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Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1826e19 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #54776 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54776) diff --git a/old/54776-8.txt b/old/54776-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d31f728..0000000 --- a/old/54776-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14830 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Ordeal by Battle, by Frederick Scott Oliver - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Ordeal by Battle - -Author: Frederick Scott Oliver - -Release Date: May 24, 2017 [EBook #54776] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ORDEAL BY BATTLE *** - - - - -Produced by Al Haines - - - - - - - - - ORDEAL BY BATTLE - - - BY - - FREDERICK SCOTT OLIVER - - - -With that they looked upon him, and began to reply in this sort: SIMPLE -said, _I see no danger_; SLOTH said, _Yet a little more sleep_; and -PRESUMPTION said, _Every Vat must stand upon his own bottom_. And so -they lay down to sleep again, and CHRISTIAN went on his way. - -_The Pilgrim's Progress_. - - - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON - 1915 - - - - -COPYRIGHT - - - - - TO - THE MEMORY OF - - HUGH DAWNAY - - COMMANDING THE 2ND LIFE GUARDS - WHO WAS KILLED AT ZWARTELEEN ON THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER 1914 - AND OF - - JOHN GOUGH, V.C. - - CHIEF OF THE STAFF OF THE FIRST ARMY - WHO FELL NEAR ESTAIRES ON THE 20TH OF FEBRUARY 1915 - - THEY WERE BROTHER-OFFICERS OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE - AND THOSE WHO KNEW THEM BOTH - WILL ALWAYS THINK OF THEM TOGETHER - - - - - _Works by the Same Author_ - - ALEXANDER HAMILTON (An Essay on American Union). - LIBRARY EDITION. Messrs. CONSTABLE & Co., London. - LIBRARY EDITION. Messrs. G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York. - POPULAR EDITION. Messrs. THOS. NELSON & SONS. - - FEDERALISM AND HOME RULE (Letters of Pacificus). - - THE ALTERNATIVES TO CIVIL WAR. - - WHAT FEDERALISM IS NOT. - - - MR. JOHN MURRAY, LONDON. - - - - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - LONDON * BOMBAY * CALCUTTA - MELBOURNE - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - NEW YORK * BOSTON * CHICAGO - DALLAS * SAN FRANCISCO - - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - TORONTO - - - - -{ix} - -PREFACE - -It is hardly necessary to plead, in extenuation of those many faults -which any impartial reader will discover in the following pages, the -impossibility of discussing events which are unfolding themselves -around us, in the same detached spirit as if we were dealing with past -history. The greater part of this volume has been written in haste, -and no one is more alive to its shortcomings than the author himself. - -Faults of style are a small matter, and will be easily forgiven. It -has not been the aim to produce a work of literary merit, but solely to -present a certain view of public affairs. It is to be hoped that -actual errors of fact are rare. Inconsistencies however--or apparent -inconsistencies--cannot be altogether avoided, even by careful -revision. But the greatest difficulty of all is to keep a true sense -of proportion. - -In Part I.--_The Causes of War_--an attempt has been made to state, -very briefly, why it has hitherto proved impossible to eliminate the -appeal to arms from human affairs; to set out the main incidents which -occurred at the opening of the present European struggle; to explain -the immediate occasions, as {x} well as the more permanent and -deep-seated causes, of this conflict; to consider some of the most -glaring miscalculations which have arisen out of misunderstanding -between nations. - -In Part II.--_The Spirit of German Policy_--an attempt has been made to -understand the ambitions of our chief antagonist, and to trace the -manner in which these ambitions have been fostered, forced, and -corrupted by a priesthood of learned men. The relations which exist -between this Pedantocracy and the Bureaucracy, the Army, the Rulers, -and the People of Germany have been examined. It would appear that -under an academic stimulus, healthy national ambitions have become -morbid, have resulted in the discovery of imaginary grievances, and -have led the Governing Classes of Germany to adopt a new code of morals -which, if universally adhered to, would make an end of human society. -On the other hand, it would also appear that the German People have -accepted the policy of their rulers, without in any way accepting, or -even understanding, the morality upon which this policy is founded. It -is also important for us to realise the nature of the judgment--not -altogether unjustified--which our enemies have passed upon the British -character, and upon our policy and institutions. - -In Part III.--_The Spirit of British Policy_--our own political course -since the beginning of the century has been considered--the -difficulties arising out of the competition for priority between aims -which are {xi} not in themselves antagonistic: between Social Reform, -Constitutional Reform, and Imperial Defence--the confusion which has -resulted from the inadequacy of one small parliament, elected upon a -large variety of cross issues, for dealing with these diverse -needs--the lowering of the tone of public life, the depreciation in the -character of public men, which have come about owing to these two -causes, and also to a third--the steadily increasing tyranny and -corruption of the party machines. - -The aim of British Foreign Policy has been simply--Security. Yet we -have failed to achieve Security, owing to our blindness, indolence, and -lack of leadership. We have refused to realise that we were not living -in the Golden Age; that Policy at the last resort depends on Armaments; -that Armaments, to be effective for their purpose, must correspond with -Policy. Political leaders of all parties up to the outbreak of the -present war ignored these essentials; or if they were aware of them, in -the recesses of their own consciousness, they failed to trust the -People with a full knowledge of the dangers which threatened their -Security, and of the means by which alone these dangers could be -withstood. - -The titles of Parts II. and III. are similar--_The Spirit of German -Policy_ and _The Spirit of British Policy_; but although the titles are -similar the treatment is not the same. Confession of a certain failure -in proportion must be made frankly. The two pieces do not balance. -German Policy is viewed {xii} from without, at a remote distance, and -by an enemy. It is easier in this case to present a picture which is -clear, than one which is true. British Policy, on the of other hand, -is viewed from within. If likewise it is tinged with prejudice, the -prejudice is of a different character. Both Parts, I fear, diverge to -a greater or less extent from the main purpose of the book. Mere -excision is easy; but compression is a difficult and lengthy process, -and I have not been able to carry it so far as I could have wished. - -In Part IV.--_Democracy and National Service_--an attempt has been made -to deal with a problem which faces us at the moment. Democracy is not -unlike other human institutions: it will not stand merely by its own -virtue. If it lacks the loyalty, courage, and strength to defend -itself when attacked, it must perish as certainly as if it possessed no -virtue whatsoever. Manhood suffrage implies manhood service. Without -the acceptance of this principle Democracy is merely an imposture. - -I prefer 'National Service' to 'Conscription,' not because I shrink -from the word 'Conscription,' but because 'National Service' has a -wider sweep. The greater includes the less. It is not only military -duties which the State is entitled to command its citizens to perform -unquestioningly in times of danger; but also civil duties. It is not -only men between the ages of twenty and thirty-eight to whom the State -should have the right to give orders; but men and women of all ages. -Under conditions of {xiii} modern warfare it is not only armies which -need to be disciplined; but whole nations. The undisciplined nation, -engaged in anything like an equal contest with a disciplined nation, -will be defeated. - - - -The Coalition Government - -This volume was in type before the Coalition Government was formed; but -there is nothing in it which I wish to change in view of that event. -This book was not undertaken with the object of helping the Unionists -back into power, or of getting the Liberals out of power. - -The new Cabinet contains those members of the late one in whom the -country has most confidence. Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. -Lloyd George, and Mr. Churchill have all made mistakes. In a great -crisis it is the bigger characters who are most liable to make -mistakes. Their superiority impels them to take risks which the -smaller men, playing always for safety, are concerned to avoid. - -The present Ministry also contains representatives of that class of -politicians which, according to the view set forth in the following -pages, is primarily responsible for our present troubles. -Lawyer-statesmanship, which failed to foresee the war, to prepare -against it, and to conduct it with energy and thoroughness when it -occurred, still occupies a large share of authority. Possibly -ministers of this school {xiv} will now walk in new ways. In any case, -they are no longer in a position of dangerous predominance. - -The Coalition Government, having wisely refused to part with any of -those men who rose to the emergency, and having received an infusion of -new blood (which may be expected to bring an accession of vigour) -starts upon its career with the goodwill and confidence of the People. - -What has happened, however, is a revolution upon an unprecedented -scale--one which is likely to have vast consequences in the future. -The country realises this fact, and accepts it as a matter of -course--accepts it indeed with a sigh of relief. But in other -quarters, what has just happened is hardly realised at all--still less -what it is likely to lead to in the future. - -During the 'Cabinet Crisis' one read a good deal of stuff in the -newspapers, and heard still more by word of mouth, which showed how -far, during the past nine months, public opinion has moved away from -the professionals of politics; how little account it takes of them; -also how much these gentlemen themselves mistake the meaning of the -present situation. - -In political circles one has heard, and read, very frequently of late, -expressions of regret--on the one hand that Unionists should have come -to the assistance of a discredited and bankrupt administration--on the -other hand that a government, secure in the confidence of the country, -should, through a mistaken {xv} sense of generosity, have admitted its -opponents to a share in the glory and prestige of office. One has -read, and heard, cavillings at the idea of appointing this, or that, -public character to this, or that, office, as a thing beyond what this, -or that, party 'could fairly be expected to stand.' Reports have -appeared of meetings of 'a hundred' perturbed Liberals; and very -possibly meetings, though unreported, of equally perturbed Unionists -have also been held. An idea seems still to be prevalent in certain -quarters, that what has just occurred is nothing more important than an -awkward and temporary disarrangement of the party game; and that this -game will be resumed, with all the old patriotism and good feeling, so -soon as war is ended. But this appears to be a mistaken view. You -cannot make a great mix-up of this sort without calling new parties -into existence. When men are thrown into the crucible of a war such as -this, the true ore will tend to run together, the dross to cake upon -the surface. No matter to what parties they may have originally owed -allegiance, the men who are in earnest, and who see realities, cannot -help but come together. May be for several generations the annual -festivals of the National Liberal Federation and the Union of -Conservative Associations will continue to be held, like other -picturesque survivals of ancient customs. When Henry VII. was crowned -at Westminster, the Wars of the Roses ended; the old factions of York -and Lancaster were dissolved, and {xvi} made way for new associations. -Something of the same sort has surely happened during the past -month--Liberal and Conservative, Radical and Tory have ceased for the -present to be real divisions. They had recently become highly -artificial and confusing; now they are gone--it is to be hoped for ever. - -Will the generation which is fighting this war--such of them as may -survive--be content to go back to the old barren wrangle when it is -done? Will those others who have lost husbands, sons, brothers, -friends--all that was dearest to them except the honour and safety of -their country--will they be found willing to tolerate the idea of -trusting their destinies ever again to the same machines, to be driven -once more to disaster by the same automatons? To all except the -automatons themselves--who share with the German Supermen the credit of -having made this war--any such resumption of business on -old-established lines appears incredible. There is something pathetic -in the sight of these huckstering sentimentalists still crying their -stale wares and ancient make-believes at the street corners, while -their country is fighting for its life. They remind one, not a little, -of those Pardoners of the fourteenth century who, as we read in history -books, continued to hawk their _Indulgences_ with unabated industry -during the days of the _Black Death_. - -{xvii} - -It is necessary to offer a few words of explanation as to how this book -came to be written. During the months of November and December 1912 -and January 1913, various meetings and discussions took place under -Lord Roberts's roof and elsewhere, between a small number of persons, -who held widely different views, and whose previous experience and -training had been as different as were their opinions. - -Our efforts were concerned with endeavouring to find answers to several -questions which had never been dealt with candidly, clearly, and -comprehensively in the public statements of political leaders. It was -clear that there was no 'national' policy, which the British people had -grasped, accepted, and countersigned, as was the case in France. But -some kind of British policy there must surely be, notwithstanding the -fact it had never been disclosed. What were the aims of this policy? -With what nation or nations were these aims likely to bring us into -collision? What armaments were necessary in order to enable us to -uphold this policy and achieve these aims? How, and when, and where -would our armaments be required in the event of war? Assuming (as we -did in our discussions) that our naval forces were adequate, was the -same statement true of our military forces? And if it were not true, -by what means could the necessary increases be obtained? - -The final conclusion at which we arrived was that National Service was -essential to security. {xviii} Under whatever aspect we regarded the -problem we always returned--even those of us who were most unwilling to -travel in that direction--to the same result. So long as Britain -relied solely upon the voluntary principle, we should never possess -either the Expeditionary Force or the Army for Home Defence which were -requisite for safety. - -It fell to me during the winter 1912-1913 to draft the summary of our -conclusions. It was afterwards decided--in the spring of 1913--that -this private Memorandum should be recast in a popular form suitable for -publication. I was asked to undertake this, and agreed to do so. But -I underestimated both the difficulties of the task and the time which -would be necessary for overcoming them. - -When we met again, in the autumn of that year, the work was still far -from complete, and by that time, not only public attention, but our -own, had become engrossed in other matters. The Irish controversy had -entered upon a most acute and dangerous stage. Lord Roberts put off -the meetings which he had arranged to address during the ensuing months -upon National Service, and threw his whole energies into the endeavour -to avert the schism which threatened the nation, and to find a way to a -peaceful settlement. Next to the security and integrity of the British -Empire I verily believe that the thing which lay nearest his heart was -the happiness and unity of Ireland. - -It is needless to recall how, during the ensuing {xix} months, affairs -in Ireland continued to march from bad to worse--up to the very day -when the menace of the present war suddenly arose before the eyes of -Europe. - -During August 1914 I went through the old drafts and memoranda which -had now been laid aside for nearly a year. Although that very thing -had happened which it had been the object of our efforts to avert, it -seemed to me that there might be advantages in publishing some portion -of our conclusions. The form, of course, would have to be entirely -different; for the recital of prophecies which had come true, though it -might have possessed a certain interest for the prophets themselves, -could have but little for the public. - -Early in September I consulted Lord Roberts, and also such of my -friends, who had originally worked with me, as were still within reach. -Finding that their opinion agreed with my own upon the desirability of -publication, I laid out a fresh scheme, and set to for a third time at -the old task. But as the work grew, it became clear that it would -contain but little of the former Memorandum, and much which the former -Memorandum had never contemplated. So many of our original -conclusions, laboriously hammered out to convince the public in the -spring of the year 1913, had become by the autumn of 1914, the most -trite of commonplaces. And as for the practical scheme which we had -evolved--endeavouring to keep our demands at the most modest {xx} -minimum--it was interesting chiefly by reason of its triviality when -contrasted with the scale of warlike preparations upon which the -Government was now engaged. Practically, therefore, the whole of the -present volume is new--not merely redrafted, but for the most part new -in substance. - - - -The author's acknowledgements. - -I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the friends with whom I have -studied the problems of policy and defence for some years past. The -responsibility for the contents and publication of the present volume -is mine alone; but I have used their ideas without hesitation, and have -drawn largely upon the notes and memoranda which they drafted for my -assistance. I wish also to thank several others--one in chief--for the -kindness with which, upon the present occasion, they have given me help -and criticism as these pages were passing through the press. - -There is also another source to which I wish here gratefully to confess -my obligations. During the past five years there have appeared in _The -Round Table_ certain articles upon the relations of England with -Germany[1] which have been characterised by {xxi} a remarkable degree -of prescience and sanity. At a certain point, however, there is a -difference between the views expressed in _The Round Table_ and those -expressed in the following pages--a difference of stress and emphasis -perhaps, rather than of fundamental opinion, but still a difference of -some importance. I have dealt with this in the concluding chapter. - -I should like to make one other acknowledgment of a different kind. I -have known the editor of _The National Review_ from a date long before -he assumed his onerous office--from days when we were freshmen together -by the banks of the Cam. During a period of upwards of thirty years, I -cannot remember that I have ever had the good fortune to see absolutely -eye to eye with Mr. Maxse upon any public question. Even now I do not -see eye to eye with him. In all probability I never shall. At times -his views have been in sharp opposition to my own. But for these very -reasons--if he will not resent it as an impertinence--I should like to -say here how greatly I respect him for three qualities, which have been -none too common among public men in recent times--first, for the -clearness with which he grasps and states his beliefs; secondly, for -the courageous constancy with which he holds to them through good and -evil report; thirdly, for the undeviating integrity of his public -career. Next to Lord Roberts, he did more perhaps than any -other--though unavailingly--to arouse public opinion to the dangers -{xxii} which menaced it from German aggression, to call attention to -the national unpreparedness, and to denounce the blindness and -indolence which treated warnings with derision. - - - -Lord Roberts. - -Lord Roberts's responsibility for the contents of this volume, as for -its publication at the present time, is nil. And yet it would never -have been undertaken in the first instance except at his wish, nor -re-undertaken in September last without his encouragement. There are -probably a good many besides myself who owe it to his inspiration, that -they first made a serious attempt to study policy and defence as two -aspects of a single problem. I also owe to him many things besides -this. - -The circumstances of Lord Roberts's death were befitting his character -and career. The first great battle of Ypres was ended. The British -line had held its own against tremendous odds of men and guns. He had -no doubt of the ultimate result of the war, and during his visit to -France and Flanders inspired all who saw him by the quiet confidence of -his words and manner. After the funeral service at Headquarters a -friend of his and mine wrote to me describing the scene. The religious -ceremony had taken place in the entrance hall of the Maine at St. Omer. -It was a day of storms; but as the coffin was borne out "the sun -{xxiii} appeared, and made a magnificent rainbow on a great black block -of cloud across the square; and an airman flew across from the rainbow -into the sunlight." - -If I were asked to name Lord Roberts's highest intellectual quality I -should say unhesitatingly that it was his instinct. And if I were -asked to name his highest moral quality I should say, also -unhesitatingly, that it was the unshakeable confidence with which he -trusted his instinct. But the firmness of his trust was not due in the -least to self-conceit, or arrogance, or obstinacy. He obeyed his -instinct as he obeyed his conscience--humbly and devoutly. The -dictates of both proceeded from the same source. It was not his own -cleverness which led him to his conclusions, but the hand of Providence -which drew aside a veil, and enabled him to see the truth. What gave -him his great strength in counsel, as in the field, was the simple -modesty of his confidence. - -He was a poor arguer; I think argument was painful to him; also that he -regarded it as a sad waste of the short span of human life. It was not -difficult to out-argue him. Plausible and perspicacious persons often -left him, after an interview, under the firm impression that they had -convinced him. But as a rule, he returned on the morrow to his old -opinion, unless his would-be converters had brought to his notice new -facts as well as new arguments. - -{xxiv} - -He arrived at an opinion neither hastily nor slowly, but at a moderate -pace. He had the gift of stating his conclusion with admirable -lucidity; and if he thought it desirable, he gave the reasons for his -view of the matter with an equal clearness. But his reasons, like his -conclusion, were in the nature of statements; they were not stages in -an argument. There are as many unanswerable reasons to be given for as -against most human decisions. Ingenuity and eloquence are a curse at -councils of war, and state, and business. Indeed, wherever action of -any kind has to be determined upon they are a curse. It was Lord -Roberts's special gift that, out of the medley of unanswerable reasons, -he had an instinct for selecting those which really mattered, and -keeping his mind close shut against the rest. - -It is superfluous to speak of his courtesy of manner and kindness of -heart, or of his unflagging devotion--up till the very day of his -death--to what he regarded as his duty. There is a passage in -Urquhart's translation of _Rabelais_ which always recalls him to my -mind:--_He was the best little great good man that ever girded a sword -on his side; he took all things in good part, and interpreted every -action in the best sense_. In a leading German newspaper there -appeared, a few days after his death, the following reference to that -event:--"It was not given to Lord Roberts to see the realisation of his -dreams of National Service; but the blows struck on the Aisne were -hammer-strokes which might after a long {xxv} time and bitter need -produce it. Lord Roberts was an honourable and, through his renown, a -dangerous enemy ... personally an extraordinarily brave enemy. Before -such a man we lower our swords, to raise them again for new blows dealt -with the joy of conflict." - -Nor was this the only allusion of the kind which figured in German -newspapers 'to the journey of an old warrior to Walhalla,' with his -final mission yet unaccomplished, but destined to be sooner or later -accomplished, if his country was to survive. In none of these -references, so far as I have been able to discover, was there the least -trace of malice against the man who had warned his fellow-countrymen, -more clearly than any other, against the premeditated aggression of -Germany. This seems very strange when we recollect how, for nearly two -years previously, a large section of the British nation had been -engaged in denouncing Lord Roberts for the outrageous provocations -which he was alleged to have offered to Germany--in apologising to -Germany for his utterances--in suggesting the propriety of depriving -him of his pension in the interests of Anglo-German amity. What this -section has itself earned in the matter of German gratitude we know -from many hymns and other effusions of hate. - -{xxvi} - -Hugh Dawnay and John Gough. - -I have dedicated this volume to the memory of John Gough and Hugh -Dawnay, not solely on grounds of friendship, but also because from both -I received, at different times, much help, advice, and criticism--from -the latter when the original Memorandum was in course of being -drafted--from both when it was being reconsidered with a view to -publication. Whether either of them would agree with the statement in -its present form is more than I can venture to say, and I have no -intention of claiming their authority for conclusions which were never -seen by them in final shape. - -In the first instance (November 1912-March 1913) Dawnay[2] and I worked -together. His original notes and memoranda are to a large extent -incorporated in Parts III. and IV.