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diff --git a/old/54082-8.txt b/old/54082-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 0659a2f..0000000 --- a/old/54082-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11770 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The New Map of Europe (1911-1914), by -Herbert Adams Gibbons - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The New Map of Europe (1911-1914) - The Story of the Recent European Diplomatic Crises and - Wars and of Europe's Present Catastrophe - -Author: Herbert Adams Gibbons - -Release Date: January 31, 2017 [EBook #54082] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE (1911-1914) *** - - - - -Produced by Al Haines - - - - - - - - -[Illustration: Map--The Balkan Peninsula in 1914] - - - - - THE - NEW MAP OF EUROPE - - (1911-1914) - - THE STORY OF THE RECENT EUROPEAN - DIPLOMATIC CRISES AND WARS AND OF - EUROPE'S PRESENT CATASTROPHE - - BY - - HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, PH.D. - - AUTHOR OF "THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE", - "PARIS REBORN," ETC. - - - - NEW YORK - THE CENTURY CO. - 1916 - - - - - COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY - THE CENTURY CO. - - _Published, November, 1914 - Second Edition, March, 1915 - Third Edition, August, 1915 - Fourth Edition, December, 1915_ - - - - - To - MY CHILDREN - - CHRISTINE ESTE of Adana, - - LLOYD IRVING of Constantinople, - and - EMILY ELIZABETH of Paris. - - Born in the midst of the wars and changes that this book describes, - may they lead lives of peace! - - - - -There are general causes, moral or physical, which act in each State, -elevate it, maintain it, or cast it down; every accident is submitted -to these causes, and if the fortune of a battle, that is to say a -particular cause, has ruined a State, there was a general cause which -brought it about that that State had to perish by a single battle. - -MONTESQUIEU. - - - - -CONTENTS - - I. Germany in Alsace and Lorraine - II. The "Weltpolitik" of Germany - III. The "Bagdadbahn" - IV. Algeciras and Agadir - V. The Passing of Persia - VI. The Partitioners and their Poles - VII. Italia Irredenta - VIII. The Danube and the Dardanelles - XIX. Austria-Hungary and her South Slavs - X. Racial Rivalries in Macedonia - XI. The Young Turk _Régime_ in the Ottoman Empire - XII. Crete and European Diplomacy - XIII. The War between Italy and Turkey - XIV. The War between the Balkan States and Turkey - XV. The Rupture between the Allies - XVI. The War between the Balkan Allies - XVII. The Treaty of Bukarest - XVIII. The Albanian Fiasco - XIX. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Servia - XX. Germany Forces War upon Russia and France - XXI. Great Britain Enters the War - -Index - - - - -MAPS - -I. The Balkan Peninsula according to the Treaties of San Stefano, -Berlin, Lausanne, and Bukarest - -II. Partitions of Poland - -III. Europe in 1911 - -IV. Europe in Africa in 1914 - -V. Belgium and the Franco-German Frontier - -VI. Europe in 1914 - - - - -{ix} - -FOREWORD - -On a July day in 1908, two American students, who had chosen to spend -the first days of their honeymoon in digging the musty pamphleteers of -the _Ligue_ out of the Bodleian Library, were walking along the High -Street in Oxford, when their attention was arrested by the cry of a -newsboy. An ha'penny invested in a London newspaper gave them the news -that Niazi bey had taken to the Macedonian highlands, and that a -revolution was threatening to overthrow the absolutist _régime_ of -Abdul Hamid. The sixteenth century was forgotten in the absorbing and -compelling interest of the twentieth. - -Two weeks later the students were entering the harbour of Smyrna on a -French steamer which was bringing back to constitutional Turkey the -Young Turk exiles, including Prince Sabaheddine effendi of the Royal -Ottoman House. From that day to this, the path of the two Americans, -whose knowledge of history heretofore had been gained only in -libraries, has led them through massacres in Asia Minor and Syria, and -through mobilizations and wars in Constantinople, Bulgaria, Macedonia, -Greece, and Albania, back westward to Austria-Hungary, {x} Italy, and -France, following the trail of blood and fire from its origin in the -Eastern question to the great European conflagration. - -On the forty-fourth anniversary of Sedan, when German aëroplanes were -flying over Paris, and the distant thunder of cannon near Meaux could -be heard, this book was begun in the Bibliothèque Nationale by one of -the students, while the other yielded to the more pressing call of Red -Cross work. It is hoped that there is nothing that will offend in what -is written here. At this time of tension, of racial rivalry, of mutual -recrimination, the writer does not expect that his judgments will pass -without protest and criticism. But he claims for them the lack of bias -which, under the circumstances, only an American--of this generation at -least--dare impute to himself. - -The changes that are bringing about a new map of Europe have come -within the intimate personal experience of the writer. - -If foot-notes are rare, it is because sources are so numerous and so -accessible. Much is what the writer saw himself, or heard from actors -in the great tragedy, when events were fresh in their memory. The books -of the colours, published by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the -countries interested, have been consulted for the negotiations of -diplomats. From day to day through these years, material has been -gathered from newspapers, especially the Paris _Temps_, the London -_Times_, the Vienna _Freie Press_, the Constantinople _Orient_, and -other journals of the Ottoman capital. {xi} The writer has used his -own correspondence to the New York _Herald_, the New York -_Independent_, and the Philadelphia _Telegraph_. For accuracy of -dates, indebtedness is acknowledged to the admirable British _Annual -Register_. - -I am indebted to my friends, Alexander Souter, Litt.D., Professor of -Humanity in Aberdeen University, and Mrs. Souter, for reading the -proofs of this book and seeing it through the press in England. In the -United States, the same kind office has been performed by my brother, -Henry Johns Gibbons, Esq., of Philadelphia. - -As this book goes to press for the third American edition, I wish to -express my thanks to readers in Great Britain, America, France, -Germany, and Australia for suggestions and corrections, and in -particular to Baron Shaw of Dunfermline, to whom I owe the idea of the -map that has been added to face the title-page. - -PARIS, July, 1915. - - - - - THE - NEW MAP OF EUROPE - - - - -{1} - -The New Map of Europe - - - -CHAPTER I - -GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE - -The war of 1870 added to the German Confederation Alsace and a large -portion of Lorraine, both of which the Germans had always considered -theirs historically and by the blood of the inhabitants. In annexing -Alsace and Lorraine, the thought of Bismarck and von Moltke was not -only to bring back into the German Confederation territories which had -formerly been a part of it, but also to secure the newly formed Germany -against the possibility of French invasion in the future. For this it -was necessary to have undisputed possession of the valley of the Rhine -and the crests of the Vosges. - -From the academic and military point of view, the German thesis was not -indefensible. But those who imposed upon a conquered people the Treaty -of Frankfort forgot to take into account the sentiments of the -population of the annexed territory. Germany annexed land. That was -possible by the {2} right of the strongest. She tried for over forty -years to annex the population, but never succeeded. The makers of -modern Germany were not alarmed at the persistent refusal of the -Alsatians to become loyal German subjects. They knew that this would -take time. They looked forward to the dying out of the party of -protest when the next generation grew up,--a generation educated in -German schools and formed in the German mould by the discipline of -military service. - -That there was still an Alsace-Lorraine "question" after forty years is -a sad commentary either on the justice of the annexation of -Alsace-Lorraine by Germany or on the ability of Germany to assimilate -that territory which she felt was historically, geographically, and -racially a part of the Teutonic Empire. In 1887, when "protesting -deputies" were returned to the _Reichstag_ in overwhelming numbers, -despite the governmental weapons of intimidation, disenfranchisement, -and North German immigration, Bismarck was face to face with the one -great failure of his career. He consoled himself with the firm belief -that all would be changed when the second generation, which knew -nothing of France and to which the war was only a memory, peopled the -unhappy provinces. - -But that second generation came. Those who participated in the war of -1870, or who suffered by it, were few and far between. The hotheads -and extreme francophiles left the country long ago, and their place was -taken by immigrants who were supposed to be loyal sons of the -Vaterland. Those of {3} the younger indigenous brood, whose parents -had brought them up as irreconcilables, ran away to serve in the French -foreign legion, or went into exile, and became naturalized Frenchmen -before their time of military service arrived. And yet the unrest -continued. Strasbourg, Metz, Mulhouse, and Colmar were centres of -political agitation, which an autocratic government and Berlin police -methods were powerless to suppress. - -The year 1910 marked the beginning of a new period of violent protest -against Prussian rule. Not since 1888 was there such a continuous -agitation and such a continuous persecution. The days when the -Prussian police forbade the use of the French language on tombstones -were revived, and the number of petty police persecutions recorded in -the local press was equalled only by the number of public -demonstrations on the part of the people, whose hatred of everything -Prussian once more came to a fever-heat. - -Let me cite a few incidents which I have taken haphazard from the -journals of Strasbourg and Metz during the first seven months of 1910. -The _Turnverein_ of Robertsau held a gymnastic exhibition in which two -French societies, those of Belfort and Giromagny, were invited to -participate. The police refused to allow the French societies to march -to the hall in procession, as was their custom, or to display their -flags. Their two presidents were threatened with arrest. A similar -incident was reported from Colmar. At Noisseville and Wissembourg the -fortieth annual commemoration services held by the {4} French veterans -were considered treasonable, and they were informed that they would -never again be allowed to hold services in the cemetery. At Mulhouse -the French veterans were insulted by the police and not allowed to -display their flags even in the room where they held their banquet. At -the college of Thann a young boy of twelve, who curiously enough was -the son of a notorious German immigrant, whistled the _Marseillaise_ -and was locked up in a cell for this offence. The conferring of the -cross of the Legion of Honour on Abbé Faller, at Mars-la-Tour, created -such an outburst of feeling that the German ambassador at Paris was -instructed to request the French Government to refrain from decorating -Alsatians. A volunteer of Mulhouse was reprimanded and refused -advancement in the army because he used his mother-tongue in a private -conversation. On July 1st, twenty-one border communes of Lorraine were -added to those in which German had been made the official language. On -July 25th, for the first time in the history of the University of -Strasbourg, a professor was hissed out of his lecture room. He had -said that the Prussians could speak better French than the Alsatians. -The most serious demonstration which has occurred in Metz since the -annexation, took place on Sunday evening, January 8, 1910, when the -police broke up forcibly a concert given by a local society. The -newspapers of Metz claimed that this was a private gathering, to which -individual invitations had been sent, and was neither public nor -political. The police invaded the hall, and requested the audience {5} -to disband. When the presiding officer refused, he and the leader of -the orchestra were arrested. The audience, after a lively tussle, was -expelled from the hall. Immediately a demonstration was planned to be -held around the statue of General Ney. A large crowd paraded the city, -singing the _Sambre-et-Meuse_ and the _Marseillaise_. When the police -found themselves powerless to stop the procession without bloodshed, -they were compelled to call out the troops to clear the streets with -fixed bayonets. - -These incidents demonstrated the fact that French ideals, French -culture, and the French language had been kept alive, and were still -the inspiration of the unceasing--and successful--protest of nearly two -million people against the Prussian domination. The effervescence was -undoubtedly as strong in Alsace-Lorraine "forty years after" as it had -been on the morrow of the annexation. But its francophile character -was not necessarily the expression of desire for reunion with France. -The inhabitants of the "lost provinces" had always been, racially and -linguistically, as much German as French. Now that the unexpected has -happened, and reunion with France seems probable, many Alsatians are -claiming that this has been the unfailing goal of their agitation. But -it is not true. It would be a lamentable distortion of fact if any -such record were to get into a serious history of the period in which -we live. - -The political ideal of the Alsatians has been self-government. Their -agitation has not been for separation _from_ the German Confederation, -but {6} for a place _in_ the German Confederation. A great number of -the immigrants who were sent to "germanize" Alsace and Lorraine came to -side with the indigenous element in their political demands. If the -question of France and things French entered into the struggle, and -became the heart of it, two reasons for this can be pointed out: France -stood for the realization of the ideals of democracy to the descendants -of the Strasbourg heroes of 1793; and the endeavour to stamp out the -traces of the former nationality of the inhabitants of the provinces -was carried on in a manner so typically and so foolishly Prussian that -it kept alive the fire instead of extinguishing it. Persecution never -fails to defeat its own ends. For human nature is keen to cherish that -which is difficult or dangerous to enjoy. - -To understand the Alsace-Lorraine question, from the internal German -point of view, it is necessary to explain the political status of these -provinces after the conquest, and their relationship to the Empire, in -order to show that their continued unrest and unhappiness were not due -to a ceaseless and stubborn protest against the Treaty of Frankfort. - -When the German Empire was constituted, in 1872, it comprehended -twenty-five distinct sovereign kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and -free cities, and in a subordinate position, the territory ceded by -France, which was made a _Reichsland_, owned in common by the -twenty-five confederated sovereignties. The King of Prussia was made -Emperor of the Confederation, and given extensive executive powers. -Two assemblies were created to legislate {7} for matters affecting the -country as a whole. The _Bundesrath_ is an advisory executive body as -well as an upper legislative assembly. _It is composed of delegates of -the sovereigns of the confederated states_. The lower imperial house, -or _Reichstag_, is a popular assembly, whose members are returned by -general elections throughout the Empire. In their internal affairs the -confederated states are autonomous, and have their own local -Parliaments. This scheme, fraught with dangers and seemingly -unsurmountable difficulties, has survived; and, thanks to the -predominance of Prussia and the genius of two great emperors, the -seemingly heterogeneous mass has been moulded into a strong and -powerful Empire. - -In such an Empire, however, there never has been any place for -Alsace-Lorraine. The conquered territory was not a national entity. -It had no sovereign, and could not enter into the confederacy on an -equal footing with the other twenty-five states. The Germans did not -dare, at the time, to give the new member a sovereign, nor could they -conjointly undertake its assimilation. Prussia, not willing to risk -the strengthening of a south German state by the addition of a million -and a half to its population, took upon herself what was the logical -task of Baden or Wurtemberg or Bavaria. - -So Alsace-Lorraine was an anomaly under the scheme of the organization -of the German Empire. During forty years the _Reichsland_ was without -representation in the _Bundesrath_, and had thus had no real voice in -the management of imperial affairs. By excluding the "reconquered -brethren" from {8} representation in the _Bundesrath_, Germany failed -to win the loyalty of her new subjects. Where petty states with a -tithe of her population and wealth have helped in shaping the destinies -of the nation, the _Reichsland_ had to feel the humiliation of -"taxation without representation." It was useless to point out to the -Alsatians that they had their vote in the _Reichstag_. For the -_Bundesrath_ is the power in Germany. - -Nor did Alsace-Lorraine have real autonomy in internal affairs. The -executive power was vested in a _Statthalter_, appointed by the -Emperor, and supported by a foreign bureaucracy and a foreign police -force. Before the Constitution of 1911, there was a local Parliament, -called the _Landesausschuss_, which amounted to nothing, as the -imperial Parliament had the privilege of initiating and enacting for -the _Reichsland_ any law it saw fit. Then, too, the delegates to the -_Landesausschuss_ were chosen by such a complicated form of suffrage -that they represented the _Statthalter_ rather than the people. And -the _Statthalter_ represented the Emperor! - -In the first decade after the annexation, Prussian brutality and an -unseemly haste to impose military service upon the conquered people led -to an emigration of all who could afford to go, or who, even at the -expense of material interest, were too high-spirited to allow their -children to grow up as Germans. This emigration was welcomed and made -easy, just as Austria-Hungary encouraged the emigration of Moslems from -Bosnia and Herzegovina. For it enabled Bismarck to introduce a strong -Prussian {9} and Westphalian element into the _Reichsland_ by settling -immigrants on the vacant properties. But most of these immigrants, -instead of prussianizing Alsace, have become Alsatians themselves. -Some of the most insistent opponents of the Government, some of the -most intractable among the agitators, have been those early immigrants -or their children. This is quite natural, when we consider that they -have cast their lot definitely with the country, and are just as much -interested in its welfare as the indigenous element. - -The revival of the agitation against Prussian Government in 1910 was a -movement for autonomy on internal affairs, and for representation in -the _Bundesrath_. The Alsatians wanted to be on a footing of -constitutional equality with the other German States. One marvels at -the Prussian mentality which could not see--either with the Poles or -with the Alsatians--that fair play and justice would have solved the -problems and put an end to the agitation which has been, during these -past few years especially, a menace on the east and west to the -existence of the Empire. - -Something had to be done in the _Reichsland_. The anomalous position -of almost two million German subjects, fighting for their political -rights, and forming a compact mass upon the borders of France, was a -question which compelled the interest of German statesmen, not only on -account of its international aspect, but also because of the growing -German public sentiment for social and political justice. The -_Reichstag_ was full of champions of the {10} claims of the -Alsatians,--champions who were not personally interested either in -Alsace-Lorraine or in the influence of the agitation in the -_Reichsland_ upon France, but who looked upon the Alsace-Lorraine -question as a wrong to twentieth-century civilization. - -On March 14, 1910, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg announced to the -_Reichstag_ that the Government was preparing a constitution for -Alsace-Lorraine which would give the autonomy so long and so vigorously -demanded. But he had in his mind, not a real solution of the question, -but some sort of a compromise, which would satisfy the confederated -states, and mollify the agitators of the _Reichsland, but at the same -time preserve the Prussian domination in Alsace-Lorraine_. In June, -Herr Delbrück, Secretary of State for the Interior, was sent to -Strasbourg to confer with the local authorities and representatives of -the people concerning the projected constitution. It was during this -visit that the Alsatians were disillusioned. A dinner, now famous or -notorious, whichever you like, was given by the _Statthalter_, to which -representative (!) members of the _Landesausschuss_ were invited. At -this dinner the real leaders of the country, such as Wetterlé, Preiss, -Blumenthal, Weber, Bucher, and Theodor,--the very men who had made the -demand for autonomy so insistent that the Government could no longer -refuse to entertain it--were conspicuous by their absence. Those -bidden to confer with Herr Delbrück in no way represented, but were on -the other hand hostile to, the wishes of the people. - -We cannot go into the involved story of the fight {11} in the -_Reichstag_ over the new Constitution. The Delbrück project was -approved by the _Bundesrath_ on December 16, 1910, and debated in the -following spring session of the _Reichstag_. Despite the warnings of -the deputies from the _Reichsland_, and the brilliant opposition of the -Socialists, the Constitution given to Alsace-Lorraine, on May 31st, was -a pure farce. In no sense was it what the people of the _Reichsland_ -had wanted, although representation in the _Bundesrath_ was seemingly -given to them. The new Constitution preserved the united sovereignty -of the confederated states, and its delegation to the Emperor, who -still had the power to appoint and recall at will the _Statthalter_, -and to initiate legislation in local matters. A _Landtag_ took the -place of the _Landesausschuss_. The Upper Chamber of the _Landtag_ -consists of thirty-six members, representing the religious confessions, -the University and other bodies, the supreme court of Colmar, and the -municipalities and chambers of commerce of Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Metz, -and Colmar, to the number of eighteen; _and the other eighteen chosen -by the Emperor_. The Lower Chamber has sixty members, elected by -direct universal suffrage, with secret ballot. Electors over -thirty-five possess two votes, and over forty-five three votes. - -By forcing this Constitution upon Alsace-Lorraine, the interests of -Prussia and of the House of Hohenzollern were considered to the -detriment of the interests of the German Empire. A glorious -opportunity for reconciliation and assimilation was lost. The Emperor -would not listen to the admission of {12} Alsace-Lorraine to the -_Bundesrath_ in the only logical way, by the creation of a new dynasty -or a republican form of government, so that the Alsatian votes would -represent a _sovereign_ state. Prussia in her dealings with -Alsace-Lorraine, has always been afraid, on the one hand, of the -addition of _Bundesrath_ votes to the seventeen of Bavaria, Saxony, -Baden, and Wurtemberg, and on the other hand, of the repercussion upon -her internal suffrage and other problems with the Socialists. - -Since 1911, the eyes of many Alsatians have been directed once more -towards France as the only--if forlorn--hope of justice and peace. -What words could be found strong enough to condemn the suicidal folly -of the German statesmen who allowed the disappointment over the -Constitution to be followed by a series of incidents which have been -like rubbing salt into a raw wound? - -The first _Landtag_, in conformity to the Constitution of 1911, was -elected in October. It brought into life a new political party, called -"The National Union," led by Blumenthal, Wetterlé, and Preiss, who -united for the purpose of demanding what the Constitution had not given -them--the autonomy of Alsace and Lorraine. This party was badly beaten -in this first election. But its defeat was not really a defeat for the -principles of autonomy, as the German press stated at the time. The -membership of the new _Landtag_ was composed, in majority, of men who -had been supporters of the demand for autonomy, but who had not joined -the new party for reasons of local politics. Herr Delbrück had given -{13} universal suffrage (a privilege the Prussian electorate had never -been able to gain in spite of its reiterated demands) to the -_Reichsland_ in the hope that the Socialists would prevent the -Nationalists from controlling the Alsatian _Landtag_. Many Socialists, -however, during the elections at Colmar and elsewhere, did not hesitate -to cry in French, "_Vive la France! A bas la Prusse!_" - -The Prussian expectations were bitterly deceived. The Landtag promptly -showed that it was merely the Landesausschuss under another name. The -nationalist struggle was revived; the same old questions came up again. -The Government's appropriation "for purposes of state" was reduced -one-third, and it was provided that the _Landtag_ receive communication -of the purposes for which the money was spent. The _Statthalter's_ -expenses were cut in half, and a bill, which had always been approved -in previous years, providing for the payment of the expense of the -Emperor's hunting trips in the _Reichsland_, failed to pass. - -In the spring of 1912, the Prussians showed their disapproval of the -actions of the new _Landtag_ by withdrawing the orders for locomotives -for the Prussian railways from the old Alsatian factory of Grafenstaden -near Strasbourg. This was done absolutely without any provocation, and -aroused a violent denunciation, not only among the purely German -employés of the factory and in the newspapers, but also in the -_Landtag_, which adopted an order of the day condemning most severely -the attitude of the Imperial Government towards {14} Alsace-Lorraine, -of which this boycott measure was a petty and mean illustration. - -The indignation was at its height when Emperor Wilhelm arrived in -Strasbourg on May 13th. Instead of acting in a tactful manner and -promising to set right this wrong done to the industrial life of -Strasbourg, the Emperor addressed the following words to the Mayor: - - -"Listen. Up to here you have known only the good side of me; it is -possible that you will learn the other side of me. Things cannot -continue as they are: if this situation lasts, we shall suppress your -Constitution and annex you to Prussia." - - -This typically Prussian speech, which in a few lines reveals the -hopelessly unsuccessful tactics of the German Government towards the -peoples whom it has tried to assimilate the world over, only served to -increase the indignation of the inhabitants of the _Reichsland_; in -fact, the repercussion throughout all Germany was very serious. - -The arbitrary threat of the Emperor was badly received in the other -federated states, whose newspapers pointed out that he had exceeded his -authority. It gave the Socialists an opportunity to attack Emperor -Wilhelm on the floor of the _Reichstag_. Four days after this threat -was made, an orator of the Socialist party declared - - -"We salute the imperial words as the confession, full of weight and -coming from a competent source, that annexation to Prussia is the -heaviest punishment that one can threaten to impose upon a {15} people -for its resistance against Germany. It is a punishment like hard -labour in the penitentiary with loss of civil rights." - - -This speech caused the Chancellor to leave the room with all the -Ministry. On May 22d, the attack upon Emperor Wilhelm for his words at -Strasbourg was renewed by another deputy, who declared that if such a -thing had happened in England, "the English would shut up such a King -at Balmoral or find for him some peaceful castle, such as that of -Stemberg or the Villa Allatini at Salonika." - -The answer of the _Landtag_ to Emperor Wilhelm's threat was the passing -of two unanimous votes: one demanding that hereafter the Constitution -could not be modified except by the law of the country and not by the -law of the Empire, and the other demanding for Alsace-Lorraine a -national flag. - -One could easily fill many pages with illustrations of senseless -persecutions, most of them of the pettiest character, but some more -serious in nature, which Alsace and Lorraine have had to endure since -the granting of the Constitution. Newspapers, illustrated journals, -clubs and organizations of all kinds have been annoyed constantly by -police interference. Their editors, artists, and managers have been -brought frequently into court. Zislin and Hansi, celebrated -caricaturists, have found themselves provoked to bolder and bolder -defiances by successive condemnations, and have endured imprisonment as -well as fines. Hansi was sentenced to a year's imprisonment by the -High Court of Leipsic only a month {16} before the present war broke -out, and chose exile rather than a Prussian fortress. - -The greatest effort during the past few years has been made in the -schools to influence the minds of the growing generation against the -"_souvenir de France_" and to impress upon the Alsatians what good -fortune had come to them to be born German citizens. - -Among the boys, the influence of this teaching has been such that over -twenty-two thousand fled from home during the period of 1900-1913 to -enlist in the Foreign Legion of the French Army. The campaign of the -German newspapers in Alsace-Lorraine, and, in fact, throughout Germany, -was redoubled in 1911. Parents were warned of the horrible treatment -accorded to the poor boys who were misguided enough to throw away their -citizenship, and go to be killed in Africa under the French flag. The -result of this campaign was that the Foreign Legion received a larger -number of Alsatians in 1912 than had enlisted during a single year -since 1871! - -Among the girls, the German educational system flattered itself that it -could completely change the sentiments of a child, especially in the -boarding-schools. Last year the Empress of Germany visited a girls' -school near Metz, which is one of the best German schools in the -_Reichsland_. As she was leaving, she told the children that she -wanted to give them something. What did they want? The answer was not -sweets or cake, but that they might be taught a little French! - -{17} - -Since 1910, the German war budget has carried successively larger items -for the strengthening of forts and the building of barracks in Metz, -Colmar, Mulhouse, Strasbourg, Neuf-Brisach, Bischwiller, Wissembourg, -Mohrange, Sarrebourg, Sarreguemines, Saarbruck, Thionville, Molsheim, -and Saverne. The former French provinces have been flooded with -garrisons, and have been treated just as they were treated forty years -ago. The insufferable spirit of militarism, and the arrogance of the -Prussian officers in Alsatian towns, have served to turn against the -Empire many thousands whom another policy might have won. For it must -be remembered that by no means all the inhabitants of the _Reichsland_ -have been by birth and by home training French sympathizers. Instead -of crushing out the "_souvenir de France_," the Prussian civil and -military officials have caused it to be born in many a soul which was -by nature German. - -The most notorious instance of military arrogance occurred in the -autumn of 1913 in Saverne. Lieutenant von Forstner, who was passing in -review cases of discipline, had before him a soldier who had stabbed an -Alsatian, and had been sentenced to two months' imprisonment. "Two -months on account of an Alsatian blackguard!" he cried. "I would have -given you ten marks for your trouble." The story spread, and the town, -tired of the attitude of its garrison, began in turn to show its -contempt for the Kaiser's soldiers. Windows in von Forstner's house -were broken. Every time officers or soldiers appeared on the streets -they were hooted. Saverne {18} was put under martial law. Threats -were made to fire upon the citizens. One day Lieutenant von Forstner -struck a lame shoemaker across the forehead with his sword. The affair -had gone so far that public sentiment in Germany demanded some action. -Instead of adequately punishing von Forstner and other officers, who -had so maddened the civil population against them, the German military -authorities gave the guilty officers nominal sentences, and withdrew -the garrison. - -All these events had a tremendous repercussion in France. It is -impossible to exaggerate the ill-feeling aroused on both sides of the -Rhine, in Germany, in Alsace-Lorraine, and in France by the -persecutions in the _Reichsland_. Only one who knows intimately the -French can appreciate their feeling--or share it--over the Zislin and -Hansi trials, the Saverne affair, the suppression of the _Souvenir -Français_, the _Lorraine Sportive_ and other organizations, and the -campaign against the Foreign Legion. It has given the French soldiers -in the present war something to fight for which is as sacred to them as -the defence of French soil. The power of this sentiment is indicated -by the invasion of Alsace, the battle of Altkirk, and the occupation of -Mulhouse at the beginning of August. The French could not be held back -from this wild dash. Strategy was powerless in the face of the -sentiment of a _national_ army. - -The Alsatian leaders themselves have seen the peril to the peace of -Europe of the German attitude towards their country. They did not want -France drawn into a war for their liberation. They were {19} alarmed -over the possibility of this, and desired it to be understood that -their agitation had nothing international in it. The attitude of all -the anti-Prussian parties may be summed up in the words of Herr Wolff, -leader of the Government Liberal party, who declared that "all the -inhabitants of the _Reichsland_ had as their political ambition was -only the elevation of Alsace-Lorraine to the rank of an independent and -federated state, like the other twenty-five component parts of the -German Empire." Their sincerity and their desire to preserve peace is -proved by the motion presented by the leaders of four of the political -groups in the _Reichsland_, which was voted on May 6, 1912, without -discussion, by the _Landtag_: - - -"The Chamber invites the _Statthalter_ to instruct the representatives -of Alsace-Lorraine in the _Bundesrath_ to use all the force they -possess against the idea of a war between Germany and France, and to -influence the _Bundesrath_ to examine the ways which might possibly -lead to a _rapprochement_ between France and Germany, which -_rapprochement_ will furnish the means of putting an end to the race of -armaments." - - -The mismanagement of the _Reichsland_ has done more than prevent the -harmonious union of the former French provinces with Germany. It has -had an effect, the influence of which cannot be exaggerated, upon -nourishing the hopes of revenge of France, and the resentment against -the amputation of 1870. On neither side of the Vosges has the wound -healed. The same folly which has kept alive a Polish question in -eastern Prussia for one hundred {20} and twenty-five years, has not -failed to make impossible the prussianizing of Alsace and Lorraine. -The Prussian has never understood how to win the confidence of others. -There has been no Rome in his political vision. As for conceptions of -toleration, of kindness, and of love, they are non-existent in Prussian -officialdom. Nietzsche revealed the character of the Prussian in his -development of the idea of the _übermensch_. The ideal of perfect -manhood is the imposition of one will on another will by force. Mercy -and pity, according to Nietzsche, were signs of weakness, the symbols -of the slave. - -Under the circumstances, then, we are compelled after forty-five years -to revise our estimate of Bismarck's sagacity. His genius was limited -by the narrow horizon of his own age. He did not see that the future -Germany needed other things that France could give far more than she -needed Alsace and Lorraine. In posterity, Bismarck would have had a -greater place had he, in the last minutes of the transactions at -Versailles, given back Alsace and Lorraine to France, waived the war -indemnity, and asked in return Algeria or other French colonies. - -But would it have been different under Germany in the French colonies? -A Herrero, employed in the Johannesburg mines, wrote his brother in -German South-West Africa: "The country of the English is truly a good -country. Even if your superior is present, he doesn't strike you, and -if he strikes you and goes thus beyond legal limits, he is punished -like anyone else." - - - - -{21} - -CHAPTER II - -THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY - -When the transrhenane provinces of the old German Empire were added to -France in the eighteenth century, the assimilation of these territories -was a far different proposition from their refusion into the mould of a -new German Empire in 1871. In the first place, the old German Empire -was a mediæval institution which, in the evolution of modern Europe, -was decaying. Alsace and Lorraine were not taken away from a political -organism of which they were a vital part. The ties severed were purely -dynastic. In the second place, the consciousness of national life was -awakened in Alsace and Lorraine during the time that they were under -French rule, and because they shared in the great movement of the birth -of democracy following the French Revolution. - -France, then, by the Treaty of Frankfort, believed that she had been -robbed of a portion of her national territory. The people of the -annexed provinces, as was clearly shown by the statement of their -representatives at Bordeaux, did not desire to enter the German -Confederation. - -{22} - -Germany failed to do the only thing that could possibly have made her -new territories an integral part of the new Empire, _i.e._ to place -Alsace-Lorraine upon a footing of equality with the other states of the -Confederation, and make their entry that of an autonomous sovereign -state. Consequently, neither in France nor in the _Reichsland_ was the -Treaty of Frankfort accepted as a permanent change in the map of -Europe. Germany has always been compelled, in her international -politics, to count upon the possibility of France making an attempt to -win back the lost provinces. She has sought to form alliances to -strengthen her own position in Europe, and to keep France weak. -France, the continued object of German hostility, has found herself -compelled to ally herself with Russia, with whom she has never had -anything in common, and to compound her colonial rivalries in Africa -with her hereditary enemy, Great Britain. This is the first cause of -the unrest in Europe that has culminated in a general European war. - -The second cause is the _Weltpolitik_ of Germany which has brought the -German Empire into conflict with Great Britain and France outside of -Europe, and with Russia in Europe. - -On the map of Europe, Russia, Great Britain, and France are, in 1914, -practically what they were in 1815. The changes, logical and in -accordance with the spirit of centralization of the nineteenth century, -have transformed middle and south-eastern Europe. The changes in -south-eastern Europe have been effected at the expense of the Ottoman -Empire, and {23} have been a gradual development throughout the -century, from the outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1822 to the -Treaty of London in 1913. In middle Europe, during the twelve years -between 1859 and 1871, the three Powers whose national unity, racially -as well as politically, was already achieved at the time of the -Congress of Vienna, were brought face to face with three new Powers, -united Germany, united Italy, and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. - -The nineteenth century has been called the age of European -colonization. Europe began to follow its commerce with other -continents by the imposition of its civilization and its political -system upon weaker races. Checked by the rising republic of the United -States from encroaching upon the liberties of the peoples of North and -South America, there have been no acquisitions of territory by European -nations in the western continents since the Congress of Vienna. -European expansion directed itself towards Africa, Asia, and the -islands of the oceans. There was no Oriental nation strong enough to -promulgate a Monroe Doctrine. - -In extra-European activities, Great Britain, France, and Russia were -the pioneers. That they succeeded during the nineteenth century in -placing under their flag the choicest portions of Africa and the -backward nations of Asia, was due neither to the superior enterprise -and energy, nor to the greater foresight, of the Anglo-Saxon, French, -and Russian nations. They had achieved their national unity, and they -were geographically in a position to take advantage of the great -opportunities which were opening to the world {24} for colonization -since the development of the steamship and the telegraph. - -But the other three Powers of Europe came late upon the scene. It has -only been within the last quarter of a century that Germany and Italy -have been in the position to look for overseas possessions. It has -only been within the last quarter of a century that Austria, finding -her union with Hungary a durable one, has been able to think of looking -beyond her limits to play a part, as other nations had long been doing, -in the history of the outside world. - -By every force of circumstances, the three new States--threatened by -their neighbours, who had looked with jealous, though powerless, eyes -upon their consolidation--were brought together into a defensive -alliance. The Powers of the Triple Alliance drifted into a union of -common general aims and ambitions, if not of particular interests, -against their three more fortunate rivals, who had been annexing the -best portions of the Asiatic and African continents while they were -struggling with internal problems. - -Oceans of ink have been wasted upon polemics against the -peace-disturbing character of the Triple Alliance. Especially has -Germany and her growing _Weltpolitik_ been subject to criticism, -continuous and untiring, on the part of the British and French press. -But the question after all is a very simple one: the three newer Powers -of Europe have not been willing to be content with an application in -practical world politics of the principle that "to him that hath shall -be given." Germany and Italy, transformed under {25} modern economic -conditions into industrial states, have been looking for outside -markets, and they have wanted to enjoy those markets in regions of the -globe either actually under their flag or subjected to their political -influence. In other words, they have wanted their share in the -division of Africa and Asia into spheres under the control of European -nations. - -Is a logical and legitimate ambition to play a part in the world's -politics in proportion to one's population, one's wealth, one's -industrial and maritime activity, necessarily a menace to the world's -peace? It has always been, and I suppose always will be, in the nature -of those who have, to look with alarm upon the efforts of those who -have not, to possess something. Thus capital, irrespective of epoch or -nationality or of religion, has raised the cry of alarm when it has -seen the tendency for betterment, for education, for the development of -ideals and a sense of justice on the part of labour. In just the same -way, Russia with her great path across the northern half of Asia and -her new and steadily growing empire in the Caucasus and central Asia; -France with the greater part of northern and central Africa, and an -important corner of Asia under her flag; and Great Britain with her -vast territories in every portion of the globe, raised the cry of -"Wolf, Wolf!" when the Powers of the Triple Alliance began to look with -envious eye upon the rich colonies of their neighbours, and to pick up -by clever diplomacy--and brutal force, if you wish--a few crumbs of -what was still left for themselves. - -The result of these alarming ambitions of the {26} Triple Alliance has -been the coming together of Russia, France, and England, hereditary -enemies in former days but now friends and allies, in the maintenance -of the colonial "trust." - -The great cry of the Triple Entente is the maintenance of the European -equilibrium. For this they have reason. Europe could know no lasting -peace under Teutonic aggression. But is there not also to the account -of the Triple Entente some blame for the unrest in Europe and for the -great catastrophe which has come upon the world? For while their -policy has been the maintenance of the European equilibrium, it has -been coupled with the maintenance of an extra-European balance of power -wholly in their favour. - -The sense of justice, of historical proportion, and the logic of -economic evolution make one sympathize, in abstract principle, not only -with the _Weltpolitik_ of Germany, but also with Austria-Hungary's -desire for an outlet to the sea, and with Italy's longing to have in -the Mediterranean the position which history and geography indicated -ought to be, and might again be, hers. - -But sympathy in abstract principle is quite another thing from sympathy -in fact. In order to appreciate the _Weltpolitik_ of Germany, and be -able to form an intelligent opinion in regard to it--_for it is the -most vital and burning problem in the world to-day_--we must consider -it from the point of view of its _full significance in practice_ in the -history of the world. - -Bismarck posed as the disinterested "honest courtier" of Europe in the -Congress of Berlin. The declaration he had made, that the whole -question {27} of the Orient "was not worth the finger bone of a -Pomeranian grenadier," was corroborated by his actions during the -sessions of the Congress. We have striking illustrations of this in -the memoirs of Karatheodory pasha, who recorded from day to day, during -the memorable sessions of the Congress, his astonishment at the -indifference which Bismarck displayed to the nationalities of the -Balkans, and to the complications which might arise in Europe from -their rivalries. - -Bismarck did not see how vital was to be the Balkan question with the -future of the nation he had built. Nor did he see the intimate -relationship between the economic progress of united Germany and the -question of colonies. One searches in vain the speeches and writings -of the Iron Chancellor for any reference to the importance of the two -problems, in seeking the solution of which the fabric of his building -is threatened with destruction. - -Perhaps it is easy for us, in looking backwards, to point out the lack -of foresight which was shown by Bismarck in regard to the future of -Germany. Forty-five years later, we are able to pass in review the -unforeseen developments of international politics and the amazing -economic evolution of contemporary Europe. Perhaps it is unreasonable -to expect that much attention and thought should have been given by the -maker of modern Germany to the possible sphere that Germany might be -called upon to play in the world outside of Europe. - -For we must remember that the new Germany, after the Franco-Prussian -War, was wholly in an {28} experimental stage, and that the duty at -hand was the immediate consolidation of the various states into a -political and economic fabric. There was enough to demand all the -attention and all the genius of Bismarck and his co-workers in solving -these problems. Cordial relationship with Austria had to be -reëstablished. The dynasties of the south German kingdoms and of the -lesser potentates, whose names still remained legion in spite of the -_Reichsdeputationshauptschluss_ of 1803, had to be carefully handled. -There were four definite internal problems which confronted Bismarck: -the relationship of the empire to the Catholic Church; the -reconciliation of the different peoples into a harmonious whole; the -establishment of representative government without giving the strong -socialistic elements the upper hand; and the development of the -economic wealth of Germany. - -There was little time to think of Germany's place in the world's -politics. In foreign affairs, it was considered that the exigencies of -the moment could be met by adopting a policy of conciliation towards -both Russia and Austria, and the winning of the friendship of Italy. -The _Kulturkampf_, the creation of the _Bundesrath_ under Prussian -hegemony, and the formation of the Triple Alliance and the events -connected with them, are important in an analysis of Germany's -international politics. Unfortunately we cannot bring them into the -scope of this book. We can mention only the various factors that have -been directly responsible for giving birth to what is called the -_Weltpolitik_. - -{29} - -These factors are the belief of the German people in the superiority of -their race and its world-civilizing mission; their connotation of the -word "German"; the consciousness of their military strength being -disproportionate to their political influence; the rapid increase of -the population and the development of the industrial and commercial -prosperity of the empire; and the realization of the necessity of a -strong navy, with naval bases and coaling-stations in all parts of the -world, for the adequate protection of commerce. - -_The belief of the German people in the superiority of their race and -its world-civilizing mission is a sober fact_. It pervades every class -of society from the Kaiser down to the workingman. It is heralded from -the pulpit, taught in the schools, and is a scientific statement in the -work of many of Germany's leading scholars. The anthropologist -Woltmann said that "the German is the superior type of the species -_homo sapiens_, from the physical as well as the intellectual point of -view." Wirth declared that "the world owes its civilization to Germany -alone" and that "the time is near when the earth must inevitably be -conquered by the Germans." The scientific book--a serious one--in -which these statements occur was so popular that it sold five editions -in three years! Paulsen remarked that "humanity is aware of, and -admires, the German omnipresence." Hartmann taught that the European -family is divided into two races, male and female, of which the first, -of course, was exclusively German, while the second included Latins, -Celts, and Slavs. "Marriage is inevitable." Goethe expressed in -_Faust_ the opinion that the work {30} of the Germans was to make the -habitable world worth living in, while Schiller boasted, "Our language -shall reign over the whole world," and that "the German day lasts until -the end of time." Schiller also prophesied that "two empires shall -perish in east and west, I tell you, and it is only the Lutheran faith -which shall remain." Fichte, one hundred years ago, exhorted the -Germans to be "German patriots, and we shall not cease to be -cosmopolitan." Heine believed that "not only Alsace and Lorraine, but -all France shall be ours." - -To show the German state of mind towards those whom they have not -hesitated to provoke to arms, the remarkable teaching of Hummel's book, -which is used in the German primary schools, is a convincing -illustration. Frenchmen are monkeys, and the best and strongest -elements in the French race asserted to be German by blood. The -Russians are slaves, as their name implies. Treitschke's opinion of -the British is that "among them love of money has killed all sentiment -of honour and all distinction of just and unjust. Their setting sun is -our aurora." One of the leading newspapers of Germany recently said: -"The army of the first line of which Germany will dispose from the -first day of the mobilization will be sufficient to crush France, even -if we must detach a part of it against England. If England enters the -war, it will be the end of the British Empire, for England is a -colossus with feet of clay." - -The Kaiser has been the spokesman of the nation in heralding publicly -the belief in the superiority of the German people, and its world -mission. It was {31} at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding -of the Empire that the scope of the _Weltpolitik_ was announced by -Wilhelm II. He said: - - -"The German Empire has become a world empire (_ein Weltreich_). -Everywhere, in the most distant lands, are established thousands and -thousands of our compatriots. German science, German activity, the -defenders of the German ideal pass the ocean. By thousands of millions -we count the wealth that Germany transports across the seas. It is -your duty, gentlemen, to aid me to establish strong bonds between our -Empire of Europe and this greater German Empire (_dieses grëssere -Deutsche Reich_) ... May our German Fatherland become one day so -powerful that, as one formerly used to say, _Civis romanus sum_, one -may in the future need only to say, _Ich bin ein deutscher Burger_." - - -At Aix-la-Chapelle, on June 20, 1902, he revealed his ambition in one -sentence, "_It is to the empire of the world that the German genius -aspires_." Just before leaving for the visit to Tangier in 1905--the -visit which was really the beginning of one of the great issues of the -present war--he said at Bremen: "If later one must speak in history of -a universal domination by the Hohenzollern, of a universal German -empire, this domination must not be established by military -conquest.... _God has called us to civilize the world: we are the -missionaries of human progress_." This idea was developed further at -Münster, on September 1, 1907, when the Kaiser proclaimed: "The German -people will be the block of granite on which our Lord will be able to -elevate and achieve the civilization of the world!" - -{32} - -This attitude of mind is as common among the disciples of those -wonderful leaders who founded the international movement for the -solidarity of interests of labour, as it is among the aristocratic and -intellectual elements of the nation. The German Socialist has -proclaimed the brotherhood of man, and the common antagonism of the -wage-earners of the world against their capitalistic oppressors. But, -for all his preaching, the German Socialist is first of all a German. -He has come to believe that the mission of Socialism will be best -fulfilled through the triumph of Germanism. This belief is sincere. -It is a far cry from Karl Marx to the militant--or rather -militarist--German Socialist, bearing arms gladly upon the battlefields -of Europe to-day, because he is inspired by the thought that the -triumph of the army in which he fights will aid the cause of -Socialism.[1] - - -[1] While the _Landtage_ of the German states are mostly controlled by -Conservative elements, owing to restricted suffrage, the _Reichstag_ is -one of the most intelligently democratic legislative bodies in the -world. Its social legislation is surpassed by that of no other -country. During thirty years the Socialist vote in Germany has -increased one thousand per cent. It now represents one-third of the -total electorate. But the Socialists are to a man behind the war. - - -There is a striking analogy between the German Socialist of the present -generation and the Jacobins of 1793. The heralders of _Liberté, -Egalité et Fraternité_ fought for the spread of the principles of the -Revolution through God's chosen instruments, the armies of France, and -were carried away by their enthusiasm until they became the facile -agents for saddling Europe with the tyranny of Napoleon. Love for {33} -humanity was turned into blood-lust, and fighting for freedom into -seeking for booty and glory. Are the profound thinkers of the German -universities, and the visionaries of the workingmen's forums following -to-day the same path? Does the propagation of an ideal lead inevitably -to a blind fanaticism, where the dreamer becomes in his own imagination -a chosen instrument of God to shed blood? - -There is undoubtedly an intellectual and idealistic basis to German -militarism and to German arrogance. - -_Their connotation of the word_ "_German_" has led the Germans to look -upon territories outside of their political confines as historically -and racially, hence rightfully, virtually, and eventually theirs. A -geography now in its two hundred and forty-fifth edition in the public -schools (Daniel's _Leitfaden der Geographie_) states that "Germany is -the heart of Europe. Around it extend Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, -Luxemburg, and Holland, which were all formerly part of the same state, -and are peopled entirely or in the majority by Germans." - -When German children have been for the past generation deliberately -taught as a matter of fact--not as an academic or debatable -question--that _Deutschland_ ought to be more than it is, we can -understand how the neutrality of their smaller neighbours seems to the -Germans a negligible consideration. No wonder the soldiers who ran up -against an implacable enemy at Liège, Namur, and Charleroi thought -there must be a mistake somewhere, and were more angered against the -opposition of those whom they regarded as their brothers of {34} blood -than they later showed themselves against the French. No wonder that -the sentiment of the whole German nation is for the retention of -Belgium, their path to the sea. It was formerly German. Its -inhabitants are German. Let it become German once more! - -But to the Germans there are other and equally important elements -belonging to their nation outside of the states upon the confines of -the empire. These are the German emigrants and German colonists in all -portions of the world. In recent years there has come to the front -more than ever the theory that _German nationality cannot be lost by -foreign residence or by transference of allegiance to another State: -once a German, always a German_. - -Convincing proof of this is found in the new citizenship law, -sanctioned with practical unanimity by the _Reichstag_ and -_Bundesrath_, which went into effect on January 1, 1914. According to -Article XIII of this law, "a former German who has not taken up his -residence in Germany may on application be naturalized." This applies -also _to one who is descended from a former German, or who has been -adopted as the child of such_! According to Article XIV, any former -German who holds a position in the German Empire in any part of the -world, in the service of a German religious society or of a German -school, is looked upon as a German citizen "by assumption." Any -foreigner holding such a position may be naturalized without having a -legal residence in Germany. The most interesting provision of all is -in Article XXV, section 2 of which says: "Citizenship is not lost by -{35} one who before acquiring foreign citizenship has secured on -application the written consent of the competent authorities of his -home state to retain his citizenship." - -Germany allows anyone of German blood to become a German citizen, even -if he has never seen Germany and has no intention of taking up his -residence there; and Germans, who have emigrated to other countries, -secure the amazing opportunity to acquire foreign citizenship without -losing their German citizenship. - -The result of this law, since the war broke out, has been to place a -natural and justifiable suspicion upon all Germans living in the -countries of the enemies of Germany. It is impossible to overestimate -the peril from the secret ill-will and espionage of Germans residing in -the countries that are at war with Germany. There are undoubtedly many -thousands of cases where Germans have been honest and sincere in their -change of allegiance, but how are the nations where they have become -naturalized to be sure of this? A legal means has been given to these -naturalized Germans to retain, _without the knowledge of the nation -where their oath of allegiance has been received in good faith_, -citizenship in Germany. - -German emigration and colonization societies, and many seemingly purely -religious organizations for "the propagation of the faith in foreign -lands," have been untiring in their efforts to preserve in the minds of -Germans who have left the Fatherland the principle, "once a German -always a German." The Catholic as well as the Lutheran Church has lent -{36} itself to this effort. Wherever there are Germans, one finds the -German church, the German school, the _Zeitung_, the _Bierhalle_, and -the _Turnverein_. The Deutschtum is sacred to the Germans. One cannot -but have the deepest respect for the pride of Germans in their -ancestry, in their language, in their church, and in the preservation -of traditional customs. There is no better blood in the world than -German blood, and one who has it in his veins may well be proud of it: -for it is an inheritance which is distinctly to a man's intellectual -and physical advantage. But, in recent years, the effort has been made -to confuse _Deutschtum_ with _Deutschland_. Here lies a great danger. -We may admire and reverence all that has come to us from Germany. But -the world cannot look on impassively at a propaganda which is leading -to _Deutschland über alles!_ - -When we take the megalomania of the Germans, their ambition to fulfil -their world mission, their belief in their peculiar fitness to fulfil -that mission, and their idea of the German character of the -neighbouring states, and contrast the dream with the reality, we see -how they must feel, _especially as they are conscious of the fact that -they dispose of a military strength disproportionate to their position -in mondial politics_. Great Britain, with one-third less population, -"the colossus with the feet of clay," owns a good fourth of the whole -world; France, the nation of "monkeys," which was easily crushed in -1870, holds sway over untold millions of acres and natives in Africa -and Asia; while Russia, the nation of "slaves," has a half of Europe -and Asia. - -{37} - -The most civilized people in the world, with a world mission to fulfil, -is dispossessed by its rivals of inferior races _and of inferior -military strength_! The thinking German is by the very nature of -things a militarist. - -But even if the _logic_ of the _Weltpolitik_, under the force of -circumstances, did not push the German of every class and category to -the belief that Germany must solve her great problems of the present -day by force of arms, especially since her military strength is so much -greater than that of her rivals, the nature of the German would make -him lean towards force as the decisive argument in the question of -extending his influence. For from the beginning of history the -_German_ has been a _war man_. He has asserted himself by force. He -has proved less amenable to the refining and softening influences of -Christianity and civilization than any other European race. He has -worshipped force, and relied wholly upon force to dominate those with -whom he has come into contact. The leopard cannot change his spots. -So it is as natural for the German of the twentieth century to use the -sword as an argument as it was for the German of the tenth century, or, -indeed, of the first century. We cannot too strongly insist upon this -fatal tendency of the German to subordinate natural, moral, legal, and -technical rights to the supremacy of brute force. There is no -conception of what is called "moral suasion" in the German mind. -Although some of the greatest thinkers of the world have been and are -to-day Germans, yet the German nation has never come to the realization -that the pen {38} may be mightier than the sword. Give the German a -pen, and he will hold the world in admiration of his intellect. Give -him a piano or a violin, and he will hold the world in adoration of his -soul. But give him a sword, and he will hold the world in abhorrence -of his force. For there never was an _übermensch_ who was not a devil. -Else he would be God. - -But the _Weltpolitik_ has had other and more tangible and substantial -causes than the three we have been considering. It is not wholly the -result of the German idea that Germany can impose her will upon the -world and has the right to do so. The power of Germany comes from the -fact that her people have been workers as well as dreamers. _The rapid -increase of the population and development of the industrial and -commercial prosperity of the empire_ have given the Germans a wholly -justifiable economic foundation for their _Weltpolitik_. - -United Germany, after the successful war of 1870, began the greatest -era of industrial growth and prosperity that has ever been known in the -history of the world. Not even the United States, with all its annual -immigration and opening up of new fields and territories, has been able -to show an industrial growth comparable to that of Germany during the -past forty years. In this old central Europe cities have grown almost -over night. Railways have been laid down, one after the other, until -the whole empire is a network of steel. Mines and factories have -sprung into being as miraculously as if it had been by the rubbing of -Aladdin's lamp. The population has increased more than half in forty -years. - -{39} - -It was as her population and her productive power increased far more -quickly and far beyond that of her neighbours, that Germany began to -look out into the extra-European world for markets. She had reached -the point when her productivity, in manufacturing lines, had exceeded -her power of consumption. Where find markets for the goods? German -merchants, and not Prussian militarists, began to spread abroad in -Germany the idea that there was a world equilibrium, as important to -the future of the nations of Europe as was the European equilibrium. -Germany, looking out over the world, saw that the prosperity of Great -Britain was due to her trade, and that the security and volume of this -trade were due to her colonies. - -Who does not remember the remarkable stamp issued by the Dominion of -Canada to celebrate the Jubilee of Queen Victoria? On the mercatorial -projection of the world, the British possessions were given in red. -One could not find any corner of the globe where there were not ports -to which British ships in transit could go, and friendly markets for -British commerce. The Germans began to compare their industries with -those of Great Britain. Their population was larger than that of the -great colonial power, and was increasing more rapidly. Their -industries were growing apace. For their excess population, emigration -to a foreign country meant annual loss of energetic and capable -compatriots. Commerce had to meet unfair competition in every part of -the world. Outside of the Baltic and North Seas, there was no place -that a {40} German ship could touch over which the German flag waved. - -It was not militarism or chauvinism or megalomania, but the natural -desire of a people who found themselves becoming prosperous to put -secure and solid foundations under that prosperity, that made the -Germans seek for colonies and launch forth upon the _Weltpolitik_. - -The first instance of the awakening on the part of the German people to -a sense that there was something which interested them outside of -Europe, was the annexation by Great Britain in 1874 of the Fiji -Islands, with which German traders had just begun, at great risk and -painstaking efforts, to build up a business. This was the time when -the Government was engaged in its struggles with the Church and -socialism, and when the working of the _Reichstag_ and the _Bundesrath_ -was still in an experimental stage. Nothing could be done. _But there -began to be a feeling among Germans that in the future Germany ought to -be consulted concerning the further extension of the sovereignty of a -European nation over any part of the world then unoccupied or still -independent_. But Germany was not in a position either to translate -this sentiment into a vigorous foreign policy, or to begin to seize her -share of the world by taking the portions which Great Britain and -Russia and France had still left vacant. - -German trade, still in its infancy, received cruel setbacks by the -British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and of Egypt in 1883, the French -occupation of Tunis in 1881, and the Russian and British dealings {41} -with central Asia and Afghanistan. The sentiment of the educated and -moneyed classes in Germany began to impose upon the Government the -necessity of entering the colonial field. The action in Egypt and in -Tunis brought about the beginning of German colonization. Bismarck had -just finished successfully his critical struggle with the socialists. -The decks were cleared for action. In 1882, a Bremen trader, Herr -Lüdritz, by treaties with the native chiefs, gained the Bay of -Angra-Pequena on the west coast of Africa. For two years no attention -was paid to this treaty, which was a purely private commercial affair. -In 1884, shortly after the occupation of Egypt, a dispute arose between -the British authorities at Cape Town and Herr Lüdritz. Bismarck saw -that he must act, or the old story of extension of British sovereignty -would be repeated. He telegraphed to the German Consul at Cape Town -that the Imperial Government had annexed the coast and _hinterland_ -from the Orange River to Cape Frio. - -Other annexations in Africa and the Pacific followed in the years -1884-1886. In Africa, the German flag was hoisted over the east coast -of the continent, north of Cape Delgado and the river Rovuma, and in -Kamerun and Togo on the Gulf of Guinea. In the Pacific, Kaiser -Wilhelm's Land was formed of a portion of New Guinea, with some -adjacent islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, -and the Marshall Islands were gathered in. Since those early years of -feverish activity, there have been no new acquisitions in Africa, other -than the portion of French Congo ceded {42} in 1912 as "compensation" -for the French protectorate of Morocco. In the Pacific, in 1899, after -the American conquest of the Philippines, the Caroline, Pelew, and -Marianne groups and two of the Samoan Islands were added. - -In China, Germany believed that she had the right to expect to gain a -position equal to that of Great Britain at Hongkong and Shanghai, of -France at Tonkin, and Russia in Manchuria. She believed that it was -just as necessary for her to have a fortified port to serve as a naval -base for her fleet as it was for the other Powers, and that by a -possession of territory which could be called her own she would be best -able to get her share of the commerce of the Far East. From 1895 to -1897, Germany examined carefully all the possible places which would -serve best for the establishment of a naval and commercial base. At -the beginning of 1897, after naval and commercial missions had made -their reports, a technical mission was sent out whose membership -included the famous Franzius, the creator of Kiel. This mission -reported in favour of Kiau-Chau on the peninsula of Shantung in north -China. - -When negotiations were opened with the Chinese, the answer of the -Chinese Government was to send soldiers to guard the bay! The Kaiser, -in a visit to the Czar at Peterhof in the summer of 1897, secured -Russian "benevolent neutrality." The murder of two missionaries in the -interior of the province, on November 1st of the same year, gave -Germany her chance. Three German war vessels landed troops on the -peninsula, and seized Kiau-Chau and Tsing-Tau. {43} After five months -of tortuous negotiations, a treaty was concluded between Germany and -China on March 6, 1899. Kiau-Chau with adjacent territory was leased -to Germany for ninety-nine years. To German capital and German -commerce were given the right of preference for every industrial -enterprise on the peninsula, the concession for the immediate -construction of a railway, and the exclusive right to mining along the -line of the railway. Thus the greater part of the province of Shantung -passed under the economic influence of Germany. - -The entry of Japan into the war of 1914 is due to her desire to remedy -a great injustice which has been done to Japanese commerce in the -province of Shantung by the German occupation, to her fear of this -naval base opposite her coast (just as she feared Port Arthur), and -probably to the intention of occupying the Marianne Islands, the -Marshall Islands, and the Eastern and Western Carolines, in order that -the Japanese navy may have important bases in a possible future -conflict with the United States. - -When Germany leased Kiau-Chau, she declared solemnly that the port of -Tsing-Tau would be an open port, _ein frei Hafen für allen Nationen_. -But Japanese trade competition soon caused her to go back on her word. -She conceived a clever scheme in 1906, by which the Chinese customs -duties were allowed to be collected within the Protectorate in return -for an annual sum of twenty per cent. upon the entire customs receipts -of the Tsing-Tau district. In this way, she is more than recompensed -for the generosity displayed in allowing German goods to {44} be -subject to the Chinese customs. She reimburses herself at the expense -of the Japanese! Berlin could not have been astonished at the -ultimatum of August 15th from Tokio. - -There has always been much opposition in Germany to the colonization -policy of the Government, the dissatisfaction over the poor success of -the attempts at African colonization led Chancellor Caprivi to state -that the worst blow an enemy could give him was to force upon him more -territories in Africa! The Germans never got on well with the negroes. -Their colonists, for the most part too poor to finance properly -agricultural schemes, lived by trading. Like all whites, they cheated -the natives and bullied them into giving up their lands. In South-West -Africa, a formidable uprising of the Herreros resulted in the massacre -of all the Germans except the missionaries and the colonists who had -established themselves there before the German occupation. The -suppression of this rebellion took more than a year, and cost Germany -an appalling sum in money and many lives. But it cost the natives -more. Two thirds of the nation of the Herreros were massacred: while -only six or seven thousand were in arms, the German official report -stated that forty thousand were killed. The Germans confiscated all -the lands of the natives. - -In 1906, after twenty-one years of German rule, there were in -South-West Africa sixteen thousand prisoners of war out of a total -native population of thirty-one thousand. All the natives lived in -concentration camps, and were forced to work for the {45} Government. -In commenting upon the Herrero campaign, Pastor Frenssen, one of the -most brilliant writers of modern Germany, put in the mouth of the hero -of his colonial novel the following words: "God has given us the -victory because we were the most noble race, and the most filled with -initiative. That is not saying much, when we compare ourselves with -this race of negroes; but we must act in such a way as to become better -and more active than all the other people of the world. It is to the -most noble, to the most firm that the world belongs. Such is the -justice of God." - -German opposition has been bitter also against the occupation of -Kiau-Chau. For traders have claimed that the _political_ presence of -Germany on the Shantung peninsula and the dealings of the German -diplomats with the Pekin court had so prejudiced the Chinese against -everything German that it was harder to do business with them than -before the leasehold was granted. They actually advocated the -withdrawal of the protectorate for the good of German commerce! - -But German pride was at stake in Africa after the Herrero rebellion. -And in China, Kiau-Chau was too valuable a naval base to give up. In -1907, a ministry of colonies was added to the Imperial Cabinet. Since -then the colonial realm has been considered an integral part of the -Empire. - -At every point of this colonial development, Germany found herself -confronted with open opposition and secret intrigue. The principal -strategic value of south-west Africa was taken away by the {46} British -possession of Walfisch Bay, and of east Africa by the protectorate -consented to by the Sultan of Zanzibar to the British Crown. Togoland -and Kamerun are hemmed in by French and British possession of the -_hinterland_. The Pacific islands are mostly "left-overs," or of minor -importance. In spite of the unpromising character of these colonies, -the commerce of Germany with them increased from 1908 to 1912 five -hundred per cent., and the commerce with China through Kiau-Chau from -1902 to 1912 nearly a thousand per cent. - -And yet, in comparison to her energies and her willingness--let us -leave till later the question of ability and fitness--Germany has had -little opportunity to exercise a colonial administration on a large -scale. She must seek to extend her political influence over new -territories. Where and how? That has been the question. Most -promising of all appeared the succession to the Portuguese colonies, -for the sharing of which Great Britain declared her willingness to meet -Germany halfway. An accord was made in 1898, against the eventuality -of Portugal selling her colonies. But since the Republic was -proclaimed in Portugal, there has been little hope that her new -Government would consider itself strong enough to part with the -heritage of several centuries. - -For the increase of her colonial empire, Germany has felt little hope. -So she has tried to secure commercial privileges in various parts of -the world, through which political control might eventually come. We -have already spoken of her effort in {47} China. Separate chapters -treat of her efforts in the three Moslem countries, Morocco, Persia, -and Turkey, and show how in each case she has found herself checkmated -by the intrigues and accords of the three rich colonial Powers. - -Long before the political union of the German States in Europe was -accomplished, there were German aspirations in regard to the New World, -when Pan-Germanists dreamed of forming states in North and South -America. - -These enthusiasts did not see that the Civil War had so brought -together the various elements of the United States, the most prominent -and most loyal of which was the German element, that any hope of a -separatist movement in the United States was chimerical. As late as -1885, however, the third edition of Roscher's _Kolonien, -Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung_ stated that "it would be a great step -forward, if the German immigrants to North America would be willing to -concentrate themselves in one of the states, and transform it into a -German state." For different reasons Wisconsin would appear to be most -particularly indicated. - -As early as 1849, the Germans commenced to organize emigration to -Brazil through a private society of Hamburg (_Hamburger -Kolonisationverein_), which bought from the Prince de Joinville, -brother-in-law of Dom Pedro, vast territories in the state of Santa -Catharina. There the German colonization in Brazil began. It soon -extended to the neighbouring states of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul. -There are now about three hundred and fifty thousand {48} Germans, -forming two per cent. of the population. In no district are they more -than fifteen per cent. However, in Rio Grande, there is a territory of -two hundred kilometres in which the German language is almost wholly -spoken; and a chain of German colonies binds Sao Leopoldo to Santa Cruz. - -Among the Pan-Germanists, the three states of southern Brazil have been -regarded as a zone particularly reserved for German expansion. The -colonial congress of 1902 at Berlin expressed a formal desire that -hereafter German emigration be directed towards the south of Brazil. -An amendment to include Argentina was rejected. The decree of Prussia, -forbidding emigration to Brazil, was revoked in 1896 in so far as it -was a question of the three states of Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio -Grande do Sul. - -It has not been very many years since diplomatic incidents arose -between Brazil and Germany over fancied German violation of Brazilian -territory by the arrest of sailors on shore. But Germany has not -entertained serious hope of getting a foothold in South America. -Brazil has increased greatly in strength, and there is