal: here we meet -with the greatest temptation to assume the existence of a "soul," -which, irrespective of time, reproduces and recognises again and again, -etc. What I have experienced, however, continues to live "in the -memory"; I have nothing to do with it when memory "comes," my will is -inactive in regard to it, as in the case of the coming and going of a -thought. Something happens, of which I become conscious: now something -similar comes--who has called it forth? Who has awakened it? - - -503. - -The whole apparatus of knowledge is an abstracting and simplifying -apparatus--not directed at knowledge, but at the _appropriation_ of -things: "end" and "means" are as remote from the essence of this -apparatus as "concepts" are. By the "end" and the "means" a process is -appropriated (--a process is _invented_ which may be grasped), but by -"_concepts_" one appropriates the "things" which constitute the process. - - -504. - -_Consciousness_ begins outwardly as co-ordination and knowledge of -impressions,--at first it is at the point which is remotest from the -biological centre of the individual; but it is a process which deepens -and which tends to become more and more an inner function, continually -approaching nearer to the centre. - - -505. - -Our perceptions, as we understand them--that is to say, the sum of all -those perceptions the consciousness whereof was useful and essential -to us and to the whole organic processes which preceded us: therefore -they do not include all perceptions (for instance, not the electrical -ones);--that is to say, we have _senses_ only for a definite selection -of perceptions--such perceptions as concern us with a view to our -self-preservation. _Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful._ -There can be no doubt that all our sense-perceptions are entirely -permeated by valuations (useful or harmful--consequently, pleasant or -painful). Every particular colour; besides being a colour, expresses a -value to us (although we seldom admit it, or do so only after it has -affected us exclusively for a long time, as in the case of convicts -in gaol or lunatics). Insects likewise react in different ways to -different colours: some like this shade, the others that. Ants are a -case in point. - - -506. - -In the beginning _images_ how images originate in the mind must be -explained. Then _words,_ applied to images. Finally _concepts,_ -possible only when there are words--the assembling of several pictures -into a whole which is not for the eye but for the ear (word). The -small amount of emotion which the "word" generates,--that is, then, -which the view of the similar pictures generates, for which one word -is used,--this simple emotion is the common factor, the basis of a -concept. That weak feelings should all be regarded as alike, _as the -same,_ is the fundamental fact. There is therefore a confusion of -two very intimately associated feelings in the _ascertainment_ of -these feelings;--but who is it that ascertains? _Faith_ is the very -first step in every sensual impression: a sort of yea-saying is the -_first_ intellectual activity! A "holding-a-thing-to-be-true" is -the beginning. It were our business, therefore, to explain how the -"holding-of-a-thing-to-be-true" arose! What sensation lies beneath the -comment "true"? - - -507. - -The _valuation_, "I believe that this and that is so," is the essence -of "truth." In all valuations, the conditions of _preservation_ and -of _growth_ find expression. All our _organs and senses_ of knowledge -have been developed only in view of the conditions of preservation -and growth. The _trust_ in reason and its categories, the trust -in dialectics, and also the _valuation_ of logic, prove only that -_experience_ has taught the usefulness of these things to life: not -their "truth." The prerequisites of all living things and of their -lives is: that there should be a large amount of faith, that it should -be possible to pass definite judgments on things, and that _there -should be no doubt_ at all concerning all essential values. Thus it is -necessary that something should be assumed to be true, _not_ that it -_is_ true. - -"The _real_ world and the world of _appearance_"-- I trace this -contrast to the _relation of values._ We have posited _our_ conditions -of existence as the _attributes of being_ in general. Owing to the -fact that, in order to prosper, we must be stable in our belief, we -developed the idea that the real world was neither a changing nor an -evolving one, but a world of _being._ - - - -_(e)_ The Origin of Reason and Logic. - - -508. - -Originally there was chaos among our ideas. Those ideas which were able -to stand side by side remained over, the greater number perished--and -are still perishing. - - -509. - -The kingdom of desires out of which logic grew: the gregarious instinct -in the background. The assumption of similar facts is the first -condition for "similar souls." _For the purpose of mutual understanding -and government._ - - -510. - -Concerning the _origin of logic._ The fundamental proneness to -_equalise_ things and to _see them equal_, gets to be modified, -and kept within bounds, by the consideration of what is useful or -harmful--in fact, by considerations of success: it then becomes adapted -in suchwise as to be gratified in a milder way, without at the same -time denying life or endangering it. This whole process corresponds -entirely with that external and mechanical process (which is its -symbol) by which the _protoplasm_ continually assimilates, makes equal -to itself, what it appropriates, and arranges it according to its own -forms and requirements. - - -511. - -Likeness and Similarity. - -1. The coarser the organ the more apparent likenesses it sees; - -2. The mind _will_ have likeness--that is to say, the identification -of one sensual impression with others already experienced: just as the -body _assimilates_ inorganic matter. - -For the understanding of Logic:-- - -_The will which tends to see likeness everywhere is the will to -power_--the belief that something is so and so (the essence of a -judgment), is the result of a will which _would fain have it_ as -similar as possible. - - -512. - -Logic is bound up with the proviso: granted _that identical cases -exist_. As a matter of fact, before one can think and conclude in a -logical fashion, _this_ condition _must_ first be assumed. That is -to say, the will to _logical truth_ cannot be consummated before a -fundamental falsification of all phenomena has been assumed. From which -it follows that an instinct rules here, which is capable of employing -both means: first, falsification; and secondly, the carrying out of its -own point of view: logic does not spring from a will to truth. - - -513. - -The inventive force which devised the categories, worked in the service -of our need of security, of quick intelligibility, in the form of -signs, sounds, and abbreviations.--"Substance," "subject," "object," -"Being," "Becoming," are not matters of metaphysical truth. It was -the powerful who made the names of things into law, and, among the -powerful, it was the greatest artists in abstraction who created the -categories. - - -514. - -A moral--that is to say, a method of living which long experience -and experiment have tested and proved efficient, at last enters -consciousness as a law, as dominant.... And then the whole group of -related values and conditions become part of it: it becomes venerable, -unassailable, holy, true; a necessary part of its evolution is that -its origin should be forgotten.... That is a sign that it has become -master. Exactly the same thing might have happened with the categories -of reason: the latter, after much groping and many trials, might have -proved true through relative usefulness.... A stage was reached when -they were grasped as a whole, and when they appealed to consciousness -as a whole,--when belief in them was commanded,--that is to say, when -they acted as if they commanded.... From that time forward they passed -as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And, possibly, they -may have been the expression of no more than a certain practicality -answering the ends of a race and a species,--their usefulness alone is -their "truth." - - -515. - -The object is, not "to know," but to schematise,--to impose as much -regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In -the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need -in us that was the determining power: not the need "to know," but -to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and -calculation. (The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and -equal things,--the same process, which every sensual impression -undergoes, is the development of reason!) No pre-existing "idea" had -anything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things -can be reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly -as equal.... _Finality_ in reason is an effect, not a cause: Life -degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant attempts -are being made to attain to those other forms of reason;--for Life -would then become too obscure, too unequal. - -The categories are "truths" only in the sense that they are the -conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional -"truth." (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are -absolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen -to be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one -idiosyncrasy alone among many others....) - -The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here, -is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility -of concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we _are_ almost this -instinct.... But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this -fact that we possess an absolute truth! ... The inability to contradict -anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth." - - -516. - -We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that -is a principle of subjective experience--which is not in the least -"necessary," _but only a sign of inability._ - -If, according to Aristotle, the _principium contradictionis_ is the -most certain of all principles; if it is the most ultimate of all, -and the basis of every demonstration; if the principle of every -other axiom lie within it: then one should analyse it all the more -severely, in order to discover how many assumptions _already lie_ at -its root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being, -as if these had become known in some other sphere--that is to say, as -if it were _impossible_ to ascribe the opposite attributes to it; or -the proposition means: that the opposites _should_ not be ascribed to -it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, _not_ directed at the -knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world _which -must seem true to us._ - -In short, the question is a debatable one: are the axioms of logic -adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone -we can, _create_ realities, or the concept "reality"?... In order to -affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen, -require a previous knowledge of Being; which is certainly not the case. -The proposition therefore contains no _criterion of truth,_ but an -_imperative_ concerning that which _should_ pass as true. - -Supposing there were no such thing as A identical with itself, as -every logical (and mathematical) proposition presupposes, and that A -is in itself an _appearance,_ then logic would have a mere world _of -appearance_ as its first condition. As a matter of fact, we believe -in that proposition, under the influence of an endless empiricism -which seems to _confirm_ it every minute. The "thing"--that is the -real substratum of A; _our belief in things_ is the first condition of -our faith in logic. The A in logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction -of the thing.... By not understanding this, and by making logic -into a criterion of _real being,_ we are already on the road to the -classification of all those hypostases, substance, attribute, object, -subject, action, etc., as realities--that is to say, the conception of -a metaphysical world or a "real world" (--_this is, however, once more -the world of appearance..._). - -The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding -of a thing for true, and the holding of a thing for not true,--in so -far as they do not only presuppose a mere habit, but the very _right_ -to postulate truth or untruth at all,--are already dominated by a -belief, _that there is such a thing as knowledge for us,_ and _that -judgments can really hit the truth:_ in short, logic never doubts that -it is able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (--that -is to say, that to the thing which is in itself true, no opposite -attributes _can_ be ascribed). - -In this belief there _reigns_ the sensual and coarse prejudice that our -sensations teach us _truths_ concerning things,--that I cannot at the -same moment of time say of one and the same thing that it is _hard_ and -_soft._ (The instinctive proof, "I cannot have two opposite sensations -at once," is quite _coarse_ and _false_.) - -That all contradiction in concepts should be forbidden, is the result -of a belief, that we _are able_ to form concepts, that a concept not -only characterises but also _holds_ the essence of a thing.... As a -matter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good of -_assumed existences which we have created._ Logic is _the attempt on -our part to understand the actual world according to a scheme of Being -devised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the -actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for -our own purposes...._ - - -517. - -In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, it is necessary -to _acknowledge that which exists:_ logic only deals with formulæ for -things which are constant. That is why this acknowledgment would not in -the least prove reality: "that which is" is part of our optics. The ego -regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution). - -The _assumed world_ of subject, substance, reason, etc., is necessary, -an adjusting, simplifying falsifying, artificially-separating power -resides in us. "Truth" is the will to be master over the manifold -sensations that reach consciousness; it is the will to _classify_ -phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out -with a belief in the "true nature" of things (we regard phenomena as -real). - -The character of the world in the process of Becoming _is not -susceptible of formulation;_ it is "false" and "contradicts itself." -_Knowledge_ and the process of _evolution_ exclude each other. -_Consequently,_ knowledge must be something else: it must be preceded -by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must -create the _illusion_ of _Being._ - - -518. - -If our "ego" is the only form of Being, according to which we make -and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very -proper to doubt whether an _illusion_ of perspective were not active -here--the apparent unity which everything assumes in our eyes on the -horizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted -by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is -allowable to use that phenomenon which is _richer_ and more easily -studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon. - -Finally: admitting that all is Becoming, _knowledge is only possible -when based on a belief in Being._ - - -519. - -If there is "only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms -of Being are made in its own image,--if, in short, the belief in the -"ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the -metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: if, in addition, the -"ego" is shown to be something that is _evolving: then----_ - - -520. - -The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the -"individual," etc.; the "number" of beings itself fluctuates. We should -know nothing of time or of movement, if, in a rough way, we did not -believe we saw things "standing still" behind or in front of things -moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect, -and without the erroneous idea of "empty space" we should never have -arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity is -based on the "fact of appearance" that there are some things alike. -Strictly speaking, it would not be possible to "understand" and "know" -an evolving world; something which is called "knowledge" exists only -in so far as the "understanding" and "knowing" intellect already -finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of a host -of mere appearances, but become fixed _to_ the extent in which this -kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent is -"knowledge" possible--that is to say, as a measuring of earlier and -more recent errors by one another. - - -521. - -_Concerning logical appearance._--The concept "individual" and the -concept "species" are equally false and only apparent. "_Species_" only -expresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at -the same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of their -further transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long -time: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are -of no account at all (--a stage of evolution in which the process of -evolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibrium -_seem_ to have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the -error of supposing _that an actual goal has been reached_--and that -evolution had a goal...). - -The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable; -but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often -"the same form is attained," it does not signify that it _is the -same form,--because something new always appears_; and we alone, who -compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as it resembles the -latter, and embody the two in the unity of "form." As if a _type_ had -to be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes. - -_Form, species, law, idea, purpose_--the same fault is made in respect -of all these concepts, namely, that of giving a false realism to a -piece of fiction: as if all phenomena were infused with some sort of -obedient spirit--an artificial distinction is here made between that -_which_ acts and that _which_ guides action (but both these things are -only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they -are not "facts"). - -We should not interpret this _constraint_ in ourselves, to imagine -concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws ("_a world of identical -cases_") as if we were in a position to construct a _real world_; but -as a constraint to adjust a world by means of which _our existence_ -will be ensured: we thereby create a world which is determinable, -simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us. - -The very same constraint is active in _the functions of the senses_ -which support the reason--by means of simplification, coarsening, -accentuation, and interpretation; whereon all "recognition," all the -ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our _needs_ have made -our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance" always -returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of _reality._ - -Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic, is expressive only -of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we -did nothing _save introduce its postulates into the nature of things:_ -now we find ourselves in their presence,--we can no longer help -it,--and now we would fain believe that this constraint is a guarantee -of "truth." We it was who created the "thing," the "same thing," the -subject, the attribute, the action, the object, the substance, and -the form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening, -and simplifying as far as possible. The world _seems_ logical to us, -because we have already made it logical. - - -522. - -_Fundamental solution._--We believe in reason: this is, however, the -philosophy of colourless _concepts._ Language is built upon the most -_naïf_ prejudices. - -Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to -_think only_ in the form of language--we also believe in the "eternal -truth" of "wisdom" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc.). - -_We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control -of language_; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt -concerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary. - -_Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme -which we cannot reject._ - - - -(_f_) Consciousness. - - -523. - -There is no greater error than that of making psychical and physical -phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance. -By this means nothing is explained: the concept _"substance"_ is -utterly useless as a means of explanation. _Consciousness_ may be -regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing, -probably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect -automatism-- - -When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb -who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements -of the speaker's lips. From the appearance of the inner mind we draw -conclusions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could -ascertain if our powers of observation were adequate for the purpose. - -For this inner world we have no finer organs, and that is why a -_complexity which is thousandfold_ reaches our consciousness as a -simple entity, and we invent a process of causation in it, despite -the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of -the change--the sequence of thoughts and feelings is nothing more -than their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence -has anything to do with a chain of causes is not worthy of belief: -consciousness never communicates an example of cause and effect to us. - - -524. - -_The part "consciousness" plays,_--It is essential that one should not -mistake the part that "consciousness plays" it is our _relation to the -outer world; it was the outer world that developed it._ On the other -hand, the _direction_--that is to say, the care and cautiousness which -is concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does -_not_ enter into our consciousness any more than does the _storing -activity_ of the intellect: that there is a superior controlling -force at work in these things cannot be doubted--a sort of directing -committee, in which the various _leading desires_ make their votes and -their power felt. "Pleasure" and "pain" are indications which reach us -from this sphere: as are also _acts of will_ and _ideas._ - -_In short:_ That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are -completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge--the sequence of -thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does not signify that -the order in which they come is a causal order: it is _so apparently,_ -however, in the highest degree. We have _based_ the whole of our notion -of _intellect, reason, logic,_ etc., upon this _apparent truth_ (all -these things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities), -and we then projected the latter into and _behind_ all things! - -As a rule _consciousness_ itself is understood to be the general -sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a _means of -communication:_ it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to -the interests of intercourse.... "Intercourse" is understood, here, -as "relation," and is intended to cover the action of the outer world -upon us and our necessary response to it, as also our actual influence -_upon_ the outer world. It is _not_ the conducting force, but an _organ -of the latter._ - - -525. - -My principle, compressed into a formula which savours of antiquity, of -Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept, -"God is _spirit,_" God as perfection is "_denied...._" - - -526. - -Wherever people have observed a certain unity in the grouping of -things, _spirit_ has always been regarded as the cause of this -co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lacking. -Why should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of that -fact? Or why should the _notion_ of a complex fact have to precede it -as its cause? - -We must be on our guard against explaining _finality_ by the spirit: -there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the -peculiar power of organising and systematising. The domain of the -nervous system is much more extensive: the realm of consciousness is -superadded. In the collective process of adaptation and systematising, -consciousness plays no part at all. - - -527. - -Physiologists, like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases -in _value_ in proportion as it _gains_ in clearness: the most lucid -consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the -_first_ order. Meanwhile--according to what standard is this value -determined?--In regard to the _discharge of will-power_ the most -superficial and _most simple_ thought is the most useful--it might -therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives over). - -_Precision in action_ is opposed to the _far-sighted_ and often -uncertain judgments of _caution:_ the latter is led by the _deeper_ -instinct. - - -528. - -_The chief error of psychologists:_ they regard the indistinct idea as -of a lower _kind_ than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance -from our consciousness and which is therefore _obscure, may_ on that -very account be quite clear in itself. _The fact that a thing becomes -obscure_ is a question _of the perspective of consciousness._ - - -529. - -The great misapprehensions:-- - -(1) The senseless _overestimation of consciousness,_ its elevation to -the dignity of an entity: "a spirit," "a soul," something that feels, -thinks, and wills; - -(2) The spirit regarded as a _cause,_ especially where finality, -system, and co-ordination appear; - -(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most -superior kind of being, as "God"; - -(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed; - -(5) The "real world" regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by -means of the facts of consciousness; - -(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness, -wherever knowledge exists at all. - -_Consequences:_-- - -Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every -step backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was -regarded as a falling-back upon the _passions_ and _senses--_as a -state of _animalism ..._.) - -Man approaches reality and real being through dialectics: man _departs_ -from them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism.... - -To convert man into a spirit, would mean to make a god of him: spirit, -will, goodness--all one. - -_All goodness_ must take its root in spirituality, must be a fact of -consciousness. - -Every step made towards _something better_ can be only a step forward -in _consciousness._ - - - -(g) Judgment. True--false. - - -530. - -Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmatism, his moral outlook, -ruled, guided, and directed him. - -The πρῶτον ψεῡδος: how is the fact knowledge possible? Is knowledge -a fact at all? What is knowledge? If we do not _know_ what knowledge -is, we cannot possibly reply to the question, Is there such a thing -as knowledge? Very _fine!_ But if I do not already "know" whether -there is, or can be, such a thing as knowledge, I cannot reasonably -ask the question, "What is knowledge?" Kant _believes_ in the fact of -knowledge: what he requires is a piece of _naïveté: the knowledge of -knowledge!_ - -"Knowledge is judgment." But judgment is a belief that something is -this or that! And not knowledge! "All knowledge consists in synthetic -judgments" which have the character of being _universally true_ (the -fact is _so_ in all cases, and does not change), and which have the -character of being _necessary_ (the reverse of the proposition cannot -be imagined to exist). - -The _validity_ of a belief in knowledge is always taken for granted; as -is also the _validity_ of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here -_moral ontology_ is the _ruling_ bias. - -The conclusion, therefore, is: (1) there are propositions which we -believe to be universally true and necessary. - -(2) This character of universal truth and of necessity cannot spring -from experience. - -(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no experience at all, _but -upon something else_, it must be derived from another source of -knowledge! - -Kant concludes (1) that there are some propositions which hold good -only on one condition; (2) this condition is that they do not spring -from experience, but from pure reason. - -Thus, the question is, whence do we derive our reasons for _believing_ -in the truth of such propositions? No, whence does our belief get -its cause? But the _origin of a belief,_ of a strong conviction, -is a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience -frequently brings about such a belief! _It already presupposes_ that -there are not only "data _a posteriori_" but also "data _a priori_"-- -that is to say, "previous to experience." Necessary and universal truth -cannot be given by experience: it is therefore quite clear that it has -come to us without experience at all? - -There is no such thing as an isolated judgment! - -An isolated judgment is never "true," it is never knowledge; only in -_connection with,_ and when _related to,_ many other judgments, is a -guarantee of its truth forthcoming. - -What is the difference between true and false belief? What is -knowledge? He "knows" it, that is heavenly! Necessary and universal -truth cannot be given by experience! It is therefore independent of -experience, _of_ all experience! The view which comes quite _a priori,_ -and therefore independent of all experience, _merely out of reason,_ is -"pure knowledge"! - -"The principles of logic, the principle of identity and of -contradiction, are examples of pure knowledge, because they precede all -experience."--But these principles are not cognitions, but _regulative -articles of faith._ - -In order to establish the _a priori_ character (the pure rationality) -of mathematical axioms, space _must be conceived as a form of pure -reason._ - -Hume had declared that there were no _a priori_ synthetic judgments. -Kant says there are--the mathematical ones! And if there are such -judgments, there may also be such things as metaphysics and a knowledge -of things by means of pure reason! - -Mathematics is possible under conditions which are _not_ allowed to -metaphysics. All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics. - -A judgment is synthetic--that is to say, it co-ordinates various ideas. -It is _a priori_--that is to say, this co-ordination is universally -true and necessary, and is arrived at, not by sensual experience, but -by pure reason. - -If there are such things as _a priori_ judgments, then reason must be -able to co-ordinate: co-ordination is a form. Reason must _possess a -formative faculty._ - - -531. - -_Judging_ is our oldest faith; it is our habit of believing this to be -true or false, of asserting or denying, our certainty that something -is thus and not otherwise, our belief that we really "know"--_what_ is -believed to be true in all judgments? - -What are _attributes_?--We did not regard changes in ourselves merely -as such, but as "things in themselves," which are strange to us, and -which we only "perceive"; and we did _not_ class them as phenomena, -but as Being, as "attributes"; and in addition we invented a creature -to which they attach themselves--that is to say, we made the _effect_ -the _working cause,_ and _the latter_ we made _Being._ But even in -this plain statement, the concept "effect" is arbitrary: for in regard -to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced -we ourselves are _not_ the cause, we still argue that they must be -effects: and this is in accordance with the belief that "every change -must have its author";--but this belief in itself is already mythology; -for it _separates_ the working _cause from_ the cause in work. When I -say the "lightning flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action -and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a thing is fancifully -affixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with it, but which is -_stable,_ which _is,_ and does not "come."--_To make the phenomenon the -working cause,_ and to make _the effect into a thing--into Being:_ -this is the _double_ error, or _interpretation,_ of which we are guilty. - - -532. - -The _Judgment_--that is the faith: "This and this is so. In every -judgment, therefore, there lies the admission that an "identical" -case has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for -granted, with the help of the memory. Judgment does _not_ create the -idea that an identical case seems to be there. It believes rather that -it actually perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that -there are such things as identical cases. But what is that much _older_ -function called, which must have been active much earlier, and which -in itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike? What is that -second function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc, -"That which provokes the same sensations as another thing is equal -to that other thing": but what is that called which makes sensations -equal, which regards them as equal?--There could be no judgments if -a sort of equalising process were not active within all sensations: -memory is only possible by means of the underscoring of all that has -already been experienced and learned. Before a judgment can be formed, -_the process of assimilation must already have been completed_: thus, -even here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does -not enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which -accompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all -the organic functions--that is to say, they consist of assimilation, -rejection, growth, etc. - -The essential thing is to start out from the body and to use it as the -general clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much -more accurate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly -established than the belief in spirit. - -"However strongly a thing may be believed, the degree of belief is no -criterion of its truth." But what is truth? Perhaps it is a form of -faith, which has become a condition of existence? Then _strength_ would -certainly be a criterion; for instance, in regard to causality. - - -533. - -Logical accuracy, transparency, considered as the criterion -of truth ("_omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte -percipitur._"--Descartes): by this means the mechanical hypothesis of -the world becomes desirable and credible. - -But this is gross confusion: like _simplex sigillum veri._ Whence comes -the knowledge that the real nature of things stands in _this_ relation -to our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? Could it not be this, -that the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of -power and security, is _preferred, valued,_ and marked as _true_--The -intellect sets its _freest_ and _strongest faculty_ and _ability_ -as the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what is -_true...._ - - "True"--from the standpoint of sentiment--is that which most - provokes sentiment ("I"); - - from the standpoint of thought--is that which gives thought - the greatest sensation of strength; - - from the standpoint of touch, sight, and hearing--is that - which calls forth the greatest resistance. - -Thus it is the _highest degrees of activity_ which awaken belief in -regard to the _object_, in regard to its "reality." The sensations of -strength, struggle, and resistance convince the subject that there is -something which is being resisted. - - -534. - -The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power. - - -535. - -According to my way of thinking, "truth" does not necessarily mean -the opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely -the relation of different errors to each other: thus one error might -be older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one -without which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist; -whereas other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as -conditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard -of those other "tyrants," could even be laid aside and "refuted." Why -should an irrefutable assumption necessarily be "true"? This question -may exasperate the logicians who limit _things_ according to the -limitations they find in themselves: but I have long since declared war -with this logician's optimism. - - -536. - -Everything simple is simply imaginary, but not "true." That which is -real and true is, however, neither a unity nor reducible to a unity. - - -537. - -_What is truth?_--Inertia; _that_ hypothesis which brings satisfaction, -the smallest expense of intellectual strength, etc. - - -538. - -First proposition. The _easier_ way of thinking always triumphs -over the more difficult way;--_dogmatically_: _simplex sigillum -veri_.--_Dico_: to suppose that _clearness_ is any proof of truth, is -absolute childishness. . . . - -Second proposition. The teaching of Being, of things, and of all those -constant entities, is a _hundred times more easy_ than the teaching of -_Becoming_ and of evolution. . . - -Third proposition. Logic was intended to be a method of _facilitating_ -thought: a _means of expression_, --not truth. . . . Later on it got to -_act_ like truth. . . . - - -539. - -Parmenides said: "One can form no concept of the non-existent";--we are -at the other extreme, and say, "That Of which a concept can be formed, -is certainly fictional." - - -540. - -There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes--therefore there -must be many kinds of "truths," and consequently there can be no truth. - - -541. - -_Inscriptions over the porch of a modern lunatic asylum._ - -"That which is necessarily true in thought must be necessarily true in -morality."--HERBERT SPENCER. - -"The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the -inconceivableness of its negation,"--HERBERT SPENCER. - - -542. - -If the character of existence were false,:--and this would be -possible,--what would truth then be, all our truth? ... An unprincipled -falsification of the false? A higher degree of falseness? ... - - -543. - -In a world which was essentially false, truthfulness would be an -_anti-natural tendency_: its only purpose would be to provide a means -of attaining to a _higher degree of falsity._ For a world of truth and -Being to be simulated, the truthful one would first have to be created -(it being understood that he must believe himself to be "truthful"). - -Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, lasting, -remaining always the same to himself, free from faults, sudden changes, -dissimulation, and form: such a man conceives a world of Being as -"_God_" in His own image. - -In order that truthfulness may be possible, the whole sphere in which -man moves must be very tidy, small, and respectable: the advantage -in every respect must be with the truthful one.--Lies, tricks, -dissimulations, must cause astonishment. - - -544. - -_"Dissimulation"_ increases in accordance with the rising _order of -rank_ among organic beings. In the inorganic world it seems to be -entirely absent. There power opposes power quite roughly _--ruse_ -begins in the organic world; plants are already masters of it. The -greatest men, such as Cæsar and Napoleon (see Stendhal's remark -concerning him),[3] as also the higher races (the Italians), the Greeks -(Odysseus); the most supreme cunning, belongs to the very _essence_ -of the elevation of man. ... The problem of the actor. My Dionysian -ideal.... The optics of all the organic functions, of all the strongest -vital instincts: the power which _will_ have error in all life; error -as the very first principle of thought itself. Before "thought" is -possible, "fancy" must first have done its work; the _picturing_ of -identical cases, of the _seemingness_ of identity, is more primeval -than the cognition of identity. - -[Footnote 3: The reference to Stendhal here, seems to point to a -passage in his _Life of Napoleon_ (Preface, p. xv) of which Nietzsche -had made a note in another place, and which reads: "Une croyance -presque instinctive chez moi c'est que tout homme puissant ment quand -il parle et à plus forte raison quand il écrit."] - - - - -_(h)_ Against Causality. - - -545. - -I believe in absolute space as the basis of force, and I believe the -latter to be limited and formed. Time, eternal. But space and time -as things in themselves do not exist. "Changes" are only appearances -(or mere processes of our senses to us); if we set recurrence, -however regular, between them, nothing is proved beyond the fact that -it has always happened so. The feeling that _post hoc_ is _propter -hoc,_ is easily explained as the result of a misunderstanding, it is -comprehensible. But appearances cannot be "causes"! - - -546. - -The interpretation of a phenomenon, _either_ as an action _or_ as the -endurance of an action (that is to say, every action involves the -suffering of it), amounts to this: every change, every differentiation, -presupposes the existence of an agent and somebody acted upon, _who_ is -"altered." - - -547. - -Psychological history of the concept _subject._ The body, the thing, -the "whole," which is visualised by the eye, awakens the thought of -distinguishing between an action and an agent; the idea that the agent -is the cause of the action, after having been repeatedly refined, at -length left the "subject" over. - - -548. - -Our absurd habit of regarding a mere mnemonic sign or abbreviated -formula as an independent being, and ultimately as a _cause_; as, for -instance, when we say of lightning that it flashes, even the little -word "I." A sort of double-sight in seeing which makes sight a _cause -of seeing in itself_: this was the feat in the invention of the -"subject" of the "ego." - - -549. - -"Subject," "object," "attribute"--these distinctions have been _made,_ -and are now used like schemes to cover all apparent facts. The false -fundamental observation is this, that I believe it is I who does -something, who suffers something, who "has" something, who "has" a -quality. - - -550. - -In every judgment lies the whole faith in subject, attribute, or cause -and effect (in the form of an assumption that every effect is the -result of activity, and that all activity presupposes an agent), and -even this last belief is only an isolated case of the first, so that -faith remains as the most fundamental belief! there are such things as -subjects, everything that happens is related attributively to a subject -of some sort. - -I notice something, and try to discover the reason of it: originally -this was, I look for an _intention_ behind it, and, above all, I -look for one who has an intention, for a subject, an agent: every -phenomenon is an action, formerly intentions were seen behind _all_ -phenomena, this is our oldest habit. Has the animal also this habit? -As a living organism, is it not also compelled to interpret things -through itself. The question why? is always a question concerning the -_causa finalis,_ and the general "purpose" of things. We have no sign -of the "sense of the efficient cause"; in this respect Hume is quite -right, habit (but not only that of the individual) allows us to expect -that a certain process, frequently observed, will follow upon another, -but nothing more! That which gives us such an extraordinarily firm -faith in causality, is not the rough habit of observing the sequence of -processes, but our _inability_ to _interpret_ a phenomenon otherwise -than as the result of _design._ It is the _belief in_ living and -thinking things, as the only agents of _causation_; it is the belief in -will, in design--the belief that all phenomena are actions, and that -all actions presuppose an agent; it is the belief in the "subject." Is -not this belief in the concepts subject and object an arrant absurdity? - -Question: Is the design the cause of a phenomenon? Or is that also -illusion? Is it not the phenomenon itself? - - -551. - -_A criticism of the concept "cause."_--We have absolutely no experience -concerning _cause_, viewed psychologically we derive the whole concept -from the subjective conviction, that _we_ ourselves are causes--that is -to say, that the arm moves.... _But that is an error._ We distinguish -ourselves, the agents, from the action, and everywhere we make use of -this scheme--we try to discover an agent behind every phenomenon. What -have we done? We have _misunderstood_ a feeling of power, tension, -resistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the -action, and posited it as a cause; or we have understood the will to -do this or that, as a cause, because the action follows it. There is -no such thing as "Cause," in those few cases in which it seemed to -be given, and in which we projected it out of ourselves in_ order to -understand a phenomenon,_ it has been shown to be an illusion. Our -understanding of a phenomenon consisted in our inventing a subject -who was responsible for something happening, and for the manner in -which it happened. In our concept "cause" we have embraced our feeling -of will, our feeling of "freedom," our feeling of responsibility and -our design to do an action: _causa efficiens_ and _causa finalis_ are -fundamentally one. - -We believed that an effect was explained when we could point to a state -in which it was inherent. As a matter of fact, we invent all causes -according to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to us.... On -the other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing -how it will "act." The thing, the subject the will, the design--all -inherent in the conception "cause." We try to discover things in order -to explain why something has changed. Even the "atom" is one of these -fanciful inventions like the "thing" and the "primitive subject."... - -At last we understand that things--consequently also atoms--effect -nothing: _because they are non-existent;_ and that the concept -causality is quite! useless. Out of a necessary sequence of states, -the latter's causal relationship does _not_ follow (that would be -equivalent to extending their _active principle_ from 1 to 2, to 3, to -4, to 5). _There is no such thing as a cause or an effect._ From the -standpoint of language we do not know how to rid ourselves of them. -But that does not matter. If I imagine _muscle_ separated from its -"effects," I have denied it.... - -In short: _a phenomenon is neither effected nor capable of effecting. -Causa_ is a _faculty to effect something,_ superadded fancifully to -what happens.... - -_The interpretation of causality is an illusion...._ A "thing" is the -sum of its effects, synthetically united by means of a concept, an -image. As a matter of fact, science has robbed the concept causality -of all meaning, and has reserved it merely as an allegorical formula, -which has made it a matter of indifference whether cause or effect be -put on this side or on that. It is asserted that in two complex states -(centres of force) the quantities of energy remain constant. - -_The calculability of a phenomenon_ does not lie in the fact that -a rule is observed, or that a necessity is obeyed, or that we have -projected a law of causality into every phenomenon: it lies in the -_recurrence of "identical cases."_ - -There is no such thing as a _sense of causality,_ as Kant would have -us believe. We are aghast, we feel insecure, we will have something -familiar, which can be relied upon.... As soon as we are shown the -existence of something old in a new thing, we are pacified. The -so-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the _fear of -the unfamiliar_, and the attempt at finding something in it which is -already _known._--It is not a search for causes, but for the familiar. - - -552. - -_To combat determinism and teleology._--From the fact that something -happens regularly, and that its occurrence may be reckoned upon, it -does not follow that it happens _necessarily._ If a quantity of force -determines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular -case, it does not prove that it has "no free will." "Mechanical -necessity" is not an established fact: it was _we_ who first read -into the nature of all phenomena. We interpreted the possibility of -_formularising_ phenomena as a result of the dominion of necessary law -over all existence. But it does not follow, because I do a determined -thing, that I am bound to do it. _Compulsion_ cannot be demonstrated -in things: all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same -phenomenon is not another phenomenon. Owing to the very fact that we -fancied the existence of subjects "_agents_" in things, the notion -arose that all phenomena are the _consequence_ of a _compulsory force_ -exercised over the subject--exercised by whom? once more by an "agent." -The concept "Cause and Effect" is a dangerous one, so long as people -believe in something that _causes,_ and a something that is _caused._ - -_(a)_ Necessity is not an established fact, but an interpretation. - -*** - -_(b)_ When it is understood that the "subject" is nothing that _acts,_ -but only a thing of fancy, there is much that follows. - -Only with the subject as model we invented _thingness_ and read it into -the pell-mell of sensations. If we cease from believing in the _acting_ -subject, the belief in _acting_ things, in reciprocal action, in cause -and effect between phenomena which we call things, also falls to pieces. - -In this case the world of _acting atoms_ also disappears: for this -world is always assumed to exist on the pre-determined grounds that -subjects are necessary. - -Ultimately, of course, _the "thing-in-itself"_ also disappears: for -at bottom it is the conception of a "subject-in-itself." But we -have seen that the subject is an imaginary thing. The antithesis -"thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is untenable; but in this way the -concept "_appearance_" also disappears. - -*** - -_(c)_ If we abandon the idea of the acting _subject,_ we also abandon -the _object_ acted upon. Duration, equality to self, Being, are -inherent neither in what is called subject, nor in what is called -object: they are complex phenomena, and in regard to other phenomena -are apparently durable--they are distinguishable, for instance, by -the different tempo with which they happen (repose--movement, fixed ---loose: all antitheses which do not exist in themselves and by means -of which _differences of degree_ only are expressed; from a certain -limited point of view, though, they seem to be antitheses. There are no -such things as antitheses; it is from logic that we derive our concept -of contrasts--and starting out from its standpoint we spread the error -over all things). - -*** - -_(d)_ If we abandon the ideas "subject" and "object"; then we must also -abandon the idea _"substance"_--and therefore its various modifications -too; for instance: "matter," "spirit," and other hypothetical things, -"eternity and the immutability of matter," etc. We are then rid of -_materiality._ - -*** - -From a moral standpoint _the world is false._ But inasmuch as morality -itself is a part of this world, morality also is false. The will -to truth is a process of _establishing things_, it is a process of -_making_ things true and lasting, a total elimination of that _false_ -character, a transvaluation of it into _being._ Thus, "truth" is not -something which is present and which has to be found and discovered; it -is something _which has to be created_ and which _gives_ its name _to a -process,_ or, better still, to the Will to overpower, which in itself -has no purpose: to introduce truth is a _processus in infinitum,_ an -_active determining_--it is not a process of becoming conscious of -something, which in itself is fixed and determined. It is merely a word -for "The Will to Power." - -Life is based on the hypothesis of a belief in stable and regularly -recurring things, the mightier it is, the more vast must be the world -of knowledge and the world called being. Logicising, rationalising, and -systematising are of assistance as means of existence. - -Man projects his instinct of truth, his "aim," to a certain extent -beyond himself, in the form of a metaphysical world of Being, a -"thing-in-itself," a world already to hand. His requirements as a -creator make him _invent_ the world in which he works in advance; he -anticipates it: this anticipation (this faith in truth) is his mainstay. - -*** - -All phenomena, movement, Becoming, regarded as the establishment of -relations of degree and of force, as a contest.... - -*** - -As soon as we _fancy_ that some one is responsible for the fact that -we are thus and thus, etc. (God, Nature), and that we ascribe our -existence, our happiness, our misery, our _destiny,_ to that some one, -we corrupt the _innocence of Becoming_ for ourselves. We then have some -one who wishes to attain to something by means of us and with us. - -*** - -The "welfare of the individual" is just as fanciful as the "welfare -of the species": the first is _not_ sacrificed to the last; seen -from afar, the species is just as fluid as the individual. "The -_preservation_ of the species" is only a result of the _growth_ of the -species--that is to say, _of the overcoming of the species_ on the road -to a stronger kind. - -*** - -Theses:--The apparent conformity of means to end ("the conformity of -means to end which far surpasses the art of man) is merely the result -of that "_Will to Power_" which manifests itself in all phenomena:--_To -become stronger_ involves a process of ordering, which may well be -mistaken for an attempted conformity of means to end:--The _ends_ which -are apparent are not intended but, as soon as a superior power prevails -over an inferior power, and the latter proceeds to work as a function -of the former, an order of _rank_ is established, an organisation which -must give rise to the idea that there is an arrangement of means and -ends. - -Against apparent "_necessity_":-- - -This is only an expression for the fact that a certain power is not -also something else. - -Against the apparent conformity of means to ends":-- - -The latter is only an _expression_ for the order among the spheres of -power and their interplay. - -_(i)_ The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance. - - -553. - -The foul blemish on Kant's criticism has at last become visible -even to the coarsest eyes: Kant had no right to his distinction -"_appearance_" and "_thing-in-itself,_"--in his own writings he had -deprived himself of the right of differentiating any longer in this -old and hackneyed manner, seeing that he had condemned the practice of -drawing any conclusions concerning the cause of an appearance from the -appearance itself, as unallowable in accordance with his conception -of the idea of causality and its _purely intraphenomenal_ validity, -and this conception, on the other hand, already anticipates that -_differentiation,_ as if the "thing in itself" were not only inferred -but actually _given._ - - -554. - -It is obvious that neither things-in-themselves _nor_ appearances can -be related to each other in the form of cause and effect: and from this -it follows that the concept "cause and effect" is _not applicable_ in a -philosophy which believes in things-in-themselves and in appearances. -Kant's mistake--... As a matter of fact, from a psychological -standpoint, the concept "cause and effect" is derived from an attitude -of mind which believes it sees the action of will upon will everywhere, -which believes only in living things, and at bottom only in souls (not -in things). Within the mechanical view of the world (which is logic -and its application to space and time) that concept is reduced to -the mathematical formula with which--and this is a fact which cannot -be sufficiently emphasised--nothing is ever understood, but rather -_defined_--deformed. - - -555. - -The greatest of all fables is the one relating to knowledge. People -would like to know how things-in-themselves are constituted: but -behold, there are no things-in-themselves! But even supposing there -_were_ an "in-itself," an unconditional thing, it could on that very -account _not be known_! Something unconditioned cannot be known: -otherwise it would not be unconditioned! Knowing, however, is always a -process of "coming into relation with something"; the knowledge-seeker, -on this principle, wants the thing, which he would know, to be nothing -to him, and to be nothing to anybody at all: and from this there -results a contradiction,--in the first place, between this _will_ to -know, and this desire that the thing to be known _should_ be nothing -to him (wherefore know at all then?); and secondly, because something -which is nothing to anybody, does not even _exist,_ and therefore -cannot be known. Knowing means: "to place one's self in relation with -something," to feel one's self conditioned by something and one's -self conditioning it under all circumstances, then, it is a process -of _making stable or fixed,_ of _defining,_ of _making conditions -conscious_ (not a process of _sounding_ things, creatures, or objects -in-themselves). - - -556. - -A "thing-in-itself" is just as absurd as a "sense-in-itself," a -"meaning-in-itself." There is no such thing as a "fact-in-itself," -_for a meaning must always be given to it before it can become a fact._ - -The answer to the question, "What is that?" is a process of _fixing a -meaning_ from a different standpoint. The "_essence_" the "_essential -factor,_" is something which is only seen as a whole in perspective, -and which presupposes a basis which is multifarious. Fundamentally the -question is "What is that for me?" (for us, for everything that lives, -etc. etc.). - -A thing would be defined when all creatures had asked and answered this -question, "What is that?" concerning it. Supposing that one single -creature, with its own relations and standpoint in regard to all -things, were lacking, that thing would still remain undefined. - -In short: the essence of a thing is really only an _opinion_ concerning -that "thing." Or, better still; "_it is worth_" is actually what is -meant by _"it is"_ or by "that is." - -One may not ask: "_Who_ interprets, then?" for the act of interpreting -_itself_ as a form of the Will to Power, manifests itself (not as -"Being," but as a _process,_ as _Becoming_) as a passion. - -The origin of "things" is wholly the work of the idealising, thinking, -willing, and feeling subject. The concept thing as well as all its -attributes.--Even "the subject" is a creation of this order, a "thing" -like all others: a simplification, aiming at a definition of the -_power_ that fixes, invents, and thinks, as such, as distinct from -all isolated fixing, inventing, and thinking. Thus a capacity defined -or distinct from all other individual capacities; at bottom action -conceived collectively in regard to all the action which has yet to -come (action and the probability of similar action). - - -557. - -The qualities of a thing are its effects upon other "things." - -If one imagines other "things" to be non-existent, a thing has no -qualities. - -That is to say; _there is nothing without other things._ - -That is to say; there is no "thing-in-itself." - - -558. - -The thing-in-itself is nonsense. If I think all the "relations," all -the "qualities" all the "activities" of a thing, away, the thing itself -does _not_ remain: for "thingness" was only _invented fancifully_ by -us to meet certain logical needs--that is to say, for the purposes of -definition and comprehension (in order to correlate that multitude of -relations, qualities, and activities). - - -559. - -"Things which have a nature _in themselves_"--a dogmatic idea, which -must be absolutely abandoned. - - -560. - -That things should have a _nature in themselves,_ quite apart from -interpretation and subjectivity, _is a perfectly idle hypothesis_: -it would presuppose that _interpretation_ and the _act of being -subjective_ are not essential, that a thing divorced from all its -relations can still be a thing. - -Or, the other way round: the apparent _objective_ character of things; -might it not be merely the result of a _difference of degree_ within -the subject perceiving?--could not that which changes slowly strike -us as being objective, lasting, Being, "in-itself"?--could not the -objective view be only a false way of conceiving things and a contrast -_within_ the perceiving subject? - - -561. - -If all unity were only unity as organisation. But the "thing" in -which we believe was _invented_ only as a substratum to the various -attributes. If the thing "acts," it means: we regard _all the other_ -qualities which are to hand, and which are momentarily latent, as -the cause accounting for the fact that one individual quality steps -forward--that is to say, _we take the sum of its qualities--x--_as -the cause of the quality _x_; which is obviously _quite_ absurd and -imbecile! - -All unity is _only so_ in the form of _organisation_ and _collective -action:_ in the same way as a human community is a unity--that is to -say, _the reverse of_ atomic _anarchy_; thus it is a body politic, -which _stands for_ one, yet _is_ not one. - - -562. - -"At some time in the development of thought, a point must have been -reached when man became conscious of the fact that what he called -the _qualities of a thing_ were merely the sensations of the feeling -subject: and thus the qualities ceased from belonging to the thing." -The "thing-in-itself" remained over. 'The distinction between the -thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, is based upon that older and -artless observation which would fain grant energy to things: but -analysis revealed that even force was only ascribed to them by our -fancy, as was also--substance. "The thing affects a subject?" Thus the -root of the idea of substance is in language, not in things outside -ourselves! The thing-in-itself is not a problem at all! - -Being will have to be conceived as a sensation which is no longer based -upon anything quite devoid of sensation. - -In movement no new _meaning_ is given to feeling. That which is, cannot -be the substance of movement: it is therefore a form of Being. - - _N.B._--The explanation of life may be sought, in the first - place, through mental images of phenomena which _precede_ it - (purposes); - - Secondly, through mental images of phenomena which follow - behind it (the mathematico-physical explanation). - -The two should not be confounded. Thus: the physical explanation, which -is the symbolisation of the world by means of feeling and thought, -cannot in itself make feeling and thinking originate again and show -its derivation: physics must rather construct the world of feeling, -consistently _without feeling or purpose _ right up to the highest man. -And teleology is only a _history of purposes,_ and is never physical. - - -563. - -Our method of acquiring "knowledge" is limited to a process of -establishing _quantities,_ but we can by no means help feeling the -difference of quantity as differences of _quality._ Quality is merely a -_relative_ truth for _us_; it is not a "thing-in-itself." - -Our senses have a certain definite quantum as a mean, within the limits -of which they perform their functions--that is to say, we become -conscious of bigness and smallness in accordance with the conditions of -our existence. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we should -perish--that is to say, we feel even _proportions_ as _qualities_ in -regard to our possibilities of existence. - - -564. - -But could not all _quantities_ be merely tokens of _qualities_? Another -consciousness and scale of desires must correspond to greater power -in fact, another point of view; growth in itself is the expression of -a desire _to become more;_ the desire for a greater _quantum_ springs -from a certain _quale,_ in a purely quantitative world, everything -would be dead, stiff, and motionless.--The reduction of all qualities -to quantities is nonsense: it is discovered that they can only stand -together, an analogy-- - - -565. - -Qualities are our insurmountable barriers; we cannot possibly help -feeling mere _differences of quantity_ as something fundamentally -different from quantity--that is to say, as _qualities,_ which we can -no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But everything in regard to -which the word "knowledge" has any sense at all, belongs to the realm -of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity whereas, conversely, -all our valuations (that is to say, our sensations) belong precisely to -the realm of qualities, _i.e._ to those truths which belong to us alone -and to our point of view, and which absolutely cannot be "known." It is -obvious that every one of us, different creatures, must feel different -qualities, and must therefore live in a different world from the rest. -Qualities are an idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand that -these our human interpretations and values, should be general and -perhaps real values, belongs to the hereditary madnesses of human pride. - - -566. - -The "real world," in whatever form it has been conceived hitherto--was -always the world of appearance _over again._ - - -567. - -The world of appearance, _i.e._ a world regarded in the light of -values; ordered, selected according to values--that is to say, in -this case, according to the standpoint of utility in regard to the -preservation and the increase of power of a certain species of animals. - -It is _the point of view,_ then, which accounts for the character of -"appearance." As if a world could remain over, when the point of view -is cancelled! By such means _relativity_ would also be cancelled! - -Every centre of energy has its _point of view_ of the whole of the -_remainder_ of the world--that is to say, its perfectly definite -_valuation,_ its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The "world of -appearance" is thus reduced to a specific kind of action on the world -proceeding from a centre. - -But there is no other kind of action: and the "world" is only a word -for the collective play of these actions. _Reality_ consists precisely -in this particular action and reaction of every isolated factor against -the whole. - -There no longer remains a shadow of a _right_ to speak here of -"appearance." ... - -The _specific way of reacting_ is the only way of reacting; we do not -know how many kinds and what sort of kinds there are. - -But there is no "_other,_" no "real," no essential being,--for thus a -world _without_ action and reaction would be expressed.... - -The antithesis: world of appearance and real world, is thus reduced to -the antitheses "world" and "nonentity." - - -568. - -A criticism of the concept "_real and apparent_ world."--Of these two -the first is a mere fiction, formed out of a host of imaginary things. - -Appearance itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; _i.e._ -in a world where there is no such thing as being, a certain calculable -world of _identical_ cases must first be created through _appearance;_ -a _tempo_ in which observation and comparison is possible, etc. - -"Appearance" is an adjusted and simplified world, in which our -_practical_ instincts have worked: for us it is perfectly true: for we -_live_ in it, we can live in it: _this is the proof_ of its truth as -far as we are concerned.... - -The world, apart from the fact that we have to live in it--the -world, which we have _not_ adjusted to our being, our logic, and our -psychological prejudices--does _not_ exist as a world "in-itself"; it -is essentially a world of relations: under certain circumstances it has -a _different aspect_ from every different point at which it is seen: -it presses against every point, and every point resists it--and these -collective relations are in every case _incongruent._ - -The _measure of power_ determines what _being_ possesses the other -measure of power: under what form, force, or constraint, it acts or -resists. - -Our particular case is interesting enough: we have created a conception -in order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just -enough to enable us to _endure_ life in that world.... - - -569. - -The nature of our psychological vision is determined by the fact-- - -(1) That _communication_ is necessary, and that for communication -to be possible something must be stable, simplified, and capable of -being stated precisely (above all, in the so-called _identical_ case). -In order that it may be communicable, it must be felt as something -_adjusted,_ as "_recognisable_." The material of the senses, arranged -by the understanding, reduced to coarse leading features, made similar -to other things, and classified with its like. Thus: the indefiniteness -and the chaos of sense-impressions are, as it were, _made logical._ - -(2) The _phenomenal_ world is the adjusted world which _we believe -to be real,_ Its "reality" lies in the constant return of similar, -familiar, and related things, in their _rationalised character,_ and in -the belief that we are here able to reckon and determine. - -(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world is not "the real world," -but the amorphous and unadjustable world consisting of the chaos of -sensations--that is to say, _another kind_ of phenomenal; world, a -world which to us is "unknowable." - -(4) The question how things-in-themselves are constituted, quite apart -from our sense-receptivity and from the activity of our understanding, -must be answered by the further question: how were we able to know -_that things existed?_ "Thingness" is one of our own inventions. The -question is whether there are not a good many more ways of creating -such a world of appearance--and whether this creating, rationalising, -adjusting, and falsifying be not the best-guaranteed _reality_ itself: -in short, whether that which "fixes the meaning of things" is not -the only reality: and whether the "effect of environment upon us" -be not merely the result of such will-exercising subjects.... The -other "creatures" act upon us; our _adjusted_ world of appearance -is an arrangement and an _overpowering_ of its activities: a sort -of _defensive_ measure. _The subject alone is demonstrable_; -the _hypothesis_ might be advanced _that subjects are all that -exist,_--that "object" is only a form of action of subject upon -subject ... a _modus of the subject._ - - - -_(k)_ The Metaphysical Need. - - -570. - -If one resembles all the philosophers that have gone before, one -can have no eyes for what has existed and what will exist--one sees -only what _is._ But as there is no such thing as Being; all that the -philosophers had to deal with was a host of _fancies,_ this was their -"world." - - -571. - -To assert the _existence_ as a whole of things concerning which we know -nothing, simply because there is an advantage in not being able to know -anything of them, was a piece of artlessness on Kant's part, and the -result of the recoil-stroke of certain needs--especially in the realm -of morals and metaphysics. - - -572. - -An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away or back from it: his -earnest opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that nebulous -residue of it which one derives from colour, form, sound, and thought; -he believes that the more subtle, attenuated, and volatile, a thing -or a man becomes, _the more valuable he becomes: the less real,_ the -greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato was guilty of yet -further audacity in the matter of turning tables--he measured the -degree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: The more -there is of "idea" the more there is of Being. He twisted the concept -"reality" round and said: "What ye regard as real is an error, and the -nearer we get to the 'idea' the nearer we are to 'truth.'"--Is this -understood? It was the _greatest of all rechristenings:_ and because -Christianity adopted it, we are blind to its astounding features. At -bottom, Plato, like the artist he was, _placed appearance before_ -Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth! unreality before -actuality!--He was, however, so convinced of the value of appearance, -that he granted it the attributes of "Being," "causality," "goodness," -and "truth," and, in short, all those things which are associated with -value. - -The concept value itself regarded as a cause: first standpoint. - -The ideal granted all attributes, conferring honour: second standpoint. - - -573. - -The idea of the "true world" or of "God" as absolutely spiritual, -intellectual, and good, is an _emergency measure_ to the extent to -which the _antagonistic_ instincts are all-powerful.... - -Moderation and existing humanity is reflected exactly in the -humanisation of the gods. The Greeks of the strongest period, who -entertained no fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary were -pleased with themselves, brought down their gods to all their emotions. - -The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a -sign of _progress_: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads -Goethe--in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is -felt as being upon a lower plane. - - -574. - -The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside in the derivation of -the conditioned out of the unconditioned. - -It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds the unconditioned to -the conditioned, that it invents it--just as it thought of and invented -the "ego" to cover the multifariousness of its processes i it measures -the world according to a host of self-devised measurements--according -to its fundamental fictions "the unconditioned," "end and means," -"things," "substances," and according to logical laws, figures, and -forms. - -There would be nothing which could be called knowledge, if thought did -not first so _re-create_ the world into "things" which are in its own -image. It is only _through_ thought that there is _untruth._ - -The _origin_ of thought, like that of _feelings,_ cannot be traced: -but that is _no_ proof of its primordiality or absoluteness! It simply -shows that we cannot get _behind it,_ because we have nothing else save -thought and feeling. - - -575. - -To know is to _point to past experience:_ in its nature it is a -_regressus in infinitum._ That which halts (in the face of a so-called -_causa prima_ or the unconditioned, etc.) is _laziness,_ weariness. - - -576. - -_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics_--the influence of fear. That -which has been most feared, the cause of the _greatest suffering_ (lust -of power, voluptuousness, etc.), has been treated with the greatest -amount of hostility by men, and eliminated from the "real" world. Thus -the _passions_ have been step by step _struck out,_ God posited as -the opposite of evil--that is to say, reality is conceived to be the -_negation of the passions and the emotions_ (i.e. _nonentity_). - -_Irrationality,_ impulsive action, accidental action, is, moreover, -hated by them (as the cause of incalculable suffering). _Consequently_ -they denied this element in the absolute, and interpreted it as -absolute "rationality" and "conformity of means to ends." - -_Change_ and _perishability_ were also feared; and by this fear an -oppressed soul is revealed, full of distrust and painful experiences -(the case with _Spinoza_: a man differently constituted would have -regarded this change as a charm). - -A nature overflowing and _playing_ with energy, would call precisely -the _passions, irrationality_ and _change, good_ in a eudemonistic -sense, together with their consequences: danger, contrast, ruin, etc. - - -577. - -Against the value of that which always remains the same (remember -Spinoza's artlessness and Descartes' likewise), the value of the -shortest and of the most perishable, the seductive flash of gold on the -belly of the serpent _vita_---- - - -578. - -_Moral values in epistemology itself:_-- - - The faith in reason--why not mistrust? - - The "real world" is the good world--why? - - Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle, regarded as - immoral: the desire for a world which _knows nothing_ of - these things. - - The transcendental world discovered, _so that_ a place may - be kept for "moral freedom" (as in Kant). - - Dialectics as the road to virtue (in Plato and Socrates: - probably because sophistry was held to be the road to - immorality). - - Time and space are ideal: consequently there is unity in - the essence of things; consequently no sin, no evil, no - imperfection, a _justification_ of God. - - Epicurus _denied_ the possibility of knowledge, in order to - keep the moral (particularly the hedonistic) values as the - highest. - - Augustine does the same, and later Pascal ("corrupted - reason"), in favour of Christian values. - - Descartes' contempt for everything variable; likewise - Spinoza's. - - -579. - -_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics._--This world is only -apparent: _therefore_ there must be a real world;--this world is -conditioned: _consequently_ there must be an unconditioned world;--this -world is contradictory: _consequently_ there is a world free from -contradiction;--this world is evolving: _consequently_ there is -somewhere a static world:--a host of false conclusions (blind faith -in reason: if A exists, then its opposite B must also _exist_). Pain -_inspires these conclusions_: at bottom they are _withes_ that such -a world might exist; the hatred of a world which leads to suffering -is likewise revealed by the fact that another and _better_ world is -imagined: the _resentment_ of the metaphysician against reality is -creative here. - -_The second_ series of questions: _wherefore_ suffer? ... and from -this a conclusion is derived concerning the relation of the real -world to our apparent, changing, suffering, and contradictory world: -(1) Suffering as the consequence of error: how is error possible? -(2) Suffering as the consequence of guilt: how is guilt possible? -(A host of experiences drawn from the sphere of nature or society, -universalised and made absolute.) But if the conditioned world be -causally determined by the unconditioned, then the _freedom to err, to -be sinful,_ must also be derived from the same quarter: and once more -the question arises, _to what purpose?_ ... The world of appearance, of -Becoming, of contradiction, of suffering, is therefore _willed; to what -purpose?_ - -The error of these conclusions; two contradictory concepts are -formed--because one of them corresponds to a reality, the other -"_must_" also correspond to a reality. "_Whence_" would one otherwise -derive its contradictory concept? _Reason_ is thus a source of -revelation concerning the absolute. - -But the _origin_ of the above contradictions _need not necessarily_ be -a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose t_he real -genesis_ of the concepts, this springs from practical spheres, from -utilitarian spheres, hence the _strong faith_ it commands _(one is -threatened with ruin_ if one's conclusions are not in conformity with -this reason; but this fact is no "_proof_" of what the latter asserts). - -_The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain,_ is quite artless. -"Eternal blessedness": psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men -never make pleasure and pain ultimate questions--they are incidental -conditions: both of them must be desired when one _will attain to_ -something. It is a sign of fatigue and illness in these metaphysicians -and religious men, that they should press questions of pleasure and -pain into the foreground. Even _morality_ in their eyes derives its -great importance _only_ from the fact that it is regarded as an -essential condition for abolishing pain. - -_The same holds good of the preoccupation with appearance and error_ -the cause of pain. A superstition that happiness and truth are related -(confusion: happiness in "certainty," in "faith"). - - -580. - -To what extent are the various _epistemological positions_ -(materialism, sensualism, idealism) consequences of valuations? The -source of the highest feelings of pleasure ("feelings of value") may -also judge concerning the problem of _reality_! - -The measure of _positive knowledge_ is quite a matter of indifference -and beside the point; as witness the development of Indici. - -The Buddhistic _negation_ of reality in general (appearance pain) is -perfectly consistent: undemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of -categories, not only for an "absolute world," but a recognition of -the _erroneous procedures_ by means of which the whole concept has -been reached. "Absolute reality," "Being in itself," a contradiction. -In a world of _Becoming,_ reality is merely a _simplification_ for -the purpose of practical ends, or a _deception_ resulting from the -coarseness of certain organs, or a variation in the tempo of Becoming. - -The logical denial of the world and Nihilism is a consequence of the -fact that we must oppose nonentity with Being, and that Becoming is -denied. ("_Something_" becomes.) - - -581. - -_Being_ and _Becoming._--"_Reason_" developed upon a sensualistic basis -upon the _prejudices of the senses_--that is to say, with the belief in -the truth of the judgment of the senses. - -"Being," as the generalisation of the concept "_Life_" (breath), "to be -animate," "to will," "to act upon," "become." - -The opposite is: "to be inanimate," "_not_ to become," "_not_ to will." -_Thus_: "Being" is _not_ opposed to "not-Being," to "appearance," nor -is it opposed to death (for only that can be dead which can also live). - -The "soul," the "ego," posited as _primeval facts;_ and introduced -wherever _there is Becoming._ - - -582. - -_Being_--we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from -"_living._"--How then can everything "be" dead? - - -583. - -_A._ - -I see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate -of being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ -of knowledge for the real world--be it what it may. - -At this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this -contradiction established?... - -The fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also -understood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we -should understand a world as subjectively conditioned, are _no_ proofs -of the actual _possibility_ of an objective world. Who urges us to -believe that subjectivity _is_ real or essential? - -The absolute is even an absurd concept: an "absolute mode of existence" -is nonsense, the concept "being," "thing," is always _relative_ to us. - -The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis "apparent" and "real," -the correlative valuations "of little value" and "absolutely valuable" -have been spread abroad. - -The world of appearance does not strike us as a "valuable" world; -appearance is on a lower plane than the highest value. Only a "real" -world can be absolutely "valuable".... - -_Prejudice of prejudices!_ It is perfectly possible in itself that -the real nature of things would be so unfriendly, so opposed to the -first conditions of life, that appearance is necessary in order to -make life possible.... This is certainly the case in a large number of -situations--for instance, marriage. - -Our empirical world would thus be conditioned, even in its limits -to knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation, we regard that -as good, valuable, and true, which favours the preservation of the -species.... - -_(a)_ We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between a -real and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist a world of -appearance, but not _our_ world of appearance.) - -_(b)_ Taking the _real_ world for granted, it might still be the _less -valuable_ to us; for the quantum of illusion might be of the highest -order, owing to its value to us as a preservative measure. (Unless -_appearance_ in itself were sufficient to condemn anything?) - -_(c)_ That there exists a correlation between the _degrees of value_ -and the _degrees of reality_ (so that the highest values also possessed -the greatest degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which -starts out with the hypothesis that we _know_ the order of rank among -values; and that this order is a _moral_ one. It is only on this -hypothesis that _truth_ is necessary as a definition of all that is of -a superior value. - -_B._ - -It is of cardinal importance that the _real world_ should be -suppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and -depredator of values, concerning the _world which we are_: it was our -most dangerous_ attempt_ heretofore on the life of Life. - -_War_ against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been -imagined. The notion that _moral values_ are the _highest_ values, -belongs to this hypothesis. - -The superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could -be shown to be the result of an _immoral_ valuation--a specific case -of real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an _appearance,_ -and as an _appearance_ it would cease from having any right to condemn -appearance. - -_C._ - -Then the "Will to Truth" would have to be examined psychologically: it -is not a moral power, but a form of the Will to Power. This would have -to be proved by the fact that it avails itself of every _immoral_ means -there is; above all, of the metaphysicians. - -At the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing -the assumption that moral values are the highest values, _Method in -research_ is attained only when all _moral prejudices_ have been -overcome: it represents a conquest over morality.... - - -584. - -The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome of the fact that, -instead of recognising in logic and the categories of reason merely -a means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (that is -to say, especially, a useful _falsification_), they were taken to be -the criterion of truth--particularly of _reality._ The "criterion -of truth" was, as a matter of fact, merely the _biological utility -of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle:_ and, -since a species of animals knows nothing more important than its own -preservation, it was indeed allowable here to speak of "truth." Where -the artlessness came in, however, was in taking this anthropocentric -idiosyncrasy as the _measure of things,_ as the canon for recognising -the "real" and the "unreal": in short, in making a relative thing -absolute. And behold, all at once, the world fell into the two halves, -"real" and "apparent": and precisely that world which man's reason had -arranged for him to live and to settle in, was discredited. Instead of -using the forms as mere instruments for making the world manageable -and calculable, the mad fancy of philosophers intervened, and saw that -in these categories the concept of that world is given which does -not correspond to the concept of the world in which man lives.... The -means were misunderstood as measures of value, and even used as a -condemnation of their original purpose.... - -The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a useful way: the means -thereto was the invention of forms and signs, with the help of which -the confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced to a useful and -wieldy scheme. - -But woe! a _moral category_ was now brought into the game: no creature -would deceive itself, no creature may deceive itself--consequently -there is only a will to truth. What is "truth"? - -The principle of contradiction provided the scheme: the real world to -which the way is being sought cannot be in contradiction with itself, -cannot change, cannot evolve, has no beginning and no end. - -That is the greatest error which has ever been committed, the really -fatal error of the world: it was believed that in the forms of reason a -criterion of reality had been found--whereas their only purpose was to -master reality, by _misunderstanding_ it intelligently.... - -And behold, the world became false precisely owing to the qualities -_which constitute its reality,_ namely, change, evolution, -multifariousness, contrast, contradiction, war. And thenceforward the -whole fatality was there. - -1. How does one get rid of the false and merely apparent world? (it was -the real and only one). - -2. How does one become one's self as remote as possible from the -world of appearance? (the concept of the perfect being as a contrast -to the real being; or, more correctly still, as _the contradiction of -life_....). - -The whole direction of values was towards the _slander of life_; people -deliberately confounded ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so -that the opposing parties also began to reject _science_ with horror. - -Thus the road to science was _doubly_ barred: first, by the belief -in the real world; and secondly, by the opponents of this belief. -Natural science and psychology were (1) condemned in their objects, (2) -deprived of their artlessness.... - -Everything is so absolutely bound and related to everything else in -the real world, that to condemn, or to _think away_ anything, means to -condemn and think away the whole. The words "this should not be," "this -ought not to be," are a farce.... If one imagines the consequences, -one would ruin the very source of Life by suppressing everything which -is in any sense whatever _dangerous or destructive._ Physiology proves -this _much better_! - -We see how morality _(a) poisons_ the whole concept of the world, _(b)_ -cuts off the way to _science, (c)_ dissipates and undermines all real -instincts (by teaching that their root is _immoral_). - -We thus perceive a terrible tool of decadence at work, which succeeds -in remaining immune, thanks to the holy names and holy attitudes it -assumes. - - -585. - -The awful recovery of our _consciousness:_ not of the individual, but -of the human species. Let us reflect; let us think backwards; let us -follow the narrow and broad highway. - -_A._ - -Man seeks "the truth": a world that does not contradict itself, -that does not deceive, that does not change, a _real_ world--a -world in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception, -variability---the causes of suffering! He does not doubt that there is -such a thing as a world as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to -it. (Indian criticism: even the ego is apparent and _not_ real.) - -Whence does man derive the concept of _reality_? --Why does he make -variability, deception, contradiction, the origin of _suffering;_ why -not rather of his happiness? ... - -The contempt and hatred of all that perishes, changes, and varies: -whence comes this valuation of stability? Obviously, the will to truth -is _merely_ the longing for a _stable world._ - -The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: _therefore,_ it was -concluded, reason is the road to a static state; the most _spiritual_ -ideas must be nearest to the "real world."--It is from the senses that -the greatest number of misfortunes come they are cheats, deluders, and -destroyers. - -Happiness can be promised only by Being: change and happiness exclude -each other. The loftiest desire is thus to be one with Being. That is -the formula for the way to happiness. - -_In summa:_ The world as it _ought_ to be exists; this world in which -we live is an error--this our world should _not_ exist. - -_The belief in Being_ shows itself only as a result: the real primum -_mobile_ is the disbelief in Becoming, the mistrust of Becoming, the -scorn of all Becoming.... - -What kind of a man reflects in this way? An unfruitful, _suffering_ -kind, a world-weary kind. If we try and fancy what the opposite kind -of man would be like, we have a picture of a creature who would not -require the belief in Being; he would rather despise it as dead, -tedious, and indifferent.... - -The belief that the world which ought to be, is, really exists, is a -belief proper to the unfruitful, _who do not wish to create a world as -it should be._ They take it for granted, they seek for means and ways -of attaining to it. "The will to truth"--_is the impotence of the will -to create._ - -To recognise that something } Antagonism in -is _thus_ or _thus:_ } the degrees of -To act so that something will } energy in -be _thus_ or _thus:_ } various natures. - - -The fiction of a world which corresponds to our desires; psychological -artifices and interpretations calculated to associate all that we -honour and regard as pleasant, with this _real world._ - -"The will to truth" at this stage is essentially _the art of -interpretation:_ to which also belongs that interpretation which still -possesses strength. - -The same species of men, grown one degree poorer, _no longer possessed -of the power_ to interpret and to create fictions, produces the -Nihi_lists._ A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it is, -that it ought _not_ to exist, and of the world as it ought to be, that -it does not exist. According to this, existence (action, suffering, -willing, and feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the "in vain" is the -Nihilist's pathos--and as pathos it is moreover an _inconsistency_ on -the part of the Nihilist. - -He who is not able to introduce his will into things, the man without -either will or energy, at least invests them with some meaning, _i.e._ -he believes that a will is already in them. - -The degree of a man's _will-power_ may be measured from the extent to -which he can dispense with the meaning in things, from the extent to -which he is able to endure a world without meaning: _because he himself -arranges a small portion of it._ - -The _philosophical objective view of things_ may thus be a sign of -poverty both of will and of energy. For energy organises what is -closest and next; the "scientists," whose only desire is to _ascertain_ -what exists, are such as cannot arrange things _as they ought to be._ - -The _artists,_ an intermediary species, they at least set up a symbol -of what should exist,--they are productive inasmuch as they actually -_alter_ and transform; not like the scientists, who leave everything as -it is. - -_The connection between philosophers and the pessimistic religions;_ -the same species of man (_they attribute the highest degree of -reality_ to the _things which are valued highest_). - -_The connection between philosophers and moral men_ and their -evaluations (the _moral_ interpretation of the world as the sense of -the world: after the collapse of the religious sense). - -_The overcoming of philosophers_ by the annihilation of the world of -being: intermediary period of Nihilism; before there is sufficient -strength present to transvalue values, and to make the world of -becoming, and of appearance, the _only_ world to be deified and called -good. - -_B._ - -Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a symptom of increasing -_strength_ or of increasing _weakness_:-- - -Partly owing to the fact that the strength _to create_ and _to will_ -has grown to such an extent, that it no longer requires this collective -interpretation and introduction of a _sense_ ("present duties," state, -etc.); - -Partly owing to the fact that even the creative power necessary -to invent sense, declines, and disappointment becomes the ruling -condition. The inability to _believe_ in a sense becomes "unbelief." - -What is the meaning of _science_ in regard to both possibilities? - -(1) It is a sign of strength and self-control; it shows an _ability_ to -dispense with healing, consoling worlds of illusion. - -(2) It is also able to undermine, to dissect, to disappoint, and to -weaken. - - -_C._ - -_The belief in truth,_ the need of holding to something which is -believed to be true: psychological reduction apart from the valuations -that have existed hitherto. Fear and laziness. - -At the same time _unbelief:_ Reduction. In what way does it acquire a -_new value,_ if a real world does not exist at all (by this means the -capacity of valuing, which hitherto has been _lavished_ upon the world -of being, becomes free once more). - - -586. - -The _real_ and the _ "apparent" world._ - -_A._ - -The _erroneous concepts_ which proceed from this concept are of three -kinds:-- - -_(a)_ An unknown world:--we are adventurers, we are inquisitive,--that -which is known to us makes us weary (the danger of the concept lies in -the fact it suggests that "this" world is known to us....); - -_(b) Another_ world, where things are different:--something in us draws -comparisons, and thereby our calm submission and our silence lose their -value--perhaps all will be for the best, we have not hoped in vain.... -The world where things are different--who knows?--where we ourselves -will be different.... - -_(c)_ A _real_ world:--that is the most singular blow and attack -which we have ever received; so many things have become encrusted in -the word "true," that we involuntarily give these to the "real world"; -the _real_ world must also be a _truthful_ world, such a one as would -not deceive us or make fools of us; to believe in it in this way is to -be almost _forced_ to believe (from convention, as is the case among -people worthy of confidence). - -*** - -The concept, "the _unknown_ world," suggests that this world is known -to us (is tedious); - -The concept, "the other world," suggests that this world _might be -different,_ it suppresses necessity and fate (it is useless to _submit_ -and to _adapt one's self_); - -The concept, _the true world,_ suggests that this world is -untruthful, deceitful, dishonest, not genuine, and not essential, -and _consequently_ not a world calculated to be useful to us (it is -unadvisable to become adapted to it; _better_ resist it). - -*** - -Thus we _escape_ from "this" world in three different ways:---- - -_(a)_ With our _curiosity_--as though the interesting part was -somewhere else; - -_(b)_ With our _submission_--as though it was not necessary to submit, -as though this world was not an ultimate necessity; - -_(c)_ With our _sympathy_ and respect--as though this world did not -deserve them, as though it was mean and dishonest towards us.... - -_In summa_: we have become revolutionaries in three different ways; we -have made _x_ our criticism of the "known world." - -_B._ - -_The first step to reason:_ to understand to what extent we have been -_seduced,_--for it might be _precisely_ the reverse: - -_(a)_ The _unknown_ world could be so constituted as to give us a -liking for "this" world--it may be a more stupid and meaner form of -existence. - -_(b)_ The other world, very far from taking account of our desires -which were never realised here, might be part of the mass of things -which _this_ world makes possible for us; to learn to know this world -would be a means of satisfying us, - -_(c)_ The _true_ world: but who actually says that the apparent world -must be of less value than the true world? Do not our instincts -contradict this judgment? Is not man eternally occupied in creating an -imaginative world, because he will have a better world than reality? -_In the first place,_ how do we know that _our_ world is _not_ the -true world? ... for it might be that the other world is the world of -"appearance" (as a matter of fact, the Greeks, for instance, actually -imagined a _region of shadows, a life of appearance,_ beside _real_ -existence). And finally, what right have we to establish _degrees of -reality,_ as it were? That is something different from an unknown -world--that is already the _will to know something of the unknown._ The -"other," the "unknown" world--good! but to speak of the "true world" is -as good as "_knowing_ something about it,"--that is the _contrary_ of -the assumption of an _x_-world.... - -In short, the world _x_ might be in every way a more tedious, a more -inhuman, and a less dignified world than this one. - -It would be quite another matter if it were assumed that there were -several _x_-worlds--that is to say, every possible kind of world -besides our own. But this has _never been assumed...._ - -_C._ - -Problem: why has the _image of the other world_ always been to the -disadvantage of "this" one--that is to say, always stood as a criticism -of it; what does this point to?-- - -A people that are proud of themselves, and who are on the ascending -path of Life, always; picture _another_ existence as lower and less -valuable than theirs; they regard the strange unknown world as their -enemy, as their opposite; they feel no curiosity, but rather repugnance -in regard to what is strange to them.... Such a body of men would never -admit that another people were the "true people".... - -The very fact that such a distinction is possible,--that this world -should be called the world of appearance, and that the other should be -called the true world,--is symptomatic. - -The places of origin of the idea, of "another world": - - The philosopher who invents a rational world where _reason_ - and logical functions are adequate:--this is the root of - the "true" world. - - The religious man who invents a "divine world";--this is the - root of the "denaturalised" and the "anti-natural" world. - - The moral man who invents a "free world":--this is the root - of the good, the perfect, the just, and the holy world. - -The _common factor_ in the three places of origin: _psychological_ -error, physiological confusion. - -With what attributes is the "other world," as it actually appears in -history, characterised? With the stigmata of philosophical, religious, -and moral prejudices. - -The "other world" as it appears in the light of these facts, is -_synonymous_ with _not-Being,_ with not-living, with the _will_ not to -live.... - -_General aspect:_ it was the instinct of the _fatigue of living,_ and -not that of life, which created the "other world." - -_Result:_ philosophy, religion, and morality are _symptoms of -decadence._ - - - -_(l)_ The Biological Value of Knowledge. - - -587. - -It might seem as though I had evaded the question concerning -"certainty". The reverse is true: but while raising the question of the -criterion of certainty, I wished to discover the weights and measures -with which men had weighed heretofore--and to show that the question -concerning certainty is already in itself a _dependent_ question, a -question of the second rank. - - -588. - -The question of values is more _fundamental_ than the question of -certainty: the latter only becomes serious once the question of values -has been answered. - -Being and appearance, regarded psychologically, yield no "Being in -itself," no criterion for reality, but only degrees of appearance, -measured according to the strength of the sympathy which we feel for -appearance. - -There is no struggle for existence between ideas and observations, -but only a struggle for supremacy--the vanquished idea is _not -annihilated,_ but only _driven to the background_ or _subordinated. -There is no such thing as annihilation in intellectual spheres._ - - -589. - - "End and means" - "Cause and effect" - "Subject and object" - "Action and suffering" - "Thing-in-itself and - appearance" - -As interpretations (_not_ as established facts)--and in what respect -were they perhaps necessary interpretations? (as "preservative -measures")--all in the sense of a Will to Power. - - -590. - -Our values are _interpreted into the heart_ of things. - -Is there, then, any _sense_ in the absolute? - -Is not sense necessarily _relative-sense_ and perspective? - -All sense is Will to Power (all relative senses may be identified with -it). - - -591. - -The desire for "established facts"--Epistemology: how much pessimism -there is in it! - - -592. - -The antagonism between the "true world," as pessimism depicts it, and -a world in which it were possible to live--for this the rights of -_truth_ must be tested. It is necessary to measure all these "ideal -forces" according to the standard of life, in order to understand the -nature of that antagonism: the struggle of sickly, desperate life, -cleaving to a beyond, against healthier, more foolish, more false, -richer, and fresher life. Thus it is not "truth" struggling with Life, -but _one_ kind of Life with another kind.--But the former would fain -be the _higher_ kind!--Here we must prove that some order of rank is -necessary,--that the first problem is _the order of rank among kinds of -Life._ - - -593. - -The belief, "It is _thus_ and _thus,_" must be altered into the will, -"Thus and thus _shall it be._" - - - - -_(m)_ Science. - - -594. - -Science hitherto has been a means of disposing of the confusion of -things by hypotheses which "explain everything"--that is to say, it -has been the result of the intellect's repugnance to chaos. This -same repugnance takes hold of me when I contemplate _myself;_ I -should like to form some kind of representation of my inner world -for myself by means of a _scheme,_ and thus overcome intellectual -confusion. Morality was a simplification of this sort: it taught man as -_recognised,_ as _known,_--Now we have annihilated morality--we have -once more grown _completely obscure_ to ourselves! I know that I know -nothing _about myself. Physics_ shows itself to be a _boon_ for the -mind: science (as the road to _knowledge_) acquires a new charm after -morality has been laid aside--and _owing to the fact_ that we find -consistency here alone, we must _order_ our lives in accordance with -it so that it may help us to _preserve it. _ This results in a sort of -_practical meditation_ concerning the _conditions of our existence_ as -investigators. - - -595. - -Our first principles: no God: no purpose: limited energy. We will take -good care to _avoid_ thinking out and prescribing the necessary lines -of thought for the lower orders. - - -596. - -No "_moral_ education" of humanity: but the _disciplinary school of -scientific errors_ is necessary, because truth disgusts and creates a -dislike of life, provided a man is not already irrevocably launched -upon his _way,_ and bears the consequences of his honest standpoint -with tragic pride. - - -597. - -The first principle of _scientific work:_ faith in the union and -continuance of scientific work, so that the individual may undertake to -work at any point, however small, and feel sure that his efforts _will -not be in vain._ - -There is a great paralysing force: to work _in vain,_ to struggle _in -vain._ - -*** - -The periods of _hoarding,_ when energy and power are stored, to be -utilised later by subsequent periods: _Science_ as a _half-way house,_ -at which the mediocre, more multifarious, and more complicated beings -find their most natural gratification and means of expression: all -those who do well to avoid _action._ - - -598. - -A. philosopher recuperates his strength in a way quite his own, and -with other means: he does it, for instance, with Nihilism. The belief -_that there is no such thing as truth,_ the Nihilistic belief, is a -tremendous relaxation for one who, as a warrior of knowledge, is -unremittingly struggling with a host of hateful truths. For truth is -ugly. - - -599. - -The "purposelessness of all phenomena": the belief in this is the -result of the view that all interpretations hitherto have been false, -it is a generalisation on the part of discouragement and weakness--it -is not a necessary belief. - -The arrogance of man: when he sees no purpose, he _denies_ that there -can be one! - - -600. - -The unlimited ways of interpreting the world: every interpretation is a -symptom of growth or decline. - -Unity (monism) is a need of inertia; Plurality in interpretation is a -sign of strength. One should not _desire to deprive_ the world of its -disquieting and enigmatical nature. - - -601. - -Against the desire for reconciliation and peaceableness. To this also -belongs every attempt on the part of monism. - - -602. - -This relative world, this world for the eye, the touch, and the -ear, is very false, even when adjusted to a much more sensitive -sensual apparatus. But its comprehensibility, its clearness, its -practicability, its beauty, will begin to _near their end_ if we -_refine_ our senses, just as beauty ceases to exist when the processes -of its history are reflected upon: the arrangement of the _end_ is in -itself an illusion. Let it suffice, that the more coarsely and more -superficially it is understood, the _more valuable,_ the more definite, -the more beautiful and important the world then seems. The more -deeply one looks into it, the further our valuation retreats from our -view,-_senselessness approaches!_ We have created the world that has -any value! Knowing this, we also perceive that the veneration of truth -is already the _result of illusion_--and that it is much more necessary -to esteem the formative, simplifying, moulding, and romancing power. - -"All is false--everything is allowed!" - -Only as the result of a certain bluntness of vision and the desire for -simplicity does the beautiful and the "valuable" make its appearance: -in itself it is purely fanciful. - - -603. - -We know that the destruction of an illusion does not necessarily -produce a truth, but only one more piece of _ignorance;_ it is the -extension of our "empty space," an increase in our "waste." - - -604. - -Of what alone can _knowledge_ consist?--"Interpretation," the -introduction of a sense into things, _not_ "explanation" (in the -majority of cases a new interpretation of an old interpretation which -has grown incomprehensible and little more than a mere sign). There -is no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates, -everything, is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all -things are our opinions. - - -605. - -The ascertaining of "truth" and "untruth," the ascertaining of facts -in general, is fundamentally different from the creative _placing,_ -forming, moulding, subduing, and _willing_ which lies at the root of -_philosophy. To give a sense to things_--this duty always remains -_over,_ provided _no sense already lies in them._ The same holds good -of sounds, and also of the fate of nations they are susceptible of the -most varied interpretations and turns, _for different purposes._ - -A higher duty is to _fix a goal_ and to mould facts according to -it: _that is,_ the _interpretation of action,_ and not merely a -_transvaluation_ of concepts. - - -606. - -Man ultimately finds nothing more in things than he himself has laid -in them--this process of finding again is science, the actual process -of laying a meaning in things, is art, religion, love, pride. In both, -even if they are child's play, one should show good courage and one -should plough ahead; on the one hand, to find again, on the other,--we -are the other,--to lay a sense in things. - - -607. - -_Science_: its two sides:-- - - In regard to the individual; - - In regard to the complex of culture ("levels of culture") - ---antagonistic valuation in regard to this and that side. - - -608. - -The development of science tends ever more to transform the known into -the unknown: its aim, however, is to do the _reverse,_ and it starts -out with the instinct of tracing the unknown to the known. - -In short, science is laying the road to _sovereign ignorance,_ to a -feeling that "knowledge" does not exist at all, that it was merely a -form of haughtiness to dream of such a thing; further, that we have not -preserved the smallest notion which would allow us to class knowledge -even as a _possibility_ that "knowledge" is a contradictory idea. We -_transfer_ a primeval myth and piece of human vanity into the land -of hard facts: we can _allow_ a thing-in-itself as a concept, just -as little as we can _allow_ "knowledge-in-itself." The _misleading_ -influence of "numbers and logic," the misleading influence of "laws." - -_Wisdom_ is an attempt to _overcome_ the perspective valuations (_i.e._ -the "will to power"): it is a principle which is both unfriendly to -Life, and also decadent; a symptom in the case of the Indians, etc.; -_weakness_ of the power of appropriation. - - -609. - -It does not suffice for you to see in what ignorance man and beast now -live; you must also have and learn the _desire_ for _ignorance._ It -is necessary that you should know that without this form of ignorance -life itself would be impossible, that it is merely a vital condition -under which, alone, a living organism can preserve itself and prosper: -a great solid belt of ignorance must stand about you. - - -610. - -Science--the transformation of Nature into concepts for the purpose of -governing Nature--that is part of the rubric _means._ - -But the _purpose_ and _will_ of mankind must grow in the same way, the -intention in regard to the whole. - - -611. - -_Thought_ is the strongest and most persistently exercised function in -all stages of life--and also in every act of perception or apparent -experience! Obviously it soon becomes the _mightiest_ and _most -exacting_ of all functions, and in time tyrannises over other powers. -Ultimately it becomes "passion in itself." - - -612. - -The right to great passion must be reclaimed for the investigator, -after self-effacement and the cult of "objectivity" have created a -false order of rank in this sphere. Error reached its zenith when -Schopenhauer taught: _in the release from passion and_ in will alone -lay the road to "truth," to knowledge; the intellect freed from will -_could not help_ seeing the true and actual essence of things. The same -error in art: as if everything became _beautiful_ the moment it was -regarded without will. - - -613. - -The contest for supremacy among the passions, and the dominion of one -of the passions over the intellect. - - -614. - -To "humanise" the world means to feel ourselves ever more and more -masters upon earth. - - -615. - -Knowledge, among a higher class of beings, will also take new forms -which are not yet necessary. - - -616. - -That the _worth of the world_ lies in our interpretations (that perhaps -yet other interpretations are possible somewhere, besides mankind's); -that the interpretations made hitherto were perspective valuations, -by means of which we were able to survive in life, _i.e._ in the -Will to Power and in the growth of power; that every _elevation of -man_ involves the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every -higher degree of strength or power attained, brings new views in its -train, and teaches a belief in new horizons--these doctrines lie -scattered through all my works. The world that _concerns us at all_ is -false--that is to say, is not a fact; but a romance, a piece of human -sculpture, made from a meagre sum of observation; it is "in flux"; it -is something that evolves, a great revolving lie continually moving -onwards and never getting any nearer to truth--for there is no such -thing as "truth." - - -617. - -_Recapitulation_:-- - -To _stamp_ Becoming with the character of Being--this is the highest -_Will to Power._ - -_The twofold falsification,_ by the senses on the one hand, by the -intellect on the other, with the view of maintaining a world of being, -of rest, of equivalent cases, etc. - -That _everything recurs,_ is the very nearest _approach of a world of -Becoming to a world of Being, the height of contemplation._ - -It is out of the values which have been attributed to Being, that the -condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, Becoming, have sprung: once -such a world of Being had been invented. - -The metamorphoses of Being (body, God, ideas, natural laws, formulæ, -etc.). - -"Being" as appearance the twisting round of values: appearance was that -which _conferred the values._ - -Knowledge in itself in a world of Becoming is impossible; how can -knowledge be possible at all, then? Only as a mistaking of one's self, -as will to power, as will to deception. - -Becoming is inventing, willing, self-denying, self-overcoming; no -subject but an action, it places things, it is creative, no "causes and -effects." - -Art is the will to overcome Becoming, it is a process of eternalising, -but short-sighted, always according to the perspective, repeating, as -it were in a small way, the tendency of the whole. - -That which _all life_ shows, is to be regarded as a reduced formula for -the collective tendency: hence the new definition of the concept "Life" -as "will to power." - -Instead of "cause and effect," the struggle of evolving factors with -one another, frequently with the result that the opponent is absorbed; -no constant number for Becoming. - -The uselessness of old ideals for the interpretation of all that takes -place, once their bestial origin and utility have been recognised, they -are, moreover, all hostile to life. - -The uselessness of the mechanical theory--it gives the impression that -there _can be no purpose._ - -All the _idealism_ of mankind, hitherto, is on the point of -turning into _Nihilism_--may be shown to be a belief in absolute -_worth_lessness, _i.e. purpose_lessness. - -The annihilation of ideals, the new desert waste the new arts which -will help us to endure it--_amphibia_ that we are! - -_First principles,_ bravery, patience, no "stepping-back," not too much -ardour to get to the fore. (_N.B._--Zarathustra constantly maintaining -an attitude of parody towards all former values, as the result of his -overflowing energy.) - - - - -II. - - -THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE. - - -1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World. - - -618. - -Of all the interpretations of the world attempted heretofore, the -_mechanical_ one seems to-day to stand most prominently in the front. -Apparently it has a clean conscience on its side; for no science -believes inwardly in progress and success unless it be with the help -of mechanical procedures. Every one knows these procedures: "reason" -and "purpose" are allowed to remain out of consideration as far as -possible; it is shown that, provided a sufficient amount of time be -allowed to elapse, everything can evolve out of everything else, and no -one attempts to suppress his malicious satisfaction, when the "apparent -design in the fate" of a plant or of the yolk of an egg, may be traced -to stress and thrust in short, people are heartily glad to pay respect -to this principle of profoundest stupidity, if I may be allowed to pass -a playful remark concerning these serious matters. Meanwhile, among the -most select intellects to be found in this movement, some presentiment -of evil, some anxiety is noticeable, as if the theory had a rent in it, -which sooner or later might be its last: I mean the sort of rent which -denotes the end of all balloons inflated with such theories. - -Stress and thrust themselves cannot be "explained," one cannot get rid -of the _actio in distans._ The belief even in the ability to explain is -now lost, and people peevishly admit that one can only describe, not -explain that the dynamic interpretation of the world, with its denial -of "empty space" and its little agglomerations of atoms, will soon get -the better of physicists: although in this way _Dynamis_ is certainly -granted an inner quality. - - -619. - -The triumphant concept "_energy_" with which our physicists created -God and the world, needs yet to be completed: it must be given an -inner will which I characterise as the "_Will to Power_"--that is to -say, as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or the application and -exercise of power as a creative instinct, etc. Physicists cannot get -rid of the "_actio in distans_" in their principles; any more than they -can a repelling force (or an attracting one). There is no help for it, -all movements, all "appearances," all "laws" must be understood as -_symptoms_ of an _inner_ phenomenon, and the analogy of man must be -used for this purpose. It is possible to trace all the instincts of an -animal to the will to power; as also all the functions of organic life -to this one source. - - -620. - -Has anybody ever been able to testify to a _force!_ No, but to -_effects,_ translated into a completely strange language. Regularity in -sequence has so spoilt us, _that we no longer wonder at the wonderful -process._ - - -621. - -A force of which we cannot form any idea, is an empty word, and ought -to have no civic rights in the city of science: and the same applies to -the purely mechanical powers of attracting and repelling by means of -which we can form an image of the world--no more! - - -622. - -_Squeezes and kicks_ are something incalculably recent, evolved and -not primeval. They presuppose something which holds together and _can_ -press and strike! But how could it hold together? - - -623. - -There is nothing _unalterable_ in chemistry: this is only appearance, -a mere school prejudice. We it was who _introduced_ the unalterable, -taking it from metaphysics as usual, Mr. Chemist. It is a mere -superficial judgment to declare that the diamond, graphite, and carbon -are identical. Why? Simply because no loss of substance can be traced -in the scales! Well then, at least they have something in common; but -the work of the molecules in the process of changing from one form to -the other, an action we can neither see nor weigh, is just exactly what -makes one material something different--with specifically different -qualities. - - -624. - -_Against_ the physical _atom._--In order to understand the world, we -must be able to reckon it up; in order to be able to reckon it up, we -must be aware of constant causes; but since we find no such constant -causes in reality, we _invent_ them for ourselves and call them atoms. -This is the origin of the atomic theory. - -The possibility of calculating the world, the possibility of expressing -all phenomena by means of formulæ--is that really "understanding"? What -would be understood of a piece of music, if all that were calculable in -it and capable of being expressed in formulas, were reckoned up?--Thus -"constant causes", things, substances, something "unconditioned," were -therefore _invented_;--what has been attained thereby? - - -625. - -The mechanical concept of "movement" is already a translation of the -original process into the _language of symbols of the eye and the -touch._ - -The concept _atom,_ the distinction between the "seat of a motive force -and the force itself," is a _language of symbols derived from our -logical and physical world._ - -It does not lie within our power to alter our means of expression: -it is possible to understand to what extend they are but symptomatic. -To demand an _adequate means of expression is nonsense_: it lies at -the heart of a language, of a medium of communication, to express -_relation_ only.... The concept "truth" is _opposed to good sense._ -The whole province of truth--_falseness_ only applies to the relations -between beings, not to an "absolute." There is no such thing as a -"being in itself" (_relations_ in the first place constitute being), -any more than there can be "knowledge in itself." - - -626. - -"_The feeling of force_ cannot proceed from movement: feeling in -general cannot proceed from movement." - -"Even in support of this, an apparent experience is the only evidence: -in a substance (brain) feeling is generated through transmitted motion -(stimuli). But generated? Would this show that the feeling did _not_ -yet exist there _at all_? so that its appearance would _have_ to -be regarded as the _creative act_ of the intermediary--motion? The -feelingless condition of this substance is only an hypothesis! not an -experience! Feeling, therefore is the _quality_ of the substance: there -actually are substances that feel." - -"Do we learn from certain substances that they have _no_ feeling? No, -we merely cannot tell that they have any. It is impossible to seek the -origin of feeling in non-sensitive substance."--_Oh what hastiness!_ - - -627. - -"To attract" and "to repel", in a purely mechanical sense, is pure -fiction: a word. We cannot imagine an attraction without a _purpose.--_ -Either the will to possess one's self of a thing, or the will to defend -one's self from a thing or to repel it--_that_ we "understand"; that -would be an interpretation which we could use. - -In short, the psychological necessity of believing in causality lies in -the _impossibility of imagining a process without a purpose_: but of -course this says nothing concerning truth or untruth (the justification -of such a belief)! The belief in _causæ_ collapses with the belief in -τέλει (against Spinoza and his causationism). - - -628. - -It is an illusion to suppose that something is _known,_ when all -we have is a mathematical formula of what has happened; it is only -_characterised, described;_ no more! - - -629. - -If I bring a regularly recurring phenomenon into a formula, I have -facilitated and shortened my task of characterising the whole -phenomenon, etc. But I have not thereby ascertained a "law," I have -only replied to the question: How is it that something recurs here? It -is a supposition that the formula corresponds to a complex of really -unknown forces and the discharge of forces; it is pure mythology to -suppose that forces here obey a law, so that, as the result of their -obedience, we have the same phenomenon every time. - - -630. - -I take good care not to speak of chemical "_laws_": to do so savours of -morality. It is much more a question of establishing certain relations -of power: the stronger becomes master of the weaker, in so far as the -latter cannot maintain its degree of independence,--here there is no -pity, no quarter, and, still less, any observance of "law." - - -631. - -The unalterable sequence of certain phenomena does not prove any "law," -but a relation of power between two or more forces. To say, "But it -is precisely this relation that remains the same!" is no better than -saying, "One and the same force cannot be another force."--It is not a -matter of _sequence,_ but a matter of _interdependence,_ a process in -which the procession of moments do _not_ determine each other after the -manner of cause and effect.... - -The separation of the "action" from the "agent"; of the phenomenon from -the _worker_ of that phenomenon: of the process from one that is not -process, but lasting, _substance,_ thing, body, soul, etc.; the attempt -to understand a life as a sort of shifting of things and a changing of -places; of a sort of "being" or stable entity: this ancient mythology -established the belief in "cause and effect," once it had found a -lasting form in the functions of speech and grammar. - - -632. - -The "regularity" of a sequence is only a metaphorical expression, not -a fact, just _as if_ a rule were followed here! And the same holds -good of "conformity to law." We find a formula in order to express an -ever-recurring kind of succession of phenomena: but that does not show -that we have _discovered a law_; much less a force which is the cause -of a recurrence of effects. The fact that something always happens -thus or thus, is interpreted here as if a creature always acted thus -or thus as the result of obedience to a law or to a lawgiver: whereas -apart from the "law" it would be free to act differently. But precisely -that inability to act otherwise might originate in the creature itself, -it might be that it did not act thus or thus in response to a law, -but simply because it was so constituted. It would mean simply: that -something cannot also be something else; that it cannot be first this, -and then something quite different; that it is neither free nor the -reverse, but merely thus or thus. _The fault lies in thinking a subject -into things._ - - -633. - -To speak of two consecutive states, the first as "cause," and the -second as "effect," is false. The first state cannot bring about -anything, the second has nothing effected in it. - -It is a question of a struggle between two elements unequal in power: -a new adjustment is arrived at, according to the measure of power each -possesses. The second state is something fundamentally different from -the first (it is not its effect): the essential thing Is, that the -factors which engage in the struggle leave it with different quanta of -power. - - -634. - -_A. criticism of Materialism._--Let us dismiss the two popular -concepts, Necessity and Law, from this idea: the first introduces a -false constraint, the second a false liberty into the world. "Things" -do not act regularly, they follow no _rule:_ there are no things (that -is our fiction); neither do they act in accordance with any necessity. -There is no obedience here: for, the fact that _something is_ as it is, -strong or weak, is not the result of obedience or of a rule or of a -constraint.... - -The degree of resistance and the degree of superior power--this is the -question around which all phenomena turn: if we, for our own purposes -and calculations, know how to express this in formulas and "laws," all -the better for us! But that does not mean that we have introduced any -"morality" into the world, just because we have fancied it as obedient. - -There are no laws: every power draws its last consequence at every -moment. Things are calculable precisely owing to the fact that there is -no possibility of their being otherwise than they are. - -A quantum of power is characterised by the effect it produces -and the influence it resists. The adiaphoric state which would be -thinkable in itself, is entirely lacking. It is essentially a will to -violence and a will to defend one's self against violence. It is not -self-preservation: every atom exercises its influence over the whole of -existence--it is thought out of existence if one thinks this radiation -of will-power away. That is why I call it a quantum of "_Will to -Power_"; with this formula one can express the character which cannot -be abstracted in thought from mechanical order, without suppressing the -latter itself in thought. - -The translation of the world of effect into a _visible_ world--a world -for the eye--is the concept "movement." Here it is always understood -that _something_ has been moved,--whether it be the fiction of an -atomic globule or even of the abstraction of the latter, the dynamic -atom, something is always imagined that has an effect--that is to say, -we have not yet rid ourselves of the habit into which our senses and -speech inveigled us. Subject and object, an agent to the action, the -action and that which does it separated: we must not forget that all -this signifies no more than semeiotics and--nothing real. Mechanics as -a teaching of _movement_ is already a translation of phenomena into -man's language of the senses. - - -635. - -We are in need of "unities" in order to be able to reckon: but this is -no reason for supposing that "unities" actually _exist._ We borrowed -the concept "unity" from our concept "ego,"--our very oldest article -of faith. If we did not believe ourselves to be unities we should never -have formed the concept "thing." Now--that is to say, somewhat late in -the day, we are overwhelmingly convinced that our conception of the -concept "ego" is no security whatever for a real entity. In order to -maintain the mechanical interpretation of the world theoretically, we -must always make the reserve that it is with fictions that we do so: -the concept of _movement_ (derived from the language of our senses) -and the concept of the _atom_ (= entity, derived from our psychical -experience) are based upon a _sense-prejudice_ and a _psychological -prejudice._ - -Mechanics formulates consecutive phenomena, and it does so -semeiologically, in the terms of the senses and of the mind (that all -influence is _movement_; that where there is movement something is at -work moving): it does not touch the question of the causal force. - -The _mechanical_ world is imagined as the eye and the sense of touch -alone could imagine a world (as "moved"),--in such a way as to be -calculable,--as to simulate causal entities "things" (atoms) whose -effect is constant (the transfer of the false concept of subject to the -concept atom). - -The mixing together of the concept of numbers, of the concept of thing -(the idea of subject), of the concept of activity (the separation of -that which is the cause, and the effect), of the concept of movement: -all these things are phenomenal; our eye and our _psychology_ are still -in it all. - -If we eliminate these adjuncts, nothing remains over but dynamic -quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: the -essence of which resides in their relation to all other quanta, in -their "influence" upon the latter. The will to power, not Being, not -Becoming, but a _pathos_--is the elementary fact, from these first -results a Becoming, an influencing.... - - -636. - -The physicists believe in a "true world" after their own kind; a -fixed _systematising of atoms_ to perform necessary movements, and -holding good equally of all creatures, so that, according to them, -the "world of appearance" reduces itself to the side of general and -generally-needed Being, which is accessible to every one according to -his kind (accessible and also adjusted,--made "subjective"). But here -they are in error. The atom which they postulate is arrived at by the -logic of that perspective of consciousness; it is in itself therefore -a subjective fiction. This picture of the world which they project -is in no way essentially different from the subjective picture: the -only difference is, that it is composed simply with more extended -senses, but certainly with _our_ senses.... And in the end, without -knowing it, they left something out of the constellation: precisely -the necessary _perspective factor,_ by means of which every centre of -power--and not man alone--constructs the rest of the world _from its -point of view_--that is to say, measures it, feels it, and moulds it -according to its degree of strength.... They forgot to reckon with -this perspective-fixing power, in "true being,"--or, in school-terms, -subject-being. They suppose that this was "evolved" and added;--but -even the chemical investigator needs it: it is indeed _specific Being,_ -which determines action and reaction according to circumstances. - -_Perspectivity is only a complex form, of specificness._ My idea is -that every specific body strives to become master of all space, and to -extend its power (its will to power), and to thrust back everything -that resists it. But inasmuch as it is continually meeting the same -endeavours on the part of other bodies, it concludes by coming to terms -with those (by "combining" with those) which are sufficiently related -to it--_and thus they conspire together for power._ And the process -continues. - - -637. - -Even in the inorganic world all that concerns an atom of energy is its -immediate neighbourhood: distant forces balance each other. Here is -the root of _perspectivity,_ and it explains why a living organism is -"egoistic" to the core. - - -638. - -Granting that the world disposed of a quantum of force, it is obvious -that any transposition of force to any place would affect the whole -system--thus, besides the causality of _sequence,_ there would also be -a dependence, _contiguity,_ and _coincidence._ - - -639. - -The only possible way of upholding the sense of the concept "God" would -be: to make _Him not_ the motive force, but the condition of _maximum -power,_ an _epoch;_ a point in the further development of the _Will to -Power;_ by means of which subsequent evolution just as much as former -evolution--up to Him--could be explained. - -Viewed mechanically, the energy of collective Becoming remains -constant; regarded from the economical standpoint, it ascends -to its zenith and then recedes therefrom in order to remain -eternally rotatory. This "_Will to Power_" expresses itself in the -_interpretation in the manner in which the strength is used._--The -conversion of energy into life; "life in its highest power" -thenceforward appears as the goal. The same amount of energy, at -different stages of development, means different things. - -That which determines growth in Life is the economy which becomes ever -more sparing and methodical, which achieves ever more and more with a -steadily decreasing amount of energy.... The ideal is the principle of -the least possible expense.... - -The only thing _that is proved_ is that the world is _not_ striving -towards a state of stability. Consequently its zenith must not be -conceived as a state of absolute equilibrium.... - -The dire necessity of the same things happening in the course of the -world, as in all other things, is not an eternal determinism reigning -over all phenomena, but merely the expression of the fact that the -impossible is not possible; that a given force cannot be different -from that given force; that a given quantity of resisting force does -not manifest itself otherwise than in conformity with its degree of -strength;--to speak of events as being necessary is tautological. - - - -2. The Will to Power as Life. - - -_(a) The Organic Process._ - - -640. - -Man imagines that he was present at the generation of the organic -world: what was there to be observed, with the eyes and the touch, -in regard to these processes? How much of it can be put into round -numbers? What rules are noticeable in the movements? Thus, man would -fain arrange all phenomena as if they were _for the eye and for the -touch,_ as if they were forms of motion: he will discover _formules_ -wherewith to _simplify_ the unwieldy mass of these experiences. - -_The reduction of all phenomena_ to the level of men with senses and -with mathematics. It is a matter of making _an inventory of human -experiences:_ granting that man, or rather the _human eye and the -ability to form concepts,_ have been the eternal witnesses of all -things. - - -641. - -A plurality of forces bound by a common nutritive process we call -"Life." To this nutritive process all so-called feeling, thinking, -and imagining belong as means--that is to say, (1) in the form of -opposing other forces; (2) in the form of an adjustment of other forces -according to mould and rhythm; (3) the form of a valuation relative to -assimilation and excretion. - - -642. - -The bond between the inorganic and the organic world must lie in the -repelling power exercised by every atom of energy. "Life" might be -defined as a lasting form of _force-establishing processes,_ in which -the various contending forces, on their part, grow unequally. To what -extent does counter-strife exist even in obedience? Individual power is -by no means surrendered through it. In the same way, there exists in -the act of commanding, an acknowledgment of the fact that the absolute -power of the adversary has not been overcome, absorbed, or dissipated. -"Obedience," and "command," are forms of the game of war. - - -643. - -The Will to Power _interprets_ (an organ in the process of formation -has to be interpreted): it defines, it determines gradations, -differences of power. Mere differences of power could not be aware of -each other as such: something must be there which _will_ grow, and -which interprets all other things that would do the same, according to -the value of the latter. In sooth, all interpretation is but a means -in itself to become master of something. (Continual _interpretation_ is -the first principle of the organic process.) - - -644. - -Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, the contiguity of the -developed organs and functions, with the disappearance of intermediate -members--if _that_ is _perfection,_ then there is a Will to Power -apparent in the organic process by means of whose _dominating, -shaping,_ and _commanding_ forces it is continually increasing the -sphere of its power, and persistently simplifying things within that -sphere, it _grows_ imperatively. - -"Spirit" is only a means and an instrument in the service of higher -life, in the service of the elevation of life. - - -645. - -"_Heredity,_" as something quite incomprehensible, cannot be used -as an explanation, but only as a designation for the identification -of a problem. And the same holds good of "_adaptability._" As a -matter of fact, the account of morphology, even supposing it were -perfect, _explains_ nothing, it merely describes an enormous fact. -_How_ a given organ gets to be used for any particular purpose is not -explained. There is just as little explained in regard to these things -by the assumption of _causæ finales_ as by the assumption of _causæ -efficientes._ The concept "causa" is only a means of expression, no -_more_; a means of designating a thing. - - -646. - -They are analogies; for instance, our _memory_ may suggest another kind -of memory which makes itself felt in heredity, development, and forms. -Our _inventive_ and experimentative powers suggest another kind of -inventiveness in the application of instruments to new ends, etc. - -That which we call our "_consciousness_" is quite guiltless of any -of the essential processes of our preservation and growth; and no -human brain could be so subtle as to construct anything more than a -machine--to which every organic process is infinitely superior. - - -647. - -_Against Darwinism._--The use of an organ does _not_ explain its -origin, on the contrary! During the greater part of the time occupied -in the formation of a certain quality, this quality does not help to -preserve the individual; it is of no use to him, and particularly not -in his struggle with external circumstances and foes. - -What is ultimately "useful"? It is necessary to ask, "Useful for what"? - -For instance, that which promotes the _lasting powers_ of the -individual might be unfavourable to his strength or his beauty; that -which preserves him might at the same time fix him and keep him stable -throughout development. On the other hand, a _deficiency,_ a state of -_degeneration,_ may be of the greatest possible use, inasmuch as it -acts as a stimulus to other organs. In the same way, a _state of need_ -may be a condition of existence, inasmuch as it reduces an individual -to that modicum of means which, though it _keeps him together,_ does -not allow him to squander his strength.--The individual himself is -the struggle of parts (for nourishment, space, etc.): his development -involves the _triumph,_ the _predominance,_ of isolated parts; the -_wasting away,_ or the "development into organs," of other parts. - -The influence of "environment" is nonsensically _overrated_ in Darwin, -the essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous -inner power to shape and to create forms, which merely _uses, exploits_ -"environment." - -The new forms built up by this inner power are not produced with a view -to any end; but, in the struggle between the parts, a new form does not -exist long _without_ becoming related to some kind of semi-utility, -and, according to its use, develops itself ever more and more perfectly. - - -648. - -"Utility" in respect of the acceleration of the speed of evolution, is -a different kind of "utility" from that which is understood to mean the -greatest possible stability and staying power of the evolved creature. - - -649. - -"Useful" in the sense of Darwinian biology means: that which favours a -thing in its struggle with others. But in my opinion the _feeling of -being surcharged,_ the feeling accompanying an _increase in strength,_ -quite apart from the utility of the struggle, is the actual _progress_: -from these feelings the will to war is first derived. - - -650. - -Physiologists should bethink themselves before putting down the -instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic -being. A living thing seeks above all to _discharge_ its strength: -"_self-preservation" _ is only one of the results thereof.--Let us -beware of _superfluous_ teleological principles!--one of which is the -whole concept of "self-preservation."[4] - -[Footnote 4: See _Beyond Good and Evil,_ in this edition, Aph. 13.] - - -651. - -The most-fundamental--and most primeval activity of a protoplasm cannot -be ascribed to a will to self-preservation, for it absorbs an amount -of material which is absurdly out of proportion with the needs of its -preservation: and what is more, it does _not_ "preserve itself" in the -process, but actually falls to _pieces...._ The instinct which rules -here, must account for this total absence in the organism of a desire -to preserve itself: hunger is already an interpretation based upon the -observation of a more or less complex organism (hunger is a specialised -and later form of the instinct; it is an expression of the system of -divided labour, in the service of a higher instinct which rules the -whole). - - -652. - -It is just as impossible to regard _hunger_ as the _primum mobile,_ as -it is to take self-preservation to be so. Hunger, considered as the -result of insufficient nourishment, means hunger as the result of a -will to power _which can no longer dominate_ It is not a question of -replacing a loss, it is only later on, as the result of the division of -labour, when the Will to Power has discovered other and quite different -ways of gratifying itself, that the appropriating lust of the organism -is _reduced_ to hunger--to the need of replacing what has been lost. - - -653. - -We can but laugh at the false "_Altruism_" of biologists: propagation -among the amœbæ appears as a process of jetsam, as an advantage to -them. It is an excretion of useless matter. - - -654. - -The division of a protoplasm into two takes place when its power is -no longer sufficient to subjugate the matter it has appropriated: -procreation is the result of impotence. - -In the cases in which the males seek the females and become one with -them, procreation is the result of hunger. - - -655. - -The weaker vessel is driven to the stronger from a need of nourishment; -it desires to get under it, if possible to become _one_ with it. The -stronger, on the contrary, defends itself from others; it refuses to -perish in this way; it prefers rather to split itself into two or more -parts in the process of growing. One may conclude that the greater the -urgency seems to become one with something else, the more weakness in -some form is present. The greater the tendency to variety, difference, -inner decay, the more strength is actually to hand. - -The instinct to cleave to something, and the instinct to repel -something, are in the inorganic as in the organic world, the uniting -bond. The whole distinction is a piece of hasty judgment. - -The will to power in every combination of forces, _defending itself -against the stronger and coming down unmercifully upon the weaker, is -more correct._ - -N. B. _All processes may be regarded as "beings"._ - - -656. - -The will to power can manifest itself only against _obstacles;_ it -therefore goes in search of what resists it--this is the primitive -tendency of the protoplasm when it extends its _pseudopodia_ and feels -about it. The act of appropriation and assimilation is, above all, the -result of a desire to overpower, a process of forming, of additional -building and rebuilding, until at last the subjected creature has -become completely a part of the superior creature's sphere of power, -and has increased the latter.--If this process of incorporation -does not succeed, then the whole organism falls to pieces; and the -_separation_ occurs as the result of the will to power: in order to -prevent the escape of that which has been subjected, the will to power -falls into two wills (under some circumstances without even abandoning -completely its relation to the two). - -"Hunger" is only a more narrow adaptation, once the fundamental -instinct of power has won power of a more abstract kind. - - -657. - -What is "passive"? - - To be hindered in the outward movement of grasping: it is - thus an act of resistance and reaction. - -What is "active"? - - To stretch out for power. - -"Nutrition"... - - Is only a derived phenomenon; the primitive form of it was - the will to stuff everything inside one's own skin. - -"Procreation"... - - Only derived; originally, in those cases In which one - will was unable to organise the collective mass it had - appropriated, an _opposing will_ came into power, which - undertook to effect the separation and establish a new - centre of organisation, after a struggle with the original - will. - -"Pleasure"... - - Is a feeling of power (presupposing the existence of pain). - - -658. - -(1) The organic functions shown to be but forms of the fundamental -will, the will to power,--and buds thereof. - -(2) The will to power specialises itself as will to nutrition, to -property, to _tools,_ to servants (obedience), and to rulers: the body -as an example.--The stronger will directs the weaker. There is no other -form of causality than that of will to will. It is not to be explained -mechanically. - -(3) Thinking, feeling, willing, in all living organisms. What is a -desire if it be not: a provocation of the feeling of power by an -obstacle (or, better still, by rhythmical obstacles and resisting -forces)--so that it surges through it? Thus in all pleasure pain is -understood.--If the pleasure is to be very great, the pains preceding -it must have been very long, and the whole bow of life must have been -strained to the utmost. - -(4) Intellectual functions. The will to shaping, forming, and making -like, etc. - - -_(b) Man._ - - -659. - -_With the body as clue._--Granting that the "_soul_" was only an -attractive and mysterious thought, from which philosophers rightly, -but reluctantly, separated themselves--that which they have since -learnt to put in its place is perhaps even more attractive and even -more mysterious. The human _body,_ in which the whole of the most -distant and most recent past of all organic life once more becomes -living and corporal, seems to flow through, this past and right over -it like a huge and inaudible torrent; the body is a more wonderful -thought than the old "soul." In all ages the body, as our actual -property, as our most certain being, in short, as our ego, has been -more earnestly believed in than the spirit (or the "soul," or the -subject, as the school jargon now calls it). It has never occurred to -any one to regard his stomach as a strange or a divine stomach; but -that there is a tendency and a predilection in man to regard all his -thoughts as "inspired," all his values as "imparted to him by a God," -all his instincts as dawning activities--this is proved by the evidence -of every age in man's history. Even now, especially among artists, -there may very often be noticed a sort of wonder, and a deferential -hesitation to decide, when the question occurs to them, by what means -they achieved their happiest work, and from which world the creative -thought came down to them: when they question in this way, they are -possessed by a feeling of guilelessness and childish shyness. They dare -not say: "That came from me; it was my hand which threw that die." -Conversely, even those philosophers and theologians, who in their logic -and piety found the most imperative reasons for regarding their body as -a deception (and even as a deception overcome and disposed of), could -not help recognising the foolish fact that the body still remained: and -the most unexpected proofs of this are to be found partly in Pauline -and partly in Vedantic philosophy. But what does _strength of faith_ -ultimately mean? Nothing!--A strong faith might also be a foolish -faith!--There is food for reflection. - -And supposing the faith in the body were ultimately but the result -of a conclusion; supposing it were a false conclusion, as idealists -declare it is, would it not then involve some doubt concerning the -trustworthiness of the spirit itself which thus causes us to draw wrong -conclusions? - -Supposing the plurality of things, and space, and time, and motion -(and whatever the other first principles of a belief in the body may -be) were errors--what suspicions would not then be roused against the -spirit which led us to form such first principles? Let it suffice that -the belief in the body is, at any rate for the present, a much stronger -belief than the belief in the spirit, and he who would fain undermine -it assails the authority of the spirit most thoroughly in so doing! - - -660. - -_The Body as an Empire._ - -The aristocracy in the body, the majority of the rulers (the fight -between the cells and the tissues). - -Slavery and the division of labour: the higher type alone possible -through the _subjection_ of the lower to a function. - -Pleasure and pain, not contraries. The feeling of power. - -"Nutrition" only a result of the insatiable lust of appropriation in -the Will to Power. - -"Procreation": this is the decay which supervenes when the ruling cells -are too weak to organise appropriated material. - -It is the _moulding_ force which will have a continual supply of new -material (more "force"). The masterly construction of an organism out -of an egg. - -"The mechanical interpretation": recognises only quantities: but the -real energy is in the quality. Mechanics can therefore only describe -processes; it cannot explain them. - -"Purpose." We should start out from the "sagacity" of plants. - -The concept of "meliorism": _not_ only greater complexity, but greater -_power_ (it need not be only greater masses). - -Conclusion concerning the evolution of man: the road to perfection lies -in the bringing forth of the most powerful individuals, for whose use -the great masses would be converted into mere tools (that is to say, -into the most intelligent and flexible tools possible). - - -661. - -Why is all _activity,_ even that of a _sense,_ associated with -pleasure? Because, before the activity was possible, an obstacle or -a burden was done away with. Or, rather, because all action is a -process of overcoming, of becoming master of, and of _increasing_ the -_feeling of power_? The pleasure of thought. Ultimately it is not -only the feeling of power, but also the pleasure of creating and of -contemplating the _creation:_ for all activity enters our consciousness -in the form of "works." - - -662. - -Creating is an act of selecting and of finishing the thing selected. -(In every act of the will, this is the essential element.) - - -663. - -All phenomena which are the result of intentions may be reduced to _the -intention of increasing power._ - - -664. - -When we do anything, we are conscious of a _feeling of strength;_ -we often have this sensation before the act--that is to say, while -imagining the thing to do (as, for instance, at the sight of an enemy, -of an obstacle, which we feel _equal to_): it is always an accompanying -sensation. Instinctively we think that this feeling of strength is -the cause of the action, that it is the "motive force." Our belief in -causation is the belief in force and its effect; it is a transcript -of our experience: in which we identify force and the feeling of -force.--Force, however, never moves things; the strength which is -conscious "does not set the muscles moving." "Of such a process we have -no experience, no idea." "We experience as little concerning force as -a motive power, as concerning the _necessity_ of a movement." Force is -said to be the constraining element! "All we know is that one thing -follows another;--we know nothing of either compulsion or arbitrariness -in regard to the one following the other. Causality is first invented -by thinking compulsion into the sequence of processes. A certain -"understanding" of the thing is the result--that is to say, we humanise -the process a little, we make it more "familiar"; the familiar is the -known habitual fact of _human compulsion associated with the feeling of -force._ - - -665. - -I have the intention of extending my arm; taking it for granted that -I know as little of the physiology of the human body and of the -mechanical laws of its movements as the man in the street, what could -there be more vague, more bloodless, more uncertain than this intention -compared with what follows it? And supposing I were the astutest -of mechanics, and especially conversant with the formulæ which are -applicable in this case, I should not be able to extend my arm one -whit the better. Our "knowledge" and our "action" in this case lie -coldly apart: as though in two different regions.