--so closely, however, that I cannot -now disentangle his from my own. The calculations as to numbers and -probable distribution of the opposing forces, were almost entirely his. -I have merely endeavoured here--not so successfully as I could wish--to -bring them up to the date of the outbreak of war. - -Dawnay took out his squadron of the 2nd Life Guards to France early in -August. Already, however, he had been appointed to the Headquarters -General Staff, on which he served with distinction, until early in -October, when he succeeded to the command {xxvii} of his regiment. He -fell at Zwarteleen near Ypres on the 6th of November 1914--one of the -most anxious days during the four weeks' battle. - -His friends have mourned his death, but none of them have grudged it; -for he died, not merely as a brave man should--in the performance of -his duty--but after having achieved, with consummate skill and daring, -his part in an action of great importance. On the afternoon of this -day General Kavanagh's Brigade of Household Cavalry[3]--summoned in -haste--dismounted, and threw back a German attack which had partially -succeeded in piercing the allied line at the point of junction between -the French and English forces. This successful counter-attack saved -the right flank of Lord Cavan's Guards' Brigade from a position of -extreme danger, which must otherwise, almost certainly, have resulted -in a perilous retreat. The whole of this Homeric story is well worth -telling, and some day it may be told; but this is not the place. - -Dawnay was fortunate inasmuch as he lost his life, not as so many brave -men have done in this war--and in all others--by a random bullet, or as -the result of somebody's blunder, or in an attempt which failed. On -the contrary he played a distinguished, and possibly a determining -part, in an action which succeeded, and the results of which were -fruitful. - -He was not merely a brave and skilful soldier {xxviii} when it came to -push of pike, but a devoted student of his profession in times of -peace. The mixture of eagerness and patience with which he went about -his work reminded one, not a little, of that same combination of -qualities as it is met with sometimes among men of science. - -Hunting accidents, the privations of Ladysmith followed by enteric, -divers fevers contracted in hot climates, and the severity of a -campaign in Somaliland, had severely tried his constitution--which -although vigorous and athletic was never robust--and had increased a -tendency to headaches and neuralgia to which he had been subject ever -since boyhood. Yet he treated pain always as a despicable enemy, and -went about his daily business as indefatigably when he was in -suffering, as when he was entirely free from it, which in later years -was but rarely. - -Dawnay had a very quick brain, and held his views most positively. It -was sometimes said of him that he did not suffer fools gladly, and this -was true up to a point. He was singularly intolerant of presumptuous -fools, who laid down the law about matters of which they were wholly -ignorant, or who--having acquired a smattering of second-hand -knowledge--proceeded to put their ingenious and sophistical theories -into practice. But for people of much slower wits than himself--if -they were trying honestly to arrive at the truth--he was usually full -of sympathy. His tact and patience upon great occasions were two of -his noblest qualities. - -{xxix} - -In some ways he used to remind me, not a little, of Colonel Henry -Esmond of Castlewood, Virginia. In both there was the same hard core -of resistance against anything, which appeared to challenge certain -adamantine principles concerning conduct befitting a gentleman. On -such matters he was exceedingly stiff and unyielding. And he resembled -the friend of Lord Bolingbroke, and General Webb, and Dick Steele also -in this, that he was addicted to the figure of irony when crossed in -discussion. One imagines, however, that Colonel Esmond must have kept -his countenance better, and remained imperturbably grave until his -shafts had all gone home. In Dawnay's case the sight of his opponent's -lengthening face was, as a rule, too much for his sense of humour, and -the attack was apt to lose some of its force--certainly all its -fierceness--in a smile which reminded one of Carlyle's -description--'sunlight on the sea.' - -The following extract from a letter written by one of his friends who -had attended the War Service at St. Paul's gives a true picture: "A -sudden vision arose in my imagination of Hugh Dawnay striding down the -choir, in full armour, like St. Michael--with his head thrown back, and -that extraordinary expression of resolution which he always seemed to -me to possess more than any one I have ever seen. His wide-apart eyes -had more of the spirit of truth in them than almost any--also an -intolerance of falsehood--or rather perhaps a disbelief in its -existence...." This is true. He was one of {xxx} that race of men -whose recumbent figures are seen in our old churches and cathedrals, -with hands clasping crusaders' swords against their breasts, their -hounds couching at their feet. - - -In physique and temperament Hugh Dawnay and John Gough[4] were in most -respects as unlike a pair of friends as ever walked this earth; but we -might have searched far before we could have found two minds which, on -most matters connected with their profession, were in more perfect -accord. Dawnay, younger by four years, had served under Gough in -trying times, and regarded him (an opinion which is very widely shared -by seniors as well as juniors) as one of the finest soldiers of his -age. Though Dawnay was slender and of great height, while Gough was -rather below the middle stature, broad and firmly knit, there was one -striking point of physical resemblance between them, in the way their -heads were set upon their shoulders. There was something in the -carriage of both which seemed to take it for granted that they would be -followed wherever they might chose to lead. In Lord Roberts, and also -in a strikingly different character--Mr. Chamberlain--there was the -same poise, the same stable equilibrium, without a trace in it of -self-consciousness or constraint. It may be that the {xxxi} habit of -command induces this bearing in a man; or it may be that there is -something in the nature of the man who bears himself thus which forces -him to become a leader. - -Gough took no part in the preparation of the original Memorandum; but -in March 1913 he discussed it with me[5] and made various criticisms -and suggestions, most of which have been incorporated here. His chief -concern with regard to all proposals for a National Army was, that the -period of training should be sufficient to allow time for turning the -average man into a soldier who had full confidence in himself. "When -war breaks out"--I can hear his words--"it's not recruits we want: it's -soldiers we want: that is, if our object is to win the war as speedily -as possible, and to lose as few lives as possible." Under normal peace -conditions he put this period at a minimum of two years for infantry; -but of course he would have admitted--and did, in fact, admit when I -saw him last December--that under the stress and excitement of war the -term might be considerably shortened. - -His chief concern in 1913 was with regard to shortage of officers. He -criticised with great severity the various recent attempts at reforming -our military {xxxii} system, not only on the ground that we had chosen -to rely upon training our national forces after war had actually broken -out (in his view a most disastrous decision); but also because we had -not taken care to provide ourselves against the very emergency which -was contemplated, by having a reserve of officers competent to -undertake the training of the new army in case of need. - -I went to see him at Aldershot on the Friday before war was declared, -and found, as I expected, that he regarded it as inevitable. He had -undergone a very severe operation in the early summer, and was still -quite unfit to stand the strain of hard exercise. It had been arranged -that we were to go together, a few days later, to Sweden, for six -weeks' shooting and fishing in the mountains. He was very anxious to -return to England for the September manoeuvres. His surgeon,[6] -however, forbade this, on the ground that even by that time he would -not be fit to sit for a whole day in the saddle. - -He was in two moods on this occasion. He was as light-hearted as a boy -who is unexpectedly released from school; the reason being that the -Army Medical Officer had that morning passed him as physically fit to -go abroad with Sir Douglas Haig, to whom he had acted as Senior Staff -Officer since the previous autumn. - -{xxxiii} - -His other mood was very different. The war which he had foreseen and -dreaded, the war which in his view might have been avoided upon one -condition, and one only--if England had been prepared--had come at -last. I don't think I have ever known any one--certainly never any -anti-militarist--whose hatred and horror of war gave the same -impression of intensity and reality as his. Not metaphorically, but as -a bare fact, his feelings with regard to it were too deep for words; he -would suddenly break off speaking about things which had occurred in -his own experience; in particular, about loss of friends and comrades. -He was an Irishman, and had not the impassive coldness of some of the -great soldiers. But most of all he hated war when it was not -inevitable--when with foresight and courage it might have been -averted--as in his opinion this war might have been. - -In radium there is said to be a virtue which enables it to affect -adjacent objects with its own properties, and to turn them, for a time, -and for certain purposes, into things of the same nature as itself. -Certain rare human characters possess a similar virtue; but although I -have met with several of these in my life, there is none of them all -who seemed to me to possess this quality in quite so high a degree as -Gough. He was an alchemist who made fine soldiers out of all sorts and -conditions of men, and whose spirit turned despondency out of doors. - -The clearness of his instinct and the power of his {xxxiv} mind were -not more remarkable than his swiftness of decision and indomitable -will. There are scores--probably hundreds--of young officers who -fought by his side, or under him, at Ypres and elsewhere, who years -hence, when they are themselves distinguished--perhaps great and -famous--and come, in the evening of their days, to reckon up and -consider the influences which have shaped their careers, will place his -influence first. And there are boys looking forward to the day when -they shall be old enough to serve in the King's Army, chiefly from the -love and honour in which they held this hero, with his winning smile -and superb self-confidence. - -He has left behind him a tradition, if ever man did. You will find it -everywhere, among young and old--among all with whom he ever came into -touch. Nor is the tradition which he has left merely among soldiers -and with regard to the art of war, but also in other spheres of private -conduct and public life. He had strong prejudices as well as -affections, which made him sometimes judge men unfairly, also on the -other hand too favourably; but he banished all meanness from his -neighbourhood, all thoughts of self-interest and personal advancement. -Duty, discipline, self-discipline, and the joy of life--these were the -rules he walked by; and if you found yourself in his company you had -perforce to walk with him, keeping up with his stride as best you could. - -We value our friends for different qualities, and would have their -tradition fulfil itself in different {xxxv} ways. Those of us who -counted these two--'Johnnie' Gough and Hugh Dawnay--among our friends -will wish that our sons may be like them, and follow in their footsteps. - -F.S.O. - -CHECKENDON COURT, OXFORDSHIRE, 1st June 1915. - - -[1] _The Round Table_ (quarterly Review). Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Of -the articles referred to the chief are: 'Anglo-German Rivalry' -(November 1910); 'Britain, France, and Germany' (December 1911); 'The -Balkan War and the Balance of Power' (June 1913); 'Germany and the -Prussian Spirit' (September 1914); 'The Schism of Europe' (March 1915). -It is to be hoped that these and some others may be republished before -long in more permanent form. - -[2] Major the Hon. Hugh Dawnay, D.S.O., _b._ 1875; educated Eton and -Sandhurst; Rifle Brigade, 1895; Nile Campaign and Omdurman, 1898; South -Africa, 1899-1900; Somaliland, 1908-1910; 2nd Life Guards, 1912; -France, August-November 1914. - -[3] This Brigade was known during the battle of Ypres as 'the Fire -Brigade,' for the reason that it was constantly being called up on a -sudden to extinguish unforeseen conflagrations. - -[4] Brigadier-General John Edmund Gough, V.C., C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C. to -the King; _b._ 1871; educated Eton and Sandhurst; Rifle Brigade, 1892; -British Central Africa, 1896-1897; Nile Campaign and Omdurman, 1898; -South Africa, 1899-1902; Somaliland, 1902-1903 and 1908-1909; France, -August 1914-February 1915. - -[5] At St. Jean de Luz, when he was endeavouring, though not very -successfully, to shake off the after-effects of his last Somaliland -campaign. He was then engaged in correcting the proofs of the volume -of his Staff College lectures which was subsequently published under -the title _Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville_ (Rees)--a most vivid -and convincing narrative. In the intervals of work and golf he spent -much of his time in visiting Wellington's adjacent battlefields and -studying his passage of the Bidassoa and forcing of the Pyrenees. - -[6] Gough's many friends will ever feel a double debt of gratitude to -that distinguished surgeon, Sir Berkeley Moynihan, who by this -operation restored him, after several years of ill-health and -suffering, almost to complete health; and who once again--when by a -strange coincidence of war he found his former patient lying in the -hospital at Estaires the day after he was brought in wounded--came to -his aid, and all but achieved the miracle of saving his life. - - - - - ORDEAL BY BATTLE - - - PART I - - THE CAUSES OF WAR - - - PART II - - THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY - - - PART III - - THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY - - - PART IV - - DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE - - - - - TABLE OF CONTENTS - - - - PART I - - THE CAUSES OF WAR - - - CHAPTER I - - PEACE AND WAR - - PAGE - - Peace is the greatest of British interests 3 - Peaceful intentions will not ensure peace 4 - Futility of Pacifism 6 - Causes of wars in general 8 - Causes of the American Civil War 10 - Influence of ideas of duty and self-sacrifice 11 - - - CHAPTER II - - THE OUTBREAK OF WAR - - July-August 1914 13 - Reality or illusion 15 - The Serajevo murders 16 - Austria and Servia 17 - English efforts to preserve peace 18 - Mobilisation in Germany and Russia 19 - Questions of neutrality 19 - German Army enters Luxemburg, Belgium, and France 20 - General conflagration 20 - - - CHAPTER III - - WHO WANTED WAR? - - Why did war occur? 22 - Servia did not want war 22 - Neither did Russia or France 23 - Nor Belgium or England 25 - Austria wanted war with Servia alone 26 - Germany encouraged Austria to bring on war 29 - Germany desired war believing that England would remain neutral 29 - Austrian eleventh-hour efforts for peace frustrated by Germany 30 - Sir Edward Grey's miscalculation 31 - M. Sazonof thought war could have been avoided by plain speaking 32 - Sir Edward Grey's reasons against plain speaking 33 - Which was right? 34 - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE PENALTY OF NEGLIGENCE - - Was war inevitable? 36 - Not if England had been prepared morally and materially 37 - Previous apprehensions of war 38 - Peculiar characteristics of German animosity 39 - British public opinion refused to treat it seriously 40 - - - CHAPTER V - - PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY - - Who actually caused the conflagration? 42 - Influence of the Professors, Press, and People of Germany 43 - Influence of the Court, Army, and Bureaucracy 44 - Various political characters 46 - The Kaiser 48 - There was no master-spirit 51 - - - CHAPTER VI - - GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS - - Hero-worship and sham super-men 53 - The Blunders of Bureaucracy 55 - As to the time-table of the war 55 - As to the quality of the French Army 55 - As to the opinion of the world 56 - As to the treatment of Belgium 57 - As to British neutrality 58 - As to the prevalence of Pacifism in England 59 - As to Civil War in Ireland 62 - As to rebellion in South Africa 64 - As to Indian sedition 65 - As to the spirit of the self-governing Dominions 67 - Lack of instinct and its consequences 67 - - - CHAPTER VII - - INTERNATIONAL ILL-WILL - - Great events do not proceed from small causes 69 - German hatred of England 70 - This is the German people's war 71 - Their illusion that England brought it about 73 - Difficulties in the way of international understandings 73 - British and German diplomacy compared 74 - German distrust and British indifference 78 - British policy as it appears to German eyes 79 - Vacillation mistaken for duplicity 80 - German policy as it appears to British eyes 81 - - - - PART II - - THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY - - - CHAPTER I - - THE BISMARCKIAN EPOCH - - National dreams 87 - 1789 and after 87 - The first German dream--Union 88 - How it was realised 89 - What the world thought of it 90 - Material development in Germany 91 - The peace policy of Bismarck 92 - - - CHAPTER II - - AFTER BISMARCK - - Nightmares and illusions 94 - Grievances against England, France, and Russia 96 - The second German dream--Mastery of the World 97 - Absorption of Belgium, Holland, and Denmark 98 - The Austro-Hungarian inheritance 98 - The Balkan peninsula 99 - Turkey in Asia 100 - German diplomacy at Constantinople 101 - The Baghdad Railway 102 - The hoped-for fruits of 'inevitable' wars 103 - The possession of Africa 103 - The Chinese Empire 104 - - - CHAPTER III - - THE GERMAN PROJECT OF EMPIRE - - Qualities of the German vision 106 - Symmetry and vastness are dangerous ideals 107 - Frederick the Great and Bismarck 108 - German predisposition to follow dreamers 108 - Grotesque proportions of the Second German dream 109 - The two Americas 110 - Pacifism and Militarism meet at infinity 111 - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE NEW MORALISTS - - Germany goes in search of an ethical basis 113 - Special grievances against France and England 114 - German thinkers recast Christian morals 115 - Heinrich von Treitschke 116 - _The principle of the state is power_ 117 - Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 118 - His contempt for British and Prussian ideals 119 - General von Bernhardi 122 - New morality never accepted by the German people 123 - Thrown over even by 'the brethren' when war occurred 124 - Causes of this apostasy 126 - - - CHAPTER V - - THE STATECRAFT OF A PRIESTHOOD - - German education a drill system 127 - Intellectuals are ranged on the government side 129 - Eighteenth-century France and modern Germany 129 - Contrast between their bureaucracies 130 - Between the attitude of their intellectuals 131 - Between their fashions of fancy dress 131 - Dangers to civilisation from within and without 132 - Political thinkers are usually destructive 133 - Unfitness of priesthoods for practical affairs 135 - Contrast between priests and lawyers 137 - Natural affinity between soldiers and priests 139 - Unforeseen consequences of German thoroughness 140 - May lead ultimately to ostracism of Germany 140 - Types of German agents 141 - Treacherous activities in time of peace 142 - The German political creed 144 - The true aim of this war 146 - - - CHAPTER VI - - THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE - - Intelligence and enterprise of the Germans 149 - They are nevertheless devoted to their own institutions 150 - German system is not reactionary but the reverse 151 - Experts are honoured and trusted 151 - German esteem for men of learning 152 - And for the military caste 153 - And for their Kaiser 155 - German contempt for party government 156 - And for the character of British official news 157 - And for the failure of the British Government to trust - the people 160 - And for its fear of asking the people to make sacrifices 161 - And for the voluntary system 162 - Their pride in the successes of German arms 163 - And in the number and spirit of their new levies 163 - Which they contrast with British recruiting 164 - The methods of which they despise 165 - What is meant by 'a popular basis' of government? 166 - - - CHAPTER VII - - THE CONFLICTS OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS - - Two issues between England and Germany 167 - Democracy cannot endure unless capable of self-defence 168 - Democracy good and bad 169 - Self-criticism may be carried too far 171 - The two dangers of democracy--German _Arms_ and German _Ideas_ 173 - Fundamental opposition between the spirit of German policy - and our own 173 - German people have not accepted the moral ideas of their - priesthood 174 - Recantation among 'the brethren' themselves on outbreak of war 175 - The cult of war 176 - - - - PART III - - THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY - - - CHAPTER I - - A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (JANUARY 1901-JULY 1914) - - In this war Democracy is fighting for its existence 181 - Against highly organised materialism 183 - The opening of the twentieth century 186 - Spirit of constitutional change 188 - Disappearance of great figures from the scene 189 - Change in character of the House of Commons 192 - Dearth of leadership 194 - Consequent demoralisation of parties 195 - And widespread anxiety 196 - Pre-eminence of Mr. Asquith 197 - His Parliamentary supremacy 198 - His maxim--_wait-and-see_ 199 - Character of his oratory 199 - Increasing prominence of lawyers in politics 200 - Their influence on Parliamentary institutions and national - policy 201 - Mr. Asquith's limitations 203 - - - CHAPTER II - - THREE GOVERNING IDEAS - - Situation at the death of Queen Victoria 207 - Comfort and security are not synonymous 208 - Two problems absorbed public attention 209 - Social and Constitutional Reform 209 - A third problem, security, was overlooked 210 - Social Reform intrinsically the most important 211 - The urgent need of peace 212 - Earnestness of public opinion 212 - How it was baulked by circumstances 213 - Limitations of popular judgment 214 - Want of leadership 216 - Strangulation of sincerity by party system 218 - The artificial opposition of three great ideas 221 - - - CHAPTER III - - POLICY AND ARMAMENTS - - The aim of British policy 223 - Organised and unorganised defences 223 - Policy depends on armaments, armaments on policy 225 - Difficulty of keeping these principles in mind 226 - Diplomacy to-day depends more than ever on armaments 228 - The sad example of China 229 - Policy should conform to national needs 230 - Dangers threatening British security (1901-1914) 231 - The Committee of Imperial Defence 232 - Reasons of its comparative failure 234 - Parliament and the people were left uneducated 235 - Naval preparations were adequate 236 - Military preparations were absurdly inadequate 237 - Our Foreign policy rested on an entirely false assumption as - regards the adequacy of our Army 238 - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE BALANCE OF POWER - - Security required that we should take account of Europe 241 - German aim--the suzerainty of Western Europe 243 - Maintenance of the _Balance of Power_ 244 - This is the unalterable condition of British security 245 - This need produced the Triple Entente 247 - Splendid isolation no longer compatible with security 249 - Meaning of a defensive war 249 - Defence of north-eastern frontier of France essential to - British security 250 - - - CHAPTER V - - THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1911) - - The British 'Expeditionary Force' 252 - Numbers as a test of adequacy 253 - Relations of Italy with Germany and Austria in event of war 254 - Troops for defence of coasts and neutral frontiers 256 - Germany must hold Russia in check with superior numbers 256 - Germany would then endeavour to crush France 257 - Having a superiority of 500,000 men available for this purpose 257 - Why neutrality of Holland was a German interest 258 - Why neutrality of Belgium was an obstacle to Germany 259 - Inadequacy of our own Army to turn the scales 260 - Our armaments did not correspond with our policy 261 - Ministerial confidence in the 'voluntary system' 261 - Three periods of war--the _onset_, the _grip_, and the _drag_ 263 - In 1870 the _onset_ decided the issue 264 - By 1914 the power of swift attack had increased 265 - Forecasts confirmed by experience (Aug.