to-day in South -America a tacit alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to -support the American Monroe Doctrine. Germany found, when she was -trying to buy a West India island from Denmark, that she had to reckon -not only with Washington, but also with Buenos Ayres, Rio, and Santiago. - -Finding herself so thoroughly hemmed in on all sides, in the New World -and in the Old World, by alliances and accords directed against her -overseas {49} political expansion, modern Germany has repeated the -history of the Jews. Deprived of some senses, one develops -extraordinarily others. Deprived of civil and social rights for -centuries, the Jews developed the business sense until to-day their -wealth and influence in the business world are far beyond the -proportionate numbers of their race. Deprived of the opportunity to -administer and develop vast overseas territories, the Germans have -turned to intensive military development at home and extensive -commercial development abroad, until to-day they are the foremost -military Power in Europe, and are threatening British commercial -supremacy in every part of the globe. - -The German counterpart of the British and French and Russian elements -that are directing the destinies of vast colonies and protectorates is -investing its energy in business. During the past generation, the -German campaign for the markets of the world has been carried on by the -brightest and best minds in Germany. There have been three phases to -this campaign: manufacturing the goods, selling the goods, and carrying -the goods. German manufactures have increased so greatly in volume and -scope since the accession of the present Emperor that there is hardly a -line of merchandise which is not offered in the markets of the world by -German firms. - -Articles "made in Germany" may not be as well made as those of other -countries. But their price is more attractive, and they have driven -other goods from many fields. One sees this right in Europe in the -markets of Germany's competitors and enemies. {50} Since the present -war began, French and British patriots are hard put to it sometimes -when they find that article after article which they have been -accustomed to buy is German. In my home in Paris, the elevator is -German, electrical fixtures are German, the range in my kitchen is -German, the best lamps for lighting are German. I have discovered -these things in the past month through endeavouring to have them -repaired. Interest led me to investigate other articles in daily use. -My cutlery is German, my silverware is German, the chairs in my -dining-room are German, the mirror in my bathroom is German, some of my -food products are German, and practically all the patented drugs and -some of the toilet preparations are German. - -All these things have been purchased in the Paris markets, without the -slightest leaning towards, or preference for, articles coming from the -Fatherland. I was not aware of the fact that I was buying German -things. They sold themselves,--the old combination of appearance, -convenience, and price, which will sell anything. - -That I am unconsciously using German manufactured articles is largely -due to the genius of the salesman. It is a great mistake to believe -that salesmanship is primarily the art of selling the goods of the -house you represent. That has been the British idea. It is today -exploded. Is it because the same type as the Britisher who is devoting -his brains and energy to solving the problems of inferior people in -different parts of the world is among the Germans devoting his energies -to German commerce in those {51} same places, that the Germans have -found the fine art of salesmanship to be quite a different thing? It -is studying the desires of the people to whom you intend to sell, -finding out what they want to buy, and persuading your house at home to -make and export those articles. From the Parisian and the Londoner, -and the New Yorker down to the naked savage, the Germans know what is -wanted, and they supply it. If the British university man is enjoying -a position of authority and of fascinating perplexity in some colony, -and feels that he has a share in shaping the destinies of the world, -the German university man is not without his revenge. Deprived of one -sense, has he not developed another--and a more practical one? - -The young German, brought up in an overpopulated country, unable to -enter a civil service which will keep him under his own flag--and -remember how intensely patriotic he is, this young German, just as -patriotic as the young Frenchman or the young Britisher,--must leave -home. He is not of the class from which come the voluntary emigrants. -His ties are all in Germany: his love--and his move--all for Germany. -So he becomes a German resident abroad, in close connection with the -Fatherland, and always working for the interests of the Fatherland. He -goes to England or to France, where he studies carefully and -methodically, as if he were to write a thesis on it (and he often -does), the business methods of and the business opportunities among the -people where he is dwelling. He is giving his life to put _Deutschland -über alles_ in business right in the {52} heart of the rival nation, -_and he is succeeding_. During October, 1914, when they tried to -arrest in the larger cities of England the German and Austrian subjects -they had to stop--there was not room in the jails for all of them! And -in many places business was paralyzed. - -In carrying the products of steadily increasing volume to steadily -growing markets, Germany has been sensible enough to make those markets -pay for the cost of transport. Up to the very selling price, all the -money goes to Germany. The process is simple: from German factories, -by German ships, through German salesmen, to German firms, in every -part of the world--beginning with London and Paris. - -Germany's merchant marine has kept pace with the development of her -industry. Essen may be the expression of one side of modern Germany, -which is said to have caused the European war. But one is more logical -in believing that Hamburg and Bremen and the Kiel Canal have done more -to bring on this war than the products of Krupp. During the last -twenty-five years the tonnage of Germany's merchant marine has -increased two hundred and fifty per cent., a quarter of which _has been -in the last five years, from 1908-1913_. There are six times as many -steamships flying the German flag as when Wilhelm II mounted the -throne. In merchant ships, Germany stands today second only to Great -Britain. The larger portion of her merchant marine is directed by -great corporations. The struggle against Great Britain and France for -the freight carrying of outside nations has been most bitter--and most -successful. _Before {53} the present war, there was no part of the -world in which the German flag was not carried by ships less than ten -years old_. - -With the exception of Kiau-Chau, the colonies of Germany have never -been of much practical value, except as possible coaling and wireless -stations for the German fleet. But here also the opposition of her -rivals has minimized their value. Walfisch Bay and Zanzibar have, as -we have already said, lessened the strategical value of the two large -colonies on either side of the African continent. In the division of -the Portuguese colonies agreed to by Great Britain, it was "the -mistress of the seas" who was to have the strategic places--not part of -them, but all of them, the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira, and the Azores. - -As Germany's commerce and shipping have so rapidly developed, the -seeking for opportunities to extend her political sovereignty outside -of Europe has not been so much an outlook for industrial enterprise as -the imperative necessity of finding naval bases and coaling stations in -different parts of the world for the adequate protection of commerce. -The development of the German navy has been the logical complement of -the development of the German merchant marine. Germany's astonishing -naval program has kept pace with the astonishing growth of the great -Hamburg and Bremen lines. Germany has had exactly the same argument -for the increase of her navy as has had Great Britain. Justification -for the money expended on the British navy is that Great Britain needs -the navy to protect her commerce, upon which the life of the nation is -dependent, {54} and to guarantee her food-supplies. The industrial -evolution of Germany has brought about for her practically the same -economic conditions as in Great Britain. In addition to the dependence -of her prosperity upon the power of her navy to protect her commerce, -Germany has felt that she must keep the sea open for the sake of -guaranteeing uninterrupted food-supplies for her industrial population. -It must not be forgotten that Germany is flanked on east and west by -hereditary enemies, and has come to look to the sea as the direction -from which her food supplies would come in case of war. - -This last factor of the _Weltpolitik_, the creation of a strong navy, -must not be looked upon either as a provocation to Great Britain or as -a menace to the equilibrium of the world. If it has brought Germany -inevitably into conflict with Great Britain, it is because the navy is -the safeguard of commerce. The _Weltpolitik_ is essentially a -_Handelspolitik_. The present tremendous conflict between Great -Britain and Germany is the result of commercial rivalry. It is more a -question of the pocket-book than of the sacredness of treaties, if we -are looking for the cause rather than the occasion of the war. It has -come in spite of honest efforts to bring Great Britain and Germany -together. - -Lord Haldane, in February, 1912, made a trip to Berlin to bring about a -general understanding between the two nations. But while there was -much discussion of the question of the Bagdad Railway, Persian and -Chinese affairs, Walfisch Bay, and the division of Africa, nothing came -of it. On March {55} 18th, Mr. Churchill said to the House of Commons: -"If Germany adds two ships in the next six years, we shall have to add -four; if Germany adds three, we shall have to add six. Whatever -reduction is made in the German naval program will probably be followed -here by a corresponding naval reduction. The Germans will not get -ahead of us, no matter what increase they make; they will not lose, no -matter what decrease they make." This was as far as Great Britain -could go. - -In the spring of 1912, the British fleet was concentrated in the North -Sea, and an accord was made with France for common defensive action in -the North Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, during M. -Poincaré's trip to Petrograd, an accord was signed between France and -Russia for common naval action in time of war. - -The Pan-Germanic movement in recent years has not been a tool of the -Government, but rather a party, including other parties, banded -together more than once to oppose the German Government in an -honourable attempt to preserve peace with the neighbours in the west. - -It is a tremendous mistake--and a mistake which has been continuously -made in the French, British, and American press since the beginning of -the war--to consider the _Weltpolitik_ as an expression of the -sentiments of the German Emperor and his officials. Since it was -forced upon Bismarck against his will, Pan-Germanism has been a power -against which the Emperor William II has had to strive frequently -throughout his reign. For it has never hesitated to {56} force him -into paths and into positions which were perilous to the theory of -monarchical authority. The Kaiser has resented the pressure of public -opinion in directing the affairs of the Empire. Pan-Germanism has been -a striking example of democracy, endeavouring to have a say in -governmental policies. The Naval and Army Leagues, the German Colonial -Society, and the Pan-Germanic Society are private groups, irresponsible -from the standpoint of the Government. They have declared the -governmental programs for an increase in armaments insufficient, and -have bitterly denounced and attacked them from the point of view -exactly opposite to that of the Socialists. The Pan-Germanic Society -refused to recognize the treaty concluded between Germany and France -after the Agadir incident. Said Herr Klaas at the Hanover Conference -on April 15, 1912: "We persist in considering Morocco as the country -which will become in the future, let us hope the near future, the -colony for German emigration." The same intractable spirit was shown in -Dr. Pohl's address at the Erfurt Congress in September, 1912. - -We hear much about the Kaiser and the military party precipitating war. -A review of the German newspapers during the past few years will -convince any fair-minded reader that German public opinion, standing -constantly behind the Pan-Germanists, has frequently made the German -Foreign Office act with a much higher hand in international questions -than it would have acted if left to itself, and that German public -opinion, from highest classes to lowest, is for this war to the bitter -finish. _It is the war of the {57} people, intelligently and -deliberately willed by them_. The statement that a revolution in -Germany, led by the democracy to dethrone the Kaiser or to get him out -of the clutches of the military party, would put an end to the war, is -foolish and pernicious. For it leads us to false hopes. It would be -much nearer the truth to say that if the Kaiser had not consented to -this war, he would have endangered his throne. - -The principle of the _Weltpolitik_, imposed upon European diplomacy by -the German nation in the assembling of the Conference of Algeciras, was -that no State should be allowed to disturb the existing political and -territorial _status quo_ of any country still free, in any part of the -world, without the consent of the other Powers. This _Weltpolitik_ -would have the natural effect, according to Karl Lamprecht, in his _Zur -Jüngsten Deutschen Vergangenheit_, of endangering a universal and -pitiless competition among the seven Great Powers in which the weakest -would eventually be eliminated. - - - - -{58} - -CHAPTER III - -THE "BAGDADBAHN" - -In the development of her _Weltpolitik_, the most formidable, the most -feasible, and the most successful conception of modern Germany has been -the economic penetration of Asiatic Turkey. She may have failed in -Africa and in China. But there can be no doubt about the successful -beginning, and the rich promise for the future, of German enterprises -in the Ottoman Empire. - -The countries of sunshine have always exercised a peculiar fascination -over the German. His literature is filled with the Mediterranean and -with Islam. From his northern climate he has looked southward and -eastward back towards the cradle of his race, and in imagination has -lived over again the Crusades. As long as Italy was under Teutonic -political influence, the path to the Mediterranean was easy. United -Italy and United Germany were born at the same time. But while the -birth of Italy threatened to close eventually the trade route to the -Mediterranean to Germany, the necessity of a trade route to the south -became more vital than ever to the new German Confederation from the -sequences of the union. - -{59} - -When her political consolidation was completed and her industrial era -commenced, Germany began to look around the world for a place to -expand. There were still three independent Mohammedan -nations--Morocco, Persia, and Turkey. In Morocco she found another -cause for conflict with France than Alsace-Lorraine. In Persia and -Turkey, she faced the bitter rivalry of Russia and Great Britain. - -The rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the fact that its -sovereign was Khalif of the Moslem world, led German statesmen to -believe that Constantinople was the best place in the world to centre -the efforts of their diplomacy in the development of the _Weltpolitik_. -Through allying herself with the Khalif, _Germany would find herself -able to strike eventually at the British occupation of India and Egypt, -and the French occupation of Algeria and Tunis, not only by joining the -interests of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Germanism, but also by winning a -place in Morocco opposite Gibraltar, a place in Asia Minor opposite -Egypt, and a place in Mesopotamia opposite India_. - -The certainty of economic success helped to make the political effort -worth while, even if it came to nothing. For Asia Minor and -Mesopotamia are countries that have been among the most fertile and -prosperous in the whole world. They could be so again. The present -backward condition of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia is due to the fact -that these countries have had no chance to live since they came under -Ottoman control, much less to develop their resources proportionately -to other nations. The {60} natives have been exploited by the Turkish -officials and by foreign holders of concessions. Frequently -concessions have been sought to stop, not to further, development. If -there have been climatic changes to account for lack of fertility in -Asia Minor, this is largely due to deforestation. Ibn Batutah, the -famous Moorish traveller of the first half of the fourteenth century, -and Shehabeddin of Damascus, his contemporary, have left glowing -accounts of the fertility and prosperity of regions of Asia Minor, now -hopelessly arid, as they existed on the eve of the foundation of the -Ottoman Empire. Not only have all the trees been cut down, but the -roots have been torn up for fuel! One frequently sees in the markets -of Anatolian towns the roots of trees for sale. The treatment of trees -is typical of everything else. The country has had no chance. In -Mesopotamia, the new irrigation schemes are not innovations of the -twentieth century, but the revival of methods of culture in vogue -thousands of years before Christ. - -The Romans and Byzantines improved their inheritance. The Osmanlis -ruined it. - -In addition to sunshine and romance, political advantages, and -prospects of making money, another influence has attracted the Germans -to the Ottoman Empire. There is a certain affinity between German and -Osmanli. The Germans have sympathy with the spirit of Islam, _as they -conceive it to be interpreted_ in the Turk. They admire the _yassak_ -of the Turk, which is the counterpart of their _verboten_. The von -Moltke who later led Prussia to her great victories had at the -beginning of his career an intimate knowledge {61} of the Turkish army. -He admired intensely the blind and passive obedience of the Turk to -authority, his imperturbability under misfortune and his fortitude in -facing hardship and danger. "Theirs not to reason why: theirs but to -do and die" is a spirit which German and Turk understand, and show, far -better than Briton, with all due respect to Tennyson. A Briton may -obey, but he questions all the same, and after the crisis is over he -demands a reckoning. Authority, to the Anglo-Saxon, rests in the body -politic, of which each individual is an integral--and -ineffaceable--part. - -The Turkish military and official cast is like that of the Germans in -three things: authority rests in superiors unaccountable to those whom -they command; the origin of authority is force upholding tradition; and -the sparing of human life and human suffering is a consideration that -must not be entertained when it is a question of advancing a political -or military end. I have seen both at work, and have seen the work of -both; so I have the right to make this statement. For all that, I have -German and Turkish friends, and deep affection for them, and deep -admiration for many traits of character of both nations. The trouble -is that the people of Germany and the people of Turkey allow their -official and military castes to do what their own instincts would not -permit them to do. The passivity of the Turk is natural: it is his -religion, his background, and his climate. The passivity of the German -is inexcusable. He will not exorcise the devil out of his own race. -It must be done for him. - -{62} - -In 1888, a group of German financiers, backed by the Deutsche Bank, -which was to have so powerful a future in Turkey, asked for the -concession of a railway line from Ismidt to Angora. The construction -of this line was followed by concessions for extension from Angora to -Cæsarea and for a _branch_ from the Ismidt-Angora line going south-west -from Eski Sheir to Konia. The extension to Cæsarea was never made. -That was not the direction in which the Germans wanted to go. The Eski -Sheir-Konia spur became the main line. The Berlin-Bagdad-Bassorah "all -rail route" was born. The Germans began to dream of connecting the -Baltic with the Persian Gulf. The Balkan Peninsula was to revert to -Austria-Hungary, and Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to Germany. The south -Slavs and the populations of the Ottoman Empire would be dispossessed -(the philosopher Haeckel actually prophesied this in a speech in 1905 -before the Geographical Society of Jena). Russia would be cut off from -the Mediterranean. This was the Pan-Germanist conception of the -_Bagdadbahn_. - -From the moment the first railway concession was granted to Germans in -Asia Minor, which coincided with the year of his accession, Wilhelm II -has been heart and soul with the development of German interests in the -Ottoman Empire. His first move in foreign politics was to visit Sultan -Abdul Hamid in 1889, when he was throwing off the yoke of Bismarck. -This visit was the beginning of an intimate connection between -Wilhelmstrasse and the Sublime Porte which has never been -interrupted--excepting {63} for a very brief period at the beginning of -the First Balkan War. The friendship between the Sultan and the Kaiser -was not in the least disturbed by the Armenian massacres. The -hecatombs of Asia Minor passed without a protest. In fact, five days -after the great massacre of August, 1896, in Constantinople, where -Turkish soldiers shot down their fellow-citizens under the eyes of the -Sultan and of the foreign ambassadors, Wilhelm II sent to Abdul Hamid -for his birthday a family photograph of himself with the Empress and -his children. - -In 1898, the Kaiser made his second voyage to Constantinople. This -voyage was followed by the concession extending the railway from Konia -to the Persian Gulf. It was the beginning of the _Bagdadbahn_ in the -official and narrower sense. After this visit of the Kaiser to Abdul -Hamid, the pilgrimage was continued to the Holy Land. At Baalbek, -there is a stone of typically German taste, set in the wall of the -great temple, to commemorate the visit of the man who dreamed he would -one day be master of the modern world. If this inscription seems a -sacrilege, what name have we for the large gap in the walls of -Jerusalem made for his triumphal entry to the Holy City? The great -Protestant German Church, whose corner-stone was laid by his father in -1869, was solemnly inaugurated by the Kaiser. As solemnly, he handed -over to Catholic Germans the title to land for a hospital and religious -establishment on the road to Bethlehem. Still solemnly, at a banquet -in his honour in Damascus, he turned to the Turkish Vali, and declared: -"Say to the three hundred million {64} Moslems of the world that I am -their friend." To prove his sincerity he went out to put a wreath upon -the tomb of Saladin. - -Wilhelm II at Damascus is reminiscent of Napoleon at Cairo. Egypt and -Syria and Mesopotamia have always cast a spell over men who have -dreamed of world empires; and Islam, as a unifying force for conquest, -has appealed to the imagination of others before the present German -Kaiser. I have used the word "imagination" intentionally. There never -has been any solidarity in the religion of Mohammed; there is none now; -there never will be. The idea of community of aims and community of -interests is totally lacking in the Mohammedan mind. Solidarity is -built upon the foundation of sacrifice of self for others. It is a -virtue not taught in the Koran, nor ever developed by any Mohammedan -civilizations. The failure of all political organisms of Mohammedan -origin to endure and to become strong has been due to the fact that -Mohammedans have never felt the necessity of giving themselves for the -common weal. The virility of a nation is in the virile service of -those who love it. If there is no willingness to serve, no incentive -to love, how can a nation live and be strong? - -The revelation of Germany's ambition by the granting of the concession -from Konia to the Persian Gulf, and the application of the German -financiers for a _firman_ constituting the Bagdad Railway Company, led -to international intrigues and negotiations for a share in the -construction of the line through Mesopotamia. It would be wearisome -and profitless {65} to follow the various phases of the Bagdad -question. Germany did not oppose international participation in the -concession. The expense of crossing the Taurus and the dubious -financial returns from the desert sections influenced the Germans to -welcome the financial support of others in an undertaking that they -would have found great difficulty in financing entirely by their own -capital. The _Bagdadbahn_ concession was granted in 1899: the _firman_ -constituting the company followed in 1903. - -Russia did not realize the danger of German influence at -Constantinople, and of the eventualities of the German "pacific -penetration" in Asia Minor. She adjusted the Macedonian question with -Emperor Franz Josef in order to have a free hand in Manchuria, and she -made no opposition to the German ambitions. She needed the friendly -neutrality of Germany in her approaching struggle with Japan. Once the -struggle was begun, Russia found herself actually dependent upon the -goodwill of Germany. It was not the time for Petrograd to fish in the -troubled waters of the Golden Horn. - -The situation was different with Great Britain. The menace of the -German approach to the Persian Gulf was brought to the British Foreign -Office just long enough before the Boer crisis became acute for a -decision to be made. Germany had sent engineers along the proposed -route of her railway. She had neglected to send diplomatic agents! - -The proposed--in fact the only feasible--terminus on the Persian Gulf -was at Koweit. Like the Sultan of Muscat, the Sheik of Koweit was -practically {66} independent of Turkey. While showing deference to the -Sultan as Khalif, Sheik Mobarek resisted every effort of the Vali of -Bassorah to exercise even the semblance of authority over his small -domain. In 1899, Colonel Meade, the British resident of the Persian -Gulf, signed with Mobarek a secret convention which assured to him -"special protection," _if he would make no cession of territory without -the knowledge and consent of the British Government_. The following -year, a German mission, headed by the Kaiser's Consul General at -Constantinople, arrived in Koweit to arrange the concession for the -terminus of the _Bagdadbahn_. They were too late. The door to the -Persian Gulf was shut in the face of Germany. - -Wilhelm II set into motion the Sultan. The Sublime Porte suddenly -remembered that Koweit was Ottoman territory, and began to display -great interest in forcing the Sheik to recognize the fact. A Turkish -vessel appeared at Koweit in 1901. But British warships and British -bluejackets upheld the _independence_ of Koweit! Since the -Constitution of 1908, all the efforts of the Young Turks at Koweit have -been fruitless. Germany remains blocked. - -British opposition to the German schemes was not limited to the -prevention of an outlet of the _Bagdadbahn_ at Koweit. In 1798, the -East India Company established a resident at Bagdad to spy upon and -endeavour to frustrate the influence of the French, just beginning to -penetrate towards India through the ambition of Napoleon to inherit the -empire of Alexander. Since that time, British interests have not -failed to be well looked after in Lower Mesopotamia. {67} After the -Lynch Brothers, in 1860, obtained the right of navigating on the -Euphrates, the development of their steamship lines gradually gave -Great Britain the bulk of the commerce of the whole region, in the -Persian as well as the Ottoman _hinterland_ of the Gulf. In 1895, -German commerce in the port of Bushir was non-existent, while British -commerce surpassed twelve million francs yearly. In 1905, the market -was shared about equally between Great Britain and Germany. In 1906, -the Hamburg-American Line established a service to Bassorah. British -merchants began to raise the cry that if the _Bagdadbahn_ appeared the -Germans would soon have not only the markets of Mesopotamia but also -that of Kermanshah. The Lynch Company declared that the _Bagdadbahn_ -would ruin their river service, and their representations were listened -to at London, despite the absurdity of their contention. The Lynches -were negotiating with Berlin also. This mixture of politics and -commerce in Mesopotamia is a sordid story, which does not improve in -the telling. - -The revolution of 1908 did not injure the German influence at -Constantinople as much as has been popularly supposed. The Germans -succeeded during the first troubled year in keeping in with both sides -through the genius of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, in spite of the -Bosnia-Herzegovina affair. Germany was fortunately out of the Cretan -and Macedonian muddles, in which her rivals were hopelessly entangled. -Mahmud Shevket pasha was always under German influence, and the Germans -had Enver bey, "hero of liberty," in training at Berlin. {68} German -influence at Constantinople succeeded also in withstanding the strain -of the Tripolitan War, although it grew increasingly embarrassing as -the months passed to be Turkey's best friend and at the same time the -ally of Italy! During the first disastrous period of the war of the -Balkan Allies against Turkey, it seemed for the time that the enemies -of Germany controlled the Sublime Porte. But the revolver of Enver bey -in the _coup d'état_ of January, 1913, brought once more the control of -Turkish affairs into hands friendly to Germany. They have remained -there ever since. - -Germany strengthened her railway scheme, and her hold on the -territories through which it was to pass, by the accord with Russia at -Potsdam in 1910. - -The last clever attack of British diplomacy on the _Bagdadbahn_ was -successfully met. In tracing the extension of the railway beyond -Adana, it was suggested to the Department of Public Works that the cost -of construction would be greatly reduced and the usefulness of the line -increased, if it passed by the Mediterranean littoral around the head -of the Gulf of Alexandretta. Then the control of the railway would -have been at the mercy of the British fleet. When the "revised" plans -went from the Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of War, it was -not hard for the German agents to persuade the General Staff to restore -the original route inland across the Amanus, following the old plan -agreed upon in the time of Abdul Hamid. More than that, the Germans -secured concessions for a branch line from Aleppo to the Mediterranean -at Alexandretta, {69} and for the construction of a port at -Alexandretta. The _Bagdadbahn_ was to have a Mediterranean terminus at -a fortified port, and Germany was to have her naval base in the -north-east corner of the Mediterranean, eight hours from Cyprus and -thirty-six hours from the Suez Canal! This was the revenge for Koweit. - -A month before the Servian ultimatum, Germany had contracted to grant a -loan to Bulgaria, one of the conditions of which was that Germany be -allowed to build a railway to the Ægean across the Rhodope Mountains to -Porto Laghos, and to construct a port there, six hours from the mouth -of the Dardanelles. There was a panic in Petrograd. - -The events in Turkey since the opening of the war are too recent -history and as yet too little understood to dwell upon. But the -reception accorded to the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ at the Dardanelles, -their present[1] anomalous position in "closed waters" in defiance of -all treaties, the abolition of the foreign post-offices, the unilateral -decision to abrogate the capitulations--all these straws show in which -direction the wind is blowing on the Bosphorus. A successful -termination of the German campaign in France, which at this writing -seems most improbable (in spite of the fact that the Germans are at -Compiègne and their aëroplanes pay us daily visits), would certainly -draw Turkey into the war--and to her ruin.[2] - - -[1] October, 1914. - -[2] This chapter was written before the sudden and astonishing acts of -war by Turkey in sinking a Russian ship and bombarding Russian Black -Sea ports on October 29, 1914. - - -{70} - -On the other hand, the German reliance upon embarrassing the French and -British in their Moslem colonies through posing as the defenders of -Islam and Islam's Khalif has not been well-founded. On the battlefield -of France, thousands of followers of Mohammed from Africa and Asia are -fighting loyally under the flags of the Allies. The Kaiser, for all -his dreams and hopes, has not succeeded in getting a single Mohammedan -to draw his sword for the combined causes of Pan-Germanism and -Pan-Islamism. Have the three hundred million Moslems forgotten the -declaration of Damascus? - -In seeking for the causes of the present conflict, it is impossible to -neglect Germany in the Ottoman Empire. As one looks up at Pera from -the Bosphorus, the most imposing building on the hill is the German -Embassy. It dominates Constantinople. There has been woven the web -that has resulted in putting Germany in the place of Great Britain to -prevent the Russian advance to the Dardanelles, in putting Germany in -the place of Russia to threaten the British occupation of India and the -trade route to India, and in putting Germany in the place of Great -Britain as the stubborn opponent of the completion of the African -Empire of France. The most conspicuous thread of the web is the -_Bagdadbahn_. In the intrigues of Constantinople, we see develop the -political evolution of the past generation, and the series of events -that made inevitable the European war of 1914. - - - - -{71} - -CHAPTER IV - -ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR - -In 1904, an accord was made between Great Britain and France in regard -to colonial policy in northern Africa. Great Britain recognized the -"special" interests of France in Morocco in exchange for French -recognition of Great Britain's "special" interests in Egypt. There was -a promise to defend each other in the protection of these interests, -but no actual agreement to carry this defence beyond the exercise of -diplomatic pressure. The accord was a secret one. Its exact terms -were not known until the incident of Agadir made necessary its -publication in November, 1911. - -But that there was an accord was known to all the world. Germany, who -had long been looking with alarm upon the extension of French influence -in Morocco, found in 1905 a favourable moment for protest. Russia had -suffered humiliation and defeat in her war with Japan. Neither in a -military nor a financial way was she at that moment a factor to be -reckoned with in support of France. Great Britain had not recovered -from the disasters to her military organization of the South African -campaign. Her domestic politics were in a chaotic state. The {72} -Conservative Ministry was losing ground daily in bye elections; the -Irish question was coming to the front again. - -German intervention in Morocco was sudden and theatrical. On March 31, -1905, a date of far-reaching importance in history, Emperor William -entered the harbour of Tangier upon his yacht, the _Hohenzollern_. -When he disembarked, he gave the cue to German policy by saluting the -representative of the Sultan, with peculiar emphasis, as the -representative of an independent sovereign. Then, turning to the -German residents in Morocco who had gathered to meet him, he said: "I -am happy to greet in you the devoted pioneers of German industry and -commerce, who are aiding in the task of keeping always in a high -position, in a _free land_, the interests of the mother country." - -The repercussion of this visit to Tangier in France and in Great -Britain was electrical. It seemed to be, and was, a direct challenge -on the part of Germany for a share in shaping the destinies of Morocco. -It was an answer to the Anglo-French accord, in which Germany had been -ignored. Great Britain was in no position to go beyond mere words in -the standing behind France. France knew this. So did Germany. After -several months of fruitless negotiations between Berlin and Paris, on -June 6th, it was made plain to France that there must be a conference -on the Moroccan question. - -M. Delcassé, at that time directing with consummate skill and courage -the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urged upon the Cabinet the necessity -for accepting {73} Germany's challenge. But the Cabinet, after hearing -the sorrowful confessions of the Ministers of War and Navy, and -learning that France was not ready to fight, refused to accept the -advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. Delcassé resigned. A -blow had been struck at French prestige. - -For six months the crisis continued in an acute stage. The -chauvinistic--or shall we say, patriotic?--elements were determined to -withstand what they called the Kaiser's interference in the _domestic_ -affairs of France. But France seemed isolated at that moment, and -prudence was the part of wisdom. M. Rouvier declared to the Chamber of -Deputies on December 16th: "France cannot be without a Moroccan policy, -for the form and direction which the evolution of Morocco will take in -the future will influence in a decisive manner the destinies of our -North African possessions." France agreed to a conference, but won -from Germany the concession that France's special interests and rights -in Morocco would be admitted as the basis of the work of the conference. - -On January 17, 1906, a conference of European States, to which the -United States of America was admitted, met to decide the international -status of Morocco. For some time the attitude of the German delegates -was uncompromising. They maintained the Kaiser's thesis as set forth -at Algiers: the _complete_ independence of Morocco, and sovereignty of -her Sultan. But they finally yielded, and acknowledged the right of -France and Spain to organize in Morocco an international police. - -The Convention was signed on April 7th. It {74} provided for: (1) -police under the sovereign authority of the Sultan, recruited from -Moorish Moslems, and distributed in the eight open ports; (2) Spanish -and French officers, placed at his disposal by their governments, to -assist the Sultan; (3) limitation of the total effective of this police -force from two thousand to two thousand five hundred, of French and -Spanish officers, commissioned sixteen to twenty, and non-commissioned -thirty to forty, appointed for five years; (4) an Inspector General, a -high officer of the Swiss army, chosen subject to the approval of the -Sultan, with residence at Tangier; (5) a State Bank of Morocco, in -which each of the signatory Powers had the right to subscribe capital; -(6) the right of foreigners to acquire property, and to build upon it, -in any part of Morocco; (7) France's exclusive right to enforce -regulations in the frontier region of Algeria and a similar right to -Spain in the frontier region of Spain; (8) the preservation of the -public services of the Empire from alienation for private interests. - -Chancellor von Bülow's speech in the _Reichstag_ on April 5, 1906, was -a justification of Germany's attitude. It showed that the policy of -Wilhelmstrasse had been far from bellicose, and that Germany's demands -were altogether reasonable. The time had come, declared the -Chancellor, when German interests in the remaining independent portions -of Africa and Asia must be considered by Europe. In going to Tangier -and in forcing the conference of Algeciras, Germany had laid down the -principle that there must be equal opportunities for {75} Germans in -independent countries, and had demonstrated that she was prepared to -enforce this principle. - -When one considers the remarkable growth in population, and the -industrial and maritime evolution of Germany, this attitude cannot be -wondered at, much less condemned. Germany, deprived by her late -entrance among nations of fruitful colonies, was finding it necessary -to adopt and uphold the policy of trying to prevent the pre-emption, -for the benefit of her rivals, of those portions of the world which -were still free. - -Neither France nor Spain had any feeling of loyalty toward the -Convention of Algeciras. However much may have been written to prove -this loyalty, the facts of the few years following Algeciras are -convincing. After 1908, Spain provoked and led on by the tremendous -expenditures entailed upon her by the Riff campaigns began to consider -the region of Morocco in which she was installed as exclusively Spanish -territory. French writers have expended much energy and ingenuity in -proving the disinterestedness of French efforts to enforce loyally the -decisions of Algeciras. But they have explained, they have protested, -too much. There has never been a moment that France has not dreamt of -the completion of the vast colonial empire in North Africa by the -inclusion of Morocco. It has been the goal for which all her military -and civil administrations in Algeria and the Sahara have been working. -To bring about the downfall of the Sultan's authority, not only press -campaigns were undertaken, but anarchy on the Algerian frontier {76} -was allowed to go on unchecked, until military measures seemed -justifiable. - -In a similar way, the German colonists of Morocco did their best to -bring about another intervention by Germany. Their methods were so -despicable and outrageous that they had frequently to be disavowed -officially. In 1910, the German Foreign Office found the claims of -Mannesmann Brothers to certain mining privileges invalid, because they -did not fulfil the requirements of the Act of Algeciras. But the -Mannesmann mining group, as well as other German enterprises in -Morocco, were secretly encouraged to make all the trouble they could -for the French, while defending the authority of the Sultan. The -Casablanca incident is only one of numerous affronts which the French -were asked to swallow. - -Great Britain had her part, though not through official agents, in the -intrigues. There is much food for thought in the motives that may, not -without reason, be imputed to the publication in the _Times_ of a -series of stories of Moroccan anarchy, and of Muley Hafid's cruelties. - -In the spring of 1911, it was realized everywhere in Europe that the -Sultan's authority was even less than it had been in 1905. The Berber -tribes were in arms on all sides. In March, accounts began to appear -of danger at Fez, not only to European residents, but also to the -Sultan. The reports of the French Consul, and the telegrams of -correspondents of two Paris newspapers, were most alarming. On April -2d, it was announced that the Berber tribes {77} had actually attacked -the city and were besieging it. Everything was prepared for the final -act of the drama. - -A relief column of native troops under Major Bremond arrived in Fez on -April 26th. The very next day, an urgent message for relief having -been received from Colonel Mangin in Fez, Colonel Brulard started for -the capital with another column. Without waiting for further word, a -French army which had been carefully prepared for the purpose, entered -Morocco under General Moinier. On May 21st, Fez was occupied by the -French. They found that all was well there with the Europeans and with -the natives. But, fortunately for the French plans, Muley Hafid's -brother had set himself up at Mequinez as pretender to the throne. The -Sultan could now retain his sovereignty only by putting himself under -the protection of the French army. Morocco had lost her independence! - -Germany made no objection to the French expeditionary corps in April. -She certainly did not expect the quick succession of events in May -which brought her face to face with the _fait accompli_ of a strong -French army in Fez. As soon as it was realized at Berlin that the -fiction of Moroccan independence had been so skilfully terminated, -France was asked "what compensation she would give to Germany in return -for a free hand in Morocco." The _pourparlers_ dragged on through -several weeks in June. France refused to acknowledge any ground for -compensation to Germany. She maintained that the recent action in -Morocco had been at the request {78} of the Sultan, and that it was a -matter entirely between him and France. - -Germany saw that a bold stroke was necessary. On July 1st, the gunboat -_Panther_ went to Agadir, a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. To -Great Britain and to France, the dispatch of the _Panther_ was -represented as due to the necessity of protecting German interests, -seeing that there was anarchy in that part of Morocco. But the German -newspapers, even those which were supposed to have official relations -with Wilhelmstrasse, spoke as if a demand for the cession of Mogador or -some other portion of Morocco was contemplated. The Chancellor -explained to the Reichstag that the sending of the _Panther_ was "to -show the world that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed to one -side." - -But in the negotiations through the German Ambassador in Paris, it was -clear that Germany was playing a game of political blackmail. The -German Foreign Office shifted its claims from Morocco to concessions in -Central Africa. On July 15th, Germany asked for the whole of the -French Congo from the sea to the River Sanga, and a renunciation in her -favour of France's contingent claims to the succession of the Belgian -Congo. The reason given to this demand was, that if Morocco were to -pass under a French protectorate, it was only just that compensation -should be given to Germany elsewhere. France, for the moment, -hesitated. She definitely refused to entertain the idea of -compensation as soon as she had received the assurance of the {79} aid -of Great Britain in supporting her against the German claims. - -On July 1st, the German Ambassador had notified Sir Edward Grey of the -dispatch of the _Panther_ to Agadir "in response to the demand for -protection from German firms there," and explained that Germany -considered the question of Morocco reopened by the French occupation of -Fez, and thought that it would be possible to make an agreement with -Spain and France for the partition of Morocco. On July 4th, Sir Edward -Grey, after a consultation with the Cabinet, answered that Great -Britain could recognize no change in Morocco without consulting France, -to whom she was bound by treaty. The Ambassador then explained that -his Government would not consider the reopening of the question in a -European conference, that it was a matter directly between Germany and -France, and that his overture to Sir Edward Grey had been merely in the -nature of a friendly explanation. - -Germany believed that the constitutional crisis in Great Britain was so -serious that the hands of the Liberal Cabinet would be tied, and that -they would not be so foolhardy as to back up France at the moment when -they themselves were being so bitterly assailed by the most influential -elements of the British electorate on the question of limiting the veto -power of the House of Lords. It was in this belief that Germany on -July 15th asked for territorial cessions from France in Central Africa. -Wilhelmstrasse thought the moment well chosen, and that there was every -hope of success. - -{80} - -But the German mentality has never seemed to appreciate the frequent -lesson of history, that the British people are able to distinguish -clearly between matters of internal and external policy. Bitterly -assailed as a traitor to his country because he advocates certain -changes of laws, a British Cabinet Minister can still be conscious of -the fact that his bitterest opponents will rally around him when he -takes a stand on a matter of foreign policy. This knowledge of -admirable national solidarity enabled Mr. Lloyd George on July 21st, -the very day on which the King gave his consent to the creation of new -peers to bring the House of Lords to reason, at a Mansion House -banquet, to warn Germany against the danger of pressing her demands -upon France. The effect, both in London and Paris, was to unify and -strengthen resistance. It seemed as if the _Panther's_ visit to Agadir -had put Germany in the unenviable position of having made a threat -which she could not enforce. - -But the ways of diplomacy are tortuous. Throughout August and -September, Germany blustered and threatened. In September, several -events happened which seemed to embarrass Russia and tie her hands, as -in the first Moroccan imbroglio of 1905. For Premier Stolypin was -assassinated at Kiev on September 14th; the United States denounced its -commercial treaty with Russia on account of the question of Jewish -passports; and the Shuster affair in Persia occupied the serious -attention of Russian diplomacy. Had it not been for the splendidly -loyal and scrupulous attitude of the {81} British Foreign Office -towards Russia in the Persian question, Germany might have been tempted -to force the issue with France. - -German demands grew more moderate, but were not abandoned. For members -of the House of Commons, of the extreme Radical wing in the Liberal -party, began to put the British Government in an uncomfortable -position. Militarism, entangling alliances with a continental Power, -the necessity for agreement with Germany,--these were the subjects -which found their way from the floor of the House of Commons to the -public press. A portion of the Liberal party which had to be reckoned -with believed that Germany ought not to have been left out of the -Anglo-French agreement. So serious was the dissatisfaction, that the -Government deemed it necessary to make an explanation to the House. -Sir Edward Grey explained and defended the action of the Cabinet in -supporting the resistance of France to Germany's claims. The whole -history of the negotiation was revealed. The Anglo-French agreement of -1904 was published for the first time, and it was seen that this -agreement did not commit Great Britain to backing France by force of -arms. - -Uncertainty of British support had the influence of bringing France to -consent to treat with Germany on the Moroccan question. Two agreements -were signed. By the first, Germany recognized the French protectorate -in Morocco, subject to the adhesion of the signers of the Convention of -Algeciras, and waived her right to take part in the negotiations -concerning Moroccan spheres of influence {82} between Spain and France. -On her side, France agreed to maintain the open door in Morocco, and to -refrain from any measures which would hinder the legitimate extension -of German commercial and mining interests. By the second agreement, -France ceded to Germany, in return for German cessions, certain -territories in southern and eastern Kamerun. - -There was a stormy Parliamentary and newspaper discussion, both in -France and Germany, over these two treaties. No one was satisfied. -The treaties were finally ratified, but under protest. - -In France, the Ministry was subject to severe criticism. There was -also some feeling of bitterness--perhaps a reaction from the -satisfaction over Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech--in the -uncertainty of Great Britain's support, as revealed by the November -discussions in the House of Commons. This uncertainty remained, as far -as French public opinion went, until Great Britain actually declared -war upon Germany in August, 1914. - -In Germany, the _Reichstag_ debates revealed the belief that the Agadir -expedition had, on final analysis, resulted in a _fiasco_. An -astonishing amount of enmity against Great Britain was displayed. It -was when Herr Heydebrand made a bitter speech against Great Britain, -and denounced the pacific attitude of the German Government, in the -Reichstag session of November 10th, that the Crown Prince made public -his position in German foreign policy by applauding loudly. - -The aftermath of Agadir, as far as it affected Morocco, resulted in the -establishment of the French {83} Protectorate, on March 30, 1912. The -Sultan signed away his independence by the Treaty of Fez. Foreign -legations at Fez ceased to exist, although diplomatic officials were -retained at Tangier. France voted the maintenance of forty thousand -troops in Morocco "for the purposes of pacification." The last -complications disappeared when, on November 27th, a Franco-Spanish -Treaty was signed at Madrid, in which the Spanish zones in Morocco were -defined, and both states promised not to erect fortifications or -strategic works on the Moroccan coast. - -But the aftermath of Agadir in France and Germany has been an increase -in naval and military armaments, and the creation of a spirit of -tension which needed only the three years of war in the Ottoman Empire -to bring about the inevitable clash between Teuton and Gaul. Taken in -connection with the recent events in Alsace and Lorraine, and the -voting of the law increasing military service in France to three years, -the logical sequence of events is clear. - - - - -{84} - -CHAPTER V - -THE PASSING OF PERSIA - -The weakness of the Ottoman Empire and of Morocco served to bring the -colonial and commercial aspiration of Germany into conflict with other -nations of Europe. The recent fortunes of Persia, the third--and only -other--independent Mohammedan state, have also helped to make possible -the general European war. - -The first decade of the twentieth century brought about in Persia, as -in Turkey, the rise of a constitutional party, which was able to force -a despotic sovereign to grant a constitution. The Young Persians had -in many respects a history similar to that of the Young Turks. They -were for the most part members of influential families, who had been -educated in Europe, or had been sent into exile. They had imbibed -deeply the spirit of the French Revolution from their reading, and had -at the same time developed a narrow and intense nationalism. But to -support their revolutionary propaganda, they had allied themselves -during the period of darkness with the Armenians and other non-Moslems. -As Salonika, a city by no means Turkish, was the _foyer_ of the young -Turk movement, so Tabriz, {85} capital of the Azerbaidjan, a city by no -means Persian, was the centre of the opposition to Persian despotism. - -Young Turks, Young Persians, Young Egyptians, Young Indians, and Young -Chinese have shown to Europe and America the peril--and the pity--of -our western and Christian education, when it is given to eastern and -non-Christian students. They are born into the intellectual life with -our ideas and are inspired by our ideals, but have none of the -background, none of the inheritance of our national atmosphere and our -family training to enable them to live up to the standards we have put -before them. Their disillusionment is bitter. They resent our -attitude of superiority. They hate us, even though they feign to -admire us. Their jealousy of our institutions leads them to console -themselves by singling out and forcing themselves to see only the weak -and vulnerable points in our civilization. Educated in our -universities, they return to their countries to conspire against us. -The illiterate and simple Oriental, who has never travelled, is -frequently the model of fidelity and loyalty and affection to his -Occidental master or friend. But no educated non-Christian Oriental, -who has travelled and studied and lived on terms of equality with -Europeans or Americans in Europe or America, can ever be a sincere -friend. The common result of social contact and intellectual -companionship is that he becomes a foe,--and conceals the fact. -Familiarity has bred more than contempt. - -The Young Persians would have no European {86} aid. They waited, and -suffered. Finally, after a particularly bad year from the standpoint -of financial exactions, the Moslem clergy of the North were drawn into -the Young Persia movement. A revolution, in which the Mohammedan -_mullahs_ took part, compelled the dying Shah, Muzaffereddin, to issue -a decree ordering the convocation of a _medjliss_ (committee of -notables) on August 5, 1906. This improvised Parliament, composed only -of delegates of the provinces nearest the capital, drafted a -constitution which was promulgated on New Year's Day, 1907. The -following week, Muzaffereddin died and was succeeded by his son, -Mohammed Ali Mirza, a reactionary of the worst type. - -Mohammed Ali had no intention of putting the Constitution into force. -A serious revolution broke out in Tabriz a few weeks after his -accession. He was compelled to acknowledge the Constitution granted by -his father. In order to nullify its effect, however, the new Shah -called to the Grand Vizierate the exiled Ali Asgar Khan, whom he -believed to be strong enough to overrule the wishes of the Parliament. -The Constitutionalists formed a society of _fedavis_ to prevent the -return to absolutism. At their instigation, Ali Asgar Khan was -assassinated. The country fell into an anarchic state. - -Constitutional Persia, as much because of the inexperience of the -Constitutionalists as of the ill-will of the Shah, was worse off than -under the despotism of Muzaffereddin. There was no money in the -treasury. The peasants would not pay their taxes. One can hardly -blame them, for not a cent of the {87} money ever went for local -improvements or local government. Throughout Persia, even in the -cities, life was unsafe. The Persians, no more than the Turks, could -call forth from the ranks of their enthusiasts a progressive and -fearless statesman of the type of Stambuloff or Venizelos. In their -Parliament they all talked at once. None was willing to listen to his -neighbour. It may have been because there was no Mirabeau. But could -a Mirabeau have overcome the fatal defects of the Mohammedan training -and character that made the Young Persians incapable of realizing the -constitutionalism of their dreams? Every man was suspicious and -jealous of his neighbour. Every man wanted to lead, and none to be -led. Every man wanted power without responsibility, prestige without -work, success without sacrifice. - -It was at this moment that one of the most significant events of -contemporary times was helped to fruition by the state of affairs in -Persia. Great Britain and Russia, rivals--even enemies--in western and -central Asia, signed a convention. Their conflicting ambitions were -amicably compromised. Along with the questions of Afghanistan and -Thibet, this accord settled the rivalry that had done much to keep -Persia a hotbed of diplomatic intrigue like Macedonia ever since the -Crimean War. - -In regard to Persia, the two Powers solemnly swore to respect its -integrity and its independence, and then went on to sign its death -warrant, by agreeing upon the question of "the spheres of influence." -In spite of all sophisms, this convention marked the {88} passing of -Persia as an independent state. Persia is worse off than Morocco and -Egypt. For one master is better than two! - -Here enters Germany. For many years German merchants had looked upon -Persia as they looked upon Morocco and Turkey. Here were the -legitimate fields for commercial expansion. Probably there were also -dreams of political advantages to be gained later. In their dealings -with the three Moslem countries that were still "unprotected" when they -inaugurated their _Weltpolitik_, the Germans had been attentive -students of British policy in the days of her first entry into India -and to Egypt. There were many Germans who honestly believed that their -activities in these independent Moslem countries would only give them -"their place under the sun," and a legitimate field for the overflow of -their population and national energy, but that it would also be a -distinct advantage to the peace of the world. Great Britain and Russia -and France had already divided up between them the larger part of Asia -and Africa. In the process, Great Britain had _recently_ come almost -to blows with both her rivals. If Germany stepped in between them, -would this not prevent a future conflict? But the rivals "divided up." -Germany was left out in the cold. It is not a very far cry from -Teheran and Koweit and Fez to Liège and Brussels and Antwerp. Belgium -is paying the bill. - -The Anglo-Russian convention of August 31, 1907, was the first of three -doors slammed in Germany's face. The Anglo-French convention of April -{89} 8, 1904, had been an attempt to do this. But by Emperor William's -visit to Tangiers in 1905, Germany got in her foot before the door was -closed! In Persia there was no way that she could intervene directly -to demand that Great Britain and Russia bring their accord before an -international congress. - -Germany began to work in Persia through two agencies. She incited -Turkey to cross the frontier of the Azerbaidjan, and to make the -perfectly reasonable request that the third limitrophe state should be -taken into the _pourparlers_ which were deciding the future of Persia. -Then she sent her agents among the Nationalists, and showed them how -terrible a blow this convention was to their new constitutionalism. -Just at the moment when they had entered upon a constitutional life, -Great Britain and Russia had conspired against their independence, went -the German thesis. - -If only there had been a sincerity for the Constitution in the heart of -the Shah, and an ability to establish a really constitutional _régime_ -in the leaders of Young Persia, the Anglo-Russian accord might have -proved of no value. But--unfortunately for Persia and for Germany--the -Shah, worked upon skilfully by Russian emissaries and by members of his -_entourage_, who were paid by Russian gold, attempted a _coup d'état_ -against the Parliament in December, 1907. He failed to carry it -through. With a smile on his lips and rage in his heart, he once more -went through the farce of swearing to be a good constitutional ruler. -But in June, 1908, he succeeded {90} in dispersing the Parliament by -bombarding the palace in which it sat. - -It would be wearisome to go into the story of the revolts and anarchy -in all parts of Persia in 1908 and 1909. After a year of fighting and -Oriental promises, of solemn oaths and the breaking of them, the -constitutionalists finally drove Mohammed Ali from Teheran in July, -1909. The Shah saved his life by taking refuge in the Russian -legation. A few days later, he took the road to exile. He has since -reappeared in Persia twice to stir up trouble in the north. On both -occasions, it was when the Russians were finding it hard to justify -their continued occupation of the northern provinces. - -Mohammed Ali was succeeded by his son Ali Mirza, a boy of eleven years, -who was still too young to be anything more than a mere plaything in -the hands of successive regents. - -The civil strife in Persia gave Great Britain and Russia the excuse for -entering the country. In accord with Great Britain, Russia sent an -expedition to occupy Tabriz on April 29, 1909. Later, Russian troops -occupied Ardebil, Recht, Kazvin, and other cities in the Russian sphere -of influence. Owing to the anarchy in the south during 1910, Great -Britain prepared to send troops "to protect the safety of the roads for -merchants." This was not actually done, for conditions of travel -slightly ameliorated. But Persia has rested since under the menace of -a British occupation. - -Every effort made to bring order out of chaos in Persia has failed. -Serious attempts at financial {91} reform were undertaken by an -American mission, under the direction of a former American official in -the Philippine Islands. - -The new American Treasurer-General would not admit that the -Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 was operative in Persia. One day in the -summer of 1911, I was walking along the Galata Quay in Constantinople. -I heard my name called from the deck of a vessel just about to leave -for Batum. Perched on top of two boxes containing typewriters, was a -young American from Boston, who was going out to help reform the -finances of Persia. I had talked to him the day before concerning the -extreme delicacy and difficulty of the task of the mission whose -secretary he was. But his refusal to admit the political limitations -of Oriental peoples made it impossible for him to see that -constitutional Persia was any different, or should be treated any -differently, from constitutional Massachusetts. - -From the sequel of the story, it would seem that Mr. Shuster had the -same attitude of mind as his secretary. He refused to appoint fiscal -agents in the Russian "sphere" on any other ground than personal -fitness and ability. Russia protested. Mr. Shuster persisted. A -march on Teheran to expel the Americans was threatened. Persia yielded -and gave up the American mission--and her independence. - -When Germany saw that the Russian troops had entered northern Persia -with the consent of Great Britain, and had come to stay, there was -nothing for her to do but to treat with Russia. - -In November, 1910, when the Czar was visiting {92} the Kaiser, Russian -and German ministers exchanged views concerning the ground upon which -Germany would agree to the _fait accompli_ of Russia's exclusive -political interests in Northern Persia, and the Russian military -occupation. Satisfactory bases were found for an agreement between -Russia and Germany concerning their respective interests in Persia and -Asiatic Turkey. The Accord of Potsdam, as it is called, was made in -the form of a note presented by the Russian Government to Germany, and -accepted by her. Russia declared that she would in no way oppose the -realization of the project of the Bagdad railway up to the Persian -Gulf, and that she would construct to the border of Persia a railway to -join a spur of the Bagdad railway from Sadije to Khanikin. In return -for this, Germany was to promise not to construct railway lines outside -of the Bagdad railway zone, to declare that she had no political -interest in Persia, and to recognize that "Russia has special interests -in Northern Persia from the political, strategic, and economic points -of view." The German Government was to abandon any intention of -securing a concession for a trans-Persian railway. On the other hand, -Russia promised to maintain in Northern Persia the "open door," so that -German commercial interests should not be injured. - -The accord between Russia and Germany was badly received everywhere. -France feared that Germany was trying to weaken the Franco-Russian -alliance. Great Britain did not look with favour upon a recognition by -Russia of German interests in Asiatic Turkey. The Sublime Porte felt -that {93} Russia and Germany had shown a disregard for the elementary -principles of courtesy in discussing and deciding questions that were -of tremendous importance to the future of Turkey without inviting the -Sublime Porte to take part in the negotiations. Turkey in the Potsdam -accord was ignored as completely as Morocco had been in the Algeciras -Convention and Persia in the Russo-British accord. - -The Potsdam stipulations brought prominently before Europe the possible -significance of Germany's free hand in Anatolian and Mesopotamian -railway constructions. It also aroused interest in the possibility of -an all-rail route from Calais to Calcutta, in which all the Great -Powers except Italy would participate. - -The trans-Persian and all other railway schemes in Persia came to -nothing. Between 1872 and 1890 twelve district railway projects had -received concessions from the Persian Government. One of these, the -Reuter group, actually started the construction of a line from the -Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. A French project for a railway from -Trebizond to Tabriz had gained powerful financial support. All these -schemes were frustrated by Russian diplomacy. In 1890, Russia secured -from the Persian Government the exclusive right for twenty-one years to -construct railways in Northern Persia. Needless to say, no lines were -built. Russia had all she could do with her trans-Siberian and -trans-Caucasian schemes. But she deliberately acted the dog in the -manger. By preventing private groups from building railways in Persia -which she would not {94} build herself, Russia has retarded the -economic progress, and is largely responsible for the financial, -military, and administrative weakness, of contemporary Persia. By the -accords of 1907 with Great Britain and 1911 with Germany, Russia -secured their connivance in still longer continuing this shameful -stagnation. To this day no railroad has been built in the Shah's -dominions. - -Just a month before the outbreak of the European war, the boy Shah of -Persia was solemnly crowned at Teheran. It was an imposing and -pathetic ceremony. The Russians and British saw to it that full honour -should be given to the sovereign of Persia. The pathos of the event -was in the fact that the Russian and British legations at Teheran paid -the expenses of the coronation. The Shah received his crown from the -hands of his despoilers. A similar farce was enacted a little while -before in Morocco. Turkey alone of Moslem nations remains. - -The last effort of Persia to shake off the Russian octopus was made on -October 8, 1914, when Russia was requested once more to withdraw her -troops from the Azerbaijan. The Russian Minister at Teheran, without -going through the form of referring the request to Petrograd, answered -that the interests of Russia and other foreign countries could be -safeguarded only by the continued occupation. To this response his -British colleague gave hearty assent. - -The importance of the passing of Persia is two-fold. It shows how in -one more direction Germany found herself shut out from a possible field -of expansion. Through the weakness of Persia, Great Britain {95} and -Russia, after fifty years of bitter struggle, were able to come to a -satisfactory compromise. It was in Persia that their animosity was -buried, and that co-operation of British democracy and Russian -autocracy in a war against Germany was first envisaged. The failure of -the Persian constitutional Government was a tremendous blow to Germany. -It strengthened the bases of the Triple Entente. For the events of -1908 and 1909 put the accord to severe test, and proved that it was -built upon a solid foundation. The agony of one people is often the -joy of another. Has Persia suffered vicariously that France may be -saved? - - - - -{96} - -CHAPTER VI - -THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES[*] - - -[*] This chapter has not been written without giving consideration to -the Russian point of view. There is an excellent book on Russia since -the Japanese War (from 1906 to 1912) by Peter Polejaïeff. - - -When Russia, Austria, and Prussia partitioned Poland at the end of the -eighteenth century, there were at the most six million Poles in the -vast territory stretching from the Baltic nearly to the Black Sea. Of -these a large number, especially in Eastern Prussia and in Silesia, had -already lost their sense of nationality. Poland was a country of -feudal nobles, whose inability to group under a dynasty for the -formation of a modern state, made the disappearance of the kingdom an -inexorable necessity in the economic evolution of Europe, and of -ignorant peasants, who were indifferent concerning the political status -of the land in which they lived. - -To-day there are twenty million Poles. Although they owe allegiance to -three different sovereigns, they are more united than ever in their -history. For their national feeling has developed in just the same way -that the national feeling of Germans and Russians has developed, by -education primarily, and by that remarkable tendency of industrialism, -{97} which has grouped people in cities, and brought them into closer -association. This influence of city life upon the destinies of Poland -comes to us with peculiar force when we realize that since the last map -of Europe was made Warsaw has grown from forty thousand to eight -hundred thousand, Lodz from one thousand to four hundred thousand, -Posen from a few hundreds to one hundred and fifty thousand, Lemberg -and Cracow from less than ten thousand to two hundred thousand and one -hundred and fifty thousand respectively. These great cities (except -Lodz, which Russia foolishly allowed to become an outpost of -Pan-Germanism in the heart of a Slavic population) are the _foyers_ of -Polish nationalism. - -The second and third dismemberments of Poland (1793 and 1795) were soon -annulled by the Napoleonic upheaval. The larger portion of Poland was -revived in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The Congress of Vienna, just one -hundred years ago, made what the representatives of the partitioning -Powers hoped would be a definite redistribution of the unwelcome ghost -stirred up by Napoleon. Poznania was returned to Prussia, and in the -western end of Galicia a Republic of Cracow was created. The greater -portion of Poland reverted to Russia, _not as conquered territory, but -as a separate state, of which the Czar assumed the kingship and swore -to preserve the liberties_. The unhappiness, the unrest, the -agitation, among the Poles of the Muscovite Empire, just as among the -Finns, came from the breaking of the promises by Russia to Europe when -these subjects of alien races were allotted to her. - -{98} - -The story of modern Poland is not different from that of any other -nationalistic movement. A sense of nationality and a desire for racial -political unity are not the phenomena which have been the underlying -causes of the evolution of Europe since the Congress of Vienna. In -Italy, in Germany, in Poland, in Alsace-Lorraine, in Finland, among the -various races of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkan Peninsula, -as well as in Turkey and Persia, the underlying cause of political -agitation, of rebellions and of revolutions has been the desire to -secure freedom from absolutism. Nationalism is simply the tangible -outward manifestation of the growth of democracy. There are few -national movements where separatism could not have been avoided by -granting local self-government. Mixed populations can live together -under the same government without friction, if the lesser races are -granted social, economic, and political equality. But nations that -have achieved their own unity and independence through devotion to a -nationalistic movement have shown no mercy or wisdom with smaller and -less fortunate races under their domination. The very methods that -European statesmen have fondly believed were necessary for assimilation -have proved fatal to it. - -The Polish question, as we understand it to-day, has little connection -with the Polish revolutions of 1830 and of 1863. These movements -against the Russian Government were conducted by the same elements of -protest against autocracy that were at work in the larger cities and -universities throughout Europe during the middle of the nineteenth -century. {99} Nationalism was the reason given rather than the cause -that prompted. The revolutions were unsuccessful because they were not -supported by the nation. The mass of the people were indifferent to -the cause, just as in other countries similar revolutions against -despotism failed for lack of real support. The apathy of the masses -has always been the bulwark of defence for autocracy and reactionary -policies. Popular rights do not come to people until the masses demand -them. Education alone brings self-government. This is the history of -the evolution of modern Europe. - -The Poles _as a nation_ began to worry their partitioners in the decade -following the last unsuccessful revolution against Russia. To -understand the contemporary phases of the Polish question, it is -necessary for us to follow first its three-fold development, as a -question of internal policy in Russia, Germany, and Austria. Only then -is its significance as an international question clear. - - - -THE POLES SINCE 1864 IN RUSSIA - -The troubles of Russia in her relationship to the Poles have come -largely from the fact that the distinction between Poland proper, -inhabited by Poles, and the provinces which the Jagellons conquered but -never assimilated, was not grasped by the statesmen who had to deal -with the aftermath of the revolution. What was possible in one was -thought to be possible in the other. What was vital in one was -believed to be vital in the other. In the kingdom {100} of Poland, as -it was bestowed upon the Russian Czar by the Congress of Vienna, there -were massed ten million Poles who could be neither exterminated nor -exiled. Nor was there a sound motive for attempting to destroy their -national life. The kingdom of Poland was not an essential portion of -the Russian Empire, and was not vitally bound to the fortunes of the -Empire. So unessential has the kingdom of Poland been to Russia, and -so fraught with the possibilities of weakness to its owner, that -patriotic and far-sighted Russian publicists have advocated its -complete autonomy, its independence or its cession to Germany. Because -it was limitrophe to the territories occupied by the Poles of the other -partitioners, there was constantly danger of weakening the defences of -the empire and of international complications. Through failing to -treat these Poles in such a way that they would be a loyal bulwark -against her enemies, Russia has done irreparable harm to herself as -well as to them. - -The Polish question in Lithuania, Podolia, and the Ukraine was a -totally different matter. These provinces had been added to Russia in -her logical development towards the west and the south-west. Their -possession was absolutely essential to the existence of the Empire. -Their population was not Polish, but Lithuanian, Ruthenian, and -Russian. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the acquisition of these -territories made possible the entrance of Russia into the concert of -European nations. They had been conquered by Poland during the period -of her greatness, and had naturally been lost by her {101} when she -became weak. In these portions of Greater Poland, the Poles were -limited to the landowning class, and to the more prosperous artisans in -the cities and villages. They were the residue of an earlier -conquering race that had never assimilated the country. They had -abused their power, and were heartily disliked. These provinces were -vital to Russia, and she was able to carry out the policy of uprooting -the Poles. Their villages were burned, their fortunes and their lands -confiscated, the landed proprietors deported to Siberia, and others so -cruelly persecuted that, when their churches and schools were closed -and they found themselves forbidden to speak their language outside of -their own homes, they emigrated. In Lithuania, the Lithuanian language -was also proscribed. The Russians had no intention of blotting out a -Polish question in order to make place for a Lithuanian one. - -Where the Poles were few in number, these measures, which were exactly -the same as the Poles had employed themselves in the same territories -several centuries before, were successful. The peasants were glad to -see their traditional persecutors get a taste of their own medicine. -It was not difficult to make these provinces Russian. They have -gradually been assimilated into the Empire. In all fairness, one can -hardly condemn the Russian point of view, as regards the Poles in -Lithuania, Podolia, and the Ukraine. Only youthful Polish irredentists -still dream of the restoration of the Empire of the Jagellons. - -In the kingdom of Poland, the situation was {102} entirely different. -This huge territory had been given to Russia by the Congress of Vienna -upon the solemn assurance that it was to be governed as a separate -kingdom by the Romanoffs. There was no thought in the Congress of -Vienna of the disappearance of the Poles as a separate nationality from -the map of Europe. But the autonomy of Poland was suppressed after the -rebellion of 1830. - -After the rebellion of 1863, Russia tried to assimilate the kingdom of -Poland as well as the Polish marches. The repression was so severe -that Polish nationalism was considered dead. The peasants had been -indifferent to the movement. Not only had they failed to support it, -but they had frequently shown themselves actually hostile to it. - -It was because the nobles and priests were believed to be leaders of -nationalistic and separatist movements, not only in Poland but in other -allogeneous portions of the composite Empire, that Czar Alexander II -emancipated the serfs. The policy of every autocratic government, when -it meets the first symptoms of unrest in a subject race, is to strike -at their church and their aristocracy. The most efficient way to -weaken the power of the nobles is to strengthen the peasants. -Alexander himself may have been actuated by motives of pure humanity, -but his ministers would never have allowed the _ukase_ to be -promulgated, had they not seen in it the means of conquering the -approaching revolution in Poland. For the moment it was an excellent -move, and accomplished its purpose. The Polish {103} peasants were led -to believe that the Czar was their father and friend and champion -against the exactions of the church and landowner. Was not their -emancipation proof of this? - -But in the long run the emancipation of the serfs proved fatal to -Russian domination in Poland. For the advisers of Alexander had not -realized that freemen would demand and attend schools, and that -schools, no matter how careful the surveillance and restrictions might -be, created democrats. Democrats would seize upon nationalism to -express their aspiration for self-government. The emancipation of the -serfs, launched as a measure to destroy Poland, has ended in making it. -Emancipation created Polish patriots. It was a natural and inevitable -result. The artificial aid of a governmental persecution helped and -hastened this result. The Irishman expressed a great truth when he -said that there are things that are not what they are. - -A flock of hungry Russian functionaries descended upon Poland in 1864. -They took possession of all departments of administration. The Polish -language was used in courts only through an interpreter, and was -forbidden as the medium of instruction in schools. No Polish signs -were tolerated in the railways or post-offices. In the parts of the -kingdom where there were bodies of the Lithuanians, their nationalism -was encouraged, and they were shown many favours, in contradiction to -the policy adopted towards the Lithuanians of Lithuania. Catholics who -followed the Western Rite were forced to join the national church. -There was a clear intention {104} to assimilate as much as possible the -populations of the border districts of Poland. - -After thirty years of repression, Russia had made no progress in -Poland. In 1897, Prince Imeretinsky wrote to the Czar that the policy -of the Government had failed. Polish national spirit, instead of -disappearing, had spread remarkably among the peasant classes. The -secret publication and importation of unauthorized journals and -pamphlets had multiplied. The number of cases brought before the -courts for infraction of the "law of association," which forbade -unlicensed public gatherings and clubs, had so increased that they -could not be heard. Heavy fines and imprisonment seem to have had no -deterring effect. - -[Illustration: Map--Partitions of Poland] - -Could Russia hope to struggle against the tendencies of modern life? -Free press and free speech are the complement of education. When men -learn to read, they learn to think, and can be reached by propaganda. -When men increase in prosperity, they begin to want a voice in the -expenditure of the money they have to pay for taxes. When men come -together in the industrial life of large cities, they form -associations. No government, no system of spies or terrorism, no laws -can prevent propaganda in cities. From 1864 to 1914, the kingdom of -Poland has become more Polish than ever before in her history. Instead -of a few students and dreamers, fascinated by the past glories of their -race, instead of a group of landowners and priests, thinking of their -private interests and of the Church, there is awakened a spirit of -protest against Russian {105} despotism in the soul of a race become -intelligently nationalistic. - -The issue between Russia and her Poles has become clearer, and for that -reason decidedly worse, since the disastrous war with Japan. The Poles -have demanded autonomy in the fullest sense of the word. The Russians -have responded by showing that it is their intention to destroy Poland, -just as they intend to destroy Finland. There is an analogy between -the so-called constitutional _régimes_ in Russia and Turkey. In each -Empire, the granting of a constitution was hailed with joy by the -various races. These races, who had been centres of agitation, -disloyalty, and weakness, were ready to co-operate with their -governments in building up a large, broad, comprehensive, national life -upon the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. But in both -Empires, the dominant race let it soon be understood that the -Constitution was to be used for a destructive policy of assimilation. -In the Ottoman Empire, the Constitution was a weapon for destroying the -national aspirations of subject races. In Russia it has been the same. - -After the Russo-Japanese War, Czar Nicholas and his ministers had their -great opportunity to profit by the lessons of Manchuria. But the -granting of a constitution was a pure farce. Blind to the fact that -the enlightened Poles were interested primarily in political reforms, -and in securing equity and justice for the kingdom of Poland, instead -of for the advancement of a narrow and theoretical nationalistic ideal, -the Russians repulsed the proffered {106} loyalty of the Poles to a -free and constitutional Russian Empire. In the second Duma, Dmowski -and other Polish deputies unanimously voted the supplies for -strengthening the Russian army. They stated that the Poles were -willing to cast their lot loyally and indissolubly with constitutional -Russia. Were they not brethren, and imbued with the same Pan-Slavic -idea? Was it not logical to look to Russia as the defender of all the -Slavs from Teutonic oppression? - -But Poland, like Finland, was to continue to be the victim of Russian -bureaucracy and of an intolerant nationalism which the Russians were -beginning to feel as keenly and as arrogantly as the Prussians. Is the -Kaiser, embodying the evils of militarism, more obnoxious and more -dangerous to civilization than the Czar, standing for the horrors of -bureaucratic despotism and absolutism? Have not the Armenian -massacres, ordered from Constantinople, and the Jewish pogroms, ordered -from Petrograd, associated Christian Czar with Mohammedan Sultan at the -beginning of the twentieth century? - -The first deliberate violation of the integrity of the kingdom of -Poland was sanctioned by the Russian Duma in the same session in which -it approved violation of Russian obligations to Finland. A law -separating Kholm from the kingdom of Poland was voted on July 6, 1912. -The test of the law declared that Kholm was still to be regarded as a -portion of the kingdom of Poland, but to be directly attached to the -Ministry of the Interior without passing by the intermediary of the -Governor-General of Warsaw; {107} and to preserve the Polish adaptation -of the Code Napoléon for its legal administration, but to have its -court of appeal at Kief. - -The elections of 1913 from the kingdom of Poland to the Duma gave a -decided setback to the party of Dmowski, who had so long and so ably -pled for a policy of Pan-Slavism through accommodation with Russia. -The law concerning Kholm had been the response of the Duma to Dmowski's -olive branch. The moderates were discredited. But the failure of the -radical nationalists to conciliate the Jewish element caused their -candidates to lose both at Warsaw and Lodz. - -The birth of an anti-Semitic movement has been disastrous to Polish -solidarity during recent years. The Polish nationalists suspected the -Jews of working either for German or Russian interests. They were -expecially bitter against the _Litvak_, or Lithuanian and south Russian -Jews, who had been forced by Russia to establish themselves in the -cities of Poland. Poland is one of the most important pales in the -Empire. The Jewish population is one-fifth of the total, and enjoys -both wealth and education in the cities. Their educated youth had been -courageous and forceful supporters of Polish nationalism. Before the -Russian intrigues of the last decade and the introduction of these -non-Polish Jews, there had never been a strong anti-Semitic feeling in -Poland. The Polish protests against the encroachment of the Russians -upon their national liberties have been greatly weakened by their -antagonism to the Jews. The anti-Semitic movement, which has carried -away {108} both the moderate party of Dmowski and the radical -nationalists, as was expected, has played into the hand of Russia. - -The Muscovite statesmen, while endeavouring to use the Balkan Wars for -the amalgamation of south Slavic races under the wing of Russia against -Austria have treated the Poles as if they were not Slavs. During 1913 -and the first part of 1914, the policy of attempting to russianize the -Poles has proved disastrous to their feeling of loyalty to the Empire. -The government announced definitely that the kingdom of Poland would be -"compensated" for the loss of Kholm by a law granting self-government -to Polish cities. This promise has not been kept. The municipal -self-government project presented to the Duma was as farcical in -practical results as all democratic and liberal legislation which that -impotent body has been asked to pass upon. - - - -THE POLES SINCE 1867 IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY - -The disappearance of Austria from Germany after the battle of Sadowa -led to the organization of a new state, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. -We must divorce in our mind the Austria before 1867 from the -Austria-Hungary of the Dual Monarchy. The political situation changed -entirely when Austrians and Hungarians agreed to live together and -share the Slavic territories of the Hapsburg Crown. Austria no longer -had need of her Galicians to keep the Hungarians in check. But there -was equally important work for them to do. - -{109} - -The Austrians have always treated the Poles very well. Galicia, which -had been Austria's share in the partition of Poland, was given local -self-government, with its own Diet, and proper representation in the -Austrian _Reichsrath_. Poles were admitted in generous numbers to the -functions of the Empire. - -The Polish nationalists of Russia and Prussia feel very bitter about -the indifference of the Galicians to the nation at large--or rather in -captivity. They claim that the lack of national feeling among the -Austrian Poles is due to the fact that they have been bribed by the -Austrians to desert not only their brethren of Russia and of Prussia, -but also their fellow-Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. I have -heard this criticism ably and feelingly presented, but I do not think -it just. Since national aspirations are awakened and sustained by the -effort to secure political equality and justice, the enjoyment of these -takes away need or desire to plot against the Government. The Poles of -Austria are like the French of Canada. Their nationalism is literary -and religious in character. There is no reason for its being -anti-governmental. - -Of late years, however, there has been a national Polish agitation in -Galicia. It is directed not against the Government, but against the -Ruthenians, who, to the number of three millions--nearly forty per -cent. of the total population--inhabit the eastern section of Galicia. -This local racial conflict, which has strengthened rather than weakened -the attachment of the Poles to the Vienna Government, arose after the -introduction of universal suffrage, when {110} eastern Galicia began to -send in large numbers Ruthenian deputies to the Galician Diet and to -the Austrian Parliament. - -On April 12, 1908, Count Potocki was assassinated by a Ruthenian -student, whose death sentence was commuted to twenty years' -imprisonment. With the complicity of wardens, the assassin escaped -from jail after three years. There has never been peace between the -Poles and the Ruthenians since that time. After serious disorders at -the University of Lemberg, where the Ruthenian students were treated -disgracefully, Polish and Ruthenian leaders tried to find common ground -for reconciliation in December, 1911. The Ruthenians demanded -electoral reform with greater representation, and the creation of a -Ruthenian university. The imperial government communicated to the -representatives of the two nationalities the project of a decree of -public instruction in Galicia in January, 1913. The project was a -marvel of ingenuity. A Ruthenian university was to be established -after four years, but if by October 1, 1916, the law voting credits for -it was not yet passed, a special school for Ruthenians would be -attached to the University of Lemberg, until their own university was a -reality. The teaching of the Ruthenian language would cease in the -University of Lemberg when this "special school" was inaugurated. The -Ruthenians were suspicious of a trick in the project. They could not -understand its vagueness. It looked as if they would be giving up -their present rights in the University of Lemberg, limited as they -were, for an uncertainty. Why was {111} no definite date for opening -specified, or indication given of the new university's location? Would -it be maintained by Galicia with a budget appropriation in proportion -to the taxes paid by Ruthenians? - -The Ruthenian question in Galicia has been cited here to show how there -are wheels within wheels in the complex questions of nationalities. -European racial questions seem to follow the law of the animal world. -The littlest animals are eaten by little animals, who in turn serve as -food for larger animals. Nations which have suffered most cruelly from -race persecution are generally themselves relentless and fanatical when -the power to persecute is in their hands. - -The Ruthenian question shows also how Poles and Austrians work -together, and are content with the mutual advantages of their union. I -have never met an Austrian Pole, who lived in Galicia and had a settled -profession or business there, who was not a loyal--even -ardent--supporter of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Austrian Poles are -dismayed as they face the terrible dilemma of union with Russia or -Germany. - - - -THE POLES SINCE 1870 IN GERMANY - -Germany, like Russia, has had a twofold Polish question: The -acquisition of Polish territory on either side of the Vistula to the -Baltic Sea was as essential to the creation of a strong Prussian -kingdom as was the acquisition of Pomerania. The portion of Poland -which, before the partition, cut off eastern {112} from western Prussia -was fully as much German as Polish,--in fact more so. It became German -by logical and natural conquest in the course of Prussia's evolution. - -The situation was different in Poznania. This territory of the later -partition reverted to Prussia at the Congress of Vienna. In 1815, its -population was only twenty per cent. German. For fifty years the -process of Germanization went on naturally--in no way forced. When the -German Empire was formed, nearly half of Poznania was German. Many of -the leading Poles had lost their sense of Polish nationality. They had -become German in language and in culture. How many families there are -in Prussia whose Polish origin is betrayed only by their names! - -But the Germanized Poles, for the most part, retained their religion. -The notorious _Kulturkampf_ of Bismarck aroused again the sense of -nationality which had been lost, not only among the prosperous Poles of -Poznania, but even of Silesia. Only the bureaucratic classes were -unaffected by this renaissance of nationalism awakened by revolt -against religious persecution. - -Just after the formation of the Empire, when Prussia needed all her -strength and force to preserve her hegemony in the new confederation -and to lead modern Germany in the path of progress and civilization, on -either side of her kingdom she had to cope with nationalist movements -of Danes and of Poles. But she did not fear to undertake also the -assimilation of Alsace and Lorraine! - -{113} - -Since the _Kulturkampf_, the Polish renaissance in Prussia has thrived -in spite of persecution. As in Russia, the Polish language was -banished, Polish teachers were transferred to schools in other parts of -the Empire, and about forty thousand Poles of Russian and Austrian -nationality were expelled from the country. The persecution has been -carried on in the schools, in the army, and in the church. School -children have been forbidden to pray in the Polish language. Two -unconstitutional laws have been passed by the Prussian Diet. The first -of these forbade the Poles to speak Polish in public gatherings. The -second, sanctioned by the _Landtag_ on March 8, 1908, authorized the -Government to expropriate land owned by Poles _for the purpose of -selling it to Germans_. - -The Prussian scheme for getting rid of the Poles was to drive them from -their lands and instal German colonists. Private enterprise was first -tried. A "colonization society" was formed, with a large capital, and -given every encouragement by Prussian officialdom. But economic laws -are not controlled by politics. The colonists were boycotted. -Enormous sums of money were lost in wasted crops. The farms of the -colonists had to be resold by the sheriff, and were bought in by Poles. -To discourage the buying back of the German farms, a law was passed -forbidding Poles to build upon land acquired by them after the date of -the colonization society's failure. The Poles got around this law most -cleverly. If one goes into Poznania to-day, he will see farmhouses, -barns, dairies, stables--even chicken-coops--on {114} wheels. The -people live in glorified wagons. They do not build. Will there be a -law now against owning wagons? - -When the failure of private enterprise was demonstrated, the Prussian -Government announced its intention of applying the law of expropriation -"for the use of the commission of colonization." This was in October, -1912. At the beginning of 1913, the Polish deputies to the _Reichstag_ -brought before their colleagues of all Germany the question of the -expropriation of Polish lands in Prussia. They asked the -representatives of a supposedly advanced and constitutional nation what -they thought of this injustice. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg tried -to keep the question from being debated. He argued with perfect reason -that it was a purely internal Prussian matter, which the Imperial -Parliament was incompetent to discuss. But the Catholic centre and the -Socialist left combined to vote an order of the day allowing the -discussion of the Polish lands question. - -In the history of the German confederation, it was the first time that -an imperial chancellor had received a direct defiance. This vote is -mentioned here to show how Prussian dealings with the Poles, just as -with Alsace-Lorraine, have tended to weaken the purely Prussian -substructure of the German confederation, and to arouse a dangerous -protest against Prussian hegemony. Contempt for the elementary -principles of justice has been the key-note of Chancellor von -Bethmann-Hollweg's career. His mentality is typical of that of German -bureaucracy--no, more than that, of German statesmanship. It is {115} -possible to have sympathy with German national aspirations, but not -with the methods by which those aspirations are being interpreted to -the world. To show how little regard he had for parliamentary opinion -in the German confederation, the Chancellor forced through the Prussian -_Landtag_, on April 22, 1913, only three months after his rebuke from -the _Reichstag_, an infamous law, voting one hundred and twenty-five -million marks for German colonization in Prussian Poland. Shortly -before the European war broke out, another unconstitutional law was -passed, which makes possible the arbitrary division of large landed -properties owned by Poles. - - - -THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF THE POLISH QUESTION - -During the war with Japan, the Czar and the Kaiser understood each -other perfectly on the Polish question. The neutrality of Germany was -essential to Russia at that time. The Russians owe much to Germany for -her benevolent attitude of those trying days. The Poles have since -paid the bill. - -As in Prussia, the Poles of Russia have seen their liberties menaced -more than ever before during the past decade, and have had to struggle -hopelessly against a policy of ruthless extermination. If on the one -hand the Prussian persecution is more to be condemned because Germany -asks the world to believe that she is an enlightened, constitutional -nation, and "the torch-bearer of civilization," while Russia is -admittedly reactionary and still half-barbarous, on the other hand -there is less excuse for {116} the Russian persecution of the Poles. -For in Russia it is not Teuton against Slav, but Slav against Slav. - -Germany and Russia have had the common interest of fellow-criminals in -their relation to the Polish nation. Russia has not hesitated to -co-operate with Germany through diplomatic and police channels in -riveting more securely the fetters of the Poles. Her championship of -the south Slavs against Teutonic aggression has been supposedly on the -grounds of "burning love for our brothers in slavery, in whose veins -runs the same blood as ours." The sham and hypocrisy of this attitude -is revealed when we consider the fact that Russia has never protested -to Germany against the treatment of the Poles of Poznania, nor shown -any inclination to treat with equity her own Poles. Here are "brothers -in slavery" nearer home. There is ground for suspicion that her -interest in the south Slavs has been purely because they are on the way -to Constantinople and the Mediterranean. One who reads the recent -history of Russia stultifies himself if he allows himself to believe -that Russia has entered into the present war to defend Servia from -Austrian aggression _through any love for or humanitarian interest in -the Servians_. If Russia gets the opportunity, will her treatment of -Servian national aspirations be any different from that of -Austria-Hungary? When we try to answer this question, let us think of -Bulgaria after 1878 (the last "war of liberation") and of Poland _in -1914_. - -On August 16, 1914, when I read the proclamation of Czar Nicholas to -the partitioned Poles, promising {117} to restore administrative -autonomy to the kingdom of Poland, and posing as the liberator of Poles -now under the yoke of Austria and of Prussia, it was hard to be -enthusiastic. For the Jews of Odessa and Kief, and the Finns of -Helsingfors, rise up to add their cry of warning to the bitter comments -of Polish friends. Only two years ago I saw in those cities subjects -of the Czar suffering cruelly from fanaticism and broken promises, and -deprived of that which is now being held out as bait to the Poles, and -as a sop to Russia's Allies. - -Austria-Hungary has been able to use the Russian treatment of Poland as -a means of strengthening her own hold on the border regions of the -Empire. It was at the instigation of Ballplatz that the Galician -deputies, on December 16, 1911, made a motion in the Reichsrath, -inviting the Minister of Foreign Affairs "to undertake steps among the -Powers who signed the conventions at Vienna in 1815 to assure the -maintenance of the frontiers of the kingdom of Poland, of which Russia, -in violation of her international obligations, was threatening the -integrity. For the separation of Kholm from Poland is an attack upon -Polish historic and national consciousness." It was tit for tat with -the two Eastern Powers. Russia burned with indignation for the -feelings of Servia when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. -Austria-Hungary burned with indignation for the feelings of her own -loyal Polish subjects, when Russia separated Kholm from Poland. Both -had violated international treaties. Russia had no genuine interest in -the Servians, and Austria {118} none in the Poles. They merely seized -upon weapons with which to attack each other. - -It is a mystery how French and British public opinion, always so -traditionally favourable to downtrodden races, and especially to the -Poles, can hail the Russian entry into Lemberg as a "victory for -civilization." To the Austrian Poles, the coming of the Cossacks is as -the coming of the Uhlans to the Belgians. They look upon the Russian -invasion of Galicia as a calamity to their national life. Fighting -with the Austrians are thirty thousand young Poles who call themselves -Sokols (falcons). Their organization is something like the German -_Turnverein_, but more purely military. The Poles of Austria-Hungary -are a unit against Russia. - -One can make no such positive statement about the attitude of the Poles -of the other two partitioners. They have little hope of any -amelioration of their lot from a change of masters through the present -war. As I write, the thunder of German cannon is heard at Warsaw, and -the unhappy kingdom of Poland is the centre of conflict between Russia -and Germany. The Poles are fighting on both sides, and Polish -non-combatants are suffering from the brutality of both "liberating" -armies. The situation is exactly expressed by a Polish proverb which -is the fruit of centuries of bitter experience: _Gdzie dwóch panów sie, -bije, ch[l-tilde]op w skur[e-cedille], dostaje_--"When two masters -fight, the peasant receives the blows." - - - - -{119} - -CHAPTER VII - -ITALIA IRREDENTA - -Irredentism grew inevitably out of the decisions of the Congress of -Vienna, whose members were subjected to two influences in making a new -map of Europe. The first consideration, so common and so necessary in -all diplomatic arrangements, was that of expediency. The second -consideration was to prevent the rise of liberalism and democracy. The -decisions on the ground of the first consideration were made under the -pressure and the play and the skill of give and take by the -representatives of the nations who fondly believed that they were -making a lasting peace for Europe. The decisions on the ground of the -second consideration were guided by the idea that the checking of -national aspirations was the best means of preventing the growth of -democracy. - -The decisions of Vienna, like the later modifications of Paris and -Berlin, could not prevent the development of the national movements -which have changed the map as it was rearranged after the collapse of -the Napoleonic _régime_. - -During the past hundred years, ten new states have appeared on the map -of Europe: Greece, {120} Belgium, Servia, Italy, the German -Confederation, Rumania, Montenegro, Norway, Bulgaria, -and--possibly--Albania. With the exception of Albania (and is this the -reason why we have to qualify its viability by the word _possibly?_), -_all of these states have appeared upon the map against the will of, -and in defiance of, the concert of the European Powers_. They have -all, again with the exception of Albania, been born through a rise of -national consciousness preceded and inspired by a literary and -educational revival. The goal has been democracy. None of them, in -achieving independence, has succeeded in including within its frontiers -all the territory occupied by people of the same race and the same -language. _Irredentism is the movement to secure the union with a -nation of contiguous territories inhabited by the same race and -speaking the same language_. It is the call of the redeemed to the -unredeemed, and of the unredeemed to the redeemed. - -If we were to regard the present unrest in Europe and the antagonism of -nations from the standpoint of nationalism, we could attribute the -breaking out of contemporary wars to five causes: the desire of nations -to get back what they have lost, illustrated by France in relationship -to Alsace-Lorraine; the desire of nations to expand according to their -legitimate racial aspirations, illustrated by the Balkan States in -relationship to Turkey and Austria-Hungary, and Italy in relationship -to Austria-Hungary; the desire of nations to expand commercially and -politically because of possession of surplus population and energy, -illustrated by Germany in her {121} _Weltpolitik_; the desire of -nations to prevent the commercial and political expansion of their -rivals, illustrated by Great Britain and Russia; and the desire of -nations to stamp out the rise of national movements which threaten -their territorial integrity, illustrated by Austria-Hungary and Turkey. - -The irredentism of the Balkan States led, first, to their war with -Turkey; second, to their war with each other; and third, to Servia -becoming the direct cause of the European war. The aspirations of none -have been satisfied. Rumanian irredentism has stood between Rumania -and the Triple Alliance. The irredentism of Italy has not yet led to -anything, but it is so full of significance as a possible factor in -bearing upon and changing the whole destinies of Europe during the -winter of 1914-1915, that it cannot be overlooked in a study of -contemporary national movements and wars. - -The entrance of Italy into an alliance with the Teutonic Powers of -Central Europe was believed by her statesmen to be an act of -self-preservation. - -The opposition of the French clerical party to the completion of the -unification of Italy during the last decade of the Third Empire -destroyed whatever gratitude the Italian people may have felt for the -decisive aid rendered to the cause of Italian unity at Solferino. On -the part of the moving spirits of Young Italy, indeed, this gratitude -was not very great. For the first great step in the unification of -Italy had been accompanied by a dismemberment of the territories from -which the royal house of Piedmont took its name. Young Italy felt that -the French {122} had been paid for their help against Austria, and paid -dearly. The cession of his birthplace, at the moment when the nation -for which he had suffered so terribly and struggled so successfully -came into being, hurt Garibaldi more than the French bullets lodged in -his body eight years later at Mentana. When the French look to-day -with joy upon Italian irredentism as the hopeless barrier between Italy -and Austria-Hungary, they should not forget that, even though fifty -years have passed, Italian irredentism includes also Savoy and Nice. - -After the Franco-German War, there were two tendencies in the policy of -the Third Republic to prevent an understanding between France and -Italy. The first of these was the recurrence in France of the old -bitter clericalism of the Empire. Italy feared that French soldiers -might again come to Rome. The second was the antagonism of France to -the budding colonial aspirations of Italy. When France occupied Tunis, -Italy felt that she had been robbed of the realization of a dream, -which was hers by right of history, geography, and necessity. - -So Italy joined the Triple Alliance. It is argued with reason in -France that the alliance of Teuton and Latin was unnatural. Since -Italy had become wholly Guelph to realize its unity, why this sudden -return to Ghibellinism? The alliance of Italy with Germany and -Austria-Hungary, however, was not more paradoxical than the alliance of -increasingly democratic and socialistic and anti-clerical France with -mediæval Russia. The reasons dictating the alliance were practically -the same. - -{123} - -But there was this difference. Italy entered into an alliance with a -former enemy and oppressor, who was still holding certain unredeemed -territories of the united Italy as it had existed in the minds of the -enthusiasts of the middle of the nineteenth century. - -Too many books have been written about the distribution of populations -in the Austro-Hungarian Empire to make necessary going into the details -here of the Italian populations of the Austrian Tyrol and of the -Austrian provinces at the north of the Adriatic Sea. The Tyrolese -Italians are undoubtedly Italian in sympathies and characteristics. -But is their union with Italy demanded by either internal Italian or -external European political and economic considerations more than would -be the union with Italy of the Italian cantons of the Swiss -confederation? - -Italian irredentism in regard to the Adriatic littoral is a far more -serious and complicated problem. One is struck everywhere in the -Adriatic, even as far south as Corfu, by the Italian character of the -cities. Cattaro, Ragusa, Spalato, Zara, Fiume, Pola, and Trieste, all -have an indefinable Italian atmosphere. It has never left them since -the Middle Ages. It is in the buildings, however, rather than in the -people. One hesitates to attribute even to the people of Fiume and -Trieste Italian characteristics in the narrower sense of the word. On -the Dalmatian coast, the Slavic element has won all the cities. In -Fiume and Trieste, it is strong enough to rob these two cities of their -distinctive Italian character. One's misgivings concerning the claims -of Italian irredentists grow when he leaves the cities. {124} There -are undoubtedly several hundred thousands of Italians in this region. -Italian is the language of commerce, and on the Austrian-Lloyd and -Hungaro-Croatian steamship lines, Italian is the language of the crews. -But the people who speak Italian are not Italians, in every other case -you meet, nor do they resemble Italians. Why is this? - -Nationality, in the twentieth century, has a mental and civic, rather -than a physical and hereditary basis. _We are the product of our -education and of the political atmosphere in which we live_. This is -why assimilation is so strikingly easy in America, where we place the -immigrant in touch with the public school, the newspaper, and the -ballot. Just as the Italians and Germans and French of Switzerland are -Swiss, despite their differences of language, so the Italians of the -Adriatic littoral are the product of the dispensation under which they -have lived. Unlike the Alsatians, they have never known political -freedom and cultural advantages in common with their kin across a -frontier forcibly raised to cut them off; unlike the Poles, they have -not been compelled to revive the nationalism of an historic past as a -means of getting rid of oppression; unlike the Slavs of the Balkans, -their national spirit has not been called into being by the tyranny of -a race alien in civilization and ideals, because alien in religion. - -I have among my clippings from French newspapers during the past five -years a legion of quotations from Vienna and Rome correspondents, -concerning the friction between Austria-Hungary and Italy, and between -the Italian-speaking population {125} of Austria and the Viennese -Government, over the question of distinct Italian nationality of -Austro-Hungarian subjects. There have been frontier incidents; there -have been demonstrations of Austrian societies visiting Italian cities -and Italian societies visiting Trieste; there has been much discussion -over the creation of an Italian Faculty of Law at the University of -Vienna, and the establishment of an Italian University at Trieste or -Vienna; and there have been occasional causes of friction between the -Austrian Governor of Istria and the Italian residents of the province. -But the general impression gained from a study of the incidents in -question, and the effort to trace out their aftermath, leads to the -conclusion that these irredentist incidents have been magnified in -importance. A clever campaign of the French press has endeavoured to -detach Italian public opinion from the Triple Alliance by publishing in -detail, on every possible occasion, any incident that might show -Austrian hostility to the Italian "nation." - -In 1844, Cesare Balbo, in his _Speranze d'Italia_, a book that is as -important to students of contemporary politics as to those of the -Risorgimento, set forth clearly that the hope of Italy to the exclusion -of Austria from Lombardy and Venetia was most reasonably based _upon -the extension of the Austrian Empire eastward through the approaching -fall of the Ottoman Empire_. Balbo was a man of great vision. He -looked beyond the accidental factors in the making of a nation to the -great and durable considerations of national existence. He grasped the -fact {126} that the insistence of the Teutonic race upon holding in -subjection purely Italian territories, and its hostility to the -unification of the Italian people, was based upon economic -considerations. Lombardy and Venetia had been for a thousand years the -pathway of German commerce to the Mediterranean. If Austria, Balbo -argued, should fall heir to a portion of the European territories of -the Ottoman Empire, she would have her outlet to the Mediterranean more -advantageously than through the possession of Lombardy and Venetia. -Once these Ottoman territories were secured, Austria would be ready to -cede Lombardy and Venetia to a future united Italy. - -After the unity of Italy had been achieved, and Austria had been driven -out of Lombardy and Venetia, she did receive compensation in Bosnia and -Herzegovina, and, just as Balbo predicted, there was born the Austrian -ambition to the succession of Macedonia. _That this ambition has not -been realized, and that Russia was determined to prevent the attempt to -revive it, explains the Austro-Hungarian willingness to fight Russia in -the summer of 1914_. - -Austria and Hungary, from the very beginning of existence as a Dual -Monarchy, have been caught in the vise between Italian irredentism and -Servian irredentism. They have not been able to secure their outlet -through Macedonia to the Ægean Sea. They have been constantly -threatened by their neighbours on the south-east and south-west with -exclusion altogether from the Adriatic, their only outlet to the -Mediterranean. - -From the economic point of view, one cannot {127} but have sympathy -with the determination of the Austrians and Hungarians to prevent the -disaster which would certainly come to them, if the aspirations of -Italian and Servian irredentism were realized. The severity of Hungary -against Croatia and the oppression of the Servians in -Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia by Austria have been dictated by the -same reasons which led England and Scotland to attempt to destroy the -national spirit of Ireland for so many centuries after they had robbed -her of her independence. They could not afford to have their -communications by sea threatened by the presence and growth of an -independent nation, especially since this nation was believed to be -susceptible to the influence of hereditary enemies. - -It has been fortunate for Austria-Hungary that the claims of the -irredentists at the head of the Adriatic have overlapped and come into -conflict in almost the same way that the claims of Greece and Bulgaria -have come into conflict in Macedonia. From time immemorial, the -Italian and Greek peoples, owing to their position on peninsulas, have -been seafaring. Consequently, it is they who have developed the -commercial life of ports in the eastern Mediterranean. Everywhere -along the littoral of the Ægean and the Adriatic, Greeks and Italians -have founded and inhabited, up to the present day, the chief ports. -But, by the same token, those engaged in commercial and maritime -occupations have never been excellent farmers, shepherds, or woodsmen. -So, while the Italians and Greeks have held the predominance in the -cities of the littoral, the {128} _hinterland_ has been occupied by -other races. Just as the _hinterland_ of Macedonia is very largely -Bulgarian, the _hinterland_ of the upper end of the Adriatic is very -largely Slavic. Just as the realization of the dreams of Hellenic -irredentists would give Greece a narrow strip of coast line along -European Turkey to Constantinople, with one or two of the larger inland -commercial cities, while the Slavs would be cut off entirely from the -sea, the realization of the dreams of Italian irredentists would give -to Italy the ports and coast line of the northern end of the Adriatic, -with no _hinterland_, and the Slavs, Hungarians, and Germans an -enormous _hinterland_ with no ports. - -Italian irredentism, in so far as the Tyrol goes, is not unreasonable. -But its realization in Istria and the Adriatic littoral is -impracticable. Our modern idea of a state is of people living together -in a political union that is to their economic advantage. Only the -thoughtless enthusiasts could advocate a change in the map of Europe by -which fifty million people would be cut off from the sea to satisfy the -national aspirations of a few hundred thousand Italians. - -The Italian Society _Dante Alighieri_ has gotten into the hands of the -irredentists, and, before the Tripolitan conquest, was successful in -influencing members of Parliament to embarrass the Government by -interpellations concerning the troubles of Italians who are Austrian -subjects. This society has advocated for Italy the adoption of a law -so modifying the legislation on naturalization that Italians who -emigrate can preserve their nationality even if they acquire that of -the countries to which they have gone. {129} It was a curious -anticipation of the famous Article XXV, of the German Citizenship Law -of 1914. In 1911, a Lombard deputy tried to raise the old cry of alarm -concerning German penetration into Italy, and emphasized the necessity -of the return to the policy of the Ghibelline motto, "_Fuori i -Tedeschi_"--"Expel the Germans." - -Italian statesmen, however, have never given serious attention to the -claims of the irredentists. The late Marquis di San Giuliano deplored -their senseless and harmful manifestations. In trying for the -impossible, and keeping up an agitation that tended to make friction -between Italy and Austria-Hungary, he pointed out that they harmed what -were the real and _attainable_ Italian interests. - -The antagonism between Italy and Austria-Hungary has had deeper and -more logical and justifiable foundation than irredentism. The two -nations have been apprehensive each about allowing the other to gain -control of the Adriatic. Up to 1903, Spezzia was the naval base for -the whole of Italy. Since that time, Tarento has become one of the -first military ports, important fortifications have been placed at -Brindisi, Bari, and Ancona, and an elaborate scheme has been drawn up -for the defence of Venice. The Venetians have been demanding that -Venice become a naval base. - -Italian naval and maritime activity having increased in the Adriatic, -there has naturally been more intense opposition and rivalry between -the two Adriatic Powers over Albania. The spread of Austro-Hungarian -influence has been bitterly fought {130} by the Italian propaganda. -This problem was becoming a serious one for the statesmen of the two -nations while Albania was still under Turkish rule. Since, at the -joint wish of Italy and Austria-Hungary, Albania has been brought into -the family of European nations, the question of the equilibrium of the -Adriatic has only become more unsettled. For free Albania turned out -to be a fiasco. - -If the relations between Austria-Hungary, fighting for life, and her -passive ally of the Triple Alliance have become more strained since the -European war began, let it be hoped for the future stability of Europe -that it has not been because Italian irredentism has gained the upper -hand at Rome. For if Italy were to intervene in the war for the -purpose of taking away from Austria-Hungary the Adriatic littoral -inhabited by Italians, she would be menacing her own future, and that -of Switzerland as well. To entertain the hope of taking and keeping -Trieste would be folly. - - - - -{131} - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES - -The River Danube and the Straits leading from the Black Sea to the -Ægean Sea have been the waterways of Europe whose fortunes have had the -greatest influence upon the evolution of international relations during -the last half century. The control of these two waterways, as long as -the Ottoman Empire remained strong, was not a question of compelling -interest to Europe. It was only when the decline of the Ottoman power -began to foreshadow the eventual disappearance of the empire from -Europe that nations began to think of the vital importance of the -control of these waterways to the economic life of Europe. - -There is an extensive and interesting literature on the history of the -evolution of international law in its relationship to the various -questions raised by the necessarily international control of the Danube -and the Dardanelles. In a book like this, an adequate statement of the -history and work of the Danube Commission, and of the various -diplomatic negotiations affecting the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, -their freedom of passage, their fortifications, their {132} -lighthouses, and their life-saving stations, cannot be attempted. It -is my intention, therefore, to treat these great waterways only in the -broader aspect of the important part that the questions raised by them -have played in leading up to the gigantic struggle which foreshadows a -new political reconstruction of the world. - -The Danube is navigable from Germany all the way to the Black Sea. On -its banks are the capitals of Austria, Hungary, and Servia. It -traverses the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire, forms a natural boundary -between Austria and Servia, Rumania and Bulgaria, and then turns north -across Rumania to separate for a short distance Rumania and Russia -before finally reaching the Black Sea. - -The volume of traffic on the Danube has increased steadily since the -Crimean War. It has become the great path of export for Austrian and -Hungarian merchandise to the Balkan States, Russia, Turkey, and Persia, -and for Servian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian products to Russia and Turkey. -The passenger service on the Danube has kept pace with the competition -of the railways. Eastward, it is frequently quicker, cheaper, and more -convenient than the railway service. You can leave Vienna or -Buda-Pesth in the evening, and reach Buda-Pesth or Belgrade in the -morning. From Belgrade to the Hungarian and Rumanian frontier towns, -the Danube furnishes the shortest route. From Bulgaria to Russia, the -Danube route, via Somovit and Galatz to Odessa, is in many ways -preferable to the through train service. It is by spending days on the -Danube that I have come to {133} realize how vital the river is to -freight and passenger communications between Austria-Hungary, the -Balkan states, and Russia. Travel gives life and meaning to -statistics. The Danube interprets itself. - -The Congresses of Paris and Berlin considered carefully the entrance of -the Danube question into international life through the enfranchisement -of the Balkan States. International laws, administered by an -international commission, govern the Danube. It is a neutral waterway. -Problems, similar to those of the Scheldt, have arisen, however, in the -present war between Austria-Hungary and Servia. If Rumania and -Bulgaria should join in the European war, no matter on which side they -should fight, the whole Danube question would become further -complicated. When war actually breaks out, the rulings of -international law concerning neutrality are invariably violated. -States act according to their own interests. - -In its larger European aspect, the Danube, as an international -waterway, is dependent upon the Dardanelles. Were Rumania to close the -navigation of the Danube, or were she to preserve its neutrality, she -would only be preventing or assisting the commerce of the riverain -states with the Black Sea. Unobstructed passage to the outside world -for Danube commerce depends upon the control of the outlet from the -Black Sea to the Ægean Sea. The Hungarian and Servian peasant looks -beyond his own great river to the narrow passage from the Sea of -Marmora. The question of the Danube is subordinated to the question of -the Dardanelles. - -That the passage from the Black Sea to the outside {134} world remain -open and secure from sudden stoppage or constant menace is of vital -importance to the riverain Danube states, Austria-Hungary and Servia, -to the states bordering the Black Sea, Russia, Rumania, and Turkey, and -to Persia, whose nearest communications with Europe are by way of the -Black Sea. Austria-Hungary, however, has another outlet through the -Adriatic, Servia is pressing towards the Adriatic and the Ægean, -Bulgaria has recently secured an Ægean littoral, Persia is dependent -upon Russia, and Turkey holds the straits. There remain Russia and -Rumania, to whom the question of the Dardanelles is a matter of life -and death. - -The international position of Rumania is most unfortunate. She must -make common cause with Germanic Europe or with Turkey to prevent her -only waterway to the outside world from falling into the hands of -Russia, or she must ally herself with Russia, and, by adding Bukovina -and Transylvania, increase her numbers to the point where she can hope -to resist the tide of Slavs around her. In discussing the neutrality -of Rumania, the French and British press have given too much emphasis -to the loyalty of King Carol for the Hohenzollern family, of which he -was a member, as the cause of the failure of Rumania to join the -enemies of the Germanic Powers, and to the hope that the death of the -sovereign who made Rumania may result in a favourable change in the -policy of the Bukarest Cabinet. The new sovereign, King Ferdinand, is -also a Hohenzollern. The hesitation of Rumania has not been, and is -not, primarily because of the family ties of her rulers. {135} The -Rumanians in Hungary may call for union with their enfranchised -brethren, just as the Italians in Austria may call for union with the -Italians who were liberated in 1859 and 1866. But is irredentism the -only factor in influencing the policy of Italy and Rumania? For -Rumania, at least, the hope of acquiring Transylvania and Bukovina in -the international settlement following the war is offset by the -apprehension of seeing Russia at the Dardanelles. - -The Dardanelles has been the scene of struggles for commercial -supremacy since the days of the Peloponnesian wars. It was in the -Dardanelles that the great battle was fought which brought about the -downfall of Athenian hegemony. It was over the question of fortifying -the island of Tenedos that Venice and Genoa in the latter half of the -fourteenth century fought the war during which the Genoese occupation -of Chioggia nearly caused the destruction of Venice. Then came the -Ottoman occupation to put a stop to international jealousies until -modern times. - -The political development of Russia from Moscow has been a consistent -forward march towards ocean waterways. There have been six possible -outlets for Russia, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the White Sea, the -Yellow Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Adriatic. At different periods -of her history, Russia has expended her efforts continuously in these -various directions. To reach the Baltic, Peter the Great built -Petrograd. One has to stand on the Kremlin on a beautiful summer day -and look out over the sacred city of the Russians to grasp the fulness -of {136} the sacrifice and the marvellous daring of the man who -abandoned Moscow to build another capital on piles driven into dreary -salt marshes. It was for the sea and contact with the outside world! -To reach the Pacific Ocean, Russia patiently conquered the former -empire of the Mongols, steppe by steppe, and when she thought the -moment of realization had arrived, did not hesitate to throw a band of -steel across the continent of Asia. To reach the Persian Gulf, she -crossed the Caucasus and launched her ships upon the Caspian Sea. To -reach the Black Sea, she broke the military power of the houses of -Jagello and Osman, building laboriously upon the ruins of Poland and -the Ottoman Empire. Is it to reach the Adriatic that her forces are -now before Przemysl? - -In spite of her struggles through three centuries, Russia is still -landlocked. The ice is an insurmountable barrier to freedom of exit -from the White Sea, her only undisputed outlet. Japan has arisen to -shatter the dreams of the future of Port Dalny, and make useless the -sacrifices to gain the Pacific. The control by Germany of the exit -from the Baltic Sea has been strengthened in recent years by the -construction and fortification of the Kiel Canal. The Persian Gulf has -been given up by the accord of 1907 with Great Britain. There has -remained what has always been the strongest hope, and the one for the -realization of which Russia has made consistent and stupendous efforts. - -Radetsky, in his memoirs, has summed up the attitude of Russia towards -the Ottoman Empire in {137} words that give the key to the whole -Eastern Question during the past century: - - -"Owing to her geographical position, Russia is the national and eternal -enemy of Turkey.... Russia must therefore do all she can to take -possession of Constantinople, for its possession alone will grant to -her the security and territorial completeness necessary for her future." - - -Three times during the nineteenth century Russia endeavoured to destroy -the Ottoman Empire in Europe so that she might gain control of the exit -to the Ægean Sea. In 1828, her armies reached Adrianople, and half a -century later the suburbs of Constantinople. In both instances, -especially the second, it was the opposition of Great Britain that -forced Russia to make peace without having attained her end. In 1854, -France and Italy joined Great Britain in the invasion of the Crimea to -preserve "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." In 1856, at the -Congress of Paris, Russia saw the western Powers uphold the principle -that the Czar had no right to sovereignty even on the Black Sea, a half -of which his ancestors had wrested from the Turks. It was no use for -Russia to plead that she had "special interests" in her own territorial -waters. The Black Sea was neutralized. The expression "_selon nos -convenances et intérêts_" was understood by Great Britain to refer only -to British interests! It was by right of might that Russia was held in -check. In 1870, Bismarck purchased the neutrality of Russia in his war -against France by agreeing to Russia's {138} denunciation of the Paris -treaty clauses which held her impotent in the Black Sea. But again, in -1878, Great Britain interfered to bottle up Russia. Since then the -Russian navy has been a prisoner in the Black Sea. Will it continue to -be so after the war of 1914? - -Just when Ottoman power was receding, the rapid development of steam -power began to make southern Russia the bread basket of Europe. Steam -machinery increased the yield of these vast and rich lands, steam -railways enabled the farmers to send their harvests to Black Sea ports, -and steamships made possible the distribution of the harvests -throughout Europe. I used to live on the Bosphorus, and from my study -window I could see every day the never-ceasing procession of grain -ships of all nations going to and coming from the Black Sea. In May, -1912, when the Dardanelles was closed for a month during the Italian -war, two hundred steamships lay at anchor in the harbour of -Constantinople. - -Another influence whose importance cannot be overestimated has -constantly turned the eyes of Russians towards Constantinople. Slavs -are idealists. For an ideal, one makes sacrifices that material -considerations do not call forth. To the Russians, Constantinople is -Tsarigrad, the city of the Emperor. It is from Constantinople that the -Russians received their religion. Their civilization is imbued with -the spirit of Byzantium. Just as one sees in the Polish language the -influence of Latin in the construction of the sentence, one sees in the -kindred Russian tongue the influence of Greek. I have frequently been -struck {139} with the close and vital relationship between -Constantinople and Russia during the period of the development of the -Russian nation. _Now that Russia seems to be entering upon a period of -national awakening, the sentiment is bound to be irresistible among the -Russians that they are the rightful inheritors of the Eastern Empire, -eclipsed for so many centuries by the shadow of Islam and now about to -be born again_. - -On a July evening in 1908, when the constitutional revolution in Turkey -was beginning to occupy the attention of Europe, I sat with my wife in -the winter garden of the Grand Hotel in Paris. We were listening to a -charming and intelligent Russian gentleman explain to us the aims of -the political parties in the Duma of 1907. A waiter came to tell us -that our baggage was ready. "Where are you going?" asked the Russian. -"To Constantinople," we answered. An expression of wistful sadness or -joy--you can never tell which it is meant to be with a Russian--came -across his face. "Constantinople!" he murmured, more to himself than -to us: "This revolution will fail. You will see. For we must come -into our own." - -The political aspect of the question of the Dardanelles has changed -greatly since Great Britain and France fought one war with Russia, and -Great Britain stood ready to fight a second, in order to prevent this -passage from falling into Russian hands. - -Almost immediately after the crisis of San Stefano and the resulting -revision of the Russo-Turkish treaty at Berlin, the interests of Great -Britain were diverted from the north-east to the south-east {140} -Mediterranean. She decided that her permanent route to India was -through the Suez Canal, and made it secure by getting possession of the -majority of the shares of the Canal and by seizing Egypt. The -Bulgarians began to show themselves lacking in the expected docility -towards their liberator. British diplomats realized that they had been -fearing what did not happen. They began to lose interest in the -Dardanelles. This loss of interest in the question of the straits as a -vital factor in their world interests has grown so complete in recent -years that Russia has no reason to anticipate another visit of the -British fleet to Besika Bay if--I refrain from prophesying. It is safe -to say, however, that London has forgotten Mohammed Ali, the Crimea, -and the Princes' Islands, while the traditions of Unkiar Skelessi are -still dominating the foreign policy of Petrograd. - -For, while the future of the Dardanelles has come to mean less to Great -Britain, it means more than ever before to Russia. Russia has been -turned back from the Pacific. The loss of Manchuria in the war with -Japan caused her once again to cast her eyes upon the outlet to the -Mediterranean. To the increase in her wheat trade has been added also -the development of the petroleum trade from the Caucasus wells. Since -the agreement for the partition of Persia with Great Britain in 1907, -and the mutual "hands off" accord with Germany at Potsdam in 1910, the -expectations of a brilliant Russian future for northern Persia and the -Armenian and Kurdish corner of Asiatic Turkey have been great. - -{141} - -Since the Congress of Berlin, Germany has come into the place of Great -Britain as the enemy who would keep Russia from finding the Ægean Sea. -The growth of German interests at Constantinople and in Asia Minor has -become the India--in anticipation--of Germany. When Russia, after her -ill-fated venture in the Far East, turned her efforts once more towards -the Balkan peninsula, it began to dawn upon her that the _Drang nach -Oesten_ might prove a menace to her control of the Dardanelles, fully -as great as was formerly the British fetish of the integrity of the -Ottoman Empire to keep open the route to India. Diplomacy endeavoured -to ward off the inevitable struggle. But the Balkan wars created a new -situation that broke rudely the accords of Skierniewice and Potsdam. -Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and Germany in Asia Minor became the -nightmare of Russia. - - - - -{142} - -CHAPTER IX - -AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SOUTH SLAVS - -It has often been predicted in recent years that the union between -Austria and Hungary would be broken by internal troubles. Hungary has -been credited with desiring to cut loose from Austria. The frequent -and serious quarrels between the members of the Dual Monarchy have -caused many a wiseacre to shake his head and say, "The union will not -outlive Franz Josef!" But the Austro-Hungarian Empire has been founded -upon sound political and economic principles, which far transcend a -single life or a dynasty. Austrians and Hungarians may be unwilling -yoke-fellows. But they know that if they do not pull together, they -cannot pull at all. They have too many Slavs around them. - -The principle upon which Austrians and Hungarians have founded a Dual -Monarchy is the old Latin proverb, _divide et impera_. In the Empire, -Austrians and Hungarians are in the minority. In each kingdom, by -dividing the Slavs cleverly between them, they hold the upper hand. -The German race is, {143} therefore, the dominant race in Austria, and -the Hungarian race is the dominant race in Hungary. - -If one looks at the map, and studies the division of the Empire, he -will readily see that it is much more durably constructed than he would -have reason to believe from statistics of the population. _The Slavic -question in the Dual Monarchy is not how many Slavs of kindred races -are to be found in Austria-Hungary, but how they are placed in -relationship to each other and to neighbouring states_. It is a -question of geography rather than of census. The student needs a map -instead of columns of figures. - -In only one place is the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy very weak, and that -is in the south. The sole port for the thirty millions of Austria is -Trieste. To reach Trieste one passes through a belt of Slavic -territory, and Trieste itself is more Italian than German. The sole -port of Hungary is Fiume. To reach Fiume one passes through a belt of -Slavic territory, and there are hardly any Hungarians in Fiume itself. -The Slavs which cut off Fiume from Hungary and the Slavs of the -Dalmatian coast and of all Bosnia and Herzegovina belong to the same -family. They speak practically the same language as the Servians and -Montenegrins. - -The Hungarians, then, have exactly the same interest as the Austrians -in every move that has been made since the proclamation of the -constitution of Turkey to prevent the foundation of a strong -independent Servian State on the confines of the {144} Austro-Hungarian -Empire, and to prevent the Slavs from reaching the Adriatic Sea. - -Austria has not been necessarily influenced in her attitude towards the -Balkan problem by Germany. Although her _Drang nach Osten_ is -frequently interpreted as a part of the Pan-Germanic movement, the -Germans of Austria have needed no German sentiment and no German -prompting to arrive at their point of view in regard to the Balkan -nationalities. It must be clearly kept in mind that the Convention of -Reichstadt in 1876, which was the beginning of Austria's consistent -policy towards the Balkan peninsula, was signed before the alliance -with Germany; that it was the conception of a _Hungarian_ statesman, -and that _the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had nothing whatever -to do with Pan-Germanism_. It was a measure of self-protection to -prevent these remote provinces of Turkey from forming a political union -with Servia, should the Russian arms, intervening on behalf of the -south Slavs against Turkey, prove successful. The extension of -sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 was to prevent the -constitutional _régime_ from trying to weaken the hold of -Austria-Hungary upon these provinces. Austria-Hungary certainly would -have preferred the more comfortable status of an occupation to the -legal adoption of a _Reichsland_. But she could take no chances with -the Young Turks. Her military occupation of the _Sandjak_ of Novi -Bazar was inspired as much by the necessity of preventing the union of -Montenegro and Servia as by the desire to provide for a future railway -extension to Salonika. - -{145} - -Hungary has had to grapple with two Balkan problems, the rise of -Rumania and the rise of Servia. She has had within her kingdom several -million Rumanian subjects and several million South Slavic subjects. -Most of her Rumanians, however, have been separated from Rumania from -the natural barrier of the Carpathian mountains, and have not found -their union with Hungary to their disadvantage. For the Rumanians of -Hungary enjoy through Buda-Pesth and Fiume a better outlet to the -markets of the world, and a cheaper haul, than they would find through -Rumania. They have benefited greatly by their economic union with -Hungary. It is not the same with the Croatians. They are situated -between Buda-Pesth and the Adriatic. They have a natural river outlet -to the Danube. They are not separated by physical barriers from their -brothers of race and language in Servia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia. Were -they to separate from Hungary, they would not find their economic -position in any way jeopardized. - -Many South Slavs have advocated a trialism to replace the present -dualism. They have claimed that the most critical problems of the -Austro-Hungarian Empire could be solved in this way. Added to Hungary -and Austria, there could be a Servian kingdom, perhaps enlarged by the -inclusion of independent Servia and Montenegro, whose crown could be -worn by the Hapsburg ruler. - -But this solution has never found favour, simple and attractive though -it sounds on first sight, with {146} either Hungarians or Austrians. -For it would mean the cutting off of both kingdoms from the sea. The -Hungarians would be altogether land-locked, and surrounded on all sides -by alien races. Austria would be forced into hopeless economic -dependence upon Germany. The Germans of Austria and the Hungarians of -Hungary have felt that their national existence depended upon keeping -in political subjection the South Slavs, and upon repressing -mercilessly any evidences of Italian irredentism upon the littoral of -the Adriatic. Italian irredentism is treated in another place. The -repression of national aspirations among the South Slavs, which -interests us here, has been the corner-stone of Austro-Hungarian policy -in the Balkans. For Hungary it has also been an internal question in -her relationship with Croatia. - -The Serbo-Croatian movement in southern Hungary has been repressed by -Hungary with the same bitterness and lack of success that have attended -the attempts to stifle national aspirations elsewhere in Europe. No -weapon has been left unused in fighting nationalism in Croatia. -Official corruption, bribery, manipulation of judges, imprisonment -without trial, military despotism, gerrymandering, electoral -intimidation,--this has been for years and is still, the daily record -in Croatia. If there were a Slavic Silvio Pellico, the world would -know that the ministers of the aged Franz Josef are not very different -from the ministers of the young Franz Josef, who crushed the Milanese -and tracked Garibaldi like a beast. Radetzkys and Gorzkowskis are -still wearing {147} Austrian livery. To Austria and Hungary, Salonika -and Macedonia may have been the dream. But Trieste, Fiume, and -Dalmatia have always been the realities. If Hungary took her heel off -the neck of the Croatians, Buda-Pesth might become another Belgrade and -Hungary another Servia, land-locked with no other outlet than the -Danube. This does not excuse, but it explains. In this world the -battle is to the strong. The survival of the fittest is a historical -as well as a biological fact. - -In spite of their juxtaposition, the Serbo-Croats have never been able -to unite. There have been more reasons for this than their political -separation. They are divided in religion. The Servians are Orthodox, -and the Croatians and Dalmatians Catholic. In Bosnia and Macedonia, -the race adhered to both confessions, though in majority Orthodox, and -has also a strong Mohammedan element. The Orthodox Servians of Servia -use the Cyrillic alphabet, and the Catholic Croatians and Dalmatians of -Austria-Hungary the Latin alphabet. - -Until the recent Balkan Wars, the Croatians and Dalmatians considered -themselves a much superior branch of the race to the Servians. They -have certainly enjoyed a superior education and demonstrated a superior -civilization. The probable reason for this is that they did not have -the misfortune to be for centuries under the Ottoman yoke. The -Croatians have never been willing to play the understudy to the -Servians. Agram has considered itself the centre of the Serbo-Croat -movement rather than Belgrade. {148} It is a far more beautiful and -modern city than Belgrade. Few cities of all Europe of its size can -equal Agram for architecture, for municipal works, and for keen, -stimulating intellectual life. Its university is the _foyer_ of -Serbo-Croat nationalism and of _risorgimento_ literature. It was here -that the one Roman bishop of the world, who dared to speak openly in -the Vatican Council of 1870 against the doctrine of papal infallibility -and remain within the Church, gave to his people the prophetic message -that nationality transcended creeds. Here also another Catholic priest -taught the oneness of Servians and Croatians in language and history, -and proved by scholarly research which is universally admired, that -Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia formed a triune kingdom, whose juridic -union with the Austro-Hungarian Empire was wholly personal connection -with the Hapsburg Crown, and had never been subjection to the Magyar. -The Hungarians, during the past few years of bitterest persecution at -Agram, have not been able to drive away the ghosts of Strossmayer and -Racki. In Croatia, the pen has proved mightier than the sword. - -Until recently, Austria-Hungary has not felt uneasy about the -relationship between the Croatians and the Servians of the independent -kingdom. But there has never been a minute since the annexation of -1908 that the statesmen of the Ballplatz have not been nervous about -the Servian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To keep Catholic -Croatians and Orthodox Servians in {149} antagonism with each other and -with the Moslems, to prevent the education and economic emancipation of -the Orthodox peasants, and to introduce German colonists and German -industrial enterprises everywhere, has been the Austro-Hungarian -program. - -Vienna has used the Catholic Church and the propaganda of Catholic -missions for dividing the Orthodox Servians in Bosnia from their -Croatian brothers of the Catholic rite. Missionaries give every -encouragement to Servians to desert the Orthodox Church. In the -greater part of Bosnia, the Government has made it absolutely -impossible for a child to receive an education elsewhere than in the -Catholic schools. There are only two hundred and sixty-eight schools -supported by the Government, of which one-tenth are placed in such a -way that they serve exclusively other populations. The Bosnian budget -provides four times as much money for the maintenance of the -_gendarmerie_ as for public schools. - -Moslem law provides that all conquered land belongs to the Khalif. He -farms it out in annual, life, or hereditary grants. In the Ottoman -conquest of the Balkan Peninsula, the territories acquired were granted -to successful soldiers on a basis which provided for a feudal army. -The feudal proprietors, or _beys_, left the land to the peasants who -occupied it, in consideration of an annual rental of a third of the -yield of the land. The peasants had in addition to pay their tenth to -the tax collectors of the Sultan. In territories that were on the -borders of the Ottoman {150} Empire, like Bosnia and Albania, the lands -were largely retained by their former proprietors, who became Moslems. -So the landed aristocracy remained indigenous. - -The lot of the peasants in Bosnia, who were largely Orthodox Servians -was not intolerable under Turkish rule, except when Moslem fanaticism -was aroused by Christian separatist propaganda. Austria-Hungary -claimed, however, that her occupation of the province was a measure -dictated by humanity to ameliorate the lot of the enslaved Christians. -But the Austrian administration has accomplished just the opposite. -The new government from the beginning supported its authority upon the -Moslem landowners, upon whose good-will they were dependent to prevent -the awakening of national feeling among the peasants. Vienna was more -complacent in overlooking abuses of the _beys_ than had been -Constantinople. For the Turks held their _beys_ in check when -exactions grew too bad. The Sublime Porte was afraid of giving an -excuse for Christian intervention. But the Austrians encouraged the -exactions of the _beys_ in order to keep in abject subjection the -Servian peasant population. - -From the first moment of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, the peasants -found that they would no longer enjoy undisturbed possession of their -lands. The exodus of Mohammedan Bosnians, who, as we have seen -elsewhere, were urged to follow the Ottoman flag, gave the Germans the -opportunity of settling colonists on the vacated lands. This process -{151} of colonization was afterwards pursued to the detriment of the -indigenous Christian population. Ernest Haeckel, the great -philosopher, once said in a lecture at Jena that "the work of the -German people to assure and develop civilization gives it the right to -occupy the Balkans, Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and to exclude -from these countries the races actually occupying them which are -powerless and incapable." This statement, publicly made before a body -of distinguished German thinkers, reveals the real ulterior ideal of -the _Drang nach Osten_. Professor Wirth, dealing specifically with -present possibilities, stated that the policy of Austria-Hungary in -Bosnia must be to keep the peasantry in slavery and, as much as -possible, to encourage them by oppression to emigrate. The reason -given for this was: "_To render powerful the Bosnian peasant is to -render powerful the Servian people, which would be the suicide of -Germany._" Can we not see from this how public sentiment in Germany -has stood behind the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia? - -From 1890 to 1914, the theory of Haeckel and the advice of Wirth have -been followed by the Austrian functionaries in Bosnia. No stone has -been left unturned to drive the peasants from their lands. Right of -inheritance has been suppressed, a tax collector has been introduced -between the bey and his peasants, the taxes have been raised in many -cases arbitrarily to the point where the peasants have been compelled -to abandon their land. To German immigrants have been given {152} -communal lands which were necessary to the peasants for pasturage and -the forests where their swine fed on acorns. - -The population of Bosnia hardly surpasses thirty-five inhabitants to -the kilometre. The total population is about two millions, of whom -eight hundred thousand are Orthodox, six hundred thousand Moslem, and -five hundred thousand Catholic. But practically all of this -population--except one hundred thousand who are Jews, Protestants, and -other German immigrants--is Servian or Servian-speaking. There are -thirty-five thousand Germans, as opposed to one million eight hundred -thousand Slavs. And yet German is the language of the administration, -and the only language of the railways and posts and telegraphs, which -in Bosnia have not ceased to be under the control of the military -government. Many functionaries after thirty years of service in Bosnia -do not know the language of the country. Two German newspapers are -supported at the expense of the public budget to attack indigenous -elements. In German schools, pupils are taught the history of Germany, -but in Slavic schools the history of the south Slavs is excluded from -the curriculum. There are fourteen schools for ten thousand Germans, -and one school for every six thousand Slavs. - -In the administration of Bosnia, only thirty-one out of three hundred -and twenty-two functionaries are Servians, only twelve out of one -hundred and twenty-five professors of lyceums, only thirty-one out of -two hundred and thirty-seven judges and {153} magistrates. And yet the -Orthodox Servians form forty-four per cent. of the population. The -young Bosnians who have graduated from the Austro-Hungarian -universities find themselves excluded from public life. Turning to -commercial life, they find eighty per cent. of the large industries -controlled by German capital and managed exclusively by Germans. -Turning to agriculture, they find economic misery and hopeless -ignorance among the peasants of their race, and every effort made by -the Government to prevent the bettering of their lot. Turning to -journalism and public speaking to work for their race, they find an -unreasoning censorship and a law against assemblies. As one of them -expressed it to me, "We must either cease to be Slavs or become -revolutionaries." - -Did Austria-Hungary need to look to Servian propaganda, to influences -_from the outside_, to find the cause of the assassination of Franz -Ferdinand? Political assassinations were not new in the south Slavic -provinces of the monarchy. A young Bosnian student attempted to -assassinate the Governor of Bosnia at Sarajevo on June 6, 1910, at the -time of the inauguration of the Bosnian _Sabor_ (Diet). Two years -later the royal commissioner in Croatia was the object of an attempt at -assassination by a Bosnian at Agram. In September of the same year, a -Croatian student shot at the Ban of Croatia. The same Ban, Skerletz, -was attacked again at Agram by another young Croatian on August 18, -1913. These assassinations preceded those of the Archduke and his -wife. They {154} were all committed by students of Austro-Hungarian -nationality. Only the last one had ever been in Servia. - -In theory, Bosnia has had since February 20, 1910, a constitution with -a deliberative assembly. But the _Sabor_ can discuss no projects of -law that have not been proposed by the two masters. Once voted, a law -has to pass the double veto of Vienna and Buda-Pesth. As if this were -not enough, the Viennese bureaucracy has so arranged the qualification -of the electorate and the electoral laws that the suffrage does not -represent the country. Then, too, the constitution decides arbitrarily -that the membership of the _Sabor_ must be divided according to -religions, one Jew, sixteen Catholics, twenty-four Moslems, and -thirty-one Orthodox. The Government has reserved for itself the right -of naming twenty members! The constitution provides for individual -liberty, the inviolability of one's home, liberty of the press and -speech, and secrecy of letters and telegrams. This enlightened measure -of the Emperor was heralded to the world. But of course there was the -joker, Article 20. Vienna held the highest card! In case of menace to -the public safety, all public and private rights may be suspended by a -word from Vienna. Public safety always being menaced in Bosnia, the -constitution is perpetually suspended. The Government even goes as far -as to prosecute deputies for their speeches in Parliament. Newspapers -are continually censored. Their telegraphic news from Vienna and -Buda-Pesth is suppressed without reason. Particularly severe {155} -fines--sometimes jail sentences--are passed upon offending journalists. - -Is it necessarily because of instigation and propaganda from Belgrade -that of the three Servian political parties in Bosnia two (the _Narod_ -and the _Otachbina_) are closely allied to the Pan-Servian Society -_Narodna Obrana_, and that these two parties openly support the -separatist movement? - -In Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Croatia in 1914 the bureaucracy of Vienna has -been engaged in the same process of repression and police persecution -as in Italy during the half century from 1815 to the liberation of -Italy. The local constitutions have been suspended everywhere. Why -have the Austrians, in spite of the lessons of the beginning of the -present reign, dared to tempt providence in exactly the same way after -the Golden Jubilee? - -The victories of the Allies in the Balkans were a terrible blow to -Austria-Hungary. Not only was her dream of reaching the Ægean Sea -through the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar and Macedonia shattered by the -Greek occupation of Salonika, but the aggrandizement of Servia, caused -by a successful war, threatened to have a serious effect upon the -fortunes of the Empire. The appearance of the Servians on the Adriatic -would mean really the extension of Russian influence through Bulgaria -and Servia to the Austrian and Italian private lake, and would cut off -Austria for ever from her economic outlet to the Ægean. But there -{156} was more than this to cause alarm both in Austria and in Hungary. -Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Dalmatia--would they remain loyal to -the Empire, if once they came under the spell of the idea of Greater -Servia? Leaving Russia entirely out of the calculation, an -independent, self-reliant, and enlarged Servia, extending towards the -Adriatic and Ægean Seas, if not actually reaching it,--would it not be, -as Professor Wirth declared, "the suicide of Germany"? The statesmen -of the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg Empires determined that it should not -occur. - -From the very moment that the Servian armies drove the Turks before -them, Austria-Hungary began to act the bully against Servia. The -Austrian consuls at Prisrend and Mitrovitza were made the first cause -of Austrian interference. It was pretended that Herr Prochaska had -been massacred and mutilated at Prisrend, and that the life of Herr -Táhy had been threatened so that he was forced to flee for safety from -Mitrovitza. A formal inquest showed that the first of these consuls -was safe, and that the trouble had been merely a discussion between -Servian officers and Herr Prochaska over some fleeing Albanians who had -taken refuge in the consulate, in the other case, there seemed to be no -ground at all for complaint. But on January 15, 1913, the Servians -acceded to the demand of Austria that the reparation be granted for the -Prisrend incident. A company of Servian soldiers saluted the -Austro-Hungarian flag as Consul Prochaska {157} solemnly raised it. -This incident seems too petty to mention, but in that part of the world -and at that moment we thought it very serious. For it showed how -anxious Austria-Hungary was to pick a quarrel with Servia in the midst -of the Balkan War. - -Two other incidents of an even more serious character immediately -followed. Servia refused the Austrian demand that Durazzo be -evacuated, supporting herself upon the hope that Russia would -intervene. During December and January, deluded by unofficial -representatives of Russian public sentiment and by demonstrations -against Austria-Hungary in Moscow and Petrograd, Servia held out. It -was only when she saw that Russian support was not forthcoming that she -withdrew from Durazzo. The international situation during January, -1913, was similar to that during July, 1914, and the cause of the -crisis was practically the same. In both cases Servia backed down, but -the second time Austria-Hungary and Germany determined to provoke the -war which they believed would be the end of Servia and the destruction -of Russia's power to influence the political evolution of Balkan -Peninsula. - -After Durazzo, it was Scutari. Servia for the third time bowed before -the will of Austria. - -The next move against Servia was the annexation on May 12, 1913, of the -little island of Ada-Kaleh on the Danube, which had curiously enough -remained Turkish property after the Treaty of Berlin. It had actually -been forgotten at that time. {158} This island, situated in front of -Orsova, would have given Servia a splendid strategic position at the -mouth of the river. Austria-Hungary anticipated the Treaty of London. - -It was to reduce Servia that secret encouragement was given to Bulgaria -to provoke the second Balkan war. There is no doubt now as to the rôle -of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Sofia in allowing this crisis to be -precipitated. - -Had Germany been willing to stand behind her at Bukarest, -Austria-Hungary would have prevented the signing of the treaty between -the Balkan States by presenting an ultimatum to Servia. But Germany -did not seem to be ready. The reason commonly given that Emperor -William did not want to embarrass King Carol of Rumania, a prince of -his own house, and his brother-in-law, the King of Greece, does not -seem credible. In view of the events that have happened since, the -signing of the Treaty of Bukarest is a mystery not yet cleared up. - -The second Balkan war acted as a boomerang to Austria-Hungary. It -increased tremendously the prestige of Servia abroad, and the -confidence of the Servians in themselves. The weakness of the Turkish -armies in the first Balkan war had been so great that Servia herself -hardly considered it a fair test of her military strength. To have -measured arms successfully with Bulgaria was worth as much to Servia as -the territory that she gained. - -We have seen how strained were the relationships of Austria-Hungary as -separate kingdoms and {159} together as an empire in their relationship -with their south Slavic subjects. The Croatians, the Dalmatians, and a -major portion of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina were Servian in -language and sympathies. They had never thought of political union -with Servia, the petty kingdom which had allowed its rulers to be -assassinated, and which seemed to be insignificant in comparison with -the powerful and brilliant country of which they would not have been -unwilling, if allowed real self-government, to remain a part. But a -large and glorified Servia, with an increased territory and a -well-earned and brilliant military reputation--would this prove an -attraction to win away the dissatisfied subjects of the Dual Monarchy? - -Austria-Hungary by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had taken to -herself more Servians in a compact mass than she could well assimilate. -They were not scattered and separated geographically like her other -Slavic subjects. It was a danger from the beginning. After the Balkan -wars, it became an imminent peril. - -The death sentence of Servia was decided by the statesmen of -Austria-Hungary and Germany the moment their newspapers brought to them -the story of the battle of Kumonova. - -I shall never forget my presentiment when I heard on June 29, 1914, -down in a little Breton village, that a Bosnian student had celebrated -the anniversary of the battle of Kossova by assassinating the Archduke -Franz Ferdinand. The incident for which Austria was waiting had -happened. There {160} came back to me the words of Hakki Pasha, "If -Italy declares war on Turkey, the cannon will not cease to speak until -all Europe is in conflagration." - - -NOTE.