--Again: Napoleon -carries out a plan of campaign--what does that mean? In this case, -everything concerning the consummation of the campaign is _known,_ -because everything must be done through words of command: but even here -subordinates are taken for granted, who apply and adapt the general -plan to the particular emergency, to the degree of strength, etc. - - -666. - -For ages we have always ascribed the value of an action, of a -character, of an existence, to the _intention,_ to the _purpose_ for -which it was done, acted, or lived: this primeval idiosyncrasy of taste -ultimately takes a dangerous turn provided the lack of intention and -purpose in all phenomena comes ever more to the front in consciousness. -With it a general depreciation of all values seems to be preparing: -"All is without sense."--This melancholy phrase means: "All sense -lies in the intention, and if the intention is absolutely lacking, -then sense must be lacking too." In conformity with this valuation, -people were forced to place the value of life in a a life after death, -or in the progressive development of ideas, or of mankind, or of the -people, or of man to superman; but in this way the _progressus in -infinitum_ of purpose had been reached: it was ultimately necessary to -find one's self a place in the process of the world (perhaps with the -disdæmonistic outlook, it was a process which led to nonentity). - -In regard to this point, "_purpose_" needs a somewhat more severe -criticism: it ought to be recognised that an action _is never -caused by a purpose;_ that an object and the means thereto are -interpretations, by means of which certain points in a phenomena -are selected and accentuated, at the cost of other, more numerous, -points, that every time something is done for a purpose, something -fundamentally different, and yet other things happen; that in regard -to the action done with a purpose, the case is the same as with the -so-called purposefulness of the heat which is radiated from the sun: -the greater part of the total sum is squandered; a portion of it, which -is scarcely worth reckoning, has a "purpose," has "sense"; that an -"end" with its "means" is an absurdly indefinite description, which -indeed may be able to command as a precept, as "will," but presupposes -a system of obedient and trained instruments, which, in the place of -the indefinite, puts forward a host of determined entities _(i.e._ we -imagine a system of _clever_ but narrow intellects who postulate end -and means, in order to be able to grant our only known "end," the rôle -of the "cause of an action,"--a proceeding to which we have no right: -it is tantamount to solving a problem by placing its solution in an -inaccessible world which we cannot observe). - -Finally, why could not an "end" be merely an _accompanying feature_ -in the series of changes among the active forces which bring about -the action--a pale stenographic symbol stretched in consciousness -beforehand, and which serves as a guide to what happens, even as -a symbol of what happens, _not_ as its cause?--But in this way we -criticise _will_ itself: is it not an illusion to regard that which -enters consciousness as will-power, as a cause? Are not all conscious -phenomena only final phenomena--the lost links in a chain, but -apparently conditioning one another in their sequence within the plane -of consciousness? This might be an illusion. - - -667. - -Science does _not_ inquire what impels us to will: on the contrary, it -_denies_ that _willing_ takes place at all, and supposes that something -quite different has happened--in short, that the belief in "will" and -"end" is an illusion. It does not inquire into the _motives_ of an -action, as if these had been present in consciousness previous to the -action, but it first divides the action up into a group of phenomena, -and then seeks the previous history of this mechanical movement--but -_not_ in the terms of feeling, perception, and thought; from this -quarter it can never accept the explanation: perception is precisely -the matter of science, _which has to be explained._--The problem of -science is precisely to explain the world, _without_ taking perceptions -as the cause: for that would mean regarding _perceptions_ themselves -as the _cause_ of perceptions. The task of science is by no means -accomplished. - -Thus: either there is _no_ such thing as will,--the hypothesis of -science,--or the will is _free_. The latter assumption represents the -prevailing feeling, of which we cannot rid ourselves, even if the -hypothesis of science were _proved._ - -The popular belief in cause and effect is founded on the principle that -free will _is the cause of every effect:_ thereby alone do we arrive -at the feeling of causation. And thereto belongs also the feeling that -every cause is _not_ an effect, but always only a cause--if will is -the cause. "Our acts of will are _not necessary_"--this lies in the -very _concept of "will."_ The effect necessarily comes _after_ the -cause--that is what we feel. It is merely a _hypothesis_ that even our -willing is compulsory in every case. - - -668. - -"To will" is not "to desire," to strive, to aspire to; it distinguishes -itself from that through the _passion of commanding._ - -There is no such thing as "willing," but only the willing of -_something:_ the _aim_ must not be severed from the state--as the -epistemologists sever it. "Willing," as they understand it, is no more -possible than "thinking": it is a pure invention. - -It is essential to willing that something should be _commanded_ (but -that does not mean that the will is carried into effect). - -The general _state of tension,_ by virtue of which a force seeks to -discharge itself, is not "willing." - - -669. - -"Pain" and "pleasure" are the most absurd _means of expressing_ -judgments, which of course does not mean that the judgments which are -enunciated in this way must necessarily be absurd. The elimination -of all substantiation and logic, a yes or no in the reduction to a -passionate desire to have or to reject, an imperative abbreviation, the -utility of which is irrefutable: that is pain and pleasure. Its origin -is in the central sphere of the intellect; its prerequisite is an -infinitely accelerated process of perceiving, ordering, co-ordinating, -calculating, concluding: pleasure and pain are always final phenomena, -they are never causes. - -As to deciding what provokes pain and pleasure, that is a question -which depends upon the _degree of power:_ the same thing, when -confronted with a small quantity of power, may seem a danger and may -suggest the need of speedy defence, and when confronted with the -consciousness of greater power, may be a voluptuous stimulus and may be -followed by a feeling of pleasure. - -All feelings of pleasure and pain presuppose a _measuring of collective -utility_ and _collective harmfulness_: consequently a sphere where -there is the willing of an object (of a condition) and the selection of -the means thereto. Pleasure and pain are never "original facts." - -The feelings of pleasure and pain are _reactions of the will_ -(emotions) in which the intellectual centre fixes the value of certain -supervening changes as a collective value, and also as an introduction -of contrary actions. - - -670. - -_The belief in "emotions"_--Emotions are a fabrication of the -intellect, an invention of _causes_ which do not exist. All general -_bodily sensations_ which we do not understand are interpreted -intellectually--that is to say, a _reason_ is sought why we feel -thus or thus among certain people or in certain experiences. Thus -something disadvantageous dangerous, and strange is taken for granted, -as if it were the cause of our being indisposed; as a matter of fact, -it gets _added to_ the indisposition, so as to make our condition -thinkable.--Mighty rushes of blood to the brain, accompanied by -a feeling of suffocation, are _interpreted_ as anger: the people -and things which provoke our anger are a means of relieving our -physiological condition. Subsequently, after long habituation, certain -processes and general feelings are so regularly correlated that the -sight of certain processes provokes that condition of general feeling, -and induces vascular engorgements, the ejection of seminal fluid, etc.: -we then say that the "emotion is provoked by propinquity." - -_Judgments_ already inhere in pleasure and pain: stimuli become -differentiated, according as to whether they increase or reduce the -feeling of power. - -_The belief in willing._ To believe that a thought may be the cause -of a mechanical movement is to believe in miracles. The _consistency -of science_ demands that once we have made the world _thinkable_ for -ourselves by means of pictures, we should also make the emotions, the -desires, the will, etc., _thinkable_--that is to say, we should _deny_ -them and treat them as _errors of the intellect._ - - -671. - -Free will or no free will?--There is _no such thing_ as "_Will_": that -is only a simplified conception on the part of the understanding, like -"matter." - -_All actions must first be prepared and made possible mechanically -before they can be willed._ Or, _in most cases_ the "_object_" of an -action enters the brain only after everything is prepared for its -accomplishment. The object is an inner "stimulus"--nothing _more._ - - -672. - -The most proximate prelude to an action relates to that action: but -_further back still_ there lies a preparatory history which covers _a -far wider field:_ the individual action is only a factor in a much more -extensive and _subsequent_ fact. The shorter and the longer processes -are not reported. - - -673. - -The theory of _chance:_ the soul is a selecting and self-nourishing -being, which is persistently extremely clever and creative (this -_creative_ power is commonly overlocked! it is taken to be merely -passive). - -I recognised the _active_ and creative _power_ within the -accidental.--Accident is in itself nothing more than _the clashing of -creative impulses._ - - -674. - -Among the enormous multiplicity of phenomena to be observed in an -organic being, that part which becomes _conscious_ is a mere means: -and the particle of "virtue," "self abnegation," and other fanciful -inventions, are denied in a most thoroughgoing manner by the whole of -the remaining phenomena. We would do well to study our organism in all -its immorality.... - -The animal functions are, as a matter of fact, a million times more -important than all beautiful states of the soul and heights of -consciousness: the latter are an overflow, in so far as they are not -needed as instruments in the service of the animal functions. The whole -of _conscious_ life: the spirit together with the soul, the heart, -goodness, and virtue; in whose service does it work? In the greatest -possible perfection of the means (for acquiring nourishment and -advancement) serving the fundamental animal functions: above all, the -_ascent of the line of Life._ - -That which is called "flesh" and "body" is of such incalculably greater -importance, that the rest is nothing more than a small appurtenance. -To continue the chain of life _so that it becomes ever more -powerful_--that is the task. - -But now observe how the heart, the soul, virtue, and spirit together -conspire formally to thwart this purpose: as _if they_ were the object -of every endeavour! ... The _degeneration of life_ is essentially -determined by the extraordinary _fallibility of consciousness,_ which -is held at bay least of all by the instincts, and thus commits the -gravest and profoundest _errors._ - -Now could any more insane extravagance of vanity be imagined than -to measure the _value_ of existence according to the _pleasant or -unpleasant feelings of this consciousness_? It is obviously only a -means: and pleasant or unpleasant feelings are also no more than means. - -According to what standard is the objective value measured? According -to the quantity of _increased_ and _more organised power_ alone. - - -675. - -The value of all _valuing._--My desire would be to see the agent once -more identified with the action, after action has been deprived of all -meaning by having been separated in thought from the agent; I should -like to see the notion of doing _something,_ the idea of a "purpose," -of an "intention," of an object, reintroduced into the action, after -action has been made insignificant by having been artificially -separated from these things. - -All "objects," "purposes," "meanings," are only manners of expression -and metamorphoses of the one will inherent in all phenomena; of the -will to power. To have an object, a purpose, or an intention, in -fact _to will_ generally, is equivalent to the desire for _greater -strength,_ for fuller growth, and for the _means_ thereto _in addition._ - -The most general and fundamental instinct in all action and willing -is precisely on that account the one which is least known and is most -concealed; for in practice we always follow its bidding, for the simple -reason that we _are_ in ourselves its bidding.... - -All valuations are only the results of, and the narrow points of view -in _servings this_ one will: valuing _in itself_ is nothing save this, -_--will to power._ - -To criticise existence from the standpoint of any one of these -values is utter nonsense and error. Even supposing that a process of -annihilation follows from such a value, even so this process is in the -service of this will. - -The _valuation of existence itself!_ But existence is this valuing -itself!--and even when we say "no," we still do what we _are._ - -We ought now to perceive the _absurdity_ of this pretence at judging -existence; and we ought to try and discover _what_ actually takes place -there. It is symptomatic. - - -676. - -_Concerning the Origin of our Valuations._ - -We are able to analyse our body, and by doing so we get the same -idea of it as of the stellar system, and the differences between -organic and inorganic lapses. Formerly the movements of the stars were -explained as the effects of beings consciously pursuing a purpose: -this is no longer required, and even in regard to the movements of -the body and its changes, the belief has long since been abandoned -that they can be explained by an appeal to a consciousness which has -a determined purpose. By far the greater number of movements have -nothing to do with consciousness at all: _neither have they anything -to do with sensation._ Sensations and thoughts are extremely _rare_ -and _insignificant_ things compared with the innumerable phenomena -occurring every second. - -On the other hand, we believe that a certain conformity of means -to ends rules over the very smallest phenomenon, which it is quite -beyond our deepest science to understand; a sort of cautiousness, -selectiveness, co-ordination, and repairing process, etc. In short, we -are in the presence of an _activity_ to which it would be necessary -to ascribe an _incalculably higher and more extensive intellect_ than -the one we are acquainted with. We learn to _think less of_ all that -is conscious: we unlearn the habit of making ourselves responsible for -ourselves, because, as conscious beings fixing purposes, we are but the -smallest part of ourselves. - -Of the numerous influences taking effect every second, for instance, -air, electricity, we feel scarcely anything at all. There might be a -number of forces, which, though they never make themselves felt by -us, yet influence us continually. Pleasure and pain are very rare and -scanty phenomena, compared with the countless stimuli with which a cell -or an organ operates upon another cell or organ. - -It is the phase of the _modesty of consciousness._ Finally, we can -grasp the conscious ego itself, merely as an instrument in the -service of that higher and more extensive intellect: and then we may -ask whether all conscious _willing,_ all conscious _purposes,_ all -_valuations,_ are not perhaps only means by virtue of which something -essentially _different is attained,_ from that which consciousness -supposes. We _mean_: it is a question of our _pleasure_ and _pain_ but -pleasure and pain might be the means whereby we _had something to do_ -which lies outside our consciousness. - -This is to show how very _superficial_ all conscious phenomena -really are; how an action and the image of it differ; how _little_ -we know about what _precedes_ an action; how fantastic our feelings, -"freewill," and "cause and effect" are; how thoughts and images, just -like words, are only signs of thoughts; the impossibility of finding -the grounds of any action; the superficiality of all praise and blame; -how _essentially our_ conscious life is composed of _fancies_ and -_illusion_; how all our words merely stand for fancies (our emotions -too), and how the _union of mankind_ depends upon the transmission -and continuation of these fancies: whereas, at bottom, the real union -of mankind by means of procreation pursues its unknown way. Does this -belief in the common fancies of men really _alter_ mankind? Or is the -whole body of ideas and valuations only an expression in itself of -unknown changes? _Are there_ really such things as will, purposes, -thoughts, values? Is the whole of conscious life perhaps no more than -_mirage_? Even when values seem to _determine_ the actions of a man, -they are, as a matter of fact, doing something quite different! In -short, granting that a certain conformity of means to end might be -demonstrated in the action of nature, without the assumption of a -ruling ego: could not _our_ notion of purposes, and our will, etc., be -only a _symbolic language_ standing for something quite different--that -is to say, something not-willing and unconscious? only the thinnest -semblance of that natural conformity of means to end in the organic -world, but not in any way different therefrom? - -Briefly, perhaps the whole of mental development is a matter of the -_body:_ it is the consciously recorded history of the fact that a -_higher body is forming._ The organic ascends to higher regions. -Our longing to know Nature is a means by virtue of which the body -would reach perfection. Or, better still, hundreds of thousands of -experiments are made to alter the nourishment and the mode of living -of the _body_: the body's consciousness and valuations, its kinds of -pleasure and pain, are _signs of these changes and experiments. In the -end, it is not a question concerning man; for he must be surpassed._ - - -677. - -_To what Extent are all Interpretations of the World Symptoms of a -Ruling Instinct._ - -The _artistic_ contemplation of the world: to sit before the world -and to survey it. But here the analysis of æsthetical contemplation, -its reduction to cruelty, its feeling of security, its judicial and -detached attitude, etc., are lacking. The artist himself must be taken, -together with his psychology (the criticism of the instinct of play, as -a discharge of energy, the love of change, the love of bringing one's -soul in touch with strange things, the absolute egoism of the artist, -etc.). What instincts does he sublimate? - -The _scientific_ contemplation of the world: a criticism of the -psychological longing for science, the desire to make everything -comprehensible; the desire to make everything practical, useful, -capable of being exploited--to what extent this is anti-æsthetic. -Only that value counts, which may be reckoned in figures. How it -happens that a mediocre type of man preponderates under the influence -of science. It would be terrible if even history were to be taken -possession of in this way--the realm of the superior, of the judicial. -What instincts are here sublimated! - -The religious contemplation of the world: a criticism of the religious -man. It is not necessary to take the moral man as the type, but the man -who has extreme feelings of exaltation and of deep depression, and who -interprets the former with thankfulness or suspicion without, however, -seeking their origin in _himself_ (nor the latter either). The man who -essentially feels anything but free, who sublimates his conditions and -states of submission. - -The _moral_ contemplation of the world. The feelings peculiar to -certain social ranks are projected into the universe: stability, -law, the making of things orderly, and the making of things alike, -are _sought_ in the highest spheres, because they are valued most -highly,--above everything or behind everything. - -What is _common_ to all: the ruling instincts _wish to be regarded_ as -_the highest values in general,_ even as the _creative_ and _ruling -powers._ It is understood that these instincts either oppose or -overcome each other (join up synthetically, or alternate in power). -Their profound antagonism is, however, so great, that in those cases in -which they _all_ insist upon being gratified, a man of very thorough -_mediocrity_ is the outcome. - - -678. - -It is a question whether the origin of our apparent "knowledge" is not -also a mere offshoot of our _older valuations,_ which are so completely -assimilated that they belong to the very basis of our nature. In this -way only _the more recent_ needs engage in battle _with results of the -oldest needs._ - -The world is seen, felt, and interpreted thus and thus, in order -that organic life may be preserved with this particular manner of -interpretation. Man is _not_ only an individual, but the continuation -of collective organic life in one definite line. The fact that _man_ -survives, proves that a certain species of interpretations (even though -it still be added to) has also survived; that, as a system, this method -of interpreting has not changed. "Adaptation." - -Our "dissatisfaction," our "ideal," etc., may possibly be the _result_ -of this incorporated piece of interpretation, of our particular point -of view: the organic world may ultimately perish owing to it just as -the division of labour in organisms may be the means of bringing about -the ruin of the whole, if one part happen to wither or weaken. The -_destruction_ of organic life, and even of the highest form thereof, -must follow the same principles as the destruction of the individual. - - -679. - -Judged from the standpoint of the theory of descent, _individuation_ -shows the continuous breaking up of one into two, and the equally -continuous annihilation of individuals _for the sake of a few_ -individuals, which evolution bears onwards; the greater mass always -perishes ("the body"). - -The fundamental phenomena: _innumerable individuals are sacrificed for -the sake of a few,_ in order to make the few possible.--One must not -allow one's self to be deceived; the case is the same with _peoples_ -and _races_: they produce the "body" for the generation of isolated and -valuable _individuals,_ who continue the great process. - - -680. - -I am opposed to the theory that the individual studies the interests of -the _species,_ or of posterity, at the cost of his own advantage: all -this is only apparent. - -The excessive importance which he attaches to the _sexual instinct_ -is not the _result_ of the latter's importance to the species, for -procreation is the actual performance of the individual, it is his -greatest interest, and therefore it is his _highest expression of -power_ (not judged from the standpoint of consciousness, but from the -very centre of the individual). - - -681. - -The _fundamental errors_ of the biologists who have lived hitherto: it -is not a matter of the species, but of rearing stronger individuals -(the many are only a means). - -Life is _not_ the continuous adjustment of internal relations to -external relations, but will to power, which, proceeding from inside, -subjugates and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of "external" -phenomena. - -These biologists _continue_ the moral valuations ("the absolutely -higher worth of Altruism," the antagonism towards the lust of dominion, -towards war, towards all that which is not useful, and towards all -order of rank and of class). - - -682. - -In natural science, the moral depreciation of the _ego_ still goes hand -in hand with the overestimation of the _species._ But the species is -quite as illusory as the ego: a false distinction has been made. The -ego is a hundred times _more_ than a mere unit in a chain of creatures; -it is the chain _itself,_ in every possible respect, and the species -is merely an abstraction suggested by the multiplicity and partial -similarity of these chains. That the individual is _sacrificed_ to the -species, as people often say he is, is not a fact at all: it is rather -only an example of false interpretation. - - -683. - -The formula of the _"progress"-superstition_ according to a famous -physiologist of the cerebral regions:-- - -_"L'animal ne fait jamais de progrès comme espèce. L'homme seul fait de -progrès comme espèce._" - -No. - - -684. - -_Anti-Darwin._--The _domestication of man:_ what definite value can -it have, or has domestication in itself a definite value?--There are -reasons for denying the latter proposition. - -Darwin's school of thought certainly goes to great pains to convince -us of the reverse: it would fain prove that the influence of -domestication may be profound and fundamental. For the time being, we -stand firmly as we did before; up to the present no results save very -superficial modification or degeneration have been shown to follow upon -domestication. And everything that escapes from the hand and discipline -of man, returns almost immediately to its original natural condition. -The type remains constant, man cannot "_dénaturer la nature_." - -Biologists reckon upon the struggle for existence, the death of the -weaker creature and the survival of the most robust, most gifted -combatant; on that account they imagine a _continuous increase in the -perfection of all creatures._ We, on the contrary, have convinced -ourselves of the fact, that in the struggle for existence, accident -serves the cause of the weak quite as much as that of the strong; -that craftiness often supplements strength with advantage; that the -_prolificness_ of a species is related in a remarkable manner to that -species _chances of destruction_.... - -_Natural Selection_ is also credited with the power of slowly -effecting unlimited metamorphoses: it is believed that every advantage -is transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the course of -generations (when heredity is known to be so capricious that ...); -the happy adaptations of certain creatures to very special conditions -of life, are regarded as the result of _surrounding influences._ -Nowhere, however, are examples of _unconscious selection_ to be found -(absolutely nowhere). The most different individuals associate one with -the other; the extremes become lost in the mass. Each vies with the -other to maintain his kind; those creatures whose appearance shields -them from certain dangers, do not alter this appearance when they are -in an environment quite devoid of danger.... If they live in places -where their coats or their hides do not conceal them, they do not adapt -themselves to their surroundings in any way. - -The _selection of the most beautiful_ has been so exaggerated, that -it greatly exceeds the instincts for beauty in our own race! As a -matter of fact, the most beautiful creature often couples with the -most debased, and the largest with the smallest. We almost always see -males and females taking advantage of their first chance meeting, and -manifesting no taste or selectiveness at all.--Modification through -climate and nourishment--but as a matter of fact unimportant. - -There are no _intermediate forms.--_ - -The growing evolution of creatures is assumed. All grounds for this -assumption are entirely lacking. Every type has its _limitations_: -beyond these evolution cannot carry it. - -_My general point of view. First proposition_: Man as a species is -_not_ progressing. Higher specimens are indeed attained; but they do -not survive. The general level of the species is not raised. - -_Second proposition_: Man as a species does not represent any sort of -progress compared with any other animal. The whole of the animal and -plant world does not develop from the lower to the higher.... but all -simultaneously, haphazardly, confusedly, and at variance. The richest -and most complex forms--and the term "higher type" means no more than -this--perish more easily: only the lowest succeed in maintaining their -apparent imperishableness. The former are seldom attained, and maintain -their superior position with difficulty, the latter are compensated -by great fruitfulness.--In the human race, also, the _superior -specimens,_ the happy cases of evolution, are the first to perish amid -the fluctuations of chances for and against them. They are exposed to -every form of decadence: they are extreme, and, on that account alone, -already decadents.... The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the -Cæsar, is _sui generis:_ such things are not hereditary. The _type_ is -inherited, there is nothing extreme or particularly "happy" about a -type----It is not a case of a particular fate, or of the "evil will" of -Nature, but merely of the concept "superior type": the higher type is -an example of an incomparably greater degree of complexity a greater -sum of co-ordinated elements: but on this account disintegration -becomes a thousand times more threatening. "Genius" is the sublimest -machine in existence--hence it is the most fragile. - -_Third propositio:_: The domestication (culture) of man does not -sink very deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immediately -becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The wild man (or, in moral -terminology, the _evil_ man) is a reversion to Nature--and, in a -certain sense, he represents a recovery, a _cure_ from the effects of -"culture." ... - - -685. - -_Anti-Darwin._--What surprises me most on making a general survey of -the great destinies of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of -what to-day Darwin and his school sees or _will_ persist in seeing: -selection in favour of the stronger, the better-constituted, and the -progress of the species. Precisely the reverse of this stares one in -the face: the suppression of the lucky cases, the uselessness of the -more highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the mediocre, -and even of those who are _below mediocrity._ Unless we are shown some -reason why man is an exception among living creatures, I incline to the -belief that Darwin's school is everywhere at fault. That will to power, -in which I perceive the ultimate reason and character of all change, -explains why it is that selection is never in favour of the exceptions -and of the lucky cases: the strongest and happiest natures are weak -when they are confronted with a majority ruled by organised gregarious -instincts and the fear which possesses the weak. My general view of -the world of values shows that in the highest values which now sway the -destiny of man, the happy cases among men, the select specimens do not -prevail: but rather the decadent specimens,--perhaps there is nothing -more interesting in the world than this _unpleasant_ spectacle.... - -Strange as it may seem, the strong always have to be upheld against the -weak; and the well-constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy -against the sick and physiologically botched. If we drew our morals -from reality, they would read thus: the mediocre are more valuable than -the exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the mediocre; the -will to nonentity prevails over the will to life--and the general aim -now is, in Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian phraseology: "It is -better not to be than to be." - -I _protest_ against this formulating of reality into a moral: and I -loathe Christianity with a deadly loathing, because it created sublime -words and attitudes in order to deck a revolting truth with all the -tawdriness of justice, virtue, and godliness.... - -I see all philosophers and the whole of science on their knees before a -reality which is the reverse of "the struggle for life," as Darwin and -his school understood it--that is to say, wherever I look, I see those -prevailing and surviving, who throw doubt and suspicion upon life and -the value of life.--The error of the Darwinian school became a problem -to me: how can one be so blind as to make _this_ mistake? - -That _species_ show an ascending tendency, is the most nonsensical -assertion that has ever been made: until now they have only manifested -a dead level. There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher -organisms have developed from the lower. I see that the lower, owing to -their numerical strength, their craft, and ruse, now preponderate,--and -I fail to see an instance in which an accidental change produces -an advantage, at least not for a very long period: for it would be -necessary to find some reason why an accidental change should become so -very strong. - -I do indeed find the "cruelty of Nature" which is so often referred -to; but in a different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky -and well-constituted children; she protects and shelters and loves the -lowly. - -In short, the increase of a species' power, as the result of the -preponderance of its particularly well-constituted and strong -specimens, is perhaps less of a certainty than that it is the result of -the preponderance of its mediocre and lower specimens ... in the case -of the latter, we find great fruitfulness and permanence: in the case -of the former, the besetting dangers are greater, waste is more rapid, -and decimation is more speedy. - - -686. - -Man as he has appeared up to the present is the embryo of the man -of the future; _all_ the formative powers which are to produce the -latter, already lie in the former: and owing to the fact that they are -enormous, the more _promising for the future_ the modern individual -happens to be, the more _suffering_ falls to his lot. This is the -profoundest concept of _suffering._ The formative powers clash.--The -isolation of the individual need not deceive one--as a matter of fact, -some uninterrupted current does actually flow through all individuals, -and does thus unite them. The fact that they feel themselves isolated, -is the _most powerful spur_ in the process of setting themselves the -loftiest of aims: their search for happiness is the means which keeps -together and moderates the formative powers, and keeps them from being -mutually destructive. - - -687. - -_Excessive intellectual_ strength sets _itself_ new goals; it is not in -the least satisfied by the command and the leadership of the inferior -world, or by the preservation of the organism, of the "individual." - -We are _more_ than the individual: we are the whole chain itself, with -the tasks of all the possible futures of that chain in us. - - - -3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations. - - -688. - -_The unitary view of psychology._--We are accustomed to regard the -development of a vast number of forms as compatible with one single -origin. - -My theory would be: that the will to power is the primitive motive -force out of which all other motives have been derived; - -That it is exceedingly illuminating to substitute _power_ for -individual "happiness" (after which every living organism is said to -strive): "It strives after power, after _more_ power";--happiness is -only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of -difference (it does not strive after happiness: but happiness steps -in when the object is attained, after which the organism has striven: -happiness is an accompanying, not an actuating factor); - -That all motive force is the will to power; that there is no other -force, either physical, dynamic, or psychic. - -In our science, where the concept cause and effect is reduced to a -relationship of complete equilibrium, and in which it seems desirable -for the _same_ quantum of force to be found on either side, _all idea -of a motive power is absent_: we only apprehend results, and we call -these equal from the point of view of their content of force.... - -It is a matter of mere experience that change never ceases: at bottom -we have not the smallest grounds for assuming that any one particular -change must follow upon any other. On the contrary, any state which -has been attained would seem almost forced to maintain itself intact -if it had not within itself a capacity for not desiring to maintain -itself.... Spinoza's proposition concerning "self-preservation" ought -as a matter of fact to put a stop to change. But the proposition is -false; the contrary is true. In all living organisms it can be clearly -shown that they do everything not to remain as they are, but to become -greater.... - - -689. - -_"Will to power" and causality._--From a psychological point of view -the idea of "cause" is our feeling of power in the act which is called -willing--our concept effect is the superstition that this feeling of -power is itself the force which moves things.... - -A state which accompanies an event and is already an effect of -that event is deemed "sufficient cause" of the latter; the tense -relationship of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of power) -and of an obstacle being overcome--are these things illusions? - -If we translate the notion "cause" back into the only sphere which is -known to us, and out of which we have taken it, we cannot imagine _any -change_ in which the will to power is not inherent. We do not know how -to account for any change which is not a _trespassing_ of one power on -another. - -Mechanics only show us the results, and then only in images (movement -is a figure of speech); gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, -because it is itself the first cause of mechanical results. - -The will to _accumulate force_ is confined to the phenomenon of life, -to nourishment, to procreation, to inheritance, to society, states, -customs, authority. Should we not be allowed to assume that this will -is the motive power also of chemistry?--and of the cosmic order? - -Not only conservation of energy, but the minimum amount of waste; so -that the only reality is this: _the will of every centre of power to -become stronger_--not self-preservation, but the desire to appropriate, -to become master, to become more, to become stronger. - -Is the fact that science is possible a proof of the principle of -causation--"From like causes, like effects"--"A permanent law of -things"--"Invariable order"? Because something is calculable, is it -therefore on that account necessary? - -If something happens thus, and thus only, it is not the manifestation -of a "principle," of a "law," of "order." What happens is that certain -quanta of power begin to operate, and their essence is to exercise -their power over all other quanta of power. Can we assume the existence -of a striving after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain, -_i.e._ without the sensation of an increase or a decrease of power? -Is mechanism only a language of signs for the concealed fact of a -world of fighting and conquering quanta of will-power? All mechanical -first-principles, matter, atoms, weight, pressure, and repulsion, are -not facts in themselves, but interpretations arrived at with the help -of psychical fictions. - -Life, which is our best known form of being, is altogether "will to -the accumulation of strength"--all the processes of life hinge on -this: everything aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and -accumulation. Life as an individual case (a hypothesis which may be -applied to existence in general) strives after the maximum feeling -of power; life is essentially a striving after more power; striving -itself is only a straining after more power; the most fundamental -and innermost thing of all is this will. (Mechanism is merely the -semeiotics of the results.) - - -690. - -The thing which is the cause of the existence of development cannot -in the course of investigation be found above development; it should -neither be regarded as "evolving" nor as evolved ... the "will to -power" cannot have been evolved. - - -691. - -What is the relation of the whole of the organic process towards the -rest of nature?--Here the fundamental will reveals itself. - - -692. - -Is the "will to power" a kind of will, or is it identical with the -concept will? Is it equivalent to desiring or commanding; is it the -will which Schopenhauer says is the essence of things? - -My proposition is that the will of psychologists hitherto has been an -unjustifiable generalisation, and that there is no such thing as this -sort of will, that instead of the development of one will into several -forms being taken as a fact, the character of will has been cancelled -owing to the fact that its content, its "whither," was subtracted from -it: in Schopenhauer this is so in the highest degree; what he calls -"will" is merely an empty word. There is even less plausibility in -the will to live: for life is simply one of the manifestations of the -will to power; it is quite arbitrary and ridiculous to suggest that -everything is striving to enter into this particular form of the will -to power. - - -693. - -If the innermost essence of existence is the will to power; if -happiness is every increase of power, and unhappiness the feeling of -not being able to resist, of not being able to become master: may -we not then postulate happiness and pain as cardinal facts? Is will -possible without these two oscillations of yea and nay? But who feels -happiness? ... Who will have power? ... Nonsensical question! If the -essence of all things is itself will to power, and consequently the -ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: contrasts and obstacles are -necessary, therefore also, relatively, units which trespass on one -another. - - -694. - -According to the obstacles which a force seeks with a view of -overcoming them, the measure of the failure and the fatality thus -provoked must increase, and in so far as every force can only manifest -itself against some thing that opposes it, an element of unhappiness is -necessarily inherent in every action. But this pain acts as a greater -incitement to life, and increases the will to power. - - -695. - -If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling of power, life would -have to represent such an increase in power that the difference, the -"plus," would have to enter consciousness. A dead level of power, -if maintained, would have to measure its happiness in relation -to depreciations of that level, _i.e._ in relation to states of -unhappiness and not of happiness.... The will to an increase lies -in the essence of happiness: that power is enhanced, and that this -difference becomes conscious. - -In a state of decadence after a certain time the opposite difference -becomes conscious, that is decrease: the memory of former strong -moments depresses the present feelings of happiness in this state -comparison reduces happiness. - - -696. - -It is not the satisfaction of the will which is the cause of happiness -(to this superficial theory I am more particularly opposed--this absurd -psychological forgery in regard to the most simple things), but it is -that the will is always striving to overcome that which stands in its -way. The feeling of happiness lies precisely in the discontentedness of -the will, in the fact that without opponents and obstacles it is never -satisfied. "The happy man": a gregarious ideal. - - -697. - -The normal discontent of our instincts--for instance, of the instinct -of hunger, of sex, of movement--contains nothing which is in itself -depressing; it rather provokes the feeling of life, and, whatever the -pessimists may say to us, like all the rhythms of small and irritating -stimuli, it strengthens. Instead of this discontent making us sick of -life, it is rather the great stimulus to life. - -(Pleasure might even perhaps be characterised as the rhythm of small -and painful stimuli.) - - -698. - -Kant says: "These lines of Count Verri's (_Sull' indole del piacere -e del dolore;_ 1781) I confirm with absolute certainty: 'Il solo -principio motore dell' uomo è il dolore. Il dolore precede ogni -piacere. Il piacere non è un essere positivo.'"[5] - -[Footnote 5: _On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain._ "The only motive -force of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure. Pleasure is not a -positive thing."--Tr.] - - -699. - -Pain is something different from pleasure--I mean it is not the -latter's opposite. - -If the essence of pleasure has been aptly characterised as the feeling -of increased power (that is to say, as a feeling of difference which -presupposes comparison), that does not define the nature of pain. -The false contrasts which the people, and consequently the language, -believes in, are always dangerous fetters which impede the march of -truth. There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is conditioned -by a certain rhythmic sequence of small, painful stimuli: in this way -a very rapid growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling of -pleasure is attained. This is the case, for instance, in tickling, -also in the sexual tickling which accompanies the coitus: here we see -pain acting as the ingredient of happiness. It seems to be a small -hindrance which is overcome, followed immediately by another small -hindrance which once again is overcome--this play of resistance and -resistance overcome is the greatest excitant of that complete feeling -of overflowing and surplus power which constitutes the essence of -happiness. - -The converse, which would be an increase in the feeling of pain through -small intercalated pleasurable stimuli, does not exist: pleasure and -pain are not opposites. - -Pain is undoubtedly an intellectual process in which a judgment is -inherent--the judgment harmful, in which long experience is epitomised. -There is no such thing as pain in itself. It is not the wound that -hurts, it is the experience of the harmful results a wound may have for -the whole organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving way, and is -called pain. (In the case of deleterious influences which were unknown -to ancient man, as, for instance, those residing in the new combination -of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain is lacking, and we are lost.) - -That which is quite peculiar in pain is the prolonged disturbance, -the quivering subsequent to a terrible shock in the ganglia of the -nervous system. As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause of -pain (from any sort of injury, for instance), but from the protracted -disturbance of his equilibrium which follows upon the shock. Pain is a -disease of the cerebral centres--pleasure is no disease at all. - -The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex actions has appearances -and even philosophical prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden -accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the reflex action occurs -appreciably earlier than the feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way -when I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had struck the bell -of my consciousness, and until a hint of what I had to do had been -telegraphed back to me. On the contrary, what I notice as clearly as -possible is, that first, in order to avoid a fall, reflex action on the -part of my foot takes place, and then, after a certain measurable space -of time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful wave in my -forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to pain. Pain is subsequently projected -into the wounded quarter--but the essence of this local pain is -nevertheless not the expression of a kind of local wound, it is merely -a local sign, the strength and nature of which is in keeping with the -severity of the wound, and of which the nerve centres have taken note. -The fact that as the result of this shock the muscular power of the -organism is materially reduced, does not prove in any way that the -essence of pain is to be sought in the lowering of the feeling of power. - -Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to pain: pain is no "cause" of -action. Pain itself is a reaction; the reflex movement is another and -earlier process--both originate at different points.... - - -700. - -The message of pain: in itself pain does not announce that which has -been momentarily damaged, but the significance of this damage for the -individual as a whole. - -Are we to suppose that there are any pains which "the species" feel, -and which the individual does not? - - -701. - -"The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum of happiness: consequently -it were better that the world did not exist"--"The world is something -which from a rational standpoint it were better did not exist, because -it occasions more pain than pleasure to the feeling subject"--this -futile gossip now calls itself pessimism! - -Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not causes; they are -second-rate valuations derived from a dominating value,--they are one -with the feeling "useful," "harmful," and therefore they are absolutely -fugitive and relative. For in regard to all utility and harmfulness -there are a hundred different ways of asking "what for?" - -I despise this pessimism of sensitiveness: it is in itself a sign of -profoundly impoverished life. - - -702. - -Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid unhappiness. Everybody -knows the famous prejudices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are -mere results, mere accompanying phenomena--that which every man, which -every tiny particle of a living organism will have, is an increase of -power. In striving after this, pleasure and pain are encountered; it is -owing to that will that the organism seeks opposition and requires that -which stands in its way.... Pain as the hindrance of its will to power -is therefore a normal feature, a natural ingredient of every organic -phenomenon; man does not avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly -in need of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure, every event -presupposes an obstacle overcome. - -Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive nourishment; the -protoplasm extends its pseudopodia in order to seek for that which -resists it,--it does not do so out of hunger, but owing to its will to -power. Then it makes the attempt to overcome, to appropriate, and to -incorporate that with which it comes into contact--what people call -"nourishment" is merely a derivative, a utilitarian application, of the -primordial will to become stronger. - -Pain is so far from acting as a diminution of our feeling of power, -that it actually forms in the majority of cases a spur to this -feeling,--the obstacle is the stimulus of the will to power. - - -703. - -Pain has been confounded with one of its subdivisions, which is -exhaustion: the latter does indeed represent a profound reduction and -lowering of the will to power, a material loss of strength--that is -to say, there is _(a)_ pain as the stimulus to an increase or power, -and _(b)_ pain following upon an expenditure of power; in the first -case it is a spur, in the second it is the outcome of excessive -spurring.... The inability to resist is proper to the latter form of -pain: the provocation of that which resists is proper to the former.... -The only happiness which is to be felt in the state of exhaustion is -that of going to sleep; in the other case, happiness means triumph.... -The great confusion of psychologists consisted in the fact that they -did not keep these two kinds of happiness--that of falling asleep, -and that of triumph--sufficiently apart. Exhausted people will have -repose, slackened limbs, peace and quiet--and these things constitute -the bliss of Nihilistic religions and philosophies, the wealthy in -vital strength, the active, want triumph, defeated opponents, and the -extension of their feeling of power over ever wider regions. Every -healthy function of the organism has this need,--and the whole organism -constitutes an intricate complexity of systems struggling for the -increase of the feeling of power.... - - -704. - -How is it that the fundamental article of faith in all psychologies is -a piece of most outrageous contortion and fabrication? "Man strives -after happiness," for instance--how much of this is true? In order to -understand what life is, and what kind of striving and tenseness life -contains, the formula should hold good not only of trees and plants, -but of animals also. "What does the plant strive after?"--But here we -have already invented a false entity which does not exist,--concealing -and denying the fact of an infinitely variegated growth, with -individual and semi-individual starting-points, if we give it the -clumsy title "plant" as if it were a unit. It is very obvious that -the ultimate and smallest "individuals" cannot be understood in the -sense of metaphysical individuals or atoms; their sphere of power is -continually shifting its ground: but with all these changes, can it be -said that any of them strives after happiness?--All this expanding, -this incorporation and growth, is a search for resistance; movement -is essentially related to states of pain: the driving power here must -represent some other desire if it leads to such continual willing and -seeking of pain.--To what end do the trees of a virgin forest contend -with each other? "For happiness"?--For power! ... - -Man is now master of the forces of nature, and master too of his own -wild and unbridled feelings (the passions have followed suit, and have -learned to become useful)--in comparison with primeval man, the man of -to-day represents an enormous quantum of power, but not an increase -in happiness! How can one maintain, then, that he has striven after -happiness?.. - - -705. - -But while I say this I see above me, and below the stars, the -glittering rat's-tail of errors which hitherto has represented the -greatest inspiration of man: "All happiness is the result of virtue all -virtue is the result of free will"! - -Let us transvalue the values: all capacity is the outcome of a -happy organisation, all freedom is the outcome of capacity (freedom -understood here as facility in self-direction. Every artist will -understand me). - - -706. - -"The value of life."--Every life stands by itself; all existence must -be justified, and not only life,--the justifying principle must be one -through which life itself speaks. - -Life is only a means to something: it is the expression of the forms of -growth in power. - - -707. - -The "conscious world" cannot be a starting-point for valuing: an -"objective" valuation is necessary. - -In comparison with the enormous and complicated antagonistic processes -which the collective life of every organism represents, its conscious -world of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small slice. -We have absolutely no right to postulate this particle of consciousness -as the object, the wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life: -the attainment of consciousness is obviously only an additional means -to the unfolding of life and to the extension of its power. That -is why it is a piece of childish simplicity to set up happiness, -or intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual sphere of -consciousness, as the highest value: and maybe to justify "the world" -with it. - -This is my fundamental objection to all philosophical and moral -cosmologies and theologies, to all wherefores and highest values that -have appeared in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto. A -kind of means is misunderstood as the object itself: conversely life -and its growth of power were debased to a means. - -If we wished to postulate an adequate object of life it would not -necessarily be related in any way with the category of conscious life; -it would require rather to explain conscious life as a mere means to -itself.... - -The "denial of life" regarded as the object of life, the object of -evolution! Existence--a piece of tremendous stupidity! Any such mad -interpretation is only the outcome of life's being measured by the -factors of consciousness (pleasure and pain, good and evil). Here -the means are made to stand against the end--the "unholy," absurd, -and, above all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any use when -it requires such means? But where the fault lies is here--instead of -looking for the end which would explain the necessity of such means, -we posited an end from the start which actually excludes such means, -_i.e._ we made a desideratum in regard to certain means (especially -pleasurable, rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only did we -decide what end would be desirable.... - -Where the fundamental fault lies is in the fact that, instead of -regarding consciousness as an instrument and an isolated phenomenon -of life in general, we made it a standard, the highest value in life: -it is the faulty standpoint of _a parte ad totum,_--and that is why -all philosophers are instinctively seeking at the present day for a -collective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills consciously with -all that happens, a "Spirit," a "God." But they must be told that it is -precisely thus that life is converted into a monster; that a "God" and -a general sensorium would necessarily be something on whose account the -whole of existence would have to be condemned.... Our greatest relief -came when we eliminated the general consciousness which postulates ends -and means--in this way we ceased from being necessarily pessimists.... -Our greatest indictment of life was the existence of God. - - -708. - -_Concerning the value of "Becoming."_--If the movement of the world -really tended to reach a final state, that state would already have -been reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is that it does -not tend to reach a final state: and every philosophy and scientific -hypothesis (_e.g._ materialism) according to which such a final state -is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact. - -I should like to have a concept of the world which does justice to this -fact. Becoming ought to be explained without having recourse to such -final designs. Booming must appear justified at every instant (or it -must defy all valuation: which has unity as its end); the present must -not under any circumstances be justified by a future, nor must the -past be justified for the sake of the present. "Necessity" must not -be interpreted in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective force -or as a prime motor; and still less as the necessary cause of some -valuable result. But to this end it is necessary to deny a collective -consciousness for Becoming,--a "God," in order that life may not be -veiled under the shadow of a being who feels and knows as we do and -yet _wills_ nothing: "God" is useless if he wants nothing; and if he -do want something, this presupposes a general sum of suffering and -irrationality which lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortunately -any such general power is lacking (a suffering God overlooking -everything, a general sensorium and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the -greatest indictment of existence). - -Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of Being must be allowed to -remain,--because in that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be -sheer and superfluous nonsense. - -The next question, then, is: how did the illusion Being originate (why -was it obliged to originate); - -Likewise: how was it that all valuations based upon the hypothesis that -there was such a thing as Being came to be depreciated. - -But in this way we have recognised that this hypothesis concerning -Being is the source of all the calumny that has been directed against -the world (the "Better world," the "True world" the "World Beyond," the -"Thing-in-itself"). - -(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not tend towards stability. - -(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance, the world of Being is -probably only appearance. - -(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value at every instant; the sum -of its value always remains equal: expressed otherwise, it has no -value; for that according to which it might be measured, and in regard -to which the word value might have some sense, is entirely lacking. -The collective value of the world defies valuation; for this reason -philosophical pessimism belongs to the order of farces. - - -709. - -We should not make our little desiderata the judges of existence! -Neither should we make culminating evolutionary forms (_e.g._ mind) the -"absolute" which stands behind evolution! - - -710. - -Our knowledge has become scientific to the extent in which it has -been able to make use of number and measure. It might be worth while -to try and see whether a scientific order of values might not be -constructed according to a scale of numbers and measures representing -energy.... All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity, and -misunderstanding. They may all be reduced to that scale of numbers and -measures representing energy. The ascent in this scale would represent -an increase of value, the descent a diminution. - -But here appearance and prejudice are against one (moral values are -only apparent values compared with those which are physiological). - - -711. - -Why the standpoint of "value" lapses:-- - -Because in the _"whole process of the universe" the work of mankind -does not come under consideration_; because a general process (viewed -in the light of a system) does not exist. - -Because there is no such thing as a whole; because no _depreciation of -human_ existence or human aims can be made in regard to something that -does not exist. - -Because "necessity," "causality," "design," are merely useful -"_semblances._" - -Because the aim is _not_ "the increase of the sphere of consciousness," -_but the increase of power_; in which increase the utility of -consciousness is also contained; and the same holds good of pleasure -and pain. - -Because a mere _means_ must not be elevated to the highest criterion -of value (such as states of consciousness like pleasure and pain, if -consciousness is in itself only a means). - -Because the world is not an organism at all, but a thing of chaos; -because the development of "intellectuality" is only a means tending -relatively to extend the duration of an organisation. - -Because all "desirability" has no sense in regard to the general -character of existence. - - -712. - -"God" is the culminating moment: life is an eternal process of deifying -and undeifying. _But withal there is no zenith of values,_ but only a -zenith of _power._ - -Absolute _exclusion of mechanical and materialistic interpretations._ -they are both only expressions of inferior states, of emotions deprived -of all spirit (of the "will to power"). - -_The retrograde movement front the zenith_ of development (the -intellectualisation of power on some slave-infected soil) may be shown -to be the _result_ of the highest degree of energy _turning against_ -itself, once it no longer has anything to organise, and utilising its -power in order to _disorganise._ - -_(a)_ The ever-increasing _suppression_ of societies, and the latter's -subjection by a smaller number of stronger individuals. - -(b) The ever-increasing suppression of the privileged and the strong, -hence the rise of democracy, and ultimately of _anarchy,_ in the -elements. - - -713. - -_Value_ is the highest amount of power that a man can assimilate--a -man, not mankind! Mankind is much more of a means than an end. It is a -question of type: mankind is merely the experimental material; it is -the overflow of the ill-constituted--a field of ruins. - - -714. - -Words relating to values are merely banners planted on those spots -where a _new blessedness_ was discovered--a new _feeling._ - - -715. - -The standpoint of "value" is the same as that of the _conditions_ of -_preservation_ and _enhancement,_ in regard to complex creatures of -relative stability appearing in the course of evolution. - -There are no such things as lasting and ultimate entities, no atoms, no -monads: here also "permanence" was first introduced by ourselves (from -practical, utilitarian, and other motives). - -"The forms that rule"; the sphere of the subjugated is continually -extended; or it decreases or increases according to the conditions -(nourishment) being either favourable or unfavourable. - -"Value" is essentially the standpoint for the increase or decrease of -these dominating centres (pluralities in any case; for "unity" cannot -be observed anywhere in the nature of development). - -The means of expression afforded by language are useless for the -purpose of conveying any facts concerning "development": the need of -positing a rougher world of stable existences and things forms part of -our _eternal desire for preservation._ We may speak of atoms and monads -in a relative sense: and this is certain, _that the smallest world -is the most stable world ..._. There is no such thing as will: there -are only punctuations of will, which are constantly increasing and -decreasing their power. - - - - -III - - -THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLIFIED IN SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. - - -1. Society and the State. - - -716. - -We take it as a principle that only individuals feel any -responsibility. Corporations are invented to do what the individual -has not the courage to do. For this reason all communities are vastly -more upright and instructive, as regards the nature of man, than the -individual who is too cowardly to have the courage of his own desires. - -All altruism is the prudence of the private man. societies are not -mutually altruistic. The commandment, "Thou shalt love thy next-door -neighbour," has never been extended to thy neighbour in general. Rather -what Manu says is probably truer: "We must conceive of all the States -on our own frontier, and their allies, as being hostile, and for the -same reason we must consider all of their neighbours as being friendly -to us." - -The study of society is invaluable, because man in society is far more -childlike than man individually. Society has never regarded virtue as -anything else than as a means to strength, power, and order. Manu's -words again are simple and dignified: "Virtue could hardly rely on her -own strength alone. Really it is only the fear of punishment that keeps -men in their limits, and leaves every one in peaceful possession of his -own." - - -717. - -The State, or _unmorality_ organised, is from within--the police, the -penal code, status, commerce, and the family; and from without, the -will to war, to power, to conquest and revenge. - -A multitude will do things an individual will not, because of the -division of responsibility, of command and execution; because the -virtues of obedience, duty, patriotism, and local sentiment are all -introduced; because feelings of pride, severity, strength, hate, -and revenge in short, all typical traits are upheld, and these are -characteristics utterly alien to the herd-man. - - -718. - -You haven't, any of you, the courage either to kill or to flog a man. -But the huge machinery of the State quells the individual and makes him -decline to be answerable for his own deed (obedience, loyalty, etc.). - -Everything that a man does in the service of the State is against his -own nature. Similarly, everything he learns in view of future service -of the State. This result is obtained through division of labour (so -that responsibility is subdivided too):-- - -The legislator--and he who fulfils the law. - -The teacher of discipline--and those who have grown hard and severe -under discipline. - - -719. - -A division of labour among the emotions exists inside society, making -individuals and classes produce an imperfect, but more useful, kind -of soul. Observe how every type in society has become atrophied with -regard to certain emotions with the view of fostering and accentuating -other emotions. - -Morality may be thus justified:-- - -_Economically,_--as aiming at the greatest possible use of all -individual power, with the view of preventing the waste of exceptional -natures. - -_Æsthetically,_--as the formation of fixed types, and the pleasure in -one's own. - -_Politically,_--as the art of bearing with the severe divergencies of -the degrees of power in society. - -_Psychologically,_ as an imaginary preference for the bungled and the -mediocre, in order to preserve the weak. - - -720. - -Man has one terrible and fundamental wish; he desires power, and this -impulse, which is called freedom, must be the longest restrained. -Hence ethics has instinctively aimed at such an education as shall -restrain the desire for power; thus our morality slanders the would-be -tyrant, and glorifies charity, patriotism, and the ambition of the herd. - - -721. - -Impotence to power, how it disguises itself and plays the hypocrite, as -obedience, subordination, the pride of duty and morality, submission, -devotion, love (the idolisation and apotheosis of the commander is a -kind of compensation, and indirect self-enhancement). It veils itself -further under fatalism and resignation, objectivity, self-tyranny, -stoicism, asceticism, self-abnegation, hallowing. Other disguises are: -criticism, pessimism, indignation, susceptibility, beautiful soul, -virtue, self--deification, philosophic detachment, freedom from contact -with the world (the realisation of impotence disguises itself as -disdain). - -There is a universal need to exercise some kind of power, or to create -for one's self the appearance of some power, if only temporarily, in -the form of intoxication. - -There are men who desire power simply for the sake of the happiness it -will bring; these belong chiefly to political parties. Other men have -the same yearning, even when power means visible disadvantages, the -sacrifice of their happiness, and well-being; they are the ambitious. -Other men, again, are only like dogs in a manger, and will have power -only to prevent its falling into the hands of others on whom they would -then be dependent. - - -722. - -If there be justice and equality before the law, what would thereby -be abolished?--Suspense, enmity, hatred. But it is a mistake to think -that you thereby increase happiness; for the Corsicans rejoice in more -happiness than the Continentals. - - -723. - -Reciprocity and the expectation of a reward is one of the most -seductive forms of the devaluation of mankind. It involves that -equality which depreciates any gulf as immoral. - - -724. - -Utility is entirely dependent upon the object to be attained,--the -wherefore? And this wherefore, this purpose, is again dependent upon -the degree of power. Utilitarianism is not, therefore, a fundamental -doctrine; it is only a story of sequels, and cannot be made obligatory -for all. - - -725. - -Of old, the State was regarded theoretically as a utilitarian -institution; it has now become so in a practical sense. The time of -kings has gone by, because people are no longer worthy of them. They do -not wish to see the symbol of their ideal in a king, but only a means -to their own ends. That's the whole truth. - - -726. - -I am trying to grasp the absolute sense of the communal standard of -judgment and valuation, naturally without any intention of deducing -morals. - -The degree of psychological falsity and denseness required in order to -sanctify the emotions essential to preservation and expansion of power, -and to create a good conscience for them. - -The degree of stupidity required in order that general rules and values -may remain possible (including education, formation of culture, and -training). - -The degree of inquisitiveness, suspicion, and intolerance required in -order to deal with exceptions, to suppress them as criminals, and thus -to give them bad consciences, and to make them sick with their own -singularity. - - -727. - -Morality is essentially a shield, a means of defence; and, in so far, -it is a sign of the imperfectly developed man (he is still in armour; -he is still stoical). - -The fully developed man is above all provided with _weapons:_ he is a -man who _attacks._ - -The weapons of war are converted into weapons of peace (out of scales -and carapaces grow feathers and hair). - - -728. - -The very notion, "living organism", implies that there must be -growth,--that there must be a striving after an extension of power, -and therefore a process of absorption of other forces. Under the -drowsiness brought on by moral narcotics, people speak of the right of -the individual to _defend himself;_ on the same principle one might -speak of his right to _attack_: for _both_--and the latter more than -the former--are necessities where all living organisms are concerned: -aggressive and defensive egoism are not questions of choice or even of -"free will," but they are fatalities of life itself. - -In this respect it is immaterial whether one have an individual, a -living body, or "an advancing society" in view. The right to punish -(or society's means of defence) has been arrived at only through a -misuse of the word "right": a right is acquired only by contract, but -self-defence and self-preservation do not stand upon the basis of a -contract. A people ought at least, with quite as much justification, to -be able to regard its lust of power, either in arms, commerce, trade, -or colonisation, as a right the right of growth, perhaps.... When the -instincts of a society ultimately make it give up war and renounce -conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy and the rule of -shopkeepers. In the majority of cases, it is true, assurances of peace -are merely stupefying draughts. - - -729. - -The maintenance of the military State is the last means of adhering to -the great tradition of the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive -it. By means of it the superior or strong type of man is preserved, -and all institutions and ideas which perpetuate enmity and order of -rank in States, such as national feeling, protective tariffs, etc., may -on that account seem justified. - - -730. - -In order that a thing may last longer than a person (that is to say, -in order that a work may outlive the individual who has created it), -all manner of limitations and prejudices must be imposed upon people. -But how? By means of love, reverence, gratitude towards the person -who created the work, or by means of the thought that our ancestors -fought for it, or by virtue of the feeling that the safety of our -descendants will be secured if we uphold the work--for instance, the -_polis._ Morality is essentially the means of; making something survive -the individual, because it makes him of necessity a slave. Obviously -the aspect from above is different from the aspect from below, and -will lead to quite different interpretations. How is organised power -_maintained_?--By the fact that countless generations sacrifice -themselves to its cause. - - -731. - -Marriage, property, speech, tradition, race, family, people, and -State, are each links in a chain--separate parts which have a more -or less high or low origin. Economically they are justified by the -surplus derived from the advantages of uninterrupted work and multiple -production, as weighed against the disadvantages of greater expense -in barter and the difficulty of making things last. (The working -parts are multiplied, and yet remain largely idle. Hence the cost of -producing them is greater, and the cost of maintaining them by no means -inconsiderable.) The advantage consists in avoiding interruption and -incident loss. Nothing is more expensive than a start. "The higher the -standard of living, the greater will be the expense of maintenance, -nourishment, and propagation, as also the risk and the probability of -an utter fall on reaching the summit." - - -732. - -In bourgeois marriages, naturally in the best sense of the word -marriage, there is no question whatsoever of love any more than there -is of money. For on love no institution can be founded. The whole -matter consists in society giving leave to two persons to satisfy -their sexual desires under conditions obviously designed to safeguard -social order. Of course there must be a certain attraction between the -parties and a vast amount of good nature, patience, compatibility, and -charity in any such contract. But the word love should not be misused -as regards such a union. For two lovers, in the real and strong meaning -of the word, the satisfaction of sexual desire is unessential; it is a -mere symbol. For the one side, as I have already said, it is a symbol -of unqualified submission: for the other, a sign of condescension--a -sign of the appropriation of property. Marriage, as understood by the -real old nobility, meant the breeding forth of the race (but are there -any nobles nowadays? _Quaeritur_),--that is to say, the maintenance -of a fixed definite type of ruler, for which object husband and wife -were sacrificed. Naturally the first consideration here had nothing to -do with love; on the contrary! It did not even presuppose that mutual -sympathy which is the _sine qua non_ of the bourgeois marriage. The -prime consideration was the interest of the race, and in the second -place came the interest of a particular class. But in the face of the -coldness and rigour and calculating lucidity of such a noble concept -of marriage as prevailed among every healthy aristocracy, like that -of ancient Athens, and even of Europe during the eighteenth century, -we warm-blooded animals, with our miserably oversensitive hearts, we -"moderns," cannot restrain a slight shudder. That is why love as a -passion, in the big meaning of this word, was invented for, and in, an -aristocratic community--where convention and abstinence are most severe. - - -733. - -_Concerning the future of marriage._ A super-tax on inherited property, -a longer term of military service for bachelors of a certain minimum -age within the community. - -Privileges of all sorts for fathers who lavish boys upon the world, and -perhaps plural votes as well. - -A medical certificate as a condition of any marriage, endorsed by the -parochial authorities, in which a series of questions addressed to the -parties and the medical officers must be answered ("family histories"). - -As a counter-agent to prostitution, or as its ennoblement, I would -recommend leasehold marriages (to last for a term of years or months), -with adequate provision for the children. - -Every marriage to be warranted and sanctioned by a certain number of -good men and true, of the parish, as a parochial obligation. - - -734. - -_Another commandment of philanthropy._--There are cases where to have a -child would be a crime--for example, for chronic invalids and extreme -neurasthenics. These people should be converted to chastity, and for -this purpose the music of _Parsifal_ might at all events be tried. For -Parsifal himself, that born fool, had ample reasons for not desiring -to propagate. Unfortunately, however, one of the regular symptoms of -exhausted stock is the inability to exercise any self-restraint in the -presence of stimuli, and the tendency to respond to the smallest sexual -attraction. It would be quite a mistake, for instance, to think of -Leopardi as a chaste man. In such cases the priest and moralist play -a hopeless game: it would be far better to send for the apothecary. -Lastly, society here has a positive duty to fulfil, and of all the -demands that are made on it, there are few more urgent and necessary -than this one. Society as the trustee of life, is responsible to life -for every botched life that comes into existence, and as it has to -atone for such lives, it ought consequently to make it impossible for -them ever to see the light of day: it should in many cases actually -prevent the act of procreation, and may, without any regard for rank, -descent, or intellect, hold in readiness the most rigorous forms of -compulsion and restriction, and, under certain circumstances, have -recourse to castration. The Mosaic law, "Thou shalt do no murder," is -a piece of ingenuous puerility compared with the earnestness of this -forbidding of life to decadents, "Thou shalt not beget"!!! ... For -life itself recognises no solidarity or equality of rights between the -healthy and unhealthy parts of an organism. The latter must at all -cost be _eliminated,_ lest the whole fall to pieces. Compassion for -decadents, equal rights for the physiologically botched--this would be -the very pinnacle of immorality, it would be setting up Nature's most -formidable opponent as morality itself! - - -735. - -There are some delicate and morbid natures, the so-called idealists, -who can never under any circumstances rise above a coarse, immature -crime: yet it is the great justification of their anæmic little -existence, it is the small requital for their lives of cowardice and -falsehood to have been for one _instant_ at least--strong. But they -generally collapse after such an act. - - -736. - -In our civilised world we seldom hear of any but the bloodless, -trembling criminal, overwhelmed by the curse and contempt of society, -doubting even himself, and always belittling and belying his deeds--a -misbegotten sort of criminal; that is why we are opposed to the idea -that _all great men have been criminals_ (only in the grand style, and -neither petty nor pitiful), that crime must be inherent in greatness -(this at any rate is the unanimous verdict of all those students of -human nature who have sounded the deepest waters of great souls). To -feel one's self adrift from all questions of ancestry, conscience, and -duty--this is the danger with which every great man is confronted. -Yet this is precisely what he desires: he desires the great goal, and -consequently the means thereto. - - -737. - -In times when man is led by reward and punishment, the class of man -which the legislator has in view is still of a low and primitive -type: he is treated as one treats a child. In our latter-day culture, -general degeneracy removes all sense from reward and punishment. This -determination of action by the prospect of reward and punishment -presupposes young, strong, and vigorous races. In effete races impulses -are so irrepressible that a mere idea has no force whatever. Inability -to offer any resistance to a stimulus, and the feeling that one must -react to it: this excessive susceptibility of decadents makes all such -systems of punishment and reform altogether senseless. - -The idea "amelioration" presupposes a normal and strong creature whose -action must in some way be balanced or cancelled if he is not to be -lost and turned into an enemy of the community. - - -738. - -_The effect of prohibition._ Every power which forbids and which knows -how to excite fear in the person forbidden creates a guilty conscience. -(That is to say, a person has a certain desire but is conscious of the -danger of gratifying it, and is consequently forced to be secretive, -underhand, and cautious.) Thus any prohibition deteriorates the -character of those who do not willingly submit themselves to it, but -are constrained thereto. - - -739. - -_"Punishment and reward."_--These two things stand or fall together. -Nowadays no one will accept a reward or acknowledge that any authority -should have the power to punish. Warfare has been reformed. We have -a desire: it meets with opposition: we then see that we shall most -easily obtain it by coming to some agreement--by drawing up a contract. -In modern society where every one has given his assent to a certain -contract, the criminal is a man who breaks that contract. This at least -is a clear concept. But in that case, anarchists and enemies of social -order could not be tolerated. - - -740. - -Crimes belong to the category of revolt against the social system, A -rebel is not punished, he is simply suppressed. He _may_ be an utterly -contemptible and pitiful creature; but there is nothing intrinsically -despicable about rebellion in fact, in our particular society revolt is -far from being disgraceful. There are cases in which a rebel deserves -honour precisely because he is conscious of certain elements in society -which cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us from our -slumbers. When a criminal commits but one crime against a particular -person, it does not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him -to make a stand against the whole social system. His isolated act is -merely a symptom. - -The idea of punishment ought to be reduced to the concept of the -suppression of revolt, a weapon against the vanquished (by means of -long or short terms of imprisonment). But punishment should not be -associated in any way with contempt. A criminal is at all events a man -who has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake; he is therefore -a man of courage. Neither should punishment be regarded as penance or -retribution, as though there were some recognised rate of exchange -between crime and punishment. Punishment does not purify, simply -because crime does not sully. - -A criminal should not be prevented from making his peace with society, -provided he does not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter -case, however, he should be opposed even before he has committed an -act of hostility. (As soon as he gets into the clutches of society the -first operation to be performed upon him should be that of castration.) -A criminal's bad manners and his low degree of intelligence should -not be reckoned against him. Nothing is more common than that he -should misunderstand himself (more particularly when his rebellious -instinct--the rancour of the _unclassed_--has not reached consciousness -simply because he has not read enough). It is natural that he should -deny and dishonour his deed while under the influence of fear at -its failure. All this is quite distinct from those cases in which, -psychologically speaking, the criminal yields to an incomprehensible -impulse, and attributes a motive to his deed by associating it with a -merely incidental and insignificant action (for example, robbing a man, -when his real desire was to take his blood). - -The worth of a man should not be measured by any one isolated act. -Napoleon warned us against this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are -more particularly insignificant. If we have no crime--let us say no -murder--on our conscience; why is it? It simply means that a few -favourable circumstances have been wanting in our lives. And supposing -we were induced to commit such a crime would our worth be materially -affected? As a matter of fact, we should only be despised, if we were -not credited with possessing the power to kill a man under certain -circumstances. In nearly every crime certain qualities come into play -without which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky was not far wrong -when he said of the inmates of the penal colonies in Siberia, that they -constituted the strongest and most valuable portion of the Russian -people. The fact that in our society the criminal happens to be a badly -nourished and stunted animal is simply a condemnation of our system. In -the days of the Renaissance the criminal was a flourishing specimen of -humanity, and acquired his own virtue for himself,--Virtue in the sense -of the Renaissance--that is to say, _virtù;_ free from moralic acid. - -It is only those whom we do not despise that we are able to elevate. -Moral contempt is a far greater indignity and insult than any kind of -crime. - - -741. - -Shame was first introduced into punishment when certain penalties -were inflicted on persons held in contempt, such as slaves. It was a -despised class that was most frequently punished, and thus it came to -pass that punishment and contempt were associated. - - -742. - -In the ancient idea of punishment a religious concept was immanent, -namely, the retributive power of chastisement. Penalties purified; in -modern society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment is a form of -paying off a debt: once it has been paid, one is freed from the deed -for which one was so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power of -punishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feeling of relief and -lightheartedness results, which is not so very far removed from a state -of convalescence and health. One has made one's peace with society, -and one appears to one's self more dignified pure.... To-day, however, -punishment isolates even more than the crime; the fate behind the sin -has become so formidable that it is almost hopeless. One rises from -punishment still an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet -another enemy against it. The _jus talionis_ may spring from the spirit -of retribution (that is to say, from a sort of modification of the -instinct of revenge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it is the -need of having some equivalent in order to do penance, or to become -free in a religious sense. - - -743. - -My pretty radical note of interrogation in the case of all more -modern laws of punishment is this: should not the punishment fit the -crime?--for in your heart of hearts thus would you have it. But then -the susceptibility of the particular criminal to pain would have to -be taken into account. In other words, there should be no such thing -as a preconceived penalty for any crime--no fixed penal code. But as -it would be no easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness -of each individual criminal, punishment would have to be abolished in -practice? What a sacrifice! Is it not? Consequently ... - - -744. - -Ah! and the philosophy of jurisprudence! That is a science which, like -all moral sciences, has not even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet. -Even among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the oldest and -most valuable significance of punishment is still misunderstood--it -is not even known. So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a new -foundation--on history and comparative anthropology--it will never -cease to quarrel over the fundamentally false abstractions which are -fondly imagined to be the "philosophy of law," and which have nothing -whatever to do with modern man. The man of to-day, however, is such a -complicated woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he allows -of the most varied interpretation. - -745. - -An old Chinese sage once said he had heard that when mighty empires -were doomed they began to have numberless laws. - -746. - -Schopenhauer would have all rapscallions castrated, and all geese shut -up in convents. But from what point of view would this be desirable? -The rascal has at least this advantage over other men--that he is not -mediocre; and the fool is superior to us inasmuch as he does not suffer -at the sight of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the gulf--that -is to say, roguery and stupidity should be increased. In this way human -nature would become broader ... but, after all, this is Fate, and -it will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy and roguery are -increasing: this is part of modern progress. - - -747. - -Society, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and reticence, and of -good-natured respect for other people's rights--even for the exactions -of strangers. To an even greater degree is there a certain charitable -and instinctive depreciation of the worth of man as shown by all -manner of trustful habits. Respect for men, and not only for the most -virtuous, is perhaps the real parting of the ways between us and the -Christian mythologists also have our good share of irony even when -listening to moral sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases -himself in our eyes and becomes almost comical. Liberal-mindedness -regarding morality is one of the best signs of our age. In cases where -it is most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a morbid -condition (the case of Carlyle in England, of Ibsen in Norway, and -Schopenhauer's pessimism throughout Europe). If there is anything -which can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the amount -of immorality which it allows itself without falling in its own -estimation--very much the reverse! In what, then, does the superiority -of culture over the want of culture consist--of the Renaissance, for -instance, over the Middle Ages? In this alone: the greater quantity of -acknowledged immorality. From this it necessarily follows that the very -_zenith_ of human development _must_ be regarded by the moral fanatic -as the _non plus ultra_ of corruption (in this connection let us recall -Savonarola's judgment of Florence, Plato's indictment of Athens under -Pericles, Luther's condemnation of Rome, Rousseau's anathemas against -the society of Voltaire, and Germany's hostility to Goethe). - -A little more fresh air, for Heaven's sake! This ridiculous condition -of Europe _must_ not last any longer. Is there a single idea behind -this bovine nationalism? What possible value can there be in -encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when everything to-day points -to greater and more common interests?--at a moment when the spiritual -dependence and denationalisation, which are obvious to all, are paving -the way for the reciprocal _rapprochements_ and fertilisations which -make up the real value and sense of present-day culture! ... And it is -precisely now that "the new German Empire" has been founded upon the -most thread-bare and discredited of ideas--universal suffrage and equal -right for all. - -Think of all this struggling for advantage among conditions which are -in every way degenerate: of this culture of big cities, of newspapers, -of hurry and scurry, and of "aimlessness"! The economic unity of -Europe must necessarily come--and with it, as a reaction, the pacivist -movement. - -A pacivist party, free from all sentimentality, which forbids its -children to wage war; which forbids recourse to courts of justice; -which forswears all fighting, all contradiction, and all persecution: -for a while the party of the oppressed, and later the powerful -party:--this party would be opposed to everything in the shape of -revenge and resentment. - -There will also be a war party, exercising the same thoroughness and -severity towards itself, which will proceed in precisely the opposite -direction. - - -749. - -The princes of Europe should really consider whether as a matter of -fact they can dispense with our services--with us, the immoralists. We -are to-day the only power which can win a victory without allies: and -we are therefore far and away the strongest of the strong. We can even -do without lying, and let me ask what other power can dispense with -this weapon? A strong temptation fights for us; the strongest, perhaps, -that exists--the temptation of truth.... Truth? How do I come by this -word? I must withdraw it: I must repudiate this proud word. But no. We -do not even want it--we shall be quite able to achieve our victory of -power without its help. The real charm which fights for us, the eye -of Venus which our opponents themselves deaden and blind--this charm -is the magic of the extreme. The fascination which everything extreme -exercises: we immoralists--we are in every way the extremists. - - -750. - -The corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling into evil odour. The -State administration of justice is a piece of cowardice, because the -great man who can serve as a standard is lacking. At last the feeling -of insecurity becomes so great that men fall in the dust before any -sort of will-power that commands. - - -751. - -"The will to power" is so loathed in democratic ages that the whole of -the psychology of these ages seems directed towards its belittlement -and slander. The types of men who sought the highest honours are said -to have been Napoleon! Cæsar! and Alexander!--as if these had not been -precisely the greatest _scorners_ of honour. - -And Helvetius would fain show us that we strive after power in order -to have those pleasures which are at the disposal of the mighty--that -is to say, according to him, this striving after power is the will to -pleasure--hedonism! - - -752. - -According as to whether a people feels: "the rights, the keenness of -vision, and the gifts of leading, etc., are with the few" or "with the -many"--it constitutes En oligarchic or a democratic community. - -Monarchy represents the belief in a man who is completely superior a -leader, a saviour, a demigod. - -Aristocracy represents the belief in a chosen few--in a higher caste. - -Democracy represents the disbelief in all great men and in all elite -societies: everybody is everybody else's equal, "At bottom we are all -herd and mob." - - -753. - -I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams ingenuously of goodness, -truth, beauty, and equal rights (anarchy pursues the same ideal, but in -a more brutal fashion). - -I am opposed to parliamentary government and the power of the press, -because they are the means whereby cattle become masters. - - -754. - -The arming of the people means in the end the arming of the mob. - - -755. - -Socialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes, because of their -absurd optimism concerning the "good man" who is supposed to be waiting -in their cupboard, and who will come into being when the present -order of society has been overturned and has made way for natural -instincts. But the opposing party is quite as ludicrous, because it -will not see the act of violence which lies beneath every law, the -severity and egoism inherent in every kind of authority. "I and my kind -will rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be either expelled -or annihilated."--This was the fundamental feeling of all ancient -legislation. The idea of a higher order of man is hated much more -profoundly than monarchs themselves. Hatred of aristocracy always uses -hatred of monarchy as a mask. - - -756. - -How treacherous are all parties! They bring to light something -concerning their leaders which the latter, perhaps, have hitherto kept -hidden beneath a bushel with consummate art. - - -757. - -Modern Socialism would fain create a profane counterpart to jesuitism: -everybody a perfect instrument. But as to the object of it all, the -purpose of it--this has not yet been ascertained. - - -758. - -_The slavery of to-day_: a piece of barbarism. Where are the masters -for whom these slaves work? One must not always expect the simultaneous -appearance of the two complementary castes of society. - -Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life. - -"The blessing of work" is an ennobling phrase for slaves. Incapacity -for leisure. - - -759. - -There is no such thing as a right to live, a right to work, or a right -to be happy: in this respect man is not different from the meanest worm. - - -760. - -We must undoubtedly think of these things as uncompromisingly as Nature -does: they preserve the species. - - -761. - -We should look upon the needs of the masses with ironic compassion: -they want something which we have got--Ah! - - -762. - -European democracy is only in a very slight degree the manifestation -of unfettered powers. It represents, above all, the unfettering of -laziness, fatigue, and _weakness_. - - -753. - -_Concerning the future of the workman_--Workmen men should learn to -regard their duties as _soldiers_ do. They receive emoluments, incomes, -but they do not get wages! - -There is no relationship between _work done_ and money received; -the individual should, _according to his kind,_ be so placed as to -_perform_ the _highest_ that is compatible with his powers. - - -764. - -Noblemen ought one day to live as the bourgeois do now--but above -them, distinguishing themselves by the simplicity of their wants--the -superior caste will then live in a poorer and simpler way and yet be in -possession of power. - -For lower orders of mankind the reverse valuations hold good: it is a -matter of implanting "virtues" in them. Absolute commands, terrible -compulsory methods, in order that they may rise above mere ease in -life. The remainder may obey, but their vanity demands that they may -feel themselves dependent, not upon great men, but upon principles. - - -765. - -"_The Atonement of all Sin?_" - -People speak of the profound injustice of the social arrangement, as -it the fact that one man is born in favourable circumstances and that -another is born in unfavourable ones--or that one should possess gifts -the other has not, were on the face of it an injustice. Among the -more honest of these opponents of society this is what is said: "We, -with all the bad, morbid, criminal qualities which we acknowledge we -possess, are only the inevitable result of the oppression for ages of -the weak by the strong"; thus they insinuate their evil natures into -the consciences of the ruling classes. They threaten and storm and -curse. They become virtuous from sheer indignation--they don't want -to have become bad men and _canaille_ for nothing. The name for this -attitude, which is an invention of the last century, is, if I am not -mistaken, pessimism; and even that pessimism which is the outcome of -indignation. It is in this attitude of mind that history is judged, -that it is deprived of its inevitable fatality, and that responsibility -and even guilt is discovered in it. For the great desideratum is to -find guilty people in it. The botched and the bungled, the decadents -of all kinds, are revolted at themselves, and require sacrifices -in order that they may not slake their thirst for destruction upon -themselves (which might, indeed, be the most reasonable procedure). But -for this purpose they at least require a semblance of justification, -_i.e._ a theory according to which the fact of their existence, and of -their character, may be expiated by a scapegoat. This scapegoat may -be God,--in Russia such resentful atheists are not wanting,--or the -order of society, or education and upbringing, or the Jews, or the -nobles, or, finally, the well-constituted of every kind. "It is a sin -for a man to have been born in decent circumstances, for by so doing -he disinherits the others, he pushes them aside, he imposes upon them -the curse of vice and of work.... How can I be made answerable for my -misery; surely some one must be responsible for it, or I could not bear -to live."... - -In short, resentful pessimism discovers responsible parties in order to -create a pleasurable sensation for itself--revenge.... "Sweeter than -honey"--thus does even old Homer speak of revenge. - -*** - -The fact that such a theory no longer meets with understanding--or -rather, let us say, contempt is accounted for by that particle of -Christianity which still circulates in the blood of every one of us; it -makes us tolerant towards things simply because we scent a Christian -savour about them.... The Socialists appeal to the Christian instincts; -this is their really refined piece of cleverness.... Thanks to -Christianity, we have now grown accustomed to the superstitious concept -of a soul--of an immortal soul, of soul monads, which, as a matter of -fact, hails from somewhere else, and which has only become inherent in -certain cases--that is to say, become incarnate in them--by accident: -but the nature of these cases is not altered, let alone determined by -it. The circumstances of society, of relationship, and of history are -only accidents for the soul, perhaps misadventures: in any case, the -world is not their work. By means of the idea of soul the individual is -made transcendental; thanks to it, a ridiculous amount of importance -can be attributed to him. - -As a matter of fact, it was Christianity which first induced the -individual to take up this position of judge of all things. It made -megalomania almost his duty: it has made everything temporary and -limited subordinate to eternal rights! What is the State, what is -society, what are historical laws, what is physiology to me? Thus -speaks something from beyond Becoming, an immutable entity throughout -history: thus speaks something immortal, something divine--it is the -soul! - -Another Christian, but no less insane, concept has percolated even -deeper into the tissues of modern ideas: the concept of the equality -of all souls before God. In this concept the prototype of all theories -concerning equal rights is to be found. Man was first taught to -stammer this proposition religiously: later, it was converted into -a moral; no wonder he has ultimately begun to take it seriously, to -take it _practically_!--that is to say, politically, socialistically, -resento-pessimistically. - -Wherever responsible circumstances or people have been looked for, -it was the _instinct of revenge_ that sought them. This instinct of -revenge obtained such an ascendancy over man in the course of centuries -that the whole of metaphysics, psychology, ideas of society, and, above -all, morality, are tainted with it. Man has nourished this idea of -responsibility to such an extent that he has introduced the bacillus -of vengeance into everything. By means of it he has made God Himself -ill, and killed innocence in the universe, by tracing every condition -of things to acts of will, to intentions, to responsible agents. The -whole teaching of will, this most fatal fraud that has ever existed -in psychology hitherto, was invented essentially for the purpose of -punishment. It was the social utility of punishment that lent this -concept its dignity, its power, and its truth. The originator of that -psychology, that we shall call volitional psychology, must be sought in -those classes which had the right of punishment in their hands; above -all, therefore, among the priests who stood on the very pinnacle of -ancient social systems: these people wanted to create for themselves -the right to wreak revenge--they wanted to supply God with the -privilege of vengeance. For this purpose; man was declared "free": to -this end every action had to be regarded as voluntary, and the origin -of every deed had to be considered as lying in consciousness. But by -such propositions as these ancient psychology is refuted. - -To-day, when Europe seems to have taken the contrary direction; when -we halcyonians would fain withdraw, dissipate, and banish the concept -of guilt and punishment with all our might from the world; when our -most serious endeavours are concentrated upon purifying psychology, -morality, history, nature, social institutions and privileges, and -even God Himself, from this filth; in whom must we recognise our most -mortal enemies? Precisely in those apostles of revenge and resentment, -in those who are _par excellence_ pessimists from indignation, who make -it their mission to sanctify their filth with the name of "righteous -indignation."... We others, whose one desire is to reclaim innocence on -behalf of Becoming, would fain be the missionaries of a purer thought, -namely, that no one is responsible for man's qualities; neither God, -nor society, nor his parents, nor his ancestors, nor himself--in -fact, that no one is to blame for him ... The being who might be made -responsible for a man's existence, for the fact that he is constituted -in a particular way, or for his birth in certain circumstances and -in a certain environment, is absolutely lacking.--_And it is a great -blessing that such a being is non-existent ..._. We are _not_ the -result of an eternal design, of a will, of a desire: there is no -attempt being made with us to attain to an "ideal of perfection," to -an "ideal of happiness," to an "ideal of virtue,"--and we are just as -little the result of a mistake on God's part in the presence of which -He ought to feel uneasy (a thought which is known to be at the very -root of the Old Testament). There is not a place nor a purpose nor a -sense to which we can attribute our existence or our kind of existence. -In the first place, no one is in a position to do this: it is quite -impossible to judge, to measure, or to compare, or even to deny the -whole universe! And why?--For five reasons, all accessible to the man -of average intelligence: for instance, _because there is no existence -outside the universe ..._ and let us say it again, this is a great -blessing, for therein lies the whole innocence of our lives. - - - -2. The Individual. - - -766. - -_Fundamental errors:_ to regard the _herd_ as an aim instead of -the individual! The herd is only a means and nothing _more_! But -nowadays people are trying to understand _the herd_ as they would an -individual, and to confer higher rights upon it than upon isolated -personalities. Terrible mistake!! In addition to this, all that makes -for gregariousness, _e.g._ sympathy, is regarded as the _more valuable_ -side of our natures. - - -767. - -The individual is something quite _new,_ and capable of _creating -new things._ He is something absolute, and all his actions are quite -his own. The individual in the end has to seek the valuation for his -actions in himself: because he has to give an individual meaning even -to traditional words and notions. His interpretation of a formula is at -least personal, even if he does not create the formula itself: at least -as an interpreter he is creative. - - -768. - -The "ego" oppresses and kills. It acts like an organic cell. It is -predatory and violent. It would fain regenerate itself--pregnancy. It -would fain give birth to its God and see all mankind at its feet. - - -769. - -Every living organism gropes around as far as its power permits, and -overcomes all that is weaker than itself: by this means it finds -pleasure in its own existence. The _increasing "humanity"_ of this -tendency consists in the fact that we are beginning to feel ever more -subtly how difficult it is really to _absorb_ others: while we could -show our power by injuring him, his will _estranges_ him from us, and -thus makes him less susceptible of being overcome. - - -770. - -The degree of resistance which has to be continually overcome in order -to remain _at the top,_ is the measure of _freedom,_ whether for -individuals or for societies: freedom being understood as positive -power, as will to power. The highest form of individual freedom, of -sovereignty, would, according to this, in all probability be found not -five feet away from its opposite--that is to say, where the danger of -slavery hangs over life, like a hundred swords of Damocles. Let any one -go through the whole of history from this point of view: the ages when -the individual reaches perfect maturity, _i.e._ the free ages, when the -classical type, _sovereign man,_ is attained to--these were certainly -not humane times! - -There should be no choice: either one must be uppermost or -nethermost--like a worm, despised, annihilated, trodden upon. One -must have tyrants against one in order to become a tyrant, _i.e._ in -order to be free. It is no small advantage to have a hundred swords of -Damocles suspended over one: it is only thus that one learns to dance, -it is only thus that one attains to any freedom in one's movements. - - -771. - -Man more than any other animal was originally _altruistic_--hence -his slow growth (child) and lofty development. Hence, too, his -extraordinary and latest kind of egoism.--Beasts of prey are much more -_individualistic._ - - -772. - -A criticism of _selfishness._ The involuntary ingenuousness of La -Rochefoucauld, who believed that he was saying something bold, liberal, -and paradoxical (in his days, of course, truth in psychological matters -was something that astonished people) when he said. "_Les grandes âmes -ne sont pas celles qui ont moins de passions et plus de vertus que les -âmes communes, mais seulement celles qui ont de plus grands desseins._" -Certainly, John Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort the _noble_ and -philosophical La Rochefoucauld of the eighteenth century) recognises -in him merely an astute and keen-sighted observer of all that which is -the result of habitual selfishness in the human breast, and he adds: "A -noble spirit is unable to see the necessity of a constant observation -of _baseness_ and _contemptibility_, unless it were to show against -what corrupting influences a lofty spirit and a noble character were -able to triumph." - - -773. - -_The Morphology of the Feelings of Self._ - -_First standpoint_--To what extent are _sympathy_ or _communal -feelings,_ the lower or preparatory states, at a time when personal -self-esteem and initiative in valuation, on the part of individuals, -are not yet possible? - -_Second standpoint._--To what extent is the zenith of collective -self-esteem, the pride in the distinction of the clan, the feeling -of inequality and a certain abhorrence of mediation, of equal rights -and of reconciliation, the school for individual self-esteem? It may -be this in so far as it compels the individual to represent the pride -of the community --he is obliged to speak and act with tremendous -self-respect, because he stands for the community And the same -holds good when the individual regards himself as the instrument or -speaking-tube of a godhead. - -_Third standpoint._--To what extent do these forms of impersonality -invest the individual with enormous importance? In so far as higher -powers are using him as an intermediary: religious shyness towards -one's self is the condition of prophets and poets. - -_Fourth standpoint._--To what extent does responsibility for a whole -educate the individual in foresight, and give him a severe and -terrible hand, a calculating and cold heart, majesty of bearing and of -action--things which he would not allow himself if he stood only for -his own rights? - -In short, collective self-esteem is the great preparatory school -for personal sovereignty. The noble caste is that which creates the -heritage of this faculty. - - -774. - -The disguised forms of will to power:-- - -(1) _The desire for freedom,_ for independence for equilibrium, -for peace, for _co-ordination._ Also that of the anchorite, the -"Free-Spirit." In its lowest form, the will to live at all costs--the -instinct of self-preservation. - -(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying the will to power of a -whole community; submissiveness, the making of one's self indispensable -and useful to him who has the power; love, a secret path to the heart -of the powerful, in order to become his master. - -(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imaginary comfort of belonging -to a higher order than those who actually hold the reins of power; -the acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows of judging even -the more powerful, self-depreciation; the discovery of new _codes of -morality_ (of which the Jews are a classical example). - - -775. - -_Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power.--_Praise and -gratitude for harvests, for good weather, victories, marriages, and -peace--all festivals need a subject on which feeling can be outpoured. -The desire is to make all good things that happen to one appear as -though they had been done to one: people will have a donor. The same -holds good of the work of art: people are not satisfied with it -alone, they must praise the artist.--What, then, is praise? It is a -sort of compensation for benefits received, a sort of giving back, -a manifestation of _our_ power--for the man who praises assents to, -blesses, values, _judges_. he arrogates to himself the right to give -his consent to a thing, to be able to confer honours. An increased -feeling of happiness or of liveliness is also an increased feeling -of power, and it is as a result of this feeling that a man _praises_ -(it is as the outcome of this feeling that he invents a donor, a -"subject"). Gratitude is thus revenge of a lofty kind: it is most -severely exercised and demanded where equality and pride both require -to be upheld--that is to say, where revenge is practised to its fullest -extent. - - -776. - -_Concerning the Machiavellism of Power._ - -The _will to power_ appears:-- - -_(a)_ Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in the form of will -to "_freedom_": the mere fact of breaking loose from something seems to -be an end in itself (in a religio-moral sense: "One is only answerable -to one's own conscience"; "evangelical freedom," etc. etc.), - -_(b)_ In the case of a stronger species, ascending to power, in the -form of the will to overpower. If this fails, then it shrinks to the -"will to justice"--that is to say, to the will to the same measure of -rights as the ruling caste possesses. - -_(c)_ In the case of the strongest, richest, most independent, and -most courageous, in the form of "love of humanity," of "love of the -people," of the "gospel," of "truth" of "God," of "pity," of self -sacrifice," etc. etc.; in the form of overpowering, of deeds of -capture, of imposing service on some one, of an instinctive reckoning -of one's self as part of a great mass of power to which one attempts -to give a direction: the hero, the prophet, the Cæsar, the Saviour, -the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes also belongs to this category, -it will overpower something, possess it utterly, and it looks like -self-abnegation. At bottom it is only the love of one's instrument, of -one's "horse"--the conviction that things belong to one because one is -in a position to use them.) - -_"Freedom," "Justice," "Love"_!!! - - -777. - -_Love._--Behold this love and pity of women--what could be more -egoistic? ... And when they do sacrifice themselves and their honour -or reputation, to whom do they sacrifice themselves? To the man? Is it -not rather to an unbridled desire? These desires are quite as selfish, -even though they may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude. -... To what extent can such a hyperfœtation of one valuation sanctify -everything else!! - - -778. - -_"Senses," "Passions."._--When the fear of the senses and of the -passions and of the desires becomes so great as to warn us against -them, it is already a symptom of _weakness:_ extreme measures always -characterise abnormal conditions. That which is lacking here, or more -precisely that which is decaying, is the power to resist an impulse: -when one feels instinctively that one must yield,--that is to say, that -one must react,--then it is an excellent thing to avoid opportunities -(temptations). - -The stimulation of the senses is only a temptation in so far as those -creatures are concerned whose systems are easily swayed and influenced: -on the other hand, in the case of remarkable constitutional obtuseness -and hardness, strong stimuli are necessary in order to set the -functions in motion. Dissipation can only be objected to in the case of -one who has no right to it; and almost all passions have fallen into -disrepute thanks to those who were not strong enough to convert them to -their own advantage. - -One should understand that passions are open to the same objections as -illnesses: yet we should not be justified in doing without illnesses, -and still less without passions. We require the abnormal; we give life -a tremendous shock by means of these great illnesses. - -In detail the following should be distinguished:-- - -(1) The _dominating passion,_ which may even bring the supremest form -of health with it: in this case the co-ordination of the internal -system and its functions to perform one task is best attained,--but -this is almost a definition of health. - -(2) The antagonism of the passions the double, treble, and multiple -soul in one breast:[6] this is very unhealthy; it is a sign of inner -ruin and of disintegration, betraying and promoting an internal dualism -and anarchy--unless, of course, one passion becomes master. _Return to -health._ - - -(3) The juxtaposition of passions without their being either opposed -or united with one another. Very often transitory, and then, as soon -as order is established, this condition may be a healthy one. A most -interesting class of men belong to this order, the chameleons; they are -not necessarily at loggerheads with themselves, they are both happy and -secure, but they cannot develop--their moods lie side by side, even -though they may seem to lie far apart. They change, but they become -nothing. - -[Footnote 6: This refers to Goethe's _Faust._ In Part I., Act I., Scene -11., we find Faust exclaiming in despair: "Two souls, alas! within my -bosom throne!" See Theodore Martin's _Faust,_ translated into English -verse.--Tr.] - - -779. - -The quantitative estimate of aims and its influence upon the valuing -standpoint, the _great_ and the _small_ criminal. The greatness or -smallness of the aims will determine whether the doer feels respect for -himself with it all, or whether he feels pusillanimous and miserable. - -The degree of intellectuality manifested in the means employed may -likewise influence our valuation. How differently the philosophical -innovator, experimenter, and man of violence stands out against -robbers, barbarians, adventurers!--There is a semblance of -disinterestedness in the former. - -Finally, noble manners, bearing, courage, self-confidence,--how they -alter the value of that which is attained by means of them! - -*** - -Concerning the optics of valuation:-- - -The influence of the greatness or smallness of the aims. - -The influence of the intellectuality of the means. The influence of the -behaviour in action. The influence of success or failure. The influence -of opposing forces and their value. The influence of that which is -permitted and that which is forbidden. - - -780. - -The tricks by means of which actions, measures, and passions are -legitimised, which from an individual standpoint are no longer good -form or even in good taste.-- - -Art, which allows us to enter such strange worlds, makes them tasteful -to us. - -Historians prove its justification and reason; travels, exoticism, -psychology, penal codes, the lunatic asylum, the criminal, sociology. - -Impersonality (so that as media of a collective whole we allow -ourselves these passions and action--the Bar, juries, the bourgeois, -the soldier, the minister, the prince, society, "critics") makes us -feel that we are _sacrificing something._ - - -781. - -Preoccupations concerning one's self and one's eternal salvation are -not expressive either of a rich or of a self-confident nature, for the -latter lets all questions of eternal bliss go to the devil,--it is -not interested in such matters of happiness it is all power, deeds, -desires; it imposes itself upon things; it even violates things. The -Christian is a romantic hypochondriac who does not stand firmly on his -legs. - -Whenever hedonistic views come to the front, one can always presuppose -the existence of pain and a certain ill-constitutedness. - - -782. - -"The growing autonomy of the individual"--Parisian philosophers like -M. Fouillée talk of such things: they would do well to study the -_race moutonnière_ for a moment; for they belong to it. For Heaven's -sake open your eyes, ye sociologists who deal with the future! The -individual grew strong under quite opposite conditions: ye describe the -extremest weakening and impoverishment of man; ye actually want this -weakness and impoverishment, and ye apply the whole lying machinery of -the old ideal in order to achieve your end. Ye are so constituted that -ye actually regard your gregarious wants as an ideal! Here we are in -the presence of an absolute lack of psychological honesty. - - -783. - -The two traits which characterise the modern European are apparently -antagonistic _individualism and the demand for equal rights_: this I -am at last beginning to understand. The individual is an extremely -vulnerable piece of vanity: this vanity, when it is conscious of its -high degree of susceptibility to pain, demands that every one should -be made equal; that the individual should only stand _inter pares_. -But in this way a social race is depicted in which, as a matter of -fact, gifts and powers are on the whole equally distributed. The pride -which would have loneliness and but few appreciators is quite beyond -comprehension: really "great" successes are only attained through the -masses--indeed, we scarcely understand yet that a mob success is in -reality only a small success; because _pulchrum est paucorum hominum._ - -No morality will countenance order of rank among men, and the jurists -know nothing of a communal conscience. The principle of individualism -rejects _really great_ men, and demands the most delicate vision for, -and the speediest discovery of, a talent among people who are almost -equal; and inasmuch as every one has some modicum of talent in such -late and civilised cultures (and can, therefore, expect to receive his -share of honour), there is a more general buttering-up of modest merits -to-day than there has ever been. This gives the age the appearance of -_unlimited justice._ Its want of justice is to be found not in its -unbounded hatred of tyrants and demagogues, even in the arts; but in -its detestation of noble natures who scorn the praise of the many. The -demand for equal rights (that is to say, the privilege of sitting in -judgment on everything and everybody) is anti-aristocratic. - -This age knows just as little concerning the absorption of the -individual, of his mergence into a great type of men who do not want to -be personalities. It was this that formerly constituted the distinction -and the zeal of many lofty natures (the greatest poets among them); or -of the desire to be a _polis,_ as in Greece; or of Jesuitism, or of -the Prussian Staff Corps, and bureaucracy; or of apprenticeship and a -continuation of the tradition of great masters: to all of which things, -non-social conditions and the absence of _petty vanity_ are necessary. - - -784. - -_Individualism_ is a modest and still unconscious form of will to -power; with it a single human unit seems to think it sufficient to free -himself from the preponderating power of society (or of the State or -Church). He does not set himself up in opposition as a _personality,_ -but merely as a unit; he represents the rights of all other individuals -as against the whole. That is to say, he instinctively places himself -on a level with every other unit: what he combats he does not combat as -a person, but as a representative of units against a mass. - -Socialism is merely an agitatory measure of individualism: it -recognises the fact that in order to attain to something, men must -organise themselves into a general movement--into a "power." But what -the Socialist requires is not society as the object of the individual, -_but society as a means of making many individuals possible_: this is -the instinct of Socialists, though they frequently deceive themselves -on this point (apart from this, however, in order to make their kind -prevail, they are compelled to deceive others to an enormous extent). -Altruistic moral preaching thus enters into the service of individual -egoism,--one of the most common frauds of the nineteenth century. - -_Anarchy_ is also merely an agitatory measure of Socialism; with it -the Socialist inspires fear, with fear he begins to fascinate and to -terrorise: but what he does above all is to draw all courageous and -reckless people to his side, even in the most intellectual spheres. - -In spite of all this, individualism is the most modest stage of the -will to power. - -*** - -When one has reached a certain degree of independence, one always -longs for more: separation in proportion to the degree of force; -the individual is no longer content to regard himself as equal to -everybody, he actually _seeks for his peer_--he makes himself stand out -from others. Individualism is followed by a development in groups and -organs; correlative tendencies join up together and become powerfully -active: now there arise between these centres of power, friction, -war, a reconnoitring of the forces on either side, reciprocity, -understandings, and the regulation of mutual services. Finally, there -appears an order of rank. - -Recapitulation-- - -1. The individuals emancipate themselves. - -2. They make war, and ultimately agree concerning equal rights (justice -is made an end in itself). - -3. Once this is reached, the actual differences in degrees of power -begin to make themselves felt, and to a greater extent than before (the -reason being that on the whole peace is established, and innumerable -small centres of power begin to create differences which formerly were -scarcely noticeable). Now the individuals begin to form groups, these -strive after privileges and preponderance, and war starts afresh in a -milder form. - -People demand freedom only when they have no power. Once power is -obtained, a preponderance thereof is the next thing to be coveted; if -this is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is still too weak for -it), then _"justice" i.e. "equality_ of power" become the objects of -desire. - - -785. - -_The rectification of the concept "egoism."_--When one has discovered -what an error the "individual" is, and that every single creature -represents the whole process of evolution (not alone "inherited," but -in "himself"), the individual then acquires _an inordinately great -importance._ The voice of instinct is quite right here. When this -instinct tends to decline, _i.e._ when the individual begins to seek -his worth in his services to others, one may be sure that exhaustion -and degeneration have set in. An altruistic attitude of mind, when -it is fundamental and free from all hypocrisy, is the instinct of -creating a second value for one's self in the service of other egoists. -As a rule, however, it is only apparent--a circuitous path to the -preservation of one's own feelings of vitality and worth. - - -786. - -_The History of Moralisation and Demoralisation._ - -_Proposition one._--There are no such things as moral actions: they -are purely imaginary. Not only is it impossible to demonstrate their -existence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for instance, both -acknowledged) but they are not even possible. Owing to psychological -misunderstanding, a man invented an _opposite_ to the instinctive -impulses of life, and believed that a new species of instinct was -thereby discovered: a _primum mobile_ was postulated which does not -exist at all. According to the valuation which gave rise to the -antithesis "moral" and "immoral," one should say: _There is nothing -else on earth but immoral intentions and actions._ - -_Proposition two._----The whole differentiation, "moral" and "immoral," -arises from the assumption that both moral and immoral actions are the -result of a spontaneous will--in short, that such a will exists; or in -other words, that moral judgments can only hold good with regard to -intuitions and actions _that are free._ But this whole order of actions -and intentions is purely imaginary: the only world to which the moral -standard could be applied does not exist at all: _there is no such -thing as a moral or an immoral action._ - -The _psychological error_ out of which the antithesis "moral" and -"immoral" arose is: "selfless," "unselfish," "self-denying"--all unreal -and fantastic. - -A false dogmatism also clustered around the concept "ego"; it was -regarded as atomic, and falsely opposed to a non-ego; it was also -liberated from Becoming, and declared to belong to the sphere of -Being. The false materialisation of the ego: this (owing to the belief -in individual immortality) was made an article of faith under the -pressure of _religio-moral discipline._ According to this artificial -liberation of the ego and its transference to the realm of the -absolute, people thought that they had arrived at an antithesis in -values which seemed quite irrefutable--the single ego and the vast -non-ego. It seemed obvious that the value of the individual ego could -only exist in conjunction with the vast non-ego, more particularly in -the sense of being subject to it and existing only for its sake. Here, -of course, the gregarious instinct determined the direction of thought: -nothing is more opposed to this instinct than the sovereignty of the -individual. Supposing, however, that the ego be absolute, then its -value must lie in _self-negation._ - -Thus: (1) the false emancipation of the "individual" as an atom; - -(2) The gregarious self-conceit which abhors the desire to remain an -atom, and regards it as hostile. - -(3) As a result: the overcoming of the individual by changing his aim. - -(4) At this point there appeared to be actions that were self-effacing: -around these actions a whole sphere of antitheses was fancied. - -(5) It was asked, in what sort of actions does man most strongly -assert himself? Around these (sexuality, covetousness, lust for power, -cruelty, etc. etc.) hate, contempt, and anathemas were heaped: it -was believed that there could be such things as selfless impulses. -Everything selfish was condemned, everything unselfish was in demand. - -(6) And the result was: what had been done? A ban had been placed -on the strongest, the most natural, yea, the only genuine impulses, -henceforward, in order that an action might be praiseworthy, there must -be no trace in it of any of those genuine impulses--_monstrous fraud -in psychology._ Every kind of "self-satisfaction" had to be remodelled -and made possible by means of misunderstanding and adjusting one's self -_sub specie boni._ Conversely: that species which found its advantage -in depriving mankind of its self-satisfaction, the representatives of -the gregarious instincts, _e.g._ the priests and the philosophers, were -sufficiently crafty and psychologically astute to show how selfishness -ruled everywhere. The Christian conclusion from this was: "Everything -is sin, even our virtues. Man is utterly undesirable. Selfless actions -are impossible." Original sin. In short, once man had opposed his -instincts to a purely imaginary world of the good, he concluded by -despising himself as incapable of performing "good" actions. - -_N.B._ In this way Christianity represents a step forward in the -sharpening of psychological insight: La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It -perceived the essential equality of human actions, and the equality of -their values as a whole (all immoral). - -*** - -Now the first serious object was to rear men in whom self-seeking -impulses were extinguished. _priests, saints._ And if people doubted -that perfection was possible, they did not doubt what perfection was. - -The psychology of the saint and of the priest and of the "good" man, -must naturally have seemed purely phantasmagorical. The real motive of -all action had been declared bad: therefore, in order to make action -still possible, deeds had to be prescribed which, though not possible, -had to be declared possible and sanctified. They now honoured and -idealised things with as much falsity as they had previously slandered -them. - -Inveighing against the instincts of life came to be regarded as holy -and estimable. The priestly ideal was: absolute chastity, absolute -obedience, absolute poverty! The lay ideal: alms, pity, self-sacrifice, -renunciation of the beautiful, of reason, and of sensuality, and a dark -frown for all the strong qualities that existed. - -*** - -An advance is made: the slandered instincts attempt to re-establish -their rights (_e.g._ Luther's Reformation, the coarsest form of -moral falsehood under the cover of "Evangelical freedom"), they are -rechristened with holy names. - -The calumniated instincts try to demonstrate that they are necessary in -order that the virtuous instincts may be possible. _Il faut vivre, afin -de vivre pour autrui:_ egoism as a means to an end.[7] - - -But people go still further: they try to grant both the egoistic and -altruistic impulses the right to exist--equal rights for both--from the -utilitarian standpoint. - -People go further: they see greater utility in placing the egoistic -rights before the altruistic--greater utility in the sense of more -happiness for the majority, or of the elevation of mankind, etc. etc. -Thus the rights of egoism begin to preponderate, but under the cloak of -an extremely altruistic standpoint--the collective utility of humanity. - -An attempt is made to reconcile the altruistic mode of action with the -natural order of things. Altruism is sought in the very roots of life. -Altruism and egoism are both based upon the essence of life and nature. - -The disappearance of the opposition between them is dreamt of as a -future possibility. Continued adaptation, it is hoped, will merge the -two into one. - -At last it is seen that altruistic actions are merely a species of the -egoistic--and that the degree to which one loves and spends one's self -is a proof of the extent of one's individual power and personality. In -short, that the more evil man can be made, the better he is, and that -one cannot be the one without the other. At this point the curtain -rises which concealed the monstrous fraud of the psychology that has -prevailed hitherto. - -*** - -_Results._--There are only immoral intentions and actions; the -so-called moral actions must be shown to be immoral. All emotions are -traced to a single will, the will to power, and are called essentially -equal. The concept of life: in the apparent antithesis good and evil, -degrees of power in the instincts alone are expressed. A temporary -order of rank is established according to which certain instincts are -either controlled or enlisted in our service. Morality is justified: -economically, etc. - -*** - -Against proposition two.--Determinism: the attempt to rescue the moral -world by transferring it to the unknown. - -Determinism is only a manner of allowing ourselves to conjure our -valuations away, once they have lost their place in a world interpreted -mechanistically. Determinism must therefore be attacked and undermined -at all costs: just as our right to distinguish between an absolute and -phenomenal world should be disputed. - -[Footnote 7: Spencer's conclusion in the _Data of Ethics._--Tr.] - - -787. - -It is absolutely necessary to emancipate ourselves from motives: -otherwise we should not be allowed to attempt to sacrifice ourselves -or to neglect ourselves! Only the innocence of Becoming gives us the -highest courage and the highest freedom. - - -788. - -A clean conscience must be restored to the evil man--has this been my -involuntary endeavour all the time? for I take as the evil man him -who is strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the convicts in prison -should be referred to here). - - -789. - -Our new "freedom." What a feeling of relief there is in the thought -that we emancipated spirits do not feel ourselves harnessed to any -system of teleological aims. Likewise that the concepts reward and -punishment have no roots in the essence of existence! Likewise that -good and evil actions are not good or evil in themselves, but only -from the point of view of the self-preservative tendencies of certain -species of humanity! Likewise that our speculations concerning pleasure -and pain are not of cosmic, far less then of metaphysical, importance! -(That form of pessimism associated with the name of Hartmann, which -pledges itself to put even the pain and pleasure of existence into -the balance, with its arbitrary confinement in the prison and within -the bounds of pre-Copernican thought, would be something not only -retrogressive, but degenerate, unless it be merely a bad joke on the -part of a "Berliner."[8]) - -[Footnote 8: "Berliner"--The citizens of Berlin are renowned in Germany -for their poor jokes.--Tr.] - - -790. - -If one is clear as to the "wherefore" of one's life, then the "how" of -it can take care of itself. - - -It is already even a sign of disbelief in the wherefore and in the -purpose and sense of life--in fact, it is a sign of a lack of -will--when the value of pleasure and pain step into the foreground, -and hedonistic and pessimistic teaching becomes prevalent; and -self-abnegation, resignation, virtue, "objectivity," _may,_ at the very -least, be signs that the most important factor is beginning to make its -absence felt. - - -791. - -Hitherto there has been no German culture. It is no refutation of this -assertion to say that there have been great anchorites in Germany -(Goethe, for instance); for these had their own culture. But it was -precisely around them, as though around mighty, defiant, and isolated -rocks, that the remaining spirit of Germany, _as their antithesis,_ -lay that is to say, as a soft, swampy, slippery soil, upon which every -step and every footprint of the rest of Europe made an impression and -created forms. German culture was a thing devoid of character and of -almost unlimited yielding power. - - -792. - -Germany, though very rich in clever and well-informed scholars, has -for some time been so excessively poor in great souls and in mighty -minds, that it almost seems to have forgotten what a great soul or -a mighty mind is; and to-day mediocre and even ill-constituted men -place themselves in the market square without the suggestion of a -conscience-prick or a sign of embarrassment, and declare themselves -great men, reformers, etc. Take the case of Eugen Dühring, for -instance, a really clever and well-informed scholar, but a man who -betrays with almost every word he says that he has a miserably small -soul, and that he is horribly tormented by narrow envious feelings; -moreover, that it is no mighty overflowing, benevolent, and spendthrift -spirit that drives him on, but only the spirit of ambition! But to be -ambitious in such an age as this is much more unworthy of a philosopher -than ever it was: to-day, when it is the mob that rules, when it is the -mob that dispenses the honours. - - -793. - -My "future": a severe polytechnic education. Conscription; so that as -a rule every man of the higher classes should be an officer, whatever -else he may be besides. - - - - -IV. - -THE WILL TO POWER IN ART. - - -794. - -Our religion, morality, and philosophy are decadent human institutions. -The counter-agent. Art. - - -795. - -The _Artist-philosopher._ A higher concept of art. Can man stand at -so great a distance from his fellows as to mould them? (Preliminary -exercises thereto:-- - -1. To become a self-former, an anchorite. - -2. To do what artists have done hitherto, _i.e._ to reach a small -degree of perfection in a certain medium.) - - -796. - -Art as it appears without the artist, _i.e._ as a body, an organisation -(the Prussian Officers' Corps, the Order of the Jesuits). To what -extent is the artist merely a preliminary stage? The world regarded as -a self-generating work of art. - - -797. - -The phenomenon, "artist," is the easiest to see through: from it one -can look down upon the fundamental instincts of power, of nature, etc., -even of religion and morality. - -"Play," uselessness--as the ideal of him who is overflowing with power, -as the ideal of the child. The childishness of God, παῑς παίζων. - - -798. - -_Apollonian, Dionysian._ There are two conditions in which art -manifests itself in man even as a force of nature, and disposes of -him whether he consent or not: it may be as a constraint to visionary -states, or it may be an orgiastic impulse. Both conditions are to be -seen in normal life, but they are then somewhat weaker: in dreams and -in moments of elation or intoxication.[9] - -But the same contrast exists between the dream state and the state of -intoxication; both of these states let loose all manner of artistic -powers within us, but each unfetters powers of a different kind. -Dreamland gives us the power of vision, of association, of poetry: -intoxication gives us the power of grand attitudes, of passion, of -song, and of dance. - -[Footnote 9: German: "Rausch."--There is no word in English for the -German expression "Rausch." When Nietzsche uses it, he means a sort of -blend of our two words: intoxication and elation.--Tr.] - - -799. - -Sexuality and voluptuousness belong to the Dionysiac intoxication: -but neither of them is lacking in the Apollonian state. There is also -a difference of tempo between the states.... _The extreme peace of -certain feelings of intoxication_ (or, more strictly, the slackening -of the feeling of time, and the reduction of the feeling of space) is -wont to reflect itself in the vision of the most restful attitudes -and states of the soul. The classical style essentially represents -repose, simplification, foreshortening, and concentration--the _highest -feeling of power_ is concentrated in the classical type. To react with -difficulty: great consciousness: no feeling of strife. - - -800. - -The feeling of intoxication is, as a matter of fact, equivalent to a -sensation of _surplus power_: it is strongest in seasons of rut: new -organs, new accomplishments, new colours, new forms. Embellishment is -an outcome of _increased power._ Embellishment is merely an expression -of a triumphant will, of an increased state of co-ordination, of a -harmony of all the strong desires, of an infallible and perpendicular -equilibrium. Logical and geometrical simplification is the result of an -increase of power: conversely, the mere aspect of such a simplification -increases the sense of power in the beholder.... The zenith of -development: the grand style. - -Ugliness signifies _the decadence of a type_: contradiction and -faulty co-ordination among the inmost desires--this means a decline -in the _organising_ power, or, psychologically speaking, in the will. -The condition of pleasure which is called intoxication is really -an exalted feeling of power. ... Sensations of space and time are -altered; inordinate distances are traversed by the eye, and only then -become visible; the extension of the vision over greater masses and -expanses; the refinement of the organ which apprehends the smallest -and most elusive things; divination, the power of understanding at the -slightest hint, at the smallest suggestion; intelligent sensitiveness; -_strength_ as a feeling of dominion in the muscles, as agility and -love of movement, as dance, as levity and quick time; strength as the -love of proving strength, as bravado, adventurousness, fearlessness, -indifference in regard to life and death.... All these elated moments -of life stimulate each other; the world of images and of imagination -of the one suffices as a suggestion for the other: in this way states -finally merge into each other, which might do better to keep apart, -_e.g._ the feeling of religious intoxication and sexual irritability -(two very profound feelings, always wonderfully co-ordinated. What is -it that pleases almost all pious women, old or young? Answer: a saint -with beautiful legs, still young, still innocent). Cruelty in tragedy -and pity (likewise normally correlated). Spring-time, dancing, music, ---all these things are but the display of one sex before the other,--as -also that "infinite yearning of the heart" peculiar to Faust. - -Artists when they are worth anything at all are men of strong -propensities (even physically), with surplus energy, powerful animals, -sensual; without a certain overheating of the sexual system a man like -Raphael is unthinkable.... To produce music is also in a sense to -produce children; chastity is merely the economy of the artist, and -in all creative artists productiveness certainly ceases with sexual -potency.... Artists should not see things as they are; they should -see them fuller, simpler, stronger: to this end, however, a kind of -youthfulness, of vernality, a sort of perpetual elation, must be -peculiar to their lives. - - -801. - -The states in which we transfigure things and make them fuller, and -rhapsodise about them, until they reflect our own fulness and love -of life back upon us: sexuality, intoxication, post-prandial states, -spring, triumph over our enemies, scorn, bravado, cruelty, the ecstasy -of religious feeling. But three elements above all are active: -_sexuality, intoxication, cruelty_; all these belong to the oldest -_festal joys_ of mankind, they also preponderate in budding artists. - -Conversely: there are things with which we meet which already show -us this transfiguration and fulness, and the animal world's response -thereto is a state of excitement in the spheres where these states -of happiness originate. A blending of these very delicate shades of -animal well-being and desires is the _æsthetic state._ The latter only -manifests itself in those natures which are capable of that spendthrift -and overflowing fulness of bodily vigour; the latter is always the -_primum mobile._ The sober-minded man, the tired man, the exhausted and -dried-up man (_e.g._ the scholar), can have no feeling for art, because -he does not possess the primitive force of art, which is the tyranny -of inner riches: he who cannot give anything away cannot feel anything -either. - -_"Perfection"_--In these states (more particularly in the case of -sexual love) there is an ingenuous betrayal of what the profoundest -instinct regards as the highest, the most desirable, the most valuable, -the ascending movement of its type; also of the condition towards which -it is actually striving. Perfection: the extraordinary expansion of -this instinct's feeling of power, its riches, its necessary overflowing -of all banks. - - -802. - -Art reminds us of states of physical vigour: it may be the overflow and -bursting forth of blooming life in the world of pictures and desires; -on the other hand, it may be an excitation of the physical functions by -means of pictures and desires of exalted life--an enhancement of the -feeling of life, the latter's stimulant. - -To what extent can ugliness exercise this power? In so far as it may -communicate something of the triumphant energy of the artist who has -become master of the ugly and the repulsive; or in so far as it gently -excites our lust of cruelty (in some circumstances even the lust of -doing harm to ourselves, self-violence, and therewith the feeling of -power over ourselves). - - -803. - -"Beauty" therefore is, to the artist, something which is above all -order of rank, because in beauty contrasts are overcome, the highest -sign of power thus manifesting itself in the conquest of opposites; -and achieved without a feeling of tension: violence being no longer -necessary, everything submitting and obeying so easily, and doing so -with good grace; this is what delights the powerful will of the artist. - - -804. - -The biological value of _beauty_ and _ugliness._ That which we feel -instinctively opposed to us æsthetically is, according to the longest -experience of mankind, felt to be harmful, dangerous, and worthy of -suspicion: the sudden utterance of the æsthetic instinct, _e.g._ in the -case of loathing, implies an act of judgment. To this extent beauty -lies within the general category of the biological values, useful, -beneficent, and life-promoting: thus, a host of stimuli which for -ages have been associated with, and remind us of, useful things and -conditions, give us the feeling of beauty, _i.e._ the increase of the -feeling of power (not only things, therefore, but the sensations which -are associated with such things or their symbols). In this way beauty -and ugliness are recognised as determined by our most fundamental -self-preservative values. Apart from this, it is nonsense to postulate -anything as beautiful or ugly. Absolute beauty exists just as little -as absolute goodness and truth. In a particular case it is a matter of -the self-preservative conditions of a certain type of man: thus the -gregarious man will have quite a different feeling for beauty from the -exceptional or super-man. - -It is the optics of things in the foreground which only consider -immediate consequences, from which the value beauty (also goodness and -truth) arises. - -All instinctive judgments are short-sighted in regard to the -concatenation of consequences: they merely advise what must be done -forthwith. Reason is essentially an obstructing apparatus preventing -the immediate response to instinctive judgments: it halts, it -calculates, it traces the chain of consequences further. - -Judgments concerning beauty and ugliness are short-sighted (reason is -always opposed to them): but they are convincing in the highest degree; -they appeal to our instincts in that quarter where the latter decide -most quickly and say yes or no with least hesitation, even before -reason can interpose. - -The most common affirmations of beauty stimulate each other -reciprocally; where the æsthetic impulse once begins to work, a -whole host of other and foreign perfections crystallise around the -"particular form of beauty." It is impossible to remain objective, it -is certainly impossible to dispense with the interpreting, bestowing, -transfiguring, and poetising power (the latter is a stringing together -of affirmations concerning beauty itself). The sight of a beautiful -woman.... - -Thus (1) judgment concerning beauty is short-sighted; it sees only the -immediate consequences. - -(2) It smothers the object which gives rise to it with a charm that is -determined by the association of various judgments concerning beauty, -which, however, are quite alien to the _essence of the particular -object._ To regard a thing as beautiful is necessarily to regard it -falsely (that is why incidentally love marriages are from the social -point of view the most unreasonable form of matrimony). - - -805. - -_Concerning the genesis of Art._ That making perfect and seeing -perfect, which is peculiar to the cerebral system overladen with sexual -energy (a lover alone with his sweetheart at eventide transfigures the -smallest details: life is a chain of sublime things, "the misfortune -of an unhappy love affair is more valuable than anything else"); on -the other hand, everything perfect and beautiful operates like an -unconscious recollection of that amorous condition and of the point of -view peculiar to it--all perfection, and the whole of the beauty of -things, through contiguity, revives aphrodisiac bliss. (Physiologically -it is the creative instinct of the artist and the distribution of -his semen in his blood.) The desire for art and beauty is an indirect -longing for the ecstasy; of sexual desire, which gets communicated to -the brain. The world become perfect through "love." - - -806. - -_Sensuality in its various disguises._--(1) As idealism (Plato), common -to youth, constructing a kind of concave-mirror in which the image of -the beloved is an incrustation, an exaggeration, a transfiguration, an -attribution of infinity to everything. (2) In the religion of love, "a -fine young man," "a beautiful woman," in some way divine; a bridegroom, -a bride of the soul. (3) In art, as a decorating force, _e.g._ just as -the man sees the woman and makes her a present of everything that can -enhance her personal charm, so the sensuality of the artist adorns an -object with everything else that he honours and esteems, and by this -means perfects it (or idealises it). Woman, knowing what man feels -in regard to her, tries to meet his idealising endeavours half-way -by decorating herself, by walking and dancing well, by expressing -delicate thoughts: in addition, she may practise modesty, shyness, -reserve--prompted by her instinctive feeling that the idealising -power of man increases with all this, (In the extraordinary finesse -of woman's instincts, modesty must not by any means be considered as -conscious hypocrisy: she guesses that it is precisely artlessness and -real shame which seduces man most and urges him to an exaggerated -esteem of her. On this account, woman is ingenuous, owing to the -subtlety of her instincts which reveal to her the utility of a state of -innocence. A wilful closing of one's eyes to one's self.... Wherever -dissembling has a stronger influence by being unconscious it actually -becomes unconscious.) - - -807. - -What a host of things can be accomplished by the state of intoxication -which is called by the name of love, and which is something else -besides love!--And yet everybody has his own experience of this matter. -The muscular strength of a girl suddenly increases as soon as a man -comes into her presence: there are instruments with which this can be -measured. In the case of a still closer relationship of the sexes, -as, for instance, in dancing and in other amusements which society -gatherings entail, this power increases to such an extent as to make -real feats of strength possible: at last one no longer trusts either -one's eyes, or one's watch! Here at all events we must reckon with the -fact that dancing itself, like every form of rapid movement, involves -a kind of intoxication of the whole nervous, muscular, and visceral -system. We must therefore reckon in this case with the collective -effects of a double intoxication.