-Sept. 1914) 266 - Immense value of British sea-power 266 - No naval success, however, can win a European war 267 - Naval supremacy not the only essential to British security 268 - - - CHAPTER VI - - THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1914) - - Changes between August 1911 and August 1914 269 - Sensational German increases in 1913 took full effect within - a year 270 - Inability of France to counter this effort unaided 270 - French increase could not take effect till 1916 271 - Russian and Austrian increases 272 - No attempt to increase British Army though it is below strength 273 - Balkan wars (1912-1913) 273 - Their effect on _Balance of Power_ 274 - Reasons why they did not lead to general conflagration 275 - Germany's two dates: June 1914-June 1916 275 - - - CHAPTER VII - - A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS - - Why should we suspect Germany of evil intentions? 277 - The German Fleet was a challenge to British security 278 - Candour of German publicists 278 - British Government finds comfort in official assurances - of Berlin 279 - Disregarded warnings 279 - _First Warning_ 279 - (1905-1906) Morocco incident 279 - After which British naval programme was reduced 280 - _Second Warning_ 281 - (1908-1909) Secret acceleration and increase of German - naval programme 281 - Imperial Defence Conference 281 - _Third Warning_ 282 - (1910) German sincerity under suspicion 282 - The Constitutional Conference 283 - Secret de Polichinelle 283 - Failure of British Government to trust the people 284 - _Fourth Warning_ 285 - (1911) The Agadir incident 285 - Mr. Lloyd George's speech 285 - Consequences of various kinds 286 - _Fifth Warning_ 287 - (1912) Lord Haldane's rebuff 287 - Menacing nature of German proposals 288 - Dangers of amateur diplomacy 289 - German love of irregular missions 290 - _Sixth Warning_ 294 - (1913) German Army Bill and War Loan 294 - British Government ignore the danger 295 - Neglect military preparations 297 - Shrink from speaking plainly to the people 298 - Difficulties of Sir Edward Grey 298 - Enemies in his own household 299 - Radical attacks on Foreign Secretary and First Lord of - Admiralty fomented by Germany 299 - Attitude of a leaderless Cabinet 300 - Parallelogram of fears determines drift of policy 301 - Evil effects of failure to educate public opinion 302 - Danger of breaking the Liberal party 303 - Occasional efficacy of self-sacrifice 303 - War not inevitable had England been prepared 304 - - - - PART IV - - DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE - - - CHAPTER I - - THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE - - Public opinion puzzled by military problems 309 - The nation's growing anxiety and distrust (1909-1914) 310 - Army affairs a shuttlecock in the political game 312 - 'The blood taxes' 313 - The nation realised it had not been treated with candour 313 - Powerful British Army the best guarantee for European peace 314 - Alone among European nations Britain had not an army - commensurate to her population, policy, and resources 316 - - - CHAPTER II - - THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY - - The _Regular Army_ 317 - Three classes of reserves 318 - The _Army Reserve_ 318 - The _Special Reserve_ 319 - The _Territorial Army_ 320 - The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war 321 - These were inadequate to redress the balance against the - Triple Entente 322 - In the _onset_ period untrained and half-trained troops - were of no use 322 - Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops 323 - Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles 324 - Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis 326 - Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914 326 - Size of British striking force necessary as complete - were of against a coolly calculated war 327 - Reserves required behind this striking force 328 - South African War no precedent for a European war 330 - - - CHAPTER III - - LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS - - The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912) 332 - Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness 332 - Attack concentrated on three passages 333 - Two of these have been proved true by events 334 - The other was misinterpreted by its critics 335 - Liberal criticism 336 - Unionist criticism 341 - Ministerial rebukes 343 - No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of - these attacks 347 - - - CHAPTER IV - - LORD KITCHENER'S TASK - - All Lord Roberts's warnings were proved true 350 - Many people nevertheless still believed that the voluntary - system was a success 351 - Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War 353 - His previous record of success 354 - His hold on public confidence 354 - His grasp of the simple essentials 355 - His determination to support France and make a New Army 355 - His remarkable achievements 356 - His want of knowledge of British political and industrial - conditions 356 - His colleagues, however, understood these thoroughly 357 - - - CHAPTER V - - MATERIAL OF WAR - - Industrial congestion at the outbreak of war 358 - Need for looking far ahead and organising production of war - material 359 - The danger of labour troubles 360 - Outcry about shortage of supplies 360 - Official denials were disbelieved 361 - - - CHAPTER VI - - METHODS OF RECRUITING - - The first need was men 364 - A call for volunteers the only way of meeting it 364 - The second need was a system to provide men as required - over the period of the war 365 - No system was devised 365 - The Government shrank from exercising its authority 366 - Trusted to indirect pressure 366 - And sensational appeals 367 - They secured a new army of the highest quality 368 - But they demoralised public opinion by their methods 369 - Public opinion at the outbreak of war was admirable 372 - It was ready to obey orders 373 - No orders came 374 - The triumph of the voluntary system 376 - From the point of view of a Belgian or a Frenchman the - triumph is not so clear 377 - The voluntary system is inadequate to our present situation 379 - Folly of waiting for disaster to demonstrate the necessity - of National Service 380 - - - CHAPTER VII - - PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT - - British methods of recruiting in normal times 382 - _The Conscription of Hunger_ 382 - The cant of the voluntary principle 384 - The 'economic' fallacy 385 - The fallacy of underrating the moral of conscript armies 387 - The army which we call 'voluntary' our enemies call 'mercenary' 389 - 'Mercenary' describes not the British Army but the British - People 389 - The true description of the British Army is 'Professional' 390 - The theory of the British Army 391 - That officers should pay for the privilege of serving 391 - That the rank and file should contract for a term of years 392 - Under pressure of want 392 - At pay which is below the market rate 392 - This contract is drastically enforced 393 - With the full approval of anti-militarist opinion 393 - Inconsistencies of the anti-militarists 394 - Their crowning inconsistency 395 - Other industries put pressure on society 396 - Why should not a professional army? 396 - The example of Rome 397 - A professional army when it first interferes in politics - usually does so as a liberator 397 - Then military despotism follows speedily 399 - A fool's paradise 399 - - - CHAPTER VIII - - SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS - - Bugbears 401 - Conflict of 'opinion' with 'the facts' 402 - An army is no defence unless it is available for service - abroad 402 - The Industrial Epoch (1832-1886) 403 - Its grudging attitude towards the Army 403 - Honour paid by conscript nations to their armies 406 - Democracy cannot subsist without personal service 406 - During the Industrial Epoch exemption from Personal Service - was regarded as the essence of Freedom 408 - War was regarded as an anachronism 409 - Since 1890 there has been a slow but steady reaction from - these ideas 410 - Volunteer movement and Territorial Army compared 411 - Effect of the Soudan campaign and South African War 411 - Effect of more recent events 412 - Have we passed out of a normal condition into an abnormal - one, or the reverse? 412 - Germany's great grievance against Britain: we thought to - hold our Empire without sacrifices 413 - The Freiherr von Hexenküchen's views-- - (1) On our present case of conscience 416 - (2) On our voluntary system 416 - The American Civil War 417 - Lincoln insisted on conscription (1863) 418 - His difficulties 418 - Results of his firmness 419 - Difference in our own case 419 - Our need for conscription is much greater 419 - It is also far easier for our Government to enforce it 420 - - - CHAPTER IX - - THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR - - The objects of this book 421 - Criticism of naval and military strategy is no part of its - purpose 422 - Nor the ultimate political settlement of Europe 424 - Nor an inquisition into 'German atrocities' 424 - But the basis of Germany's policy must be understood 425 - And what we are fighting for and against 425 - The causes of German strength 427 - The causes of British weakness 427 - Illusions as to the progress of the war 428 - The real cause of our going to war 430 - Democracy is not by its nature invincible 431 - Leadership is our chief need 433 - The folly of telling half-truths to the People 435 - - - - -PART I - -THE CAUSES OF WAR - - - -Then _Apollyon_ strodled quite over the whole breadth of the way, and -said, I am void of fear in this matter, prepare thyself to die; for I -swear by my infernal Den, that thou shalt go no further; here will I -spill thy soul. - -And with that he threw a flaming Dart at his breast, but _Christian_ -had a shield in his hand, with which he caught it, and so prevented the -danger of that. - -Then did _Christian_ draw, for he saw 'twas time to bestir him: and -_Apollyon_ as fast made at him, throwing Darts as thick as Hail; by the -which, notwithstanding all that _Christian_ could do to avoid it, -_Apollyon_ wounded him in his _head_, his _hand_, and _foot_: this made -_Christian_ give a little back; _Apollyon_ therefore followed his work -amain, and _Christian_ again took courage, and resisted as manfully as -he could. This sore Combat lasted for above half a day, even till -_Christian_ was almost quite spent; for you must know that _Christian_, -by reason of his wounds, must needs grow weaker and weaker. - -Then _Apollyon_ espying his opportunity, began to gather up close to -_Christian_, and wrestling with him, gave him a dreadful fall; and with -that _Christian's_ sword flew out of his hand. Then said _Apollyon, I -am sure of thee now_: and with that he had almost pressed him to death, -so that _Christian_ began to despair of life. But as God would have -it, while Apollyon was fetching of his last blow, thereby to make a -full end of this good man, _Christian_ nimbly reached out his hand for -his Sword, and caught it, saying, _Rejoice not against me, O mine -enemy! when I fall I shall arise_; and with that gave him a deadly -thrust, which made him give back, as one that had received his mortal -wound: _Christian_ perceiving that, made at him again, saying, _Nay, in -all these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved -us_. And with that _Apollyon_ spread forth his dragon's wings, and -sped him away, that _Christian_ for a season saw him no more. - -In this Combat no man can imagine, unless he had seen and heard as I -did, what yelling and hideous roaring, _Apollyon_ made all the time of -the fight; he spake like a Dragon.... - -_The Pilgrim's Progress._ - - - - -{3} - -CHAPTER I - -PEACE AND WAR - -It is a considerable number of years since the most distinguished Tory -statesman of his time impressed upon his fellow-countrymen as a maxim -of policy, that _Peace is the greatest of British interests_. There -was an unexpectedness about Lord Salisbury's words, coming as they did -from the leader of a party which had hitherto lain under suspicion of -jingoism, which gave the phrase almost the colour of an epigram. The -truth of the saying, however, gradually became manifest to all men; and -thereupon a new danger arose out of this very fact. - -As a nation we are in some ways a great deal too modest; or it may be, -looking at the matter from a critical standpoint, too self-centred. We -have always been inclined to assume in our calculations that we -ourselves are the only possible disturbers of the peace, and that if we -do not seek war, or provoke it, no other Power will dream of forcing -war upon us. This unfortunately has rarely been the case; and those -persons who, in recent times, have refused most scornfully to consider -the lessons of past history, have now at last learned from a sterner -schoolmaster the falseness of their favourite doctrine. - -The United Kingdom needed and desired peace, so {4} that it might -proceed undistracted, and with firm purpose, to set its house in order. -The Dominions needed peace, so that they might have time to people -their fertile but empty lands, to strike deep roots and become secure. -To the Indian Empire and the Dependencies peace was essential, if a -system of government, which aimed, not unsuccessfully, at giving -justice and fostering well-being, was to maintain its power and -prestige unshaken. The whole British race had nothing material to gain -by war, but much to lose, much at any rate which would be put in -jeopardy by war. In spite of all these weighty considerations which no -man of sense and knowledge will venture to dispute, we should have been -wiser had we taken into account the fact, that they did not apply to -other nations, that in the main they affected ourselves alone, and that -our case was no less singular than, in one sense at all events, it was -fortunate. - -We did not covet territory or new subjects. Still less were we likely -to engage in campaigns out of a thirst for glory. In the latter -particular at least we were on a par with the rest of the world. The -cloud of anxiety which for ten or more years has brooded over the great -conscript nations, growing steadily darker, contained many dangers, but -among these we cannot reckon such antiquated motives as trivial -bravado, light-hearted knight-errantry, or the vain pursuit of military -renown. - -What is called in history books 'an insult' seemed also to have lost -much of its ancient power for plunging nations into war. The -Chancelleries of Europe had grown cautious, and were on the watch -against being misled by the emotions of the moment. A sensational but -unintended injury was not allowed to drive us {5} into war with Russia -in 1904, and this precedent seemed of good augury. Moreover, when -every statesman in Europe was fully alive to the electric condition of -the atmosphere, a deliberate insult was not very likely to be offered -from mere ill-manners or in a fit of temper, but only if there were -some serious purpose behind it, in which case it would fall under a -different category. - -Fear was a great danger, and everybody knew it to be so--fear lest this -nation, or that, might be secretly engaged in strengthening its -position in order to crush one of its neighbours at some future date, -unless that neighbour took time by the forelock and struck out -forthwith. Among the causes which might bring about a surprise -outbreak of war this was the most serious and probable. It was -difficult to insure against it. But though perilous in the extreme -while it lasts, panic is of the nature of an epidemic: it rages for a -while and passes away. It had been raging now with great severity ever -since 1909,[1] and by midsummer 1914 optimists were inclined to seek -consolation in the thought that the crisis must surely be over. - -[Sidenote: DANGERS TO PEACE] - -More dangerous to peace in the long run even than fear, were certain -aims and aspirations, which from one standpoint were concrete and -practical, but regarded from another were among the cloudiest of -abstractions--'political interests,' need of new markets, hunger for -fresh territory to absorb the outflow of emigrants, and the like; on -the other hand, those hopes and anxieties which haunt the {6} -imaginations of eager men as they look into the future, and dream -dreams and see visions of a grand national fulfilment. - -If the British race ever beheld a vision of this sort, it had been -realised already. We should have been wise had we remembered that this -accomplished fact, these staked-out claims of the British Empire, -appeared to fall like a shadow across visions seen by other eyes, -blotting out some of the fairest hopes, and spoiling the noble -proportions of the patriot's dream. - -There is a region where words stumble after truth, like children -chasing a rainbow across a meadow to find the pot of fairy gold. -Multitudinous volumes stuffed with the cant of pacifism and militarism -will never explain to us the nature of peace and war. But a few bars -of music may sometimes make clear things which all the moralists, and -divines, and philosophers--even the poets themselves for the most part, -though they come nearer to it at times than the rest--have struggled -vainly to show us in their true proportions. The songs of a nation, -its national anthems--if they be truly national and not merely some -commissioned exercise--are better interpreters than state papers. A -man will learn more of the causes of wars, perhaps even of the rights -and wrongs of them, by listening to the burst and fall of the French -hymn, the ebb and surge of the Russian, in Tschaikovsky's famous -overture, than he ever will from books or speeches, argument or oratory. - -[Sidenote: IMPOTENCE OF LOGIC] - -Yet there are people who think it not impossible to prove to mankind by -logical processes, that the loss which any great nation must inevitably -sustain through war, will far outweigh any advantages which {7} can -ensue from it, even if the arms of the conqueror were crowned with -victories greater than those of Caesar or Napoleon. They draw us -pictures of the exhaustion which must inevitably follow upon such a -struggle conducted upon the modern scale, of the stupendous loss of -capital, destruction of credit, paralysis of industry, arrest of -progress in things spiritual as well as temporal, the shock to -civilisation, and the crippling for a generation, probably for several -generations, possibly for ever, of the victorious country in its race -with rivals who have wisely stood aside from the fray. These arguments -may conceivably be true, may in no particular be over-coloured, or an -under-valuation, either of the good which has been attained by battle, -or of the evils which have been escaped. But they would be difficult -to establish even before an unbiassed court, and they are infinitely -more difficult to stamp upon popular belief. - -It is not sufficient either with statesmen or peoples to set before -them a chain of reasoning which is logically unanswerable. Somehow or -other the new faith which it is desired to implant, must be rendered -independent of logic and unassailable by logic. It must rise into a -higher order of convictions than the intellectual before it can begin -to operate upon human affairs. For it is matched against opinions -which have been held and acted upon so long, that they have become -unquestionable save in purely academic discussions. At those decisive -moments, when action follows upon thought like a flash, conclusions -which depend upon a train of reasoning are of no account: instinct will -always get the better of any syllogism. - -{8} - -So when nations are hovering on the brink of war, it is impulse, -tradition, or some stuff of the imagination--misused deliberately, as -sometimes happens, by crafty manipulators--which determines action much -more often than the business calculations of shopkeepers and -economists. Some cherished institution seems to be threatened. Some -nationality supposed--very likely erroneously--to be of the same flesh -and blood as ourselves, appears--very likely on faulty information--to -be unjustly oppressed. Two rival systems of civilisation, of morals, -of religion, approach one another like thunder-clouds and come together -in a clash. Where is the good at such times of casting up sums, and -exhibiting profit-and-loss accounts to the public gaze? People will -not listen, for in their view considerations of prosperity and the -reverse are beside the question. Wealth, comfort, even life itself, -are not regarded; nor are the possible sufferings of posterity allowed -to count any more than the tribulations of to-day. In the eyes of the -people the matter is one of duty not of interest. When men fight in -this spirit the most lucid exposition of material drawbacks is worse -than useless; for the national mood, at such moments, is one of -self-sacrifice. The philosopher, or the philanthropist, is more likely -to feed the flames than to put them out when he proves the certainty of -loss and privation, and dwells upon the imminent peril of ruin and -destruction. - -The strength of the fighter is the strength of his faith. Each new -Gideon who goes out against the Midianites fancies that the sword of -the Lord is in his hand. He risks all that he holds dear, in order -that he may pull down the foul images of Baal and build up an altar to -Jehovah, in order that his race {9} may not be shorn of its -inheritance, in order that it may hold fast its own laws and -institutions, and not pass under the yoke of the Gentiles. This habit -of mind is unchanging throughout the ages. What moved men to give -their lives at Marathon moved them equally, more than a thousand years -later, to offer the same sacrifice under the walls of Tours. It is -still moving them, after yet another thousand years and more have -passed away, in the plains of Flanders and the Polish Marshes. - -[Sidenote: THE MOTIVES OF NATIONS] - -When the Persian sought to force the dominion of his ideals upon the -Greek, the states of Hellas made head against him from the love and -honour in which they held their own. When the successors of the -Prophet, zealous for their faith, confident in the protection of the -One God, drove the soldiers of the Cross before them from the passes of -the Pyrenees to the vineyards of Touraine, neither side would have -listened with any patience to a dissertation upon the inconveniences -resulting from a state of war and upon the economic advantages of -peace. It was there one faith against another, one attitude towards -life against another, one system of manners, customs, and laws against -another. When a collision occurs in this region of human affairs there -is seldom room for compromise or adjustment. Things unmerchantable -cannot be purchased with the finest of fine gold. - -In these instances, seen by us from far off, the truth of this is -easily recognised. But what some of our recent moralists have -overlooked, is the fact that forces of precisely the same order exist -in the world of to-day, and