--As a commentary on Austrian rule in Bosnia, particularly in -connection with the statistics on pages 152-153 of this chapter, -consider von Kállay who, as Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, fought so -bitterly the rise of national feeling among the Servians through the -teaching in their schools. This same von Kállay, in his earlier days, -wrote a scholarly history of Servia, which I have had occasion to use. -It is admirably written and accurate in detail. As a research scholar, -von Kállay believed that Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats were _the same -race_, and supported this thesis; but, as an Austrian official, he -disclaimed such dangerous teaching by placing the ban upon his own -book, which he forbade to be introduced into the provinces of which he -was governor! - - - - -{161} - -CHAPTER X - -RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA - -In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the peace of Europe was -twice disturbed, and terrible wars occurred, over the question of the -integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Since it is still the same question -which has had most to do--directly at least--with bringing on the -general European war of 1914, it is important to consider what has -been, since the Treaty of Berlin, the very heart of the Eastern -question in relation to Europe, the rivalry of races in Macedonia. - -When the European Powers, following the lead of Great Britain, -intervened after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 to annul the Treaty -of San Stefano, they frustrated the emancipation from Moslem rule of -the Christian populations in Macedonia. A Balkan territorial and -political _status quo_ was decided upon by a Congress of the Powers at -Berlin in 1878. In receiving back Macedonia, Turkey solemnly promised -to give equal rights to her Christian subjects. In taking upon -themselves the terrible responsibility of restoring Christians to -Turkish rule, the Powers assumed at the same time the obligation to -watch Turkey and _compel her to keep her promises_. - -{162} - -The delegates of the Powers brought to the Congress of Berlin a -determination to solve the problems of South-eastern Europe, according -to what they believed to be the personal selfish interests of the -nations they represented. From the beginning of the Congress to the -end, there was never a single thought of serving the interests of the -people whose destinies they were presuming to decide. They compromised -with each other "to preserve the peace of Europe." This formula has -always been interpreted in diplomacy as the getting of all you can for -your country without having to fight for it! - -Practically every provision of the Treaty of Berlin has been -disregarded by the contracting parties and by the Balkan States. The -policy of Turkey in this respect has not been different from that of -the Christian Powers. Great Britain and France, as their colonial -empires increased, ignored the obligations of the treaty which they had -signed, because they feared the effect upon their commercial and -colonial interests overseas, were they to press the Khalif. The only -effective pressure would have been force of arms. When popular -sympathy was stirred to the depths by the cruelty of Abdul Hamid's -oppression and massacres, successive British and French Cabinets washed -their hands of any responsibility towards the Christians in Turkey. -Pan-Islamism was their nightmare. They had an overwhelming fear of -arousing Mohammedan sentiment against them in their colonies. Germany -refused to hold Abdul Hamid to his promises, because she wanted to -curry favour with him to get a foothold in Asiatic Turkey. {163} -Russia and Austria, the Powers most vitally interested in the Ottoman -Empire, because they were its neighbours, were agreed upon preserving -the Sultan's domination in the Balkan Peninsula, no matter how great -the oppression of Christians became. Neither Power wanted to see the -other increase in influence among the Balkan nationalities. - -The centres of intrigue were Bulgaria, Albania, Thrace, Bosnia and -Herzegovina, and Macedonia, the portions of the Peninsula which had -been refused emancipation by the Congress of Berlin. Bulgaria worked -out her own emancipation. She refused the tutelage of Russia, annexed -Eastern Rumelia in defiance of the Powers in 1885, and proclaimed her -independence in 1908. The fortunes of Albania have been followed in -another chapter. Thrace was too near Constantinople, the forbidden -city, too unimportant economically, and too largely Moslem in -population to be coveted by the Balkan States. Bosnia and Herzegovina, -administered by Austria-Hungary since 1878, were annexed in defiance of -treaty obligations in 1908. The principal victim of the mischief done -by the Congress of Berlin was Macedonia. - -The future of Macedonia has been the great source of conflict between -Austria-Hungary and Russia, and between the Balkan States. At Athens, -Sofia, Belgrade, Bukarest, and Cettinje, the diplomats of Russia, -Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, from the morrow of the Berlin Congress to -the eve of the recent Balkan Wars, played a game against each other, -endeavouring always to use the Balkan States {164} as pawns in their -sordid strife. Turkey was backed by France and England, whenever it -suited opportune diplomacy to do so. Austria-Hungary was backed by -Germany, who at the same time did not hesitate to play a hand with the -Turks. Russia has always stood more or less alone in the Balkan -question, even after the conclusion of the alliance with France. -Except at Cettinje, Italian activity in this diplomatic game has never -been particularly marked. - -What has been the object of the game? This is difficult to state -categorically. Aims have changed with changing conditions. For -example, during the five years immediately following the Congress of -Berlin, British diplomacy was directed strenuously towards keeping down -emancipated Bulgaria, and towards preventing the encroachment of Servia -in the direction of the Adriatic and the Ægean. But when she saw that -Bulgaria had refused to be the tool of Russia, and when her problem of -the trade route of India had been solved by the buying up of the -majority of shares in the Suez Canal and the occupation of Egypt, Great -Britain championed Bulgaria and sustained her in the annexation of -Eastern Rumelia. British policy remained anti-Servian for thirty -years. There was more in the withdrawal of the British Legation from -Belgrade than disapproval of a dastardly regicide. But the moment -British commerce began to fear German competition, and an accord had -been made with Russia to remove causes of conflict, the British press -began to change its tone towards Servia. What a miracle has been -wrought in the decade since "an {165} immoral race of blackguards, with -no sense of national honour" has become "that brave and noble little -race, spirited defenders of the liberties of Europe!" I quote these -two sentiments from the same newspapers. If Premier Asquith is sincere -in his belief that this present war is to defend the principle of the -sanctity of treaties, will he insist, when peace is concluded, that -Servia make good her oath to Bulgaria, and Russia her international -treaty obligations in regard to the kingdom of Poland? Great Britain -is the least of the offenders when it comes to diplomatic cant and -hypocrisy. For the British electorate has a keen sense of justice, and -an intelligent determination that British influence shall be exerted -for the betterment of humanity. Cabinets must reckon with this -electorate when they decide questions of foreign policy. - -But we do not want to lose ourselves in a maze of diplomatic intrigue, -which it is fruitless to follow, even if we could. We must limit -ourselves to an exposition of the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and of -the Balkan States to the possession of this coveted province. - -Since the creation of modern Italy, the great German trade route to the -Mediterranean has been changed. The influence in Teutonic commercial -evolution of the passing of Lombardy and Venetia from the political -tutelage of a thousand years has been of tremendous importance, for the -connection between Germany and Italy had always been vital. It was the -first Napoleon who broke this connection. It was the third Napoleon -who nullified the effort {166} of the Congress of Vienna to -re-establish it. United Italy gave a new direction to Teutonic -expansion. United Germany gave to it a new impulsion. The _Drang nach -Osten_ was born. - -By the Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, Austria-Hungary secured from -Russia the promise of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina -in return for her neutrality in the "approaching war of liberation" of -Russia against Turkey. In order to liberate some Slavs, Russia changed -the subjection of others. The Convention of Reichstadt is really the -starting-point of the quarrel which has grown so bitterly during the -last generation between Austria and Russia over the Slavs of the Balkan -Peninsula. Russia paid dearly for a "free hand" with Turkey in 1877. -She is paying still. - -In her attitude towards the Balkans, Austria has had three distinct -aims: the prevention of a Slavic outlet to the Adriatic, the -realization of a German outlet to the Ægean, and the effectual -hindrance of the growth in the Balkans of a strong independent south -Slavic state, which might prove a fatal attraction to her own provinces -of Croatia and Dalmatia. It was this triple consideration that led her -to the occupation and annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the -policy of hostility to Servia, which is developed in another chapter. -Desiring to possess for herself the wonderful port of Salonika on the -Ægean bea, to reach which her railroads would have to cross Macedonia, -the policy of Austria-Hungary towards Macedonia has been consistently -to endeavour to uphold the semblance of Turkish {167} authority, and at -the same time to make that authority difficult to uphold through the -exciting of racial rivalry among Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and -Albania, in this turbulent country. Turkey and Austria met on the -common ground of "keeping the pot boiling," although with a different -aim. By keeping the pot boiling, Turkey thought that her sovereignty -was safe, while Austria hoped that when Turkey and the Balkan States -had worn themselves out, each opposing the other, she could step in and -capture the prize. - -Turkey and Austria-Hungary, then, conspired together to create as many -points of conflict as possible among the Macedonians of different -races. The most devilish ingenuity was constantly exercised in -stirring up and keeping alive the hatred of each race over the other. -While frequently aroused to the point of making perfunctory protests, -the other nations of Europe, with the exception of Russia, let Austria -and Turkey do as they pleased, just as Turkey was allowed a free hand -in massacring the Armenians. The _laissez faire_ policy of the Powers -was a denial of their treaty obligations. - -It was only when the Balkan States awoke to the realization of the fact -that they were regarded as mere pawns upon the chessboard of world -politics, to be sacrificed without compunction by the European Powers -whenever it was to their interest, that they buried differences for a -moment, and worked out their own salvation. If the Balkan Wars have -brought the present terrible disaster upon Europe, it is no more than -the contemptible {168} diplomacy of self interest and mutual jealousy -could expect. - -Why was the Austro-Turkish policy possible, and why did it succeed for -a whole generation? - -The Ottoman Empire was founded in the Balkan peninsula by rulers whose -military genius was coupled with their ability to use one Christian -population against the other. The Osmanlis never fought a battle in -which the Balkan Christians did not give valuable assistance in forging -the chains of their slavery. The Osmanlis conquered the Balkan peoples -by means of the Balkan peoples. They kept possession of the country -just as long as they could pit one chief against another, and then, -when national feeling arose, one race against another. - -Gradually, in the portion of the Balkans where one race was -predominant, nationalities began to form states, which secured -independence as soon as they demonstrated the possibility of harmony. -Greece was the first, and was followed by Servia. Moldavia and -Wallachia united into the principality of Rumania. Last of all came -Bulgaria. After having gained autonomy, independence was only a matter -of form. But in the central portion of the Balkan Peninsula, from the -Black Sea to the Ægean, through Thrace, Macedonia, and Albania, the -sovereignty of Turkey, restored by the Treaty of Berlin, was able to -endure. For the people were mixed up, race living with race, and in no -place could the Christians of any one race claim that the country was -wholly theirs. - -As emancipated Greeks, Servians and Bulgarians {169} formed independent -states, they looked towards Macedonia as the legitimate territory for -expansion. But here their claims, both historically and racially, -overlapped. Greece regarded Macedonia as entirely Hellenic. Had it -not always been Greek before the Osmanlis came, from the days of Philip -of Macedon to the Paleologi of the Byzantine Empire? The Servians, on -the other hand, invoked the memory of the Servian Empire of Stephen -Dushan, who in the fourteenth century, on the eve of the Ottoman -conquest, was crowned "King of Romania" at Serres. It was from the -Servians and not from the Greeks, that the Osmanlis conquered Macedonia -in the three battles of the Maritza, Tchernomen, and Kossova. The -Bulgarians invoked the memory of their mediæval domination of Macedonia -and Thrace. It was by the Bulgarians that northern Thrace was defended -against the Ottoman invasion; a Bulgarian prince was the last -independent ruler of central Macedonia; and long before the ephemeral -Servian Empire of Stephen Dushan, the Bulgarian Czars were recognized -from Tirnova to Okrida. This latter city, in fact, was the seat of the -autonomous Bulgarian patriarchate in the Middle Ages. - -These historical claims, to us of western Europe, would have only a -sentimental value. They had been forgotten by the subject populations -of European Turkey for many centuries. The first revival of political -ambitions was that of Hellenism. Modern Greece, divorcing itself from -the impossible and pagan dream of a restoration of classic Greece, with -Athens as its capital, which had been woven for it {170} by western -European admirers during the first half century of its liberation, -began to take stock of its Byzantine and Christian heritage during the -latter part of the reign of Abdul Aziz. The new Hellenism, as the -prestige of the Ottoman Empire decreased, took the definite form of a -determination to succeed the Ottoman Empire, as it had preceded it, -with Constantinople as capital. - -The Greeks believed themselves to be the unifying Christian race of the -Balkan Peninsula. They had a tremendous advantage over the Slavs, -because the ecclesiastical organization, to which all the Christians of -the Balkan Peninsula owed allegiance, was in their hands. When -Mohammed the Conqueror entered Constantinople, he gave to the Patriarch -of the Eastern Church the headship of the Balkan Christians. The -spirit of Moslem institutions provides for no other form of government -than a theocracy. Religion has always been to the Osmanli the test of -nationality. The Christians formed one _millet_, or nation. This -_millet_ was Greek. During all the centuries of Ottoman subjection, -the Balkan Christians owed allegiance to the Greek Patriarchate. -Whatever their native tongue, the language of the Church and _of the -schools_ was Greek. - -Unfortunately for Hellenism, the new Greek aspirations came into -immediate conflict with the renaissance of the Bulgarian nation. -Russia had long been encouraging, for the purposes of Pan-Slavism, the -awakening of a sense of nationality in the south Slavs. Her agents had -been long and patiently working among the Bulgarians. But they {171} -overshot their mark. When Bulgarian priests and the few educated men -of the peasant nation turned their attention to their past and their -language, it was not the idea of their kinship with the great Slavic -Power of eastern Europe that was aroused, _but the consciousness of -their own particular race_. Bulgaria had been great when Russia was -practically unknown. Bulgaria could be great once more, when, by the -disappearance of Ottoman rule, the Bulgarian Empire of the Middle Ages -would be born again in the Balkans. - -One can readily appreciate that _the first necessity of Bulgarian -renaissance was liberation from the Greek Church_. Russia strenuously -opposed this separatist agitation. What she wanted was a Slavic -movement within the bosom of the Greek Orthodox Church, which, if -bitterly persecuted by the Patriarchate, would throw the south Slavs -upon the Russian Synod for protection, or, if tolerated, would give -Russia a powerful voice in the councils of the Orthodox Church in the -Ottoman Empire. But the Bulgarians had progressed too far on the road -of religious separation from the Greeks to be arrested by their Russian -godfather. It was a prophecy of the future independent spirit of the -Bulgarian people, which Beaconsfield and Salisbury unfortunately failed -to note, that the Bulgarians determined to go the length of uniting -with Rome in order to get free from Phanar. Another Uniate sect would -have been born had Russia not yielded. With bad grace, her Ambassador -obtained from Sultan Abdul Aziz the _firman_ of March 11, 1870, -creating the Bulgarian Exarchate. - -{172} - -The cleverness of the Bulgarians outwitted the manoeuvre made to have -the seat of the Exarchate at Sofia. The Greeks realized that a -formidable competitor had entered into the struggle for Macedonia. -From that moment there has been hatred between Greek and Bulgarian. In -spite of the treaty of Bukarest, the end of the struggle is not yet. -The policy and ambition of the modern state are dictated by strong -economic reasons, of which sentimental aspirations are only the outward -expression. If wars and the treaties that follow them were guided by -honest confession of the real issues at stake, how much easier the -solution of problems, and how much greater the chances of finding -durable bases for treaties! The whole effort of Bulgaria in Macedonia -may be explained by the simple statement that the Bulgarian race has -been seeking its natural, logical, and inevitable outlet to the Ægean -Sea. - -During the middle of the nineteenth century, Servian national -aspirations were directed toward Croatia, Dalmatia, and -Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Servians thought only in terms of the west. -It was the foundation of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy in 1867, -followed by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the -_sandjak_ of Novi Bazar, that let Servia to enter into the struggle for -Macedonia. - -As soon as Russia saw that she could not control Bulgaria, she began to -favour a Servian propaganda in the valley of the Vardar. Russian -intrigues at Constantinople led to the suppression of the Bulgarian -bishoprics of Okrida, Uskub, Küprülü (Veles) {173} and Nevrokop. -Bulgaria secured the restoration of these bishoprics through the -efforts of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. The story of Macedonia -is full of instances like this of intrigue and counter intrigue by -European Powers at the Sublime Porte. Combinations of interests -changed sometimes over night. Is it any wonder that the Turks grew to -despise the European alliances, and to laugh at every "joint note" of -the Powers in relation to Macedonia? - -Austria-Hungary opposed the Russian aid given to Servia by introducing -a new racial propaganda. Ever since the Roman occupation there had -been a small, but widely diffused, element in the population of -Macedonia, which retained the Roman language, just as the Wallachians -and Moldavians north of the Danube had done. Diplomatic suggestion at -Bukarest succeeded in interesting Rumania in these Kutzo-Wallachians, -as they came to be called. Rumania did not have a common boundary with -European Turkey. But her statesmen were quick to see the advantage of -having "a finger in the pie" when the Ottoman Empire disappeared from -Europe. So Rumania became protector of the Kutzo-Wallachian. The -Sublime Porte gladly agreed to recognize this protectorate. The -development of a strong Rumanian element in Macedonia would help -greatly to preserve Turkish sovereignty. For Rumania could have no -territorial aspirations there, and would look with disfavour upon -Rumania being swallowed up by Greece, Servia, or Bulgaria. Another -propaganda, well financed, and encouraged {174} by the Austro-Hungarian -and Turkish Governments was added to the rivalry of races in Macedonia. - -We cannot do more than suggest these intrigues. After 1885, the -Macedonian question became gradually the peculiar care of the two "most -interested" Powers. There was little to attract again international -attention until the question of Turkey's existence as a state was -brought forward in a most startling way by the repercussion throughout -the Empire of the Armenian massacres of 1893-96. _By refusing to -intervene at that time, the Powers, who fondly thought that they were -acting in the interest of the integrity of the Empire, were really -contributing to its further decline_. - -Elsewhere we have spoken of the Cretan insurrection of 1896 and the -train of events that followed it, ending in the formation of the Balkan -alliance to drive Turkey out of Europe. Here we take up the other -thread which leads us to the Balkan Wars. Bulgaria, remembering the -happy result of her own sufferings from the massacres of twenty years -before, was keen enough to see in the Asiatic holocausts of the "Red -Sultan" a sign of weakness instead of a show of strength. The -statesmen of the European Powers had not acted to stop the massacres of -the Armenians. But their indecision and impolitic irresolution was not -an expression of the sentiments of the civilized races whom they -represented. The time was ripe for an insurrection in Macedonia. -Public opinion in Europe would sustain it. The movement was launched -from Sofia. - -From that moment, Turkish sovereignty was {175} doomed. Turkey did not -realize this, however. Instead of adopting the policy of treating with -Bulgaria, and giving her an economic outlet to the Ægean Sea, the -Sublime Porte was delighted with the anticipation of a new era of -racial rivalry in Macedonia. For it knew that Bulgaria's efforts to -secure Macedonian autonomy would be opposed by Servia and Greece. In -fact, the Greeks were so alarmed by the Bulgarian activity that -immediately after their unhappy war with Turkey they gave active -support to the Turks in putting down the Bulgarian rebels. The -services of the Greek Patriarchate were particularly valuable to Turkey -at this time. - -Nor did Austria-Hungary and Russia appreciate the significance of the -Bulgarian movement. In 1897, they signed an accord, solemnly agreeing -that the _status quo_ be preserved in the Balkan peninsula. Russia was -anxious for this convention with Austria. For the moment all her -energies were devoted to developing the policy in the Far East that was -to end so abruptly eight years later on the battlefield of Mukden. -Austria-Hungary was delighted to have the solution of the Macedonian -problem delayed. _She felt that every year of anarchy in European -Turkey would bring her nearer to Salonika_. The _Drang nach Osten_ was -to be made possible through the strife of Servian, Bulgarian, and Greek. - -The moment was favourable for the Bulgarian propaganda. Russia was too -much involved in Manchuria to help the Servians. The Greeks had lost -prestige with the Macedonians by their easy {176} and humiliating -defeat at the hands of Turkey. Gathering force with successive years, -and supported by the admirably laid foundation of the Bulgarian -ecclesiastic and scholastic organizations throughout Macedonia, the -Bulgarian bands gradually brought the _vilayets_ of Monastir, Uskub, -and Salonika into a state of civil war. In 1901 and 1902, conditions -in Macedonia were beyond description. But the Powers waited for some -new initiative on the part of Austria-Hungary and Russia. - -Emperor Franz Josef and Czar Nicholas met at Mürszteg in the autumn of -1903. Russia, more and more involved in Manchuria, and on the eve of -her conflict with Japan, found no difficulty in falling in with the -suggestion of the Austrian Foreign Secretary that the two Powers -present to the signers of the Treaty of Berlin a program of "reforms" -for Macedonia. Europe received with delight this new manifestation of -harmony between Austria-Hungary and Russia. - -In 1904 the "Program of Mürszteg" was imposed upon Turkey by a -comic-opera show of force on the part of the Powers. An international -_gendarmerie_ was their solution of the Macedonian problem. Different -spheres were mapped out, and allotted to officers of the different -Powers. Germany refused to participate in this farce, just as she had -refused to participate in "protecting" Crete. - -The international "pacification" failed in Macedonia for the same -reasons that it had failed in Crete, and was to fail a third time ten -years later in Albania. _It was a compromise between the Powers, {177} -dictated by considerations which had nothing whatever to do with the -problem of which it was supposed to be the solution_. This is the -story of European diplomacy in the Near East. - -From the very moment that Turkey found herself compelled to accept the -policing of Macedonia by European officers, she set to work to make -their task impossible. Hussein Hilmi pasha was sent to Salonika as -Governor. An accord was quickly established between him and the -Austro-Hungarian agents in Macedonia. Where the Bulgarians were weak, -the Turks and the Austrian emissaries encouraged the Bulgarian -propaganda. Where the Greeks were weak, Hellenic bands were allowed -immunity. Where the Servians were weak, the connivance of the -Government. The European _gendarmerie_ was powerless to struggle -against Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, and Balkan intrigues. The -correspondence of the European officers and consuls, and of journalists -who visited Macedonia during this period, makes interesting reading. -Their point of view is almost invariably that of their surroundings. -It depended upon just what part of Macedonia one happened to be in, or -the company in which one travelled, whether a certain nationality were -"noble heroes suffering for an ideal" or "blood-thirsty ruffians." Why -are so many writers who pretend to be impartial observers like -chameleons? - -Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria were alike guilty of subsidizing bands of -armed men, who imagined that they were fulfilling a patriotic duty in -brutally {178} forcing their particular nationality upon ignorant -peasants, most of whom did not know--or care--to what nation they -belonged. There was little to choose between the methods and the -actions of the different bands. Everywhere pillage, incendiarism, and -assassination were the order of the day. When Christian propagandists -let them alone, the poor villagers had to endure the same treatment -from Moslem Albanians and from the Turkish soldiery. - -In order to give the "reforms" of the Program of Mürszteg a chance, -Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade ostensibly withdrew their active support of -the bands. But the efforts of the Powers had still not only the secret -bad faith of Austria-Hungary and Turkey to contend with, but also the -determination of the Macedonians themselves not to be "reformed" _à -l'européenne_, that is to say, _à la turque_. The powerful Bulgarian -"interior organization" in Macedonia kept up the struggle in the hope -that the continuation of anarchy would bring the Powers to see that -there was no other solution possible of the Macedonian question _than -the autonomy of Macedonia under a Christian governor_. Greeks and -Servians opposed the project of autonomy, however, because they knew -that it would result eventually in the reversion of Macedonia to -Bulgaria. The history of Eastern Rumelia would be repeated. In -considering the Macedonian problem, it must never be forgotten that the -great bulk of the population of Macedonia is Bulgarian, in spite of all -the learned dissertations and imposing statistics of Greek and Servian -writers. But the difficulty is that this {179} Bulgarian population is -agricultural. In the cities _near the sea_ and all along the seacoast -from Salonika to Dedeagatch the Greek element is predominant. No -geographical division of Macedonia can be made, viable from the -economic point of view, which satisfies racial claims by following the -principle of preponderant nationality. - -After her disasters in the Far East, Russia began to turn her attention -once more to the Near East. A reopening of the Macedonian question -between Austria-Hungary and Russia was imminent when the Young Turk -revolution of July, 1908, upset all calculations, and brought a new -factor into the problem of the future of European Turkey. -Austria-Hungary boldly challenged--more than that, defied--Russia by -annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this action she was backed by Germany. -Russia and France were not ready for war. Great Britain and Italy, -each involved in an internal social revolution of tremendous -importance, could not afford to risk the programs of their respective -cabinets by embarking upon uncertain foreign adventures. - -The Balkan States were left to solve the Macedonian problem by -themselves. Their solution was the Treaty of Bukarest. The success of -Servia in planting herself in the valley of the Vardar, and in -occupying Monastir, is the result of the struggle of races in -Macedonia. It is the direct, immediate cause of the European War of -1914. - - - - -{180} - -CHAPTER XI - -THE YOUNG TURK _RÉGIME_ IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE - -No event during the first decade of the twentieth century was heralded -throughout Europe with so great and so sincere interest and sympathy as -the bloodless revolution of July 24, 1908, by which the _régime_ of -Abdul Hamid was overthrown and the constitution of 1876 resuscitated. - -Although the world was unprepared for this event, it was not due to any -sudden cause. For twenty years the leaven of liberalism had been -working in the minds of the educated classes in the Ottoman Empire. -Moslems, as well as Christians, had been in attendance in large numbers -at the American, French, Italian, and German schools in Turkey, and had -gone abroad to complete their education. Just as in Italy and in -Germany, Young Turkey had come into existence through contact with -those free institutions in the outside world which other races enjoyed, -had been emancipated from superstition and from the stultifying -influences of religious formalism, and had grown, in the army, to -numbers sufficient to dictate the policy of the Government. - -From the beginning of his reign, Abdul Hamid had {181} done all in his -power to prevent the growth of the liberal spirit. The result of -thirty years, in so far as civil officials of the Government were -concerned, had been the stamping out of every man who combined ability -with patriotism and devotion to an ideal. The best elements had taken -the road to death, to imprisonment, or to exile, so that from the -palace down to the humblest village, the Turkish civil service was -composed of a set of men absolutely lacking in independence and in -honour, and devoted to the master who ruled from Yildiz. But in the -army, this same policy, though attempted, had not wholly succeeded. A -portion at least of the officers received an education; many of them, -indeed, had been sent abroad to Germany and to France in order to keep -abreast with the development of military science, so essential to the -very existence of Turkey. In the army, then, hundreds of officers of -high character and high ideals were able to avoid the fate which had -come to other educated Moslems in Turkey. They learned to love their -country, and with that love came a sense of shame for the results of -the despotism under which they existed. To have lived in Paris or in -Berlin was enough to make them dissatisfied; to have visited Cairo or -Alexandria, Sofia or Bukarest or Athens, and to have contrasted the -conditions of life in these cities, recently their own, with -Constantinople, Salonika, and Smyrna, was sufficient. - -It is impossible in the limits of this book to tell how this bloodless -revolution was planned by exiles abroad and officers at home. It was -successful, as {182} well as bloodless, because the army refused to -obey the orders of the Sultan. To save his life and his throne, Abdul -Hamid was compelled to resuscitate the constitution which he had -granted, and then suppressed, at the beginning of his reign. - -We who lived through those dream days of the beginning of the new -_régime_ will never forget the sense of joy of an emancipated people. -The spy system was abolished, newspapers were allowed to tell the truth -and express their own opinions, passports and _teskeres_ (permissions -to travel from one point to another within the Empire) were declared -unnecessary, _bakshish_ was refused at the custom house and police -station. Moslem _ulema_ and Christian clergy embraced each other in -public, rode through the streets in triumph in the same carriages, and -harangued the multitudes from the same platform in mosque and church. -A new era of Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality, they said, had dawned -for all the races in Turkey. The Sultan was the father, Turkey the -fatherland, barriers and disabilities of creed and race had ceased to -exist. It seemed incredible, but these scenes were really happening -from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf. - -Optimism, hope for the future, was so strong that one had not the heart -to express very loudly his belief that no real revolution was ever -bloodless, that no real change in political and social life of the -people could come in a single day or as a result of an official -document. No one could think of anything else but the constitution, -which had broken the chains for Moslem and Christian alike, the -constitution which {183} was going to restore Turkey to its lawful -place among the nations of Europe, the constitution which was to heal -the sick man and solve the question of the Orient. In Smyrna, in -Constantinople, in Beirut, and in Asia Minor, I heard the same story -over and over again. But there was always the misgiving, the -apprehension for the future, from which the foreigner in Turkey is -never free. It seemed too good to be true; it _was_ too good to be -true. It was against the logic of history. The most wonderful -constitution that the world has ever known is that of England. It does -not exist on paper; there is no need for a document. It is good, and -it has endured, because it has been written in blood, in suffering, and -in the agony of generations, on the pages of eight centuries of -history. Could Turkey hope to be free in a day? - -The first test of the constitution came, of course, with the election -and composition of the Parliament. The election was held quietly, in -some parts of the Empire secretly even, and when the Parliament -assembled at Constantinople, one began to see already the handwriting -on the wall. For its composition was in no way in accordance with the -distribution of population in the Empire. The Turk--and by the Turk I -mean the composite Moslem race which has grown up through centuries of -inter-marriage and forcible conversion--had always been the ruling -race. With the establishment of a constitutional _régime_, the Young -Turks did not mean to abdicate in favour of Moslem Arabs or Christian -Greeks and Armenians. They had "arranged" the elections in such a way -that they would have in the {184} Parliament a substantial majority -over any possible combination of other racial elements. - -One cannot but have sympathy with the natural feeling of racial pride -which is inborn in the Turks. A race of masters,--who could expect -that they would be willing to surrender the privileges of centuries? -But they forgot that a constitutional _régime_ and the principles of -Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity must necessarily imply the yielding -of their unique position in the Empire. The Turk, as a race, is -composed of two elements, a ruling class of land-owners and military -and civil officials, arrogant though courteous, corrupt though honest -in private life, parasitical though self-respecting, and a peasant -class, hopelessly ignorant, lacking in energy, initiative, ambition, -aspirations, and ideals. The great bulk of the Turkish element in the -Empire looked with the indifference of ignorance and the hostility of -jealous regard for their unique position in the community upon the -granting of a constitution. I doubt if five per cent. of the Turkish -population of the Empire has ever known what a constitutional _régime_ -means, or cared whether it exists or not. - -There remains the five per cent. Of these the great bulk belong either -to the corrupt official class, whose subjection to the tyranny of -Yildiz Kiosk had totally unfitted them for service under the new -_régime_ on which they were entering, and the land-owners, whose wealth -was dependent upon the unequal privileges that the law allowed to them -as Moslems, and whose interests were totally at variance with the -spirit of the constitution. There are {185} left small groups of -younger army officers and of professional men, who had been educated in -foreign schools or by foreign teachers in Turkey and abroad. They -were, for the most part, either without the knowledge of any other -_métier_ than the army, or, if civilian, unfitted by training and -experience for governmental executive and administrative work. -Consequently from the very beginning, the genuine Young Turks who were -honest in their idealism had to make a compact with the higher army -officers and with corrupt civil officials of Abdul Hamid. When the -real Young Turks controlled the Cabinet, their disasters were those of -theorists and visionaries. When they yielded the control of affairs to -men more experienced than they, it was simply the renewal of the -tyranny of Abdul Hamid. It was because these two elements were united -in the firm resolution to keep the control in the hands of Moslem -Turks, that the constitutional _régime_ in Turkey has gone from Scylla -to Charybdis without ever entering port. - -From the very beginning, thoughtful men pointed out that there was only -one way of salvation and of liberal evolution for the Ottoman Empire. -That was an honest and sincere co-operation with the Christian elements -of the Empire, and with the Arabic and Albanian Moslem elements. -Fanaticism and racial pride prevented the Young Turks from adopting the -sole possible way of establishing the constitutional _régime_. From -the very beginning, then, they failed, and it is their failure which -has plunged Europe into the series of wars that has ended in the -devastation of unhappy Belgium, so far remote from the cause and {186} -so innocent of any part in the events which brought upon her such -terrible misfortunes. One could write a whole book upon the events of -the first five years of constitutional government in Turkey and could -show, beyond a shadow of a doubt, how from the very beginning there was -no honest and loyal effort made to apply even the most rudimentary -principles of constitutional government. Despotism means the -subjection of a country to the will of its rulers. Constitutionalism -means the subjection of the rulers to the will of the country. The -Young Turks, embodied in the "Committee of Union and Progress," merely -continued the despotism of Abdul Hamid. They were far worse than Abdul -Hamid, however, for they were irresponsible and unskilled. One -handling the helm, knowing how to steer, might have kept the ship of -state afloat, all the more easily, perhaps, because the waters were so -troubled. Many hands, none knowing where or how to go, steered the -Ottoman Empire to inevitable shipwreck. - -Although the vicissitudes of various Cabinets and Parliaments can have -place in our work only so far as they have a direct bearing on foreign -relations, there are six matters of internal policy which must be -mentioned in order to explain how rapidly and surely the Ottoman Empire -went to its destruction; the treatment of Armenians before and after -the Adana massacres; the attempt to suppress the liberties of the -Orthodox Church; the Cretan question, ending in the Greek boycott; the -Macedonian policy; the Albanian uprisings; and the lack of co-operation -and sympathy with the Arabs. - - - -{187} - -THE ARMENIANS AND THE ADANA MASSACRES - -Among the various races of the Ottoman Empire, none was more overcome -with joy at the proclamation of the constitutional _régime_ than the -Armenian. Scattered everywhere throughout the Empire, and in no region -an element of preponderance, the Armenians had always made themselves -felt in the commercial and intellectual life of Turkey far out of -proportion to their numerical strength. They appreciated and -understood, best of all the Christian populations, the significance of -constitutional government. Honestly applied, it meant more to them -than to any other element of the Empire. - -In the first place, the burden of Turkish and Moslem oppression had -fallen most heavily on them. It was not only the massacres of 1894 to -1896, horrible as they were, which had put the Armenians in continual -fear for their lives; it was the centuries-old petty persecution, from -which they believed they were now to be freed. Turkish officialdom had -grown rich in extorting the last farthing from the Armenians. Only -those who had seen this persecution and extortion can realize how large -a part it played in the daily life of the Armenians, and how continuous -and rich a source of revenue it was to the official Turk. For every -little service the official expected his fat fee, always charging up to -the limit his victim was able to pay. You could not carry on your -business, you could not build a house, you could not enlarge or alter -or repair your shop, you could not get a tax on your harvest estimated, -you could {188} not travel even from one village to another for the -purpose of business or pleasure or study, without paying the officials. -Very frequently between the local Turkish official and the Armenian -stood a middle man who must also be paid for the purpose of carrying -the fee or bribe to the official in charge. How people could have -lived under such a _régime_ and have prospered, is beyond the -comprehension of the Occidental. Nothing speaks so eloquently for the -business acumen of the Armenian race, as well as for devotion to the -religion of its fathers. - -Naturally, the Armenians expected that the constitution would bring to -them a complete relief from economic repression, as well as from the -terrors of massacre. They were led to believe this by the Young Turks -who had so long plotted the overthrow of Abdul Hamid's despotism. -During the campaign from 1890-1908, the Young Turks needed the money -and the brains of Armenians in the larger centres of population where -they had their _foyers_, and in the cities abroad where they lived in -exile. It cannot be doubted that there were among the Young Turks -during the period when they had to keep alive their ideals in the fire -of hope, an honest intention to give the Armenians a share in the -regeneration of the Ottoman Empire. But, as soon as they realized -their ambitions, racial and religious fanaticism came to them with such -force that they forgot the brilliant promises as well as the -affectionate intercourse of the days of suffering and struggle. - -In the second place, Armenians, unlike the Greeks, the Macedonians, and -the Arabs, had, as a race, no {189} separatist tendencies. They were -not looking towards another state to come and redeem them. They feared -Russia. They were too scattered to hope to form, by the break-up of -the Ottoman Empire, a state of their own. They loved the land in which -they lived with all the passion of their nature. In many regions, -Turkish was their native tongue. They were industrious tillers of the -soil, as well as merchants. The Sultan could have had no more loyal -subjects than these, had he so desired. - -Although the composition of the new Parliament chosen in October, 1908, -and of the first constitutional Cabinet, was a prophecy of how they -were to be left out in the cold, the Armenians were throughout that -winter, when the constitution was new, firm and loyal, as well as -intelligent, supporters of regenerated Turkey. The wish was father to -the thought. For them there was no longer the barrier of race and -creed. All were Osmanlis, and willing to lose their identity in the -politically amalgamated race. The reign of Abdul Hamid was a -nightmare, quickly forgotten. The future was full of hope. If only -the Young Turks had realized what a tremendous influence the Armenians -could have played in the creation of New Turkey, if only they had been -willing to use these allies, we might have been able to write a -different history of the past few years in Europe. - -But the awakening was to be cruel. It came in a region of the Empire -that never before experienced the horrors of a general massacre, where -Christians felt not only at ease, but on friendly terms with their -Moslem neighbours. - -{190} - -On April 14, 1909, on a morning when the sun had risen upon the -peaceful and happy city of Adana, out of a clear sky came the tragedy -which was the beginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire. Without -provocation, the Moslem population began to attack and kill the -Christians. The Governor of the province and his military officials -not only did nothing whatever to stop the bloodshed, but they actually -handed out arms and munitions to the blood-frenzied mob of peasants, -who were pouring into the city. For three days, killing, looting, and -burning of houses were aided by the authorities. The massacres spread -west through the great Cilician plain to Tarsus, and east over the -Amanus Range into northern Syria, as far as Antioch, where the -followers of Jesus were first called Christians. The world, horrified -by the stories which soon made their way to the newspapers, realized -that the "bloodless revolution" had not regenerated Turkey. The blood -had come at last, and without the regeneration! The Great Powers sent -their warships to Mersina, the port of Tarsus and Adana. Even from the -distant United States came two cruisers, under pressure, over six -thousand miles. - -In the meantime, events of great importance, but not of equal -significance in the future of Turkey, were taking place at -Constantinople. On the eve of the first Adana massacre, Abdul Hamid, -having corrupted the soldiers of the Constantinople garrison, set in -motion a demonstration against the constitution. The soldiers shot -down their officers in cold blood, marched to Yildiz Kiosk, and -demanded of the {191} Sultan the abolition of the constitution, which -they declared was at variance with the _Sheriat_, the sacred law of -Islam. Abdul Hamid gladly consented. Popular sympathy in -Constantinople and throughout the Empire was with the Sultan, as far as -the object of the revolution went. But the way in which it was brought -about made it impossible for the Sultan to remain within the pale of -civilization. Of all nations, none relied on its army more than -Turkey. Were the assassination of the officers to go unpunished, the -disintegration of the Empire necessarily followed. So the military -hierarchy, "Old" Turks as well as "Young," rose against the Sultan. -The army corps in Salonika under the command of Mahmud Shevket pasha, -marched against the capital and with very little resistance mastered -the mutiny of the Constantinople garrison. Abdul Hamid was deposed, -and sent into exile at the Villa Alatini at Salonika. His brother, -Reshid Mohammed, came to the throne, under the title of Mohammed V. - -As soon as the Young Turks found themselves again in control of the -situation, even before the proclamation of the new Sultan, they sent -from Beirut to Adana a division of infantry to "re-establish order." -These regiments disembarked at Mersina on the day Mohammed V ascended -the throne, April 25th. Immediately upon their arrival in Adana they -began a second massacre which was more horrible than the first. -Thousands were shot and burned, and more than half the city was in -ruins. This second massacre occurred in spite of the fact {192} that a -dozen foreign warships were by this time anchored in the harbour of -Mersina. - -It is impossible to estimate the losses of life and property in the -_vilayets_ of Cilicia and northern Syria during the last two weeks of -April, 1908. Not less than thirty thousand Armenians were massacred. -The losses of property in Adana alone were serious enough to cause the -foremost fire insurance company in France to fight in the courts for -two years the payments of its claims. But it is not in the realm of -our work to follow out the local aftermath of this terrible story. We -are interested here only in its bearing on the fortunes of the Empire -and of Europe. - -From the very beginning, the Young Turks, now re-established in -Constantinople with a Sultan of their own creation, and having nothing -more to fear from the genius and bad will of Abdul Hamid, protested -before Europe that the massacres were due to the old _régime_ and that -they had been arranged by Abdul Hamid, whose deposition cleared them of -responsibility. But the revelations of the _New York Herald_, the -_Tribuna_ of Rome, and the _Berliner Tageblatt_, translated and -reprinted in the British, French, and Russian press, were so moving -that it was necessary for the Young Turks to send special commissions -to the capitals of Europe to counteract the impression of these -articles. - -Europe was willing to accept the explanation of the Constantinople -Cabinet, and to continue its faith, though shaken, in the intentions of -the Young Turks to grant to the Christians of Turkey the _régime_ of -equality and security of life and property {193} which the constitution -guaranteed. Even the Armenians, terrible as this blow had been, were -also willing to forgive and forget. But the condition of forgiveness, -and the proof of sincerity of the declarations of the Young Turks, both -to the outside world and to the Armenians, would be the punishment of -those who had been guilty of this most horrible blot upon the -civilization of the twentieth century. This was to be the test. - -The Court-Martial, sent to Adana from Constantinople after the new -Sultan was established upon the throne and the Young Turks were certain -of their position, had every guarantee to enable it to do its work -thoroughly and justly. It was not influenced or threatened. There -was, however, no honest intention to give decisions impartially and in -accordance with the facts that the investigation would bring forth. -The methods and findings of the Court-Martial were a travesty of -justice. Its members refused absolutely to go to the bottom of the -massacre, and to punish those who had been guilty. I happen to be the -only foreign witness whose deposition they took. They refused to allow -me to testify against the Vali and his fellow-conspirators. The line -of conduct had been decided before their arrival. The idea was to -condemn to death a few Moslems of the dregs of the population, who -would probably have found their way to the gallows sooner or later any -way. With them were to be hanged a number of Armenians, whose only -crime was that they had defended the lives and honour of their women -and children. The Vali of Adana, who had planned the {194} massacre -and had carried it out, and two or three Moslem leaders of the city who -had co-operated with him and with the military authorities in the -effort to exterminate the Armenians, were not even sent to prison. No -testimony against them was allowed to be brought before the -Court-Martial. They went into exile "until the affair blew over." - -When a future generation has the prospective to make researches into -the downfall of the Young Turk constitutional _régime_ in Turkey, they -will probably find the beginning of the end in the failure to punish -the perpetrators of the Adana massacres. For this was a formal -notification to the Christians of Turkey that the constitutional -_régime_ brought to them no guarantees of security, or justice, but, on -the other hand, made their position in the Empire even more precarious -than it had been under the despotism of Abdul Hamid. After Adana, the -Armenian population became definitely alienated from the constitutional -movement, and was convinced that its only hope lay in the absolute -disappearance of Turkish rule. - - - - THE ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS THE LIBERTIES OF - THE ORTHODOX CHURCH - -When Mohammed the Conqueror entered Constantinople in 1453, he showed a -wise determination to continue the policy of his predecessors by -preserving the independence of the Orthodox Church. For he knew well -that the success of the Osmanlis had been due to religious toleration, -and that no durable empire could be built in Asia Minor and the Balkan -{195} Peninsula by a Moslem government, unless the liberties of the -Christian inhabitants were assured through the recognition of the Greek -patriarchate. The first thing that Mohammed did was to seek out the -Greek patriarch, and confirm him in his position as the political, as -well as the religious, head of Christian Ottoman subjects. - -Islam is a theocracy. The spirit of its government is inspired by the -sacred law, the _Sheriat_, based upon the Koran and the writings of the -earliest fathers of Islam. Down to the smallest details, the -organization of the state, of the courts of justice, and of the social -life of Mohammedan peoples, is influenced by ecclesiastical law, and by -the power of the Church. As this law does not provide for the -inclusion of non-Moslem elements either in the political or social life -of the nation, it has always been evident that people of another -religion, within the limits of a Moslem state, can exist only if they -have an ecclesiastical organization of their own, with well-defined -liberties, privileges, and safeguards. - -This principle was recognized by the Osmanlis for over five hundred -years; even the most despotic of sultans never dreamed of abandoning -it. There might be persecutions, there might be massacres, there might -be even assassination of patriarchs, but, until the Young Turk -_régime_, no Ottoman ministry ever dreamed of destroying the organism -which had made possible the life of Moslem and Christian under the same -rule. - -The thesis of the Young Turks was, from a theoretical standpoint, -perfectly sound and just. They {196} said that ecclesiastical autonomy -was necessary under a despotism, but that it had ceased to have a -_raison d'être_ under a constitutional government. The constitution -guaranteed equal rights, irrespective of religion, to all the races of -the Empire. Therefore the Greek Church must resign its prerogatives of -a political nature, for they were wholly incompatible with the idea of -constitutional government. - -Many foreigners, carried away by the reasonableness of this argument, -severely condemned the Orthodox Church for continuing to resist the -encroachments of the new Government upon its secular -privileges--secular in both senses of the word. They attributed the -attitude of the Greek ecclesiastics to hostility to the constitution, -to the reactionary tendency of every ecclesiastic organization, and to -selfish desire to hold firmly the privileges which enabled them to keep -in their clutches the Greek population of Turkey, and continue to enjoy -the prestige and wealth accruing to them from these privileges. Such -criticism only revealed ignorance of history and a lack of appreciation -of the real issue at stake. - -No ecclesiastical organization can, under a constitutional government, -continue indefinitely to be a state within a state, and to enjoy -peculiar privileges and immunities. But the application of the -constitution must come first. It must enter into the life of the -people. It must become the vital expression of their national -existence, evolved through generations of testing and experimenting. -The constitution is finally accepted and supported by a nation {197} -when, and because, it has been found good and has come to reflect the -needs and wishes of the people. Then, without any great trouble, the -ecclesiastical organization will find itself gradually deprived of -every special privilege. For the privileges will have become an -anachronism. - -But, just as in the establishment of the constitution, in their -attitude toward the Greek Church the Young Turks acted as if the work -of generations in other countries could be for them, in spite of their -peculiarly delicate problems and the differences in creed involved, the -act of a single moment. This mentality of the half-educated, immature -visionary has been shown in every one of the numerous senseless and -disastrous decisions which have brought the Ottoman Empire so speedily -to its ruin. - -The Greek Church resisted bitterly every move of the Young Turks to -bring about the immediate millennium. The patriarch was a man of wide -experience, of sound common sense, and of undaunted courage. Backed by -the Lay Assembly, which has always been an admirable democratic -institution of the Orthodox Church, he refused to give up realities for -chimeras. With all its privileges and all its power, it had been hard -enough for the Orthodox Church to protect the Greek subjects of Turkey. -The patriarch did not intend to surrender the safeguards by which he -was enabled to make tolerable the life of his flock for illusory and -untested guarantees. Let the constitution become really the expression -of the will of the people of Turkey, let it demonstrate the uselessness -of any safeguards for {198} protecting the Christians from Moslem -oppression, let the era of liberty and equality and fraternity actually -be realized in the Ottoman Empire, and then the Church would resign its -privileges. For they would be antiquated, and fall naturally into -desuetude. But in constitutions, as in other things, the proof of the -pudding is in the eating. - -What the Young Turks attempted to do was to destroy the privileges of -the Orthodox Church, on the ground that these privileges were a barrier -to the assimilation of the races in the Empire. Americans, above all -nations, have deep sympathies for, and well justified reasons for -having faith in, the policy of assimilation. Have not the various -races of Europe, different in religion and in political and social -customs, passed wonderfully through the crucible of assimilation on -American soil? But by assimilation the Young Turks meant, not the -amalgamation of races, each co-operating and sharing in the building up -of the fatherland, as in America, but the complete subjection and -ultimate disappearance of all other elements in the Empire than their -own. They intended, from the very first days of the constitutional -_régime_, to make Turkey a nation of Turks. Theirs was the strong, -virile race, into which the other races would be fused. Turkey was -weak, they declared, because it was the home of a conglomeration of -peoples. If Turkey was to become like the nations of Europe, these -different nationalities must be destroyed. To destroy them, the -Government had first to aim at the _foyer_ of national life, the -ecclesiastical hierarchies. - -{199} - -I have talked with many a zealous Young Turk. What I have written here -is not only the logical interpretation of the facts; it is also the -faithful expression of the ideas of the most earnest and intelligent -Turkish partisans of the new _régime_. They pointed out, with perfect -logic, that this process had gone on in every European country, and -that it was the only way in which a strong nation could be built. So -far they were right. But, aside from the fact that in Europe this -political and social evolution had taken centuries, there was also the -working of the law of the survival of the fittest. In European nations -it had been the element, always composite, which deserved to live, that -formed the nucleus of a nationality. The whole root of the question in -Turkey was, were the Young Turks justified in believing that the Turk -was this element? - -There is not space to discuss the reasons for the supremacy of the -Osmanli in the Ottoman Empire. Up to the eighteenth century, the -Osmanli was undoubtedly the "fittest" element. For the past two -hundred years, the continued domination of Turk and the continued -subjection of Christian populations, in Turkey, has been due to causes -outside of the Empire. The Turk has remained the ruling race. But is -he still the fittest? One may examine the different elements of the -Ottoman Empire, and measure them by the tests of civilization. From -the intellectual standpoint, from the business standpoint, from the -administrative standpoint, the Turk is hardly able to sustain his claim -to continue to be, in a twentieth-century empire, the element which can -{200} hope to assimilate Greek, Armenian, Albanian, Slav, and Arab. He -is less fit than any of the others, especially than the Greek and -Armenian in intellectual and business faculties, and than the Albanian -in administrative faculties. There remains, then, as his sole claim to -dominate the other races, his physical superiority. By history and by -legend, he is the fighting man and rules by right of conquest and force. - -It was always the sane--and only safe--policy of the Turks to keep -Christians out of the army. They saw to it that the _métier_ of arms -remained wholly to the Moslems. In spite of the increasing wealth and -education of the Christian elements of the Empire, the ascendancy was -preserved to the Turk through the army. But at what a sacrifice! By -reason of military service, the Turkish peasant has been kept in -economic and intellectual serfdom, while his Christian neighbour -progressed. The Turkish population has actually decreased, and the -ravages of garrison life, due to dyspepsia and syphilis, have -diminished fearfully the physical vigour of the race. By the same -token, the upper classes, knowing only the life of army officers, have -been removed from the necessity of competing in the world for position -and success. Can manhood be formed in any other mould than that of -competition, where the goal is achievement, and is reached only by -continued effort of will and brain? The upper class Turk is a -parasite, and, like all parasites, helpless when that upon which he -feeds is taken from him. - -[Illustration: Map--Europe in 1911] - -{201} - -The attack of the Young Turk party upon the Greek Church failed. The -patriarch refused to surrender his privileges. The Greek clergy and -the Lay Council held out under persecution and threats. In October, -1910, when the Lay Council met in Constantinople, its members were -arrested, and thrown into jail. In Macedonia and Thrace, in the Ægean -Islands, along the coast of Asia Minor, the bishops and clergy suffered -untold persecutions. Some were even assassinated. I shall never -forget a memorable interview I had with Joachim III, during that -crisis. His Holiness untied with trembling fingers the _dossier_ of -persecutions, which contained letters and sworn statements from a dozen -dioceses. "They treat us like dogs!" he cried. "Never under Abdul -Hamid or any Sultan have my people suffered as they are suffering now. -But we are too strong for them. We refuse to be exterminated. I see -all Europe stained with blood because of these crimes." How prophetic -these words as I record them now! - -The Turk could not hope to assimilate the Greek by peaceful methods, -because he was his intellectual inferior. When he planned to use -force, the Balkan Alliance was formed. The battle of Lulé Burgas took -away from the Turk his last claim to fitness as dominant race. He -could no longer fight better than Christians. The first Balkan War -gave the _coup de grâce_ to the final--and has it not been all along -the only?--argument for Turkish racial supremacy. - - - -THE CRETAN QUESTION AND THE GREEK BOYCOTT - -The island of Crete had long been to Turkey, in relation to Greece, -what Cuba had been to Spain, in {202} relation to the United States. -In both cases, and about the same time, wars of liberation broke out. -But Greece was not as fortunate in her efforts for the emancipation of -an enslaved and continually rebellious population as was the United -States. Powerless and humiliated, after the war of 1897, Greece could -no longer hope to have a voice, by reason of her own force, in the -direction of Cretan affairs. Crete became the foundling of European -diplomacy. - -Together with the declaration of Bulgarian independence, and the -annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, the Young -Turks had to face a decree of the Cretan assembly to the effect that -Crete was indissolubly united to the kingdom of Greece. The Young -Turks could do nothing against Bulgaria. For the ceremony of Tirnovo -had been no more than the _de jure_ sanction of a _de facto_ condition. -The only cause for conflict, the question of the railroads in eastern -Rumelia, was solved by Russian diplomacy. Against Austria-Hungary a -boycott was declared. It resulted in a few successful attempts to -prevent the landing of mails and freights from Austrian steamers, and -in the tearing up of several million fezes which were of Austrian -manufacture. These, by the way, were soon replaced by new fezes from -the same factories. The Sublime Porte settled the Bosnia-Herzegovina -question by accepting a money payment from Austria-Hungary. - -All the rancour resulting from these losses and humiliation, all the -vials of wrath, were poured upon the head of Greece. The Cretan -question became {203} the foremost problem in European diplomacy. The -Cretans stubbornly refused to listen to the Powers, and decided to -maintain their decision to belong to Greece. But Greece was threatened -with war by Turkey, if she did not refuse to accept the annexation -decree voted by the Cretans themselves. In order to prevent Turkey -from attacking Greece, the Powers decided to use force against the -Cretans. Turkey, not satisfied with the efforts of the Powers to -preserve the Ottoman sovereignty and Ottoman pride in Crete, demanded -still more of Greece. She asked that the Greek Parliament should not -only declare its disinterestedness in Crete, but should take upon -itself the obligation to maintain that disinterestedness in the future. - -To go into all the tortuous phases of the Cretan question up to the -time of the Balkan War would make this chapter out of proportion; and -yet Crete, like Alsace-Lorraine, has had a most vital influence upon -the present European war. The one point to be emphasized here is, that -to bring pressure to bear upon Greece in defining her attitude toward -Crete, the Young Turks decided to revive the commercial boycott which -they had used against Austria. I have seen from close range the -notorious Greek boycott of 1910 to 1912. It was far more disastrous to -the Turks than to the Greeks of Turkey. It threatened so completely, -however, the economic prosperity of Greece, which is a commercial -rather than an agricultural country, that it forced Greece into the -Balkan Alliance much against her will, for the sake of -self-preservation. - -{204} - -If this boycott had been carried on against the Greeks of Greece alone, -it would not have affected vitally the prosperity of the Greeks in the -Ottoman Empire. Their imports come from every country, and for their -exports the freight steamers of all the European nations competed. But -it was directed also against the Greeks who were Ottoman subjects. In -Salonika, Constantinople, Trebizond, Smyrna, and other ports, commerce -was entirely in the hands of Greeks. They owned almost every steamer -bearing the Ottoman flag. They owned the cargoes. They bought and -sold the merchandise. The Young Turks, working through the _hamals_ or -longshoremen and the boatmen who manned the lighters,--all Turks and -Kurds,--succeeded in tying up absolutely the commerce of Ottoman -Greeks. The Greek merchants and shippers were ruined. It was urged -cleverly that this was the chance for Moslems to get the trade of the -great ports of Turkey into their own hands. The Government encouraged -them by buying and maintaining steamship lines. But the Turks had no -knowledge of commerce, no money to buy goods, and no inclination to do -the work and accept the responsibilities necessary for successful -commercial undertakings. The result was that imports were stopped, -prices went up, and the Moslems were hurt as much as, if not more than, -the Christians. After several voyages, the new government passenger -vessels were practically _hors de combat_. There was no longer first, -second, and third class. Peasants squatted on the decks and in the -saloons. Filth reigned supreme, and hopeless confusion. No {205} -European could endure a voyage on one of these steamers, and no -merchant cared to entrust his shipments to them. - -The boycott died because it was a hopeless undertaking. For many -months, the Government lost heavily through the falling off in the -custom house receipts. The labouring class (almost wholly Moslems) of -the seaports suffered terribly, as our labouring class suffers during a -prolonged strike. The boycott was removed, Greeks were allowed to -resume their business, so essential for the prosperity of the -community, and, as is always the case in Turkey, everything worked -again in the same old way. - -But, just as the failure to punish the perpetrators of the Adana -massacre alienated definitely and irrevocably the sympathy and loyal -support of the Armenian element from the constitutional _régime_, so -the boycott, iniquitous and futile, lost to the Young Turks the -allegiance of the Greeks of the Empire. Already alarmed by the attack -upon the liberties of the patriarchate, the Greeks began to look to -Greece for help; and, in the islands of the Ægean and in Macedonia, the -hope was strong that a successful war might put an end to what they -were suffering. - -The Greeks of Turkey are not free from the universal characteristic of -human nature. You can persecute and browbeat a man, you can bully him -and do him physical injury, you can refuse him a share in the -government and put him in an inferior social position, and he will -continue to endure it. But, {206} rob him of the chance of making a -livelihood, and he will commence to conspire against the government. A -man's vital point is his pocket-book. That vital point the Young Turks -threatened by their boycott. - - - -THE YOUNG TURKS AND THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM - -It was at Salonika that the Young Turk movement first gained its -footing in the Ottoman Empire, and until the loss of European Turkey, -after the disastrous war with the Balkan States, Salonika continued to -be the centre of the "Committee of Union and Progress." Its congresses -were always held there. From Salonika the third army corps went forth -to suppress, in April, 1909, the counter-revolution in Constantinople. -To the Young Turks, Salonika seemed the safest place in all the Ottoman -dominions for the imprisonment of Abdul Hamid. Many of the leading -members of the party were natives of Macedonia. In fact, it was -because the Young Turks saw clearly that European Turkey would soon be -lost to the Empire, unless there was a regeneration, that they -precipitated in 1908 the revolution which had so long been brewing. - -It is natural, then, that the Macedonian problem should be the first -and uppermost of all the many problems that had to be solved in the -regeneration of Turkey. The "Committee of Union and Progress" saw that -immediate action must be taken to strengthen Ottoman authority, so -severely shaken since the war with Russia, in the European _vilayets_. - -We have already shown in a previous chapter how {207} the struggle of -races in European Turkey had made Macedonia the bloody centre of Balkan -rivalry, and had reduced the _vilayets_ of Uskub and Salonika to -anarchy. - -Up to the coming of the constitutional _régime_, there had been a very -strong element in Macedonia, principally Bulgarian, which saw--oh, how -prophetically!