--And how clever it is to be a little -off your head at times! There are some realities which we cannot admit -even to ourselves: especially when; we are women and have all sorts -of feminine, _"pudeurs."..._Those young creatures dancing over there -are obviously beyond all reality: they are dancing only with a host -of tangible ideals: what is more, they even see ideals sitting around -them, their mothers!... An opportunity for quoting _Faust._ They look -incomparably fairer, do these pretty creatures, when they have lost -their head a little; and how well they know it too, they are even more -delightful _because_ they know it! Lastly, it is their finery which -inspires them; their finery is their third little intoxication. They -believe in their dressmaker as in their God: and who would destroy this -faith in them? Blessed is this faith! And self-admiration is healthy! -Self-admiration can protect one even from cold! Has a beautiful woman, -who knew she was well-dressed, ever caught cold? Never yet on this -earth! I even suppose a case in which she has scarcely a rag on her. - - -808. - -If one should require the most astonishing proof of how far the power -of transfiguring, which comes of intoxication, goes, this proof is -at hand in the phenomenon of love; or what is called love in all -the languages and silences of the world. Intoxication works to such -a degree upon reality in this passion that in the consciousness of -the lover the cause of his love is quite suppressed, and something -else seems to take its place,--a vibration and a glitter of all the -charm-mirrors of Circe.... In this respect to be man or an animal -makes no difference: and still less does spirit, goodness, or honesty. -If one is astute, one is befooled astutely; if one is thick-headed, -one is befooled in a thick-headed way. But love, even the love of -God, saintly love, "the love that saves the soul," are at bottom all -one; they are nothing but a fever which has reasons to transfigure -itself--a state of intoxication which does well to lie about itself.... -And, at any rate, when a man loves, he is a good liar about himself -and to himself: he seems to himself transfigured, stronger, richer, -more perfect; he _is_ more perfect.... _Art_ here acts as an organic -function: we find it present in the most angelic instinct "love"; -we find it as the greatest stimulus of life--thus art is sublimely -utilitarian, even in the fact that it lies.... But we should be wrong -to halt at its power to lie: it does more than merely imagine; it -actually transposes values. And it not only transposes the _feeling_ -for values: the lover actually _has_ a greater value; he is stronger. -In animals this condition gives rise to new weapons, colours, pigments, -and forms, and above all to new movements, new rhythms, new love-calls -and seductions. In man it is just the same. His whole economy is -richer, mightier, and _more complete_ when he is in love than when he -is not. The lover becomes a spendthrift; he is rich enough for it. He -now dares; he becomes an adventurer, and even a donkey in magnanimity -and innocence; his belief in God and in virtue revives, because he -believes in love. Moreover, such idiots of happiness acquire wings and -new capacities, and even the door to art is opened to them. - -If we cancel the suggestion of this intestinal fever from the lyric -of tones and words, what is left to poetry and music? ... _L'art pour -l'art_ perhaps; the professional cant of frogs shivering outside in -the cold, and dying of despair in their swamp.... Everything else was -created by love. - - -809. - -All art works like a suggestion on the muscles and the senses which -were originally active in the ingenuous artistic man; its voice is only -heard by artists--it speaks to this kind of man, whose constitution -is attuned to such subtlety in sensitiveness. The concept "layman" -is a misnomer. The deaf man is not a subdivision of the class, whose -ears are sound. All art works as a _tonic;_ it increases strength, it -kindles desire _(i.e._ the feeling of strength), it excites all the -more subtle recollections of intoxication; there is actually a special -kind of memory which underlies such states--a distant flitful world of -sensations here returns to being. - -Ugliness is the contradiction of art. It is that which art _excludes,_ -the _negation_ of art: wherever decline, impoverishment of life, -impotence, decomposition, dissolution, are felt, however remotely, the -æsthetic man reacts with his _No._ Ugliness _depresses_: it is the sign -of depression. It _robs_ strength, it impoverishes, it weighs down, ... -Ugliness _suggests_ repulsive things. From one's states of health one -can test how an indisposition may increase one's power of fancying ugly -things. One's selection of things, interests, and questions becomes -different. Logic provides a state which is next of kin to ugliness: -heaviness, bluntness. In the presence of ugliness equilibrium is -lacking in a mechanical sense: ugliness limps and stumbles--the direct -opposite of the godly agility of the dancer. - -The æsthetic state represents an overflow _of means of communication_ -as well as a condition of extreme sensibility to stimuli and signs. It -is the zenith of communion and transmission between living creatures; -it is the source of languages. In it, languages, whether of signs, -sounds, or glances, have their birthplace. The richer phenomenon is -always the beginning: our abilities are subtilised forms of richer -abilities. But even to-day we still listen with our muscles, we even -read with our muscles. - -Every mature art possesses a host of conventions as a basis: in so -far as it is a language. Convention is a condition of great art, -_not_ an obstacle to it.... Every elevation of life likewise elevates -the power of communication, as also the understanding of man. _The -power of living in other people's souls_ originally had nothing to do -with morality, but with a physiological irritability of suggestion: -"sympathy," or what is called "altruism," is merely a product of -that psycho-motor relationship which is reckoned as spirituality -(psycho-motor induction, says Charles Féré). People never communicate a -thought to one another: they communicate a movement, an imitative sign -which is then interpreted as a thought. - - -810. - -_Compared with music,_ communication by means of words is a shameless -mode of procedure; words reduce and stultify; words make impersonal; -words make common that which is uncommon. - - -811. - -It is exceptional states that determine the artist--such states as are -all intimately related and entwined with morbid symptoms, so that it -would seem almost impossible to be an artist without being ill. - -The physiological conditions which in the artist become moulded into a -"personality," and which, to a certain degree, may attach themselves to -any man:-- - -(1) Intoxication, the feeling of enhanced power; the inner compulsion -to make things a mirror of one's own fulness and perfection. - -(2) The extreme sharpness of certain senses, so that they are capable -of understanding a totally different language of signs--and to create -such a language (this is a condition which manifests itself in some -nervous diseases); extreme susceptibility out of which great powers of -communion are developed; the desire to speak on the part of everything -that is capable of making-signs; a need of being rid of one's self by -means of gestures and attitudes; the ability of speaking about one's -self in a hundred different languages--in fact, a state of _explosion._ - -One must first imagine this condition as one in which there is a -pressing and compulsory desire of ridding one's self of the ecstasy of -a state of tension, by all kinds of muscular work and movement; also as -an involuntary _co-ordination_ of these movements with inner processes -(images, thoughts, desires)--as a kind of automatism of the whole -muscular system under the compulsion of strong stimuli acting from -within; the inability to resist reaction; the apparatus of resistance -is also suspended. Every inner movement (feeling, thought, emotion) -is accompanied by _vascular changes,_ and consequently by changes in -colour, temperature, and secretion. The suggestive power of music, its -"_suggestion mentale._" - -(3) _The compulsion to imitate:_ extreme irritability, by means of -which a certain example becomes contagious--a condition is guessed -and represented merely by means of a few signs.... A complete picture -is visualised by one's inner consciousness, and its effect soon shows -itself in the movement of the limbs,--in a certain suspension of the -_will_ (Schopenhauer!!!!). A sort of blindness and deafness towards the -external world,--the realm of admitted stimuli is sharply defined. - -This differentiates the artist from the layman (from the spectator -of art): the latter reaches the height of his excitement in the mere -act of apprehending: the former in giving--and in such a way that -the antagonism between these two gifts is not only natural but even -desirable. Each of these states has an opposite standpoint--to demand -of the artist that he should have the point of view of the spectator -(of the critic) is equivalent to asking him to impoverish his creative -power.... In this respect the same difference holds good as that which -exists between the sexes: one should not ask the artist who gives to -become a woman--to _"receive."_ - -Our æsthetics have hitherto been women's æsthetics, inasmuch as they -have only formulated the experiences of what is beautiful, from the -point of view of the receivers in art. In the whole of philosophy -hitherto the artist has been lacking ... _i.e._ as we have already -suggested, a necessary fault: for the artist who would begin to -understand himself would therewith begin to mistake himself--he must -not look backwards, he must not look at all; he must give.--It is an -honour for an artist to have no critical faculty; if he can criticise -he is mediocre, he is modern. - - -812. - -Here I lay down a series of psychological states as signs of -flourishing and complete life, which to-day we are in the habit of -regarding as morbid. But, by this time, we have broken ourselves of -the habit of speaking of healthy and morbid as opposites: the question -is one of degree, what I maintain on this point is that what people -call healthy nowadays represents a lower level of that which under -favourable circumstances actually would be healthy--that we are -relatively sick.... - -The artist belongs to a much stronger race. That which in us would be -harmful and sickly, is natural in him. But people object to this that -it is precisely the impoverishment of the machine which renders this -extraordinary power of comprehending every kind of suggestion possible: -_e.g._ our hysterical females. - -An overflow of spunk and energy may quite as well lead to symptoms of -partial constraint, sense hallucinations, peripheral sensitiveness, -as a poor vitality does--the stimuli are differently determined, the -effect is the same.... What is not the same is above all the ultimate -result; the extreme torpidity of all morbid natures, after their -nervous eccentricities, has nothing in common with the states of the -artist, who need in no wise repent his best moments.... He is rich -enough for it all: he can squander without becoming poor. - -Just as we now feel justified in judging genius as a form of neurosis, -we may perhaps think the same of artistic suggestive power,--and -our artists are, as a matter of fact, only too closely related to -hysterical females!!! This, however, is only an argument against the -present day, and not against artists in general. - -The inartistic states are: objectivity, reflection suspension of the -will ... (Schopenhauer's scandalous misunderstanding consisted in -regarding art as a mere bridge to the denial of life)... The inartistic -states are: those which impoverish, which subtract, which bleach, under -which life suffers--the Christian. - - -813. - -The modern artist who, in his physiology, is next of kin to the -hysteric, may also be classified as a character belonging to this state -of morbidness. The hysteric is false,--he lies from the love of lying, -he is admirable in all the arts of dissimulation,--unless his morbid -vanity hood-wink him. This vanity is like a perpetual fever which is -in need of stupefying drugs, and which recoils from no self-deception -and no farce that promises it the most fleeting satisfaction. (The -incapacity for pride and the need of continual revenge for his -deep-rooted self-contempt, this is almost the definition of this man's -vanity.) - -The absurd irritability of his system, which makes a crisis out of -every one of his experiences, and sees dramatic elements in the most -insignificant occurrences of life, deprives him of all calm reflection; -he ceases from being a personality, at most he is a rendezvous of -personalities of which first one and then the other asserts itself with -barefaced assurance. Precisely on this account he is great as an actor -_i_ all these poor will-less people, whom doctors study so profoundly, -astound one through their virtuosity in mimicking, in transfiguration, -in their assumption of almost any character required. - - -814. - -Artists are not men of great passion, despite all their assertions -to the contrary both to themselves and to others. And for the -following two reasons: they lack all shyness towards themselves (they -watch themselves live, they spy upon themselves, they are much too -inquisitive), and they also lack shyness in the presence of passion -(as artists they exploit it). Secondly, however, that vampire, their -talent, generally forbids them such an expenditure of energy as passion -demands.--A man, who has a talent is sacrificed to that talent; he -lives under the vampirism of his talent. - -A man does not get rid of his passion by reproducing it, but rather -he is rid of it if he is able to reproduce it. (Goethe teaches the -reverse, but it seems as though he deliberately misunderstood himself -here--from a sense of delicacy.) - - -815. - -_Concerning a reasonable mode of life._--.Relative, chastity, a -fundamental and shrewd caution in regard to _erotica,_ even in thought, -may be a reasonable mode of life even in richly equipped and perfect -natures. But this principle applies more particularly to artists; it -belongs to the best wisdom of their lives. Wholly trustworthy voices -have already been raised in favour of this view, _e.g._ Stendhal, Th. -Gautier, and Flaubert. The artist is perhaps in his way necessarily -a sensual man, generally susceptible, accessible to everything, and -capable of responding to the remotest stimulus or suggestion of a -stimulus. Nevertheless, as a rule he is in the power of his work, of -his will to mastership, really a sober and often even a chaste man. His -dominating instinct will have him so: it does not allow him to spend -himself haphazardly. It is one and the same form of strength which is -spent in artistic conception and in the sexual act: there is only one -form of strength. The artist who yields in this respect, and who spends -himself, is betrayed: by so doing he reveals his lack of instinct, his -lack of will in general. It may be a sign of decadence,--in any case it -reduces the value of his art to an incalculable degree. - - -816. - -Compared with the artist, the scientific man, regarded as a phenomenon, -is indeed a sign of a certain storing-up and levelling-down of -life (but also of an increase of strength, severity, hardness, and -will-power). To what extent can falsity and indifference towards truth -and utility be a sign of youth, of childishness, in the artist? ... -Their habitual manner, their unreasonableness, their ignorance of -themselves, their indifference to "eternal values," their seriousness -in play, their lack of dignity; clowns and gods in one; the saint and -the rabble.... Imitation as an imperious instinct.--Do not artists of -ascending life and artists of degeneration belong to all phases? ... -Yes! - - -817. - -Would any link be missing in the whole chain of science and art, if -woman, if woman's work, were excluded from it? Let us acknowledge the -exception--it proves the rule--that woman is capable of perfection in -everything which does not constitute a work: in letters, in memoirs, -in the most intricate handiwork--in short, in everything which is not -a craft; and just precisely because in the things mentioned woman -perfects herself, because in them she obeys the only artistic impulse -in her nature,--which is to captivate.... But what has woman to do -with the passionate indifference of the genuine artist who sees more -importance in a breath, in a sound, in the merest trifle, than in -himself?--who with all his five fingers gropes for his most secret -and hidden treasures?--who attributes no value to anything unless -it knows how to take shape (unless it surrenders itself, unless it -visualises itself in some way). Art as it is practised by artists--do -you not understand what it is? is it not an outrage on all _our -pudeurs? ..._ Only in this century has woman dared to try her hand at -literature ("_Vers la canaille plumière écrivassière,"_ to speak with -old Mirabeau): woman now writes, she now paints, she is losing her -instincts. And to what purpose, if one may put such a question? - - -818. - -A man is an artist to the extent to which he regards everything -that inartistic people call "form" as the actual substance, as the -"principal" thing. With such ideas a man certainly belongs to a world -upside down: for henceforward substance seems to him something merely -formal,--his own life included. - - -819. - -A sense for, and a delight in, nuances (which is characteristic of -modernity), in that which is not general, runs counter to the instinct -which finds its joy and its strength in grasping what is typical: like -Greek taste in its best period. In this there is an overcoming of the -plenitude of life; restraint dominates, the peace of the strong soul -which is slow to move and which feels a certain repugnance towards -excessive activity is defeated. The general rule, the law, is honoured -and made prominent, conversely, the exception is laid aside, and shades -are suppressed. All that which is firm, mighty, solid, life resting -on a broad and powerful basis, concealing its strength this pleases: -_i.e._ it corresponds with what we think of ourselves. - - -820. - -In the main I am much more in favour of artists than any philosopher -that has appeared hitherto: artists, at least, did not lose sight of -the great course which life pursues; they loved the things "of this -world,"--they loved their senses. To strive after "spirituality," -in cases where this is not pure hypocrisy or self-deception, seems -to me to be either a misunderstanding, a disease, or a cure, I wish -myself, and all those who live without the troubles of a puritanical -conscience, and who are able to live in this way, an ever greater -spiritualisation and multiplication of the senses. Indeed, we would -fain be grateful to the senses for their subtlety, power, and -plenitude, and on that account offer them the best we have in the way -of spirit. What do we care about priestly and metaphysical anathemas -upon the senses? We no longer require to treat them in this way: it -is a sign of well-constitutedness when a man like Goethe clings with -ever greater joy and heartiness to the "things of this world"--in this -way he holds firmly to the grand concept of mankind, which is that man -becomes the glorifying power of existence when he learns to glorify -himself. - - -821. - -_Pessimism in art?_--The artist gradually learns to like for their own -sake, those means which bring about the condition of æsthetic elation; -extreme delicacy and glory of colour, definite delineation, quality of -tone; distinctness where in normal conditions distinctness is absent. -All distinct things, all nuances, in so far as they recall extreme -degrees of power which give rise to intoxication, kindle this feeling -of intoxication by association;--the effect of works of art is the -excitation of the state which creates art, of æsthetic intoxication. - -The essential feature in art is its power of perfecting -existence, its production of perfection and plenitude; art is -essentially the affirmation, the blessing, and the deification of -existence.... What does a pessimistic art signify? Is it not a -_contradictio_?--Yes.--Schopenhauer is in error when he makes certain -works of art serve the purpose of pessimism. Tragedy does not teach -"resignation." ... To represent terrible and questionable things -is, in itself, the sign of an instinct of power and magnificence -in the artist; he doesn't fear them.... There is no such thing as -a pessimistic, art.... Art affirms. Job affirms. But Zola? and the -Goncourts?--the things they show us are ugly, their reason, however, -for showing them to us is their love of ugliness ... I don't care what -you say! You simply deceive yourselves if you think otherwise.--What a -relief Dostoievsky is! - - -822. - -If I have sufficiently initiated my readers into the doctrine that -even "goodness," in the whole comedy of existence, represents a form -of exhaustion, they will now credit Christianity with consistency for -having conceived the good to be the ugly. In this respect Christianity -was right. - -It is absolutely unworthy of a philosopher to say that "the good and -the beautiful are one"; if he should add "and also the true," he -deserves to be thrashed. Truth is ugly. - -Art is with us in order that we may not perish through truth. - - -823. - -Moralising tendencies may be combated with art. Art is freedom from -moral bigotry and philosophy _à la_ Little Jack Horner: or it may be -the mockery of these things. The flight to Nature, where beauty and -terribleness are coupled. The concept of the great man. - ---Fragile, useless souls-de-luxe, which are disconcerted by a mere -breath of wind, "beautiful souls." - ---Ancient ideals, in their inexorable hardness and brutality, ought to -be awakened, as the mightiest of monsters that they are. - ---We should feel a boisterous delight in the psychological perception -of how all moralised artists become worms and actors without knowing it. - ---The falsity of art, its immorality, must be brought into the light of -day. - ---The "fundamental idealising powers" (sensuality, intoxication, -excessive animality) should be brought to light. - - -824. - -Modern counterfeit practices in the arts: regarded as necessary--that -is to say, as fully in keeping with the needs most proper to the modern -soul. - -The gaps in the gifts, and still more in the education, antecedents, -and schooling of modern artists, are now filled up in this way:-- - -_First:_ A less artistic public is sought which is capable of unlimited -love (and is capable of falling on its knees before a personality). -The superstition of our century, the belief in "genius," assists this -process. - -_Secondly;_ Artists harangue the dark instincts of the dissatisfied, -the ambitious, and the self-deceivers of a democratic age: the -importance of poses. - -_Thirdly:_ The procedures of one art are transferred to the realm -of another; the object of art is confounded with that of science, -with that of the Church, or with that of the interests of the race -(nationalism), or with that of philosophy--a man rings all bells at -once, and awakens the vague suspicion that he is a god. - -_Fourthly:_ Artists flatter women, sufferers, and indignant folk. -Narcotics and opiates are made to preponderate in art. The fancy of -cultured people, and of the readers of poetry and ancient history, is -tickled. - - -825. - -We must distinguish between the "public" and the "select"; to satisfy -the public a man must be a charlatan to-day, to satisfy the select he -_will_ be a virtuoso and nothing else. The geniuses peculiar to our -century overcame this distinction, they were great for both; the great -charlatanry of Victor Hugo and Richard Wagner was coupled with such -genuine virtuosity that it even satisfied the most refined artistic -connoisseurs. This is why greatness is lacking: these geniuses had a -double outlook; first, they catered for the coarsest needs, and then -for the most refined. - - -826. - -False "accentuation": (1) In romanticism, this unremitting -"_expressivo_" is not a sign of strength, but of a feeling of -deficiency; - -(2) Picturesque music, the so-called dramatic kind, is above all -easier (as is also the brutal scandalmongering and the juxtaposition of -facts and traits in realistic novels); - -(3) "Passion" as a matter of nerves and exhausted souls; likewise the -delight in high mountains, deserts, storms, orgies, and disgusting -details,--in bulkiness and massiveness (historians, for instance); as a -matter of fact, there is actually a cult of exaggerated feelings (how -is it that in stronger ages art desired just the opposite--a restraint -of passion?); - -(4) The preference for exciting materials (_Erotica_ or _Socialistica_ -or _Pathologica_): all these things are the signs of the style -of public that is being catered for to-day--that is to say, for -overworked, absentminded, or enfeebled people. - -Such people must be tyrannised over in order to be affected. - - -827. - -Modern art is the art of tyrannising. A coarse and salient definiteness -in delineation; the motive simplified into a formula; formulæ -tyrannise. Wild arabesques within the lines; overwhelming masses, -before which the senses are confused; brutality in coloration, in -subject-matter, in the desires. Examples: Zola, Wagner, and, in a more -spiritualised degree, Taine. Hence logic, massiveness, and brutality. - - -828. - -In regard to the painter: _Tous ces modernes sont des poètes qui ont -voulu être peintres, L'un a cherché des drames dans l'histoire, -l'autre des scènes de mœurs, celui ci traduit des religions, celui -là une philosophie._ One imitates Raphael, another the early Italian -masters. The landscapists employ trees and clouds in order to make odes -and elegies. Not one is simply a painter; they are all archæologists, -psychologists, and impresarios of one or another kind of event or -theory. They enjoy our erudition and our philosophy. Like us, they are -full, and too full, of general ideas. They like a form, not because it -is what it is, but because of what it expresses. They are the scions of -a learned, tormented, and reflecting generation, a thousand miles away -from the Old Masters who never read, and only concerned themselves with -feasting their eyes. - - -829. - -At bottom, even Wagner's music, in so far as it stands for the whole -of French romanticism, is literature: the charm of exoticism (strange -times, customs, passions), exercised upon sensitive cosy-corner people. -The delight of entering into extremely distant and prehistoric lands to -which books lead one, and by which means the whole horizon is painted -with new colours and new possibilities.... Dreams of still more distant -and unexploited worlds; disdain of the boulevards. ... For Nationalism, -let us not deceive ourselves, is also only a form of exoticism.... -Romantic musicians merely relate what exotic books have made of them: -people would fain experience exotic sensations and passions according -to Florentine and Venetian taste; finally they are satisfied to look -for them in an image.... The essential factor is the kind of novel -desire, the desire to imitate, the desire to live as people have -lived once before in the past, and the disguise and dissimulation of -the soul.... Romantic art is only an emergency exit from defective -"reality." - -The attempt to perform new things: revolution, Napoleon. Napoleon -represents the passion of new spiritual possibilities, of an extension -of the soul's domain. - -The greater the debility of the will, the greater the extravagances in -the desire to feel, to represent, and to dream new things.--The result -of the excesses which have been indulged in: an insatiable thirst for -unrestrained feelings.... Foreign literatures afford the strongest -spices. - - -830. - -Winckelmann's and Goethe's Greeks, Victor Hugo's Orientals, Wagner's -Edda characters, Walter Scott's Englishmen of the thirteenth -century--some day the whole comedy will be exposed! All of it was -disproportionately historical and false, _but_--modern. - - -831. - -Concerning the characteristics of national genius in regard to the -strange and to the borrowed-- - -English genius vulgarises and makes realistic everything it sees; - -The French whittles down, simplifies, rationalises, embellishes; - -The German muddles, compromises, involves, and infects everything with -morality; - -The Italian has made by far the freest and most subtle use of borrowed -material, and has enriched it with a hundred times more beauty than -it ever drew out of it: it is the richest genius, it had the most to -bestow. - - -832. - -The Jews, with Heinrich Heine and Offenbach, approached genius in -the sphere of art. The latter was the most intellectual and most -high-spirited satyr, who as a musician abided by great tradition, -and who, for him who has something more than ears, is a real relief -after the sentimental and, at bottom, degenerate musicians of German -romanticism. - - -833. - -_Offenbach;_ trench music imbued with Voltaire's intellect, free, -wanton, with a slight sardonic grin, but clear and intellectual almost -to the point of banality (Offenbach never titivates), and free from the -_mignardise_ of morbid or blond-Viennese sensuality. - - -834. - -If by artistic genius we understand the most consummate freedom -within the law, divine ease, and facility in overcoming the greatest -difficulties, then Offenbach has even more right to the title genius -than Wagner has. Wagner is heavy and clumsy: nothing is more foreign to -him than the moments of wanton perfection which this clown Offenbach -achieves as many as five times, six times, in nearly every one of his -buffooneries. But by genius we ought perhaps to understand something -else. - - -835. - -_Concerning "music."_--French, German, and Italian music. (Our most -debased periods in a political sense are our most productive. The -Slavs?)--The ballet, which is the outcome of excessive study of the -history of strange civilisations, has become master of opera.--Stage -music and musicians music.--It is an error to suppose that what Wagner -composed was _a. form_: it was rather formlessness. The possibilities -of dramatic construction have yet to be discovered.--Rhythm. -"Expression" at all costs. Harlotry in instrumentation.--All honour to -Heinrich Schütz; all honour to Mendelssohn: in them we find an element -of Goethe, but nowhere else! (We also find another element of Goethe -coming to blossom in Rahel; a third element in Heinrich Heine.) - - -836. - -Descriptive music leaves reality to work its effects alone.... All -these kinds of art are easier, and more easy to imitate; poorly gifted -people have recourse to them. The appeal to the instincts; suggestive -art. - - -837. - -_Concerning our modern music._--The decay of melody, like the decay -of "ideas," and of the freedom of intellectual activity, is a piece -of clumsiness and obtuseness, which is developing itself into new -feats of daring and even into principles;--in the end man has only the -principles of his gifts, or of his lack of gifts. - -"Dramatic music"--nonsense! It is simply bad music.... "Feeling" and -"passion" are merely substitutes when lofty intellectuality and the -joy of it (_e.g._ Voltaire's) can no longer be attained. Expressed -technically, feeling and "passion" are easier; they presuppose a much -poorer kind of artist. The recourse to drama betrays that an artist is -much more a master in tricky means than in genuine ones. To-day we have -both dramatic painting and dramatic poetry, etc. - - -838. - -What we lack in music is an æsthetic which would impose laws upon -musicians and give them a conscience; and as a result of this we lack -a real contest concerning "principles."--For as musicians we laugh -at Herbart's velleities in this department just as heartily as we -laugh at Schopenhauer's. As a matter of fact, tremendous difficulties -present themselves here. We no longer know on what basis to found our -concepts of what is exemplary, masterly, perfect. With the instincts -of old loves and old admiration we grope about in a realm of values, -and we almost believe, "that is good which pleases us".... I am always -suspicious when I hear people everywhere speak innocently of Beethoven -as a "classic"; what I would maintain, and with some seventy, is that, -in other arts, a classic is the very reverse of Beethoven. But when -the complete and glaring dissolution of style, Wagner's so-called -dramatic style, is taught and honoured as exemplary, as masterly, as -progressive, then my impatience exceeds all bounds. Dramatic style in -music, as Wagner understood it, is simply renunciation of all style -whatever; it is the assumption that something else, namely, drama, is a -hundred times more important than music. Wagner can paint; he does not -use music for the sake of music, with it he accentuates attitudes; he -is a poet. Finally he made an appeal to beautiful feelings and heaving -breasts, just as all other theatrical artists have done, and with it -all he converted women and even those whose souls thirst for culture -to him. But what do women and the uncultured care about music? All -these people have no conscience for art: none of them suffer when the -first and fundamental virtues of an art are scorned and trodden upon in -favour of that which is merely secondary (as _ancilla dramaturgica_). -What good can come of all extension in the means of expression, when -that which is expressed, art itself, has lost all its law and order? -The picturesque pomp and power of tones, the symbolism of sound, -rhythm, the colour effects of harmony and discord, the suggestive -significance of music, the whole sensuality of this art which Wagner -made prevail--it is all this that Wagner derived, developed, and drew -out of music. Victor Hugo did something very similar for language: but -already people in France are asking themselves, in regard to the case -of Victor Hugo, whether language was not corrupted by him, whether -reason, intellectuality, and thorough conformity to law in language -are not suppressed when the sensuality of expression is elevated to a -high place? Is it not a sign of decadence that the poets in France have -become plastic artists, and that the musicians of Germany have become -actors and culturemongers? - - -839. - -To-day there exists a sort of musical pessimism even among people -who are not musicians. Who has not met and cursed the confounded -youthlet who torments his piano until it shrieks with despair, -and who single-handed heaves the slime of the most lugubrious and -drabby harmonies before him? By so doing a man betrays himself as a -pessimist.... It is open to question, though, whether he also proves -himself a musician by this means. I for my part could never be made -to believe it. Wagnerite _pur sang_ is unmusical, he submits to the -elementary forces of music very much as a woman submits to the will -of the man who hypnotises her--and in order to be able to do this he -must not be made suspicious _in rebus musicis et musicantibus_ by a -too severe or too delicate conscience. I said "very much as"--but in -this respect I spoke perhaps more than a parable. Let any one consider -the means which Wagner uses by preference, when he wishes to make an -effect (means which for the greater part he first had to invent), they -are appallingly similar to the means by which a hypnotist exercises -his power (the choice of his movements, the general colour of his -orchestration; the excruciating evasion of consistency, and fairness -and squareness, in rhythm; the creepiness, the soothing touch, the -mystery, the hysteria of his "unending melody"). And is the condition -to which the overture to _Lohengrin,_ for instance, reduces the men, -and still more the women, in the audience, so essentially different -from the somnambulistic trance? On one occasion after the overture in -question had been played, I heard an Italian lady say, with her eyes -half closed, in a way in which female Wagnerites are adepts: "_Come si -dorme con questa musica!_"[10] - -[Footnote 10: "How the music makes one sleep!"--Tr.] - - -840. - -_Religion in music._--What a large amount of satisfaction all religious -needs get out of Wagnerian music, though this is never acknowledged -or even understood! How much prayer, virtue, unction, virginity, -salvation, speaks through this music!... Oh what capital this cunning -saint, who leads and seduces us back to everything that was once -believed in, makes out of the fact that he may dispense with words -and concepts! ... Our intellectual conscience has no need to feel -ashamed--it stands apart--if any old instinct puts its trembling lips -to the rim of forbidden philtres.... This is shrewd and healthy, and, -in so far as it betrays a certain shame in regard to the satisfaction -of the religious instinct, it is even a good sign.... Cunning -Christianity: the type of the music which came from the "last Wagner." - - -841. - -I distinguish between courage before persons, courage before things, -and courage on paper. The latter was the courage of David Strauss, for -instance. I distinguish again between the courage before witnesses -and the courage without witnesses: the courage of a Christian, or -of believers in God in general, can never be the courage without -witnesses--but on this score alone Christian courage stands condemned. -Finally, I distinguish between the courage which is temperamental and -the courage which is the fear of fear; a single instance of the latter -kind is moral courage. To this list the courage of despair should be -added. - -This is the courage which Wagner possessed. His attitude in regard to -music was at bottom a desperate one. He lacked two things which go -to make up a good musician: nature and nurture, the predisposition -for music and the discipline and schooling which music requires. He -had courage: out of this deficiency he established a principle; he -invented a kind of music for himself. The dramatic music which he -invented was the music which he was able to compose,--its limitations -are Wagner's limitations. - -And he was misunderstood!--Was he really misunderstood?... Such is -the case with five-sixths of the artists of to-day. Wagner is their -Saviour: five-sixths, moreover, is the "lowest proportion." In any case -where Nature has shown herself without reserve, and wherever culture is -an accident, a mere attempt, a piece of dilettantism, the artist turns -instinctively--what do I say?--I mean enthusiastically, to Wagner; as -the poet says: "Half drew he him, and half sank he."[11] - -[Footnote 11: This is an adapted quotation from Goethe's poem, "The -Fisherman." The translation is E. A. Bowring's.--Tr.] - - -842. - -"Music" and the grand style. The greatness of an artist is not to be -measured by the beautiful feelings which he evokes: let this belief -be left to the girls. It should be measured according to the extent -to which he approaches the grand style, according to the extent to -which he is capable of the grand style. This style and great passion -have this in common--that they scorn to please; that they forget to -persuade; that they command: that they will.... To become master of -the chaos which is in one; to compel one's inner chaos to assume form; -to become consistent, simple, unequivocal, mathematical, law this is -the great ambition here. By means of it one repels; nothing so much -endears people to such powerful men as this,--a desert seems to lie -around them, they impose silence upon all, and awe every one with the -greatness Of their sacrilege.... All arts know this kind of aspirant to -the grand style: why are they absent in music? Never yet has a musician -built as that architect did who erected the Palazzo Pitti.... This is a -problem. Does music perhaps belong to that culture in which the reign -of powerful men of various types is already at an end? Is the concept -"grand style" in fact a contradiction of the soul of music,--of "the -Woman" in our music? ... - -With this I touch upon the cardinal question: how should all our music -be classified? The age of classical taste knows nothing that can be -compared with it: it bloomed when the world of the Renaissance reached -its evening, when "freedom" had already bidden farewell to both men and -their customs--is it characteristic of music to be Counter-Renaissance? -Is music, perchance, the sister of the baroque style, seeing that in -any case they were contemporaries? Is not music, modern music, already -decadence? ... - -I have put my finger before on this question: whether music is not an -example of Counter-Renaissance art? whether it is not the next of kin -to the baroque style? whether it has not grown in Opposition to all -classic taste, so that any aspiration to classicism is forbidden by the -very nature of music? - -The answer to this most important of all questions of values would -not be a very doubtful one, if people thoroughly understood the -fact that music attains to its highest maturity and plenitude as -romanticism--likewise as a reactionary movement against classicism. - -Mozart, a delicate and lovable soul, but quite eighteenth century, -even in his serious lapses ... Beethoven, the first great romanticist -according to the French conception of romanticism, just as Wagner is -the last great romanticist ... both of them are instinctive opponents -of classical taste, of severe style--not to speak of "grand" in this -regard. - - -843. - -Romanticism: an ambiguous question, like all modern questions. - -The æsthetic conditions are twofold:-- - -The abundant and generous, as opposed to the seeking and the desiring. - - -844. - -A romanticist is an artist whose great dissatisfaction with himself -makes him productive--; who looks away from himself and his fellows, -and sometimes, therefore, looks backwards. - - -845. - -Is art the result of dissatisfaction with reality? or is it the -expression of gratitude for happiness experienced? In the first case, -it is romanticism; in the second, it is glorification and dithyramb -(in short, apotheosis art): even Raphael belongs to this, except for -the fact that he was guilty of the duplicity of having defied the -appearance of the Christian view of the world. He was thankful for life -precisely where it was not exactly Christian. - -With a moral interpretation the world is insufferable; Christianity was -the attempt to overcome the world with morality: _i.e._ to deny it. -_In praxi_ such a mad experiment--an imbecile elevation of man above -the world--could only end in the beglooming, the dwarfing, and the -impoverishment of mankind: the only kind of man who gained anything by -it, who was promoted by it, was the most mediocre, the most harmless -and gregarious type. - -Homer as an apotheosis artist; Rubens also. Music has not yet had such -an artist. - -The idealisation of the great criminal (the feeling for his greatness) -is Greek; the depreciation, the slander, the contempt of the sinner, is -Judæo-Christian. - - -846. - -Romanticism and its opposite. In regard to all æsthetic values I now -avail myself of this fundamental distinction: in every individual -case I ask myself has hunger or has superabundance been creative -here? At first another distinction might perhaps seem preferable, it -is far more obvious,--_e.g._ the distinction which decides whether a -desire for stability, for eternity, for Being, or whether a desire for -destruction, for change, for Becoming, has been the cause of creation. -But both kinds of desire, when examined more closely, prove to be -ambiguous, and really susceptible of interpretation only according to -that scheme already mentioned and which I think is rightly preferred. - -The desire for destruction, for change, for Becoming, may be the -expression of an overflowing power pregnant with promises for the -future (my term for this, as is well known, is Dionysian); it may, -however, also be the hate of the ill-constituted, of the needy and of -the physiologically botched, that destroys, and must destroy, because -such creatures are indignant at, and annoyed by everything lasting and -stable. - -The act of immortalising can, on the other hand, be the outcome -of gratitude and love: an art which has this origin is always an -apotheosis art; dithyrambic, as perhaps with Rubens, happy, as perhaps -with Hafiz; bright and gracious, and shedding a ray of glory over all -things, as in Goethe. But it may also, however, be the outcome of the -tyrannical will of the great sufferer who would make the most personal, -individual, and narrow trait about him, the actual idiosyncrasy of his -pain--in fact, into a binding law and imposition, and who thus wreaks -his revenge upon all things by stamping, branding, and violating them -with the image of his torment. The latter case is romantic pessimism -in its highest form, whether this be Schopenhauerian voluntarism or -Wagnerian music. - - -847. - -It is a question whether the antithesis, classic and romantic, does not -conceal that other antithesis, the active and the reactive. - - -848. - -In order to be a classic, one must be possessed of all the strong and -apparently contradictory gifts and passions: but in such a way that -they run in harness together, and culminate simultaneously in elevating -a certain species of literature or art or politics to its height and -zenith (they must not do this after that elevation has taken place -...). They must reflect the complete state (either of a people or of -a culture), and express its most profound and most secret nature, -at a time when it is still stable and not yet discoloured by the -imitation of foreign things (or when it is still dependent ...); not -a reactive but a deliberate and progressive spirit, saying Yea in all -circumstances, even in its hate. - -"And does not the highest personal value belong thereto?" It is worth -considering whether moral prejudices do not perhaps exercise their -influence here, and whether great moral loftiness is not perhaps a -contradiction of the classical? ... Whether the moral monsters must -not necessarily be romantic in word and deed? Any such preponderance -of one virtue over others (as in the case of the moral monster) is -precisely what with most hostility counteracts the classical power in -equilibrium, supposing a people manifested this moral loftiness and -were classical notwithstanding, we should have to conclude boldly that -they were also on the same high level in immorality! this was perhaps -the case with Shakespeare (provided that he was really Lord Bacon). - - -849. - -_Concerning the future. Against the romanticism of great passion._--We -must understand how a certain modicum of coldness, lucidity, -and hardness is inseparable from all classical taste: above all -consistency, happy intellectuality, "the three unities," concentration, -hatred of all feeling, of all sentimentality, of all _esprit,_ -hatred of all multiformity, of all uncertainty, evasiveness, and of -all nebulosity, as also of all brevity, finicking, prettiness and -good nature. Artistic formulæ must not be played with: life must be -remodelled so that it should be forced to formulate itself accordingly. - -It is really an exhilarating spectacle which we have only learned -to laugh at quite recently, because we have only seen through it -quite recently: this spectacle of Herder's, Winckelmann's, Goethe's, -and Hegel's contemporaries claiming that they had rediscovered the -classical ideal ... and at the same time, Shakespeare! And this same -crew of men had scurvily repudiated all relationship with the classical -school of France! As if the essential principle could not have been -learnt as well here as elsewhere! ... But what people wanted was -"nature," and "naturalness": Oh, the stupidity of it! It was thought -that classicism was a kind of naturalness! - -Without either prejudice or indulgence we should try and investigate -upon what soil a classical taste can be evolved. The hardening, -the simplification, the strengthening, and the bedevilling of man -are inseparable from classical taste. Logical and psychological -simplification. A contempt of detail, of complexity, of obscurity. - -The romanticists of Germany do not protest against classicism, but -against reason, against illumination, against taste, against the -eighteenth century. - -The essence of romantico-Wagnerian music is the opposite of the -classical spirit. - -The will to unity (because unity tyrannises. _e.g._ the listener and -the spectator), but the artist's inability to tyrannise over himself -where it is most needed--that is to say, in regard to the work itself -(in regard to knowing what to leave out, what to shorten, what to -clarify, what to simplify). The overwhelming by means of masses -(Wagner, Victor Hugo, Zola, Taine). - - -850. - -_The Nihilism of artists._--Nature is cruel in her cheerfulness; -cynical in her sunrises. We are hostile to emotions. We flee thither -where Nature moves our senses and our imagination, where we have -nothing to love, where we are not reminded of the moral semblances and -delicacies of this northern nature; and the same applies to the arts. -We prefer that which no longer reminds us of good and evil. Our moral -sensibility and tenderness seem to be relieved in the heart of terrible -and happy Nature, in the fatalism of the senses and forces. Life -without goodness. - -Great well-being arises from contemplating Nature's indifference to -good and evil. - -No justice in history, no goodness in Nature. That is why the -pessimist when he is an artist prefers those historical subjects where -the absence of justice reveals itself with magnificent simplicity, -where perfection actually comes to expression--and likewise he prefers -that in Nature, where her callous evil character is not hypocritically -concealed, where that character is seen in perfection.... The -Nihilistic artist betrays himself in willing and preferring cynical -history and cynical Nature. - - -851. - -What is tragic?--Again and again I have pointed to the great -misunderstanding of Aristotle in maintaining that the tragic emotions -were the two depressing emotions--fear and pity. Had he been right, -tragedy would be an art unfriendly to life: it would have been -necessary to caution people against it as against something generally -harmful and suspicious. Art, otherwise the great stimulus of life, the -great intoxicant of life, the great will to life, here became a tool of -decadence, the hand-maiden of pessimism and ill-health (for to suppose, -as Aristotle supposed, that by exciting these emotions we thereby -purged people of them, is simply an error). Something which habitually -excites fear or pity, disorganises, weakens, and discourages: and -supposing Schopenhauer were right in thinking that tragedy taught -resignation (_i.e._ a meek renunciation of happiness, hope, and of -the will to live), this would presuppose an art in which art itself -was denied. Tragedy would then constitute a process of dissolution; -the instinct of life would destroy itself in the instinct of art. -Christianity, Nihilism, tragic art, physiological decadence; these -things would then be linked, they would then preponderate together -and assist each other onwards--downwards.... Tragedy would thus be a -symptom of decline. - -This theory may be refuted in the most cold-blooded way, namely, by -measuring the effect of a tragic emotion by means of a dynamometer -The result would be a fact which only the bottomless falsity of -a doctrinaire could misunderstand: that tragedy is a tonic. If -Schopenhauer refuses to see the truth here, if he regards general -depression as a tragic condition, if he would have informed the Greeks -(who to his disgust were not "resigned") that they did not firmly -possess the highest principles of life: it is only owing to his _parti -pris,_ to the need of consistency in his system, to the dishonesty of -the doctrinaire--that dreadful dishonesty which step for step corrupted -the whole psychology of Schopenhauer (he who had arbitrarily and almost -violently misunderstood genius, art itself, morality, pagan religion, -beauty, knowledge, and almost everything). - - -852. - -_The tragic artist._--Whether, and in regard to what, the judgment -"beautiful" is established is a question of an individual's or of a -people's strength The feeling of plenitude, of overflowing strength -(which gaily and courageously meets many an obstacle before which -the weakling shudders)--the feeling of power utters the judgment -"beautiful" concerning things and conditions which the instinct of -impotence can only value as hateful and ugly. The _flair_ which -enables us to decide whether the objects we encounter are dangerous, -problematic, or alluring, likewise determines our æsthetic Yea. ("This -is beautiful," is an affirmation). - -From this we see that, generally speaking, a preference for -questionable and terrible things is a symptom of strength; whereas the -taste for pretty and charming trifles is characteristic of the weak -and the delicate. The love of tragedy is typical of strong ages and -characters: its _non plus ultra_ is perhaps the _Divina Commedia._ It -is the heroic spirits which in tragic cruelty say Yea unto themselves: -they are hard enough to feel pain as a pleasure. - -On the other hand, supposing weaklings desire to get pleasure from -an art which was not designed for them, what interpretation must we -suppose they would like to give tragedy in order to make it suit their -taste? They would interpret their own feeling of value into it: _e.g._ -the "triumph of the moral order of things," or the teaching of the -"uselessness of existence," or the incitement to "resignation" (or also -half-medicinal and half-moral outpourings, _à la_ Aristotle). Finally, -the art of terrible natures, in so far as it may excite the nerves, -may be regarded by the weak and exhausted as a stimulus: this is now -taking place, for instance, in the case of the admiration meted out to -Wagner's art. A test of man's well-being and consciousness of power is -the extent to which he can acknowledge the terrible and questionable -character of things, and whether he is in any need of a faith at the -end. - -This kind of artistic pessimism is precisely the reverse of that -religio-moral pessimism which suffers from the corruption of man -and the enigmatic character of existence: the latter insists upon -deliverance, or at least upon the hope of deliverance. Those -who suffer, doubt, and distrust themselves,--the sick, in other -words,--have in all ages required the transporting influence of visions -in order to be able to exist at all (the notion "blessedness" arose in -this way). A similar case would be that of the artists of decadence, -who at bottom maintain a Nihilistic attitude to life, and take -refuge in the beauty of form,--in those select cases in which Nature -is perfect, in which she is indifferently great and indifferently -beautiful. (The "love of the beautiful" may thus be something very -different from the ability to see or create the beautiful: it may be -the expression of impotence in this respect.) The most convincing -artists are those who make harmony ring out of every discord, and -who benefit all things by the gift of their power and inner harmony: -in every work of art they merely reveal the symbol of their inmost -experiences--their creation is gratitude for life. - -The depth of the tragic artist consists in the fact that his æsthetic -instinct surveys the more remote results, that he does not halt -shortsightedly at the thing that is nearest, that he says Yea to the -whole cosmic economy, which justifies the terrible, the evil, and the -questionable; which more than justifies it. - - -853. - -_Art in the "Birth of Tragedy."_ - -I. - -The conception of the work which lies right in the background of this -book, is extraordinarily gloomy and unpleasant: among all the types -of pessimism which have ever been known hitherto, none seems to have -attained to this degree of malice. The contrast of a true and of an -apparent world is entirely absent here: there is but one world, and it -is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, and without sense. A world, -thus constituted is the true world. We are in need of lies in order to -rise superior to this reality, to this truth--that is to say, in order -to live.... That lies should be necessary to life is part and parcel of -the terrible and questionable character of existence. - -Metaphysics, morality, religion, science, in this book, all these -things are regarded merely as different forms of falsehood: by means of -them we are led to believe in life. "Life, must inspire confidence"; -the task which this imposes upon us is enormous. In order to solve, -this problem man must already be a liar in his heart, but he must above -all else be an artist. And he is that. Metaphysics, religion, morality, -science, all these things are but the offshoot of his will to art, -to falsehood, to a flight from "truth," to a denial of "truth." This -ability, this artistic capacity _par excellence_ of man--thanks to -which he overcomes reality with lies,--is a quality which he has in -common with all other forms of existence. He himself is indeed a piece -of reality, of truth, of nature: how could he help being also a piece -of genius in prevarication! - -The fact that the character of existence is misunderstood, is the -profoundest and the highest secret motive behind everything relating -to virtue, science, piety, and art. To be blind to many things, to -see many things falsely, to fancy many things: Oh, how clever man has -been in those circumstances in which he believed he was anything but -clever! Love, enthusiasm, "God"--are but subtle forms of ultimate -Self-deception; they are but seductions to life and to the belief in -life! In those moments when man was deceived, when he had befooled -himself and when he believed in life: Oh, how his spirit swelled within -him! Oh, what ecstasies he had! What power he felt! And what artistic -triumphs in the feeling of power! ... Man had once more become master -of "matter,"--master of truth! ... And whenever man rejoices it is -always in the same way: he rejoices as an artist, his power is his joy, -he enjoys falsehood as his power.... - - -II. - -Art and nothing else! Art is the great means of making life possible, -the great seducer to life, the great stimulus of life. - -Art is the only superior counter-agent to all will to the denial of -life; it is _par excellence_ the anti-Christian, the anti-Buddhistic, -the anti-Nihilistic force. - -Art is the alleviation of the seeker after knowledge,--of him who -recognises the terrible and questionable character Of existence, and -who will recognise it,--of the tragic seeker after knowledge. - -Art is the alleviation of the man of action,--of him who not only sees -the terrible and questionable character of existence, but also lives -it, will live it,--of the tragic and warlike man, the hero. Art is the -alleviation of the sufferer,--as the way to states in which pain is -willed, is transfigured, is deified, where suffering is a form of great -ecstasy. - - -III. - -It is clear that in this book pessimism, or, better still, Nihilism, -stands for "truth." But truth is not postulated as the highest measure -of value, and still less as the highest power. The will to appearance, -to illusion, to deception, to becoming, and to change (to objective -deception), is here regarded as more profound, as more primeval, as -more metaphysical than the will to truth, to reality, to appearance: -the latter is merely a form of the will to illusion. Happiness is -likewise conceived as more primeval than pain: and pain is considered -as conditioned, as a consequence Of the will to happiness (of the will -to Becoming, to growth, to forming, i.e. to creating; in creating, -however, destruction is included). The highest state of Yea-saying to -existence is conceived as one from which the greatest pain may not be -excluded: the tragico-Dionysian state. - - -IV. - -In this way this book is even anti-pessimistic, namely, in the sense -that it teaches something which is stronger than pessimism and which -is more "divine" than truth: Art. Nobody, it would seem, would be more -ready seriously to utter a radical denial of life, an actual denial -of action even more than a denial of life, than the author of this -book. Except that he knows--for he has experienced it, and perhaps -experienced little else!--that art is of more value than truth. - -Even in the preface, in which Richard Wagner is, as it were, invited -to join with him in conversation, the author expresses this article of -faith, this gospel for artists; "Art is the only task of life, art is -the metaphysical activity of life...." - - - - -FOURTH BOOK - - -DISCIPLINE AND BREEDING. - - - - -I. - - -THE ORDER OF RANK. - - -1. The Doctrine of the Order of Rank. - - -854. - -In this age of universal suffrage, in which everybody is allowed to -sit in judgment upon everything and everybody, I feel compelled to -re-establish the order of rank. - - -855. - -Quanta of power alone determine rank and distinguish rank: nothing else -does. - - -856. - -_The will to power._--How must those men be constituted who would -undertake this transvaluation? The order of rank as the order of power: -war and danger are the prerequisites which allow of a rank maintaining -its conditions. The prodigious example: man in Nature--the weakest and -shrewdest creature making himself master, and putting a yoke upon all -less intelligent forces. - - -857. - -I distinguish between the type which represents ascending life and -that which represents decay, decomposition and weakness. Ought one to -suppose that the question of rank between these two types can be at all -doubtful? - - -858. - -The modicum of power which you represent decides your rank; all the -rest is cowardice. - - -859. - -The advantages of standing detached from one's age.--Detached from -the two movements, that of individualism and that of collectivist -morality; for even the first does not recognise the order of rank, and -would give one individual the same freedom as another. My thoughts are -not concerned with the degree of freedom which should be granted to -the one or to the other or to all, but with the degree of power which -the one or the other should exercise over his neighbour or over all; -and more especially with the question to what extent a sacrifice of -freedom, or even enslavement, may afford the basis for the cultivation, -of a _superior_ type. In plain words: _how could one sacrifice the -development of mankind_ in order to assist a higher species than man to -come into being. - - -860. - -_Concerning rank._--The terrible consequences of "equality"--in the end -everybody thinks he has the right to every problem. All order of rank -has vanished. - - -861. - -It is necessary for _higher_ men to declare war upon the masses! In -all directions mediocre people are joining hands in order to make -themselves masters. Everything that pampers, that softens, and that -brings the "people" or "woman" to the front, operates in favour of -universal suffrage,--that is to say, the dominion of _inferior_ men. -But we must make reprisals, and draw the whole state of affairs (which -commenced in Europe with Christianity) to the light of day and to -judgment. - - -862. - -A teaching is needed which is strong enough to work in a _disciplinary_ -manner; it should operate in such a way as to strengthen the strong and -to paralyse and smash up the world-weary. - -The annihilation of declining races. The decay of Europe. The -annihilation of slave-tainted valuations. The dominion of the world -as a means to the rearing of a higher type. The annihilation of the -humbug which is called morality (Christianity as a hysterical kind -of honesty in this regard: Augustine, Bunyan.) The annihilation of -universal suffrage--that is to say, that system by means of which the -lowest natures prescribe themselves as a law for higher natures. The -annihilation of mediocrity and its prevalence. (The one-sided, the -individuals--peoples; constitutional plenitude should be aimed at by -means of the coupling of opposites; to this end race-combinations -should be tried.) The new kind of courage--no _a priori_ truths (those -who were accustomed to believe in something sought such truths!), -but _free_ submission to a ruling thought, which has its time; for -instance, time conceived as the quality of space, etc. - - - -2. The Strong and the Weak. - - -863. - -_The notion, "strong and weak man"_ resolves itself into this, that in -the first place much strength is inherited--the man is a total sum; in -the other, _not yet enough_ (inadequate inheritance, subdivision of the -inherited qualities). Weakness may be a _starting_ phenomenon: _not yet -enough_; or a final phenomenon: "no more." - -The determining point is there where great strength is present, or -where a great amount of strength can be discharged. The mass, as the -sum-total of the _weak,_ reacts _slowly;_ it defends itself against -much for which it is too weak,--against that for which it has no -use; it _never_ creates, it _never_ takes a step forward. This is -opposed to the theory which denies the strong individual and would -maintain that the "masses do everything." The difference is similar -to that which obtains between separated generations: four or even -five generations may lie between the masses and him who is the moving -spirit--it is a _chronological_ difference. - -The _values of the weak_ are in the van, because the strong have -adopted them in order to _lead_ with them. - - -864. - -_Why the weak triumph._--On the whole, the sick and the weak have -more _sympathy_ and are more "humane"; the sick and the weak have -more intellect, and are more changeable more variegated, more -entertaining--more malicious; the sick alone invented _malice._ (A -morbid precocity is often to be observed among rickety, scrofulitic, -and tuberculous people.) _Esprit:_ the property of older races; Jews, -Frenchmen, Chinese. (The anti-Semites do not forgive the Jews for -having both intellect--and money. Anti-Semites--another name for -"bungled and botched.") - -The sick and the weak have always had _fascination_ on their side; they -are more _interesting_ than the healthy: the fool and the saint--the -two most interesting kinds of men.... Closely related thereto is the -"genius." The "great adventurers and criminals" and all great men, -the most healthy in particular, have always been _sick_ at certain -periods of their lives--great disturbances of the emotions, the -passion for power, love, revenge, are all accompanied by very profound -perturbations. And, as for decadence, every man who does not die -prematurely manifests it in almost every respect--he therefore knows -from experience the instincts which belong to it: for _half his life_ -nearly every man is decadent. - -And finally, woman! _One-half of mankind is weak,_ chronically sick, -changeable, shifty woman requires strength in order to cleave to it; -she also requires a religion of the weak which glorifies weakness, -love, and modesty as divine: or, better still, she makes the strong -weak--she _rules_ when she succeeds in overcoming the strong. Woman -has always conspired with decadent types,--the priests, for instance, -against the mighty, against the "strong," against _men._ Women avail -themselves of children for the cult of piety, pity, and love:--the -_mother_ stands as the symbol of _convincing_ altruism. - -Finally, the increase of civilisation with its necessary correlatives, -the increase of morbid elements, of the _neurotic_ and _psychiatric_ -and of the _criminal._ A sort of _intermediary species_ arises, -the artist. He is distinct from those who are criminals as the -result of weak wills and of the fear of society, although they may -not yet be ripe for the asylum; but he has antennas which grope -inquisitively into both spheres, this specific plant of culture, -the modern artist, painter, musician, and, above all, novelist, who -designates his particular kind of attitude with the very indefinite -word "naturalism."... Lunatics, criminals, and realists[1] are on -the increase: this is the sign of a growing culture plunging forward -at headlong speed--that is to say, its excrement, its refuse, the -rubbish that is shot from it every day, is beginning to acquire more -importance, the retrogressive movement _keeps pace_ with the advance. - -Finally, _the social mishmash,_ which is the result of revolution, -of the establishment of equal rights, and of the superstition, the -"equality of men." Thus the possessors of the instincts of decline -(of resentment, of discontent, of the lust of destruction, of anarchy -and Nihilism), as also the instincts of slavery, of cowardice, of -craftiness, and of rascality, which are inherent among those classes -of society which have long been suppressed, are beginning to get -infused into the blood of all ranks. Two or three generations later, -the race can no longer be recognised--everything has become _mob._ And -thus there results a collective instinct against _selection,_ against -every kind of _privilege_, and this instinct operates with such power, -certainty, hardness, and cruelty that, as a matter of fact, in the end, -even the privileged classes have to submit: all those who still wish to -hold on to power flatter the mob, work with the mob, and must have the -mob on their side--the "geniuses" _above all._ The latter become the -_heralds_ of those feelings with which the mob can be inspired,--the -expression of pity, of honour, even for all that suffers, all that is -low and despised, and has lived under persecution, becomes predominant -(types: Victor Hugo, Richard Wagner).--The rise of the mob signifies -once more the rise of old values. - -In the case of such an extreme movement, both in tempo and in means, -as characterises our civilisation, man's ballast is shifted. Those -men whose worth is greatest, and whose mission, as it were, is to -compensate for the very great danger of such a morbid movement,--such -men become dawdlers _par excellence_; they are slow to accept anything, -and are tenacious; they are creatures that are relatively lasting -in the midst of this vast mingling and changing of elements. In -such circumstances power is necessarily relegated to the _mediocre: -mediocrity,_ as the trustee and bearer of the future, consolidates -itself against the rule of the mob and of eccentricities (both of -which are, in most cases, united). In this way a new antagonist is -evolved for exceptional men--or in certain cases a new temptation. -Provided that they do not adapt themselves to the mob, and stand up -for what satisfies the instincts of the disinherited, they will find -it necessary to be "mediocre" and sound. They know: _mediocritas_ -is also _aurea,_--it alone has command of money and _gold_ (of all -that glitters ...).... And, once more, old virtue and the whole -superannuated world of ideals in general secures a gifted host of -special-pleaders.... Result: mediocrity acquires intellect, wit, and -genius, it becomes entertaining, and even seductive. - -*** - -_Result._--A high culture can only stand upon a broad basis, upon a -strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. In its service and -assisted by it, _science_ and even art do their work. Science could -not wish for a better state of affairs: in its essence it belongs to a -middle-class type of man,--among exceptions it is out of place,--there -is not anything aristocratic and still less anything anarchic in its -instincts.--The power of the middle classes is then upheld by means of -commerce, but, above all, by means of money-dealing: the instinct of -great financiers is opposed to everything extreme--on this account -the Jews are, for the present, the most _conservative_ power in the -threatening and insecure conditions of modern Europe. They can have -no use either for revolutions, for socialism, or for militarism: if -they would have power, and if they should need it, even over the -revolutionary party, this is only the result of what I have already -said, and it in no way contradicts it. Against other extreme movements -they may occasionally require to excite terror by showing how much -power is in their hands. But their instinct itself is inveterately -conservative and "mediocre, ... Wherever power exists, they know how to -become mighty; but the application of their power always takes the same -direction. The polite term for _mediocre,_ as is well known, is the -word _"Liberal."_ - -_Reflection._--It is all nonsense to suppose that this general -_conquest of values_ is anti-biological. In order to explain it, we -ought to try and show that it is the result of a certain interest of -life to maintain the type "man," even by means of this method which -leads to the prevalence of the weak and the physiologically botched--if -things were otherwise, might man not cease to exist? Problem ... - -The _enhancement_ of the type may prove fatal to the _maintenance of -the species._ Why?--The experience of history shows that strong races -_decimate_ each other _mutually,_ by means of war, lust for power, and -venturousness; the strong emotions; wastefulness (strength is no longer -capitalised, disturbed mental systems arise from excessive tension); -their existence is a costly affair in short, they persistently give -rise to friction _between themselves;_ periods of _profound slackness_ -and torpidity intervene: all great ages have to be _paid for...._ The -strong are, after all, weaker, less wilful, and more absurd than the -average weak ones. - -They are _squandering_ races. "_Permanence,_" in itself, can have no -value: that which ought to be preferred thereto would be a shorter life -for the species, but a life _richer_ in creations. It would remain -to be proved that, even as things are, a richer sum of creations is -attained than in the case of the shorter existence; _i.e._ that man, as -a storehouse of power, attains to a much higher degree of dominion over -things under the conditions which have existed hitherto.... We are here -face to face with a problem of _economics._ - -[Footnote 1: The German word is "Naturalist," and really means -"realist" in a bad sense.--Tr.] - - -865. - -The state of mind which calls itself "idealism," and which will neither -allow mediocrity to be mediocre nor woman to be woman! Do not make -everything uniform! We should have a clear idea of how _dearly we have -to pay for the establishment of a virtue;_ and that virtue is nothing -generally desirable, but a _noble piece of madness,_ a beautiful -exception, which gives us the privilege of feeling elated.... - - -866. - -It is _necessary_ to show _that a counter-movement is inevitably -associated_ with any increasingly economical consumption of men -and mankind, and with an ever more closely involved "machinery" of -interests and services. I call this counter-movement the _separation -of the luxurious surplus of mankind:_ by means of it a stronger kind, -a higher type, must come to light, which has other conditions for its -origin and for its maintenance than the average man. My concept, my -metaphor for this type is, as you know, the word "Superman." Along the -first road, which can now be completely surveyed, arose adaptation, -stultification, higher Chinese culture, modesty in the Instincts, -and satisfaction at the sight of the belittlement of man--a kind of -_stationary level of mankind._ If ever we get that inevitable and -imminent, general control of the economy of the earth, then mankind -_can_ be used as machinery and find its best purpose in the service of -this economy--as an enormous piece of clock-work consisting of ever -smaller and ever more subtly adapted wheels; then all the dominating -and commanding elements will become ever more superfluous; and the -whole gains enormous energy, while the individual factors which compose -it represent but small modicums of strength and of _value._ To oppose -this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialised kind of utility, a -reverse movement is needed -the procreation of the _synthetic_ man who -_embodies_ everything and _justifies_ it; that man for whom the turning -of mankind into a machine is a first condition of existence, for whom -the rest of mankind is but soil on which he can devise his _higher -mode_ of existence. - -He is in need of the _opposition_ of the masses, of those who are -"levelled down"; he requires that feeling of distance from them; he -stands upon them, he lives on them. This higher form of _aristocracy_ -is the form of the future. From the moral point of view, the collective -machinery above described, that solidarity of all wheels, represents -the most extreme example in the _exploitation of mankind_: but it -presupposes the existence of those for whom such an exploitation would -have some _meaning.[2]_ Otherwise it would signify, as a matter of -fact, merely the general depreciation of the type man,--a _retrograde -phenomenon_ on a grand scale. - -Readers are beginning to see what I am combating--namely, _economic_ -optimism: as if the genera] welfare of everybody must necessarily -increase with the growing self-sacrifice of everybody. The very reverse -seems to me to be the case, _the self-sacrifice of everybody amounts -to a collective loss;_ man becomes _inferior_--so that nobody knows -what end this monstrous purpose has served. A wherefore? a _new_ -wherefore?--this is what mankind requires. - -[Footnote 2: This sentence for ever distinguishes Nietzsche's -aristocracy from our present plutocratic and industrial one, for which, -at the present moment at any rate, it would be difficult to discover -some meaning.--Tr.] - - - -867. - -The recognition of the _increase of collective power:_ we should -calculate to what extent the ruin of individuals, of castes, of ages, -and of peoples, is included in this general increase. - -The transposition of the _ballast_ of a culture. The _cost_ of every -vast growth: who bears it? _Why must it be enormous at the present -time?_ - - -868. - -General aspect of the future European: the latter regarded as the most -intelligent servile animal, very industrious, at bottom very modest, -inquisitive to excess, multifarious, pampered, weak of will,--a chaos -of cosmopolitan passions and intelligences. How would it be possible -for a stronger race to be bred from him?--Such a race as would have a -classical taste? The classical taste: this is the will to simplicity, -to accentuation, and to happiness made visible, the will to the -terrible, and the courage for psychological _nakedness_ (simplification -is the outcome of the will to accentuate; allowing happiness as well -as nakedness to become visible is a consequence of the will to the -terrible ...). In order to fight one's way out of that chaos, and up -to this form, a certain _disciplinary constraint_ is necessary: a man -should have to choose between either going to the dogs or _prevailing._ -A ruling race can only arise amid terrible and violent conditions. -Problem: where are the _barbarians_ of the twentieth century? Obviously -they will only show themselves and consolidate themselves after -enormous socialistic crises. They will consist of those elements which -are capable of the _greatest hardness towards themselves,_ and which -can guarantee the _most enduring will-power._ - - -869. - -The mightiest and most dangerous passions of man, by means of which he -most easily goes to rack and ruin, have been so fundamentally banned -that mighty men themselves have either become impossible or else must -regard themselves as _evil,_ "harmful and prohibited." The losses are -heavy, but up to the present they have been necessary. Now, however, -that a whole host of counter-forces has been reared, by means of the -temporary suppression of these passions (the passion for dominion, the -love of change and deception), their liberation has once more become -possible: they will no longer possess their old savagery. We can now -allow ourselves this tame sort of barbarism: look at our artists and -our statesmen! - - -870. - - - -_The root of all evil:_ that the slave morality of modesty, chastity, -selflessness, and absolute obedience should have triumphed. Dominating -natures were thus condemned (1) to hypocrisy, (2) to qualms of -conscience,--creative natures regarded themselves as rebels against -God, uncertain and hemmed in by eternal values. - -The barbarians showed that the ability o_f keeping within the bounds -of moderation_ was not in the scope of their powers: they feared and -slandered the passions and instincts of nature--likewise the aspect -of the ruling Cæsars and castes. On the other hand, there arose the -suspicion that all _restraint_ is a form of weakness or of incipient -old age and fatigue (thus La Rochefoucauld suspects that "virtue" is -only a euphemism in the mouths of those to whom vice no longer affords -any pleasure). The capacity for restraint was represented as a matter -of hardness, self-control, asceticism, as a fight with the devil, -etc. etc. The natural _delight_ of æsthetic natures, in measure; _the -pleasure derived from the beauty of measure,_ was _overlooked_ and -_denied,_ because that which was desired was an anti-eudæmonistic -morality. The belief in the pleasure which comes of restraint has -been lacking hitherto--this pleasure of a rider on a fiery steed! The -moderation of weak natures was confounded with the restraint of the -strong! - -In short, the best things have been blasphemed because weak or -immoderate swine have thrown a bad light upon them--the best men have -_remained concealed_--and have often _misunderstood_ themselves. - - -871. - -_Vicious_ and _unbridled people_: their depressing influence upon the -_value of the pussions._ It was the appalling barbarity of morality -which was principally responsible in the Middle Ages for the compulsory -recourse to a veritable "league _of_ virtue"--and this was coupled with -an equally appalling exaggeration of all that which constitutes the -value of man. Militant "civilisation" (taming) is in need of all kinds -of irons and tortures in order to maintain itself against terrible and -beast-of-prey natures. - -In this case, contusion, although it may have the most nefarious -influences, is quite natural: that which _men of power and will are -able to demand of themselves_ gives them the standard for what they -may also allow themselves. Such natures are the very opposite of the -_vicious_ and the _unbridled;_ although under certain circumstances -they may perpetrate deeds for which an inferior man would be convicted -of vice and intemperance. - -In this respect the concept, "_all men are equal before God_" does -an extraordinary amount of harm; actions and attitudes of mind were -forbidden which belonged to the prerogative of the strong alone, just -as if they were in themselves unworthy of man. All the tendencies of -strong men were brought into disrepute by the fact that the defensive -weapons of the most weak (even of those who were weakest towards -themselves) were established as a standard of valuation. - -The confusion went so far that precisely the great _virtuosos_ of life -(whose self-control presents the sharpest contrast to the vicious and -the unbridled) were branded with the most opprobrious names. Even to -this day people feel themselves compelled to disparage a Cæsar Borgia: -it is simply ludicrous. The Church has anathematised German Kaisers -owing to their vices: as if a monk or a priest had the right to say -a word as to what a Frederick II. should allow himself. Don Juan is -sent to hell: this is very _naïf._ Has anybody ever noticed that all -interesting men are lacking in heaven? ... This is only a hint to the -girls, as to where they may best find salvation. If one think at all -logically, and also have a profound insight into that which makes a -great man, there, can be no doubt at all that the Church has dispatched -all "great men" to Hades--its fight is _against_ all "greatness in man." - - -872. - -The rights which a man arrogates to himself are relative to the duties -which he sets himself, and to the tasks which he feels _capable of -performing._ The great majority of men have no right to life, and are -only a misfortune to their higher fellows. - - -873. - -_The misunderstanding of egoism:_ on the part of _ignoble natures_ who -know nothing of the lust of conquest and the insatiability of great -love, and who likewise know nothing of the overflowing feelings of -power which make a man wish to overcome things, to force them over to -himself, and to lay them on his heart, the power which impels an artist -to his material. It often happens also that the active spirit looks -for a field for its activity. In ordinary "egoism" it is precisely the -... "non-ego," the _profoundly mediocre creature,_ the member of the -herd, who wishes to maintain himself--and when this is perceived by the -rarer, more subtle, and less mediocre natures, it revolts them. For the -judgment of the latter is this: "We are the _noble_! It is much more -important to maintain _us_ than _that_ cattle!" - - -874. - -_The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes_ has been the -cause of all the great disorders in history! Without the Roman Cæsars -and Roman society, Christianity would never have prevailed. - -When it occurs to inferior men to doubt whether higher men exist, then -the danger is great I It is then that men finally discover that there -are virtues even among inferior, suppressed, and poor-spirited men, -and that everybody is equal before God: which is the _non plus ultra_ -of all confounded nonsense that has ever appeared on earth! For in the -end higher men begin to measure themselves according to the standard -of virtues upheld by the slaves--and discover that they are "proud," -etc., and that all their _higher_ qualities should be condemned. - -When Nero and Caracalla stood at the helm, it was then that the paradox -arose: "The lowest man is of more value than that one on the throne!" -And thus the path was prepared for an _image of God_ which was as -remote as possible from the image of the mightiest,--God on the Cross! - - -875. - -_Higher man and gregarious man._--When great men are _wanting,_ the -great of the past are converted into demigods or whole gods: the rise -of religions proves that mankind no longer has any pleasure in man -("nor in woman neither," as in Hamlet's case). Or a host of men are -brought together in a heap, and it is hoped that as a Parliament they -will operate just as tyrannically. - -Tyrannising is the distinctive quality of great men; they make inferior -men stupid. - - -876. - -Buckle affords the best example of the extent to which a plebeian -agitator of the mob is incapable of arriving at a clear idea of -the concept, "higher nature." The opinion which he _combats_ so -passionately--that "great men," individuals, princes, statesmen, -geniuses, warriors, are the levers and _causes_ of all great movements, -is instinctively misunderstood by him, as if it meant that all that was -essential and valuable in such a "higher man," was the fact that he -was capable of setting masses in motion; in short, that his sole merit -was the effect he produced.... But the "higher nature" of the great man -resides precisely in being different, in being unable to communicate -with others, in the loftiness of his rank--_not_ in any sort of effect -he may produce even though this be the shattering of both hemispheres. - - -877. - -The Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification. -We ought to desire the anarchical collapse of the whole of our -civilisation if such a reward were to be its result. Napoleon made -nationalism possible: that is the latter's excuse. - -The value of a man (apart, of course, from morality and immorality: -because with these concepts a man's _worth_ is not even skimmed) does -not lie in his utility; because he would continue to exist even if -there were nobody to whom he could be useful. And why could not that -man be the very pinnacle of manhood who was the source of the worst -possible effects for his race: so high and so superior, that in his -presence everything would go to rack and ruin from envy? - - -878. - -To appraise the value of a man according to his _utility_ to mankind, -or according to what he costs it, or the _damage_ he is able to inflict -upon it, is just as good and just as bad as to appraise the value -of a work of art according to its _effects._ But in this way the -value of one man compared with another is not even touched upon. The -"moral valuation," in so far as it is _social_ measures men altogether -according to their effects. But what about the man who has his own -taste on his tongue, who is surrounded and concealed by his isolation, -uncommunicative and not to be communicated with; a man whom no one has -fathomed yet--that is to say, a creature of a higher, and, at any rate, -_different_ species, how would ye appraise his worth, seeing that ye -cannot know him and can compare him with nothing? - -_Moral valuation_ was the cause of the most enormous obtuseness -of judgment: the value of a man in himself is _underrated,_ -well-nigh _overlooked,_ practically _denied._ This is the remains of -simple-minded teleology: the value of man _can only be measured with -regard to other men._ - - -879. - -_To be obsessed by moral considerations_ presupposes a very low -grade of intellect: it shows that the instinct for special rights, -for standing apart, the feeling of freedom in creative natures, in -"children of God" (or of the devil), is lacking. And irrespective of -whether _he_ preaches a ruling morality or _criticises_ the prevailing -ethical code from the point of view of his own ideal: by doing these -things a man shows that he belongs to the herd--even though he may be -what it is most in need of--that is to say, a "shepherd." - - -880. - -We should substitute morality by the will to our own ends, and -_consequently_ to the means to them. - - -881. - -_Concerning the order of rank._--What is it that constitutes the -_mediocrity_ of the typical man? That he does not understand that -things necessarily have _their other side;_ that he combats evil -conditions as if they could be dispensed with, that he will not take -the one with the other; that he would fain obliterate and erase the -_specific character of a thing,_ of a circumstance, of an age, and -of a person, by calling only a portion of their qualities good, and -suppressing the remainder. The "desirability" of the mediocre is that -which we others combat: their _ideal_ is something which shall no -longer contain anything harmful, evil, dangerous, questionable, and -destructive. We recognise the reverse of this: that with every growth -of man his other side must grow as well; that the highest man, if -such a concept be allowed, would be that man who would represent _the -antagonistic character of existence_ most strikingly, and would be its -glory and its only justification.... Ordinary men may only represent -a small corner and nook of this natural character; they perish the -moment the multifariousness of the elements composing them, and the -tension between their antagonistic traits, increases: but this is the -prerequisite for greatness in man. That man should become better and at -the same time more evil, is my formula for this inevitable fact. - -The majority of people are only piecemeal and fragmentary examples -of man: only when all these creatures are jumbled together does one -whole man arise Whole ages and whole peoples in this sense, have a -fragmentary character about them; it may perhaps be part of the economy -of human development that man should develop himself only piecemeal. -But, for this reason, one should not forget that the only important -consideration is the rise of the synthetic man; that inferior men, and -by far the great majority of people, are but rehearsals and exercises -out of which here and there a whole man may arise; a man who is a -human milestone, and who indicates how far mankind has advanced up to -a certain point. Mankind does not advance in a straight line,--often -a type is attained which is again lost (for instance, with all the -efforts of three hundred years, we have not reached the men of the -Renaissance again, and in addition to this we must not forget that the -man of the Renaissance was already behind his brother of classical -antiquity). - - -882. - -The superiority of the Greek and the man of the Renaissance is -recognised, but people would like to produce them without the -conditions and causes of which they were the result. - - -883. - -_"Purification of taste"_ can only be the result of the _strengthening_ -of the type. Our society to-day represents only the cultivating -systems, the cultivated man is _lacking._ The great _synthetic man,_ in -whom the various forces for attaining a purpose are correctly harnessed -together, is altogether wanting. The specimen we possess is the -_multifarious_ man, the most interesting form of chaos that has ever -existed: but _not_ the chaos _preceding_ the creation of the world, but -that following it: _Goethe_ as the most beautiful expression of the -type (_completely and utterly un-Olympian_!)[3] - -[Footnote 3: The Germans always call Goethe the Olympian.--Tr.] - - -884. - -Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, and Bismarck, are characteristic of the -_strong German type._ They lived with equanimity, surrounded by -contrasts. They were full of that agile kind of strength which -cautiously avoids convictions and doctrines, by using the one as a -weapon against the other, and reserving absolute freedom for themselves. - - -885. - -Of this I am convinced, that if the rise of great and rare men had -been made dependent upon the voices of the multitude (taking for -granted, of course, that the latter knew the qualities which belong -to greatness, and also the price that all greatness pays for its -self-development), then there would never have been any such thing as a -great man! - -The fact that things pursue their course _independently_ of the voice -of the many, is the reason why, a few astonishing things have taken -place on earth. - - -886. - -_The Order of Rank in Human Values._ - -_(a)_ A man should not be valued according to isolated acts. _Epidermal -actions._ Nothing is more rare than a _personal_ act. Class, rank, -race, environment, accident--all these things are much more likely to -be expressed in an action or deed than the "personality" of the doer. - -_(b)_ We should on no account jump to the conclusion that there are -many people who are personalities. Some men are but conglomerations -of personalities, whilst the majority are not even _one._ In all -cases in which those average qualities preponderate, which ensure -the maintenance of the species, to be a personality would involve -unnecessary expense, it would be a luxury in fact, it would be -foolish to demand of anybody that he should be a personality. In such -circumstances everybody is a channel or a transmitting vessel. - -_(c)_ A "personality" is a relatively _isolated_ phenomenon; in view of -the superior importance of the continuation of the race at an average -level, a personality might even be regarded as something _hostile to -nature._ For a personality to be possible, timely isolation and the -necessity for an existence of offence and defence, are prerequisites; -something in the nature of a walled enclosure, a capacity for shutting -out the world; but above all, a much _lower degree of sensitiveness_ -than the average man has, who is too easily infected with the views of -others. - -The first _question_ concerning the _order of rank:_ how far is a man -disposed to be _solitary_ or _gregarious?_ (in the latter case, his -value consists in those qualities which secure the survival of his -tribe or his type; in the former case, his qualities are those which -distinguish him from others, which isolate and defend him, and make his -_solitude possible_). - -_Consequence:_ the solitary type should not be valued from the -standpoint of the gregarious type, or _vice versâ._ - -Viewed from above, both types are necessary; as is likewise their -antagonism,--and nothing is _more_ thoroughly reprehensible than -the "desire" which would develop a _third_ thing out of the two -("virtue" as hermaphroditism). This is as little worthy of desire as -the equalisation and reconciliation of the sexes. The _distinguishing -qualities must be developed ever more and more,_ the gulf must _be made -ever wider...._ - -The concept of _degeneration_ in both cases: the approximation of -the qualities of the herd to those of solitary creatures: and _vice -versâ_--in short, when they begin to _resemble_ each other. This -concept of degeneration is beyond the sphere of moral judgments. - - -887. - -Where the _strongest natures_ are to be sought. The ruin and -degeneration of the _solitary_ species is much greater and more -terrible: they have the instincts of the herd, and the tradition of -values, against them; their weapons of defence, their instincts of -self-preservation, are from the beginning insufficiently strong and -reliable--fortune must be peculiarly favourable to them if they are _to -prosper_ (they prosper best in the lowest ranks and dregs of society; -if ye are seeking _personalities_ it is there that ye will find them -with much greater certainty than in the middle classes!) - -When the dispute between ranks and classes, which aims at equality of -rights, is almost settled, the fight will begin against the _solitary -person._ (In a certain sense _the latter can maintain and develop -himself most easily in a democratic society:_ there where the coarser -means of defence are no longer necessary, and a certain habit of -order, honesty, justice, trust, is already a general condition.) The -_strongest_ must be most tightly bound, most strictly watched, laid -in chains and supervised: this is the instinct of the herd. To them -belongs a régime of self-mastery, of ascetic detachment, of "duties" -consisting in exhausting work, in which one can no longer call one's -soul one's own. - - -888. - -I am attempting an _economic_ justification of virtue. The object is to -make man as useful as possible, and to make him approximate as nearly -as one can to an infallible machine: to this end he must be equipped -with _machine-like virtues_ (he must learn to value those states in -which he works in a most mechanically useful way, as the highest of -all: to this end it is necessary to make him as disgusted as possible -with the other states, and to represent them as very dangerous and -despicable). - -Here is the first stumbling-block: the tediousness and monotony -which all mechanical activity brings with it. To learn to endure -_this_--and not only to endure it, but to see tedium enveloped in a -ray of exceeding charm: this hitherto has been the task of all higher -schools. To learn something which you don't care a fig about, and to -find precisely your "duty" in this "objective" activity; to learn to -value happiness and duty as things apart; this is the invaluable task -and performance of higher schools. It is on this account that the -philologist has, hitherto, been the educator _per se:_ because his -activity, in itself, affords the best pattern of magnificent monotony -in action; under his banner youths learn to "swat": first prerequisite -for the thorough fulfilment of mechanical duties in the future (as -State officials, husbands, slaves of the desk, newspaper readers, -and soldiers). Such an existence may perhaps require a philosophical -glorification and justification more than any other: pleasurable -feelings must be valued by some sort of infallible tribunal, as -altogether of inferior rank; "duty _per se_" perhaps even the pathos -of reverence in regard to everything unpleasant,--must be demanded -imperatively as that which is above all useful, delightful, and -practical things.... A mechanical form of existence regarded as the -highest and most respectable form of existence, worshipping itself -(type: Kant as the fanatic of the formal concept "Thou shalt"). - - -889. - -The economic valuation of all the ideals that have existed -hitherto--that is to say, the selection and rearing of definite -passions and states at the cost of other passions and states. The -lawgiver (or the instinct of the community) selects a number of states -and passions the existence of which guarantees the performance of -regular actions (mechanical actions would thus be the result of the -regular requirements of those passions and states). - -In the event of these states and passions containing ingredients -which were painful, a means would have to be found for overcoming -this painfulness by means of a valuation; pain would have to be -interpreted as something valuable, as something pleasurable in a higher -sense. Conceived in a formula: "_How does something unpleasant become -pleasant?_" For instance, when our obedience and our submission to the -law become honoured, thanks to the energy, power, and self-control -they entail. The same holds good of our public spirit, of our -neighbourliness, of our patriotism, our "humanisation," our "altruism," -and our "heroism." The _object of all idealism_ should, be to induce -people to do unpleasant things cheerfully. - - -890. - -The _belittlement_ of man must be held as the chief aim for a long -while: because what is needed in the first place is a broad basis from -which a stronger species of man may arise (to what extent hitherto has -_every stronger_ species of man arisen from a _substratum of inferior -people?_). - - -891. - -The absurd and contemptible form of idealism which would not have -mediocrity mediocre, and which instead of feeling triumphant at being -exceptional, becomes _indignant_ at cowardice, falseness, pettiness, -and wretchedness. _We should not wish things to be any different,_ we -should make the gulfs even _wider_!--The higher types among men should -be compelled to distinguish themselves by means of the sacrifices which -they make to their own existence. - -_Principal point of view; distances_ must be established, but _no -contrasts must be created._ The _middle classes_ must be dissolved, and -their influence decreased: this is the principal means of maintaining -distances. - - -892. - -Who would dare to disgust the mediocre of their mediocrity! As -you observe, I do precisely the reverse: every step away from -mediocrity--thus do I teach--leads to _immorality._ - - -893. - -To hate mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher: it is almost a note of -interrogation to his "_right_ to philosophy." It is precisely because -he is the exception that he must protect the rule and ingratiate all -mediocre people. - - -894. - -What I combat: that an exceptional form should make war upon the -rule--instead of understanding that the continued existence of the rule -is the first condition of the value of the exception. For instance, -there are women who, instead of considering their abnormal thirst for -knowledge as a distinction, would fain dislocate the whole status of -womanhood. - - -895. - -The _increase of strength_ despite the temporary ruin of the -individual:-- - -A new level must be established; - -We must have a method of storing up forces for the maintenance of small -performances, in opposition to economic waste; - -Destructive nature must for once be reduced to an _instrument_ of this -economy of the future; - -The weak must be maintained, because there is an enormous mass of -_finicking_ work to be done; - -The weak and the suffering must be upheld in their belief that -existence is still possible; - -_Solidarity_ must be implanted as an instinct opposed to the instinct -of fear and servility; - -War must be made upon accident, even upon the accident of "the great -man." - - -896. - -War upon _great_ men justified on economic grounds. Great men are -dangerous; they are accidents, exceptions, tempests, which are strong -enough to question things which it has taken time to build and -establish. Explosive material must not only be discharged harmlessly, -but, if possible, its discharge must be _prevented_ altogether, this is -the fundamental instinct of all civilised society. - - -897. - -He who thinks over the question of how the type man may be elevated -to its highest glory and power, will realise from the start that he -must place himself beyond morality; for morality was directed in its -essentials at the opposite goal--that is to say, its aim was to arrest -and to annihilate that glorious development wherever it was in process -of accomplishment. For, as a matter of fact, development of that sort -implies that such an enormous number of men must be subservient to -it, that a _counter-movement_ is only too natural: the weaker, more -delicate, more mediocre existences, find it necessary to take up sides -_against_ that glory of life and power; and for that purpose they -must get a new valuation of themselves by means of which they are -able to condemn, and if possible to destroy, life in this high degree -of plenitude. Morality is therefore essentially the expression of -hostility to life, in so far as it would overcome vital types. - - -898. - -_The strong of the future._--To what extent necessity on the one hand -and accident on the other have attained to conditions from which a -_stronger species_ may be reared: this we are now able to understand -and to bring about consciously; we can now create those conditions -under which such an elevation is possible. - -Hitherto education has always aimed at the utility of society: _not_ -the greatest possible utility for the future, but the utility of the -society actually extant. What people required were "instruments" for -this purpose. Provided the _wealth of forces were greater,_ it would -be possible to think of a draft being made upon them, the aim of which -would not be the utility of society, but some future utility. - -The more people grasped to what extent the present form of society -was in such a state of transition as sooner or later to be _no longer -able to exist for its own sake,_ but only as a means in the hands of a -stronger race, the more _this task would have to be brought forward._ - -The increasing belittlement of man is precisely the impelling -power which leads one to think of the cultivation of a _stronger -race:_ a race which would have a surplus precisely there where the -dwarfed species was weak and growing weaker (will, responsibility, -self-reliance, the ability to postulate aims for one's self). - -The means would be those which history teaches: _isolation_ by means of -preservative interests which would be the reverse of those generally -accepted; exercise in transvalued valuations; distance as pathos; a -clean conscience in what to-day is most despised and most prohibited. - -The _levelling_ of the mankind of Europe is the great process which -should not be arrested; it should even be accelerated. The necessity of -_cleaving gulfs,_ of _distance,_ of the _order of rank,_ is therefore -imperative; but not the necessity of retarding the process above -mentioned. - -This _levelled-down_ species requires justification as soon as it is -attained: its justification is that it exists for the service of a -higher and sovereign race which stands upon it and can only be elevated -upon its shoulders to the task which it is destined to perform. Not -only a ruling race whose task would be consummated in ruling alone: -but a race with _vital spheres_ of its own, with an overflow of energy -for beauty, bravery, culture, and manners, even for the most abstract -thought; a yea-saying race which would be able to allow itself every -kind of great luxury--strong enough to be able to dispense with the -tyranny of the imperatives of virtue, rich enough to be in no need of -economy or pedantry; beyond good and evil; a forcing-house for rare and -exceptional plants. - - -899. - -Our psychologists, whose glance dwells involuntarily upon the symptoms -of decadence, lead us to mistrust intellect ever more and more. People -persist in seeing only the weakening, pampering, and sickening effects -of intellect, but there are now going to appear:-- - -New Cynics The union of intellectual - barbarians Experimentalists superiority with well-being - Conquerors and an overflow of strength. - - - -900. - -I point to something new: certainly for such a democratic community -there is a danger of barbarians; but these are sought only down below. -There is also _another kind of barbarians_ who come from the heights: a -kind of conquering and ruling natures, which are in search of material -that they can mould. Prometheus was a barbarian of this stamp. - - -901. - -_Principal standpoint:_ one should not suppose the mission of a higher -species to be the _leading_ of inferior men (as Comte does, for -instance); but the inferior should be regarded as the _foundation_ -upon which a higher species may live their higher life--upon which -alone they _can stand._ The conditions under which a _strong, noble_ -species maintains itself (in the matter of intellectual discipline) are -precisely the reverse of those under which the industrial masses--the -tea-grocers _à la_ Spencer--subsist. Those qualities which are within -the grasp only of the _strongest_ and most _terrible_ natures, and -which make their existence possible leisure, adventure, disbelief, and -even dissipation--would necessarily ruin mediocre natures --and does -do so--when they possess them. In the case of the latter industry, -regularity, moderation, and strong "conviction" are in their proper -place--in short, all "gregarious virtues": under their influence these -mediocre men become perfect. - - -902. - -_Concerning the ruling types._ The shepherd as opposed to the "lord" -(the former is only a means to the maintenance of the herd; the latter, -the _purpose_ for which the herd exists). - - -903. - -The temporary preponderance of social valuations is both comprehensible -and useful; it is a matter of building a _foundation_ upon which a -_stronger_ species will ultimately be made possible. The standard -of strength: to be able to live under the transvalued valuations, -and to desire them for all eternity. State and society regarded as a -sub-structure: economic point of view, education conceived as breeding. - - -904. - -A consideration which "free spirits" _lack_: that the same discipline -which makes a strong nature still stronger, and enables it to go in for -big undertakings, _breaks up and withers the mediocre_: doubt --_la -largeur de cœur_--experiment--independence. - - -905. - -The hammer. How should men who must value in the opposite way be -constituted?--Men who possess _all_ the qualities of the modern soul, -but are strong enough to convert them into real health? The means to -their task. - - -906. - -The strong man, who is mighty in the instincts of a strong and healthy -organisation, digests his deeds just as well as he digests his meals; -he even gets over the effects of heavy fare: in the main, however, he -is led by an inviolable and severe instinct which prevents his doing -anything which goes against his grain, just as he never does anything -against his taste. - - -907. - -_Can_ we _foresee_ the favourable circumstances under which creatures -of the highest value might arise? It is a thousand times too -complicated, and the probabilities of failure are _very great:_ on that -account we cannot be inspired by the thought of striving after them! -Scepticism.--To oppose this we can enhance courage, insight, hardness, -independence, and the feeling of responsibility; we can also subtilise -and learn to forestall the delicacy of the scales, so that favourable -accidents may be enlisted on our side. - - -908. - -Before we can even think of acting, an enormous amount of work requires -to be done. In the main, however, _a cautious exploitation_ of the -present conditions would be our best and most advisable course of -action. The actual _creation_ of conditions such as those which occur -by accident, presupposes the existence of _iron_ men such as have not -yet lived. Our first task must be to make the personal ideal _prevail_ -and _become realised_! He who has understood the nature of man and _the -origin of mankind's greatest specimens, shudders before man and takes -flight from all action_: this is the result of inherited valuations!! - -My consolation is, that the nature of man is _evil,_ and this -guarantees his _strength_! - - -909. - -_The typical forms of self-development, or the eight principal -questions:_-- - -1. Do we want to be more multifarious or more simple than we are? - -2. Do we want to be happier than we are, or more indifferent to both -happiness and unhappiness? - -3. Do we want to be more satisfied with ourselves, or more exacting and -more inexorable? - -4. Do we want to be softer, more yielding, and more human than we are, -or more inhuman? - -5. Do we want to be more prudent than we are, or more daring? - -6. Do we want to attain a goal, or do we want to avoid all goals (like -the philosopher, for instance, who scents a boundary, a _cul-de-sac,_ a -prison, a piece of foolishness in every goal)? - -7. Do we want to become more respected, or more feared, or more -_despised_? - -8. Do we want to become tyrants, and seducers, or do we want to become -shepherds and gregarious animals? - - -910. - -_The type of my disciples._--To such men as _concern vie in any way_ -I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of -all kinds. I wish them to be acquainted with profound self-contempt, -with the martyrdom of self-distrust, with the misery of the defeated: I -have no pity for them; because I wish them to have the only thing which -to-day proves whether a man has any value or not, namely, _the capacity -of sticking to his guns._ - - -911. - -The happiness and self-contentedness of the lazzaroni, or the -blessedness of "beautiful souls," or the consumptive love of Puritan -pietists, proves nothing in regard to _the order of rank_ among men. -As a great educator one ought inexorably to thrash a race of such -blissful creatures into unhappiness. The danger of belittlement and of -a slackening of powers follows immediately I am _opposed_ to happiness -_à la_ Spinoza or _à la_ Epicurus, and to all the relaxation of -contemplative states. But when virtue is the means to such happiness, -well then, _one must master even virtue._ - - -912. - -I cannot see how any one can make up for having missed going to _a -good school_ at the proper time. Such a person does not know himself; -he walks through life without ever having learned to walk. His soft -muscles betray themselves at every step. Occasionally life itself is -merciful enough to make a man recover this lost and severe schooling: -by means of periods of sickness, perhaps, which exact the utmost -will-power and self-control; or by means of a sudden state of poverty, -which threatens his wife and child, and which may force a man to -such activity as will restore energy to his slackened tendons, and a -_tough spirit_ to his will to life. The most desirable thing of all, -however, is, under all circumstances to have severe discipline _at -the right time, i.e._ at that age when it makes us proud that people -should expect great things from us. For this is what distinguishes hard -schooling, as good schooling, from every other schooling, namely, that -a good deal is demanded, that a good deal is severely exacted; that -goodness, nay even excellence itself, is required as if it were normal; -that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent; that blame is -sharp, practical, and without reprieve, and has no regard to talent and -antecedents. We are in every way in need of such a school: and this -holds good of corporeal as well as of spiritual things; it would be -fatal to draw distinctions here! The same discipline makes the soldier -and the scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there is no -true scholar who has not the instincts of a true soldier in his veins. -To be able to command and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to -keep one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready at any moment -to lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh what is permitted -and what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be more hostile to -pettiness, slyness, and parasitism than to wickedness. What is it that -one _learns_ in a hard school?--_to obey_ and _to command._ - - -913. - -We should _repudiate_ merit--and do only that which stands above all -praise and above all understanding. - - -914. - -The new forms of morality:-- - -Faithful vows concerning that which one wishes to do or to leave -undone; complete and definite abstention from many things. Tests as to -whether one is _ripe_ for such discipline. - - -915. - -It is my desire to _naturalise asceticism:_ I would substitute the -old intention of asceticism, "self-denial," by my own intention, -_self-strengthening:_ a gymnastic of the will; a period of abstinence -and occasional fasting of every kind, even in things intellectual; a -casuistry in deeds, in regard to the opinions which we derive from our -powers; we should try our hand at adventure and at deliberate dangers. -(_Dîners chez Magny:_ all intellectual gourmets with spoilt stomachs.) -_Tests_ ought also to be devised for discovering a man's power in -keeping his word. - - -916. - -The things which have become _spoilt_ through having been abused by the -Church:-- - -(1) _Asceticism._--People have scarcely got the courage yet to bring to -light the natural utility and necessity of asceticism for the purpose -of the _education of the will._ Our ridiculous world of education, -before whose eyes the useful State official hovers as an ideal to -be striven for, believes that it has completed its duty when it has -instructed or trained the brain; it never even suspects that something -else is first of all necessary --the education of _will-power;_ tests -are devised for everything except for the most important thing of all: -whether a man can _will,_ whether he can _promise;_ the young man -completes his education without a question or an inquiry having been -made concerning the problem of the highest value of his nature. - -(2) _Fasting:_--In every sense--even as a means of maintaining the -capacity for taking pleasure in all good things (for instance, to give -up reading for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease from -being amiable for a while: one ought also to have fast days for one's -virtues). - -(3) _The monastery._--Temporary isolation with severe seclusion from -all letters, for instance; a kind of profound introspection and -self-recovery, which does not go out of the way of "temptations," but -out of the way of "duties"; a stepping out of the daily round of one's -environment; a detachment from the tyranny of stimuli and external -influences, which condemns us to expend our power only in reactions, -and does not allow it to gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous -activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely: they only think -reflexively, _i.e._ they must first read before they can think). - -(4) _Feasts._--A man must be very coarse in order not to feel the -presence of Christians and Christian values as oppressive, so -oppressive as to send all festive moods to the devil. By feasts we -understand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of all kinds of -seriousness and Philistinism; a divine saying of Yea to one's self, as -the result of physical plenitude and perfection--all states to which -the Christian cannot honestly say Yea. _A feast is a pagan thing par -excellence._ - -(5) The _courage of ones own nature: dressing-up in morality,_--To be -able to call one's passions good without the help of a moral formula: -this is the standard which measures the extent to which a man is able -to say Yea to his own nature, namely, how much or how little he has to -have recourse to morality. - -(6) _Death._--The foolish physiological fact must be converted into a -moral necessity. One should live in such a way that _one may have the -will to die at the right time_! - - -917. - -_To feel ones self stronger_ or, expressed otherwise: happiness always -presupposes a comparison (not necessarily with others, but with one's -self, in the midst of a state of growth, and without being conscious -that one is comparing). - -_Artificial_ accentuation: whether by means of exciting chemicals or -exciting errors ("hallucinations.") - -Take, for instance, the Christian's feeling of _security_; he feels -himself strong in his confidence, in his patience, and his resignation: -this artificial accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is protected -by a God. Take the feeling of _superiority,_ for instance: as when the -Caliph of Morocco sees only globes on which his three united kingdoms -cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling of _uniqueness,_ -for instance: as when the European imagines that culture belongs to -Europe alone, and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged cosmic -process; or, as when the Christian makes all existence revolve round -the "Salvation of man." - -The question is, where does one begin to feel the pressure of -constraint: it is thus that different degrees are ascertained. A -philosopher for instance, in the midst of the coolest and most -transmontane feats of abstraction feels like a fish that enters its -element: while colours and tones oppress him; not to speak of those -dumb desires--of that which others call "the ideal." - - -918. - -A healthy and vigorous little boy will look up sarcastically if he be -asked: "Wilt thou become virtuous?"--but he immediately becomes eager -if he be asked: "Wilt thou become stronger than thy comrades?" - -*** - -How does one become stronger?--By deciding slowly; and by holding -firmly to the decision once it is made. Everything else follows -of itself. Spontaneous and changeable natures: both species of -the weak. We must not confound ourselves with them; we must feel -distance--betimes! - -Beware of good-natured people!. Dealings with them make one torpid. -All environment is good which makes one exercise those defensive and; -aggressive powers which are instinctive in man. All one's inventiveness -should apply itself to putting one's power of will to the test.... -_Here_ the determining factor must be recognised as something which is -not knowledge, astuteness, or wit. - -One must learn to command betimes,--likewise to obey. A man must learn -modesty and tact in modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to -honour where modesty is displayed; he must likewise distinguish and -honour wherever he bestows his confidence. - -What does one repent most? One's modesty; the fact that one has not -lent an ear to one's most individual needs; the fact that one has -mistaken one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self low; -the fact that one has lost all delicacy of hearing in regard to one's -instincts.--This want of reverence in regard to one's self is avenged -by all sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being, pride, -cheerfulness, freedom, determination, courage. A man never forgives -himself, later on, for this want of genuine egoism: he regards it as an -objection and as a cause of doubt concerning his real ego. - - -919. - -I should like man to begin by _respecting_ himself: everything else -follows of itself. Naturally a man ceases from being anything to others -in this way: for this is precisely what they are least likely to -forgive. "What? a man who respects himself?"[4] This is something quite -different from the blind instinct to _love_ one's self. Nothing is more -common in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is called -ego, than a certain contempt for that which is loved the fatalism of -love. - -[Footnote 4: Cf. Disraeli in _Tancred:_ "Self-respect, too, is a -superstition of past ages.... It is not suited to these times; it -is much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No one is -important enough to have self-respect nowadays" (book iii. chap. -v.).--Tr.] - - -920. - -"I will have this or that"; "I would that this or that were so"; "I -know that this or that is so the degrees of power: the man of _will,_ -the man of _desire,_ the man of _fate._ - - -921. - -_The means by which a strong species maintains itself_:-- - -It grants itself the right of exceptional actions, as a test of the -power of self-control and of freedom. - -It abandons itself to states in which a man is not allowed to be -anything else than a barbarian. - -It tries to acquire strength of will by every kind of asceticism. - -It is not expansive, it practises silence; it is cautious in regard to -all charms. - -It learns to obey in such a way that obedience provides a test of -self-maintenance. Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in regard -to points of honour. - -It never argues, "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the -gander,"--but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay, -as a privilege, as a distinction. - -It does not covet _other_ people's virtues. - - -922. - -The way in which one has to treat raw savages and the impossibility of -dispensing with barbarous methods, becomes obvious, in practice, when -one is transplanted, with all one's European pampering, to a spot such -as the Congo, or anywhere else where it is necessary to maintain one's -mastery over barbarians. - - -923. - -_Warlike and peaceful people._--Art thou a man who has the instincts of -a warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do -thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend? The rest of mankind, -all those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord, -freedom, "equal rights": these things are but names and steps for one -and the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary -for them to defend themselves,--such men become discontented with -themselves when they are obliged to offer resistance: they would fain -create circumstances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst -came to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit: all -these things are better than waging war--thus does the Christian's -instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born warrior's -character there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his -circumstances and in the development of every one of his qualities, -weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised -by the former. - -What expedients and what virtues do the unarmed and the undefended -require in order to survive--and even to conquer? - - -924. - -What will become of a man who no longer has any reasons for either -defence or attack? What will remain of his _passions_ when he has lost -those which form his defence and his weapons? - - -925. - -A marginal note to a _niaiserie anglaise_: "Do not to others that -which you would not that they should do unto you." This stands for -wisdom; this stands for prudence; this stands as the very basis of -morality as "a golden maxim." John Stuart Mill believes in it (and what -Englishman does not?).... But the maxim does not bear investigation. -The argument, Do not as you would not be done by, forbids action -which produce harmful results; the thought behind always is that an -action is invariably requited. What if some one came forward with the -_"Principe"_ in his hands, and said: "We must do those actions alone -which enable us to steal a march on others,--and which deprive others -of the power of doing the same to us"?--On the other hand, let us -remember the Corsican who pledges his honour to vendetta. He too does -not desire to have a bullet through him; but the prospect of one, the -probability of getting one, does not deter him from vindicating his -honour.... And in all really decent actions are we not intentionally -indifferent as to what result they will bring? To avoid an action which -might have harmful results,--that would be tantamount to forbidding all -decent actions in general. - -Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable because it betrays a -certain _type of man_: it is the instinct of the herd which formulates -itself through him,--we are equal, we regard each other as equal: as -I am to thee so art thou to me.--In this community equivalence of -actions is really believed in--an equivalence which never under any -circumstances manifests itself in real conditions. It is impossible -to requite every action: among real individuals equal actions do not -exist, consequently there can be no such thing as "requital." ... When -I do anything, I am very far from thinking that any man is able to do -anything at all like it: the action belongs to me.... Nobody can pay -me back for anything I do; the most that can be done is to make me the -victim of another action. - - -926. - -_Against John Stuart Mill._--I abhor the man's vulgarity when he says: -"What is right for one man is right for another"; "Do not to others -that which you would not that they should do unto you. Such principles -would fain establish the whole of human traffic _upon mutual services,_ -so that every action would appear to be a cash payment for something -done to us. The hypothesis here is ignoble to the last degree: it -is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value -between my actions and thine; the most personal value Of an action is -simply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no -equivalent and which cannot be remunerated). "Reciprocity" is a piece -of egregious vulgarity; the mere fact that what I do _cannot_ and _may_ -not be done by another, that there is _no such thing as equivalence_ -(except in those _very select circles_ where one actually has one's -equal, _inter pares_), that in a really profound sense a man never -requites because he is something _unique_ in himself and can only do -_unique_ things,--this fundamental conviction contains the cause of -_aristocratic aloofness from the mob_, because the latter believes in -equality, and _consequently_ in the feasibility of equivalence and -"reciprocity." - - -927. - -The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations and of its concepts -"useful" and "harmful" is well founded; it is the necessary point of -view of a community which is only able to see and survey _immediate -and proximate_ consequences. The _State_ and the _political man_ are -already in need of a more _super-moral_ attitude of mind: because -they have to calculate concerning a much more complicated tissue -of consequences. An economic policy for the whole world should be -possible which could look at things in such broad perspective that all -its isolated demands would seem for the moment not only unjust, but -arbitrary. - - -928. - -"_Should one follow one's feelings?_"--To set one's life at stake on -the impulse of the moment, and actuated by a generous feeling, has -little worth, and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is alike in -being capable of this--and in behaving in this way with determination, -the criminal, the bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the -honest man. - -A higher degree of excellence would be to overcome this impulse, and to -refrain from performing an heroic deed at its bidding--and to remain -cold, _raisonnable_, free from the tempestuous surging of concomitant -sensations of delight.... The same holds good of pity: it must first be -_sifted through_ reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous as -any other passion. - -The _blind yielding_ to a passion, whether it be generosity, pity, or -hostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character -does not consist in not possessing these passions--on the contrary, a -man should possess them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them -by the bridle.. and even this he should not do out of love of control, -but merely because.... - - -929. - -"To give up one's life for a cause"--very effective. But there are many -things for which one gives up one's life: the passions, one and all, -will be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to pity, to anger, -or to revenge--it matters not from the point of view of value. How -many have not sacrificed their lives for pretty girls--and even what -is worse, their health! When one has temperament, one instinctively -chooses the most dangerous things: if one is a philosopher, for -instance, one chooses the adventures of speculation; if one is -virtuous, one chooses immorality. One kind of man will risk nothing, -another kind will risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On the -contrary, what we seek is life raised to a higher power, life in -danger.... But, let me repeat, we do not, on that account, wish to -be more virtuous than others, Pascal, for instance, wished to risk -nothing, and remained a Christian. That perhaps was virtuous.----A man -always sacrifices something. - - -930. - -How many _advantages_ does not a man sacrifice! To how small an extent -does he seek his own profit! All his emotions and passions wish to -assert their rights, and how remote a passion is From that cautious -utility which consists in personal profit! - -A man does _not_ strive after "happiness"; one must be an Englishman to -be able to believe that a man is always seeking his own advantage. Our -desires long to violate things with passion--their overflowing strength -seeks obstacles. - - -931. - -All passions are generally _useful,_ some directly, others indirectly; -in regard to utility it is absolutely impossible to fix upon any -gradation of values,--however certainly the forces of nature in general -may be regarded as good (_i.e._ useful), from an economic point of -view, they are still the sources of much that is terrible and much -that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might say would be, that -the mightiest passions are the most valuable: seeing that no stronger -sources of power exist. - - -932. - -All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes of mind have _not_ -come to be honoured on account of their usefulness: but because they -are the conditions peculiar to _rich souls_ who are able to bestow -and whose value consists in their vital exuberance. Look into the -eyes of the benevolent man! In them you will see the exact reverse of -self-denial, of hatred of self, of Pascalism. - - -933. - -_In short,_ what we require is to dominate the passions and not to -weaken or to extirpate them!--The greater the dominating power of the -will, the greater the freedom that may be given to the passions. - -The "great man" is so, owing to the free scope which he gives to his -desires, and to the still greater power which knows how to enlist these -magnificent monsters into its service. - -The "good man" in every stage of civilisation is at one and the same -time the _least dangerous_ and the _most useful:_ a sort of medium; -the idea formed of such a man by the common mind is that he is some -one _whom one has no reason to fear, but whom one must not therefore -despise._ - -Education: essentially a means of _ruining_ exceptions in favour of the -rule. Culture: essentially the means of directing taste against the -exceptions in favour of the mediocre. - -Only when a culture can dispose of an overflow of force, is it capable -of being a hothouse for the luxurious culture of the exception, of the -experiment, of the danger, of the _nuance: this_ is the tendency of -_every_ aristocratic culture. - - -934. - -All questions of strength: to what extent ought one to try and -prevail against the preservative measures of society and the latter's -prejudices?--to what extent ought one to unfetter _one's terrible -qualities,_ through which so many go to the dogs?--to what extent -ought one to run counter to _truth,_ and take up sides with its most -questionable aspects?--to what extent ought one to oppose suffering, -self-contempt, pity, disease, vice, when it is always open to question -whether one can ever master them (what does not kill us makes us -_stronger..._.)?--and, finally, to what extent ought one to acknowledge -the rights of the rule, of the common-place, of the petty, of the good, -of the upright, in fact of the average man, without thereby allowing -one's self to become vulgar? ... The strongest test of character is to -resist being ruined by the seductiveness of goodness. _Goodness_ must -be regarded as a luxury, as a refinement, as a _vice._ - - - -3. The Noble Man. - - -935. - -_Type._ real goodness, nobility, greatness of soul, as the result of -vital wealth: which does not give in order to receive--and which has no -desire to _elevate_ itself by being good, _squandering_ is typical of -genuine goodness, vital _personal_ wealth is its prerequisite. - - -936. - -_Aristocracy._--Gregarious ideals at present culminating in the highest -standard of value for society. It has been attempted to give them a -cosmic, yea, and even a metaphysical, value.--I defend _aristocracy_ -against them. - -Any society which would of itself preserve a feeling of respect -and _délicatesse_ in regard to freedom, must consider itself as an -exception, and have a force against it from which it distinguishes -itself, and upon which it looks down with hostility. - -The more rights I surrender and the more I level myself down to others, -the more deeply do I sink into the average and ultimately into the -greatest number. The first condition which an aristocratic society -must have in order to maintain a high degree of freedom among its -members, is that extreme tension which arises from the presence of -the most _antagonistic_ instincts in all its units: from their will to -dominate.... - -If ye would fain do away with strong contrasts and differences of rank, -ye will also abolish, strong love, lofty attitudes of mind, and the -feeling of individuality. - -*** - -Concerning the _actual_ psychology of societies based upon freedom and -equality.--What is it that tends to _diminish_ in such a society? - -The will to be _responsible for ones self_ (the loss of this is a sign -of the decline of autonomy); the ability to defend and to attack, even -in spiritual matters; the power of command; the sense of reverence, -of subservience, the ability to be silent, _great passion,_ great -achievements, tragedy and cheerfulness. - - -937. - -In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what Montlosier had said in his work, _De -la Monarchie française:_ he answered with a cry of indignation, and set -himself to his task. That emigrant had said: - -"_Race d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrachés de nos mains, peuple -tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous fut octroyée d'être libres, -et non pas à nous d'être nobles; pour nous tout est de droit, pour -vous tout est de grâce, nous ne sommes point de votre communauté; nous -sommes un tout par nous mêmes._" - - -938. - -How constantly the aristocratic world shears and weakens itself ever -more and more! By means of its noble instincts it abandons its -privileges, and owing to its refined and excessive culture, it takes -an interest in the people, the weak, the poor, and the poetry of the -lowly, etc. - - -939. - -There is such a thing as a noble and dangerous form of carelessness, -which allows of profound conclusions and insight: the carelessness -of the self-reliant and over-rich soul, which has never _troubled_ -itself about friends, but which knows only hospitality and knows -how to practise it; whose heart and house are open to all who will -enter--beggar, cripple, or king. This is genuine sociability: he who is -capable of it has hundreds of "friends," but probably not one friend. - - -940. - -The teaching μηδὲν ἄγαν applies to men with overflowing -strength,--not to the mediocre, ἐγκράτεια and ἄσκησις are only -steps to higher things. Above them stands "golden Nature." - -_"Thou shalt"_--unconditional obedience in Stoics, in Christian and -Arabian Orders, in Kant's philosophy (it is immaterial whether this -obedience is shown to a superior or to a concept). - -Higher than "Thou shalt" stands "I will" (the heroes); higher than "I -will" stands "I am" (the gods of the Greeks). - -Barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure of restraint,--they are -neither simple, nor light-hearted, nor moderate. - - -941. - -The essence of our gardens and palaces (and to the same extent the -essence of all yearning after riches) is _the desire to rid the eye of -disorder and vulgarity, and to build a home for our soul's nobility._ - -The majority of people certainly believe that they will develop higher -natures when those beautiful and peaceful things have operated upon -them: hence the exodus to Italy, hence all travelling, etc., and all -reading and visits to theatres. _People want to be formed_--that is the -kernel of their labours for culture! But the strong, the mighty, would -themselves _have a hand in the forming, and would fain have nothing -strange about them_! - -It is for this reason, too, that men go to open Nature, not to find -themselves, but to lose themselves and to forget themselves. The desire -"_to get away from one's self_" is proper to all weaklings, and to all -those who are discontented with themselves. - - -942. - -The only nobility is that of birth and blood. (I do not refer here to -the prefix "Lord" and _L'almanac de Gotha_: this is a parenthesis for -donkeys.) Wherever people speak of the "aristocracy of intellect," -reasons are generally not lacking for concealing something, it is -known to be a password among ambitious Jews. Intellect alone does -not ennoble; on the contrary, something is always needed _to ennoble -intellect._--What then is needed?--Blood. - - -943. - -What is noble? - ---External punctiliousness; because this punctiliousness hedges a man -about, keeps him at a distance, saves him from being confounded with -somebody else. - -A frivolous appearance in word, clothing, and bearing, with which -stoical hardness and self-control protect themselves from all prying -inquisitiveness or curiosity. - ---A slow step and a slow glance. There are not too many valuable things -on earth: and these come and wish to come of themselves to him who has -value. We are not quick to admire. - ---We know how to bear poverty, want, and even illness. - ---We avoid small honours owing to our mistrust of all who are -over-ready to praise: for the man who praises believes he understands -what he praises: but to understand--Balzac, that typical man of -ambition, betrayed the fact _comprendre c'est égaler._ - ---Our doubt concerning the communicativeness of our hearts goes very -deep; to us, loneliness is not a matter of choice, it is imposed upon -us. - ---We are convinced that we only have duties to our equals, to others we -do as we think best: we know that justice is only to be expected among -equals (alas! this will not be realised for some time to come), - ---We are ironical towards the "gifted"; we hold the belief that no -morality is possible without good birth. - ---We always feel as if we were those who had to dispense honours: while -he is not found too frequently who would be worthy of honouring us. - ---We are always disguised: the higher a man's nature the more is he -in need of remaining incognito. If there be a God, then out of sheer -decency He ought only to show Himself on earth in the form of a man. - ---We are capable of _otium,_ of the unconditional conviction that -although a handicraft does not shame one in any sense, it certainly -reduces one's rank. However much we may respect "industry," and know -how to give it its due, we do not appreciate it in a bourgeois sense, -or after the manner of those insatiable and cackling artists who, like -hens, cackle and lay eggs, and cackle again. - ---We protect artists and poets and any one who happens to be a master -in something; but as creatures of a higher order than those, who only -know how to do something, who are only "productive men," we do not -confound ourselves with them. - ---We find joy in all _forms_ and ceremonies; we would fain foster -everything formal, and we are convinced that courtesy is one of the -greatest virtues; we feel suspicious of every kind of _laisser aller,_ -including the freedom of the press and of thought; because, under such -conditions, the intellect grows easy-going and coarse, and stretches -its limbs. - ---We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate, -and more ethereal kind of creature. What a treat it is to meet -creatures who have only dancing and nonsense and finery in their -minds! They have always been the delight of every tense and profound -male soul, whose life is burdened with heavy responsibilities. - ---We take pleasure in princes and in priests, because in big things, as -in small, they actually uphold the belief in the difference of human -values, even in the estimation of the past, and at least symbolically. - ---We are able to keep silence _i_ but we do not breathe a word of this -in the presence of listeners. - ---We are able to endure long enmities: we lack the power of easy -reconciliations. - ---We have a loathing of demagogism, of enlightenment, of amiability, -and plebeian familiarity. - ---We collect precious things, the needs of higher and fastidious souls; -we wish to possess nothing in common. We want to have our own books, -our _own_ landscapes. - ---We protest against evil and fine experiences, and take care not to -generalise too quickly. The individual case: how ironically we regard -it when it has the bad taste to put on the airs of a rule! - ---We love that which is _naïf,_ and _naïf_ people, but as spectators -and higher creatures; we think Faust is just as simple as his Margaret. - ---We have a low estimation of good people, because they are gregarious -animals: we know how often an invaluable golden drop of goodness -lies concealed beneath the most evil, the most malicious, and the -hardest exterior, and that this single grain outweighs all the mere -goody-goodiness of milk-and-watery souls. - ---We don't regard a man of our kind as refuted by his vices, nor by his -tomfooleries. We are well aware that we are not recognised with ease, -and that we have every reason to make our foreground very prominent. - - -944. - -_What is noble?_--The fact that one is constantly forced to be playing -a part. That one is constantly searching for situations in which one -is forced to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the _greatest -number:_ the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, of virtue, -of comfort, and of Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness, _à la_ Spencer. -That one instinctively seeks for heavy responsibilities. That one knows -how to create enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That -one contradicts the _greatest number,_ not in words at all, but by -continually behaving differently from them. - - -945. - -Virtue (for instance, truthfulness) is _our_ most noble and most -dangerous luxury. We must not decline the disadvantages which it brings -in its train. - - -946. - -We refuse to be _praised:_ we do what serves our purpose, what gives us -pleasure, or what we are obliged to do. - - -947. - -What is chastity in a man? It means that his taste in sex has remained -noble; that _in eroticis_ he likes neither the brutal, the morbid, nor -the clever. - - -948. - -The concept of honour is founded upon the belief in select society, -in knightly excellences, in the obligation of having continually to -play a part. In essentials it means that one does not take one's life -too seriously, that one adheres unconditionally to the most dignified -manners in one's dealings with everybody (at least in so far as they do -not belong to "us"); that one is neither familiar, nor good-natured, -nor hearty, nor modest, except _inter pares_; that one is _always -playing a part._ - - -949. - -The fact that one sets one's life, one's health, and one's honour -at stake, is the result of high spirits and of an overflowing and -spendthrift will: it is not the result of philanthropy, but of the fact -that every danger kindles our curiosity concerning the measure of our -strength, and provokes our courage. - - -950. - -Eagles swoop down straight nobility of soul is best revealed by the -magnificent and proud foolishness with which it makes its _attacks._ - - -951. - -War should be made against all namby-pamby ideas of _nobility_!--A -certain modicum of brutality cannot be dispensed with: no more -than we can do without a certain approximation to criminality. -"Self-satisfaction" must _not_ be allowed; a man should look upon -himself with an adventurous spirit; he should experiment with himself -and run risks with himself--no beautiful soul-quackery should be -tolerated. I want to give _a more robust ideal_ a chance of prevailing. - - -952. - -"Paradise is under the shadow of a swordsman"--this is also a symbol -and a test-word by which souls with noble and warrior-like origin -betray and discover themselves. - - -953. - -_The two paths._--There comes a period when man has a surplus amount -of power at his disposal. Science aims at establishing the _slavery of -nature._ - -Then man acquires the _leisure_ in which to develop himself into -something new and more lofty. _A new aristocracy._ It is then that a -large number of virtues which are now _conditions of existence_ are -superseded.--Qualities which are no longer needed are on that account -lost. We no longer need virtues: _consequently_ we are losing them -(likewise the morality of "one thing is needful," of the salvation of -the soul, and of immortality: these were means wherewith to make man -capable of enormous self-tyranny, through the emotion of great fear!!!). - -The different kinds of needs by means of whose discipline man is -formed: need teaches work, thought, and self-control. - -*** - -_Physiological_ purification and strengthening. The new aristocracy is -in need of an opposing body which it may combat: it must be driven to -extremities in order to maintain itself. - -_The two futures of mankind_: (1) the consequence of a levelling-down -to mediocrity, (2) conscious aloofness and self-development. - -A doctrine which would cleave a _gulf:_ it maintains the _highest and -the lowest species_ (it destroys the intermediate). - -The aristocracies, both spiritual and temporal, which have existed -hitherto prove nothing _against_ the necessity of a new aristocracy. - - - -4. The Lords of the Earth. - - -954. - -A certain question constantly recurs to us; it is perhaps a seductive -and evil question; may it be whispered into the ears of those who -have a right to such doubtful problems--those strong souls of to-day -whose dominion over themselves is unswerving: is it not high time, -now that the type "gregarious animal" is developing ever more and -more in Europe, to set about rearing, thoroughly, artificially, and -consciously, an opposite type, and to attempt to establish the latter's -virtues? And would not the democratic movement itself find for the -first time a sort of goal, salvation, and justification, if some one -appeared who availed himself of it--so that at last, beside its new -and sublime product, slavery (for this must be the end of European -democracy), that higher species of ruling and Cæsarian spirits might -also be produced, which would stand upon it, hold to it, and would -elevate themselves through it? This new race would climb aloft to new -and hitherto impossible things, to a broader vision, and to its task on -earth. - - -955. - -The aspect of the European of to-day makes me very hopeful. A daring -and ruling race is here building itself up upon the foundation of -an extremely intelligent, gregarious mass. It is obvious that the -educational movements for the latter are not alone prominent nowadays. - - -956. - -The same conditions which go to develop the gregarious animal also -force the development of the leaders. - - -957. - -The question, and at the same time the task, is approaching with -hesitation, terrible as Fate, but nevertheless inevitable: how shall -the earth as a whole be ruled? And to what end shall man as a whole--no -longer as a people or as a race--be reared and trained? - -Legislative moralities are the principal means by which one can form -mankind, according to the fancy of a creative and profound will: -provided, of course, that such an artistic will of the first order gets -the power into its own hands, and can make its creative will prevail -over long periods in the form of legislation, religions, and morals. -At present, and probably for some time to come, one will seek such -colossally creative men, such really great men, as I understand them, -in vain: they will be lacking, until, after many disappointments, we -are forced to begin to understand why it is they are lacking, and that -nothing bars with greater hostility their rise and development, at -present and for some time to come, than that which is now called _the_ -morality in Europe. Just as if there were no other kind of morality, -and could be no other kind, than the one we have already characterised -as herd-morality. It is this morality which is now striving with -all its power to attain to that green-meadow happiness on earth, -which consists in security, absence of danger, ease, facilities for -livelihood, and, last but not least, "if all goes well," even hopes -to dispense with all kinds of shepherds and bell-wethers. The two -doctrines which it preaches most universally are "equality of rights" -and "pity for all sufferers"--and it even regards suffering itself as -something which must be got rid of absolutely. That such ideas may be -modern leads one to think very poorly of modernity. He, however, who -has reflected deeply concerning the question, how and where the plant -man has hitherto grown most vigorously, is forced to believe that this -has always taken place under the opposite conditions; that to this end -the danger of the situation has to increase enormously, his inventive -faculty and dissembling powers have to fight their way up under long -oppression and compulsion, and his will to life has to be increased -to the unconditioned will to power, to over-power: he believes that -danger, severity, violence, peril in the street and in the heart, -inequality of rights, secrecy, stoicism, seductive art, and devilry of -every kind--in short, the opposite of all gregarious desiderata--are -necessary for the elevation of man. Such a morality with opposite -designs, which would rear man upwards instead of to comfort and -mediocrity; such a morality, with the intention of producing a ruling -caste--the future lords of the earth--must, in order to be taught at -all, introduce itself as if it were in some way correlated to the -prevailing moral law, and must come forward under the cover of the -latter's words and forms. But seeing that, to this end, a host of -transitionary and deceptive measures must be discovered, and that the -life of a single individual stands for almost nothing in view of the -accomplishment of such lengthy tasks and aims, the first thing that -must be done is to rear _a new kind_ of man in whom the duration of -the necessary will and the necessary instincts is guaranteed for many -generations. This must be a new kind of ruling species and caste--this -ought to be quite as clear as the somewhat lengthy and not easily -expressed consequences of this thought. The aim should be to prepare -a _transvaluation of values_ for a particularly strong kind of man, -most highly gifted in intellect and will, and, to this end, slowly -and cautiously to liberate in him a whole host of slandered instincts -hitherto held in check: whoever meditates about this problem belongs -to us, the free spirits--certainly not to that kind of "free spirit" -which has existed hitherto: for these desired practically the reverse. -To this order, it seems to me, belong, above all, the pessimists of -Europe, the poets and thinkers of a revolted idealism, in so far as -their discontent with existence in general must _consistently_ at least -have led them to be dissatisfied with the man of the present; the same -applies to certain insatiably ambitious artists who courageously and -unconditionally fight against the gregarious animal for the special -rights of higher men, and subdue all herd-instincts and precautions -of more exceptional minds by their seductive art. Thirdly and lastly, -we should include in this group all those critics and historians by -whom the discovery of the Old World, which has begun so happily--this -was the work of the _new_ Columbus, of German intellect--will be -courageously _continued_ (for we still stand in the very first stages -of this conquest). For in the Old World, as a matter of fact, a -different and more lordly morality ruled than that of to-day; and the -man of antiquity, under the educational ban of his morality, was a -stronger and deeper man than the man of to-day--up to the present he -has been the only well-constituted man. The temptation, however, which -from antiquity to the present day has always exercised its power on -such lucky strokes of Nature, _i.e._ on strong and enterprising souls, -is, even at the present day, the most subtle and most effective of -anti-democratic and anti-Christian powers, just as it was in the time -of the Renaissance. - - -958. - -I am writing for a race of men which does not yet exist: for "the lords -of the earth." - -In Plato's _Theages_ the following passage will be found: "Every one -of us would like if possible to be master of mankind; if possible, a -_God!" This_ attitude of mind must be reinstated in our midst. - -Englishmen, Americans, and Russians. - - -959. - -That primeval forest-plant Man always appears where the struggle for -power has been waged longest. _Great_ men. - -Primeval forest creatures, the _Romans._ - - -960. - -From now henceforward there will be such favourable first conditions -for greater ruling powers as have never yet been found on earth. -And this is by no means the most important point. The establishment -has been made possible of international race unions which will set -themselves the task of rearing a ruling race, the future "lords -of the earth"--a new, vast aristocracy based upon the most severe -self-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and -artist-tyrants will be stamped upon thousands of years: a higher -species of men which, thanks to their preponderance of will, knowledge, -riches, and influence, will avail themselves of democratic Europe as -the most suitable and supple instrument they can have for taking the -fate of the earth into their own hands, and working as artists upon man -himself. Enough! The time is coming for us to transform all our views -on politics. - - - -5. The Great Man. - - -961. - -I will endeavour to see at which periods in history great men arise. -The significance of despotic moralities that have lasted a long time: -they strain the bow, provided they do not break it. - - -962. - -A great man,--a man whom Nature has built up and invented in a grand -style,--What is such a man? _First,_ in his general course of action -his consistency is so broad that owing to its very breadth it can be -surveyed only with difficulty, and consequently misleads; he possesses -the capacity of extending his will over great stretches of his life, -and of despising and rejecting all small things, whatever most -beautiful and "divine" things of the world there may be among them. -_Secondly,_ he is _colder, harder, less cautious and more free from -the fear of "public opinion";_ he does not possess the virtues which -are compatible with respectability and with being respected, nor any -of those things which are counted among the "virtues of the herd." If -he is unable to _lead_, he walks alone; he may then perchance grunt -at many things which he meets on his way. _Thirdly_, he asks for no -"compassionate" heart, but servants, instruments; in his dealings with -men his one aim is _to make_ something out of them. He knows that he -cannot reveal himself to anybody: he thinks it bad taste to become -familiar; and as a rule he is not familiar when people think he is. -When he is not talking to his soul, he wears a mask. He would rather -lie than tell the truth, because lying requires more spirit and _will_. -There is a loneliness within his heart which neither praise nor blame -can reach, because he is his own judge from whom is no appeal. - - -963. - -The great man is necessarily a sceptic (I do not mean to say by this -that he must appear to be one), provided that greatness consists in -this: to _will_ something great, together with the means thereto. -Freedom from any kind of conviction is a factor in his _strength -of will_. And thus it is in keeping with that "enlightened form of -despotism" which every great passion exercises. Such a passion enlists -intellect in its service; it even has the courage for unholy means; -it creates without hesitation; it allows itself convictions, it even -_uses_ them, but it never submits to them. The need of faith and -of anything unconditionally negative or affirmative is a proof of -weakness; all weakness is weakness of will. The man of faith, the -believer, is necessarily an inferior species of man. From this it -follows that "all freedom of spirit," _i.e._ instinctive scepticism, is -the prerequisite of greatness. - - -964. - -The great man is conscious of his power over a people, and of the fact -that he coincides temporarily with a people or with a century--this -_magnifying_ of his self-consciousness as _causa_ and _voluntas_ -is _misunderstood_ as "altruism": he feels driven to _means_ of -communication: all great men are _inventive_ in such means. They want -to form great communities in their own image; they would fain give -multiformity and disorder definite shape; it stimulates them to behold -chaos. - -The misunderstanding of love. There is a _slavish_ love which -subordinates itself and gives itself away--which idealises and deceives -itself; there is a _divine_ species of love which despises and loves at -the same time, and which _remodels_ and _elevates_ the thing it loves. - -The object is to attain that enormous _energy of greatness_ which can -model the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means -of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched, and which -can yet avoid _going to ruin_ at the sight of the suffering _created_ -thereby, the like of which has never been seen before. - - -965. - -The revolution, confusion, and distress of whole peoples is in my -opinion of less importance than _the misfortunes which attend great -individuals in their development._ We must not allow ourselves to be -deceived: the many misfortunes of all these small folk do not together -constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of _mighty_ men.