are at work, not only among the fierce -Balkan peoples, in the resurgent empire of Japan, and in the great -military nations--the French, the {10} Germans, and the Russians--but -also in America and England. The last two pride themselves upon a -higher civilisation, and in return are despised by the prophets of -militarism as worshippers of material gain. The unfavourable and the -flattering estimate agree, however, upon a single point--in assuming -that our own people and those of the United States are unlikely to -yield themselves to unsophisticated impulse. This assumption is wholly -false. - -[Sidenote: VIRTUES OF THE WAR SPIRIT] - -If we search carefully, we shall find every where underlying the great -struggles recorded in past history, no less than those which have -occurred, and are now occurring, in our own time, an antagonism of one -kind or another between two systems, visions, or ideals, which in some -particular were fundamentally opposed and could not be reconciled. -State papers and the memoranda of diplomatists, when in due course they -come to light, are not a little apt to confuse the real issues, by -setting forth a diary of minor incidents and piquant details, not in -their true proportions, but as they appeared at the moment of their -occurrence to the eyes of harassed and suspicious officials. But even -so, all the emptying of desks and pigeon-holes since the great American -Civil War, has not been able to cover up the essential fact, that in -this case a million lives were sacrificed by one of the most -intelligent, humane, and practical nations upon earth, and for no other -cause than that there was an irreconcilable difference amongst them, -with regard to what St. Paul has called 'the substance of things hoped -for.' On the one side there was an ideal of Union and a determination -to make it prevail: on the other side there was an ideal of -Independence and an equal determination to defend it whatsoever {11} -might be the cost. If war on such grounds be possible within the -confines of a single nation, nurtured in the same traditions, and born -to a large extent of the same stock, how futile is the assurance that -economic and material considerations will suffice to make war -impossible between nations, who have not even the tie of a common -mother-tongue! - -A collision may occur, as we know only too well, even although one of -two vessels be at anchor, if it happens to lie athwart the course of -the other. It was therefore no security against war that British -policy did not aim at any aggrandisement or seek for any territorial -expansion. The essential questions were--had we possessions which -appeared to obstruct the national aspirations and ideals of others; and -did these others believe that alone, or in alliance, they had the power -to redress the balance? - -The real difficulty which besets the philanthropist in his endeavour to -exorcise the spirit of war is caused, not by the vices of this spirit, -but by its virtues. In so far as it springs from vainglory or -cupidity, it is comparatively easy to deal with. In so far as it is -base, there is room for a bargain. It can be compounded with and -bought off, as we have seen before now, with some kind of material -currency. It will not stand out for very long against promises of -prosperity and threats of dearth. But where, as at most crises, this -spirit is not base, where its impulse is not less noble, but more noble -than those which influence men day by day in the conduct of their -worldly affairs, where the contrast which presents itself to their -imagination is between duty on the one hand and gain on the other, -between self-sacrifice and self-interest, between their country's need -and {12} their own ease, it is not possible to quench the fires by -appeals proceeding from a lower plane. The philanthropist, if he is to -succeed, must take still higher ground, and higher ground than this it -is not a very simple matter to discover. - - - -[1] The increase and acceleration of German shipbuilding was discovered -by the British Government in the autumn of 1908, and led to the -Imperial Defence Conference in the summer of the following year. - - - - -{13} - -CHAPTER II - -THE OUTBREAK OF WAR - -When war came, it came suddenly. A man who had happened to fall sick -of a fever on St. Swithin's day 1914, but was so far on the way to -convalescence four weeks later as to desire news of the outside world, -must have been altogether incredulous of the tidings which first -greeted his ears. - -When he fell ill the nations were at peace. The townspeople of Europe -were in a holiday humour, packing their trunks and portmanteaus for -'land travel or sea-faring.' The country people were getting in their -harvest or looking forward hopefully to the vintage. Business was -prosperous. Credit was good. Money, in banking phraseology, was -'cheap.' The horror of the Serajevo assassinations had already faded -almost into oblivion. At the worst this sensational event was only an -affair of police. Such real anxiety as existed in the United Kingdom -had reference to Ireland. - -We can imagine the invalid's first feeble question on public -affairs:--'What has happened in Ulster?'--The answer, 'Nothing has -happened in Ulster.'--The sigh of relief with which he sinks back on -his pillows. - -When, however, they proceed to tell him what has happened, elsewhere -than in Ulster, during the {14} four weeks while they have been -watching by his bedside, will he not fancy that his supposed recovery -is only an illusion, and that he is still struggling with the phantoms -of his delirium? - -For what will they have to report? That the greater part of the world -which professes Christianity has called out its armies; that more than -half Europe has already joined battle; that England, France, Russia, -Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro on the one side are ranged against -Germany and Austria on the other. Japan, they will tell him, is upon -the point of declaring war. The Turk is wondering if, and when, he may -venture to come in; while the Italian, the Roumanian, the Bulgar, the -Greek, the Dutchman, the Dane, and the Swede are reckoning no less -anxiously for how short or long a period it may still be safe for them -to stand out. Three millions of men, or thereabouts--a British Army -included--are advancing against one another along the mountain barriers -of Luxemburg, Lorraine, and Alsace. Another three millions are engaged -in similar evolutions among the lakes of East Prussia, along the -river-banks of Poland, and under the shadow of the Carpathians. A -large part of Belgium is already devastated, her villages are in ashes -or flames, her eastern fortresses invested, her capital threatened by -the invader. - -Nine-tenths or more of the navies of the world are cleared for action, -and are either scouring the seas in pursuit, or are withdrawn under the -shelter of land-batteries watching their opportunity for a stroke. -Air-craft circle by day and night over the cities, dropping bombs, with -a careless and impartial aim, upon buildings both private and public, -both sacred and profane, upon churches, palaces, hospitals, {15} and -arsenals. The North Sea and the Baltic are sown with mines. The trade -of the greater part of industrial Europe is at a standstill; the rest -is disorganised; while the credit and finances, not merely of Europe, -but of every continent, are temporarily in a state either of chaos or -paralysis. - -[Sidenote: A NIGHTMARE] - -To the bewildered convalescent all this may well have seemed -incredible. It is hardly to be wondered at if he concluded that the -fumes of his fever were not yet dispersed, and that this frightful -phantasmagoria had been produced, not by external realities, but by the -disorders of his own brain. - -How long it might have taken to convince him of the truth and substance -of these events we may judge from our own recent experience. How long -was it after war broke out, before even we, who had watched the trouble -brewing through all its stages, ceased to be haunted, even in broad -daylight, by the feeling that we were asleep, and that the whole thing -was a nightmare which must vanish when we awoke? We were faced (so at -least it seemed at frequent moments) not by facts, but by a spectre, -and one by no means unfamiliar--the spectre of Europe at war, so long -dreaded by some, so scornfully derided by others, so often driven away, -of late years so persistently reappearing. But this time the thing -refused to be driven away. It sat, hunched up, with its head resting -on its hands, as pitiless and inhuman as one of the gargoyles on a -Gothic cathedral, staring through us, as if we were merely vapour, at -something beyond. - - -So late as Wednesday, July 29--the day on which Austria declared war on -Servia--there was {16} probably not one Englishman in a hundred who -believed it possible that, within a week, his own country would be at -war; still less, that a few days later the British Army would be -crossing the Channel to assist France and Belgium in repelling a German -invasion. To the ordinary man--and not merely to the ordinary man, but -equally to the press, and the great majority of politicians--such -things were unthinkable until they occurred. Unfortunately, the -inability to think a thing is no more a protection against its -occurrence than the inability to see a thing gives security to the -ostrich. - -The sequence of events which led up to the final disaster is of great -importance, although very far from being in itself a full explanation -of the causes. - -On June 28, 1914, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, together -with his consort, was murdered by a young Bosnian at Serajevo, not far -distant from the southern frontier. The Imperial authorities -instituted a secret enquiry into the circumstances of the plot, as a -result of which they professed to have discovered that it had been -hatched at Belgrade, that Government officials were implicated in it, -and that so far from being reprobated, it was approved by Servian -public opinion.[1] - -On Thursday, July 23--a month after the tragedy--Austria suddenly -delivered an ultimatum to Servia, and demanded an acceptance of its -terms within forty-eight hours. The demands put forward were {17} -harsh, humiliating, and unconscionable. They were such as could not -have been accepted, as they stood, by any nation which desired to -preserve a shred of its independence. They had been framed with the -deliberate intention, either of provoking a refusal which might afford -a pretext for war, or of procuring an acceptance which would at once -reduce the Servian Kingdom to the position of a vassal. Even in Berlin -it was admitted[2] that this ultimatum asked more than it was -reasonable to expect Servia to yield. But none the less, there can be -but little doubt that the German ambassador at Vienna saw and approved -the document before it was despatched, and it seems more than likely -that he had a hand in drafting it. It also rests on good authority -that the German Kaiser was informed beforehand of the contents, and -that he did not demur to its presentation.[3] - -[Sidenote: THE SERVIAN REPLY] - -On the evening of Saturday, July 25, the Servian Government, as -required, handed in its answer. The purport of this, when it became -known to the world, excited surprise by the humility of its tone and -the substance of its submission. Almost everything that {18} Austria -had demanded was agreed to. What remained outstanding was clearly not -worth quarrelling about, unless a quarrel were the object of the -ultimatum. The refusal, such as it was, did not close the door, but, -on the contrary, contained an offer to submit the subjects of -difference to the Hague Convention.[4] - -The document was a lengthy one. The Austrian minister at Belgrade -nevertheless found time to read it through, to weigh it carefully, to -find it wanting, to ask for his passports, and to catch his train, all -within a period not exceeding three-quarters of an hour from the time -at which it was put into his hands.[5] - -When these occurrences became known, the English Foreign Minister -immediately made proposals for a conference between representatives of -Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, with the object of -discovering some means of peaceful settlement.[6] France and Italy -promptly accepted his invitation.[7] Germany, while professing to -desire mediation, did not accept it.[8] Consequently Sir Edward Grey's -effort failed; and before he was able to renew it in any more -acceptable form, Austria, acting with a promptitude almost unique in -her annals, declared war upon Servia, and hostilities began. - -It is unnecessary to enter here into an examination of the feverish and -fruitless attempts to preserve peace, which were made in various -quarters during the next four and twenty hours. They present a {19} -most pathetic appearance, like the efforts of a crew, sitting with oars -unshipped, arguing, exhorting, and imploring, while their boat drifts -on to the smooth lip of the cataract. - - -[Sidenote: MOBILIZATION] - -Russia ordered the mobilisation of her Southern armies, alleging that -she could not stand by while a Slav nation was being crushed out of -existence, despite the fact that it had made an abject submission for -an unproved offence.[9] - -Subsequently, on Friday, July 31, Russia--having, as she considered, -reasons for believing that Germany was secretly mobilising her whole -forces--proceeded to do likewise.[10] - -Germany simultaneously declared 'a state of war' within her own -territories, and a veil instantly fell upon all her internal -proceedings. She demanded that Russia should cease her mobilisation, -and as no answer which satisfied her was forthcoming, but only an -interchange of telegrams between the two sovereigns--disingenuous on -the one side and not unreasonably suspicious on the other--Germany -declared war on Russia on Saturday, August 1. - -On Saturday and Sunday, war on a grand scale being by this time -certain, the chief interest centred in questions of neutrality. -Germany enquired of France whether she would undertake to stand -aside--knowing full well beforehand that the terms of the Dual Alliance -compelled the Republic to lend assistance if Russia were attacked by -more than one power. {20} Sir Edward Grey enquired of France and -Germany if they would undertake to respect the integrity of Belgium. -France replied in the affirmative. Germany declined to commit herself, -and this was rightly construed as a refusal.[11] - -While this matter was still the subject of diplomatic discussion the -German Army advanced into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and was -correctly reported as having entered Belgian territory near Liège and -French territory near Cirey. - -On the evening of Sunday, August 2, the German Government presented an -ultimatum to Belgium[12] demanding free passage for its troops, thereby -putting its intentions beyond all doubt. - -On the same day Italy issued a declaration of neutrality, making it -clear that, although a member of the Triple Alliance, she did not -consider herself bound to support her allies in a war of aggression.[13] - -Meanwhile Germany had been making enquiries as to the attitude of -England, and, startled to discover that this country might not be -willing tamely to submit to the violation of Belgium and invasion of -France, proceeded to state, under cross-examination, the price she was -prepared to pay, or at any rate to promise, for the sake of securing -British neutrality.[14] - -[Sidenote: ENGLAND DECLARES WAR] - -On Tuesday, August 4, the British Ambassador at Berlin presented an -ultimatum which demanded an assurance, before midnight, that the -integrity of Belgium would not be violated. The answer was given -informally at a much earlier hour by the {21} bombardment of Liège; and -shortly before midnight England declared war on Germany.[15] - -Two days later Austria declared herself to be at war with Russia, and -within a week from that date Great Britain and France issued a similar -declaration against Austria. - - - -[1] There is perhaps as much reason, certainly no more, for believing -that an official clique at Belgrade plotted the Serajevo murders, as -that an official clique at Vienna connived at them, by deliberately -withdrawing police protection from the unfortunate and unpopular -Archduke on the occasion of his visit to a notorious hotbed of sedition. - -[2] Herr von Jagow "also admitted that the Servian Government could not -swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.... He repeated very -earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all the contents -of that note, he had in fact no such knowledge."--Sir H. Rumbold at -Berlin to Sir Edward Grey (White Paper, No. 18). - -[3] "Although I am unable to verify it, I have private information that -the German Ambassador (_i.e._ at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian -ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the -German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he -endorses every line of it."--British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward -Grey (White Paper, No. 95). (Cf. also White Book, Nos. 95 and 141; -French Yellow Book, No. 87; Russian Orange Book, No. 41.) - -"The German Ambassador (_i.e._ in London) read me a telegram from the -German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known -beforehand, and had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff -terms of the Austrian note to Servia."--Sir Edward Grey to the British -Ambassador in Berlin (White Paper, No. 25). (Cf. also French Yellow -Book, Nos. 17, 30, 36, 41, 57, and 94.) - -[4] Last paragraph of Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian -note. - -[5] White Paper, Nos. 20 and 23. - -[6] White Paper, No. 36. - -[7] White Paper, Nos. 35, 42, and 52. - -[8] White Paper, Nos. 43 and 71. Cf. also German White Book, Nos. 12 -and 15. - -[9] White Paper, No. 113; Russian Orange Book, No. 77; French Yellow -Book, No. 95. - -[10] These suspicions were well founded. German mobilisation began at -least two days earlier (White Paper, No. 113; French Yellow Book, Nos. -60, 88, 89, and 106). - -[11] White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, and 125. - -[12] Belgian Grey Book, No. 20; French Yellow Book, No. 141. - -[13] White Paper, No. 152; French Yellow Book, No. 124. - -[14] White Paper, Nos. 85 and 123. - -[15] "I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once -began a harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that -the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree: -just for a word--'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often -been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to -make war on a kindred nation, who desired nothing better than to be -friends with her."--British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey -(White Paper, No. 160). - - - - -{22} - -CHAPTER III - -WHO WANTED WAR? - -Such is the chronological order of events; but on the face of it, it -explains little of the underlying causes of this conflagration. Why -with the single exception of Italy had all the great naval and military -powers of Europe, together with several smaller nations, suddenly -plunged into war? Which of the combatants wanted war? ... To the -latter question the answer can be given at once and with -certainty--save Germany and Austria no nation wanted war, and even -Germany and Austria did not want _this_ war. - -[Sidenote: DESIRE FOR PEACE] - -Whatever opinion we may entertain of the Servian character or of her -policy in recent times, it is at all events certain that she did not -desire war with Austria. That she submitted to the very depths of -humiliation in order to avoid war cannot be doubted by any one who has -read her reply to the demands put forward by Vienna. Only a few months -since, she had emerged from two sanguinary wars--the first against -Turkey and the second against Bulgaria--and although victory had -crowned her arms in both of these contests, her losses in men and -material had been very severe. - -That Russia did not desire war was equally plain. {23} She was still -engaged in repairing the gigantic losses which she had sustained in her -struggle with Japan. At least two years must elapse before her new -fleet would be in a condition to take the sea, and it was generally -understood that at least as long a period would be necessary, in order -to carry through the scheme of reorganisation by which she hoped to -place her army in a state of efficiency. Whatever might be the -ultimate designs of Russia, it was altogether incredible that she would -have sought to bring about a war, either at this time or in the near -future. - -Russia, like England, had nothing to gain by war. Her development was -proceeding rapidly. For years to come her highest interest must be -peace. A supreme provocation was necessary in order to make her draw -the sword. Such a provocation had been given in 1909 when, ignoring -the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, Austria had formally annexed the -provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But at that time Russia's -resources were not merely unprepared; they were utterly exhausted. -Menaced simultaneously by Vienna and Berlin, she had been forced on -that occasion to stand by, while her prestige in the Balkan peninsula -suffered a blow which she was powerless to ward off. Now a further -encroachment was threatened from the same quarters. A Serb power which -looked to St. Petersburg[1] for protection was to be put under the heel -of Austria. - -Nor can any one believe that France wanted war. It is true that for a -year, or rather more, after the Agadir episode[2] the spirit of France -was perturbed. But no Foreign Office in the world--least of all that -{24} of Germany--was so ill-informed as to believe that the sporadic -demonstrations, which occurred in the press and elsewhere, were caused -by any eagerness for adventure or any ambition of conquest. They were -due, as every calm observer was aware, to one thing and one thing -only--the knowledge that the Republic had come to the very end of her -human resources; that all her sons who were capable of bearing arms had -already been enrolled in her army; that she could do nothing further to -strengthen her defences against Germany, who up to that time, had taken -for military training barely one half of her available male population, -and who was now engaged in increasing her striking power both by land -and sea. The cause of this restlessness in France was the fear that -Germany was preparing an invincible superiority and would strike so -soon as her weapon was forged. If so, would it not be better for -France to strike at once, while she had still a fighting chance, and -before she was hopelessly outnumbered? But this mood, the product of -anxiety and suspense, which had been somewhat prevalent in -irresponsible quarters during the autumn of 1912 and the early part of -the following year, had passed away. Partly it wore itself out; partly -popular interest was diverted to other objects of excitement. - -France, during the twelve months preceding Midsummer 1914, had been -singularly quiescent as regards foreign affairs. Her internal -conditions absorbed attention. Various events had conspired to disturb -public confidence in the fidelity of her rulers, and in the adequacy of -their military preparations. The popular mood had been sobered, -disquieted, and scandalised to such a point that war, {25} so far from -being sought after, was the thing of all others which France most -wished to avoid. - -[Sidenote: THE CASE OF BELGIUM] - -It is unnecessary to waste words in establishing the aversion of -Belgium from war. There was nothing which she could hope to gain by it -in any event. Suffering and loss--how great suffering and loss even -Belgium herself can hardly have foreseen--were inevitable to her civil -population, as well as to her soldiers, whether the war went well or -ill. Her territory lay in the direct way of the invaders, and was -likely, as in times past, to become the 'cockpit of Europe.' She was -asked to allow the free passage of the Germanic forces. She was -promised restoration of her independence and integrity at the end of -the war. But to grant this arrogant demand would have been to destroy -her dynasty and wreck her institutions; for what King or Constitution -could have withstood the popular contempt for a government which -acquiesced in national degradation? And to believe the promise, was a -thing only possible for simpletons; for what was such an assurance -worth, seeing that, at the very moment of the offer, Germany was -engaged in breaking her former undertaking, solemnly guaranteed and -recorded, that the neutrality of Belgium should be respected? That the -sympathies of Belgium would have been with France in any event cannot -of course be doubted; for a French victory threatened no danger, -whereas the success of German arms was a menace to her independence, -and a prelude to vassalage or absorption in the Empire. - -Neither the British people nor their Government wanted war. In the end -they accepted it reluctantly, and only after most strenuous efforts had -been made {26} to prevent its occurrence. To the intelligent foreign -observer, however unfriendly, who has a thorough understanding of -British interests, ideas, and habits of mind this is self-evident. He -does not need a White Paper to prove it to him. - -It is clear that Austria wanted war--not this war certainly, but a snug -little war with a troublesome little neighbour, as to the outcome of -which, with the ring kept, there could be no possibility of doubt. She -obviously hoped that indirectly, and as a sort of by-product of this -convenient little war, she would secure a great victory of the -diplomatic sort over her most powerful neighbour--a matter of -infinitely more consequence to her than the ostensible object of her -efforts. - -The crushing of Servia would mean the humiliation of Russia, and would -shake, for a second time within five years, the confidence of the -Balkan peoples in the power of the Slav Empire to protect its kindred -and co-religionists against the aggression of the Teutons and Magyars. -Anything which would lower the credit of Russia in the Balkan peninsula -would be a gain to Austria. To her more ambitious statesmen such an -achievement might well seem to open the way for coveted expansions -towards the Aegean Sea, which had been closed against her, to her great -chagrin, by the Treaty of Bucharest.