--that the liberation of Macedonia from Turkish rule -would endanger, rather than aid, the propaganda for eventual Bulgarian -hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula. These Bulgarians, wise in their day -and generation beyond their emancipated brethren, advocated the -intervention of Bulgarian arms, not to secure independence, but -autonomy. They felt that by the creation, for a period of years, of an -autonomous province of Macedonia under the suzerainty of the Sultan, -the felicitous history of Eastern Rumelia would repeat itself. - -The Young Turks decided to solve the Macedonian problem by -strengthening the Moslem element in every corner of the _vilayets_ of -Salonika and Uskub. The means of doing this were at hand. After the -annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkish agents began to work -among the Moslem population in these countries to induce them to -emigrate and come under the dominion of the "Padishah," as the Sultan -is called by his faithful subjects. They were brought in and settled, -with the help of the Government, in those districts of Macedonia where -the Moslem element was weak. This was a repetition of the policy of -Abdul Hamid after the Congress of Berlin, when, in Eastern Rumelia and -Thrace, {208} to oppose the Bulgarians Circassians from the lost -Caucasus were settled, and to oppose the Servians Albanian emigration -into old Servia and the Sandjak of Novi Bazar was encouraged. - -In addition to this, the Young Turks decided to secure the loyalty of -their Christian subjects in European Turkey by abolishing the _karadj_ -(head tax) which exempted Christians from military service. -Bulgarians, Greeks, and Servians were summoned to serve in the Ottoman -army. - -The first of these measures should never have been adopted. The bitter -experience of former years should have taught the Young Turks the -lesson that emigration of this nature not only tended to arouse -religious fanaticism, but also introduced an element, ignorant and -unruly, and wholly worthless from the economic point of view. It has -often been recorded that Moslems, prompted to the sacrifice of -abandoning everything for their love of remaining Turkish subjects, -have made these "treks" after the unsuccessful wars of Turkey _of their -own initiative_. Nothing is farther from the truth. There has never -been an exodus of this sort which has not been due to the instigation -of political agents. From the very fact that large industrious and -influential Moslem elements have remained and prospered under Russian, -Bulgarian, and Austrian rule, it can be inferred that those who yielded -to the solicitation of Turkish agents were the undesirable Moslem -element, who, never having acquired anything where they were, had -nothing to lose by making a change. If one excepts a certain portion -of the Circassians, the {209} statement may well be made that these -emigrants--_muhadjirs_ they are called in Turkish--are an element -forming the lowest dregs of the population, as worthless and shiftless -as the great majority of the Jews whom the Zionist movement has -attracted to Palestine. More than this, the _muhadjirs_ have been -fanatical and lawless, and it is they whose massacres of Christians -have invariably ended in irretrievable disaster for Turkey. - -In Macedonia, the muhadjirs, in conjunction with the Albanian Moslem -immigrants, were responsible for the succession of massacres in 1912, -such as those of Ishtip and Kotchana, which helped to bring about the -Balkan alliance. The same thing is happening to-day in the coast towns -of Asia Minor and Thrace, where the brutality and blood lust of the -_muhadjirs_ since 1913 will eventually cause another attack of Greece -upon Turkey. - -The second policy--that of enrolling Christians in the army--was -recorded, back in the days of the first attempt at the emancipation of -Christians, the _Tanzimat_ of 1839, as a measure which would ameliorate -their lot and bring about equality. The idea was splendid, but its -application was impracticable. Ottoman Christians are so wholly -incompatible, from their social and educational background, with -Ottoman Moslems, that they cannot be placed in the army, in mixed -regiments, without incurring humiliation, degradation, and persecution -of the most cruel sort. - -The only way in which Christians could be called to serve in the -Ottoman army would have been the formation, at first, of separate -regiments, where the {210} soldiers would enjoy immunity from -persecution. When this reform was made, there should have been also a -provision from the very first, that the ranks of officers be recruited -from the Christian elements in the Empire, in proportion to their -numerical strength. But with both Christians and Jews, obligatory army -service was used from the beginning--it is still used today--as a means -of extorting money from those who could pay, and terrorizing and -reducing to slavery those who could not raise the forty pounds required -for exemption. Even if there were no religious fanaticism, even if it -were not necessary for Christians of intelligence to serve in an army -wholly officered by Moslems, the terrible and criminal conditions of -service which they were called upon to suffer would have justified the -Christians in adopting every possible measure to avoid military service. - -Throughout the Empire, intelligent Christians who could not purchase -their freedom from this obligation preferred exile to military service. -From 1909 to 1914, Turkey has lost hundreds of thousands of its best -young blood. - -The result in Macedonia of the coming of the _muhadjirs_ and the taking -of Christians for the army, was that the Macedonians abandoned their -advocacy of autonomy, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and looked to -the Balkan States for freedom from Turkish rule. - - - -THE ALBANIAN UPRISINGS - -Albania was never fully conquered by the Osmanlis. Like the -Montenegrins, the Albanians were always {211} able to resist the -extension of Turkish authority in their mountains. Not only did the -nature of the country favour them, but their proximity to the Adriatic, -and their ability to call at will for Italian and Austrian help, made -it advisable for the Supreme Porte to compromise with them. Many -Albanians, including principally, as in Bosnia, the landowning -families, were converted to Mohammedanism, and attached themselves to -the fortunes of Turkey. Without ever giving up their local -independence, these renegade Albanians became the most loyal and -efficient supporters of Ottoman authority _outside of Albania_. - -Turkey has gained much from the Albanians. Her higher classes, endowed -with extreme intelligence and physical activity, have been the most -valuable civil and military officials that the Government has ever -enjoyed. Because they were Moslems, they were able to take high -positions in the army and government service. It is one of the most -remarkable facts of Ottoman history that the great majority of the -really great statesmen and soldiers of the Empire, if not of Christian -ancestry, have been, and still are, Albanians. In strengthening the -Turkish domination in the European provinces, after the period of -decline set in, the Albanians have been indispensable. Their -emigration from their mountains into Epirus, Old Servia, the valley of -the Vardar, and the coast towns of Macedonia checked for a long time -the conspiracies and rebellions of the Christian elements. - -The Sultans of Turkey and their counsellors have always recognized the -value of the Albanians. In {212} return for their great services to -the Empire, they were allowed to retain their local privileges. This -meant independence, in reality, rather than autonomy. They gave what -taxes they pleased, or none. Military service was rendered upon their -own terms. Christian Albanians, as well as Moslem, have preferred -Ottoman sovereignty to any other. They have never thought of -independence, because this would have brought them responsibilities and -dangers from which, under the fetish of "the integrity of the Ottoman -Empire," they were free. So they resisted every effort of Italian, -Austrian, Slav, and Greek to weaken their allegiance to the Sultan. -Turkey also allowed them to remain under the mediæval conditions in -which they lived back in the fourteenth century. They wanted neither -railways, roads, nor ports. Among all the subjects of the Sultan, the -Albanians were best satisfied with the absolute lack of progress under -Moslem rule. These are the reasons why the majority of Albanians want -to return once more to the fold of Turkey. - -The Young Turks were no more felicitous in their treatment of the -Albanians than of the Greeks and Armenians. Without any consideration -of the peculiar problems involved, they decided immediately, tackling -every problem at once, that Albania must be civilized and that Ottoman -sovereignty must work there in exactly the same way as in any other -part of the Empire. Albanians must render military service, and submit -to being sent wherever the authorities at Constantinople decided. -Local independence must cease. Taxes must be paid regularly. When the -{213} Albanians resisted, as they did immediately, an army was sent to -pacify the country. - -One cannot but sympathize with the principle laid down by the Minister -of the Interior at Constantinople, that the central authority must be -recognized and that the only way to stamp out the Albanian anarchy was -to disarm the population. But the Young Turks knew no other way of -doing this than by force. They did not realize that anarchy and -lawlessness disappear only with education and economic progress. -Instead of starting to "civilize" the Albanians by establishing schools -and opening up the country with railways, they sent rapid-firing guns. -In the summer of 1909, the rebellion was stamped out with ruthless -cruelty by the burning of villages, the destruction of crops, and the -seizing of cattle. Such measures were a very poor argument for the -Albanian to induce him to comply with the disarmament decree. Under -ordinary circumstances an Albanian would rather lose his leg than his -gun. Under these circumstances, he preferred risking his life to -giving up what he considered his only means of defence. - -Every year the Albanian rebellion broke out afresh. Every year the -Young Turks exhausted the strength and spent the resources of their -armies in European Turkey against the invulnerable mountains of -Albania. After every "pacification," Albania in arms was just as -certain each May as the coming again of summer. - -In 1912, when affairs were in a critical state as regards the Christian -neighbours, the Cabinet in {214} Constantinople was once more engaged -in the hopeless task of subduing Albanian opposition. The Albanians, -however, seemed to gain strength rather than lose it. In September, -1912, I was in Uskub just four weeks before the Balkan War broke out. -The Albanian chieftains were there, having made a truce for Ramazan -(the sacred month of the Moslem fasting). They said to me that the -next year, if the Turks did not stop persecuting them, they would take -their army to Constantinople. Others were to get ahead of them, and -they were to win their independence without having to fight the Turks -again. The poor showing of the Turkish arms against the Greeks and -Servians is very largely due to the exhaustion which had come to them -through continuous and unsuccessful attempts to get the better of the -Albanian uprisings. The Balkan States knew how severely the western -Macedonian army had suffered in July and August, 1912. It was one of -the considerations which decided them to strike at that moment. - - - -THE TREATMENT OF THE ARABIC ELEMENT - -In Asiatic Turkey there are supposed to be about eight million -Arabic-speaking inhabitants. These figures may be an exaggeration, for -no census has ever been taken. But the _vilayets_ are occupied almost -exclusively by Arabs and races speaking Arabic. They form a half of -the Empire's dominions in Asia, starting with the Taurus and Amanus -ranges, south through Syria to Arabia and east and south-east through -Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. - -{215} - -These large stretches of territory were never thoroughly conquered by -the Turks. They did not settle there in the way they had done in the -Balkan Peninsula, outside of Albania and Montenegro, and in Asia Minor. -The race from whom they had taken their religion and from whom they -soon absorbed whatever culture and art they can be said to possess, was -never assimilated by the Turks. Their simple warrior and herdsman -language was enriched by Arabic substantives, as Anglo-Saxon was -enriched by the Latin gotten through the Normans and through the -Church. But there was no racial fusion. - -Only in appearance did Turkish officialdom and the authority of the -Sultan ever get a real hold over the Arabs. By habit they came to -respect the Sultan as Khalif. The allegiance which they gave him as -ruler was altogether without value--a pure matter of form. An -aggressive pasha found it easy to detach Egypt from Turkish rule. It -was conglomerate populations and a lack of natural boundaries for -forming states that prevented the other Arabic portions of the Ottoman -Empire from following Egypt. In Arabia proper, and in the larger -portion of Mesopotamia, up to the present day, the Arabs have been as -independent of the Sublime Porte as have been the Albanians. - -In the reign of Abdul Hamid, when the idea of the Pan-Islamic movement -was conceived, the importance of joining the sacred cities of Medina -and Mecca more closely with the Turkish Empire was recognized. French -interests were building a railway across the Lebanon Mountains to -Aleppo and Damascus. The {216} Germans had launched their project for -the _Bagdadbahn_. Abdul Hamid decided to create a railway directly -under government control, from Damascus to Medina and Mecca. For the -first time since they were joined to the Ottoman Empire, the Arabic -provinces saw themselves in prospective connection with the capital. -It had been for a long time easier and quicker to go from -Constantinople to the United States or to China than to Bagdad or to -Mecca. The railways would have one of two results: either the Arabs -would be brought more closely into connection with the Empire, or they -would be definitely alienated from it. - -The Arabic question stood thus when the constitution was re-established -in 1908. There are many Arabs among the Young Turks, but these, like -the Slavs in the military and official service of Austria-Hungary, have -been definitely alienated from their own nationality. Here was the -opportunity to bring into sympathy with the constitutional movement the -millions of Arabic-speaking subjects of the Sultan, who formed the most -numerous Moslem element in the Empire. But the Young Turks were no -more tactful in the treatment of the Arabs, who were mostly of their -own religion, than of the Greeks and Armenians. In the first -Parliament, they were almost as unfair to Moslem Arabs as to -Christians. In the apportionment of places in the Cabinet, the Arabs -were ignored. It is true that some Cabinet members, some high -officials both in the military and civil administration, and some -members of the inner council of the Committee of Union and Progress -{217} were of Arabic origin. But they must be counted practically as -Turks, for they had lived so long away from their own country and their -people that they had lost all Arabic sympathies. Some who were called -Arabs were in reality members of the old Turkish families, who in -Mesopotamia, as in Syria and Egypt, had received large tracts of land -at the time of the conquest, and had always been Turks by interests and -by atmosphere. The younger nationalistic Arabic element, educated, and -living by professional or business interests in cities of the Arabic -portion of the Empire, were from the very beginning ignored. - -Two things soon became evident. In the first place, the Young Turks -tried to impose their language in local administration as the sole -official language of the Empire. In many places in Syria and -Mesopotamia, civil officials, even in the courts of justice, were -appointed without a knowledge of the language of the people among whom -they had to serve. In the Balkans and in Asia Minor, where there were -so many races and so many tongues, the Turks were acting reasonably and -sensibly in imposing their own language as a medium for the transaction -of government business, but in _vilayets_ which were _wholly_ Arabic -speaking, the foisting of the Turkish language upon the people could be -likened to a bastard child endeavouring to rule the branch of his -family from which he had received his best and purest blood. Before a -year had passed, the educated, intellectual Arabs were wholly out of -sympathy with the new _régime_. Many of them began to dream of the -revival of {218} the Arabian khalifate, and looked to the nationalistic -movement in Egypt as the seed from which their Pan-Arabic tree would -some day grow. Others, older and less sentimental, did not hesitate to -express a desire to see British or French sovereignty extended over -Syria and Mesopotamia. - -In the second place, among the quasi-independent tribes of the Syrian -_hinterland_, and of the Arabian peninsula, the attempt of the Turks to -destroy their privileges ended in the same way as it had done in -Albania. From 1908 up to the outbreak of the Balkan War, millions of -treasure and thousands of the best soldiers of the Empire were lost in -fruitless efforts to realize the aspirations of the Young Turks. We -cannot even enumerate these rebellions. They were as perennial as the -Albanian uprisings, and as disastrous to the Turkish army. In Arabia, -rebellious Arabs treated with the Italians. In Syria, beyond the -Jordan, they made a practice of tearing up the tracks and burning the -stations of the Hedjaz railway. In Mesopotamia, they refused to -respond to the obligation of military service. - - -This incomplete summary of the Young Turk _régime_ in the Ottoman -Empire has been given to throw light upon the collapse of the -constitutional _régime_ and of the military reputation of Turkey. I -have refrained from going into a discussion of party politics, of -intrigues, and of the bickerings of Parliament. Enough has been told -to show that the constitutional _régime_ was marked for failure from -the beginning for three reasons: There was no honest {219} attempt to -bring together the various races of the Empire in a common effort for -regeneration. The Young Turks, having no statesmen among their -leaders, depended upon untrained men and upon those Abdul Hamid had -trained in sycophancy and despotism. In spite of the heroic and able -efforts of the German military mission and the British naval mission, -no progress was made in reforming the only force by which the Young -Turks could have held in respect and obedience the Sultan's own -subjects, as well as those foreign nations who were looking for the -opportunity to dismember the Empire. - -If the hopes of the true friends of Turkey had been realized, if only -the constitution had been applied, if only there had been the _will_ to -regenerate Turkey, all the wars of the past few years, including the -one which is now shaking Europe to its foundations, would have been -avoided. - - - - -{220} - -CHAPTER XII - -CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY - -On November 19, 1910, the Cretan General Assembly made a stirring -appeal "to the four Great Powers who are protectors of the island, to -the two great Powers of Central Europe, to the great Republic of the -New World, to the liberal and enlightened press of two Continents, and -in general to all Christians, in favour of the rights of the Cretan -people which it represents,--rights acquired and made legal by so many -sacrifices and sufferings." The Cretans definitely included the United -States and the American press in this manifesto. They wanted the -American people to become acquainted with what was known to the -chancelleries of Europe as "the Cretan question." For one fifth of the -Cretans have members of their families in America. There are few -hamlets in the island into which the spirit and influence of "the great -Republic of the New World" has not penetrated. - -A review of the relationship between Crete and the European Powers is -as necessary in trying to throw light upon the events which led up to -the war of 1914 as is the exposition of the later phases of the -Albanian question. It helps us to grasp the attitude {221} of the -Powers towards Turkey in the years immediately after the proclamation -of the constitution, the tremendous power of Hellenism under the wise -and skilful guidance of a statesman such as M. Venizelos has proved -himself to be, the importance of the Cretan question in precipitating -the Balkan Wars, and the impotence of European diplomacy to preserve -the _status quo_, and decide _ex cathedra_ the destinies of countries -like Crete and Macedonia, whose emancipated kinsfolk had acquired the -spirit of the soldiers who sang: - - - "As Christ died to make men holy, let us die to make men free." - - -A century ago, Crete was cut off from the outside world. It had been -for two hundred and fifty years under the Turks, who took a peculiar -pride in the island from the fact that it was their last great -conquest. Its Christian inhabitants, although forming the majority of -the population, lived, or rather existed, under the same hopeless -conditions as prevailed throughout Turkey. In the sea-coast towns the -Christians prospered better than the Moslems, owing to their aptitude -for commerce; but the bulk of the Christian population was in abject -slavery to the Turkish _beys_, who were the great landowners. - -The Greek war of liberation was shared in by the Cretans, who lent -valuable aid to their brethren of the mainland. They endured all the -sufferings of the war, but reaped none of its rewards. It is quite -possible that they might have thrown off the Turkish yoke at that -favourable moment had it not been for {222} the astute policy of the -Turks, who, seeing the danger of losing Crete, handed it over to -Mehemet Ali in 1830 as a reward for Egyptian aid in the Greek war and -compensation for the ships destroyed at Navarino. With the downfall of -Mehemet Ali's schemes of conquest in 1840, the island reverted to -Turkey. At this time the Powers could easily have united Crete with -Greece, but deliberately sacrificed the Cretans to their commercial -rivalries. - -Turkey never succeeded in gaining her former ascendancy in Crete. -Insurrection after insurrection was drowned in blood. During two -generations the Turks sent into the unhappy island successive armies, -whose orgies of cruelty and lust are better left undescribed. But the -tortures of hell could not extinguish the flames of liberty. Every few -years the Cretans would rise again and repay blood with blood until -they were overwhelmed by Anatolian soldiers, of whom Turkey possesses -an unlimited supply. - -At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Greeks pled, with much force, for -the privilege of annexing Crete. As we read them to-day, the arguments -of M. Delyannis are a prophecy. The Powers put Crete back under -Ottoman control, subject to a reformed constitution called the Pact of -Holepa, which provided a fairly good administration, if a capable and -sincere governor were chosen. Everything went well until Sultan Abdul -Hamid in 1889 practically annulled the solemn agreement he had made by -appointing a Moslem Governor-General, and reducing the representation -in the General Assembly in such a way that the Moslem minority in the -island came into {223} power again. It would be fruitless to go into -the complex history of the next seven years during which the -lawlessness of former times was revived. - -Christian refugees fled to Greece and carried the tale of their -sufferings. A massacre in Canea in February, 1897, engineered by -Turkish officers fresh from similar work in Armenia, had such a -repercussion in Greece that King George would have lost his throne had -he remained deaf to the popular demand that aid be sent to the Cretans. -Greek soldiers crossed to the stricken island. This meant war with -Turkey. In a few weeks Greece was overwhelmed in Thessaly, and the -Powers were compelled to intervene. Much ridicule has been cast upon -Greece for her impotence in the war of 1897. Her defeat was a foregone -conclusion, and she was severely blamed for having jeopardized the -peace of Europe just as the Balkan States are being blamed to-day. - -But there are times when a nation simply has to fight. So it was with -Greece in 1897. In exactly similar circumstances, but with conditions -less serious and an issue not so long outstanding or so vital to -national well-being, the United States a year later declared war on -Spain. There was great similarity between the Cretan situation in 1897 -and that of 1912 in Crete and Macedonia. Refugees, crossing the -borders and telling unspeakable tales to their brothers of blood and -religion, were continually before the eyes of the Bulgarians and -Servians and Montenegrins and Greeks since the proclamation of the -constitution in 1908. Each nationality suffered {224} by massacres in -Macedonia which were followed by no serious punishment. - -Even though defeated in 1897, Greece forced the hand of the Powers and -of Turkey. Crete was given autonomy, and placed under the protection -of Italy, Great Britain, France, and Russia, who occupied the principal -ports of the island. For a year and a half they searched for a -"neutral" governor for the Cretans. The Turkish troops, however, -remained at Candia, leaving the rest of the island to the -revolutionaries. It was not until the British were attacked in the -harbour of Candia, and their Vice-Consul murdered, that the Powers -moved. But, as at Alexandria in 1882, it was a bluff admiral and not -the diplomats who settled the status of the island. The Turkish troops -were compelled to withdraw, and the Powers were told that they would -either have to appease the Cretans by some encouragement of their -aspirations or conquer the island by force. A way out of the dilemma -was found in the appointment of Prince George of Greece as High -Commissioner of the protecting Powers in Crete. - -Here is where the Powers, if they had at that time any intention of -"preserving the rights of Turkey" in Crete, made the first of their -blunders. To call the son of the King of Greece to the chief -magistracy of an island which had so long aspired to political union -with Greece was, in the eyes of the people, a direct encouragement to -their aspirations. How could they think otherwise? The Turkish -Cretans, too, regarded this step as the end of Ottoman sovereignty, for -they emigrated in so great a number that soon the {225} Moslem -population was reduced to ten per cent. Prince George's appointment, -made in December, 1898, was for three years, but really lasted eight. -In 1906 he withdrew because he had become hopelessly involved in party -politics, and had "backed the wrong horses." - -Now comes the second blunder, _unless the Powers were preparing Crete -for union with Greece_. They sent a letter to the King of Greece, -asking him to appoint a successor to his son! Let me quote from the -exact wording of this letter: - - -"The protecting Powers, in order to manifest their desire to take into -account as far as possible the aspirations of the Cretan people, and to -recognize in a practical manner the interest which His Hellenic Majesty -must always take in the prosperity of Crete, are in accord to propose -to His Majesty that hereafter, whenever the post of High Commissioner -of Crete shall become vacant, His Majesty, after confidential -consultations with the representatives of the Powers at Athens, will -designate a candidate capable of exercising the mandate of the Powers -in this island...." - - -Turkey naturally protested against the change in the _status quo_ which -such a step implied, and pointed out that it was a virtual destruction -even of the _suzerainty_ of the Sultan. The Powers, however, did not -object to the publication of their note to the King of Greece in the -newspapers of Crete. M. Zaimis, a former prime minister of Greece, was -appointed High Commissioner. The island had its own flag and postage -stamps, and laws identical with those of {226} Greece. Cretan officers -in Greek uniform commanded the militia and constabulary of the island. -Turkey treated Crete as a foreign country. For this statement there is -no more conclusive proof than the records of the custom-houses at -Smyrna and Salonika which show that Cretan products were subjected to -the same duties as were applied to all foreign imports. - -It would seem, then, that Crete was in practically the same position as -Eastern Roumelia in 1885, or, in fact, as Bulgaria herself. Nothing -was more natural than that the establishment of a constitutional -_régime_ in Turkey should lead to a proclamation of union with Greece. -The motives which led to this action were identical with those which -Austria-Hungary put forth as an explanation of her annexation of Bosnia -and Herzegovina. The Cretans quite justly feared that the Young Turks -would repudiate the obligations assumed by Abdul Hamid, and endeavour -to bring Crete back into the Turkish fold. At the moment Turkey was so -engrossed in the question of the Austrian annexation and the Bulgarian -declaration of independence and seizure of the railways in Eastern -Roumelia that she contented herself with a formal protest against the -action of the Cretan Assembly. - -What did the Powers do? Turkey, at the moment, could have done nothing -had they recognized the union with Greece. But they did not want to go -that far. On the other hand, they did not want to offend Greece and -the Cretans. They made no threats, and took no action, although their -troops were in the island. Inaction and indecision were made worse by -{227} the following note, which was sent by the four Consuls at Candia -to the self-appointed provisional government: - - -"The undersigned, agents of France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, -by order of their respective governments, have the honour of bringing -to the knowledge of the Cretan government (_sic_) that the protecting -Powers consider the union of Crete to Greece as depending upon the -assent of the Powers who have contracted obligations with Turkey. -Nevertheless they would not refuse to envisage with kindly and -sympathetic interest the discussion of this question with Turkey, if -order is maintained in the island and if the safety of the Moslem -population is secured." - - -That diplomatic sanction would sooner or later be given to the action -of the Cretans, if they showed their ability to preserve order in the -island and treat the Moslems well, is an altogether justifiable -interpretation of this note of the Powers. Otherwise would they not -have protested against the illegality of the provisional government, -and have forbidden the Cretan authorities to promulgate their decrees -in the name of King George? Although the High Commissioner had -disappeared, and the Cretans were running the island just as if the -annexation were an assured fact, the Powers, far from protesting, -announced their intention of withdrawing their troops of occupation! - -What were their intentions concerning Crete, and what was their -understanding of the _status quo_ at the moment of withdrawal? This -question they did not {228} answer then, nor did they answer it -afterwards. They simply withdrew from the island without stating what -legal power was to succeed them. This was in the summer of 1909. M. -Venizelos, then Prime Minister of Crete, asked the Powers to state -definitely their intentions. He said that he did not wish to run -counter to the orders of the Powers, but that he would have to raise -the flag of Greece over the island when their troops left, unless they -_formally_ forbade him to do so. With admirable clearness and -irrefutable logic he pointed out to the Powers that the only other -alternative would be anarchy. But the Powers, pressed by their -ambassadors at Constantinople, were afraid to assent to annexation. -They were equally averse to taking the opposite course. So they -contented themselves with giving M. Venizelos "friendly counsels" not -to hoist the Greek flag. The result was the ludicrous spectacle of the -cutting down of the Greek flag by marines landed from eight warships. -It was like a scene from a comic opera, and M. Venizelos must have -formed then the opinion which every succeeding action of the Powers -strengthened and to which he gave expression after the Balkan War was -declared--that the Powers were "venerable old women." - -Crete now began to be menaced by the insensate chauvinism of the Young -Turks, who thought they could avenge the loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina and -the Bulgarian declaration of independence by destroying the autonomy of -Crete and re-establishing the authority of the Sultan in this island -which had been repudiating the Ottoman government for eighty {229} -years. In the spring of 1910, the _Tanine_, at that time official -organ of the Committee of Union and Progress, laid down five points as -the _minimum_ which the Porte would accept in the definite and -permanent solution of the status of Crete: - - -"1. Formal recognition of the rights of the Sultan. - -"2. The right of the Sultan to name the Governor-General of the island -among three Cretan candidates elected by the General Assembly. - -"3. The right of the _sheik-ul-islam_ to name the religious chiefs of -the Cretan Moslems. - -"4. Establishment in the Bay of Suda of a coaling-station for the -Ottoman fleet, and the maintenance there of a permanent _stationnaire_ -like the _stationnaires_ of the embassies at Constantinople. - -"5. Restriction of the rights of the Cretan government in the matter of -conclusion of treaties of commerce and agreements with foreign powers." - - -What the "rights of the Sultan" might be were not specified then, nor -have they been since: but articles four and five were enough to throw -the whole of Crete into a state of wildest excitement. The Turks, -after having lost the island, were trying to win it back. - -Left to themselves (as they had every reason to believe) the Cretans -convoked the National Assembly for April 26, 1910. The Assembly was -opened in the name of George I., King of the Hellenes. The Moslem -deputies immediately presented a protest in which they rejected the -sovereignty of Greece over Crete. The deputies were then asked to take -the oath of allegiance in the name of King George. A second petition -was presented by the {230} Moslem deputies, declaring that, as the -Sultan of Turkey held "sovereign rights" in the island, they, in the -name of their Moslem constituents, protested against such an action. -They refused to take the oath. Should they be excluded from the -Assembly, or be allowed to sit without taking the oath? - -Instead of insisting on the admission of the Moslem deputies, the -Powers again gave "friendly counsels." Once more M. Venizelos pleaded -that they speak out their mind in the matter of the legal status of the -island. The diplomats "temporized" again, and the warships reappeared -to assure to the Moslem deputies "their lawful rights." When M. -Venizelos could get no statement from the Powers as to the grounds upon -which these "lawful rights" rested, he saw that all hope of help from -the Powers was over, and that he was only wasting his time. Like -Cavour, when he turned with disgust from his efforts to interest the -Powers and had the inspiration, _Italia fara da se_, the Cretan leader -abandoned the antechamber of the chancelleries. While the Powers still -sought a _modus vivendi_ for Crete, M. Venizelos made one. From that -moment the Balkan War was a certainty. - -The Young Turk Cabinet, arrogant and drunk with the success of their -boycott against Austria-Hungary, and at the same time knowing that they -must turn public attention away from the loss of Bosnia and -Herzegovina, began to press the Powers for the restoration in Crete of -the _status quo_ as it had existed before the diplomatic blunders I -have outlined above, and, in addition, for the coaling station and for -control over Crete's foreign relations. At {231} the same time, they -demanded of the Athens Cabinet that Greece renounce formally, not only -for the present _but also for the future_, any intention of annexing -Crete. The Young Turks represented that public opinion in Turkey was -so wrought up over the Cretan question that war with Greece would -certainly follow. To illustrate to the Powers and to Greece the force -of this public opinion, a widespread boycott against everything Greek -in Turkey was started. This economic warfare is described in another -chapter. In some parts of Turkey the boycott has never ceased. There -is no doubt that this boycott was one of the very most important -factors in bringing on the Balkan War. For it taught the Greeks, who -were continually being bullied and threatened with an invasion in -Thessaly, the imperative necessity of reconciliation with Bulgaria by a -compromise of rival claims in Macedonia. - -Thinking that he could serve his country better in Greece than in -Crete, M. Venizelos posed his candidacy to the Greek Chamber in the -summer of 1910. Seemingly he was abandoning Crete to its fate, and he -had to bear many unjust reproaches from his fellow-countrymen. His -wonderful personality and extraordinary political genius soon brought -him to the front in Greece. The Cretan revolutionary became Prime -Minister of Greece. Steadfast in his purpose he began to negotiate -with the other Balkan States and with Russia. He was able to -accomplish the impossible. The war with Turkey is largely his personal -success. No statesman since Bismarck has had so brilliant a triumph. - -{232} - -In 1910, M. Venizelos took the step which was the turning point in his -career and in the history of Greece. Firmly persuaded that Crete could -be annexed to Greece only by Greece proving herself stronger than -Turkey, and not by diplomatic manoeuvres, he decided to desert Cretan -politics, and enter the larger sphere open to him at Athens. It was -easy to secure a seat in the Greek Parliament, but that was the only -easy part about it. When one considered the fickle character of the -Greek people in their politics, the selfish narrowness and bitter -prejudices of their leaders, the inefficiency of the army and navy, -whose officers had been ruined by political activity, the emptiness of -the treasury, the unpopularity of the royal family, and the general -disorder throughout the country, it seems incredible that M. Venizelos -should have been willing to assume the responsibility of government, -let alone succeed in his self-imposed task. Had you asked the leading -statesmen of Europe five years ago what country presented the most -formidable and at the same time most hopeless task tor a Premier, there -would have been unanimity in selecting Greece. - -But for Eleutherios Venizelos there was no difficulty which could not -be overcome. It is the nature of the man to refuse to see failure -ahead. "If one loves to work, and works for love," he has declared, -"failure does not exist." - -Called to be Prime Minister in August, 1910, M. Venezelos began to -reform everything in sight. His first step was to endow Greece with a -new constitution, whose most important changes were a Council of {233} -State, chosen for life and irremovable, to act as a Senate (Greece has -single-chamber government), legalizing the state of siege, sanctioning -the employment of foreigners in the service of the Government, fixing -twenty-four hours as the maximum delay for bringing one who had been -arrested before a magistrate, forbidding the publication of uncensored -news relative to military and naval operations in time of war, -establishing free, obligatory primary instruction, excluding from -Parliament directors in corporations, and facilitating the -expropriation of property for public purposes. I have given enough to -show the practical character of the new constitution. - -Although strongly urged to do so, both by the King and by the political -leaders, M. Venizelos refused to turn his Constituent Assembly into an -ordinary Parliament, and proceed to the legislation made possible by -the new constitution. Seeing clearly that durable and effective -ministerial power could be derived only from the people and supported -only by their intelligent good-will, he balked the intrigues of the -politicians, and overcame the dynastic fears of the King. The -Constituent Assembly was dissolved. M. Venizelos went before the -people, travelling everywhere and explaining his program for the -reformation of the country. The result was a triumph such as no man -has ever received in modern Greece. In November, 1910, followers of M. -Venizelos were returned in so overwhelming a majority that he could -afford to ignore the Athenian politicians who saw in him a menace to -their personal rule, their sloth, and their "graft." - -{234} - -Since that day M. Venizelos has been the idol of Greece. Never has -trust in public man been more amply justified. Every administration of -the State was completely transformed within eighteen months. Even to -outline what M. Venizelos has accomplished reads like a fairy tale. -Only those who knew the Greece before his arrival and are able to -contrast it with the Greece of today can appreciate the immensity of -his labours and the radical character of the changes he has made. I -cannot dwell on the talent shown by this Cretan in matters of financial -reform. But his military and naval reforms, and his foreign policy, -have been so important in making possible the Balkan alliance and its -successes that they cannot be passed over. - -M. Venizelos, when he first came to Athens, saw what was the matter -with the Greek military and naval establishments. Like Peter the Great -and the Japanese, he realized that the Greeks must learn from Europe by -submitting to European teachers. To persuade his fellow-countrymen, -who have a very exalted opinion of their own ability (the Greeks are -always sure they were born to command, without first having learned to -obey!), that they must not only call in foreign advisers, but must -submit to their authority, has been the most Herculean of the tasks -this great man set before him. Article three of the new constitution -had authorized the appointment of foreigners as officers of the -Government and given them temporarily Hellenic citizenship. From -England was asked a naval mission, from France a military mission, and -from {235} Italy officers to reorganize the _gendarmerie_. In Greece -the foreign officers were able to accomplish more in eighteen months -than the foreign "advisers" of Turkey had accomplished in many long -years. This is no assertion of personal opinion. The facts of the -Balkan War speak for themselves. Why is this? In Turkey, the foreign -teachers have never been given any real authority, and have seen every -effort they put forth nullified by the insouciance, self-sufficiency, -and cursed apathy of the Turk. The Greeks, on the contrary, "became as -little children," and lo! a miracle was wrought! - -When foreigners who visited Greece within recent years read about the -successes of the Crown Prince at Salonika and Janina, the assassination -of King George, the mourning of the Greek people, and the hearty -acclamation of King Constantine, the national hero, they could think -back to less than four years ago when the Crown Prince was practically -banished from Greece, after having been dismissed from his command in -the army by a popular uprising, and when the portrait of the King was -removed from every coffee-house in Athens. What is the cause of the -complete revulsion in public feeling towards the dynasty? It is due to -the common sense of M. Venizelos. He saw that the present dynasty was -necessary for Greece, and that the Crown Prince must come back and take -command of the army. In defiance of public opinion, he insisted on -this point. This attitude was a bitter disappointment to many who -imagined that M. Venizelos would be anti-dynastic in his policy. As a -result of his {236} success in reconciling the Greeks with their -sovereign and his family, the sympathies of Russia and Germany and -Great Britain were not alienated from the Greek people, as was rapidly -becoming the case. Emperor William especially, whose sister is wife of -the new Greek King, was so delighted with the success of M. Venizelos -in rehabilitating his brother-in-law that he asked the Greek Premier to -visit him at Corfu. - -This visit of the former Cretan revolutionary to the German Emperor in -April, 1912, was hardly commented upon by the European press. But -epoch-making words must have been spoken in the villa Achilleion, for -immediately after that visit the semi-official German press began to -prepare the public for the events which were to take place in the -Balkans. The eloquence and remorseless logic which had carried the day -among Cretan insurgents and Greek electors was not lost on the -"war-lord of Europe." Emperor William carried back to Berlin the -conviction that no diplomacy could outwit the Greek Premier's -determination that Turkey should disappear from Crete and Macedonia. - -I do not think I am exaggerating in saying that when the Young Turks, -by their insensate chauvinism, caused M. Venizelos to despair of saving -Crete through Crete itself, they signed their own death-warrant. If -they had refrained from their boycott and let Crete alone, would M. -Venizelos have gone to Greece? I think not. It is one of those -strange coincidences of history that on the very day when Mahmud -Shevket pasha, in the Ottoman Parliament, {237} declared that if Greece -did not make a public statement to the effect that she had no intention -at any time to extend her sovereignty over Crete, a million Turkish -bayonets would gleam upon the plains of Thessaly, Eleutherios Venizelos -was quietly leaving Crete for Athens. - -To bring together Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro into an -alliance which would drive the Turk out of Europe was in the mind of M. -Venizelos as far back as the summer of 1909, when he saw the -international fleet at Canea land marines to cut down the Greek flag -which he had raised. It became an obsession with him. It was -possible, because he believed it was possible. But no one else -regarded it as more than an idle dream. The rare friends to whom M. -Venizelos vaguely hinted that such an alliance was the only way of -solving the Balkan question called it the "acme of absurdity." I quote -the words of an eminent diplomat to whom this solution was mentioned. -At the opening of the Italian War, when I suggested to the Turkish -Grand Vizier that such an alliance was possible, he looked at me -pityingly, and said, "The questions you ask display your ignorance of -conditions in this part of the world. My time is too valuable to -discuss such an impossible hypothesis. Go to Hussein Hilmi pasha, and -ask him if he thinks the Greeks and Bulgarians could ever unite." -Hussein Hilmi pasha referred me to every single book that has ever been -written about the Macedonian question. "I do not care which you read," -said the ex-Governor-General of Macedonia, "they all tell the same -story." - -{238} - -But M. Venizelos was not asking himself, "Can I do it?" but, "How shall -I do it?" Once more he saw clearly. The pan-Hellenic national ideal -must be given up. Greece must content herself with Epiros, the Ægean -Islands, Crete, and a slice of Macedonia west of the Vardar--possibly -including Salonika, if the army proved as victory-winning as those of -Bulgaria and Servia. Everything else must be left to Bulgaria and -Servia. When first proposed to the leaders of Greece, this proposition -seemed so preposterous that M. Venizelos was accused of being a traitor -to Hellenism. He is still denounced by the fanatics, after all that he -has accomplished. But patiently he built up his argument, using all -his magnetism and his eloquence to convince his colleagues. He showed -how Greece was being constantly humiliated and menaced by the -chauvinism of the Young Turks, how the boycott was ruining Greek -shipping, how Crete itself would gradually get to like independence -better than union with Greece, and how inevitable it was that the Slavs -should in the course of time come to possess Thrace and Macedonia. -Instead of sacrificing everything to Bulgaria, he maintained, "this is -our only chance to get any part of European Turkey. We must give up -our ideal, because it is impracticable. With Bulgaria, we can crush -Turkey. Without Bulgaria, Turkey will crush us. And if Bulgaria -helps, we must pay the price." It may be years--not until archives are -open to historians and memoirs of present actors are published--before -everything is clear concerning the formation of an alliance which was -as great a surprise {239} to Europe as it was to Turkey. But the -famous telegram which M. Gueshoff, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, -addressed to his colleagues at Athens after the first successes of the -war were won, is sufficient testimony to the essential part played by -M. Venizelos in forming the coalition. - -After M. Venizelos left Crete, a last blunder made the protecting -Powers the laughing-stock of Europe. The Cretans elected deputies to -the Greek Chamber, and the warships of the Powers played hide-and-seek -with small Cretan craft in a fruitless endeavour to prevent the chosen -deputies from proceeding to Athens. This move was altogether -unnecessary, for they had not yet learned the matchless worth of their -opponent. M. Venizelos, knowing that Greece and her new allies were -not yet ready for war with Turkey, "tipped off" both the Cretans and -the leaders in the Greek Parliament that they would have to wait one or -two years longer. But, to satisfy the _hoi polloi_ on the one hand and -the diplomats on the other, a little comedy was enacted before the -Parliament House in Athens which threw wool over everybody's eyes. - -As soon as he saw that war was inevitable and that his allies were -ready, M. Venizelos admitted the Cretan deputies. Europe was face to -face with a _fait accompli_. The Cretan and Macedonian questions were -settled by war. The hand of Turkey and the diplomats was forced. - -Now we see the importance of the Cretan question. The Balkan War could -have been avoided by a courageous and straightforward policy of -efficient {240} protection of Christians who lived under the Ottoman -flag. It is because the Powers did not fulfil the obligations of the -Treaty of Berlin, and sacrificed Cretans and Bulgarians and Servians -and Greeks to the furthering of their commercial interests at -Constantinople, that all Europe is now stained with blood. By -flattering the Turk and condoning his crimes, the Powers succeeded in -destroying the "integrity of the Ottoman Empire," which they professed -to uphold. In trying to be the friends of the Turk they proved his -worst enemies. - -The Cretan question is a commentary upon the utter futility of -insincere and procrastinating diplomacy. - - - - -{241} - -CHAPTER XIII - -THE WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY - -Since the days when Mazzini, looking beyond the almost irrealizable -dream of Italian unity, said in his Paris exile, "North Africa will -belong to Italy," a new Punic conquest has been the steadfast hope of -the Italians. France had already started her conquest of Algeria when -Mazzini spoke, and was mistress of the richest portion of the southern -Mediterranean littoral before the Italian unification was completed. -Late though they were in the race, the Italians began to try to realize -their dream by sending thousands of colonists to Egypt and to Tunis. -But the events of the years 1881-1883 in these two countries, -consummated by the Convention of London in 1885, gave Egypt to England -and Tunis to France. Italy was too weak at the time to protest, and -Germany had not yet begun to develop her _Weltpolitik_. - -For some years Italian colonial aspirations were directed towards -Somaliland and Abyssinia. The battle of Adowa in 1896 was a death-blow -to the hopes of founding an Italian empire of Erythrea. Ten years ago -Giolitti received a portfolio in the Zanardelli ministry, and ever -since then there has {242} been a new Cato at Rome, crying "Tripoli -must be taken." By the Franco-Italian protocol of 1901, it was agreed -that if France should ever extend her protectorate over Morocco, Italy -should have the Tripolitaine and Barca, with the Fezzan as a -_hinterland_. This "right" of Italy was recognized at the -international conference of Algeciras in 1906, and has since been -accepted in principle by the European cabinets. - -During the past decade Italy quietly prepared to seize -Tripoli,--peacefully, if possible, and if not, by force. Had Italy -been ready, Turkey would have lost Tripoli in the autumn of 1908, when -Bulgaria declared her independence and Austria annexed Bosnia and -Herzegovina. Internal politics made a bold stroke impossible at that -favourable moment. - -To accomplish her purpose, Italy worked along two lines. She tried to -make her economic position so strong in Tripoli that the country would -virtually belong to her and be exploited by her without any necessity -for a change in its political status, until Arabs and Berbers, choosing -between prosperity under Italy and poverty under Turkey, would of their -own accord expel the Turks. Foreseeing a possibility of failure in -this plan, she at the same time prepared for a forcible occupation of -the country. - -Immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, the Italian Ministries of War and -Marine began to make a study of the question of transporting troops and -landing them under the cover of a fleet. Tourists who were in Italy -during the summer of 1904 will remember the famous dress rehearsal of -the Tenth Army Corps. - -{243} - -Some six thousand men, completely provided with horses, ammunition, -artillery, and provisions, were embarked in eleven hours. The convoy -put to sea, escorted by a squadron of battleships and torpedo-boats, in -two columns of five transports each. Despite a heavy swell, these -troops and all their stores were landed in the Bay of Naples in sixteen -hours. I wonder if many who were watching and applauding on that -memorable day understood why Italy was practising so assiduously -landing from transports,--and under the protection of the fleet. For -what war was she preparing in time of peace? In 1907, the Minister of -Marine announced in the _Italia Militare_ that Italy could send seventy -thousand troops upon a distant expedition oversea and one hundred and -fourteen thousand _for a short journey not exceeding two nights at sea_! - -The peaceable conquest of Tripoli was cleverly conceived, and has been -faithfully tried. Branches of the Banco di Roma were established at -Tripoli and Benghazi, and, for the first time since the days of -Imperial Rome, a serious attempt was made to develop the agricultural -and commercial resources of the country. The natives were encouraged -in every enterprise, and managed in such a way that they became--in the -vicinity of the seaports and trading-posts, at least--dependent for -their livelihood upon the Banco di Roma. Italian steamship lines, -heavily subsidized, maintained regular and frequent services between -Tunis and Tripoli and Benghazi and Derna and Alexandria. The more -enterprising natives travelled for a few piastres to {244} Alexandria, -and the object-lesson of contrast was left without words to work its -effect upon them. The admirable Italian parcel post system--one of the -most successful in Europe--extended its operations into the -_hinterland_ and captured the ostrich feather trade. The Italians -began to talk of making secure the routes to Ghadames and Ghat and -Murzuk, and of establishing for the interior postal and banking -facilities that these regions could never hope to have under Turkish -administration. Railways were contemplated as soon as they could be -financed entirely by Italian capital. - -The Italian schemes were working beautifully when the birth of New -Turkey in the revolution of July, 1908, changed the whole situation. -The indolent and corrupt officials of the _vilayet_ of Tripoli and -_sandjak_ of Benghazi, whose attention had been turned from Italian -activities by Italian gold pieces, were replaced by members of the -Union and Progress party. These new officials, owing to their utter -inexperience and their sense of self-esteem, may have been no better -than the old ones; probably they proved as inefficient, for executive -power is not inherent in the Turkish character. But they were men who -had passed through the fire of persecution and suffering for love of -their fatherland, and the renaissance of Turkey was the supreme thing -in their lives. Their patriotism and enthusiasm knew no bounds. Their -ambitions for Turkey may have been far in advance of their ability to -serve her. But criticism is silent before patriotism which has proved -its willingness to sacrifice Life for country. - -{245} - -One can imagine the feelings of the Young Turks when they saw what -Italy was doing. It is easy enough to say that they should have -immediately reformed the administration of the country and given to the -Tripolitans an efficient government. Reform does not come in a -twelvemonth, and the Young Turks had to act quickly to prevent the loss -of Tripoli. They took the only means they had. They began to thwart -and obstruct every Italian enterprise, to extend the military frontiers -of Tripoli into the Soudan, to bring all the Moslem tribes of Africa -into touch with the Constantinople khalifate. - -Italy saw her hopes being destroyed as other colonial hopes had been -destroyed one after the other. Representations at Constantinople were -without effect. The more her ambassador tried, the more he realized -the hopelessness of his case. Surely it was a fruitless diplomatic -task to persuade Young Turkey that her officials in Tripoli and -Benghazi should be forbidden to hinder the onward march of Italian -"peaceable conquest." The Italian economic fabric in Tripoli, so -carefully and so patiently built, seemed to be for nothing. -Austria-Hungary had begun the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by -the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. No Power had -successfully protested, much less the helpless Turks. So Italy began -to prepare her coup. - -The crisis could not be precipitated. Italian public opinion, wary of -colonial enterprises since the terrible Abyssinian disaster, and -opposed to the imposition of fresh taxes, had to be carefully prepared -to sustain the Ministry in a hostile action against Turkey. - -{246} - -In January, 1911, the Italian press began to publish articles on -Tripoli, dilating upon its economic value and its vital importance to -Italy, if she were to hold her place among the great Powers of Europe. -Every little Turkish persecution--and there were many of them--was made -the subject of a first-page bit of telegraphic news. The Italian -people were worked up to believe that not only in Tripoli, but -elsewhere, the Young Turks were showing their contempt for Italian -officials and for the Italian flag. An Italian sailing vessel was -seized at Hodeidah in the Red Sea; the incident was magnified. An -American archæological expedition was granted a concession in Tripoli; -a similar concession had been refused to Italian applicants. The -newspapers pretended that the Americans were really prospecting for -sulphur mines, whose development would mean disaster to the great mines -in Sicily! French troops reached the Oasis of Ghadames; the -_hinterland_ of Tripoli was threatened by the extension of French -sovereignty into the Sahara. At this moment the reopening of the -Morocco question by the Agadir incident gave Italy the incentive and -the encouragement to show her hand. - -In September, the press campaign against the Turkish treatment of -Italians in Tripoli became daily and violent. Signor Giolitti -succeeded in getting all parties, except the extreme Socialists, to -promise their support. - -It was not until the last moment that the Sublime Porte realized the -danger. On September 26th, the _Derna_, a transport, arrived at -Tripoli, with {247} much-needed munitions of war. There had been a -shameful neglect to keep up the garrisons in the African provinces, and -when it was too late--as is so often the case at Constantinople--there -dawned the realization that the provinces were practically without -defence. - -On September 27th, the first of the series of ultimatums which have -brought all Europe into war was delivered to the Sublime Porte. Italy -gave Turkey forty-eight hours to consent to the occupation of Tripoli, -with the proviso of the Sultan's sovereignty under the Italian -protectorate, and the payment of an annual subsidy into the Ottoman -Treasury. In Italy, two classes were mobilized, General Caneva -embarked his troops upon transports that had already been prepared, and -the Italian fleet proceeded to Tripoli. - -The Turks did not believe that there would be war. On the afternoon of -September 29th, the Grand Vizier, as far-seeing in his understanding of -international affairs as he was blind in grasping what was best for -Turkey's interests, told me that he was sure Italy would hesitate -before entering upon a war that would be the prelude to the greatest -catastrophe that the world has ever known. "Italy will not draw the -sword," he declared, "because she knows that if she does attack us, all -Europe will be eventually drawn into the bloodiest struggle of -history,--a struggle that has always been certain to follow the -destruction of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Hakki pasha was -right, except in one important particular. Perhaps Italy did know what -an attack upon Turkey {248} would eventually lead to. But two hours -after my conversation with the Grand Vizier, he received a declaration -of war. - -Simultaneously with the news of the declaration of war, Constantinople -learned that the first shots had already been fired. Without waiting -for any formalities, the Italian fleet had attacked and sunk Turkish -torpedo-boats off Preveza at the mouth of the Adriatic. The Turkish -fleet had just left Beirut to return to Constantinople, and for three -days it was feared that the Italians would follow up their offensive by -destroying the naval power of Turkey. They did not do so, although it -would have been an easy victory. For it was the hope of the Giolitti -Cabinet that there would be no real war. - -The attack at Preveza had a double purpose of preventing the -torpedo-boats from interfering with the Italian commerce, and of -striking terror into the hearts of the Turks. The Italians did not -want to widen the breach and draw upon themselves the hatred and enmity -of Turkey by sinking her navy. Such an action would make difficult the -negotiations which they still hoped to pursue. It was not war against -the people of Turkey that they had declared; that was a mere form. -What they wanted was a pretext for seizing Tripoli. So naval and -military operations were directed not against Turkey, but against the -coveted African provinces. Considerations of international diplomacy, -also, dictated this policy. - -The Italian warships opened fire upon Tripoli on September 30th. On -October 2d and 3d, the forts {249} were dismantled and the garrison -driven out of the city by the bombardment. On October 5th, Tripoli -surrendered. The expeditionary corps disembarked on the 11th. The -next transports from Italy went farther east. Derna capitulated on the -8th, but a heavy sea prevented the troops from landing until the 18th. -General Ameglio took Benghazi at the point of the bayonet on October -19th. Homs was occupied on the 21st. - -The Turks and Arabs attempted to retake Tripoli on October 23d. While -the Italian soldiers were in the trenches they were fired upon from -behind by Arabs who were supposed to be non-combatants. Discovery of -the assailants was practically impossible, because many clothed -themselves like women and hid their faces by veils. The Italians had -to repress this move from the rear with ruthless severity. They did -what any other army would have done under the circumstances, for their -safety depended upon putting down the enemy that had arisen in their -rear. Failure to act quickly and severely would have encouraged a -revolution in the city and its suburbs. Horror was excited throughout -the world by the highly coloured stories of this repression. Details -of Italian cruelty were emphasized. No effort was made to explain -impartially the provocation which had led to this killing. There was -an unconscious motive in these stories to embarrass Italy in her -attempt to build a colonial empire, just exactly as there had been in -the time of the Abyssinian War in 1896. The American Consul at Tripoli -has assured me that the correspondents who were {250} guests at the -time of the Italian army did not give the facts as they were. - -The French and English newspaper campaign against Italy was as violent -as it had been against Austria in 1908, at the time of the first -violation of Ottoman territorial integrity. Attempts were made to -denounce the high-handed act of piracy of which Italy had been guilty, -and to poison the public mind against the Italian army. It is -significant to note this attitude of the press of the two countries, -which are now so persuasively extending the olive branch to Italy. -Great Britain and France were alarmed over the menace to the -"equilibrium" of the Mediterranean. This is why they did not hesitate -to denounce unsparingly the successful effort of Italy to follow in -their own footsteps! The tension between France and Italy was -illustrated by the vehement newspaper protests against the Italian use -of the right of search for contraband on French ships. Italy was taken -to task for acting in exactly the same way that France has since acted -in arresting Dutch ships in August and September, 1914. - -The attempt of October 23d failed, in spite of the conspiracy behind -the lines. A second attempt on the 26th was equally unsuccessful. On -November 6th, the garrison of Tripoli started to take the offensive. -But progress beyond the suburbs of the city was found to be impossible. - -A decree annexing the African provinces of Turkey was approved by the -Italian Parliament on November 5th. The Italian "adventure," as those -who looked upon Italy's aggression with unfriendly eyes {251} persisted -in calling it, was now shown to be irrevocable. Turkey's opportunity -to compromise had passed. - -In Tripoli, as well as in the other cities, it took the whole winter to -make the foothold on the coast secure. From November 27th to March 3d, -Enver bey made three attempts to retake Derna. From November 28th to -March 12th, six assaults of Turks and Arabs were made upon Benghazi. -The Italian positions at Homs were not secure until February 27th. -Italy was practically on the defensive everywhere. - -Hakki pasha found himself compelled to resign when the war was -declared. In fact, he considered himself fortunate not to be -assassinated by army officers, who declared that he had been negligent -to the point of treason in laying Turkey open to the possibility of -being attacked where and when she was weakest. Saïd pasha became Grand -Vizier--he had held the post six times under Abdul Hamid. Five members -of the former Cabinet, including Mahmud Shevket pasha, remained in -office. - -The first appearance of Saïd pasha's Cabinet before Parliament is a -scene that I shall never forget. No pains had been spared to make it a -brilliant spectacle. The Sultan was present during the reading of his -speech from the throne. Everyone expected an important pronouncement. -The speech of Saïd pasha was typically Turkish. Instead of announcing -how Turkey was to resist Italy, he gave it to be understood in vague -language that diplomacy was going to save the day once more, and that -Turkey was secure because the preservation of her territorial integrity -was necessary for Europe. - -{252} - -The action of Italy, however, had upset the calculations of the Young -Turks in the game they were trying to play in European diplomacy. It -was their dream--more than that, their belief--that Turkey held the -balance of power between the two great groups of European Powers. They -thought that the destinies of Europe were in their hands. I heard -Mahmud Shevket pasha say once that "the million bayonets of Turkey -would decide the fortunes of Europe." Turkey was essentially mixed up -in the European imbroglio. But it was the absence of those million -bayonets, of which Mahmud Shevket pasha boasted, that changed the -fortunes of Europe. The military weakness of the Ottoman Empire has -brought us to the present catastrophe. - -The embarrassment of the Young Turks was that Italy belonged to the -Triple Alliance, and that Germany, while professing deep and loyal -friendship, stood by and saw Turkey attacked by her ally, Italy, just -as she had stood by in 1908, when the other partner of the Triple -Alliance had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those who had based their -hopes of Turkey's future upon the pan-Germanic movement had a bitter -awakening. In what sense could Wilhelm II be called "the defender of -Islam"? - -I attended sessions of Parliament frequently during the five weeks -between the outbreak of the war and the passing of the decree by which -the African possessions of Turkey were annexed to the kingdom of Italy. -Before this step had been taken by Italy, there was a possibility of -saving the situation. But the Turks, instead of presenting a united -front to the {253} world, and finding ways and means of making a -successful resistance against Italy, wasted not only the precious month -of October, when there was still a way out, but also the whole winter -that followed. In November, the opposition in the House and Senate -formed a new party which they called the "Entente Liberale." The -principal discussions in Parliament were about whether the Hakki pasha -Cabinet should be tried for high treason, and whether the Chamber of -Deputies could be prorogued by the Sultan without the consent of the -Senate. The opposition grew so rapidly that the Committee of Union and -Progress induced the Sultan to dissolve Parliament on January 18, 1913. - -The new elections were held at the end of March. Throughout the Empire -they were a pure farce. The functionaries of the Government saw to it -that only members of the Committee of Union and Progress were returned. -While the Young Turks were playing their game of parties, anarchy was -rife in different parts of the Empire. The "Interior Organization" had -been revived in Macedonia. The Albanians, who had been left entirely -out of the fold in the new elections, were determined to get redress. -In Arabia, the neutrality of Iman Yahia in the war with Italy was -purchased only by the granting of complete autonomy. It was the -surrender of the last vestige of Turkish authority in an important part -of Arabia. Saïd Idris, the other powerful chief in the Yemen, refused -to accept autonomy, and continued to harass the Turkish army. - -The Committee of Union and Progress was not {254} allowed to enjoy long -its fraudulent victory. In the army an organization which called -itself "The Military League for the Defence of the Country" was formed, -and received so many adhesions that Mahmud Shevket pasha was compelled -to leave the Ministry of War on July 10th, and Saïd pasha the Grand -Vizirate eight days later. Ghazi Mukhtar pasha accepted the task of -forming a new Cabinet. The Unionist Parliament refused to listen to -his program. So he secured from the Sultan a second prorogation of -Parliament on August 5th. The weapon the Unionists had used was turned -against them. - -While Turkey showed herself absolutely incapable of making any military -move to recover the invaded provinces or to punish the invader, Italy -had none the less a difficult problem to face. A few Turkish officers -had succeeded in organizing among the Arabs of Tripoli and Benghazi a -troublesome resistance. General Caneva went to Rome at the beginning -of February, and told the Cabinet very plainly that it would take -months to get a start in Africa, and years to complete the pacification -of the new colonies, unless the Turks consented to withdraw the support -of their military leadership and to cease their religious agitation. - -The question was, how could Turkey be forced to recognize the -annexation decree of November 5th? The Italian fleet could not be kept -indefinitely, at tremendous expense and monthly depreciation of the -value of the ships, under steam. The Turkish fleet did not come out to -give battle, so the Italians were immobilized at the mouth of the -Dardanelles. Italian {255} commerce in the Black Sea and eastern -Mediterranean was at a standstill. Upon Italian imports into Turkey -had been placed a duty of one hundred per cent. Where, outside of -Tripoli, was the pressure to be exercised? - -Premier San Giuliano had promised before the war started that he would -not disturb political conditions in the Balkan peninsula. The alliance -with Austria-Hungary made impossible operations in the Adriatic. But -it was clear that something must be done. Public opinion in Italy had -been getting very restless. It did not seem to the Italians that the -considerations of international diplomacy should stand in the way of -finishing the war. Were they to burden themselves with heavy taxes in -order to spare the feelings of the Great Powers? Had Russia hesitated -in the Caucasus? Had Great Britain hesitated in Egypt? Had Austria -hesitated in Bosnia-Herzegovina? - -As a sop to public opinion, and also as a feeler to see how the move -would be taken by the other Powers, the Cabinet decided upon direct -action against Turkey. The fleet appeared before Beirut on February -24th, and sank two Turkish warships in the harbour. It was not exactly -a bombardment of the city, but many shells did fall on the buildings -and on the streets near the quay. Neither Turkey nor Europe paid much -attention to this demonstration. In April, Italy had come to the point -where she felt that she must cast all scruples to the winds. A direct -attack upon Turkey was decided. Italy, at this writing the only -neutral among the Great Powers of Europe, took the action {256} which -brought Balkan ambitions to a ferment, and caused the kindling of the -European conflagration. Her declaration of war on Turkey and the -annexation of Tripoli inevitably led to this. On April 18th Admiral -Viala bombarded the forts of Kum Kale at the Dardanelles, and on the -same day the port of Vathy in Samos. Four days later Italian marines -disembarked on the island of Stampali. On May 4th, Rhodes was invaded, -a battle occurred in the streets of the town, and the Turks withdrew to -the interior of the island. They were pursued, and surrendered on the -17th. Ten other islands at the mouth of the Ægean Sea were occupied. - -A demonstration at Patmos for union with Greece was vigorously -repressed. Italy protested her good faith in regard to the islands. -But the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, arrested at San Stefano in -1878, had begun again. - -Turkey responded to the bombardment of Kum Kale by closing the -Dardanelles, and to the occupation of Rhodes by attempting to expel -from Turkey all Italian residents. The expulsion decree, however, was -carried out with great humanity and consideration by the Turks. During -the Italian War and also the Balkan War, Turkish treatment of subjects -of hostile states living in Ottoman territory was highly praiseworthy. -The Christian nations of Europe would today do well to follow their -example! - -The closing of the straits lasted for a month. It disturbed all -Europe. Never before has the question of the straits been shown to be -so vital to the world. From April 18th to May 18th, over two hundred -{257} merchant vessels of all nations were immobilized in -Constantinople. It was a sight to be witness of once in a lifetime. -For these ships were not lost in a maze of basins, docks, and piers. -They lay in the stream of the Bosphorus and at the entrance to the Sea -of Marmora. You could count them all from the Galata Tower. The loss -to shipping was tremendous. Southern Russia is the bread basket of -Europe. No European resident could remain unaffected by a closing of -the only means of egress for these billions of bushels of wheat. Angry -protests were in vain. Turkey reopened the straits only when assurance -had been given to her that the attack of the Italian fleet would not be -repeated. - -Little had been gained by Italy as far as hastening peace was -concerned. She had done all that she could. Turkey still remained -passive and unresisting, because she knew well that any vital action, -such as the bombardment of Salonika or Smyrna, or the invasion of -European Turkey by way of Albania or Macedonia, would bring on a -general European war. Italy could not take this responsibility before -history. So for months longer it remained a war without battles. Many -Italian warships had not fired a single shot. - -During May, June, and July, the Italians pushed on painfully to the -interior of Tripoli. There was no other way. In August, the Turkish -resistance on the side of Tunis was finished. In September, a -desperate attack of Enver bey against Derna was repulsed. The Italian -forces were in a much better position than before. But the attacks of -the Arabs {258} were of such a character that they could not be -suppressed by overwhelming numbers of trained men that the Italians -could muster. It was a guerilla warfare with the oases of the desert -as the background. The Italians felt that the Arabs, if left to -themselves, would soon tire of the conflict. For they were, after all, -traders, and were dependent upon the outlets for their caravan trade -which was now completely in the hands of Italians. It was the mere -handful of Turkish troops and Turkish officers who kept the Arabs -stirred up to fight. - -As early as June, Italian and Turkish representatives met informally at -Ouchy on Lac Leman to discuss bases for a solution of the conflict -which had degenerated into an odd _impasse_. Italy was anxious to -conclude peace for several reasons. Her commerce was suffering. Her -warships needed the drydock badly. While Turkey could no longer -prevent the conquest of Tripoli and Benghazi, the absence of Turkish -direction in keeping the tribesmen of the interior stirred up, and the -cessation of the propaganda against the Italian occupation on the -ground of religion, would help greatly in the pacification of the -provinces. Since the Albanian revolution had assumed alarming -proportions, Turkey also became anxious for peace. She was uncertain -of Italy's attitude in case of an outbreak in the Balkans. -Unofficially, Italy had let it be known that there was a limit to -patience, and that the development of a hostile attitude by the Balkan -States against Turkey would find her, in spite of Europe, in alliance -with them against her. In reality, however, the Italian {259} -ministers at the Balkan courts had all along done their best to keep -Greece and Bulgaria from being carried away by the temptation to take -advantage of the situation. This had been especially true in April and -May, during the period of Italian activity in the Ægean. - -Turkey knew perfectly well, before the _pourparlers_ at Ouchy, what -were the Italian terms. In March, when the five other Powers had -offered to mediate, Italy had laid down the following points: tacit -recognition of the Italian conquest and withdrawal of the Turkish army -from Africa; recognition by the Powers, if not by Turkey, of the decree -of annexation. Italy promised, if this were done, to recognize the -Sultan as Khalif in the African provinces (this meant purely religious -sovereignty); to respect the religious liberty and customs of the -Moslem populations; to accord an amnesty to the Arabs; to guarantee to -the Ottoman Public Debt the obligations for which the customs-duties of -Tripoli had been mortgaged; to buy the properties owned by the Ottoman -Government; to guarantee, in accord with the other Powers, the -(future!) "integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Turkey had refused these -terms, in spite of the pressure of the Powers at the Sublime Porte. -Then followed the loss of Rhodes and the other islands. - -The first _pourparlers_ at Ouchy had been interrupted by the fall of -Saïd pasha. They were resumed on August 12th by duly accredited -delegates. After six weeks an accord was prepared, and sent to -Constantinople. The ministry, although facing a war with the Balkan -States, tried to prolong the {260} negotiations. Italy then addressed -an ultimatum on October 12th. The Sublime Porte was doing its best to -prevent war with the Balkan States. Italy was determined now to go to -any length to wring peace from her stubborn opponent. For the Balkan -storm was breaking, and she wanted to get her ambassador back to -Constantinople to take part in the councils of the Great Powers. The -continuance of a state of war with Turkey was never more clearly -against her interests. When the ultimatum arrived, Turkey yielded. -The preliminaries of Ouchy were signed on October 15th. - -There were two distinct parts to the Treaty of Lausanne, as it is -generally called. In order to save the pride of Turkey, nothing was -said in the text of the treaty about a cession of territory. Turkey -was not asked to recognize the Italian conquest. The unofficial -portion of the treaty consisted of a _firman_, granting complete -autonomy to the African _vilayet_, and appointing a personal religious -representative of the Khalif, with functions purely nominal; and the -promise of amnesty and good administration to the Ægean Islands. - -The text of the treaty provided for the cessation of hostilities; the -withdrawal of the Turkish army from Tripoli and Benghazi and the -withdrawal of the Italian army from the islands of the Ægean; the -resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations; and the assumption -by Italy of Tripoli's share of the Ottoman Public Debt. - -Italy had no intention of fulfilling the spirit of the second clause of -this treaty, which was that the {261} islands occupied by her be -restored to Turkey. The text of the treaty provided that the recall of -the Italian troops be subordinated to the recall of the Turkish troops -from Tripoli. It was easy enough to quibble at a later time about the -meaning of "Turkish." As long as there was opposition to the Italian -pacification, the opponents could be called Turkish. Italy said that -the holding of the Dodecanese was a guarantee of Turkish good faith in -preventing the continuance secretly of armed opposition to her -subjugation of the new African colonies. As