--To -think of one's self in moments of great danger, and to draw ones own -advantage from the calamities of thousands in the case of the man -who differs very much from the common ruck--may be a sign of a great -character which is able to master its feeling of pity and justice. - - -966. - -In contradistinction to the animal, man has developed such a host -of _antagonistic_ instincts and impulses in himself, that he has -become master of the earth by means of this synthesis.--Moralities -are only the expression of local and limited _orders of rank in_ this -multifarious world of instincts which prevent man from perishing -through their _antagonism._ Thus a masterful instinct so weakens and -subtilises the instinct which opposes it that it becomes an _impulse_ -which provides the _stimulus_ for the activity of the principal -instinct. - -The highest man would have the greatest multifariousness in his -instincts, and he would _possess_ these in the relatively strongest -degree in which he is able to endure them. As a matter of fact, -wherever the plant, man, is found strong, mighty instincts are to be -found opposing each other (_e.g._ Shakespeare), but they are subdued. - - -967. - -Would one not be justified in reckoning all great men among the -_wicked?_ This is not so easy to demonstrate in the case of -individuals. They are so frequently capable of masterly dissimulation -that they very often assume the airs and forms of great virtues. Often, -too, they seriously reverence virtues, and in such a way as to be -passionately hard towards themselves; but as the result of cruelty. -Seen from a distance such things are liable to deceive. Many, on the -other hand, misunderstand themselves; not infrequently, too, a great -mission will call forth great qualities, _e.g._ justice. The essential -fact is: the greatest men may also perhaps have great virtues, but then -they also have the opposites of these virtues. I believe that it is -precisely out of the presence of these opposites and of the feelings -they suscitate, that the great man arises,--for the great man is the -broad arch which spans two banks lying far apart. - - -968. - -In _great men_ we find the specific qualities of life in their highest -manifestation: injustice, falsehood, exploitation. But inasmuch as -their effect has always been _overwhelming,_ their essential nature has -been most thoroughly misunderstood, and interpreted as goodness. The -type of such an interpreter would be Carlyle.[5] - -[Footnote 5: This not only refers to _Heroes and Hero-Worship,_ -but doubtless to Carlyle's prodigious misunderstanding of Goethe a -misunderstanding which still requires to be put right by a critic -untainted by Puritanism.--Tr.] - - -969. - -Generally speaking, everything _is worth no more and no less than one -has paid for it._ This of course does not hold good in the case of an -isolated individual; the great capacities of the individual have no -relation whatsoever to that which he has done, sacrificed, and suffered -for them. But if one should examine the previous history of his race -one would be sure to find the record of an extraordinary storing up and -capitalising of power by means of all kinds of abstinence, struggle, -industry, and determination. It is because the great man has cost so -much, and not because he stands there as a miracle, as a gift from -heaven, or as an accident, that he became great: "Heredity" is a false -notion. A man's ancestors have always paid the price of what he is. - - -970. - -_The danger of modesty._ To adapt ourselves too early to duties, -societies, and daily schemes of work in which accident may have placed -us, at a time when neither our powers nor our aim in life has stepped -peremptorily into our consciousness; the premature certainty of -conscience and feeling of relief and of sociability which is acquired -by this precocious, modest attitude, and which appears to our minds -as a deliverance from those inner and outer disturbances of our -feelings--all this pampers and keeps a man down in the most dangerous -fashion imaginable. To learn to respect things which people about us -respect, as if we had no standard or right of our own to determine -values; the strain of appraising things as others appraise them, -_counter_ to the whisperings of our inner taste, which also has a -conscience of its own, becomes a terribly subtle kind of constraint: -and if in the end no explosion takes place which bursts all the bonds -of love and morality at once, then such a spirit becomes withered, -dwarfed, feminine, and objective. The reverse of this is bad enough, -but still it is better than the foregoing: to suffer from one's -environment, from its praise just as much as from its blame; to be -wounded by it and to fester inwardly without betraying the fact; to -defend one's self involuntarily and suspiciously against its love; to -learn to be silent, and perchance to conceal this by talking; to create -nooks and safe, lonely hiding-places where one can go and take breath -for a moment, or shed tears of sublime comfort--until at last one has -grown strong enough to say: "What on earth have I to do with you?" and -to go _one's_ way alone. - - -971. - -Those men who are in themselves destinies, and whose advent is the -advent of fate, the whole race of _heroic_ bearers of burdens: oh! -how heartily and gladly would they have respite from themselves for -once in a while!--how they crave after stout hearts and shoulders, that -they might free themselves, were it but for an hour or two, from that -which oppresses them! And how fruitlessly they crave! ... They wait; -they observe all that passes before their eyes: no man even cometh nigh -to them with a thousandth part of their suffering and passion, no man -guesseth to what end they have waited.... At last, at last, they learn -the first lesson of their life: to wait no longer; and forthwith they -learn their second lesson: to be affable, to be modest; and from that -time onwards to endure everybody and every kind of thing--in short, to -endure still a little more than they had endured theretofore. - - - -6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future. - - -972. - -_The lawgivers of the future._--After having tried for a long time in -vain to attach a particular meaning to the word "philosopher,"--for I -found many antagonistic traits, I recognised that we can distinguish -between two kinds of philosophers:-- - -(1) Those who desire to establish any large system of values (logical -or moral); - -(2) Those who are the _lawgivers_ of such valuations. - -The former try to seize upon the world of the present or the past, -by embodying or abbreviating the multifarious phenomena by means of -signs: their object is to make it possible for us to survey, to reflect -upon, to comprehend, and to utilise everything that has happened -hitherto--they serve the purpose of man by using all past things to the -benefit of his future. - -The second class, however, are _commanders;_ they say: "Thus shall it -be!" They alone determine the "whither" and the "wherefore," and that -which will be useful and beneficial to man; they have command over the -previous work of scientific men, and all knowledge is to them only -a means to their creations. This second kind of philosopher seldom -appears; and as a matter of fact their situation and their danger is -appalling. How often have they not intentionally blindfolded their -eyes in order to shut out the sight of the small strip of ground which -separates them from the abyss and from utter destruction. Plato, for -instance, when he persuaded himself that "the good," as he wanted it, -was not Plato's good, but "the good in itself," the eternal treasure -which a certain man of the name of Plato had chanced to find on his -way! This same will to blindness prevails in a much coarser form in the -case of the founders of religion; their "Thou shalt" must on no account -sound to their ears like "I will,"--they only dare to pursue their task -as if under the command of God; their legislation of values can only be -a burden they can bear if they regard it as "revelation," in this way -their conscience is not crushed by the responsibility. - -As soon as those two comforting expedients--that of Plato and that of -Muhammed--have been overthrown, and no thinker can any longer relieve -his conscience with the hypothesis "God" or "eternal values," the -claim of the lawgiver to determine new values rises to an awfulness -which has not yet been experienced. Now those elect, on whom the -faint light of such a duty is beginning to dawn, try and see whether -they cannot escape it--as their greatest danger--by means of a timely -side-spring: for instance, they try to persuade themselves that their -task is already accomplished, or that it defies accomplishment, or that -their shoulders are not broad enough for such burdens, or that they -are already taken up with burdens closer to hand, or even that this -new and remote duty is a temptation and a seduction, drawing them away -from all other duties; a disease, a kind of madness. Many, as a matter -of fact, do succeed in evading the path appointed to them: throughout -the whole of history we can see the traces of such deserters and their -guilty consciences. In most cases,, however, there comes to such men -of destiny that hour of delivery, that autumnal season of maturity, in -which they are forced to do that which they did not even "wish to do": -and that deed before which in the past they have trembled most, falls -easily and unsought from the tree, as an involuntary deed, almost as a -present. - - -973. - -_The human horizon._--Philosophers may be conceived as men who make -the greatest efforts to _discover_ to what extent man can _elevate_ -himself--this holds good more particularly of Plato: how far man's -_power_ can extend. But they do this as individuals; perhaps the -instinct of Cæsars and of all founders of states, etc., was greater, -for it preoccupied itself with the question how far man could be urged -forward in _development_ under "favourable circumstances." What they -did not sufficiently understand, however, was the nature of favourable -circumstances. The great question: "Where has the plant 'man' grown -most magnificently heretofore? In order to answer this, a comparative -study of history is necessary. - - -974. - -Every fact and every work exercises a fresh persuasion over every age -and every new species of man. History always enunciates new truths. - - -975. - -To remain objective, severe, firm, and hard while making a thought -prevail is perhaps the best forte of artists; but if for this purpose -any one have to work upon human material (as teachers, statesmen, -have to do, etc.), then the repose, the coldness, and the hardness -soon vanish. In natures like Cæsar and Napoleon we are able to divine -something of the nature of "disinterestedness" in their work on their -marble, whatever be the number of men that are sacrificed in the -process. In this direction the future of higher men lies: to bear the -greatest responsibilities and not to go to rack and ruin through -them.--Hitherto the deceptions of inspiration have almost always been -necessary for a man not to lose faith in his own hand, and in his right -to his task. - - -976. - -The reason why philosophers are mostly failures. Because among the -conditions which determine them there are qualities which generally -ruin other men:-- - -(1) A philosopher must have an enormous multiplicity of qualities; he -must be a sort of abbreviation of man and have all man's high and base -desires: the danger of the contrast within him, and of the possibility -of his loathing himself; - -(2) He must be inquisitive in an extraordinary number of ways: the -danger of versatility; - -(3) He must be just and honest in the highest sense, but profound both -in love and hate (and in injustice); - -(4) He must not only be a spectator but a lawgiver: a judge and -defendant (in so far as he is an abbreviation of the world); - -(5) He must be extremely multiform and yet firm and hard. He must be -supple. - - -977. - -The really _regal_ calling of the philosopher (according to the -expression of Alcuin the Anglo-Saxon): "_Prava corrigere, et recta -corroborare, et sancta sublimare._" - - -978. - -The new philosopher can only arise in conjunction with a ruling class, -as the highest spiritualisation of the latter. Great politics, the -rule of the earth, as a proximate contingency, the total _lack of -principles_ necessary thereto. - - -979. - -Fundamental concept: the new values must first be created--this remains -_our duty_! The philosopher must be our lawgiver. New species. (How the -greatest species hitherto [for instance, the Greeks] were reared: this -kind of accident must now be _consciously_ striven for.) - - -980. - -Supposing one thinks of the philosopher as an educator who, looking -down from his lonely elevation, is powerful enough to draw long chains -of generations up to him: then he must be granted the most terrible -privileges of a great educator. An educator never says what he himself -thinks; but only that which he thinks it is good for those whom he is -educating to hear upon any subject. This dissimulation on his part -must not be found out; it is part of his masterliness that people -should believe in his honesty, he must be capable of all the means of -discipline and education: there are some natures which he will only be -able to raise by means of lashing them with his scorn; others who are -lazy, irresolute, cowardly, and vain, he will be able to affect only -with exaggerated praise. Such a teacher stands beyond good and evil, -but nobody must know that he does. - - -981. - -We must _not_ make men "better," we must _not_ talk to them about -morality in any form as if "morality in itself," or an ideal kind -of man in general, could be taken for granted; but we must _create -circumstances_ in which _stronger men are necessary,_ such as for -their part will require a morality (or, better still: a bodily and -spiritual discipline) which makes men strong, and upon which they will -consequently insist! As they will need one so badly, they will have it. - -We must not let ourselves be seduced by blue eyes and heaving breasts: -_greatness of soul has absolutely nothing romantic about it. And -unfortunately nothing whatever amiable either._ - - -982. - -From warriors we must learn: (1) to associate death with those -interests for which we are fighting--that makes us venerable; (2) we -must learn to _sacrifice_ numbers, and to take our cause sufficiently -seriously not to spare men; (3) we must practise inexorable discipline, -and allow ourselves violence and cunning in war. - - -983. - -The _education_ which rears those _ruling_ virtues that allow a man to -become master of his benevolence and his pity: the great disciplinary -virtues ("Forgive thine enemies" is mere child's play beside them), -_and the passions of the creator, must be elevated_ to the heights--we -must cease from carving marble! The exceptional and powerful position -of those creatures (compared with that of all princes hitherto): the -Roman Cæsar with Christ's soul. - - -984. - -We must not separate greatness of soul from intellectual greatness. For -the former involves _independence_; but without intellectual greatness -independence should not be allowed; all it does is to create disasters -even in its lust of well-doing and of practising "justice." Inferior -spirits _must_ obey, consequently they cannot be possessed of greatness. - - -985. - -The more lofty philosophical man who is surrounded by loneliness, not -because he wishes to be alone, but because he is what he is, and cannot -find his equal: what a number of dangers and torments are reserved for -him, precisely at the present time, when we have lost our belief in -the order of rank, and consequently no longer know how to understand -or honour this isolation! Formerly the sage almost sanctified himself -in the consciences of the mob by going aside in this way; to-day -the anchorite sees himself as though enveloped in a cloud of gloomy -doubt and suspicions. And not alone by the envious and the wretched: -in every well-meant act that he experiences he is bound to discover -misunderstanding, neglect, and superficiality. He knows the crafty -tricks of foolish pity which makes these people feel so good and holy -when they attempt to save him from his own destiny, by giving him more -comfortable situations and more decent and reliable society. Yes, he -will even get to admire the unconscious lust of destruction with which -all mediocre spirits stand up and oppose him, believing all the while -that they have a holy right to do so! For men of such incomprehensible -loneliness it is necessary to put a good stretch of country between -them and the officiousness of their fellows: this is part of their -prudence. For such a man to maintain himself uppermost to-day amid -the dangerous maelstroms of the age which threaten to draw him under, -even cunning and disguise will be necessary. Every attempt he makes to -order his life in the present and with the present, every time he draws -near to these men and their modern desires, he will have to expiate as -if it were an actual sin: and withal he may look with wonder at the -concealed wisdom of his nature, which after every one of these attempts -immediately leads him back to himself by means of illnesses and painful -accidents. - - -986. - - _"Maledetto colui_ - _che contrista, un spirto immortal!"_ - MANZONI (_Conte di Carmagnola,_ Act II.) - - -987. - -The most difficult and the highest form which man can attain is the -most seldom successful: thus the history of philosophy reveals a -superabundance of bungled and unhappy cases of manhood, and its march -is an extremely slow one; whole centuries intervene and suppress what -has been achieved: and in this way the connecting-link is always made -to fail. It is an appalling history, this history of the highest men, -of the sages.--What is most often damaged is precisely the recollection -of great men, for the semi-successful and botched cases of mankind -misunderstand them and overcome them by their "successes." Whenever -an "effect" is noticeable, the masses gather in a crowd round it; -to hear the inferior and the poor in spirit having their say is a -terrible ear-splitting torment for him who knows and trembles at the -thought, that the fate of man depends upon the success of its highest -types. From the days of my childhood I have reflected upon the sage's -conditions of existence, and I will not conceal my happy conviction -that in Europe he has once more become possible--perhaps only for a -short time. - - -988. - -These new philosophers begin with a description of a systematic order -of rank and difference of value among men,--what they desire is, alas -precisely the reverse of an assimilation and equalisation of man: they -teach estrangement in every sense, they cleave gulfs such as have -never yet existed, and they would fain have man become more evil than -he ever was. For the present they live concealed and estranged even -from each other. For many reasons they will find it necessary to be -anchorites and to wear masks--they will therefore be of little use -in the matter of seeking for their equals. They will live alone, and -probably know the torments of all the loneliest forms of loneliness. -Should they, however, thanks to any accident, meet each other on the -road, I wager that they would not know each other, or that they would -deceive each other in a number of ways. - - -989. - -"Les philosophes ne sont pas faits pour s'aimer. Les aigles ne volent -point en compagnie. Il faut laisser cela aux perdrix, aux étourneaux -... Planer au-dessus et avoir des griffes, voila le lot des grands -génies."--GALIANI. - - -990. - -I forgot to say that such philosophers are cheerful, and that they -like to sit in the abyss of a perfectly clear sky: they are in need of -different means for enduring life than other men; for they suffer in -a different way (that is to say, just as much from the depth of their -contempt of man as from their love of man).--The animal which suffered -most on earth discovered for itself _--laughter._ - - -991. - -_Concerning the misunderstanding of "cheerfulness."_ --It is a -temporary relief from long tension; it is the wantonness, the -Saturnalia of a spirit, which is consecrating and preparing itself for -long and terrible resolutions. The "fool" in the form of "science." - - -992. - -The new order of rank among spirits; tragic natures no longer in the -van. - - -993. - -It is a comfort to me to know that over the smoke and filth of human -baseness there is a _higher and brighter_ mankind, which, judging from -their number, must be a small race (for everything that is in any way -distinguished is _ipso facto_ rare). A man does not belong to this race -because he happens to be more gifted, more virtuous, more heroic, or -more loving than the men below, but because he is _colder, brighter, -more far-sighted, and more lonely;_ because he endures, prefers, and -even insists upon, loneliness as the joy, the privilege, yea, even the -condition of existence; because he lives amid clouds and lightnings as -among his equals, and likewise among sunrays, dewdrops, snowflakes, -and all that which must needs come from the heights, and which in its -course moves ever from heaven to earth. The desire to look aloft is not -our desire.--Heroes, martyrs, geniuses, and enthusiasts of all kinds, -are not quiet, patient, subtle, cold, or slow enough for us. - - -994. - -The absolute conviction that valuations above and below are different; -that innumerable experiences are wanting to the latter: that when -looking upwards from below misunderstandings are necessary. - - -995. - -How do men attain to great power and to great tasks? All the virtues -and proficiences of the body and the soul are little by little -laboriously acquired, through great industry, self-control, and keeping -one's self within narrow bounds, through a frequent, energetic, and -genuine repetition of the same work and of the same hardships; but -there are men who are the heirs and masters of this slowly acquired -and manifold treasure of virtues and proficiences because, owing -to happy and reasonable marriages and also to lucky accidents, the -acquired and accumulated forces of many generations, instead of being -squandered and subdivided, have been assembled together by means of -steadfast struggling and willing. And thus, in the end, a man appears -who is such a monster of strength, that he craves for a monstrous -task. For it is our power which has command of us: and the wretched -intellectual play of aims and intentions and motivations lies only in -the foreground--however much weak eyes may recognise the principal -factors in these things. - - -990. - -The sublime man has the highest value, even when he is most delicate -and fragile, because an abundance of very difficult and rare things -have been reared through many generations and united in him. - - -997. - -I teach that there are higher and lower men, and that a single -individual may under certain circumstances justify whole millenniums of -existence --that is to say, a wealthier, more gifted, greater, and more -complete man, as compared with innumerable imperfect and fragmentary -men. - - -998. - -Away from rulers and rid of all bonds, live the highest men: and in the -rulers they have their instruments. - - -999. - -_The order of rank:_ he who _determines_ values and leads the will of -millenniums, and does this by leading the highest natures--he _is the -highest man._ - - -1000. - -I fancy I have divined some of the things that lie hidden in the soul -of the highest man; perhaps every man who has divined so much must go -to ruin: but he who has seen the highest man must do all he can to -make him _possible._ Fundamental thought: we must make the future the -standard of all our valuations--and not seek the laws for our conduct -behind us. - - -1001. - -Not "mankind," but _Superman_ is the goal! - - -1002. - -"Come l'uom s'eterna...."--_Inf._ xv. 85. - - - - -II. - - -DIONYSUS. - - -1003. - -To _him who is one of Nature's lucky strokes,_ to, him unto whom my -heart goes out, to him who is carved from one integral block, which is -hard, sweet, and fragrant--to him from whom even my nose can derive -some pleasure--let this book be dedicated. - -He enjoys that which is beneficial to him. - -His pleasure in anything ceases when the limits of what is beneficial -to him are overstepped. - -He divines the remedies for partial injuries; his illnesses are the -great stimulants of his existence. - -He understands how to exploit his serious accidents. - -He grows stronger under the misfortunes which threaten to annihilate -him. - -He instinctively gathers from all he sees, hears, and experiences, -the materials for what concerns him most,--he pursues a selective -principle,--he rejects a good deal. - -He reacts with that tardiness which long caution and deliberate -_pride_ have bred in him,--he tests the stimulus: whence does it come? -whither does it lead? He does not submit. - -He is always in his own company, whether his intercourse be with books, -with men, or with Nature. - -He honours anything by choosing it, by conceding to it, by trusting it. - - -1004. - -We should attain to such a height, to such a lofty eagle's ledge, in -our observation, as to be able to understand that everything happens, -_just as it ought to happen_: and that all "imperfection," and the pain -it brings, belong to all that which is most eminently desirable. - - -1005. - -Towards 1876 I experienced a fright; for I saw that everything I had -most wished for up to that time was being compromised. I realised this -when I perceived what Wagner was actually driving at: and I was bound -very fast to him--by all the bonds of a profound similarity of needs, -by gratitude, by the thought that he could not be replaced, and by the -absolute void which I saw facing me. - -Just about this time I believed myself to be inextricably entangled in -my philology and my professorship--in the accident and last shift of my -life: I did not know how to get out of it, and was tired, used up, and -on my last legs. - -At about the same time I realised that what my instincts most desired -to attain was precisely the reverse of what Schopenhauer's instincts -wanted--that is to say, a _justification of life,_ even where it was -most terrible, most equivocal, and most false: to this end, I had the -formula "_Dionysian_" in my hand. - -Schopenhauer's interpretation of the "absolute" as _will_ was certainly -a step towards that concept of the "absolute" which supposed it to be -necessarily good, blessed, true, and integral, but Schopenhauer did -not understand how to deify this will: he remained suspended in the -moral-Christian ideal. Indeed, he was still so very much under the -dominion of Christian values, that, once he could no longer regard -the absolute as God, he had to conceive it as evil, foolish, utterly -reprehensible. He did not realise that there is an infinite number of -ways of being different, and even of being God. - - -1006. - -Hitherto, moral values have been the highest values: does anybody doubt -this? If we bring down the values from their pedestal, we thereby -alter _all_ values; the principle of their _order of rank_ which has -prevailed hitherto is thus overthrown. - - -1007. - -Transvalue values--what does this mean? It implies that all spontaneous -motives, all new, future, and stronger motives, are still extant; but -that they now appear under false names and false valuations, and have -not yet become conscious of themselves. - -We ought to have the courage to become, conscious, and to affirm all -that which has been _attained_--to get rid of the humdrum character -of old valuations, which makes us unworthy of the best and strongest -things that we have achieved. - - -1008. - -Any doctrine would be superfluous for which everything is not already -prepared in the way of accumulated forces and explosive material. A -transvaluation of values can only be accomplished when there is a -tension of new needs, and a new set of needy people who feel all old -values as painful,--although they are not conscious of what is wrong. - - -1009. - -The standpoint from which my values are determined: is abundance or -desire active? ... Is one a mere spectator, or is one's own shoulder -at the wheel--is one looking away or is one turning aside? ... Is one -acting spontaneously, as the result of accumulated strength, or is one -merely reacting to a goad or to a stimulus? ... Is one simply acting -as the result of a paucity of elements, or of such an overwhelming -dominion over a host of elements that this power enlists the latter -into its service if it requires them? ... Is one a _problem_ one's -self or is one a _solution_ already? ... Is _one perfect_ through -the smallness of the task, or _imperfect_ owing to the extraordinary -character of the aim? ... Is one genuine or only an _actor;_ is one -genuine as an actor, or only the bad copy of an actor? is one a -representative or the creature represented? Is one a personality or -merely a rendezvous of personalities? ... Is one ill from a disease or -from surplus health? Does one lead as a shepherd, or as an "exception" -(third alternative: as a fugitive)? Is one in need of dignity, or can -one play the clown? Is one in search of resistance, or is one evading -it? Is one imperfect owing to one's precocity or to one's tardiness? Is -it one's nature to say yea, or no, or is one a peacock's tail of garish -parts? Is one proud enough not to feel ashamed even of one's vanity? Is -one still able to feel a bite of conscience (this species is becoming -rare; formerly conscience had to bite too often: it is as if it now no -longer had enough teeth to do so)? Is one still capable of a "duty"? -(there are some people who would lose the whole joy of their lives -if they were _deprived_ of their duty--this holds good especially of -feminine creatures, who are born subjects). - - -1010. - -Supposing our common comprehension of the universe were a -_misunderstanding,_ would it be possible to conceive of a form of -_perfection,_ within the limits of which even such a _misunderstanding -as this_ could be sanctioned? - -The concept of a _new_ form of perfection: that which does _not_ -correspond to our logic, to our "beauty," to our "good," to our -"truth," might be perfect in a _higher_ sense even than our ideal is. - - -1011. - -Our most important limitation: we must not deify the unknown; we are -just beginning to know so little. The false and wasted endeavours. - -Our "new world": we must ascertain to what extent we are the _creators_ -of our valuations--we will thus be able to put "sense" into history. - -This belief in truth is reaching its final logical conclusion in -us--ye know how it reads: that if there is anything at all that must -be worshipped it is _appearance;_ that _falsehood_ and _not_ truth -is--divine. - - -1012. - -He who urges rational thought forward, thereby also drives its -antagonistic power--mysticism and foolery of every kind--to new feats -of strength. - -We should recognise that every movement is (1) _partly_ the -manifestation of fatigue resulting from a previous movement (satiety -after it, the malice of weakness towards it, and disease); and (2) -_partly_ a newly awakened accumulation of long slumbering forces, and -therefore wanton, violent, healthy. - - -1013. - -Health and morbidness: let us be careful! The standard is the bloom of -the body, the agility, courage, and cheerfulness of the mind--but also, -of course, how much _morbidness a man can bear and overcome,_--and -convert into health. That which would send more delicate natures to the -dogs, belongs to the stimulating means of _great_ health. - - -1014. - -It is only a question of power: to have all the morbid traits of the -century, but to balance them I by means of overflowing, plastic, and -rejuvenating power. The _strong_ man. - - -1015. - -_Concerning the strength of the nineteenth century.--_We are more -mediæval than the eighteenth century; not only more inquisitive or more -susceptible to the strange and to the rare. We have revolted against -the _Revolution,_ ... We have freed ourselves from the fear of reason, -which was the spectre of the eighteenth century: we once more dare to -be childish, lyrical, absurd, in a word, we are musicians. And we are -just as little frightened of the _ridiculous_ as of the _absurd._ The -_devil_ finds that he is tolerated even by God:[6] better still, he has -become interesting as one who has been misunderstood and slandered for -ages,--we are the saviours of the devil's honour. - -We no longer separate the great from the terrible. We reconcile good -things, in all their complexity, with the very _worst_ things; we -have overcome the _desideratum_ of the past (which wanted goodness to -grow without the increase of evil). The _cowardice_ towards the ideal, -peculiar to the Renaissance, has diminished--we even dare to aspire to -the latter's morality. _Intolerance_ towards priests and the Church has -at the same time come to an end; "It is immoral to believe in God"--but -this is precisely what we regard as the best possible justification of -this belief. - -On all these things we have conferred the civic rights of our minds. We -do not tremble before the back side of "good things" (we even look for -it, we are brave and inquisitive enough for that), of Greek antiquity, -of morality, of reason, of good taste, for instance (we reckon up -the losses which we incur with all this treasure: we almost reduce -ourselves to poverty with such a treasure). Neither do we conceal the -back side of "evil things" from ourselves. - -[Footnote 6: This is reminiscent of Goethe's _Faust,_ See "Prologue in -Heaven."--Tr.] - - -1016. - -_That which does us honour._--If anything does us honour, it is this: -we have transferred our seriousness to other things; all those things -which have been despised and laid aside as base by all ages, we regard -as important--on the other hand, we surrender "fine feelings" at a -cheap rate. - -Could any aberration be more dangerous than the contempt of the body? -As if all intellectuality were not thereby condemned to become morbid, -and to take refuge in the _vapeurs_ of "idealism"! - -Nothing that has been thought out by Christians and idealists holds -water: we are more radical. We have discovered the "smallest world" -everywhere as the most decisive. - -The paving-stones in the streets, good air in our rooms, food -understood according to its worth: we value all the _necessaries_ of -life seriously, and _despise_ all "beautiful soulfulness" as a form of -"levity and frivolity." That which has been most despised hitherto, is -now pressed into the front rank. - - -1017 - -In the place of Rousseau's "man of Nature," the nineteenth century has -discovered a much _more genuine_ image of "Man,"--it had the courage -to do this.... On the whole, the Christian concept of man has in a way -been reinstalled. What we have not had the courage to do, was to call -precisely this "man _par excellence_," good, and to see the future of -mankind guaranteed in him. In the same way, we did not dare to regard -the _growth in the terrible side_ of man's character as an accompanying -feature of every advance in culture; in this sense we are still -under the influence of the Christian ideal, and side with it against -paganism, and likewise against the Renaissance concept of _virtù._ But -the key of culture is not to be found in this way: and _in praxi_ we -still have the forgeries of history in favour of the "good man" (as if -he alone constituted the progress of humanity) and the _socialistic -ideal (i.e._ the _residue_ of Christianity and of Rousseau in the -de-Christianised world). - -_The fight against the eighteenth century:_ it meets with its _greatest -conquerors_ in _Goethe_ and _Napoleon._ Schopenhauer, too, fights -against the eighteenth century; but he returns involuntarily to -the seventeenth--he is a modern Pascal, with Pascalian valuations, -_without_ Christianity. Schopenhauer was not strong enough to invent a -_new yea._ - -_Napoleon:_ we see the necessary relationship between the higher and -the terrible man. "Man" reinstalled, and her due of contempt and fear -restored to woman. Highest activity and health are the signs of the -great man; the straight line and grand style rediscovered in action; -the mightiest of all instincts, that of life itself,--the lust of -dominion,--heartily welcomed. - - -1018. - -(_Revue des deux mondes,_ 15th February 1887. Taine concerning -Napoleon) "Suddenly the master faculty reveals itself: the _artist,_ -which was latent in the politician, comes forth from his scabbard; he -creates _dans l'idéal et l'impossible._ He is once more recognised as -that which he is: the posthumous brother of Dante and of Michelangelo; -and verily, in view of the definite contours of his vision, the -intensity, the coherence, and inner consistency of his dream, the depth -of his meditations, the superhuman greatness of his conception, he is -their equal: _son génie a la même taille et la même structure; il est -un des trois esprits souverains de la renaissance italienne._" - -_Nota bene._ Dante, Michelangelo, Napoleon. - - -1019. - -_Concerning the pessimism of strength._ In the internal economy of -_the primitive_ man's soul, the _fear_ of evil preponderates. What is -_evil!_ Three kinds of things: accident, uncertainty, the unexpected. -How does primitive man combat evil?--He conceives it as a thing of -reason, of power, even as a person. By this means he is enabled to -make treaties with it, and generally to operate upon it in advance--to -forestall it. - ---Another expedient is to declare its evil and harmful character to -be but apparent: the consequences of accidental occurrences, and of -uncertainty and the unexpected, are interpreted as _well-meant,_ as -reasonable. - ---A third means is to interpret evil, above all, as merited: evil is -thus justified as a punishment. - ---In short, _man submits to in_ all religious and moral interpretations -are but forms of submission to evil.--The belief that a good purpose -lies behind all evil, implies the renunciation of any desire to combat -it. - -Now, the history of every culture shows a diminution of this _fear -of the accidental, of the uncertain, and of the unexpected._ Culture -means precisely, to learn to reckon, to discover causes, to acquire -the power of forestalling events, to acquire a belief in necessity. -With the growth of culture, man is able to dispense with that primitive -form of submission to evil (called religion or morality), and that -"justification of evil." Now he wages war against "evil,"--he gets rid -of it. Yes, a state of security, of belief in law and the possibility -of calculation, is possible, in which consciousness regards these -things with tedium,--in which the joy of the accidental, of the -uncertain, and of the unexpected, actually becomes a spur. - -Let us halt a moment before this symptom of _highest_ culture, I -call it the _pessimism of strength._ Man now no longer requires a -"justification of evil"; justification is precisely what he abhors: -he enjoys evil, _pur, cru_; he regards purposeless evil as the most -interesting kind of evil. If he had required a God in the past, he now -delights in cosmic disorder without a God, a world of accident, to the -essence of which terror, ambiguity, and seductiveness belong. - -In a state of this sort, it is precisely _goodness_ which requires -to be justified--that is to say, it must either have an evil and a -dangerous basis, or else it must contain a vast amount of stupidity: -_in which case it still pleases._ Animality no longer awakens terror -now; a very intellectual and happy wanton spirit in favour of the -animal in man, is, in such periods, the most triumphant form of -spirituality. Man is now strong enough to be able to feel ashamed of -_a belief in God:_ he may now play the part of the devil's advocate -afresh. If in practice he pretends to uphold virtue, it will be for -those reasons which lead virtue to be associated with subtlety, -cunning, lust of gain, and a form of the lust of power. - -_This pessimism of strength_ also ends in a _theodicy, i.e._ in an -absolute saying of yea to the world--but the same arguments will -be raised in favour of life which formerly were raised against it: -and in this way, in a conception of this world _as the highest ideal -possible,_ which has been effectively attained. - - -1020. - -_The principal kinds of pessimism:--_ - -The pessimism of _sensitiveness_ (excessive irritability with a -preponderance of the feelings of pain). - -The pessimism of the _will that is not free_ (otherwise expressed: the -lack of resisting power against stimuli). - -The pessimism of _doubt_ (shyness in regard to everything fixed, in -regard to all grasping and touching). - -The psychological conditions which belong to these different kinds of -pessimism, may all be observed in a lunatic asylum, even though they -are there found in a slightly exaggerated form. The same applies to -"Nihilism" (the penetrating feeling of nonentity). - -What, however, is the nature of Pascal's moral pessimism, and the -_metaphysical pessimism_ of the Vedânta-Philosophy? What is the nature -of the _social pessimism_ of anarchists (as of Shelley), and of the -pessimism of compassion (like that of Leo Tolstoy and of Alfred de -Vigny)? - -Are all these things not also the phenomena of decay and sickness?... -And is not excessive seriousness in regard to moral values, or in -regard to "other-world" fictions, or social calamities, or _suffering_ -in general, of the same order? All such _exaggeration_ of a single and -narrow standpoint is in itself a sign of sickness. The same applies to -the preponderance of a negative over an affirmative attitude! - -_In this respect we must not confound with the above:_ the joy of -saying and doing _no,_ which is the result of the enormous power and -tenseness of an affirmative attitude--peculiar to all rich and mighty -men and ages. It is, as it were, a luxury, a form of courage too, -which opposes the terrible, which has sympathy with the frightful and -the questionable, because, among other things, one is terrible and -questionable: the _Dionysian_ in will, intellect, and taste. - - -1021. - -_My Five "Noes."_ - -(1) My fight against _the feeling of sin_ and the introduction of -the notion of _punishment_ into the physical and metaphysical world, -likewise into psychology and the interpretation of history. The -recognition of the fact that all philosophies and valuations hitherto -have been saturated with morality. - -(2) My identification and my discovery of the _traditional_ ideal, -of the Christian ideal, even where the dogmatic form of Christianity -has been wrecked. The _danger of the Christian ideal_ resides in its -valuations, in that which can dispense with concrete expression: my -struggle against _latent Christianity_ (for instance, in music, in -Socialism). - -(3) My struggle against the eighteenth century of Rousseau, against -his "Nature," against his "good man," his belief in the dominion of -feeling--against the pampering, weakening, and moralising of man: an -ideal born of the _hatred of aristocratic culture,_ which in practice -is the dominion of unbridled feelings of resentment, and invented as a -standard for the purpose of war (the Christian morality of the feeling -of sin, as well as the morality of resentment, is an attitude of the -mob). - -(4) My fight against _Romanticism,_ in which the ideals of Christianity -and of Rousseau converge, but which possesses at the same time a -yearning for that _antiquity_ which knew of sacerdotal and aristocratic -culture, a yearning for _virtù,_ and for the "strong man"--something -extremely hybrid; a false and imitated kind of _stronger_ humanity, -which appreciates extreme conditions in general and sees the symptom -of strength in them ("the cult of passion"; an imitation of the -most expressive _forms, furore espressivo,_ originating not out of -plenitude, but out _of want)._--(In the nineteenth century there are -some things which are born out of relative plenitude--_i.e._ out of -_well-being;_ cheerful music, etc.--among poets, for instance, Stifter -and Gottfried Keller give signs of more strength and inner well-being -than--. The great strides of engineering, of inventions, of the natural -sciences and of history (?) are relative products of the strength and -self-reliance of the nineteenth century.) - -(5) My struggle against the _predominance of gregarious instincts,_ now -science makes common cause with them; against the profound hate with -which every kind of order of rank and of aloofness is treated. - - -1022. - -From the pressure of plenitude, from the tension of forces that are -continually increasing within us and which cannot yet discharge -themselves, a condition is produced which is very similar to that which -precedes a storm: we--like Nature's sky--become overcast. I hat, too, -is "pessimism.".. A teaching which puts an end to such a condition by -the fact that it _commands_ something: a transvaluation of values by -means of which the accumulated forces are given a channel, a direction, -so that they explode into deeds and flashes of lightning-does not -in the least require to be a hedonistic teaching: in so far as it -_releases strength_ which was compressed to an agonising degree, it -brings happiness. - - -1023. - -_Pleasure_ appears with the feeling of power. - -_Happiness_ means that the consciousness of power and triumph has begun -to prevail. - -_Progress_ is the strengthening of the type, the ability to exercise -great will-power, everything else is a misunderstanding and a danger. - - -1024. - -There comes a time when the old masquerade and moral togging-up of the -passions provokes repugnance: _naked Nature;_ when the _quanta_ of -_power_ are recognised as _decidedly_ simple (as _determining rank_); -when _grand style_ appears again as the result of great passion. - - -1025. - -The purpose of culture _would have_ us enlist everything terrible, -step by step and experimentally, into its service; but before it is -_strong enough_ for this it must combat, moderate, mask, and even curse -everything terrible. - -Wherever a culture points to anything as evil, it betrays its _fear_ -and therefore weakness. - -_Thesis:_ everything good is the evil of yore which has been rendered -serviceable. _Standard:_ the more terrible and the greater the passions -may be which an age, a people, and an individual are at liberty to -possess, because they are able to use them as _a means, the higher is -their culture:_ the more mediocre, weak, submissive, and cowardly a man -may be, the more things he will regard as _evil:_ according to him the -kingdom of evil is the largest. The lowest man will see the kingdom of -evil (_i.e._ that which is forbidden him and which is hostile to him) -everywhere. - - -1026. - -It is not a fact that "happiness follows virtue"--but it is the mighty -man who first _declares his happy state to be virtue._ - -Evil actions belong to the mighty and the virtuous: bad and base -actions belong to the subjected. - -The mightiest man, the creator, would have to be the most evil, -inasmuch as he makes his ideal prevail over all men in _opposition_ to -their ideals, and remoulds them according to his own image. - -Evil, in this respect, means hard, painful, enforced. - -Such men as Napoleon must always return and always settle our belief -in the self-glory of the individual afresh: he himself, however, was -corrupted by the means he had to stoop to, and had _lost noblesse_ -of character. If he had had to prevail among another kind of men, he -could have availed himself of other means; and thus it would not seem -_necessary_ that a Cæsar _must become bad._ - - -1027. - -Man is a combination of the _beast_ and the _super-beast_; higher -man a combination of the monster and the superman:[7] these opposites -belong to each other. With every degree of a man's growth towards -greatness and loftiness, he also grows downwards into the depths and -into the terrible: we should not desire the one without the other;--or, -better still: the more fundamentally we desire the one, the more -completely we shall achieve the other. - -[Footnote 7: The play on the German words: "Unthier" and "Überthier," -"Unmensch" and "Übermensch," is unfortunately not translatable.--Tr.] - - -1028. - -Terribleness belongs to greatness: let us not deceive ourselves. - - -1029. - -I have taught the knowledge of such terrible things, that all -"Epicurean contentment" is impossible concerning them. Dionysian -pleasure is the only _adequate_ kind here: _I was the first to discover -the tragic._ Thanks to their superficiality in ethics, the Greeks -misunderstood it. Resignation is not the lesson of tragedy, but only -the misunderstanding of it! The yearning for nonentity is the _denial_ -of tragic wisdom, its opposite! - - -1030. - -A rich and powerful soul not only gets over painful and even terrible -losses, deprivations, robberies, and insults: it actually leaves such -dark infernos in possession of still greater plenitude and power; -and, what is most important of all, in possession of an increased -blissfulness in love. I believe that he who has divined something of -the most fundamental conditions of love, will understand Dante for -having written over the door of his Inferno: "I also am the creation of -eternal love." - - -1031. - -To have travelled over the whole circumference of the modern soul, -and to have sat in all its corners--my ambition, my torment, and my -happiness. - -Veritably to have _overcome_ pessimism, and, as the result thereof, to -have acquired the eyes of a Goethe--full of love and goodwill. - - -1032. - -The first question is by no means whether we are satisfied with -ourselves; but whether we are satisfied with anything at all. Granting -that we should say yea to any single moment, we have then affirmed -not only ourselves, but the whole of existence. For nothing stands by -itself, either in us or in other things: and if our soul has vibrated -and rung with happiness, like a chord, once only and only once, then -all eternity was necessary in order to bring about that one event,--and -all eternity, in this single moment of our affirmation, was called -good, was saved, justified, and blessed. - - -1033. - -The passions which _say yea._ I ride, happiness, health, the love of -the sexes, hostility and war, reverence, beautiful attitudes, manners, -strong will, the discipline of lofty spirituality, the will to power, -and gratitude to the Earth and to Life: all that is rich, that would -fain bestow, and that refreshes, gilds, immortalises, and deifies -Life--the whole power of the virtues that _glorify_--all declaring -things good, saying yea, and doing yea. - - -1034. - -We, many or few, who once more dare to live in a world _purged of -morality_, we _pagans_ in faith, we are probably also the first who -understand what a _pagan faith_ is: to be obliged to imagine higher -creatures than man, but to imagine them _beyond_ good and evil; to be -compelled to value all higher existence as _immoral_ existence. We -believe in Olympus, and _not_ in the "man on the cross." - - -1035. - -The more modern man has exercised his idealising power in regard to a -_God_ mostly by _moralising the latter_ ever more and more--what does -that mean?--nothing good, a diminution in man's strength. - -As a matter of fact, the reverse would be possible: and indications -of this are not wanting. God imagined as emancipation from morality, -comprising the whole of the abundant assembly of Life's contrasts, and -_saving_ and _justifying_ them in a divine agony. God as the beyond, -the superior elevation, to the wretched _cul-de-sac_ morality of "Good -and Evil." - - -1036. - -A humanitarian God cannot be _demonstrated_ from the world that -is known to us: so much are ye driven and forced to conclude -to-day. But what conclusion do ye draw from this? "He cannot be -demonstrated to _us_": the scepticism of knowledge. You all _fear_ -the conclusion: "From the world that is known to us quite a different -God would be _demonstrable,_ such a one as would certainly not be -humanitarian"--and, in a word, you cling fast to your God, and invent a -world for Him which _is unknown to us._ - - -1037. - -Let us banish the highest good from our concept of God: it is unworthy -of a God. Let us likewise banish the highest wisdom: it is the vanity -of philosophers who have perpetrated the absurdity of a God who is a -monster of wisdom: the idea was to make Him as like them as possible. -No! God _as the highest power_--that is sufficient!--Everything -follows from that, even--"the world"! - - -1038 - -And how many new Gods are not still possible! I, myself, in whom the -religious--that is to say, the god-_creating_ instinct occasionally -becomes active at the most inappropriate moments: how very differently -the divine has revealed itself every time to me! ... So many strange -things have passed before me in those timeless moments, which fall into -a man's life as if they came from the moon, and in which he absolutely -no longer knows how old he is or how young he still may be! ... I would -not doubt that there are several kinds of gods.... Some are not wanting -which one could not possibly imagine without a certain halcyonic calm -and levity.... Light feet perhaps belong to the concept "God". Is it -necessary to explain that a _God_ knows how to hold Himself preferably -outside all Philistine and rationalist circles? also (between -ourselves) beyond good and evil? His outlook is a _free_ one--as Goethe -would say.--And to invoke the authority of Zarathustra, which cannot be -too highly appreciated in this regard: Zarathustra goes as far as to -confess, "I would only believe in a God who knew how to _dance_ ..." - -Again I say: how many new Gods are not still possible! Certainly -Zarathustra himself is merely an old atheist: he believes neither in -old nor in new gods. Zarathustra says, _"he would"_--but Zarathustra -will not.... Take care to understand him well. - -The type God conceived according to the type of creative spirits, of -"great men." - - -1039. - -And how many new _ideals_ are not, at bottom, still possible? Here is -a little ideal that I seize upon every five weeks, while upon a wild -and lonely walk, in the azure moment of a blasphemous joy. To spend -one's life amid delicate and absurd things; a stranger to reality, -half-artist, half-bird, half-metaphysician; without a yea or a nay for -reality, save that from time to time one acknowledges it, after the -manner of a good dancer, with the tips of one's toes; always tickled -by some happy ray of sunlight; relieved and encouraged even by sorrow ---for sorrow _preserves_ the happy man; fixing a little tail of jokes -even to the most holy thing: this, as is clear, is the ideal of a heavy -spirit, a ton in weight _of the spirit of gravity._ - - -1040. - -_From the military-school of the soul._ (Dedicated to the brave, the -good-humoured, and the abstinent.) - -I should not like to undervalue the amiable virtues; but greatness -of soul is not compatible with them. Even in the arts, grand style -excludes all merely pleasing qualities. - -*** - -In times of painful tension and vulnerability, choose war. War hardens -and develops muscle. - -*** - -Those who have been deeply wounded have the Olympian laughter; a man -only has what he needs. - -*** - -It has now already lasted ten years: no sound any longer _reaches_ -me--a land without rain. A man must have a vast amount of humanity at -his disposal in order not to pine away in such drought.[8] - -[Footnote 8: For the benefit of those readers who are not acquainted -with the circumstances of Nietzsche's life, it would be as well to -point out that this is a purely personal plaint, comprehensible enough -in the mouth of one who, like Nietzsche, was for years a lonely -anchorite.--Tr.] - - -1041. - -_My new road to an affirmative attitude._--Philosophy, as I have -understood it and lived it up to the present, is the voluntary quest -of the repulsive and atrocious aspects of existence. From the long -experience derived from such wandering over ice and desert, I learnt -to regard quite differently everything that had been philosophised -hitherto: the _concealed_ history of philosophy, the psychology of its -great names came into the light for me. "How much truth can a spirit -_endure_; for how much truth is it _daring_ enough?"--this for me -was the real measure of value. Error is a piece of _cowardice_ ... -every victory on the part of knowledge, is the _result_ of courage, of -hardness towards one's self, of cleanliness towards one's self.... The -kind of _experimental philosophy_ which I am living, even anticipates -the possibility of the most fundamental Nihilism, on principle: but -by this I do not mean that it remains standing at a negation, at a -_no,_ or at a will to negation. It would rather attain to the very -reverse--to a _Dionysian affirmation_ of the world, as it is, without -subtraction, exception, or choice--it would have eternal circular -motion: the same things, the same reasoning, and the same illogical -concatenation. The highest state to which a philosopher can attain: to -maintain a Dionysian attitude to Life--my formula for this is _amor -fati._ - -To this end we must not only consider those aspects of life which -have been denied hitherto, as: _necessary,_ but as desirable, and not -only desirable to those aspects which have been affirmed hitherto (as -complements or first prerequisites, so to speak), but for their own -sake, as the more powerful, more terrible, and more _veritable_ aspects -of life, in which the latter's will expresses itself most clearly. - -To this end, we must also value that aspect of existence which alone -has been affirmed until now; we must understand whence this valuation -arises, and to how slight an extent it has to do with a Dionysian -valuation of Life: I selected and understood that which in this respect -says "yea" (on the one hand, the instinct of the sufferer; on the -other, the gregarious instinct; and thirdly, the _instinct of the -greater number_ against the exceptions). - -Thus I divined to what extent a stronger kind of man must necessarily -imagine--the elevation and enhancement of man in another direction: -_higher creatures,_ beyond good and evil, beyond those values which -bear the stamp of their origin in the sphere of suffering, of the herd, -and of the greater number--I searched for the data of this topsy-turvy -formation of ideals in history (the concepts "pagan," "classical," -"noble," have been discovered afresh and brought forward). - - -1042. - -We should demonstrate to what extent the religion of the Greeks was -_higher_ than Judæo-Christianity. The latter triumphed because the -Greek religion was degenerate (and decadent). - - -1043. - -It is not surprising that a couple of centuries have been necessary in -order to link up again--a couple of centuries are very little indeed. - - -1044. - -There must be some people who sanctify functions, not only eating and -drinking, and not only in memory of them, or in harmony with them; but -this world must be for ever glorified anew, and in a novel fashion. - - -1045. - -The most intellectual men feel the ecstasy and charm of _sensual_ -things in a way which other men --those with "fleshy hearts"--cannot -possibly imagine, and ought not to be able to imagine: they are -sensualists with the best possible faith, because they grant the senses -a more fundamental value than that fine sieve, that thinning and -mincing machine, or whatever it is called, which in the language of the -people is termed _"spirit"_ The strength and power of the senses--this -is the most essential thing in a sound man who is one of Nature's lucky -strokes: the splendid beast must first be there--otherwise what is the -value of all "humanisation"? - - -1046. - -(1) We want to hold fast to our senses, and to the belief in them--and -accept their logical conclusions! The hostility to the senses in the -philosophy that has been written up to the present, has been man's -greatest feat of nonsense. - -(2) The world now extant, on which all earthly and living things have -so built themselves, that it now appears as it does (enduring and -proceeding slowly), we would fain _continue building_--not criticise it -away as false! - -(3) Our valuations help in the process of building; they emphasise and -accentuate. What does it mean when whole religions say: "Everything is -bad and false and evil"? This condemnation of the whole process can -only be the judgment of the failures! - -(4) True, the failures might be the greatest sufferers and therefore -the most subtle! The contented might be worth little! - -(5) We must understand the fundamental _artistic_ phenomenon which is -called "Life,"--_the formative_ spirit, which constructs under the most -unfavourable circumstances: and in the slowest manner possible----The -_proof_ of all its combinations must first be given afresh: _it -maintains itself._ - - -1047. - -Sexuality, lust of dominion, the pleasure derived from appearance -and deception, great and joyful gratitude to Life and its typical -conditions--these things are essential to all paganism, and it has -a good conscience on its side.--_That which is hostile to Nature_ -(already in Greek antiquity) combats paganism in the form of morality -and dialectics. - - -1040. - -An anti-metaphysical view of the world--yes, but an artistic one. - - -1049. - -_Apollo's_ misapprehension: the eternity of beautiful forms, the -aristocratic prescription, "_Thus shall it ever be!_" - -_Dionysus_. Sensuality and cruelty. The perishable nature of existence -might be interpreted as the joy of procreative and destructive force, -as _unremitting creation._ - - -1050. - -The word "_Dionysian_" expresses: a constraint to unity, a soaring -above personality, the common-place, society, reality, and above -the abyss of the _ephemeral_, the passionately painful sensation of -superabundance, in darker, fuller, and more fluctuating conditions; -an ecstatic saying of yea to the collective character of existence, -as that which remains the same, and equally mighty and blissful -throughout all change, the great pantheistic sympathy with pleasure -and pain, which declares even the most terrible and most questionable -qualities of existence good, and sanctifies them; the eternal will to -procreation, to fruitfulness, and to recurrence; the feeling of unity -in regard to the necessity of creating and annihilating. - -The word "_Apollonian_" expresses: the constraint to be absolutely -isolated, to the typical "individual," to everything that simplifies, -distinguishes, and makes strong, salient, definite, and typical to -freedom within the law. - -The further development of art is just as necessarily bound up with the -antagonism of these two natural art-forces, as the further development -of mankind is bound up with the antagonism of the sexes. The plenitude -of power and restraint, the highest form of self-affirmation in a cool, -noble, and reserved kind of beauty: the Apollonianism of the Hellenic -will. - -This antagonism of the Dionysian and of the Apollonian in the Greek -soul, is one of the great riddles which made me feel drawn to the -essence of Hellenism. At bottom, I troubled about nothing save the -solution of the question, why precisely Greek Apollonianism should have -been forced to grow out of a Dionysian soil: the Dionysian Greek had -need of being Apollonian; that is to say in order to break his will to -the titanic, to the complex, to the uncertain, to the horrible by a -will to measure, to simplicity, and to submission to rule and concept. -Extravagance, wildness, and Asiatic tendencies lie at the root of the -Greeks. Their courage consists in their struggle with their Asiatic -nature: they were not given beauty, any more than they were given Logic -and moral! naturalness: in them these things are victories, they are -willed and fought for--they constitute the _triumph_ of the Greeks. - - -1051. - -It is clear that only the rarest and most lucky cases of humanity -can attain to the highest and most sublime human joys in which Life -celebrates its own glorification; and this only happens when these -rare creatures themselves and their forbears have lived a long -preparatory life leading to this goal, without, however, having done -so consciously. It is then that an overflowing wealth of multifarious -forces and the most agile power of "free will" and lordly command -exist together in perfect concord in one man; then the intellect is -just as much at ease, or at home, in the senses as the senses are at -ease or at home in it; and everything that takes place in the latter -must give rise to extraordinarily subtle joys in the former. And _vice -versâ:_ just think of this _vice versâ_ for a moment in a man like -Hafiz; even Goethe, though to a lesser degree, gives some idea of this -process. It is probable that, in such perfect and well-constituted -men, the most sensual functions are finally transfigured by a symbolic -elatedness of the highest intellectuality; in themselves they feel a -kind of _deification of the body_ and are most remote from the ascetic -philosophy of the principle "God is a Spirit": from this principle it -is clear that the ascetic is the "botched man" who declares only that -to be good and "God" which is absolute, and which judges and condemns. - -From that height of joy in which man feels himself completely and -utterly a deified form and self-justification of nature, down to the -joy of healthy peasants and healthy semi-human beasts, the whole of -this long and enormous gradation of the light and colour of _happiness_ -was called by the Greek--not without that grateful quivering of one -who is initiated into secret, not without much caution and pious -silence--by the godlike name: _Dionysus._ What then _do_ all modern -men--the children of a crumbling, multifarious, sick and strange age -_know_ of the _compass_ of Greek happiness, how _could_ they know -anything about it! Whence would the slaves of "modern ideas" derive -their right to Dionysian feasts! - -When the Greek body and soul were in full "bloom," and not, as it were, -in states of morbid exaltation and madness, there arose the secret -symbol of the loftiest affirmation and transfiguration of life and the -world that has ever existed. There we have a _standard_ beside which -everything that has grown since must seem too short, too poor, too -narrow: if we but pronounce the word "Dionysus" in the presence of -the best of more recent names and things, in the presence of Goethe, -for instance, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare, or Raphael, in a trice we -realise that our best things and moments are _condemned._ Dionysus -is a _judge!_ Am I understood? There can be no doubt that the Greeks -sought to interpret, by means of their Dionysian experiences, the -final mysteries of the "destiny of the soul" and everything they knew -concerning the education and the purification of man, and above all -concerning the absolute hierarchy and inequality of value between man -and man. There is the deepest experience of all Greeks, which they -conceal beneath great silence,--_we do not know the Greeks_ so long -as this hidden and sub-terranean access to them remains obstructed. -The indiscreet eyes of scholars will never perceive anything in these -things, however much learned energy may still have to be expended in -the service of this excavation--; even the noble zeal of such friends -of antiquity as Goethe and Winckelmann, seems to savour somewhat of -bad form and of arrogance, precisely in this respect. To wait and to -prepare oneself; to await the appearance of new sources of knowledge; -to prepare oneself in solitude for the sight of new faces and the -sound of new voices; to cleanse one's soul ever more and more of the -dust and noise, as of a country fair, which is peculiar to this age; -to _overcome_ everything Christian by something super-Christian, -and not only to rid oneself of it,--for the Christian doctrine is -the counter-doctrine to the Dionysian; to rediscover the _South_ -in oneself, and to stretch a clear, glittering, and mysterious -southern sky above one; to reconquer the southern healthiness and -concealed power of the soul, once more for oneself; to increase the -compass of one's soul step by step, and to become more supernational, -more European, more super-European, more Oriental, and finally more -_Hellenic_--for Hellenism was, as a matter of fact, the first great -union and synthesis of everything Oriental, and precisely on that -account, the _beginning_ of the European soul, the discovery of _our -"new_ world":--he who lives under such imperatives, who knows what he -may not encounter some day? Possibly--a _new dawn!_ - - -1052. - -_The two types; Dionysus and Christ on the Cross._ We should ascertain -whether the typically _religious_ man is a decadent phenomenon (the -great innovators are one and all morbid and epileptic); but do not let -us forget to include that type of the religious man who is _pagan._ Is -the pagan cult not a form of gratitude for, and affirmation of, Life? -Ought not its most representative type to be an apology and deification -of Life? The type of a well-constituted and ecstatically overflowing -spirit! The type of a spirit which absorbs the contradictions and -problems of existence, and which _solves_ them! - -At this point I set up the _Dionysus_ of the Greeks: the religious -affirmation of Life, of the whole of Life, not of denied and partial -Life (it is typical that in this cult the sexual act awakens ideas of -depth, mystery, and reverence). - -Dionysus _versus_ "Christ"; here you have the contrast. It is _not_ -a difference in regard to the martyrdom,--but the latter has a -different meaning. Life itself--Life s eternal fruitfulness and -recurrence caused anguish, destruction, and the will to annihilation. -In the other case, the suffering of the "Christ as the Innocent One" -stands as an objection against Life, it is the formula of Life's -condemnation.--Readers will guess that the problem concerns the meaning -of suffering; whether a Christian or a tragic meaning be given to it. -In the first case it is the road to a holy mode of existence; in the -second case _existence itself is regarded as sufficiently holy_ to -justify an enormous amount of suffering. The tragic man says yea even -to the most excruciating suffering: he is sufficiently strong, rich, -and capable of deifying, to be able to do this; the Christian denies -even the happy lots on earth: he is weak, poor, and disinherited enough -to suffer from life in any form. God on the Cross is a curse upon Life, -a signpost directing people to deliver themselves from it;--Dionysus -cut into pieces is a _promise_ of Life: it will be for ever born anew, -and rise afresh from destruction. - - - - -III. - - -ETERNAL RECURRENCE. - - -1053. - -My philosophy reveals the triumphant thought through which all other -systems of thought must ultimately perish. It is the great disciplinary -thought: those races that cannot bear it are doomed; those which regard -it as the greatest blessing are destined to rule. - - -1054. - -The _greatest_ of all fights: for this purpose a new _weapon_ is -required. - -A hammer: a terrible alternative must be created. Europe must be -brought face to face with the logic of facts, and confronted with the -question whether its will for ruin is really earnest. - -General levelling down to mediocrity must be avoided. Rather than this -it would be preferable to perish. - - -1055. - -A pessimistic attitude of mind and a pessimistic doctrine and ecstatic -Nihilism, may in certain circumstances even prove indispensable to the -philosopher--that is to say, as a mighty form of pressure, or hammer, -with which he can smash up degenerate, perishing races and put them out -of existence; with which he can beat a track to a new order of life, -or instil a longing for nonentity in those who are degenerate and who -desire to perish. - - -1056. - -I wish to teach the thought which gives unto many the right to cancel -their existences--the great disciplinary thought. - - -1057. - -_Eternal Recurrence. _ A prophecy. - -1. The exposition of the doctrine and its _theoretical_ first -principles and results. - -2. The proof of the doctrine. - -3. Probable results which will follow from its being _believed._ (It -makes everything break open.) - -_(a)_ The means of enduring it. - -_(b)_ The means of ignoring it. - -4. Its place in history is a means. - -The period _of_ greatest danger. The foundation of an oligarchy _above_ -peoples and their interests: education directed at establishing a -political policy for humanity in general. - -_A counterpart of Jesuitism._ - - -1058. - -The two greatest philosophical points of view (both discovered by -Germans). - -(a) That of _becoming_ and that of _evolution._ - -(b) That based upon the _values of existence_ (but the wretched form of -German pessimism must first be overcome!)-- - -Both points of view reconciled by me in a decisive manner. - -Everything becomes and returns for ever, _escape is impossible!_ - -Granted that we _could_ appraise the value of existence, what would -be the result of it? The thought of recurrence is a principle _of -selection_ in the service of _power_ (and barbarity!). - -The ripeness of man for this thought. - - -1059. - -1. The thought of eternal recurrence: its first principles which must -necessarily be true if it were true. What its result is. - -2. It is the most _oppressive_ thought: its probable results, provided -it be not prevented, that is to say, provided all values be not -transvalued. - -3. The means of _enduring it:_ the transvaluation of all values. -Pleasure no longer to be found in certainty, but in uncertainty; no -longer "cause and effect," but continual creativeness; no longer -the will to self-preservation, but to power; no longer the modest -expression "it is all _only_ subjective," but "it is all _our_ work! -let us be proud of it." - - -1060. - -In order to endure the thought of recurrence, freedom from morality -is necessary; new means against the _fact pain_ (pain regarded as -the instrument, as the father of pleasure; there is no accretive -consciousness of pain); pleasure derived from all kinds of uncertainty -and tentativeness, as a counterpoise to extreme fatalism; suppression -of the concept "necessity"; suppression of the "will"; suppression of -"absolute knowledge." - -_Greatest elevation_ of man's _consciousness of strength,_ as that -which creates superman. - - -1061. - -The two extremes of thought--the materialistic and the platonic--are -reconciled in _eternal recurrence_: both are regarded as ideals. - - -1062. - -If the universe had a goal, that goal would have been reached by now. -If any sort of unforeseen final state existed, that state also would -have! been reached. If it were capable of any halting or stability of -any being, it would only have possessed this capability of becoming -stable for one instant in its development; and again becoming would -have been at an end for ages, and with it all thinking and all -"spirit." The fact of "intellects" being in a _state of development_ -proves that the universe can have no goal, no final state, and is -incapable of being. But the old habit of thinking of some purpose in -regard to all phenomena, and of thinking of a directing and creating -deity in regard to the universe, is so powerful, that the thinker has -to go to great pains in order to avoid thinking of the very aimlessness -of the world as intended. The idea that the universe intentionally -evades a goal, and even knows artificial means wherewith it prevents -itself from falling into a circular movement, must occur to all those -who would fain attribute to the universe the capacity of eternally -regenerating itself--that is to say, they would fain impose upon a -finite, definite force which is invariable in quantity, like the -universe, the miraculous gift of renewing its forms and its conditions -_for all eternity._ Although the universe is no longer a God, it must -still be capable of the divine power of creating and transforming; -it must forbid itself to relapse into any one of its previous forms; -it must not only have the intention, but also the means, of avoiding -any sort of repetition, every second of its existence, even, it must -control every single one of its movements, with the view of avoiding -goals, final states, and repetitions and all the other results of such -an unpardonable and insane method of thought and desire. All this -is nothing more than the old religious mode of thought and desire, -which, in spite of all, longs to believe that in some way or other the -universe resembles the old, beloved, infinite, and infinitely-creative -God--that in some way or other "the old God still lives"--that longing -of Spinoza's which is expressed in the words "_deus sive natura_" -(what he really felt was "_natura sive deus_"). Which, then, is the -proposition and belief in which the decisive change, the present -_preponderance_ of the scientific spirit over the religious and -god-fancying spirit, is best formulated? Ought it not to be: the -universe, as force, must not be thought of as unlimited, because it -cannot be thought of in this way,--we forbid ourselves the concept -_infinite_ force, because it is _incompatible_ with the idea of force? -Whence it follows that the universe lacks the power of eternal renewal. - - -1063. - -The principle of the conservation of energy inevitably involves -_eternal recurrence._ - - -1064. - -That a state of equilibrium has never been reached, proves that it is -impossible, but in infinite space it must have been reached. Likewise -in spherical space. The _form_ of space must be the cause of the -eternal movement, and ultimately of all imperfection. That "energy" and -"stability" and "immutability" are contradictory. The measure of energy -(dimensionally) is fixed though it is essentially fluid. - -"That which is timeless" must be refuted, any given moment of energy, -the absolute conditions for a new distribution of all forces are -present, it cannot remain stationary. Change is part of its essence, -therefore time is as well; by this means, however, the necessity of -change has only been established once more in theory. - - -1065. - -A certain emperor always bore the fleeting nature of all things in his -mind, in order not to value them too seriously, and to be able to live -quietly in their midst. Conversely, everything seems to me much too -important for it to be so fleeting, I seek an eternity for everything: -ought one to pour the most precious salves and wines into the sea? My -consolation is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea will -wash it up again. - - -1066. - -_The new concept of the universe._ The universe exists; it is nothing -that grows into existence and that passes out of existence. Or, better -still, it develops, it passes away, but it never began to develop, -and has never ceased from passing away; it _maintains_ itself in both -states. It lives on itself, its excrements are its nourishment. - -We need not concern ourselves for one instant with the hypothesis of a -_created_ world. The concept create is to-day utterly indefinable and -unrealisable; it is but a word which hails from superstitious ages, -nothing can be explained with a word. The last attempt that was made -to conceive of a world that _began_ occurred quite recently, in many -cases with the help of logical reasoning,--generally, too, as you will -guess, with an ulterior theological motive. - -Several attempts have been made lately to show that the concept that -"the universe has an infinite past (_regressus in infinitum_) is -contradictory, it was even demonstrated, it is true, at the price -of confounding the head with the tail. Nothing can prevent me from -calculating backwards from this moment of time, and of saying: "I -shall never reach the end"; just as I can calculate without end in a -forward direction, from the same moment. It is only when I wish to -commit the error--I shall be careful to avoid it--of reconciling this -correct concept of a _regressus in infinitum_ with the absolutely -unrealisable concept of a finite _progressus_ up to the present; only -when I consider the direction (forwards or backwards) as logically -indifferent, that I take hold of the head--this very moment--and think -I hold the tail: this pleasure I leave to you, Mr. Dühring!... - -I have come across this thought in other thinkers before me, and every -time I found that it was determined by other ulterior motives (chiefly -theological, in favour of a _creator spiritus)._ If the universe were -in any way able to congeal, to dry up, to perish; or if it were capable -of attaining to a state of equilibrium; or if it had any kind of goal -at all which a long lapse of time, immutability, and finality reserved -for it (in short, to speak metaphysically, if becoming could resolve -itself into being or into nonentity), this state ought already to have -been reached. - -But it has not been reached: it therefore follows.... This is the only -certainty we can grasp, which can serve as a corrective to a host of -cosmic hypotheses possible in themselves. If, for instance, materialism -cannot consistently escape the conclusion of a finite state, which -William Thomson has traced out for it, then materialism is thereby -refuted. - -If the universe may be conceived as a definite quantity of energy, -as a definite number of centres of energy,--and every other concept -remains indefinite and therefore useless,--it follows therefrom that -the universe must go through a calculable number of combinations in -the great game of chance which constitutes its existence. In infinity, -at some moment or other, every possible combination must once have -been realised; not only this, but it must have been realised an -infinite number of times. And inasmuch as between every one of these -combinations and its next recurrence every other possible combination -would necessarily have been undergone, and since every one of these -combinations would determine the whole series in the same order, a -circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: -the universe is thus shown to be a circular movement which has already -repeated itself an infinite number of times, and which plays its game -for all eternity.--This conception is not simply materialistic; for if -it were this, it would not involve an infinite recurrence of identical -cases, but a finite state. Owing to the fact that the universe has -not reached this finite state, materialism shows itself to be but an -imperfect and provisional hypothesis. - - -1067. - -And do ye know what "the universe" is to my mind? Shall I show it -to you in my mirror? This universe is a monster of energy, without -beginning or end; a fixed and brazen quantity o; energy which grows -neither bigger nor smaller, which does not consume itself, but only -alters its face; as a whole its bulk is immutable, it is a household -without either losses or gains, but likewise without increase and -without sources of revenue, surrounded by nonentity as by a frontier, -it is nothing vague or wasteful, it does not stretch into infinity; -but it is a definite quantum of energy located in limited space, -and not in space which would be anywhere empty. It is rather energy -everywhere, the play of forces and force-waves, at the same time one -and many, agglomerating here and diminishing there, a sea of forces -storming and raging in itself, for ever changing, for ever rolling -back over in calculable ages to recurrence, with an ebb and flow of -its forms, producing the most complicated things out of the most -simple structures; producing the most ardent, most savage, and most -contradictory things out of the quietest, most rigid, and most frozen -material, and then returning from multifariousness to uniformity, from -the play of contradictions back into the delight of consonance, saying -yea unto itself, even in this homogeneity of its courses and ages; for -ever blessing itself as something which recurs for all eternity,--a -becoming which knows not satiety, or disgust, or weariness:--this, my -Dionysian world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction, -this mysterious world of twofold voluptuousness; this, my "Beyond Good -and Evil" without aim, unless there is an aim in the bliss of the -circle, without will, unless a ring must by nature keep goodwill to -itself,--would you have a name for my world? A _solution_ of all your -riddles? Do ye also want a light, ye most concealed, strongest and -most undaunted men of the blackest midnight?--_This world is the Will -to Power--and nothing else!_ And even ye yourselves are this will to -power--and nothing besides! - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Will to Power, Book III and IV, by -Friedrich Nietzsche - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WILL TO POWER, BOOK III AND IV *** - -***** This file should be named 52915-0.txt or 52915-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/9/1/52915/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe Free Literature (back online -soon in an extended version, alo linking to free sources -for education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational -materials,...) 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: The Will to Power, Book III and IV - An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values - -Author: Friedrich Nietzsche - -Editor: Oscar Levy - -Translator: Anthony M. Ludovici - -Release Date: August 28, 2016 [EBook #52915] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WILL TO POWER, BOOK III AND IV *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe Free Literature (back online -soon in an extended version, alo linking to free sources -for education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational -materials,...) (Images generously made available by the -Internet Archive.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> - -<h1>THE WILL TO POWER</h1> - -<h3><i>AN ATTEMPTED</i></h3> - -<h3><i>TRANSVALUATION OF ALL VALUES</i></h3> - -<h3>By</h3> - -<h2>FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE</h2> - - -<h4>TRANSLATED BY</h4> - -<h4>ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI</h4> - - -<h4>VOL. II</h4> - -<h4>BOOKS III AND IV</h4> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 175px;"> -<img src="images/ill_niet.jpg" width="175" alt="" /> -</div> - -<h4>The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche</h4> - -<h5>The First Complete and Authorised English Translation</h5> - -<h4>Edited by Dr Oscar Levy</h4> - -<h4>Volume Seventeen</h4> - -<h5>T.N. FOULIS</h5> - -<h5>13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET</h5> - -<h5>EDINBURGH: AND LONDON</h5> - -<h5>1913</h5> -<hr class="full" /> - - -<h4>CONTENTS OF VOL. II.</h4> - -<p> -<span class="smcap">Third Book. the Principles of a New Valuation.</span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">I. The Will to Power in Science—</span><br /> -<br /> -<i>(a)</i> The Method of Investigation <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_3">3</a></span><br /> -<i>(b)</i> The Starting-Point of Epistemology <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_5">5</a></span><br /> -<i>(c)</i> The Belief in the "Ego." Subject <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_12">12</a></span><br /> -<i>(d)</i> Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_20">20</a></span><br /> -<i>(e)</i> The Origin of Reason and Logic <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_26">26</a></span><br /> -<i>(f)</i> Consciousness <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_38">38</a></span><br /> -<i>(g)</i> Judgment. True—False <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_43">43</a></span><br /> -<i>(h)</i> Against Causality <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_53">53</a></span><br /> -<i>(i)</i> The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_62">62</a></span><br /> -<i>(k)</i> The Metaphysical Need <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_74">74</a></span><br /> -<i>(l)</i> The Biological Value of Knowledge <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_96">96</a></span><br /> -<i>(m)</i> Science <span class="tabnum"> <a href="#Page_99">99</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">II. The Will to Power in Nature—</span><br /> -<br /> -1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_109">109</a></span><br /> -2. The Will to Power as Life—<br /> -<i>(a)</i> The Organic Process <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_123">123</a></span><br /> -<i>(b)</i> Man <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_132">132</a></span><br /> -3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_161">161</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">III. The Will to Power As Exemplified in Society and</span><br /> -<span class="smcap" style="margin-left: 2.5em;">in the Individual</span><br /> -<br /> -1. Society and the State <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></span><br /> -2. The Individual <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_214">214</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">IV. The Will to Power in Art</span> <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_239">239</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Fourth Book. Discipline and Breeding.</span><br /> -<br /> -I. <span class="smcap">The Order of Rank—</span><br /> -<br /> -1. The Doctrine of the Order of Rank <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_295">295</a></span><br /> -2. The Strong and the Weak <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_298">298</a></span><br /> -3. The Noble Man <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_350">350</a></span><br /> -4. The Lords of the Earth <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_360">360</a></span><br /> -5. The Great Man <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_366">366</a></span><br /> -6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_373">373</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">II. Dionysus</span> <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_388">388</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">III. Eternal Recurrence</span> <span class="tabnum"><a href="#Page_422">422</a></span></p> - - - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4>TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.</h4> - - -<p>For the history of the text constituting this volume I would refer -readers to my preface to <i>The Will to Power,</i> Books I, and II., where -they will also find a brief explanation of the actual title of the -complete work.</p> - -<p>In the two books before us Nietzsche boldly carries his principle -still further into the various departments of human life, and does not -shrink from showing its application even to science, to art, and to -metaphysics.</p> - -<p>Throughout Part I. of the Third Book we find him going to great pains -to impress the fact upon us that science is as arbitrary as art in -its mode of procedure, and that the knowledge of the scientist is but -the outcome of his inexorable will to power interpreting facts in the -terms of the self-preservative conditions of the particular order of -human beings to which he belongs. In Aphorisms 515 and 516, which are -typical of almost all the thought expressed in Part I., Nietzsche says -distinctly: "The object is not 'to know,' but to schematise,—to impose -as much regularity and form upon chaos as our practical needs require."</p> - -<p>Unfamiliarity, constant change, and the inability to reckon with -possibilities, are sources of great<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span> danger: hence, everything <i>must</i> -be explained, assimilated, and rendered capable of calculation, if -Nature is to be mastered and controlled.</p> - -<p>Schemes for interpreting earthly phenomena must be devised which, -though they do not require to be absolute or irrefutable, must -yet favour the maintenance of the kind of men that devises them. -Interpretation thus becomes all important, and facts sink down to -the rank of raw material which must first be given some shape (some -sense—always anthropocentric) before they can become serviceable.</p> - -<p>Even the development of reason and logic Nietzsche consistently shows -to be but a spiritual development of the physiological function -of digestion which compels an organism to make things "like" (to -"assimilate") before it can absorb them (Aph. 510). And seeing that he -denies that hunger can be a first motive (Aphs. 651-656), and proceeds -to show that it is the amœba's will to power which makes it extend its -pseudopodia in search of what it can appropriate, and that, once the -appropriated matter is enveloped, it is a process of making <i>similar</i> -which constitutes the process of absorption, reason itself is by -inference acknowledged to be merely a form of the same fundamental will.</p> - -<p>An interesting and certainly inevitable outcome of Nietzsche's argument -appears in Aph. 516, where he declares that even our inability to deny -and affirm one and the same thing is not in the least necessary, <i>but -only a sign of inability.</i></p> - -<p>The whole argument of Part I. tends to draw<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span> science ever nearer and -nearer to art (except, of course, in those cases in which science -happens to consist merely of an ascertainment of facts), and to prove -that the one like the other is no more than a means of gaining some -foothold upon the slippery soil of a world that is for ever in flux.</p> - -<p>In the rush and pell-mell of Becoming, some milestones must be fixed -for the purposes of human orientation. In the torrent of evolutionary -changes pillars must be made to stand, to which man can for a space -hold tight and collect his senses. Science, like art, accomplishes this -for us, and it is our will to power which "creates the impression of -Being out of Becoming" (Aph. 517).</p> - -<p>According to this standpoint, then, consciousness is also but a weapon -in the service of the will to power, and it extends or contracts -according to our needs (Aph. 524). It might disappear altogether (Aph. -523), or, on the other hand, it might increase and make our life more -complicated than it already is. But we should guard against making -it the Absolute behind Becoming, simply because it happens to be the -highest and most recent evolutionary form (Aph. 709). If we had done -this with each newly acquired characteristic, sight itself, which is a -relatively recent development, would also have required to have been -deified.</p> - -<p>Pantheism, Theism, Unitarianism—in fact all religions in which a -<i>conscious</i> god is worshipped, are thus aptly classed by Nietzsche -as the result of man's desire to elevate that which is but a new and -wonderful instrument of his will to power, to the chief place in the -imaginary world beyond<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span> (eternal soul), and to make it even the deity -itself (God Omniscient).</p> - -<p>With the question of Truth we find Nietzsche quite as ready to uphold -his thesis as with all other questions. He frankly declares that "the -criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power" -(Aph. 534), and thus stands in diametrical opposition to Spencer, who -makes constraint or inability the criterion of truth. (See <i>Principles -of Psychology,</i> new edition, chapter ix.... "the unconceivableness of -its negation is the ultimate test of the truth of a proposition.")</p> - -<p>However paradoxical Nietzsche's view may seem, we shall find that -it is actually substantiated by experience; for the activity of our -senses certainly convinces us more or less according to the degree to -which it is provoked. Thus, if we walked for long round a completely -dark room, and everything yielded, however slightly, to our touch, we -should remain quite unconvinced that we were in a room at all, more -particularly if—to suppose a still more impossible case—the floor -yielded too. What provokes great activity in the bulbs of our fingers, -then, likewise generates the sensation of truth.</p> - -<p>From this Nietzsche proceeds to argue that what provokes the strongest -sentiments in ourselves is also true to us, and, from the standpoint of -thought, "that which gives thought the greatest sensation of strength" -(Aph. 533).</p> - -<p>The provocation of intense emotion, and therefore the provocation -of that state in which the body is above the normal in power, thus -becomes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> the index to truth; and it is a very remarkable thing that two -prominent English thinkers should, at the very end of their careers, -have practically admitted this, despite the fact that all their -philosophical productions had been based upon a completely different -belief. I refer, of course, to Spencer and Buckle, who both upheld the -view that in a system of thought the emotional factor is of the highest -importance.</p> - -<p>It follows from all this, that lies and false doctrines may quite -conceivably prove to be even more preservative to species than truth -itself, and although this is a view we have already encountered in the -opening aphorisms of <i>Beyond Good and Evil,</i> in Aph, 538 this volume -we find it further elucidated by Nietzsche's useful demonstration -of the fact that "the easier way of thinking always triumphs over -the more difficult way"; and that logic, inasmuch as it facilitated -classification and orderly thought, ultimately "got to act like truths."</p> - -<p>Before leaving Part I., with which it would be impossible to deal in -full, a word or two ought to be said in regard to Nietzsche's views -concerning the belief in "cause and effect." In the <i>Genealogy of -Morals</i> (1st Essay, Aph. 13), we have already read a forecast of our -author's more elaborate opinions on this question, and the aphorism -in question might be read with advantage in conjunction with the -discussion on the subject found in this book (Aphs. 545-555).</p> - -<p>The whole of Nietzsche's criticism, however, resolves itself into -this, that the doctrine of causality<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span> begins with an unnecessary -duplication of all that happens. Language, and its origin among a -people uneducated in thoughts and concepts, is at the root of this -scientific superstition, and Nietzsche traces its evolution from the -primeval and savage desire always to find a "doer" behind every deed: -to find some one who is responsible and who, being known, thus modifies -the unfamiliarity of the deed which requires explaining. "The so-called -instinct of causality [of which Kant speaks with so much assurance] is -nothing more than the fear of the unfamiliar."</p> - -<p>In Aph. 585 (A), we have a very coherent and therefore valuable -exposition of much that may still seem obscure in Nietzsche's -standpoint, and we might almost regard this aphorism as the key to -the epistemology of the Will to Power. When we find the "will to -truth" defined merely as "the longing for a stable world," we are in -possession of the very leitmotiv of Nietzsche's thought throughout Part -I., and most of what follows is clearly but an elaboration of this -thought.</p> - -<p>In Part II. Nietzsche reveals himself as utterly opposed to all -mechanistic and materialistic interpretations of the Universe. He -exalts the spirit and repudiates the idea that mere pressure from -without—naked environment—is to be held responsible (and often -guilty!) for all that materialistic science would lay at its door. -Darwin again comes in for a good deal of sharp criticism; and, to those -who are familiar with the nature of Nietzsche's disagreement with this -naturalist, such aphorisms as Nos. 643, 647, 649, 651, 684, 685,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span> will -be of special interest. There is one question of great moment, which -all Nietzsche's perfectly sincere and profoundly serious deprecation -of the Darwinian standpoint ought to bring home to all Englishmen who -have perhaps too eagerly endorsed the conclusions of their own British -school of organic evolution, and that is, to what extent were Malthus, -and afterwards his disciple Darwin, perhaps influenced in their -analysis of nature by preconceived notions drawn from the state of -high pressure which prevailed in the thickly-populated and industrial -country in which they both lived?</p> - -<p>It is difficult to defend Darwin from the fundamental attack which -Nietzsche directs at the very root of his teaching, and which turns -upon the question of the motive of all Life's struggle. To assume -that the motive is always a "struggle for existence" presupposes the -constant presence of two conditions—want and over-population,—an -assumption which is absolutely non-proven, and it likewise lends a -peculiarly ignoble and cowardly colouring to the whole of organic life, -which not only remains unsubstantiated in fact, but which the struggle -for power completely escapes. In Part III., which, throughout, is -pretty plain sailing, Aphorism 786 contains perhaps the most important -statements. Here morality is shown to be merely an instrument, but this -time it is the instrument of the gregarious will to power. In the last -paragraph of this aphorism Nietzsche shows himself quite antagonistic -to Determinism, because of its intimate relation to, and its origin in, -a mechanistic interpretation of the Universe.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> But we should always -remember that, inasmuch as Nietzsche would distribute beliefs, just as -others distribute bounties—that is to say, according to the needs of -those whom he has in view, we must never take for granted that a belief -which he deprecates for one class of man ought necessarily, according -to him, to be denied another class.</p> - -<p>Hard as it undoubtedly is to bear this in mind, we should remember that -his appeal is almost without interruption made to higher men, and that -doctrines and creeds which he condemns for them he would necessarily -exalt in the case of people who were differently situated and otherwise -constituted. Christianity is a case in point (see <i>Will to Power,</i> vol. -i. Aph. 132).</p> - -<p>We now come to Part IV., which is possibly the most important part of -all, seeing that it treats of those questions which may be regarded as -Nietzsche's most constant concern from the time when he wrote his first -book.</p> - -<p>The world as we now see and know it, with all that it contains which is -beautiful, indifferent, or ugly, from a human standpoint, is, according -to Nietzsche, the creation of our own valuing minds. Perhaps only a few -people have had a hand in shaping this world of values. Maybe their -number could be counted on the fingers of two hands; but still, what -Nietzsche insists upon is, that it is human in its origin. Our whole -outlook, everything that gives us joy or pain, must at one time or -other have been valued for us, and in persisting in these valuations -we, as the acclimatised herd, are indebted to our artists, to our -higher men, to all those in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> history, who at some time or other have -dared to stand up and to declare emphatically that <i>this</i> was ugly and -that <i>that</i> was beautiful, and to fight, and if necessary to die, for -their opinion.</p> - -<p>Religion, morality, and philosophy, while they all aim at so-called -universal Truth, tend to depreciate the value of life in the eyes of -exceptional men. Though they establish the "beautiful" for the general -stock, and in that way enhance the value of life for that stock, -they contradict higher men's values, and, by so doing, destroy their -innocent faith in the world. For the problem here is not, what value is -true?—but, what value is most conducive to the highest form of human -life on earth?</p> - -<p>Nietzsche would fain throw all the burden of valuing upon the Dionysian -artist him who speaks about this world out of the love and plenitude -of power that is in his own breast, him who, from the very health that -is within him, cannot look out upon life without transfiguring it, -hallowing it, blessing it, and making it appear better, bigger, and -more beautiful. And, in this view, Nietzsche is quite consistent; for, -if we must accept his conclusion that our values are determined for us -by our higher men, then it becomes of the highest importance that these -valuers should be so constituted that their values may be a boon and -not a bane to the rest of humanity.</p> - -<p>Alas! only too often, and especially in the nineteenth century, have -men who lacked this Dionysian spirit stood up and valued the world; and -it is against these that Nietzsche protests. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span> is the bad air they -have spread which he would fain dispel.</p> - -<p>An to what art means to the artist himself, apart from its actual -effect on the world, Nietzsche would say that it is a manner of -discharging his will to power. The artist tries to stamp his opinion -of what is desirable, and of what is beautiful or ugly, upon his -contemporaries and the future; it is in this valuing that his impulse -to prevail finds its highest expression. Hence the instinctive economy -of artists in sex matters—that is to say, in precisely that quarter -whither other men go when their impulse to prevail urges them to -action. Nietzsche did not of course deny the sensual nature of artists -(Aph. 815); all he wished to make plain was this, that an artist who -was not moderate, <i>in eroticis,</i> while engaged upon his task, was open -to the strongest suspicion.</p> - -<p>In the Fourth Book Nietzsche is really at his very best. Here, while -discussing questions such as "The Order of Rank," he is so thoroughly -in his exclusive sphere, that practically every line, even if it were -isolated and taken bodily from the context, would bear the unmistakable -character of its author. The thought expressed in Aphorism 871 reveals -a standpoint as new as it is necessary. So used have we become to the -practice of writing and legislating for a mass, that we have forgotten -the rule that prevails even in our own navy—that the speed of a fleet -is measured by its slowest vessel.</p> - -<p>On the same principle, seeing that all our philosophies and moralities -have hitherto been directed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span> at a mass and at a mob, we find that their -elevation must of necessity be decided by the lowest of mankind. Thus -all passions are banned, because base men do not know how to enlist -them in their service. Men who are masters of themselves and of others, -men who understand the management and privilege of passion, become the -most despised of creatures in such systems of thought, because they are -confounded with the vicious and licentious; and the speed of mankind's -elevation thus gets to be determined by humanity's slowest vessels.</p> - -<p>Aphorisms 881, 882, 886 fully elucidate the above considerations, while -in 912, 916, 943, and 951 we have plans of a constructive teaching -which the remainder of Part I. elaborates.</p> - -<p>And now, following Nietzsche carefully through Part II. (Dionysus), -what is the inevitable conclusion of all we have read? This analysis -of the world's collective values and their ascription to a certain -"will to power" may now seem to many but an exhaustive attempt at a new -system of nomenclature, and little else. As a matter or fact it is very -much more than this. By mean? of it Nietzsche wishes to show mankind -how much has lain, and how much still lies, in man's power By laying -his finger on everything and declaring to man that it was human will -that created it. Nietzsche wished to give man the courage of this will, -and a clean conscience in exercising it. For it was precisely this very -will to power which had been most hated and most maligned by everybody -up to Nietzsche's time.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a></span></p> - -<p>Long enough, prompted by the fear of attributing any one of his -happiest thoughts to this hated fundamental will, had man ascribed -all his valuations and all his most sublime inspirations to something -outside himself,—whether this something were a God, a principle, or -the concept Truth. But Nietzsche's desire was to show man how human, -all too human, have been the values that have appeared heretofore; -he wished to prove, that to the rare sculptors of values, the world, -despite its past, is still an open field of yielding clay, and in -pointing to what the will to power has done until now, Nietzsche -suggests to these coming sculptors what might still be done, provided -they fear nothing, and have that innocence and that profound faith in -the fundamental will which others hitherto have had in God, Natural -Laws, Truth, and other euphemistic fictions.</p> - -<p>The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, to which Nietzsche attached so much -importance that it may be regarded almost as the inspiration which led -to his great work, <i>Thus Spake Zarathustra,</i> ought to be understood -in the light of a purely disciplinary and chastening creed. In one of -his posthumous works we find Nietzsche saying: "The question which -thou shalt have to answer before every deed that thou doest;—is this -such a deed as I am prepared to perform an incalculable number of -times,—is the best ballast." Thus it is obvious that, feeling the need -of something in his teaching which would replace the metaphysics of -former beliefs, he applied the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence to this -end. Seeing, however,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span> that even among Nietzscheans themselves there -is considerable doubt concerning the actual value of the doctrine as -a ruling belief, it does not seem necessary to enter here into the -scientific justification which he claims for it. Suffice it to say -that, as knowledge stands at present, the statement that the world will -recur eternally in small things as in great, is still a somewhat daring -conjecture—a conjecture, however, which would have been entirely -warrantable if its disciplinary value had been commensurate with its -daring.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 75%; font-size: 0.8em;">ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a><br /><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="THIRD_BOOK" id="THIRD_BOOK">THIRD BOOK.</a></h4> - -<h3>THE PRINCIPLES OF A NEW VALUATION.</h3> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a><br /><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="I" id="I">I.</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.</h4> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<p class="title"><i>(a)</i> The Method of Investigation.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">466.</p> - -<p>The distinguishing feature of our nineteenth century is not the triumph -of <i>science,</i> but the triumph of the scientific <i>method</i> over science.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">467.</p> - -<p><i>The history of scientific methods</i> was regarded by Auguste Comte -almost as philosophy itself.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">468.</p> - -<p>The great <i>Methodologists:</i> Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Auguste Comte.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">469.</p> - -<p>The most valuable knowledge is always discovered last: but the most -valuable knowledge consists of <i>methods.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span></p> - -<p>All methods, all the hypotheses on which the science of our day -depends, were treated with the profoundest contempt for centuries: -on their account a man used to be banished from the society of -<i>respectable</i> people—he was held to be an "<i>enemy of God,</i>" a reviler -of the highest ideal, a madman.</p> - -<p>We had the whole <i>pathos</i> of mankind against us,—our notion of what -"truth" ought to be, of what the service of truth ought to be, our -objectivity, our method, our calm, cautious and distrustful manner were -altogether <i>despicable....</i> At bottom, that which has kept men back -most, is an æsthetic taste: they believed in the picturesque effect of -truth; what they demanded of the scientist was, that he should make a -strong appeal to their imagination.</p> - -<p>From the above, it would almost seem as if the very <i>reverse</i> had been -achieved, as if a sudden <i>jump</i> had been made: as a matter of fact, the -schooling which the moral hyperboles afforded, gradually prepared the -way for that <i>milder form of pathos</i> which at last became incarnate in -the scientific man....</p> - -<p><i>Conscientiousness in small things,</i> the self-control of the religious -man, was a preparatory school for the scientific character, as was -also, in a very pre-eminent sense, the attitude of mind which makes a -man <i>take problems seriously,</i> irrespective of what personal advantage -he may derive from them....</p> - -<hr /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="title"><i>(b)</i> The Starting-point of Epistemology.></p> - - -<p class="parnum">470.</p> - -<p>Profound disinclination to halt once and for all at any collective view -of the world. The charm of the opposite point of view: the refusal to -relinquish the stimulus residing in the enigmatical.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">471.</p> - -<p>The hypothesis that, at bottom, things proceed in such a moral fashion -that <i>human reason must be right,</i> is a mere piece of good-natured -and simple-minded trustfulness, the result of the belief in Divine -truthfulness—God regarded as the Creator of all things.—These -concepts are our inheritance from a former existence in a Beyond.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">472.</p> - -<p>The contradiction of the so-called "facts of consciousness." -Observation a thousand times more difficult, error is perhaps the -absolute <i>condition</i> of observation.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">473.</p> - -<p>The intellect cannot criticise itself, simply because it can be -compared with no other kind of intellect, and also because its ability -to know would only reveal itself in the presence of "actual reality"; -that is to say, because, in order to criticise the intellect, we should -have to be higher<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> creatures with "absolute knowledge." This would -presuppose the existence of <i>something,</i> a "thing-in-itself," apart -from all the perspective kinds of observation and senso-spiritual -perception. But the psychological origin of the belief in <i>things,</i> -forbids our speaking of "things in themselves."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">474.</p> - -<p>The idea that a sort of adequate relation exists between <i>subject</i> and -<i>object,</i> that the object is something which <i>when seen from inside</i> -would be a subject, is a well-meant invention which, I believe, has -seen its best days. The measure of that which we are conscious of, is -perforce entirely dependent upon the coarse utility of the function of -consciousness: how could this little garret-prospect of consciousness -warrant our asserting anything in regard to "subject" and "object," -which would bear any relation to reality!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">475.</p> - -<p>Criticism of modern philosophy: erroneous starting-point, as if there -were such things as "facts of consciousness"—and no <i>phenomenalism</i> in -<i>introspection.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">476.</p> - -<p>"Consciousness"—to what extent is the idea which is thought of, the -idea of will, or the idea of a feeling (<i>which is known by us alone</i>), -quite superficial? Our <i>inner</i> world is also "appearance."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">477.</p> - -<p>I am convinced of the phenomenalism of the <i>inner</i> world also: -everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and completely -adjusted, simplified, schematised, interpreted, the <i>actual</i> process -of inner "perception," the <i>relation of causes</i> between thoughts, -feelings, desires, between subject and object, is absolutely concealed -from us, and may be purely imaginary. This "<i>inner</i> world of -appearance" is treated with precisely the same forms and procedures as -the "outer" world. We never come across a single "fact": pleasure and -pain are more recently evolved intellectual phenomena....</p> - -<p>Causality evades us; to assume the existence of an immediate causal -relation between thoughts, as Logic does, is the result of the coarsest -and most clumsy observation. There are <i>all sorts of passions</i> that may -intervene between two thoughts: but the interaction is too rapid—that -is why we <i>fail to recognise</i> them, that is why we actually <i>deny</i> -their existence....</p> - -<p>"Thinking," as the epistemologists understand <i>\r</i> it, never takes -place at all: it is an absolutely gratuitous fabrication, arrived at -by selecting one element from the process and by eliminating all the -rest—an artificial adjustment for the purpose of the understanding....</p> - -<p>The "mind," <i>something that thinks</i>: at times, even, "the mind absolute -and pure"—this concept is an evolved and second result of false -introspection, which believes in "thinking": in the first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> place an act -is imagined here which does not really occur at all, <i>i.e.</i> "thinking"; -and, <i>secondly,</i> a subject-substratum is imagined in which every -process of this thinking has its origin, and nothing else—that is to -say, <i>both the action and the agent are fanciful.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">478.</p> - -<p>Phenomenalism must not be sought in the wrong quarter: nothing is more -phenomenal, or, to be more precise, nothing is so much <i>deception,</i> as -this inner world, which we observe with the "inner sense."</p> - -<p>Our belief that the will is a cause was so great, that, according to -our personal experiences in general, we projected a cause into all -phenomena (<i>i.e.</i> a certain motive is posited as the cause of all -phenomena).</p> - -<p>We believe that the thoughts which follow one upon the other in our -minds are linked by some sort of causal relation: the logician, more -especially, who actually speaks of a host of facts which have never -once been seen in reality, has grown accustomed to the prejudice that -thoughts <i>are the cause</i> of thoughts.</p> - -<p>We believe—and even our philosophers believe it still—that pleasure -and pain are the causes of reactions, that the very purpose of pleasure -and pain is to occasion reactions. For hundreds of years, pleasure and -pain have been represented as the <i>motives</i> for every action. Upon -reflection, however, we are bound to concede that everything would have -proceeded in exactly the same way, according to precisely the same -sequence of cause<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> and effect, if the states "pleasure" and "pain" had -been entirely absent; and that we are simply deceived when we believe -that they actually cause anything:—they are the <i>attendant phenomena,</i> -and they have quite a different purpose from that of provoking -reactions; they are in themselves effects involved in the process of -reaction which takes place.</p> - -<p><i>In short:</i> Everything that becomes conscious is a final phenomenon, a -conclusion—and is the cause of nothing; all succession of phenomena -in consciousness is absolutely atomistic.—And we tried to understand -the universe from the <i>opposite</i> point of view—as if nothing were -effective or real, save thinking, feeling, willing! ...</p> - - -<p class="parnum">479.</p> - -<p><i>The phenomenalism of the "inner world!" A chronological inversion -takes place,</i> so that the cause reaches consciousness as the -effect.—We know that pain is projected into a certain part of the -body although it is not really situated there; we have learnt that all -sensations which were ingenuously supposed to be conditioned by the -outer world are, as a matter of fact, conditioned by the inner world: -that the real action of the outer world never takes place in a way of -which we can become conscious.... That fragment of the outer world of -which we become conscious, is born after the effect produced by the -outer world has been recorded, and is subsequently interpreted as the -"cause" of that effect....</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span></p> - -<p>In the phenomenalism of the "inner world," the chronological order -of cause and effect is inverted. The fundamental fact of "inner -experience" is, that the cause is imagined after the effect has been -recorded.... The same holds good of the sequence of thoughts: we seek -for the reason of a thought, before it has reached our consciousness; -and then the reason reaches consciousness first, whereupon follows -its effect. All our dreams are the interpretation of our collective -feelings with the view of discovering the possible causes of the -latter; and the process is such that a condition only becomes -conscious, when the supposed causal link has reached consciousness.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>The whole of "inner experience" is founded on this: that a cause is -sought and imagined which accounts for a certain irritation in our -nerve-centres, and that it is only the cause which is found in this way -which reaches consciousness; this cause may have absolutely nothing to -do with the real cause—it is a sort of groping assisted by former -"inner experiences," that is to say, by memory. The memory, however, -retains the habit of old interpretations,—that is to say, of erroneous -causality,—so that "inner experience" comprises in itself all the -results of former erroneous fabrications of causes. Our "outside -world," as we conceive it every instant, is indissolubly bound up with -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> old error of cause: we interpret by means of the schematism of -"the thing," etc.</p> - - -<p>"Inner experience" only enters consciousness when it has found a -language which the individual can <i>understand</i>—that is to say, a -translation of a certain condition into conditions with which he is -<i>familiar;</i> "understand" means simply this: to be able to express -something new in the terms of something old or familiar. For instance, -"I feel unwell"—a judgment of this sort presupposes a <i>very great and -recent neutrality on the part of the observer:</i> the simple man always -says, "This and that make me feel unwell,"—he begins to be clear -concerning his indisposition only after he has discovered a reason for -it.... This is what I call <i>a lack of philological</i> knowledge; to be -able to read a text, <i>as such,</i> without reading an interpretation into -it, is the latest form of "inner experience,"—it is perhaps a barely -possible form....</p> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> When in our dream we hear a bell ringing, or a tapping at -our door, we scarcely ever wake before having already accounted for the -sound, in the terms of the dream-world we were in.—TR.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">480.</p> - -<p>There are no such things as "mind," reason, thought, consciousness, -soul, will, or truth: they all belong to fiction, and can serve no -purpose. It is not a question of "subject and object," but of a -particular species of animal which can prosper only by means of a -certain <i>exactness,</i> or, better still, <i>regularity</i> in recording its -perceptions (in order that experience may be capitalised)....</p> - -<p>Knowledge works as an <i>instrument</i> of power. It is therefore obvious -that it increases with each advance of power....</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span></p> - -<p>The purpose of knowledge: in this case, as in the case of "good" or -"beautiful," the concept must be regarded strictly and narrowly from an -anthropocentric and biological standpoint. In order that a particular -species may maintain and increase its power, its conception of reality -must contain enough which is calculable and constant to allow of its -formulating a scheme of conduct. <i>The utility of preservation</i>—and -<i>not</i> some abstract or theoretical need to eschew deception—stands as -the motive force behind the development of the organs of knowledge; ... -they evolve in such a way that their observations may suffice for our -preservation. In other words, the <i>measure</i> of the desire for knowledge -depends upon the extent to which <i>the Will to Power</i> grows in a certain -species: a species gets a grasp of a given amount of reality, <i>in order -to master it, in order to enlist that amount in its service.</i></p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title"><i>(c)</i> The Belief in the "Ego." Subject.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">481.</p> - -<p>In opposition to Positivism, which halts at phenomena and says, -"These are only <i>facts</i> and nothing more," I would say: No, -facts are precisely what is lacking, all that exists consists of -<i>interpretations.</i> We cannot establish any fact "in itself": it -may even be nonsense to desire to do such a thing. "Everything is -<i>subjective,</i>" ye say: but that in itself is <i>interpretation.</i> The -subject is nothing given, but something superimposed by fancy, -something<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> introduced behind.—Is it necessary to set an interpreter -behind the interpretation already to hand? Even that would be fantasy, -hypothesis.</p> - -<p>To the extent to which knowledge has any sense at all, the world is -knowable: but it may be interpreted <i>differently,</i> it has not one sense -behind it, but hundreds of senses.—"Perspectivity."</p> - -<p>It is our needs that <i>interpret the world</i>; our instincts and their -impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power; -each has its point of view, which it would fain impose upon all the -other instincts as their norm.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">482.</p> - -<p>Where our ignorance really begins, at that point from which we can see -no further, we set a word; for instance, the word "I," the word "do," -the word "suffer"—these concepts may be the horizon lines of our -knowledge, but they are not "truths."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">483.</p> - -<p>Owing to the phenomenon "thought," the ego is taken for granted; but -up to the present everybody believed, like the people, that there -was something unconditionally certain in the notion "I think," and -that by analogy with our understanding of all other causal reactions -this "I" was the given <i>cause</i> of the thinking. However customary -and indispensable this fiction may have become now, this fact proves -nothing against the imaginary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> nature of its origin; it might be a -life-preserving belief and <i>still</i> be <i>false.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">484.</p> - -<p>"Something is thought, therefore there is something that thinks": this -is what Descartes' argument amounts to. But this is tantamount to -considering our belief in the notion "<i>substance</i>" as an "<i>a priori</i>" -truth:—that there must be something "that thinks" when we think, is -merely a formulation of a grammatical custom which sets an agent to -every action. In short, a metaphysico-logical postulate is already put -forward here—and it is not merely <i>an ascertainment of fact....</i> On -Descartes' lines nothing absolutely certain is attained, but only the -fact of a very powerful faith.</p> - -<p>If the proposition be reduced to "Something is thought, therefore there -are thoughts," the result is mere tautology; and precisely the one -factor which is in question, the "<i>reality</i> of thought," is not touched -upon,—so that, in this form, the apparitional character of thought -cannot be denied. What Descartes <i>wanted</i> to prove was, that thought -not only had <i>apparent reality,</i> but absolute reality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">485.</p> - -<p>The concept <i>substance</i> is an outcome of the concept <i>subject,</i> and not -conversely! If we surrender the concept soul, the subject, the very -conditions for the concept "substance" are lacking. <i>Degrees of Being</i> -are obtained, but Being is lost.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span></p> - -<p>Criticism of "<i>reality</i>": what does a <i>"plus or minus of reality"</i> lead -to, the gradation of Being in which we believe?</p> - -<p>The degree of our feeling of <i>life</i> and <i>power</i> (the logic and -relationship of past life) presents us with the measure of "Being," -"reality," "non-appearance."</p> - -<p><i>Subject i</i> this is the term we apply to our belief in an <i>entity</i> -underlying all the different moments of the most intense sensations -of reality; we regard this belief as the effect of a cause,—and we -believe in our belief to such an extent that, on its account alone, -we imagine "truth," "reality," "substantiality."—a "Subject" is the -fiction which would fain make us believe that several similar states -were the effect of one substratum: but we it was who first <i>created</i> -the "similarity" of these states; the similising and adjusting of them -is the <i>fact—not</i> their similarity (on the contrary, this ought rather -to be denied).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">486.</p> - -<p>One would have to know what <i>Being</i> is, in order to be able to -<i>decide</i> whether this or that is real (for instance, "the facts of -consciousness"); it would also be necessary to know what <i>certainty</i> -and <i>knowledge</i> are, and so forth.—But, as we do <i>not</i> know these -things, a criticism of the faculty of knowledge is nonsensical: how is -it possible for an instrument to criticise itself, when it is itself -that exercises the critical faculty. It cannot even define itself!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">487.</p> - -<p>Should not all philosophy ultimately disclose the first principles on -which the reasoning processes depend?—that is to say, our <i>belief</i> -in the "ego" as a substance, as the only reality according to which, -alone, we are able to ascribe reality to things? The oldest realism -at length comes to light, simultaneously with man's recognition of -the fact that his whole religious history is no more than a history -of soul-superstitions. <i>Here there is a barrier;</i> our very thinking, -itself, involves that belief (with its distinctions—substance, -accident, action, agent, etc.); to abandon it would mean to cease from -being able to think.</p> - -<p>But that a belief, however useful it may be for the preservation of a -species, has nothing to do with the truth, may be seen from the fact -that we <i>must</i> believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling -ourselves compelled to regard them as absolute realities.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">488.</p> - -<p><i>The psychological origin of our belief in reason.—</i>The ideas -"reality," "Being," are derived from our <i>subject-</i>feeling.</p> - -<p>"Subject," interpreted through ourselves so that the ego may stand as -substance, as the cause of action, as the <i>agent.</i></p> - -<p>The metaphysico-logical postulates, the belief in substance, accident, -attribute, etc. etc., draws its convincing character from our habit of -regarding all our actions as the result of our will: so that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> the ego, -as substance, does not vanish in the multiplicity of changes.—<i>But -there is no such thing as will.</i> We have no categories which allow -us to separate a "world as thing-in-itself," from "a world of -appearance." All our <i>categories of reason</i> have a sensual origin: they -are deductions from the empirical world. "The soul," "the ego"—the -history of these concepts shows that here, also, the oldest distinction -("<i>spiritus</i>," "life") obtains....</p> - -<p>If there is nothing material, then there can be nothing immaterial. The -concept no longer <i>means</i> anything.</p> - -<p>No subject-"atoms." The sphere of a subject <i>increasing</i> or -<i>diminishing</i> unremittingly, the centre of the system continually -<i>displacing</i> itself, in the event of the system no longer being able -to organise the appropriated mass, it divides into two. On the other -hand, it is able, without destroying it, to transform a weaker subject -into one of its own functionaries, and, to a certain extent, to compose -a new entity with it. Not a "substance," but rather something which in -itself strives after greater strength; and which wishes to "preserve" -itself only indirectly (it wishes to <i>surpass</i> itself).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">489.</p> - -<p>Everything that reaches consciousness as an entity is already -enormously complicated: we never have anything more than the <i>semblance -of an entity.</i></p> - -<p>The phenomenon of the <i>body</i> is the richer, more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> distinct, and more -tangible phenomenon: it should be methodically drawn to the front, and -no mention should be made of its ultimate significance.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">490.</p> - -<p>The assumption of a <i>single subject</i> is perhaps not necessary, it -may be equally permissible to assume a plurality of subjects, whose -interaction and struggle lie at the bottom of our thought and our -consciousness in general. A sort of <i>aristocracy</i> of "cells" in which -the ruling power is vested? Of course an aristocracy of equals, who are -accustomed to ruling co-operatively, and understand how to command?</p> - -<p><i>My hypotheses</i>. The subject as a plurality. Pain intellectual and -dependent upon the judgment harmful, projected. The effect always -"unconscious": the inferred and imagined cause is projected, it -<i>follows</i> the event. Pleasure is a form of pain. The only kind of power -that exists is of the same nature as the power of will: a commanding -of other subjects which thereupon alter themselves. The unremitting -transientness and volatility of the subject. "Mortal soul." <i>Number</i> as -perspective form.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">491.</p> - -<p>The belief in the body is more fundamental than the belief in the soul: -the latter arose from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> the unscientific observation of the agonies -of the body. (Something which leaves it. The belief in the <i>truth of -dreams</i>)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">492.</p> - -<p>The body and physiology the starting-point: why?—We obtain a correct -image of the nature of our subject-entity, that is to say, as a -number of regents at the head of a community (not as "souls" or as -"life-forces") as also of the dependence of these regents upon their -subjects, and upon the conditions of a hierarchy, and of the division -of labour, as the means ensuring the existence of the part and the -whole. We also obtain a correct image of the way in which the living -entities continually come into being and expire, and we see how -eternity cannot belong to the "subject"; we realise that the struggle -finds expression in obeying as well as in commanding, and that a -fluctuating definition of the limits of power is a factor of life. The -comparative <i>ignorance</i> in which the ruler is kept, of the individual -performances and even disturbances taking place in the community, -also belong to the conditions under which government may be carried -on. In short, we obtain a valuation even of <i>want-of-knowledge,</i> -of seeing-things-generally-as-a-whole, of simplification, of -falsification, and of perspective. What is most important, however, -is, that we regard the ruler and his subjects as of the <i>same kind,</i> -all feeling, willing, thinking—and that wherever we see or suspect -movement in a body, we conclude that there is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> co-operative-subjective -and invisible life. Movement as a symbol for the eye; it denotes that -something has been felt, willed, thought.</p> - -<p>The danger of directly questioning the subject <i>concerning</i> the -subject, and all spiritual self-reflection, consists in this, that it -might be a necessary condition of its activity to interpret itself -<i>erroneously.</i> That is why we appeal to the body and lay the evidence -of sharpened senses aside: or we try and see whether the subjects -themselves cannot enter into communication with us.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title"><i>(d)</i> Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">493.</p> - -<p><i>Truth is that kind of error</i> without which a certain species of living -being cannot exist. The value for <i>Life</i> is ultimately decisive.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">494.</p> - -<p>It is unlikely that our "knowledge" extends farther than is exactly -necessary for our self-preservation. Morphology shows us how the -senses and the nerves as well as the brain evolve in proportion as the -difficulties of acquiring sustenance increase.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">495.</p> - -<p>If the morality of "Thou shalt not lie" be refuted, the sense for truth -will then have to justify<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> itself before another tribunal—as a means -to the preservation of man, <i>as Will to Power.</i></p> - -<p>Likewise our love of the beautiful: it is also the <i>creative will.</i> -Both senses stand side by side; the sense of truth is the means -wherewith the power is appropriated to adjust things according to one's -taste. The love of adjusting and reforming—a primeval love! We can -only <i>take cognisance</i> of a world which we ourselves have <i>made.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">496.</p> - -<p>Concerning the multifariousness of knowledge. The tracing of <i>its</i> -relation to many other things (or the relation of kind)—how should -"knowledge" be of another? The way to know and to investigate is in -itself among the conditions of life; that is why the conclusion that -there could be no other kind of intellect (for ourselves) than the kind -which serves the purpose of our preservation is an excessively hasty -one: this <i>actual</i> condition may be only an accidental, not in the -least an essential; one.</p> - -<p>Our apparatus for acquiring knowledge is not adjusted for knowledge.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">497.</p> - -<p><i>The most strongly credited a priori "truths" are, to my mind, mere -assumptions pending further investigation</i>; for instance, the law -of causation is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> a belief so thoroughly acquired by practice and so -completely assimilated, that to disbelieve in it would mean the ruin of -our kind. But is it therefore true? What an extraordinary conclusion! -As if truth were proved by the mere fact that man survives!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">498.</p> - -<p>To what extent is our <i>intellect</i> also a result of the conditions of -life?—We should not have it did we not <i>need</i> to have it, and we -should not have it <i>as</i> we have it, if we did not need it <i>as</i> we need -it—that is to say, if we could live otherwise.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">499.</p> - -<p>Thinking in a primitive (inorganic) state is to <i>persevere in forms,</i> -as in the case of the crystal.—In <i>our</i> thought, the <i>essential -factor</i> is the harmonising of the new material with the old schemes (= -Procrustes' bed), the <i>assimilation</i> of the unfamiliar.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">500.</p> - -<p>The perception of the senses projected outwards: "inwards" and -"outwards"—does the <i>body</i> command here?</p> - -<p>The same equalising and ordering power which rules in the idioplasma, -also rules in the incorporation of the outer world: our sensual -perceptions are already the <i>result</i> of this process of <i>adaptation</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> -and <i>harmonisation</i> in regard to <i>all</i> the past in us; they do not -follow directly upon the "impression."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">501.</p> - -<p>All thought, judgment, perception, regarded as an act of <i>comparing</i><a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -has as a first condition the act of <i>equalising,</i> and earlier still the -act of <i>"making equal."</i> The process of making equal is the same as the -assimilation by the amœba of the nutritive matter it appropriates.</p> - -<p>"Memory" late, in so far as the equalising instinct appears to have -been <i>subdued</i>: the difference is preserved. Memory—a process of -classification and collocation; active—who?</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The German word <i>vergleichen,</i> meaning "to compare," -contains the root "equal" <i>(gleich)</i> which cannot be rendered in -English. TR.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">502.</p> - -<p>In regard to the <i>memory,</i> we must unlearn a great deal: here we meet -with the greatest temptation to assume the existence of a "soul," -which, irrespective of time, reproduces and recognises again and again, -etc. What I have experienced, however, continues to live "in the -memory"; I have nothing to do with it when memory "comes," my will is -inactive in regard to it, as in the case of the coming and going of a -thought. Something happens, of which I become conscious: now something -similar comes—who has called it forth? Who has awakened it?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">503.</p> - -<p>The whole apparatus of knowledge is an abstracting and simplifying -apparatus—not directed at knowledge, but at the <i>appropriation</i> of -things: "end" and "means" are as remote from the essence of this -apparatus as "concepts" are. By the "end" and the "means" a process is -appropriated (—a process is <i>invented</i> which may be grasped), but by -"<i>concepts</i>" one appropriates the "things" which constitute the process.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">504.</p> - -<p><i>Consciousness</i> begins outwardly as co-ordination and knowledge of -impressions,—at first it is at the point which is remotest from the -biological centre of the individual; but it is a process which deepens -and which tends to become more and more an inner function, continually -approaching nearer to the centre.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">505.</p> - -<p>Our perceptions, as we understand them—that is to say, the sum of all -those perceptions the consciousness whereof was useful and essential -to us and to the whole organic processes which preceded us: therefore -they do not include all perceptions (for instance, not the electrical -ones);—that is to say, we have <i>senses</i> only for a definite selection -of perceptions—such perceptions as concern us with a view to our -self-preservation. <i>Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful.</i> -There can be no doubt that all our sense-perceptions are entirely -permeated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> by valuations (useful or harmful—consequently, pleasant or -painful). Every particular colour; besides being a colour, expresses a -value to us (although we seldom admit it, or do so only after it has -affected us exclusively for a long time, as in the case of convicts -in gaol or lunatics). Insects likewise react in different ways to -different colours: some like this shade, the others that. Ants are a -case in point.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">506.</p> - -<p>In the beginning <i>images</i> how images originate in the mind must be -explained. Then <i>words,</i> applied to images. Finally <i>concepts,</i> -possible only when there are words—the assembling of several pictures -into a whole which is not for the eye but for the ear (word). The -small amount of emotion which the "word" generates,—that is, then, -which the view of the similar pictures generates, for which one word -is used,—this simple emotion is the common factor, the basis of a -concept. That weak feelings should all be regarded as alike, <i>as the -same,</i> is the fundamental fact. There is therefore a confusion of -two very intimately associated feelings in the <i>ascertainment</i> of -these feelings;—but who is it that ascertains? <i>Faith</i> is the very -first step in every sensual impression: a sort of yea-saying is the -<i>first</i> intellectual activity! A "holding-a-thing-to-be-true" is -the beginning. It were our business, therefore, to explain how the -"holding-of-a-thing-to-be-true" arose! What sensation lies beneath the -comment "true"?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">507.</p> - -<p>The <i>valuation</i>, "I believe that this and that is so," is the essence -of "truth." In all valuations, the conditions of <i>preservation</i> and -of <i>growth</i> find expression. All our <i>organs and senses</i> of knowledge -have been developed only in view of the conditions of preservation -and growth. The <i>trust</i> in reason and its categories, the trust -in dialectics, and also the <i>valuation</i> of logic, prove only that -<i>experience</i> has taught the usefulness of these things to life: not -their "truth." The prerequisites of all living things and of their -lives is: that there should be a large amount of faith, that it should -be possible to pass definite judgments on things, and that <i>there -should be no doubt</i> at all concerning all essential values. Thus it is -necessary that something should be assumed to be true, <i>not</i> that it -<i>is</i> true.</p> - -<p>"The <i>real</i> world and the world of <i>appearance</i>"— I trace this -contrast to the <i>relation of values.</i> We have posited <i>our</i> conditions -of existence as the <i>attributes of being</i> in general. Owing to the -fact that, in order to prosper, we must be stable in our belief, we -developed the idea that the real world was neither a changing nor an -evolving one, but a world of <i>being.</i></p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title"><i>(e)</i> The Origin of Reason and Logic.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">508.</p> - -<p>Originally there was chaos among our ideas. Those ideas which were able -to stand side by side<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> remained over, the greater number perished—and -are still perishing.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">509.</p> - -<p>The kingdom of desires out of which logic grew: the gregarious instinct -in the background. The assumption of similar facts is the first -condition for "similar souls." <i>For the purpose of mutual understanding -and government.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">510.</p> - -<p>Concerning the <i>origin of logic.</i> The fundamental proneness to -<i>equalise</i> things and to <i>see them equal</i>, gets to be modified, -and kept within bounds, by the consideration of what is useful or -harmful—in fact, by considerations of success: it then becomes adapted -in suchwise as to be gratified in a milder way, without at the same -time denying life or endangering it. This whole process corresponds -entirely with that external and mechanical process (which is its -symbol) by which the <i>protoplasm</i> continually assimilates, makes equal -to itself, what it appropriates, and arranges it according to its own -forms and requirements.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">511.</p> - -<p>Likeness and Similarity.</p> - -<p>1. The coarser the organ the more apparent likenesses it sees;</p> - -<p>2. The mind <i>will</i> have likeness—that is to say, the identification -of one sensual impression with others already experienced: just as the -body <i>assimilates</i> inorganic matter.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span></p> - -<p>For the understanding of Logic:—</p> - -<p><i>The will which tends to see likeness everywhere is the will to -power</i>—the belief that something is so and so (the essence of a -judgment), is the result of a will which <i>would fain have it</i> as -similar as possible.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">512.</p> - -<p>Logic is bound up with the proviso: granted <i>that identical cases -exist</i>. As a matter of fact, before one can think and conclude in a -logical fashion, <i>this</i> condition <i>must</i> first be assumed. That is -to say, the will to <i>logical truth</i> cannot be consummated before a -fundamental falsification of all phenomena has been assumed. From which -it follows that an instinct rules here, which is capable of employing -both means: first, falsification; and secondly, the carrying out of its -own point of view: logic does not spring from a will to truth.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">513.</p> - -<p>The inventive force which devised the categories, worked in the service -of our need of security, of quick intelligibility, in the form of -signs, sounds, and abbreviations.—"Substance," "subject," "object," -"Being," "Becoming," are not matters of metaphysical truth. It was -the powerful who made the names of things into law, and, among the -powerful, it was the greatest artists in abstraction who created the -categories.