[3] To others, whose chief anxiety -was to preserve peace in their own time, and to prevent the -Austro-Hungarian State from splitting asunder, the repression of Servia -seemed to promise security against the growing unrest and discontent of -the vast Slav population which was included in the Empire. - -{27} - -[Sidenote: AUSTRIAN ILL-FORTUNE] - -For something nearer two centuries than one the Austro-Hungarian Empire -has been miscalculating and suffering for its miscalculations, until -its blunders and ill-fortune have become a byword. Scheming ever for -safety, Austria has never found it. The very modesty of her aim has -helped to secure its own defeat. Her unvarying method has been a timid -and unimaginative repression. In politics, as in most other human -affairs, equilibrium is more easily attained by moving forward than by -standing still. Austria has sought security for powers, and systems, -and balances which were worn out, unsuited to our modern world, and -therefore incapable of being secured at all. The more she has schemed -for safety the more precarious her integrity has become. There are -things which scheming will never accomplish--things which for their -achievement need a change of spirit, some new birth of faith or -freedom. But in Vienna change in any direction is ill-regarded, and -new births are ever more likely to be strangled in their cradles than -to arrive at maturity. - -Distracted by the problem of her divers, discordant, and unwelded[4] -races, Austria has always inclined to put her trust in schemers who -were able to produce some plausible system, some ingenious device, some -promising ladder of calculation, or miscalculation, for reaching the -moon without going through the clouds. In the present case there can -be no doubt that she allowed herself to be persuaded by her German -neighbours that Russia was not in a position to make {28} an effective -fight, and would therefore probably stand by, growling and showing her -teeth. Consequently it was safe to take a bold line; to present Servia -with an ultimatum which had been made completely watertight against -acceptance of the unconditional and immediate kind; to reject any -acceptance which was not unconditional and immediate; to allow the -Government of King Peter no time for second thoughts, the European -Powers no time for mediation, her own Minister at Belgrade time only to -give one hasty glance at the reply, call for his passports, and catch -his train. So far as poor humanity can make certain of anything, -Austria, with German approval and under German guidance, made certain -of war with Servia. - -But the impression produced, when this matter first began to excite -public attention, was somewhat different. Foreign newspaper -correspondents at Vienna and Berlin were specially well cared for after -the Serajevo murders, and when the ultimatum was delivered, they -immediately sent to England and elsewhere accounts of the position -which made it appear, that the Austrian Government and people, provoked -beyond endurance by the intrigues of Servia, had acted impetuously, -possibly unwisely, but not altogether inexcusably. - -At this stage the idea was also sedulously put about that the Kaiser -was behaving like a gentleman. It was suggested that Germany had been -left very much in the dark until the explosion actually occurred, and -that she was now paying the penalty of loyalty to an indiscreet friend, -by suffering herself to be dragged into a quarrel in which she had -neither interest nor concern. In these early days, when {29} Sir -Edward Grey was striving hopefully, if somewhat innocently, after -peace, it was assumed by the world in general, that Germany, for her -own reasons, must desire, at least as ardently as the British Foreign -Minister, to find a means of escape from an exceedingly awkward -position, and that she would accordingly use her great influence with -her ally to this end. If there had been a grain of truth in this -assumption, peace would have been assured, for France and Italy had -already promised their support. But this theory broke down very -speedily; and as soon as the official papers were published, it was -seen never to have rested on the smallest basis of fact. - -[Sidenote: GERMANY USES AUSTRIA] - -So far from Germany having been dragged in against her will, it was -clear that from the beginning she had been using Austria as an agent, -who was not unwilling to stir up strife, but was only half-conscious of -the nature and dimensions of the contest which was bound to follow. It -is not credible that Germany was blind to the all-but-inevitable -results of letting Austria loose to range around, of hallooing her on, -and of comforting her with assurances of loyal support. But it may -well be believed that Austria herself did not see the situation in the -same clear light, and remained almost up to the last, under the -delusion, which had been so industriously fostered by the German -ambassador at Vienna, that Russia could not fight effectively and -therefore would probably choose not to fight at all. - -But although Austria may have had no adequate conception of the -consequences which her action would bring about, it is certain that -Germany foresaw them, with the single exception of British {30} -intervention; that what she foresaw she also desired; and further, that -at the right moment she did her part, boldly but clumsily, to guard -against any miscarriage of her schemes. - -Germany continued to make light of all apprehensions of serious danger -from St. Petersburg; but at the eleventh hour Austria appears suddenly -to have realised for herself the appalling nature of the catastrophe -which impended. Something happened; what it was we do not know, and -the present generation will probably never know. We may conjecture, -however--but it is only conjecture--that by some means or other the -intrigues of the war cabal at Vienna--the instrument of German policy, -owing more fealty to the Kaiser than to their own Emperor--had been -unmasked. In hot haste they were disavowed, and Austria opened -discussions with Russia 'in a perfectly friendly manner,'[5] and with -good hopes of success, as to how the catastrophe might still be averted. - -On Thursday, July 30, we are informed, the tension between Vienna and -St. Petersburg had greatly relaxed. An arrangement compatible with the -honour and interests of both empires seemed almost in sight when, on -the following day, Germany suddenly intervened with ultimatums to -France and Russia, of a kind to which only one answer was possible. -The spirit of the Ems telegram[6] had inebriated a duller generation. -"A few days' delay," our Ambassador at Vienna concludes, "might in all -{31} probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities -in history."[7] - -[Sidenote: SIR EDWARD GREY] - -As we turn over the official pages in which the British Government has -set out its case, we are inclined to marvel--knowing what we now -know--that our Foreign Minister should have shown so much zeal and -innocence in pleading the cause of peace on high grounds of humanity, -and with a faith, apparently unshaken to the last, that in principle at -least, the German Government were in full agreement with his aims. The -practical disadvantages of being a gentleman are that they are apt to -make a man too credulous and not sufficiently inquisitive. Sir Edward -Grey acted according to his nature. His miscalculation was one which -his fellow-countrymen have not hesitated to forgive. But clearly he -misjudged the forces which were opposed to him. He was deceived by -hollow assurances. He beat hopefully, but vainly and pathetically, -against a door which was already barred and bolted, and behind which -(could he but have seen) the Kaiser, with his Ministers and Staff, was -wholly absorbed in the study of war maps and tables of mobilisation. - -Sir Edward Grey failed to prevent war, and in the circumstances it is -hardly to be wondered at. But if he failed in one direction he -succeeded in another. His whole procedure from first to last was so -transparently disinterested and above board that, when war did actually -come upon us, it found us, not merely as a nation, but also as an -Empire, more united than we have ever been at any crisis, since the -Great Armada was sighted off Plymouth Sound. English people felt that -whatever else there {32} might be to reproach themselves with, they at -any rate went into the fight with clean hands. What is even more -remarkable, the people of all neutral countries, with the possible -exception of the rigid moralists of Constantinople, appeared for once -to share the same opinion. - -This was a great achievement; nearly, but not quite, the greatest of -all. To have prevented war would have been a greater achievement -still.... But was war inevitable? Or was M. Sazonof right, when he -said to our Ambassador, on the morning of the day when Servia replied -to the Austrian ultimatum,[8] that if Britain then took her stand -firmly with France and Russia there would be no war; but that if we -failed them then, rivers of blood would flow, and in the end we should -be dragged into war?[9] - -Sir Edward Grey refused to take this course. He judged that a -pronouncement of such a character would appear in the light of a menace -to the governments of Germany and Austria, and also to public opinion -in those countries; that it would only stiffen their backs; that a more -hopeful way of proceeding was for England to deal with Germany as a -friend, letting it be understood that if our counsels of moderation -were disregarded, we might be driven most reluctantly into the camp of -her enemies. To this, when it was urged by our Ambassador at St. -Petersburg, the Russian Minister only replied--and the words seem to -have in them a note of tragedy and weariness, as if the speaker well -knew that he was talking to deaf ears--that unfortunately Germany was -convinced that she could count upon the neutrality of Britain.[10] - -{33} - -The alternative was to speak out as Mr. Lloyd George spoke at the time -of the Agadir crisis, 'to rattle the sabre,' and to take our stand 'in -shining armour' beside the other two members of the Entente. - -Sir Edward Grey believed that this procedure would not have the effect -desired, but the reverse. Further, it would have committed this -country to a policy which had never been submitted to it, and which it -had never considered, far less approved, even in principle. The Agadir -precedent could be distinguished. There the danger which threatened -France arose directly out of treaty engagements with ourselves. Here -there was no such particular justification, but a wide general question -of the safety of Europe and the British Empire. - -With regard to this wider question, notwithstanding its imminence for a -good many years, the British Empire had not made up its mind, nor -indeed had it ever been asked to do so by those in authority. Sir -Edward Grey appears to have thought that, on democratic principles, he -had not the right to make such a pronouncement as M. Sazonof desired; -and that even if this pathway might have led to peace, it was one which -he could not tread. - -The one alternative was tried, and failed. We proffered our good -offices, we urged our counsels of moderation, all in vain. That, at -any rate, is among the certainties. And it is also among the -certainties that, although this alternative failed, it brought us two -signal benefits, in the unity of our own people and the goodwill of the -world. - -About the other alternative, which was not tried, we cannot of course -speak with the same sureness. If Sir Edward Grey had taken the step -which {34} M. Sazonof desired him to take, he would at once have been -vehemently opposed and denounced by a very large body of his own -fellow-countrymen, who, never having been taken frankly into the -confidence of the Government with regard to the foundations of British -policy, were at this early stage of the proceedings almost wholly -ignorant of the motives and issues involved. This being so, if war had -ensued, we should then have gone into it a divided instead of a united -nation. On the other hand, if peace had ensued, it must have been a -patched-up ill-natured peace; and it is not improbable that Sir Edward -Grey would have been driven from office by enemies in his own -household, playing the game of Germany unconsciously, as on previous -occasions, and would have brought the Cabinet down with him in his -fall. For at this time, owing to domestic difficulties, the Government -stood in a very perilous position, and it needed only such a mutiny, as -a bold departure in foreign affairs would almost certainly have -provoked among the Liberal party, to bring Mr. Asquith's government to -an end. - -As one reads and re-reads the official documents in our present -twilight, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that on the main -point Sir Edward Grey was wrong and M. Sazonof right. Germany, with -her eyes wide open, had determined on war with Russia and France, -unless by Russia's surrender of her prestige in the Balkans--a -surrender in its way almost as abject as that which had already been -demanded of Servia--the results of victory could be secured without -recourse to arms. Germany, nevertheless, was not prepared for war with -Britain. She was reckoning with confidence on our standing aside, {35} -on our unwillingness and inability to intervene.[11] If it had been -made clear to her, that in case she insisted on pressing things to -extremity, we should on no account stand aside, she might then have -eagerly forwarded, instead of deliberately frustrating, Austria's -eleventh-hour negotiations for an accommodation with St. Petersburg. - -No one, except Germans, whose judgments, naturally enough, are -disordered by the miscarriage of their plans, has dreamed of bringing -the charge against Sir Edward Grey that he wished for war, or fomented -it, or even that through levity or want of vigilance, he allowed it to -occur. The criticism is, that although his intentions were of the -best, and his industry unflagging, he failed to realise the situation, -and to adopt the only means which might have secured peace. - -The charge which is not only alleged, but established against Austria -is of a wholly different order. It is that she provoked war--blindly -perhaps, and not foreseeing what the war would be, but at any rate -recklessly and obstinately. - -The crime of which Germany stands accused is that she deliberately -aimed at war, and that when there seemed a chance of her plan -miscarrying, she promptly took steps to render peace impossible. Among -neutral countries is there one, the public opinion of which has -acquitted her? And has not Italy, her own ally, condemned her by -refusing assistance on the ground that this war is a war of German -aggression? - - - -[1] The name of the Russian capital was not changed until after the -declaration of war, and therefore St. Petersburg is used in this -chapter instead of Petrograd. - -[2] July-September 1911. - -[3] August 1913. - -[4] The total population of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including -Bosnia-Herzegovina, is roughly 50 millions. Of these 11 millions are -Germans and 10 millions Magyars. About 24 millions are composed of a -strange variety of Slav races. The remaining 5 millions consist of -Italians, Roumanians, and Jews. - -[5] White Paper, No. 161. - -[6] A harmless and unprovocative telegram from the King of Prussia to -Bismarck in July 1870 was, by the latter, so altered in tone that when -published it achieved the intention of its editor and served as 'a red -rag to the Gallic bull' and brought about the declaration of war by -Napoleon III.--Bismarck's _Reflections and Reminiscences_, vol. ii. p. -100. - -[7] White Paper, No. 161. - -[8] Saturday, July 25. - -[9] White Paper, No. 17. - -[10] Ibid. Nos. 17 and 44. - -[11] A proof of this is the outburst of hatred in Germany against -England so soon as we ranged ourselves with France and Russia. - - - - -{36} - -CHAPTER IV - -THE PENALTY OF NEGLIGENCE - -The East has been drawn into the circle of this war as well as the -West, the New World as well as the Old; nor can any man feel certain, -or even hopeful, that the conflagration will be content to burn itself -out where it is now raging, and will not spread across further -boundaries.... It is therefore no matter of surprise that people -should be asking themselves--"Of what nature is this war? Is it one of -those calamities, like earthquake or tempest, drought or flood, which -lawyers describe as 'the act of God'? Or is it a thing which, having -been conceived and deliberately projected by the wit of man, could have -been averted by human courage and judgment? Was this war, or was it -not, inevitable?" ... To which it may be answered, that no war is -inevitable until it occurs; and then every war is apt to make -pretensions to that character. - -In old times it was the Fates, superior even to Zeus, who decreed wars. -In later days wars were regarded as the will of God. And to-day -professional interpreters of events are as ready as ever with -explanations why this war was, in the nature of things, unavoidable. -Whether the prevailing priesthood wears white robes and fillets, or -rich vestments, or {37} cassocks and Geneva bands, or the severer -modern garb of the professor or politician, it appears to be equally -prone to dogmatic blasphemy. There is no proof that this war was -pre-ordained either by a Christian God or by the laws of Pagan Nature. - -[Sidenote: WAS WAR INEVITABLE?] - -One may doubt if any war is inevitable. If statesmen can gain time the -chances are that they will gain peace. This was the view of public -opinion throughout the British Empire down to July 1914. It was in a -special sense the view of the Liberal party; and their view was -endorsed, if not by the whole body of Unionists, at any rate by their -leader, in terms which admitted of no misunderstanding.[1] It is also -the point of view from which this book is written.... This war was not -inevitable; it could have been avoided, but on one condition--_if -England had been prepared_. - -England was not prepared either morally or materially. Her rulers had -left her in the dark as to the dangers which surrounded her. They had -neglected to make clear to her--probably even to themselves--the -essential principles of British policy, and the sacrifices which it -entailed. They had failed to provide armaments to correspond with this -policy. When the crisis arose their hands were tied. They had to sit -down hurriedly, and decipher their policy, and find out what it meant. -Still more hurriedly they had to get it approved, not merely by their -fellow-countrymen, but by their own colleagues--a work, if rumour[2] -speaks truly, of {38} considerable difficulty. Then they found that -one of the main supports was wanting; and they had to set to work -frantically to make an army adequate to their needs. - -But it was too late. By this time their policy had fallen about their -ears in ruins. For their policy was the neutrality of Belgium, and -that was already violated. Their policy was the defence of France, and -invasion had begun. Their policy was peace, and peace was broken. The -nation which would enjoy peace must be strong enough to enforce peace. - - -The moods of nations pass like clouds, only more slowly. They bank up -filled with menace; we look again and are surprised to find that they -have melted away as silently and swiftly as they came. One does not -need to be very old to recall various wars, deemed at one time or -another to be inevitable, which never occurred. In the 'sixties' war -with the second Empire was judged to be inevitable; and along our -coasts dismantled forts remain to this day as monuments of our fathers' -firm belief in the imminence of an invasion. In the 'seventies,' and -indeed until we had entered the present century, war with Russia was -regarded as inevitable by a large number of well-informed people; and -for a part of this period war with the French Republic was judged to be -no less so. Fortune on the whole was favourable. Circumstances -changed. The sense of a common danger healed old antagonisms. Causes -of chronic irritation disappeared of themselves, or were removed by -diplomatic surgery. And with the disappearance of these inflammatory -centres, misunderstandings, prejudices, and suspicions began to vanish -also. {39} Gradually it became clear, that what had been mistaken on -both sides for destiny was nothing more inexorable than a fit of -temper, or a conflict of business interests not incapable of -adjustment. And in a sense the German menace was less formidable than -any of these others, for the reason that it was a fit of temper on one -side only--a fit of temper, or megalomania. We became fully conscious -of the German mood only after the end of the South African War, when -its persistence showed clearly that it arose, not from any sympathy -with the Dutch, but from some internal cause. When this cause was -explained to us it seemed so inadequate, so absurd, so unreal, so -contrary to the facts, that only a small fraction of our nation ever -succeeded in believing that it actually existed. We had been taught by -Carlyle, that while the verities draw immortal life from the facts to -which they correspond, the falsities have but a phenomenal existence, -and a brief influence over the minds of men. Consequently the greater -part of the British people troubled their heads very little about this -matter, never thought things would come to a crisis, or lead to serious -mischief; but trusted always that, in due time, the ridiculous -illusions of our neighbours would vanish and die of their own inanity. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN JEALOUSY] - -We listened with an equal wonder and weariness to German complaints -that we were jealous of her trade and bent on strangling it; that we -grudged her colonial expansion, and were intriguing all the world over -to prevent it; that we had isolated her and ringed her round with -hostile alliances. We knew that these notions were all entirely false. -We knew that, so far from hampering German commerce, {40} our Free -Trade system in the United Kingdom, in the Dependencies, and in the -Indian Empire had fostered it and helped its rapid and brilliant -success more than any other external factor. - -For fully thirty years from 1870--during which period what remained of -the uncivilised portions of the world was divided up, during which -period also Germany was the most powerful nation in Europe, and could -have had anything she wanted of these new territories almost for the -asking--Bismarck and the statesmen of his school, engrossed mainly in -the European situation, set little store by colonies, thought of them -rather as expensive and dangerous vanities, and abstained deliberately -from taking an energetic part in the scramble. We knew, that in Africa -and the East, Germany had nevertheless obtained considerable -possessions, and that it was, primarily her own fault that she had not -obtained more. We assumed, no doubt very foolishly, that she must -ultimately become aware of her absurdity in blaming us for her own -neglect. We forgot human nature, and the apologue of the drunkard who -cursed the lamp-post for its clumsiness in getting in his way. - -The British people knew that Germany was talking nonsense; but -unfortunately they never fully realised that she was sincere, and meant -all the things she said. They thought she only half believed in her -complaints, as a man is apt to do when ill-temper upsets his -equanimity. They were confident that in the end the falsities would -perish and the verities remain, and that in the fulness of time the two -nations would become friends. - -As to this last the British people probably judged correctly; but they -entirely overlooked the fact, {41} that if truth was to be given a -chance of prevailing in the end, it was important to provide against -mischief which might very easily occur in the meantime. Nor did their -rulers, whose duty it was, ever warn them seriously of this necessity. - -[Sidenote: DANGERS OF ILL-TEMPER] - -When a man works himself up into a rage and proceeds to flourish a -loaded revolver, something more is necessary for the security of the -bystanders than the knowledge that his ill-temper does not rest upon a -reasonable basis. War was not inevitable, certainly; but until the -mood of Germany changed, it was exceedingly likely to occur unless the -odds against the aggressor were made too formidable for him to face. -None of the governments, however, which have controlled our national -destinies since 1900, ever developed sufficient energy to realise the -position of affairs, or ever mustered up courage to tell the people -clearly what the risks were, to state the amount of the premium which -was required to cover the risks, and to insist upon the immediate duty -of the sacrifice which imperial security inexorably demanded. - - - -[1] "I hear it also constantly said--there is no use shutting our eyes -or ears to obvious facts--that owing to divergent interests, war some -day or other between this country and Germany is inevitable. I never -believe in these inevitable wars."--Mr. Bonar Law in _England and -Germany_. - -[2] Rumour finds confirmation in the White Paper; also in an interview -with Mr. Lloyd George, reported in _Pearson's Magazine_, March 1915, p. -265, col. ii. - - - - -{42} - -CHAPTER V - -PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY - -Although in a technical sense the present war was brought on by -Austrian diplomacy, no one, in England at least, is inclined to rate -the moral responsibility of that empire at the highest figure. It is -in Germany that we find, or imagine ourselves to have found, not only -the true and deep-seated causes of the war, but the immediate occasions -of it. - -Not the least of our difficulties, however, is to decide the point--Who -is Germany? Who was her man of business? Who acted for her in the -matter of this war? Who pulled the wires, or touched the button that -set the conflagration blazing? Was this the work of an individual or a -camarilla? Was it the result of one strong will prevailing, or of -several wills getting to loggerheads--wills not particularly strong, -but obstinate, and flustered by internal controversy and external -events? What actually happened--was it meant by the 'super-men' to -happen, or did it come as a shock--not upon 'supermen' at all--but upon -several groups of surprised blunderers? These questions are not likely -to be answered for a generation or more--until, if ever, the archives -of Vienna and Berlin give up their {43} secrets--and it would therefore -be idle to waste too much time in analysis of the probabilities. - -The immediate occasion of the catastrophe has been variously attributed -to the German court, army, bureaucracy, professors, press, and people. -If we are looking only for a single thing--the hand which lit the -conflagration--and not for the profounder and more permanent causes and -origins of the trouble, we can at once dismiss several of these -suspects from the dock. - -[Sidenote: MEN OF LETTERS] - -Men of learning and letters, professors of every variety--a class which -has been christened 'the Pedantocracy' by unfriendly critics--may be -all struck off the charge-sheet as unconcerned in the actual -delinquency of arson. - -In fact, if not in name, these are a kind of priesthood, and a large -part of their lives' work has been to spread among German youth the -worship of the State under Hohenzollern kingship. It is impossible of -course to make 'a silk purse out of a sow's ear,' a religion out of a -self-advertising dynasty, or a god out of a machine. Consequently, -except for mischief, their efforts have been mainly wasted. Over a -long period of years, however, they have been engaged in heaping up -combustibles. They have filled men's minds to overflowing with notions -which are very liable to lead to war, and which indeed were designed -for no other purpose than to prepare public opinion for just such a war -as this. Their responsibility therefore is no light one, and it will -be dealt with later. But they are innocent at all events of complicity -in this particular exploit of fire-raising; and if, after the event, -they have sought to excuse, vindicate, and uphold the action of their -rulers it would be hard measure to condemn them for that. - -{44} - -Nor did the press bring about the war. In other countries, where the -press is free and irresponsible, it has frequently been the prime mover -in such mischief; but never in Germany. For in Germany the press is -incapable of bringing about anything of the political kind, being -merely an instrument and not a principal. - -Just as little can the charge of having produced the war be brought -against the people. In other countries, where the people are used to -give marching orders to their rulers, popular clamour has led to -catastrophe of this kind more frequently than any other cause. But -this, again, has never been so in Germany. The German people are -sober, steadfast, and humble in matters of high policy. They have -confidence in their rulers, believe what they are told, obey orders -readily, but do not think of giving them. When war was declared, all -Germans responded to the call of duty with loyalty and devotion. Nay, -having been prepared for at least a generation, they welcomed war with -enthusiasm. According to the lights which were given them to judge by, -they judged every whit as rightly as our own people. The lights were -false lights, hung out deliberately to mislead them and to justify -imperial policy. But this was no fault of theirs. Moreover, the -judgment which they came to with regard to the war was made after the -event, and cannot therefore in any case be held responsible for its -occurrence. This is a people's war surely enough, but just as surely, -the people had no hand in bringing it about. - -The circle of the accused is therefore narrowed down to the Court, the -Army, and the Bureaucracy. And there we must leave it for the -present--a joint indictment against all three. But whether these {45} -parties were guilty, all three in equal measure, we cannot conjecture -with the least approach to certainty. Nor can we even say precisely of -what they were guilty--of misunderstanding--of a quarrel among -themselves--of a series of blunders--or of a crime so black and -deliberate, that no apologist will be able ever to delete it from the -pages of history. On all this posterity must be left to pronounce. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN MILITARY OPINION] - -It is only human nevertheless to be curious about personalities. -Unfortunately for the satisfaction of this appetite, all is darkness as -to the German Army. We may suspect that the Prussian junker, or -country gentleman, controls and dominates it. But even as to this we -may conceivably be wrong. The military genius of some Hanoverian, -Saxon, or Bavarian may possess the mastery in council. As to the real -heads of the army, as to their individual characters, and their potency -in directing policy we know nothing at all. After nine months of war, -we have arrived at no clear notion, even with regard to their relative -values as soldiers in the field. We have even less knowledge as to -their influence beforehand in shaping and deciding the issues of war -and peace. - -This much, however, we may reasonably deduce from Bernhardi and other -writers--that military opinion had been anxious for some considerable -number of years past, and more particularly since the Agadir -incident,[1] lest war, which it regarded as ultimately inevitable, -should be delayed until the forces ranged against Germany, especially -upon her Eastern frontier, were too strong for her to cope with. - -In the pages of various official publications, and in newspaper reports -immediately before and after {46} war began, we caught glimpses of -certain characters at work; but these were not professional soldiers; -they were members of the Court and the Bureaucracy. - -Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, comes upon the -scene--a harassed and indignant official--sorely flustered--not by any -means master of his temper--not altogether certain of his facts--in -considerable doubt apparently as to whether things have not passed -behind his back which he ought to have been told of by higher powers, -but was not. He appears to us as a diligent and faithful servant,--one -who does not seek to impose his own decisions, but to excuse, justify, -and carry out, if he can, decisions which have been made by others, -more highly placed and greedier of responsibility than himself. - -Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Minister, is much affected. He drops -tears--or comes somewhere near dropping them--over the lost hopes of a -peaceful understanding between England and Germany. We can credit the -sincerity of his sorrow all the more easily, for the reason that Herr -von Jagow behaves throughout the crisis as the courteous gentleman; -while others, who by position were even greater gentlemen, forget -momentarily, in their excitement, the qualities which are usually -associated with that title. - -Then there is the German Ambassador at Vienna--obviously a -firebrand--enjoying, one imagines, the confidence of the war parties in -both capitals: also apparently a busy intriguer. The documents show -him acting behind the back of the Berlin Foreign Office, and -communicating direct with the Kaiser. - -We gather very clearly that he egged on the {47} statesmen of Vienna, -with great diligence and success, to press Servia to extremes, and to -shear time so short that peace-makers had nothing left to catch hold -of. Russia, he assured them, would never carry her opposition to the -point of war. Even if she did so, he argued with much plausibility, -she would be negligible. For she stood midway in a great military and -naval reformation, than which no situation is more deplorable for the -purposes of carrying on a campaign. - -[Sidenote: PRINCE LICHNOWSKY] - -When Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, took his -departure at the outbreak of war, he probably left no single enemy -behind him. A simple, friendly, sanguine figure, with a pardonable -vanity which led him to believe the incredible. He produced what is -called in the cant of the day 'an atmosphere,' mainly in drawing-rooms -and newspaper offices, but occasionally, one conjectures, even in -Downing Street itself. His artistry was purely in air and touched -nothing solid. He was useful to his employers, mainly because he put -England off her guard. He would not have been in the least useful if -he had not been mainly sincere. - -But though he was useful to German policy, he was not trusted by the -powers in Berlin to attend to their business at the Court of St. -James's except under strict supervision. What precisely were the -duties of Baron von Kuhlmann, Councillor to the Embassy? He was always -very cheerful, and obliging, and ready to smooth any little difficulty -out of the way. On the other hand, he was also very deft at inserting -an obstacle with an air of perfect innocence, which imposed on nearly -every one--even occasionally on the editors of newspapers. For {48} -some reason, however, very few people were willing to accept this -plausible diplomatist's assurances without a grain or two of salt. -Indeed quite a large number were so misled by their prejudices against -him, that they were convinced his prime vocation was that of a spy--a -spy on the country to which he was accredited and on the Ambassador -under whom he served.[2] - -[Illustration: THE KAISER] - -We know more of the Kaiser than of any of these others, and we have -known him over a much longer period. And yet our knowledge of him has -never enabled us to forecast his actions with any certainty. British -ministers and diplomatists, whose business it is to gauge, not only the -muzzle-velocity of eminent characters, but also the forces of their -recoil, never seem to have arrived at any definite conclusions with -regard to this baffling personality. Whatever he did or did not do, -they were always surprised by it, which gives us some measure of their -capacity if not of his. - -The Kaiser is pre-eminently a man of moods. At one time he is Henry -the Fifth, at another Richard the Second. Upon occasions he appears as -Hamlet, cursing fate which impels him to make a decision. Within the -same hour he is Autolycus crying up his wares with an unfeigned -cheerfulness. He is possessed by the demon of quick-change and -restlessness. We learn on good authority that he possesses an almost -{49} incredible number of uniforms which he actually wears, and of -royal residences which he occasionally inhabits. He clothes himself -suitably for each brief occasion, and sleeps rarely, if reports can be -believed, for more than two nights together under the same roof. He is -like an American millionaire in his fondness for rapid and sudden -journeys, and like a democratic politician in his passion for -speech-making. - -The phenomena of the moment--those which flicker upon the surface of -things--engage his eager and vivacious interest. Upon such matters his -commentaries are often apt and entertaining. But when he attempts to -deal with deeper issues, and with the underlying principles and causes -of human action, his utterances immediately lose the mind's attention -and keep hold only of the ear's, by virtue of a certain resonance and -blatancy. When the Kaiser discourses to us, as he often does, upon the -profundities of politics, philosophy, and religion, he falls instantly -into set forms, which express nothing that is living and real. He -would have the world believe, and doubtless himself sincerely believes, -that he has plunged, like a pearl-diver, into the deeps, and has -returned thence laden with rich treasures of thought and experience. -But in truth he has never visited this region at all, being of a nature -far too buoyant for such enterprises. He has not found truth, but only -remembered phrases. - -The Kaiser is frequently upbraided for his charm of manner by people -who have come under its influence and been misled. One of the -commonest accusations against him is that of duplicity; but indeed it -seems hardly more just to condemn him for duplicity than it would be to -praise him for sincerity. He is a man dangerous to have dealings with, -but this {50} is owing to the irresponsible effervescence of his ideas. -At any given moment he probably means the greater part of what he says; -but the image of one moment is swiftly expelled and obliterated by that -of the next. The Kaiser's untrustworthiness arises not from duplicity, -so much as from the quickness of his fancy, the shallowness of his -judgment, and the shortness of his memory. That his communications -frequently produce the same effects as duplicity, is due to the fact -that he recognises no obligation either to stand by his word, or to -correct the impression which his hasty assurances may have produced in -the mind of his interlocutor. The statesman who is won over to-day by -his advocacy of an English alliance, is astounded on the morrow to find -him encouraging an English pogrom.[3] - -{51} - -[Sidenote: THE IDEA OF ANTICHRIST] - -When a violent convulsion shakes the world people immediately begin to -look about them for some mighty and malevolent character who can be -held responsible for it. To the generations which knew them, Cromwell, -Napoleon, and Bismarck all figured as Antichrist. But in regard to the -policy which produced the present war, of what man can it be said -truly, either that he controlled that policy, or that he brought about -the results which he aimed at? Which of the great personages concerned -possesses the sublime qualities of the spirit of evil?[4] - -It is conceivable, though very unlikely, that behind the scenes there -was some strong silent man who worked the others like puppets on a -string; but among those who have made themselves known to us in the -pages of White Papers and the like, there is none whose features bear -the least resemblance to our conception of Antichrist; none who had -firm {52} control of events, or even of himself. There is none of whom -it is possible to say truly that he achieved the results at which he -aimed. - -It is clear that the war which the joint efforts of these great -personages brought into existence was a monstrous birth, and that it -filled those who were responsible for it with dismay, only a degree -less than it shocked other people. For proof of this, it is -unnecessary to look further than the miscalculations of the political -kind which became recognised for such within a few weeks after war was -declared. - - - -[1] July 1911. - -[2] Prussian policy appears to be modelled upon the human body. Just -as man is endowed with a duality of certain organs--eyes, nostrils, -lungs, kidneys, etc.--so Prussian policy appears to proceed upon the -principle of a double diplomatic representation, two separate Foreign -Office departments, etc., etc. It is no doubt an excellent plan to -have a second string to your bow; but it is not yet clear how far this -can be carried with advantage in delicate negotiations without -destroying confidence in your sincerity. - -[3] A labour leader, highly impressed by the spectacle, gave a vivid -description of an equestrian parade through the streets of Berlin after -the declaration of war--the Kaiser in helmet of gold, seated on his -white charger, frowning terribly, in a kind of immobility, as if his -features had been frozen into this dramatically appropriate -expression--following behind him in a carriage the Crown Prince and -Princess, all vivacity and smiles, and bows to this side and the -other--a remarkable contrast! - -It is interesting to contrast the ornate and flamboyant being whom we -know as Kaiser Wilhelm the Second with Carlyle's famous description of -the great Frederick:-- - -"A highly interesting lean little old man, of alert though slightly -stooping figure; whose name among strangers was King Friedrich the -Second, or Frederick the Great of Prussia, and at home among the common -people, who much loved and esteemed him, was _Vater Fritz_,--Father -Fred,--a name of familiarity which had not bred contempt in that -instance. He is a King every inch of him, though without the trappings -of a King. Presents himself in a Spartan simplicity of vesture; no -crown but an old military cocked-hat,--generally old, or trampled and -kneaded into absolute _softness_, if new;--no sceptre but one like -Agamemnon's, a walking-stick cut from the woods, which serves also as a -riding-stick (with which he hits the horse 'between the ears' say -authors);--and for royal robes, a mere soldier's blue coat with red -facings, coat likely to be old, and sure to have a good deal of Spanish -snuff on the breast of it; rest of the apparel dim, unobtrusive in -colour or cut, ending in high over-knee military boots, which may be -brushed (and, I hope, kept soft with an underhand suspicion of oil), -but are not permitted to be blackened or varnished; Day and Martin with -their soot-pots forbidden to approach. - -"The man is not of godlike physiognomy, any more than of imposing -stature or costume; close-shut mouth with thin lips, prominent jaws and -nose, receding brow, by no means of Olympian height; head, however, is -of long form, and has superlative gray eyes in it. Not what is called -a beautiful man; nor yet, by all appearance, what is called a happy. -On the contrary, the face bears evidence of many sorrows, as they are -termed, of much hard labour done in this world; and seems to anticipate -nothing but more still coming. Quiet stoicism, capable enough of what -joy there were, but not expecting any worth mention; great unconscious -and some conscious pride, well tempered with a cheery mockery of -humour,--are written on that old face; which carries its chin well -forward, in spite of the slight stoop about the neck; snuffy nose -rather flung into the air under its old cocked hat,--like an old snuffy -lion on the watch; and such a pair of eyes as no man or lion or lynx of -that century bore elsewhere, according to all the testimony we -have."--Carlyle, _History of Frederick the Great_, Bk. I. chap. i. - -[4] A friend who has been kind enough to read the proofs of this volume -takes exception to the rating of Antichrist. The Devil, he maintains, -is not at all a clever or profound spirit, though he is exceedingly -industrious. The conception of him in the old Mystery Plays, where he -figures as a kind of butt, whose elaborate and painfully constructed -schemes are continually being upset owing to some ridiculous oversight, -or by some trivial accident, is the true Satan; the Miltonic idea is a -poetical myth, not in the least borne out by human experience. - - - - -{53} - -CHAPTER VI - -GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS - -In the world's play-house there are a number of prominent and -well-placed seats, which the instinct of veneration among mankind -insists on reserving for Super-men; and as mankind is never content -unless the seats of the super-men are well filled, 'the Management'--in -other words, the press, the publicists, and other manipulators of -opinion--have to do the best they can to find super-men to sit in them. -When that is impossible, it is customary to burnish up, fig out, and -pass off various colourable substitutes whom it is thought, may be -trusted to comport themselves with propriety until the curtain falls. -But those resplendent creatures whom we know so well by sight and fame, -and upon whom all eyes and opera-glasses are directed during the -_entr'-actes_, are for the most part not super-men at all, but merely -what, in the slang of the box-office, is known as 'paper.' Indeed -there have been long periods, even generations, during which the -supposed super-men have been wholly 'paper.' - -Of course so long as the super-men substitutes have only to walk to -their places, to bow, smile, frown, overawe, and be admired, everything -goes safely enough. The audience is satisfied and the {54} -'management' rubs its hands. But if anything has to be done beyond -this parade business, if the unexpected happens, if, for instance, -there is an alarm of fire--in which case the example set by the -super-creatures might be of inestimable assistance--the 'paper' element -is certain to crumple up, according to the laws of its nature, being -after all but dried pulp. Something of this kind appears to have -happened in various great countries during the weeks which immediately -preceded and followed the outbreak of war, and in none was the -crumpling up of the supermen substitutes more noticeable than in -Germany. - -The thoroughness of the German race is no empty boast. All the world -knows as much by experience in peace as well as war. Consequently, -people had said to themselves: "However it may be with other nations, -in Germany at all events the strings of foreign policy are firmly held -in giant fingers." But as day succeeded day, unmasking one -miscalculation after another, it became clear that there must have been -at least as much 'paper' in the political high places of Germany as -elsewhere. - -Clearly, although this war was made in Germany, it did not at all -follow the course which had been charted for it in the official -forecasts. For the German bureaucracy and general staff had laid their -plans to crush France at the first onset--to crush her till the bones -stuck out through her skin. And they had reckoned to out-general -Russia and roll back her multitudes, as yet unorganised--so at least it -was conceived--in wave upon wave of encroaching defeat. - -Having achieved these aims before the fall of the leaf, Germany would -have gained thereby another {55} decade for the undisturbed development -of wealth and world-power. Under Prussian direction the power of -Austria would then be consolidated within her own dominions and -throughout the Balkan Peninsula. At the end of this interval of -vigorous recuperation, or possibly earlier, Germany would attack -England, and England would fall an easy prey. For having stood aside -from the former struggle she would be without allies. Her name would -stink in the nostrils of Russia and France; and indeed to the whole -world she would be recognised for what she was--a decadent and coward -nation. Even her own children would blush for her dishonour. - -That these were the main lines of the German forecast no man can doubt, -who has watched and studied the development of events; and although it -is as yet too early days to make sure that nothing of all this vast -conception will ever be realised, much of it--the time-table at all -events--has certainly miscarried for good and all. - - -[Sidenote: THE TIME-TABLE MISCARRIES] - -According to German calculations England would stand aside; but England -took part. Italy would help her allies; but Italy refused. Servia was -a thing of naught; but Servia destroyed several army corps. Belgium -would not count; and yet Belgium by her exertions counted, if for -nothing more, for the loss of eight precious days, while by her -sufferings she mobilised against the aggressor the condemnation of the -whole world. - -The Germans reckoned that the army of France was terrible only upon -paper. Forty-five years of corrupt government and political peculation -must, according to their calculations, have paralysed the {56} general -staff and betrayed the national spirit. The sums voted for equipment, -arms, and ammunition must assuredly have been spirited away, as under -The Third Empire, into the pockets of ministers, senators, deputies, -and contractors. The results of this régime would become apparent, as -they had done in 1870, only in the present case sooner. - -War was declared by the Third Napoleon at mid-July, by William the -Second not until August 1; but Sedan or its equivalent would occur, -nevertheless, in the first days of September, in 1914 as in 1870. In -the former contest Paris fell at the end of six months; in this one, -with the aid of howitzers, it would fall at the end of six weeks. - -Unfortunately for this confident prediction, whatever may have been the -deficiency in the French supplies, however dangerous the consequent -hitches in mobilisation, things fell out quite differently. The spirit -of the people of France, and the devotion of her soldiers, survived the -misfeasances of the politicians, supposing indeed that such crimes had -actually been committed. - - -It was a feature of Bismarck's diplomacy that he put a high value upon -the good opinion of the world, and took the greatest pains to avoid its -condemnation. In 1870, as we now know, he schemed successfully, to -lure the government of Napoleon the Third into a declaration of war, -thereby saddling the French government with the odium which attaches to -peace-breakers.