long as an Arab held the -field against the Italian army, it could still be claimed that Turkey -had not fulfilled her side of the promise in Article 2. At the moment, -Turkey was quite willing to see the Italians stay in the southern -islands of the Ægean. For otherwise they would have inevitably fallen -into the hands of the Greeks when the Balkan War broke out. - -Since the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the Italians have remained in -the Dodecanese. Not only that, but they have used their position in -Rhodes to begin a propaganda of Italian economic influence in -south-western Asia Minor. Before the present European war, Italy might -have found herself compelled to relinquish her hold on these islands. -But now her advantageous neutrality has put into her hands the cards by -which she can secure the acquiescence of Europe to the annexation of -Rhodes. - -The outbreak of indignation in Turkey against Italy at the beginning of -the war was even more vehement than that against Austria-Hungary when -she had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. {262} Hussein Djahid bey, -in the _Tanine_, wrote an editorial, in which he said: "Never shall we -have any dealings with the Italians in the future. Never shall a ship -bearing their flag find trade at an Ottoman port. And we shall teach -our children, and tell them to teach their children, the reasons for -the undying hatred between Osmanli and Italian as long as history -lasts." Having read the same sort of a thing in 1908, I was interested -in seeing just how long the hatred would last. Just a year from the -day war was declared, and this editorial appeared, the Italian -ambassador returned on a warship to Constantinople, the Italian post -offices opened, and all my Italian friends began to reappear. This is -told here to illustrate the fact that cannot be too strongly -emphasized: _there is no public opinion in Turkey_. - -The chief importance of the year of "the war that was no war" is not in -the loss of Tripoli. It is in the fact that the integrity of the -Ottoman Empire, secure since 1878, had been attacked _by violence_. -The example given by Italy was to be followed by the Balkan States. -What Europe had feared had come. This war was the prelude to Europe in -arms. - - - - -{263} - -CHAPTER XIV - -THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY - -During the year 1911 there had been a perceptible drawing together of -the Balkan States in the effort to find a common ground for an -offensive alliance against Turkey. The path of union was very -difficult for the diplomats of the Balkan States to follow. It was -clear to them in principle that they would never be able to oppose the -policy of the Young Turks separately. They were not even sure whether -their united armies could triumph over the large forces which the -Ottoman Empire was able to put in the field, and which were reputed to -be well trained and disciplined. This reputation was sustained by the -unanimous opinion of the military _attachés_ of the Great Powers at -Constantinople. And then, there were the mutual antipathies to be -healed, and the problem of the terrible rivalry in Macedonia, of which -we have spoken before, to be solved. Most formidable of all, was the -uncertainty as to the benefit to the different Balkan nations of a -successful war against Turkey. - -It is impossible to explain here all the diplomatic {264} steps leading -up to the Balkan alliance against Turkey. They have been set forth, -with much divergency of opinion, by a number of writers who were in -intimate touch with the diplomatic circles of the Balkan capitals -during the years immediately preceding the formation of the alliance. -We must confine ourselves to a statement of the general causes which -induced the Balkan States, against the better judgment of many of their -wisest leaders, to form the alliance, and to declare war upon Turkey. -Both Bulgaria and Greece had sentimental reasons; the terrible -persecution of the Christians of their own race in Macedonia seemed -cause enough for war. But while Bulgaria had long held the thesis of -Macedonian autonomy, which was sustained by the Bulgarian Macedonians -themselves, Greece was afraid that the creation of such a _régime_ -would in the end prove an irrevocable blow to Hellenistic aspirations. -It was well known to the Greeks that the population of Macedonia was -not only largely Bulgarian, but aggressively so, and that its sense of -nationality had been intelligently and skilfully awakened and fostered -by the educational propaganda. Above all things Hellenism feared the -Bulgarian schools. Under an autonomous _régime_ their influence could -not be combated. - -The possibility of the Balkan alliance was really in the hands of -Greece. For it was recognized that no matter how large and powerful an -army Bulgaria and Servia could raise, the co-operation of the Greek -navy, which would prevent the use of the Ægean ports of the Macedonian -littoral for disembarking {265} troops from Asia, was absolutely -essential to success. In spite of their fears for the future of -Macedonia, the Greeks were converted to the idea of an alliance with -the Slavic Balkan States to destroy the power of Turkey by the -continual bullying of the Young Turks over Crete, and by the economic -disasters from the boycott. It is not too much to say that the -attitude of the Young Turks towards the Cretan questions, and their -institution of the boycott, were two factors directly responsible for -the downfall of the Empire. - -The visit of three hundred Bulgarian students to Athens in Easter week, -1911, should have been a warning to Turkey of the danger which attended -her policy of goading the Greeks to desperation. I was present on the -Acropolis at the memorable reception given by the students of Athens to -their guests from the University of Sofia, and remember well the -peculiar political significance of the speeches of welcome addressed to -them there. Later in the same year, Greece followed the example of the -other Balkan States in sending her Crown Prince to Sofia to join in the -festivities attendant upon the coming of age of Crown Prince Boris. - -Bulgaria was drawn into the Balkan alliance, and reluctantly compelled -to abandon the policy of Macedonian autonomy, by the attitude of the -Young Turks toward Macedonians. The settlement of immigrants from -Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the conscription for the Turkish army, led -to reprisals on the part of Bulgarian bands. These were followed by -massacres at Ishtib and elsewhere. In the {266} first week of August, -1912, the massacre of Kotchana was for Bulgaria the last straw on the -camel's back. I was in Sofia at the end of August when the national -congress, called together wholly without the Government's co-operation, -declared that war was a necessity. Seated one evening in the public -garden at a café--if I remember rightly it was the 1st of September--I -heard from the lips of one of the influential delegates at this -congress that public opinion in Bulgaria was so wholly determined to -force war, that the King and the Cabinet would have to yield. - -In Servia and Montenegro, it had long been recognized that any -opportunity to unite with Bulgaria and Greece to bring pressure to bear -upon Turkey could not but be beneficial to these two kingdoms. There -was the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar to be divided between Montenegro and -Servia. There was the possibility of an outlet to the Adriatic. So -far as Macedonia was concerned, if we believe that she was honest and -sincere in the treaty of partition with Bulgaria, Servia was quite -content with the idea of a possible annexation of Old Servia, and the -opportunity to drive back the Moslem Albanians, who had been -established on her frontiers under the Young Turk _régime_, and were -ruthlessly destroying Slavs wherever they got the opportunity. - -One does not have any hesitation in declaring that the political -leaders in power in the Balkan States at first hoped to avoid a war -with Turkey. That they did not succeed in doing so was due to the -pressure of public sentiment upon them. This public sentiment forced -them to action. Every Balkan {267} Cabinet would have fallen had the -ministries remained advocates of peace. Over against the fear of the -Turkish army, which (let me say it emphatically) was very strong among -the military authorities in each of the Balkan States, was the feeling -that the time was very favourable to act, and that chances of success -in a common war against Turkey were greater in the autumn of 1912 than -they would be later; for the Young Turks were spending tremendous sums -of money on army reorganization. At that moment, they were coming to -the end of a demoralizing war with Italy, and the Macedonian army had -suffered greatly during the summer by the Albanian uprising. - -Early in September, Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro decided -that peace could be preserved only by the actual application, under -sufficient guarantees, of sweeping reforms in Macedonia. They appealed -to the Powers to sustain them in demanding for Macedonia a provincial -assembly, a militia recruited within the limits of the province, and a -Christian Governor. The Great Powers, as usual, tried to carry water -on both shoulders. Blind to the fact that inaction and vague promises -would no longer keep in check the neighbours of Turkey, they urged the -Balkan States to refrain from "being insistent," and pointed out to -Turkey the "advisability" of making concessions. The Turks did not -believe in the reality of the union of the Balkan States. They could -not conceive upon what grounds their neighbours had succeeded in -forming an alliance. Neither the Balkan States nor Turkey had {268} -any respect for the threats or promises or offers of assistance of the -Powers. - -In order to convince the Balkan States that they had better think twice -before making a direct ultimatum, the Turks organized autumn manoeuvres -north of Adrianople, in which fifty thousand of the _élite_ army corps -were to take part. The answer of the Balkan States was an order for -general mobilization issued simultaneously in the four capitals. This -was on September 30th. The next day Turkey began to mobilize. All the -Greek ships in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were seized. -Munitions of war, disembarked at Salonika for Servia, were confiscated. -It was not until then that it began to dawn upon Turkey and her -sponsors, the Great Powers, that the Balkan States meant business. The -questions of reforms in Macedonia had been so long the prerogative of -the Powers that they did not realize that the moment had come when the -little Balkan States, whom they called "troublesome," were no longer -going to be put off with promises. The absolute failure of concerted -European diplomacy to accomplish anything in the Ottoman Empire was -demonstrated from the results in Macedonia, and also in Crete. - -So the Balkan States were not in the proper frame of mind to receive -the joint note on the _status quo_, which will remain famous in the -annals of European diplomacy as a demonstration of the futility of -concerted diplomatic action, when there is no genuine unity behind it. -On the morning of October 8th, the ministers of Russia and Austria, -acting in the {269} name of the six "Great Powers," handed in at Sofia, -Athens, Belgrade, and Cettinje, the following note: - - -"The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments declare to the Balkan -States: - -"1. That the Powers condemn energetically every measure capable of -leading to a rupture of peace; - -"2. That, supporting themselves on Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, -they will take in hand, in the interest of the populations, the -realization of the reforms in the administration of European Turkey, on -the understanding that these reforms will not diminish the sovereignty -of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the territorial integrity of the -Ottoman Empire; this declaration reserves, also, the liberty of the -Powers for the collective and ulterior study of the reforms; - -"3. That if, in spite of this note, war does break out between the -Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, they will not admit, at the end -of the conflict, any modification in the territorial _status quo_ in -European Turkey. - -"The Powers will make collectively to the Sublime Porte the steps which -the preceding declaration makes necessary." - - -The shades of San Stefano, Berlin, Cyprus, and Egypt, Armenian -massacres, Mitylene and Mürszteg, Bagdad railway, Bosnia-Herzegovina, -Tripoli, and Rhodes, haunted this declaration, and made it impotent, -honest effort though it was to preserve the peace of Europe. It was -thirty-six years too late. - -For, one hour after it was delivered, the _chargé {270} d'affaires_ of -the Montenegrin legation at Constantinople, evidently as a result of an -anticipation of a joint note from the Powers, left at the Sublime Porte -the following memorable declaration of war: - - -"In conformity with the authorization of King Nicholas, I have the -honour of informing you that I shall leave Constantinople to-day. The -Government of Montenegro breaks off all relations with the Ottoman -Empire, leaving to the fortunes of arms of the Montenegrins the -recognition of their rights and of the rights scorned through centuries -of their brothers of the Ottoman Empire. - -"I leave Constantinople. - -"The royal government will give to the Ottoman representative at -Cettinje his passports. - -"October 8, 1912. PLAMENATZ." - - -There could no longer be any doubt of the trend of things. Inevitable -result, this declaration of war, of the action of Italy one year -before, just as the action of Italy harked back to Russian action in -the Caucasus, British action in Egypt, Austrian action in -Bosnia-Herzegovina, and French action in Morocco. Inevitable -precursor, this declaration of war, of the European catastrophe of -1914. Who, then, is presumptuous enough to maintain that the cause is -simple, and the blame all at one door? Europe is reaping in blood-lust -what _all_ the "Great Powers" have sown in land-lust. - -The chancelleries made strenuous efforts to nullify what their inspired -organs called the "blunder," or the "hasty and inconsiderate action," -of King Nicholas. There was feverish activity in Constantinople, {271} -and a continual exchange of conferences between the embassies and the -Sublime Porte. The ambassadors gravely handed in a common note, in -which they offered to avert war by taking in hand themselves the -long-delayed reforms. Had they forgotten the institution of the -_gendarmerie_ in 1903, and Hussein Hilmi pasha at Salonika? - -On this same day, the Montenegrin ex-minister at Constantinople, whose -declaration of war had been so theatrical, was reported as having said -at Bukarest on his way home, "Montenegro wants territorial -aggrandizements, and will not give back whatever conquests she makes. -We do not fear to cross the will of the Great Powers, for they do not -worry us." These words express exactly the sentiments of the other -allies, both as regards their possible conquests and their attitude -towards the _dictum_ of the Powers. - -Events moved rapidly during the next ten days. On October 13th, the -Balkan States responded to the Russo-Austrian note, thanking the Powers -for their generous offices, but declaring that they had come to the end -of their patience in the matter of Turkish promises for Macedonian -reform, and were going to request of the Ottoman Government that it -accord "without delay the reforms that have been demanded, and that it -promise to apply them in six months, with the help of the Great Powers, -and of the Balkan States whose interests are involved." This response -was not only a refusal of mediation. It was an assertion, as the last -words show, that the time had come when the Balkan States felt strong -{272} enough to claim a part in the management of their own affairs. - -Acting in accordance with this notification to the Powers, on October -14th, Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria demanded of Turkey the autonomy of -the European provinces, under Christian governors; the occupation of -the provinces by the allied armies while the reforms were being -applied; the payment of an indemnity for the expenses of mobilization; -the immediate demobilization of Turkey; and the promise that the -reforms would be effected within six months. The demand was in the -character of an ultimatum, and forty-eight hours were given for a -response. - -It was now evident that unless the Powers could compel the Balkan -States to withdraw this sweeping claim, war would be inevitable. For -no independent state could accept such a demand, and retain its -self-respect. The representatives of Turkey at Belgrade and Athens -were quite right in refusing to receive the note and transmit it to -Constantinople. - -The Sublime porte did not answer directly the ultimatum of the allies. -An effort was made to anticipate the Balkan claims, and get the Powers -to intervene, by reviving the law of reform for the _vilayets_, which -provided for the organization of communes and schools, the building of -roads, and the limitation of military service to the _vilayet_ or -recruitment. But the fact that this law had been on the statute books -since 1880, and had remained throughout the Empire a dead letter, gave -little hope that it would be seriously applied now. - -{273} - -On October 15th, fighting began on the Serbo-Turkish frontier. The war -had already brought about Turkish reverses at the hands of the -Montenegrins. Greece threw an additional defiance in the face of -Turkey by admitting the Cretan deputies to the Greek legislative -chamber. - -To gain time, for she was unprepared, and her mobilization progressing -very slowly, Turkey made desperate efforts to delay the declaration of -war by offering to treat at Sofia, on the basis of a cessation of -Moslem immigration into Macedonia, and the suspension of enrolment of -Christians in Moslem regiments. These points, as we have already -shown, were the two principal reasons why the Bulgarians of Macedonia -had changed their policy from autonomy to independence. But Bulgaria, -feeling that cause for hesitation over a war of liberation had been -removed by her secret partition treaty with Servia, remained obdurate. - -Then the Turkish diplomats turned their attention to Athens, and tried -to detach the Greeks from the alliance by agreeing to recognize the -annexation of Crete to Greece, and promising an autonomous government -for some of the Ægean Islands. This failed. But, to the very last, -the Turks believed that Greece might stay out of the war. For this -reason her representative at Athens was instructed to do all in his -power to remain at his post, even if war were declared by the Sublime -Porte on Bulgaria and Servia. - -Peace was hurriedly concluded with Italy at Ouchy on October 15th. On -the 16th, when the {274} forty-eight hours of the ultimatum had -expired, and there was no answer from Turkey, every one expected a -declaration of war from the allies. None came. On the 18th, to -preserve her dignity, Turkey saw that she must be the one to act. It -was no longer possible to wait until the allies were "good and ready"! -She declared war on Bulgaria and Servia. Greece waited till afternoon -to receive a similar declaration. None came. So Greece declared war -on Turkey. - - - -THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR - -While the diplomats were still agitating and blustering, while Turkey -was procrastinating and trying to put off the evil day, and while the -larger Balkan States were quietly completing their mobilization, -Montenegro entered into action. On October 9th, the day following her -declaration of war, the Montenegrins entered the _sandjak_ of Novi -Bazar, and surrounded the frontier fortress of Berana. This was -captured after six days of fighting. On the same day, Biepolje fell. -Nearly one thousand prisoners, fourteen cannon, and a large number of -rifles and stores were captured by the Montenegrins. In the meantime, -two other Montenegrin columns had marched southward, reached San -Giovanni di Medua, at the mouth of the Boyana, and cut Scutari off from -the sea. Scutari was invested, but the Montenegrins, who had been able -to put into the field scarcely more than thirty thousand men, found -themselves mobilized for the entire winter. The {275} great fortress -of Tarabosh, a high mountain, towering over the town of Scutari and the -lower end of the lake, was too strong for their forces and for their -artillery. Inside the city of Scutari, it was the Albanians fighting -for their national life, and not the Turks, who organized and -maintained the splendid and protracted resistance. - -The mobilization in the other Balkan States was not completed until the -18th, when the declaration of war was made on both sides. - -Most important of the foes of Turkey were the Bulgarians, whose -military organization had for some years been attracting the admiration -of all who had been privileged to see their manoeuvres and to visit -their casernes. Bulgaria had been carefully and secretly preparing her -mobilization long before the crisis became acute. I had the privilege -of travelling in Bulgaria during the last two weeks of July, and of -spending the month of August along the frontier between Thrace and -Bulgaria. Everywhere one could see the accumulation of the soldiers of -the standing army already on war footing, and of military stores, at a -number of different places. During August and September, every detail -of the mobilization had been carefully arranged. When war was -declared, Bulgaria had four armies with a total effective of over three -hundred thousand. Three of them were quickly massed on the frontier, -fully equipped. No army has ever entered the field under better -auspices. - -On the day of the declaration of war, the Czar Ferdinand issued a -proclamation to his troops which {276} clearly defined the issue. It -was to be a war of liberation, a crusade, undertaken to free the -brothers of blood and faith from the yoke of Moslem oppression. In -summing up, the Czar said: "In this struggle of the Cross against the -Crescent, of liberty against tyranny, we shall have the sympathy of all -those who love justice and progress." At the time, bitter criticism -was directed against the Czar for having used words which brought out -so sharply the religious issue. The proclamation of a _crusade_ could -bring forth on the other side the response of a _djehad_ (holy war). -This, above all things, was what the European Powers wished to avoid; -for they feared not only that it would make the war more bitter and -more cruel between the opponents in the field, but that it would awaken -a wave of fanaticism among the Moslems living under European control in -Asia and in Africa. How many lessons will it need to teach Europe that -the political menace of Pan-Islamism is a phantom, a myth! - -According to the plan adopted by the allied States, the offensive -movement in Thrace, in which the bulk of the Turkish army would be met, -was to be undertaken solely by Bulgaria. Only a Bulgarian army of -secondary importance was to enter eastern Macedonia, to protect the -flank of the main Bulgarian army from a sudden eastward march of the -Turkish Macedonian army. Its objective point, though not actually -agreed upon, was to be Serres. - -The rôle of Servia and Greece, who in the general mobilization were -expected to put about one hundred and fifty thousand troops each into -the field, was {277} to keep in check the Turkish army in Macedonia, -and to prevent Albanian reinforcements from reaching the Turkish army -in Thrace. In addition to this, Servia and Montenegro were expected to -prevent the possible surprise of Austrian interference, while the fleet -of Greece would perform the absolutely necessary service of preventing -the passage of Turkish forces from Asia Minor to a Macedonian port. - -The allies expected a bitter struggle and, in Macedonia and Thrace at -least, the successful opposition of a Turkish offensive, rather than -the destruction of the Turkish armies. - -The mobilization in Turkey was described by many newspaper men who had -come to Constantinople for the war in the most glowing terms. The -efforts of Mahmud Shevket pasha to prepare the Turkish army for war -were declared to be bearing splendid fruits in the first days of the -mobilization. Wholly inaccurate accounts were written of the wonderful -enthusiasm of the Turkish people for the war. Naturally, what even the -residents of Constantinople saw at the beginning was the best foot -front. We knew that tremendous sums had been expended for four years -in bringing the army up to a footing of efficiency. We had seen with -our own eyes the brilliant manoeuvres on the anniversary of the -Sultan's accession in May, and on the anniversary of the Constitution -in July. The work accomplished by the German mission had cast its -spell over us. We saw what we were expecting to see during the first -days of the mobilization. The "snap {278} judgments" of special -correspondents have little value, other than freshness and _naïveté_, -except to readers even less informed than they are. But the East is a -sphinx even to those who live there. After you have figured out, from -what you call your "experience," what _ought_ to happen, the chances -are even that just the opposite comes true. In spite of the misgivings -which had been awakened by a trip into the interior of Asia Minor, as -far as Konia, during the third week of September, I believed that the -Turkish army was going to give a good account of itself against the -Bulgarians, whose spirit and whose organization I had had opportunity -to see and admire during that very summer. - -Every one was mistaken. There were large bodies of splendidly trained -and well-equipped troops in Thrace. Spick and span regiments did come -over from garrison towns in Asia. We saw them fill the trains at -Stambul and at San Stefano. But we over-estimated their number. The -truth of the matter is that the _trained_ and _well-equipped_ forces of -the Thracian army, officered by capable men, did not amount to more -than eighty thousand. In retrospect, after going over carefully the -position of the forces which met the Bulgarians, I feel that these -figures can be pretty accurately established. But even these eighty -thousand soldiers of the _nizam_ (active army) could have done wonders -in the Thracian campaign, if they had been allowed to go ahead to meet -the Bulgarians, and to form the first line of battle. But this was not -done. - -There are three time-honoured principles that {279} cannot afford to be -neglected at the beginning of a campaign. The army used for _initial_ -offensive action against the enemy should be composed _wholly_ of -soldiers in active service. The army should be concentrated to meet -the attack, or to attack one opposing army first, leaving the others -until later. Armies must be kept mobile, and not allow themselves to -be trapped in fortresses. The fortresses in the portions of territory -which may have to be abandoned temporarily to the invasion of the enemy -may easily be overstocked with defenders, but never with provisions and -munitions of war. In spite of the instructions of von der Goltz pasha, -the Turks showed no regard for the first two, at least, of these -elementary principles. The mobile army in Macedonia, outside of the -fortresses, was not recalled to Thrace, and _redifs_ (reservists) were -mixed with _nizams_ (actives) in the first line of battle. The neglect -of these principles was the direct cause of the Turkish disasters. - -After the _nizams_, most of whom were already in Thrace, came the -_redifs_ from Asia Minor. They arrived at Constantinople and at San -Stefano in huge numbers, and without equipment. I saw many of them -with their feet bound in rags. There were no tents over them or other -shelter; there was no proper field equipment for them, and, even while -they were patiently waiting for days to be forwarded to the front, they -lacked (within sight of the minarets of Stambul!) bread to eat, shoes -for their feet, and blankets to cover them at night. More than that, -among them were many thousands who did {280} not know how to use the -rifles that were given to them, and who had not even a rudimentary -military education. In defensive warfare, as they proved at Adrianople -and at Tchatalja, they could fight like lions. But for an offensive -movement in the field the great majority of the _redifs_ were worse -than useless. - -The Turks were absolutely sure of victory. The press of the capital, -on the day that war was declared, stated that the army of Thrace was -composed of four hundred thousand soldiers, and that it was the -intention to march direct to Sofia. Turkish officers of my -acquaintance told me that they were all taking their dress uniforms in -their baggage for this triumphal entry into Sofia, and that the -invasion of Bulgaria would commence immediately. - -On the 19th of October, the Bulgarian army appeared in force at Mustafa -Pasha, the first railway station after passing the Turkish frontier on -the line from Sofia to Constantinople, and about eighteen miles -north-west of Adrianople. It was the announced intention of the -Bulgarians to attack immediately the fortress of Adrianople, whose -cannon commanded the sole railway line from Bulgaria into Thrace. Two -of the Bulgarian armies were directed upon Adrianople, and the third -army under General Dimitrieff received similar orders. In Bulgaria, as -well as in Turkey, every one expected to see an attack upon Adrianople. -Had not General Savoff declared openly that he would sacrifice fifty -thousand men, if necessary, as the Japanese had done at Fort Arthur, in -order to capture Adrianople? - -{281} - -A strict censorship was established in Bulgaria. No one, native or -foreigner, who by chance saw just what the armies were doing, could -have any hope of sending out the information. Postal and telegraphic -communications were in the hands of the military authorities. No one, -who happened to be in the region in which the troops were moving -forward, was allowed to leave by train, automobile, bicycle, or even on -foot. Never in history has the world been so completely in the dark as -to the operations of the army. But the attacks of the outposts of -Adrianople, and the commencement of the bombardment of the forts, -seemed to indicate the common objective of the three Bulgarian armies. -Adrianople had the reputation of being one of the strongest fortresses -in the world. This reputation was well justified. - -Some miles to the east of Adrianople, guarding the mountains of the -south-eastern frontier of Bulgaria, was Kirk Kilissé, which was also -supposed to be an impregnable position. Here the Ottoman military -authorities had placed stores to form the base of supplies for the -offensive military operation against Bulgaria. Shortly before the war, -a branch railway from the sole line between Constantinople and -Adrianople, going north from Lulé Burgas, was completed. It furnished -direct means of communication between the capital and Kirk Kilissé. - -The General Staff at Constantinople wisely decided to leave in -Adrianople only a sufficient garrison to defend the forts and the city. -It was their intention to send the bulk of their Thracian army {282} -north-west from Kirk Kilissé, using that fortress as a base, in order -to cut off the Bulgarians from their supplies, and throw them back -against the forts of Adrianople. In this way they intended to put the -Bulgarians between two fires and crush them. Then they would commence -the invasion of Bulgaria. The plan was excellent. If Turkey had -actually had in the field a half million men well trained and well -equipped, well officered and with a spirit of enthusiasm, and--most -important of all--properly fed, it is probable that the Bulgarians -could have been held in check. But this army did not exist. The -millions spent for equipment had disappeared--who knows where? There -were not enough horses, even with the requisitions in Constantinople, -for the artillery, and for the cavalry reserves. That meant that there -were no horses at all for the commissary department. The only means of -communication with the front was a single railway track. Roads had -never been made in Thrace since the conquest. The artillery and the -waggons had to be drawn through deep mud. - -Beyond the needs of the _nizam_ (active) regiments, there were hardly -any officers. The wretched masses of _redifs_ (reservists) were -without proper leadership. Not only was this all important factor for -keeping up the _morale_ of the soldiers lacking, but, from the moment -they left Constantinople--even before that--there was insufficient -food. Nor did the soldiers know why they were fighting. There was no -enthusiasm for a cause. The great mass of the civil population, if -not, like the Christians, hostile to the army, {283} was wholly -indifferent. I do not believe there were ten thousand people in the -city of Constantinople, who really cared what happened in Thrace. -Since I have been in the midst of a mobilization in France, and have -seen how the French soldiers are equipped for war and fed, and how they -have been made to feel that every man, woman, and child in the nation -was ready to make any sacrifice--no matter how great--for "the little -soldiers of France," I feel more deeply the tragedy of the Turkish -_redifs_. My wonder is that they were able to fight as bravely as they -did. The world has no use for the government--for the "system"--which -caused them to suffer as they did, and to give their lives in a wholly -useless sacrifice. - -The story of the Thracian campaign I heard from the lips of many of -those who had taken part in it, when the events were still fresh in -their memory. It is fruitless to go into all the details, to discuss -the strategy of the generals in command, and to give a technical -description of the battles, and of the retreat. Turkish and Bulgarian -officers, as well as a host of foreign correspondents, have published -books on this campaign. Most of them hide the real causes of the -defeat under a mass of unimportant detail, and seem to be written -either to emphasize the writer's claim as a "first-hand" witness, to -take to task certain generals, or to prove the superiority of French -artillery, and the faultiness of German military instruction. When all -these issues are cast to one side, the campaign can be briefly -described. - -We have already anticipated the _débâcle_ of the military power of -Turkey by giving the causes. {284} This is not illogical. For these -causes existed, and led to the inevitable result, before the first gun -was fired. - -On October 19th, the Bulgarians began the investment of Adrianople from -the north and west. There was no serious opposition. The Turkish -garrison naturally fell back to the protection of the forts, for the -Turks had not planned to oppose, beyond Adrianople, the Bulgarian -approach. The Ottoman advance-guard, composed of the corps of -Constantinople and Rodosto, under the command of Abdullah and Mahmud -Mukhtar pashas, was ordered to take the offensive north of Kirk -Kilissé. They were to be followed by another army. This movement was -intended to cut off the Bulgarians from their base of supplies, and -throw them back on Adrianople. The remainder of the Turkish forces in -Thrace were to wait the result of this movement. If the Bulgarians -moved down the valley of the Maritza, leaving Adrianople, they would -meet these imposing forces which covered Constantinople, and would have -behind them the garrison of Adrianople, and the army of Abdullah and -Mahmud Mukhtar threatening their communications. If they besieged -Adrianople, the second army would take the offensive and the Bulgarians -would be encircled. - -The outposts of the Turkish army came into contact with the Bulgarians -on October 20th. Believing that they had to do with the left of the -army investing Adrianople, Mahmud and Abdullah decided to begin -immediately their encircling movement. On the 21st and 22d, the two -columns of the Turkish {285} army were in fact engaged with the -advance-guards of the first and second Bulgarian armies. But, in the -meantime, General Dimitrieff and the third army (which they believed -was on the extreme Bulgarian right, pressing down the Maritza to invest -the southern forts of Adrianople) had quietly crossed the frontier -almost directly north of Kirk Kilissé, and fell like a cyclone upon the -Turks. The Turkish positions were excellent, and had to be taken at -the point of the bayonet. From morning till night on October 23d, the -Bulgarian third army captured position after position, without the help -of their artillery, which was stuck in the mud some miles in the rear. -In the evening, during a terrible storm, two fresh Bulgarian columns -made an assault upon the Turkish positions. It was not until then that -the Turks realized that they were fighting another army than that -charged with the investment of Adrianople. A wild panic broke out -among the _redifs_, who were mostly without officers. They started to -retreat, and were soon followed by the remainder of the army. At -Uskubdere, they met during the night reinforcements coming to their -aid. Two regiments fired on each other, mutually mistaking the other -for Bulgarians. The reinforcements joined in the disorderly retreat, -which did not end until morning, when, exhausted and still crazed by -fear, what remained of the Turkish army had reached Eski Baba and Bunar -Hissar. - -The army was saved from annihilation by the darkness and the storm. -For not only were the Bulgarians ignorant of the abandonment of Kirk -{286} Kilissé, but, along the line where they knew the enemy were -retreating, their cavalry could not advance in the darkness and mud, -nor could their artillery shell the retreating columns. On the morning -of the 24th, when General Dimitrieff was preparing to make the assault -upon Kirk Kilissé, he learned that the Turkish army had fled, and that -the fortress was undefended. - -By the capture of Kirk Kilissé the Bulgarians gained enormous stores. -They had a railway line open to them towards Constantinople. The only -menace to a successful investment of Adrianople was removed. The -victory, so easily purchased, was far beyond their dreams. But it -would not have been possible had it not been for the willingness of the -Bulgarian soldiers to charge without tiring or faltering at the point -of the bayonet. The victory was earned, in spite of the Turkish panic. -For the Bulgarian steel had much to do with that panic. - -As soon as he realized the extent of the victory of Kirk Kilissé, -General Savoff ordered a general advance of the three Bulgarian armies. -Only enough troops were left around Adrianople to prevent a sortie of -the garrison. Notwithstanding the unfavourable condition of the roads, -the Bulgarian armies moved with great rapidity. The cavalry in two -days made reconnaissances on the east as far as Midia, and on the south -as far as Rodosto. The main--and sole--armies of the Turks were thus -ascertained to be along the Ergene, and beyond in the direction of the -capital. On the left, the third army of General Dimitrieff, not -delaying at Kirk Kilissé, was in contact with the {287} Turks at Eski -Baba on the 28th. On the afternoon of the same day the Bulgarians -drove the Turks out of the village of Lulé Burgas, on the railway to -Constantinople, east of the point where the Dedeagatch-Salonika line -branches off. - -For three days, October 29-31, the Turkish armies made a stand along -the Ergene from Bunar Hissar to Lulé Burgas. Since Gettysburg, Sadowa, -and Sedan, no battle except that of Mukden has approached the battle of -Lulé Burgas in importance, not only because of the numbers engaged, but -also of the issue at stake. Three hundred and fifty thousand soldiers -were in action, the forces being about evenly divided. For two days, -in spite of the demonstration of Kirk Kilissé, the Turks fought with -splendid courage and tenacity. Time and again the desperate charges of -the Bulgarian infantry were hurled back with heavy loss. Not until the -third day did the fighting seem to lean decisively to the advantage of -the Bulgarians. Their artillery began to show marked superiority. -From many points shells began to fall with deadly effect into the -Turkish entrenchments. The Turks were unable to silence the murderous -fire of the Bulgarian batteries. The soldiers, _because they were -starving_, did not have it in them to attempt to take the most -troublesome Bulgarian positions by assault. - -The retreat began on the afternoon of the 31st. On November 1st, owing -to lack of officers and of central direction, it became a disorderly -flight, a _sauve qui peut_. Camp equipment was abandoned. The -soldiers threw away their knapsacks and rifles, {288} so that they -could run more quickly. The artillery-men cut the traces of their -gun-wagons and ammunition-wagons, and made off on horseback. -Everything was abandoned to the enemy. Nazim pasha, generalissimo, and -the general staff, who had been in headquarters at Tchorlu, without -proper telegraphic or telephonic communication with the battle front, -were drawn into the flight. The Turkish army did not stop until it had -placed itself behind the Tchatalja line of forts, which protected the -city of Constantinople. - -The battle of Lulé Burgas marked more than the destruction of the -Turkish military power and the loss of European Turkey to the Empire. -It revealed the inefficiency of Turkish organization and administration -to cope with modern conditions, even when in possession of modern -instruction and modern tools. With the Turks, it is not a question of -an ignorance or a backwardness which can be remedied. Total lack of -organizing and administrative ability is a fault of their nature. -Courage alone does not win battles in the twentieth century. - -The Bulgarians were without sufficient cavalry and mounted machine-guns -to follow up their victory. The defeat of the Turks, too, had not been -gained without the expenditure of every ounce of energy in the army -that had in those three days won undying fame. The problem of pursuit -was difficult. There was only a single railway track. Food and -munitions for the large army had to be brought up. The artillery -advanced painfully through roads hub-deep in mud. It took two weeks -for the Bulgarian {289} army to move from the Ergene to Tchatalja, and -prepare for the assault of the last line of Turkish defence. - -An immediate offensive after Lulé Burgas would have found -Constantinople at the mercy of the victorious army. The two weeks of -respite changed the aspect of things. For in this time the forts -across the peninsula from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea were -hastily repaired. They were mounted with guns from the Bosphorus -defences, the Servian Creusots detained at Salonika at the beginning of -the war, and whatever artillery could be brought from Asia Minor. The -army had been reformed, the worthless, untrained elements ruthlessly -weeded out, and a hundred thousand of the best soldiers, among whom the -only _redifs_ were those who had come fresh from Asia Minor, and had -not been contaminated by the demoralization of Kirk Kilissé and Lulé -Burgas, were placed behind the forts. The Turkish cruisers whose guns -were able to be fired were recalled from the Dardanelles, and anchored -off the end of the line on either side. - -On November 15th, the Bulgarians began to put their artillery in -position all along the Tchatalja line from Buyuk-Tchekmedje on the Sea -of Marmora to Derkos Lake, near the Black Sea. At the same time, they -entrenched the artillery positions by earthworks and ditches, working -with incredible rapidity. For they had to take every precaution -against a sudden sortie of the enemy. In forty-eight hours they were -ready. - -The attack on the Tchatalja lines commenced {290} at six o'clock on -Sunday morning, November 17th, by machine-gun and rifle fire as well as -by artillery. The forts and the Turkish cruisers responded. In the -city and in the villages along the Bosphorus we could hear the firing -distinctly. On the 17th and 18th, the Bulgarians delivered assaults in -several places. Near Derkos they even got through the lines for a -short while. These were merely for the purpose of testing the Turkish -positions, however. Several of the assaults were repulsed. The -Bulgarians suffered heavily on the 18th, when the first and only -prisoners of the war were made. On the 19th, the artillery fire grew -less and less, and there were no further attacks. Towards evening it -was evident that the Bulgarians had abandoned their advanced lines, and -did not intend to continue the attack. No general assault had been -delivered. - -It seems certain that General Savoff had in mind the capture of -Constantinople on November 17th. Turkish overtures for peace, opened -on the 15th, had been repulsed. Every preparation was made for the -attempt to pierce Tchatalja. Why was the plan abandoned before it was -actually proven impossible? Did General Savoff fear the risk of a -reverse? Was he short of ammunition? Had the Turkish defence of the -17th and 18th been more determined than he had expected? Was it fear -of a cholera epidemic among his soldiers? Or was the abandonment of -the attempt to capture Constantinople for that is what a triumph at -Tchatalja would have meant, dictated by political reasons? - -Perhaps there was a shortage of ammunition. {291} But it is impossible -to believe that General Savoff ceased the attack because he feared a -failure, or because he paused before the heavy sacrifice of life it -would involve. The Bulgarians were too fresh from their sudden and -overwhelming victories to be halted by the unimportant fighting of the -17th and 18th. They were not yet aware of the terrible danger from -cholera. - -At the time it was the common belief in Constantinople--I heard it -expressed in a number of intelligent circles--that the Great Powers--in -particular Russia--had informed Bulgaria that she should halt where she -was. A second San Stefano! This seems improbable. Even in the moment -of delirium over Lulé Burgas, the Bulgarians had no thought of -occupying permanently Constantinople. They knew that this would be a -task beyond their ability as a nation to undertake. If there was a -thought of entering Constantinople, it was to satisfy military pride, -and to be able to dictate more expeditiously and satisfactorily terms -of peace. - -The real reason for the halt of Tchatalja, and the willingness to -conclude an armistice, must be found in the alarm awakened in Bulgaria -by the Servian and Greek successes. Greece had settled herself in -Salonika, and the King and royal family had come there to live. Is it -merely a coincidence that _on November 18th_ the Servians captured -Monastir, _foyer_ of Bulgarianism in western Macedonia, and _on the -following day_, a telegram from Sofia caused the cessation of the -Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja? - -{292} - -At Adrianople, a combined Bulgarian and Servian army, under the command -of General Ivanoff, which had been hampered during the first month of -operations by the floods of the Maritza, and by daring sorties of the -garrison, after receiving experienced reinforcements on November 22d, -began a determined bombardment and narrow investment of the forts. Ten -days later, a general attack was ordered, probably to hurry the Turks -in the armistice negotiations. The investing army had made very little -progress on December 2d and 3d, when the signing of the armistice -caused a cessation of hostilities. - -But while the Bulgarians were vigorously pressing the attack upon -Adrianople, they were inactive at Tchatalja. - -At the beginning of the Thracian campaign, a portion of the Turkish -fleet started to attack the Bulgarian coast. The Bulgarians had only -one small cruiser and six torpedo-boats of doubtful value. But their -two ports, termini of railway lines, were well protected by forts. On -October 19th, two Turkish battleships and four torpedo-boats appeared -before Varna, and fired without effect upon the forts. Then they -bombarded the small open port of Kavarna, near the Rumanian frontier. -On the 21st, they succeeded in throwing a few shells into Varna, but -did not risk approaching near enough to do serious damage. This was -the extent of the offensive naval action against Bulgaria. A short -time later, the _Hamidieh_, which was stationed on the Thracian coast -of the Black Sea to protect the landing of _redifs_ from Samsun, was -surprised in the night by {293} Bulgarian torpedo-boats. Two torpedoes -tore holes in her bow. She was able to return to Constantinople under -her own steam, but had to spend ten weeks in dry-dock. The only -service rendered by the Turkish fleet against the Bulgarians was the -safeguarding of the transport of troops from Black Sea ports of Asiatic -Turkey, and the co-operation at the ends of the Tchatalja lines during -the Bulgarian assaults of November 17th and 18th. - -The Servian campaign was a good second to the astounding successes of -the Bulgarians in Thrace. The third army entered the _sandjak_ of Novi -Bazar, so long coveted by Servia, and expelled the Turks in five days. -A portion of this army next occupied Prisrend and Diakova, descended -the valley of the Drin through the heart of northern Albania to -Alessio, where it joined on November 19th the Montenegrins, who were -already at San Giovanni di Medua. On the 28th, they occupied Durazzo. -The Servians had reached the Adriatic! - -While the third army was in the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar, the second -Servian army crossed into Old Servia, passed through the plain of -Kossova, where the Turks had destroyed the independence of Servia in -1389, and occupied Pristina on October 23d. This gave them control of -the branch railway from Uskub to the confines of the _sandjak_. - -The flower of the Servian fighting strength was reserved for the first -army under the command of Crown Prince Alexander. This force, -considerably larger than the two other armies combined, mustered over -seventy thousand. Its objective point was {294} Uskub, covering which -was the strong Turkish army of Zekki pasha. Battle was joined outside -of Kumanova on October 22d. After three days of fighting, during which -the Turkish cavalry was annihilated by the Servian artillery and the -Servian infantry took the Turkish artillery positions at the point of -the bayonet, the army of Zekki Pasha evacuated Kumanova. No attempt -was made to defend Uskub, which the Servians entered on October 26th. -The Turkish army retreated to Küprülü on the Vardar, towards Salonika. -When the Servians continued their march, Zekki pasha retreated to -Prilip, where he occupied positions that could not well be shelled by -artillery. After two days of continuous fighting, the Servians' -bayonets dislodged the Turks. They withdrew to Monastir with the -Servians hot upon their heels. - -Together with Kumanova, in which the bulk of Prince Alexander's forces -did not find it necessary to engage, the capture of Monastir is the -most brilliant feat of an army whose intrepidity, agility, and -intelligence deserve highest praise. Into Monastir had been thrown the -army of Tahsin pasha, pushed northward by the Greeks, as well as that -of Zekki pasha, harried southward by the Servians. The Servians did -not hesitate to approach the defences of the city on one side up to -their arm-pits in water, while on the other side they scaled the -heights dominating Monastir--heights which ought to have been defended -for weeks without great difficulty. The Turks were compelled to -withdraw, for they were at the mercy of the Servian artillery. They -tried to {295} retreat to Okrida, but the Servian left wing anticipated -this movement. Only ten thousand escaped into Epirus. Nearly forty -thousand Turks surrendered to the Servians on November 18th. Monastir -and Okrida were captured. The Turkish armies of Macedonia had ceased -to exist. - -The Greeks were eager to wipe out the shame of the war of 1897. -Fifteen years had wrought a great difference in the _morale_ of the -Greek army. A new body of officers, who spent their time in learning -their profession instead of in discussing politics at _café terrasses_, -had been created. The French military mission, under General Eydoux, -had been working for several years in the complete reorganization of -the Greek army. I had the privilege at Athens of enjoying the -hospitality of Greek officers in their casernes at several successive -Easter festivals. Each year one could notice the progress. They were -always ready to show you how the transformation of their artillery, and -its equipment for mountain service as well as for field work, would -make all the difference in the world in the "approaching" war with the -Turks. The results were beyond expectations. What the Greeks had been -working for was mobility. This they demonstrated that they had -learned. They had also an _esprit de corps_ which, in fighting, made -up for what they lacked of Slavic dogged perseverance. Neither in -actual combat, nor in strategy, with the exception of Janina, were the -Greeks put to the test, or called upon to bear the burden, of the -Bulgarians and Servians. But, especially when we take into -consideration the {296} invaluable service of their fleet, there is no -reason to belittle their part in the downfall of Turkey. If the effort -had been necessary, they probably would have been equal to it. - -The Greeks sent a small army into Epirus. The bulk of their forces, -following a sound military principle, were led into Thessaly by the -Crown Prince Constantine. They crossed the frontier without -resistance, fought a sharp combat at Elassona on the 19th, in which -they stood admirably under fire, and broke down the last Turkish -resistance at Servia. The army of Tahsin pasha was thrown back upon -Monastir. The battles of the next ten days were hardly more than -skirmishes, for the Turkish stand was never formidable. At Yanitza, -the only real battle of the Greek campaign was fought. The Turks fled. -The way to Salonika was open. - -The battle of Yanitza (Yenidje-Vardar) was fought on November 3d. On -October 30th, a Greek torpedo-boat had succeeded, in spite of the -strong harbour fortifications, equipped with electric searchlights, and -the mined channel, in coming right up to the jetty at Salonika during -the night, and launching three torpedoes at an old Turkish cruiser -which lay at anchor there. The cruiser sank. On his way out to open -sea, the commander of the torpedo-boat did not hesitate to fire upon -the forts! - -[Illustration: Map--Africa in 1914] - -This daring feat, and the approach of the Greek army, threw the city -into a turmoil of excitement. The people had been fed for two weeks on -false news, and telegrams had been printed from day to day, relating -wonderful victories over the Servians, {297} Bulgarians, and Greeks. -But the coming of the refugees, fresh thousands from nearer places -every day, and the presence in the streets of the city of deserters in -uniform, gave the lie to the "official" news. When the German -_stationnaire_ arrived from Constantinople, and embarked the prisoner -of the Villa Allatini, ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, the most pessimistic -suspicions were confirmed. - -Although he had thirty thousand soldiers, and plenty of munitions, -Tahsin pasha, commandant of Salonika, did not even attempt to defend -the city. He began immediately to negotiate with the advancing Greek -army. When the Crown Prince refused to accept any other than -unconditional surrender, and moved upon the city, Tahsin pasha yielded. -Not a shot was fired. On November 9th, without any opposition, the -Greek army marched into Salonika. - -In other places the Turks at least fought, even if they did not fight -well. At Salonika their surrender demonstrated to what humiliation and -degradation the arrogance of the Young Turks had brought a nation whose -past was filled with glorious deeds of arms. - -The Bulgarian expeditionary corps for Macedonia, under General -Theodoroff, had crossed the frontier on October 18th. Joined to it -were the notorious bands of _comitadjis_ under the command of -Sandansky, who afterwards related to me the story of this march. -General Theodoroff's mission was to engage the portion of the Turkish -Fifth Army Corps, which was stationed in the valleys of the Mesta and -Struma, {298} east of the Vardar, thus preventing it from assembling -and making a flank movement against the main Servian or Bulgarian -armies. The Bulgarians were greeted everywhere as liberators, and, -although they were not in great numbers, the Turks did not try to -oppose them. Soldiers and Moslem Macedonians together fled before them -towards Salonika. - -When General Theodoroff realized the demoralization of the Turks, and -heard how the Greeks were approaching Salonika without any more serious -opposition than that which confronted him, he hurried his column -towards Salonika. The Bulgarian Princes Boris and Cyril joined him. -They were not in time to take part in the negotiations for the -surrender of the city. The cowardice of Tahsin pasha had brought -matters to a climax on November 9th. But they were able to enter -Salonika on the 10th, at the same time that Crown Prince Constantine -was making his triumphal entry. Sandansky and his _comitadjis_ hurried -to the principal ancient church of the city, for over four hundred -years the Saint Sophia of Salonika, and placed the Bulgarian flag in -the minarets before the Greeks knew they had been outwitted. On the -12th, King George of Greece arrived to make his residence in the city -that was to be his tomb. - -After the capture of Monastir, the Servians pressed on to Okrida, on -November 23d, and from there into Albania to Elbassan, which they -reached five days later. It was their intention to join at Durazzo the -other column of the third Servian army, of whose march down the Drin we -have already spoken. But {299} the threatening attitude of -Austria-Hungary necessitated the recall of the bulk of the Servian -forces to Nish. This is the reason they were not able, at that stage -of the war, to give the Montenegrins effective assistance against -Scutari. - -The left wing of the Thessalian Greek army, after the capture of -Monastir by the Servians, pursued towards Albania, the Turks who had -escaped from Monastir. With great skill, they managed to prevent the -Turks from turning north-west into the interior of Albania. After the -brilliant and daring storming of the heights of Tchangan, what remained -of the Turkish army was compelled to retreat into Epirus towards Janina. - -On October 20th, the Greek fleet under Admiral Koundouriotis appeared -at the Dardanelles to offer battle to the Turks. Under the cover of -the protection of their fleet, the Greeks occupied Lemnos, Thasos, -Imbros, Samothrace, Nikaria, and the smaller islands. The inhabitants -of Samos had expelled the Turkish garrisons on their own initiative at -the outbreak of the war. Mitylene was captured without great -difficulty on November 2lst. The Greeks landed at Chios on the 24th. -Here the Turkish garrison of two thousand retired to the mountainous -centre of the island, and succeeded in prolonging their resistance -until January. When he saw that no help was coming from Asia Minor, -whose shores had been in sight during all the weeks of combat and -suffering, the heroic Turkish commander surrendered with one thousand -eight hundred starving men on January 3d. It was only because Italy, -{300} by a clause of the Treaty of Ouchy, still held the Dodecanese, -that all of the Ægean Islands were not "gathered into the fold" by -Greece. - -There had been less than six weeks of fighting. The Balkan allies had -swept from the field all the Turkish forces in Europe. The Turkish -armies were bottled up in Constantinople, Adrianople, Janma, and -Scutari, with absolutely no hope of making successful sorties. Except -at Constantinople, they were besieged, and could expect neither -reinforcements nor food supplies. The Greek fleet was master of the -Ægean Sea, and held the Turkish navy blocked in the Dardanelles. No -new armies could come from Asiatic Turkey. This was the situation when -the armistice was signed. The Ottoman Empire in Europe had ceased to -exist. The military prestige of Turkey had received a mortal blow. - - - -THE ARMISTICE AND THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF LONDON - -The hopelessness of the outcome of the war with Italy, the -dissatisfaction over the foolish and arbitrary rule of its secret -committees had weakened the hold of the "Committee of Union and -Progress" over the army. Despite its success in the spring elections -of 1912, its position was precarious. In July, Mahmud Shevket pasha, -who was suspected of planning a military _pronunciamento_, resigned the -Ministry of War. The Grand Vizier, Saïd pasha, soon followed him into -retirement. The Sultan declared that a {301} ministry not under the -control of a political party was a necessity. - -Ghazi Mukhtar pasha, after much difficulty, succeeded in forming a -ministry, in which a distinguished Armenian, Noradounghian effendi, was -given the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The Unionist majority in the -lower house of Parliament proved intractable. Its obstructionist -tactics won for the Chamber of Deputies the name of the "comic -operahouse of Fundukli." (Fundukli was the Bosphorus quarter in which -the House of Parliament was located.) With the help of the Senate, and -the moral support of the army, the Sultan dissolved Parliament on -August 5th. Only the menace of the Albanian revolution prevented the -Committee from attempting to set up a rival Parliament at Salonika. -This was the unenviable internal situation of Turkey at the opening of -the Balkan War. - -The disasters of the Thracian campaign led to the resignation of the -Ghazi Mukhtar pasha Cabinet. The aged statesman of the old _régime_, -Kiamil pasha, was called for the eighth time to the Grand Vizirate. He -retained Nazim pasha, generalissimo of the Turkish army, and -Noradounghian effendi, in the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. -The most influential of the Young Turks, who had opposed bitterly the -peace with Italy and were equally determined that no negotiations -should be undertaken with the Balkan States, were exiled. Kiamil pasha -saw clearly that peace was absolutely necessary. His long experience -allowed him to have no illusions as to the possibility of continuing -the struggle. Before {302} the Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja, he -began _pourparlers_ with General Savoff. After the repulse of November -17th and 18th, he was just as firm in his decision that the -negotiations must be continued. He won over to his point of view the -members of the Cabinet, and notably Nazim pasha. - -The conditions of the armistice, signed on December 3d, were an -acknowledgment of the complete _débâcle_ of the Turkish army. Bulgaria -forced the stipulation that her army in front of Tchatalja should be -revictualled by the railway which passed under the guns of Adrianople, -while that fortress remained without food! Greece, by an agreement -with her allies, refused to sign the armistice, but was allowed to be -represented in the peace conference. The allies felt that the state of -war on sea must continue, in order that Turkey should be prevented -during the armistice from bringing to the front her army corps from -Syria and Mesopotamia and Arabia; while Greece, in particular, was -determined to run no risk in connection with the Ægean Islands. The -peace delegates were to meet in London. - -Orientals, Christian as well as Moslem, are famous for bargaining. -Nothing can be accomplished without an exchange of proposals and -counter-proposals _ad infinitum_. In the Conference of London, the -demands of the allies were the cession of all European Turkey, except -Albania, whose boundaries were not defined, of Crete, and of the -islands in the Ægean Sea. A war indemnity was also demanded. Turkey -was to be allowed to retain Constantinople, and a strip of territory -from Midia on the Black Sea to {303} Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora, and -the peninsula of the Thracian Chersonese, which formed the European -shore of the Dardanelles. The boundaries of Albania, and its future -status, were to be decided by the Powers. - -I had a long conversation with the Grand Vizier, Kiamil pasha, on the -day the peace delegates left for London. He was frank and unhesitating -in the statement of his belief that Turkey could not continue the war. -He denounced unsparingly the visionaries who were clamouring for a -continuance of the struggle. "It is because of them that we are in our -present humiliating position," he said. "They cry out now that we must -not accept peace, but they know well that we cannot hope to win back -any portion of what we have lost." - -There were a number of reasons why the position of Kiamil pasha was -sound. First of all, the army organization was in hopeless confusion. -Although the Bulgarians were checked at Tchatalja, the conditions on -the Constantinople side of the forts was terrible. The general -headquarters at Hademkeuy were buried in filth and mud. Although the -army was but twenty-five miles from the city, there were days on end -when not even bread arrived. Cholera was making great ravages. -Soldiers, crazed from hunger, were shot dead for disobeying the order -which forbade their eating raw vegetables. There were neither fuel, -shelter, nor blankets. Winter was at hand. At San Stefano, one of the -most beautiful suburbs of Stambul, in a concentration camp the soldiers -died by the thousands of starvation fever. {304} It was one of the -most heart-rending tragedies of history. - -All the while, in the cafés of Péra, Galata, and Stambul, Turkish -officers sat the day long, sipping their coffee, and deciding that -Adrianople must not be given up. Even while the fighting was going on, -when the fate of the city hung in the balance, I saw these degenerate -officers _by the hundreds_, feasting at Péra, while their soldiers were -dying like dogs at Tchatalja and San Stefano. This is an awful -statement to make, but it is the record of fact. Notices in the -newspapers, declaring that officers found in Constantinople without -permission would be immediately taken before the Court-Martial, had -absolutely no effect. - -The navy failed to give any account of itself to the Greeks, who were -waiting outside of the Dardanelles. Finally, on December 16th, after -the people of the vicinity had openly cursed and taunted them, the -fleet sailed out to fight. An action at long range did little damage -to either side. The Turkish vessels refused to go beyond the -protection of their forts. They returned in the evening to anchor. -The mastery of the sea remained to the Greeks.[1] - - -[1] In this connection, it would be forgetting to pay tribute to a -remarkable exploit to omit mention of the raid of the _Hamidieh_ during -the late winter. One Ottoman officer at least chafed under the -disgrace of the inaction of the Ottoman navy. With daring and skill, -Captain Reouf bey slipped out into the Ægean Sea on the American-built -cruiser, the _Hamidieh_. He evaded the Greek blockaders, bombarded -some outposts on one of the islands, and sank the auxiliary cruiser, -the _Makedonia_, in a Greek port. The _Hamidieh_ next appeared in the -Adriatic, where she sank several transports, and bombarded Greek -positions on the coast of Albania. The cruiser was next heard of at -Port Said. She passed through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea for a -couple of weeks, and then returned boldly into the Mediterranean, -although Greek torpedo-boats were lying in wait. Captain Reouf bey ran -again the gauntlet of the Greek fleet, and got back to the Dardanelles -without mishap. This venture, undertaken without permission from the -Turkish admiral, had no effect upon the war. For it came too late. -But it showed what a little enterprise and courage might have done to -prevent the Turkish débâcle, if undertaken at the beginning of the war. - - -{305} - -If the army and the navy were powerless, how about the people of the -capital? From the very beginning of the war, the inhabitants of -Constantinople, Moslem as well as Christian, displayed the most -complete indifference concerning the fortunes of the battles. Even -when the Bulgarians were attacking Tchatalja, the city took little -interest. Buying and selling went on as usual. There were few -volunteers for national defence, but the cafés were crowded and the -theatres and dance-halls of Péra were going at full swing. The -refugees came and camped in our streets and in the cemeteries outside -of the walls. Those who did not die passed on to Asia. The wounded -arrived, and crowded our hospitals and barracks. The cholera came. -The soldiers starved to death at San Stefano. The spirit of Byzantium -was over the city still. The year 1913 began as 1453 had begun. - -The Government tried to raise money by a national loan. It could get -none from Europe, unless it agreed to surrender Adrianople and make -peace practically on the terms of the allies. An appeal must be made -to the Osmanlis. For how could the war be resumed without money? -There are many wealthy pashas at Constantinople. Their palaces line -both shores of the Bosphorus. They spend money at Monte Carlo {306} -like water. They live at Nice, as they live at Constantinople, like -princes--or like American millionaires! One of the sanest and wisest -of Turkish patriots, a man whom I have known and admired, was appointed -to head a committee to wait upon these pashas, many of them married to -princesses of the imperial family, and solicit their contributions. -The scheme was that the subscribers should advance five years of taxes -on their properties for the purposes of national defence. The -committee hired a small launch, and spent a day visiting the homes of -the pashas. On their return, after paying the rental of the launch, -they had about forty pounds sterling! Was it not two million pounds -that was raised for the Prince of Wales Fund recently in London? Was -not the French loan "for national defence," issued just before the -present war, subscribed in a few hours _forty-three times _over the -large amount of thirty-two million pounds asked for? - -In the face of these facts, the Young Turks were vociferous in their -demand that the war be continued. Adrianople must not be surrendered! -Kiamil pasha decided to call a "Divan," or National Assembly, of the -most important men in Turkey. They were summoned by the Sultan to meet -at the palace of Dolma-Baghtche on January 22, 1913. I went to see -what would happen there. One would expect that the whole of -Constantinople would be hanging on the words of this council, whose -decision the Cabinet had agreed to accept. A half-dozen policemen at -the palace gate, a vendor of lemonade, two street-sweepers, an Italian -cinematograph photographer, {307} and a dozen foreign newspaper -men--that was the extent of the crowd. - -The Divan, after hearing the _exposés_ of the Ministers of War, -Finance, and Foreign Affairs, decided that there was nothing to -discuss. The decision was inevitable. Peace must be signed. That -night Kiamil pasha telegraphed to London to the Turkish commissioners, -directing them to consent to the reddition of Adrianople; and, the -other fortresses which were still holding out, and to make peace at the -price of ceding all the Ottoman territories in Europe beyond a line -running from Enos on the Ægean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River, -to Midia on the Black Sea. - -On the following day, January 23d, a _coup d'état_ was successfully -carried out. - -Enver bey, the former "hero of liberty," who had taken a daring and -praiseworthy part in the revolution of 1908, had been ruined afterwards -by being appointed military _attaché_ of the Ottoman Embassy at Berlin. -There was much that was admirable and winning in Enver bey, much that -was what the French call "elevation of soul." He was a sincere -patriot. But the years at Berlin, and the deadening influence of -militarism and party politics mixed together, had changed him from a -patriot to a politician. He went to Tripoli during the Italian War, -and organized a resistance in Benghazi, which he announced would be "as -long as he lived." But it was a decision _à la Turque_. The Balkan -War found him again at Constantinople--not at the front leading a -company against the enemy--but at {308} Constantinople, plotting with -the other Young Turks how they could once more get the reins of -government in their hands. The decision of the Divan was the -opportunity. Enver bey led a small band of followers into the Sublime -Porte, and shot Nazim pasha and his _aide-de-camp_ dead. The other -members of the Cabinet were imprisoned, and the telephone to the palace -cut. Enver bey was driven at full speed in an automobile to the -palace. He secured from the Sultan a _firman_ calling on Mahmud -Shevket pasha to form a new Cabinet. The Young Turks were again in -power. - -The bodies of Nazim pasha and the _aide-de-camp_ were buried quickly -and secretly. For one of Enver's companions, a man of absolutely no -importance, who had been killed by defenders of Nazim, a great military -funeral was held. - -Mahmud Shevket pasha, who had been living in retirement at Scutari -since the war began, accepted the position of Grand Vizier. I heard -him, on the steps of the Sublime Porte, justify the murder of Nazim -pasha, on the ground that there had been the intention to give up -Adrianople. The new Cabinet was going to redeem the country, and save -it from a shameful peace. - -When the news of the _coup d'état_ reached London, it was recognized -that further negotiations were useless. The peace conference had -failed. - - - -THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR - -It is very doubtful if Mahmud Shevket, Enver, and their accomplices had -any hope whatever of {309} retrieving the fortunes of Turkish arms. -They had prepared the _coup d'état_ to get back again into office. -This could not be done without the tacit consent of the army. At the -moment of the Divan the army was stirred up over the surrender of -Adrianople. It was the moment to act. At any other time the army -would not have acquiesced in the murder of its generalissimo. The -Sultan's part in the plot was not clear. His assent was, however, -immediately given. Living in seclusion, and knowing practically -nothing of what was going on, he signed the _firmans_, accepting the -resignation of the Kiamil pasha Cabinet and charging Mahmud Shevket -with the formation of a new Cabinet, either by force or by playing upon -his fears of what might be his own fate, should the agreement to -surrender Adrianople lead to a revolution. - -On January 29th, the allies denounced the armistice, and hostilities -reopened. The Bulgarians at Tchatalja had strongly entrenched -themselves, and were content to rest on the defensive. They did not -desire to capture Constantinople. But the Turks wanted to relieve -Adrianople. The offensive movement must come from them. The Young -Turks had killed Nazim pasha, they said, because they believed -Adrianople could be saved. The word was now to Mahmud Shevket and -Enver. Let them justify their action. - -Enthusiastic speeches were made at Constantinople. We were told that -the army at Tchatalja had moved forward, and was going to drive the -Bulgarians out of Thrace. The Turks did advance some kilometres, but, -like their fleet at the Dardanelles, {310} not beyond the protection of -the forts! They did not dare to make a general assault upon the -Bulgarian positions. The renewal of the war, as far as Tchatalja was -concerned, was a perfect farce. Every one in Constantinople knew that -the army was not even trying to relieve Adrianople by a forward march -from Constantinople. - -Enver bey, who realized that he must make some move to justify the -_coup d'état_ of January 23d, gathered two army corps on the small -boats which serve the Bosphorus villages and the Isles of Princes. It -was his intention to land on the European shore of the Dardanelles, and -take the Bulgarians in the rear. A few of his troops--the first that -were sent--disembarked at Gallipoli, and, co-operating with the -Dardanelles garrison, attempted an offensive movement against the -Bulgarian positions at Bulair, which were bottling the peninsula. The -attack failed ignominiously. For the Bulgarians, after dispersing the -first bayonet charge by their machine-guns, were not content to wait -for another attack. They scrambled over their trenches, and attacked -the Turks at the point of the bayonet. The army broke, and fled. Some -six thousand Turks were left on the field. The Bulgarian losses were -trifling. On the same day, February 8th, and the following day, the -rest of Enver bey's forces tried to land at several places on the -European shore of the Sea of Marmora. For some reason that has never -been explained, the Turkish fleet did not co-operate with Enver bey's -attempted landings. Naturally the Turks were mowed down. At Sharkeuy -it was simply slaughter. {311} Three divisions were butchered. Those -few who succeeded in getting foot on shore were driven into the sea and -bayoneted. The two corps were practically annihilated. - -After this exploit, Enver bey returned to Constantinople, and received -the congratulations of the Grand Vizier whom he had created, by a -murder, _to redeem Turkey and recover Adrianople_. - -The inability to advance at Tchatalja and at Bulair, and the failure to -land troops on the coasts of Thrace, entirely immobilized the Turkish -armies during the second period of the war. They were content to sit -and watch the fall of the three fortresses of Janina, Adrianople, and -Scutari. At the moment of the _coup d'état_, I telegraphed that the -whole miserable affair was nothing more than a party move of the "outs" -to oust the "ins." The events confirmed this judgment. Mahmud Shevket -pasha had no other policy than that of Kiamil pasha and Nazim pasha. -He, and the Young Turk party, did absolutely nothing to relieve the -situation. As soon as they thought they were safe from those who swore -to avenge Nazim's death, they began again negotiations for peace, and -on exactly the same terms. - -In the meantime, the Greeks, who had not signed the armistice, decided -that they must take Janina by assault. The worst of the winter was not -yet over, but plans were made to increase the small Greek forces which -had been practically inactive since the siege began. Janina had never -been completely invested. When the Crown Prince arrived, he planned to -capture the most troublesome forts, and {312} from them to make -untenable the formidable hills which commanded the city. The Greeks -followed the plan with great skill and courage. Position after -position was taken until the city was at the mercy of their artillery. -During the night of March 5th, Essad pasha sent to Prince Constantino -emissaries to surrender the city, garrison, and munitions of war -without conditions. - -The Crown Prince returned to Salonika in triumph. A few days later, -the assassination of King George made him King. From this time on, the -diplomatic position of Premier Venizelos, in his endeavour to keep -within bounds the military party which had the ear of the new King, -became most difficult. Even his great genius could not prevent the -rupture with Bulgaria. - -After the fall of Janina, the Bulgarian general staff realized that it -was essential for them to force the capitulation of Adrianople, or to -take the city by assault. As they had to keep a large portion of their -army before Tchatalja and Bulair, it was decided that forty-five -thousand Servians, with their siege cannon, should co-operate in the -attack upon Adrianople. It was afterwards given by the Servians as an -excuse for breaking their treaty with Bulgaria, that they had helped in -the fall of Adrianople. But it must be remembered that the Bulgarian -army, by its maintenance of the positions at Tchatalja and Bulair, was -rendering service not to herself alone but to the common cause of the -allies. Greece and Servia will never be able to get away from the fact -that Bulgaria bore the brunt of the burden in the first {313} Balkan -War, and that her services in the common cause were far greater than -those of either of her allies. One cannot too strongly emphasize the -point, also, that the capture and possession of Adrianople did not mean -to Bulgaria either from the practical or from the sentimental -standpoint what Salonika meant to the Greeks and Uskub to the Servians. -The Servian contingent before Adrianople was not helping Bulgaria to do -what was to be wholly to the benefit of Bulgaria. The Servians were -co-operating in an enterprise that was to contribute to the success of -their common cause. - -Adrianople had been closely