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">514.</p> - -<p>A moral—that is to say, a method of living which long experience -and experiment have tested and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> proved efficient, at last enters -consciousness as a law, as dominant.... And then the whole group of -related values and conditions become part of it: it becomes venerable, -unassailable, holy, true; a necessary part of its evolution is that -its origin should be forgotten.... That is a sign that it has become -master. Exactly the same thing might have happened with the categories -of reason: the latter, after much groping and many trials, might have -proved true through relative usefulness.... A stage was reached when -they were grasped as a whole, and when they appealed to consciousness -as a whole,—when belief in them was commanded,—that is to say, when -they acted as if they commanded.... From that time forward they passed -as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And, possibly, they -may have been the expression of no more than a certain practicality -answering the ends of a race and a species,—their usefulness alone is -their "truth."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">515.</p> - -<p>The object is, not "to know," but to schematise,—to impose as much -regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In -the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need -in us that was the determining power: not the need "to know," but -to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and -calculation. (The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and -equal things,—the same process, which every sensual impression<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> -undergoes, is the development of reason!) No pre-existing "idea" had -anything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things -can be reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly -as equal.... <i>Finality</i> in reason is an effect, not a cause: Life -degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant attempts -are being made to attain to those other forms of reason;—for Life -would then become too obscure, too unequal.</p> - -<p>The categories are "truths" only in the sense that they are the -conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional -"truth." (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are -absolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen -to be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one -idiosyncrasy alone among many others....)</p> - -<p>The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here, -is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility -of concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we <i>are</i> almost this -instinct.... But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this -fact that we possess an absolute truth! ... The inability to contradict -anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">516.</p> - -<p>We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that -is a principle of subjective experience—which is not in the least -"necessary," <i>but only a sign of inability.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span></p> - -<p>If, according to Aristotle, the <i>principium contradictionis</i> is the -most certain of all principles; if it is the most ultimate of all, -and the basis of every demonstration; if the principle of every -other axiom lie within it: then one should analyse it all the more -severely, in order to discover how many assumptions <i>already lie</i> at -its root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being, -as if these had become known in some other sphere—that is to say, as -if it were <i>impossible</i> to ascribe the opposite attributes to it; or -the proposition means: that the opposites <i>should</i> not be ascribed to -it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, <i>not</i> directed at the -knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world <i>which -must seem true to us.</i></p> - -<p>In short, the question is a debatable one: are the axioms of logic -adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone -we can, <i>create</i> realities, or the concept "reality"?... In order to -affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen, -require a previous knowledge of Being; which is certainly not the case. -The proposition therefore contains no <i>criterion of truth,</i> but an -<i>imperative</i> concerning that which <i>should</i> pass as true.</p> - -<p>Supposing there were no such thing as A identical with itself, as -every logical (and mathematical) proposition presupposes, and that A -is in itself an <i>appearance,</i> then logic would have a mere world <i>of -appearance</i> as its first condition. As a matter of fact, we believe -in that proposition, under the influence of an endless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> empiricism -which seems to <i>confirm</i> it every minute. The "thing"—that is the -real substratum of A; <i>our belief in things</i> is the first condition of -our faith in logic. The A in logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction -of the thing.... By not understanding this, and by making logic -into a criterion of <i>real being,</i> we are already on the road to the -classification of all those hypostases, substance, attribute, object, -subject, action, etc., as realities—that is to say, the conception of -a metaphysical world or a "real world" (—<i>this is, however, once more -the world of appearance...</i>).</p> - -<p>The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding -of a thing for true, and the holding of a thing for not true,—in so -far as they do not only presuppose a mere habit, but the very <i>right</i> -to postulate truth or untruth at all,—are already dominated by a -belief, <i>that there is such a thing as knowledge for us,</i> and <i>that -judgments can really hit the truth:</i> in short, logic never doubts that -it is able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (—that -is to say, that to the thing which is in itself true, no opposite -attributes <i>can</i> be ascribed).</p> - -<p>In this belief there <i>reigns</i> the sensual and coarse prejudice that our -sensations teach us <i>truths</i> concerning things,—that I cannot at the -same moment of time say of one and the same thing that it is <i>hard</i> and -<i>soft.</i> (The instinctive proof, "I cannot have two opposite sensations -at once," is quite <i>coarse</i> and <i>false</i>.)</p> - -<p>That all contradiction in concepts should be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> forbidden, is the result -of a belief, that we <i>are able</i> to form concepts, that a concept not -only characterises but also <i>holds</i> the essence of a thing.... As a -matter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good of -<i>assumed existences which we have created.</i> Logic is <i>the attempt on -our part to understand the actual world according to a scheme of Being -devised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the -actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for -our own purposes....</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">517.</p> - -<p>In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, it is necessary -to <i>acknowledge that which exists:</i> logic only deals with formulæ for -things which are constant. That is why this acknowledgment would not in -the least prove reality: "that which is" is part of our optics. The ego -regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution).</p> - -<p>The <i>assumed world</i> of subject, substance, reason, etc., is necessary, -an adjusting, simplifying falsifying, artificially-separating power -resides in us. "Truth" is the will to be master over the manifold -sensations that reach consciousness; it is the will to <i>classify</i> -phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out -with a belief in the "true nature" of things (we regard phenomena as -real).</p> - -<p>The character of the world in the process of Becoming <i>is not -susceptible of formulation;</i> it is "false" and "contradicts itself." -<i>Knowledge</i> and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> the process of <i>evolution</i> exclude each other. -<i>Consequently,</i> knowledge must be something else: it must be preceded -by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must -create the <i>illusion</i> of <i>Being.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">518.</p> - -<p>If our "ego" is the only form of Being, according to which we make -and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very -proper to doubt whether an <i>illusion</i> of perspective were not active -here—the apparent unity which everything assumes in our eyes on the -horizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted -by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is -allowable to use that phenomenon which is <i>richer</i> and more easily -studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon.</p> - -<p>Finally: admitting that all is Becoming, <i>knowledge is only possible -when based on a belief in Being.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">519.</p> - -<p>If there is "only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms -of Being are made in its own image,—if, in short, the belief in the -"ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the -metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: if, in addition, the -"ego" is shown to be something that is <i>evolving: then——<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span></i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">520.</p> - -<p>The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the -"individual," etc.; the "number" of beings itself fluctuates. We should -know nothing of time or of movement, if, in a rough way, we did not -believe we saw things "standing still" behind or in front of things -moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect, -and without the erroneous idea of "empty space" we should never have -arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity is -based on the "fact of appearance" that there are some things alike. -Strictly speaking, it would not be possible to "understand" and "know" -an evolving world; something which is called "knowledge" exists only -in so far as the "understanding" and "knowing" intellect already -finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of a host -of mere appearances, but become fixed <i>to</i> the extent in which this -kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent is -"knowledge" possible—that is to say, as a measuring of earlier and -more recent errors by one another.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">521.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning logical appearance.</i>—The concept "individual" and the -concept "species" are equally false and only apparent. "<i>Species</i>" only -expresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at -the same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> -further transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long -time: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are -of no account at all (—a stage of evolution in which the process of -evolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibrium -<i>seem</i> to have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the -error of supposing <i>that an actual goal has been reached</i>—and that -evolution had a goal...).</p> - -<p>The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable; -but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often -"the same form is attained," it does not signify that it <i>is the -same form,—because something new always appears</i>; and we alone, who -compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as it resembles the -latter, and embody the two in the unity of "form." As if a <i>type</i> had -to be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes.</p> - -<p><i>Form, species, law, idea, purpose</i>—the same fault is made in respect -of all these concepts, namely, that of giving a false realism to a -piece of fiction: as if all phenomena were infused with some sort of -obedient spirit—an artificial distinction is here made between that -<i>which</i> acts and that <i>which</i> guides action (but both these things are -only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they -are not "facts").</p> - -<p>We should not interpret this <i>constraint</i> in ourselves, to imagine -concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws ("<i>a world of identical -cases</i>") as if we were in a position to construct a <i>real world</i>; but -as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> a constraint to adjust a world by means of which <i>our existence</i> -will be ensured: we thereby create a world which is determinable, -simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us.</p> - -<p>The very same constraint is active in <i>the functions of the senses</i> -which support the reason—by means of simplification, coarsening, -accentuation, and interpretation; whereon all "recognition," all the -ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our <i>needs</i> have made -our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance" always -returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of <i>reality.</i></p> - -<p>Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic, is expressive only -of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we -did nothing <i>save introduce its postulates into the nature of things:</i> -now we find ourselves in their presence,—we can no longer help -it,—and now we would fain believe that this constraint is a guarantee -of "truth." We it was who created the "thing," the "same thing," the -subject, the attribute, the action, the object, the substance, and -the form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening, -and simplifying as far as possible. The world <i>seems</i> logical to us, -because we have already made it logical.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">522.</p> - -<p><i>Fundamental solution.</i>—We believe in reason: this is, however, the -philosophy of colourless <i>concepts.</i> Language is built upon the most -<i>naïf</i> prejudices.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span></p> - -<p>Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to -<i>think only</i> in the form of language—we also believe in the "eternal -truth" of "wisdom" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc.).</p> - -<p><i>We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control -of language</i>; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt -concerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.</p> - -<p><i>Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme -which we cannot reject.</i></p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">(<i>f</i>) Consciousness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">523.</p> - -<p>There is no greater error than that of making psychical and physical -phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance. -By this means nothing is explained: the concept <i>"substance"</i> is -utterly useless as a means of explanation. <i>Consciousness</i> may be -regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing, -probably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect -automatism—</p> - -<p>When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb -who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements -of the speaker's lips. From the appearance of the inner mind we draw -conclusions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could -ascertain if our powers of observation were adequate for the purpose.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span></p> - -<p>For this inner world we have no finer organs, and that is why a -<i>complexity which is thousandfold</i> reaches our consciousness as a -simple entity, and we invent a process of causation in it, despite -the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of -the change—the sequence of thoughts and feelings is nothing more -than their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence -has anything to do with a chain of causes is not worthy of belief: -consciousness never communicates an example of cause and effect to us.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">524.</p> - -<p><i>The part "consciousness" plays,</i>—It is essential that one should not -mistake the part that "consciousness plays" it is our <i>relation to the -outer world; it was the outer world that developed it.</i> On the other -hand, the <i>direction</i>—that is to say, the care and cautiousness which -is concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does -<i>not</i> enter into our consciousness any more than does the <i>storing -activity</i> of the intellect: that there is a superior controlling -force at work in these things cannot be doubted—a sort of directing -committee, in which the various <i>leading desires</i> make their votes and -their power felt. "Pleasure" and "pain" are indications which reach us -from this sphere: as are also <i>acts of will</i> and <i>ideas.</i></p> - -<p><i>In short:</i> That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are -completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge—the sequence of -thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> not signify that -the order in which they come is a causal order: it is <i>so apparently,</i> -however, in the highest degree. We have <i>based</i> the whole of our notion -of <i>intellect, reason, logic,</i> etc., upon this <i>apparent truth</i> (all -these things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities), -and we then projected the latter into and <i>behind</i> all things!</p> - -<p>As a rule <i>consciousness</i> itself is understood to be the general -sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a <i>means of -communication:</i> it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to -the interests of intercourse.... "Intercourse" is understood, here, -as "relation," and is intended to cover the action of the outer world -upon us and our necessary response to it, as also our actual influence -<i>upon</i> the outer world. It is <i>not</i> the conducting force, but an <i>organ -of the latter.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">525.</p> - -<p>My principle, compressed into a formula which savours of antiquity, of -Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept, -"God is <i>spirit,</i>" God as perfection is "<i>denied....</i>"</p> - - -<p class="parnum">526.</p> - -<p>Wherever people have observed a certain unity in the grouping of -things, <i>spirit</i> has always been regarded as the cause of this -co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lacking. -Why should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of that -fact? Or why should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> the <i>notion</i> of a complex fact have to precede it -as its cause?</p> - -<p>We must be on our guard against explaining <i>finality</i> by the spirit: -there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the -peculiar power of organising and systematising. The domain of the -nervous system is much more extensive: the realm of consciousness is -superadded. In the collective process of adaptation and systematising, -consciousness plays no part at all.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">527.</p> - -<p>Physiologists, like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases -in <i>value</i> in proportion as it <i>gains</i> in clearness: the most lucid -consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the -<i>first</i> order. Meanwhile—according to what standard is this value -determined?—In regard to the <i>discharge of will-power</i> the most -superficial and <i>most simple</i> thought is the most useful—it might -therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives over).</p> - -<p><i>Precision in action</i> is opposed to the <i>far-sighted</i> and often -uncertain judgments of <i>caution:</i> the latter is led by the <i>deeper</i> -instinct.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">528.</p> - -<p><i>The chief error of psychologists:</i> they regard the indistinct idea as -of a lower <i>kind</i> than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance -from our consciousness and which is therefore <i>obscure, may</i> on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> that -very account be quite clear in itself. <i>The fact that a thing becomes -obscure</i> is a question <i>of the perspective of consciousness.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">529.</p> - -<p>The great misapprehensions:—</p> - -<p>(1) The senseless <i>overestimation of consciousness,</i> its elevation to -the dignity of an entity: "a spirit," "a soul," something that feels, -thinks, and wills;</p> - -<p>(2) The spirit regarded as a <i>cause,</i> especially where finality, -system, and co-ordination appear;</p> - -<p>(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most -superior kind of being, as "God";</p> - -<p>(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;</p> - -<p>(5) The "real world" regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by -means of the facts of consciousness;</p> - -<p>(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness, -wherever knowledge exists at all.</p> - -<p><i>Consequences:</i>—</p> - -<p>Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every -step backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was -regarded as a falling-back upon the <i>passions</i> and <i>senses—</i>as a -state of <i>animalism ...</i>.)</p> - -<p>Man approaches reality and real being through dialectics: man <i>departs</i> -from them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism....</p> - -<p>To convert man into a spirit, would mean to make a god of him: spirit, -will, goodness—all one.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>All goodness</i> must take its root in spirituality, must be a fact of -consciousness.</p> - -<p>Every step made towards <i>something better</i> can be only a step forward -in <i>consciousness.</i></p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">(g) Judgment. True—false.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">530.</p> - -<p>Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmatism, his moral outlook, -ruled, guided, and directed him.</p> - -<p>The πρῶτον ψεῡδος: how is the fact knowledge possible? Is knowledge -a fact at all? What is knowledge? If we do not <i>know</i> what knowledge -is, we cannot possibly reply to the question, Is there such a thing -as knowledge? Very <i>fine!</i> But if I do not already "know" whether -there is, or can be, such a thing as knowledge, I cannot reasonably -ask the question, "What is knowledge?" Kant <i>believes</i> in the fact of -knowledge: what he requires is a piece of <i>naïveté: the knowledge of -knowledge!</i></p> - -<p>"Knowledge is judgment." But judgment is a belief that something is -this or that! And not knowledge! "All knowledge consists in synthetic -judgments" which have the character of being <i>universally true</i> (the -fact is <i>so</i> in all cases, and does not change), and which have the -character of being <i>necessary</i> (the reverse of the proposition cannot -be imagined to exist).</p> - -<p>The <i>validity</i> of a belief in knowledge is always taken for granted; as -is also the <i>validity</i> of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here -<i>moral ontology</i> is the <i>ruling</i> bias.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p> - -<p>The conclusion, therefore, is: (1) there are propositions which we -believe to be universally true and necessary.</p> - -<p>(2) This character of universal truth and of necessity cannot spring -from experience.</p> - -<p>(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no experience at all, <i>but -upon something else</i>, it must be derived from another source of -knowledge!</p> - -<p>Kant concludes (1) that there are some propositions which hold good -only on one condition; (2) this condition is that they do not spring -from experience, but from pure reason.</p> - -<p>Thus, the question is, whence do we derive our reasons for <i>believing</i> -in the truth of such propositions? No, whence does our belief get -its cause? But the <i>origin of a belief,</i> of a strong conviction, -is a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience -frequently brings about such a belief! <i>It already presupposes</i> that -there are not only "data <i>a posteriori</i>" but also "data <i>a priori</i>"— -that is to say, "previous to experience." Necessary and universal truth -cannot be given by experience: it is therefore quite clear that it has -come to us without experience at all?</p> - -<p>There is no such thing as an isolated judgment!</p> - -<p>An isolated judgment is never "true," it is never knowledge; only in -<i>connection with,</i> and when <i>related to,</i> many other judgments, is a -guarantee of its truth forthcoming.</p> - -<p>What is the difference between true and false belief? What is -knowledge? He "knows" it, that is heavenly! Necessary and universal -truth cannot be given<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> by experience! It is therefore independent of -experience, <i>of</i> all experience! The view which comes quite <i>a priori,</i> -and therefore independent of all experience, <i>merely out of reason,</i> is -"pure knowledge"!</p> - -<p>"The principles of logic, the principle of identity and of -contradiction, are examples of pure knowledge, because they precede all -experience."—But these principles are not cognitions, but <i>regulative -articles of faith.</i></p> - -<p>In order to establish the <i>a priori</i> character (the pure rationality) -of mathematical axioms, space <i>must be conceived as a form of pure -reason.</i></p> - -<p>Hume had declared that there were no <i>a priori</i> synthetic judgments. -Kant says there are—the mathematical ones! And if there are such -judgments, there may also be such things as metaphysics and a knowledge -of things by means of pure reason!</p> - -<p>Mathematics is possible under conditions which are <i>not</i> allowed to -metaphysics. All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics.</p> - -<p>A judgment is synthetic—that is to say, it co-ordinates various ideas. -It is <i>a priori</i>—that is to say, this co-ordination is universally -true and necessary, and is arrived at, not by sensual experience, but -by pure reason.</p> - -<p>If there are such things as <i>a priori</i> judgments, then reason must be -able to co-ordinate: co-ordination is a form. Reason must <i>possess a -formative faculty.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">531.</p> - -<p><i>Judging</i> is our oldest faith; it is our habit of believing this to be -true or false, of asserting or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> denying, our certainty that something -is thus and not otherwise, our belief that we really "know"—<i>what</i> is -believed to be true in all judgments?</p> - -<p>What are <i>attributes</i>?—We did not regard changes in ourselves merely -as such, but as "things in themselves," which are strange to us, and -which we only "perceive"; and we did <i>not</i> class them as phenomena, -but as Being, as "attributes"; and in addition we invented a creature -to which they attach themselves—that is to say, we made the <i>effect</i> -the <i>working cause,</i> and <i>the latter</i> we made <i>Being.</i> But even in -this plain statement, the concept "effect" is arbitrary: for in regard -to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced -we ourselves are <i>not</i> the cause, we still argue that they must be -effects: and this is in accordance with the belief that "every change -must have its author";—but this belief in itself is already mythology; -for it <i>separates</i> the working <i>cause from</i> the cause in work. When I -say the "lightning flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action -and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a thing is fancifully -affixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with it, but which is -<i>stable,</i> which <i>is,</i> and does not "come."—<i>To make the phenomenon the -working cause,</i> and to make <i>the effect into a thing—into Being:</i> -this is the <i>double</i> error, or <i>interpretation,</i> of which we are guilty.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">532.</p> - -<p>The <i>Judgment</i>—that is the faith: "This and this is so. In every -judgment, therefore, there lies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> the admission that an "identical" -case has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for -granted, with the help of the memory. Judgment does <i>not</i> create the -idea that an identical case seems to be there. It believes rather that -it actually perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that -there are such things as identical cases. But what is that much <i>older</i> -function called, which must have been active much earlier, and which -in itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike? What is that -second function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc, -"That which provokes the same sensations as another thing is equal -to that other thing": but what is that called which makes sensations -equal, which regards them as equal?—There could be no judgments if -a sort of equalising process were not active within all sensations: -memory is only possible by means of the underscoring of all that has -already been experienced and learned. Before a judgment can be formed, -<i>the process of assimilation must already have been completed</i>: thus, -even here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does -not enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which -accompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all -the organic functions—that is to say, they consist of assimilation, -rejection, growth, etc.</p> - -<p>The essential thing is to start out from the body and to use it as the -general clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much -more accurate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly -established than the belief in spirit.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span></p> - -<p>"However strongly a thing may be believed, the degree of belief is no -criterion of its truth." But what is truth? Perhaps it is a form of -faith, which has become a condition of existence? Then <i>strength</i> would -certainly be a criterion; for instance, in regard to causality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">533.</p> - -<p>Logical accuracy, transparency, considered as the criterion -of truth ("<i>omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte -percipitur.</i>"—Descartes): by this means the mechanical hypothesis of -the world becomes desirable and credible.</p> - -<p>But this is gross confusion: like <i>simplex sigillum veri.</i> Whence comes -the knowledge that the real nature of things stands in <i>this</i> relation -to our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? Could it not be this, -that the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of -power and security, is <i>preferred, valued,</i> and marked as <i>true</i>—The -intellect sets its <i>freest</i> and <i>strongest faculty</i> and <i>ability</i> -as the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what is -<i>true....</i></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>"True"—from the standpoint of sentiment—is that which most -provokes sentiment ("I");</p> - -<p>from the standpoint of thought—is that which gives thought -the greatest sensation of strength;</p> - -<p>from the standpoint of touch, sight, and hearing—is that -which calls forth the greatest resistance.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p></blockquote> - -<p>Thus it is the <i>highest degrees of activity</i> which awaken belief in -regard to the <i>object</i>, in regard to its "reality." The sensations of -strength, struggle, and resistance convince the subject that there is -something which is being resisted.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">534.</p> - -<p>The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">535.</p> - -<p>According to my way of thinking, "truth" does not necessarily mean -the opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely -the relation of different errors to each other: thus one error might -be older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one -without which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist; -whereas other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as -conditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard -of those other "tyrants," could even be laid aside and "refuted." Why -should an irrefutable assumption necessarily be "true"? This question -may exasperate the logicians who limit <i>things</i> according to the -limitations they find in themselves: but I have long since declared war -with this logician's optimism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">536.</p> - -<p>Everything simple is simply imaginary, but not "true." That which is -real and true is, however, neither a unity nor reducible to a unity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">537.</p> - -<p><i>What is truth?</i>—Inertia; <i>that</i> hypothesis which brings satisfaction, -the smallest expense of intellectual strength, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">538.</p> - -<p>First proposition. The <i>easier</i> way of thinking always triumphs -over the more difficult way;—<i>dogmatically</i>: <i>simplex sigillum -veri</i>.—<i>Dico</i>: to suppose that <i>clearness</i> is any proof of truth, is -absolute childishness. . . .</p> - -<p>Second proposition. The teaching of Being, of things, and of all those -constant entities, is a <i>hundred times more easy</i> than the teaching of -<i>Becoming</i> and of evolution. . .</p> - -<p>Third proposition. Logic was intended to be a method of <i>facilitating</i> -thought: a <i>means of expression</i>, —not truth. . . . Later on it got to -<i>act</i> like truth. . . .</p> - - -<p class="parnum">539.</p> - -<p>Parmenides said: "One can form no concept of the non-existent";—we are -at the other extreme, and say, "That Of which a concept can be formed, -is certainly fictional."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">540.</p> - -<p>There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes—therefore there -must be many kinds of "truths," and consequently there can be no truth.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">541.</p> - -<p><i>Inscriptions over the porch of a modern lunatic asylum.</i></p> - -<p>"That which is necessarily true in thought must be necessarily true in -morality."—<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">HERBERT SPENCER.</span></p> - -<p>"The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the -inconceivableness of its negation,"—<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">HERBERT SPENCER.</span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">542.</p> - -<p>If the character of existence were false,:—and this would be -possible,—what would truth then be, all our truth? ... An unprincipled -falsification of the false? A higher degree of falseness? ...</p> - - -<p class="parnum">543.</p> - -<p>In a world which was essentially false, truthfulness would be an -<i>anti-natural tendency</i>: its only purpose would be to provide a means -of attaining to a <i>higher degree of falsity.</i> For a world of truth and -Being to be simulated, the truthful one would first have to be created -(it being understood that he must believe himself to be "truthful").</p> - -<p>Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, lasting, -remaining always the same to himself, free from faults, sudden changes, -dissimulation, and form: such a man conceives a world of Being as -"<i>God</i>" in His own image.</p> - -<p>In order that truthfulness may be possible, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> whole sphere in which -man moves must be very tidy, small, and respectable: the advantage -in every respect must be with the truthful one.—Lies, tricks, -dissimulations, must cause astonishment.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">544.</p> - -<p><i>"Dissimulation"</i> increases in accordance with the rising <i>order of -rank</i> among organic beings. In the inorganic world it seems to be -entirely absent. There power opposes power quite roughly <i>—ruse</i> -begins in the organic world; plants are already masters of it. The -greatest men, such as Cæsar and Napoleon (see Stendhal's remark -concerning him),<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> as also the higher races (the Italians), the Greeks -(Odysseus); the most supreme cunning, belongs to the very <i>essence</i> -of the elevation of man. ... The problem of the actor. My Dionysian -ideal.... The optics of all the organic functions, of all the strongest -vital instincts: the power which <i>will</i> have error in all life; error -as the very first principle of thought itself. Before "thought" is -possible, "fancy" must first have done its work; the <i>picturing</i> of -identical cases, of the <i>seemingness</i> of identity, is more primeval -than the cognition of identity.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The reference to Stendhal here, seems to point to a -passage in his <i>Life of Napoleon</i> (Preface, p. xv) of which Nietzsche -had made a note in another place, and which reads: "Une croyance -presque instinctive chez moi c'est que tout homme puissant ment quand -il parle et à plus forte raison quand il écrit."</p></div> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span></p> - -<hr /> -<p class="title"><i>(h)</i> Against Causality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">545.</p> - -<p>I believe in absolute space as the basis of force, and I believe the -latter to be limited and formed. Time, eternal. But space and time -as things in themselves do not exist. "Changes" are only appearances -(or mere processes of our senses to us); if we set recurrence, -however regular, between them, nothing is proved beyond the fact that -it has always happened so. The feeling that <i>post hoc</i> is <i>propter -hoc,</i> is easily explained as the result of a misunderstanding, it is -comprehensible. But appearances cannot be "causes"!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">546.</p> - -<p>The interpretation of a phenomenon, <i>either</i> as an action <i>or</i> as the -endurance of an action (that is to say, every action involves the -suffering of it), amounts to this: every change, every differentiation, -presupposes the existence of an agent and somebody acted upon, <i>who</i> is -"altered."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">547.</p> - -<p>Psychological history of the concept <i>subject.</i> The body, the thing, -the "whole," which is visualised by the eye, awakens the thought of -distinguishing between an action and an agent; the idea that the agent -is the cause of the action, after having been repeatedly refined, at -length left the "subject" over.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">548.</p> - -<p>Our absurd habit of regarding a mere mnemonic sign or abbreviated -formula as an independent being, and ultimately as a <i>cause</i>; as, for -instance, when we say of lightning that it flashes, even the little -word "I." A sort of double-sight in seeing which makes sight a <i>cause -of seeing in itself</i>: this was the feat in the invention of the -"subject" of the "ego."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">549.</p> - -<p>"Subject," "object," "attribute"—these distinctions have been <i>made,</i> -and are now used like schemes to cover all apparent facts. The false -fundamental observation is this, that I believe it is I who does -something, who suffers something, who "has" something, who "has" a -quality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">550.</p> - -<p>In every judgment lies the whole faith in subject, attribute, or cause -and effect (in the form of an assumption that every effect is the -result of activity, and that all activity presupposes an agent), and -even this last belief is only an isolated case of the first, so that -faith remains as the most fundamental belief! there are such things as -subjects, everything that happens is related attributively to a subject -of some sort.</p> - -<p>I notice something, and try to discover the reason of it: originally -this was, I look for an <i>intention</i> behind it, and, above all, I -look for one who has an intention, for a subject, an agent:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> every -phenomenon is an action, formerly intentions were seen behind <i>all</i> -phenomena, this is our oldest habit. Has the animal also this habit? -As a living organism, is it not also compelled to interpret things -through itself. The question why? is always a question concerning the -<i>causa finalis,</i> and the general "purpose" of things. We have no sign -of the "sense of the efficient cause"; in this respect Hume is quite -right, habit (but not only that of the individual) allows us to expect -that a certain process, frequently observed, will follow upon another, -but nothing more! That which gives us such an extraordinarily firm -faith in causality, is not the rough habit of observing the sequence of -processes, but our <i>inability</i> to <i>interpret</i> a phenomenon otherwise -than as the result of <i>design.</i> It is the <i>belief in</i> living and -thinking things, as the only agents of <i>causation</i>; it is the belief in -will, in design—the belief that all phenomena are actions, and that -all actions presuppose an agent; it is the belief in the "subject." Is -not this belief in the concepts subject and object an arrant absurdity?</p> - -<p>Question: Is the design the cause of a phenomenon? Or is that also -illusion? Is it not the phenomenon itself?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">551.</p> - -<p><i>A criticism of the concept "cause."</i>—We have absolutely no experience -concerning <i>cause</i>, viewed psychologically we derive the whole concept -from the subjective conviction, that <i>we</i> ourselves are causes—that is -to say, that the arm moves.... <i>But<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> that is an error.</i> We distinguish -ourselves, the agents, from the action, and everywhere we make use of -this scheme—we try to discover an agent behind every phenomenon. What -have we done? We have <i>misunderstood</i> a feeling of power, tension, -resistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the -action, and posited it as a cause; or we have understood the will to -do this or that, as a cause, because the action follows it. There is -no such thing as "Cause," in those few cases in which it seemed to -be given, and in which we projected it out of ourselves in<i> order to -understand a phenomenon,</i> it has been shown to be an illusion. Our -understanding of a phenomenon consisted in our inventing a subject -who was responsible for something happening, and for the manner in -which it happened. In our concept "cause" we have embraced our feeling -of will, our feeling of "freedom," our feeling of responsibility and -our design to do an action: <i>causa efficiens</i> and <i>causa finalis</i> are -fundamentally one.</p> - -<p>We believed that an effect was explained when we could point to a state -in which it was inherent. As a matter of fact, we invent all causes -according to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to us.... On -the other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing -how it will "act." The thing, the subject the will, the design—all -inherent in the conception "cause." We try to discover things in order -to explain why something has changed. Even the "atom" is one of these -fanciful inventions like the "thing" and the "primitive subject."...</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span></p> - -<p>At last we understand that things—consequently also atoms—effect -nothing: <i>because they are non-existent;</i> and that the concept -causality is quite! useless. Out of a necessary sequence of states, -the latter's causal relationship does <i>not</i> follow (that would be -equivalent to extending their <i>active principle</i> from 1 to 2, to 3, to -4, to 5). <i>There is no such thing as a cause or an effect.</i> From the -standpoint of language we do not know how to rid ourselves of them. -But that does not matter. If I imagine <i>muscle</i> separated from its -"effects," I have denied it....</p> - -<p>In short: <i>a phenomenon is neither effected nor capable of effecting. -Causa</i> is a <i>faculty to effect something,</i> superadded fancifully to -what happens....</p> - -<p><i>The interpretation of causality is an illusion....</i> A "thing" is the -sum of its effects, synthetically united by means of a concept, an -image. As a matter of fact, science has robbed the concept causality -of all meaning, and has reserved it merely as an allegorical formula, -which has made it a matter of indifference whether cause or effect be -put on this side or on that. It is asserted that in two complex states -(centres of force) the quantities of energy remain constant.</p> - -<p><i>The calculability of a phenomenon</i> does not lie in the fact that -a rule is observed, or that a necessity is obeyed, or that we have -projected a law of causality into every phenomenon: it lies in the -<i>recurrence of "identical cases."</i></p> - -<p>There is no such thing as a <i>sense of causality,</i> as Kant would have -us believe. We are aghast,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> we feel insecure, we will have something -familiar, which can be relied upon.... As soon as we are shown the -existence of something old in a new thing, we are pacified. The -so-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the <i>fear of -the unfamiliar</i>, and the attempt at finding something in it which is -already <i>known.</i>—It is not a search for causes, but for the familiar.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">552.</p> - -<p><i>To combat determinism and teleology.</i>—From the fact that something -happens regularly, and that its occurrence may be reckoned upon, it -does not follow that it happens <i>necessarily.</i> If a quantity of force -determines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular -case, it does not prove that it has "no free will." "Mechanical -necessity" is not an established fact: it was <i>we</i> who first read -into the nature of all phenomena. We interpreted the possibility of -<i>formularising</i> phenomena as a result of the dominion of necessary law -over all existence. But it does not follow, because I do a determined -thing, that I am bound to do it. <i>Compulsion</i> cannot be demonstrated -in things: all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same -phenomenon is not another phenomenon. Owing to the very fact that we -fancied the existence of subjects "<i>agents</i>" in things, the notion -arose that all phenomena are the <i>consequence</i> of a <i>compulsory force</i> -exercised over the subject—exercised by whom? once more by an "agent." -The concept "Cause and Effect" is a dangerous one,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> so long as people -believe in something that <i>causes,</i> and a something that is <i>caused.</i></p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> Necessity is not an established fact, but an interpretation.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> When it is understood that the "subject" is nothing that <i>acts,</i> -but only a thing of fancy, there is much that follows.</p> - -<p>Only with the subject as model we invented <i>thingness</i> and read it into -the pell-mell of sensations. If we cease from believing in the <i>acting</i> -subject, the belief in <i>acting</i> things, in reciprocal action, in cause -and effect between phenomena which we call things, also falls to pieces.</p> - -<p>In this case the world of <i>acting atoms</i> also disappears: for this -world is always assumed to exist on the pre-determined grounds that -subjects are necessary.</p> - -<p>Ultimately, of course, <i>the "thing-in-itself"</i> also disappears: for -at bottom it is the conception of a "subject-in-itself." But we -have seen that the subject is an imaginary thing. The antithesis -"thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is untenable; but in this way the -concept "<i>appearance</i>" also disappears.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> If we abandon the idea of the acting <i>subject,</i> we also abandon -the <i>object</i> acted upon. Duration, equality to self, Being, are -inherent neither in what is called subject, nor in what is called -object: they are complex phenomena, and in regard to other phenomena -are apparently durable—they are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> distinguishable, for instance, by -the different tempo with which they happen (repose—movement, fixed -—loose: all antitheses which do not exist in themselves and by means -of which <i>differences of degree</i> only are expressed; from a certain -limited point of view, though, they seem to be antitheses. There are no -such things as antitheses; it is from logic that we derive our concept -of contrasts—and starting out from its standpoint we spread the error -over all things).</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p><i>(d)</i> If we abandon the ideas "subject" and "object"; then we must also -abandon the idea <i>"substance"</i>—and therefore its various modifications -too; for instance: "matter," "spirit," and other hypothetical things, -"eternity and the immutability of matter," etc. We are then rid of -<i>materiality.</i></p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>From a moral standpoint <i>the world is false.</i> But inasmuch as morality -itself is a part of this world, morality also is false. The will -to truth is a process of <i>establishing things</i>, it is a process of -<i>making</i> things true and lasting, a total elimination of that <i>false</i> -character, a transvaluation of it into <i>being.</i> Thus, "truth" is not -something which is present and which has to be found and discovered; it -is something <i>which has to be created</i> and which <i>gives</i> its name <i>to a -process,</i> or, better still, to the Will to overpower, which in itself -has no purpose: to introduce truth is a <i>processus in infinitum,</i> an -<i>active determining</i>—it is not a process of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> becoming conscious of -something, which in itself is fixed and determined. It is merely a word -for "The Will to Power."</p> - -<p>Life is based on the hypothesis of a belief in stable and regularly -recurring things, the mightier it is, the more vast must be the world -of knowledge and the world called being. Logicising, rationalising, and -systematising are of assistance as means of existence.</p> - -<p>Man projects his instinct of truth, his "aim," to a certain extent -beyond himself, in the form of a metaphysical world of Being, a -"thing-in-itself," a world already to hand. His requirements as a -creator make him <i>invent</i> the world in which he works in advance; he -anticipates it: this anticipation (this faith in truth) is his mainstay.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>All phenomena, movement, Becoming, regarded as the establishment of -relations of degree and of force, as a contest....</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>As soon as we <i>fancy</i> that some one is responsible for the fact that -we are thus and thus, etc. (God, Nature), and that we ascribe our -existence, our happiness, our misery, our <i>destiny,</i> to that some one, -we corrupt the <i>innocence of Becoming</i> for ourselves. We then have some -one who wishes to attain to something by means of us and with us.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>The "welfare of the individual" is just as fanciful as the "welfare -of the species": the first is <i>not</i> sacrificed to the last; seen -from afar, the species<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> is just as fluid as the individual. "The -<i>preservation</i> of the species" is only a result of the <i>growth</i> of the -species—that is to say, <i>of the overcoming of the species</i> on the road -to a stronger kind.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Theses:—The apparent conformity of means to end ("the conformity of -means to end which far surpasses the art of man) is merely the result -of that "<i>Will to Power</i>" which manifests itself in all phenomena:—<i>To -become stronger</i> involves a process of ordering, which may well be -mistaken for an attempted conformity of means to end:—The <i>ends</i> which -are apparent are not intended but, as soon as a superior power prevails -over an inferior power, and the latter proceeds to work as a function -of the former, an order of <i>rank</i> is established, an organisation which -must give rise to the idea that there is an arrangement of means and -ends.</p> - -<p>Against apparent "<i>necessity</i>":—</p> - -<p>This is only an expression for the fact that a certain power is not -also something else.</p> - -<p>Against the apparent conformity of means to ends":—</p> - -<p>The latter is only an <i>expression</i> for the order among the spheres of -power and their interplay.</p> - -<p class="title"><i>(i)</i> The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">553.</p> - -<p>The foul blemish on Kant's criticism has at last become visible -even to the coarsest eyes: Kant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> had no right to his distinction -"<i>appearance</i>" and "<i>thing-in-itself,</i>"—in his own writings he had -deprived himself of the right of differentiating any longer in this -old and hackneyed manner, seeing that he had condemned the practice of -drawing any conclusions concerning the cause of an appearance from the -appearance itself, as unallowable in accordance with his conception -of the idea of causality and its <i>purely intraphenomenal</i> validity, -and this conception, on the other hand, already anticipates that -<i>differentiation,</i> as if the "thing in itself" were not only inferred -but actually <i>given.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">554.</p> - -<p>It is obvious that neither things-in-themselves <i>nor</i> appearances can -be related to each other in the form of cause and effect: and from this -it follows that the concept "cause and effect" is <i>not applicable</i> in a -philosophy which believes in things-in-themselves and in appearances. -Kant's mistake—... As a matter of fact, from a psychological -standpoint, the concept "cause and effect" is derived from an attitude -of mind which believes it sees the action of will upon will everywhere, -which believes only in living things, and at bottom only in souls (not -in things). Within the mechanical view of the world (which is logic -and its application to space and time) that concept is reduced to -the mathematical formula with which—and this is a fact which cannot -be sufficiently emphasised—nothing is ever understood, but rather -<i>defined</i>—deformed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">555.</p> - -<p>The greatest of all fables is the one relating to knowledge. People -would like to know how things-in-themselves are constituted: but -behold, there are no things-in-themselves! But even supposing there -<i>were</i> an "in-itself," an unconditional thing, it could on that very -account <i>not be known</i>! Something unconditioned cannot be known: -otherwise it would not be unconditioned! Knowing, however, is always a -process of "coming into relation with something"; the knowledge-seeker, -on this principle, wants the thing, which he would know, to be nothing -to him, and to be nothing to anybody at all: and from this there -results a contradiction,—in the first place, between this <i>will</i> to -know, and this desire that the thing to be known <i>should</i> be nothing -to him (wherefore know at all then?); and secondly, because something -which is nothing to anybody, does not even <i>exist,</i> and therefore -cannot be known. Knowing means: "to place one's self in relation with -something," to feel one's self conditioned by something and one's -self conditioning it under all circumstances, then, it is a process -of <i>making stable or fixed,</i> of <i>defining,</i> of <i>making conditions -conscious</i> (not a process of <i>sounding</i> things, creatures, or objects -in-themselves).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">556.</p> - -<p>A "thing-in-itself" is just as absurd as a "sense-in-itself," a -"meaning-in-itself." There is no such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> thing as a "fact-in-itself," -<i>for a meaning must always be given to it before it can become a fact.</i></p> - -<p>The answer to the question, "What is that?" is a process of <i>fixing a -meaning</i> from a different standpoint. The "<i>essence</i>" the "<i>essential -factor,</i>" is something which is only seen as a whole in perspective, -and which presupposes a basis which is multifarious. Fundamentally the -question is "What is that for me?" (for us, for everything that lives, -etc. etc.).</p> - -<p>A thing would be defined when all creatures had asked and answered this -question, "What is that?" concerning it. Supposing that one single -creature, with its own relations and standpoint in regard to all -things, were lacking, that thing would still remain undefined.</p> - -<p>In short: the essence of a thing is really only an <i>opinion</i> concerning -that "thing." Or, better still; "<i>it is worth</i>" is actually what is -meant by <i>"it is"</i> or by "that is."</p> - -<p>One may not ask: "<i>Who</i> interprets, then?" for the act of interpreting -<i>itself</i> as a form of the Will to Power, manifests itself (not as -"Being," but as a <i>process,</i> as <i>Becoming</i>) as a passion.</p> - -<p>The origin of "things" is wholly the work of the idealising, thinking, -willing, and feeling subject. The concept thing as well as all its -attributes.—Even "the subject" is a creation of this order, a "thing" -like all others: a simplification, aiming at a definition of the -<i>power</i> that fixes, invents, and thinks, as such, as distinct from -all isolated fixing, inventing, and thinking. Thus a capacity defined -or distinct from all other individual capacities; at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> bottom action -conceived collectively in regard to all the action which has yet to -come (action and the probability of similar action).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">557.</p> - -<p>The qualities of a thing are its effects upon other "things."</p> - -<p>If one imagines other "things" to be non-existent, a thing has no -qualities.</p> - -<p>That is to say; <i>there is nothing without other things.</i></p> - -<p>That is to say; there is no "thing-in-itself."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">558.</p> - -<p>The thing-in-itself is nonsense. If I think all the "relations," all -the "qualities" all the "activities" of a thing, away, the thing itself -does <i>not</i> remain: for "thingness" was only <i>invented fancifully</i> by -us to meet certain logical needs—that is to say, for the purposes of -definition and comprehension (in order to correlate that multitude of -relations, qualities, and activities).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">559.</p> - -<p>"Things which have a nature <i>in themselves</i>"—a dogmatic idea, which -must be absolutely abandoned.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">560.</p> - -<p>That things should have a <i>nature in themselves,</i> quite apart from -interpretation and subjectivity, <i>is a perfectly idle hypothesis</i>: -it would presuppose<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> that <i>interpretation</i> and the <i>act of being -subjective</i> are not essential, that a thing divorced from all its -relations can still be a thing.</p> - -<p>Or, the other way round: the apparent <i>objective</i> character of things; -might it not be merely the result of a <i>difference of degree</i> within -the subject perceiving?—could not that which changes slowly strike -us as being objective, lasting, Being, "in-itself"?—could not the -objective view be only a false way of conceiving things and a contrast -<i>within</i> the perceiving subject?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">561.</p> - -<p>If all unity were only unity as organisation. But the "thing" in -which we believe was <i>invented</i> only as a substratum to the various -attributes. If the thing "acts," it means: we regard <i>all the other</i> -qualities which are to hand, and which are momentarily latent, as -the cause accounting for the fact that one individual quality steps -forward—that is to say, <i>we take the sum of its qualities—x—</i>as -the cause of the quality <i>x</i>; which is obviously <i>quite</i> absurd and -imbecile!</p> - -<p>All unity is <i>only so</i> in the form of <i>organisation</i> and <i>collective -action:</i> in the same way as a human community is a unity—that is to -say, <i>the reverse of</i> atomic <i>anarchy</i>; thus it is a body politic, -which <i>stands for</i> one, yet <i>is</i> not one.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">562.</p> - -<p>"At some time in the development of thought, a point must have been -reached when man became conscious of the fact that what he called<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> -the <i>qualities of a thing</i> were merely the sensations of the feeling -subject: and thus the qualities ceased from belonging to the thing." -The "thing-in-itself" remained over. 'The distinction between the -thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, is based upon that older and -artless observation which would fain grant energy to things: but -analysis revealed that even force was only ascribed to them by our -fancy, as was also—substance. "The thing affects a subject?" Thus the -root of the idea of substance is in language, not in things outside -ourselves! The thing-in-itself is not a problem at all!</p> - -<p>Being will have to be conceived as a sensation which is no longer based -upon anything quite devoid of sensation.</p> - -<p>In movement no new <i>meaning</i> is given to feeling. That which is, cannot -be the substance of movement: it is therefore a form of Being.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>N.B.</i>—The explanation of life may be sought, in the first -place, through mental images of phenomena which <i>precede</i> it -(purposes);</p> - -<p>Secondly, through mental images of phenomena which follow -behind it (the mathematico-physical explanation).</p></blockquote> - -<p>The two should not be confounded. Thus: the physical explanation, which -is the symbolisation of the world by means of feeling and thought, -cannot in itself make feeling and thinking originate again and show -its derivation: physics must rather construct the world of feeling, -consistently <i>without feeling or purpose </i> right up to the highest man. -And teleology is only a <i>history of purposes,</i> and is never physical.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">563.</p> - -<p>Our method of acquiring "knowledge" is limited to a process of -establishing <i>quantities,</i> but we can by no means help feeling the -difference of quantity as differences of <i>quality.</i> Quality is merely a -<i>relative</i> truth for <i>us</i>; it is not a "thing-in-itself."</p> - -<p>Our senses have a certain definite quantum as a mean, within the limits -of which they perform their functions—that is to say, we become -conscious of bigness and smallness in accordance with the conditions of -our existence. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we should -perish—that is to say, we feel even <i>proportions</i> as <i>qualities</i> in -regard to our possibilities of existence.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">564.</p> - -<p>But could not all <i>quantities</i> be merely tokens of <i>qualities</i>? Another -consciousness and scale of desires must correspond to greater power -in fact, another point of view; growth in itself is the expression of -a desire <i>to become more;</i> the desire for a greater <i>quantum</i> springs -from a certain <i>quale,</i> in a purely quantitative world, everything -would be dead, stiff, and motionless.—The reduction of all qualities -to quantities is nonsense: it is discovered that they can only stand -together, an analogy—</p> - - -<p class="parnum">565.</p> - -<p>Qualities are our insurmountable barriers; we cannot possibly help -feeling mere <i>differences of quantity</i> as something fundamentally -different from quantity—that is to say, as <i>qualities,</i> which we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> can -no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But everything in regard to -which the word "knowledge" has any sense at all, belongs to the realm -of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity whereas, conversely, -all our valuations (that is to say, our sensations) belong precisely to -the realm of qualities, <i>i.e.</i> to those truths which belong to us alone -and to our point of view, and which absolutely cannot be "known." It is -obvious that every one of us, different creatures, must feel different -qualities, and must therefore live in a different world from the rest. -Qualities are an idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand that -these our human interpretations and values, should be general and -perhaps real values, belongs to the hereditary madnesses of human pride.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">566.</p> - -<p>The "real world," in whatever form it has been conceived hitherto—was -always the world of appearance <i>over again.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">567.</p> - -<p>The world of appearance, <i>i.e.</i> a world regarded in the light of -values; ordered, selected according to values—that is to say, in -this case, according to the standpoint of utility in regard to the -preservation and the increase of power of a certain species of animals.</p> - -<p>It is <i>the point of view,</i> then, which accounts for the character of -"appearance." As if a world could remain over, when the point of view -is cancelled! By such means <i>relativity</i> would also be cancelled!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span></p> - -<p>Every centre of energy has its <i>point of view</i> of the whole of the -<i>remainder</i> of the world—that is to say, its perfectly definite -<i>valuation,</i> its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The "world of -appearance" is thus reduced to a specific kind of action on the world -proceeding from a centre.</p> - -<p>But there is no other kind of action: and the "world" is only a word -for the collective play of these actions. <i>Reality</i> consists precisely -in this particular action and reaction of every isolated factor against -the whole.</p> - -<p>There no longer remains a shadow of a <i>right</i> to speak here of -"appearance." ...</p> - -<p>The <i>specific way of reacting</i> is the only way of reacting; we do not -know how many kinds and what sort of kinds there are.</p> - -<p>But there is no "<i>other,</i>" no "real," no essential being,—for thus a -world <i>without</i> action and reaction would be expressed....</p> - -<p>The antithesis: world of appearance and real world, is thus reduced to -the antitheses "world" and "nonentity."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">568.</p> - -<p>A criticism of the concept "<i>real and apparent</i> world."—Of these two -the first is a mere fiction, formed out of a host of imaginary things.</p> - -<p>Appearance itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; <i>i.e.</i> -in a world where there is no such thing as being, a certain calculable -world of <i>identical</i> cases must first be created through <i>appearance;</i> -a <i>tempo</i> in which observation and comparison is possible, etc.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span></p> - -<p>"Appearance" is an adjusted and simplified world, in which our -<i>practical</i> instincts have worked: for us it is perfectly true: for we -<i>live</i> in it, we can live in it: <i>this is the proof</i> of its truth as -far as we are concerned....</p> - -<p>The world, apart from the fact that we have to live in it—the -world, which we have <i>not</i> adjusted to our being, our logic, and our -psychological prejudices—does <i>not</i> exist as a world "in-itself"; it -is essentially a world of relations: under certain circumstances it has -a <i>different aspect</i> from every different point at which it is seen: -it presses against every point, and every point resists it—and these -collective relations are in every case <i>incongruent.</i></p> - -<p>The <i>measure of power</i> determines what <i>being</i> possesses the other -measure of power: under what form, force, or constraint, it acts or -resists.</p> - -<p>Our particular case is interesting enough: we have created a conception -in order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just -enough to enable us to <i>endure</i> life in that world....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">569.</p> - -<p>The nature of our psychological vision is determined by the fact—</p> - -<p>(1) That <i>communication</i> is necessary, and that for communication -to be possible something must be stable, simplified, and capable of -being stated precisely (above all, in the so-called <i>identical</i> case). -In order that it may be communicable, it must be felt as something -<i>adjusted,</i> as "<i>recognisable</i>." The material of the senses, arranged -by the understanding,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> reduced to coarse leading features, made similar -to other things, and classified with its like. Thus: the indefiniteness -and the chaos of sense-impressions are, as it were, <i>made logical.</i></p> - -<p>(2) The <i>phenomenal</i> world is the adjusted world which <i>we believe -to be real,</i> Its "reality" lies in the constant return of similar, -familiar, and related things, in their <i>rationalised character,</i> and in -the belief that we are here able to reckon and determine.</p> - -<p>(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world is not "the real world," -but the amorphous and unadjustable world consisting of the chaos of -sensations—that is to say, <i>another kind</i> of phenomenal; world, a -world which to us is "unknowable."</p> - -<p>(4) The question how things-in-themselves are constituted, quite apart -from our sense-receptivity and from the activity of our understanding, -must be answered by the further question: how were we able to know -<i>that things existed?</i> "Thingness" is one of our own inventions. The -question is whether there are not a good many more ways of creating -such a world of appearance—and whether this creating, rationalising, -adjusting, and falsifying be not the best-guaranteed <i>reality</i> itself: -in short, whether that which "fixes the meaning of things" is not -the only reality: and whether the "effect of environment upon us" -be not merely the result of such will-exercising subjects.... The -other "creatures" act upon us; our <i>adjusted</i> world of appearance -is an arrangement and an <i>overpowering</i> of its activities: a sort -of <i>defensive</i> measure. <i>The subject alone is demonstrable</i>; -the <i>hypothesis</i> might be advanced <i>that subjects are all that -exist,</i>—that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> "object" is only a form of action of subject upon -subject ... a <i>modus of the subject.</i></p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title"><i>(k)</i> The Metaphysical Need.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">570.</p> - -<p>If one resembles all the philosophers that have gone before, one -can have no eyes for what has existed and what will exist—one sees -only what <i>is.</i> But as there is no such thing as Being; all that the -philosophers had to deal with was a host of <i>fancies,</i> this was their -"world."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">571.</p> - -<p>To assert the <i>existence</i> as a whole of things concerning which we know -nothing, simply because there is an advantage in not being able to know -anything of them, was a piece of artlessness on Kant's part, and the -result of the recoil-stroke of certain needs—especially in the realm -of morals and metaphysics.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">572.</p> - -<p>An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away or back from it: his -earnest opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that nebulous -residue of it which one derives from colour, form, sound, and thought; -he believes that the more subtle, attenuated, and volatile, a thing -or a man becomes, <i>the more valuable he becomes: the less real,</i> the -greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato was guilty of yet -further audacity in the matter of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> turning tables—he measured the -degree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: The more -there is of "idea" the more there is of Being. He twisted the concept -"reality" round and said: "What ye regard as real is an error, and the -nearer we get to the 'idea' the nearer we are to 'truth.'"—Is this -understood? It was the <i>greatest of all rechristenings:</i> and because -Christianity adopted it, we are blind to its astounding features. At -bottom, Plato, like the artist he was, <i>placed appearance before</i> -Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth! unreality before -actuality!—He was, however, so convinced of the value of appearance, -that he granted it the attributes of "Being," "causality," "goodness," -and "truth," and, in short, all those things which are associated with -value.</p> - -<p>The concept value itself regarded as a cause: first standpoint.</p> - -<p>The ideal granted all attributes, conferring honour: second standpoint.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">573.</p> - -<p>The idea of the "true world" or of "God" as absolutely spiritual, -intellectual, and good, is an <i>emergency measure</i> to the extent to -which the <i>antagonistic</i> instincts are all-powerful....</p> - -<p>Moderation and existing humanity is reflected exactly in the -humanisation of the gods. The Greeks of the strongest period, who -entertained no fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary were -pleased with themselves, brought down their gods to all their emotions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span></p> - -<p>The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a -sign of <i>progress</i>: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads -Goethe—in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is -felt as being upon a lower plane.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">574.</p> - -<p>The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside in the derivation of -the conditioned out of the unconditioned.</p> - -<p>It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds the unconditioned to -the conditioned, that it invents it—just as it thought of and invented -the "ego" to cover the multifariousness of its processes i it measures -the world according to a host of self-devised measurements—according -to its fundamental fictions "the unconditioned," "end and means," -"things," "substances," and according to logical laws, figures, and -forms.</p> - -<p>There would be nothing which could be called knowledge, if thought did -not first so <i>re-create</i> the world into "things" which are in its own -image. It is only <i>through</i> thought that there is <i>untruth.</i></p> - -<p>The <i>origin</i> of thought, like that of <i>feelings,</i> cannot be traced: -but that is <i>no</i> proof of its primordiality or absoluteness! It simply -shows that we cannot get <i>behind it,</i> because we have nothing else save -thought and feeling.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">575.</p> - -<p>To know is to <i>point to past experience:</i> in its nature it is a -<i>regressus in infinitum.</i> That which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> halts (in the face of a so-called -<i>causa prima</i> or the unconditioned, etc.) is <i>laziness,</i> weariness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">576.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the psychology of metaphysics</i>—the influence of fear. That -which has been most feared, the cause of the <i>greatest suffering</i> (lust -of power, voluptuousness, etc.), has been treated with the greatest -amount of hostility by men, and eliminated from the "real" world. Thus -the <i>passions</i> have been step by step <i>struck out,</i> God posited as -the opposite of evil—that is to say, reality is conceived to be the -<i>negation of the passions and the emotions</i> (i.e. <i>nonentity</i>).</p> - -<p><i>Irrationality,</i> impulsive action, accidental action, is, moreover, -hated by them (as the cause of incalculable suffering). <i>Consequently</i> -they denied this element in the absolute, and interpreted it as -absolute "rationality" and "conformity of means to ends."</p> - -<p><i>Change</i> and <i>perishability</i> were also feared; and by this fear an -oppressed soul is revealed, full of distrust and painful experiences -(the case with <i>Spinoza</i>: a man differently constituted would have -regarded this change as a charm).</p> - -<p>A nature overflowing and <i>playing</i> with energy, would call precisely -the <i>passions, irrationality</i> and <i>change, good</i> in a eudemonistic -sense, together with their consequences: danger, contrast, ruin, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">577.</p> - -<p>Against the value of that which always remains the same (remember -Spinoza's artlessness and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> Descartes' likewise), the value of the -shortest and of the most perishable, the seductive flash of gold on the -belly of the serpent <i>vita</i>——</p> - - -<p class="parnum">578.</p> - -<p><i>Moral values in epistemology itself:</i>—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The faith in reason—why not mistrust?</p> - -<p>The "real world" is the good world—why?</p> - -<p>Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle, regarded as -immoral: the desire for a world which <i>knows nothing</i> of -these things.</p> - -<p>The transcendental world discovered, <i>so that</i> a place may -be kept for "moral freedom" (as in Kant).</p> - -<p>Dialectics as the road to virtue (in Plato and Socrates: -probably because sophistry was held to be the road to -immorality).</p> - -<p>Time and space are ideal: consequently there is unity in -the essence of things; consequently no sin, no evil, no -imperfection, a <i>justification</i> of God.</p> - -<p>Epicurus <i>denied</i> the possibility of knowledge, in order to -keep the moral (particularly the hedonistic) values as the -highest.</p> - -<p>Augustine does the same, and later Pascal ("corrupted -reason"), in favour of Christian values.</p> - -<p>Descartes' contempt for everything variable; likewise -Spinoza's.</p></blockquote> - - -<p class="parnum">579.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the psychology of metaphysics.</i>—This world is only -apparent: <i>therefore</i> there must be a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> real world;—this world is -conditioned: <i>consequently</i> there must be an unconditioned world;—this -world is contradictory: <i>consequently</i> there is a world free from -contradiction;—this world is evolving: <i>consequently</i> there is -somewhere a static world:—a host of false conclusions (blind faith -in reason: if A exists, then its opposite B must also <i>exist</i>). Pain -<i>inspires these conclusions</i>: at bottom they are <i>withes</i> that such -a world might exist; the hatred of a world which leads to suffering -is likewise revealed by the fact that another and <i>better</i> world is -imagined: the <i>resentment</i> of the metaphysician against reality is -creative here.</p> - -<p><i>The second</i> series of questions: <i>wherefore</i> suffer? ... and from -this a conclusion is derived concerning the relation of the real -world to our apparent, changing, suffering, and contradictory world: -(1) Suffering as the consequence of error: how is error possible? -(2) Suffering as the consequence of guilt: how is guilt possible? -(A host of experiences drawn from the sphere of nature or society, -universalised and made absolute.) But if the conditioned world be -causally determined by the unconditioned, then the <i>freedom to err, to -be sinful,</i> must also be derived from the same quarter: and once more -the question arises, <i>to what purpose?</i> ... The world of appearance, of -Becoming, of contradiction, of suffering, is therefore <i>willed; to what -purpose?</i></p> - -<p>The error of these conclusions; two contradictory concepts are -formed—because one of them corresponds to a reality, the other -"<i>must</i>" also correspond to a reality. "<i>Whence</i>" would one otherwise<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> -derive its contradictory concept? <i>Reason</i> is thus a source of -revelation concerning the absolute.</p> - -<p>But the <i>origin</i> of the above contradictions <i>need not necessarily</i> be -a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose t<i>he real -genesis</i> of the concepts, this springs from practical spheres, from -utilitarian spheres, hence the <i>strong faith</i> it commands <i>(one is -threatened with ruin</i> if one's conclusions are not in conformity with -this reason; but this fact is no "<i>proof</i>" of what the latter asserts).</p> - -<p><i>The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain,</i> is quite artless. -"Eternal blessedness": psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men -never make pleasure and pain ultimate questions—they are incidental -conditions: both of them must be desired when one <i>will attain to</i> -something. It is a sign of fatigue and illness in these metaphysicians -and religious men, that they should press questions of pleasure and -pain into the foreground. Even <i>morality</i> in their eyes derives its -great importance <i>only</i> from the fact that it is regarded as an -essential condition for abolishing pain.</p> - -<p><i>The same holds good of the preoccupation with appearance and error</i> -the cause of pain. A superstition that happiness and truth are related -(confusion: happiness in "certainty," in "faith").</p> - - -<p class="parnum">580.</p> - -<p>To what extent are the various <i>epistemological positions</i> -(materialism, sensualism, idealism) consequences of valuations? The -source of the highest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> feelings of pleasure ("feelings of value") may -also judge concerning the problem of <i>reality</i>!</p> - -<p>The measure of <i>positive knowledge</i> is quite a matter of indifference -and beside the point; as witness the development of Indici.</p> - -<p>The Buddhistic <i>negation</i> of reality in general (appearance pain) is -perfectly consistent: undemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of -categories, not only for an "absolute world," but a recognition of -the <i>erroneous procedures</i> by means of which the whole concept has -been reached. "Absolute reality," "Being in itself," a contradiction. -In a world of <i>Becoming,</i> reality is merely a <i>simplification</i> for -the purpose of practical ends, or a <i>deception</i> resulting from the -coarseness of certain organs, or a variation in the tempo of Becoming.</p> - -<p>The logical denial of the world and Nihilism is a consequence of the -fact that we must oppose nonentity with Being, and that Becoming is -denied. ("<i>Something</i>" becomes.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">581.</p> - -<p><i>Being</i> and <i>Becoming.</i>—"<i>Reason</i>" developed upon a sensualistic basis -upon the <i>prejudices of the senses</i>—that is to say, with the belief in -the truth of the judgment of the senses.</p> - -<p>"Being," as the generalisation of the concept "<i>Life</i>" (breath), "to be -animate," "to will," "to act upon," "become."</p> - -<p>The opposite is: "to be inanimate," "<i>not</i> to become," "<i>not</i> to will." -<i>Thus</i>: "Being" is <i>not</i> opposed to "not-Being," to "appearance," nor -is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> it opposed to death (for only that can be dead which can also live).</p> - -<p>The "soul," the "ego," posited as <i>primeval facts;</i> and introduced -wherever <i>there is Becoming.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">582.</p> - -<p><i>Being</i>—we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from -"<i>living.</i>"—How then can everything "be" dead?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">583.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>A.</i></p> - -<p>I see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate -of being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ -of knowledge for the real world—be it what it may.</p> - -<p>At this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this -contradiction established?...</p> - -<p>The fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also -understood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we -should understand a world as subjectively conditioned, are <i>no</i> proofs -of the actual <i>possibility</i> of an objective world. Who urges us to -believe that subjectivity <i>is</i> real or essential?</p> - -<p>The absolute is even an absurd concept: an "absolute mode of existence" -is nonsense, the concept "being," "thing," is always <i>relative</i> to us.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span></p> - -<p>The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis "apparent" and "real," -the correlative valuations "of little value" and "absolutely valuable" -have been spread abroad.</p> - -<p>The world of appearance does not strike us as a "valuable" world; -appearance is on a lower plane than the highest value. Only a "real" -world can be absolutely "valuable"....</p> - -<p><i>Prejudice of prejudices!</i> It is perfectly possible in itself that -the real nature of things would be so unfriendly, so opposed to the -first conditions of life, that appearance is necessary in order to -make life possible.... This is certainly the case in a large number of -situations—for instance, marriage.</p> - -<p>Our empirical world would thus be conditioned, even in its limits -to knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation, we regard that -as good, valuable, and true, which favours the preservation of the -species....</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between a -real and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist a world of -appearance, but not <i>our</i> world of appearance.)</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> Taking the <i>real</i> world for granted, it might still be the <i>less -valuable</i> to us; for the quantum of illusion might be of the highest -order, owing to its value to us as a preservative measure. (Unless -<i>appearance</i> in itself were sufficient to condemn anything?)</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> That there exists a correlation between the <i>degrees of value</i> -and the <i>degrees of reality</i> (so that the highest values also possessed -the greatest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which -starts out with the hypothesis that we <i>know</i> the order of rank among -values; and that this order is a <i>moral</i> one. It is only on this -hypothesis that <i>truth</i> is necessary as a definition of all that is of -a superior value.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>B.</i></p> - -<p>It is of cardinal importance that the <i>real world</i> should be -suppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and -depredator of values, concerning the <i>world which we are</i>: it was our -most dangerous<i> attempt</i> heretofore on the life of Life.</p> - -<p><i>War</i> against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been -imagined. The notion that <i>moral values</i> are the <i>highest</i> values, -belongs to this hypothesis.</p> - -<p>The superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could -be shown to be the result of an <i>immoral</i> valuation—a specific case -of real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an <i>appearance,</i> -and as an <i>appearance</i> it would cease from having any right to condemn -appearance.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>C.</i></p> - -<p>Then the "Will to Truth" would have to be examined psychologically: it -is not a moral power, but a form of the Will to Power. This would have -to be proved by the fact that it avails itself of every <i>immoral</i> means -there is; above all, of the metaphysicians.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span></p> - -<p>At the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing -the assumption that moral values are the highest values, <i>Method in -research</i> is attained only when all <i>moral prejudices</i> have been -overcome: it represents a conquest over morality....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">584.</p> - -<p>The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome of the fact that, -instead of recognising in logic and the categories of reason merely -a means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (that is -to say, especially, a useful <i>falsification</i>), they were taken to be -the criterion of truth—particularly of <i>reality.</i> The "criterion -of truth" was, as a matter of fact, merely the <i>biological utility -of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle:</i> and, -since a species of animals knows nothing more important than its own -preservation, it was indeed allowable here to speak of "truth." Where -the artlessness came in, however, was in taking this anthropocentric -idiosyncrasy as the <i>measure of things,</i> as the canon for recognising -the "real" and the "unreal": in short, in making a relative thing -absolute. And behold, all at once, the world fell into the two halves, -"real" and "apparent": and precisely that world which man's reason had -arranged for him to live and to settle in, was discredited. Instead of -using the forms as mere instruments for making the world manageable -and calculable, the mad fancy of philosophers intervened, and saw that -in these categories the concept of that world is given which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> does -not correspond to the concept of the world in which man lives.... The -means were misunderstood as measures of value, and even used as a -condemnation of their original purpose....</p> - -<p>The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a useful way: the means -thereto was the invention of forms and signs, with the help of which -the confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced to a useful and -wieldy scheme.</p> - -<p>But woe! a <i>moral category</i> was now brought into the game: no creature -would deceive itself, no creature may deceive itself—consequently -there is only a will to truth. What is "truth"?</p> - -<p>The principle of contradiction provided the scheme: the real world to -which the way is being sought cannot be in contradiction with itself, -cannot change, cannot evolve, has no beginning and no end.</p> - -<p>That is the greatest error which has ever been committed, the really -fatal error of the world: it was believed that in the forms of reason a -criterion of reality had been found—whereas their only purpose was to -master reality, by <i>misunderstanding</i> it intelligently....</p> - -<p>And behold, the world became false precisely owing to the qualities -<i>which constitute its reality,</i> namely, change, evolution, -multifariousness, contrast, contradiction, war. And thenceforward the -whole fatality was there.</p> - -<p>1. How does one get rid of the false and merely apparent world? (it was -the real and only one).</p> - -<p>2. How does one become one's self as remote<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> as possible from the -world of appearance? (the concept of the perfect being as a contrast -to the real being; or, more correctly still, as <i>the contradiction of -life</i>....).</p> - -<p>The whole direction of values was towards the <i>slander of life</i>; people -deliberately confounded ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so -that the opposing parties also began to reject <i>science</i> with horror.</p> - -<p>Thus the road to science was <i>doubly</i> barred: first, by the belief -in the real world; and secondly, by the opponents of this belief. -Natural science and psychology were (1) condemned in their objects, (2) -deprived of their artlessness....</p> - -<p>Everything is so absolutely bound and related to everything else in -the real world, that to condemn, or to <i>think away</i> anything, means to -condemn and think away the whole. The words "this should not be," "this -ought not to be," are a farce.... If one imagines the consequences, -one would ruin the very source of Life by suppressing everything which -is in any sense whatever <i>dangerous or destructive.</i> Physiology proves -this <i>much better</i>!</p> - -<p>We see how morality <i>(a) poisons</i> the whole concept of the world, <i>(b)</i> -cuts off the way to <i>science, (c)</i> dissipates and undermines all real -instincts (by teaching that their root is <i>immoral</i>).</p> - -<p>We thus perceive a terrible tool of decadence at work, which succeeds -in remaining immune, thanks to the holy names and holy attitudes it -assumes.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">585.</p> - -<p>The awful recovery of our <i>consciousness:</i> not of the individual, but -of the human species. Let us reflect; let us think backwards; let us -follow the narrow and broad highway.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>A.</i></p> - -<p>Man seeks "the truth": a world that does not contradict itself, -that does not deceive, that does not change, a <i>real</i> world—a -world in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception, -variability—-the causes of suffering! He does not doubt that there is -such a thing as a world as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to -it. (Indian criticism: even the ego is apparent and <i>not</i> real.)</p> - -<p>Whence does man derive the concept of <i>reality</i>? —Why does he make -variability, deception, contradiction, the origin of <i>suffering;</i> why -not rather of his happiness? ...</p> - -<p>The contempt and hatred of all that perishes, changes, and varies: -whence comes this valuation of stability? Obviously, the will to truth -is <i>merely</i> the longing for a <i>stable world.</i></p> - -<p>The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: <i>therefore,</i> it was -concluded, reason is the road to a static state; the most <i>spiritual</i> -ideas must be nearest to the "real world."—It is from the senses that -the greatest number of misfortunes come they are cheats, deluders, and -destroyers.</p> - -<p>Happiness can be promised only by Being: change and happiness exclude -each other. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> loftiest desire is thus to be one with Being. That is -the formula for the way to happiness.</p> - -<p><i>In summa:</i> The world as it <i>ought</i> to be exists; this world in which -we live is an error—this our world should <i>not</i> exist.</p> - -<p><i>The belief in Being</i> shows itself only as a result: the real primum -<i>mobile</i> is the disbelief in Becoming, the mistrust of Becoming, the -scorn of all Becoming....</p> - -<p>What kind of a man reflects in this way? An unfruitful, <i>suffering</i> -kind, a world-weary kind. If we try and fancy what the opposite kind -of man would be like, we have a picture of a creature who would not -require the belief in Being; he would rather despise it as dead, -tedious, and indifferent....</p> - -<p>The belief that the world which ought to be, is, really exists, is a -belief proper to the unfruitful, <i>who do not wish to create a world as -it should be.</i> They take it for granted, they seek for means and ways -of attaining to it. "The will to truth"—<i>is the impotence of the will -to create.</i></p> - -<table border="0" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">To recognise that something</td><td align="left">}</td><td align="left">Antagonism in</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">is <i>thus</i> or <i>thus:</i></td><td align="left">}</td><td align="left">the degrees of</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">To act so that something will</td><td align="left">}</td><td align="left">energy in</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">be <i>thus</i> or <i>thus:</i></td><td align="left">}</td><td align="left">various natures.</td></tr> -</table> - -<p>The fiction of a world which corresponds to our desires; psychological -artifices and interpretations calculated to associate all that we -honour and regard as pleasant, with this <i>real world.</i></p> - -<p>"The will to truth" at this stage is essentially <i>the art of -interpretation:</i> to which also belongs that interpretation which still -possesses strength.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span></p> - -<p>The same species of men, grown one degree poorer, <i>no longer possessed -of the power</i> to interpret and to create fictions, produces the -Nihi<i>lists.</i> A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it is, -that it ought <i>not</i> to exist, and of the world as it ought to be, that -it does not exist. According to this, existence (action, suffering, -willing, and feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the "in vain" is the -Nihilist's pathos—and as pathos it is moreover an <i>inconsistency</i> on -the part of the Nihilist.</p> - -<p>He who is not able to introduce his will into things, the man without -either will or energy, at least invests them with some meaning, <i>i.e.</i> -he believes that a will is already in them.</p> - -<p>The degree of a man's <i>will-power</i> may be measured from the extent to -which he can dispense with the meaning in things, from the extent to -which he is able to endure a world without meaning: <i>because he himself -arranges a small portion of it.</i></p> - -<p>The <i>philosophical objective view of things</i> may thus be a sign of -poverty both of will and of energy. For energy organises what is -closest and next; the "scientists," whose only desire is to <i>ascertain</i> -what exists, are such as cannot arrange things <i>as they ought to be.</i></p> - -<p>The <i>artists,</i> an intermediary species, they at least set up a symbol -of what should exist,—they are productive inasmuch as they actually -<i>alter</i> and transform; not like the scientists, who leave everything as -it is.</p> - -<p><i>The connection between philosophers and the pessimistic religions;</i> -the same species of man<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> (<i>they attribute the highest degree of -reality</i> to the <i>things which are valued highest</i>).</p> - -<p><i>The connection between philosophers and moral men</i> and their -evaluations (the <i>moral</i> interpretation of the world as the sense of -the world: after the collapse of the religious sense).</p> - -<p><i>The overcoming of philosophers</i> by the annihilation of the world of -being: intermediary period of Nihilism; before there is sufficient -strength present to transvalue values, and to make the world of -becoming, and of appearance, the <i>only</i> world to be deified and called -good.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>B.</i></p> - -<p>Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a symptom of increasing -<i>strength</i> or of increasing <i>weakness</i>:—</p> - -<p>Partly owing to the fact that the strength <i>to create</i> and <i>to will</i> -has grown to such an extent, that it no longer requires this collective -interpretation and introduction of a <i>sense</i> ("present duties," state, -etc.);</p> - -<p>Partly owing to the fact that even the creative power necessary -to invent sense, declines, and disappointment becomes the ruling -condition. The inability to <i>believe</i> in a sense becomes "unbelief."</p> - -<p>What is the meaning of <i>science</i> in regard to both possibilities?</p> - -<p>(1) It is a sign of strength and self-control; it shows an <i>ability</i> to -dispense with healing, consoling worlds of illusion.</p> - -<p>(2) It is also able to undermine, to dissect, to disappoint, and to -weaken.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="center"><i>C.</i></p> - -<p><i>The belief in truth,</i> the need of holding to something which is -believed to be true: psychological reduction apart from the valuations -that have existed hitherto. Fear and laziness.</p> - -<p>At the same time <i>unbelief:</i> Reduction. In what way does it acquire a -<i>new value,</i> if a real world does not exist at all (by this means the -capacity of valuing, which hitherto has been <i>lavished</i> upon the world -of being, becomes free once more).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">586.</p> - -<p>The <i>real</i> and the <i> "apparent" world.</i></p> - -<p class="center"><i>A.</i></p> - -<p>The <i>erroneous concepts</i> which proceed from this concept are of three -kinds:—</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> An unknown world:—we are adventurers, we are inquisitive,—that -which is known to us makes us weary (the danger of the concept lies in -the fact it suggests that "this" world is known to us....);</p> - -<p><i>(b) Another</i> world, where things are different:—something in us draws -comparisons, and thereby our calm submission and our silence lose their -value—perhaps all will be for the best, we have not hoped in vain.... -The world where things are different—who knows?—where we ourselves -will be different....</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> A <i>real</i> world:—that is the most singular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> blow and attack -which we have ever received; so many things have become encrusted in -the word "true," that we involuntarily give these to the "real world"; -the <i>real</i> world must also be a <i>truthful</i> world, such a one as would -not deceive us or make fools of us; to believe in it in this way is to -be almost <i>forced</i> to believe (from convention, as is the case among -people worthy of confidence).</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>The concept, "the <i>unknown</i> world," suggests that this world is known -to us (is tedious);</p> - -<p>The concept, "the other world," suggests that this world <i>might be -different,</i> it suppresses necessity and fate (it is useless to <i>submit</i> -and to <i>adapt one's self</i>);</p> - -<p>The concept, <i>the true world,</i> suggests that this world is -untruthful, deceitful, dishonest, not genuine, and not essential, -and <i>consequently</i> not a world calculated to be useful to us (it is -unadvisable to become adapted to it; <i>better</i> resist it).</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Thus we <i>escape</i> from "this" world in three different ways:——</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> With our <i>curiosity</i>—as though the interesting part was -somewhere else;</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> With our <i>submission</i>—as though it was not necessary to submit, -as though this world was not an ultimate necessity;</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> With our <i>sympathy</i> and respect—as though this world did not -deserve them, as though it was mean and dishonest towards us....</p> - -<p><i>In summa</i>: we have become revolutionaries in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> three different ways; we -have made <i>x</i> our criticism of the "known world."</p> - -<p class="center"><i>B.</i></p> - -<p><i>The first step to reason:</i> to understand to what extent we have been -<i>seduced,</i>—for it might be <i>precisely</i> the reverse:</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> The <i>unknown</i> world could be so constituted as to give us a -liking for "this" world—it may be a more stupid and meaner form of -existence.</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> The other world, very far from taking account of our desires -which were never realised here, might be part of the mass of things -which <i>this</i> world makes possible for us; to learn to know this world -would be a means of satisfying us,</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> The <i>true</i> world: but who actually says that the apparent world -must be of less value than the true world? Do not our instincts -contradict this judgment? Is not man eternally occupied in creating an -imaginative world, because he will have a better world than reality? -<i>In the first place,</i> how do we know that <i>our</i> world is <i>not</i> the -true world? ... for it might be that the other world is the world of -"appearance" (as a matter of fact, the Greeks, for instance, actually -imagined a <i>region of shadows, a life of appearance,</i> beside <i>real</i> -existence). And finally, what right have we to establish <i>degrees of -reality,</i> as it were? That is something different from an unknown -world—that is already the <i>will to know something of the unknown.</i> The -"other," the "unknown" world—good! but to speak of the "true world" is -as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> good as "<i>knowing</i> something about it,"—that is the <i>contrary</i> of -the assumption of an <i>x</i>-world....</p> - -<p>In short, the world <i>x</i> might be in every way a more tedious, a more -inhuman, and a less dignified world than this one.</p> - -<p>It would be quite another matter if it were assumed that there were -several <i>x</i>-worlds—that is to say, every possible kind of world -besides our own. But this has <i>never been assumed....</i></p> - -<p class="center"><i>C.</i></p> - -<p>Problem: why has the <i>image of the other world</i> always been to the -disadvantage of "this" one—that is to say, always stood as a criticism -of it; what does this point to?—</p> - -<p>A people that are proud of themselves, and who are on the ascending -path of Life, always; picture <i>another</i> existence as lower and less -valuable than theirs; they regard the strange unknown world as their -enemy, as their opposite; they feel no curiosity, but rather repugnance -in regard to what is strange to them.... Such a body of men would never -admit that another people were the "true people"....</p> - -<p>The very fact that such a distinction is possible,—that this world -should be called the world of appearance, and that the other should be -called the true world,—is symptomatic.</p> - -<p>The places of origin of the idea, of "another world":</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The philosopher who invents a rational world where <i>reason</i> -and logical functions are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> adequate:—this is the root of -the "true" world.</p> - -<p>The religious man who invents a "divine world";—this is the -root of the "denaturalised" and the "anti-natural" world.</p> - -<p>The moral man who invents a "free world":—this is the root -of the good, the perfect, the just, and the holy world.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The <i>common factor</i> in the three places of origin: <i>psychological</i> -error, physiological confusion.</p> - -<p>With what attributes is the "other world," as it actually appears in -history, characterised? With the stigmata of philosophical, religious, -and moral prejudices.</p> - -<p>The "other world" as it appears in the light of these facts, is -<i>synonymous</i> with <i>not-Being,</i> with not-living, with the <i>will</i> not to -live....</p> - -<p><i>General aspect:</i> it was the instinct of the <i>fatigue of living,</i> and -not that of life, which created the "other world."</p> - -<p><i>Result:</i> philosophy, religion, and morality are <i>symptoms of -decadence.</i></p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title"><i>(l)</i> The Biological Value of Knowledge.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">587.</p> - -<p>It might seem as though I had evaded the question concerning -"certainty". The reverse is true: but while raising the question of the -criterion of certainty, I wished to discover the weights and measures -with which men had weighed heretofore—and to show that the question<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> -concerning certainty is already in itself a <i>dependent</i> question, a -question of the second rank.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">588.</p> - -<p>The question of values is more <i>fundamental</i> than the question of -certainty: the latter only becomes serious once the question of values -has been answered.</p> - -<p>Being and appearance, regarded psychologically, yield no "Being in -itself," no criterion for reality, but only degrees of appearance, -measured according to the strength of the sympathy which we feel for -appearance.</p> - -<p>There is no struggle for existence between ideas and observations, -but only a struggle for supremacy—the vanquished idea is <i>not -annihilated,</i> but only <i>driven to the background</i> or <i>subordinated. -There is no such thing as annihilation in intellectual spheres.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">589.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -"End and means"<br /> -"Cause and effect"<br /> -"Subject and object"<br /> -"Action and suffering"<br /> -"Thing-in-itself and<br /> -appearance"<br /> -</p> - -<p>As interpretations (<i>not</i> as established facts)—and in what respect -were they perhaps necessary interpretations? (as "preservative -measures")—all in the sense of a Will to Power.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">590.</p> - -<p>Our values are <i>interpreted into the heart</i> of things.</p> - -<p>Is there, then, any <i>sense</i> in the absolute?</p> - -<p>Is not sense necessarily <i>relative-sense</i> and perspective?</p> - -<p>All sense is Will to Power (all relative senses may be identified with -it).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">591.</p> - -<p>The desire for "established facts"—Epistemology: how much pessimism -there is in it!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">592.</p> - -<p>The antagonism between the "true world," as pessimism depicts it, and -a world in which it were possible to live—for this the rights of -<i>truth</i> must be tested. It is necessary to measure all these "ideal -forces" according to the standard of life, in order to understand the -nature of that antagonism: the struggle of sickly, desperate life, -cleaving to a beyond, against healthier, more foolish, more false, -richer, and fresher life. Thus it is not "truth" struggling with Life, -but <i>one</i> kind of Life with another kind.—But the former would fain -be the <i>higher</i> kind!—Here we must prove that some order of rank is -necessary,—that the first problem is <i>the order of rank among kinds of -Life.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">593.</p> - -<p>The belief, "It is <i>thus</i> and <i>thus,</i>" must be altered into the will, -"Thus and thus <i>shall it be.</i>"</p> - -<hr /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="title"><i>(m)</i> Science.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">594.</p> - -<p>Science hitherto has been a means of disposing of the confusion of -things by hypotheses which "explain everything"—that is to say, it -has been the result of the intellect's repugnance to chaos. This -same repugnance takes hold of me when I contemplate <i>myself;</i> I -should like to form some kind of representation of my inner world -for myself by means of a <i>scheme,</i> and thus overcome intellectual -confusion. Morality was a simplification of this sort: it taught man as -<i>recognised,</i> as <i>known,</i>—Now we have annihilated morality—we have -once more grown <i>completely obscure</i> to ourselves! I know that I know -nothing <i>about myself. Physics</i> shows itself to be a <i>boon</i> for the -mind: science (as the road to <i>knowledge</i>) acquires a new charm after -morality has been laid aside—and <i>owing to the fact</i> that we find -consistency here alone, we must <i>order</i> our lives in accordance with -it so that it may help us to <i>preserve it. </i> This results in a sort of -<i>practical meditation</i> concerning the <i>conditions of our existence</i> as -investigators.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">595.</p> - -<p>Our first principles: no God: no purpose: limited energy. We will take -good care to <i>avoid</i> thinking out and prescribing the necessary lines -of thought for the lower orders.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">596.</p> - -<p>No "<i>moral</i> education" of humanity: but the <i>disciplinary school of -scientific errors</i> is necessary, because truth disgusts and creates a -dislike of life, provided a man is not already irrevocably launched -upon his <i>way,</i> and bears the consequences of his honest standpoint -with tragic pride.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">597.</p> - -<p>The first principle of <i>scientific work:</i> faith in the union and -continuance of scientific work, so that the individual may undertake to -work at any point, however small, and feel sure that his efforts <i>will -not be in vain.</i></p> - -<p>There is a great paralysing force: to work <i>in vain,</i> to struggle <i>in -vain.</i></p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>The periods of <i>hoarding,</i> when energy and power are stored, to be -utilised later by subsequent periods: <i>Science</i> as a <i>half-way house,</i> -at which the mediocre, more multifarious, and more complicated beings -find their most natural gratification and means of expression: all -those who do well to avoid <i>action.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">598.</p> - -<p>A. philosopher recuperates his strength in a way quite his own, and -with other means: he does it, for instance, with Nihilism. The belief -<i>that there is no such thing as truth,</i> the Nihilistic belief, is a -tremendous relaxation for one who, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> a warrior of knowledge, is -unremittingly struggling with a host of hateful truths. For truth is -ugly.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">599.</p> - -<p>The "purposelessness of all phenomena": the belief in this is the -result of the view that all interpretations hitherto have been false, -it is a generalisation on the part of discouragement and weakness—it -is not a necessary belief.</p> - -<p>The arrogance of man: when he sees no purpose, he <i>denies</i> that there -can be one!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">600.</p> - -<p>The unlimited ways of interpreting the world: every interpretation is a -symptom of growth or decline.</p> - -<p>Unity (monism) is a need of inertia; Plurality in interpretation is a -sign of strength. One should not <i>desire to deprive</i> the world of its -disquieting and enigmatical nature.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">601.</p> - -<p>Against the desire for reconciliation and peaceableness. To this also -belongs every attempt on the part of monism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">602.</p> - -<p>This relative world, this world for the eye, the touch, and the -ear, is very false, even when adjusted to a much more sensitive -sensual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> apparatus. But its comprehensibility, its clearness, its -practicability, its beauty, will begin to <i>near their end</i> if we -<i>refine</i> our senses, just as beauty ceases to exist when the processes -of its history are reflected upon: the arrangement of the <i>end</i> is in -itself an illusion. Let it suffice, that the more coarsely and more -superficially it is understood, the <i>more valuable,</i> the more definite, -the more beautiful and important the world then seems. The more -deeply one looks into it, the further our valuation retreats from our -view,-<i>senselessness approaches!</i> We have created the world that has -any value! Knowing this, we also perceive that the veneration of truth -is already the <i>result of illusion</i>—and that it is much more necessary -to esteem the formative, simplifying, moulding, and romancing power.</p> - -<p>"All is false—everything is allowed!"</p> - -<p>Only as the result of a certain bluntness of vision and the desire for -simplicity does the beautiful and the "valuable" make its appearance: -in itself it is purely fanciful.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">603.</p> - -<p>We know that the destruction of an illusion does not necessarily -produce a truth, but only one more piece of <i>ignorance;</i> it is the -extension of our "empty space," an increase in our "waste."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">604.</p> - -<p>Of what alone can <i>knowledge</i> consist?—"Interpretation," the -introduction of a sense into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> things, <i>not</i> "explanation" (in the -majority of cases a new interpretation of an old interpretation which -has grown incomprehensible and little more than a mere sign). There -is no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates, -everything, is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all -things are our opinions.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">605.</p> - -<p>The ascertaining of "truth" and "untruth," the ascertaining of facts -in general, is fundamentally different from the creative <i>placing,</i> -forming, moulding, subduing, and <i>willing</i> which lies at the root of -<i>philosophy. To give a sense to things</i>—this duty always remains -<i>over,</i> provided <i>no sense already lies in them.</i> The same holds good -of sounds, and also of the fate of nations they are susceptible of the -most varied interpretations and turns, <i>for different purposes.</i></p> - -<p>A higher duty is to <i>fix a goal</i> and to mould facts according to -it: <i>that is,</i> the <i>interpretation of action,</i> and not merely a -<i>transvaluation</i> of concepts.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">606.</p> - -<p>Man ultimately finds nothing more in things than he himself has laid -in them—this process of finding again is science, the actual process -of laying a meaning in things, is art, religion, love, pride. In both, -even if they are child's play, one should show good courage and one -should plough ahead; on the one hand, to find again, on the other,—we -are the other,—to lay a sense in things.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">607.</p> - -<p><i>Science</i>: its two sides:—</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>In regard to the individual;</p> - -<p>In regard to the complex of culture ("levels of culture")</p></blockquote> - -<p>—antagonistic valuation in regard to this and that side.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">608.</p> - -<p>The development of science tends ever more to transform the known into -the unknown: its aim, however, is to do the <i>reverse,</i> and it starts -out with the instinct of tracing the unknown to the known.</p> - -<p>In short, science is laying the road to <i>sovereign ignorance,</i> to a -feeling that "knowledge" does not exist at all, that it was merely a -form of haughtiness to dream of such a thing; further, that we have not -preserved the smallest notion which would allow us to class knowledge -even as a <i>possibility</i> that "knowledge" is a contradictory idea. We -<i>transfer</i> a primeval myth and piece of human vanity into the land -of hard facts: we can <i>allow</i> a thing-in-itself as a concept, just -as little as we can <i>allow</i> "knowledge-in-itself." The <i>misleading</i> -influence of "numbers and logic," the misleading influence of "laws."</p> - -<p><i>Wisdom</i> is an attempt to <i>overcome</i> the perspective valuations (<i>i.e.</i> -the "will to power"): it is a principle which is both unfriendly to -Life, and also decadent; a symptom in the case of the Indians, etc.; -<i>weakness</i> of the power of appropriation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">609.</p> - -<p>It does not suffice for you to see in what ignorance man and beast now -live; you must also have and learn the <i>desire</i> for <i>ignorance.</i> It -is necessary that you should know that without this form of ignorance -life itself would be impossible, that it is merely a vital condition -under which, alone, a living organism can preserve itself and prosper: -a great solid belt of ignorance must stand about you.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">610.</p> - -<p>Science—the transformation of Nature into concepts for the purpose of -governing Nature—that is part of the rubric <i>means.</i></p> - -<p>But the <i>purpose</i> and <i>will</i> of mankind must grow in the same way, the -intention in regard to the whole.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">611.</p> - -<p><i>Thought</i> is the strongest and most persistently exercised function in -all stages of life—and also in every act of perception or apparent -experience! Obviously it soon becomes the <i>mightiest</i> and <i>most -exacting</i> of all functions, and in time tyrannises over other powers. -Ultimately it becomes "passion in itself."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">612.</p> - -<p>The right to great passion must be reclaimed for the investigator, -after self-effacement and the cult of "objectivity" have created a -false order of rank in this sphere. Error reached its zenith<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> when -Schopenhauer taught: <i>in the release from passion and</i> in will alone -lay the road to "truth," to knowledge; the intellect freed from will -<i>could not help</i> seeing the true and actual essence of things. The same -error in art: as if everything became <i>beautiful</i> the moment it was -regarded without will.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">613.</p> - -<p>The contest for supremacy among the passions, and the dominion of one -of the passions over the intellect.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">614.</p> - -<p>To "humanise" the world means to feel ourselves ever more and more -masters upon earth.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">615.</p> - -<p>Knowledge, among a higher class of beings, will also take new forms -which are not yet necessary.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">616.</p> - -<p>That the <i>worth of the world</i> lies in our interpretations (that perhaps -yet other interpretations are possible somewhere, besides mankind's); -that the interpretations made hitherto were perspective valuations, -by means of which we were able to survive in life, <i>i.e.</i> in the -Will to Power and in the growth of power; that every <i>elevation of -man</i> involves the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every -higher degree of strength or power attained, brings new views in its -train, and teaches a belief in new horizons—these doctrines lie<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> -scattered through all my works. The world that <i>concerns us at all</i> is -false—that is to say, is not a fact; but a romance, a piece of human -sculpture, made from a meagre sum of observation; it is "in flux"; it -is something that evolves, a great revolving lie continually moving -onwards and never getting any nearer to truth—for there is no such -thing as "truth."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">617.</p> - -<p><i>Recapitulation</i>:—</p> - -<p>To <i>stamp</i> Becoming with the character of Being—this is the highest -<i>Will to Power.</i></p> - -<p><i>The twofold falsification,</i> by the senses on the one hand, by the -intellect on the other, with the view of maintaining a world of being, -of rest, of equivalent cases, etc.</p> - -<p>That <i>everything recurs,</i> is the very nearest <i>approach of a world of -Becoming to a world of Being, the height of contemplation.</i></p> - -<p>It is out of the values which have been attributed to Being, that the -condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, Becoming, have sprung: once -such a world of Being had been invented.</p> - -<p>The metamorphoses of Being (body, God, ideas, natural laws, formulæ, -etc.).</p> - -<p>"Being" as appearance the twisting round of values: appearance was that -which <i>conferred the values.</i></p> - -<p>Knowledge in itself in a world of Becoming is impossible; how can -knowledge be possible at all, then? Only as a mistaking of one's self, -as will to power, as will to deception.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span></p> - -<p>Becoming is inventing, willing, self-denying, self-overcoming; no -subject but an action, it places things, it is creative, no "causes and -effects."</p> - -<p>Art is the will to overcome Becoming, it is a process of eternalising, -but short-sighted, always according to the perspective, repeating, as -it were in a small way, the tendency of the whole.</p> - -<p>That which <i>all life</i> shows, is to be regarded as a reduced formula for -the collective tendency: hence the new definition of the concept "Life" -as "will to power."</p> - -<p>Instead of "cause and effect," the struggle of evolving factors with -one another, frequently with the result that the opponent is absorbed; -no constant number for Becoming.</p> - -<p>The uselessness of old ideals for the interpretation of all that takes -place, once their bestial origin and utility have been recognised, they -are, moreover, all hostile to life.</p> - -<p>The uselessness of the mechanical theory—it gives the impression that -there <i>can be no purpose.</i></p> - -<p>All the <i>idealism</i> of mankind, hitherto, is on the point of -turning into <i>Nihilism</i>—may be shown to be a belief in absolute -<i>worth</i>lessness, <i>i.e. purpose</i>lessness.</p> - -<p>The annihilation of ideals, the new desert waste the new arts which -will help us to endure it—<i>amphibia</i> that we are!</p> - -<p><i>First principles,</i> bravery, patience, no "stepping-back," not too much -ardour to get to the fore. (<i>N.B.</i>—Zarathustra constantly maintaining -an attitude of parody towards all former values, as the result of his -overflowing energy.)</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="II" id="II">II.</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.</h4> - -<hr /> -<p class="title">1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">618.</p> - -<p>Of all the interpretations of the world attempted heretofore, the -<i>mechanical</i> one seems to-day to stand most prominently in the front. -Apparently it has a clean conscience on its side; for no science -believes inwardly in progress and success unless it be with the help -of mechanical procedures. Every one knows these procedures: "reason" -and "purpose" are allowed to remain out of consideration as far as -possible; it is shown that, provided a sufficient amount of time be -allowed to elapse, everything can evolve out of everything else, and no -one attempts to suppress his malicious satisfaction, when the "apparent -design in the fate" of a plant or of the yolk of an egg, may be traced -to stress and thrust in short, people are heartily glad to pay respect -to this principle of profoundest stupidity, if I may be allowed to pass -a playful remark concerning these serious matters. Meanwhile, among the -most select intellects to be found in this movement,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> some presentiment -of evil, some anxiety is noticeable, as if the theory had a rent in it, -which sooner or later might be its last: I mean the sort of rent which -denotes the end of all balloons inflated with such theories.</p> - -<p>Stress and thrust themselves cannot be "explained," one cannot get rid -of the <i>actio in distans.</i> The belief even in the ability to explain is -now lost, and people peevishly admit that one can only describe, not -explain that the dynamic interpretation of the world, with its denial -of "empty space" and its little agglomerations of atoms, will soon get -the better of physicists: although in this way <i>Dynamis</i> is certainly -granted an inner quality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">619.</p> - -<p>The triumphant concept "<i>energy</i>" with which our physicists created -God and the world, needs yet to be completed: it must be given an -inner will which I characterise as the "<i>Will to Power</i>"—that is to -say, as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or the application and -exercise of power as a creative instinct, etc. Physicists cannot get -rid of the "<i>actio in distans</i>" in their principles; any more than they -can a repelling force (or an attracting one). There is no help for it, -all movements, all "appearances," all "laws" must be understood as -<i>symptoms</i> of an <i>inner</i> phenomenon, and the analogy of man must be -used for this purpose. It is possible to trace all the instincts of an -animal to the will to power; as also all the functions of organic life -to this one source.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">620.</p> - -<p>Has anybody ever been able to testify to a <i>force!</i> No, but to -<i>effects,</i> translated into a completely strange language. Regularity in -sequence has so spoilt us, <i>that we no longer wonder at the wonderful -process.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">621.</p> - -<p>A force of which we cannot form any idea, is an empty word, and ought -to have no civic rights in the city of science: and the same applies to -the purely mechanical powers of attracting and repelling by means of -which we can form an image of the world—no more!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">622.</p> - -<p><i>Squeezes and kicks</i> are something incalculably recent, evolved and -not primeval. They presuppose something which holds together and <i>can</i> -press and strike! But how could it hold together?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">623.</p> - -<p>There is nothing <i>unalterable</i> in chemistry: this is only appearance, -a mere school prejudice. We it was who <i>introduced</i> the unalterable, -taking it from metaphysics as usual, Mr. Chemist. It is a mere -superficial judgment to declare that the diamond, graphite, and carbon -are identical. Why? Simply because no loss of substance can be traced -in the scales! Well then, at least they have something in common; but -the work of the molecules in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> process of changing from one form to -the other, an action we can neither see nor weigh, is just exactly what -makes one material something different—with specifically different -qualities.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">624.</p> - -<p><i>Against</i> the physical <i>atom.</i>—In order to understand the world, we -must be able to reckon it up; in order to be able to reckon it up, we -must be aware of constant causes; but since we find no such constant -causes in reality, we <i>invent</i> them for ourselves and call them atoms. -This is the origin of the atomic theory.</p> - -<p>The possibility of calculating the world, the possibility of expressing -all phenomena by means of formulæ—is that really "understanding"? What -would be understood of a piece of music, if all that were calculable in -it and capable of being expressed in formulas, were reckoned up?—Thus -"constant causes", things, substances, something "unconditioned," were -therefore <i>invented</i>;—what has been attained thereby?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">625.</p> - -<p>The mechanical concept of "movement" is already a translation of the -original process into the <i>language of symbols of the eye and the -touch.</i></p> - -<p>The concept <i>atom,</i> the distinction between the "seat of a motive force -and the force itself," is a <i>language of symbols derived from our -logical and physical world.</i></p> - -<p>It does not lie within our power to alter our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> means of expression: -it is possible to understand to what extend they are but symptomatic. -To demand an <i>adequate means of expression is nonsense</i>: it lies at -the heart of a language, of a medium of communication, to express -<i>relation</i> only.... The concept "truth" is <i>opposed to good sense.</i> -The whole province of truth—<i>falseness</i> only applies to the relations -between beings, not to an "absolute." There is no such thing as a -"being in itself" (<i>relations</i> in the first place constitute being), -any more than there can be "knowledge in itself."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">626.</p> - -<p>"<i>The feeling of force</i> cannot proceed from movement: feeling in -general cannot proceed from movement."</p> - -<p>"Even in support of this, an apparent experience is the only evidence: -in a substance (brain) feeling is generated through transmitted motion -(stimuli). But generated? Would this show that the feeling did <i>not</i> -yet exist there <i>at all</i>? so that its appearance would <i>have</i> to -be regarded as the <i>creative act</i> of the intermediary—motion? The -feelingless condition of this substance is only an hypothesis! not an -experience! Feeling, therefore is the <i>quality</i> of the substance: there -actually are substances that feel."</p> - -<p>"Do we learn from certain substances that they have <i>no</i> feeling? No, -we merely cannot tell that they have any. It is impossible to seek the -origin of feeling in non-sensitive substance."—<i>Oh what hastiness!</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">627.</p> - -<p>"To attract" and "to repel", in a purely mechanical sense, is pure -fiction: a word. We cannot imagine an attraction without a <i>purpose.—</i> -Either the will to possess one's self of a thing, or the will to defend -one's self from a thing or to repel it—<i>that</i> we "understand"; that -would be an interpretation which we could use.</p> - -<p>In short, the psychological necessity of believing in causality lies in -the <i>impossibility of imagining a process without a purpose</i>: but of -course this says nothing concerning truth or untruth (the justification -of such a belief)! The belief in <i>causæ</i> collapses with the belief in -τέλει (against Spinoza and his causationism).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">628.</p> - -<p>It is an illusion to suppose that something is <i>known,</i> when all -we have is a mathematical formula of what has happened; it is only -<i>characterised, described;</i> no more!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">629.</p> - -<p>If I bring a regularly recurring phenomenon into a formula, I have -facilitated and shortened my task of characterising the whole -phenomenon, etc. But I have not thereby ascertained a "law," I have -only replied to the question: How is it that something recurs here? It -is a supposition that the formula corresponds to a complex of really -unknown forces and the discharge of forces; it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> pure mythology to -suppose that forces here obey a law, so that, as the result of their -obedience, we have the same phenomenon every time.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">630.</p> - -<p>I take good care not to speak of chemical "<i>laws</i>": to do so savours of -morality. It is much more a question of establishing certain relations -of power: the stronger becomes master of the weaker, in so far as the -latter cannot maintain its degree of independence,—here there is no -pity, no quarter, and, still less, any observance of "law."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">631.</p> - -<p>The unalterable sequence of certain phenomena does not prove any "law," -but a relation of power between two or more forces. To say, "But it -is precisely this relation that remains the same!" is no better than -saying, "One and the same force cannot be another force."—It is not a -matter of <i>sequence,</i> but a matter of <i>interdependence,</i> a process in -which the procession of moments do <i>not</i> determine each other after the -manner of cause and effect....</p> - -<p>The separation of the "action" from the "agent"; of the phenomenon from -the <i>worker</i> of that phenomenon: of the process from one that is not -process, but lasting, <i>substance,</i> thing, body, soul, etc.; the attempt -to understand a life as a sort of shifting of things and a changing of -places; of a sort of "being" or stable entity: this ancient mythology<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> -established the belief in "cause and effect," once it had found a -lasting form in the functions of speech and grammar.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">632.</p> - -<p>The "regularity" of a sequence is only a metaphorical expression, not -a fact, just <i>as if</i> a rule were followed here! And the same holds -good of "conformity to law." We find a formula in order to express an -ever-recurring kind of succession of phenomena: but that does not show -that we have <i>discovered a law</i>; much less a force which is the cause -of a recurrence of effects. The fact that something always happens -thus or thus, is interpreted here as if a creature always acted thus -or thus as the result of obedience to a law or to a lawgiver: whereas -apart from the "law" it would be free to act differently. But precisely -that inability to act otherwise might originate in the creature itself, -it might be that it did not act thus or thus in response to a law, -but simply because it was so constituted. It would mean simply: that -something cannot also be something else; that it cannot be first this, -and then something quite different; that it is neither free nor the -reverse, but merely thus or thus. <i>The fault lies in thinking a subject -into things.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">633.</p> - -<p>To speak of two consecutive states, the first as "cause," and the -second as "effect," is false. The first state cannot bring about -anything, the second has nothing effected in it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is a question of a struggle between two elements unequal in power: -a new adjustment is arrived at, according to the measure of power each -possesses. The second state is something fundamentally different from -the first (it is not its effect): the essential thing Is, that the -factors which engage in the struggle leave it with different quanta of -power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">634.</p> - -<p><i>A. criticism of Materialism.</i>—Let us dismiss the two popular -concepts, Necessity and Law, from this idea: the first introduces a -false constraint, the second a false liberty into the world. "Things" -do not act regularly, they follow no <i>rule:</i> there are no things (that -is our fiction); neither do they act in accordance with any necessity. -There is no obedience here: for, the fact that <i>something is</i> as it is, -strong or weak, is not the result of obedience or of a rule or of a -constraint....</p> - -<p>The degree of resistance and the degree of superior power—this is the -question around which all phenomena turn: if we, for our own purposes -and calculations, know how to express this in formulas and "laws," all -the better for us! But that does not mean that we have introduced any -"morality" into the world, just because we have fancied it as obedient.</p> - -<p>There are no laws: every power draws its last consequence at every -moment. Things are calculable precisely owing to the fact that there is -no possibility of their being otherwise than they are.</p> - -<p>A quantum of power is characterised by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> effect it produces -and the influence it resists. The adiaphoric state which would be -thinkable in itself, is entirely lacking. It is essentially a will to -violence and a will to defend one's self against violence. It is not -self-preservation: every atom exercises its influence over the whole of -existence—it is thought out of existence if one thinks this radiation -of will-power away. That is why I call it a quantum of "<i>Will to -Power</i>"; with this formula one can express the character which cannot -be abstracted in thought from mechanical order, without suppressing the -latter itself in thought.</p> - -<p>The translation of the world of effect into a <i>visible</i> world—a world -for the eye—is the concept "movement." Here it is always understood -that <i>something</i> has been moved,—whether it be the fiction of an -atomic globule or even of the abstraction of the latter, the dynamic -atom, something is always imagined that has an effect—that is to say, -we have not yet rid ourselves of the habit into which our senses and -speech inveigled us. Subject and object, an agent to the action, the -action and that which does it separated: we must not forget that all -this signifies no more than semeiotics and—nothing real. Mechanics as -a teaching of <i>movement</i> is already a translation of phenomena into -man's language of the senses.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">635.</p> - -<p>We are in need of "unities" in order to be able to reckon: but this is -no reason for supposing that "unities" actually <i>exist.</i> We borrowed -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> concept "unity" from our concept "ego,"—our very oldest article -of faith. If we did not believe ourselves to be unities we should never -have formed the concept "thing." Now—that is to say, somewhat late in -the day, we are overwhelmingly convinced that our conception of the -concept "ego" is no security whatever for a real entity. In order to -maintain the mechanical interpretation of the world theoretically, we -must always make the reserve that it is with fictions that we do so: -the concept of <i>movement</i> (derived from the language of our senses) -and the concept of the <i>atom</i> (= entity, derived from our psychical -experience) are based upon a <i>sense-prejudice</i> and a <i>psychological -prejudice.</i></p> - -<p>Mechanics formulates consecutive phenomena, and it does so -semeiologically, in the terms of the senses and of the mind (that all -influence is <i>movement</i>; that where there is movement something is at -work moving): it does not touch the question of the causal force.</p> - -<p>The <i>mechanical</i> world is imagined as the eye and the sense of touch -alone could imagine a world (as "moved"),—in such a way as to be -calculable,—as to simulate causal entities "things" (atoms) whose -effect is constant (the transfer of the false concept of subject to the -concept atom).</p> - -<p>The mixing together of the concept of numbers, of the concept of thing -(the idea of subject), of the concept of activity (the separation of -that which is the cause, and the effect), of the concept of movement: -all these things are phenomenal; our eye and our <i>psychology</i> are still -in it all.</p> - -<p>If we eliminate these adjuncts, nothing remains<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> over but dynamic -quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: the -essence of which resides in their relation to all other quanta, in -their "influence" upon the latter. The will to power, not Being, not -Becoming, but a <i>pathos</i>—is the elementary fact, from these first -results a Becoming, an influencing....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">636.</p> - -<p>The physicists believe in a "true world" after their own kind; a -fixed <i>systematising of atoms</i> to perform necessary movements, and -holding good equally of all creatures, so that, according to them, -the "world of appearance" reduces itself to the side of general and -generally-needed Being, which is accessible to every one according to -his kind (accessible and also adjusted,—made "subjective"). But here -they are in error. The atom which they postulate is arrived at by the -logic of that perspective of consciousness; it is in itself therefore -a subjective fiction. This picture of the world which they project -is in no way essentially different from the subjective picture: the -only difference is, that it is composed simply with more extended -senses, but certainly with <i>our</i> senses.... And in the end, without -knowing it, they left something out of the constellation: precisely -the necessary <i>perspective factor,</i> by means of which every centre of -power—and not man alone—constructs the rest of the world <i>from its -point of view</i>—that is to say, measures it, feels it, and moulds it -according to its degree of strength.... They forgot to reckon with -this perspective-fixing power,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> in "true being,"—or, in school-terms, -subject-being. They suppose that this was "evolved" and added;—but -even the chemical investigator needs it: it is indeed <i>specific Being,</i> -which determines action and reaction according to circumstances.</p> - -<p><i>Perspectivity is only a complex form, of specificness.</i> My idea is -that every specific body strives to become master of all space, and to -extend its power (its will to power), and to thrust back everything -that resists it. But inasmuch as it is continually meeting the same -endeavours on the part of other bodies, it concludes by coming to terms -with those (by "combining" with those) which are sufficiently related -to it—<i>and thus they conspire together for power.</i> And the process -continues.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">637.</p> - -<p>Even in the inorganic world all that concerns an atom of energy is its -immediate neighbourhood: distant forces balance each other. Here is -the root of <i>perspectivity,</i> and it explains why a living organism is -"egoistic" to the core.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">638.</p> - -<p>Granting that the world disposed of a quantum of force, it is obvious -that any transposition of force to any place would affect the whole -system—thus, besides the causality of <i>sequence,</i> there would also be -a dependence, <i>contiguity,</i> and <i>coincidence.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">639.</p> - -<p>The only possible way of upholding the sense of the concept "God" would -be: to make <i>Him not</i> the motive force, but the condition of <i>maximum -power,</i> an <i>epoch;</i> a point in the further development of the <i>Will to -Power;</i> by means of which subsequent evolution just as much as former -evolution—up to Him—could be explained.</p> - -<p>Viewed mechanically, the energy of collective Becoming remains -constant; regarded from the economical standpoint, it ascends -to its zenith and then recedes therefrom in order to remain -eternally rotatory. This "<i>Will to Power</i>" expresses itself in the -<i>interpretation in the manner in which the strength is used.</i>—The -conversion of energy into life; "life in its highest power" -thenceforward appears as the goal. The same amount of energy, at -different stages of development, means different things.</p> - -<p>That which determines growth in Life is the economy which becomes ever -more sparing and methodical, which achieves ever more and more with a -steadily decreasing amount of energy.... The ideal is the principle of -the least possible expense....</p> - -<p>The only thing <i>that is proved</i> is that the world is <i>not</i> striving -towards a state of stability. Consequently its zenith must not be -conceived as a state of absolute equilibrium....</p> - -<p>The dire necessity of the same things happening in the course of the -world, as in all other things, is not an eternal determinism reigning -over all phenomena, but merely the expression of the fact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> that the -impossible is not possible; that a given force cannot be different -from that given force; that a given quantity of resisting force does -not manifest itself otherwise than in conformity with its degree of -strength;—to speak of events as being necessary is tautological.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="title">2. The Will to Power as Life.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<p style="text-align: center;"><i>(a) The Organic Process.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">640.</p> - -<p>Man imagines that he was present at the generation of the organic -world: what was there to be observed, with the eyes and the touch, -in regard to these processes? How much of it can be put into round -numbers? What rules are noticeable in the movements? Thus, man would -fain arrange all phenomena as if they were <i>for the eye and for the -touch,</i> as if they were forms of motion: he will discover <i>formules</i> -wherewith to <i>simplify</i> the unwieldy mass of these experiences.</p> - -<p><i>The reduction of all phenomena</i> to the level of men with senses and -with mathematics. It is a matter of making <i>an inventory of human -experiences:</i> granting that man, or rather the <i>human eye and the -ability to form concepts,</i> have been the eternal witnesses of all -things.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">641.</p> - -<p>A plurality of forces bound by a common nutritive process we call -"Life." To this nutritive<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> process all so-called feeling, thinking, -and imagining belong as means—that is to say, (1) in the form of -opposing other forces; (2) in the form of an adjustment of other forces -according to mould and rhythm; (3) the form of a valuation relative to -assimilation and excretion.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">642.</p> - -<p>The bond between the inorganic and the organic world must lie in the -repelling power exercised by every atom of energy. "Life" might be -defined as a lasting form of <i>force-establishing processes,</i> in which -the various contending forces, on their part, grow unequally. To what -extent does counter-strife exist even in obedience? Individual power is -by no means surrendered through it. In the same way, there exists in -the act of commanding, an acknowledgment of the fact that the absolute -power of the adversary has not been overcome, absorbed, or dissipated. -"Obedience," and "command," are forms of the game of war.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">643.</p> - -<p>The Will to Power <i>interprets</i> (an organ in the process of formation -has to be interpreted): it defines, it determines gradations, -differences of power. Mere differences of power could not be aware of -each other as such: something must be there which <i>will</i> grow, and -which interprets all other things that would do the same, according to -the value of the latter. In sooth, all interpretation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> is but a means -in itself to become master of something. (Continual <i>interpretation</i> is -the first principle of the organic process.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">644.</p> - -<p>Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, the contiguity of the -developed organs and functions, with the disappearance of intermediate -members—if <i>that</i> is <i>perfection,</i> then there is a Will to Power -apparent in the organic process by means of whose <i>dominating, -shaping,</i> and <i>commanding</i> forces it is continually increasing the -sphere of its power, and persistently simplifying things within that -sphere, it <i>grows</i> imperatively.</p> - -<p>"Spirit" is only a means and an instrument in the service of higher -life, in the service of the elevation of life.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">645.</p> - -<p>"<i>Heredity,</i>" as something quite incomprehensible, cannot be used -as an explanation, but only as a designation for the identification -of a problem. And the same holds good of "<i>adaptability.</i>" As a -matter of fact, the account of morphology, even supposing it were -perfect, <i>explains</i> nothing, it merely describes an enormous fact. -<i>How</i> a given organ gets to be used for any particular purpose is not -explained. There is just as little explained in regard to these things -by the assumption of <i>causæ finales</i> as by the assumption of <i>causæ -efficientes.</i> The concept "causa" is only a means of expression, no -<i>more</i>; a means of designating a thing.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">646.</p> - -<p>They are analogies; for instance, our <i>memory</i> may suggest another kind -of memory which makes itself felt in heredity, development, and forms. -Our <i>inventive</i> and experimentative powers suggest another kind of -inventiveness in the application of instruments to new ends, etc.</p> - -<p>That which we call our "<i>consciousness</i>" is quite guiltless of any -of the essential processes of our preservation and growth; and no -human brain could be so subtle as to construct anything more than a -machine—to which every organic process is infinitely superior.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">647.</p> - -<p><i>Against Darwinism.</i>—The use of an organ does <i>not</i> explain its -origin, on the contrary! During the greater part of the time occupied -in the formation of a certain quality, this quality does not help to -preserve the individual; it is of no use to him, and particularly not -in his struggle with external circumstances and foes.</p> - -<p>What is ultimately "useful"? It is necessary to ask, "Useful for what"?</p> - -<p>For instance, that which promotes the <i>lasting powers</i> of the -individual might be unfavourable to his strength or his beauty; that -which preserves him might at the same time fix him and keep him stable -throughout development. On the other hand, a <i>deficiency,</i> a state of -<i>degeneration,</i> may be of the greatest possible use, inasmuch as it -acts as a stimulus to other organs. In the same way,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> a <i>state of need</i> -may be a condition of existence, inasmuch as it reduces an individual -to that modicum of means which, though it <i>keeps him together,</i> does -not allow him to squander his strength.—The individual himself is -the struggle of parts (for nourishment, space, etc.): his development -involves the <i>triumph,</i> the <i>predominance,</i> of isolated parts; the -<i>wasting away,</i> or the "development into organs," of other parts.</p> - -<p>The influence of "environment" is nonsensically <i>overrated</i> in Darwin, -the essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous -inner power to shape and to create forms, which merely <i>uses, exploits</i> -"environment."</p> - -<p>The new forms built up by this inner power are not produced with a view -to any end; but, in the struggle between the parts, a new form does not -exist long <i>without</i> becoming related to some kind of semi-utility, -and, according to its use, develops itself ever more and more perfectly.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">648.</p> - -<p>"Utility" in respect of the acceleration of the speed of evolution, is -a different kind of "utility" from that which is understood to mean the -greatest possible stability and staying power of the evolved creature.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">649.