[1] But in the case of the present war, {57} which, as -it out-Bismarcked Bismarck in deliberate aggressiveness, stood all the -more in need of a tactful introduction to the outside world, the -precautions of that astute statesman were neglected or despised. From -the beginning all neutral nations were resentful of German procedure, -and after the devastation of Belgium and the destruction of Louvain, -the spacious morality of the Young Turks alone was equal to the -profession of friendship and admiration. - -[Sidenote: CRUELTIES IN BELGIUM] - -The objects which Germany sought to gain by the cruelties perpetrated, -under orders, by her soldiers in Belgium and Northern France are clear -enough. These objects were certainly of considerable value in a -military as well as in a political sense. One wonders, however, if -even Germany herself now considers them to have been worth the -abhorrence and disgust which they have earned for her throughout the -civilised world. - -In nothing is the sham super-man more easily detected than in the -confidence and self-complacency with which he pounces upon the -immediate small advantage, regardless of the penalty he will have to -pay in the future. By spreading death and devastation broadcast in -Belgium the Germans hoped to attain three things, and it is not -impossible that they have succeeded in attaining them all. They sought -to secure their communications by putting the fear of death, and worse -than death, into the hearts of the civil population. They sought to -send the countryside fleeing terror-stricken before their advance, -choking and cumbering the highways; than which nothing is ever more -hampering to the operations of an army in retreat, or more depressing -to its spirits. But chiefly they desired to set a ruthless -object-lesson before the {58} eyes of Holland, in order to show her the -consequences of resistance; so that when it came to her turn to answer -a summons to surrender she might have the good sense not to make a -fuss. They desired in their dully-calculating, official minds that -Holland might never forget the clouds of smoke, from burning villages -and homesteads, which the August breezes carried far across her -frontiers; the sights of horror, the tales of suffering and ruin which -tens of thousands of starved, forlorn, and hurrying fugitives brought -with them when they came seeking sanctuary in her territories. But if -the Germans gained all this, and even if they gained in addition the -loving admiration of the Young Turks, was it worth while to purchase -these advantages at such a price? It seems a poor bargain to save your -communications, if thereby you lose the good opinion of the whole world. - - -What is of most interest to ourselves, however, in the long list of -miscalculations, is the confidence of Germany that Britain would remain -neutral. For a variety of reasons which satisfied the able bureaucrats -at Berlin, it was apparently taken for granted by them that we were -determined to stand out; and indeed that we were in no position to come -in even if we would. We conjecture that the reports of German -ambassadors, councillors, consuls, and secret service agents must have -been very certain and unanimous in this prediction. - -[Illustration: GERMAN VIEW OF ENGLAND] - -According to the German theory, the British race, at home and abroad, -was wholly immersed in gain, and in a kind of pseudo-philanthropy--in -making money, and in paying blackmail to the working-classes in order -to be allowed to go on making money. {59} Our social legislation and -our 'People's Budgets' were regarded in Germany with contempt, as sops -and shams, wanting in thoroughness and tainted with hypocrisy. - -English politicians, acting upon the advice of obliging financiers, had -been engaged during recent years (so grossly was the situation -misjudged by our neighbours) in imposing taxation which hit the trader, -manufacturer, and country-gentleman as hard as possible; which also hit -the working-class hard, though indirectly; but which left holes through -which the financiers themselves--by virtue of their international -connections and affiliations--could glide easily into comparative -immunity. - -From these faulty premisses, Germans concluded that Britain was held in -leading-strings by certain sentimentalists who wanted vaguely to do -good; and that these sentimentalists, again, were helped and guided by -certain money-lenders and exploiters, who were all very much in favour -of paying ransom out of other people's pockets. A nation which had -come to this pass would be ready enough to sacrifice future -interests--being blind to them--for the comforts of a present peace. - -The Governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions were largely -influenced--so it was believed at Berlin--by crooks and cranks of -various sorts, by speculators and 'speculatists,'[2] many of them of -foreign origin or descent--who preached day in and day out the doctrine -that war was an anachronism, _vieux jeu_, even an impossibility in the -present situation of the world. - - -[2] 'Speculatists' was a term used by contemporary American writers to -describe the eloquent theorists who played so large a part in the -French Revolution. - - -{60} - -The British Government appeared to treat these materially-minded -visionaries with the highest favour. Their advice was constantly -sought; they were recipients of the confidences of Ministers; they -played the part of Lords Bountiful to the party organisations; they -were loaded with titles, if not with honour. Their abhorrence of -militarism knew no bounds, and to a large extent it seemed to German, -and even to English eyes, as if they carried the Cabinet, the -party-machine, and the press along with them. - -'Militarism,' as used by these enthusiasts, was a comprehensive term. -It covered with ridicule and disrepute even such things as preparation -for the defence of the national existence. International law was -solemnly recommended as a safer defence than battleships. - -Better certainly, they allowed, if militarism could be rooted out in -all countries; but at any rate England, the land of their birth or -adoption, must be saved from the contamination of this brutalising -idea. In their anxiety to discredit Continental exemplars they even -went so far as to evolve an ingenious theory, that foreign nations -which followed in the paths of militarism, did so at serious loss to -themselves, but with wholly innocent intentions. More especially, they -insisted, was this true in the case of Germany. - -The Liberal party appeared to listen to these opinions with respect; -Radicals hailed them with enthusiasm; while the Labour party was at one -time so much impressed, as to propose through some of its more -progressive spirits that, in the exceedingly unlikely event of a German -landing, working-men {61} should continue steadily at their usual -labours and pay no heed to the military operations of the invaders. - -In Berlin, apparently, all this respect and enthusiasm for pacifism, -together with the concrete proposals for putting its principles into -practice, were taken at their face value. There at any rate it was -confidently believed that the speculators and the 'speculatists' had -succeeded in changing or erasing the spots of the English leopard. - -[Sidenote: ERRORS OF INFERENCE] - -But in order to arrive at such a conclusion as this the able German -bureaucrats must have understood very little, one would think, of human -nature in general, and of British human nature in particular. Clearly -they built more hopes on our supposed conversion to pacifism than the -foundations would stand. They were right, of course, in counting it a -benefit to themselves that we were unprepared and unsuspicious of -attack; that we had pared down our exiguous army and stinted our navy -somewhat beyond the limits of prudence. They were foolish, however, -not to perceive that if the British people found themselves confronted -with the choice, between a war which they believed to be righteous, and -a peace which they saw clearly would not only be wounding to their own -honour but ruinous to their security, all their fine abstract -convictions would go by the board; that party distinctions would then -for the time being disappear, and the speculators and the -'speculatists' would be interned in the nethermost pit of national -distrust.... In so far, therefore, as the Germans reckoned on our -unpreparedness they were wise; but in counting upon British neutrality -they were singularly wide of the mark. - -{62} - -One imagines that among the idealists of Berlin there must surely have -been a few sceptics who did not altogether credit this wholesale -conversion and quakerisation of the British race. But for these -doubters, if indeed they existed, there were other considerations of a -more practical kind which seemed to indicate that Britain must -certainly stand aside. - -The first and most important of these was the imminence of civil war in -Ireland. If Prince Lichnowsky and Baron von Kuhlmann reported that -this had become inevitable, small blame to their perspicacity! For in -this their judgment only tallied with that of most people in the United -Kingdom who had any knowledge of the true facts. - -In March an incident occurred among the troops stationed in Ireland -which must have given comfort at Berlin, even in greater measure than -it caused disquiet at home. For it showed in a vivid flash the -intrinsic dangers of the Irish situation, and the tension, almost to -breaking-point, which existed between the civil authorities and the -fighting services. - -It also showed, what in the circumstances must have been peculiarly -reassuring to the German Government, that our Navy and Army were under -the charge of Ministers whose judgments were apt to be led captive by -their tempers. Although the Secretary of State for War did not remain -in office for many days to encourage the hearts of the general staff at -Berlin, his important post was never filled. It was only occupied and -kept warm by the Prime Minister, whose labours and -responsibilities--according to the notions of the Germans, who are a -painstaking and thorough people--were already enough for one man to -undertake. Moreover, the First {63} Lord of the Admiralty had not -resigned; and it was perhaps natural, looking at what had just -happened, to conclude that he would be wholly incapable of the sound -and swift decision by which a few months later he was destined to atone -for his recent blunder. - -[Sidenote: THE DUBLIN RIOT] - -Moreover, although the Curragh incident, as it was called, had been -patched over in a sort of way, the danger of civil war in Ireland had -not diminished in the least by Midsummer. Indeed it had sensibly -increased. During the interval large quantities of arms and ammunition -had been imported by Ulstermen in defiance of the Government, and -Nationalists were eagerly engaged in emulating their example. The -emergency conference of the leaders of parties which the King, acting -upon the desperate advice of his Ministers, had called together at -Buckingham Palace ended in complete failure. - -On Monday the 27th of July readers of the morning newspapers, looking -anxiously for news of the Servian reply to the Austrian ultimatum, -found their eyes distracted by even blacker headlines, which announced -that a Scots regiment had fired on a Dublin mob. - -How the bureaucrats of Berlin must have rubbed their hands and admired -their own prescience! Civil war in Ireland had actually begun, and in -the very nick of time! And this occurrence, no less dramatic than -opportune, was a triumph not merely for German foresight but for German -contrivance--like a good many other things, indeed, which have taken -place of late. When the voyage of the good ship _Fanny_, which in -April carried arms to the coast of Antrim, comes to be written, and -that of the anonymous yacht which sailed from German waters, -transhipped its {64} cargo in the channel, whence it was safely -conveyed by another craft to Dublin Bay to kindle this blaze in -July--when these narratives are set out by some future historian, as -they deserve to be, but not until then, it will be known how zealously, -benevolently, and impartially our loyal and kindly Teuton cousins -forwarded and fomented the quarrel between Covenanter and Nationalist. -What the German bureaucrats, however, with all their foresight, -apparently did not in the least foresee, was that the wound which they -had intentionally done so much to keep open, they would speedily be -helping unintentionally to heal. - - -With regard to South Africa, German miscalculation and intrigue pursued -a somewhat similar course, though with little better results. It was -assumed that South Africa, having been fully incorporated in the Empire -as a self-governing unit only twelve years earlier, and as the result -of a prolonged and sanguinary war, must necessarily be bent on severing -the British connection at the earliest opportunity. The Dutch, like -the frogs in the fable, were imagined to be only awaiting a favourable -moment to exchange the tyranny of King Log for the benevolent rule of -King Stork. - -In these forecasts, however, various considerations were overlooked. -In the first place, the methods of incorporation pursued by the British -in South Africa were as nearly as possible the opposite of those -adopted by Prussia in Poland, in Schleswig-Holstein, and in -Alsace-Lorraine. In many quarters there were doubtless bitter memories -among the Dutch, and in some others disappointed ambition still ached; -{65} but these forces were not enough to plunge into serious civil war -two races which, after nearly a century of strife and division, had but -a few years before entered into a solemn and voluntary covenant to make -a firm union, and dwell henceforth in peace one with another. What -object could there be for Dutchmen to rise in rebellion against a -government, which consisted almost exclusively of Dutch statesmen, and -which had been put in office and was kept there by the popular vote? - -[Sidenote: MISTAKES AS TO DUTCH] - -What German intrigue and bribery could do it did. But Dutchmen whose -recollections went back so far as twenty years were little likely to -place excessive confidence in the incitements and professions of -Berlin. They remembered with what busy intrigues Germany had in former -times encouraged their ambitions, with what a rich bribery of promises -she had urged them on to war, with what cold indifference, when war -arose, she had left them to their fate. They also remembered how, when -their aged President, an exiled and broken-hearted man, sought an -interview with the great sovereign whose consideration for him in his -more prosperous days had never lacked for warmth, he received for an -answer, that Berlin was no place for people who had been beaten to come -whining, and was turned from the door. - - -In India, as in South Africa, Germany entertained confident hopes of a -successful rising. Had not the Crown Prince, a shrewd judge, visited -there a few years earlier and formed his own estimate of the situation? -Was there not a widely spread network of sedition covering the whole of -our Eastern Empire, an incendiary press, and orators who openly -counselled {66} violence and preached rebellion? Had not riots been -increasing rapidly in gravity and number? Had not assassins been -actively pursuing their trade? Had not a ship-load of Indians just -been refused admission to Canada, thereby causing a not unnatural -outburst of indignation? - -How far German statesmen had merely foreseen these things, how far they -had actually contrived them, we are as yet in ignorance; but judging by -what has happened in other places--in Ireland, South Africa, Belgium, -and France--it would surprise no one to learn that the bombs which were -thrown at the Viceroy and his wife with tragic consequences owed -something to German teaching. It is unlikely that German emissaries -had been less active in fomenting unrest in India than elsewhere among -the subjects of nations with which they were ostensibly at peace; while -the fact that the Crown Prince had but recently enjoyed the hospitality -of the Viceregal Court was only a sentimental consideration unworthy of -the attention of super-men. - -Moreover, it had for long been abundantly clear, on _a priori_ grounds, -to thinkers like Treitschke and Bernhardi that India was already ripe -for rebellion on a grand scale. There are but two things which affect -the Indian mind with awe and submission--a sublime philosophy and a -genius for war. The English had never been philosophers, and they had -ceased to be warriors. How, then, could a race which worshipped only -soldiers and sages be expected to reverence and obey a garrison of -clerks and shopkeepers? A war between England and Germany would -provide an opportunity for making an end for ever of the British Raj. - -{67} - -[Sidenote: MISTAKES AS TO DOMINIONS] - -The self-governing Dominions were believed to be affected with the same -decadent spirit and fantastic illusions as their Mother Country; only -with them these cankers had spread more widely, were more logically -followed out in practice, and less tempered and restrained by -aristocratic tradition. Their eloquent outpourings of devotion and -cohesion were in reality quite valueless; merely what in their own -slang is known as 'hot air.' They hated militarism in theory and -practice, and they loved making money with at least an equal fervour. -Consequently, it was absurd to suppose that their professions of -loyalty would stand the strain of a war, by which not only their -national exchequers, but the whole mass of the people must inevitably -be impoverished, in which the manhood of the Dominions would be called -on for military service, and their defenceless territories placed in -danger of invasion. - -It was incredible to the wise men at Berlin that the timid but clear -minds of English Statesmen had not appreciated these obvious facts. -War, therefore, would be avoided as long as possible. And when at a -later date, war was forced by Germany upon the pusillanimous islanders, -the Dominions would immediately discern various highly moral pleas for -standing aloof. Germany, honouring these pleas for the time being with -a mock respect, would defer devouring the Dominions until she had -digested the more serious meal. - - -It will be seen from all this how good the grounds were on which the -best-informed and most efficient bureaucracy in the world decided that -the British Empire would remain neutral in the present war. {68} -Looked at from the strictly intellectual standpoint, the reasons which -satisfied German Statesmen with regard to Britain's neutrality were -overwhelming, and might well have convinced others, of a similar -outlook and training, who had no personal interest whatsoever in coming -to one conclusion rather than another. - -None the less the judgment of the Kaiser and his Ministers was not only -bad, but inexcusably bad. We expect more from statesmen than that they -should arrive at logical conclusions. Logic in such cases is nothing; -all that matters is to be right; but unless instinct rules and reason -serves, right judgment will rarely be arrived at in such matters as -these. If a man cannot feel as well as reason, if he cannot gauge the -forces which are at work among the nations by some kind of -second-sight, he has no title to set up his bills as a statesman. It -is incredible that Lincoln, Cavour, or Bismarck would ever have -blundered into such a war as this, under the delusion that Britain -could remain neutral even if she would. Nor would any of these three -have been so far out in his reckoning as to believe, that the immediate -effect of such a war, if Britain joined in it, would be the disruption -of her empire. They might have calculated that in the event of the war -being prolonged and disastrous to England, disintegration would in the -end come about; but without stopping to reason the matter out, they -would have known by instinct, that the first effect produced by such a -war would be a consolidation and knitting together of the loose -Imperial fabric, and a suspension, or at least a diminution, of -internal differences. - - - -[1] British public opinion in regard to that war was divided roughly -according to party lines, the Conservatives favouring France on -sentimental grounds, the Liberals favouring Germany as a -highly-educated, peace-loving people who had been wantonly attacked. - - - - -{69} - -CHAPTER VII - -INTERNATIONAL ILL-WILL - -In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to consider the series -of events which immediately preceded the recent outbreak of war. But -the most complete account of moves and counter-moves, and of all the -pretexts, arguments, demands, and appeals which were put forward by the -various governments concerned, with the object of forcing on, -justifying, circumscribing, or preventing the present struggle, can -never give us the true explanation of why it occurred. For this we -must look much further back than Midsummer last, and at other things -besides the correspondence between Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors. - -Nobody in his senses believes that Europe is at present in a convulsion -because the heir-presumptive to the throne of Austria was murdered at -Serajevo on the 28th of June. This event was tragic and deplorable, -but it was merely a spark--one of that cloud of sparks which is always -issuing from the chimney-stack of the European furnace. This one by -ill-luck happened to fall upon a heap of combustibles, and set it in a -blaze. - -Great events, as the Greeks discovered several thousand years ago, do -not spring from small causes, {70} though more often than not they have -some trivial beginning. How came it that so much inflammable material -was lying ready to catch fire? - -To answer this question truthfully we need more knowledge of men and -things than is given in those books, of varying hue, which the -Chancelleries of Europe have published to explain their causes of -action. The official sources provide much valuable information; but -they will never explain to us why public opinion in Germany, ever since -the beginning of the present century, has been inflamed with hatred -against this country. Nor will they ever give us any clear idea as to -what extent, and where, the practical aims and policies of that nation -and our own were in conflict. - -According to the state papers, it would appear that Russia was drawn -into this war because of