invested ever since the battle of Kirk -Kilissé. No army came to the relief of the garrison after the fatal -retreat of October 24th. The Bulgarians had not made a serious effort -to capture the city during the first period of the war. The armistice -served their ends well, because each day lessened the provisions of the -besieged. Inside the city Shukri pasha had done all he could to keep -up the courage of the inhabitants. He himself was ignorant of the real -situation at Constantinople. Perhaps it was in good faith that he -assured the garrison continually that the hour of deliverance was at -hand. By wireless, the authorities at Constantinople, after the _coup -d'état_ especially, kept assuring him that the army was advancing, and -that it was a question only of days. So, in spite of starvation and of -the continual rain of shells upon the city, he managed to maintain the -_morale_ of his garrison. The allies finally decided upon a systematic -assault of the forts on all sides of the city at once. In this way, -{314} the Turks were not able to use their heavy artillery to best -advantage. Advancing with scissors, the Bulgarians and Servians cut -their way through the tangle of barbed wire. On the 24th and 25th, the -forts fell one after the other. Czar Ferdinand entered the city with -his troops on March 26th. - -It was at the moment of this heroic capture, in which there was glory -enough for all, that the clouds of trouble between Bulgaria and Servia -began to appear on the horizon. Shukri pasha, following the old policy -of the Turks, which had been so successful for centuries in the Balkan -Peninsula, tried to surrender to the Servian general, who was too loyal -to discipline to fall into this trap. But the Servian newspapers began -to say that it was really the Servian army who had captured the city, -and that Shukri pasha recognized this fact when he sent to find the -Servian commander. There was an unedifying duel of newspapers between -Belgrade and Sofia, which showed that the material for conflagration -was ready. - -In the second period of the war, the Servians gave substantial aid, -especially in artillery, to the Montenegrins, who had been besieging -Scutari ever since October 15th. I went over the mountain of Tarabosh -on horse with an Albanian who had been one of its defenders. He -related graphically the story of the repeated assaults of the -Montenegrins and Servians. Each time they were driven back before they -reached those batteries that dominated Scutari and made impossible the -entry to the city without their capture. The loss of life was -tremendous. The bravery of the {315} assailants could do nothing -against the miles and miles of barbed wire. No means of stopping -assault has ever proved more efficacious. The besiegers were unable to -capture Tarabosh. So they could not enter the city. - -At the beginning of the war, Scutari was under the command of Hassan -Riza pasha. In February, he was assassinated by his subordinate, Essad -pasha, an Albanian of the Toptani family, who had been a favourite of -Abdul Hamid, and had had a rather questionable career in the -_gendarmerie_ during the days of despotism. After the assassination of -the Turkish commandant, it was for Albania and not for Turkey that -Essad pasha continued the resistance. In March, Austria began to -threaten the Montenegrins, and assure them that they could not keep the -city. The story of how she secured the agreement of the Great Powers -in coercing Montenegro is told in another chapter. Montenegro was -defiant, and paid no attention to an international blockade. But on -April 13th, the Servians, fearing international complications, withdrew -from the siege. It was astonishing news to the world that after this, -on April 22d, Essad pasha surrendered Scutari to the King of -Montenegro, with the stipulation that he could withdraw with his -garrison, his light artillery, and whatever munitions he might be able -to take with him. - -The Ottoman flag had ceased to wave in any part of Europe except -Constantinople and the Dardanelles. The war was over, whether the -Young Turks would have it so or not. Facts are facts. - - - -{316} - -THE TREATY OF LONDON - -Nazim pasha was assassinated on January 23d. The armistice was -denounced on the 29th. On February 10th, Mahmud Shevket pasha began to -sound the Great Powers for their intervention in securing peace. It -was necessary, however, now that the war had been resumed, that the -impossibility of relieving Adrianople be demonstrated, so that it might -not continue to be a stumbling-block in reopening the negotiations. -The Great Powers were willing to act as mediators, but could not make -any acceptable overture until after the fall of Janina and Adrianople. - -On March 23d, they proposed the following as basis for the renewal of -the negotiations at London: - - -"1. A frontier line from Enos to Midia, which would follow the course -of the Maritza, and the cession to the Allies of all the territories -west of that line, with the exception of Albania, whose status and -frontiers would be decided upon by the Powers. - -"2. Decision by the Powers of the question of the Ægean Islands. - -"3. Abandonment of Crete by Turkey. - -"4. Arrangement of all financial questions at Paris, by an -international commission, in which the representatives of Turkey and -the allies would be allowed to sit. Participation of the allies in the -Ottoman Debt, and in the financial obligations of the territories newly -acquired. No indemnity of war, in principle. - -"5. End of hostilities immediately after the acceptance of this basis -of negotiations." - - -{317} - -Turkey agreed to these stipulations. The Balkan States, however, did -not want to commit themselves to the Enos-Midia line "as definitely -agreed upon," but only as a base of _pourparlers_. They insisted that -the Ægean Islands must be ceded directly to them. They wanted to know -what the Powers had in mind in regard to the frontiers of Albania. In -the last place, they refused to relinquish the possibility of an -indemnity of war. - -Notes were exchanged back and forth among the chancelleries until April -20th, when the Balkan States finally agreed to accept the mediation of -the Powers. They had practically carried all their points, however, -except that of the communication of the Albanian frontier. Hostilities -ceased. There really was not much more to fight about, at least as far -as Turkey was concerned. - -It was a whole month before the second conference at London opened. -The only gleam of hope that the Turks were justified in entertaining, -when they decided to renew the war, had been the possible outbreak of a -war between the Allies. If only the quarrel over Macedonia had come, -for which they looked from week to week, they might have been able to -put pressure on Bulgaria for the return of Adrianople, and on Greece -for the return of the Ægean Islands. But the rupture between the -Allies did not take place until after they had settled with Turkey. -Why fight over the bear's skin until it was actually in their hands? - -The negotiations were reopened in London on May 20th. On May 30th, the -peace preliminaries {318} were signed. The Sultan of Turkey ceded to -the Kings of the allied states his dominions in Europe beyond the -Enos-Midia line. Albania, its status and frontiers, were intrusted by -the Sultan to the sovereigns of the Great Powers. He ceded Crete to -the allied sovereigns, but left the decision as to the islands in the -Ægean Sea, and the status of Mount Athos, to the Great Powers. - -The war between the allies enabled Turkey to violate this treaty. They -won back from Bulgaria, without opposition, most of Thrace, including -Adrianople and Kirk Kilissé. Later, treaties were made separately with -each of the Balkan States. But, as it seems to be a principle of -history that no territories that have once passed from the shadow of -the Crescent return, it is probable that the Treaty of London will, in -the end, represent the _minimum_ of what Turkey's former subjects have -wrested from her. - - - - -{319} - -CHAPTER XV - -THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES - -To those who knew the centuries-old hatred and race rivalry between -Greece and Servia and Bulgaria in the Balkan Peninsula, an alliance for -the purpose of liberating Macedonia seemed impossible. The Ottoman -Government had a sense of security which seemed to be justifiable. -They had known how to keep alive and intensify racial hatred in -European Turkey, and believed that they were immune from concerted -attack because the Balkan States would never be able to agree as to the -division of spoils after a successful war. - -The history of the ten years of rivalry between bands, which had -nullified the efforts of the Powers to "reform" Macedonia by installing -a _gendarmerie_ under European control, had taught the diplomats that -they had working against the pacification of Macedonia not only the -Ottoman authorities, but also the native Christian population and the -neighbouring emancipated countries. They were ready to believe the -astute Hussein Hilmy pasha, Vali of Macedonia, when he said: "I am -ruling over an insane asylum. Were the Turkish flag withdrawn, {320} -they would fly at each other's throats, and instead of reform, you -would have anarchy." - -If the Balkan States had realized how completely and how easily they -were going to overthrow the military power of Turkey, they probably -would not have attempted it. This seems paradoxical, but it is true -all the same. - -The Allies did not anticipate more than the holding of the Ottoman -forces in check and the occupation of the frontiers and of the upper -valleys of the Vardar and Struma. Greece felt that she would be -rewarded by a slight rectification of boundary in Thessaly and Epirus, -if only the war would settle the status of Crete and result in an -autonomous _régime_ for the Ægean Islands. At the most, the Balkan -States hoped to force upon Turkey the autonomy of Macedonia under a -Christian governor. So jealous was each of the possibility of -another's gaining control of Macedonia that this solution would have -satisfied them more than the complete disappearance of Turkish rule. -Both hopes and fears as to Macedonia were envisaged rather in -connection with each other than in connection with the Turks. - -Between Servia and Bulgaria there was a definite treaty, signed on -March 13, 1912, which defined future spheres of influence in upper -Macedonia. But Greece had no agreement either with Bulgaria or Servia. - -The events of October, 1912, astonished the whole world. No such -sudden and complete collapse of the Ottoman power in Europe was dreamed -of. I {321} have already spoken of how fearful the European -Chancelleries were of an Ottoman victory. Had they not been so morally -certain of Turkey's triumph they would never have sent to the -belligerents their famous--and in the light of subsequent events -ridiculous--joint note concerning the _status quo_. - -But if the Great Powers were unprepared for the succession of Balkan -triumphs, the allies were much more astonished at what they were able -to accomplish. Kirk Kilissé and Lulé Burgas gave Thrace to Bulgaria. -Kumanovo opened up the valley of the Vardar to the Servians, while the -Greeks marched straight to Salonika without serious opposition. - -The victories of the Servians and Greeks, so easily won, were to the -Bulgarians a calamity which overshadowed their own striking military -successes. They had spilled much blood and wasted their strength in -the conquest of Thrace which they did not want, while their allies--but -rivals for all that--were in possession of Macedonia, the _Bulgaria -irredenta_. To be encircling Adrianople and besieging Constantinople, -cities in which they had only secondary interest, while the Servians -attacked Monastir and the Greeks were settling themselves comfortably -in Salonika, was the irony of fate for those who felt that others were -reaping the fruits for which they had made so great and so admirable a -sacrifice. - -When we come to judge dispassionately the folly of Bulgaria in -provoking a war with her comrades in arms, and the seemingly amazing -greed for land which it revealed, we must remember that the Bulgarians -felt that they had accomplished everything {322} to receive nothing. -Salonika and not Adrianople was the city of their dreams. Macedonia -and not Thrace was the country which they had taken arms to liberate. -The Ægean Sea and not the extension of their Black Sea littoral formed -the substantial and logical economic background to the appeal of race -which led them to insist so strongly in gathering under their -sovereignty all the elements of the Bulgarian people. European writers -have not been able to understand how little importance the Bulgarians -attached to their territorial acquisitions in Thrace, and of how little -interest it was for them to acquire new possessions in which there were -so few Bulgarians. - -Then, too, the powerful elements which had pushed Bulgaria into the war -with Turkey, and had contributed so greatly to her successes, were of -Macedonian origin. In Sofia, the Macedonians are numerically, as well -as financially and politically, very strong. I had a revelation of -this, such as the compilation of statistics cannot give, on the day -after the massacre of Kotchana. The newspapers called upon all the -Macedonians in Sofia to put out flags tied with crêpe. In the main -streets of the city, it seemed as if every second house was that of a -Macedonian. To these people, ardent and powerful patriots, Macedonia -was home. It had been the dream of their lives to unite the regions -from which they had come--once emancipated from the Turks--to the -mother country. From childhood, they had been taught to look towards -the Rhodope Mountains as the hills from which should come their help. -Is it any wonder then, that, after the striking victories {323} of -their arms, there should be a feeling of insanity--for it was -that--when they saw the dreams of a lifetime about to vanish? - -But the mischief of the matter, as a Scotchman would say, was that -Greeks and Servians felt the same way about the same places. -Populations had been mixed for centuries. At some time or other in -past history each of the three peoples had had successful dynasties to -spread their sovereignty over exactly the same territories. Each then -could evoke the same historical memories, each the same past of -suffering, each the same present of hopes, and the same prayers of the -emancipated towards Sofia and Athens and Belgrade. - -After the occupation of Salonika by the Greeks, the Bulgarian ambitions -to break the power of Turkey were not the same as they had been before. -Had Salonika been occupied two weeks earlier, there might not have been -a Lulé Burgas. An armistice was hurriedly concluded. During the -trying period of negotiations in London, and during the whole of the -second part of the war, the jealousies of the allies had been awakened -one against the other. Between Greeks and Bulgarians, it had been keen -since the very first moment that the Greek army entered Macedonia. The -crisis between Servia and Bulgaria did not become acute until Servia -saw her way blocked to the Adriatic by the absurd attempt to create a -free Albania. Then she naturally began to insist that the treaty of -partition which she had signed with Bulgaria could not be carried out -by her. In vain she appealed to the sense of justice of the -Bulgarians. {324} The treaty had been signed on the understanding that -Albania would fall under the sphere of Servian aggrandizement. Nor, on -the other hand, had it been contested that Thrace would belong to -Bulgaria. If the treaty were carried out, Bulgaria would get -everything and Servia nothing. Servia also reminded the Bulgarians of -the loyal aid that had been given them in the reduction of Adrianople. -But Bulgaria held to her pound of flesh. - -Under the circumstances of the division of territory, Bulgaria's claim -to cross the Vardar and go as far as Monastir and Okrida, would not -only have given her possession of a fortress from which she could -dominate both Servia and Greece, but would have put another state -between Servia and Salonika. Bulgaria was, in fact, demanding -everything as far as Servia was concerned. Servia cannot be blamed -then for coming to an understanding with Greece, even if it were for -support in the violation of a treaty. For where does history give us -the example of a nation holding to a treaty when it was against her -interest to do so? - -After their return from London, the Premiers Venizelos and Pasitch made -an offensive and defensive alliance for ten years against the Bulgarian -aspirations. In this alliance, concluded at Athens shortly after King -George's death, the frontiers were definitely settled. In the -negotiations, Greece showed the same desire to have everything for -herself which Bulgaria was displaying. Finally she agreed to allow -Servia to keep Monastir. Without this concession, Servia would have -fared as badly {325} at the hands of Greece as at the hands of -Bulgaria. It is only because Greece feared that Servia might be driven -to combine with Bulgaria against her, that the frontier in this -agreement was drawn south of Monastir. The Greek army officers opposed -strongly this concession, but Venizelos was wise enough to see that the -maintenance of Greek claims to Monastir might result in the loss of -Salonika. The Serbo-Greek alliance was not made public until the -middle of June. Bulgaria had also been making overtures to Greece, and -at the end of May had expressed her willingness to waive her claim to -Salonika in return for Greek support against Servia. Venizelos, -already bound to Servia, was honourable enough to refuse this -proposition. - -But the military reputation of Bulgaria was still so strong in -Bulgarian diplomacy that Servia and Greece were anxious to arrive, if -possible, at an arrangement without war. Venizelos proposed a meeting -at Salonika. Bulgaria declined. Then Venizelos and Pasitch together -proposed the arbitration of the Czar. Bulgaria at the first seemed to -receive this proposition favourably, but stipulated that it would be -only for the disputed matter in her treaty with Servia. At this -moment, the Russian Czar sent a moving appeal to the Balkan States to -avoid the horrors of a fratricidal war. Bulgaria then agreed to send, -together with her Allies, delegates to a conference at Petrograd. - -All the while, Premier Gueshoff of Bulgaria had been struggling for -peace against the pressure and the intrigues of the Macedonian party at -Sofia. {326} They looked upon the idea of a Petrograd conference as -the betrayal of Macedonians and Bulgarians by the mother country. -Unable to maintain his position, Gueshoff resigned. His withdrawal -ruined Bulgaria, for he was replaced by M. Daneff, who was heart and -soul with the Macedonian party. A period of waiting followed. But -from this moment war seemed inevitable to those who knew the feeling on -both sides. Daneff and his friends did not hesitate. They would not -listen to reason. They believed that they had the power to force -Greece and Servia to a peace very nearly on their own terms. Public -opinion was behind them, for news was continually coming to Sofia of -Greek and Servian oppression of Bulgarians in the region between -Monastir and Salonika. These stories of unspeakable cruelty, which -were afterwards established to be true by the Carnegie Commission, had -much to do with making possible the second war. - -It was not difficult for the Macedonian party at Sofia to precipitate -hostilities. The Bulgarian general staff, in spite of the caution that -should have imposed itself upon them by the consideration of the -exhausting campaign in the winter, felt certain of their ability to -defeat the Servians and Greeks combined. Then, too, the army on the -frontiers, in which there was a large element--perhaps twenty per -cent.--of Macedonians, had already engaged in serious conflicts with -the Greeks. - -In fact, frontier skirmishes had begun in April. The affair of Nigrita -was really a battle. After these outbreaks, Bulgarian and Greek -officers had {327} been compelled to establish a neutral zone in order -to prevent the new war from beginning of itself. At the end of May, -there had been fighting in the Panghaeon district, east of the river -Strymon. The Bulgarian staff had wanted to prevent the Greeks from -being in a position to cut the railway from Serres to Drama. In the -beginning of June, Bulgarian coast patrols had fired on the _Averoff_. -By the end of June, the Bulgarian outposts were not far from Salonika. - -The first Bulgarian plan was to seize suddenly Salonika, which would -thus cut off the Greek army from its base of supplies and its -advantageous communication by sea with Greece. There were nearly one -thousand five hundred Bulgarian soldiers in Salonika under the command -of General Hassapsieff. How many _comitadjis_ had been introduced into -the city no one knows. I was there during the last week of June, and -saw many Bulgarian peasants, big strapping fellows, who seemed to have -no occupation. When I visited the Bulgarian company, which was -quartered in the historic mosque of St. Sophia, two days before their -destruction, they seemed to me to be absolutely sure of their position. -At this moment, the atmosphere among the few Bulgarians in Salonika was -that of complete confidence. - -Among the Greeks, a spirit of excitement and of apprehension made them -realize the gravity and the dangers of the events which were so soon to -follow. Perfect confidence, while highly recommended by the theorists, -does not seem to win wars. Nervousness, {328} on the other hand, makes -an army alert, and ready to exert all the greater effort, from the fact -that it feels it needs that effort. In all the wars with which this -book deals this has been true,--Italian confidence in 1911, Turkish -confidence in 1912, Bulgarian confidence in 1913, and German confidence -in 1914. - -On the 29th of June, when I left Salonika to go to Albania, it was the -opinion of the Greek officers in Salonika that the war--which they -viewed with apprehension--would be averted by the conference at -Petrograd. When I got on my steamship, the first man I met was -Sandansky, who had become famous a decade before by the capture of Miss -Stone, an American missionary. He had embarked on this Austrian Lloyd -steamer at Kavalla, with the expectation of slipping ashore at -Salonika, if possible, to prepare the way for the triumphal entry of -the Bulgarian army. But he was only able to look sorrowfully out on -the city, for the police were waiting to arrest him. What bitter -thoughts he must have had when he saw the Bulgarian flag, which he had -planted there with his own hands, waving from the minaret of St. -Sophia, and he unable to organize its defence! A week later I saw -Sandansky at a café in Valona. The war had then started, and he was -probably trying to persuade the Albanians to enter the struggle and to -take the Servians in the rear. - -{330} - -CHAPTER XVI - -THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES - -On Sunday night, June 29th, without any declaration of war or even -warning, General Savoff ordered a general attack all along the Greek -and Servian lines. There was no direct provocation on the part of -Bulgaria's allies. - -The responsibility for precipitating the war which brought about the -humiliation of Bulgaria can be directly fixed. Two general orders, -dated from the military headquarters at Sofia on June 29th, have been -published. They set forth an amazing and devilish scheme, which stands -out as a most cold and bloody calculation, even among all the horrors -of Balkan history. General Savoff stated positively that this -energetic action was not the commencement of a war. It was merely for -the purpose of occupying as much territory as possible in the contested -regions before the intervention of the Powers. It had a two-fold -object: to cut the communications between the Greeks and Servians at -Veles (Küprülü) on the Vardar, and to throw an army suddenly into -Salonika. The fighting began in the night-time. The Bulgarians -naturally were able to advance into a number of important positions. - -{331} - -When the news became known at Salonika on the morning of the 30th, -General Hassapsieff, on the ground that he was a diplomatic agent, was -allowed to leave. Before his departure he gave an order to his forces -to resist, if they were attacked, as he would return with the Bulgarian -army in twenty-four hours. - -Early in the afternoon the Greeks sent an ultimatum ordering the -Bulgarians in Salonika to surrender by six o'clock. Their refusal led -to all-night street fighting. Barricaded in St. Sophia and several -other buildings, they were able to defend themselves until the Greeks -turned artillery upon their places of refuge. Not many were killed on -either side. Salonika was calm again the next day. One thousand three -hundred Bulgarian soldiers and a number of prominent Bulgarian -residents of Salonika, under conditions of exceptional cruelty and -barbarism, were sent to Crete. The Greek forces in Salonika, among -whom were some twenty thousand from America, were hurried to the -outposts for the defence of the city. - -There was no diplomatic action following the treachery of the -Bulgarians towards their allies. The Greek Foreign Minister stated -that Greece considered the Bulgarian attack an act of war, and that the -Greek army had been ordered to advance immediately to retake the -positions which the Bulgarians had captured. Nor did Servia show any -disposition to treat with Bulgaria. No official communications reached -Sofia from a Great Power. There had been a miscalculation. Bulgaria -was {332} compelled, as a consequence of her ill-considered act, to -face a new war. There was no withdrawal possible. - -From a purely military point of view, it seems hard to believe that the -Bulgarians really thought that their night attack would bring about -war. Their army had borne the brunt of the campaign against the Turks, -and had suffered terribly during the winter spent in the trenches -before Tchatalja. They were not in a good strategic position, for the -army was spread out over a long line, and the character of the country -made concentration difficult. Adequate railway communication with the -bases of supplies was lacking. The Greeks and Servians, on the other -hand, held not only the railway from Salonika to Nish through the -valley of the Vardar, but even were it successfully cut, had -communication by railway with their bases at Salonika, Monastir, -Mitrovitza, Uskub, and Nish. - -General Ivanoff, in command of the second Bulgarian army, was charged -with confronting the whole of the Greek forces, in a line passing from -the Ægean Sea to Demir-Hissar on the Vardar, between Serres and -Salonika. When we realize that General Ivanoff had less than fifty -thousand men, a portion of whom were recruits from the region of -Serres, and that he had to guard against an attack on his right flank -from the Servians, we cannot help wondering what the Bulgarian general -staff had counted upon in provoking their allies to battle. Did they -expect that the Greeks and Servians would be intimidated by the night -attack of June 29th, and would {333} agree to continue the project of a -conference at Petrograd? Or did they think that the Greek army was of -so little value that they could brush it aside, and enter Salonika, -just as the Greeks had been able to enter in November? Whatever -hypothesis we adopt, it shows contempt for their opponents and belief -in their own star. The proof of the fact that the Bulgarians never -dreamed of anything but the success of their "bluff," or, if there was -resistance, of an easy victory, is found in the few troops at the -disposal of General Ivanoff, and in the choice of Doiran, so near the -front of battle, as the base of supplies. At Doiran everything that -the second army needed in provisions and munitions of war was stored. -From the financial standpoint alone, Bulgaria could not afford to risk -the loss of these supplies. - -On July 2d, the Greek army, under the command of Crown Prince -Constantine, took the offensive against the Bulgarians, who had -occupied on the previous day the crest of Beshikdag, from the mouth of -the Struma to the plateau of Lahana, across the road from Salonika to -Serres, and the heights north of Lake Ardzan, commanding the left bank -of the Vardar. The positions were strong. If the Greek army had been -of the calibre that the Bulgarians evidently expected, or if General -Ivanoff had had sufficient forces to hold the positions against the -Greek attack, there would undoubtedly have been _pourparlers_, and a -probable cessation of hostilities just as the Bulgarians counted upon. - -But the Greeks soon proved that they were as brave and as determined as -their opponents. Their {334} artillery fire was excellent. There was -no wavering before the deadly resistance of the entrenched Bulgarians. -After five days of struggle, in which both sides showed equal courage, -the forces of General Ivanoff yielded to superior numbers. The -Bulgarians were compelled to retreat, on July 6th, in two columns, -towards Demir-Hissar and Strumitza. The retreat was effected in good -order, and the Greeks, though in possession of mobile artillery, could -not surround either column. Victory had been purchased at a terrible -price. The Greek losses in five days were greater than during the -whole war with Turkey. They admitted ten thousand _hors du combat_. -The Greeks had received their first serious baptism of fire, and had -demonstrated that they could fight. The Turks had never given them the -opportunity to wipe out the disgrace of 1897. - -It is a tribute to the quickness of decision of the Crown Prince -Constantine and his general staff, and to the spirit of his soldiers, -that this severe trial of five days of continuous fighting and fearful -loss of life was not followed by a respite. The Greek headquarters -were moved to Doiran on the 7th. It was decided to maintain the -offensive as long as the army had strength to march and men to fill the -gaps made by the fall of thousands every day. The Bulgarians, although -they contested desperately every step, were kept on the move. On the -right, the Greeks pushed through to Serres, joining there, on July -11th, the advance-guard of the detachments which the Greek fleet had -landed at Kavalla on the 9th. - -{335} - -The advance of the Greek armies was along the Vardar, the Struma, and -the Mesta. On the Vardar, the Bulgarian abandonment of Demir-Hissar, -on the 10th, enabled the Greeks to repair the railway, and establish -communication with the Servian army. The right wing, advancing by the -Mesta, occupied Drama. On July 19th, the Bulgarian resistance was -concentrated at Nevrokop. When it broke here, the Greek right wing was -able to send its outposts to the foothills of the Rhodope Mountains, on -the Bulgarian frontier. - -The Greeks began to speak of the invasion of Bulgaria, and of making -peace at Sofia. But the bulk of their forces met an invincible -resistance at Simitli. From the 23d to the 26th, they attacked the -Bulgarian positions, and believed that the advantage was theirs. But -on the 27th the Bulgarians began a counter-attack against both wings of -the Greek army at once. On the 29th, the Greeks began to plan their -retreat. On the 30th, they realized that the retreat was no longer -possible. The Bulgarians were on both their flanks. It was then that -the armistice saved them. - -While the Greek army was gaining its victories in the _hinterland_ of -Macedonia, the ports of the Ægean coast, Kavalla, Makri, Porto-Lagos, -and Dedeagatch were occupied without resistance by the Greek fleet. -Detachments withdrawn from Epirus were brought to these ports. Some -went to Serres and Drama. Others garrisoned the ports, and occupied -Xanthi and other nearby inland towns. - -The Bulgarians may have had some reason to {336} discount the value of -the Greek army. For it had not yet been tried. But the Servians had -shown from the very first day of the war with Turkey that they -possessed high military qualities. The courage of their troops was -coupled with agility. They had had more experience than the Bulgarians -and Greeks in quick marches, and in breaking up their forces into -numerous columns. There is probably no army in Europe to-day which can -equal the Servians in mobility. It is incredible that the Bulgarians -could have hoped to surprise the Servians, and find a weak place -anywhere along their lines. On the defensive, in localities which they -had come to know intimately by nine months in the field, it would have -taken a larger force than the Bulgarians could muster to get the better -of soldiers such as the Servians had proved themselves to be. - -Whether it was by scorn for the Greeks, or by appreciation of the -Servian concentration, the Bulgarians had planned to confront the -Servians with four of their five armies. We have already seen that -General Ivanoff had the second army alone to oppose to the Greeks, and -that even a few battalions of his troops were needed on the Servian -flank. - -The engagements between the Bulgarians and the Servians had two -distinct fields of action, one in Macedonia, and the other on the -Bulgaro-Servian frontier. - -In Macedonia, the Bulgarians experienced the same surprise in regard to -the Servians as in regard to the Greeks. Their sudden attack of June -30th did not strike terror to the hearts of their opponents. {337} -Instead of gaining for them a favourable diplomatic position, they -found that the Servians did not even suggest a parley. On July 1st, -the Servians started a counter-attack, and kept a steady offensive -against their former allies for eight days. Gradually the Bulgarians, -along the Bregalnitza, gave ground, retreating from position to -position, always with their face towards the enemy. The battle, after -the first day, was for the Bulgarians a defensive action all along the -line. - -On July 4th, General Dimitrieff assumed the functions of generalissimo -of the Bulgarian forces. He tried his best to check the Servian -offensive. But the aggressive spirit had gone out of the Bulgarian -army. Lulé Burgas could not be repeated. It was incapable of more -than a stubborn resistance to the Servian advance. By July 8th, the -Servians were masters of the approaches to Istip, and had cleared the -Bulgarians out of the territory which led down into the valley of the -Vardar. Then they stopped. From this time on to the signing of the -armistice, the Macedonian Servian army was content with the victories -of the first week. - -Along the Servian-Bulgarian frontier, the Bulgarian army had some -initial success. But General Kutincheff did not dispose of enough men -to make possible a successful aggressive movement towards Nish. From -the very first, when the Macedonian army failed to advance, the -Bulgarian plans for an invasion of Servia fell to the ground. They had -based everything upon an advance in Macedonia to the Vardar. So the -forward movement wavered. {338} The Servians, now sure of Rumanian -co-operation, advanced in turn towards Widin. General Kutincheff was -compelled to fall back on Sofia by the Rumanian invasion. Widin was -invested by the Servians on July 23d. - -Rumania had watched with alarm the rise of the military power of -Bulgaria. She could not intervene in the first Balkan war on the side -of the Turks. The civilized world would not have countenanced such a -move, nor would it have had the support of Rumanian public opinion. -Whatever the menace of Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula, -Rumania had to wait until peace had been signed between the allies and -the Turks. But, as we have already seen, during the first negotiations -at London, her Minister to Great Britain had been instructed to treat -with Bulgaria for a cession of territory from the Danube at Silistria -to the Black Sea, in order that Rumania might have the strategic -frontier which the Congress of Berlin ought to have given her, when the -Dobrudja was awarded to her, without her consent, in exchange for -Bessarabia. As Rumania had helped to free Bulgaria in 1877-78, and had -never received any reward for her great sacrifices, while the -Bulgarians had done little to win their own independence, the demand of -a rectification of frontier was historically reasonable. Since Rumania -had so admirably developed the Dobrudja, and had constructed the port -of Constanza, it was justified from the economic standpoint. For the -possession of Silivria, and a change of frontier on the Dobrudja, was -the only means by which Rumania {339} could hope to defend her southern -frontier from attack. - -At first, the Bulgarians bitterly opposed any compensation to Rumania. -They discounted the importance of her neutrality, for they knew that -she could not act against them as long as they were at war with Turkey. -They denounced the demands of Rumania, perfectly reasonable as they -were, as "blackmail." They were too blinded with the dazzling glory of -their unexpected victories against the Turks to realize how essential -the friendship of Rumania--at least, the neutrality of Rumania--was to -their schemes for taking all Macedonia to themselves. When, in April, -they signed with very ill grace the cession of Silivria, as a -compromise, and refused to yield the small strip of territory from -Silivria to Kavarna on the Black Sea, the Bulgarians made a fatal -political mistake. It was madness enough to go into the second Balkan -war in the belief that they could frighten, or, if that failed, -overwhelm the Servians and Greeks. What shall we call the failure to -take into their political calculations the possibility of a Rumanian -intervention? Even if there were not the question of the frontier in -the Dobrudja, would not Rumanian intervention still be justified by the -consideration of preserving the balance of power in the Balkans? By -intervening, Rumania would be acting, in her small corner of the world, -just as the larger nations of Europe had acted time and again since the -sixteenth century. - -The Rumanian mobilization commenced on July {340} 3d. On July 10th, -Rumania declared war, and crossed the Danube. The Bulgarians decided -that they would not oppose the Rumanian invasion. How could they? -Already their armies were on the defensive, and hard pressed, by Greeks -and Servians. There is a limit to what a few hundred thousand men -could do. It is possible, though not probable, that the Bulgarian -armies might have gained the upper hand in the end against their former -allies in Macedonia. But with Rumania bringing into the field a fresh -army, larger than that of any other Balkan States, Bulgaria's case was -hopeless. The Rumanians advanced without opposition, and began to -march upon Sofia. They occupied, on July 15th, the seaport of Varna, -from which the Bulgarian fleet had withdrawn to Sebastopol. - -It would have been easy for the Rumanians to have occupied Sofia, and -waited there for the Servian and Greek armies to arrive. The -humiliation of Bulgaria could have been made complete. Why, then, the -armistice of July 30th? Why the assembling hastily of a peace -conference at Bukarest? Political and financial, as well as military, -considerations dictated the wisdom of granting to Bulgaria an armistice. - -Greece and Servia were exhausted financially, and their armies could -gain little more than glory by continuing the war. The Greek army, in -fact, was in a critical position, and ran the risk of being surrounded -and crushed by the Bulgarians. The Servians had not shown much hurry -to come to the aid of the Greeks. The truth of the matter is that, -{341} after the battle of the Bregalnitza, which ended on July 10th, -the Servians began to get very nervous about the successes of their -Greek allies. They knew well the Greek character, and feared that too -easy victories over the Bulgarians might necessitate a third war with -Greece over Monastir. So, on July 11th, with the ostensible reason -that such a measure was necessary to protect their rear against the -Albanians, the Servian general staff withdrew from the front a number -of the best regiments, and placed them in a position where they could -act, if the Greeks tried to seize Monastir. On the other hand, Rumania -gave both Greece and Servia to understand that she had entered the war, -not from any altruistic desire to help them, but for her own interests. -To see Bulgaria too greatly humiliated and weakened was decidedly no -more to the interest of Rumania than to see her triumphant. - -As for Montenegro, she had entered the second Balkan war to give loyal -support to Servia, from whom she expected in return a generous spirit -in dividing the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar. Her co-operation, however, as -I am able to state from having been in Cettinje when the decision was -taken to send ten thousand men against Bulgaria, was not made the -subject of any bargain. So, when Servia thought best to sign the -armistice, Montenegro was in thorough accord. - -After a month of fighting, in which the losses had been far greater -than during the war with Turkey, and the treatment of non-combatants by -all the armies horrible beyond description, the scene of {342} battle -shifted from the blood-stained mountains and valleys of Macedonia to -the council chamber at Bukarest. Rumania was to preside over a Balkan -Congress of Berlin! - - - - -{343} - -CHAPTER XVII - -THE TREATY OF BUKAREST - -When the delegates from the various important capitals reached Bukarest -on July 30th, the armies were still fighting. Everyone, however, -seemed anxious to come to an understanding as soon as possible. The -first session of the delegates was held on the afternoon of July 30th. -Premier Pasitch for Servia and Premier Venizelos for Greece were -present. But Premier Daneff, who had so wanted the war, did not have -the manhood to face its consequences. The Bulgarians were represented -in Bukarest by no outstanding leader, either political or military. -Premier Majoresco of Rumania presided over the conference. The first -necessity was the decision for an armistice. A suspension of arms was -agreed upon to begin upon August 1st at noon. On August 4th the -armistice was extended for three days to August 8th. - -In the conference of Bukarest, Bulgaria, naturally, stood by herself. -It was necessary, if there was to be peace, that her delegates should -come to an understanding as to the sacrifices she was willing to make -with each of her neighbours separately. {344} Consequently the -important decisions were made in committee meetings. The general -assembly of delegates had little else to do than to ratify the -concessions wrung from Bulgaria in turn by each of the opponents. - -Rarely have peace delegates been put in a more painful position than -the men whom Bulgaria sent to Bukarest. It will always be an open -question as to whether the military situation of Bulgaria on the 31st -of July, as regards Servia and Greece, was retrievable. But the -presence of a Rumanian army in Bulgaria made absolutely impossible the -continuance of the war. Consequently there was nothing for Bulgaria to -do but to yield to the demands of Greece and Servia. The only check -upon the Servian and Greek delegates was the determination of Rumania -not to see Bulgaria too greatly weakened. She had entered into line to -gain her bit of territory in the south of the Dobrudja. But she had -also in mind the prevention of Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkan -Peninsula, and she did not propose to see this hegemony go elsewhere. -This explains the favourable terms which Bulgaria received. - -The Bulgarian and Rumanian delegates quickly agreed upon a frontier to -present to the meeting of August 4th. By this, the first of the -protocols, Bulgaria ceded to Rumania all her territory north of a line -from the Danube, above Turtukaia, to the end of the Black Sea, south of -Ekrene. In addition, she bound herself to dismantle the present -fortresses and promised not to construct forts at Rustchuk, Schumla, -and the country between and for twenty kilometres around Baltchik. - -{345} - -On August 6th, the protocol with Servia was presented. The Servian -frontier was to start at a line drawn from the summit of Patarika on -the old frontier, and to follow the watershed between the Vardar and -the Struma to the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, with the exception of the -upper valley of the Strumnitza which remained Servian territory. - -The following day the protocol with Greece was presented. The -Greek-Bulgarian frontier was to run from the crest of Belashitcha to -the mouth of the River Mesta on the Ægean Sea. Bulgaria formally -agreed to waive all pretensions to Crete. The protocol with the Greeks -was the only one over which the Bulgarians made a resolute stand. When -they signed this protocol, they stated that the accord was only because -they had taken notice of the notes which Austria-Hungary and Russia -presented to the conference, to the effect that in their ratification -they would reserve for future discussion the inclusion of Kavalla in -Greek territory. - -The Bulgarians insisted on a clause guaranteeing autonomy for churches -and schools in the condominium of liberated territories. Servia -opposed this demand mildly, and Greece strongly. They were right. The -question of national propaganda through churches and schools had done -more to arouse and keep alive racial hatred in Macedonia than any other -cause. If there were to be a lasting peace, nothing could be more -unwise than the continuance of the propaganda which had plunged -Macedonia into such terrible confusion. - -Rumania, however, secured in the Treaty of {346} Bukarest from each of -the States what they had been unwilling to grant each other. Rumania -imposed upon Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia, the obligation of granting -autonomy to the Kutzo-Wallachian churches, and assent to the creation -of bishoprics subsidized by the Rumanian Government. - -A rather amusing incident occurred on August 5th by the proposition of -the United States Government through its Minister at Bukarest, that a -provision be embodied in the treaty according full religious liberties -in transferred territories. The ignorance of American diplomacy, so -frequently to be deplored, never made a greater blunder than this. It -showed how completely the American State Department and its advisors on -Near Eastern affairs had misunderstood the Macedonian question. Quite -rightly, the consideration even of this request was rejected as -superfluous. Mr. Venizelos administered a well-deserved rebuke when he -said that religious liberty, in the right sense of the word, was -understood through the extension of each country's constitution over -the territories acquired. - -Much has been written concerning the intrigues of European Powers at -Bukarest during the ten days of the conference which made a new map for -the Balkan Peninsula. It will be many years, if ever, before these -intrigues are brought to light. Therefore we cannot discuss the -question of the pressure which was brought to bear upon Rumania, upon -Bulgaria, and upon Servia and Greece to determine the partition of -territories. Germany looked with alarm upon the possibility of a -durable {347} settlement. Austria was determined that Bulgaria and -Servia should not become reconciled. - -Austria-Hungary and Russia, though for different reasons, were right in -their attitude toward the matter of Greece's claim upon Kavalla. -Greece would have done well had she been content to leave to Bulgaria a -larger littoral on the Ægean Sea, and the port which is absolutely -essential for the proper economic development of the _hinterland_ -attributed to her. By taking her pound of flesh, the Greeks only -exposed themselves to future dangers. The laws of economics are -inexorable. Bulgaria cannot allow herself to think sincerely about -peace until her portion of Macedonia, by the inclusion of Kavalla, is -logically complete. It would have been better politics for Greece to -have shown herself magnanimous on this point. As George Sand has so -aptly said: "It is not philanthropy, but our own interest, which leads -us sometimes to do good to men in order that they may be prevented in -the future from doing harm to us." - -When we come to look back upon the second Balkan war, and have traced -out the sad consequences and the continued unrest which followed the -Treaty of Bukarest, it is possible that Servia's responsibility may be -considered as great, if not greater, than that of Bulgaria in bringing -about the strife between the allies. In our sympathy with the inherent -justice of Servia's claim for adequate territorial compensation for -what she had suffered for, and what she had contributed to, the Turkish -_débâcle_ in Europe, we are apt to overlook three {348} indisputable -facts: that Servia repudiated a solemn treaty with Bulgaria, on the -basis of which Bulgaria had agreed to the alliance against Turkey; that -the territories granted to Servia, _south of the line which she had -sworn not to pass in her territorial claims_, and a portion of those in -the "contested zone" of her treaty with Bulgaria, were beyond any -shadow of doubt inhabited by Bulgarians; and that since these -territories were ceded to her she has not, as was tacitly understood at -Bukarest, extended to them the guarantees and privileges of the Servian -constitution. - -The Treaty of Bukarest, so far as the disputed territories allotted to -Servia are concerned, has created a situation analogous to that of -Alsace and Lorraine after the Treaty of Frankfort. And Servia started -in to cope with it by following Prussian methods. What Servians of -Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia have suffered from Austrian rule, -free Servia is inflicting upon the Bulgarians who became her subjects -after the second Balkan war. - -It would not be an exaggeration to say that the population of -Macedonia, as a whole, of whatever race or creed, would welcome to-day -a return to the Ottoman rule of Abdul Hamid. The Turkish -"constitutional _régime_" was worse than Abdul Hamid, the war of -"liberation" worse than the Young Turks, and the present disposition of -territories satisfies none. Poor Macedonia! - -After the disastrous and humiliating losses at Bukarest, Bulgaria still -had her former vanquished foe to reckon with. The Turks were again at -Adrianople {349} and Kirk Kilissé. Thrace was once more in her power. -The Treaty of Bukarest, while attributing Thrace to Bulgaria on the -basis of the Treaty of London, actually said nothing whatever about it. -Nor were there any promises of aid in helping Bulgaria to get back -again what she had lost, without a struggle, by her folly and treachery. - -A new war by Bulgaria alone in her weakened military condition and with -her empty treasury, to drive once more the Turks back south of the -Enos-Midia line, was impossible. Bulgaria appealed to the -chancelleries of Europe to help her in taking possession of the -Thracian territory ceded to her at London. The Powers made one of -their futile overtures to Turkey, requesting that she accept the treaty -which she had signed a few months before. - -But no one could blame the Turks for having taken advantage of -Bulgarian folly. Who could expect them to meekly withdraw behind the -Enos-Midia line? Bulgaria could get no support in applying the -argument of force. - -In the end, the victors of Lulé Burgas had to go to Constantinople and -make overtures directly to the Sublime Porte. They fared very badly. -The Enos-Midia line was drawn, but it took a curve northward from the -Black Sea and westward across the Maritza in such a way that the Turks -obtained not only Adrianople, but also Kirk Kilissé and Demotica. The -Bulgarians were not even masters of the one railway leading to -Dedeagatch, their sole port on the Ægean Sea. - -The year 1913 for Bulgaria will remain the most {350} bitter one of her -history. She had to learn the lesson that the life of nations, as well -as of individuals, is one of give as well as take, and that compromise -is the basis of sound statesmanship. Who wants all, generally gets -nothing. - - - - -{351} - -CHAPTER XVIII - -THE ALBANIAN FIASCO - -The world has not known just what to do with the mountainous country -which comes out in a bend on the upper western side of the Balkan -Peninsula directly opposite the heel of Italy. It caused trouble to -the Romans from the very moment that they became an extra-Italian -power. Inherited from them by the Byzantines, fought for with the -varying fortunes by the Frankish princes, the Venetians, and the Turks, -Albania has remained a country which cannot be said to have ever been -wholly subjected. Nor can it be said to have ever had a national -entity. Its present mediæval condition is due to the fact that, owing -to its high mountains and its being on the road to nowhere, it has not, -since the Roman days at least, undergone the influences of a -contemporary civilization. - -Venice recognized the importance of Albania during the days of her -commercial prosperity. For the Albanian coast, with its two splendid -harbours, of Valona and Durazzo, effectively guards the entrance of the -Adriatic into the Mediterranean Sea. - -But Albania did not demand attention a hundred years ago when the last -map of Europe was being {352} made by the Congress of Vienna. The -reason for this is simple. Italy was not a political whole. The head -of the Adriatic was entirely in the hands of Austria. There was no -thought at that time of our modern navies, and of the importance of -keeping open the Straits of Otranto. It was the Dalmatian coast, north -of Albania, which Austria considered essential to her commercial -supremacy. Then, too, Greece had not yet received her freedom, and the -Servians had not risen in rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. There -were no Slavic, Hellenic, and Italian questions to disturb Austria in -her peaceful possession of the Adriatic Sea. - -It was not until the union of Italy had been accomplished, and the -south Slavic nationalities had formed themselves into political units, -that Albania became a "question" in the chancelleries of Europe. - -Austria-Hungary determined that Italy should not get a foothold in -Albania. Italy had the same determination in regard to -Austria-Hungary. Since the last Russo-Turkish War, Austria-Hungary and -Italy have had the united determination to keep the Slavs from reaching -the Adriatic. For the past generation, feeling certain that the end of -the Ottoman Empire was at hand, Austria and Italy through their -missionaries, their schools, and their consular and commercial agents, -have struggled hard against each other to secure the ascendancy in -Albania. Their intrigues have not ceased up to this day. - -When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Young Turk -oppression of the Albanians aroused the first expression of what might -possibly {353} be called national feeling since the time of Skander -bey's resistance to the Ottoman conquest, the rival Powers, instead of -following in the line of Russia and Great Britain in Persia, and -establishing spheres of interest, agreed to support the Albanian -national movement as the best possible check upon Servian and Greek -national aspirations. This was the status of Albania in her -relationship to the Adriatic Powers, when the war of the Balkan States -against Turkey broke out. The accord between Austria and Italy had -stood the strain of Italy's war with Turkey. Largely owing to their -fear of Russia and to the pressure of Germany, it stood the strain of -the Balkan War. But both Italy and Austria let it be known to the -other Powers that if the Turkish Empire in Europe disappeared, there -must be an independent Albania. - -This dictum was accepted in principle by the other four Powers, who saw -in it the only possible chance of preventing the outbreak of a conflict -between Austria and Russia which would be bound to involve all Europe -in war. No nation wanted to fight over the question of Albania. -Russia could not hope to have support from Great Britain and France to -impose upon the Triple Alliance her desire for a Slavic outlet to the -Adriatic. For neither France nor Great Britain was anxious for the -Russian to get to the Mediterranean. The accord between the Powers was -shown in the warning given to Greece and Servia that the solution of -the Albanian question must be reserved for the Powers when a treaty of -peace was signed with Turkey. The accord weathered {354} the severe -test put upon it by the bold defiance of the Montenegrin occupation of -Scutari. - -We have spoken elsewhere of the policy of the Young Turks towards -Albania. This most useful and loyal corner of the Sultan's dominions -was turned into a country of perennial revolutions, which started soon -after the inauguration of the constitutional _régime_. In the winter -of 1911-1912, when the group of Albanian deputies in the Ottoman -Parliament saw their demands for reforms rejected by the Cabinet, and -even the right of discussion of their complaints refused on the floor -of Parliament, the Albanians north and south, Catholic and Moslem, -united in a resistance to the Turkish authorities that extended to -Uskub and Monastir. After the spring elections of 1912, the resistance -became a formidable revolt. For the Young Turks had rashly manoeuvred -the balloting with more than Tammany skill. The Albanians were left -without representatives in Parliament! Former deputies, such as Ismail -Kemal bey, Hassan bey, and chiefs such as Isa Boletinatz, Idris Sefer, -and Ali Riza joined in a determination to demand autonomy by force of -arms. - -When, in July, the Cabinet decided to move an army against the -Albanians, there were wholesale desertions from the garrison of -Monastir, and of Albanian officers from all parts of European Turkey. -Mahmoud Shevket pasha was compelled to resign the Ministry of War, and -was followed by Saïd pasha and the whole Cabinet. The Albanians -demanded as a _sine qua non_ the dissolution of Parliament. The {355} -Mukhtar Cabinet agreed to the dissolution, and accepted almost all the -demands of the rebels in a conference at Pristina. - -For the tables had now been turned. Instead of a Turkish invasion of -Albania for "pacification," as in previous summers, it was a question -now of an Albanian invasion of Turkey. In spite of the conciliatory -spirit of the new Cabinet, the agitation persisted. It was rumoured -that the Malissores and the Mirdites were planning a campaign against -Scutari and Durazzo. I was in Uskub in the early part of September. -Isa Boletinatz and his band were practically in possession of the city. -A truce for Ramazan, the Moslem fast month, had been arranged between -Turks and Albanians. But the Albanians said they would not lay down -their arms until a new and honestly constitutional election was held. - -Immediately after Ramazan came the Balkan War. Albania found herself -separated from Turkey, and in a position to have more than autonomy -without having to deal further with the Turks. - -During the Balkan War, the attitude of the Albanians was a tremendous -disappointment to the Turks. One marvels that loyalty to the Empire -could have been expected, even from the Moslem element, in Albania. -And yet the Turks did expect that a Pan-Islamic feeling would draw the -Albanian _beys_ to fight for the Sultan, just as they had expected a -similar phenomenon on the part of the rebellious Arabs of the Arabic -peninsula during the war with Italy. - -{356} - -From the very beginning the Albanians adopted an attitude of -opportunism. They did not lift a hand directly to help the Turks. Had -they so desired, they might have made impossible the investment of -Janina by the Greeks. But nowhere, save in Scutari, did the Albanians -make a stubborn stand against the military operations of the Balkan -allies. Almost from the beginning, they had understood that the Powers -would not allow the partition of Albania. They knew that the retention -of Janina was hopeless after the successes of the allies during -October. But they received encouragement from both Austria-Hungary and -Italy to fight for Scutari. - -The heroic defence of Scutari, which lasted longer than that of any of -the other fortified towns in the Balkan Peninsula, cannot be regarded -as a feat of the Turkish army. During the siege, the general -commanding Scutari had been assassinated by order of Essad pasha, who -was his second in command. Essad then assumed charge of the defence as -purely Albanian in character. He refused to accept the armistice, and -continued the struggle throughout the debates in London. Scutari is at -the south end of a lake which is shared between Albania and Montenegro. -Commanding the city is a steep barren hill called Tarabosh. With their -heavy artillery on this hill, the Albanians were able to prevent -indefinitely the capture of their city. Servians and Montenegrins -found themselves confronted with the task of taking Tarabosh by -assault, if they hoped to occupy Scutari. This was a feat beyond the -strength of a Balkan army. On the {357} steep slopes of this hill were -placed miles of barbed wire. The assailants were mowed down each time -they tried to reach the batteries at the top. As Tarabosh commanded -the four corners of the horizon, its cannon could prevent an assault or -bombardment of the city from the plain. The allies were unable to -silence the batteries on the crest of this hill. - -During the winter, the principal question before the concert of -European Powers was that of Scutari. Austria-Hungary was so determined -that Scutari should not fall into the hands of the Montenegrins and -Servians that she mobilized several army corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina -and on the Russian frontier of Galicia, at Christmas time, 1912. The -New Year brought with it ominous forebodings for the peace of Europe. -Diplomacy worked busily to bring about an accord between the Powers, -and pressure upon the besiegers of Scutari. In the middle of March, it -was unanimously agreed that Scutari should remain to Albania, and that -Servia should receive Prizrend, Ipek, Dibra, and Diakova as -compensation for not reaching the Adriatic, and the assurance of an -economic outlet for a railroad at some Albanian port. The European -concert then decided to demand at Belgrade and Cettinje the lifting of -the siege of Scutari. - -Servia, yielding to the warning of Russia that nothing further could be -done for her, consented to withdraw her troops from before Scutari, and -to abandon the points in Albanian territory which had been allotted by -the Powers to the independent Albanian State which they intended to -create. {358} Servia had another reason for doing this. Seeing the -hopelessness of territorial aggrandizement in Albania, she decided to -denounce her treaty of partition, concluded before the war, with -Bulgaria. To realize this act of faithlessness and treachery, she had -need of the sympathetic support of the Powers in the quarrel which was -bound to ensue. We see here how the blocking of Servia's outlet to the -Adriatic led inevitably to a war between the Balkan Allies. - -But with Montenegro the situation was entirely different. She had -sacrificed one-fifth of her army in the attacks upon Tarabosh, and -Scutari seemed to her the only thing that she was to get out of the war -with Turkey. Perched up in her mountains, there was little harm that -the Powers could do to her. Just as King Nicholas had precipitated the -Balkan War against the advice of the Powers the previous October, he -decided on April 1st to refuse to obey the command of the Powers to -lift the siege of Scutari. From what I have gathered myself from -conversations in the Montenegrin capital two months later, I feel that -the King of Montenegro can hardly be condemned for what the newspapers -of Europe called his "audacious folly" in refusing to give a favourable -response to the joint note presented to him by the European Ministers -at Cettinje. The Montenegrins are illiterate mountaineers, who know -nothing whatever about considerations of international diplomacy. If -their King had listened to words written on a piece of paper, and had -ordered the Montenegrin troops to withdraw from {359} before Scutari, -he would probably have lost his throne. - -So the Powers were compelled to make a show of force. Little -Montenegro, with its one port, and its total population not equal to a -single _arrondissement_ of the city of Paris, received the signal -honour of an international blockade. On April 7th, an international -fleet, under the command of the British Admiral Burney, blockaded the -coast from Antivari to Durazzo. While all Europe was showing its -displeasure in the Adriatic, the Montenegrins kept on, although -deserted by the Servians, sitting in a circle around Scutari, only -twenty-five miles inland from the blockading fleet. On April 23d, -after the Balkan War was all finished, Europe was electrified by the -news that the Albanians had surrendered Scutari to Montenegro. The -worst was to be feared, for Austria announced her determination to send -her troops across the border from Bosnia into Montenegro. Such an -action would certainly have brought on a great European war. For -neither at Rome nor at Petrograd could Austrian intervention have been -tolerated. - -No Power in Europe was at that moment ready for war. Largely through -pressure brought to bear at Cettinje by his son-in-law, the King of -Italy, King Nicholas decided on May 5th to deliver Scutari to the -Powers. The Montenegrins withdrew, and ten days later Scutari was -occupied by detachments of marines from the international squadron. -The blockade was lifted. The peace of Europe was saved. - -{360} - -The Treaty of London, signed on May 30, 1913, put Albania into the -hands of the Powers. The northern and eastern frontiers had been -arranged by the promise made to Servia in return for her withdrawal -from the siege of Scutari. But the southern frontier was still an open -question. Here Italy was as much interested as was Austria in the -north. With Corfu in the possession of Greece, Italy would not agree -that the coast of the mainland opposite should also be Hellenic. The -Greeks, on the contrary, declared that the littoral and _hinterland_, -up beyond Santi Quaranta, was part of ancient Epirus, and inhabited -principally by Greeks. It should therefore revert logically to greater -Greece. Athens lifted again the old cry, "Where there are Hellenes, -there is Hellas." The Greeks were occupying Santi Quaranta. They -claimed as far north as Argyrokastron. But they consented to withdraw -from the Adriatic, north of and opposite Corfu, if interior points -equally far to the north were left to them. An international -commission was formed to make a southern boundary for Albania. Its -task has is still open. - -What was to be done with this new state, foster child of all Europe, -with indefinite boundaries, with guardians each jealous of the other, -and neighbours waiting only for a favourable moment to throw themselves -upon her and extinguish her life? - -I visited Albania in July, 1913, during the second Balkan War. At -Valona, in the south, I found a provisional government, -self-constituted during the {361} previous winter, whose authority was -problematical outside of Valona itself. At the head of the government -was Ismail Kemal, whom I had known as the champion of Albanian autonomy -in the Ottoman Parliament at Constantinople. He talked passionately of -Albania, the new State in Europe, with its _united_ population and its -_national_ aspirations. He was eager to have the claims of Albania to -a generous southern frontier presented at London. He assured me that I -could write with perfect confidence in glowing terms concerning the -future of Albania, that a spirit of harmony reigned throughout the -country, and that the Albanians of all creeds, freed from Turkish -oppression, were looking eagerly to their new life as an independent -nation. When I expressed misgivings as to the rôle of Essad pasha, the -provisional president asserted that the former commander of Scutari was -wholly in accord with him, and cited as proof the fact that he had that -very day received from Essad pasha his acceptance of the portfolio of -Minister of the Interior. - -But that indefinable feeling of misgiving, which one always has over -the enthusiasm of Orientals, caused me to withhold judgment as to the -liability of Albania until I had seen how things were going in other -portions of the new kingdom. - -At Durazzo, the northern port of Albania, the friends of Essad pasha -were in control of the government. Things were still being done _à la -turque_, and there was a feeling of great uncertainty concerning the -future. Few had any faith whatever in the provisional government at -Valona, and it was declared {362} that the influence of Essad pasha -would decide the attitude of the Albanians in Durazzo, Tirana, and -Elbassan. Essad was chief of the Toptanis, the most influential family -in the neighbourhood of Durazzo. He had "made his career" in the -_gendarmerie_, and had risen rapidly through the approval and -admiration of Abdul Hamid. This is an indication of his character. He -was credited with the ambition of ruling Albania. To withdraw his -forces and his munitions of war intact, so that he could press these -claims, is the only explanation of his "deal" with King Nicholas of -Montenegro to surrender Scutari. Essad had sacrificed the pride and -honour of Albania to his personal ambition. - -From Durazzo, I went to San Giovanni di Medua, which was occupied by -the Montenegrins, just as I had found Santi Quaranta in the south -occupied by the Greeks. Going inland from this port (one must use his -imagination in calling San Giovanni di Medua a port) by way of Alessio, -I reached Scutari, from whose citadel flew the flags of the Powers. In -every quarter of this typically and hopelessly Turkish town, one ran -across sailors from various nations. Each Power had its quarter, and -had named the streets with some curious results. The Via Garibaldi ran -into the Platz Radetzky. On the Catholic cathedral was a sign -informing you that you were in the Rue Ernest Renan. - -This accidental naming of streets was a prophecy of the hopelessness of -trying to reconcile the conflicting aims and ideals of the Powers whose -bands were playing side by side in the public garden. In {363} the -dining-room of the hotel, when I saw Austrians, Italians, Germans, -British, and French officers eating together at the long tables, -instead of rejoicing at this seeming spirit of European harmony, I had -the presentiment of the inevitable result of the struggle between Slav -and Teuton, to prevent which these men were there. Just a year later, -I stood in front of the Gare du Montparnasse in Paris reading the order -for General Mobilization. There came back to me as in a dream the -public garden at Scutari, and the mingled strains of national anthems, -with officers standing rigidly in salute beside their half-filled -glasses. - -In the palatial home of a British nobleman who had loved the Albanians -and had lived long in Scutari, Admiral Burney established his -headquarters. I talked with him there one afternoon concerning the -present and the future of Albania, and the relationship of the problem -which he had before him with the peace of Europe. Never have I found a -man more intelligently apprehensive of the possible outcome of the -drama in which he was playing a part, and at the same time more -determinedly hopeful to use all his ability and power to save the peace -of Europe by welding together the Albanians into a nation worthy of the -independence that has been given to them by the European concert. Such -men as Admiral Burney are more than the glory of a nation: they are the -making of a nation. The greatness of Britain is due to the men who -serve her. High ideals, self-sacrifice, ability, and energy are the -corner-stones of the British overseas Empire. - -{364} - -There was little, however, that Admiral Burney, or anyone in fact, -could do for Albania. No nation can exist in modern times, when -national life is in the will of the people rather than in the unifying -qualities of a ruler, if there are no common ideals and the -determination to attain them. Albania is without a national spirit and -a national past. It is, therefore, no unit, capable of being welded -into a state. The creation by the Ambassadors of the Powers in London -may have been thought by them to be a necessity. But it was really a -makeshift. If the Albanians had done their part, and had shown the -possibility of union, the makeshift might have developed into a new -European state. As things have turned out, it has stayed what it was -in the beginning,--a fiasco. - -Among the many candidates put forward for the new throne, Prince -William of Wied was finally decided upon. He was a Protestant, and -could occupy a position of neutrality among his Moslem, Orthodox, and -Catholic subjects. He was a German, and could not be suspected of -Slavic sympathies. He was a relative of the King of Rumania, and could -expect powerful support in the councils of the Balkan Powers. - -It would be wearisome to go into the story of Prince William's short -and unhappy reign. At Durazzo, which was chosen for the capital, he -quickly showed himself incapable of the rôle which a genius among -rulers might have failed to play successfully. Lost in a maze of -bewildering intrigues, foreign and domestic, the ruler of Albania saw -his prestige, and {365} then his dignity, disappear. He never had any -real authority. He had been forced upon the Albanians. They did not -want him. The Powers who had placed him upon the throne did not -support him. In the spring, the usual April heading, "Albania in -Arms," appeared once more in the newspapers of the world. Up to the -outbreak of the European war, when Albania was "lost in the shuffle," -almost daily telegrams detailed the march of the insurgents upon -Durazzo, the useless and fatal heroism of the Dutch officers of the -_gendarmerie_, the incursions of the Epirote bands in the south, and -the embarrassing position of the international forces still occupying -Scutari. What the Albanians really wanted, none could guess, much less -they themselves! - -The European war, in August, 1914, enabled the Powers to withdraw -gracefully from the Albanian fiasco. Their contingents hurriedly -abandoned Scutari, and sailed for home. The French did not have time -to do this, so they went to Montenegro. Since the catastrophe, to -prevent which they had created Albania, had fallen upon Europe, what -further need was there for the Powers to bother about the fortunes of -Prince William and his subjects? Italy alone was left with hands free, -and her interests were not at stake, so long as Greece kept out of the -fray. For Prince William of Wied, Italy felt no obligation whatever. - -Without support and without money, there was nothing left to Prince -William but to get out. He did not have the good sense to make his -withdrawal from Albania a dignified proceeding. The palace {366} was -left under seals. The Prince issued a proclamation which would lead -the Albanians to believe that it was his intention to return. It may -be that he thought the triumph of the German and Austrian armies in the -European war would mean his re-establishment to Durazzo. But after he -was once again safely home at Neu-Wied, he did what he ought to have -done many months before. A high-sounding manifesto announced his -abdication, and wished the Albanians Godspeed in the future. After -this formality had been accomplished, the former Mpret of Albania -rejoined his regiment in the German army, and went out to fight against -the French. - -With Prince William of Wied and the international corps of occupation -gone, the Albanians were left to themselves. At Durazzo, a body of -notables, calling themselves the Senate, adopted resolutions restoring -the Ottoman flag and the suzerainty of the Sultan, invited Prince -Burhaneddin effendi, a son of Abdul Hamid, to become their ruler, and -solemnly decreed that hereafter the Turkish language should be restored -to its former position as the official language of the country. - -But Essad pasha thought otherwise. The psychological moment, for which -he had been waiting ever since his surrender of Scutari to the -Montenegrins, had come. In the first week of October, he hurried to -Durazzo with his followers, had himself elected head of a new -provisional government by the Albanian Senate, and announced openly -that his policy would be to look to Italy instead of to Austria for -support. After rendering homage to the Sultan as Khalif, {367} asking -the people to celebrate the happy spirit of harmony which now reigned -throughout Albania, and prophesying a new era of peace and prosperity -for Europe's latest-born independent state, the former _gendarme_ of -Abdul Hamid entered the palace, broke the seals of the international -commission, and went to sleep in the bed of Prince William of Wied. - -One wonders whether the new ruler of Albania will have more restful -slumbers than his predecessor. In spite of all protests, Greece is -still secretly encouraging the Epirotes in their endeavour to push -northward the frontier of the Hellenic kingdom. Italy has two army -corps at Brindisi waiting for a favourable moment to occupy Valona. -The Montenegrins and Servians are planning once more to reach the -Adriatic through the valleys of the Boyana and Drin, after they have -driven the Austro-Hungarian armies from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only -an Austrian triumph could now save Albania from her outside enemies. -But could anything save her from her inside enemies? When I read of -Essad Pasha in Durazzo, self-chosen Moses of his people, there comes -back to me a conversation with the leading Moslem chieftain of Scutari, -whose guest I had the privilege of being, in his home in the summer of -1913. When I mentioned Essad pasha, he rose to his feet before the -fire, waved his arms, and cried out: "When I see Essad, I shall shoot -him like a dog!" - - - - -{368} - -CHAPTER XIX - -THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA - -In discussing the relations of the Austrians and Hungarians with their -south Slavic subjects, and the rivalries of races in Macedonia the -general causes behind the hostile attitude of Austria-Hungary to the -development of Servia have been explained. Specific treatment of the -Servian attitude towards the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was -reserved for this chapter, because the events of the summer of 1914 are -the direct sequence of the events of the winter of 1908-1909. - -On October 3, 1908, Marquis Pallavicini, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at -Constantinople, notified verbally the Sublime Porte that -Austria-Hungary had annexed the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and -Herzegovina, whose administration was entrusted to her by the Treaty of -Berlin just thirty years before. Austria-Hungary was willing to -renounce the right given her by the Treaty of Berlin to the military -occupation of the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar (a strip of Turkish territory -between Servia and Montenegro), if Turkey would renounce her -sovereignty of the annexed provinces. - -{369} - -This violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria-Hungary aroused a -strong protest not only in Servia and in Turkey, but also among the -other Powers who had signed at Berlin the conditions of the maintenance -of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The protest was especially -strong in London and Petrograd. But Austria-Hungary had the backing of -Germany, whose Ambassador at Petrograd, Count de Pourtales, did not -hesitate several times during the winter to exercise pressure _that -went almost to the point of being a threat_ upon the Russian Foreign -Office to refrain from encouraging the intractable attitude of Servia -towards the annexation. - -With Germany's support, Austria-Hungary did not have much difficulty in -silencing the protests of all the Great Powers. She had a free hand, -thanks to Germany, in forcing Turkey and Servia to accept the _fait -accompli_ of the annexation. - -Turkish protests took the form of the boycott of which we have spoken -elsewhere. On November 22d, Austria-Hungary threatened to put the -whole status of European Turkey into question by convoking the European -congress to revise the Treaty of Berlin. This is exactly what -Austria-Hungary herself did not want. But neither did Turkey. Both -governments had a common interest in preventing outside intervention in -the Balkan Peninsula. The boycott, as evidencing anti-Austrian -feeling, was rather a sop to public opinion of Young Turkey, and a -blind to the Powers to hide the perfect accord that existed between -Germany and Turkey at the moment, than the expression of hostility to -Austria-Hungary. {370} After several months of _pourparlers_ an -agreement was made between Constantinople and Vienna