</p> - -<p>"Useful" in the sense of Darwinian biology means: that which favours a -thing in its struggle with others. But in my opinion the <i>feeling of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> -being surcharged,</i> the feeling accompanying an <i>increase in strength,</i> -quite apart from the utility of the struggle, is the actual <i>progress</i>: -from these feelings the will to war is first derived.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">650.</p> - -<p>Physiologists should bethink themselves before putting down the -instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic -being. A living thing seeks above all to <i>discharge</i> its strength: -"<i>self-preservation" </i> is only one of the results thereof.—Let us -beware of <i>superfluous</i> teleological principles!—one of which is the -whole concept of "self-preservation."<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See <i>Beyond Good and Evil,</i> in this edition, Aph. 13.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">651.</p> - -<p>The most-fundamental—and most primeval activity of a protoplasm cannot -be ascribed to a will to self-preservation, for it absorbs an amount -of material which is absurdly out of proportion with the needs of its -preservation: and what is more, it does <i>not</i> "preserve itself" in the -process, but actually falls to <i>pieces....</i> The instinct which rules -here, must account for this total absence in the organism of a desire -to preserve itself: hunger is already an interpretation based upon the -observation of a more or less complex organism (hunger is a specialised -and later form of the instinct; it is an expression of the system of -divided labour, in the service of a higher instinct which rules the -whole).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">652.</p> - -<p>It is just as impossible to regard <i>hunger</i> as the <i>primum mobile,</i> as -it is to take self-preservation to be so. Hunger, considered as the -result of insufficient nourishment, means hunger as the result of a -will to power <i>which can no longer dominate</i> It is not a question of -replacing a loss, it is only later on, as the result of the division of -labour, when the Will to Power has discovered other and quite different -ways of gratifying itself, that the appropriating lust of the organism -is <i>reduced</i> to hunger—to the need of replacing what has been lost.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">653.</p> - -<p>We can but laugh at the false "<i>Altruism</i>" of biologists: propagation -among the amœbæ appears as a process of jetsam, as an advantage to -them. It is an excretion of useless matter.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">654.</p> - -<p>The division of a protoplasm into two takes place when its power is -no longer sufficient to subjugate the matter it has appropriated: -procreation is the result of impotence.</p> - -<p>In the cases in which the males seek the females and become one with -them, procreation is the result of hunger.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">655.</p> - -<p>The weaker vessel is driven to the stronger from a need of nourishment; -it desires to get under it,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> if possible to become <i>one</i> with it. The -stronger, on the contrary, defends itself from others; it refuses to -perish in this way; it prefers rather to split itself into two or more -parts in the process of growing. One may conclude that the greater the -urgency seems to become one with something else, the more weakness in -some form is present. The greater the tendency to variety, difference, -inner decay, the more strength is actually to hand.</p> - -<p>The instinct to cleave to something, and the instinct to repel -something, are in the inorganic as in the organic world, the uniting -bond. The whole distinction is a piece of hasty judgment.</p> - -<p>The will to power in every combination of forces, <i>defending itself -against the stronger and coming down unmercifully upon the weaker, is -more correct.</i></p> - -<p>N. B. <i>All processes may be regarded as "beings".</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">656.</p> - -<p>The will to power can manifest itself only against <i>obstacles;</i> it -therefore goes in search of what resists it—this is the primitive -tendency of the protoplasm when it extends its <i>pseudopodia</i> and feels -about it. The act of appropriation and assimilation is, above all, the -result of a desire to overpower, a process of forming, of additional -building and rebuilding, until at last the subjected creature has -become completely a part of the superior creature's sphere of power, -and has increased the latter.—If this process of incorporation -does not succeed, then the whole organism falls to pieces; and the -<i>separation</i> occurs as the result of the will to power: in order to -prevent the escape of that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> which has been subjected, the will to power -falls into two wills (under some circumstances without even abandoning -completely its relation to the two).</p> - -<p>"Hunger" is only a more narrow adaptation, once the fundamental -instinct of power has won power of a more abstract kind.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">657.</p> - -<p>What is "passive"?</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>To be hindered in the outward movement of grasping: it is -thus an act of resistance and reaction.</p></blockquote> - -<p>What is "active"?</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>To stretch out for power.</p></blockquote> - -<p>"Nutrition"...</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Is only a derived phenomenon; the primitive form of it was -the will to stuff everything inside one's own skin.</p></blockquote> - -<p>"Procreation"...</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Only derived; originally, in those cases In which one -will was unable to organise the collective mass it had -appropriated, an <i>opposing will</i> came into power, which -undertook to effect the separation and establish a new -centre of organisation, after a struggle with the original -will.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span></p> - -<p>"Pleasure"...</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Is a feeling of power (presupposing the existence of pain).</p></blockquote> - - -<p class="parnum">658.</p> - -<p>(1) The organic functions shown to be but forms of the fundamental -will, the will to power,—and buds thereof.</p> - -<p>(2) The will to power specialises itself as will to nutrition, to -property, to <i>tools,</i> to servants (obedience), and to rulers: the body -as an example.—The stronger will directs the weaker. There is no other -form of causality than that of will to will. It is not to be explained -mechanically.</p> - -<p>(3) Thinking, feeling, willing, in all living organisms. What is a -desire if it be not: a provocation of the feeling of power by an -obstacle (or, better still, by rhythmical obstacles and resisting -forces)—so that it surges through it? Thus in all pleasure pain is -understood.—If the pleasure is to be very great, the pains preceding -it must have been very long, and the whole bow of life must have been -strained to the utmost.</p> - -<p>(4) Intellectual functions. The will to shaping, forming, and making -like, etc.</p> - -<hr /> -<p style="text-align: center;"><i>(b) Man.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">659.</p> - -<p><i>With the body as clue.</i>—Granting that the "<i>soul</i>" was only an -attractive and mysterious thought,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> from which philosophers rightly, -but reluctantly, separated themselves—that which they have since -learnt to put in its place is perhaps even more attractive and even -more mysterious. The human <i>body,</i> in which the whole of the most -distant and most recent past of all organic life once more becomes -living and corporal, seems to flow through, this past and right over -it like a huge and inaudible torrent; the body is a more wonderful -thought than the old "soul." In all ages the body, as our actual -property, as our most certain being, in short, as our ego, has been -more earnestly believed in than the spirit (or the "soul," or the -subject, as the school jargon now calls it). It has never occurred to -any one to regard his stomach as a strange or a divine stomach; but -that there is a tendency and a predilection in man to regard all his -thoughts as "inspired," all his values as "imparted to him by a God," -all his instincts as dawning activities—this is proved by the evidence -of every age in man's history. Even now, especially among artists, -there may very often be noticed a sort of wonder, and a deferential -hesitation to decide, when the question occurs to them, by what means -they achieved their happiest work, and from which world the creative -thought came down to them: when they question in this way, they are -possessed by a feeling of guilelessness and childish shyness. They dare -not say: "That came from me; it was my hand which threw that die." -Conversely, even those philosophers and theologians, who in their logic -and piety found the most imperative reasons for regarding their body as -a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> deception (and even as a deception overcome and disposed of), could -not help recognising the foolish fact that the body still remained: and -the most unexpected proofs of this are to be found partly in Pauline -and partly in Vedantic philosophy. But what does <i>strength of faith</i> -ultimately mean? Nothing!—A strong faith might also be a foolish -faith!—There is food for reflection.</p> - -<p>And supposing the faith in the body were ultimately but the result -of a conclusion; supposing it were a false conclusion, as idealists -declare it is, would it not then involve some doubt concerning the -trustworthiness of the spirit itself which thus causes us to draw wrong -conclusions?</p> - -<p>Supposing the plurality of things, and space, and time, and motion -(and whatever the other first principles of a belief in the body may -be) were errors—what suspicions would not then be roused against the -spirit which led us to form such first principles? Let it suffice that -the belief in the body is, at any rate for the present, a much stronger -belief than the belief in the spirit, and he who would fain undermine -it assails the authority of the spirit most thoroughly in so doing!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">660.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>The Body as an Empire.</i></p> - -<p>The aristocracy in the body, the majority of the rulers (the fight -between the cells and the tissues).</p> - -<p>Slavery and the division of labour: the higher type alone possible -through the <i>subjection</i> of the lower to a function.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span></p> - -<p>Pleasure and pain, not contraries. The feeling of power.</p> - -<p>"Nutrition" only a result of the insatiable lust of appropriation in -the Will to Power.</p> - -<p>"Procreation": this is the decay which supervenes when the ruling cells -are too weak to organise appropriated material.</p> - -<p>It is the <i>moulding</i> force which will have a continual supply of new -material (more "force"). The masterly construction of an organism out -of an egg.</p> - -<p>"The mechanical interpretation": recognises only quantities: but the -real energy is in the quality. Mechanics can therefore only describe -processes; it cannot explain them.</p> - -<p>"Purpose." We should start out from the "sagacity" of plants.</p> - -<p>The concept of "meliorism": <i>not</i> only greater complexity, but greater -<i>power</i> (it need not be only greater masses).</p> - -<p>Conclusion concerning the evolution of man: the road to perfection lies -in the bringing forth of the most powerful individuals, for whose use -the great masses would be converted into mere tools (that is to say, -into the most intelligent and flexible tools possible).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">661.</p> - -<p>Why is all <i>activity,</i> even that of a <i>sense,</i> associated with -pleasure? Because, before the activity was possible, an obstacle or -a burden was done away with. Or, rather, because all action is a -process of overcoming, of becoming master of, and of <i>increasing</i> the -<i>feeling of power</i>? The pleasure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> of thought. Ultimately it is not -only the feeling of power, but also the pleasure of creating and of -contemplating the <i>creation:</i> for all activity enters our consciousness -in the form of "works."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">662.</p> - -<p>Creating is an act of selecting and of finishing the thing selected. -(In every act of the will, this is the essential element.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">663.</p> - -<p>All phenomena which are the result of intentions may be reduced to <i>the -intention of increasing power.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">664.</p> - -<p>When we do anything, we are conscious of a <i>feeling of strength;</i> -we often have this sensation before the act—that is to say, while -imagining the thing to do (as, for instance, at the sight of an enemy, -of an obstacle, which we feel <i>equal to</i>): it is always an accompanying -sensation. Instinctively we think that this feeling of strength is -the cause of the action, that it is the "motive force." Our belief in -causation is the belief in force and its effect; it is a transcript -of our experience: in which we identify force and the feeling of -force.—Force, however, never moves things; the strength which is -conscious "does not set the muscles moving." "Of such a process we have -no experience, no idea." "We experience as little concerning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> force as -a motive power, as concerning the <i>necessity</i> of a movement." Force is -said to be the constraining element! "All we know is that one thing -follows another;—we know nothing of either compulsion or arbitrariness -in regard to the one following the other. Causality is first invented -by thinking compulsion into the sequence of processes. A certain -"understanding" of the thing is the result—that is to say, we humanise -the process a little, we make it more "familiar"; the familiar is the -known habitual fact of <i>human compulsion associated with the feeling of -force.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">665.</p> - -<p>I have the intention of extending my arm; taking it for granted that -I know as little of the physiology of the human body and of the -mechanical laws of its movements as the man in the street, what could -there be more vague, more bloodless, more uncertain than this intention -compared with what follows it? And supposing I were the astutest -of mechanics, and especially conversant with the formulæ which are -applicable in this case, I should not be able to extend my arm one -whit the better. Our "knowledge" and our "action" in this case lie -coldly apart: as though in two different regions.—Again: Napoleon -carries out a plan of campaign—what does that mean? In this case, -everything concerning the consummation of the campaign is <i>known,</i> -because everything must be done through words of command: but even here -subordinates are taken for granted, who apply<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> and adapt the general -plan to the particular emergency, to the degree of strength, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">666.</p> - -<p>For ages we have always ascribed the value of an action, of a -character, of an existence, to the <i>intention,</i> to the <i>purpose</i> for -which it was done, acted, or lived: this primeval idiosyncrasy of taste -ultimately takes a dangerous turn provided the lack of intention and -purpose in all phenomena comes ever more to the front in consciousness. -With it a general depreciation of all values seems to be preparing: -"All is without sense."—This melancholy phrase means: "All sense -lies in the intention, and if the intention is absolutely lacking, -then sense must be lacking too." In conformity with this valuation, -people were forced to place the value of life in a a life after death, -or in the progressive development of ideas, or of mankind, or of the -people, or of man to superman; but in this way the <i>progressus in -infinitum</i> of purpose had been reached: it was ultimately necessary to -find one's self a place in the process of the world (perhaps with the -disdæmonistic outlook, it was a process which led to nonentity).</p> - -<p>In regard to this point, "<i>purpose</i>" needs a somewhat more severe -criticism: it ought to be recognised that an action <i>is never -caused by a purpose;</i> that an object and the means thereto are -interpretations, by means of which certain points in a phenomena -are selected and accentuated, at the cost of other, more numerous, -points, that every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> time something is done for a purpose, something -fundamentally different, and yet other things happen; that in regard -to the action done with a purpose, the case is the same as with the -so-called purposefulness of the heat which is radiated from the sun: -the greater part of the total sum is squandered; a portion of it, which -is scarcely worth reckoning, has a "purpose," has "sense"; that an -"end" with its "means" is an absurdly indefinite description, which -indeed may be able to command as a precept, as "will," but presupposes -a system of obedient and trained instruments, which, in the place of -the indefinite, puts forward a host of determined entities <i>(i.e.</i> we -imagine a system of <i>clever</i> but narrow intellects who postulate end -and means, in order to be able to grant our only known "end," the rôle -of the "cause of an action,"—a proceeding to which we have no right: -it is tantamount to solving a problem by placing its solution in an -inaccessible world which we cannot observe).</p> - -<p>Finally, why could not an "end" be merely an <i>accompanying feature</i> -in the series of changes among the active forces which bring about -the action—a pale stenographic symbol stretched in consciousness -beforehand, and which serves as a guide to what happens, even as -a symbol of what happens, <i>not</i> as its cause?—But in this way we -criticise <i>will</i> itself: is it not an illusion to regard that which -enters consciousness as will-power, as a cause? Are not all conscious -phenomena only final phenomena—the lost links in a chain, but -apparently conditioning one another in their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> sequence within the plane -of consciousness? This might be an illusion.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">667.</p> - -<p>Science does <i>not</i> inquire what impels us to will: on the contrary, it -<i>denies</i> that <i>willing</i> takes place at all, and supposes that something -quite different has happened—in short, that the belief in "will" and -"end" is an illusion. It does not inquire into the <i>motives</i> of an -action, as if these had been present in consciousness previous to the -action, but it first divides the action up into a group of phenomena, -and then seeks the previous history of this mechanical movement—but -<i>not</i> in the terms of feeling, perception, and thought; from this -quarter it can never accept the explanation: perception is precisely -the matter of science, <i>which has to be explained.</i>—The problem of -science is precisely to explain the world, <i>without</i> taking perceptions -as the cause: for that would mean regarding <i>perceptions</i> themselves -as the <i>cause</i> of perceptions. The task of science is by no means -accomplished.</p> - -<p>Thus: either there is <i>no</i> such thing as will,—the hypothesis of -science,—or the will is <i>free</i>. The latter assumption represents the -prevailing feeling, of which we cannot rid ourselves, even if the -hypothesis of science were <i>proved.</i></p> - -<p>The popular belief in cause and effect is founded on the principle that -free will <i>is the cause of every effect:</i> thereby alone do we arrive -at the feeling of causation. And thereto belongs also the feeling that -every cause is <i>not</i> an effect, but always onl<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span>y a cause—if will is -the cause. "Our acts of will are <i>not necessary</i>"—this lies in the -very <i>concept of "will."</i> The effect necessarily comes <i>after</i> the -cause—that is what we feel. It is merely a <i>hypothesis</i> that even our -willing is compulsory in every case.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">668.</p> - -<p>"To will" is not "to desire," to strive, to aspire to; it distinguishes -itself from that through the <i>passion of commanding.</i></p> - -<p>There is no such thing as "willing," but only the willing of -<i>something:</i> the <i>aim</i> must not be severed from the state—as the -epistemologists sever it. "Willing," as they understand it, is no more -possible than "thinking": it is a pure invention.</p> - -<p>It is essential to willing that something should be <i>commanded</i> (but -that does not mean that the will is carried into effect).</p> - -<p>The general <i>state of tension,</i> by virtue of which a force seeks to -discharge itself, is not "willing."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">669.</p> - -<p>"Pain" and "pleasure" are the most absurd <i>means of expressing</i> -judgments, which of course does not mean that the judgments which are -enunciated in this way must necessarily be absurd. The elimination -of all substantiation and logic, a yes or no in the reduction to a -passionate desire to have or to reject, an imperative abbreviation, the -utility of which is irrefutable: that is pain and pleasure. Its origin -is in the central sphere<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> of the intellect; its prerequisite is an -infinitely accelerated process of perceiving, ordering, co-ordinating, -calculating, concluding: pleasure and pain are always final phenomena, -they are never causes.</p> - -<p>As to deciding what provokes pain and pleasure, that is a question -which depends upon the <i>degree of power:</i> the same thing, when -confronted with a small quantity of power, may seem a danger and may -suggest the need of speedy defence, and when confronted with the -consciousness of greater power, may be a voluptuous stimulus and may be -followed by a feeling of pleasure.</p> - -<p>All feelings of pleasure and pain presuppose a <i>measuring of collective -utility</i> and <i>collective harmfulness</i>: consequently a sphere where -there is the willing of an object (of a condition) and the selection of -the means thereto. Pleasure and pain are never "original facts."</p> - -<p>The feelings of pleasure and pain are <i>reactions of the will</i> -(emotions) in which the intellectual centre fixes the value of certain -supervening changes as a collective value, and also as an introduction -of contrary actions.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">670.</p> - -<p><i>The belief in "emotions"</i>—Emotions are a fabrication of the -intellect, an invention of <i>causes</i> which do not exist. All general -<i>bodily sensations</i> which we do not understand are interpreted -intellectually—that is to say, a <i>reason</i> is sought why we feel -thus or thus among certain people or in certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> experiences. Thus -something disadvantageous dangerous, and strange is taken for granted, -as if it were the cause of our being indisposed; as a matter of fact, -it gets <i>added to</i> the indisposition, so as to make our condition -thinkable.—Mighty rushes of blood to the brain, accompanied by -a feeling of suffocation, are <i>interpreted</i> as anger: the people -and things which provoke our anger are a means of relieving our -physiological condition. Subsequently, after long habituation, certain -processes and general feelings are so regularly correlated that the -sight of certain processes provokes that condition of general feeling, -and induces vascular engorgements, the ejection of seminal fluid, etc.: -we then say that the "emotion is provoked by propinquity."</p> - -<p><i>Judgments</i> already inhere in pleasure and pain: stimuli become -differentiated, according as to whether they increase or reduce the -feeling of power.</p> - -<p><i>The belief in willing.</i> To believe that a thought may be the cause -of a mechanical movement is to believe in miracles. The <i>consistency -of science</i> demands that once we have made the world <i>thinkable</i> for -ourselves by means of pictures, we should also make the emotions, the -desires, the will, etc., <i>thinkable</i>—that is to say, we should <i>deny</i> -them and treat them as <i>errors of the intellect.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">671.</p> - -<p>Free will or no free will?—There is <i>no such thing</i> as "<i>Will</i>": that -is only a simplified<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> conception on the part of the understanding, like -"matter."</p> - -<p><i>All actions must first be prepared and made possible mechanically -before they can be willed.</i> Or, <i>in most cases</i> the "<i>object</i>" of an -action enters the brain only after everything is prepared for its -accomplishment. The object is an inner "stimulus"—nothing <i>more.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">672.</p> - -<p>The most proximate prelude to an action relates to that action: but -<i>further back still</i> there lies a preparatory history which covers <i>a -far wider field:</i> the individual action is only a factor in a much more -extensive and <i>subsequent</i> fact. The shorter and the longer processes -are not reported.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">673.</p> - -<p>The theory of <i>chance:</i> the soul is a selecting and self-nourishing -being, which is persistently extremely clever and creative (this -<i>creative</i> power is commonly overlocked! it is taken to be merely -passive).</p> - -<p>I recognised the <i>active</i> and creative <i>power</i> within the -accidental.—Accident is in itself nothing more than <i>the clashing of -creative impulses.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">674.</p> - -<p>Among the enormous multiplicity of phenomena to be observed in an -organic being, that part which becomes <i>conscious</i> is a mere means: -and the particle of "virtue," "self abnegation,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> and other fanciful -inventions, are denied in a most thoroughgoing manner by the whole of -the remaining phenomena. We would do well to study our organism in all -its immorality....</p> - -<p>The animal functions are, as a matter of fact, a million times more -important than all beautiful states of the soul and heights of -consciousness: the latter are an overflow, in so far as they are not -needed as instruments in the service of the animal functions. The whole -of <i>conscious</i> life: the spirit together with the soul, the heart, -goodness, and virtue; in whose service does it work? In the greatest -possible perfection of the means (for acquiring nourishment and -advancement) serving the fundamental animal functions: above all, the -<i>ascent of the line of Life.</i></p> - -<p>That which is called "flesh" and "body" is of such incalculably greater -importance, that the rest is nothing more than a small appurtenance. -To continue the chain of life <i>so that it becomes ever more -powerful</i>—that is the task.</p> - -<p>But now observe how the heart, the soul, virtue, and spirit together -conspire formally to thwart this purpose: as <i>if they</i> were the object -of every endeavour! ... The <i>degeneration of life</i> is essentially -determined by the extraordinary <i>fallibility of consciousness,</i> which -is held at bay least of all by the instincts, and thus commits the -gravest and profoundest <i>errors.</i></p> - -<p>Now could any more insane extravagance of vanity be imagined than -to measure the <i>value</i> of existence according to the <i>pleasant or -unpleasant feelings of this consciousness</i>? It is obviously only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> a -means: and pleasant or unpleasant feelings are also no more than means.</p> - -<p>According to what standard is the objective value measured? According -to the quantity of <i>increased</i> and <i>more organised power</i> alone.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">675.</p> - -<p>The value of all <i>valuing.</i>—My desire would be to see the agent once -more identified with the action, after action has been deprived of all -meaning by having been separated in thought from the agent; I should -like to see the notion of doing <i>something,</i> the idea of a "purpose," -of an "intention," of an object, reintroduced into the action, after -action has been made insignificant by having been artificially -separated from these things.</p> - -<p>All "objects," "purposes," "meanings," are only manners of expression -and metamorphoses of the one will inherent in all phenomena; of the -will to power. To have an object, a purpose, or an intention, in -fact <i>to will</i> generally, is equivalent to the desire for <i>greater -strength,</i> for fuller growth, and for the <i>means</i> thereto <i>in addition.</i></p> - -<p>The most general and fundamental instinct in all action and willing -is precisely on that account the one which is least known and is most -concealed; for in practice we always follow its bidding, for the simple -reason that we <i>are</i> in ourselves its bidding....</p> - -<p>All valuations are only the results of, and the narrow points of view -in <i>servings this</i> one will: valuing <i>in itself</i> is nothing save this, -<i>—will to power.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span></p> - -<p>To criticise existence from the standpoint of any one of these -values is utter nonsense and error. Even supposing that a process of -annihilation follows from such a value, even so this process is in the -service of this will.</p> - -<p>The <i>valuation of existence itself!</i> But existence is this valuing -itself!—and even when we say "no," we still do what we <i>are.</i></p> - -<p>We ought now to perceive the <i>absurdity</i> of this pretence at judging -existence; and we ought to try and discover <i>what</i> actually takes place -there. It is symptomatic.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">676.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>Concerning the Origin of our Valuations.</i></p> - -<p>We are able to analyse our body, and by doing so we get the same -idea of it as of the stellar system, and the differences between -organic and inorganic lapses. Formerly the movements of the stars were -explained as the effects of beings consciously pursuing a purpose: -this is no longer required, and even in regard to the movements of -the body and its changes, the belief has long since been abandoned -that they can be explained by an appeal to a consciousness which has -a determined purpose. By far the greater number of movements have -nothing to do with consciousness at all: <i>neither have they anything -to do with sensation.</i> Sensations and thoughts are extremely <i>rare</i> -and <i>insignificant</i> things compared with the innumerable phenomena -occurring every second.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, we believe that a certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> conformity of means -to ends rules over the very smallest phenomenon, which it is quite -beyond our deepest science to understand; a sort of cautiousness, -selectiveness, co-ordination, and repairing process, etc. In short, we -are in the presence of an <i>activity</i> to which it would be necessary -to ascribe an <i>incalculably higher and more extensive intellect</i> than -the one we are acquainted with. We learn to <i>think less of</i> all that -is conscious: we unlearn the habit of making ourselves responsible for -ourselves, because, as conscious beings fixing purposes, we are but the -smallest part of ourselves.</p> - -<p>Of the numerous influences taking effect every second, for instance, -air, electricity, we feel scarcely anything at all. There might be a -number of forces, which, though they never make themselves felt by -us, yet influence us continually. Pleasure and pain are very rare and -scanty phenomena, compared with the countless stimuli with which a cell -or an organ operates upon another cell or organ.</p> - -<p>It is the phase of the <i>modesty of consciousness.</i> Finally, we can -grasp the conscious ego itself, merely as an instrument in the -service of that higher and more extensive intellect: and then we may -ask whether all conscious <i>willing,</i> all conscious <i>purposes,</i> all -<i>valuations,</i> are not perhaps only means by virtue of which something -essentially <i>different is attained,</i> from that which consciousness -supposes. We <i>mean</i>: it is a question of our <i>pleasure</i> and <i>pain</i> but -pleasure and pain might be the means whereby we <i>had something to do</i> -which lies outside our consciousness.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span></p> - -<p>This is to show how very <i>superficial</i> all conscious phenomena -really are; how an action and the image of it differ; how <i>little</i> -we know about what <i>precedes</i> an action; how fantastic our feelings, -"freewill," and "cause and effect" are; how thoughts and images, just -like words, are only signs of thoughts; the impossibility of finding -the grounds of any action; the superficiality of all praise and blame; -how <i>essentially our</i> conscious life is composed of <i>fancies</i> and -<i>illusion</i>; how all our words merely stand for fancies (our emotions -too), and how the <i>union of mankind</i> depends upon the transmission -and continuation of these fancies: whereas, at bottom, the real union -of mankind by means of procreation pursues its unknown way. Does this -belief in the common fancies of men really <i>alter</i> mankind? Or is the -whole body of ideas and valuations only an expression in itself of -unknown changes? <i>Are there</i> really such things as will, purposes, -thoughts, values? Is the whole of conscious life perhaps no more than -<i>mirage</i>? Even when values seem to <i>determine</i> the actions of a man, -they are, as a matter of fact, doing something quite different! In -short, granting that a certain conformity of means to end might be -demonstrated in the action of nature, without the assumption of a -ruling ego: could not <i>our</i> notion of purposes, and our will, etc., be -only a <i>symbolic language</i> standing for something quite different—that -is to say, something not-willing and unconscious? only the thinnest -semblance of that natural conformity of means to end in the organic -world, but not in any way different therefrom?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span></p> - -<p>Briefly, perhaps the whole of mental development is a matter of the -<i>body:</i> it is the consciously recorded history of the fact that a -<i>higher body is forming.</i> The organic ascends to higher regions. -Our longing to know Nature is a means by virtue of which the body -would reach perfection. Or, better still, hundreds of thousands of -experiments are made to alter the nourishment and the mode of living -of the <i>body</i>: the body's consciousness and valuations, its kinds of -pleasure and pain, are <i>signs of these changes and experiments. In the -end, it is not a question concerning man; for he must be surpassed.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">677.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>To what Extent are all Interpretations of the World Symptoms of a -Ruling Instinct.</i></p> - -<p>The <i>artistic</i> contemplation of the world: to sit before the world -and to survey it. But here the analysis of æsthetical contemplation, -its reduction to cruelty, its feeling of security, its judicial and -detached attitude, etc., are lacking. The artist himself must be taken, -together with his psychology (the criticism of the instinct of play, as -a discharge of energy, the love of change, the love of bringing one's -soul in touch with strange things, the absolute egoism of the artist, -etc.). What instincts does he sublimate?</p> - -<p>The <i>scientific</i> contemplation of the world: a criticism of the -psychological longing for science, the desire to make everything -comprehensible; the desire to make everything practical, useful, -capable of being exploited—to what extent this is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> anti-æsthetic. -Only that value counts, which may be reckoned in figures. How it -happens that a mediocre type of man preponderates under the influence -of science. It would be terrible if even history were to be taken -possession of in this way—the realm of the superior, of the judicial. -What instincts are here sublimated!</p> - -<p>The religious contemplation of the world: a criticism of the religious -man. It is not necessary to take the moral man as the type, but the man -who has extreme feelings of exaltation and of deep depression, and who -interprets the former with thankfulness or suspicion without, however, -seeking their origin in <i>himself</i> (nor the latter either). The man who -essentially feels anything but free, who sublimates his conditions and -states of submission.</p> - -<p>The <i>moral</i> contemplation of the world. The feelings peculiar to -certain social ranks are projected into the universe: stability, -law, the making of things orderly, and the making of things alike, -are <i>sought</i> in the highest spheres, because they are valued most -highly,—above everything or behind everything.</p> - -<p>What is <i>common</i> to all: the ruling instincts <i>wish to be regarded</i> as -<i>the highest values in general,</i> even as the <i>creative</i> and <i>ruling -powers.</i> It is understood that these instincts either oppose or -overcome each other (join up synthetically, or alternate in power). -Their profound antagonism is, however, so great, that in those cases in -which they <i>all</i> insist upon being gratified, a man of very thorough -<i>mediocrity</i> is the outcome.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">678.</p> - -<p>It is a question whether the origin of our apparent "knowledge" is not -also a mere offshoot of our <i>older valuations,</i> which are so completely -assimilated that they belong to the very basis of our nature. In this -way only <i>the more recent</i> needs engage in battle <i>with results of the -oldest needs.</i></p> - -<p>The world is seen, felt, and interpreted thus and thus, in order -that organic life may be preserved with this particular manner of -interpretation. Man is <i>not</i> only an individual, but the continuation -of collective organic life in one definite line. The fact that <i>man</i> -survives, proves that a certain species of interpretations (even though -it still be added to) has also survived; that, as a system, this method -of interpreting has not changed. "Adaptation."</p> - -<p>Our "dissatisfaction," our "ideal," etc., may possibly be the <i>result</i> -of this incorporated piece of interpretation, of our particular point -of view: the organic world may ultimately perish owing to it just as -the division of labour in organisms may be the means of bringing about -the ruin of the whole, if one part happen to wither or weaken. The -<i>destruction</i> of organic life, and even of the highest form thereof, -must follow the same principles as the destruction of the individual.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">679.</p> - -<p>Judged from the standpoint of the theory of descent, <i>individuation</i> -shows the continuous breaking<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> up of one into two, and the equally -continuous annihilation of individuals <i>for the sake of a few</i> -individuals, which evolution bears onwards; the greater mass always -perishes ("the body").</p> - -<p>The fundamental phenomena: <i>innumerable individuals are sacrificed for -the sake of a few,</i> in order to make the few possible.—One must not -allow one's self to be deceived; the case is the same with <i>peoples</i> -and <i>races</i>: they produce the "body" for the generation of isolated and -valuable <i>individuals,</i> who continue the great process.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">680.</p> - -<p>I am opposed to the theory that the individual studies the interests of -the <i>species,</i> or of posterity, at the cost of his own advantage: all -this is only apparent.</p> - -<p>The excessive importance which he attaches to the <i>sexual instinct</i> -is not the <i>result</i> of the latter's importance to the species, for -procreation is the actual performance of the individual, it is his -greatest interest, and therefore it is his <i>highest expression of -power</i> (not judged from the standpoint of consciousness, but from the -very centre of the individual).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">681.</p> - -<p>The <i>fundamental errors</i> of the biologists who have lived hitherto: it -is not a matter of the species, but of rearing stronger individuals -(the many are only a means).</p> - -<p>Life is <i>not</i> the continuous adjustment of internal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> relations to -external relations, but will to power, which, proceeding from inside, -subjugates and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of "external" -phenomena.</p> - -<p>These biologists <i>continue</i> the moral valuations ("the absolutely -higher worth of Altruism," the antagonism towards the lust of dominion, -towards war, towards all that which is not useful, and towards all -order of rank and of class).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">682.</p> - -<p>In natural science, the moral depreciation of the <i>ego</i> still goes hand -in hand with the overestimation of the <i>species.</i> But the species is -quite as illusory as the ego: a false distinction has been made. The -ego is a hundred times <i>more</i> than a mere unit in a chain of creatures; -it is the chain <i>itself,</i> in every possible respect, and the species -is merely an abstraction suggested by the multiplicity and partial -similarity of these chains. That the individual is <i>sacrificed</i> to the -species, as people often say he is, is not a fact at all: it is rather -only an example of false interpretation.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">683.</p> - -<p>The formula of the <i>"progress"-superstition</i> according to a famous -physiologist of the cerebral regions:—</p> - -<p><i>"L'animal ne fait jamais de progrès comme espèce. L'homme seul fait de -progrès comme espèce.</i>"</p> - -<p>No.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">684.</p> - -<p><i>Anti-Darwin.</i>—The <i>domestication of man:</i> what definite value can -it have, or has domestication in itself a definite value?—There are -reasons for denying the latter proposition.</p> - -<p>Darwin's school of thought certainly goes to great pains to convince -us of the reverse: it would fain prove that the influence of -domestication may be profound and fundamental. For the time being, we -stand firmly as we did before; up to the present no results save very -superficial modification or degeneration have been shown to follow upon -domestication. And everything that escapes from the hand and discipline -of man, returns almost immediately to its original natural condition. -The type remains constant, man cannot "<i>dénaturer la nature</i>."</p> - -<p>Biologists reckon upon the struggle for existence, the death of the -weaker creature and the survival of the most robust, most gifted -combatant; on that account they imagine a <i>continuous increase in the -perfection of all creatures.</i> We, on the contrary, have convinced -ourselves of the fact, that in the struggle for existence, accident -serves the cause of the weak quite as much as that of the strong; -that craftiness often supplements strength with advantage; that the -<i>prolificness</i> of a species is related in a remarkable manner to that -species <i>chances of destruction</i>....</p> - -<p><i>Natural Selection</i> is also credited with the power of slowly -effecting unlimited metamorphoses: it is believed that every advantage -is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the course of -generations (when heredity is known to be so capricious that ...); -the happy adaptations of certain creatures to very special conditions -of life, are regarded as the result of <i>surrounding influences.</i> -Nowhere, however, are examples of <i>unconscious selection</i> to be found -(absolutely nowhere). The most different individuals associate one with -the other; the extremes become lost in the mass. Each vies with the -other to maintain his kind; those creatures whose appearance shields -them from certain dangers, do not alter this appearance when they are -in an environment quite devoid of danger.... If they live in places -where their coats or their hides do not conceal them, they do not adapt -themselves to their surroundings in any way.</p> - -<p>The <i>selection of the most beautiful</i> has been so exaggerated, that -it greatly exceeds the instincts for beauty in our own race! As a -matter of fact, the most beautiful creature often couples with the -most debased, and the largest with the smallest. We almost always see -males and females taking advantage of their first chance meeting, and -manifesting no taste or selectiveness at all.—Modification through -climate and nourishment—but as a matter of fact unimportant.</p> - -<p>There are no <i>intermediate forms.—</i></p> - -<p>The growing evolution of creatures is assumed. All grounds for this -assumption are entirely lacking. Every type has its <i>limitations</i>: -beyond these evolution cannot carry it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>My general point of view. First proposition</i>: Man as a species is -<i>not</i> progressing. Higher specimens are indeed attained; but they do -not survive. The general level of the species is not raised.</p> - -<p><i>Second proposition</i>: Man as a species does not represent any sort of -progress compared with any other animal. The whole of the animal and -plant world does not develop from the lower to the higher.... but all -simultaneously, haphazardly, confusedly, and at variance. The richest -and most complex forms—and the term "higher type" means no more than -this—perish more easily: only the lowest succeed in maintaining their -apparent imperishableness. The former are seldom attained, and maintain -their superior position with difficulty, the latter are compensated -by great fruitfulness.—In the human race, also, the <i>superior -specimens,</i> the happy cases of evolution, are the first to perish amid -the fluctuations of chances for and against them. They are exposed to -every form of decadence: they are extreme, and, on that account alone, -already decadents.... The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the -Cæsar, is <i>sui generis:</i> such things are not hereditary. The <i>type</i> is -inherited, there is nothing extreme or particularly "happy" about a -type——It is not a case of a particular fate, or of the "evil will" of -Nature, but merely of the concept "superior type": the higher type is -an example of an incomparably greater degree of complexity a greater -sum of co-ordinated elements: but on this account disintegration -becomes a thousand times more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> threatening. "Genius" is the sublimest -machine in existence—hence it is the most fragile.</p> - -<p><i>Third propositio:</i>: The domestication (culture) of man does not -sink very deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immediately -becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The wild man (or, in moral -terminology, the <i>evil</i> man) is a reversion to Nature—and, in a -certain sense, he represents a recovery, a <i>cure</i> from the effects of -"culture." ...</p> - - -<p class="parnum">685.</p> - -<p><i>Anti-Darwin.</i>—What surprises me most on making a general survey of -the great destinies of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of -what to-day Darwin and his school sees or <i>will</i> persist in seeing: -selection in favour of the stronger, the better-constituted, and the -progress of the species. Precisely the reverse of this stares one in -the face: the suppression of the lucky cases, the uselessness of the -more highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the mediocre, -and even of those who are <i>below mediocrity.</i> Unless we are shown some -reason why man is an exception among living creatures, I incline to the -belief that Darwin's school is everywhere at fault. That will to power, -in which I perceive the ultimate reason and character of all change, -explains why it is that selection is never in favour of the exceptions -and of the lucky cases: the strongest and happiest natures are weak -when they are confronted with a majority ruled by organised gregarious -instincts and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> fear which possesses the weak. My general view of -the world of values shows that in the highest values which now sway the -destiny of man, the happy cases among men, the select specimens do not -prevail: but rather the decadent specimens,—perhaps there is nothing -more interesting in the world than this <i>unpleasant</i> spectacle....</p> - -<p>Strange as it may seem, the strong always have to be upheld against the -weak; and the well-constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy -against the sick and physiologically botched. If we drew our morals -from reality, they would read thus: the mediocre are more valuable than -the exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the mediocre; the -will to nonentity prevails over the will to life—and the general aim -now is, in Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian phraseology: "It is -better not to be than to be."</p> - -<p>I <i>protest</i> against this formulating of reality into a moral: and I -loathe Christianity with a deadly loathing, because it created sublime -words and attitudes in order to deck a revolting truth with all the -tawdriness of justice, virtue, and godliness....</p> - -<p>I see all philosophers and the whole of science on their knees before a -reality which is the reverse of "the struggle for life," as Darwin and -his school understood it—that is to say, wherever I look, I see those -prevailing and surviving, who throw doubt and suspicion upon life and -the value of life.—The error of the Darwinian school became a problem -to me: how can one be so blind as to make <i>this</i> mistake?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span></p> - -<p>That <i>species</i> show an ascending tendency, is the most nonsensical -assertion that has ever been made: until now they have only manifested -a dead level. There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher -organisms have developed from the lower. I see that the lower, owing to -their numerical strength, their craft, and ruse, now preponderate,—and -I fail to see an instance in which an accidental change produces -an advantage, at least not for a very long period: for it would be -necessary to find some reason why an accidental change should become so -very strong.</p> - -<p>I do indeed find the "cruelty of Nature" which is so often referred -to; but in a different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky -and well-constituted children; she protects and shelters and loves the -lowly.</p> - -<p>In short, the increase of a species' power, as the result of the -preponderance of its particularly well-constituted and strong -specimens, is perhaps less of a certainty than that it is the result of -the preponderance of its mediocre and lower specimens ... in the case -of the latter, we find great fruitfulness and permanence: in the case -of the former, the besetting dangers are greater, waste is more rapid, -and decimation is more speedy.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">686.</p> - -<p>Man as he has appeared up to the present is the embryo of the man -of the future; <i>all</i> the formative powers which are to produce the -latter, already lie in the former: and owing to the fact that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> they are -enormous, the more <i>promising for the future</i> the modern individual -happens to be, the more <i>suffering</i> falls to his lot. This is the -profoundest concept of <i>suffering.</i> The formative powers clash.—The -isolation of the individual need not deceive one—as a matter of fact, -some uninterrupted current does actually flow through all individuals, -and does thus unite them. The fact that they feel themselves isolated, -is the <i>most powerful spur</i> in the process of setting themselves the -loftiest of aims: their search for happiness is the means which keeps -together and moderates the formative powers, and keeps them from being -mutually destructive.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">687.</p> - -<p><i>Excessive intellectual</i> strength sets <i>itself</i> new goals; it is not in -the least satisfied by the command and the leadership of the inferior -world, or by the preservation of the organism, of the "individual."</p> - -<p>We are <i>more</i> than the individual: we are the whole chain itself, with -the tasks of all the possible futures of that chain in us.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">688.</p> - -<p><i>The unitary view of psychology.</i>—We are accustomed to regard the -development of a vast number of forms as compatible with one single -origin.</p> - -<p>My theory would be: that the will to power<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> is the primitive motive -force out of which all other motives have been derived;</p> - -<p>That it is exceedingly illuminating to substitute <i>power</i> for -individual "happiness" (after which every living organism is said to -strive): "It strives after power, after <i>more</i> power";—happiness is -only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of -difference (it does not strive after happiness: but happiness steps -in when the object is attained, after which the organism has striven: -happiness is an accompanying, not an actuating factor);</p> - -<p>That all motive force is the will to power; that there is no other -force, either physical, dynamic, or psychic.</p> - -<p>In our science, where the concept cause and effect is reduced to a -relationship of complete equilibrium, and in which it seems desirable -for the <i>same</i> quantum of force to be found on either side, <i>all idea -of a motive power is absent</i>: we only apprehend results, and we call -these equal from the point of view of their content of force....</p> - -<p>It is a matter of mere experience that change never ceases: at bottom -we have not the smallest grounds for assuming that any one particular -change must follow upon any other. On the contrary, any state which -has been attained would seem almost forced to maintain itself intact -if it had not within itself a capacity for not desiring to maintain -itself.... Spinoza's proposition concerning "self-preservation" ought -as a matter of fact to put a stop to change. But the proposition is -false; the contrary is true. In all living organisms it can<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> be clearly -shown that they do everything not to remain as they are, but to become -greater....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">689.</p> - -<p><i>"Will to power" and causality.</i>—From a psychological point of view -the idea of "cause" is our feeling of power in the act which is called -willing—our concept effect is the superstition that this feeling of -power is itself the force which moves things....</p> - -<p>A state which accompanies an event and is already an effect of -that event is deemed "sufficient cause" of the latter; the tense -relationship of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of power) -and of an obstacle being overcome—are these things illusions?</p> - -<p>If we translate the notion "cause" back into the only sphere which is -known to us, and out of which we have taken it, we cannot imagine <i>any -change</i> in which the will to power is not inherent. We do not know how -to account for any change which is not a <i>trespassing</i> of one power on -another.</p> - -<p>Mechanics only show us the results, and then only in images (movement -is a figure of speech); gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, -because it is itself the first cause of mechanical results.</p> - -<p>The will to <i>accumulate force</i> is confined to the phenomenon of life, -to nourishment, to procreation, to inheritance, to society, states, -customs, authority. Should we not be allowed to assume that this will -is the motive power also of chemistry?—and of the cosmic order?</p> - -<p>Not only conservation of energy, but the minimum amount of waste; so -that the only reality is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> this: <i>the will of every centre of power to -become stronger</i>—not self-preservation, but the desire to appropriate, -to become master, to become more, to become stronger.</p> - -<p>Is the fact that science is possible a proof of the principle of -causation—"From like causes, like effects"—"A permanent law of -things"—"Invariable order"? Because something is calculable, is it -therefore on that account necessary?</p> - -<p>If something happens thus, and thus only, it is not the manifestation -of a "principle," of a "law," of "order." What happens is that certain -quanta of power begin to operate, and their essence is to exercise -their power over all other quanta of power. Can we assume the existence -of a striving after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain, -<i>i.e.</i> without the sensation of an increase or a decrease of power? -Is mechanism only a language of signs for the concealed fact of a -world of fighting and conquering quanta of will-power? All mechanical -first-principles, matter, atoms, weight, pressure, and repulsion, are -not facts in themselves, but interpretations arrived at with the help -of psychical fictions.</p> - -<p>Life, which is our best known form of being, is altogether "will to -the accumulation of strength"—all the processes of life hinge on -this: everything aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and -accumulation. Life as an individual case (a hypothesis which may be -applied to existence in general) strives after the maximum feeling -of power; life is essentially a striving after more power; striving -itself is only a straining after more power;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> the most fundamental -and innermost thing of all is this will. (Mechanism is merely the -semeiotics of the results.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">690.</p> - -<p>The thing which is the cause of the existence of development cannot -in the course of investigation be found above development; it should -neither be regarded as "evolving" nor as evolved ... the "will to -power" cannot have been evolved.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">691.</p> - -<p>What is the relation of the whole of the organic process towards the -rest of nature?—Here the fundamental will reveals itself.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">692.</p> - -<p>Is the "will to power" a kind of will, or is it identical with the -concept will? Is it equivalent to desiring or commanding; is it the -will which Schopenhauer says is the essence of things?</p> - -<p>My proposition is that the will of psychologists hitherto has been an -unjustifiable generalisation, and that there is no such thing as this -sort of will, that instead of the development of one will into several -forms being taken as a fact, the character of will has been cancelled -owing to the fact that its content, its "whither," was subtracted from -it: in Schopenhauer this is so in the highest degree; what he calls -"will" is merely an empty word. There is even less plausibility in -the will to live: for life is simply one of the manifestations of the -will to power; it is quite arbitrary and ridiculous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> to suggest that -everything is striving to enter into this particular form of the will -to power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">693.</p> - -<p>If the innermost essence of existence is the will to power; if -happiness is every increase of power, and unhappiness the feeling of -not being able to resist, of not being able to become master: may -we not then postulate happiness and pain as cardinal facts? Is will -possible without these two oscillations of yea and nay? But who feels -happiness? ... Who will have power? ... Nonsensical question! If the -essence of all things is itself will to power, and consequently the -ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: contrasts and obstacles are -necessary, therefore also, relatively, units which trespass on one -another.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">694.</p> - -<p>According to the obstacles which a force seeks with a view of -overcoming them, the measure of the failure and the fatality thus -provoked must increase, and in so far as every force can only manifest -itself against some thing that opposes it, an element of unhappiness is -necessarily inherent in every action. But this pain acts as a greater -incitement to life, and increases the will to power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">695.</p> - -<p>If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling of power, life would -have to represent such an increase in power that the difference, the -"plus,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> would have to enter consciousness. A dead level of power, -if maintained, would have to measure its happiness in relation -to depreciations of that level, <i>i.e.</i> in relation to states of -unhappiness and not of happiness.... The will to an increase lies -in the essence of happiness: that power is enhanced, and that this -difference becomes conscious.</p> - -<p>In a state of decadence after a certain time the opposite difference -becomes conscious, that is decrease: the memory of former strong -moments depresses the present feelings of happiness in this state -comparison reduces happiness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">696.</p> - -<p>It is not the satisfaction of the will which is the cause of happiness -(to this superficial theory I am more particularly opposed—this absurd -psychological forgery in regard to the most simple things), but it is -that the will is always striving to overcome that which stands in its -way. The feeling of happiness lies precisely in the discontentedness of -the will, in the fact that without opponents and obstacles it is never -satisfied. "The happy man": a gregarious ideal.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">697.</p> - -<p>The normal discontent of our instincts—for instance, of the instinct -of hunger, of sex, of movement—contains nothing which is in itself -depressing; it rather provokes the feeling of life, and, whatever the -pessimists may say to us, like all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> the rhythms of small and irritating -stimuli, it strengthens. Instead of this discontent making us sick of -life, it is rather the great stimulus to life.</p> - -<p>(Pleasure might even perhaps be characterised as the rhythm of small -and painful stimuli.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">698.</p> - -<p>Kant says: "These lines of Count Verri's (<i>Sull' indole del piacere -e del dolore;</i> 1781) I confirm with absolute certainty: 'Il solo -principio motore dell' uomo è il dolore. Il dolore precede ogni -piacere. Il piacere non è un essere positivo.'"<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain.</i> "The only motive -force of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure. Pleasure is not a -positive thing."—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">699.</p> - -<p>Pain is something different from pleasure—I mean it is not the -latter's opposite.</p> - -<p>If the essence of pleasure has been aptly characterised as the feeling -of increased power (that is to say, as a feeling of difference which -presupposes comparison), that does not define the nature of pain. -The false contrasts which the people, and consequently the language, -believes in, are always dangerous fetters which impede the march of -truth. There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is conditioned -by a certain rhythmic sequence of small, painful stimuli: in this way -a very rapid growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> of -pleasure is attained. This is the case, for instance, in tickling, -also in the sexual tickling which accompanies the coitus: here we see -pain acting as the ingredient of happiness. It seems to be a small -hindrance which is overcome, followed immediately by another small -hindrance which once again is overcome—this play of resistance and -resistance overcome is the greatest excitant of that complete feeling -of overflowing and surplus power which constitutes the essence of -happiness.</p> - -<p>The converse, which would be an increase in the feeling of pain through -small intercalated pleasurable stimuli, does not exist: pleasure and -pain are not opposites.</p> - -<p>Pain is undoubtedly an intellectual process in which a judgment is -inherent—the judgment harmful, in which long experience is epitomised. -There is no such thing as pain in itself. It is not the wound that -hurts, it is the experience of the harmful results a wound may have for -the whole organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving way, and is -called pain. (In the case of deleterious influences which were unknown -to ancient man, as, for instance, those residing in the new combination -of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain is lacking, and we are lost.)</p> - -<p>That which is quite peculiar in pain is the prolonged disturbance, -the quivering subsequent to a terrible shock in the ganglia of the -nervous system. As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause of -pain (from any sort of injury, for instance), but from the protracted -disturbance of his equilibrium which follows upon the shock. Pain is a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> -disease of the cerebral centres—pleasure is no disease at all.</p> - -<p>The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex actions has appearances -and even philosophical prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden -accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the reflex action occurs -appreciably earlier than the feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way -when I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had struck the bell -of my consciousness, and until a hint of what I had to do had been -telegraphed back to me. On the contrary, what I notice as clearly as -possible is, that first, in order to avoid a fall, reflex action on the -part of my foot takes place, and then, after a certain measurable space -of time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful wave in my -forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to pain. Pain is subsequently projected -into the wounded quarter—but the essence of this local pain is -nevertheless not the expression of a kind of local wound, it is merely -a local sign, the strength and nature of which is in keeping with the -severity of the wound, and of which the nerve centres have taken note. -The fact that as the result of this shock the muscular power of the -organism is materially reduced, does not prove in any way that the -essence of pain is to be sought in the lowering of the feeling of power.</p> - -<p>Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to pain: pain is no "cause" of -action. Pain itself is a reaction; the reflex movement is another and -earlier process—both originate at different points....</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">700.</p> - -<p>The message of pain: in itself pain does not announce that which has -been momentarily damaged, but the significance of this damage for the -individual as a whole.</p> - -<p>Are we to suppose that there are any pains which "the species" feel, -and which the individual does not?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">701.</p> - -<p>"The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum of happiness: consequently -it were better that the world did not exist"—"The world is something -which from a rational standpoint it were better did not exist, because -it occasions more pain than pleasure to the feeling subject"—this -futile gossip now calls itself pessimism!</p> - -<p>Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not causes; they are -second-rate valuations derived from a dominating value,—they are one -with the feeling "useful," "harmful," and therefore they are absolutely -fugitive and relative. For in regard to all utility and harmfulness -there are a hundred different ways of asking "what for?"</p> - -<p>I despise this pessimism of sensitiveness: it is in itself a sign of -profoundly impoverished life.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">702.</p> - -<p>Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid unhappiness. Everybody -knows the famous prejudices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are -mere results, mere accompanying phenomena—that which every man, which -every tiny particle of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> living organism will have, is an increase of -power. In striving after this, pleasure and pain are encountered; it is -owing to that will that the organism seeks opposition and requires that -which stands in its way.... Pain as the hindrance of its will to power -is therefore a normal feature, a natural ingredient of every organic -phenomenon; man does not avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly -in need of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure, every event -presupposes an obstacle overcome.</p> - -<p>Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive nourishment; the -protoplasm extends its pseudopodia in order to seek for that which -resists it,—it does not do so out of hunger, but owing to its will to -power. Then it makes the attempt to overcome, to appropriate, and to -incorporate that with which it comes into contact—what people call -"nourishment" is merely a derivative, a utilitarian application, of the -primordial will to become stronger.</p> - -<p>Pain is so far from acting as a diminution of our feeling of power, -that it actually forms in the majority of cases a spur to this -feeling,—the obstacle is the stimulus of the will to power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">703.</p> - -<p>Pain has been confounded with one of its subdivisions, which is -exhaustion: the latter does indeed represent a profound reduction and -lowering of the will to power, a material loss of strength—that is -to say, there is <i>(a)</i> pain as the stimulus to an increase or power, -and <i>(b)</i> pain following<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> upon an expenditure of power; in the first -case it is a spur, in the second it is the outcome of excessive -spurring.... The inability to resist is proper to the latter form of -pain: the provocation of that which resists is proper to the former.... -The only happiness which is to be felt in the state of exhaustion is -that of going to sleep; in the other case, happiness means triumph.... -The great confusion of psychologists consisted in the fact that they -did not keep these two kinds of happiness—that of falling asleep, -and that of triumph—sufficiently apart. Exhausted people will have -repose, slackened limbs, peace and quiet—and these things constitute -the bliss of Nihilistic religions and philosophies, the wealthy in -vital strength, the active, want triumph, defeated opponents, and the -extension of their feeling of power over ever wider regions. Every -healthy function of the organism has this need,—and the whole organism -constitutes an intricate complexity of systems struggling for the -increase of the feeling of power....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">704.</p> - -<p>How is it that the fundamental article of faith in all psychologies is -a piece of most outrageous contortion and fabrication? "Man strives -after happiness," for instance—how much of this is true? In order to -understand what life is, and what kind of striving and tenseness life -contains, the formula should hold good not only of trees and plants, -but of animals also. "What does the plant strive after?"—But here we -have already invented a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> false entity which does not exist,—concealing -and denying the fact of an infinitely variegated growth, with -individual and semi-individual starting-points, if we give it the -clumsy title "plant" as if it were a unit. It is very obvious that -the ultimate and smallest "individuals" cannot be understood in the -sense of metaphysical individuals or atoms; their sphere of power is -continually shifting its ground: but with all these changes, can it be -said that any of them strives after happiness?—All this expanding, -this incorporation and growth, is a search for resistance; movement -is essentially related to states of pain: the driving power here must -represent some other desire if it leads to such continual willing and -seeking of pain.—To what end do the trees of a virgin forest contend -with each other? "For happiness"?—For power! ...</p> - -<p>Man is now master of the forces of nature, and master too of his own -wild and unbridled feelings (the passions have followed suit, and have -learned to become useful)—in comparison with primeval man, the man of -to-day represents an enormous quantum of power, but not an increase -in happiness! How can one maintain, then, that he has striven after -happiness?..</p> - - -<p class="parnum">705.</p> - -<p>But while I say this I see above me, and below the stars, the -glittering rat's-tail of errors which hitherto has represented the -greatest inspiration of man: "All happiness is the result of virtue all -virtue is the result of free will"!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span></p> - -<p>Let us transvalue the values: all capacity is the outcome of a -happy organisation, all freedom is the outcome of capacity (freedom -understood here as facility in self-direction. Every artist will -understand me).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">706.</p> - -<p>"The value of life."—Every life stands by itself; all existence must -be justified, and not only life,—the justifying principle must be one -through which life itself speaks.</p> - -<p>Life is only a means to something: it is the expression of the forms of -growth in power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">707.</p> - -<p>The "conscious world" cannot be a starting-point for valuing: an -"objective" valuation is necessary.</p> - -<p>In comparison with the enormous and complicated antagonistic processes -which the collective life of every organism represents, its conscious -world of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small slice. -We have absolutely no right to postulate this particle of consciousness -as the object, the wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life: -the attainment of consciousness is obviously only an additional means -to the unfolding of life and to the extension of its power. That -is why it is a piece of childish simplicity to set up happiness, -or intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual sphere of -consciousness, as the highest value: and maybe to justify "the world" -with it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span></p> - -<p>This is my fundamental objection to all philosophical and moral -cosmologies and theologies, to all wherefores and highest values that -have appeared in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto. A -kind of means is misunderstood as the object itself: conversely life -and its growth of power were debased to a means.</p> - -<p>If we wished to postulate an adequate object of life it would not -necessarily be related in any way with the category of conscious life; -it would require rather to explain conscious life as a mere means to -itself....</p> - -<p>The "denial of life" regarded as the object of life, the object of -evolution! Existence—a piece of tremendous stupidity! Any such mad -interpretation is only the outcome of life's being measured by the -factors of consciousness (pleasure and pain, good and evil). Here -the means are made to stand against the end—the "unholy," absurd, -and, above all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any use when -it requires such means? But where the fault lies is here—instead of -looking for the end which would explain the necessity of such means, -we posited an end from the start which actually excludes such means, -<i>i.e.</i> we made a desideratum in regard to certain means (especially -pleasurable, rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only did we -decide what end would be desirable....</p> - -<p>Where the fundamental fault lies is in the fact that, instead of -regarding consciousness as an instrument and an isolated phenomenon -of life in general, we made it a standard, the highest value in life: -it is the faulty standpoint of <i>a parte ad<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> totum,</i>—and that is why -all philosophers are instinctively seeking at the present day for a -collective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills consciously with -all that happens, a "Spirit," a "God." But they must be told that it is -precisely thus that life is converted into a monster; that a "God" and -a general sensorium would necessarily be something on whose account the -whole of existence would have to be condemned.... Our greatest relief -came when we eliminated the general consciousness which postulates ends -and means—in this way we ceased from being necessarily pessimists.... -Our greatest indictment of life was the existence of God.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">708.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the value of "Becoming."</i>—If the movement of the world -really tended to reach a final state, that state would already have -been reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is that it does -not tend to reach a final state: and every philosophy and scientific -hypothesis (<i>e.g.</i> materialism) according to which such a final state -is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.</p> - -<p>I should like to have a concept of the world which does justice to this -fact. Becoming ought to be explained without having recourse to such -final designs. Booming must appear justified at every instant (or it -must defy all valuation: which has unity as its end); the present must -not under any circumstances be justified by a future, nor must the -past be justified for the sake of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> present. "Necessity" must not -be interpreted in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective force -or as a prime motor; and still less as the necessary cause of some -valuable result. But to this end it is necessary to deny a collective -consciousness for Becoming,—a "God," in order that life may not be -veiled under the shadow of a being who feels and knows as we do and -yet <i>wills</i> nothing: "God" is useless if he wants nothing; and if he -do want something, this presupposes a general sum of suffering and -irrationality which lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortunately -any such general power is lacking (a suffering God overlooking -everything, a general sensorium and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the -greatest indictment of existence).</p> - -<p>Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of Being must be allowed to -remain,—because in that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be -sheer and superfluous nonsense.</p> - -<p>The next question, then, is: how did the illusion Being originate (why -was it obliged to originate);</p> - -<p>Likewise: how was it that all valuations based upon the hypothesis that -there was such a thing as Being came to be depreciated.</p> - -<p>But in this way we have recognised that this hypothesis concerning -Being is the source of all the calumny that has been directed against -the world (the "Better world," the "True world" the "World Beyond," the -"Thing-in-itself").</p> - -<p>(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not tend towards stability.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span></p> - -<p>(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance, the world of Being is -probably only appearance.</p> - -<p>(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value at every instant; the sum -of its value always remains equal: expressed otherwise, it has no -value; for that according to which it might be measured, and in regard -to which the word value might have some sense, is entirely lacking. -The collective value of the world defies valuation; for this reason -philosophical pessimism belongs to the order of farces.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">709.</p> - -<p>We should not make our little desiderata the judges of existence! -Neither should we make culminating evolutionary forms (<i>e.g.</i> mind) the -"absolute" which stands behind evolution!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">710.</p> - -<p>Our knowledge has become scientific to the extent in which it has -been able to make use of number and measure. It might be worth while -to try and see whether a scientific order of values might not be -constructed according to a scale of numbers and measures representing -energy.... All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity, and -misunderstanding. They may all be reduced to that scale of numbers and -measures representing energy. The ascent in this scale would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> represent -an increase of value, the descent a diminution.</p> - -<p>But here appearance and prejudice are against one (moral values are -only apparent values compared with those which are physiological).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">711.</p> - -<p>Why the standpoint of "value" lapses:—</p> - -<p>Because in the <i>"whole process of the universe" the work of mankind -does not come under consideration</i>; because a general process (viewed -in the light of a system) does not exist.</p> - -<p>Because there is no such thing as a whole; because no <i>depreciation of -human</i> existence or human aims can be made in regard to something that -does not exist.</p> - -<p>Because "necessity," "causality," "design," are merely useful -"<i>semblances.</i>"</p> - -<p>Because the aim is <i>not</i> "the increase of the sphere of consciousness," -<i>but the increase of power</i>; in which increase the utility of -consciousness is also contained; and the same holds good of pleasure -and pain.</p> - -<p>Because a mere <i>means</i> must not be elevated to the highest criterion -of value (such as states of consciousness like pleasure and pain, if -consciousness is in itself only a means).</p> - -<p>Because the world is not an organism at all, but a thing of chaos; -because the development of "intellectuality" is only a means tending -relatively to extend the duration of an organisation.</p> - -<p>Because all "desirability" has no sense in regard to the general -character of existence.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">712.</p> - -<p>"God" is the culminating moment: life is an eternal process of deifying -and undeifying. <i>But withal there is no zenith of values,</i> but only a -zenith of <i>power.</i></p> - -<p>Absolute <i>exclusion of mechanical and materialistic interpretations.</i> -they are both only expressions of inferior states, of emotions deprived -of all spirit (of the "will to power").</p> - -<p><i>The retrograde movement front the zenith</i> of development (the -intellectualisation of power on some slave-infected soil) may be shown -to be the <i>result</i> of the highest degree of energy <i>turning against</i> -itself, once it no longer has anything to organise, and utilising its -power in order to <i>disorganise.</i></p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> The ever-increasing <i>suppression</i> of societies, and the latter's -subjection by a smaller number of stronger individuals.</p> - -<p>(b) The ever-increasing suppression of the privileged and the strong, -hence the rise of democracy, and ultimately of <i>anarchy,</i> in the -elements.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">713.</p> - -<p><i>Value</i> is the highest amount of power that a man can assimilate—a -man, not mankind! Mankind is much more of a means than an end. It is a -question of type: mankind is merely the experimental material; it is -the overflow of the ill-constituted—a field of ruins.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">714.</p> - -<p>Words relating to values are merely banners planted on those spots -where a <i>new blessedness</i> was discovered—a new <i>feeling.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">715.</p> - -<p>The standpoint of "value" is the same as that of the <i>conditions</i> of -<i>preservation</i> and <i>enhancement,</i> in regard to complex creatures of -relative stability appearing in the course of evolution.</p> - -<p>There are no such things as lasting and ultimate entities, no atoms, no -monads: here also "permanence" was first introduced by ourselves (from -practical, utilitarian, and other motives).</p> - -<p>"The forms that rule"; the sphere of the subjugated is continually -extended; or it decreases or increases according to the conditions -(nourishment) being either favourable or unfavourable.</p> - -<p>"Value" is essentially the standpoint for the increase or decrease of -these dominating centres (pluralities in any case; for "unity" cannot -be observed anywhere in the nature of development).</p> - -<p>The means of expression afforded by language are useless for the -purpose of conveying any facts concerning "development": the need of -positing a rougher world of stable existences and things forms part of -our <i>eternal desire for preservation.</i> We may speak of atoms and monads -in a relative sense: and this is certain, <i>that the smallest world -is the most stable world ...</i>. There is no such thing as will: there -are only punctuations of will, which are constantly increasing and -decreasing their power.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="III" id="III">III</a></h4> - - -<h4>THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLIFIED IN SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.</h4> - -<hr /> -<p class="title">1. Society and the State.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">716.</p> - -<p>We take it as a principle that only individuals feel any -responsibility. Corporations are invented to do what the individual -has not the courage to do. For this reason all communities are vastly -more upright and instructive, as regards the nature of man, than the -individual who is too cowardly to have the courage of his own desires.</p> - -<p>All altruism is the prudence of the private man. societies are not -mutually altruistic. The commandment, "Thou shalt love thy next-door -neighbour," has never been extended to thy neighbour in general. Rather -what Manu says is probably truer: "We must conceive of all the States -on our own frontier, and their allies, as being hostile, and for the -same reason we must consider all of their neighbours as being friendly -to us."</p> - -<p>The study of society is invaluable, because man in society is far more -childlike than man<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> individually. Society has never regarded virtue as -anything else than as a means to strength, power, and order. Manu's -words again are simple and dignified: "Virtue could hardly rely on her -own strength alone. Really it is only the fear of punishment that keeps -men in their limits, and leaves every one in peaceful possession of his -own."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">717.</p> - -<p>The State, or <i>unmorality</i> organised, is from within—the police, the -penal code, status, commerce, and the family; and from without, the -will to war, to power, to conquest and revenge.</p> - -<p>A multitude will do things an individual will not, because of the -division of responsibility, of command and execution; because the -virtues of obedience, duty, patriotism, and local sentiment are all -introduced; because feelings of pride, severity, strength, hate, -and revenge in short, all typical traits are upheld, and these are -characteristics utterly alien to the herd-man.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">718.</p> - -<p>You haven't, any of you, the courage either to kill or to flog a man. -But the huge machinery of the State quells the individual and makes him -decline to be answerable for his own deed (obedience, loyalty, etc.).</p> - -<p>Everything that a man does in the service of the State is against his -own nature. Similarly, everything he learns in view of future service -of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> State. This result is obtained through division of labour (so -that responsibility is subdivided too):—</p> - -<p>The legislator—and he who fulfils the law.</p> - -<p>The teacher of discipline—and those who have grown hard and severe -under discipline.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">719.</p> - -<p>A division of labour among the emotions exists inside society, making -individuals and classes produce an imperfect, but more useful, kind -of soul. Observe how every type in society has become atrophied with -regard to certain emotions with the view of fostering and accentuating -other emotions.</p> - -<p>Morality may be thus justified:—</p> - -<p><i>Economically,</i>—as aiming at the greatest possible use of all -individual power, with the view of preventing the waste of exceptional -natures.</p> - -<p><i>Æsthetically,</i>—as the formation of fixed types, and the pleasure in -one's own.</p> - -<p><i>Politically,</i>—as the art of bearing with the severe divergencies of -the degrees of power in society.</p> - -<p><i>Psychologically,</i> as an imaginary preference for the bungled and the -mediocre, in order to preserve the weak.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">720.</p> - -<p>Man has one terrible and fundamental wish; he desires power, and this -impulse, which is called freedom, must be the longest restrained. -Hence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> ethics has instinctively aimed at such an education as shall -restrain the desire for power; thus our morality slanders the would-be -tyrant, and glorifies charity, patriotism, and the ambition of the herd.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">721.</p> - -<p>Impotence to power, how it disguises itself and plays the hypocrite, as -obedience, subordination, the pride of duty and morality, submission, -devotion, love (the idolisation and apotheosis of the commander is a -kind of compensation, and indirect self-enhancement). It veils itself -further under fatalism and resignation, objectivity, self-tyranny, -stoicism, asceticism, self-abnegation, hallowing. Other disguises are: -criticism, pessimism, indignation, susceptibility, beautiful soul, -virtue, self—deification, philosophic detachment, freedom from contact -with the world (the realisation of impotence disguises itself as -disdain).</p> - -<p>There is a universal need to exercise some kind of power, or to create -for one's self the appearance of some power, if only temporarily, in -the form of intoxication.</p> - -<p>There are men who desire power simply for the sake of the happiness it -will bring; these belong chiefly to political parties. Other men have -the same yearning, even when power means visible disadvantages, the -sacrifice of their happiness, and well-being; they are the ambitious. -Other men, again, are only like dogs in a manger, and will have power -only to prevent its falling into the hands of others on whom they would -then be dependent.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">722.</p> - -<p>If there be justice and equality before the law, what would thereby -be abolished?—Suspense, enmity, hatred. But it is a mistake to think -that you thereby increase happiness; for the Corsicans rejoice in more -happiness than the Continentals.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">723.</p> - -<p>Reciprocity and the expectation of a reward is one of the most -seductive forms of the devaluation of mankind. It involves that -equality which depreciates any gulf as immoral.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">724.</p> - -<p>Utility is entirely dependent upon the object to be attained,—the -wherefore? And this wherefore, this purpose, is again dependent upon -the degree of power. Utilitarianism is not, therefore, a fundamental -doctrine; it is only a story of sequels, and cannot be made obligatory -for all.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">725.</p> - -<p>Of old, the State was regarded theoretically as a utilitarian -institution; it has now become so in a practical sense. The time of -kings has gone by, because people are no longer worthy of them. They do -not wish to see the symbol of their ideal in a king, but only a means -to their own ends. That's the whole truth.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">726.</p> - -<p>I am trying to grasp the absolute sense of the communal standard of -judgment and valuation, naturally without any intention of deducing -morals.</p> - -<p>The degree of psychological falsity and denseness required in order to -sanctify the emotions essential to preservation and expansion of power, -and to create a good conscience for them.</p> - -<p>The degree of stupidity required in order that general rules and values -may remain possible (including education, formation of culture, and -training).</p> - -<p>The degree of inquisitiveness, suspicion, and intolerance required in -order to deal with exceptions, to suppress them as criminals, and thus -to give them bad consciences, and to make them sick with their own -singularity.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">727.</p> - -<p>Morality is essentially a shield, a means of defence; and, in so far, -it is a sign of the imperfectly developed man (he is still in armour; -he is still stoical).</p> - -<p>The fully developed man is above all provided with <i>weapons:</i> he is a -man who <i>attacks.</i></p> - -<p>The weapons of war are converted into weapons of peace (out of scales -and carapaces grow feathers and hair).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">728.</p> - -<p>The very notion, "living organism", implies that there must be -growth,—that there must be a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> striving after an extension of power, -and therefore a process of absorption of other forces. Under the -drowsiness brought on by moral narcotics, people speak of the right of -the individual to <i>defend himself;</i> on the same principle one might -speak of his right to <i>attack</i>: for <i>both</i>—and the latter more than -the former—are necessities where all living organisms are concerned: -aggressive and defensive egoism are not questions of choice or even of -"free will," but they are fatalities of life itself.</p> - -<p>In this respect it is immaterial whether one have an individual, a -living body, or "an advancing society" in view. The right to punish -(or society's means of defence) has been arrived at only through a -misuse of the word "right": a right is acquired only by contract, but -self-defence and self-preservation do not stand upon the basis of a -contract. A people ought at least, with quite as much justification, to -be able to regard its lust of power, either in arms, commerce, trade, -or colonisation, as a right the right of growth, perhaps.... When the -instincts of a society ultimately make it give up war and renounce -conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy and the rule of -shopkeepers. In the majority of cases, it is true, assurances of peace -are merely stupefying draughts.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">729.</p> - -<p>The maintenance of the military State is the last means of adhering to -the great tradition of the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive -it. By means of it the superior or strong type of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> man is preserved, -and all institutions and ideas which perpetuate enmity and order of -rank in States, such as national feeling, protective tariffs, etc., may -on that account seem justified.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">730.</p> - -<p>In order that a thing may last longer than a person (that is to say, -in order that a work may outlive the individual who has created it), -all manner of limitations and prejudices must be imposed upon people. -But how? By means of love, reverence, gratitude towards the person -who created the work, or by means of the thought that our ancestors -fought for it, or by virtue of the feeling that the safety of our -descendants will be secured if we uphold the work—for instance, the -<i>polis.</i> Morality is essentially the means of; making something survive -the individual, because it makes him of necessity a slave. Obviously -the aspect from above is different from the aspect from below, and -will lead to quite different interpretations. How is organised power -<i>maintained</i>?—By the fact that countless generations sacrifice -themselves to its cause.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">731.</p> - -<p>Marriage, property, speech, tradition, race, family, people, and -State, are each links in a chain—separate parts which have a more -or less high or low origin. Economically they are justified by the -surplus derived from the advantages of uninterrupted work and multiple -production, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> weighed against the disadvantages of greater expense -in barter and the difficulty of making things last. (The working -parts are multiplied, and yet remain largely idle. Hence the cost of -producing them is greater, and the cost of maintaining them by no means -inconsiderable.) The advantage consists in avoiding interruption and -incident loss. Nothing is more expensive than a start. "The higher the -standard of living, the greater will be the expense of maintenance, -nourishment, and propagation, as also the risk and the probability of -an utter fall on reaching the summit."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">732.</p> - -<p>In bourgeois marriages, naturally in the best sense of the word -marriage, there is no question whatsoever of love any more than there -is of money. For on love no institution can be founded. The whole -matter consists in society giving leave to two persons to satisfy -their sexual desires under conditions obviously designed to safeguard -social order. Of course there must be a certain attraction between the -parties and a vast amount of good nature, patience, compatibility, and -charity in any such contract. But the word love should not be misused -as regards such a union. For two lovers, in the real and strong meaning -of the word, the satisfaction of sexual desire is unessential; it is a -mere symbol. For the one side, as I have already said, it is a symbol -of unqualified submission: for the other, a sign of condescension—a -sign of the appropriation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> property. Marriage, as understood by the -real old nobility, meant the breeding forth of the race (but are there -any nobles nowadays? <i>Quaeritur</i>),—that is to say, the maintenance -of a fixed definite type of ruler, for which object husband and wife -were sacrificed. Naturally the first consideration here had nothing to -do with love; on the contrary! It did not even presuppose that mutual -sympathy which is the <i>sine qua non</i> of the bourgeois marriage. The -prime consideration was the interest of the race, and in the second -place came the interest of a particular class. But in the face of the -coldness and rigour and calculating lucidity of such a noble concept -of marriage as prevailed among every healthy aristocracy, like that -of ancient Athens, and even of Europe during the eighteenth century, -we warm-blooded animals, with our miserably oversensitive hearts, we -"moderns," cannot restrain a slight shudder. That is why love as a -passion, in the big meaning of this word, was invented for, and in, an -aristocratic community—where convention and abstinence are most severe.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">733.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the future of marriage.</i> A super-tax on inherited property, -a longer term of military service for bachelors of a certain minimum -age within the community.</p> - -<p>Privileges of all sorts for fathers who lavish boys upon the world, and -perhaps plural votes as well.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span></p> - -<p>A medical certificate as a condition of any marriage, endorsed by the -parochial authorities, in which a series of questions addressed to the -parties and the medical officers must be answered ("family histories").</p> - -<p>As a counter-agent to prostitution, or as its ennoblement, I would -recommend leasehold marriages (to last for a term of years or months), -with adequate provision for the children.</p> - -<p>Every marriage to be warranted and sanctioned by a certain number of -good men and true, of the parish, as a parochial obligation.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">734.</p> - -<p><i>Another commandment of philanthropy.</i>—There are cases where to have a -child would be a crime—for example, for chronic invalids and extreme -neurasthenics. These people should be converted to chastity, and for -this purpose the music of <i>Parsifal</i> might at all events be tried. For -Parsifal himself, that born fool, had ample reasons for not desiring -to propagate. Unfortunately, however, one of the regular symptoms of -exhausted stock is the inability to exercise any self-restraint in the -presence of stimuli, and the tendency to respond to the smallest sexual -attraction. It would be quite a mistake, for instance, to think of -Leopardi as a chaste man. In such cases the priest and moralist play -a hopeless game: it would be far better to send for the apothecary. -Lastly, society here has a positive duty to fulfil, and of all the -demands that are made on it, there are few more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> urgent and necessary -than this one. Society as the trustee of life, is responsible to life -for every botched life that comes into existence, and as it has to -atone for such lives, it ought consequently to make it impossible for -them ever to see the light of day: it should in many cases actually -prevent the act of procreation, and may, without any regard for rank, -descent, or intellect, hold in readiness the most rigorous forms of -compulsion and restriction, and, under certain circumstances, have -recourse to castration. The Mosaic law, "Thou shalt do no murder," is -a piece of ingenuous puerility compared with the earnestness of this -forbidding of life to decadents, "Thou shalt not beget"!!! ... For -life itself recognises no solidarity or equality of rights between the -healthy and unhealthy parts of an organism. The latter must at all -cost be <i>eliminated,</i> lest the whole fall to pieces. Compassion for -decadents, equal rights for the physiologically botched—this would be -the very pinnacle of immorality, it would be setting up Nature's most -formidable opponent as morality itself!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">735.</p> - -<p>There are some delicate and morbid natures, the so-called idealists, -who can never under any circumstances rise above a coarse, immature -crime: yet it is the great justification of their anæmic little -existence, it is the small requital for their lives of cowardice and -falsehood to have been for one <i>instant</i> at least—strong. But they -generally collapse after such an act.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">736.</p> - -<p>In our civilised world we seldom hear of any but the bloodless, -trembling criminal, overwhelmed by the curse and contempt of society, -doubting even himself, and always belittling and belying his deeds—a -misbegotten sort of criminal; that is why we are opposed to the idea -that <i>all great men have been criminals</i> (only in the grand style, and -neither petty nor pitiful), that crime must be inherent in greatness -(this at any rate is the unanimous verdict of all those students of -human nature who have sounded the deepest waters of great souls). To -feel one's self adrift from all questions of ancestry, conscience, and -duty—this is the danger with which every great man is confronted. -Yet this is precisely what he desires: he desires the great goal, and -consequently the means thereto.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">737.</p> - -<p>In times when man is led by reward and punishment, the class of man -which the legislator has in view is still of a low and primitive -type: he is treated as one treats a child. In our latter-day culture, -general degeneracy removes all sense from reward and punishment. This -determination of action by the prospect of reward and punishment -presupposes young, strong, and vigorous races. In effete races impulses -are so irrepressible that a mere idea has no force whatever. Inability -to offer any resistance to a stimulus, and the feeling that one must -react to it: this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> excessive susceptibility of decadents makes all such -systems of punishment and reform altogether senseless.</p> - -<p>The idea "amelioration" presupposes a normal and strong creature whose -action must in some way be balanced or cancelled if he is not to be -lost and turned into an enemy of the community.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">738.</p> - -<p><i>The effect of prohibition.</i> Every power which forbids and which knows -how to excite fear in the person forbidden creates a guilty conscience. -(That is to say, a person has a certain desire but is conscious of the -danger of gratifying it, and is consequently forced to be secretive, -underhand, and cautious.) Thus any prohibition deteriorates the -character of those who do not willingly submit themselves to it, but -are constrained thereto.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">739.</p> - -<p><i>"Punishment and reward."</i>—These two things stand or fall together. -Nowadays no one will accept a reward or acknowledge that any authority -should have the power to punish. Warfare has been reformed. We have -a desire: it meets with opposition: we then see that we shall most -easily obtain it by coming to some agreement—by drawing up a contract. -In modern society where every one has given his assent to a certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> -contract, the criminal is a man who breaks that contract. This at least -is a clear concept. But in that case, anarchists and enemies of social -order could not be tolerated.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">740.</p> - -<p>Crimes belong to the category of revolt against the social system, A -rebel is not punished, he is simply suppressed. He <i>may</i> be an utterly -contemptible and pitiful creature; but there is nothing intrinsically -despicable about rebellion in fact, in our particular society revolt is -far from being disgraceful. There are cases in which a rebel deserves -honour precisely because he is conscious of certain elements in society -which cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us from our -slumbers. When a criminal commits but one crime against a particular -person, it does not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him -to make a stand against the whole social system. His isolated act is -merely a symptom.</p> - -<p>The idea of punishment ought to be reduced to the concept of the -suppression of revolt, a weapon against the vanquished (by means of -long or short terms of imprisonment). But punishment should not be -associated in any way with contempt. A criminal is at all events a man -who has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake; he is therefore -a man of courage. Neither should punishment be regarded as penance or -retribution, as though there were some recognised rate of exchange -between crime and punishment. Punishment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> does not purify, simply -because crime does not sully.</p> - -<p>A criminal should not be prevented from making his peace with society, -provided he does not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter -case, however, he should be opposed even before he has committed an -act of hostility. (As soon as he gets into the clutches of society the -first operation to be performed upon him should be that of castration.) -A criminal's bad manners and his low degree of intelligence should -not be reckoned against him. Nothing is more common than that he -should misunderstand himself (more particularly when his rebellious -instinct—the rancour of the <i>unclassed</i>—has not reached consciousness -simply because he has not read enough). It is natural that he should -deny and dishonour his deed while under the influence of fear at -its failure. All this is quite distinct from those cases in which, -psychologically speaking, the criminal yields to an incomprehensible -impulse, and attributes a motive to his deed by associating it with a -merely incidental and insignificant action (for example, robbing a man, -when his real desire was to take his blood).</p> - -<p>The worth of a man should not be measured by any one isolated act. -Napoleon warned us against this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are -more particularly insignificant. If we have no crime—let us say no -murder—on our conscience; why is it? It simply means that a few -favourable circumstances have been wanting in our lives. And supposing -we were induced to commit such a crime<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> would our worth be materially -affected? As a matter of fact, we should only be despised, if we were -not credited with possessing the power to kill a man under certain -circumstances. In nearly every crime certain qualities come into play -without which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky was not far wrong -when he said of the inmates of the penal colonies in Siberia, that they -constituted the strongest and most valuable portion of the Russian -people. The fact that in our society the criminal happens to be a badly -nourished and stunted animal is simply a condemnation of our system. In -the days of the Renaissance the criminal was a flourishing specimen of -humanity, and acquired his own virtue for himself,—Virtue in the sense -of the Renaissance—that is to say, <i>virtù;</i> free from moralic acid.</p> - -<p>It is only those whom we do not despise that we are able to elevate. -Moral contempt is a far greater indignity and insult than any kind of -crime.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">741.</p> - -<p>Shame was first introduced into punishment when certain penalties -were inflicted on persons held in contempt, such as slaves. It was a -despised class that was most frequently punished, and thus it came to -pass that punishment and contempt were associated.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">742.</p> - -<p>In the ancient idea of punishment a religious concept was immanent, -namely, the retributive power<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> of chastisement. Penalties purified; in -modern society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment is a form of -paying off a debt: once it has been paid, one is freed from the deed -for which one was so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power of -punishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feeling of relief and -lightheartedness results, which is not so very far removed from a state -of convalescence and health. One has made one's peace with society, -and one appears to one's self more dignified pure.... To-day, however, -punishment isolates even more than the crime; the fate behind the sin -has become so formidable that it is almost hopeless. One rises from -punishment still an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet -another enemy against it. The <i>jus talionis</i> may spring from the spirit -of retribution (that is to say, from a sort of modification of the -instinct of revenge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it is the -need of having some equivalent in order to do penance, or to become -free in a religious sense.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">743.</p> - -<p>My pretty radical note of interrogation in the case of all more -modern laws of punishment is this: should not the punishment fit the -crime?—for in your heart of hearts thus would you have it. But then -the susceptibility of the particular criminal to pain would have to -be taken into account. In other words, there should be no such thing -as a preconceived penalty for any crime—no fixed penal code. But as -it would be no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness -of each individual criminal, punishment would have to be abolished in -practice? What a sacrifice! Is it not? Consequently ...</p> - - -<p class="parnum">744.</p> - -<p>Ah! and the philosophy of jurisprudence! That is a science which, like -all moral sciences, has not even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet. -Even among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the oldest and -most valuable significance of punishment is still misunderstood—it -is not even known. So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a new -foundation—on history and comparative anthropology—it will never -cease to quarrel over the fundamentally false abstractions which are -fondly imagined to be the "philosophy of law," and which have nothing -whatever to do with modern man. The man of to-day, however, is such a -complicated woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he allows -of the most varied interpretation.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">745.</p> - -<p>An old Chinese sage once said he had heard that when mighty empires -were doomed they began to have numberless laws.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">746.</p> - -<p>Schopenhauer would have all rapscallions castrated, and all geese shut -up in convents. But from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> what point of view would this be desirable? -The rascal has at least this advantage over other men—that he is not -mediocre; and the fool is superior to us inasmuch as he does not suffer -at the sight of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the gulf—that -is to say, roguery and stupidity should be increased. In this way human -nature would become broader ... but, after all, this is Fate, and -it will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy and roguery are -increasing: this is part of modern progress.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">747.</p> - -<p>Society, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and reticence, and of -good-natured respect for other people's rights—even for the exactions -of strangers. To an even greater degree is there a certain charitable -and instinctive depreciation of the worth of man as shown by all -manner of trustful habits. Respect for men, and not only for the most -virtuous, is perhaps the real parting of the ways between us and the -Christian mythologists also have our good share of irony even when -listening to moral sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases -himself in our eyes and becomes almost comical. Liberal-mindedness -regarding morality is one of the best signs of our age. In cases where -it is most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a morbid -condition (the case of Carlyle in England, of Ibsen in Norway, and -Schopenhauer's pessimism throughout Europe). If there is anything -which can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the amount -of immorality which it allows itself without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> falling in its own -estimation—very much the reverse! In what, then, does the superiority -of culture over the want of culture consist—of the Renaissance, for -instance, over the Middle Ages? In this alone: the greater quantity of -acknowledged immorality. From this it necessarily follows that the very -<i>zenith</i> of human development <i>must</i> be regarded by the moral fanatic -as the <i>non plus ultra</i> of corruption (in this connection let us recall -Savonarola's judgment of Florence, Plato's indictment of Athens under -Pericles, Luther's condemnation of Rome, Rousseau's anathemas against -the society of Voltaire, and Germany's hostility to Goethe).</p> - -<p>A little more fresh air, for Heaven's sake! This ridiculous condition -of Europe <i>must</i> not last any longer. Is there a single idea behind -this bovine nationalism? What possible value can there be in -encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when everything to-day points -to greater and more common interests?—at a moment when the spiritual -dependence and denationalisation, which are obvious to all, are paving -the way for the reciprocal <i>rapprochements</i> and fertilisations which -make up the real value and sense of present-day culture! ... And it is -precisely now that "the new German Empire" has been founded upon the -most thread-bare and discredited of ideas—universal suffrage and equal -right for all.</p> - -<p>Think of all this struggling for advantage among conditions which are -in every way degenerate: of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> this culture of big cities, of newspapers, -of hurry and scurry, and of "aimlessness"! The economic unity of -Europe must necessarily come—and with it, as a reaction, the pacivist -movement.</p> - -<p>A pacivist party, free from all sentimentality, which forbids its -children to wage war; which forbids recourse to courts of justice; -which forswears all fighting, all contradiction, and all persecution: -for a while the party of the oppressed, and later the powerful -party:—this party would be opposed to everything in the shape of -revenge and resentment.</p> - -<p>There will also be a war party, exercising the same thoroughness and -severity towards itself, which will proceed in precisely the opposite -direction.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">749.</p> - -<p>The princes of Europe should really consider whether as a matter of -fact they can dispense with our services—with us, the immoralists. We -are to-day the only power which can win a victory without allies: and -we are therefore far and away the strongest of the strong. We can even -do without lying, and let me ask what other power can dispense with -this weapon? A strong temptation fights for us; the strongest, perhaps, -that exists—the temptation of truth.... Truth? How do I come by this -word? I must withdraw it: I must repudiate this proud word. But no. We -do not even want it—we shall be quite able to achieve our victory of -power without its help. The real charm which fights for us, the eye -of Venus which our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> opponents themselves deaden and blind—this charm -is the magic of the extreme. The fascination which everything extreme -exercises: we immoralists—we are in every way the extremists.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">750.</p> - -<p>The corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling into evil odour. The -State administration of justice is a piece of cowardice, because the -great man who can serve as a standard is lacking. At last the feeling -of insecurity becomes so great that men fall in the dust before any -sort of will-power that commands.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">751.</p> - -<p>"The will to power" is so loathed in democratic ages that the whole of -the psychology of these ages seems directed towards its belittlement -and slander. The types of men who sought the highest honours are said -to have been Napoleon! Cæsar! and Alexander!—as if these had not been -precisely the greatest <i>scorners</i> of honour.</p> - -<p>And Helvetius would fain show us that we strive after power in order -to have those pleasures which are at the disposal of the mighty—that -is to say, according to him, this striving after power is the will to -pleasure—hedonism!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">752.</p> - -<p>According as to whether a people feels: "the rights, the keenness of -vision, and the gifts of leading, etc., are with the few" or "with the -many"—<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span>it constitutes En oligarchic or a democratic community.</p> - -<p>Monarchy represents the belief in a man who is completely superior a -leader, a saviour, a demigod.</p> - -<p>Aristocracy represents the belief in a chosen few—in a higher caste.</p> - -<p>Democracy represents the disbelief in all great men and in all elite -societies: everybody is everybody else's equal, "At bottom we are all -herd and mob."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">753.</p> - -<p>I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams ingenuously of goodness, -truth, beauty, and equal rights (anarchy pursues the same ideal, but in -a more brutal fashion).</p> - -<p>I am opposed to parliamentary government and the power of the press, -because they are the means whereby cattle become masters.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">754.</p> - -<p>The arming of the people means in the end the arming of the mob.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">755.</p> - -<p>Socialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes, because of their -absurd optimism concerning the "good man" who is supposed to be waiting -in their cupboard, and who will come into being when the present -order of society has been overturned and has made way for natural -instincts. But the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> opposing party is quite as ludicrous, because it -will not see the act of violence which lies beneath every law, the -severity and egoism inherent in every kind of authority. "I and my kind -will rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be either expelled -or annihilated."—This was the fundamental feeling of all ancient -legislation. The idea of a higher order of man is hated much more -profoundly than monarchs themselves. Hatred of aristocracy always uses -hatred of monarchy as a mask.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">756.</p> - -<p>How treacherous are all parties! They bring to light something -concerning their leaders which the latter, perhaps, have hitherto kept -hidden beneath a bushel with consummate art.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">757.</p> - -<p>Modern Socialism would fain create a profane counterpart to jesuitism: -everybody a perfect instrument. But as to the object of it all, the -purpose of it—this has not yet been ascertained.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">758.</p> - -<p><i>The slavery of to-day</i>: a piece of barbarism. Where are the masters -for whom these slaves work? One must not always expect the simultaneous -appearance of the two complementary castes of society.</p> - -<p>Utility and pleasure are slave theories of life.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span></p> - -<p>"The blessing of work" is an ennobling phrase for slaves. Incapacity -for leisure.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">759.</p> - -<p>There is no such thing as a right to live, a right to work, or a right -to be happy: in this respect man is not different from the meanest worm.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">760.</p> - -<p>We must undoubtedly think of these things as uncompromisingly as Nature -does: they preserve the species.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">761.</p> - -<p>We should look upon the needs of the masses with ironic compassion: -they want something which we have got—Ah!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">762.</p> - -<p>European democracy is only in a very slight degree the manifestation -of unfettered powers. It represents, above all, the unfettering of -laziness, fatigue, and <i>weakness</i>.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">753.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the future of the workman</i>—Workmen men should learn to -regard their duties as <i>soldiers</i> do. They receive emoluments, incomes, -but they do not get wages!</p> - -<p>There is no relationship between <i>work done</i> and money received; -the individual should,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> <i>according to his kind,</i> be so placed as to -<i>perform</i> the <i>highest</i> that is compatible with his powers.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">764.</p> - -<p>Noblemen ought one day to live as the bourgeois do now—but above -them, distinguishing themselves by the simplicity of their wants—the -superior caste will then live in a poorer and simpler way and yet be in -possession of power.</p> - -<p>For lower orders of mankind the reverse valuations hold good: it is a -matter of implanting "virtues" in them. Absolute commands, terrible -compulsory methods, in order that they may rise above mere ease in -life. The remainder may obey, but their vanity demands that they may -feel themselves dependent, not upon great men, but upon principles.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">765.</p> - -<p class="center">"<i>The Atonement of all Sin?</i>"</p> - -<p>People speak of the profound injustice of the social arrangement, as -it the fact that one man is born in favourable circumstances and that -another is born in unfavourable ones—or that one should possess gifts -the other has not, were on the face of it an injustice. Among the -more honest of these opponents of society this is what is said: "We, -with all the bad, morbid, criminal qualities which we acknowledge we -possess, are only the inevitable result of the oppression for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> ages of -the weak by the strong"; thus they insinuate their evil natures into -the consciences of the ruling classes. They threaten and storm and -curse. They become virtuous from sheer indignation—they don't want -to have become bad men and <i>canaille</i> for nothing. The name for this -attitude, which is an invention of the last century, is, if I am not -mistaken, pessimism; and even that pessimism which is the outcome of -indignation. It is in this attitude of mind that history is judged, -that it is deprived of its inevitable fatality, and that responsibility -and even guilt is discovered in it. For the great desideratum is to -find guilty people in it. The botched and the bungled, the decadents -of all kinds, are revolted at themselves, and require sacrifices -in order that they may not slake their thirst for destruction upon -themselves (which might, indeed, be the most reasonable procedure). But -for this purpose they at least require a semblance of justification, -<i>i.e.</i> a theory according to which the fact of their existence, and of -their character, may be expiated by a scapegoat. This scapegoat may -be God,—in Russia such resentful atheists are not wanting,—or the -order of society, or education and upbringing, or the Jews, or the -nobles, or, finally, the well-constituted of every kind. "It is a sin -for a man to have been born in decent circumstances, for by so doing -he disinherits the others, he pushes them aside, he imposes upon them -the curse of vice and of work.... How can I be made answerable for my -misery; surely some one must be responsible for it, or I could not bear -to live."...</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span></p> - -<p>In short, resentful pessimism discovers responsible parties in order to -create a pleasurable sensation for itself—revenge.... "Sweeter than -honey"—thus does even old Homer speak of revenge.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>The fact that such a theory no longer meets with understanding—or -rather, let us say, contempt is accounted for by that particle of -Christianity which still circulates in the blood of every one of us; it -makes us tolerant towards things simply because we scent a Christian -savour about them.... The Socialists appeal to the Christian instincts; -this is their really refined piece of cleverness.... Thanks to -Christianity, we have now grown accustomed to the superstitious concept -of a soul—of an immortal soul, of soul monads, which, as a matter of -fact, hails from somewhere else, and which has only become inherent in -certain cases—that is to say, become incarnate in them—by accident: -but the nature of these cases is not altered, let alone determined by -it. The circumstances of society, of relationship, and of history are -only accidents for the soul, perhaps misadventures: in any case, the -world is not their work. By means of the idea of soul the individual is -made transcendental; thanks to it, a ridiculous amount of importance -can be attributed to him.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, it was Christianity which first induced the -individual to take up this position of judge of all things. It made -megalomania almost his duty: it has made everything temporary and -limited subordinate to eternal rights! What<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> is the State, what is -society, what are historical laws, what is physiology to me? Thus -speaks something from beyond Becoming, an immutable entity throughout -history: thus speaks something immortal, something divine—it is the -soul!</p> - -<p>Another Christian, but no less insane, concept has percolated even -deeper into the tissues of modern ideas: the concept of the equality -of all souls before God. In this concept the prototype of all theories -concerning equal rights is to be found. Man was first taught to -stammer this proposition religiously: later, it was converted into -a moral; no wonder he has ultimately begun to take it seriously, to -take it <i>practically</i>!—that is to say, politically, socialistically, -resento-pessimistically.</p> - -<p>Wherever responsible circumstances or people have been looked for, -it was the <i>instinct of revenge</i> that sought them. This instinct of -revenge obtained such an ascendancy over man in the course of centuries -that the whole of metaphysics, psychology, ideas of society, and, above -all, morality, are tainted with it. Man has nourished this idea of -responsibility to such an extent that he has introduced the bacillus -of vengeance into everything. By means of it he has made God Himself -ill, and killed innocence in the universe, by tracing every condition -of things to acts of will, to intentions, to responsible agents. The -whole teaching of will, this most fatal fraud that has ever existed -in psychology hitherto, was invented essentially for the purpose of -punishment. It was the social utility of punishment that lent this -concept its dignity, its power, and its truth.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> The originator of that -psychology, that we shall call volitional psychology, must be sought in -those classes which had the right of punishment in their hands; above -all, therefore, among the priests who stood on the very pinnacle of -ancient social systems: these people wanted to create for themselves -the right to wreak revenge—they wanted to supply God with the -privilege of vengeance. For this purpose; man was declared "free": to -this end every action had to be regarded as voluntary, and the origin -of every deed had to be considered as lying in consciousness. But by -such propositions as these ancient psychology is refuted.</p> - -<p>To-day, when Europe seems to have taken the contrary direction; when -we halcyonians would fain withdraw, dissipate, and banish the concept -of guilt and punishment with all our might from the world; when our -most serious endeavours are concentrated upon purifying psychology, -morality, history, nature, social institutions and privileges, and -even God Himself, from this filth; in whom must we recognise our most -mortal enemies? Precisely in those apostles of revenge and resentment, -in those who are <i>par excellence</i> pessimists from indignation, who make -it their mission to sanctify their filth with the name of "righteous -indignation."... We others, whose one desire is to reclaim innocence on -behalf of Becoming, would fain be the missionaries of a purer thought, -namely, that no one is responsible for man's qualities; neither God, -nor society, nor his parents, nor his ancestors, nor himself—in -fact,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> that no one is to blame for him ... The being who might be made -responsible for a man's existence, for the fact that he is constituted -in a particular way, or for his birth in certain circumstances and -in a certain environment, is absolutely lacking.—<i>And it is a great -blessing that such a being is non-existent ...</i>. We are <i>not</i> the -result of an eternal design, of a will, of a desire: there is no -attempt being made with us to attain to an "ideal of perfection," to -an "ideal of happiness," to an "ideal of virtue,"—and we are just as -little the result of a mistake on God's part in the presence of which -He ought to feel uneasy (a thought which is known to be at the very -root of the Old Testament). There is not a place nor a purpose nor a -sense to which we can attribute our existence or our kind of existence. -In the first place, no one is in a position to do this: it is quite -impossible to judge, to measure, or to compare, or even to deny the -whole universe! And why?—For five reasons, all accessible to the man -of average intelligence: for instance, <i>because there is no existence -outside the universe ...</i> and let us say it again, this is a great -blessing, for therein lies the whole innocence of our lives.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">2. The Individual.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">766.</p> - -<p><i>Fundamental errors:</i> to regard the <i>herd</i> as an aim instead of -the individual! The herd is only a means and nothing <i>more</i>! But -nowadays<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> people are trying to understand <i>the herd</i> as they would an -individual, and to confer higher rights upon it than upon isolated -personalities. Terrible mistake!! In addition to this, all that makes -for gregariousness, <i>e.g.</i> sympathy, is regarded as the <i>more valuable</i> -side of our natures.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">767.</p> - -<p>The individual is something quite <i>new,</i> and capable of <i>creating -new things.</i> He is something absolute, and all his actions are quite -his own. The individual in the end has to seek the valuation for his -actions in himself: because he has to give an individual meaning even -to traditional words and notions. His interpretation of a formula is at -least personal, even if he does not create the formula itself: at least -as an interpreter he is creative.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">768.</p> - -<p>The "ego" oppresses and kills. It acts like an organic cell. It is -predatory and violent. It would fain regenerate itself—pregnancy. It -would fain give birth to its God and see all mankind at its feet.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">769.</p> - -<p>Every living organism gropes around as far as its power permits, and -overcomes all that is weaker than itself: by this means it finds -pleasure in its own existence. The <i>increasing "humanity"</i> of this -tendency consists in the fact that we are beginning to feel ever more -subtly how difficult<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> it is really to <i>absorb</i> others: while we could -show our power by injuring him, his will <i>estranges</i> him from us, and -thus makes him less susceptible of being overcome.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">770.</p> - -<p>The degree of resistance which has to be continually overcome in order -to remain <i>at the top,</i> is the measure of <i>freedom,</i> whether for -individuals or for societies: freedom being understood as positive -power, as will to power. The highest form of individual freedom, of -sovereignty, would, according to this, in all probability be found not -five feet away from its opposite—that is to say, where the danger of -slavery hangs over life, like a hundred swords of Damocles. Let any one -go through the whole of history from this point of view: the ages when -the individual reaches perfect maturity, <i>i.e.</i> the free ages, when the -classical type, <i>sovereign man,</i> is attained to—these were certainly -not humane times!</p> - -<p>There should be no choice: either one must be uppermost or -nethermost—like a worm, despised, annihilated, trodden upon. One -must have tyrants against one in order to become a tyrant, <i>i.e.</i> in -order to be free. It is no small advantage to have a hundred swords of -Damocles suspended over one: it is only thus that one learns to dance, -it is only thus that one attains to any freedom in one's movements.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">771.</p> - -<p>Man more than any other animal was originally <i>altruistic</i>—hence -his slow growth (child) and lofty<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> development. Hence, too, his -extraordinary and latest kind of egoism.—Beasts of prey are much more -<i>individualistic.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">772.</p> - -<p>A criticism of <i>selfishness.</i> The involuntary ingenuousness of La -Rochefoucauld, who believed that he was saying something bold, liberal, -and paradoxical (in his days, of course, truth in psychological matters -was something that astonished people) when he said. "<i>Les grandes âmes -ne sont pas celles qui ont moins de passions et plus de vertus que les -âmes communes, mais seulement celles qui ont de plus grands desseins.</i>" -Certainly, John Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort the <i>noble</i> and -philosophical La Rochefoucauld of the eighteenth century) recognises -in him merely an astute and keen-sighted observer of all that which is -the result of habitual selfishness in the human breast, and he adds: "A -noble spirit is unable to see the necessity of a constant observation -of <i>baseness</i> and <i>contemptibility</i>, unless it were to show against -what corrupting influences a lofty spirit and a noble character were -able to triumph."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">773.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>The Morphology of the Feelings of Self.</i></p> - -<p><i>First standpoint</i>—To what extent are <i>sympathy</i> or <i>communal -feelings,</i> the lower or preparatory states, at a time when personal -self-esteem and initiative in valuation, on the part of individuals, -are not yet possible?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>Second standpoint.</i>—To what extent is the zenith of collective -self-esteem, the pride in the distinction of the clan, the feeling -of inequality and a certain abhorrence of mediation, of equal rights -and of reconciliation, the school for individual self-esteem? It may -be this in so far as it compels the individual to represent the pride -of the community —he is obliged to speak and act with tremendous -self-respect, because he stands for the community And the same -holds good when the individual regards himself as the instrument or -speaking-tube of a godhead.</p> - -<p><i>Third standpoint.</i>—To what extent do these forms of impersonality -invest the individual with enormous importance? In so far as higher -powers are using him as an intermediary: religious shyness towards -one's self is the condition of prophets and poets.</p> - -<p><i>Fourth standpoint.</i>—To what extent does responsibility for a whole -educate the individual in foresight, and give him a severe and -terrible hand, a calculating and cold heart, majesty of bearing and of -action—things which he would not allow himself if he stood only for -his own rights?</p> - -<p>In short, collective self-esteem is the great preparatory school -for personal sovereignty. The noble caste is that which creates the -heritage of this faculty.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">774.</p> - -<p>The disguised forms of will to power:—</p> - -<p>(1) <i>The desire for freedom,</i> for independence for equilibrium, -for peace, for <i>co-ordination.</i> Also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> that of the anchorite, the -"Free-Spirit." In its lowest form, the will to live at all costs—the -instinct of self-preservation.</p> - -<p>(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying the will to power of a -whole community; submissiveness, the making of one's self indispensable -and useful to him who has the power; love, a secret path to the heart -of the powerful, in order to become his master.</p> - -<p>(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imaginary comfort of belonging -to a higher order than those who actually hold the reins of power; -the acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows of judging even -the more powerful, self-depreciation; the discovery of new <i>codes of -morality</i> (of which the Jews are a classical example).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">775.</p> - -<p><i>Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power.—</i>Praise and -gratitude for harvests, for good weather, victories, marriages, and -peace—all festivals need a subject on which feeling can be outpoured. -The desire is to make all good things that happen to one appear as -though they had been done to one: people will have a donor. The same -holds good of the work of art: people are not satisfied with it -alone, they must praise the artist.—What, then, is praise? It is a -sort of compensation for benefits received, a sort of giving back, -a manifestation of <i>our</i> power—for the man who praises assents to, -blesses, values, <i>judges</i>. he arrogates to himself the right to give -his consent to a thing, to be able to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> confer honours. An increased -feeling of happiness or of liveliness is also an increased feeling -of power, and it is as a result of this feeling that a man <i>praises</i> -(it is as the outcome of this feeling that he invents a donor, a -"subject"). Gratitude is thus revenge of a lofty kind: it is most -severely exercised and demanded where equality and pride both require -to be upheld—that is to say, where revenge is practised to its fullest -extent.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">776.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the Machiavellism of Power.</i></p> - -<p>The <i>will to power</i> appears:—</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in the form of will -to "<i>freedom</i>": the mere fact of breaking loose from something seems to -be an end in itself (in a religio-moral sense: "One is only answerable -to one's own conscience"; "evangelical freedom," etc. etc.),</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> In the case of a stronger species, ascending to power, in the -form of the will to overpower. If this fails, then it shrinks to the -"will to justice"—that is to say, to the will to the same measure of -rights as the ruling caste possesses.</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> In the case of the strongest, richest, most independent, and -most courageous, in the form of "love of humanity," of "love of the -people," of the "gospel," of "truth" of "God," of "pity," of self -sacrifice," etc. etc.; in the form of overpowering, of deeds of -capture, of imposing service on some one, of an instinctive reckoning -of one's self as part of a great mass of power to which one attempts -to give<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> a direction: the hero, the prophet, the Cæsar, the Saviour, -the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes also belongs to this category, -it will overpower something, possess it utterly, and it looks like -self-abnegation. At bottom it is only the love of one's instrument, of -one's "horse"—the conviction that things belong to one because one is -in a position to use them.)</p> - -<p><i>"Freedom," "Justice," "Love"</i>!!!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">777.</p> - -<p><i>Love.</i>—Behold this love and pity of women—what could be more -egoistic? ... And when they do sacrifice themselves and their honour -or reputation, to whom do they sacrifice themselves? To the man? Is it -not rather to an unbridled desire? These desires are quite as selfish, -even though they may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude. -... To what extent can such a hyperfœtation of one valuation sanctify -everything else!!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">778.</p> - -<p><i>"Senses," "Passions.".</i>—When the fear of the senses and of the -passions and of the desires becomes so great as to warn us against -them, it is already a symptom of <i>weakness:</i> extreme measures always -characterise abnormal conditions. That which is lacking here, or more -precisely that which is decaying, is the power to resist an impulse: -when one feels instinctively that one must yield,—that is to say, that -one must react,—then it is an excellent thing to avoid opportunities -(temptations).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span></p> - -<p>The stimulation of the senses is only a temptation in so far as those -creatures are concerned whose systems are easily swayed and influenced: -on the other hand, in the case of remarkable constitutional obtuseness -and hardness, strong stimuli are necessary in order to set the -functions in motion. Dissipation can only be objected to in the case of -one who has no right to it; and almost all passions have fallen into -disrepute thanks to those who were not strong enough to convert them to -their own advantage.</p> - -<p>One should understand that passions are open to the same objections as -illnesses: yet we should not be justified in doing without illnesses, -and still less without passions. We require the abnormal; we give life -a tremendous shock by means of these great illnesses.</p> - -<p>In detail the following should be distinguished:—</p> - -<p>(1) The <i>dominating passion,</i> which may even bring the supremest form -of health with it: in this case the co-ordination of the internal -system and its functions to perform one task is best attained,—but -this is almost a definition of health.</p> - -<p>(2) The antagonism of the passions the double, treble, and multiple -soul in one breast:<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> this is very unhealthy; it is a sign of inner -ruin and of disintegration, betraying and promoting an internal dualism -and anarchy—unless, of course, one passion becomes master. <i>Return to -health.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span></p> -<p>(3) The juxtaposition of passions without their being either opposed -or united with one another. Very often transitory, and then, as soon -as order is established, this condition may be a healthy one. A most -interesting class of men belong to this order, the chameleons; they are -not necessarily at loggerheads with themselves, they are both happy and -secure, but they cannot develop—their moods lie side by side, even -though they may seem to lie far apart. They change, but they become -nothing.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> This refers to Goethe's <i>Faust.</i> In Part I., Act I., Scene -11., we find Faust exclaiming in despair: "Two souls, alas! within my -bosom throne!" See Theodore Martin's <i>Faust,</i> translated into English -verse.—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">779.</p> - -<p>The quantitative estimate of aims and its influence upon the valuing -standpoint, the <i>great</i> and the <i>small</i> criminal. The greatness or -smallness of the aims will determine whether the doer feels respect for -himself with it all, or whether he feels pusillanimous and miserable.</p> - -<p>The degree of intellectuality manifested in the means employed may -likewise influence our valuation. How differently the philosophical -innovator, experimenter, and man of violence stands out against -robbers, barbarians, adventurers!—There is a semblance of -disinterestedness in the former.</p> - -<p>Finally, noble manners, bearing, courage, self-confidence,—how they -alter the value of that which is attained by means of them!</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p class="center">Concerning the optics of valuation:—</p> - -<p>The influence of the greatness or smallness of the aims.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span></p> - -<p>The influence of the intellectuality of the means. The influence of the -behaviour in action. The influence of success or failure. The influence -of opposing forces and their value. The influence of that which is -permitted and that which is forbidden.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">780.</p> - -<p>The tricks by means of which actions, measures, and passions are -legitimised, which from an individual standpoint are no longer good -form or even in good taste.—</p> - -<p>Art, which allows us to enter such strange worlds, makes them tasteful -to us.</p> - -<p>Historians prove its justification and reason; travels, exoticism, -psychology, penal codes, the lunatic asylum, the criminal, sociology.</p> - -<p>Impersonality (so that as media of a collective whole we allow -ourselves these passions and action—the Bar, juries, the bourgeois, -the soldier, the minister, the prince, society, "critics") makes us -feel that we are <i>sacrificing something.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">781.</p> - -<p>Preoccupations concerning one's self and one's eternal salvation are -not expressive either of a rich or of a self-confident nature, for the -latter lets all questions of eternal bliss go to the devil,—it is -not interested in such matters of happiness it is all power, deeds, -desires; it imposes itself upon things; it even violates things. The -Christian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> is a romantic hypochondriac who does not stand firmly on his -legs.</p> - -<p>Whenever hedonistic views come to the front, one can always presuppose -the existence of pain and a certain ill-constitutedness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">782.</p> - -<p>"The growing autonomy of the individual"—Parisian philosophers like -M. Fouillée talk of such things: they would do well to study the -<i>race moutonnière</i> for a moment; for they belong to it. For Heaven's -sake open your eyes, ye sociologists who deal with the future! The -individual grew strong under quite opposite conditions: ye describe the -extremest weakening and impoverishment of man; ye actually want this -weakness and impoverishment, and ye apply the whole lying machinery of -the old ideal in order to achieve your end. Ye are so constituted that -ye actually regard your gregarious wants as an ideal! Here we are in -the presence of an absolute lack of psychological honesty.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">783.</p> - -<p>The two traits which characterise the modern European are apparently -antagonistic <i>individualism and the demand for equal rights</i>: this I -am at last beginning to understand. The individual is an extremely -vulnerable piece of vanity: this vanity, when it is conscious of its -high degree of susceptibility to pain, demands that every one should -be made equal; that the individual should only stand <i>inter pares</i>. -But in this way a social<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> race is depicted in which, as a matter of -fact, gifts and powers are on the whole equally distributed. The pride -which would have loneliness and but few appreciators is quite beyond -comprehension: really "great" successes are only attained through the -masses—indeed, we scarcely understand yet that a mob success is in -reality only a small success; because <i>pulchrum est paucorum hominum.</i></p> - -<p>No morality will countenance order of rank among men, and the jurists -know nothing of a communal conscience. The principle of individualism -rejects <i>really great</i> men, and demands the most delicate vision for, -and the speediest discovery of, a talent among people who are almost -equal; and inasmuch as every one has some modicum of talent in such -late and civilised cultures (and can, therefore, expect to receive his -share of honour), there is a more general buttering-up of modest merits -to-day than there has ever been. This gives the age the appearance of -<i>unlimited justice.</i> Its want of justice is to be found not in its -unbounded hatred of tyrants and demagogues, even in the arts; but in -its detestation of noble natures who scorn the praise of the many. The -demand for equal rights (that is to say, the privilege of sitting in -judgment on everything and everybody) is anti-aristocratic.</p> - -<p>This age knows just as little concerning the absorption of the -individual, of his mergence into a great type of men who do not want to -be personalities. It was this that formerly constituted the distinction -and the zeal of many lofty natures (the greatest poets among them); or -of the desire<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> to be a <i>polis,</i> as in Greece; or of Jesuitism, or of -the Prussian Staff Corps, and bureaucracy; or of apprenticeship and a -continuation of the tradition of great masters: to all of which things, -non-social conditions and the absence of <i>petty vanity</i> are necessary.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">784.</p> - -<p><i>Individualism</i> is a modest and still unconscious form of will to -power; with it a single human unit seems to think it sufficient to free -himself from the preponderating power of society (or of the State or -Church). He does not set himself up in opposition as a <i>personality,</i> -but merely as a unit; he represents the rights of all other individuals -as against the whole. That is to say, he instinctively places himself -on a level with every other unit: what he combats he does not combat as -a person, but as a representative of units against a mass.</p> - -<p>Socialism is merely an agitatory measure of individualism: it -recognises the fact that in order to attain to something, men must -organise themselves into a general movement—into a "power." But what -the Socialist requires is not society as the object of the individual, -<i>but society as a means of making many individuals possible</i>: this is -the instinct of Socialists, though they frequently deceive themselves -on this point (apart from this, however, in order to make their kind -prevail, they are compelled to deceive others to an enormous extent). -Altruistic moral preaching thus enters into the service of individual -egoism,—one of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> the most common frauds of the nineteenth century.</p> - -<p><i>Anarchy</i> is also merely an agitatory measure of Socialism; with it -the Socialist inspires fear, with fear he begins to fascinate and to -terrorise: but what he does above all is to draw all courageous and -reckless people to his side, even in the most intellectual spheres.</p> - -<p>In spite of all this, individualism is the most modest stage of the -will to power.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>When one has reached a certain degree of independence, one always -longs for more: separation in proportion to the degree of force; -the individual is no longer content to regard himself as equal to -everybody, he actually <i>seeks for his peer</i>—he makes himself stand out -from others. Individualism is followed by a development in groups and -organs; correlative tendencies join up together and become powerfully -active: now there arise between these centres of power, friction, -war, a reconnoitring of the forces on either side, reciprocity, -understandings, and the regulation of mutual services. Finally, there -appears an order of rank.</p> - -<p>Recapitulation—</p> - -<p>1. The individuals emancipate themselves.</p> - -<p>2. They make war, and ultimately agree concerning equal rights (justice -is made an end in itself).</p> - -<p>3. Once this is reached, the actual differences in degrees of power -begin to make themselves felt, and to a greater extent than before (the -reason being that on the whole peace is established, and innumerable -small centres of power begin to create<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> differences which formerly were -scarcely noticeable). Now the individuals begin to form groups, these -strive after privileges and preponderance, and war starts afresh in a -milder form.</p> - -<p>People demand freedom only when they have no power. Once power is -obtained, a preponderance thereof is the next thing to be coveted; if -this is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is still too weak for -it), then <i>"justice" i.e. "equality</i> of power" become the objects of -desire.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">785.</p> - -<p><i>The rectification of the concept "egoism."</i>—When one has discovered -what an error the "individual" is, and that every single creature -represents the whole process of evolution (not alone "inherited," but -in "himself"), the individual then acquires <i>an inordinately great -importance.</i> The voice of instinct is quite right here. When this -instinct tends to decline, <i>i.e.</i> when the individual begins to seek -his worth in his services to others, one may be sure that exhaustion -and degeneration have set in. An altruistic attitude of mind, when -it is fundamental and free from all hypocrisy, is the instinct of -creating a second value for one's self in the service of other egoists. -As a rule, however, it is only apparent—a circuitous path to the -preservation of one's own feelings of vitality and worth.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">786.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>The History of Moralisation and Demoralisation.</i></p> - -<p><i>Proposition one.</i>—There are no such things as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> moral actions: they -are purely imaginary. Not only is it impossible to demonstrate their -existence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for instance, both -acknowledged) but they are not even possible. Owing to psychological -misunderstanding, a man invented an <i>opposite</i> to the instinctive -impulses of life, and believed that a new species of instinct was -thereby discovered: a <i>primum mobile</i> was postulated which does not -exist at all. According to the valuation which gave rise to the -antithesis "moral" and "immoral," one should say: <i>There is nothing -else on earth but immoral intentions and actions.</i></p> - -<p><i>Proposition two.</i>——The whole differentiation, "moral" and "immoral," -arises from the assumption that both moral and immoral actions are the -result of a spontaneous will—in short, that such a will exists; or in -other words, that moral judgments can only hold good with regard to -intuitions and actions <i>that are free.</i> But this whole order of actions -and intentions is purely imaginary: the only world to which the moral -standard could be applied does not exist at all: <i>there is no such -thing as a moral or an immoral action.</i></p> - -<p>The <i>psychological error</i> out of which the antithesis "moral" and -"immoral" arose is: "selfless," "unselfish," "self-denying"—all unreal -and fantastic.</p> - -<p>A false dogmatism also clustered around the concept "ego"; it was -regarded as atomic, and falsely opposed to a non-ego; it was also -liberated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> from Becoming, and declared to belong to the sphere of -Being. The false materialisation of the ego: this (owing to the belief -in individual immortality) was made an article of faith under the -pressure of <i>religio-moral discipline.</i> According to this artificial -liberation of the ego and its transference to the realm of the -absolute, people thought that they had arrived at an antithesis in -values which seemed quite irrefutable—the single ego and the vast -non-ego. It seemed obvious that the value of the individual ego could -only exist in conjunction with the vast non-ego, more particularly in -the sense of being subject to it and existing only for its sake. Here, -of course, the gregarious instinct determined the direction of thought: -nothing is more opposed to this instinct than the sovereignty of the -individual. Supposing, however, that the ego be absolute, then its -value must lie in <i>self-negation.</i></p> - -<p>Thus: (1) the false emancipation of the "individual" as an atom;</p> - -<p>(2) The gregarious self-conceit which abhors the desire to remain an -atom, and regards it as hostile.</p> - -<p>(3) As a result: the overcoming of the individual by changing his aim.</p> - -<p>(4) At this point there appeared to be actions that were self-effacing: -around these actions a whole sphere of antitheses was fancied.</p> - -<p>(5) It was asked, in what sort of actions does man most strongly -assert himself? Around these (sexuality, covetousness, lust for power, -cruelty, etc. etc.) hate, contempt, and anathemas were heaped: it -was believed that there could be such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> things as selfless impulses. -Everything selfish was condemned, everything unselfish was in demand.</p> - -<p>(6) And the result was: what had been done? A ban had been placed -on the strongest, the most natural, yea, the only genuine impulses, -henceforward, in order that an action might be praiseworthy, there must -be no trace in it of any of those genuine impulses—<i>monstrous fraud -in psychology.</i> Every kind of "self-satisfaction" had to be remodelled -and made possible by means of misunderstanding and adjusting one's self -<i>sub specie boni.</i> Conversely: that species which found its advantage -in depriving mankind of its self-satisfaction, the representatives of -the gregarious instincts, <i>e.g.</i> the priests and the philosophers, were -sufficiently crafty and psychologically astute to show how selfishness -ruled everywhere. The Christian conclusion from this was: "Everything -is sin, even our virtues. Man is utterly undesirable. Selfless actions -are impossible." Original sin. In short, once man had opposed his -instincts to a purely imaginary world of the good, he concluded by -despising himself as incapable of performing "good" actions.</p> - -<p><i>N.B.</i> In this way Christianity represents a step forward in the -sharpening of psychological insight: La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It -perceived the essential equality of human actions, and the equality of -their values as a whole (all immoral).</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Now the first serious object was to rear men in whom self-seeking -impulses were extinguished.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> <i>priests, saints.</i> And if people doubted -that perfection was possible, they did not doubt what perfection was.</p> - -<p>The psychology of the saint and of the priest and of the "good" man, -must naturally have seemed purely phantasmagorical. The real motive of -all action had been declared bad: therefore, in order to make action -still possible, deeds had to be prescribed which, though not possible, -had to be declared possible and sanctified. They now honoured and -idealised things with as much falsity as they had previously slandered -them.</p> - -<p>Inveighing against the instincts of life came to be regarded as holy -and estimable. The priestly ideal was: absolute chastity, absolute -obedience, absolute poverty! The lay ideal: alms, pity, self-sacrifice, -renunciation of the beautiful, of reason, and of sensuality, and a dark -frown for all the strong qualities that existed.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>An advance is made: the slandered instincts attempt to re-establish -their rights (<i>e.g.</i> Luther's Reformation, the coarsest form of -moral falsehood under the cover of "Evangelical freedom"), they are -rechristened with holy names.</p> - -<p>The calumniated instincts try to demonstrate that they are necessary in -order that the virtuous instincts may be possible. <i>Il faut vivre, afin -de vivre pour autrui:</i> egoism as a means to an end.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span></p> -<p>But people go still further: they try to grant both the egoistic and -altruistic impulses the right to exist—equal rights for both—from the -utilitarian standpoint.</p> - -<p>People go further: they see greater utility in placing the egoistic -rights before the altruistic—greater utility in the sense of more -happiness for the majority, or of the elevation of mankind, etc. etc. -Thus the rights of egoism begin to preponderate, but under the cloak of -an extremely altruistic standpoint—the collective utility of humanity.</p> - -<p>An attempt is made to reconcile the altruistic mode of action with the -natural order of things. Altruism is sought in the very roots of life. -Altruism and egoism are both based upon the essence of life and nature.</p> - -<p>The disappearance of the opposition between them is dreamt of as a -future possibility. Continued adaptation, it is hoped, will merge the -two into one.</p> - -<p>At last it is seen that altruistic actions are merely a species of the -egoistic—and that the degree to which one loves and spends one's self -is a proof of the extent of one's individual power and personality. In -short, that the more evil man can be made, the better he is, and that -one cannot be the one without the other. At this point the curtain -rises which concealed the monstrous fraud of the psychology that has -prevailed hitherto.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p><i>Results.</i>—There are only immoral intentions and actions; the -so-called moral actions must be shown<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> to be immoral. All emotions are -traced to a single will, the will to power, and are called essentially -equal. The concept of life: in the apparent antithesis good and evil, -degrees of power in the instincts alone are expressed. A temporary -order of rank is established according to which certain instincts are -either controlled or enlisted in our service. Morality is justified: -economically, etc.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Against proposition two.—Determinism: the attempt to rescue the moral -world by transferring it to the unknown.</p> - -<p>Determinism is only a manner of allowing ourselves to conjure our -valuations away, once they have lost their place in a world interpreted -mechanistically. Determinism must therefore be attacked and undermined -at all costs: just as our right to distinguish between an absolute and -phenomenal world should be disputed.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Spencer's conclusion in the <i>Data of Ethics.</i>—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">787.</p> - -<p>It is absolutely necessary to emancipate ourselves from motives: -otherwise we should not be allowed to attempt to sacrifice ourselves -or to neglect ourselves! Only the innocence of Becoming gives us the -highest courage and the highest freedom.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">788.</p> - -<p>A clean conscience must be restored to the evil man—has this been my -involuntary endeavour all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> the time? for I take as the evil man him -who is strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the convicts in prison -should be referred to here).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">789.</p> - -<p>Our new "freedom." What a feeling of relief there is in the thought -that we emancipated spirits do not feel ourselves harnessed to any -system of teleological aims. Likewise that the concepts reward and -punishment have no roots in the essence of existence! Likewise that -good and evil actions are not good or evil in themselves, but only -from the point of view of the self-preservative tendencies of certain -species of humanity! Likewise that our speculations concerning pleasure -and pain are not of cosmic, far less then of metaphysical, importance! -(That form of pessimism associated with the name of Hartmann, which -pledges itself to put even the pain and pleasure of existence into -the balance, with its arbitrary confinement in the prison and within -the bounds of pre-Copernican thought, would be something not only -retrogressive, but degenerate, unless it be merely a bad joke on the -part of a "Berliner."<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>)</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> "Berliner"—The citizens of Berlin are renowned in Germany -for their poor jokes.—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">790.</p> - -<p>If one is clear as to the "wherefore" of one's life, then the "how" of -it can take care of itself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span></p> -<p>It is already even a sign of disbelief in the wherefore and in the -purpose and sense of life—in fact, it is a sign of a lack of -will—when the value of pleasure and pain step into the foreground, -and hedonistic and pessimistic teaching becomes prevalent; and -self-abnegation, resignation, virtue, "objectivity," <i>may,</i> at the very -least, be signs that the most important factor is beginning to make its -absence felt.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">791.</p> - -<p>Hitherto there has been no German culture. It is no refutation of this -assertion to say that there have been great anchorites in Germany -(Goethe, for instance); for these had their own culture. But it was -precisely around them, as though around mighty, defiant, and isolated -rocks, that the remaining spirit of Germany, <i>as their antithesis,</i> -lay that is to say, as a soft, swampy, slippery soil, upon which every -step and every footprint of the rest of Europe made an impression and -created forms. German culture was a thing devoid of character and of -almost unlimited yielding power.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">792.</p> - -<p>Germany, though very rich in clever and well-informed scholars, has -for some time been so excessively poor in great souls and in mighty -minds, that it almost seems to have forgotten what a great soul or -a mighty mind is; and to-day mediocre and even ill-constituted men -place themselves in the market square without the suggestion of a -conscience-prick or a sign of embarrassment, and declare<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> themselves -great men, reformers, etc. Take the case of Eugen Dühring, for -instance, a really clever and well-informed scholar, but a man who -betrays with almost every word he says that he has a miserably small -soul, and that he is horribly tormented by narrow envious feelings; -moreover, that it is no mighty overflowing, benevolent, and spendthrift -spirit that drives him on, but only the spirit of ambition! But to be -ambitious in such an age as this is much more unworthy of a philosopher -than ever it was: to-day, when it is the mob that rules, when it is the -mob that dispenses the honours.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">793.</p> - -<p>My "future": a severe polytechnic education. Conscription; so that as -a rule every man of the higher classes should be an officer, whatever -else he may be besides.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="IV" id="IV">IV.</a></h4> - -<h4>THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.</h4> - - -<p class="parnum">794.</p> - -<p>Our religion, morality, and philosophy are decadent human institutions. -The counter-agent. Art.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">795.</p> - -<p>The <i>Artist-philosopher.</i> A higher concept of art. Can man stand at -so great a distance from his fellows as to mould them? (Preliminary -exercises thereto:—</p> - -<p>1. To become a self-former, an anchorite.</p> - -<p>2. To do what artists have done hitherto, <i>i.e.</i> to reach a small -degree of perfection in a certain medium.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">796.</p> - -<p>Art as it appears without the artist, <i>i.e.</i> as a body, an organisation -(the Prussian Officers' Corps, the Order of the Jesuits). To what -extent is the artist merely a preliminary stage? The world regarded as -a self-generating work of art.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">797.</p> - -<p>The phenomenon, "artist," is the easiest to see through: from it one -can look down upon the fundamental instincts of power, of nature, etc., -even of religion and morality.</p> - -<p>"Play," uselessness—as the ideal of him who is overflowing with power, -as the ideal of the child. The childishness of God, παῑς παίζων.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">798.</p> - -<p><i>Apollonian, Dionysian.</i> There are two conditions in which art -manifests itself in man even as a force of nature, and disposes of -him whether he consent or not: it may be as a constraint to visionary -states, or it may be an orgiastic impulse. Both conditions are to be -seen in normal life, but they are then somewhat weaker: in dreams and -in moments of elation or intoxication.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<p>But the same contrast exists between the dream state and the state of -intoxication; both of these states let loose all manner of artistic -powers within us, but each unfetters powers of a different kind. -Dreamland gives us the power of vision, of association, of poetry: -intoxication gives us the power of grand attitudes, of passion, of -song, and of dance.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> German: "Rausch."—There is no word in English for the -German expression "Rausch." When Nietzsche uses it, he means a sort of -blend of our two words: intoxication and elation.—Tr.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span></p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">799.</p> - -<p>Sexuality and voluptuousness belong to the Dionysiac intoxication: -but neither of them is lacking in the Apollonian state. There is also -a difference of tempo between the states.... <i>The extreme peace of -certain feelings of intoxication</i> (or, more strictly, the slackening -of the feeling of time, and the reduction of the feeling of space) is -wont to reflect itself in the vision of the most restful attitudes -and states of the soul. The classical style essentially represents -repose, simplification, foreshortening, and concentration—the <i>highest -feeling of power</i> is concentrated in the classical type. To react with -difficulty: great consciousness: no feeling of strife.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">800.</p> - -<p>The feeling of intoxication is, as a matter of fact, equivalent to a -sensation of <i>surplus power</i>: it is strongest in seasons of rut: new -organs, new accomplishments, new colours, new forms. Embellishment is -an outcome of <i>increased power.</i> Embellishment is merely an expression -of a triumphant will, of an increased state of co-ordination, of a -harmony of all the strong desires, of an infallible and perpendicular -equilibrium. Logical and geometrical simplification is the result of an -increase of power: conversely, the mere aspect of such a simplification -increases the sense of power in the beholder.... The zenith of -development: the grand style.</p> - -<p>Ugliness signifies <i>the decadence of a type</i>:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> contradiction and -faulty co-ordination among the inmost desires—this means a decline -in the <i>organising</i> power, or, psychologically speaking, in the will. -The condition of pleasure which is called intoxication is really -an exalted feeling of power. ... Sensations of space and time are -altered; inordinate distances are traversed by the eye, and only then -become visible; the extension of the vision over greater masses and -expanses; the refinement of the organ which apprehends the smallest -and most elusive things; divination, the power of understanding at the -slightest hint, at the smallest suggestion; intelligent sensitiveness; -<i>strength</i> as a feeling of dominion in the muscles, as agility and -love of movement, as dance, as levity and quick time; strength as the -love of proving strength, as bravado, adventurousness, fearlessness, -indifference in regard to life and death.... All these elated moments -of life stimulate each other; the world of images and of imagination -of the one suffices as a suggestion for the other: in this way states -finally merge into each other, which might do better to keep apart, -<i>e.g.</i> the feeling of religious intoxication and sexual irritability -(two very profound feelings, always wonderfully co-ordinated. What is -it that pleases almost all pious women, old or young? Answer: a saint -with beautiful legs, still young, still innocent). Cruelty in tragedy -and pity (likewise normally correlated). Spring-time, dancing, music, -—all these things are but the display of one sex before the other,—as -also that "infinite yearning of the heart" peculiar to Faust.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span></p> - -<p>Artists when they are worth anything at all are men of strong -propensities (even physically), with surplus energy, powerful animals, -sensual; without a certain overheating of the sexual system a man like -Raphael is unthinkable.... To produce music is also in a sense to -produce children; chastity is merely the economy of the artist, and -in all creative artists productiveness certainly ceases with sexual -potency.... Artists should not see things as they are; they should -see them fuller, simpler, stronger: to this end, however, a kind of -youthfulness, of vernality, a sort of perpetual elation, must be -peculiar to their lives.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">801.</p> - -<p>The states in which we transfigure things and make them fuller, and -rhapsodise about them, until they reflect our own fulness and love -of life back upon us: sexuality, intoxication, post-prandial states, -spring, triumph over our enemies, scorn, bravado, cruelty, the ecstasy -of religious feeling. But three elements above all are active: -<i>sexuality, intoxication, cruelty</i>; all these belong to the oldest -<i>festal joys</i> of mankind, they also preponderate in budding artists.</p> - -<p>Conversely: there are things with which we meet which already show -us this transfiguration and fulness, and the animal world's response -thereto is a state of excitement in the spheres where these states -of happiness originate. A blending of these very delicate shades of -animal well-being and desires is the <i>æsthetic state.</i> The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> latter only -manifests itself in those natures which are capable of that spendthrift -and overflowing fulness of bodily vigour; the latter is always the -<i>primum mobile.</i> The sober-minded man, the tired man, the exhausted and -dried-up man (<i>e.g.</i> the scholar), can have no feeling for art, because -he does not possess the primitive force of art, which is the tyranny -of inner riches: he who cannot give anything away cannot feel anything -either.</p> - -<p><i>"Perfection"</i>—In these states (more particularly in the case of -sexual love) there is an ingenuous betrayal of what the profoundest -instinct regards as the highest, the most desirable, the most valuable, -the ascending movement of its type; also of the condition towards which -it is actually striving. Perfection: the extraordinary expansion of -this instinct's feeling of power, its riches, its necessary overflowing -of all banks.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">802.</p> - -<p>Art reminds us of states of physical vigour: it may be the overflow and -bursting forth of blooming life in the world of pictures and desires; -on the other hand, it may be an excitation of the physical functions by -means of pictures and desires of exalted life—an enhancement of the -feeling of life, the latter's stimulant.</p> - -<p>To what extent can ugliness exercise this power? In so far as it may -communicate something of the triumphant energy of the artist who has -become master of the ugly and the repulsive;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> or in so far as it gently -excites our lust of cruelty (in some circumstances even the lust of -doing harm to ourselves, self-violence, and therewith the feeling of -power over ourselves).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">803.</p> - -<p>"Beauty" therefore is, to the artist, something which is above all -order of rank, because in beauty contrasts are overcome, the highest -sign of power thus manifesting itself in the conquest of opposites; -and achieved without a feeling of tension: violence being no longer -necessary, everything submitting and obeying so easily, and doing so -with good grace; this is what delights the powerful will of the artist.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">804.</p> - -<p>The biological value of <i>beauty</i> and <i>ugliness.</i> That which we feel -instinctively opposed to us æsthetically is, according to the longest -experience of mankind, felt to be harmful, dangerous, and worthy of -suspicion: the sudden utterance of the æsthetic instinct, <i>e.g.</i> in the -case of loathing, implies an act of judgment. To this extent beauty -lies within the general category of the biological values, useful, -beneficent, and life-promoting: thus, a host of stimuli which for -ages have been associated with, and remind us of, useful things and -conditions, give us the feeling of beauty, <i>i.e.</i> the increase of the -feeling of power (not only things, therefore, but the sensations which -are associated with such things or their symbols).<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> In this way beauty -and ugliness are recognised as determined by our most fundamental -self-preservative values. Apart from this, it is nonsense to postulate -anything as beautiful or ugly. Absolute beauty exists just as little -as absolute goodness and truth. In a particular case it is a matter of -the self-preservative conditions of a certain type of man: thus the -gregarious man will have quite a different feeling for beauty from the -exceptional or super-man.</p> - -<p>It is the optics of things in the foreground which only consider -immediate consequences, from which the value beauty (also goodness and -truth) arises.</p> - -<p>All instinctive judgments are short-sighted in regard to the -concatenation of consequences: they merely advise what must be done -forthwith. Reason is essentially an obstructing apparatus preventing -the immediate response to instinctive judgments: it halts, it -calculates, it traces the chain of consequences further.</p> - -<p>Judgments concerning beauty and ugliness are short-sighted (reason is -always opposed to them): but they are convincing in the highest degree; -they appeal to our instincts in that quarter where the latter decide -most quickly and say yes or no with least hesitation, even before -reason can interpose.</p> - -<p>The most common affirmations of beauty stimulate each other -reciprocally; where the æsthetic impulse once begins to work, a -whole host of other and foreign perfections crystallise around the -"particular form of beauty." It is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> impossible to remain objective, it -is certainly impossible to dispense with the interpreting, bestowing, -transfiguring, and poetising power (the latter is a stringing together -of affirmations concerning beauty itself). The sight of a beautiful -woman....</p> - -<p>Thus (1) judgment concerning beauty is short-sighted; it sees only the -immediate consequences.</p> - -<p>(2) It smothers the object which gives rise to it with a charm that is -determined by the association of various judgments concerning beauty, -which, however, are quite alien to the <i>essence of the particular -object.</i> To regard a thing as beautiful is necessarily to regard it -falsely (that is why incidentally love marriages are from the social -point of view the most unreasonable form of matrimony).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">805.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the genesis of Art.</i> That making perfect and seeing -perfect, which is peculiar to the cerebral system overladen with sexual -energy (a lover alone with his sweetheart at eventide transfigures the -smallest details: life is a chain of sublime things, "the misfortune -of an unhappy love affair is more valuable than anything else"); on -the other hand, everything perfect and beautiful operates like an -unconscious recollection of that amorous condition and of the point of -view peculiar to it—all perfection, and the whole of the beauty of -things, through contiguity, revives aphrodisiac bliss. (Physiologically -it is the creative instinct of the artist and the distribution<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> of -his semen in his blood.) The desire for art and beauty is an indirect -longing for the ecstasy; of sexual desire, which gets communicated to -the brain. The world become perfect through "love."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">806.</p> - -<p><i>Sensuality in its various disguises.</i>—(1) As idealism (Plato), common -to youth, constructing a kind of concave-mirror in which the image of -the beloved is an incrustation, an exaggeration, a transfiguration, an -attribution of infinity to everything. (2) In the religion of love, "a -fine young man," "a beautiful woman," in some way divine; a bridegroom, -a bride of the soul. (3) In art, as a decorating force, <i>e.g.</i> just as -the man sees the woman and makes her a present of everything that can -enhance her personal charm, so the sensuality of the artist adorns an -object with everything else that he honours and esteems, and by this -means perfects it (or idealises it). Woman, knowing what man feels -in regard to her, tries to meet his idealising endeavours half-way -by decorating herself, by walking and dancing well, by expressing -delicate thoughts: in addition, she may practise modesty, shyness, -reserve—prompted by her instinctive feeling that the idealising -power of man increases with all this, (In the extraordinary finesse -of woman's instincts, modesty must not by any means be considered as -conscious hypocrisy: she guesses that it is precisely artlessness and -real shame which seduces man most and urges him to an exaggerated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> -esteem of her. On this account, woman is ingenuous, owing to the -subtlety of her instincts which reveal to her the utility of a state of -innocence. A wilful closing of one's eyes to one's self.... Wherever -dissembling has a stronger influence by being unconscious it actually -becomes unconscious.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">807.</p> - -<p>What a host of things can be accomplished by the state of intoxication -which is called by the name of love, and which is something else -besides love!—And yet everybody has his own experience of this matter. -The muscular strength of a girl suddenly increases as soon as a man -comes into her presence: there are instruments with which this can be -measured. In the case of a still closer relationship of the sexes, -as, for instance, in dancing and in other amusements which society -gatherings entail, this power increases to such an extent as to make -real feats of strength possible: at last one no longer trusts either -one's eyes, or one's watch! Here at all events we must reckon with the -fact that dancing itself, like every form of rapid movement, involves -a kind of intoxication of the whole nervous, muscular, and visceral -system. We must therefore reckon in this case with the collective -effects of a double intoxication.—And how clever it is to be a little -off your head at times! There are some realities which we cannot admit -even to ourselves: especially when; we are women and have all sorts -of feminine,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> <i>"pudeurs."...</i>Those young creatures dancing over there -are obviously beyond all reality: they are dancing only with a host -of tangible ideals: what is more, they even see ideals sitting around -them, their mothers!... An opportunity for quoting <i>Faust.</i> They look -incomparably fairer, do these pretty creatures, when they have lost -their head a little; and how well they know it too, they are even more -delightful <i>because</i> they know it! Lastly, it is their finery which -inspires them; their finery is their third little intoxication. They -believe in their dressmaker as in their God: and who would destroy this -faith in them? Blessed is this faith! And self-admiration is healthy! -Self-admiration can protect one even from cold! Has a beautiful woman, -who knew she was well-dressed, ever caught cold? Never yet on this -earth! I even suppose a case in which she has scarcely a rag on her.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">808.</p> - -<p>If one should require the most astonishing proof of how far the power -of transfiguring, which comes of intoxication, goes, this proof is -at hand in the phenomenon of love; or what is called love in all -the languages and silences of the world. Intoxication works to such -a degree upon reality in this passion that in the consciousness of -the lover the cause of his love is quite suppressed, and something -else seems to take its place,—a vibration and a glitter of all the -charm-mirrors of Circe.... In this respect to be man or an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> animal -makes no difference: and still less does spirit, goodness, or honesty. -If one is astute, one is befooled astutely; if one is thick-headed, -one is befooled in a thick-headed way. But love, even the love of -God, saintly love, "the love that saves the soul," are at bottom all -one; they are nothing but a fever which has reasons to transfigure -itself—a state of intoxication which does well to lie about itself.... -And, at any rate, when a man loves, he is a good liar about himself -and to himself: he seems to himself transfigured, stronger, richer, -more perfect; he <i>is</i> more perfect.... <i>Art</i> here acts as an organic -function: we find it present in the most angelic instinct "love"; -we find it as the greatest stimulus of life—thus art is sublimely -utilitarian, even in the fact that it lies.... But we should be wrong -to halt at its power to lie: it does more than merely imagine; it -actually transposes values. And it not only transposes the <i>feeling</i> -for values: the lover actually <i>has</i> a greater value; he is stronger. -In animals this condition gives rise to new weapons, colours, pigments, -and forms, and above all to new movements, new rhythms, new love-calls -and seductions. In man it is just the same. His whole economy is -richer, mightier, and <i>more complete</i> when he is in love than when he -is not. The lover becomes a spendthrift; he is rich enough for it. He -now dares; he becomes an adventurer, and even a donkey in magnanimity -and innocence; his belief in God and in virtue revives, because he -believes in love. Moreover, such idiots of happiness acquire wings and -new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> capacities, and even the door to art is opened to them.</p> - -<p>If we cancel the suggestion of this intestinal fever from the lyric -of tones and words, what is left to poetry and music? ... <i>L'art pour -l'art</i> perhaps; the professional cant of frogs shivering outside in -the cold, and dying of despair in their swamp.... Everything else was -created by love.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">809.</p> - -<p>All art works like a suggestion on the muscles and the senses which -were originally active in the ingenuous artistic man; its voice is only -heard by artists—it speaks to this kind of man, whose constitution -is attuned to such subtlety in sensitiveness. The concept "layman" -is a misnomer. The deaf man is not a subdivision of the class, whose -ears are sound. All art works as a <i>tonic;</i> it increases strength, it -kindles desire <i>(i.e.</i> the feeling of strength), it excites all the -more subtle recollections of intoxication; there is actually a special -kind of memory which underlies such states—a distant flitful world of -sensations here returns to being.</p> - -<p>Ugliness is the contradiction of art. It is that which art <i>excludes,</i> -the <i>negation</i> of art: wherever decline, impoverishment of life, -impotence, decomposition, dissolution, are felt, however remotely, the -æsthetic man reacts with his <i>No.</i> Ugliness <i>depresses</i>: it is the sign -of depression. It <i>robs</i> strength, it impoverishes, it weighs down, ... -Ugliness <i>suggests</i> repulsive things. From one's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> states of health one -can test how an indisposition may increase one's power of fancying ugly -things. One's selection of things, interests, and questions becomes -different. Logic provides a state which is next of kin to ugliness: -heaviness, bluntness. In the presence of ugliness equilibrium is -lacking in a mechanical sense: ugliness limps and stumbles—the direct -opposite of the godly agility of the dancer.</p> - -<p>The æsthetic state represents an overflow <i>of means of communication</i> -as well as a condition of extreme sensibility to stimuli and signs. It -is the zenith of communion and transmission between living creatures; -it is the source of languages. In it, languages, whether of signs, -sounds, or glances, have their birthplace. The richer phenomenon is -always the beginning: our abilities are subtilised forms of richer -abilities. But even to-day we still listen with our muscles, we even -read with our muscles.</p> - -<p>Every mature art possesses a host of conventions as a basis: in so -far as it is a language. Convention is a condition of great art, -<i>not</i> an obstacle to it.... Every elevation of life likewise elevates -the power of communication, as also the understanding of man. <i>The -power of living in other people's souls</i> originally had nothing to do -with morality, but with a physiological irritability of suggestion: -"sympathy," or what is called "altruism," is merely a product of -that psycho-motor relationship which is reckoned as spirituality -(psycho-motor induction, says Charles Féré). People never communicate a -thought to one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> another: they communicate a movement, an imitative sign -which is then interpreted as a thought.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">810.</p> - -<p><i>Compared with music,</i> communication by means of words is a shameless -mode of procedure; words reduce and stultify; words make impersonal; -words make common that which is uncommon.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">811.</p> - -<p>It is exceptional states that determine the artist—such states as are -all intimately related and entwined with morbid symptoms, so that it -would seem almost impossible to be an artist without being ill.</p> - -<p>The physiological conditions which in the artist become moulded into a -"personality," and which, to a certain degree, may attach themselves to -any man:—</p> - -<p>(1) Intoxication, the feeling of enhanced power; the inner compulsion -to make things a mirror of one's own fulness and perfection.</p> - -<p>(2) The extreme sharpness of certain senses, so that they are capable -of understanding a totally different language of signs—and to create -such a language (this is a condition which manifests itself in some -nervous diseases); extreme susceptibility out of which great powers of -communion are developed; the desire to speak on the part of everything -that is capable of making-signs; a need of being rid of one's self by -means of gestures<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> and attitudes; the ability of speaking about one's -self in a hundred different languages—in fact, a state of <i>explosion.</i></p> - -<p>One must first imagine this condition as one in which there is a -pressing and compulsory desire of ridding one's self of the ecstasy of -a state of tension, by all kinds of muscular work and movement; also as -an involuntary <i>co-ordination</i> of these movements with inner processes -(images, thoughts, desires)—as a kind of automatism of the whole -muscular system under the compulsion of strong stimuli acting from -within; the inability to resist reaction; the apparatus of resistance -is also suspended. Every inner movement (feeling, thought, emotion) -is accompanied by <i>vascular changes,</i> and consequently by changes in -colour, temperature, and secretion. The suggestive power of music, its -"<i>suggestion mentale.</i>"</p> - -<p>(3) <i>The compulsion to imitate:</i> extreme irritability, by means of -which a certain example becomes contagious—a condition is guessed -and represented merely by means of a few signs.... A complete picture -is visualised by one's inner consciousness, and its effect soon shows -itself in the movement of the limbs,—in a certain suspension of the -<i>will</i> (Schopenhauer!!!!). A sort of blindness and deafness towards the -external world,—the realm of admitted stimuli is sharply defined.</p> - -<p>This differentiates the artist from the layman (from the spectator -of art): the latter reaches the height of his excitement in the mere -act of apprehending: the former in giving—and in such a way that -the antagonism between these two gifts is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> only natural but even -desirable. Each of these states has an opposite standpoint—to demand -of the artist that he should have the point of view of the spectator -(of the critic) is equivalent to asking him to impoverish his creative -power.... In this respect the same difference holds good as that which -exists between the sexes: one should not ask the artist who gives to -become a woman—to <i>"receive."</i></p> - -<p>Our æsthetics have hitherto been women's æsthetics, inasmuch as they -have only formulated the experiences of what is beautiful, from the -point of view of the receivers in art. In the whole of philosophy -hitherto the artist has been lacking ... <i>i.e.</i> as we have already -suggested, a necessary fault: for the artist who would begin to -understand himself would therewith begin to mistake himself—he must -not look backwards, he must not look at all; he must give.—It is an -honour for an artist to have no critical faculty; if he can criticise -he is mediocre, he is modern.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">812.</p> - -<p>Here I lay down a series of psychological states as signs of -flourishing and complete life, which to-day we are in the habit of -regarding as morbid. But, by this time, we have broken ourselves of -the habit of speaking of healthy and morbid as opposites: the question -is one of degree, what I maintain on this point is that what people -call healthy nowadays represents a lower level of that which under -favourable circumstances actually would be healthy—that we are -relatively sick....</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span></p> - -<p>The artist belongs to a much stronger race. That which in us would be -harmful and sickly, is natural in him. But people object to this that -it is precisely the impoverishment of the machine which renders this -extraordinary power of comprehending every kind of suggestion possible: -<i>e.g.</i> our hysterical females.</p> - -<p>An overflow of spunk and energy may quite as well lead to symptoms of -partial constraint, sense hallucinations, peripheral sensitiveness, -as a poor vitality does—the stimuli are differently determined, the -effect is the same.... What is not the same is above all the ultimate -result; the extreme torpidity of all morbid natures, after their -nervous eccentricities, has nothing in common with the states of the -artist, who need in no wise repent his best moments.... He is rich -enough for it all: he can squander without becoming poor.</p> - -<p>Just as we now feel justified in judging genius as a form of neurosis, -we may perhaps think the same of artistic suggestive power,—and -our artists are, as a matter of fact, only too closely related to -hysterical females!!! This, however, is only an argument against the -present day, and not against artists in general.</p> - -<p>The inartistic states are: objectivity, reflection suspension of the -will ... (Schopenhauer's scandalous misunderstanding consisted in -regarding art as a mere bridge to the denial of life)... The inartistic -states are: those which impoverish, which subtract, which bleach, under -which life suffers—the Christian.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">813.</p> - -<p>The modern artist who, in his physiology, is next of kin to the -hysteric, may also be classified as a character belonging to this state -of morbidness. The hysteric is false,—he lies from the love of lying, -he is admirable in all the arts of dissimulation,—unless his morbid -vanity hood-wink him. This vanity is like a perpetual fever which is -in need of stupefying drugs, and which recoils from no self-deception -and no farce that promises it the most fleeting satisfaction. (The -incapacity for pride and the need of continual revenge for his -deep-rooted self-contempt, this is almost the definition of this man's -vanity.)</p> - -<p>The absurd irritability of his system, which makes a crisis out of -every one of his experiences, and sees dramatic elements in the most -insignificant occurrences of life, deprives him of all calm reflection; -he ceases from being a personality, at most he is a rendezvous of -personalities of which first one and then the other asserts itself with -barefaced assurance. Precisely on this account he is great as an actor -<i>i</i> all these poor will-less people, whom doctors study so profoundly, -astound one through their virtuosity in mimicking, in transfiguration, -in their assumption of almost any character required.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">814.</p> - -<p>Artists are not men of great passion, despite all their assertions -to the contrary both to themselves and to others. And for the -following two reasons:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> they lack all shyness towards themselves (they -watch themselves live, they spy upon themselves, they are much too -inquisitive), and they also lack shyness in the presence of passion -(as artists they exploit it). Secondly, however, that vampire, their -talent, generally forbids them such an expenditure of energy as passion -demands.—A man, who has a talent is sacrificed to that talent; he -lives under the vampirism of his talent.</p> - -<p>A man does not get rid of his passion by reproducing it, but rather -he is rid of it if he is able to reproduce it. (Goethe teaches the -reverse, but it seems as though he deliberately misunderstood himself -here—from a sense of delicacy.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">815.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning a reasonable mode of life.</i>—.Relative, chastity, a -fundamental and shrewd caution in regard to <i>erotica,</i> even in thought, -may be a reasonable mode of life even in richly equipped and perfect -natures. But this principle applies more particularly to artists; it -belongs to the best wisdom of their lives. Wholly trustworthy voices -have already been raised in favour of this view, <i>e.g.</i> Stendhal, Th. -Gautier, and Flaubert. The artist is perhaps in his way necessarily -a sensual man, generally susceptible, accessible to everything, and -capable of responding to the remotest stimulus or suggestion of a -stimulus. Nevertheless, as a rule he is in the power of his work, of -his will to mastership, really a sober and often even a chaste man. His -dominating instinct will have him so:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> it does not allow him to spend -himself haphazardly. It is one and the same form of strength which is -spent in artistic conception and in the sexual act: there is only one -form of strength. The artist who yields in this respect, and who spends -himself, is betrayed: by so doing he reveals his lack of instinct, his -lack of will in general. It may be a sign of decadence,—in any case it -reduces the value of his art to an incalculable degree.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">816.</p> - -<p>Compared with the artist, the scientific man, regarded as a phenomenon, -is indeed a sign of a certain storing-up and levelling-down of -life (but also of an increase of strength, severity, hardness, and -will-power). To what extent can falsity and indifference towards truth -and utility be a sign of youth, of childishness, in the artist? ... -Their habitual manner, their unreasonableness, their ignorance of -themselves, their indifference to "eternal values," their seriousness -in play, their lack of dignity; clowns and gods in one; the saint and -the rabble.... Imitation as an imperious instinct.—Do not artists of -ascending life and artists of degeneration belong to all phases? ... -Yes!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">817.</p> - -<p>Would any link be missing in the whole chain of science and art, if -woman, if woman's work, were excluded from it? Let us acknowledge the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> -exception—it proves the rule—that woman is capable of perfection in -everything which does not constitute a work: in letters, in memoirs, -in the most intricate handiwork—in short, in everything which is not -a craft; and just precisely because in the things mentioned woman -perfects herself, because in them she obeys the only artistic impulse -in her nature,—which is to captivate.... But what has woman to do -with the passionate indifference of the genuine artist who sees more -importance in a breath, in a sound, in the merest trifle, than in -himself?—who with all his five fingers gropes for his most secret -and hidden treasures?—who attributes no value to anything unless -it knows how to take shape (unless it surrenders itself, unless it -visualises itself in some way). Art as it is practised by artists—do -you not understand what it is? is it not an outrage on all <i>our -pudeurs? ...</i> Only in this century has woman dared to try her hand at -literature ("<i>Vers la canaille plumière écrivassière,"</i> to speak with -old Mirabeau): woman now writes, she now paints, she is losing her -instincts. And to what purpose, if one may put such a question?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">818.</p> - -<p>A man is an artist to the extent to which he regards everything -that inartistic people call "form" as the actual substance, as the -"principal" thing. With such ideas a man certainly belongs to a world -upside down: for henceforward substance seems to him something merely -formal,—his own life included.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">819.</p> - -<p>A sense for, and a delight in, nuances (which is characteristic of -modernity), in that which is not general, runs counter to the instinct -which finds its joy and its strength in grasping what is typical: like -Greek taste in its best period. In this there is an overcoming of the -plenitude of life; restraint dominates, the peace of the strong soul -which is slow to move and which feels a certain repugnance towards -excessive activity is defeated. The general rule, the law, is honoured -and made prominent, conversely, the exception is laid aside, and shades -are suppressed. All that which is firm, mighty, solid, life resting -on a broad and powerful basis, concealing its strength this pleases: -<i>i.e.</i> it corresponds with what we think of ourselves.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">820.</p> - -<p>In the main I am much more in favour of artists than any philosopher -that has appeared hitherto: artists, at least, did not lose sight of -the great course which life pursues; they loved the things "of this -world,"—they loved their senses. To strive after "spirituality," -in cases where this is not pure hypocrisy or self-deception, seems -to me to be either a misunderstanding, a disease, or a cure, I wish -myself, and all those who live without the troubles of a puritanical -conscience, and who are able to live in this way, an ever greater -spiritualisation and multiplication of the senses. Indeed, we would -fain be grateful to the senses for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> their subtlety, power, and -plenitude, and on that account offer them the best we have in the way -of spirit. What do we care about priestly and metaphysical anathemas -upon the senses? We no longer require to treat them in this way: it -is a sign of well-constitutedness when a man like Goethe clings with -ever greater joy and heartiness to the "things of this world"—in this -way he holds firmly to the grand concept of mankind, which is that man -becomes the glorifying power of existence when he learns to glorify -himself.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">821.</p> - -<p><i>Pessimism in art?</i>—The artist gradually learns to like for their own -sake, those means which bring about the condition of æsthetic elation; -extreme delicacy and glory of colour, definite delineation, quality of -tone; distinctness where in normal conditions distinctness is absent. -All distinct things, all nuances, in so far as they recall extreme -degrees of power which give rise to intoxication, kindle this feeling -of intoxication by association;—the effect of works of art is the -excitation of the state which creates art, of æsthetic intoxication.</p> - -<p>The essential feature in art is its power of perfecting -existence, its production of perfection and plenitude; art is -essentially the affirmation, the blessing, and the deification of -existence.... What does a pessimistic art signify? Is it not a -<i>contradictio</i>?—Yes.—Schopenhauer is in error when he makes certain -works of art serve the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> purpose of pessimism. Tragedy does not teach -"resignation." ... To represent terrible and questionable things -is, in itself, the sign of an instinct of power and magnificence -in the artist; he doesn't fear them.... There is no such thing as -a pessimistic, art.... Art affirms. Job affirms. But Zola? and the -Goncourts?—the things they show us are ugly, their reason, however, -for showing them to us is their love of ugliness ... I don't care what -you say! You simply deceive yourselves if you think otherwise.—What a -relief Dostoievsky is!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">822.</p> - -<p>If I have sufficiently initiated my readers into the doctrine that -even "goodness," in the whole comedy of existence, represents a form -of exhaustion, they will now credit Christianity with consistency for -having conceived the good to be the ugly. In this respect Christianity -was right.</p> - -<p>It is absolutely unworthy of a philosopher to say that "the good and -the beautiful are one"; if he should add "and also the true," he -deserves to be thrashed. Truth is ugly.</p> - -<p>Art is with us in order that we may not perish through truth.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">823.</p> - -<p>Moralising tendencies may be combated with art. Art is freedom from -moral bigotry and philosophy <i>à la</i> Little Jack Horner: or it may be -the mockery of these things. The flight to Nature,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> where beauty and -terribleness are coupled. The concept of the great man.</p> - -<p>—Fragile, useless souls-de-luxe, which are disconcerted by a mere -breath of wind, "beautiful souls."</p> - -<p>—Ancient ideals, in their inexorable hardness and brutality, ought to -be awakened, as the mightiest of monsters that they are.</p> - -<p>—We should feel a boisterous delight in the psychological perception -of how all moralised artists become worms and actors without knowing it.</p> - -<p>—The falsity of art, its immorality, must be brought into the light of -day.</p> - -<p>—The "fundamental idealising powers" (sensuality, intoxication, -excessive animality) should be brought to light.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">824.</p> - -<p>Modern counterfeit practices in the arts: regarded as necessary—that -is to say, as fully in keeping with the needs most proper to the modern -soul.</p> - -<p>The gaps in the gifts, and still more in the education, antecedents, -and schooling of modern artists, are now filled up in this way:—</p> - -<p><i>First:</i> A less artistic public is sought which is capable of unlimited -love (and is capable of falling on its knees before a personality). -The superstition of our century, the belief in "genius," assists this -process.</p> - -<p><i>Secondly;</i> Artists harangue the dark instincts of the dissatisfied, -the ambitious, and the self-deceivers of a democratic age: the -importance of poses.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>Thirdly:</i> The procedures of one art are transferred to the realm -of another; the object of art is confounded with that of science, -with that of the Church, or with that of the interests of the race -(nationalism), or with that of philosophy—a man rings all bells at -once, and awakens the vague suspicion that he is a god.</p> - -<p><i>Fourthly:</i> Artists flatter women, sufferers, and indignant folk. -Narcotics and opiates are made to preponderate in art. The fancy of -cultured people, and of the readers of poetry and ancient history, is -tickled.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">825.</p> - -<p>We must distinguish between the "public" and the "select"; to satisfy -the public a man must be a charlatan to-day, to satisfy the select he -<i>will</i> be a virtuoso and nothing else. The geniuses peculiar to our -century overcame this distinction, they were great for both; the great -charlatanry of Victor Hugo and Richard Wagner was coupled with such -genuine virtuosity that it even satisfied the most refined artistic -connoisseurs. This is why greatness is lacking: these geniuses had a -double outlook; first, they catered for the coarsest needs, and then -for the most refined.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">826.</p> - -<p>False "accentuation": (1) In romanticism, this unremitting -"<i>expressivo</i>" is not a sign of strength, but of a feeling of -deficiency;</p> - -<p>(2) Picturesque music, the so-called dramatic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> kind, is above all -easier (as is also the brutal scandalmongering and the juxtaposition of -facts and traits in realistic novels);</p> - -<p>(3) "Passion" as a matter of nerves and exhausted souls; likewise the -delight in high mountains, deserts, storms, orgies, and disgusting -details,—in bulkiness and massiveness (historians, for instance); as a -matter of fact, there is actually a cult of exaggerated feelings (how -is it that in stronger ages art desired just the opposite—a restraint -of passion?);</p> - -<p>(4) The preference for exciting materials (<i>Erotica</i> or <i>Socialistica</i> -or <i>Pathologica</i>): all these things are the signs of the style -of public that is being catered for to-day—that is to say, for -overworked, absentminded, or enfeebled people.</p> - -<p>Such people must be tyrannised over in order to be affected.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">827.</p> - -<p>Modern art is the art of tyrannising. A coarse and salient definiteness -in delineation; the motive simplified into a formula; formulæ -tyrannise. Wild arabesques within the lines; overwhelming masses, -before which the senses are confused; brutality in coloration, in -subject-matter, in the desires. Examples: Zola, Wagner, and, in a more -spiritualised degree, Taine. Hence logic, massiveness, and brutality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">828.</p> - -<p>In regard to the painter: <i>Tous ces modernes sont des poètes qui ont -voulu être peintres, L'un a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> cherché des drames dans l'histoire, -l'autre des scènes de mœurs, celui ci traduit des religions, celui -là une philosophie.</i> One imitates Raphael, another the early Italian -masters. The landscapists employ trees and clouds in order to make odes -and elegies. Not one is simply a painter; they are all archæologists, -psychologists, and impresarios of one or another kind of event or -theory. They enjoy our erudition and our philosophy. Like us, they are -full, and too full, of general ideas. They like a form, not because it -is what it is, but because of what it expresses. They are the scions of -a learned, tormented, and reflecting generation, a thousand miles away -from the Old Masters who never read, and only concerned themselves with -feasting their eyes.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">829.</p> - -<p>At bottom, even Wagner's music, in so far as it stands for the whole -of French romanticism, is literature: the charm of exoticism (strange -times, customs, passions), exercised upon sensitive cosy-corner people. -The delight of entering into extremely distant and prehistoric lands to -which books lead one, and by which means the whole horizon is painted -with new colours and new possibilities.... Dreams of still more distant -and unexploited worlds; disdain of the boulevards. ... For Nationalism, -let us not deceive ourselves, is also only a form of exoticism.... -Romantic musicians merely relate what exotic books have made of them: -people would fain experience exotic sensations and passions according -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> Florentine and Venetian taste; finally they are satisfied to look -for them in an image.... The essential factor is the kind of novel -desire, the desire to imitate, the desire to live as people have -lived once before in the past, and the disguise and dissimulation of -the soul.... Romantic art is only an emergency exit from defective -"reality."</p> - -<p>The attempt to perform new things: revolution, Napoleon. Napoleon -represents the passion of new spiritual possibilities, of an extension -of the soul's domain.</p> - -<p>The greater the debility of the will, the greater the extravagances in -the desire to feel, to represent, and to dream new things.—The result -of the excesses which have been indulged in: an insatiable thirst for -unrestrained feelings.... Foreign literatures afford the strongest -spices.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">830.</p> - -<p>Winckelmann's and Goethe's Greeks, Victor Hugo's Orientals, Wagner's -Edda characters, Walter Scott's Englishmen of the thirteenth -century—some day the whole comedy will be exposed! All of it was -disproportionately historical and false, <i>but</i>—modern.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">831.</p> - -<p>Concerning the characteristics of national genius in regard to the -strange and to the borrowed—</p> - -<p>English genius vulgarises and makes realistic everything it sees;</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span></p> - -<p>The French whittles down, simplifies, rationalises, embellishes;</p> - -<p>The German muddles, compromises, involves, and infects everything with -morality;</p> - -<p>The Italian has made by far the freest and most subtle use of borrowed -material, and has enriched it with a hundred times more beauty than -it ever drew out of it: it is the richest genius, it had the most to -bestow.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">832.</p> - -<p>The Jews, with Heinrich Heine and Offenbach, approached genius in -the sphere of art. The latter was the most intellectual and most -high-spirited satyr, who as a musician abided by great tradition, -and who, for him who has something more than ears, is a real relief -after the sentimental and, at bottom, degenerate musicians of German -romanticism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">833.</p> - -<p><i>Offenbach;</i> trench music imbued with Voltaire's intellect, free, -wanton, with a slight sardonic grin, but clear and intellectual almost -to the point of banality (Offenbach never titivates), and free from the -<i>mignardise</i> of morbid or blond-Viennese sensuality.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">834.</p> - -<p>If by artistic genius we understand the most consummate freedom -within the law, divine ease, and facility in overcoming the greatest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> -difficulties, then Offenbach has even more right to the title genius -than Wagner has. Wagner is heavy and clumsy: nothing is more foreign to -him than the moments of wanton perfection which this clown Offenbach -achieves as many as five times, six times, in nearly every one of his -buffooneries. But by genius we ought perhaps to understand something -else.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">835.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning "music."</i>—French, German, and Italian music. (Our most -debased periods in a political sense are our most productive. The -Slavs?)—The ballet, which is the outcome of excessive study of the -history of strange civilisations, has become master of opera.—Stage -music and musicians music.—It is an error to suppose that what Wagner -composed was <i>a. form</i>: it was rather formlessness. The possibilities -of dramatic construction have yet to be discovered.—Rhythm. -"Expression" at all costs. Harlotry in instrumentation.—All honour to -Heinrich Schütz; all honour to Mendelssohn: in them we find an element -of Goethe, but nowhere else! (We also find another element of Goethe -coming to blossom in Rahel; a third element in Heinrich Heine.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">836.</p> - -<p>Descriptive music leaves reality to work its effects alone.... All -these kinds of art are easier, and more easy to imitate; poorly gifted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> -people have recourse to them. The appeal to the instincts; suggestive -art.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">837.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning our modern music.</i>—The decay of melody, like the decay -of "ideas," and of the freedom of intellectual activity, is a piece -of clumsiness and obtuseness, which is developing itself into new -feats of daring and even into principles;—in the end man has only the -principles of his gifts, or of his lack of gifts.</p> - -<p>"Dramatic music"—nonsense! It is simply bad music.... "Feeling" and -"passion" are merely substitutes when lofty intellectuality and the -joy of it (<i>e.g.</i> Voltaire's) can no longer be attained. Expressed -technically, feeling and "passion" are easier; they presuppose a much -poorer kind of artist. The recourse to drama betrays that an artist is -much more a master in tricky means than in genuine ones. To-day we have -both dramatic painting and dramatic poetry, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">838.</p> - -<p>What we lack in music is an æsthetic which would impose laws upon -musicians and give them a conscience; and as a result of this we lack -a real contest concerning "principles."—For as musicians we laugh -at Herbart's velleities in this department just as heartily as we -laugh at Schopenhauer's. As a matter of fact, tremendous difficulties -present themselves here. We no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> longer know on what basis to found our -concepts of what is exemplary, masterly, perfect. With the instincts -of old loves and old admiration we grope about in a realm of values, -and we almost believe, "that is good which pleases us".... I am always -suspicious when I hear people everywhere speak innocently of Beethoven -as a "classic"; what I would maintain, and with some seventy, is that, -in other arts, a classic is the very reverse of Beethoven. But when -the complete and glaring dissolution of style, Wagner's so-called -dramatic style, is taught and honoured as exemplary, as masterly, as -progressive, then my impatience exceeds all bounds. Dramatic style in -music, as Wagner understood it, is simply renunciation of all style -whatever; it is the assumption that something else, namely, drama, is a -hundred times more important than music. Wagner can paint; he does not -use music for the sake of music, with it he accentuates attitudes; he -is a poet. Finally he made an appeal to beautiful feelings and heaving -breasts, just as all other theatrical artists have done, and with it -all he converted women and even those whose souls thirst for culture -to him. But what do women and the uncultured care about music? All -these people have no conscience for art: none of them suffer when the -first and fundamental virtues of an art are scorned and trodden upon in -favour of that which is merely secondary (as <i>ancilla dramaturgica</i>). -What good can come of all extension in the means of expression, when -that which is expressed, art itself, has lost all its law and order? -The picturesque pomp and power<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> of tones, the symbolism of sound, -rhythm, the colour effects of harmony and discord, the suggestive -significance of music, the whole sensuality of this art which Wagner -made prevail—it is all this that Wagner derived, developed, and drew -out of music. Victor Hugo did something very similar for language: but -already people in France are asking themselves, in regard to the case -of Victor Hugo, whether language was not corrupted by him, whether -reason, intellectuality, and thorough conformity to law in language -are not suppressed when the sensuality of expression is elevated to a -high place? Is it not a sign of decadence that the poets in France have -become plastic artists, and that the musicians of Germany have become -actors and culturemongers?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">839.</p> - -<p>To-day there exists a sort of musical pessimism even among people -who are not musicians. Who has not met and cursed the confounded -youthlet who torments his piano until it shrieks with despair, -and who single-handed heaves the slime of the most lugubrious and -drabby harmonies before him? By so doing a man betrays himself as a -pessimist.... It is open to question, though, whether he also proves -himself a musician by this means. I for my part could never be made -to believe it. Wagnerite <i>pur sang</i> is unmusical, he submits to the -elementary forces of music very much as a woman submits to the will -of the man who hypnotises her—and in order to be able to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> do this he -must not be made suspicious <i>in rebus musicis et musicantibus</i> by a -too severe or too delicate conscience. I said "very much as"—but in -this respect I spoke perhaps more than a parable. Let any one consider -the means which Wagner uses by preference, when he wishes to make an -effect (means which for the greater part he first had to invent), they -are appallingly similar to the means by which a hypnotist exercises -his power (the choice of his movements, the general colour of his -orchestration; the excruciating evasion of consistency, and fairness -and squareness, in rhythm; the creepiness, the soothing touch, the -mystery, the hysteria of his "unending melody"). And is the condition -to which the overture to <i>Lohengrin,</i> for instance, reduces the men, -and still more the women, in the audience, so essentially different -from the somnambulistic trance? On one occasion after the overture in -question had been played, I heard an Italian lady say, with her eyes -half closed, in a way in which female Wagnerites are adepts: "<i>Come si -dorme con questa musica!</i>"<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> "How the music makes one sleep!"—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">840.</p> - -<p><i>Religion in music.</i>—What a large amount of satisfaction all religious -needs get out of Wagnerian music, though this is never acknowledged -or even understood! How much prayer, virtue, unction, virginity, -salvation, speaks through this music!... Oh what capital this cunning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> -saint, who leads and seduces us back to everything that was once -believed in, makes out of the fact that he may dispense with words -and concepts! ... Our intellectual conscience has no need to feel -ashamed—it stands apart—if any old instinct puts its trembling lips -to the rim of forbidden philtres.... This is shrewd and healthy, and, -in so far as it betrays a certain shame in regard to the satisfaction -of the religious instinct, it is even a good sign.... Cunning -Christianity: the type of the music which came from the "last Wagner."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">841.</p> - -<p>I distinguish between courage before persons, courage before things, -and courage on paper. The latter was the courage of David Strauss, for -instance. I distinguish again between the courage before witnesses -and the courage without witnesses: the courage of a Christian, or -of believers in God in general, can never be the courage without -witnesses—but on this score alone Christian courage stands condemned. -Finally, I distinguish between the courage which is temperamental and -the courage which is the fear of fear; a single instance of the latter -kind is moral courage. To this list the courage of despair should be -added.</p> - -<p>This is the courage which Wagner possessed. His attitude in regard to -music was at bottom a desperate one. He lacked two things which go -to make up a good musician: nature and nurture, the predisposition -for music and the discipline and schooling which music requires. He -had courage: out of this deficiency he established a principle;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> he -invented a kind of music for himself. The dramatic music which he -invented was the music which he was able to compose,—its limitations -are Wagner's limitations.</p> - -<p>And he was misunderstood!—Was he really misunderstood?... Such is -the case with five-sixths of the artists of to-day. Wagner is their -Saviour: five-sixths, moreover, is the "lowest proportion." In any case -where Nature has shown herself without reserve, and wherever culture is -an accident, a mere attempt, a piece of dilettantism, the artist turns -instinctively—what do I say?—I mean enthusiastically, to Wagner; as -the poet says: "Half drew he him, and half sank he."<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> This is an adapted quotation from Goethe's poem, "The -Fisherman." The translation is E. A. Bowring's.—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">842.</p> - -<p>"Music" and the grand style. The greatness of an artist is not to be -measured by the beautiful feelings which he evokes: let this belief -be left to the girls. It should be measured according to the extent -to which he approaches the grand style, according to the extent to -which he is capable of the grand style. This style and great passion -have this in common—that they scorn to please; that they forget to -persuade; that they command: that they will.... To become master of -the chaos which is in one; to compel one's inner chaos to assume form; -to become consistent, simple, unequivocal, mathematical, law this is -the great ambition here. By means of it one repels; nothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> so much -endears people to such powerful men as this,—a desert seems to lie -around them, they impose silence upon all, and awe every one with the -greatness Of their sacrilege.... All arts know this kind of aspirant to -the grand style: why are they absent in music? Never yet has a musician -built as that architect did who erected the Palazzo Pitti.... This is a -problem. Does music perhaps belong to that culture in which the reign -of powerful men of various types is already at an end? Is the concept -"grand style" in fact a contradiction of the soul of music,—of "the -Woman" in our music? ...</p> - -<p>With this I touch upon the cardinal question: how should all our music -be classified? The age of classical taste knows nothing that can be -compared with it: it bloomed when the world of the Renaissance reached -its evening, when "freedom" had already bidden farewell to both men and -their customs—is it characteristic of music to be Counter-Renaissance? -Is music, perchance, the sister of the baroque style, seeing that in -any case they were contemporaries? Is not music, modern music, already -decadence? ...</p> - -<p>I have put my finger before on this question: whether music is not an -example of Counter-Renaissance art? whether it is not the next of kin -to the baroque style? whether it has not grown in Opposition to all -classic taste, so that any aspiration to classicism is forbidden by the -very nature of music?</p> - -<p>The answer to this most important of all questions of values would -not be a very doubtful<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> one, if people thoroughly understood the -fact that music attains to its highest maturity and plenitude as -romanticism—likewise as a reactionary movement against classicism.</p> - -<p>Mozart, a delicate and lovable soul, but quite eighteenth century, -even in his serious lapses ... Beethoven, the first great romanticist -according to the French conception of romanticism, just as Wagner is -the last great romanticist ... both of them are instinctive opponents -of classical taste, of severe style—not to speak of "grand" in this -regard.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">843.</p> - -<p>Romanticism: an ambiguous question, like all modern questions.</p> - -<p>The æsthetic conditions are twofold:—</p> - -<p>The abundant and generous, as opposed to the seeking and the desiring.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">844.</p> - -<p>A romanticist is an artist whose great dissatisfaction with himself -makes him productive—; who looks away from himself and his fellows, -and sometimes, therefore, looks backwards.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">845.</p> - -<p>Is art the result of dissatisfaction with reality? or is it the -expression of gratitude for happiness experienced? In the first case, -it is romanticism; in the second, it is glorification and dithyramb -(in short, apotheosis art): even Raphael belongs to this, except for -the fact that he was guilty of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> duplicity of having defied the -appearance of the Christian view of the world. He was thankful for life -precisely where it was not exactly Christian.</p> - -<p>With a moral interpretation the world is insufferable; Christianity was -the attempt to overcome the world with morality: <i>i.e.</i> to deny it. -<i>In praxi</i> such a mad experiment—an imbecile elevation of man above -the world—could only end in the beglooming, the dwarfing, and the -impoverishment of mankind: the only kind of man who gained anything by -it, who was promoted by it, was the most mediocre, the most harmless -and gregarious type.</p> - -<p>Homer as an apotheosis artist; Rubens also. Music has not yet had such -an artist.</p> - -<p>The idealisation of the great criminal (the feeling for his greatness) -is Greek; the depreciation, the slander, the contempt of the sinner, is -Judæo-Christian.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">846.</p> - -<p>Romanticism and its opposite. In regard to all æsthetic values I now -avail myself of this fundamental distinction: in every individual -case I ask myself has hunger or has superabundance been creative -here? At first another distinction might perhaps seem preferable, it -is far more obvious,—<i>e.g.</i> the distinction which decides whether a -desire for stability, for eternity, for Being, or whether a desire for -destruction, for change, for Becoming, has been the cause of creation. -But both kinds of desire, when examined more closely, prove to be -ambiguous, and really susceptible of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> interpretation only according to -that scheme already mentioned and which I think is rightly preferred.</p> - -<p>The desire for destruction, for change, for Becoming, may be the -expression of an overflowing power pregnant with promises for the -future (my term for this, as is well known, is Dionysian); it may, -however, also be the hate of the ill-constituted, of the needy and of -the physiologically botched, that destroys, and must destroy, because -such creatures are indignant at, and annoyed by everything lasting and -stable.</p> - -<p>The act of immortalising can, on the other hand, be the outcome -of gratitude and love: an art which has this origin is always an -apotheosis art; dithyrambic, as perhaps with Rubens, happy, as perhaps -with Hafiz; bright and gracious, and shedding a ray of glory over all -things, as in Goethe. But it may also, however, be the outcome of the -tyrannical will of the great sufferer who would make the most personal, -individual, and narrow trait about him, the actual idiosyncrasy of his -pain—in fact, into a binding law and imposition, and who thus wreaks -his revenge upon all things by stamping, branding, and violating them -with the image of his torment. The latter case is romantic pessimism -in its highest form, whether this be Schopenhauerian voluntarism or -Wagnerian music.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">847.</p> - -<p>It is a question whether the antithesis, classic and romantic, does not -conceal that other antithesis, the active and the reactive.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">848.</p> - -<p>In order to be a classic, one must be possessed of all the strong and -apparently contradictory gifts and passions: but in such a way that -they run in harness together, and culminate simultaneously in elevating -a certain species of literature or art or politics to its height and -zenith (they must not do this after that elevation has taken place -...). They must reflect the complete state (either of a people or of -a culture), and express its most profound and most secret nature, -at a time when it is still stable and not yet discoloured by the -imitation of foreign things (or when it is still dependent ...); not -a reactive but a deliberate and progressive spirit, saying Yea in all -circumstances, even in its hate.</p> - -<p>"And does not the highest personal value belong thereto?" It is worth -considering whether moral prejudices do not perhaps exercise their -influence here, and whether great moral loftiness is not perhaps a -contradiction of the classical? ... Whether the moral monsters must -not necessarily be romantic in word and deed? Any such preponderance -of one virtue over others (as in the case of the moral monster) is -precisely what with most hostility counteracts the classical power in -equilibrium, supposing a people manifested this moral loftiness and -were classical notwithstanding, we should have to conclude boldly that -they were also on the same high level in immorality! this was perhaps -the case with Shakespeare (provided that he was really Lord Bacon).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">849.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the future. Against the romanticism of great passion.</i>—We -must understand how a certain modicum of coldness, lucidity, -and hardness is inseparable from all classical taste: above all -consistency, happy intellectuality, "the three unities," concentration, -hatred of all feeling, of all sentimentality, of all <i>esprit,</i> -hatred of all multiformity, of all uncertainty, evasiveness, and of -all nebulosity, as also of all brevity, finicking, prettiness and -good nature. Artistic formulæ must not be played with: life must be -remodelled so that it should be forced to formulate itself accordingly.</p> - -<p>It is really an exhilarating spectacle which we have only learned -to laugh at quite recently, because we have only seen through it -quite recently: this spectacle of Herder's, Winckelmann's, Goethe's, -and Hegel's contemporaries claiming that they had rediscovered the -classical ideal ... and at the same time, Shakespeare! And this same -crew of men had scurvily repudiated all relationship with the classical -school of France! As if the essential principle could not have been -learnt as well here as elsewhere! ... But what people wanted was -"nature," and "naturalness": Oh, the stupidity of it! It was thought -that classicism was a kind of naturalness!</p> - -<p>Without either prejudice or indulgence we should try and investigate -upon what soil a classical taste can be evolved. The hardening, -the simplification, the strengthening, and the bedevilling of man -are inseparable from classical taste. Logical and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> psychological -simplification. A contempt of detail, of complexity, of obscurity.</p> - -<p>The romanticists of Germany do not protest against classicism, but -against reason, against illumination, against taste, against the -eighteenth century.</p> - -<p>The essence of romantico-Wagnerian music is the opposite of the -classical spirit.</p> - -<p>The will to unity (because unity tyrannises. <i>e.g.</i> the listener and -the spectator), but the artist's inability to tyrannise over himself -where it is most needed—that is to say, in regard to the work itself -(in regard to knowing what to leave out, what to shorten, what to -clarify, what to simplify). The overwhelming by means of masses -(Wagner, Victor Hugo, Zola, Taine).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">850.</p> - -<p><i>The Nihilism of artists.</i>—Nature is cruel in her cheerfulness; -cynical in her sunrises. We are hostile to emotions. We flee thither -where Nature moves our senses and our imagination, where we have -nothing to love, where we are not reminded of the moral semblances and -delicacies of this northern nature; and the same applies to the arts. -We prefer that which no longer reminds us of good and evil. Our moral -sensibility and tenderness seem to be relieved in the heart of terrible -and happy Nature, in the fatalism of the senses and forces. Life -without goodness.</p> - -<p>Great well-being arises from contemplating Nature's indifference to -good and evil.</p> - -<p>No justice in history, no goodness in Nature.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> That is why the -pessimist when he is an artist prefers those historical subjects where -the absence of justice reveals itself with magnificent simplicity, -where perfection actually comes to expression—and likewise he prefers -that in Nature, where her callous evil character is not hypocritically -concealed, where that character is seen in perfection.... The -Nihilistic artist betrays himself in willing and preferring cynical -history and cynical Nature.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">851.</p> - -<p>What is tragic?—Again and again I have pointed to the great -misunderstanding of Aristotle in maintaining that the tragic emotions -were the two depressing emotions—fear and pity. Had he been right, -tragedy would be an art unfriendly to life: it would have been -necessary to caution people against it as against something generally -harmful and suspicious. Art, otherwise the great stimulus of life, the -great intoxicant of life, the great will to life, here became a tool of -decadence, the hand-maiden of pessimism and ill-health (for to suppose, -as Aristotle supposed, that by exciting these emotions we thereby -purged people of them, is simply an error). Something which habitually -excites fear or pity, disorganises, weakens, and discourages: and -supposing Schopenhauer were right in thinking that tragedy taught -resignation (<i>i.e.</i> a meek renunciation of happiness, hope, and of -the will to live), this would presuppose an art in which art itself -was denied. Tragedy would then constitute a process of dissolution; -the instinct of life would destroy itself in the instinct of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> art. -Christianity, Nihilism, tragic art, physiological decadence; these -things would then be linked, they would then preponderate together -and assist each other onwards—downwards.... Tragedy would thus be a -symptom of decline.</p> - -<p>This theory may be refuted in the most cold-blooded way, namely, by -measuring the effect of a tragic emotion by means of a dynamometer -The result would be a fact which only the bottomless falsity of -a doctrinaire could misunderstand: that tragedy is a tonic. If -Schopenhauer refuses to see the truth here, if he regards general -depression as a tragic condition, if he would have informed the Greeks -(who to his disgust were not "resigned") that they did not firmly -possess the highest principles of life: it is only owing to his <i>parti -pris,</i> to the need of consistency in his system, to the dishonesty of -the doctrinaire—that dreadful dishonesty which step for step corrupted -the whole psychology of Schopenhauer (he who had arbitrarily and almost -violently misunderstood genius, art itself, morality, pagan religion, -beauty, knowledge, and almost everything).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">852.</p> - -<p><i>The tragic artist.</i>—Whether, and in regard to what, the judgment -"beautiful" is established is a question of an individual's or of a -people's strength The feeling of plenitude, of overflowing strength -(which gaily and courageously meets many an obstacle before which -the weakling shudders)—the feeling of power utters the judgment -"beautiful" concerning things and conditions which the instinct of -impotence can only value as hateful and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> ugly. The <i>flair</i> which -enables us to decide whether the objects we encounter are dangerous, -problematic, or alluring, likewise determines our æsthetic Yea. ("This -is beautiful," is an affirmation).</p> - -<p>From this we see that, generally speaking, a preference for -questionable and terrible things is a symptom of strength; whereas the -taste for pretty and charming trifles is characteristic of the weak -and the delicate. The love of tragedy is typical of strong ages and -characters: its <i>non plus ultra</i> is perhaps the <i>Divina Commedia.</i> It -is the heroic spirits which in tragic cruelty say Yea unto themselves: -they are hard enough to feel pain as a pleasure.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, supposing weaklings desire to get pleasure from -an art which was not designed for them, what interpretation must we -suppose they would like to give tragedy in order to make it suit their -taste? They would interpret their own feeling of value into it: <i>e.g.</i> -the "triumph of the moral order of things," or the teaching of the -"uselessness of existence," or the incitement to "resignation" (or also -half-medicinal and half-moral outpourings, <i>à la</i> Aristotle). Finally, -the art of terrible natures, in so far as it may excite the nerves, -may be regarded by the weak and exhausted as a stimulus: this is now -taking place, for instance, in the case of the admiration meted out to -Wagner's art. A test of man's well-being and consciousness of power is -the extent to which he can acknowledge the terrible and questionable -character of things, and whether he is in any need of a faith at the -end.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span></p> - -<p>This kind of artistic pessimism is precisely the reverse of that -religio-moral pessimism which suffers from the corruption of man -and the enigmatic character of existence: the latter insists upon -deliverance, or at least upon the hope of deliverance. Those -who suffer, doubt, and distrust themselves,—the sick, in other -words,—have in all ages required the transporting influence of visions -in order to be able to exist at all (the notion "blessedness" arose in -this way). A similar case would be that of the artists of decadence, -who at bottom maintain a Nihilistic attitude to life, and take -refuge in the beauty of form,—in those select cases in which Nature -is perfect, in which she is indifferently great and indifferently -beautiful. (The "love of the beautiful" may thus be something very -different from the ability to see or create the beautiful: it may be -the expression of impotence in this respect.) The most convincing -artists are those who make harmony ring out of every discord, and -who benefit all things by the gift of their power and inner harmony: -in every work of art they merely reveal the symbol of their inmost -experiences—their creation is gratitude for life.</p> - -<p>The depth of the tragic artist consists in the fact that his æsthetic -instinct surveys the more remote results, that he does not halt -shortsightedly at the thing that is nearest, that he says Yea to the -whole cosmic economy, which justifies the terrible, the evil, and the -questionable; which more than justifies it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">853.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>Art in the "Birth of Tragedy."</i></p> - -<p class="center">I.</p> - -<p>The conception of the work which lies right in the background of this -book, is extraordinarily gloomy and unpleasant: among all the types -of pessimism which have ever been known hitherto, none seems to have -attained to this degree of malice. The contrast of a true and of an -apparent world is entirely absent here: there is but one world, and it -is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, and without sense. A world, -thus constituted is the true world. We are in need of lies in order to -rise superior to this reality, to this truth—that is to say, in order -to live.... That lies should be necessary to life is part and parcel of -the terrible and questionable character of existence.</p> - -<p>Metaphysics, morality, religion, science, in this book, all these -things are regarded merely as different forms of falsehood: by means of -them we are led to believe in life. "Life, must inspire confidence"; -the task which this imposes upon us is enormous. In order to solve, -this problem man must already be a liar in his heart, but he must above -all else be an artist. And he is that. Metaphysics, religion, morality, -science, all these things are but the offshoot of his will to art, -to falsehood, to a flight from "truth," to a denial of "truth." This -ability, this artistic capacity <i>par excellence</i> of man—thanks to -which he overcomes reality with lies,—is a quality which he has in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> -common with all other forms of existence. He himself is indeed a piece -of reality, of truth, of nature: how could he help being also a piece -of genius in prevarication!</p> - -<p>The fact that the character of existence is misunderstood, is the -profoundest and the highest secret motive behind everything relating -to virtue, science, piety, and art. To be blind to many things, to -see many things falsely, to fancy many things: Oh, how clever man has -been in those circumstances in which he believed he was anything but -clever! Love, enthusiasm, "God"—are but subtle forms of ultimate -Self-deception; they are but seductions to life and to the belief in -life! In those moments when man was deceived, when he had befooled -himself and when he believed in life: Oh, how his spirit swelled within -him! Oh, what ecstasies he had! What power he felt! And what artistic -triumphs in the feeling of power! ... Man had once more become master -of "matter,"—master of truth! ... And whenever man rejoices it is -always in the same way: he rejoices as an artist, his power is his joy, -he enjoys falsehood as his power....</p> - - -<p class="center">II.</p> - -<p>Art and nothing else! Art is the great means of making life possible, -the great seducer to life, the great stimulus of life.</p> - -<p>Art is the only superior counter-agent to all will to the denial of -life; it is <i>par excellence</i> the anti-Christian, the anti-Buddhistic, -the anti-Nihilistic force.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span></p> - -<p>Art is the alleviation of the seeker after knowledge,—of him who -recognises the terrible and questionable character Of existence, and -who will recognise it,—of the tragic seeker after knowledge.</p> - -<p>Art is the alleviation of the man of action,—of him who not only sees -the terrible and questionable character of existence, but also lives -it, will live it,—of the tragic and warlike man, the hero. Art is the -alleviation of the sufferer,—as the way to states in which pain is -willed, is transfigured, is deified, where suffering is a form of great -ecstasy.</p> - - -<p class="center">III.</p> - -<p>It is clear that in this book pessimism, or, better still, Nihilism, -stands for "truth." But truth is not postulated as the highest measure -of value, and still less as the highest power. The will to appearance, -to illusion, to deception, to becoming, and to change (to objective -deception), is here regarded as more profound, as more primeval, as -more metaphysical than the will to truth, to reality, to appearance: -the latter is merely a form of the will to illusion. Happiness is -likewise conceived as more primeval than pain: and pain is considered -as conditioned, as a consequence Of the will to happiness (of the will -to Becoming, to growth, to forming, i.e. to creating; in creating, -however, destruction is included). The highest state of Yea-saying to -existence is conceived as one from which the greatest pain may not be -excluded: the tragico-Dionysian state.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="center">IV.</p> - -<p>In this way this book is even anti-pessimistic, namely, in the sense -that it teaches something which is stronger than pessimism and which -is more "divine" than truth: Art. Nobody, it would seem, would be more -ready seriously to utter a radical denial of life, an actual denial -of action even more than a denial of life, than the author of this -book. Except that he knows—for he has experienced it, and perhaps -experienced little else!—that art is of more value than truth.</p> - -<p>Even in the preface, in which Richard Wagner is, as it were, invited -to join with him in conversation, the author expresses this article of -faith, this gospel for artists; "Art is the only task of life, art is -the metaphysical activity of life...."</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="FOURTH_BOOK" id="FOURTH_BOOK">FOURTH BOOK</a></h4> - - -<h3>DISCIPLINE AND BREEDING.</h3> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a><br /><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span></p> - - -<h4>I.</h4> - - -<h4>THE ORDER OF RANK.</h4> - -<hr /> -<p class="title">1. The Doctrine of the Order of Rank.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">854.</p> - -<p>In this age of universal suffrage, in which everybody is allowed to -sit in judgment upon everything and everybody, I feel compelled to -re-establish the order of rank.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">855.</p> - -<p>Quanta of power alone determine rank and distinguish rank: nothing else -does.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">856.</p> - -<p><i>The will to power.</i>—How must those men be constituted who would -undertake this transvaluation? The order of rank as the order of power: -war and danger are the prerequisites which allow of a rank maintaining -its conditions. The prodigious example: man in Nature—the weakest and -shrewdest creature making himself master, and putting a yoke upon all -less intelligent forces.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">857.</p> - -<p>I distinguish between the type which represents ascending life and -that which represents decay, decomposition and weakness. Ought one to -suppose that the question of rank between these two types can be at all -doubtful?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">858.</p> - -<p>The modicum of power which you represent decides your rank; all the -rest is cowardice.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">859.</p> - -<p>The advantages of standing detached from one's age.—Detached from -the two movements, that of individualism and that of collectivist -morality; for even the first does not recognise the order of rank, and -would give one individual the same freedom as another. My thoughts are -not concerned with the degree of freedom which should be granted to -the one or to the other or to all, but with the degree of power which -the one or the other should exercise over his neighbour or over all; -and more especially with the question to what extent a sacrifice of -freedom, or even enslavement, may afford the basis for the cultivation, -of a <i>superior</i> type. In plain words: <i>how could one sacrifice the -development of mankind</i> in order to assist a higher species than man to -come into being.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">860.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning rank.</i>—The terrible consequences of "equality"—in the end -everybody thinks he has the right to every problem. All order of rank -has vanished.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">861.</p> - -<p>It is necessary for <i>higher</i> men to declare war upon the masses! In -all directions mediocre people are joining hands in order to make -themselves masters. Everything that pampers, that softens, and that -brings the "people" or "woman" to the front, operates in favour of -universal suffrage,—that is to say, the dominion of <i>inferior</i> men. -But we must make reprisals, and draw the whole state of affairs (which -commenced in Europe with Christianity) to the light of day and to -judgment.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">862.</p> - -<p>A teaching is needed which is strong enough to work in a <i>disciplinary</i> -manner; it should operate in such a way as to strengthen the strong and -to paralyse and smash up the world-weary.</p> - -<p>The annihilation of declining races. The decay of Europe. The -annihilation of slave-tainted valuations. The dominion of the world -as a means to the rearing of a higher type. The annihilation of the -humbug which is called morality (Christianity as a hysterical kind -of honesty in this regard: Augustine, Bunyan.)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> The annihilation of -universal suffrage—that is to say, that system by means of which the -lowest natures prescribe themselves as a law for higher natures. The -annihilation of mediocrity and its prevalence. (The one-sided, the -individuals—peoples; constitutional plenitude should be aimed at by -means of the coupling of opposites; to this end race-combinations -should be tried.) The new kind of courage—no <i>a priori</i> truths (those -who were accustomed to believe in something sought such truths!), -but <i>free</i> submission to a ruling thought, which has its time; for -instance, time conceived as the quality of space, etc.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">2. The Strong and the Weak.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">863.</p> - -<p><i>The notion, "strong and weak man"</i> resolves itself into this, that in -the first place much strength is inherited—the man is a total sum; in -the other, <i>not yet enough</i> (inadequate inheritance, subdivision of the -inherited qualities). Weakness may be a <i>starting</i> phenomenon: <i>not yet -enough</i>; or a final phenomenon: "no more."</p> - -<p>The determining point is there where great strength is present, or -where a great amount of strength can be discharged. The mass, as the -sum-total of the <i>weak,</i> reacts <i>slowly;</i> it defends itself against -much for which it is too weak,—against that for which it has no -use; it <i>never</i> creates, it <i>never</i> takes a step forward. This is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> -opposed to the theory which denies the strong individual and would -maintain that the "masses do everything." The difference is similar -to that which obtains between separated generations: four or even -five generations may lie between the masses and him who is the moving -spirit—it is a <i>chronological</i> difference.</p> - -<p>The <i>values of the weak</i> are in the van, because the strong have -adopted them in order to <i>lead</i> with them.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">864.</p> - -<p><i>Why the weak triumph.</i>—On the whole, the sick and the weak have -more <i>sympathy</i> and are more "humane"; the sick and the weak have -more intellect, and are more changeable more variegated, more -entertaining—more malicious; the sick alone invented <i>malice.</i> (A -morbid precocity is often to be observed among rickety, scrofulitic, -and tuberculous people.) <i>Esprit:</i> the property of older races; Jews, -Frenchmen, Chinese. (The anti-Semites do not forgive the Jews for -having both intellect—and money. Anti-Semites—another name for -"bungled and botched.")</p> - -<p>The sick and the weak have always had <i>fascination</i> on their side; they -are more <i>interesting</i> than the healthy: the fool and the saint—the -two most interesting kinds of men.... Closely related thereto is the -"genius." The "great adventurers and criminals" and all great men, -the most healthy in particular, have always been <i>sick</i> at certain -periods of their lives—great disturbances of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> emotions, the -passion for power, love, revenge, are all accompanied by very profound -perturbations. And, as for decadence, every man who does not die -prematurely manifests it in almost every respect—he therefore knows -from experience the instincts which belong to it: for <i>half his life</i> -nearly every man is decadent.</p> - -<p>And finally, woman! <i>One-half of mankind is weak,</i> chronically sick, -changeable, shifty woman requires strength in order to cleave to it; -she also requires a religion of the weak which glorifies weakness, -love, and modesty as divine: or, better still, she makes the strong -weak—she <i>rules</i> when she succeeds in overcoming the strong. Woman -has always conspired with decadent types,—the priests, for instance, -against the mighty, against the "strong," against <i>men.</i> Women avail -themselves of children for the cult of piety, pity, and love:—the -<i>mother</i> stands as the symbol of <i>convincing</i> altruism.</p> - -<p>Finally, the increase of civilisation with its necessary correlatives, -the increase of morbid elements, of the <i>neurotic</i> and <i>psychiatric</i> -and of the <i>criminal.</i> A sort of <i>intermediary species</i> arises, -the artist. He is distinct from those who are criminals as the -result of weak wills and of the fear of society, although they may -not yet be ripe for the asylum; but he has antennas which grope -inquisitively into both spheres, this specific plant of culture, -the modern artist, painter, musician, and, above all, novelist, who -designates his particular kind of attitude with the very indefinite -word "naturalism."... Lunatics, criminals, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> realists<a name="FNanchor_1_12" id="FNanchor_1_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_12" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> are on -the increase: this is the sign of a growing culture plunging forward -at headlong speed—that is to say, its excrement, its refuse, the -rubbish that is shot from it every day, is beginning to acquire more -importance, the retrogressive movement <i>keeps pace</i> with the advance.</p> - -<p>Finally, <i>the social mishmash,</i> which is the result of revolution, -of the establishment of equal rights, and of the superstition, the -"equality of men." Thus the possessors of the instincts of decline -(of resentment, of discontent, of the lust of destruction, of anarchy -and Nihilism), as also the instincts of slavery, of cowardice, of -craftiness, and of rascality, which are inherent among those classes -of society which have long been suppressed, are beginning to get -infused into the blood of all ranks. Two or three generations later, -the race can no longer be recognised—everything has become <i>mob.</i> And -thus there results a collective instinct against <i>selection,</i> against -every kind of <i>privilege</i>, and this instinct operates with such power, -certainty, hardness, and cruelty that, as a matter of fact, in the end, -even the privileged classes have to submit: all those who still wish to -hold on to power flatter the mob, work with the mob, and must have the -mob on their side—the "geniuses" <i>above all.</i> The latter become the -<i>heralds</i> of those feelings with which the mob can be inspired,—the -expression of pity, of honour, even for all that suffers, all that is -low and despised, and has lived<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> under persecution, becomes predominant -(types: Victor Hugo, Richard Wagner).—The rise of the mob signifies -once more the rise of old values.</p> - -<p>In the case of such an extreme movement, both in tempo and in means, -as characterises our civilisation, man's ballast is shifted. Those -men whose worth is greatest, and whose mission, as it were, is to -compensate for the very great danger of such a morbid movement,—such -men become dawdlers <i>par excellence</i>; they are slow to accept anything, -and are tenacious; they are creatures that are relatively lasting -in the midst of this vast mingling and changing of elements. In -such circumstances power is necessarily relegated to the <i>mediocre: -mediocrity,</i> as the trustee and bearer of the future, consolidates -itself against the rule of the mob and of eccentricities (both of -which are, in most cases, united). In this way a new antagonist is -evolved for exceptional men—or in certain cases a new temptation. -Provided that they do not adapt themselves to the mob, and stand up -for what satisfies the instincts of the disinherited, they will find -it necessary to be "mediocre" and sound. They know: <i>mediocritas</i> -is also <i>aurea,</i>—it alone has command of money and <i>gold</i> (of all -that glitters ...).... And, once more, old virtue and the whole -superannuated world of ideals in general secures a gifted host of -special-pleaders.... Result: mediocrity acquires intellect, wit, and -genius, it becomes entertaining, and even seductive.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p><i>Result.</i>—A high culture can only stand upon a broad basis, upon a -strongly and soundly consolidated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> mediocrity. In its service and -assisted by it, <i>science</i> and even art do their work. Science could -not wish for a better state of affairs: in its essence it belongs to a -middle-class type of man,—among exceptions it is out of place,—there -is not anything aristocratic and still less anything anarchic in its -instincts.—The power of the middle classes is then upheld by means of -commerce, but, above all, by means of money-dealing: the instinct of -great financiers is opposed to everything extreme—on this account -the Jews are, for the present, the most <i>conservative</i> power in the -threatening and insecure conditions of modern Europe. They can have -no use either for revolutions, for socialism, or for militarism: if -they would have power, and if they should need it, even over the -revolutionary party, this is only the result of what I have already -said, and it in no way contradicts it. Against other extreme movements -they may occasionally require to excite terror by showing how much -power is in their hands. But their instinct itself is inveterately -conservative and "mediocre, ... Wherever power exists, they know how to -become mighty; but the application of their power always takes the same -direction. The polite term for <i>mediocre,</i> as is well known, is the -word <i>"Liberal."</i></p> - -<p><i>Reflection.</i>—It is all nonsense to suppose that this general -<i>conquest of values</i> is anti-biological. In order to explain it, we -ought to try and show that it is the result of a certain interest of -life to maintain the type "man," even by means of this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> method which -leads to the prevalence of the weak and the physiologically botched—if -things were otherwise, might man not cease to exist? Problem ...</p> - -<p>The <i>enhancement</i> of the type may prove fatal to the <i>maintenance of -the species.</i> Why?—The experience of history shows that strong races -<i>decimate</i> each other <i>mutually,</i> by means of war, lust for power, and -venturousness; the strong emotions; wastefulness (strength is no longer -capitalised, disturbed mental systems arise from excessive tension); -their existence is a costly affair in short, they persistently give -rise to friction <i>between themselves;</i> periods of <i>profound slackness</i> -and torpidity intervene: all great ages have to be <i>paid for....</i> The -strong are, after all, weaker, less wilful, and more absurd than the -average weak ones.</p> - -<p>They are <i>squandering</i> races. "<i>Permanence,</i>" in itself, can have no -value: that which ought to be preferred thereto would be a shorter life -for the species, but a life <i>richer</i> in creations. It would remain -to be proved that, even as things are, a richer sum of creations is -attained than in the case of the shorter existence; <i>i.e.</i> that man, as -a storehouse of power, attains to a much higher degree of dominion over -things under the conditions which have existed hitherto.... We are here -face to face with a problem of <i>economics.</i></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_12" id="Footnote_1_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_12"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The German word is "Naturalist," and really means -"realist" in a bad sense.—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">865.</p> - -<p>The state of mind which calls itself "idealism," and which will neither -allow mediocrity to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> mediocre nor woman to be woman! Do not make -everything uniform! We should have a clear idea of how <i>dearly we have -to pay for the establishment of a virtue;</i> and that virtue is nothing -generally desirable, but a <i>noble piece of madness,</i> a beautiful -exception, which gives us the privilege of feeling elated....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">866.</p> - -<p>It is <i>necessary</i> to show <i>that a counter-movement is inevitably -associated</i> with any increasingly economical consumption of men -and mankind, and with an ever more closely involved "machinery" of -interests and services. I call this counter-movement the <i>separation -of the luxurious surplus of mankind:</i> by means of it a stronger kind, -a higher type, must come to light, which has other conditions for its -origin and for its maintenance than the average man. My concept, my -metaphor for this type is, as you know, the word "Superman." Along the -first road, which can now be completely surveyed, arose adaptation, -stultification, higher Chinese culture, modesty in the Instincts, -and satisfaction at the sight of the belittlement of man—a kind of -<i>stationary level of mankind.</i> If ever we get that inevitable and -imminent, general control of the economy of the earth, then mankind -<i>can</i> be used as machinery and find its best purpose in the service of -this economy—as an enormous piece of clock-work consisting of ever -smaller and ever more subtly adapted wheels; then all the dominating -and commanding elements<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> will become ever more superfluous; and the -whole gains enormous energy, while the individual factors which compose -it represent but small modicums of strength and of <i>value.</i> To oppose -this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialised kind of utility, a -reverse movement is needed -the procreation of the <i>synthetic</i> man who -<i>embodies</i> everything and <i>justifies</i> it; that man for whom the turning -of mankind into a machine is a first condition of existence, for whom -the rest of mankind is but soil on which he can devise his <i>higher -mode</i> of existence.</p> - -<p>He is in need of the <i>opposition</i> of the masses, of those who are -"levelled down"; he requires that feeling of distance from them; he -stands upon them, he lives on them. This higher form of <i>aristocracy</i> -is the form of the future. From the moral point of view, the collective -machinery above described, that solidarity of all wheels, represents -the most extreme example in the <i>exploitation of mankind</i>: but it -presupposes the existence of those for whom such an exploitation would -have some <i>meaning.<a name="FNanchor_2_13" id="FNanchor_2_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_13" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></i> Otherwise it would signify, as a matter of -fact, merely the general depreciation of the type man,—a <i>retrograde -phenomenon</i> on a grand scale.</p> - -<p>Readers are beginning to see what I am combating—namely, <i>economic</i> -optimism: as if<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> the genera] welfare of everybody must necessarily -increase with the growing self-sacrifice of everybody. The very reverse -seems to me to be the case, <i>the self-sacrifice of everybody amounts -to a collective loss;</i> man becomes <i>inferior</i>—so that nobody knows -what end this monstrous purpose has served. A wherefore? a <i>new</i> -wherefore?—this is what mankind requires.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_13" id="Footnote_2_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_13"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> This sentence for ever distinguishes Nietzsche's -aristocracy from our present plutocratic and industrial one, for which, -at the present moment at any rate, it would be difficult to discover -some meaning.—Tr.</p></div> - - - -<p class="parnum">867.</p> - -<p>The recognition of the <i>increase of collective power:</i> we should -calculate to what extent the ruin of individuals, of castes, of ages, -and of peoples, is included in this general increase.</p> - -<p>The transposition of the <i>ballast</i> of a culture. The <i>cost</i> of every -vast growth: who bears it? <i>Why must it be enormous at the present -time?</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">868.</p> - -<p>General aspect of the future European: the latter regarded as the most -intelligent servile animal, very industrious, at bottom very modest, -inquisitive to excess, multifarious, pampered, weak of will,—a chaos -of cosmopolitan passions and intelligences. How would it be possible -for a stronger race to be bred from him?—Such a race as would have a -classical taste? The classical taste: this is the will to simplicity, -to accentuation, and to happiness made visible, the will to the -terrible, and the courage for psychological <i>nakedness</i> (simplification -is the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> outcome of the will to accentuate; allowing happiness as well -as nakedness to become visible is a consequence of the will to the -terrible ...). In order to fight one's way out of that chaos, and up -to this form, a certain <i>disciplinary constraint</i> is necessary: a man -should have to choose between either going to the dogs or <i>prevailing.</i> -A ruling race can only arise amid terrible and violent conditions. -Problem: where are the <i>barbarians</i> of the twentieth century? Obviously -they will only show themselves and consolidate themselves after -enormous socialistic crises. They will consist of those elements which -are capable of the <i>greatest hardness towards themselves,</i> and which -can guarantee the <i>most enduring will-power.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">869.</p> - -<p>The mightiest and most dangerous passions of man, by means of which he -most easily goes to rack and ruin, have been so fundamentally banned -that mighty men themselves have either become impossible or else must -regard themselves as <i>evil,</i> "harmful and prohibited." The losses are -heavy, but up to the present they have been necessary. Now, however, -that a whole host of counter-forces has been reared, by means of the -temporary suppression of these passions (the passion for dominion, the -love of change and deception), their liberation has once more become -possible: they will no longer possess their old savagery. We can now -allow ourselves this tame sort of barbarism: look at our artists and -our statesmen!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">870.</p> - - - -<p><i>The root of all evil:</i> that the slave morality of modesty, chastity, -selflessness, and absolute obedience should have triumphed. Dominating -natures were thus condemned (1) to hypocrisy, (2) to qualms of -conscience,—creative natures regarded themselves as rebels against -God, uncertain and hemmed in by eternal values.</p> - -<p>The barbarians showed that the ability o<i>f keeping within the bounds -of moderation</i> was not in the scope of their powers: they feared and -slandered the passions and instincts of nature—likewise the aspect -of the ruling Cæsars and castes. On the other hand, there arose the -suspicion that all <i>restraint</i> is a form of weakness or of incipient -old age and fatigue (thus La Rochefoucauld suspects that "virtue" is -only a euphemism in the mouths of those to whom vice no longer affords -any pleasure). The capacity for restraint was represented as a matter -of hardness, self-control, asceticism, as a fight with the devil, -etc. etc. The natural <i>delight</i> of æsthetic natures, in measure; <i>the -pleasure derived from the beauty of measure,</i> was <i>overlooked</i> and -<i>denied,</i> because that which was desired was an anti-eudæmonistic -morality. The belief in the pleasure which comes of restraint has -been lacking hitherto—this pleasure of a rider on a fiery steed! The -moderation of weak natures was confounded with the restraint of the -strong!</p> - -<p>In short, the best things have been blasphemed because weak or -immoderate swine have thrown a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> bad light upon them—the best men have -<i>remained concealed</i>—and have often <i>misunderstood</i> themselves.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">871.</p> - -<p><i>Vicious</i> and <i>unbridled people</i>: their depressing influence upon the -<i>value of the pussions.</i> It was the appalling barbarity of morality -which was principally responsible in the Middle Ages for the compulsory -recourse to a veritable "league <i>of</i> virtue"—and this was coupled with -an equally appalling exaggeration of all that which constitutes the -value of man. Militant "civilisation" (taming) is in need of all kinds -of irons and tortures in order to maintain itself against terrible and -beast-of-prey natures.</p> - -<p>In this case, contusion, although it may have the most nefarious -influences, is quite natural: that which <i>men of power and will are -able to demand of themselves</i> gives them the standard for what they -may also allow themselves. Such natures are the very opposite of the -<i>vicious</i> and the <i>unbridled;</i> although under certain circumstances -they may perpetrate deeds for which an inferior man would be convicted -of vice and intemperance.</p> - -<p>In this respect the concept, "<i>all men are equal before God</i>" does -an extraordinary amount of harm; actions and attitudes of mind were -forbidden which belonged to the prerogative of the strong alone, just -as if they were in themselves unworthy of man. All the tendencies of -strong men were brought into disrepute by the fact that the defensive -weapons of the most weak (even of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> those who were weakest towards -themselves) were established as a standard of valuation.</p> - -<p>The confusion went so far that precisely the great <i>virtuosos</i> of life -(whose self-control presents the sharpest contrast to the vicious and -the unbridled) were branded with the most opprobrious names. Even to -this day people feel themselves compelled to disparage a Cæsar Borgia: -it is simply ludicrous. The Church has anathematised German Kaisers -owing to their vices: as if a monk or a priest had the right to say -a word as to what a Frederick II. should allow himself. Don Juan is -sent to hell: this is very <i>naïf.</i> Has anybody ever noticed that all -interesting men are lacking in heaven? ... This is only a hint to the -girls, as to where they may best find salvation. If one think at all -logically, and also have a profound insight into that which makes a -great man, there, can be no doubt at all that the Church has dispatched -all "great men" to Hades—its fight is <i>against</i> all "greatness in man."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">872.</p> - -<p>The rights which a man arrogates to himself are relative to the duties -which he sets himself, and to the tasks which he feels <i>capable of -performing.</i> The great majority of men have no right to life, and are -only a misfortune to their higher fellows.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">873.</p> - -<p><i>The misunderstanding of egoism:</i> on the part of <i>ignoble natures</i> who -know nothing of the lust of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> conquest and the insatiability of great -love, and who likewise know nothing of the overflowing feelings of -power which make a man wish to overcome things, to force them over to -himself, and to lay them on his heart, the power which impels an artist -to his material. It often happens also that the active spirit looks -for a field for its activity. In ordinary "egoism" it is precisely the -... "non-ego," the <i>profoundly mediocre creature,</i> the member of the -herd, who wishes to maintain himself—and when this is perceived by the -rarer, more subtle, and less mediocre natures, it revolts them. For the -judgment of the latter is this: "We are the <i>noble</i>! It is much more -important to maintain <i>us</i> than <i>that</i> cattle!"</p> - - -<p class="parnum">874.</p> - -<p><i>The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes</i> has been the -cause of all the great disorders in history! Without the Roman Cæsars -and Roman society, Christianity would never have prevailed.</p> - -<p>When it occurs to inferior men to doubt whether higher men exist, then -the danger is great I It is then that men finally discover that there -are virtues even among inferior, suppressed, and poor-spirited men, -and that everybody is equal before God: which is the <i>non plus ultra</i> -of all confounded nonsense that has ever appeared on earth! For in the -end higher men begin to measure themselves according to the standard -of virtues upheld by the slaves—and discover that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> they are "proud," -etc., and that all their <i>higher</i> qualities should be condemned.</p> - -<p>When Nero and Caracalla stood at the helm, it was then that the paradox -arose: "The lowest man is of more value than that one on the throne!" -And thus the path was prepared for an <i>image of God</i> which was as -remote as possible from the image of the mightiest,—God on the Cross!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">875.</p> - -<p><i>Higher man and gregarious man.</i>—When great men are <i>wanting,</i> the -great of the past are converted into demigods or whole gods: the rise -of religions proves that mankind no longer has any pleasure in man -("nor in woman neither," as in Hamlet's case). Or a host of men are -brought together in a heap, and it is hoped that as a Parliament they -will operate just as tyrannically.</p> - -<p>Tyrannising is the distinctive quality of great men; they make inferior -men stupid.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">876.</p> - -<p>Buckle affords the best example of the extent to which a plebeian -agitator of the mob is incapable of arriving at a clear idea of -the concept, "higher nature." The opinion which he <i>combats</i> so -passionately—that "great men," individuals, princes, statesmen, -geniuses, warriors, are the levers and <i>causes</i> of all great movements, -is instinctively misunderstood by him, as if it meant that all that was -essential and valuable in such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> a "higher man," was the fact that he -was capable of setting masses in motion; in short, that his sole merit -was the effect he produced.... But the "higher nature" of the great man -resides precisely in being different, in being unable to communicate -with others, in the loftiness of his rank—<i>not</i> in any sort of effect -he may produce even though this be the shattering of both hemispheres.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">877.</p> - -<p>The Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification. -We ought to desire the anarchical collapse of the whole of our -civilisation if such a reward were to be its result. Napoleon made -nationalism possible: that is the latter's excuse.</p> - -<p>The value of a man (apart, of course, from morality and immorality: -because with these concepts a man's <i>worth</i> is not even skimmed) does -not lie in his utility; because he would continue to exist even if -there were nobody to whom he could be useful. And why could not that -man be the very pinnacle of manhood who was the source of the worst -possible effects for his race: so high and so superior, that in his -presence everything would go to rack and ruin from envy?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">878.</p> - -<p>To appraise the value of a man according to his <i>utility</i> to mankind, -or according to what he costs it, or the <i>damage</i> he is able to inflict -upon it,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> is just as good and just as bad as to appraise the value -of a work of art according to its <i>effects.</i> But in this way the -value of one man compared with another is not even touched upon. The -"moral valuation," in so far as it is <i>social</i> measures men altogether -according to their effects. But what about the man who has his own -taste on his tongue, who is surrounded and concealed by his isolation, -uncommunicative and not to be communicated with; a man whom no one has -fathomed yet—that is to say, a creature of a higher, and, at any rate, -<i>different</i> species, how would ye appraise his worth, seeing that ye -cannot know him and can compare him with nothing?</p> - -<p><i>Moral valuation</i> was the cause of the most enormous obtuseness -of judgment: the value of a man in himself is <i>underrated,</i> -well-nigh <i>overlooked,</i> practically <i>denied.</i> This is the remains of -simple-minded teleology: the value of man <i>can only be measured with -regard to other men.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">879.</p> - -<p><i>To be obsessed by moral considerations</i> presupposes a very low -grade of intellect: it shows that the instinct for special rights, -for standing apart, the feeling of freedom in creative natures, in -"children of God" (or of the devil), is lacking. And irrespective of -whether <i>he</i> preaches a ruling morality or <i>criticises</i> the prevailing -ethical code from the point of view of his own ideal: by doing these -things a man shows that he belongs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> to the herd—even though he may be -what it is most in need of—that is to say, a "shepherd."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">880.</p> - -<p>We should substitute morality by the will to our own ends, and -<i>consequently</i> to the means to them.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">881.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the order of rank.</i>—What is it that constitutes the -<i>mediocrity</i> of the typical man? That he does not understand that -things necessarily have <i>their other side;</i> that he combats evil -conditions as if they could be dispensed with, that he will not take -the one with the other; that he would fain obliterate and erase the -<i>specific character of a thing,</i> of a circumstance, of an age, and -of a person, by calling only a portion of their qualities good, and -suppressing the remainder. The "desirability" of the mediocre is that -which we others combat: their <i>ideal</i> is something which shall no -longer contain anything harmful, evil, dangerous, questionable, and -destructive. We recognise the reverse of this: that with every growth -of man his other side must grow as well; that the highest man, if -such a concept be allowed, would be that man who would represent <i>the -antagonistic character of existence</i> most strikingly, and would be its -glory and its only justification.... Ordinary men may only represent -a small corner and nook of this natural character; they perish the -moment the multifariousness of the elements composing them, and the -tension between their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> antagonistic traits, increases: but this is the -prerequisite for greatness in man. That man should become better and at -the same time more evil, is my formula for this inevitable fact.</p> - -<p>The majority of people are only piecemeal and fragmentary examples -of man: only when all these creatures are jumbled together does one -whole man arise Whole ages and whole peoples in this sense, have a -fragmentary character about them; it may perhaps be part of the economy -of human development that man should develop himself only piecemeal. -But, for this reason, one should not forget that the only important -consideration is the rise of the synthetic man; that inferior men, and -by far the great majority of people, are but rehearsals and exercises -out of which here and there a whole man may arise; a man who is a -human milestone, and who indicates how far mankind has advanced up to -a certain point. Mankind does not advance in a straight line,—often -a type is attained which is again lost (for instance, with all the -efforts of three hundred years, we have not reached the men of the -Renaissance again, and in addition to this we must not forget that the -man of the Renaissance was already behind his brother of classical -antiquity).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">882.</p> - -<p>The superiority of the Greek and the man of the Renaissance is -recognised, but people would like to produce them without the -conditions and causes of which they were the result.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">883.</p> - -<p><i>"Purification of taste"</i> can only be the result of the <i>strengthening</i> -of the type. Our society to-day represents only the cultivating -systems, the cultivated man is <i>lacking.</i> The great <i>synthetic man,</i> in -whom the various forces for attaining a purpose are correctly harnessed -together, is altogether wanting. The specimen we possess is the -<i>multifarious</i> man, the most interesting form of chaos that has ever -existed: but <i>not</i> the chaos <i>preceding</i> the creation of the world, but -that following it: <i>Goethe</i> as the most beautiful expression of the -type (<i>completely and utterly un-Olympian</i>!)<a name="FNanchor_3_14" id="FNanchor_3_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_14" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_14" id="Footnote_3_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_14"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The Germans always call Goethe the Olympian.—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">884.</p> - -<p>Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, and Bismarck, are characteristic of the -<i>strong German type.</i> They lived with equanimity, surrounded by -contrasts. They were full of that agile kind of strength which -cautiously avoids convictions and doctrines, by using the one as a -weapon against the other, and reserving absolute freedom for themselves.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">885.</p> - -<p>Of this I am convinced, that if the rise of great and rare men had -been made dependent upon the voices of the multitude (taking for -granted, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> course, that the latter knew the qualities which belong -to greatness, and also the price that all greatness pays for its -self-development), then there would never have been any such thing as a -great man!</p> - -<p>The fact that things pursue their course <i>independently</i> of the voice -of the many, is the reason why, a few astonishing things have taken -place on earth.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">886.</p> - -<p class="center"><i>The Order of Rank in Human Values.</i></p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> A man should not be valued according to isolated acts. <i>Epidermal -actions.</i> Nothing is more rare than a <i>personal</i> act. Class, rank, -race, environment, accident—all these things are much more likely to -be expressed in an action or deed than the "personality" of the doer.</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> We should on no account jump to the conclusion that there are -many people who are personalities. Some men are but conglomerations -of personalities, whilst the majority are not even <i>one.</i> In all -cases in which those average qualities preponderate, which ensure -the maintenance of the species, to be a personality would involve -unnecessary expense, it would be a luxury in fact, it would be -foolish to demand of anybody that he should be a personality. In such -circumstances everybody is a channel or a transmitting vessel.</p> - -<p><i>(c)</i> A "personality" is a relatively <i>isolated</i> phenomenon; in view of -the superior importance of the continuation of the race at an average -level, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> personality might even be regarded as something <i>hostile to -nature.</i> For a personality to be possible, timely isolation and the -necessity for an existence of offence and defence, are prerequisites; -something in the nature of a walled enclosure, a capacity for shutting -out the world; but above all, a much <i>lower degree of sensitiveness</i> -than the average man has, who is too easily infected with the views of -others.</p> - -<p>The first <i>question</i> concerning the <i>order of rank:</i> how far is a man -disposed to be <i>solitary</i> or <i>gregarious?</i> (in the latter case, his -value consists in those qualities which secure the survival of his -tribe or his type; in the former case, his qualities are those which -distinguish him from others, which isolate and defend him, and make his -<i>solitude possible</i>).</p> - -<p><i>Consequence:</i> the solitary type should not be valued from the -standpoint of the gregarious type, or <i>vice versâ.</i></p> - -<p>Viewed from above, both types are necessary; as is likewise their -antagonism,—and nothing is <i>more</i> thoroughly reprehensible than -the "desire" which would develop a <i>third</i> thing out of the two -("virtue" as hermaphroditism). This is as little worthy of desire as -the equalisation and reconciliation of the sexes. The <i>distinguishing -qualities must be developed ever more and more,</i> the gulf must <i>be made -ever wider....</i></p> - -<p>The concept of <i>degeneration</i> in both cases: the approximation of -the qualities of the herd to those of solitary creatures: and <i>vice -versâ</i>—in short, when they begin to <i>resemble</i> each other. This -concept of degeneration is beyond the sphere of moral judgments.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">887.</p> - -<p>Where the <i>strongest natures</i> are to be sought. The ruin and -degeneration of the <i>solitary</i> species is much greater and more -terrible: they have the instincts of the herd, and the tradition of -values, against them; their weapons of defence, their instincts of -self-preservation, are from the beginning insufficiently strong and -reliable—fortune must be peculiarly favourable to them if they are <i>to -prosper</i> (they prosper best in the lowest ranks and dregs of society; -if ye are seeking <i>personalities</i> it is there that ye will find them -with much greater certainty than in the middle classes!)</p> - -<p>When the dispute between ranks and classes, which aims at equality of -rights, is almost settled, the fight will begin against the <i>solitary -person.</i> (In a certain sense <i>the latter can maintain and develop -himself most easily in a democratic society:</i> there where the coarser -means of defence are no longer necessary, and a certain habit of -order, honesty, justice, trust, is already a general condition.) The -<i>strongest</i> must be most tightly bound, most strictly watched, laid -in chains and supervised: this is the instinct of the herd. To them -belongs a régime of self-mastery, of ascetic detachment, of "duties" -consisting in exhausting work, in which one can no longer call one's -soul one's own.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">888.</p> - -<p>I am attempting an <i>economic</i> justification of virtue. The object is to -make man as useful as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> possible, and to make him approximate as nearly -as one can to an infallible machine: to this end he must be equipped -with <i>machine-like virtues</i> (he must learn to value those states in -which he works in a most mechanically useful way, as the highest of -all: to this end it is necessary to make him as disgusted as possible -with the other states, and to represent them as very dangerous and -despicable).</p> - -<p>Here is the first stumbling-block: the tediousness and monotony -which all mechanical activity brings with it. To learn to endure -<i>this</i>—and not only to endure it, but to see tedium enveloped in a -ray of exceeding charm: this hitherto has been the task of all higher -schools. To learn something which you don't care a fig about, and to -find precisely your "duty" in this "objective" activity; to learn to -value happiness and duty as things apart; this is the invaluable task -and performance of higher schools. It is on this account that the -philologist has, hitherto, been the educator <i>per se:</i> because his -activity, in itself, affords the best pattern of magnificent monotony -in action; under his banner youths learn to "swat": first prerequisite -for the thorough fulfilment of mechanical duties in the future (as -State officials, husbands, slaves of the desk, newspaper readers, -and soldiers). Such an existence may perhaps require a philosophical -glorification and justification more than any other: pleasurable -feelings must be valued by some sort of infallible tribunal, as -altogether of inferior rank; "duty <i>per se</i>" perhaps even the pathos -of reverence in regard to everything unpleasant,—must be demanded -imperatively as that which is above all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> useful, delightful, and -practical things.... A mechanical form of existence regarded as the -highest and most respectable form of existence, worshipping itself -(type: Kant as the fanatic of the formal concept "Thou shalt").</p> - - -<p class="parnum">889.</p> - -<p>The economic valuation of all the ideals that have existed -hitherto—that is to say, the selection and rearing of definite -passions and states at the cost of other passions and states. The -lawgiver (or the instinct of the community) selects a number of states -and passions the existence of which guarantees the performance of -regular actions (mechanical actions would thus be the result of the -regular requirements of those passions and states).</p> - -<p>In the event of these states and passions containing ingredients -which were painful, a means would have to be found for overcoming -this painfulness by means of a valuation; pain would have to be -interpreted as something valuable, as something pleasurable in a higher -sense. Conceived in a formula: "<i>How does something unpleasant become -pleasant?</i>" For instance, when our obedience and our submission to the -law become honoured, thanks to the energy, power, and self-control -they entail. The same holds good of our public spirit, of our -neighbourliness, of our patriotism, our "humanisation," our "altruism," -and our "heroism." The <i>object of all idealism</i> should, be to induce -people to do unpleasant things cheerfully.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">890.</p> - -<p>The <i>belittlement</i> of man must be held as the chief aim for a long -while: because what is needed in the first place is a broad basis from -which a stronger species of man may arise (to what extent hitherto has -<i>every stronger</i> species of man arisen from a <i>substratum of inferior -people?</i>).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">891.</p> - -<p>The absurd and contemptible form of idealism which would not have -mediocrity mediocre, and which instead of feeling triumphant at being -exceptional, becomes <i>indignant</i> at cowardice, falseness, pettiness, -and wretchedness. <i>We should not wish things to be any different,</i> we -should make the gulfs even <i>wider</i>!—The higher types among men should -be compelled to distinguish themselves by means of the sacrifices which -they make to their own existence.</p> - -<p><i>Principal point of view; distances</i> must be established, but <i>no -contrasts must be created.</i> The <i>middle classes</i> must be dissolved, and -their influence decreased: this is the principal means of maintaining -distances.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">892.</p> - -<p>Who would dare to disgust the mediocre of their mediocrity! As -you observe, I do precisely the reverse: every step away from -mediocrity—thus do I teach—leads to <i>immorality.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">893.</p> - -<p>To hate mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher: it is almost a note of -interrogation to his "<i>right</i> to philosophy." It is precisely because -he is the exception that he must protect the rule and ingratiate all -mediocre people.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">894.</p> - -<p>What I combat: that an exceptional form should make war upon the -rule—instead of understanding that the continued existence of the rule -is the first condition of the value of the exception. For instance, -there are women who, instead of considering their abnormal thirst for -knowledge as a distinction, would fain dislocate the whole status of -womanhood.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">895.</p> - -<p>The <i>increase of strength</i> despite the temporary ruin of the -individual:—</p> - -<p>A new level must be established;</p> - -<p>We must have a method of storing up forces for the maintenance of small -performances, in opposition to economic waste;</p> - -<p>Destructive nature must for once be reduced to an <i>instrument</i> of this -economy of the future;</p> - -<p>The weak must be maintained, because there is an enormous mass of -<i>finicking</i> work to be done;</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span></p> - -<p>The weak and the suffering must be upheld in their belief that -existence is still possible;</p> - -<p><i>Solidarity</i> must be implanted as an instinct opposed to the instinct -of fear and servility;</p> - -<p>War must be made upon accident, even upon the accident of "the great -man."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">896.</p> - -<p>War upon <i>great</i> men justified on economic grounds. Great men are -dangerous; they are accidents, exceptions, tempests, which are strong -enough to question things which it has taken time to build and -establish. Explosive material must not only be discharged harmlessly, -but, if possible, its discharge must be <i>prevented</i> altogether, this is -the fundamental instinct of all civilised society.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">897.</p> - -<p>He who thinks over the question of how the type man may be elevated -to its highest glory and power, will realise from the start that he -must place himself beyond morality; for morality was directed in its -essentials at the opposite goal—that is to say, its aim was to arrest -and to annihilate that glorious development wherever it was in process -of accomplishment. For, as a matter of fact, development of that sort -implies that such an enormous number of men must be subservient to -it, that a <i>counter-movement</i> is only too natural: the weaker, more -delicate, more mediocre existences, find it necessary to take up sides -<i>against</i> that glory<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span> of life and power; and for that purpose they -must get a new valuation of themselves by means of which they are -able to condemn, and if possible to destroy, life in this high degree -of plenitude. Morality is therefore essentially the expression of -hostility to life, in so far as it would overcome vital types.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">898.</p> - -<p><i>The strong of the future.</i>—To what extent necessity on the one hand -and accident on the other have attained to conditions from which a -<i>stronger species</i> may be reared: this we are now able to understand -and to bring about consciously; we can now create those conditions -under which such an elevation is possible.</p> - -<p>Hitherto education has always aimed at the utility of society: <i>not</i> -the greatest possible utility for the future, but the utility of the -society actually extant. What people required were "instruments" for -this purpose. Provided the <i>wealth of forces were greater,</i> it would -be possible to think of a draft being made upon them, the aim of which -would not be the utility of society, but some future utility.</p> - -<p>The more people grasped to what extent the present form of society -was in such a state of transition as sooner or later to be <i>no longer -able to exist for its own sake,</i> but only as a means in the hands of a -stronger race, the more <i>this task would have to be brought forward.</i></p> - -<p>The increasing belittlement of man is precisely the impelling -power which leads one to think of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> the cultivation of a <i>stronger -race:</i> a race which would have a surplus precisely there where the -dwarfed species was weak and growing weaker (will, responsibility, -self-reliance, the ability to postulate aims for one's self).</p> - -<p>The means would be those which history teaches: <i>isolation</i> by means of -preservative interests which would be the reverse of those generally -accepted; exercise in transvalued valuations; distance as pathos; a -clean conscience in what to-day is most despised and most prohibited.</p> - -<p>The <i>levelling</i> of the mankind of Europe is the great process which -should not be arrested; it should even be accelerated. The necessity of -<i>cleaving gulfs,</i> of <i>distance,</i> of the <i>order of rank,</i> is therefore -imperative; but not the necessity of retarding the process above -mentioned.</p> - -<p>This <i>levelled-down</i> species requires justification as soon as it is -attained: its justification is that it exists for the service of a -higher and sovereign race which stands upon it and can only be elevated -upon its shoulders to the task which it is destined to perform. Not -only a ruling race whose task would be consummated in ruling alone: -but a race with <i>vital spheres</i> of its own, with an overflow of energy -for beauty, bravery, culture, and manners, even for the most abstract -thought; a yea-saying race which would be able to allow itself every -kind of great luxury—strong enough to be able to dispense with the -tyranny of the imperatives of virtue, rich enough to be in no need of -economy or pedantry; beyond good and evil; a forcing-house for rare and -exceptional plants.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">899.</p> - -<p>Our psychologists, whose glance dwells involuntarily upon the symptoms -of decadence, lead us to mistrust intellect ever more and more. People -persist in seeing only the weakening, pampering, and sickening effects -of intellect, but there are now going to appear:—</p> - -<table border="0" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="left">New barbarians </td><td align="left">Cynics</td><td align="left">The union of intellectual</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="left">Experimentalists </td><td align="left">superiority with well-being</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="left">Conquerors</td><td align="left">and an overflow of strength.</td></tr> -</table> - - -<p class="parnum">900.</p> - -<p>I point to something new: certainly for such a democratic community -there is a danger of barbarians; but these are sought only down below. -There is also <i>another kind of barbarians</i> who come from the heights: a -kind of conquering and ruling natures, which are in search of material -that they can mould. Prometheus was a barbarian of this stamp.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">901.</p> - -<p><i>Principal standpoint:</i> one should not suppose the mission of a higher -species to be the <i>leading</i> of inferior men (as Comte does, for -instance); but the inferior should be regarded as the <i>foundation</i> -upon which a higher species may live their higher life—upon which -alone they <i>can stand.</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> The conditions under which a <i>strong, noble</i> -species maintains itself (in the matter of intellectual discipline) are -precisely the reverse of those under which the industrial masses—the -tea-grocers <i>à la</i> Spencer—subsist. Those qualities which are within -the grasp only of the <i>strongest</i> and most <i>terrible</i> natures, and -which make their existence possible leisure, adventure, disbelief, and -even dissipation—would necessarily ruin mediocre natures —and does -do so—when they possess them. In the case of the latter industry, -regularity, moderation, and strong "conviction" are in their proper -place—in short, all "gregarious virtues": under their influence these -mediocre men become perfect.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">902.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the ruling types.</i> The shepherd as opposed to the "lord" -(the former is only a means to the maintenance of the herd; the latter, -the <i>purpose</i> for which the herd exists).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">903.</p> - -<p>The temporary preponderance of social valuations is both comprehensible -and useful; it is a matter of building a <i>foundation</i> upon which a -<i>stronger</i> species will ultimately be made possible. The standard -of strength: to be able to live under the transvalued valuations, -and to desire them for all eternity. State and society regarded as a -sub-structure: economic point of view, education conceived as breeding.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">904.