on February 26, -1909. Turkey agreed to recognize the annexation in return for -financial compensation. The negotiations at Constantinople concerning -Bosnia and Herzegovina are a monument to the diplomatic finesse and -skill of the late Baron Marschall von Bieberstein and of Marquis -Pallavicini. - -To lose something that you know you can no longer keep is far different -from losing the hope of possession. It is always more cruel to be -deprived of an anticipation than of a reality. Turkey gave up Bosnia -and Herzegovina with her usual fatalistic indifference. Her -sovereignty had been only a fiction after all. But Servia saw in the -action of Austria-Hungary a fatal blow to her national aspirations. -The inhabitants of the two Turkish provinces on her west were Servian: -Bosnia-Herzegovina formed the centre of the Servian race. Montenegro -on the south was Servian. Dalmatia on the west was Servian. Croatia -on the north was Servian. Everything was Servian to the Adriatic Sea. -And yet Servia was land-locked. The Servians determined they would not -accept this annexation. They appealed to the signatory Powers of -Berlin, and succeeded in arousing a sentiment in Europe favourable to a -European conference. They threatened to make Austrian and Hungarian -sovereignty intolerable, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also -in Croatia and Dalmatia. - -Austria-Hungary was more than irritated; she was alarmed. She appealed -to her ally, and pictured {371} the danger to the _Drang nach Osten_. -The powerful intervention of the German ambassadors in the various -European capitals succeeded in isolating Belgrade. Russian support of -Servia would have meant a European war. Rather than risk this, France -begged Russia to yield. Russia, not yet recovered from the Manchurian -disaster, ordered Servia to yield. Austria-Hungary was allowed to -force Servia into submission. - -Friendless in the face of her too powerful adversary, Servia directed -her Minister at Vienna on March 31, 1909, to make the following formal -declaration to the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: - - -"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the -situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt -herself to the decisions at which the Powers are going to arrive in -reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils -of the Powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest -and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to -the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction -of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to -live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations." - - -The crisis passed. Servia's humiliation was the price of European -peace. Germany had shown her determination to stand squarely behind -Austria-Hungary in her dealings with Servia. It was a lesson for the -future. Five years later history repeated itself--except that Russia -did not back down! - -{372} - -We have already told the story of Austria-Hungary's dealings with -Servia after the first victorious month of the Balkan War with Turkey: -how Servia was compelled, owing to lack of support from Russia, to give -satisfaction to Austria-Hungary in the Prochaska incident, to withdraw -her troops from Durazzo and from before Scutari; and how the Powers -saved the peace of Europe in May, 1913, by compelling Montenegro to -abandon Scutari. - -Ever since the Treaty of Bukarest, Austria-Hungary watched Servia -keenly for an opportunity to pick a quarrel with her. It is marvellous -how the Servians, elated as they naturally were by their military -successes against Turkey and Bulgaria, avoided knocking the chip off -the shoulder of their jealous and purposely sensitive neighbour. - -It was one thing to be able to keep a perfectly correct official -attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Government. This the Servian -Government had promised to do in the note wrung from it on March 31, -1909. This it _did_ do. But it was a totally different thing to -expect the authorities at Belgrade to stifle the national aspirations -of twelve million Servians, the majority of whom were outside of her -jurisdiction. Even if it had been the wiser course for her to -pursue--and this is doubtful,--could Servia have been able to repress -the thoroughly awakened and triumphant nationalism of her own subjects -who had borne so successfully and so heroically the sufferings and -sacrifices of two wars within one year? - -Individual Servians, living within the kingdom of {373} Servia, were -irredentists, but without official sanction. They were undoubtedly in -connection with the revolutionaries created by Austrian and Hungarian -methods in the Servian provinces of the Dual Monarchy. There was -undoubtedly a dream of Greater Servia, and a strong hope in the hearts -of nationalists on both sides of the frontiers that the day would dawn -_by their efforts_ when Greater Servia would be a reality. No -government could have continued to exist in Servia which tried to -suppress the _Narodna Obrana_. I make this statement without -hesitation. King Peter did not intend to become another Charles Albert. - -Ought the Vienna and Berlin statesmen to have expected Servia to do so? -What answer would Switzerland or Holland or Belgium or Brazil receive, -were their ministers to present a note at Wilhelmstrasse or Ballplatz, -calling attention to the menace to their independence of the -Pan-Germanic movement, citing speeches delivered by eminent professors -in universities, books written by officials of the imperial -Governments, and asking that certain societies be suppressed and -certain geographies be removed from use in German schools? Their cause -would have been as just, and their right as clear, _for exactly the -same reasons_, as that of the Austrian Government in its attitude -towards Servia. The only difference between Pan-Servianism and -Pan-Germanism--and you must remember that the latter is not only -encouraged, but also subsidized, by the Berlin and Vienna -governments--is that the former is the aspiration of twelve millions -while the latter {374} is the aspiration of ninety millions. Is not -the answer the old Bismarckian formula that might makes right? - -During the winter following the Treaty of Bukarest the Austro-Hungarian -agents and police continued their careful surveillance of the _Narodna -Obrana_, and followed all its dealings with Servians of -Austro-Hungarian nationality. But it could find no _casus belli_. The -attitude of the Servian Government was perfectly correct at all times. -Traps were laid, but Servian officials did not fall into them. The -occasion for striking Servia came in a most tragic way. - -It seems like tempting Providence to have sent the Archduke Franz -Ferdinand and his wife to Sarajevo on the anniversary of the battle of -Kossova. Things had been going from bad to worse in Bosnia. Flags of -the Dual Monarchy had been burned in Sarajevo and Mostar, and the -garrisons called upon to intervene to restore order. The Constitution -of 1910 had been modified in 1912, so that the military Governor was -invested with civil power. The local Bosnian Diet had been twice -prorogued. In May, 1913, the constitution was suspended, and a state -of siege declared in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Throughout the winter of -1913-1914, incipient rebellions had to be checked by force in many -places. It was known to the police that Servian secret societies were -active, and that the provinces were in a state of danger and -insecurity. The Servian Government was apprehensive concerning the -announced visit of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. In fact, -so greatly was it feared that some attempt {375} might be made against -the life of Franz Ferdinand, and that this would be used as an excuse -for an attack upon Servia, that the Servian Minister at Vienna, a week -before the date announced for the visit, informed the Government that -there was reason to fear a plot to assassinate the Archduke. - -On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the -Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo. -Austria-Hungary realized that her moment had come. Germany was -sounded, and found to be ready to prevent outside interference in -whatever measures Vienna might see fit to take with Belgrade. - -In the spring of 1914, the Pasitch Cabinet had almost succumbed in the -struggle between civil and military elements. Premier Pasitch retained -his power by agreeing to a dissolution of Parliament, and binding -himself to the necessity of following the leadership of the military -part. So far were the chiefs of the military party from being in a -mood to consider the susceptibilities of Austria-Hungary that they were -actually, according to a telegram from a well-informed source in Agram -on June 26, 1914, debating the means of uniting Servia and Montenegro. -The difficult question of dynasties was in the way of being solved, -and, despite Premier Pasitch's misgivings, the _ballon d'essai_ of the -project of union had been launched in Europe. It was at this critical -and delicate moment for the Belgrade Cabinet that the storm broke. - -I was surprised by the spirit of optimism which seemed to pervade the -French press during the {376} period immediately following the -assassination of Franz Ferdinand. For three weeks the telegrams from -Vienna repeated over and over again the statement that the ultimatum -which Austria-Hungary intended to present at Belgrade as a result of -the Sarajevo assassination would be so worded that Russia could not -take offence. This optimistic opinion, which seems to have been given -almost official sanction by the Ballplatz, was shared by the French -Government. France is a country in which the inmost thoughts of her -statesmen are voiced freely in the daily newspapers of Paris. If there -had been any serious misgivings, the protocol for the visit of -President Poincaré to Petrograd and to the Scandinavian capitals would -certainly have been modified. - -The President of France sailed for the Baltic on July 15th. At six -o'clock in the evening of the 23d, the note of the Austro-Hungarian -Government concerning the events of the assassination of Sarajevo was -given to the Servian Government. It commenced by reproducing the text -of the Servian declaration of March 31, 1909, which we have quoted -above. Servia was accused of not having fulfilled the promise made in -this declaration, and of permitting the Pan-Servian propaganda in the -newspapers and public schools of the kingdom. The assassination of the -Archduke Franz Ferdinand was stated to be the direct result of Servian -failure to live up to her declaration of March 31, 1909. -Austria-Hungary claimed that the assassination of the heir to her -throne had been investigated, and that ample proof had been found of -the connivance of two Servians, {377} one an army officer and the other -a functionary who belonged to the _Narodna Obrana_; that the assassins -had received their arms and their bombs from these two men, and had -been knowingly allowed to pass into Bosnia by the Servian authorities -on the Serbo-Bosnian frontier. Being unable to endure longer the -Pan-Servian agitation, of which Belgrade was the _foyer_ and the crime -of Sarajevo a direct result, the Austro-Hungarian Government found -itself compelled to demand of the Servian Government the formal -assurance that it condemned this propaganda, which was dangerous to the -existence of the Dual Monarchy, because its final end was to detach -from Austria-Hungary large portions of her territory and attach them to -Servia. - -After this preamble, the note went on to demand that on the first page -of the _Journal Officiel_ of July 26th the Servian Government publish a -new declaration, the text of which is so important that we quote it in -full. - - -"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against -Austria-Hungary, _i.e._, the entirety of those machinations whose aim -it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories -belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences -of these criminal actions. - -"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and -officials have participated in the propaganda cited above, and have -thus threatened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal -Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March -31, 1909. - -"The Royal Government, which disapproves and {378} rejects every -thought or every attempt at influencing the destinies of the -inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to -call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials, -and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will hereafter -proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar -actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort." - - -Simultaneously with the publication in the_ Journal Officiel_, -Austria-Hungary demanded that the declaration be brought to the -knowledge of the Servian army by an order of the day of King Peter, and -be published in the official organ of the army. The Servian Government -was also asked to make ten promises: - - -1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt -for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general tendency is -directed against the latter's territorial integrity; - -2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society _Narodna -Obrana_, to confiscate its entire means of propaganda, and to proceed -in the same manner against the other societies and associations in -Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against -Austria-Hungary, and to take the necessary measures that the dissolved -societies may not continue their activities under another name or in -another form; - -3. To eliminate without delay from the public instruction in Servia, so -far as the teaching staff as well as the curriculum is concerned, -whatever serves or may serve to foster the propaganda against -Austria-Hungary; - -4. To remove from military service and public {379} office in general -all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against -Austria-Hungary and whose names, with a communication of the evidence -which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the -Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the -Royal Government; - -5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of members of the official -machinery (_organes_) of the Imperial and Royal Government in the -suppression of the movement directed against Austro-Hungarian -territorial integrity; - -6. To commence a judicial investigation (_enquête judiciaire_) against -the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian -territory--members of the official machinery (_organes_) delegated by -the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the researches -(_recherches_) relative thereto; - -7. To proceed immediately to arrest Major Vorja Tankositch and a -certain Milan Ciganovitch, a functionary of the Servian State, who have -been compromised by the result of the preliminary investigation at -Sarajevo; - -8. To prevent, by effective measures, the participation of the Servian -authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the -frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the functionaries at the -frontier at Shabatz and at Loznica, guilty of having aided the authors -of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating their crossing of the frontier; - -9. To give to the Austro-Hungarian Government explanations concerning -the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries, in Servia and -abroad, who, in spite of their official position have not hesitated, -after the crime of June 28th, to express themselves in interviews in a -hostile manner against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; - -{380} - -10. To notify without delay to the Austro-Hungarian Government the -execution of the measures included in the preceding points. - - -Annexed to the note was a memorandum which declared that the -investigation of the police, after the assassination of the Archduke -and his wife, had established that the plot had been formed at Belgrade -by the assassins with the help of a commandant in the Servian army, -that the six bombs and four Browning pistols with their ammunition had -been given at Belgrade to the assassins by the Servian functionary and -the Servian army officer whose names were cited in the note, that the -bombs were hand grenades which came from the Servian army headquarters -at Kragujevac, that the assassins were given instruction in the use of -the arms by Servian officers, and that the introduction into Bosnia and -Herzegovina of the assassins and their arms was facilitated by the -connivance of three frontier captains and a customs official. - -The wording of this note seemed to have been entirely unexpected. The -intention of the ultimatum was clear. It was understood that Russia -would not accept an attack upon the integrity of Servia. Six years had -passed since 1908, and two since 1912. Russia had recuperated from the -Japanese War, and her Persian accord with Great Britain had borne much -fruit. She was sure of France. Was this not a deliberate provocation -to Russia? - -Forty-eight hours had been given to Servia to respond. Russia and -France had both counselled {381} Servia to give an answer that would be -a _general_ acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. Neither -France nor Russia wanted war. So anxious were they to avoid giving -Austria-Hungary the opportunity to precipitate the crisis before they -were ready for it that _for the third time in six years_ Servia was -asked to swallow her pride and submit. On the night of July 24th, a -memorable council was held in Belgrade. The Premier and the leaders of -the opposition, together with some members of the _Narodna Obrana_ were -shown clearly what course they must follow, if they expected the loyal -support of Russia. The answer to the ultimatum must be worded in such -a way that Austria-Hungary would have no ground upon which to stand in -forcing immediately the war. Servia must once more "eat humble pie." -But this time the promise of Russian support was given _to defend the -territorial integrity and the independence of Servia_. - -The Servian answer was far more conciliatory than was expected. The -allegations of the Austro-Hungarian preamble were denied, but the -publication of the declaration in the _Journal Officiel_ and in the -army bulletin, and its incorporation in an order of the day to the -army, were promised. But there were to be two changes in the text of -the declaration. Instead of "the Royal Servian Government condemns -_the propaganda against_ Austria-Hungary," the Servians agreed to -declare that "the Royal Servian Government condemns _every propaganda -which should be directed against_ Austria-Hungary," and instead of "the -Royal Government regrets _that Servian officers {382} and officials_ -... have participated in the propaganda cited above," the Servian King -could say no more than "the Royal Government regrets _that according to -a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government certain officers -and functionaries ... etc._" - -The German _White Book_ makes a special point of the bad faith of -Servia in altering the text of the declaration in this way. But what -government could be expected to admit what was only a supposition, and -what king worthy of the name would denounce as a regicide openly before -his army one of his officers upon the unsupported statement of a -political document? The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had given no proof -of its charges against the man named in its note, and forty-eight hours -was too short a time for the Servian Government to investigate the -charges to its own satisfaction. - -In order to make clear just what was the nature of the demands which -Austria-Hungary made upon Servia, I have cited the ten articles in full. - -One can readily see that the demands of Articles 1, 2, and 3, in their -entirety, meant the extinction of the Pan-Servian movement and Servian -nationalism. Austria-Hungary was asking of Servia something that -neither member of the Dual Monarchy had succeeded in accomplishing in -its own territories! The German _White Book_ attempts to sustain the -justice of the demands of its ally in striking at the press, the -nationalist societies, and the schools. The methods of arousing a -nationalistic spirit in the Servian people through the press, through -the formation of societies, {383} and through the teaching of -irredentism by school-books, were borrowed from Germany. But Servia -agreed to make her press laws more severe, to dissolve the _Narodna -Obrana_ and other societies; and "to eliminate from the public -instruction in Servia anything which might further the propaganda -directed against Austria-Hungary, provided the Imperial and Royal -Government furnishes actual proofs." - -Article 4 was agreed to only so far as it could be actually proved that -the officers and officials in question had been "guilty of actions -against the territorial integrity of the monarchy." To promise to -remove all who were "guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary" -would have meant the disbanding of the Servian army and the Servian -Government! Is there any man with red blood in his veins who can be -prevented from having hopes and dislikes, and expressing them? Could -Servia prevent Servians from stating how they felt about the political -_status_ of their race in Croatia and in Bosnia? Did Austria-Hungary -ever make a similar request to her ally, Italy, about irredentist -literature and speeches? - -Articles 5 and 6 are open to discussion. There is no doubt that the -newspapers of nations hostile to Austria-Hungary and Germany have been -unfair in their interpretation and in their translation of these two -articles. The Servian answer deliberately gives a false meaning to the -Austrian request here, and represents it as an attack upon the -independence of her courts. Servia had enough good grounds for -resistance to the ultimatum without equivocating {384} on this point. -In her answer she refused what had not been actually demanded, a -co-operation in the _enquête judiciaire_ of Austro-Hungarian _organes_. -What Austria-Hungary demanded was the co-operation of her police -officials in the _recherches_. - -Articles 7 to 10 were accepted by Servia _in toto_. As a proof of her -good faith, the Servian answer declared that Major Tankositch had been -arrested on the evening of the day on which the ultimatum was received. - -In conclusion, Servia offered, if her response to the ultimatum were -found insufficient, to place her case in the hands of the Hague -Tribunal and of the different Powers at whose suggestion she had signed -the declaration of March 31, 1909, after the excitement over the -Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. - -The answer to the ultimatum was taken by Premier Pasitch in person to -the Minister of Austria-Hungary at Belgrade before six o'clock on the -evening of July 25th. Without referring the response to his -Government, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, acting on previous -instructions that _no answer other than an acceptance in every -particular of the ultimatum would be admissible_, replied that the -response was not satisfactory. At half-past six, he left Belgrade with -all members of the legation. - -While the European chancelleries were trying to find some means to heal -the breach, Austria-Hungary formally declared war on Servia on the -morning of July 28th. The same evening, the bombardment of Belgrade -from Semlin and from the Danube {385} was begun. The Servian -Government retired to Nish. - -Only the intervention of Germany could now prevent the European -cataclysm. - - - - -{386} - -CHAPTER XX - -GERMANY FORCES WAR UPON RUSSIA AND FRANCE - -The title of this chapter seems to indicate that I have the intention -of taking sides in what many people believe to be an open question. -But this is not the case. The German contention, that Russia caused -the war, must be clearly distinguished from the contention, that Russia -forced the war. There is a great deal of reason in the first -contention. No impartial student, who has written with sympathy -concerning Great Britain's attitude in the Crimean War, can fail to -give Germany just as strong justification for declaring war on Russia -in 1914 as Great Britain had in 1854. But, when we come down to the -narrower question of responsibility for launching the war in which -almost all of Europe is now engaged, there can be no doubt that it was -deliberately willed by the German Government, and that the chain of -circumstances which brought it about was carefully woven by the -officials of Wilhelmstrasse and Ballplatz. There may be honest -difference of opinion as to whether Germany was justified in forcing -the war. But the facts allow no difference of opinion as to whether -Germany _did_ force the war. - -{387} - -A war to crush France and Russia has for many years been accepted as a -necessary eventuality in the evolution of Germany's foreign policy. -That when this war came, Great Britain would take the opportunity of -joining in order to strike at German commerce, which had begun to be -looked upon by British merchants as a formidable rival in the markets -of the world, was thought probable. The leading men of Germany, -especially since the passing of Morocco and Persia, have felt that this -war was vital to the existence of the German Empire. During recent -years the questions, "Ought there to be a war?" and "Will there be a -war?" ceased to be debated in Germany. One heard only, "Under what -circumstances could _the_ war be most favourably declared?" and "How -soon will _the_ war come?" - -Germany has believed that the events of the past decade have shown the -unalterable determination of Great Britain and France to make -impossible the political development of the _Weltpolitik_, without -which her commercial development would always be insecure. This -determination has been consistently revealed in the hostility of her -western rivals to her colonial expansion in Africa and Asia. The world -equilibrium, already decidedly disadvantageous to the overseas future -of Germans at the time they began their career as a united people, has -been disturbed more and more during the past forty years. - -The Balkan wars, resulting as they did in the aggrandizement of Servia, -threatened the equilibrium of the Near East, where lay Germany's most -vital {388} and most promising external activities. We must remember, -when we are considering the reasons for the consistent backing given to -Austria-Hungary by Germany in her treatment of Servian aspirations, the -words of Wirth: "_To render powerful the Servian people would be the -suicide of Germany._" - -Germany has had as much reason, in the development of the present -crisis, for regarding Servia as the outpost of Russia as had Great -Britain for awarding this rôle to Bulgaria in 1876. Germany has had as -much reason for declaring war on Russia to prevent the Russians from -securing the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire as had Great Britain and -France to take exactly the same step in 1854. The extension, in 1914, -of Russian influence in what was until recently European Turkey would -be just as disastrous to the interests of Germany and -Austria-Hungary--far more so--than it would have been to Great Britain -and France sixty years ago. What she has in Asia-Minor to-day is as -great a stake for Germany to fight for as what Great Britain had in -India in the middle of the nineteenth century. - -There is, however, this important difference. Germany, in supporting -the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, was not responding to the overt act of -an enemy. She calculated carefully the cost, waited for a favourable -moment, and, when she decided that the favourable moment had come, -deliberately provoked the war. - -Germany, looking for the opportunity to strike her two powerful -neighbours on the east and west, believed that the propitious moment -had come in the {389} summer of 1914. Her rivals were facing serious -internal crises. Russia was embarrassed by the menace of a -widely-spread industrial strike. But Russia did not count for much in -the German calculations. _It was the situation in France that induced -the German statesmen to take advantage of the assassination of Franz -Ferdinand_. The spring elections had revealed a tremendous sentiment -against the law recently voted extending military service for three -years. The French Parliament had just overthrown the admirable Ribot -Cabinet for no other reason than purely personal considerations of a -bitter party strife. An eminent Parliamentarian had exposed publicly -from the tribune the alarming unpreparedness of France for war. The -trial for murder of the wife of the former Premier Caillaux bade fair -to complicate further internal Parliamentary strife. - -These were the favourable circumstances of the end of June and the -beginning of July. - -But the decision had wider grounds than the advantages of the moment. -The German Government was finding it more and more difficult every year -to secure the credits necessary for the maintenance and increase of her -naval and military establishments. Socialism and anti-militarism were -making alarming progress in the German _Reichstag_. On the other hand, -the Russian military reorganization, commenced after the Japanese War, -was beginning to show surprising fruits. And was France to be allowed -time for the spending of the eight hundred and five million francs just -borrowed by her in June {390} to correct the weak spots in her -fortifications and war material, and for the application of the _loi -des trois ans_ to increase her standing army? - -Furthermore, would Great Britain be able to intervene on behalf of -France and Russia? The crisis over the Home Rule Bill seemed to have -developed so seriously that civil war was feared. Sir Edward Carson, -leader of the Protestant irreconcilables in the north of Ireland, had -formed an army that was being drilled in open defiance of the -Government. - -The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of -Hohenberg came at this advantageous moment. A _casus belli_ against -Servia, so provokingly lacking, had at last been given. -Austria-Hungary was only too ready for the chance to crush Servia. If -there were any misgivings about the risk of doing this, they were -immediately allayed by Germany, who assured Austria-Hungary that she -would not allow Russia even to mobilize. Austria-Hungary was given by -Germany _carte blanche_ in the matter of her dealings with Servia. It -is possible, as the German Ambassador at Petrograd declared to M. -Sasonow, that the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had not been -submitted beforehand for the approval of Wilhelmstrasse. But the -general tenor of the ultimatum had certainly been agreed upon. Germany -knew well that the ultimatum would be so worded as to be a challenge to -Russia. Either Russia would accept once more the humiliation of a -diplomatic defeat and see Servia crushed, or she would intervene to -save Servia. In the latter {391} contingency, Germany could declare -war upon Russia on the ground that her ally, Austria-Hungary, had been -attacked. The Franco-Russian Alliance would then be put to the test, -as well as whatever understanding there might be between Great Britain -and France. - -Subsequent events proved that Germany left no means, other than -complete submission to her will, to France and Russia for avoiding war. -Negotiations were so carried on that there would be no loop-hole for -escape either to Servia, or to the Great Powers that were her -champions. She did not even wait for Russia to attack Austria-Hungary, -or for France to aid Russia. As for Great Britain, it is not yet clear -whether Germany really thought that she was making an honest effort to -keep her out of the war. - -From the very beginning of the Servian crisis, Germany associated -herself "for better or for worse with Austria-Hungary." On the day -that the ultimatum to Servia was delivered, Chancellor von -Bethmann-Hollweg wrote to the German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and -Petrograd, requesting them to call upon the Foreign Ministers of the -governments to which they were accredited and point out that the -ultimatum was necessary for the "safety and integrity" of -Austria-Hungary, and to state with special "emphasis" that "_in this -question there is concerned an affair which should be settled -absolutely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which -it must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to ensure_. We -anxiously desire _the localization of the conflict_, {392} because any -intercession by another Power would precipitate, on account of the -various alliances, inconceivable consequences." - -The position of Germany is admirably stated in these instructions, -which I quote from Exhibit I of the German official _White Book_. To -this position, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg consistently held -throughout the last week of July. In the four words "_localization of -the conflict_" the intention of Germany was summed up. There was to be -a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. That could not be -avoided. The only thing that could be avoided was the intervention of -Russia to prevent the approaching attack of Austria-Hungary upon -Servia. If the Powers friendly to Russia did not prevail upon the Czar -to refrain from interfering, there would be, "_on account of the -various alliances, inconceivable consequences_." - -The next day, July 24th, a telegram from the German Ambassador at -Petrograd to the Chancellor stated that M. Sasonow was very much -agitated, and had "declared most positively that Russia could not -permit under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be -settled alone between the parties concerned." - -[Illustration: Map--Belgium and the Franco-German Frontier] - -There was still time for Germany, warned by the attitude taken by -Russia, to counsel her ally to accept whatever conciliatory response -Servia might give. But this was not done. As we have already seen in -the previous chapter, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, -without communicating with his Government, declared the Servian -response unsatisfactory, {393} even though it gave an opening for -further negotiations, and withdrew from Belgrade with all the members -of the legation staff. - -This precipitate, and, in view of the gravity of the international -situation, unreasonable action could have been avoided, had Chancellor -von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed the word to Vienna. - -Not only was the Austro-Hungarian Minister allowed to leave Belgrade in -this way, but, _after three days had elapsed_, Austria-Hungary took the -irrevocable step of declaring war on Servia. - -During these three days, Sir Edward Grey requested the British -Ambassadors at Rome and Vienna and Berlin to make every possible effort -to find ground for negotiation. On the morning of July 27th, Sir -Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, submitted to Count -Berchtold the proposition of Sir Edward Grey, which was made -simultaneously at Petrograd, that the question at issue be adjusted in -a conference held at London. In the meantime, after a conversation -with Sir Rennell Rodd, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian -Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Berlin, suggesting that -Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy mediate between -Austria-Hungary and Russia. In sharp contrast to the efforts being -made by the British Ambassadors, the German Ambassador at Paris, in an -interview with Premier Viviani, insisted upon the impossibility of a -conference of mediation, and announced categorically that _the only -possible solution of the difficulty was a common French and German -intervention at Petrograd_. In {394} other words, France could avoid -war by assisting her enemy in humiliating her ally! - -On July 28th, the German position was: "That Austria-Hungary must be -left a free hand in her dealings with Servia, and that it must be -pointed out to Russia, if France and Great Britain really wanted to -save the peace of Europe, that she should not mobilize against -Austria-Hungary." Diplomatic intervention, then, could do nothing -except attempt to force Russia to refrain from interfering between -Austria-Hungary and Servia. Germany would aid the other Powers in -coercing Russia, but she would not urge herself, or aid them in urging, -upon Austria-Hungary, _who had started the trouble_, the advisability -of modifying her attitude towards Servia, and postponing hostilities -that were bound to lead to a European war. - -Germany had refused all intervention at Vienna. She agreed, however, -to prove her good-will by letting it be known that Austria-Hungary was -willing to make the promise to seek no territorial aggrandizement in -her war with Servia, but to limit herself to a "punitive expedition." -_But this suggestion did not come until Russia had already committed -herself to defend Servia against invasion_. - -There was another way in which the peace of Europe could have been -saved, and that was by a declaration on the part of Germany that she -would allow Russia and Austria-Hungary to fight out the question of -hegemony in south-eastern Europe. But there was no proposition from -Germany to France suggesting a mutual neutrality. On the other hand, -{395} Germany let it be known that she would stand by Austria-Hungary -if Russia attacked her, and, in the same breath, warned France against -the danger of being loyal to the Russian alliance! - -On July 29th, it was announced from Petrograd that a partial -mobilization had been ordered in the south and south-east. The German -Ambassador in Petrograd, in an interview with M. Sasonow, pointed out -"very solemnly that the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by -the danger of a general European conflagration, and endeavoured to -present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. It was -impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia could now be -deserted by Russia." On the same day, Ambassador von Schoen at Paris -was directed by the German Chancellor to "call the attention of the -French Government to the fact that preparation for war in France would -call forth counter-measures in Germany." An exchange of telegrams on -the 29th and 30th between the Kaiser and the Czar showed the -irreconcilability between the Russian and German points of view. The -idea of the Kaiser was that the Czar should give Austria-Hungary a free -hand. The idea of the Czar was that the attack by Austria-Hungary upon -Servia absolutely demanded a Russian mobilization "directed solely -against Austria-Hungary." - -On July 31st, the German Ambassador at Petrograd was ordered to notify -Russia that mobilization against Austria-Hungary must be stopped within -twelve hours, or Germany would mobilize against Russia. At the same -time a telegram was sent to {396} the German Ambassador at Paris, -ordering him to "ask the French Government whether it intends to remain -neutral in a Russo-German war." - -On August 1st, at 7.30 P.M., the German Ambassador at Petrograd handed -the following declaration of war to Russia: - - -"The Imperial Government has tried its best from the beginning of the -crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. Yielding to a desire which -had been expressed to Him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His -Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in accord with England, was engaged in -accomplishing the rôle of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and -of Petrograd, when Russia, without awaiting the result of this -mediation, proceeded to the mobilization of its forces by land and sea. - -"As a result of this threatening measure, which was actuated by no -military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found -itself facing a grave and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government -had failed to ward off this danger, it would compromise the security -and very existence of Germany. Consequently the German Government saw -itself forced to address itself to the Government of His Majesty, the -Emperor of all the Russias, insisting upon the cessation of the said -military acts. Russia having refused to accede, and having manifested -by this refusal that this action was directed against Germany, I have -the honour of making known to Your Excellency the following order from -my Government: - -"His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the -Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself in the state of -war with Russia." - - -{397} - -The same afternoon, President Poincaré ordered a general mobilization -in France. What Ambassador von Schoen tried to get from Premier -Viviani, and what he _did_ get was expressed in his telegram sent from -Paris three hours before the call to mobilization was issued: - -"Upon the repeated definite enquiry whether France would remain neutral -in the case of a Russo-German War, the Premier declared that France -would do that which her interests dictated." - -Germany violated the neutrality of Luxemburg on August 2d, and of -Belgium on August 3d, after vainly endeavouring to secure permission -from Belgium for the free passage of her troops to the French frontier. -On Sunday morning, August 2d, French soil was invaded. But Ambassador -von Schoen stayed in Paris until Monday evening "waiting for -instructions." Then he called at the Quai d'Orsay, and handed the -following note to Premier Viviani, who was acting also as Minister of -Foreign Affairs: - - -"The German civil and military authorities have reported a certain -number of definite acts of hostility committed on German territory by -French military aviators. Several of these have clearly violated the -neutrality of Belgium in flying over the territory of this country. -One of them tried to destroy structures near Wesel; others have been -seen in the region of Eiffel, another has thrown bombs on the railway -near Karlsruhe and Nürnberg. - -"I am charged, and I have the honour to make known to Your Excellency -that, in the presence of these aggressions, the German Empire considers -{398} itself in state of war with France by the act of this latter -Power. - -"I have at the same time the honour to bring to the knowledge of Your -Excellency that the German authorities will detain the French merchant -ships in German ports, but that they will release them if in -forty-eight hours complete reciprocity is assured. - -"My diplomatic mission having come to an end, there remains to me no -more than to beg Your Excellency to be willing to give me my passports -and to take what measures you may judge necessary to assure my return -to Germany with the staff of the embassy, as well as with the staff of -the legation of Bavaria and of the German Consulate-General at Paris." - - -In communicating this declaration of war to the Chamber of Deputies on -the following morning, August 4th, Premier Viviani declared formally -that "at no moment has a French aviator penetrated into Belgium; no -French aviator has committed either in Bavaria or in any part of the -German Empire any act of hostility." - - - - -{399} - -CHAPTER XXI - -GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR - -The balance of power in European diplomacy led inevitably to a -_rapprochement_ between France and Russia and Great Britain to offset -the Triple Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary and Italy. - -The Triple Alliance, however, while purely _defensive_, was still an -alliance. It had endured or over thirty years, and the three Powers -generally sustained each other in diplomatic moves. Their military and -naval strategists were in constant communication, and ready at any time -to bring all their forces into play in a European war. - -France and Russia had also entered into a defensive alliance. This had -not been accomplished without great difficulty. Were it not for the -constant menace to France from Germany, the French Parliament would not -have ratified the alliance in the first place, nor would it have stood -the strain of increasing Radicalism in French sentiment during the last -decade. While there is much intellectual and temperamental affinity -between Gaul and Slav, there is no political affinity between -democratic France and autocratic Russia. - -The commercial rivalry of Great Britain and {400} Germany led to a -rivalry of armaments. The struggle of German industry for the control -of the world markets is the real cause of the creation and rapid -development of the German navy to threaten the British mastery of the -seas. It is possible that the statesmen of Great Britain, by a liberal -policy in regard to German colonial expansion in Africa and Asia and in -regard to German ambitions in Asiatic Turkey, might have diverted -German energy from bending all its efforts to destroy British commerce. -It is possible that such a policy might have enabled the German -democracy to gain the power to prevent Prussian militarism from -dominating the Confederation. But that would have been expecting too -much of human nature. Nations are like individuals. There never has -been any exception to this rule. What we have we want to keep. We -want more than we have, and we try to get it by taking it away from our -neighbour. Thus the world is in constant struggle. Until we have the -millennium, and by the millennium I mean the change of human nature -from selfishness to altruism, we shall have war. Then, too, the -British have seen in themselves so striking an illustration of the -proverb that the appetite grows with eating that they could hardly -expect anything else of the Germans, were they to allow them -voluntarily "a place in the sun." - -The rapid growth of Germany along the lines similar to the development -of Great Britain has made the two nations rivals. As a result of this -rivalry, Great Britain has been forced to prepare for the eventuality -of a conflict between herself and {401} Germany by giving up the policy -of "splendid isolation," and seeking to enter into friendly -relationship with those European Powers that were the enemies of her -rival. The first decade of the twentieth century saw British diplomacy -compounding colonial rivalry with France in Africa and with Russia in -Asia. The African accord of 1904 and the Asiatic accord of 1907 marked -a new era in British foreign relations. Since their conclusion, Great -Britain has drawn gradually nearer to France and Russia. - -But British statesmen have had to reckon with the development of -Radical tendencies in the British electorate. These tendencies have -become more and more marked during the very period in which British -foreign policy found that its interests coincided with those of Russia -and France. British democracy had the same antipathy to a Russian -alliance as had French democracy. But the menace of Germany, which -threw France into the arms of Russia, has not seemed as real to the -British electorate. There was also the sentiment against militarism, -which has made it difficult for the Liberal Cabinet to secure from -Parliament sufficient sums for the maintenance of an adequate naval -establishment, and has blocked every effort to provide even a modified -form of compulsory military service and military training in Great -Britain and Ireland. - -When one considers all that Sir Edward Grey has had to contend with -during the years that he has held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in -the British Cabinet admiration for his achievements knows no limits. -It is never safe to make comparisons or form judgments {402} in the -appreciation of contemporary figures in history. But I cannot refrain -from stating my belief that British foreign policy has never passed -through a more trying and critical period, and British interests have -never been more ably served, than during the years since the conference -of Algeciras. - -The menace of a war between Great Britain and Germany has disturbed -Europe several times during the past decade. There has not been, -however, a direct crisis, involving the interests of the two rival -nations, to make an appeal to arms inevitable, or even probable. But, -although British public sentiment might have been slow in supporting -the intervention of the Cabinet in favour of France, had Germany -attacked France in 1905, in 1908, or in 1911, to have stayed out of the -war would have been suicidal folly, and Great Britain would soon have -awakened to this fact. - -The crisis over the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to Servia became acute -after the terms of the ultimatum were known. Sir Edward Grey, seconded -by as skilful and forceful ambassadors as have ever represented British -interests on the continent of Europe, honestly tried to prevent the -outbreak of war. It was not to the interests of Great Britain that -this war should be fought. All sentimental considerations to one side, -the moment was peculiarly unfavourable on purely material grounds. The -British Parliament was facing one of the most serious problems of its -history. The confidence of the country in the wisdom of the measures -in Ireland {403} that the Government seemed determined to carry out was -severely shaken. The interest of the British public in the troubles -between Austria-Hungary and Servia was not great enough to make the war -popular. The efforts of Lord Haldane had done much to improve the -relationship between Great Britain and Germany. Sympathy with Russia -had been alienated by the increasingly reactionary policy of the Czar's -government towards the Poles, the Finns, and the Jews. The British -press was disgusted by the overthrow of the Ribot Ministry and by the -revelations of the Caillaux trial. - -As there was no actual alliance between Great Britain and France, and -no understanding of any nature whatever with Russia, French public -opinion was far from being certain that British aid would be given in -the approaching war, _and British public opinion was far from being -certain as to whether it would be necessary to give this aid, or -whether it wanted to do so_. I am speaking here of the feeling among -the electorate, which, accurately represented by Parliament, is the -final court of appeal in Great Britain. There was no doubt about the -opinion of Sir Edward Grey and the majority of his colleagues in the -Cabinet, as well as of the leaders of the Opposition. There was, -however, very serious doubt as to the attitude of Parliament. Would it -sustain France and Russia over the question of Servia, at a time when -there was so serious a division in the nation concerning the Home Rule -Bill--even the open menace of civil war? - -When Germany decided to declare war on Russia, {404} and it was seen -that France would be drawn into the struggle, Chancellor von -Bethmann-Hollweg declared to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador to -Germany, that "the neutrality of Great Britain once guaranteed, every -assurance would be given to the Cabinet at London that the Imperial -Government did not have in view territorial acquisitions at the expense -of France." Sir Edward questioned the Chancellor about the French -colonies, "the portions of territories and possessions of France -situated outside of the continent of Europe." Herr von -Bethmann-Hollweg answered that it was not within his power to make any -promise on that subject. - -There was no hesitation or equivocation in the response of the British -Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to this proposition. He said -that neutrality under such conditions was impossible, and that Great -Britain could not stand by and see France crushed, even if she were -left her European territory intact, for she would be reduced to the -position of a satellite of Germany. To make a bargain with Germany at -the expense of France would be a disgrace from which Great Britain -would never recover. It was pointed out to the Chancellor that the -only means of maintaining good relations between Great Britain and -Germany would be for the two Powers to continue to work together to -safeguard the peace of Europe. Sir Edward Grey promised that all his -personal efforts would be directed towards guaranteeing Germany and her -Allies against any aggression on the part of Russia and France, and -hoped that, if Germany showed her good faith in the present crisis, -{405} more friendly relations between Great Britain and Germany would -ensue than had been the case up to that moment. - -This dignified and manly response could have left no doubt in the minds -of German statesmen as to the stand which the British Cabinet intended -to take. Did they believe that Parliament and the people would not -support Sir Edward Grey? - -The position of Great Britain was explicitly put before the House of -Commons on the evening of August 3d. Because of her naval agreement -with France, by which the French navy was concentrated in the -Mediterranean in order that the British Admiralty might keep its full -forces in home waters, Great Britain was bound in honour to prevent an -attack of a hostile fleet upon the Atlantic seacoast of France. If -Germany were to make such an attack, Great Britain would be drawn into -the war without any further question. There had also been since -November, 1912, an understanding between the British and French -military and naval authorities concerning common action on land and sea -"against an enemy." But, at the time this understanding was made, it -was put in writing that it was merely a measure of prudence, and did -not bind Great Britain in any way whatever to act with France either in -a defensive or offensive war. - -Great Britain was drawn into the war by the German violation of the -neutrality of Belgium. - -On Sunday evening, August 2d, at seven o'clock, Germany gave the -following ultimatum to Belgium: - -"The German Government has received sure news, {406} according to which -the French forces have the intention of marching on the Meuse by way of -Givet and Namur; this news leaves no doubt of the intention of France -to march against Germany by way of Belgian territory. The Imperial -German Government cannot help fearing that Belgium, in spite of its -very good will, will not be able to repulse, without help, a forward -march of French troops which promises so large a development. - -"In this fact we find sufficient certitude of a threat directed against -Germany; it is an imperious duty for self-preservation for Germany to -forestall this attack of the enemy. - -"The German Government would regret exceedingly should Belgium regard -as an act of hostility against it the fact that the enemies of Germany -oblige her to violate, on her side, the territory of Belgium. In order -to dissipate every misunderstanding, the German Government declares as -follows: - -"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium, if Belgium -consents, in the war which is going to commence, to adopt an attitude -of benevolent neutrality in regard to Germany. The German Government, -on its side, promises, at the moment of peace, to guarantee the kingdom -and its possessions in their entire extent. 2. Germany promises to -evacuate Belgian territory, under the condition above pronounced, -immediately peace is concluded. 3. If Belgium observes a friendly -attitude, Germany is ready, in accord with the authorities of the -Belgian Government, to buy, paying cash, all that would be necessary -for her troops, and to indemnify the losses caused to Belgium. 4. If -Belgium conducts herself in a hostile manner against the German troops -and makes in particular difficulties for their forward march by an -opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse or by the destruction of -{407} roads, railways, tunnels, or other constructions, Germany will be -obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy. - -"In this case, Germany will make no promise in regard to the kingdom, -but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the relations of the two -states one toward the other to the decision of arms. - -"The German Government has the hope with reason that this eventuality -will not take place, and that the Belgian Government will know how to -take the necessary measures suitable for preventing it from taking -place. - -"In this case, the relations of friendship which unite the two -neighbouring states will become narrower and more lasting." - - -Belgium did not hesitate to respond promptly as follows: - - -"By its note of August 2, 1914, the German Government has made known -that according to sure news the French forces have the intention of -marching on the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in -spite of her very good will, would not be able to repulse without help -the forward march of the French troops. - -"The German Government would believe itself under the obligation of -forestalling this attack and of violating the Belgian territory. In -these conditions, Germany proposes to the Government of the King to -adopt in regard to her a friendly attitude, and she promises at the -moment of the peace to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of -its possessions in their entire extent. - -"The note adds that if Belgium makes difficulty for the forward march -of the German troops, Germany will be obliged to consider her as an -enemy but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the {408} relations -of the two states one towards the other by the decision of arms. - -"This note has aroused in the Government of the King a deep and -grievous astonishment. The intentions that it attributes to France are -in contradiction with the formal declarations which have been made to -us on August 1st, in the name of the Government of the Republic. - -"However, if in opposition to our expectation a violation of the -Belgian neutrality is going to be committed by France, Belgium would -fulfil all her international duties, and her army would oppose itself -to the invader with the most vigorous resistance. The treaties of -1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, make sacred the independence -and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers and -notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia. - -"Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she -has accomplished her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has -neglected no effort to maintain and to make respected her neutrality. -The attack upon her independence with which the German Government -menaces her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. - -"No strategic interest justifies the violation of international law. -The Belgian Government in accepting the propositions of which it has -received notice would sacrifice the honour of the nation at the same -time as it would betray its duties toward Europe. Conscious of the -rôle that Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the -civilization of the world, it does not allow itself to believe that the -independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the price of the -violation of her neutrality. If this hope is deceived, the Belgian -Government is firmly decided to repulse by every means in its power -every attack upon its rights." - -[Illustration: Map--Europe in 1914] - -{409} - -As I record these two statements, there is before me a cartoon from a -recent issue of _Punch_. The Kaiser, with a leer on his face, is -leaning over the shoulder of King Albert, who is looking out with -folded arms upon the smoking ruins of his country, and the long defile -of refugees. The Kaiser says, "See, you have lost all." King Albert -answers, "Not my soul." - -To be just to Germany, is necessary for us to quote the explanation of -this action made by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the _Reichstag_, -on August 4th, when Germany had commenced to carry into execution her -threat: - - -"Here is the truth. We are in necessity, and necessity knows no law. - -"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already put their -foot upon Belgium territory. - -"It is against the law of nations. The French Government has, it is -true, declared at Brussels that it would respect the neutrality of -Belgium, so long as the enemy respected it. We knew, however, that -France was ready for the aggression. France could wait; we, no. A -French attack upon our flank in the Lower Rhine might have been fatal -to us. So we have been forced to pass beyond the well-founded -protestations of Luxemburg and the Belgian Government. We shall -recompense them for the wrong that we have thus caused them as soon as -we shall have attained our military end. - -"When one is as threatened as we are and when one fights for that which -is most sacred to him, one can think only of one thing, that is, to -attain his end, cost what it may." - - -{410} - -"I repeat the words of the Emperor; 'It is with pure conscience that -Germany goes to the combat.'" - - -On the afternoon of August 3d, as Sir Edward Grey was leaving for -Parliament to make his _exposé_ of Great Britain's position in the -European crisis, he received from the King a telegram that had just -arrived from King Albert of Belgium: - - -"Remembering the numerous proofs of friendship of Your Majesty and of -Your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870, -as well as of the new gage of friendship that she has just given me, I -address a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty -to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." - - -Sir Edward Grey read this telegram to Parliament, and explained that -the diplomatic intervention asked for had already been made both at -Paris and Berlin, for this eventuality had been foreseen. To the -questions of the British Ambassadors concerning their intentions -towards Belgium, _to respect and maintain the neutrality of which each -of these Powers was equally bound with Great Britain by the treaty of -1839_, France responded by telegraph received August 1st: - - -"French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, -and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that -neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order -to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise." - - -Germany answered the same day through Sir E. Goschen; - -{411} - -"I have seen the Secretary of State, who informs me that he must -consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer." - - -When Sir Edward Goschen expressed the hope that the answer would not be -delayed, Herr von Jagow gave him clearly to understand that he doubted -whether he could respond, "for any response on his part would not fail, -in case of war, to have the regrettable effect of divulging a part of -the German plan of campaign!" - -There was no doubt about the sentiment of Parliament. The Cabinet saw -that party lines had been obliterated, and that the country was behind -them. The following day, August 4th, Great Britain presented an -ultimatum to Germany, demanding an assurance that the neutrality of -Belgium should be respected. Germany gave no answer. Her army had -already invaded Belgium. A few hours after the reception of the -British ultimatum, the advance on Liège was ordered. After waiting -until evening, Great Britain declared war on Germany. - -It is probable that Germany counted the cost before she invaded -Belgium. Whatever may have been said at Berlin, the intervention of -Great Britain was not the surprise that it has been represented to be. -In deciding to violate Belgian neutrality, in spite of the British -ultimatum, the German argument was: It is morally certain that Great -Britain will intervene if we enter Belgium. But what will this -intervention mean? She has no army worth the name. Her navy can do -practically nothing to harm {412} us while we are crushing France and -Russia. The participation of Great Britain in the war is a certainty a -few weeks later. By precipitating her intervention, we are less harmed -than we would be by refusing to avail ourselves of the advantage of -attacking France through Belgium. - -In believing that the eventual participation of Great Britain was -certain, even if there were no Belgian question, Germany was right. -The violation of the neutrality of Belgium was not the cause, but the -occasion, of Great Britain's entry into the war. It was, however, a -most fortunate opportunity for the British Cabinet to secure popular -sympathy and support in declaring war upon Germany. For it is certain -that Great Britain ought not to have delayed entering the war. The -nation might have awakened too late to the fact that the triumph of -Germany in Europe would menace her national existence. There is no -room in the world for the amicable dwelling side by side of Anglo-Saxon -idealism and German militarism. One or the other must perish. - -In August, 1914, the only way to have avoided the catastrophe of a -general European war would have been to allow Germany to make, -according to her own desires and ambitions, the new map of Europe. - - - - -{413} - -INDEX - - -Abdul-Hamid deposed as Sultan, 185 - -Adana massacres, 190 - -Adrianople, invested by Bulgarians in Balkan War, 292; captured by -combined Servian and Bulgarian armies, 313; Turks reoccupy, 349 - -Agadir expedition reopens the Moroccan question in 1911, 78; terms of -the two treaties signed by France and Germany, 81 - -Agram and the Serbo-Croat movement, 147-8 - -Albania: hotbed of rebellions, but partial to Moslem rule, 210; a thorn -in the flesh to the chancelleries of Europe, 351; her political status -before and during the Balkan War, 353; put in the hands of the Powers -by the Treaty of London, 1913, 360; Prince William of Wied made ruler -of new kingdom, 364; his abdication, 366; now under the provisional -government of Essad pasha, 366 - -Algeciras, Conference of European Powers on the Moroccan question at, -73; provisions of the Convention, signed April 7, 1906, 74 - -Alsace-Lorraine, annexed to Germany in 1871, 1; political status in the -Empire, 6; new Constitution granted in 1911, 11; autonomy demanded, 12; -persecutions suffered from Prussian military arrogance, 15-20 - -Analogy between German Socialists of to-day and the Jacobins of 1793, 32 - -Anglo-French agreement of 1904 published, 81 - -Arabs in Ottoman Empire oppose Young Turk hegemony, 214-218 - -Armenia, Turkish and Moslem oppression in, 187; horrors of the Adana -massacres, 190 - -Austria-Hungary, and her south Slavs, 142-160; the Dual Monarchy's -Balkan policy and problems, 144-160; acts the bully against Servia, 156 - -Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia, 368-385; the direct sequence of -the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908-1909, 368-371; -exciting cause: the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife at -Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, 374; Austria's note to Servia and demands -for reparation, 376; the Servian reply, 381; declared not satisfactory -by Austro-Hungarian Minister, 384; war declared on Servia, July 28, -1914, 384 - - -_Bagdadbahn_, The, 58-70, 216; the Pan-Germanist conception of it, 62; -concession granted in 1899, and company constituted in 1903, 65; -British oppose successfully German schemes in Asiatic Turkey, 66 - -Balbo, Cesare, on the "Hope of Italy," 125 - -Balkan States: Alliance of Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro -against Turkey, 263; Russian and Austro-Hungarian joint note to the -States, 268; war declared by Montenegro, October 8, 1912, 270; causes -of Turkish disasters, 279; story of the Thracian campaign, 283-293; -capture of Kirk Kilissé and battle of Lulé Burgas, 285-289; Bulgarians -halt at Tchatalja, 290; Servian and Greek successes, 293-300; -conditions of armistice, signed December 3d, 302; failure of first -peace conference, 308; mediation of the Great Powers accepted, 316; -terms of the Treaty of London, which ended war, 316; rupture between -the Balkan allies, 319-329; disputes over division of the spoil bring -on second Balkan War, 321-327; treachery of the Bulgarians at Salonika, -330-334; Servian and Greek successes, 333-337; Rumania intervenes -against Bulgaria, 338; Montenegro supports Servia, 341; Bulgaria -humiliated, and new map for the Balkan peninsula made by the Treaty of -Bukarest, 343-350 - -Banca di Roma in Tripoli, 243 - -Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, August 3, 1914, 397 - -Belgium, Germany's ultimatum to, 405; the reply, 407 - -Bethmann-Hollweg, von, German Chancellor, 10; his arbitrary ruling -forbidding discussion of the Polish lands question in the _Reichstag_, -rebuked, 114; his disregard for parliamentary opinion in the German -Confederation, 115; his notes to London, Paris, and Petrograd on the -Servian ultimatum, 391; tries to bargain for Great Britain's neutrality -at the expense of France, but fails, 404; his explanation in the -_Reichstag_ for Germany's violation of neutrality, 409 - -Bismarck, in the Congress of Berlin, 26; indifferent to the Eastern -Question, 27; concerned chiefly with internal problems, 28; inaugurates -new German colonial policy by annexations in Africa, 41; purchases -Russian neutrality in 1870, 137-8 - -Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the rule of Austria-Hungary, 148-155; how -their annexation was effected despite the protests of England, Russia, -Turkey, and Servia, 368-371 - -Bülow, von, German Chancellor, on the Moroccan situation in 1906, 74 - -Bulgaria, aspirations in Macedonia, 168-173, 176-8, 207; alliance with -Greece, 231, 237-8, 265; in the Balkan War, 275-293; attitude towards -Servia and Greece after the Treaty of London, 321-7; fights her former -allies, 328-40; loses Adrianople again to Turks, 349 - -_Bundesrath_, composition of, 7, 11 - -Burney, British Admiral, on the future of Albania, 363 - - -Carol, King of Rumania, loyalty to Hohenzollerns, 134 - -Colonization policy of the German Government, 44; opposition against it -in Germany, 44-45 - -Congress of Berlin, 161; its provisions disregarded by the contracting -Powers and the Balkan States, 162, 240; its action on the Cretan -question, 222 - -Congress of Vienna, 97, 119 - -Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, 144, 166 - -_Coup d'état_ of January 23, 1913, in Turkey, 307 - -Crete: Assembly decrees the island indissolubly united to Greece, 202; -Turkey enforces the Greek commercial boycott, 203; put back under -Ottoman rule by Congress of Berlin, 222; granted autonomy by the Powers -in 1898, 224; Young Turks attempt to re-establish their authority, 228; -rise of M. Venizelos from a Cretan revolutionary to become Prime -Minister of Greece, 231; insincere and procrastinating diplomacy of the -Powers on the Cretan question leads to the first Balkan War, 230-240, -264 - - -Danube and the Dardanelles, 131-141; how the former is subordinated to -the latter, 133; Russia's struggles for ocean waterways, 135-141 - -Dellbrück, Herr, Secretary of State for the Interior, sent to confer -with Alsatians concerning the new Constitution, 10 - -_Deutschland über Alles!_ 36 - -Duma, Poles in, 105-8 - -Durazzo, Servia forced to evacuate, 157 - -_Drang nach Osten_, according to Professors Haeckel and Wirth, 151; -Austro-Hungarian attitude towards, 144; birth of, 165-6 - - -Enver bey, in training at Berlin, 67; and the _coup d'état_ of January -23, 1913, 307; attempts an offensive movement on the Gallipoli -peninsula, 310 - -Essad pasha, in control of northern Albania, 361; put at head of new -provisional government by Albanian Senate, 366 - - -France: opposes German intervention in Morocco, 72; sends expeditionary -force and captures Fez, 77; patches peace with Germany by mutual -concessions, 81 - -Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, assassinated, with his wife, at -Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914, 374; assassinations preceding this, 153 - - -German, connotation of word, 33 - -German citizenship law of 1914, 34-6 - -German Empire, how constituted in 1872, 6 - -German _White Book_, 382, 392 - -Germans quoted on the superiority of their race, 29-31 - -Germany: in Alsace and Lorraine, 1-20; annexed the land but not the -people, 2; her industrial prosperity since 1870 necessitated entering -the colonial field, 40; annexations in Africa, China, and the Pacific, -41; how her campaign for the markets of the world has been carried on, -49; historical _résumé_ of the attempts to obtain concessions in Asia -Minor and Mesopotamia, 62-70; intervenes in Morocco in 1905 and 1910, -72-83; fails to obtain a foothold in Persia, 89-95: her treatment of -the Poles, 111; forces war upon Russia and France, 386-398; backs -Austria-Hungary in her demands upon Servia, 388; diplomatic exchanges -day by day preceding the declaration of war, 392-398; violates the -neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, 397; sends ultimatum to Belgium, -405 - -Great Britain enters the war, 399-412; commercial rivalry with Germany -one of the causes, 399; Sir Edward Grey's efforts to prevent the -outbreak, 402; refuses to make a bargain with Germany at the expense of -France, 404; violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany the occasion -for declaring war, 405, 411 - -Greece: her impotence in the war of 1897, 223; drawn into the Balkan -alliance, 264; her rôle in the Balkan War, 276, 295, 299, 331, 333, 336 - -Greek Church, 170, 171, 196, 197 - -Grey, Sir Edward, supports France in resisting German claims in -Morocco, 81; makes strenuous efforts to prevent war, 393, 402, 404 - - -Hakki pasha predicts European War, 247 - -Haldane, Lord, his mission to Germany in 1912, 54 - -_Hamidieh_, Turkish cruiser, raids the Ægean, 304 note - -Herreros against Germany, 20, 44 - -Holepa, Pact of, 222 - -Hussein Hilmi pasha, characterization of Macedonians, 237 - - -Italia Irredenta, 119-130; meaning of the term "Irredentism," 120; -Cesare Balbo on the "Hope of Italy," 125; the struggle to gain control -of the Adriatic, 128 - -Italy: sends ultimatum to Turkey to consent to the occupation of -Tripoli, 247; war begins September 30, 1911, 248; decree annexing the -African provinces of Turkey approved by Italian Parliament, November -5th, 250; peace secured by Treaty of Lausanne, October 15, 1912, 260, -273 - - -Janina, surrendered to the Greeks, 311 - -Jews, development of business sense, 49; oppressed in Poland and -Russia, 107, 117 - - -Kholm separated from the Kingdom of Poland in 1912, 106 - -Kiau-Chau, China, leased to Germany for ninety-nine years, 43; increase -of commerce of, 46 - -Kirk-Kilissé captured by the Bulgarians, 286 - -Koweit, British seize, 66 - - -Lausanne, Treaty of, 260 - -Lodz, a German outpost in Poland, 97 - -London, Treaty of, 316 - -Lulé Burgas, battle of, 287 - -Luxemburg neutrality violated by Germany, August 2, 1914, 397 - - -Macedonia, racial rivalries in, 161-179; fomented by Austro-Turkish -policy, 167; complicated by Russian intrigues in the Balkan States, -171; Armenian massacres of 1893-96, 174; failure of the international -"pacification" policy, 176; how the Young Turks decided to solve the -Macedonian problem, 207 - -Mesopotamia, British and German rivalry in, 67 - -Montenegro, opens first Balkan War by a memorable declaration, 270; -enters war against Bulgaria, 341 - -Morocco, German intervention in 1905 in, 72; Convention of Algeciras in -1906 decides the international status of, 73; question reopened by the -Agadir incident in 1911, 78; French protectorate over, agreed to by -Germany, 81-82 - -Mürszteg, Program of, 176 - - -_Narodna Obrana_, Servian patriotic society organized in support of the -national aspirations for a "Greater Servia," 155, 373; its dissolution -demanded by Austria-Hungary, 378; and agreed to by Servia, 383 - -Nazim pasha assassinated, 308 - -New citizenship law enacted in Germany, January 1, 1914, 34 - -Nicholas, Czar, proclamation to Poles, Aug. 16, 1914, 116 - -Novi Bazar, Sandjak of, 144, 368, 341 - - -Osmanlis, contrast of civilization to Roman and Byzantine, 60 - - -Pan-Germanic movement in Germany, 55 - -Pan-Islamic movement, failure of, 64, 70 - -Paris, Congress of (1856), forbids the Black Sea to Russia, 137 - -Persia, Passing of, 84-95; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 87; terms -of the Russo-German Accord of 1911, 92 - -Persian Constitutionalists, weakness of, 87 - -Poland, and its partitioners, 96-118; its redistribution by the -Congress of Vienna, 97; the Polish revolutions of 1830 and 1863, 98; -harsh treatment of the Poles since 1864 in Russia, 99; separation of -Kholm in 1912, 106; condition of the Poles in Austria-Hungary since -1867, 108; how the Poles have fared in Germany since 1870, 111; -international aspect of the Polish question, 115-118 - -"Program of Mürszteg," proposed as a solution of the Macedonian -problem, 176 - - -Radetzky, on the attitude of Russia to the Ottoman Empire, 136 - -_Reichsland_, Alsace-Lorraine constituted a, 6 - -Reichstadt, Convention of, 144 - -Ribot Ministry, fall of, 389, 403 - -Rumania: her neutrality discussed, 134; her rôle in the second Balkan -War, 338-340; and the Treaty of Bukarest, 346 - -Ruthenians in Galicia, 109-111 - -Russia: ends Asiatic rivalry with Great Britain by convention of August -31, 1907, 87; sends troops to northern Persia in 1909, 90; comes to -accord with Germany in Persia, 92; her despotic rule in Poland, 99; her -strivings after ocean waterways, 135; promises to support Servia -against Austrian aggression, 381, 394 - - -Salonika, Austro-Hungarian dream of possessing, 144, 166; surrendered -to the Greeks, 297, 321 - -Sandansky, the capturer of Miss Stone, an American missionary, 328 - -Sarajevo, Archduke Ferdinand and his wife assassinated at, 374 - -Saverne, affair of, 17-18 - -Scutari surrendered to the Montenegrins, 315 - -Serbo-Croatian national aspirations repressed in southern Hungary, 146 - -Servia: her national aspirations for a strong independent state held in -check by Austria-Hungary, 143-149, 155-158; her rôle in the Balkan -alliance, against Turkey, 276, 293; capture of Monastir, 294; her -rupture with Bulgaria precipitates second Balkan War, 323; protests -against annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, 368; -forced into submission, 371; receives ultimatum from Austria for the -Sarajevo assassination, 376; her answer conciliatory but not -satisfactory, 381-384; war declared against her, 384 - -Shuster mission in Persia a failure, 91 - - -Tchatalja, Bulgarian attack halted at, 291 - -Thracian campaign in the Balkan War, 276-292 - -Treaty of Bukarest, 343-350: terms of the protocols signed by the -allies and new map of the Balkan peninsula, 345-350 - -Treaty of Frankfort, 6, 21, 22 - -Treaty of Lausanne ends war between Italy and Turkey, 260 - -Treaty of London, signed May 30, 1913, 316; its terms, 318, 360 - -Treitschke's opinion of the British, 30 - -Triple Alliance, 24, 28, 122 - -Triple Entente, 26 - -Tripoli annexed by Italy, 250 - -Turkey, the bloodless revolution of 1908, 180; Young Turks' -constitutional _régime_, 182-219; why it failed, 185, 218; treatment of -Armenians before and after the Adana massacres, 186; the attempt to -suppress the liberties of the Orthodox Church, 194; the Cretan question -and the Greek boycott, 201; the Young Turks and the Macedonian problem, -206, the Albanian uprisings, 210; treatment of the Arabs in Asiatic -Turkey, 214; war with Italy over the occupation of Tripoli, 247, 262; -war with the Balkan States, 263-300 - - -Venizelos, Eleutherios, Prime Minister of Crete, urges Powers to place -the island under Greek protection, 228; the diplomats temporize, 230; -becomes Prime Minister of Greece and inaugurates constitutional -reforms, 232 - - -_Weltpolitik_ of Germany, 22-57; the factors which have given birth to -it, 29; its scope as announced by the Kaiser, 31; supported by new -citizenship law, 34; "once a German always a German," 35; led to -colonial annexations in Africa, China, and the Pacific, 41; its -development creates a strong navy and merchant marine, 52; leads to -railway concessions in Asia Minor and formation of the Bagdad Railway -Company, 64; German intrigues in the Ottoman Empire, 66 - -Wilhelm, Emperor, makes tactless speech at Strasbourg, 14; attacked by -Socialists in the _Reichstag_, 14-15; announces scope of the -_Weltpolitik_, 31; historic speech in Tangier, March 31, 1905, 72; -Venizelos interviews, 236 - -William of Wied, Prince, made Mpret of Albania, 364; abdicates after a -short reign, 366 - -Wolff, Herr, leader of the German Liberal party, on the attitude of the -anti-Prussian parties in the _Reichsland_, 19 - - -Young Turks, _see under_ Albania, Crete, Italy, Macedonia, and Turkey - - - - - - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The New Map of Europe (1911-1914), by -Herbert Adams Gibbons - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE (1911-1914) *** - -***** This file should be named 54082-8.txt or 54082-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/0/8/54082/ - -Produced by Al Haines -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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