</p> - -<p>A consideration which "free spirits" <i>lack</i>: that the same discipline -which makes a strong nature still stronger, and enables it to go in for -big undertakings, <i>breaks up and withers the mediocre</i>: doubt —<i>la -largeur de cœur</i>—experiment—independence.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">905.</p> - -<p>The hammer. How should men who must value in the opposite way be -constituted?—Men who possess <i>all</i> the qualities of the modern soul, -but are strong enough to convert them into real health? The means to -their task.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">906.</p> - -<p>The strong man, who is mighty in the instincts of a strong and healthy -organisation, digests his deeds just as well as he digests his meals; -he even gets over the effects of heavy fare: in the main, however, he -is led by an inviolable and severe instinct which prevents his doing -anything which goes against his grain, just as he never does anything -against his taste.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">907.</p> - -<p><i>Can</i> we <i>foresee</i> the favourable circumstances under which creatures -of the highest value might arise? It is a thousand times too -complicated, and the probabilities of failure are <i>very great:</i> on that -account we cannot be inspired by the thought of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> striving after them! -Scepticism.—To oppose this we can enhance courage, insight, hardness, -independence, and the feeling of responsibility; we can also subtilise -and learn to forestall the delicacy of the scales, so that favourable -accidents may be enlisted on our side.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">908.</p> - -<p>Before we can even think of acting, an enormous amount of work requires -to be done. In the main, however, <i>a cautious exploitation</i> of the -present conditions would be our best and most advisable course of -action. The actual <i>creation</i> of conditions such as those which occur -by accident, presupposes the existence of <i>iron</i> men such as have not -yet lived. Our first task must be to make the personal ideal <i>prevail</i> -and <i>become realised</i>! He who has understood the nature of man and <i>the -origin of mankind's greatest specimens, shudders before man and takes -flight from all action</i>: this is the result of inherited valuations!!</p> - -<p>My consolation is, that the nature of man is <i>evil,</i> and this -guarantees his <i>strength</i>!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">909.</p> - -<p><i>The typical forms of self-development, or the eight principal -questions:</i>—</p> - -<p>1. Do we want to be more multifarious or more simple than we are?</p> - -<p>2. Do we want to be happier than we are, or more indifferent to both -happiness and unhappiness?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span></p> - -<p>3. Do we want to be more satisfied with ourselves, or more exacting and -more inexorable?</p> - -<p>4. Do we want to be softer, more yielding, and more human than we are, -or more inhuman?</p> - -<p>5. Do we want to be more prudent than we are, or more daring?</p> - -<p>6. Do we want to attain a goal, or do we want to avoid all goals (like -the philosopher, for instance, who scents a boundary, a <i>cul-de-sac,</i> a -prison, a piece of foolishness in every goal)?</p> - -<p>7. Do we want to become more respected, or more feared, or more -<i>despised</i>?</p> - -<p>8. Do we want to become tyrants, and seducers, or do we want to become -shepherds and gregarious animals?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">910.</p> - -<p><i>The type of my disciples.</i>—To such men as <i>concern vie in any way</i> -I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of -all kinds. I wish them to be acquainted with profound self-contempt, -with the martyrdom of self-distrust, with the misery of the defeated: I -have no pity for them; because I wish them to have the only thing which -to-day proves whether a man has any value or not, namely, <i>the capacity -of sticking to his guns.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">911.</p> - -<p>The happiness and self-contentedness of the lazzaroni, or the -blessedness of "beautiful souls,"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> or the consumptive love of Puritan -pietists, proves nothing in regard to <i>the order of rank</i> among men. -As a great educator one ought inexorably to thrash a race of such -blissful creatures into unhappiness. The danger of belittlement and of -a slackening of powers follows immediately I am <i>opposed</i> to happiness -<i>à la</i> Spinoza or <i>à la</i> Epicurus, and to all the relaxation of -contemplative states. But when virtue is the means to such happiness, -well then, <i>one must master even virtue.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">912.</p> - -<p>I cannot see how any one can make up for having missed going to <i>a -good school</i> at the proper time. Such a person does not know himself; -he walks through life without ever having learned to walk. His soft -muscles betray themselves at every step. Occasionally life itself is -merciful enough to make a man recover this lost and severe schooling: -by means of periods of sickness, perhaps, which exact the utmost -will-power and self-control; or by means of a sudden state of poverty, -which threatens his wife and child, and which may force a man to -such activity as will restore energy to his slackened tendons, and a -<i>tough spirit</i> to his will to life. The most desirable thing of all, -however, is, under all circumstances to have severe discipline <i>at -the right time, i.e.</i> at that age when it makes us proud that people -should expect great things from us. For this is what distinguishes hard -schooling, as good schooling, from every other schooling, namely, that -a good deal is demanded, that a good<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> deal is severely exacted; that -goodness, nay even excellence itself, is required as if it were normal; -that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent; that blame is -sharp, practical, and without reprieve, and has no regard to talent and -antecedents. We are in every way in need of such a school: and this -holds good of corporeal as well as of spiritual things; it would be -fatal to draw distinctions here! The same discipline makes the soldier -and the scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there is no -true scholar who has not the instincts of a true soldier in his veins. -To be able to command and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to -keep one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready at any moment -to lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh what is permitted -and what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be more hostile to -pettiness, slyness, and parasitism than to wickedness. What is it that -one <i>learns</i> in a hard school?—<i>to obey</i> and <i>to command.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">913.</p> - -<p>We should <i>repudiate</i> merit—and do only that which stands above all -praise and above all understanding.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">914.</p> - -<p class="center">The new forms of morality:—</p> - -<p>Faithful vows concerning that which one wishes to do or to leave -undone; complete and definite abstention from many things. Tests as to -whether one is <i>ripe</i> for such discipline.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">915.</p> - -<p>It is my desire to <i>naturalise asceticism:</i> I would substitute the -old intention of asceticism, "self-denial," by my own intention, -<i>self-strengthening:</i> a gymnastic of the will; a period of abstinence -and occasional fasting of every kind, even in things intellectual; a -casuistry in deeds, in regard to the opinions which we derive from our -powers; we should try our hand at adventure and at deliberate dangers. -(<i>Dîners chez Magny:</i> all intellectual gourmets with spoilt stomachs.) -<i>Tests</i> ought also to be devised for discovering a man's power in -keeping his word.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">916.</p> - -<p>The things which have become <i>spoilt</i> through having been abused by the -Church:—</p> - -<p>(1) <i>Asceticism.</i>—People have scarcely got the courage yet to bring to -light the natural utility and necessity of asceticism for the purpose -of the <i>education of the will.</i> Our ridiculous world of education, -before whose eyes the useful State official hovers as an ideal to -be striven for, believes that it has completed its duty when it has -instructed or trained the brain; it never even suspects that something -else is first of all necessary —the education of <i>will-power;</i> tests -are devised for everything except for the most important thing of all: -whether a man can <i>will,</i> whether he can <i>promise;</i> the young man -completes his education without a question or an inquiry having been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> -made concerning the problem of the highest value of his nature.</p> - -<p>(2) <i>Fasting:</i>—In every sense—even as a means of maintaining the -capacity for taking pleasure in all good things (for instance, to give -up reading for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease from -being amiable for a while: one ought also to have fast days for one's -virtues).</p> - -<p>(3) <i>The monastery.</i>—Temporary isolation with severe seclusion from -all letters, for instance; a kind of profound introspection and -self-recovery, which does not go out of the way of "temptations," but -out of the way of "duties"; a stepping out of the daily round of one's -environment; a detachment from the tyranny of stimuli and external -influences, which condemns us to expend our power only in reactions, -and does not allow it to gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous -activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely: they only think -reflexively, <i>i.e.</i> they must first read before they can think).</p> - -<p>(4) <i>Feasts.</i>—A man must be very coarse in order not to feel the -presence of Christians and Christian values as oppressive, so -oppressive as to send all festive moods to the devil. By feasts we -understand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of all kinds of -seriousness and Philistinism; a divine saying of Yea to one's self, as -the result of physical plenitude and perfection—all states to which -the Christian cannot honestly say Yea. <i>A feast is a pagan thing par -excellence.</i></p> - -<p>(5) The <i>courage of ones own nature: dressing-up in morality,</i>—To be -able to call one's passions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> good without the help of a moral formula: -this is the standard which measures the extent to which a man is able -to say Yea to his own nature, namely, how much or how little he has to -have recourse to morality.</p> - -<p>(6) <i>Death.</i>—The foolish physiological fact must be converted into a -moral necessity. One should live in such a way that <i>one may have the -will to die at the right time</i>!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">917.</p> - -<p><i>To feel ones self stronger</i> or, expressed otherwise: happiness always -presupposes a comparison (not necessarily with others, but with one's -self, in the midst of a state of growth, and without being conscious -that one is comparing).</p> - -<p><i>Artificial</i> accentuation: whether by means of exciting chemicals or -exciting errors ("hallucinations.")</p> - -<p>Take, for instance, the Christian's feeling of <i>security</i>; he feels -himself strong in his confidence, in his patience, and his resignation: -this artificial accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is protected -by a God. Take the feeling of <i>superiority,</i> for instance: as when the -Caliph of Morocco sees only globes on which his three united kingdoms -cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling of <i>uniqueness,</i> -for instance: as when the European imagines that culture belongs to -Europe alone, and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged cosmic -process; or, as when the Christian makes all existence revolve round -the "Salvation of man."</p> - -<p>The question is, where does one begin to feel the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> pressure of -constraint: it is thus that different degrees are ascertained. A -philosopher for instance, in the midst of the coolest and most -transmontane feats of abstraction feels like a fish that enters its -element: while colours and tones oppress him; not to speak of those -dumb desires—of that which others call "the ideal."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">918.</p> - -<p>A healthy and vigorous little boy will look up sarcastically if he be -asked: "Wilt thou become virtuous?"—but he immediately becomes eager -if he be asked: "Wilt thou become stronger than thy comrades?"</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>How does one become stronger?—By deciding slowly; and by holding -firmly to the decision once it is made. Everything else follows -of itself. Spontaneous and changeable natures: both species of -the weak. We must not confound ourselves with them; we must feel -distance—betimes!</p> - -<p>Beware of good-natured people!. Dealings with them make one torpid. -All environment is good which makes one exercise those defensive and; -aggressive powers which are instinctive in man. All one's inventiveness -should apply itself to putting one's power of will to the test.... -<i>Here</i> the determining factor must be recognised as something which is -not knowledge, astuteness, or wit.</p> - -<p>One must learn to command betimes,—likewise to obey. A man must learn -modesty and tact in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to -honour where modesty is displayed; he must likewise distinguish and -honour wherever he bestows his confidence.</p> - -<p>What does one repent most? One's modesty; the fact that one has not -lent an ear to one's most individual needs; the fact that one has -mistaken one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self low; -the fact that one has lost all delicacy of hearing in regard to one's -instincts.—This want of reverence in regard to one's self is avenged -by all sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being, pride, -cheerfulness, freedom, determination, courage. A man never forgives -himself, later on, for this want of genuine egoism: he regards it as an -objection and as a cause of doubt concerning his real ego.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">919.</p> - -<p>I should like man to begin by <i>respecting</i> himself: everything else -follows of itself. Naturally a man ceases from being anything to others -in this way: for this is precisely what they are least likely to -forgive. "What? a man who respects himself?"<a name="FNanchor_4_15" id="FNanchor_4_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_15" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> This is something quite -different from the blind instinct to <i>love</i> one's self. Nothing is more -common in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> called -ego, than a certain contempt for that which is loved the fatalism of -love.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_15" id="Footnote_4_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_15"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Cf. Disraeli in <i>Tancred:</i> "Self-respect, too, is a -superstition of past ages.... It is not suited to these times; it -is much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No one is -important enough to have self-respect nowadays" (book iii. chap. -v.).—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">920.</p> - -<p>"I will have this or that"; "I would that this or that were so"; "I -know that this or that is so the degrees of power: the man of <i>will,</i> -the man of <i>desire,</i> the man of <i>fate.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">921.</p> - -<p><i>The means by which a strong species maintains itself</i>:—</p> - -<p>It grants itself the right of exceptional actions, as a test of the -power of self-control and of freedom.</p> - -<p>It abandons itself to states in which a man is not allowed to be -anything else than a barbarian.</p> - -<p>It tries to acquire strength of will by every kind of asceticism.</p> - -<p>It is not expansive, it practises silence; it is cautious in regard to -all charms.</p> - -<p>It learns to obey in such a way that obedience provides a test of -self-maintenance. Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in regard -to points of honour.</p> - -<p>It never argues, "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the -gander,"—but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay, -as a privilege, as a distinction.</p> - -<p>It does not covet <i>other</i> people's virtues.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">922.</p> - -<p>The way in which one has to treat raw savages and the impossibility of -dispensing with barbarous methods, becomes obvious, in practice, when -one is transplanted, with all one's European pampering, to a spot such -as the Congo, or anywhere else where it is necessary to maintain one's -mastery over barbarians.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">923.</p> - -<p><i>Warlike and peaceful people.</i>—Art thou a man who has the instincts of -a warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do -thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend? The rest of mankind, -all those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord, -freedom, "equal rights": these things are but names and steps for one -and the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary -for them to defend themselves,—such men become discontented with -themselves when they are obliged to offer resistance: they would fain -create circumstances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst -came to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit: all -these things are better than waging war—thus does the Christian's -instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born warrior's -character there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his -circumstances and in the development of every one of his qualities, -weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised -by the former.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span></p> - -<p>What expedients and what virtues do the unarmed and the undefended -require in order to survive—and even to conquer?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">924.</p> - -<p>What will become of a man who no longer has any reasons for either -defence or attack? What will remain of his <i>passions</i> when he has lost -those which form his defence and his weapons?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">925.</p> - -<p>A marginal note to a <i>niaiserie anglaise</i>: "Do not to others that -which you would not that they should do unto you." This stands for -wisdom; this stands for prudence; this stands as the very basis of -morality as "a golden maxim." John Stuart Mill believes in it (and what -Englishman does not?).... But the maxim does not bear investigation. -The argument, Do not as you would not be done by, forbids action -which produce harmful results; the thought behind always is that an -action is invariably requited. What if some one came forward with the -<i>"Principe"</i> in his hands, and said: "We must do those actions alone -which enable us to steal a march on others,—and which deprive others -of the power of doing the same to us"?—On the other hand, let us -remember the Corsican who pledges his honour to vendetta. He too does -not desire to have a bullet through him; but the prospect of one, the -probability of getting one, does not deter him from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> vindicating his -honour.... And in all really decent actions are we not intentionally -indifferent as to what result they will bring? To avoid an action which -might have harmful results,—that would be tantamount to forbidding all -decent actions in general.</p> - -<p>Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable because it betrays a -certain <i>type of man</i>: it is the instinct of the herd which formulates -itself through him,—we are equal, we regard each other as equal: as -I am to thee so art thou to me.—In this community equivalence of -actions is really believed in—an equivalence which never under any -circumstances manifests itself in real conditions. It is impossible -to requite every action: among real individuals equal actions do not -exist, consequently there can be no such thing as "requital." ... When -I do anything, I am very far from thinking that any man is able to do -anything at all like it: the action belongs to me.... Nobody can pay -me back for anything I do; the most that can be done is to make me the -victim of another action.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">926.</p> - -<p><i>Against John Stuart Mill.</i>—I abhor the man's vulgarity when he says: -"What is right for one man is right for another"; "Do not to others -that which you would not that they should do unto you. Such principles -would fain establish the whole of human traffic <i>upon mutual services,</i> -so that every action would appear to be a cash payment for something -done to us. The hypothesis<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> here is ignoble to the last degree: it -is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value -between my actions and thine; the most personal value Of an action is -simply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no -equivalent and which cannot be remunerated). "Reciprocity" is a piece -of egregious vulgarity; the mere fact that what I do <i>cannot</i> and <i>may</i> -not be done by another, that there is <i>no such thing as equivalence</i> -(except in those <i>very select circles</i> where one actually has one's -equal, <i>inter pares</i>), that in a really profound sense a man never -requites because he is something <i>unique</i> in himself and can only do -<i>unique</i> things,—this fundamental conviction contains the cause of -<i>aristocratic aloofness from the mob</i>, because the latter believes in -equality, and <i>consequently</i> in the feasibility of equivalence and -"reciprocity."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">927.</p> - -<p>The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations and of its concepts -"useful" and "harmful" is well founded; it is the necessary point of -view of a community which is only able to see and survey <i>immediate -and proximate</i> consequences. The <i>State</i> and the <i>political man</i> are -already in need of a more <i>super-moral</i> attitude of mind: because -they have to calculate concerning a much more complicated tissue -of consequences. An economic policy for the whole world should be -possible which could look at things in such broad perspective that all -its isolated demands would seem for the moment not only unjust, but -arbitrary.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">928.</p> - -<p>"<i>Should one follow one's feelings?</i>"—To set one's life at stake on -the impulse of the moment, and actuated by a generous feeling, has -little worth, and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is alike in -being capable of this—and in behaving in this way with determination, -the criminal, the bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the -honest man.</p> - -<p>A higher degree of excellence would be to overcome this impulse, and to -refrain from performing an heroic deed at its bidding—and to remain -cold, <i>raisonnable</i>, free from the tempestuous surging of concomitant -sensations of delight.... The same holds good of pity: it must first be -<i>sifted through</i> reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous as -any other passion.</p> - -<p>The <i>blind yielding</i> to a passion, whether it be generosity, pity, or -hostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character -does not consist in not possessing these passions—on the contrary, a -man should possess them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them -by the bridle.. and even this he should not do out of love of control, -but merely because....</p> - - -<p class="parnum">929.</p> - -<p>"To give up one's life for a cause"—very effective. But there are many -things for which one gives up one's life: the passions, one and all, -will be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to pity, to anger, -or to revenge—it matters not from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> the point of view of value. How -many have not sacrificed their lives for pretty girls—and even what -is worse, their health! When one has temperament, one instinctively -chooses the most dangerous things: if one is a philosopher, for -instance, one chooses the adventures of speculation; if one is -virtuous, one chooses immorality. One kind of man will risk nothing, -another kind will risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On the -contrary, what we seek is life raised to a higher power, life in -danger.... But, let me repeat, we do not, on that account, wish to -be more virtuous than others, Pascal, for instance, wished to risk -nothing, and remained a Christian. That perhaps was virtuous.——A man -always sacrifices something.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">930.</p> - -<p>How many <i>advantages</i> does not a man sacrifice! To how small an extent -does he seek his own profit! All his emotions and passions wish to -assert their rights, and how remote a passion is From that cautious -utility which consists in personal profit!</p> - -<p>A man does <i>not</i> strive after "happiness"; one must be an Englishman to -be able to believe that a man is always seeking his own advantage. Our -desires long to violate things with passion—their overflowing strength -seeks obstacles.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">931.</p> - -<p>All passions are generally <i>useful,</i> some directly, others indirectly; -in regard to utility it is absolutely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> impossible to fix upon any -gradation of values,—however certainly the forces of nature in general -may be regarded as good (<i>i.e.</i> useful), from an economic point of -view, they are still the sources of much that is terrible and much -that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might say would be, that -the mightiest passions are the most valuable: seeing that no stronger -sources of power exist.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">932.</p> - -<p>All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes of mind have <i>not</i> -come to be honoured on account of their usefulness: but because they -are the conditions peculiar to <i>rich souls</i> who are able to bestow -and whose value consists in their vital exuberance. Look into the -eyes of the benevolent man! In them you will see the exact reverse of -self-denial, of hatred of self, of Pascalism.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">933.</p> - -<p><i>In short,</i> what we require is to dominate the passions and not to -weaken or to extirpate them!—The greater the dominating power of the -will, the greater the freedom that may be given to the passions.</p> - -<p>The "great man" is so, owing to the free scope which he gives to his -desires, and to the still greater power which knows how to enlist these -magnificent monsters into its service.</p> - -<p>The "good man" in every stage of civilisation is at one and the same -time the <i>least dangerous</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> and the <i>most useful:</i> a sort of medium; -the idea formed of such a man by the common mind is that he is some -one <i>whom one has no reason to fear, but whom one must not therefore -despise.</i></p> - -<p>Education: essentially a means of <i>ruining</i> exceptions in favour of the -rule. Culture: essentially the means of directing taste against the -exceptions in favour of the mediocre.</p> - -<p>Only when a culture can dispose of an overflow of force, is it capable -of being a hothouse for the luxurious culture of the exception, of the -experiment, of the danger, of the <i>nuance: this</i> is the tendency of -<i>every</i> aristocratic culture.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">934.</p> - -<p>All questions of strength: to what extent ought one to try and -prevail against the preservative measures of society and the latter's -prejudices?—to what extent ought one to unfetter <i>one's terrible -qualities,</i> through which so many go to the dogs?—to what extent -ought one to run counter to <i>truth,</i> and take up sides with its most -questionable aspects?—to what extent ought one to oppose suffering, -self-contempt, pity, disease, vice, when it is always open to question -whether one can ever master them (what does not kill us makes us -<i>stronger...</i>.)?—and, finally, to what extent ought one to acknowledge -the rights of the rule, of the common-place, of the petty, of the good, -of the upright, in fact of the average man, without thereby allowing -one's self to become vulgar? ... The strongest test of character is to -resist being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> ruined by the seductiveness of goodness. <i>Goodness</i> must -be regarded as a luxury, as a refinement, as a <i>vice.</i></p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">3. The Noble Man.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">935.</p> - -<p><i>Type.</i> real goodness, nobility, greatness of soul, as the result of -vital wealth: which does not give in order to receive—and which has no -desire to <i>elevate</i> itself by being good, <i>squandering</i> is typical of -genuine goodness, vital <i>personal</i> wealth is its prerequisite.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">936.</p> - -<p><i>Aristocracy.</i>—Gregarious ideals at present culminating in the highest -standard of value for society. It has been attempted to give them a -cosmic, yea, and even a metaphysical, value.—I defend <i>aristocracy</i> -against them.</p> - -<p>Any society which would of itself preserve a feeling of respect -and <i>délicatesse</i> in regard to freedom, must consider itself as an -exception, and have a force against it from which it distinguishes -itself, and upon which it looks down with hostility.</p> - -<p>The more rights I surrender and the more I level myself down to others, -the more deeply do I sink into the average and ultimately into the -greatest number. The first condition which an aristocratic society -must have in order to maintain a high degree of freedom among its -members, is that extreme tension which arises from the presence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> of -the most <i>antagonistic</i> instincts in all its units: from their will to -dominate....</p> - -<p>If ye would fain do away with strong contrasts and differences of rank, -ye will also abolish, strong love, lofty attitudes of mind, and the -feeling of individuality.</p> - -<p class="center">***</p> - -<p>Concerning the <i>actual</i> psychology of societies based upon freedom and -equality.—What is it that tends to <i>diminish</i> in such a society?</p> - -<p>The will to be <i>responsible for ones self</i> (the loss of this is a sign -of the decline of autonomy); the ability to defend and to attack, even -in spiritual matters; the power of command; the sense of reverence, -of subservience, the ability to be silent, <i>great passion,</i> great -achievements, tragedy and cheerfulness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">937.</p> - -<p>In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what Montlosier had said in his work, <i>De -la Monarchie française:</i> he answered with a cry of indignation, and set -himself to his task. That emigrant had said:</p> - -<p>"<i>Race d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrachés de nos mains, peuple -tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous fut octroyée d'être libres, -et non pas à nous d'être nobles; pour nous tout est de droit, pour -vous tout est de grâce, nous ne sommes point de votre communauté; nous -sommes un tout par nous mêmes.</i>"</p> - - -<p class="parnum">938.</p> - -<p>How constantly the aristocratic world shears and weakens itself ever -more and more! By<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> means of its noble instincts it abandons its -privileges, and owing to its refined and excessive culture, it takes -an interest in the people, the weak, the poor, and the poetry of the -lowly, etc.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">939.</p> - -<p>There is such a thing as a noble and dangerous form of carelessness, -which allows of profound conclusions and insight: the carelessness -of the self-reliant and over-rich soul, which has never <i>troubled</i> -itself about friends, but which knows only hospitality and knows -how to practise it; whose heart and house are open to all who will -enter—beggar, cripple, or king. This is genuine sociability: he who is -capable of it has hundreds of "friends," but probably not one friend.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">940.</p> - -<p>The teaching μηδὲν ἄγαν applies to men with overflowing -strength,—not to the mediocre, ἐγκράτεια and ἄσκησις are only -steps to higher things. Above them stands "golden Nature."</p> - -<p><i>"Thou shalt"</i>—unconditional obedience in Stoics, in Christian and -Arabian Orders, in Kant's philosophy (it is immaterial whether this -obedience is shown to a superior or to a concept).</p> - -<p>Higher than "Thou shalt" stands "I will" (the heroes); higher than "I -will" stands "I am" (the gods of the Greeks).</p> - -<p>Barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure of restraint,—they are -neither simple, nor light-hearted, nor moderate.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">941.</p> - -<p>The essence of our gardens and palaces (and to the same extent the -essence of all yearning after riches) is <i>the desire to rid the eye of -disorder and vulgarity, and to build a home for our soul's nobility.</i></p> - -<p>The majority of people certainly believe that they will develop higher -natures when those beautiful and peaceful things have operated upon -them: hence the exodus to Italy, hence all travelling, etc., and all -reading and visits to theatres. <i>People want to be formed</i>—that is the -kernel of their labours for culture! But the strong, the mighty, would -themselves <i>have a hand in the forming, and would fain have nothing -strange about them</i>!</p> - -<p>It is for this reason, too, that men go to open Nature, not to find -themselves, but to lose themselves and to forget themselves. The desire -"<i>to get away from one's self</i>" is proper to all weaklings, and to all -those who are discontented with themselves.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">942.</p> - -<p>The only nobility is that of birth and blood. (I do not refer here to -the prefix "Lord" and <i>L'almanac de Gotha</i>: this is a parenthesis for -donkeys.) Wherever people speak of the "aristocracy of intellect," -reasons are generally not lacking for concealing something, it is -known to be a password among ambitious Jews. Intellect alone does -not ennoble; on the contrary, something is always needed <i>to ennoble -intellect.</i>—What then is needed?—Blood.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">943.</p> - -<p class="center">What is noble?</p> - -<p>—External punctiliousness; because this punctiliousness hedges a man -about, keeps him at a distance, saves him from being confounded with -somebody else.</p> - -<p>A frivolous appearance in word, clothing, and bearing, with which -stoical hardness and self-control protect themselves from all prying -inquisitiveness or curiosity.</p> - -<p>—A slow step and a slow glance. There are not too many valuable things -on earth: and these come and wish to come of themselves to him who has -value. We are not quick to admire.</p> - -<p>—We know how to bear poverty, want, and even illness.</p> - -<p>—We avoid small honours owing to our mistrust of all who are -over-ready to praise: for the man who praises believes he understands -what he praises: but to understand—Balzac, that typical man of -ambition, betrayed the fact <i>comprendre c'est égaler.</i></p> - -<p>—Our doubt concerning the communicativeness of our hearts goes very -deep; to us, loneliness is not a matter of choice, it is imposed upon -us.</p> - -<p>—We are convinced that we only have duties to our equals, to others we -do as we think best: we know that justice is only to be expected among -equals (alas! this will not be realised for some time to come),</p> - -<p>—We are ironical towards the "gifted"; we hold the belief that no -morality is possible without good birth.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span></p> - -<p>—We always feel as if we were those who had to dispense honours: while -he is not found too frequently who would be worthy of honouring us.</p> - -<p>—We are always disguised: the higher a man's nature the more is he -in need of remaining incognito. If there be a God, then out of sheer -decency He ought only to show Himself on earth in the form of a man.</p> - -<p>—We are capable of <i>otium,</i> of the unconditional conviction that -although a handicraft does not shame one in any sense, it certainly -reduces one's rank. However much we may respect "industry," and know -how to give it its due, we do not appreciate it in a bourgeois sense, -or after the manner of those insatiable and cackling artists who, like -hens, cackle and lay eggs, and cackle again.</p> - -<p>—We protect artists and poets and any one who happens to be a master -in something; but as creatures of a higher order than those, who only -know how to do something, who are only "productive men," we do not -confound ourselves with them.</p> - -<p>—We find joy in all <i>forms</i> and ceremonies; we would fain foster -everything formal, and we are convinced that courtesy is one of the -greatest virtues; we feel suspicious of every kind of <i>laisser aller,</i> -including the freedom of the press and of thought; because, under such -conditions, the intellect grows easy-going and coarse, and stretches -its limbs.</p> - -<p>—We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate, -and more ethereal kind of creature. What a treat it is to meet -creatures<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> who have only dancing and nonsense and finery in their -minds! They have always been the delight of every tense and profound -male soul, whose life is burdened with heavy responsibilities.</p> - -<p>—We take pleasure in princes and in priests, because in big things, as -in small, they actually uphold the belief in the difference of human -values, even in the estimation of the past, and at least symbolically.</p> - -<p>—We are able to keep silence <i>i</i> but we do not breathe a word of this -in the presence of listeners.</p> - -<p>—We are able to endure long enmities: we lack the power of easy -reconciliations.</p> - -<p>—We have a loathing of demagogism, of enlightenment, of amiability, -and plebeian familiarity.</p> - -<p>—We collect precious things, the needs of higher and fastidious souls; -we wish to possess nothing in common. We want to have our own books, -our <i>own</i> landscapes.</p> - -<p>—We protest against evil and fine experiences, and take care not to -generalise too quickly. The individual case: how ironically we regard -it when it has the bad taste to put on the airs of a rule!</p> - -<p>—We love that which is <i>naïf,</i> and <i>naïf</i> people, but as spectators -and higher creatures; we think Faust is just as simple as his Margaret.</p> - -<p>—We have a low estimation of good people, because they are gregarious -animals: we know how often an invaluable golden drop of goodness -lies concealed beneath the most evil, the most malicious, and the -hardest exterior, and that this single grain outweighs all the mere -goody-goodiness of milk-and-watery souls.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span></p> - -<p>—We don't regard a man of our kind as refuted by his vices, nor by his -tomfooleries. We are well aware that we are not recognised with ease, -and that we have every reason to make our foreground very prominent.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">944.</p> - -<p><i>What is noble?</i>—The fact that one is constantly forced to be playing -a part. That one is constantly searching for situations in which one -is forced to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the <i>greatest -number:</i> the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, of virtue, -of comfort, and of Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness, <i>à la</i> Spencer. -That one instinctively seeks for heavy responsibilities. That one knows -how to create enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That -one contradicts the <i>greatest number,</i> not in words at all, but by -continually behaving differently from them.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">945.</p> - -<p>Virtue (for instance, truthfulness) is <i>our</i> most noble and most -dangerous luxury. We must not decline the disadvantages which it brings -in its train.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">946.</p> - -<p>We refuse to be <i>praised:</i> we do what serves our purpose, what gives us -pleasure, or what we are obliged to do.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">947.</p> - -<p>What is chastity in a man? It means that his taste in sex has remained -noble; that <i>in eroticis</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> he likes neither the brutal, the morbid, nor -the clever.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">948.</p> - -<p>The concept of honour is founded upon the belief in select society, -in knightly excellences, in the obligation of having continually to -play a part. In essentials it means that one does not take one's life -too seriously, that one adheres unconditionally to the most dignified -manners in one's dealings with everybody (at least in so far as they do -not belong to "us"); that one is neither familiar, nor good-natured, -nor hearty, nor modest, except <i>inter pares</i>; that one is <i>always -playing a part.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">949.</p> - -<p>The fact that one sets one's life, one's health, and one's honour -at stake, is the result of high spirits and of an overflowing and -spendthrift will: it is not the result of philanthropy, but of the fact -that every danger kindles our curiosity concerning the measure of our -strength, and provokes our courage.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">950.</p> - -<p>Eagles swoop down straight nobility of soul is best revealed by the -magnificent and proud foolishness with which it makes its <i>attacks.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">951.</p> - -<p>War should be made against all namby-pamby ideas of <i>nobility</i>!—A -certain modicum of brutality<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> cannot be dispensed with: no more -than we can do without a certain approximation to criminality. -"Self-satisfaction" must <i>not</i> be allowed; a man should look upon -himself with an adventurous spirit; he should experiment with himself -and run risks with himself—no beautiful soul-quackery should be -tolerated. I want to give <i>a more robust ideal</i> a chance of prevailing.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">952.</p> - -<p>"Paradise is under the shadow of a swordsman"—this is also a symbol -and a test-word by which souls with noble and warrior-like origin -betray and discover themselves.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">953.</p> - -<p><i>The two paths.</i>—There comes a period when man has a surplus amount -of power at his disposal. Science aims at establishing the <i>slavery of -nature.</i></p> - -<p>Then man acquires the <i>leisure</i> in which to develop himself into -something new and more lofty. <i>A new aristocracy.</i> It is then that a -large number of virtues which are now <i>conditions of existence</i> are -superseded.—Qualities which are no longer needed are on that account -lost. We no longer need virtues: <i>consequently</i> we are losing them -(likewise the morality of "one thing is needful," of the salvation of -the soul, and of immortality: these were means wherewith to make man -capable of enormous self-tyranny, through the emotion of great fear!!!).</p> - -<p>The different kinds of needs by means of whose<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span> discipline man is -formed: need teaches work, thought, and self-control.</p> - -<p>***</p> - -<p><i>Physiological</i> purification and strengthening. The new aristocracy is -in need of an opposing body which it may combat: it must be driven to -extremities in order to maintain itself.</p> - -<p><i>The two futures of mankind</i>: (1) the consequence of a levelling-down -to mediocrity, (2) conscious aloofness and self-development.</p> - -<p>A doctrine which would cleave a <i>gulf:</i> it maintains the <i>highest and -the lowest species</i> (it destroys the intermediate).</p> - -<p>The aristocracies, both spiritual and temporal, which have existed -hitherto prove nothing <i>against</i> the necessity of a new aristocracy.</p> - - - -<p class="title">4. The Lords of the Earth.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">954.</p> - -<p>A certain question constantly recurs to us; it is perhaps a seductive -and evil question; may it be whispered into the ears of those who -have a right to such doubtful problems—those strong souls of to-day -whose dominion over themselves is unswerving: is it not high time, -now that the type "gregarious animal" is developing ever more and -more in Europe, to set about rearing, thoroughly, artificially, and -consciously, an opposite type, and to attempt to establish the latter's -virtues? And would not the democratic movement itself find for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> the -first time a sort of goal, salvation, and justification, if some one -appeared who availed himself of it—so that at last, beside its new -and sublime product, slavery (for this must be the end of European -democracy), that higher species of ruling and Cæsarian spirits might -also be produced, which would stand upon it, hold to it, and would -elevate themselves through it? This new race would climb aloft to new -and hitherto impossible things, to a broader vision, and to its task on -earth.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">955.</p> - -<p>The aspect of the European of to-day makes me very hopeful. A daring -and ruling race is here building itself up upon the foundation of -an extremely intelligent, gregarious mass. It is obvious that the -educational movements for the latter are not alone prominent nowadays.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">956.</p> - -<p>The same conditions which go to develop the gregarious animal also -force the development of the leaders.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">957.</p> - -<p>The question, and at the same time the task, is approaching with -hesitation, terrible as Fate, but nevertheless inevitable: how shall -the earth as a whole be ruled? And to what end shall man as a whole—no -longer as a people or as a race—be reared and trained?</p> - -<p>Legislative moralities are the principal means<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> by which one can form -mankind, according to the fancy of a creative and profound will: -provided, of course, that such an artistic will of the first order gets -the power into its own hands, and can make its creative will prevail -over long periods in the form of legislation, religions, and morals. -At present, and probably for some time to come, one will seek such -colossally creative men, such really great men, as I understand them, -in vain: they will be lacking, until, after many disappointments, we -are forced to begin to understand why it is they are lacking, and that -nothing bars with greater hostility their rise and development, at -present and for some time to come, than that which is now called <i>the</i> -morality in Europe. Just as if there were no other kind of morality, -and could be no other kind, than the one we have already characterised -as herd-morality. It is this morality which is now striving with -all its power to attain to that green-meadow happiness on earth, -which consists in security, absence of danger, ease, facilities for -livelihood, and, last but not least, "if all goes well," even hopes -to dispense with all kinds of shepherds and bell-wethers. The two -doctrines which it preaches most universally are "equality of rights" -and "pity for all sufferers"—and it even regards suffering itself as -something which must be got rid of absolutely. That such ideas may be -modern leads one to think very poorly of modernity. He, however, who -has reflected deeply concerning the question, how and where the plant -man has hitherto grown most vigorously, is forced to believe that this -has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span> always taken place under the opposite conditions; that to this end -the danger of the situation has to increase enormously, his inventive -faculty and dissembling powers have to fight their way up under long -oppression and compulsion, and his will to life has to be increased -to the unconditioned will to power, to over-power: he believes that -danger, severity, violence, peril in the street and in the heart, -inequality of rights, secrecy, stoicism, seductive art, and devilry of -every kind—in short, the opposite of all gregarious desiderata—are -necessary for the elevation of man. Such a morality with opposite -designs, which would rear man upwards instead of to comfort and -mediocrity; such a morality, with the intention of producing a ruling -caste—the future lords of the earth—must, in order to be taught at -all, introduce itself as if it were in some way correlated to the -prevailing moral law, and must come forward under the cover of the -latter's words and forms. But seeing that, to this end, a host of -transitionary and deceptive measures must be discovered, and that the -life of a single individual stands for almost nothing in view of the -accomplishment of such lengthy tasks and aims, the first thing that -must be done is to rear <i>a new kind</i> of man in whom the duration of -the necessary will and the necessary instincts is guaranteed for many -generations. This must be a new kind of ruling species and caste—this -ought to be quite as clear as the somewhat lengthy and not easily -expressed consequences of this thought. The aim should be to prepare -a <i>transvaluation of values</i> for a particularly strong kind of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span> man, -most highly gifted in intellect and will, and, to this end, slowly -and cautiously to liberate in him a whole host of slandered instincts -hitherto held in check: whoever meditates about this problem belongs -to us, the free spirits—certainly not to that kind of "free spirit" -which has existed hitherto: for these desired practically the reverse. -To this order, it seems to me, belong, above all, the pessimists of -Europe, the poets and thinkers of a revolted idealism, in so far as -their discontent with existence in general must <i>consistently</i> at least -have led them to be dissatisfied with the man of the present; the same -applies to certain insatiably ambitious artists who courageously and -unconditionally fight against the gregarious animal for the special -rights of higher men, and subdue all herd-instincts and precautions -of more exceptional minds by their seductive art. Thirdly and lastly, -we should include in this group all those critics and historians by -whom the discovery of the Old World, which has begun so happily—this -was the work of the <i>new</i> Columbus, of German intellect—will be -courageously <i>continued</i> (for we still stand in the very first stages -of this conquest). For in the Old World, as a matter of fact, a -different and more lordly morality ruled than that of to-day; and the -man of antiquity, under the educational ban of his morality, was a -stronger and deeper man than the man of to-day—up to the present he -has been the only well-constituted man. The temptation, however, which -from antiquity to the present day has always exercised its power on -such lucky<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span> strokes of Nature, <i>i.e.</i> on strong and enterprising souls, -is, even at the present day, the most subtle and most effective of -anti-democratic and anti-Christian powers, just as it was in the time -of the Renaissance.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">958.</p> - -<p>I am writing for a race of men which does not yet exist: for "the lords -of the earth."</p> - -<p>In Plato's <i>Theages</i> the following passage will be found: "Every one -of us would like if possible to be master of mankind; if possible, a -<i>God!" This</i> attitude of mind must be reinstated in our midst.</p> - -<p>Englishmen, Americans, and Russians.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">959.</p> - -<p>That primeval forest-plant Man always appears where the struggle for -power has been waged longest. <i>Great</i> men.</p> - -<p>Primeval forest creatures, the <i>Romans.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">960.</p> - -<p>From now henceforward there will be such favourable first conditions -for greater ruling powers as have never yet been found on earth. -And this is by no means the most important point. The establishment -has been made possible of international race unions which will set -themselves the task of rearing a ruling race, the future "lords -of the earth"—a new, vast aristocracy based upon the most severe -self-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and -artist-tyrants will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> be stamped upon thousands of years: a higher -species of men which, thanks to their preponderance of will, knowledge, -riches, and influence, will avail themselves of democratic Europe as -the most suitable and supple instrument they can have for taking the -fate of the earth into their own hands, and working as artists upon man -himself. Enough! The time is coming for us to transform all our views -on politics.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">5. The Great Man.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">961.</p> - -<p>I will endeavour to see at which periods in history great men arise. -The significance of despotic moralities that have lasted a long time: -they strain the bow, provided they do not break it.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">962.</p> - -<p>A great man,—a man whom Nature has built up and invented in a grand -style,—What is such a man? <i>First,</i> in his general course of action -his consistency is so broad that owing to its very breadth it can be -surveyed only with difficulty, and consequently misleads; he possesses -the capacity of extending his will over great stretches of his life, -and of despising and rejecting all small things, whatever most -beautiful and "divine" things of the world there may be among them. -<i>Secondly,</i> he is <i>colder, harder, less cautious and more free from -the fear of "public opinion";</i> he does not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> possess the virtues which -are compatible with respectability and with being respected, nor any -of those things which are counted among the "virtues of the herd." If -he is unable to <i>lead</i>, he walks alone; he may then perchance grunt -at many things which he meets on his way. <i>Thirdly</i>, he asks for no -"compassionate" heart, but servants, instruments; in his dealings with -men his one aim is <i>to make</i> something out of them. He knows that he -cannot reveal himself to anybody: he thinks it bad taste to become -familiar; and as a rule he is not familiar when people think he is. -When he is not talking to his soul, he wears a mask. He would rather -lie than tell the truth, because lying requires more spirit and <i>will</i>. -There is a loneliness within his heart which neither praise nor blame -can reach, because he is his own judge from whom is no appeal.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">963.</p> - -<p>The great man is necessarily a sceptic (I do not mean to say by this -that he must appear to be one), provided that greatness consists in -this: to <i>will</i> something great, together with the means thereto. -Freedom from any kind of conviction is a factor in his <i>strength -of will</i>. And thus it is in keeping with that "enlightened form of -despotism" which every great passion exercises. Such a passion enlists -intellect in its service; it even has the courage for unholy means; -it creates without hesitation; it allows itself convictions, it even -<i>uses</i> them, but it never submits<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> to them. The need of faith and -of anything unconditionally negative or affirmative is a proof of -weakness; all weakness is weakness of will. The man of faith, the -believer, is necessarily an inferior species of man. From this it -follows that "all freedom of spirit," <i>i.e.</i> instinctive scepticism, is -the prerequisite of greatness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">964.</p> - -<p>The great man is conscious of his power over a people, and of the fact -that he coincides temporarily with a people or with a century—this -<i>magnifying</i> of his self-consciousness as <i>causa</i> and <i>voluntas</i> -is <i>misunderstood</i> as "altruism": he feels driven to <i>means</i> of -communication: all great men are <i>inventive</i> in such means. They want -to form great communities in their own image; they would fain give -multiformity and disorder definite shape; it stimulates them to behold -chaos.</p> - -<p>The misunderstanding of love. There is a <i>slavish</i> love which -subordinates itself and gives itself away—which idealises and deceives -itself; there is a <i>divine</i> species of love which despises and loves at -the same time, and which <i>remodels</i> and <i>elevates</i> the thing it loves.</p> - -<p>The object is to attain that enormous <i>energy of greatness</i> which can -model the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means -of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched, and which -can yet avoid <i>going to ruin</i> at the sight of the suffering <i>created</i> -thereby, the like of which has never been seen before.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">965.</p> - -<p>The revolution, confusion, and distress of whole peoples is in my -opinion of less importance than <i>the misfortunes which attend great -individuals in their development.</i> We must not allow ourselves to be -deceived: the many misfortunes of all these small folk do not together -constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of <i>mighty</i> men.—To -think of one's self in moments of great danger, and to draw ones own -advantage from the calamities of thousands in the case of the man -who differs very much from the common ruck—may be a sign of a great -character which is able to master its feeling of pity and justice.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">966.</p> - -<p>In contradistinction to the animal, man has developed such a host -of <i>antagonistic</i> instincts and impulses in himself, that he has -become master of the earth by means of this synthesis.—Moralities -are only the expression of local and limited <i>orders of rank in</i> this -multifarious world of instincts which prevent man from perishing -through their <i>antagonism.</i> Thus a masterful instinct so weakens and -subtilises the instinct which opposes it that it becomes an <i>impulse</i> -which provides the <i>stimulus</i> for the activity of the principal -instinct.</p> - -<p>The highest man would have the greatest multifariousness in his -instincts, and he would <i>possess</i> these in the relatively strongest -degree in which he is able to endure them. As a matter of fact, -wherever the plant, man, is found strong,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> mighty instincts are to be -found opposing each other (<i>e.g.</i> Shakespeare), but they are subdued.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">967.</p> - -<p>Would one not be justified in reckoning all great men among the -<i>wicked?</i> This is not so easy to demonstrate in the case of -individuals. They are so frequently capable of masterly dissimulation -that they very often assume the airs and forms of great virtues. Often, -too, they seriously reverence virtues, and in such a way as to be -passionately hard towards themselves; but as the result of cruelty. -Seen from a distance such things are liable to deceive. Many, on the -other hand, misunderstand themselves; not infrequently, too, a great -mission will call forth great qualities, <i>e.g.</i> justice. The essential -fact is: the greatest men may also perhaps have great virtues, but then -they also have the opposites of these virtues. I believe that it is -precisely out of the presence of these opposites and of the feelings -they suscitate, that the great man arises,—for the great man is the -broad arch which spans two banks lying far apart.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">968.</p> - -<p>In <i>great men</i> we find the specific qualities of life in their highest -manifestation: injustice, falsehood, exploitation. But inasmuch as -their effect has always been <i>overwhelming,</i> their essential nature has -been most thoroughly misunderstood,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> and interpreted as goodness. The -type of such an interpreter would be Carlyle.<a name="FNanchor_5_16" id="FNanchor_5_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_16" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_16" id="Footnote_5_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_16"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> This not only refers to <i>Heroes and Hero-Worship,</i> -but doubtless to Carlyle's prodigious misunderstanding of Goethe a -misunderstanding which still requires to be put right by a critic -untainted by Puritanism.—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">969.</p> - -<p>Generally speaking, everything <i>is worth no more and no less than one -has paid for it.</i> This of course does not hold good in the case of an -isolated individual; the great capacities of the individual have no -relation whatsoever to that which he has done, sacrificed, and suffered -for them. But if one should examine the previous history of his race -one would be sure to find the record of an extraordinary storing up and -capitalising of power by means of all kinds of abstinence, struggle, -industry, and determination. It is because the great man has cost so -much, and not because he stands there as a miracle, as a gift from -heaven, or as an accident, that he became great: "Heredity" is a false -notion. A man's ancestors have always paid the price of what he is.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">970.</p> - -<p><i>The danger of modesty.</i> To adapt ourselves too early to duties, -societies, and daily schemes of work in which accident may have placed -us, at a time when neither our powers nor our aim in life has stepped -peremptorily into our consciousness;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> the premature certainty of -conscience and feeling of relief and of sociability which is acquired -by this precocious, modest attitude, and which appears to our minds -as a deliverance from those inner and outer disturbances of our -feelings—all this pampers and keeps a man down in the most dangerous -fashion imaginable. To learn to respect things which people about us -respect, as if we had no standard or right of our own to determine -values; the strain of appraising things as others appraise them, -<i>counter</i> to the whisperings of our inner taste, which also has a -conscience of its own, becomes a terribly subtle kind of constraint: -and if in the end no explosion takes place which bursts all the bonds -of love and morality at once, then such a spirit becomes withered, -dwarfed, feminine, and objective. The reverse of this is bad enough, -but still it is better than the foregoing: to suffer from one's -environment, from its praise just as much as from its blame; to be -wounded by it and to fester inwardly without betraying the fact; to -defend one's self involuntarily and suspiciously against its love; to -learn to be silent, and perchance to conceal this by talking; to create -nooks and safe, lonely hiding-places where one can go and take breath -for a moment, or shed tears of sublime comfort—until at last one has -grown strong enough to say: "What on earth have I to do with you?" and -to go <i>one's</i> way alone.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">971.</p> - -<p>Those men who are in themselves destinies, and whose advent is the -advent of fate, the whole race of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> <i>heroic</i> bearers of burdens: oh! -how heartily and gladly would they have respite from themselves for -once in a while!—how they crave after stout hearts and shoulders, that -they might free themselves, were it but for an hour or two, from that -which oppresses them! And how fruitlessly they crave! ... They wait; -they observe all that passes before their eyes: no man even cometh nigh -to them with a thousandth part of their suffering and passion, no man -guesseth to what end they have waited.... At last, at last, they learn -the first lesson of their life: to wait no longer; and forthwith they -learn their second lesson: to be affable, to be modest; and from that -time onwards to endure everybody and every kind of thing—in short, to -endure still a little more than they had endured theretofore.</p> - - -<hr /> -<p class="title">6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">972.</p> - -<p><i>The lawgivers of the future.</i>—After having tried for a long time in -vain to attach a particular meaning to the word "philosopher,"—for I -found many antagonistic traits, I recognised that we can distinguish -between two kinds of philosophers:—</p> - -<p>(1) Those who desire to establish any large system of values (logical -or moral);</p> - -<p>(2) Those who are the <i>lawgivers</i> of such valuations.</p> - -<p>The former try to seize upon the world of the present or the past, -by embodying or abbreviating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> the multifarious phenomena by means of -signs: their object is to make it possible for us to survey, to reflect -upon, to comprehend, and to utilise everything that has happened -hitherto—they serve the purpose of man by using all past things to the -benefit of his future.</p> - -<p>The second class, however, are <i>commanders;</i> they say: "Thus shall it -be!" They alone determine the "whither" and the "wherefore," and that -which will be useful and beneficial to man; they have command over the -previous work of scientific men, and all knowledge is to them only -a means to their creations. This second kind of philosopher seldom -appears; and as a matter of fact their situation and their danger is -appalling. How often have they not intentionally blindfolded their -eyes in order to shut out the sight of the small strip of ground which -separates them from the abyss and from utter destruction. Plato, for -instance, when he persuaded himself that "the good," as he wanted it, -was not Plato's good, but "the good in itself," the eternal treasure -which a certain man of the name of Plato had chanced to find on his -way! This same will to blindness prevails in a much coarser form in the -case of the founders of religion; their "Thou shalt" must on no account -sound to their ears like "I will,"—they only dare to pursue their task -as if under the command of God; their legislation of values can only be -a burden they can bear if they regard it as "revelation," in this way -their conscience is not crushed by the responsibility.</p> - -<p>As soon as those two comforting expedients—<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span>that of Plato and that of -Muhammed—have been overthrown, and no thinker can any longer relieve -his conscience with the hypothesis "God" or "eternal values," the -claim of the lawgiver to determine new values rises to an awfulness -which has not yet been experienced. Now those elect, on whom the -faint light of such a duty is beginning to dawn, try and see whether -they cannot escape it—as their greatest danger—by means of a timely -side-spring: for instance, they try to persuade themselves that their -task is already accomplished, or that it defies accomplishment, or that -their shoulders are not broad enough for such burdens, or that they -are already taken up with burdens closer to hand, or even that this -new and remote duty is a temptation and a seduction, drawing them away -from all other duties; a disease, a kind of madness. Many, as a matter -of fact, do succeed in evading the path appointed to them: throughout -the whole of history we can see the traces of such deserters and their -guilty consciences. In most cases,, however, there comes to such men -of destiny that hour of delivery, that autumnal season of maturity, in -which they are forced to do that which they did not even "wish to do": -and that deed before which in the past they have trembled most, falls -easily and unsought from the tree, as an involuntary deed, almost as a -present.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">973.</p> - -<p><i>The human horizon.</i>—Philosophers may be conceived as men who make -the greatest efforts to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> <i>discover</i> to what extent man can <i>elevate</i> -himself—this holds good more particularly of Plato: how far man's -<i>power</i> can extend. But they do this as individuals; perhaps the -instinct of Cæsars and of all founders of states, etc., was greater, -for it preoccupied itself with the question how far man could be urged -forward in <i>development</i> under "favourable circumstances." What they -did not sufficiently understand, however, was the nature of favourable -circumstances. The great question: "Where has the plant 'man' grown -most magnificently heretofore? In order to answer this, a comparative -study of history is necessary.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">974.</p> - -<p>Every fact and every work exercises a fresh persuasion over every age -and every new species of man. History always enunciates new truths.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">975.</p> - -<p>To remain objective, severe, firm, and hard while making a thought -prevail is perhaps the best forte of artists; but if for this purpose -any one have to work upon human material (as teachers, statesmen, -have to do, etc.), then the repose, the coldness, and the hardness -soon vanish. In natures like Cæsar and Napoleon we are able to divine -something of the nature of "disinterestedness" in their work on their -marble, whatever be the number of men that are sacrificed in the -process. In this direction the future of higher men lies: to bear the -greatest responsibilities and not to go to rack and ruin<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span> through -them.—Hitherto the deceptions of inspiration have almost always been -necessary for a man not to lose faith in his own hand, and in his right -to his task.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">976.</p> - -<p>The reason why philosophers are mostly failures. Because among the -conditions which determine them there are qualities which generally -ruin other men:—</p> - -<p>(1) A philosopher must have an enormous multiplicity of qualities; he -must be a sort of abbreviation of man and have all man's high and base -desires: the danger of the contrast within him, and of the possibility -of his loathing himself;</p> - -<p>(2) He must be inquisitive in an extraordinary number of ways: the -danger of versatility;</p> - -<p>(3) He must be just and honest in the highest sense, but profound both -in love and hate (and in injustice);</p> - -<p>(4) He must not only be a spectator but a lawgiver: a judge and -defendant (in so far as he is an abbreviation of the world);</p> - -<p>(5) He must be extremely multiform and yet firm and hard. He must be -supple.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">977.</p> - -<p>The really <i>regal</i> calling of the philosopher (according to the -expression of Alcuin the Anglo-Saxon): "<i>Prava corrigere, et recta -corroborare, et sancta sublimare.</i>"</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">978.</p> - -<p>The new philosopher can only arise in conjunction with a ruling class, -as the highest spiritualisation of the latter. Great politics, the -rule of the earth, as a proximate contingency, the total <i>lack of -principles</i> necessary thereto.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">979.</p> - -<p>Fundamental concept: the new values must first be created—this remains -<i>our duty</i>! The philosopher must be our lawgiver. New species. (How the -greatest species hitherto [for instance, the Greeks] were reared: this -kind of accident must now be <i>consciously</i> striven for.)</p> - - -<p class="parnum">980.</p> - -<p>Supposing one thinks of the philosopher as an educator who, looking -down from his lonely elevation, is powerful enough to draw long chains -of generations up to him: then he must be granted the most terrible -privileges of a great educator. An educator never says what he himself -thinks; but only that which he thinks it is good for those whom he is -educating to hear upon any subject. This dissimulation on his part -must not be found out; it is part of his masterliness that people -should believe in his honesty, he must be capable of all the means of -discipline and education: there are some natures which he will only be -able to raise by means of lashing them with his scorn; others who are -lazy, irresolute, cowardly, and vain, he will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> be able to affect only -with exaggerated praise. Such a teacher stands beyond good and evil, -but nobody must know that he does.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">981.</p> - -<p>We must <i>not</i> make men "better," we must <i>not</i> talk to them about -morality in any form as if "morality in itself," or an ideal kind -of man in general, could be taken for granted; but we must <i>create -circumstances</i> in which <i>stronger men are necessary,</i> such as for -their part will require a morality (or, better still: a bodily and -spiritual discipline) which makes men strong, and upon which they will -consequently insist! As they will need one so badly, they will have it.</p> - -<p>We must not let ourselves be seduced by blue eyes and heaving breasts: -<i>greatness of soul has absolutely nothing romantic about it. And -unfortunately nothing whatever amiable either.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">982.</p> - -<p>From warriors we must learn: (1) to associate death with those -interests for which we are fighting—that makes us venerable; (2) we -must learn to <i>sacrifice</i> numbers, and to take our cause sufficiently -seriously not to spare men; (3) we must practise inexorable discipline, -and allow ourselves violence and cunning in war.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">983.</p> - -<p>The <i>education</i> which rears those <i>ruling</i> virtues that allow a man to -become master of his benevolence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> and his pity: the great disciplinary -virtues ("Forgive thine enemies" is mere child's play beside them), -<i>and the passions of the creator, must be elevated</i> to the heights—we -must cease from carving marble! The exceptional and powerful position -of those creatures (compared with that of all princes hitherto): the -Roman Cæsar with Christ's soul.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">984.</p> - -<p>We must not separate greatness of soul from intellectual greatness. For -the former involves <i>independence</i>; but without intellectual greatness -independence should not be allowed; all it does is to create disasters -even in its lust of well-doing and of practising "justice." Inferior -spirits <i>must</i> obey, consequently they cannot be possessed of greatness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">985.</p> - -<p>The more lofty philosophical man who is surrounded by loneliness, not -because he wishes to be alone, but because he is what he is, and cannot -find his equal: what a number of dangers and torments are reserved for -him, precisely at the present time, when we have lost our belief in -the order of rank, and consequently no longer know how to understand -or honour this isolation! Formerly the sage almost sanctified himself -in the consciences of the mob by going aside in this way; to-day -the anchorite sees himself as though enveloped in a cloud of gloomy -doubt and suspicions. And not alone by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span> envious and the wretched: -in every well-meant act that he experiences he is bound to discover -misunderstanding, neglect, and superficiality. He knows the crafty -tricks of foolish pity which makes these people feel so good and holy -when they attempt to save him from his own destiny, by giving him more -comfortable situations and more decent and reliable society. Yes, he -will even get to admire the unconscious lust of destruction with which -all mediocre spirits stand up and oppose him, believing all the while -that they have a holy right to do so! For men of such incomprehensible -loneliness it is necessary to put a good stretch of country between -them and the officiousness of their fellows: this is part of their -prudence. For such a man to maintain himself uppermost to-day amid -the dangerous maelstroms of the age which threaten to draw him under, -even cunning and disguise will be necessary. Every attempt he makes to -order his life in the present and with the present, every time he draws -near to these men and their modern desires, he will have to expiate as -if it were an actual sin: and withal he may look with wonder at the -concealed wisdom of his nature, which after every one of these attempts -immediately leads him back to himself by means of illnesses and painful -accidents.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">986.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%; margin-top: 1.5em;"> -<span style="margin-left: 20%;"><i>"Maledetto colui</i></span><br /> -<i>che contrista, un spirto immortal!"</i><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">MANZONI</span> (<i>Conte di Carmagnola,</i> Act II.) -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">987.</p> - -<p>The most difficult and the highest form which man can attain is the -most seldom successful: thus the history of philosophy reveals a -superabundance of bungled and unhappy cases of manhood, and its march -is an extremely slow one; whole centuries intervene and suppress what -has been achieved: and in this way the connecting-link is always made -to fail. It is an appalling history, this history of the highest men, -of the sages.—What is most often damaged is precisely the recollection -of great men, for the semi-successful and botched cases of mankind -misunderstand them and overcome them by their "successes." Whenever -an "effect" is noticeable, the masses gather in a crowd round it; -to hear the inferior and the poor in spirit having their say is a -terrible ear-splitting torment for him who knows and trembles at the -thought, that the fate of man depends upon the success of its highest -types. From the days of my childhood I have reflected upon the sage's -conditions of existence, and I will not conceal my happy conviction -that in Europe he has once more become possible—perhaps only for a -short time.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">988.</p> - -<p>These new philosophers begin with a description of a systematic order -of rank and difference of value among men,—what they desire is, alas -precisely the reverse of an assimilation and equalisation of man: they -teach estrangement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> in every sense, they cleave gulfs such as have -never yet existed, and they would fain have man become more evil than -he ever was. For the present they live concealed and estranged even -from each other. For many reasons they will find it necessary to be -anchorites and to wear masks—they will therefore be of little use -in the matter of seeking for their equals. They will live alone, and -probably know the torments of all the loneliest forms of loneliness. -Should they, however, thanks to any accident, meet each other on the -road, I wager that they would not know each other, or that they would -deceive each other in a number of ways.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">989.</p> - -<p>"Les philosophes ne sont pas faits pour s'aimer. Les aigles ne volent -point en compagnie. Il faut laisser cela aux perdrix, aux étourneaux -... Planer au-dessus et avoir des griffes, voila le lot des grands -génies."—<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">GALIANI.</span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">990.</p> - -<p>I forgot to say that such philosophers are cheerful, and that they -like to sit in the abyss of a perfectly clear sky: they are in need of -different means for enduring life than other men; for they suffer in -a different way (that is to say, just as much from the depth of their -contempt of man as from their love of man).—The animal which suffered -most on earth discovered for itself <i>—laughter.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">991.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the misunderstanding of "cheerfulness."</i> —It is a -temporary relief from long tension; it is the wantonness, the -Saturnalia of a spirit, which is consecrating and preparing itself for -long and terrible resolutions. The "fool" in the form of "science."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">992.</p> - -<p>The new order of rank among spirits; tragic natures no longer in the -van.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">993.</p> - -<p>It is a comfort to me to know that over the smoke and filth of human -baseness there is a <i>higher and brighter</i> mankind, which, judging from -their number, must be a small race (for everything that is in any way -distinguished is <i>ipso facto</i> rare). A man does not belong to this race -because he happens to be more gifted, more virtuous, more heroic, or -more loving than the men below, but because he is <i>colder, brighter, -more far-sighted, and more lonely;</i> because he endures, prefers, and -even insists upon, loneliness as the joy, the privilege, yea, even the -condition of existence; because he lives amid clouds and lightnings as -among his equals, and likewise among sunrays, dewdrops, snowflakes, -and all that which must needs come from the heights, and which in its -course moves ever from heaven to earth. The desire to look aloft is not -our desire.—Heroes, martyrs, geniuses, and enthusiasts of all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> kinds, -are not quiet, patient, subtle, cold, or slow enough for us.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">994.</p> - -<p>The absolute conviction that valuations above and below are different; -that innumerable experiences are wanting to the latter: that when -looking upwards from below misunderstandings are necessary.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">995.</p> - -<p>How do men attain to great power and to great tasks? All the virtues -and proficiences of the body and the soul are little by little -laboriously acquired, through great industry, self-control, and keeping -one's self within narrow bounds, through a frequent, energetic, and -genuine repetition of the same work and of the same hardships; but -there are men who are the heirs and masters of this slowly acquired -and manifold treasure of virtues and proficiences because, owing -to happy and reasonable marriages and also to lucky accidents, the -acquired and accumulated forces of many generations, instead of being -squandered and subdivided, have been assembled together by means of -steadfast struggling and willing. And thus, in the end, a man appears -who is such a monster of strength, that he craves for a monstrous -task. For it is our power which has command of us: and the wretched -intellectual play of aims and intentions and motivations lies only in -the foreground—however much weak eyes may recognise the principal -factors in these things.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">990.</p> - -<p>The sublime man has the highest value, even when he is most delicate -and fragile, because an abundance of very difficult and rare things -have been reared through many generations and united in him.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">997.</p> - -<p>I teach that there are higher and lower men, and that a single -individual may under certain circumstances justify whole millenniums of -existence —that is to say, a wealthier, more gifted, greater, and more -complete man, as compared with innumerable imperfect and fragmentary -men.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">998.</p> - -<p>Away from rulers and rid of all bonds, live the highest men: and in the -rulers they have their instruments.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">999.</p> - -<p><i>The order of rank:</i> he who <i>determines</i> values and leads the will of -millenniums, and does this by leading the highest natures—he <i>is the -highest man.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1000.</p> - -<p>I fancy I have divined some of the things that lie hidden in the soul -of the highest man; perhaps every man who has divined so much must go -to ruin: but he who has seen the highest man must do all he can to -make him <i>possible.</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> Fundamental thought: we must make the future the -standard of all our valuations—and not seek the laws for our conduct -behind us.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1001.</p> - -<p>Not "mankind," but <i>Superman</i> is the goal!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1002.</p> - -<p>"Come l'uom s'eterna...."—<i>Inf.</i> xv. 85.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4>II.</h4> - - -<h4>DIONYSUS.</h4> - - -<p class="parnum">1003.</p> - -<p>To <i>him who is one of Nature's lucky strokes,</i> to, him unto whom my -heart goes out, to him who is carved from one integral block, which is -hard, sweet, and fragrant—to him from whom even my nose can derive -some pleasure—let this book be dedicated.</p> - -<p>He enjoys that which is beneficial to him.</p> - -<p>His pleasure in anything ceases when the limits of what is beneficial -to him are overstepped.</p> - -<p>He divines the remedies for partial injuries; his illnesses are the -great stimulants of his existence.</p> - -<p>He understands how to exploit his serious accidents.</p> - -<p>He grows stronger under the misfortunes which threaten to annihilate -him.</p> - -<p>He instinctively gathers from all he sees, hears, and experiences, -the materials for what concerns him most,—he pursues a selective -principle,—he rejects a good deal.</p> - -<p>He reacts with that tardiness which long caution<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> and deliberate -<i>pride</i> have bred in him,—he tests the stimulus: whence does it come? -whither does it lead? He does not submit.</p> - -<p>He is always in his own company, whether his intercourse be with books, -with men, or with Nature.</p> - -<p>He honours anything by choosing it, by conceding to it, by trusting it.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1004.</p> - -<p>We should attain to such a height, to such a lofty eagle's ledge, in -our observation, as to be able to understand that everything happens, -<i>just as it ought to happen</i>: and that all "imperfection," and the pain -it brings, belong to all that which is most eminently desirable.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1005.</p> - -<p>Towards 1876 I experienced a fright; for I saw that everything I had -most wished for up to that time was being compromised. I realised this -when I perceived what Wagner was actually driving at: and I was bound -very fast to him—by all the bonds of a profound similarity of needs, -by gratitude, by the thought that he could not be replaced, and by the -absolute void which I saw facing me.</p> - -<p>Just about this time I believed myself to be inextricably entangled in -my philology and my professorship—in the accident and last shift of my -life: I did not know how to get out of it, and was tired, used up, and -on my last legs.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span></p> - -<p>At about the same time I realised that what my instincts most desired -to attain was precisely the reverse of what Schopenhauer's instincts -wanted—that is to say, a <i>justification of life,</i> even where it was -most terrible, most equivocal, and most false: to this end, I had the -formula "<i>Dionysian</i>" in my hand.</p> - -<p>Schopenhauer's interpretation of the "absolute" as <i>will</i> was certainly -a step towards that concept of the "absolute" which supposed it to be -necessarily good, blessed, true, and integral, but Schopenhauer did -not understand how to deify this will: he remained suspended in the -moral-Christian ideal. Indeed, he was still so very much under the -dominion of Christian values, that, once he could no longer regard -the absolute as God, he had to conceive it as evil, foolish, utterly -reprehensible. He did not realise that there is an infinite number of -ways of being different, and even of being God.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1006.</p> - -<p>Hitherto, moral values have been the highest values: does anybody doubt -this? If we bring down the values from their pedestal, we thereby -alter <i>all</i> values; the principle of their <i>order of rank</i> which has -prevailed hitherto is thus overthrown.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1007.</p> - -<p>Transvalue values—what does this mean? It implies that all spontaneous -motives, all new,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span> future, and stronger motives, are still extant; but -that they now appear under false names and false valuations, and have -not yet become conscious of themselves.</p> - -<p>We ought to have the courage to become, conscious, and to affirm all -that which has been <i>attained</i>—to get rid of the humdrum character -of old valuations, which makes us unworthy of the best and strongest -things that we have achieved.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1008.</p> - -<p>Any doctrine would be superfluous for which everything is not already -prepared in the way of accumulated forces and explosive material. A -transvaluation of values can only be accomplished when there is a -tension of new needs, and a new set of needy people who feel all old -values as painful,—although they are not conscious of what is wrong.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1009.</p> - -<p>The standpoint from which my values are determined: is abundance or -desire active? ... Is one a mere spectator, or is one's own shoulder -at the wheel—is one looking away or is one turning aside? ... Is one -acting spontaneously, as the result of accumulated strength, or is one -merely reacting to a goad or to a stimulus? ... Is one simply acting -as the result of a paucity of elements, or of such an overwhelming -dominion over a host of elements that this power enlists the latter -into its service if it requires them? ... Is one a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> <i>problem</i> one's -self or is one a <i>solution</i> already? ... Is <i>one perfect</i> through -the smallness of the task, or <i>imperfect</i> owing to the extraordinary -character of the aim? ... Is one genuine or only an <i>actor;</i> is one -genuine as an actor, or only the bad copy of an actor? is one a -representative or the creature represented? Is one a personality or -merely a rendezvous of personalities? ... Is one ill from a disease or -from surplus health? Does one lead as a shepherd, or as an "exception" -(third alternative: as a fugitive)? Is one in need of dignity, or can -one play the clown? Is one in search of resistance, or is one evading -it? Is one imperfect owing to one's precocity or to one's tardiness? Is -it one's nature to say yea, or no, or is one a peacock's tail of garish -parts? Is one proud enough not to feel ashamed even of one's vanity? Is -one still able to feel a bite of conscience (this species is becoming -rare; formerly conscience had to bite too often: it is as if it now no -longer had enough teeth to do so)? Is one still capable of a "duty"? -(there are some people who would lose the whole joy of their lives -if they were <i>deprived</i> of their duty—this holds good especially of -feminine creatures, who are born subjects).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1010.</p> - -<p>Supposing our common comprehension of the universe were a -<i>misunderstanding,</i> would it be possible to conceive of a form of -<i>perfection,</i> within the limits of which even such a <i>misunderstanding -as this</i> could be sanctioned?</p> - -<p>The concept of a <i>new</i> form of perfection: that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> which does <i>not</i> -correspond to our logic, to our "beauty," to our "good," to our -"truth," might be perfect in a <i>higher</i> sense even than our ideal is.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1011.</p> - -<p>Our most important limitation: we must not deify the unknown; we are -just beginning to know so little. The false and wasted endeavours.</p> - -<p>Our "new world": we must ascertain to what extent we are the <i>creators</i> -of our valuations—we will thus be able to put "sense" into history.</p> - -<p>This belief in truth is reaching its final logical conclusion in -us—ye know how it reads: that if there is anything at all that must -be worshipped it is <i>appearance;</i> that <i>falsehood</i> and <i>not</i> truth -is—divine.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1012.</p> - -<p>He who urges rational thought forward, thereby also drives its -antagonistic power—mysticism and foolery of every kind—to new feats -of strength.</p> - -<p>We should recognise that every movement is (1) <i>partly</i> the -manifestation of fatigue resulting from a previous movement (satiety -after it, the malice of weakness towards it, and disease); and (2) -<i>partly</i> a newly awakened accumulation of long slumbering forces, and -therefore wanton, violent, healthy.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1013.</p> - -<p>Health and morbidness: let us be careful! The standard is the bloom of -the body, the agility, courage, and cheerfulness of the mind—but also, -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> course, how much <i>morbidness a man can bear and overcome,</i>—and -convert into health. That which would send more delicate natures to the -dogs, belongs to the stimulating means of <i>great</i> health.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1014.</p> - -<p>It is only a question of power: to have all the morbid traits of the -century, but to balance them I by means of overflowing, plastic, and -rejuvenating power. The <i>strong</i> man.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1015.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the strength of the nineteenth century.—</i>We are more -mediæval than the eighteenth century; not only more inquisitive or more -susceptible to the strange and to the rare. We have revolted against -the <i>Revolution,</i> ... We have freed ourselves from the fear of reason, -which was the spectre of the eighteenth century: we once more dare to -be childish, lyrical, absurd, in a word, we are musicians. And we are -just as little frightened of the <i>ridiculous</i> as of the <i>absurd.</i> The -<i>devil</i> finds that he is tolerated even by God:<a name="FNanchor_6_17" id="FNanchor_6_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_17" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> better still, he has -become interesting as one who has been misunderstood and slandered for -ages,—we are the saviours of the devil's honour.</p> - -<p>We no longer separate the great from the terrible. We reconcile good -things, in all their complexity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> with the very <i>worst</i> things; we -have overcome the <i>desideratum</i> of the past (which wanted goodness to -grow without the increase of evil). The <i>cowardice</i> towards the ideal, -peculiar to the Renaissance, has diminished—we even dare to aspire to -the latter's morality. <i>Intolerance</i> towards priests and the Church has -at the same time come to an end; "It is immoral to believe in God"—but -this is precisely what we regard as the best possible justification of -this belief.</p> - -<p>On all these things we have conferred the civic rights of our minds. We -do not tremble before the back side of "good things" (we even look for -it, we are brave and inquisitive enough for that), of Greek antiquity, -of morality, of reason, of good taste, for instance (we reckon up -the losses which we incur with all this treasure: we almost reduce -ourselves to poverty with such a treasure). Neither do we conceal the -back side of "evil things" from ourselves.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_17" id="Footnote_6_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_17"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> This is reminiscent of Goethe's <i>Faust,</i> See "Prologue in -Heaven."—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">1016.</p> - -<p><i>That which does us honour.</i>—If anything does us honour, it is this: -we have transferred our seriousness to other things; all those things -which have been despised and laid aside as base by all ages, we regard -as important—on the other hand, we surrender "fine feelings" at a -cheap rate.</p> - -<p>Could any aberration be more dangerous than the contempt of the body? -As if all intellectuality were not thereby condemned to become morbid, -and to take refuge in the <i>vapeurs</i> of "idealism"!</p> - -<p>Nothing that has been thought out by Christians<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> and idealists holds -water: we are more radical. We have discovered the "smallest world" -everywhere as the most decisive.</p> - -<p>The paving-stones in the streets, good air in our rooms, food -understood according to its worth: we value all the <i>necessaries</i> of -life seriously, and <i>despise</i> all "beautiful soulfulness" as a form of -"levity and frivolity." That which has been most despised hitherto, is -now pressed into the front rank.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1017</p> - -<p>In the place of Rousseau's "man of Nature," the nineteenth century has -discovered a much <i>more genuine</i> image of "Man,"—it had the courage -to do this.... On the whole, the Christian concept of man has in a way -been reinstalled. What we have not had the courage to do, was to call -precisely this "man <i>par excellence</i>," good, and to see the future of -mankind guaranteed in him. In the same way, we did not dare to regard -the <i>growth in the terrible side</i> of man's character as an accompanying -feature of every advance in culture; in this sense we are still -under the influence of the Christian ideal, and side with it against -paganism, and likewise against the Renaissance concept of <i>virtù.</i> But -the key of culture is not to be found in this way: and <i>in praxi</i> we -still have the forgeries of history in favour of the "good man" (as if -he alone constituted the progress of humanity) and the <i>socialistic -ideal (i.e.</i> the <i>residue</i> of Christianity and of Rousseau in the -de-Christianised world).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>The fight against the eighteenth century:</i> it meets with its <i>greatest -conquerors</i> in <i>Goethe</i> and <i>Napoleon.</i> Schopenhauer, too, fights -against the eighteenth century; but he returns involuntarily to -the seventeenth—he is a modern Pascal, with Pascalian valuations, -<i>without</i> Christianity. Schopenhauer was not strong enough to invent a -<i>new yea.</i></p> - -<p><i>Napoleon:</i> we see the necessary relationship between the higher and -the terrible man. "Man" reinstalled, and her due of contempt and fear -restored to woman. Highest activity and health are the signs of the -great man; the straight line and grand style rediscovered in action; -the mightiest of all instincts, that of life itself,—the lust of -dominion,—heartily welcomed.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1018.</p> - -<p>(<i>Revue des deux mondes,</i> 15th February 1887. Taine concerning -Napoleon) "Suddenly the master faculty reveals itself: the <i>artist,</i> -which was latent in the politician, comes forth from his scabbard; he -creates <i>dans l'idéal et l'impossible.</i> He is once more recognised as -that which he is: the posthumous brother of Dante and of Michelangelo; -and verily, in view of the definite contours of his vision, the -intensity, the coherence, and inner consistency of his dream, the depth -of his meditations, the superhuman greatness of his conception, he is -their equal: <i>son génie a la même taille et la même structure; il est -un des trois esprits souverains de la renaissance italienne.</i>"</p> - -<p><i>Nota bene.</i> Dante, Michelangelo, Napoleon.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1019.</p> - -<p><i>Concerning the pessimism of strength.</i> In the internal economy of -<i>the primitive</i> man's soul, the <i>fear</i> of evil preponderates. What is -<i>evil!</i> Three kinds of things: accident, uncertainty, the unexpected. -How does primitive man combat evil?—He conceives it as a thing of -reason, of power, even as a person. By this means he is enabled to -make treaties with it, and generally to operate upon it in advance—to -forestall it.</p> - -<p>—Another expedient is to declare its evil and harmful character to -be but apparent: the consequences of accidental occurrences, and of -uncertainty and the unexpected, are interpreted as <i>well-meant,</i> as -reasonable.</p> - -<p>—A third means is to interpret evil, above all, as merited: evil is -thus justified as a punishment.</p> - -<p>—In short, <i>man submits to in</i> all religious and moral interpretations -are but forms of submission to evil.—The belief that a good purpose -lies behind all evil, implies the renunciation of any desire to combat -it.</p> - -<p>Now, the history of every culture shows a diminution of this <i>fear -of the accidental, of the uncertain, and of the unexpected.</i> Culture -means precisely, to learn to reckon, to discover causes, to acquire -the power of forestalling events, to acquire a belief in necessity. -With the growth of culture, man is able to dispense with that primitive -form of submission to evil (called religion or morality), and that -"justification of evil." Now he wages war against "evil,"—he gets rid -of it. Yes, a state of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> security, of belief in law and the possibility -of calculation, is possible, in which consciousness regards these -things with tedium,—in which the joy of the accidental, of the -uncertain, and of the unexpected, actually becomes a spur.</p> - -<p>Let us halt a moment before this symptom of <i>highest</i> culture, I -call it the <i>pessimism of strength.</i> Man now no longer requires a -"justification of evil"; justification is precisely what he abhors: -he enjoys evil, <i>pur, cru</i>; he regards purposeless evil as the most -interesting kind of evil. If he had required a God in the past, he now -delights in cosmic disorder without a God, a world of accident, to the -essence of which terror, ambiguity, and seductiveness belong.</p> - -<p>In a state of this sort, it is precisely <i>goodness</i> which requires -to be justified—that is to say, it must either have an evil and a -dangerous basis, or else it must contain a vast amount of stupidity: -<i>in which case it still pleases.</i> Animality no longer awakens terror -now; a very intellectual and happy wanton spirit in favour of the -animal in man, is, in such periods, the most triumphant form of -spirituality. Man is now strong enough to be able to feel ashamed of -<i>a belief in God:</i> he may now play the part of the devil's advocate -afresh. If in practice he pretends to uphold virtue, it will be for -those reasons which lead virtue to be associated with subtlety, -cunning, lust of gain, and a form of the lust of power.</p> - -<p><i>This pessimism of strength</i> also ends in a <i>theodicy, i.e.</i> in an -absolute saying of yea to the world—but the same arguments will -be raised in favour of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> life which formerly were raised against it: -and in this way, in a conception of this world <i>as the highest ideal -possible,</i> which has been effectively attained.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1020.</p> - -<p><i>The principal kinds of pessimism:—</i></p> - -<p>The pessimism of <i>sensitiveness</i> (excessive irritability with a -preponderance of the feelings of pain).</p> - -<p>The pessimism of the <i>will that is not free</i> (otherwise expressed: the -lack of resisting power against stimuli).</p> - -<p>The pessimism of <i>doubt</i> (shyness in regard to everything fixed, in -regard to all grasping and touching).</p> - -<p>The psychological conditions which belong to these different kinds of -pessimism, may all be observed in a lunatic asylum, even though they -are there found in a slightly exaggerated form. The same applies to -"Nihilism" (the penetrating feeling of nonentity).</p> - -<p>What, however, is the nature of Pascal's moral pessimism, and the -<i>metaphysical pessimism</i> of the Vedânta-Philosophy? What is the nature -of the <i>social pessimism</i> of anarchists (as of Shelley), and of the -pessimism of compassion (like that of Leo Tolstoy and of Alfred de -Vigny)?</p> - -<p>Are all these things not also the phenomena of decay and sickness?... -And is not excessive seriousness in regard to moral values, or in -regard to "other-world" fictions, or social calamities, or <i>suffering</i> -in general, of the same order? All such <i>exaggeration</i> of a single and -narrow standpoint is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> in itself a sign of sickness. The same applies to -the preponderance of a negative over an affirmative attitude!</p> - -<p><i>In this respect we must not confound with the above:</i> the joy of -saying and doing <i>no,</i> which is the result of the enormous power and -tenseness of an affirmative attitude—peculiar to all rich and mighty -men and ages. It is, as it were, a luxury, a form of courage too, -which opposes the terrible, which has sympathy with the frightful and -the questionable, because, among other things, one is terrible and -questionable: the <i>Dionysian</i> in will, intellect, and taste.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1021.</p> - -<p><i>My Five "Noes."</i></p> - -<p>(1) My fight against <i>the feeling of sin</i> and the introduction of -the notion of <i>punishment</i> into the physical and metaphysical world, -likewise into psychology and the interpretation of history. The -recognition of the fact that all philosophies and valuations hitherto -have been saturated with morality.</p> - -<p>(2) My identification and my discovery of the <i>traditional</i> ideal, -of the Christian ideal, even where the dogmatic form of Christianity -has been wrecked. The <i>danger of the Christian ideal</i> resides in its -valuations, in that which can dispense with concrete expression: my -struggle against <i>latent Christianity</i> (for instance, in music, in -Socialism).</p> - -<p>(3) My struggle against the eighteenth century of Rousseau, against -his "Nature," against his "good<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> man," his belief in the dominion of -feeling—against the pampering, weakening, and moralising of man: an -ideal born of the <i>hatred of aristocratic culture,</i> which in practice -is the dominion of unbridled feelings of resentment, and invented as a -standard for the purpose of war (the Christian morality of the feeling -of sin, as well as the morality of resentment, is an attitude of the -mob).</p> - -<p>(4) My fight against <i>Romanticism,</i> in which the ideals of Christianity -and of Rousseau converge, but which possesses at the same time a -yearning for that <i>antiquity</i> which knew of sacerdotal and aristocratic -culture, a yearning for <i>virtù,</i> and for the "strong man"—something -extremely hybrid; a false and imitated kind of <i>stronger</i> humanity, -which appreciates extreme conditions in general and sees the symptom -of strength in them ("the cult of passion"; an imitation of the -most expressive <i>forms, furore espressivo,</i> originating not out of -plenitude, but out <i>of want).</i>—(In the nineteenth century there are -some things which are born out of relative plenitude—<i>i.e.</i> out of -<i>well-being;</i> cheerful music, etc.—among poets, for instance, Stifter -and Gottfried Keller give signs of more strength and inner well-being -than—. The great strides of engineering, of inventions, of the natural -sciences and of history (?) are relative products of the strength and -self-reliance of the nineteenth century.)</p> - -<p>(5) My struggle against the <i>predominance of gregarious instincts,</i> now -science makes common cause with them; against the profound hate with -which every kind of order of rank and of aloofness is treated.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1022.</p> - -<p>From the pressure of plenitude, from the tension of forces that are -continually increasing within us and which cannot yet discharge -themselves, a condition is produced which is very similar to that which -precedes a storm: we—like Nature's sky—become overcast. I hat, too, -is "pessimism.".. A teaching which puts an end to such a condition by -the fact that it <i>commands</i> something: a transvaluation of values by -means of which the accumulated forces are given a channel, a direction, -so that they explode into deeds and flashes of lightning-does not -in the least require to be a hedonistic teaching: in so far as it -<i>releases strength</i> which was compressed to an agonising degree, it -brings happiness.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1023.</p> - -<p><i>Pleasure</i> appears with the feeling of power.</p> - -<p><i>Happiness</i> means that the consciousness of power and triumph has begun -to prevail.</p> - -<p><i>Progress</i> is the strengthening of the type, the ability to exercise -great will-power, everything else is a misunderstanding and a danger.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1024.</p> - -<p>There comes a time when the old masquerade and moral togging-up of the -passions provokes repugnance: <i>naked Nature;</i> when the <i>quanta</i> of -<i>power</i> are recognised as <i>decidedly</i> simple (as <i>determining rank</i>); -when <i>grand style</i> appears again as the result of great passion.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1025.</p> - -<p>The purpose of culture <i>would have</i> us enlist everything terrible, -step by step and experimentally, into its service; but before it is -<i>strong enough</i> for this it must combat, moderate, mask, and even curse -everything terrible.</p> - -<p>Wherever a culture points to anything as evil, it betrays its <i>fear</i> -and therefore weakness.</p> - -<p><i>Thesis:</i> everything good is the evil of yore which has been rendered -serviceable. <i>Standard:</i> the more terrible and the greater the passions -may be which an age, a people, and an individual are at liberty to -possess, because they are able to use them as <i>a means, the higher is -their culture:</i> the more mediocre, weak, submissive, and cowardly a man -may be, the more things he will regard as <i>evil:</i> according to him the -kingdom of evil is the largest. The lowest man will see the kingdom of -evil (<i>i.e.</i> that which is forbidden him and which is hostile to him) -everywhere.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1026.</p> - -<p>It is not a fact that "happiness follows virtue"—but it is the mighty -man who first <i>declares his happy state to be virtue.</i></p> - -<p>Evil actions belong to the mighty and the virtuous: bad and base -actions belong to the subjected.</p> - -<p>The mightiest man, the creator, would have to be the most evil, -inasmuch as he makes his ideal prevail over all men in <i>opposition</i> to -their ideals, and remoulds them according to his own image.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span></p> - -<p>Evil, in this respect, means hard, painful, enforced.</p> - -<p>Such men as Napoleon must always return and always settle our belief -in the self-glory of the individual afresh: he himself, however, was -corrupted by the means he had to stoop to, and had <i>lost noblesse</i> -of character. If he had had to prevail among another kind of men, he -could have availed himself of other means; and thus it would not seem -<i>necessary</i> that a Cæsar <i>must become bad.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1027.</p> - -<p>Man is a combination of the <i>beast</i> and the <i>super-beast</i>; higher -man a combination of the monster and the superman:<a name="FNanchor_7_18" id="FNanchor_7_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_18" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> these opposites -belong to each other. With every degree of a man's growth towards -greatness and loftiness, he also grows downwards into the depths and -into the terrible: we should not desire the one without the other;—or, -better still: the more fundamentally we desire the one, the more -completely we shall achieve the other.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_18" id="Footnote_7_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_18"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The play on the German words: "Unthier" and "Überthier," -"Unmensch" and "Übermensch," is unfortunately not translatable.—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">1028.</p> - -<p>Terribleness belongs to greatness: let us not deceive ourselves.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1029.</p> - -<p>I have taught the knowledge of such terrible things, that all -"Epicurean contentment" is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> impossible concerning them. Dionysian -pleasure is the only <i>adequate</i> kind here: <i>I was the first to discover -the tragic.</i> Thanks to their superficiality in ethics, the Greeks -misunderstood it. Resignation is not the lesson of tragedy, but only -the misunderstanding of it! The yearning for nonentity is the <i>denial</i> -of tragic wisdom, its opposite!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1030.</p> - -<p>A rich and powerful soul not only gets over painful and even terrible -losses, deprivations, robberies, and insults: it actually leaves such -dark infernos in possession of still greater plenitude and power; -and, what is most important of all, in possession of an increased -blissfulness in love. I believe that he who has divined something of -the most fundamental conditions of love, will understand Dante for -having written over the door of his Inferno: "I also am the creation of -eternal love."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1031.</p> - -<p>To have travelled over the whole circumference of the modern soul, -and to have sat in all its corners—my ambition, my torment, and my -happiness.</p> - -<p>Veritably to have <i>overcome</i> pessimism, and, as the result thereof, to -have acquired the eyes of a Goethe—full of love and goodwill.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1032.</p> - -<p>The first question is by no means whether we are satisfied with -ourselves; but whether we are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span> satisfied with anything at all. Granting -that we should say yea to any single moment, we have then affirmed -not only ourselves, but the whole of existence. For nothing stands by -itself, either in us or in other things: and if our soul has vibrated -and rung with happiness, like a chord, once only and only once, then -all eternity was necessary in order to bring about that one event,—and -all eternity, in this single moment of our affirmation, was called -good, was saved, justified, and blessed.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1033.</p> - -<p>The passions which <i>say yea.</i> I ride, happiness, health, the love of -the sexes, hostility and war, reverence, beautiful attitudes, manners, -strong will, the discipline of lofty spirituality, the will to power, -and gratitude to the Earth and to Life: all that is rich, that would -fain bestow, and that refreshes, gilds, immortalises, and deifies -Life—the whole power of the virtues that <i>glorify</i>—all declaring -things good, saying yea, and doing yea.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1034.</p> - -<p>We, many or few, who once more dare to live in a world <i>purged of -morality</i>, we <i>pagans</i> in faith, we are probably also the first who -understand what a <i>pagan faith</i> is: to be obliged to imagine higher -creatures than man, but to imagine them <i>beyond</i> good and evil; to be -compelled to value all higher existence as <i>immoral</i> existence. We -believe in Olympus, and <i>not</i> in the "man on the cross."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1035.</p> - -<p>The more modern man has exercised his idealising power in regard to a -<i>God</i> mostly by <i>moralising the latter</i> ever more and more—what does -that mean?—nothing good, a diminution in man's strength.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, the reverse would be possible: and indications -of this are not wanting. God imagined as emancipation from morality, -comprising the whole of the abundant assembly of Life's contrasts, and -<i>saving</i> and <i>justifying</i> them in a divine agony. God as the beyond, -the superior elevation, to the wretched <i>cul-de-sac</i> morality of "Good -and Evil."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1036.</p> - -<p>A humanitarian God cannot be <i>demonstrated</i> from the world that -is known to us: so much are ye driven and forced to conclude -to-day. But what conclusion do ye draw from this? "He cannot be -demonstrated to <i>us</i>": the scepticism of knowledge. You all <i>fear</i> -the conclusion: "From the world that is known to us quite a different -God would be <i>demonstrable,</i> such a one as would certainly not be -humanitarian"—and, in a word, you cling fast to your God, and invent a -world for Him which <i>is unknown to us.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1037.</p> - -<p>Let us banish the highest good from our concept of God: it is unworthy -of a God. Let us<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span> likewise banish the highest wisdom: it is the vanity -of philosophers who have perpetrated the absurdity of a God who is a -monster of wisdom: the idea was to make Him as like them as possible. -No! God <i>as the highest power</i>—that is sufficient!—Everything -follows from that, even—"the world"!</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1038</p> - -<p>And how many new Gods are not still possible! I, myself, in whom the -religious—that is to say, the god-<i>creating</i> instinct occasionally -becomes active at the most inappropriate moments: how very differently -the divine has revealed itself every time to me! ... So many strange -things have passed before me in those timeless moments, which fall into -a man's life as if they came from the moon, and in which he absolutely -no longer knows how old he is or how young he still may be! ... I would -not doubt that there are several kinds of gods.... Some are not wanting -which one could not possibly imagine without a certain halcyonic calm -and levity.... Light feet perhaps belong to the concept "God". Is it -necessary to explain that a <i>God</i> knows how to hold Himself preferably -outside all Philistine and rationalist circles? also (between -ourselves) beyond good and evil? His outlook is a <i>free</i> one—as Goethe -would say.—And to invoke the authority of Zarathustra, which cannot be -too highly appreciated in this regard: Zarathustra goes as far as to -confess, "I would only believe in a God who knew how to <i>dance</i> ..."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span></p> - -<p>Again I say: how many new Gods are not still possible! Certainly -Zarathustra himself is merely an old atheist: he believes neither in -old nor in new gods. Zarathustra says, <i>"he would"</i>—but Zarathustra -will not.... Take care to understand him well.</p> - -<p>The type God conceived according to the type of creative spirits, of -"great men."</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1039.</p> - -<p>And how many new <i>ideals</i> are not, at bottom, still possible? Here is -a little ideal that I seize upon every five weeks, while upon a wild -and lonely walk, in the azure moment of a blasphemous joy. To spend -one's life amid delicate and absurd things; a stranger to reality, -half-artist, half-bird, half-metaphysician; without a yea or a nay for -reality, save that from time to time one acknowledges it, after the -manner of a good dancer, with the tips of one's toes; always tickled -by some happy ray of sunlight; relieved and encouraged even by sorrow -—for sorrow <i>preserves</i> the happy man; fixing a little tail of jokes -even to the most holy thing: this, as is clear, is the ideal of a heavy -spirit, a ton in weight <i>of the spirit of gravity.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1040.</p> - -<p><i>From the military-school of the soul.</i> (Dedicated to the brave, the -good-humoured, and the abstinent.)</p> - -<p>I should not like to undervalue the amiable virtues; but greatness -of soul is not compatible with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> them. Even in the arts, grand style -excludes all merely pleasing qualities.</p> - -<p>***</p> - -<p>In times of painful tension and vulnerability, choose war. War hardens -and develops muscle.</p> - -<p>***</p> - -<p>Those who have been deeply wounded have the Olympian laughter; a man -only has what he needs.</p> - -<p>***</p> - -<p>It has now already lasted ten years: no sound any longer <i>reaches</i> -me—a land without rain. A man must have a vast amount of humanity at -his disposal in order not to pine away in such drought.<a name="FNanchor_8_19" id="FNanchor_8_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_19" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_19" id="Footnote_8_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_19"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> For the benefit of those readers who are not acquainted -with the circumstances of Nietzsche's life, it would be as well to -point out that this is a purely personal plaint, comprehensible enough -in the mouth of one who, like Nietzsche, was for years a lonely -anchorite.—Tr.</p></div> - - -<p class="parnum">1041.</p> - -<p><i>My new road to an affirmative attitude.</i>—Philosophy, as I have -understood it and lived it up to the present, is the voluntary quest -of the repulsive and atrocious aspects of existence. From the long -experience derived from such wandering over ice and desert, I learnt -to regard quite differently everything that had been philosophised -hitherto: the <i>concealed</i> history of philosophy, the psychology of its -great names came into the light for me. "How much truth can a spirit -<i>endure</i>; for how much truth is it <i>daring</i> enough?"—this for me -was the real<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> measure of value. Error is a piece of <i>cowardice</i> ... -every victory on the part of knowledge, is the <i>result</i> of courage, of -hardness towards one's self, of cleanliness towards one's self.... The -kind of <i>experimental philosophy</i> which I am living, even anticipates -the possibility of the most fundamental Nihilism, on principle: but -by this I do not mean that it remains standing at a negation, at a -<i>no,</i> or at a will to negation. It would rather attain to the very -reverse—to a <i>Dionysian affirmation</i> of the world, as it is, without -subtraction, exception, or choice—it would have eternal circular -motion: the same things, the same reasoning, and the same illogical -concatenation. The highest state to which a philosopher can attain: to -maintain a Dionysian attitude to Life—my formula for this is <i>amor -fati.</i></p> - -<p>To this end we must not only consider those aspects of life which -have been denied hitherto, as: <i>necessary,</i> but as desirable, and not -only desirable to those aspects which have been affirmed hitherto (as -complements or first prerequisites, so to speak), but for their own -sake, as the more powerful, more terrible, and more <i>veritable</i> aspects -of life, in which the latter's will expresses itself most clearly.</p> - -<p>To this end, we must also value that aspect of existence which alone -has been affirmed until now; we must understand whence this valuation -arises, and to how slight an extent it has to do with a Dionysian -valuation of Life: I selected and understood that which in this respect -says "yea" (on the one hand, the instinct of the sufferer; on the -other, the gregarious instinct; and thirdly, the <i>instinct of the -greater number</i> against the exceptions).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span></p> - -<p>Thus I divined to what extent a stronger kind of man must necessarily -imagine—the elevation and enhancement of man in another direction: -<i>higher creatures,</i> beyond good and evil, beyond those values which -bear the stamp of their origin in the sphere of suffering, of the herd, -and of the greater number—I searched for the data of this topsy-turvy -formation of ideals in history (the concepts "pagan," "classical," -"noble," have been discovered afresh and brought forward).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1042.</p> - -<p>We should demonstrate to what extent the religion of the Greeks was -<i>higher</i> than Judæo-Christianity. The latter triumphed because the -Greek religion was degenerate (and decadent).</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1043.</p> - -<p>It is not surprising that a couple of centuries have been necessary in -order to link up again—a couple of centuries are very little indeed.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1044.</p> - -<p>There must be some people who sanctify functions, not only eating and -drinking, and not only in memory of them, or in harmony with them; but -this world must be for ever glorified anew, and in a novel fashion.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1045.</p> - -<p>The most intellectual men feel the ecstasy and charm of <i>sensual</i> -things in a way which other men<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span> —those with "fleshy hearts"—cannot -possibly imagine, and ought not to be able to imagine: they are -sensualists with the best possible faith, because they grant the senses -a more fundamental value than that fine sieve, that thinning and -mincing machine, or whatever it is called, which in the language of the -people is termed <i>"spirit"</i> The strength and power of the senses—this -is the most essential thing in a sound man who is one of Nature's lucky -strokes: the splendid beast must first be there—otherwise what is the -value of all "humanisation"?</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1046.</p> - -<p>(1) We want to hold fast to our senses, and to the belief in them—and -accept their logical conclusions! The hostility to the senses in the -philosophy that has been written up to the present, has been man's -greatest feat of nonsense.</p> - -<p>(2) The world now extant, on which all earthly and living things have -so built themselves, that it now appears as it does (enduring and -proceeding slowly), we would fain <i>continue building</i>—not criticise it -away as false!</p> - -<p>(3) Our valuations help in the process of building; they emphasise and -accentuate. What does it mean when whole religions say: "Everything is -bad and false and evil"? This condemnation of the whole process can -only be the judgment of the failures!</p> - -<p>(4) True, the failures might be the greatest sufferers and therefore -the most subtle! The contented might be worth little!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span></p> - -<p>(5) We must understand the fundamental <i>artistic</i> phenomenon which is -called "Life,"—<i>the formative</i> spirit, which constructs under the most -unfavourable circumstances: and in the slowest manner possible——The -<i>proof</i> of all its combinations must first be given afresh: <i>it -maintains itself.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1047.</p> - -<p>Sexuality, lust of dominion, the pleasure derived from appearance -and deception, great and joyful gratitude to Life and its typical -conditions—these things are essential to all paganism, and it has -a good conscience on its side.—<i>That which is hostile to Nature</i> -(already in Greek antiquity) combats paganism in the form of morality -and dialectics.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1040.</p> - -<p>An anti-metaphysical view of the world—yes, but an artistic one.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1049.</p> - -<p><i>Apollo's</i> misapprehension: the eternity of beautiful forms, the -aristocratic prescription, "<i>Thus shall it ever be!</i>"</p> - -<p><i>Dionysus</i>. Sensuality and cruelty. The perishable nature of existence -might be interpreted as the joy of procreative and destructive force, -as <i>unremitting creation.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1050.</p> - -<p>The word "<i>Dionysian</i>" expresses: a constraint to unity, a soaring -above personality, the common-place,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span> society, reality, and above -the abyss of the <i>ephemeral</i>, the passionately painful sensation of -superabundance, in darker, fuller, and more fluctuating conditions; -an ecstatic saying of yea to the collective character of existence, -as that which remains the same, and equally mighty and blissful -throughout all change, the great pantheistic sympathy with pleasure -and pain, which declares even the most terrible and most questionable -qualities of existence good, and sanctifies them; the eternal will to -procreation, to fruitfulness, and to recurrence; the feeling of unity -in regard to the necessity of creating and annihilating.</p> - -<p>The word "<i>Apollonian</i>" expresses: the constraint to be absolutely -isolated, to the typical "individual," to everything that simplifies, -distinguishes, and makes strong, salient, definite, and typical to -freedom within the law.</p> - -<p>The further development of art is just as necessarily bound up with the -antagonism of these two natural art-forces, as the further development -of mankind is bound up with the antagonism of the sexes. The plenitude -of power and restraint, the highest form of self-affirmation in a cool, -noble, and reserved kind of beauty: the Apollonianism of the Hellenic -will.</p> - -<p>This antagonism of the Dionysian and of the Apollonian in the Greek -soul, is one of the great riddles which made me feel drawn to the -essence of Hellenism. At bottom, I troubled about nothing save the -solution of the question, why precisely Greek Apollonianism should have -been forced to grow out of a Dionysian soil: the Dionysian Greek<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span> had -need of being Apollonian; that is to say in order to break his will to -the titanic, to the complex, to the uncertain, to the horrible by a -will to measure, to simplicity, and to submission to rule and concept. -Extravagance, wildness, and Asiatic tendencies lie at the root of the -Greeks. Their courage consists in their struggle with their Asiatic -nature: they were not given beauty, any more than they were given Logic -and moral! naturalness: in them these things are victories, they are -willed and fought for—they constitute the <i>triumph</i> of the Greeks.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1051.</p> - -<p>It is clear that only the rarest and most lucky cases of humanity -can attain to the highest and most sublime human joys in which Life -celebrates its own glorification; and this only happens when these -rare creatures themselves and their forbears have lived a long -preparatory life leading to this goal, without, however, having done -so consciously. It is then that an overflowing wealth of multifarious -forces and the most agile power of "free will" and lordly command -exist together in perfect concord in one man; then the intellect is -just as much at ease, or at home, in the senses as the senses are at -ease or at home in it; and everything that takes place in the latter -must give rise to extraordinarily subtle joys in the former. And <i>vice -versâ:</i> just think of this <i>vice versâ</i> for a moment in a man like -Hafiz; even Goethe, though to a lesser degree, gives some idea of this -process. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span> is probable that, in such perfect and well-constituted -men, the most sensual functions are finally transfigured by a symbolic -elatedness of the highest intellectuality; in themselves they feel a -kind of <i>deification of the body</i> and are most remote from the ascetic -philosophy of the principle "God is a Spirit": from this principle it -is clear that the ascetic is the "botched man" who declares only that -to be good and "God" which is absolute, and which judges and condemns.</p> - -<p>From that height of joy in which man feels himself completely and -utterly a deified form and self-justification of nature, down to the -joy of healthy peasants and healthy semi-human beasts, the whole of -this long and enormous gradation of the light and colour of <i>happiness</i> -was called by the Greek—not without that grateful quivering of one -who is initiated into secret, not without much caution and pious -silence—by the godlike name: <i>Dionysus.</i> What then <i>do</i> all modern -men—the children of a crumbling, multifarious, sick and strange age -<i>know</i> of the <i>compass</i> of Greek happiness, how <i>could</i> they know -anything about it! Whence would the slaves of "modern ideas" derive -their right to Dionysian feasts!</p> - -<p>When the Greek body and soul were in full "bloom," and not, as it were, -in states of morbid exaltation and madness, there arose the secret -symbol of the loftiest affirmation and transfiguration of life and the -world that has ever existed. There we have a <i>standard</i> beside which -everything that has grown since must seem too short, too poor, too -narrow: if we but pronounce the word<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> "Dionysus" in the presence of -the best of more recent names and things, in the presence of Goethe, -for instance, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare, or Raphael, in a trice we -realise that our best things and moments are <i>condemned.</i> Dionysus -is a <i>judge!</i> Am I understood? There can be no doubt that the Greeks -sought to interpret, by means of their Dionysian experiences, the -final mysteries of the "destiny of the soul" and everything they knew -concerning the education and the purification of man, and above all -concerning the absolute hierarchy and inequality of value between man -and man. There is the deepest experience of all Greeks, which they -conceal beneath great silence,—<i>we do not know the Greeks</i> so long -as this hidden and sub-terranean access to them remains obstructed. -The indiscreet eyes of scholars will never perceive anything in these -things, however much learned energy may still have to be expended in -the service of this excavation—; even the noble zeal of such friends -of antiquity as Goethe and Winckelmann, seems to savour somewhat of -bad form and of arrogance, precisely in this respect. To wait and to -prepare oneself; to await the appearance of new sources of knowledge; -to prepare oneself in solitude for the sight of new faces and the -sound of new voices; to cleanse one's soul ever more and more of the -dust and noise, as of a country fair, which is peculiar to this age; -to <i>overcome</i> everything Christian by something super-Christian, -and not only to rid oneself of it,—for the Christian doctrine is -the counter-doctrine to the Dionysian; to rediscover the <i>South</i> -in oneself, and to stretch a clear, glittering, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span> mysterious -southern sky above one; to reconquer the southern healthiness and -concealed power of the soul, once more for oneself; to increase the -compass of one's soul step by step, and to become more supernational, -more European, more super-European, more Oriental, and finally more -<i>Hellenic</i>—for Hellenism was, as a matter of fact, the first great -union and synthesis of everything Oriental, and precisely on that -account, the <i>beginning</i> of the European soul, the discovery of <i>our -"new</i> world":—he who lives under such imperatives, who knows what he -may not encounter some day? Possibly—a <i>new dawn!</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1052.</p> - -<p><i>The two types; Dionysus and Christ on the Cross.</i> We should ascertain -whether the typically <i>religious</i> man is a decadent phenomenon (the -great innovators are one and all morbid and epileptic); but do not let -us forget to include that type of the religious man who is <i>pagan.</i> Is -the pagan cult not a form of gratitude for, and affirmation of, Life? -Ought not its most representative type to be an apology and deification -of Life? The type of a well-constituted and ecstatically overflowing -spirit! The type of a spirit which absorbs the contradictions and -problems of existence, and which <i>solves</i> them!</p> - -<p>At this point I set up the <i>Dionysus</i> of the Greeks: the religious -affirmation of Life, of the whole of Life, not of denied and partial -Life (it is typical that in this cult the sexual act awakens ideas of -depth, mystery, and reverence).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span></p> - -<p>Dionysus <i>versus</i> "Christ"; here you have the contrast. It is <i>not</i> -a difference in regard to the martyrdom,—but the latter has a -different meaning. Life itself—Life s eternal fruitfulness and -recurrence caused anguish, destruction, and the will to annihilation. -In the other case, the suffering of the "Christ as the Innocent One" -stands as an objection against Life, it is the formula of Life's -condemnation.—Readers will guess that the problem concerns the meaning -of suffering; whether a Christian or a tragic meaning be given to it. -In the first case it is the road to a holy mode of existence; in the -second case <i>existence itself is regarded as sufficiently holy</i> to -justify an enormous amount of suffering. The tragic man says yea even -to the most excruciating suffering: he is sufficiently strong, rich, -and capable of deifying, to be able to do this; the Christian denies -even the happy lots on earth: he is weak, poor, and disinherited enough -to suffer from life in any form. God on the Cross is a curse upon Life, -a signpost directing people to deliver themselves from it;—Dionysus -cut into pieces is a <i>promise</i> of Life: it will be for ever born anew, -and rise afresh from destruction.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4>III.</h4> - - -<h4>ETERNAL RECURRENCE.</h4> - - -<p class="parnum">1053.</p> - -<p>My philosophy reveals the triumphant thought through which all other -systems of thought must ultimately perish. It is the great disciplinary -thought: those races that cannot bear it are doomed; those which regard -it as the greatest blessing are destined to rule.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1054.</p> - -<p>The <i>greatest</i> of all fights: for this purpose a new <i>weapon</i> is -required.</p> - -<p>A hammer: a terrible alternative must be created. Europe must be -brought face to face with the logic of facts, and confronted with the -question whether its will for ruin is really earnest.</p> - -<p>General levelling down to mediocrity must be avoided. Rather than this -it would be preferable to perish.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1055.</p> - -<p>A pessimistic attitude of mind and a pessimistic doctrine and ecstatic -Nihilism, may in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span> certain circumstances even prove indispensable to the -philosopher—that is to say, as a mighty form of pressure, or hammer, -with which he can smash up degenerate, perishing races and put them out -of existence; with which he can beat a track to a new order of life, -or instil a longing for nonentity in those who are degenerate and who -desire to perish.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1056.</p> - -<p>I wish to teach the thought which gives unto many the right to cancel -their existences—the great disciplinary thought.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1057.</p> - -<p><i>Eternal Recurrence. </i> A prophecy.</p> - -<p>1. The exposition of the doctrine and its <i>theoretical</i> first -principles and results.</p> - -<p>2. The proof of the doctrine.</p> - -<p>3. Probable results which will follow from its being <i>believed.</i> (It -makes everything break open.)</p> - -<p><i>(a)</i> The means of enduring it.</p> - -<p><i>(b)</i> The means of ignoring it.</p> - -<p>4. Its place in history is a means.</p> - -<p>The period <i>of</i> greatest danger. The foundation of an oligarchy <i>above</i> -peoples and their interests: education directed at establishing a -political policy for humanity in general.</p> - -<p><i>A counterpart of Jesuitism.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1058.</p> - -<p>The two greatest philosophical points of view (both discovered by -Germans).</p> - -<p>(a) That of <i>becoming</i> and that of <i>evolution.</i></p> - -<p>(b) That based upon the <i>values of existence</i> (but the wretched form of -German pessimism must first be overcome!)—</p> - -<p>Both points of view reconciled by me in a decisive manner.</p> - -<p>Everything becomes and returns for ever, <i>escape is impossible!</i></p> - -<p>Granted that we <i>could</i> appraise the value of existence, what would -be the result of it? The thought of recurrence is a principle <i>of -selection</i> in the service of <i>power</i> (and barbarity!).</p> - -<p>The ripeness of man for this thought.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1059.</p> - -<p>1. The thought of eternal recurrence: its first principles which must -necessarily be true if it were true. What its result is.</p> - -<p>2. It is the most <i>oppressive</i> thought: its probable results, provided -it be not prevented, that is to say, provided all values be not -transvalued.</p> - -<p>3. The means of <i>enduring it:</i> the transvaluation of all values. -Pleasure no longer to be found in certainty, but in uncertainty; no -longer "cause and effect," but continual creativeness; no longer -the will to self-preservation, but to power; no longer the modest -expression "it is all <i>only</i> subjective," but "it is all <i>our</i> work! -let us be proud of it."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1060.</p> - -<p>In order to endure the thought of recurrence, freedom from morality -is necessary; new means against the <i>fact pain</i> (pain regarded as -the instrument, as the father of pleasure; there is no accretive -consciousness of pain); pleasure derived from all kinds of uncertainty -and tentativeness, as a counterpoise to extreme fatalism; suppression -of the concept "necessity"; suppression of the "will"; suppression of -"absolute knowledge."</p> - -<p><i>Greatest elevation</i> of man's <i>consciousness of strength,</i> as that -which creates superman.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1061.</p> - -<p>The two extremes of thought—the materialistic and the platonic—are -reconciled in <i>eternal recurrence</i>: both are regarded as ideals.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1062.</p> - -<p>If the universe had a goal, that goal would have been reached by now. -If any sort of unforeseen final state existed, that state also would -have! been reached. If it were capable of any halting or stability of -any being, it would only have possessed this capability of becoming -stable for one instant in its development; and again becoming would -have been at an end for ages, and with it all thinking and all -"spirit." The fact of "intellects" being in a <i>state of development</i> -proves that the universe can have no goal, no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span> final state, and is -incapable of being. But the old habit of thinking of some purpose in -regard to all phenomena, and of thinking of a directing and creating -deity in regard to the universe, is so powerful, that the thinker has -to go to great pains in order to avoid thinking of the very aimlessness -of the world as intended. The idea that the universe intentionally -evades a goal, and even knows artificial means wherewith it prevents -itself from falling into a circular movement, must occur to all those -who would fain attribute to the universe the capacity of eternally -regenerating itself—that is to say, they would fain impose upon a -finite, definite force which is invariable in quantity, like the -universe, the miraculous gift of renewing its forms and its conditions -<i>for all eternity.</i> Although the universe is no longer a God, it must -still be capable of the divine power of creating and transforming; -it must forbid itself to relapse into any one of its previous forms; -it must not only have the intention, but also the means, of avoiding -any sort of repetition, every second of its existence, even, it must -control every single one of its movements, with the view of avoiding -goals, final states, and repetitions and all the other results of such -an unpardonable and insane method of thought and desire. All this -is nothing more than the old religious mode of thought and desire, -which, in spite of all, longs to believe that in some way or other the -universe resembles the old, beloved, infinite, and infinitely-creative -God—that in some way or other "the old God still lives"—that longing -of Spinoza's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span> which is expressed in the words "<i>deus sive natura</i>" -(what he really felt was "<i>natura sive deus</i>"). Which, then, is the -proposition and belief in which the decisive change, the present -<i>preponderance</i> of the scientific spirit over the religious and -god-fancying spirit, is best formulated? Ought it not to be: the -universe, as force, must not be thought of as unlimited, because it -cannot be thought of in this way,—we forbid ourselves the concept -<i>infinite</i> force, because it is <i>incompatible</i> with the idea of force? -Whence it follows that the universe lacks the power of eternal renewal.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1063.</p> - -<p>The principle of the conservation of energy inevitably involves -<i>eternal recurrence.</i></p> - - -<p class="parnum">1064.</p> - -<p>That a state of equilibrium has never been reached, proves that it is -impossible, but in infinite space it must have been reached. Likewise -in spherical space. The <i>form</i> of space must be the cause of the -eternal movement, and ultimately of all imperfection. That "energy" and -"stability" and "immutability" are contradictory. The measure of energy -(dimensionally) is fixed though it is essentially fluid.</p> - -<p>"That which is timeless" must be refuted, any given moment of energy, -the absolute conditions for a new distribution of all forces are -present, it cannot remain stationary. Change is part of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span> its essence, -therefore time is as well; by this means, however, the necessity of -change has only been established once more in theory.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1065.</p> - -<p>A certain emperor always bore the fleeting nature of all things in his -mind, in order not to value them too seriously, and to be able to live -quietly in their midst. Conversely, everything seems to me much too -important for it to be so fleeting, I seek an eternity for everything: -ought one to pour the most precious salves and wines into the sea? My -consolation is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea will -wash it up again.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1066.</p> - -<p><i>The new concept of the universe.</i> The universe exists; it is nothing -that grows into existence and that passes out of existence. Or, better -still, it develops, it passes away, but it never began to develop, -and has never ceased from passing away; it <i>maintains</i> itself in both -states. It lives on itself, its excrements are its nourishment.</p> - -<p>We need not concern ourselves for one instant with the hypothesis of a -<i>created</i> world. The concept create is to-day utterly indefinable and -unrealisable; it is but a word which hails from superstitious ages, -nothing can be explained with a word. The last attempt that was made -to conceive of a world that <i>began</i> occurred quite recently,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> in many -cases with the help of logical reasoning,—generally, too, as you will -guess, with an ulterior theological motive.</p> - -<p>Several attempts have been made lately to show that the concept that -"the universe has an infinite past (<i>regressus in infinitum</i>) is -contradictory, it was even demonstrated, it is true, at the price -of confounding the head with the tail. Nothing can prevent me from -calculating backwards from this moment of time, and of saying: "I -shall never reach the end"; just as I can calculate without end in a -forward direction, from the same moment. It is only when I wish to -commit the error—I shall be careful to avoid it—of reconciling this -correct concept of a <i>regressus in infinitum</i> with the absolutely -unrealisable concept of a finite <i>progressus</i> up to the present; only -when I consider the direction (forwards or backwards) as logically -indifferent, that I take hold of the head—this very moment—and think -I hold the tail: this pleasure I leave to you, Mr. Dühring!...</p> - -<p>I have come across this thought in other thinkers before me, and every -time I found that it was determined by other ulterior motives (chiefly -theological, in favour of a <i>creator spiritus).</i> If the universe were -in any way able to congeal, to dry up, to perish; or if it were capable -of attaining to a state of equilibrium; or if it had any kind of goal -at all which a long lapse of time, immutability, and finality reserved -for it (in short, to speak metaphysically, if becoming could resolve -itself into being or into nonentity), this state ought already to have -been reached.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span></p> - -<p>But it has not been reached: it therefore follows.... This is the only -certainty we can grasp, which can serve as a corrective to a host of -cosmic hypotheses possible in themselves. If, for instance, materialism -cannot consistently escape the conclusion of a finite state, which -William Thomson has traced out for it, then materialism is thereby -refuted.</p> - -<p>If the universe may be conceived as a definite quantity of energy, -as a definite number of centres of energy,—and every other concept -remains indefinite and therefore useless,—it follows therefrom that -the universe must go through a calculable number of combinations in -the great game of chance which constitutes its existence. In infinity, -at some moment or other, every possible combination must once have -been realised; not only this, but it must have been realised an -infinite number of times. And inasmuch as between every one of these -combinations and its next recurrence every other possible combination -would necessarily have been undergone, and since every one of these -combinations would determine the whole series in the same order, a -circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: -the universe is thus shown to be a circular movement which has already -repeated itself an infinite number of times, and which plays its game -for all eternity.—This conception is not simply materialistic; for if -it were this, it would not involve an infinite recurrence of identical -cases, but a finite state. Owing to the fact that the universe has -not reached this finite state, materialism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> shows itself to be but an -imperfect and provisional hypothesis.</p> - - -<p class="parnum">1067.</p> - -<p>And do ye know what "the universe" is to my mind? Shall I show it -to you in my mirror? This universe is a monster of energy, without -beginning or end; a fixed and brazen quantity o; energy which grows -neither bigger nor smaller, which does not consume itself, but only -alters its face; as a whole its bulk is immutable, it is a household -without either losses or gains, but likewise without increase and -without sources of revenue, surrounded by nonentity as by a frontier, -it is nothing vague or wasteful, it does not stretch into infinity; -but it is a definite quantum of energy located in limited space, -and not in space which would be anywhere empty. It is rather energy -everywhere, the play of forces and force-waves, at the same time one -and many, agglomerating here and diminishing there, a sea of forces -storming and raging in itself, for ever changing, for ever rolling -back over in calculable ages to recurrence, with an ebb and flow of -its forms, producing the most complicated things out of the most -simple structures; producing the most ardent, most savage, and most -contradictory things out of the quietest, most rigid, and most frozen -material, and then returning from multifariousness to uniformity, from -the play of contradictions back into the delight of consonance, saying -yea unto itself, even in this homogeneity of its courses and ages; for -ever blessing itself as something which recurs for all eternity,—a -becoming which knows not satiety, or disgust, or weariness:—this, my -Dionysian world of eternal self-creation, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span> eternal self-destruction, -this mysterious world of twofold voluptuousness; this, my "Beyond Good -and Evil" without aim, unless there is an aim in the bliss of the -circle, without will, unless a ring must by nature keep goodwill to -itself,—would you have a name for my world? A <i>solution</i> of all your -riddles? Do ye also want a light, ye most concealed, strongest and -most undaunted men of the blackest midnight?—<i>This world is the Will -to Power—and nothing else!</i> And even ye yourselves are this will to -power—and nothing besides!</p> - - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Will to Power, Book III and IV, by -Friedrich Nietzsche - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WILL TO POWER, BOOK III AND IV *** - -***** This file should be named 52915-h.htm or 52915-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/9/1/52915/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe Free Literature (back online -soon in an extended version, alo linking to free sources -for education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational -materials,...) 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