Servia, and France because of Russia, and -Belgium because of France, and we ourselves because of Belgium; but it -may well be doubted if even the first of this row of ninepins would -have been allowed to fall, had it not been for the feelings which the -German people and their rulers entertained towards Britain. - -It is always hard for a man to believe in the sincerity, friendliness, -and peaceful intentions of one against whom he is himself engaged in -plotting an injury. German distrust of England was based upon the -surest of all foundations--upon her own fixed and envious determination -to overthrow our empire and rob us of our property. Her own mind being -filled with this ambition, how could she be otherwise than incredulous -of our expressions of goodwill? How could she conceive that we were so -blind as not to have penetrated her thoughts, so deaf as not to have -heard the threats which her public characters {71} were proclaiming so -openly? Consequently when British Statesmen uttered amiable assurances -they were judged guilty of a treacherous dissimulation.... One can -only shrug one's shoulders, marvelling at the nightmares and suspicions -which a bad conscience is capable of producing even among intelligent -people. - - -[Sidenote: THE DANGER POINT] - -It has been the fashion for half a century or more to talk of the -Balkans as the danger-point of European peace. In a sense this is -true. The crust is very thin in that region, and violent eruptions are -of common occurrence. But the real danger of upheaval comes, not so -much from the thinness of the crust, as from the violence of the -subterranean forces. Of these, by far the most formidable in recent -times have been the attitude of public opinion in Germany towards -England--the hatred of England which has been sedulously and -systematically inculcated among the people of all ranks--the suspicions -of our policy which have been sown broadcast--the envy of our position -in the world which has been instilled, without remission, by all and -sundry the agencies and individuals subject to the orders and -inspiration of government. An obsession has been created, by these -means, which has distorted the whole field of German vision. National -ill-will accordingly has refused to yield to any persuasion. Like its -contrary, the passion of love, it has burned all the more fiercely, -being unrequited. - -The fact which it is necessary to face, fairly and squarely, is that we -are fighting the whole German people. We may blame, and blame justly, -the Prussian junkers, the German bureaucracy, the Kaiser himself, for -having desired this war, schemed {72} for it, set the match to it by -intention or through a blunder; but to regard it as a Kaiser's war, or -a junkers' war, or a bureaucrats' war is merely to deceive ourselves. -It is a people's war if ever there was one. It could not have been -more a people's war than it is, even if Germany had been a democracy -like France or England. - -The Kaiser, as regards this matter, is the mirror of his people. The -Army and the Navy are his trusted servants against whom not a word will -be believed. The wisdom of the bureaucracy is unquestioned. In -matters of faith the zealous eloquence of the learned men is wholly -approved. All classes are as one in devotion, and are moved by the -same spirit of self-sacrifice. Hardly a murmur of criticism has been -heard, even from the multitudes who at other times march under the red -flag of Socialism. - -Although a German panic with regard to Russia may have been the -proximate occasion of this war, the force which most sustains it in its -course is German hatred of England. We must recognise this fact with -candour, however painful it may be. And we must also note that, during -the past nine months, the feelings against England have undergone a -change by no means for the better. - -At the beginning the German people, if we may judge from published -utterances, were convinced that the war had been engineered by Russia, -and that England had meanly joined in it, because she saw her chance of -crushing a dangerous and envied rival. - -Two months later, however, it was equally clear that the German people -were persuaded--Heaven {73} knows how or why!--that the war had been -engineered by England, who was using France and Russia as her tools. -Behind Russia, France, Belgium, Servia, and Japan--according to this -view--stood Britain--perfidious throughout the ages--guiding her -puppets with indefatigable skill to the destruction of German trade, -colonies, navy, and world-power. - -[Sidenote: FANTASTIC ERRORS] - -Confiding Germany, in spite of all her unremitting abuse of Britain, -had apparently, for some reason, really believed her to be a friend and -a fellow Teuton! Could any treachery have been blacker than our own in -outraging these family affections? And for Britain to support the Slav -and the Celt against the Teuton, was judged to be the worst treachery -of all--race treachery--especially by the Prussians, who, having -forgotten that they themselves are half Slavs, seemed also to have -forgotten that the British are largely Celts. - -Every Englishman, whether he be an admirer of Sir Edward Grey's -administration of Foreign Affairs or not, knows these dark suspicions -to be merely nonsense. He knows this as one of the common certainties -of existence--just as he knows that ginger is hot i' the mouth. Every -Englishman knows that Sir Edward Grey, his colleagues, his advisers, -his supporters in Parliament and out of it, and the whole British race -throughout the world, hated the idea of war, and would have done--and -in fact did, so far as in them lay--everything they could think of to -avert it. Yet the German people do not at present believe a single -word of this; and there must be some reason for their disbelief as for -other things. - -Unfortunately the nations of the world never {74} see one another face -to face. They carry on their intercourse, friendly and otherwise, by -high-angle fire, from hidden batteries of journalistic howitzers. -Sometimes the projectiles which they exchange are charged with ideal -hate which explodes and kills; at others with ideal love and admiration -which dissolve in golden showers, delightful and amazing to behold. -But always the gunners are invisible to each other, and the ideal love -and admiration are often as far removed from the real merits of their -objective as the ideal hate. - -That there was no excuse, beyond mere fancy on Germany's part, for her -distrust of British policy, no one, unless he were wholly ignorant of -the facts, would dream of maintaining. During the years which have -passed since 1870, our intentions have very rarely been unfriendly. -Still more rarely, however, have we ever shown any real comprehension -of the German point of view. Never have we made our policy clear. The -last is hardly to be wondered at, seeing that we had not ourselves -taken the pains to understand it. - -On occasions, it is true, we have been effusive, and have somewhat -overstepped the limits of dignity, plunging into a gushing -sentimentality, or else wheedling and coaxing, with some material -object--the abatement of naval expenditure, for example--showing very -plainly through our blandishments. And as our methods at these times -have been lacking in self-respect, it is not wonderful if they have -earned little or no respect from others. Our protestations that we -were friends, our babble about blood-relationship, were suspected to -have their origin in timidity; our appeals for restriction of -armaments, {75} to our aversion from personal sacrifice and our senile -penuriousness. - -[Sidenote: FAULTS OF ENGLISH METHODS] - -Until lately these lapses into excessive amiability, it must be -allowed, were not very frequent. The main excuse for German suspicion -is to be found elsewhere--in the dilatoriness of our foreign policy--in -its inability to make up its mind--in its changeability after its mind -might have been supposed made up--in its vagueness with regard to the -nature of our obligations towards other powers--whom we would support, -and to what extent, and upon what pleas. - -Irritation on the part of Germany would have been natural in these -circumstances, even if she had not been in the mood to suspect dark -motives in the background. From the days of Lord Granville to those of -Sir Edward Grey, we had been dealing with a neighbour who, whatever her -failings might be, was essentially businesslike in her methods. We, on -the other hand, continued to exhibit many of those faults which are -most ill-regarded by business men. We would not say clearly what -regions came within our sphere of influence. We would not say clearly -where Germany might go and where we should object to her going; but -wherever she went, we were apt after the event to grumble and make -trouble. - -The delay and indecision which marked Lord Granville's dealings with -Bismarck over the partition of Africa were both bad manners in the -international sense, and bad policy. The neglect of Sir Edward Grey, -after Agadir, to make clear to his fellow-countrymen, and to the world -at large, the nature and extent of our obligations to France, was bad -business. Next {76} to the British people and our present allies, -Germany had the best reason to complain of this procedure, or rather of -this failure to proceed. - -The blame for this unfortunate record rests mainly upon our political -system, rather than on individuals. We cannot enjoy the benefits of -the most highly developed party system in the world, without losing by -it in various directions. A change of Government, actual or impending, -has more often been the cause of procrastination and uncertainty than -change in the mind of the Foreign Minister. There are people who -assure us that this must always be so, that it is one of the inherent -weaknesses of party government, and even of democracy itself. This is -not altogether true. It is true, however, that whereas statesmen may -be reticent and keep their own counsel under an autocracy, they are -bound to be frank, and simple, and outspoken as to their aims, where -their power is drawn directly from popular support. - -[Sidenote: BAD DIPLOMACY] - -The criticism against British foreign policy for upwards of a century, -is that it has aimed at managing our international relations on a -system of hoodwinking the people, which is altogether incompatible with -the nature of our institutions. The evils which have resulted from -this mistake are not confined to ourselves, but have reacted abroad. -"With whom," we can imagine some perplexed foreign Chancellor asking -himself--"with whom does power really rest in England? With the -Government or with the people? With which of these am I to deal? To -which must I address myself? As regards France there is little -difficulty, for her policy is national, and agreed on all hands. But -in England, so far as we can judge, the people have no idea of {77} -being dragged under any circumstances into a European war; while on the -other hand, the Government is obviously drifting, consciously or -unconsciously, into continental relations which, in certain events, can -lead to no other result...." Nor is it surprising that under these -conditions German diplomacy should have directed itself of late, with -much industry, to the cultivation of public opinion in this country, -and should at times have treated our Government with scant respect. - -The fact is that the two nations, which had most to gain by -clear-sighted and tactful foreign policy, were perhaps of all nations -in the world the least well served in that particular. English -relations with Germany have for many years past been more mismanaged -than anything except German relations with England. In their mutual -diplomacy the fingers of both nations have been all thumbs. - -It is not to be wondered at that two characters so antagonistic in -their natures and methods as English and German foreign policy should -have come to regard one another as impossible. The aggressive -personage who does know his own mind, and the vague, supercilious -personage who does not, have only one point in common--that they -understand and care very little about the feelings of other people. -But although this is a point in common, it is anything but a point of -agreement.[1] - -{78} The causes of what has happened will never be clear to us unless -we can arrive at some understanding of the ideas, aspirations, and -dreams which have filled the minds of the German people and our own -during recent years. On logical grounds we must consider the case of -Germany first, for the reason that all the warmth of enmity has -proceeded from her side, and, until recent events suddenly aroused the -Old Adam in us, the uncharitable sentiments of our neighbours were not -at all cordially reciprocated over here. - -As in romantic drama, according to the cynics, there is usually one who -loves and another who allows itself to be loved, so in this case there -was one who hated and another who allowed itself to be hated. The -British nation could not understand why the Germans were so angry and -suspicious. Nor would it trouble to understand. It was bored with the -whole subject; and even the irritation which it felt at having to find -huge sums annually for the Navy did not succeed in shaking it out of -its boredom. - -[Sidenote: INTERNATIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS] - -The most careful analysis of our thoughts about Germany would do little -to explain matters, because, as it happened, by far the greater part of -our thoughts was occupied with other things. Indeed we thought about -Germany as little as we could help thinking; and although we regretted -her annoyance, {79} our consciences absolved us from any responsibility -for it. - -It was entirely different with Germany. For many years past she had -been more occupied with her grievances against Britain, and with the -complications and dangers which would beset any attempt at redress, -than with any other single subject; or indeed, so it would appear, with -all other subjects put together. - -It is important to understand the German point of view, but it is -difficult. For at once we are faced with the eternal obstacle of the -foreigner, who sets out in search of a simple explanation. The mind of -the ordinary man, like that of the philosopher, is hypnotised by a -basic assumption of the One-ness of Things. He wants to trace all -trouble to a single root, as if it were a corn and could be extracted. -But in an enquiry like the present we are confronted at every turn with -the Two-ness of Things, or indeed with the Multiplicity of Things. - -We have only to read a few pages of any German book on England to see -that the other party to the dispute is confronted with exactly the same -difficulty. We are amazed, and perhaps not altogether chagrined, to -discover that, to German eyes, British policy appears to be a thing of -the most rigorous consistency. It is deliberate, far-sighted, and -ruthless. It is pursued with constancy from decade to decade--nay from -century to century--never faltering, never retreating, but always going -forward under Whig and Tory, Liberal and Conservative alike, to the -same goal. And we of course know, if we know anything, that this -picture, though very flattering to our political instinct, is untrue. - -{80} - -If Englishmen know anything at all, they know that the foreign policy -of this country during the last fifty years--under Lord Beaconsfield, -and Mr. Gladstone, Lord Salisbury, and Mr. Asquith--has been at times a -series of the most eccentric wobbles and plunges, like a kite which is -drawn at the wrong angle to the wind. Nay, even as regards our -participation in this very War--which in the German White Book is -asserted to have been preconceived and undertaken by us with a craft -and coolness worthy of Machiavelli himself--we can see from our own -White Paper that the final decision wavered this way and the other, -from day to day during the critical week, neither the Cabinet nor -public opinion being clear and unanimous as to the course which ought -to be pursued. - -Vacillation in national policy usually appears to hostile observers in -the light of perfidy. And it must be admitted that there is good -excuse for the mistake, seeing that weakness in such high matters is -quite as likely to injure everybody concerned as wickedness itself. - -Assuredly no sensible person who was required to make a defence of -British foreign policy, either during the century which has passed -since the battle of Waterloo, or in the much shorter period since the -death of Queen Victoria, would ever dream of doing so on the ground -that its guiding principles have been consistency and singleness of -purpose. These, indeed, are almost the last virtues he would think of -claiming for it. And yet these are the very qualities which foreign -nations are inclined to attribute to British statesmen, by way of -praise or blame. Our failures are apt to be overlooked by outside {81} -observers; our successes on the other hand are plain and memorable. -Other nations assume that because we have happened to achieve some -particular result, we must therefore have deliberately and patiently -set out to achieve it. Much more often this result has been due either -to pure good luck or else to some happy inspiration of the moment. - -A wise apologist for our foreign policy would at once concede that it -has frequently been characterised by feebleness and indecision, and -almost always by a want of clear perception of the end in view; but he -could contend with justice that upon the whole, for upwards of a -century, it has meant well by other nations, and that accusations of -far-sighted duplicity are purely ridiculous. - -Our own temptation on the other hand is to visualise a single, gross, -overbearing, and opinionated type of the Teuton species. We tend to -ignore important differences; and because German public opinion appears -to be unanimous in regard to the present War, we are apt to overlook -the fact that the love and admiration of the Bavarian and the Saxon for -the Prussian are probably some degrees less cordial than those which -the men of Kerry and Connemara entertain for the Belfast Covenanters. -And we incline also to forget, that though opinion in Germany in favour -of war became solid so soon as war was apprehended, and certainly -before it was declared, it is exceedingly unlikely, that even in -governing circles, there was an equal unanimity as to the procedure -which led up to the climax. - -[Sidenote: THE TRIANGLE OF FORCES] - -If it were really so, the case is unique in history, which shows us at -every other crisis of this sort always the same triangle of forces--a -War party, a Peace {82} party, and a Wait-and-See party; each of them -pulling vigorously in its own direction; each intriguing against, and -caballing with, the other two by turns; until at last the group, still -struggling, falls back on the side of safety or, as in the recent -instance, pitches over the edge of the precipice. - -It would be very hard to persuade any student of history that something -of this sort was not occurring both in Vienna and Berlin during the -months of June and July 1914. While he would admit to more than a -suspicion that intelligences had been passing for a considerably longer -period--for a year at least[2]--between the War parties in these two -capitals, he would be inclined to take the view, that in the last stage -of all, the Berlin group went staggering to perdition, dragging after -it the Vienna group, which by that time was struggling feebly in the -opposite direction. - -[Sidenote: LIMITS OF ENQUIRY] - -When we come to consider the German case it is wise to bear in mind the -erroneous judgments which foreigners have passed upon ourselves. It is -probable that the One-ness of things which we discover in their actions -is to some extent an illusion, like that which they have discovered in -our own. Indeed it is a fruitless task to hunt for logic and -consistency in things which, in their nature, are neither logical nor -consistent. For most of us, who have but a limited range of German -books, state papers, journalism, and acquaintances to judge from, it -would be vain and foolish to pretend that in a chapter, or a volume, we -can lay bare the German attitude of {83} mind. The most we can hope to -do is to illuminate this complex subject at certain points; and these -for the most part are where the edges rub, and where German policy and -temperament have happened to come into conflict with our own. - - - -[1] If we may offer a very homely simile--German policy may be compared -to a rude heavy fellow, who comes shoving his way into a crowded bus, -snorting aggressively, treading on everybody's corns, poking his -umbrella into people's eyes, and finally plumping himself down without -a word of regret or apology, between the two meekest and most -helpless-looking of the passengers. - -British diplomacy, on the other hand, bears a close resemblance to a -nuisance, equally well known to the bus public, and no less dreaded. -It reminds us constantly of that dawdling, disobliging female who never -can make up her mind, till the bus has actually started, whether she -wants to go to Shepherd's Bush or the Mansion House. If she has taken -a seat she insists on stopping the conveyance in order to get out. If -she has remained gaping on the pavement she hails it in order to get -in. She cares nothing about the inconvenience caused thereby to other -passengers, who do know whither they want to be conveyed, and desire to -arrive at their destination as quickly as possible. - -[2] We have recently learned from Signor Giolitti, ex-Premier of Italy, -that in August 1913 the Foreign Minister, the late Marquis di San -Giuliano, was sounded by Austria-Hungary as to whether he would join in -an attack upon Servia. - - - - -PART II - -THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY - - - -CHRISTIAN: Met you with nothing else in that Valley? - -FAITHFUL: Yes, I met with _Shame_. But of all the Men I met with in my -Pilgrimage, he I think bears the wrong name: ... this boldfaced -_Shame_, would never have done. - -CHRISTIAN: Why, what did he say to you? - -FAITHFUL: What! Why he objected against Religion itself; he said it -was a pitiful low sneaking business for a Man to mind Religion; he said -that a tender conscience was an unmanly thing, and that for a Man to -watch over his words and ways, so as to tye up himself from that -hectoring liberty that the brave spirits of the times accustom -themselves unto, would make me the Ridicule of the times. - -He objected also, that but few of the Mighty, Rich, or Wise, were ever -of my opinion; nor any of them, neither, before they were perswaded to -be Fools, and to be of a voluntary fondness to venture the loss of all, -_for no body else knows what_. - -Yea, he did hold me to it at that rate also about a great many more -things than here I relate; as, that it was a _shame_ ... to ask my -neighbour forgiveness for petty faults, or to make restitution where I -had taken from any. He said also that Religion made a man grow strange -to the great because of a few vices (which he called by finer names).... - -_The Pilgrim's Progress_. - - - - -{87} - -CHAPTER I - -THE BISMARCKIAN EPOCH - -All nations dream--some more than others; while some are more ready -than others to follow their dreams into action. Nor does the -prevalence, or even the intensity, of these national dreams seem to -bear any fixed relation to the strength of will which seeks to turn -them into achievement. - -After 1789 there was a great deal of dreaming among the nations of -Europe. At the beginning of it all was revolutionary France, who -dreamed of offering freedom to all mankind. A few years later, an -altogether different France was dreaming furiously of glory for her own -arms. In the end it was still France who dreamed; and this time she -sought to impose the blessings of peace, order, and uniformity upon the -whole world. Her first dream was realised in part, the second wholly; -but the third ended in ruin. - -Following upon this momentous failure came a short period when the -exhausted nations slept much too soundly to dream dreams. During this -epoch Europe was parcelled out artificially, like a patch-work quilt, -by practical and unimaginative diplomatists, anxious certainly to take -securities for a lasting {88} peace, but still more anxious to bolster -up the ancient dynasties. - -Against their arbitrary expedients there was soon a strong reaction, -and dreaming began once more among the nations, as they turned in their -sleep, and tried to stretch their hampered limbs. At the beginning -their dreaming was of a mild and somewhat futile type. It called -itself 'liberalism'--a name coined upon the continent of Europe. It -aimed by methods of peaceful persuasion, at reaching the double goal of -nationality as the ideal unit of the state, and popular representation -as the ideal system of government. Then the seams of the patchwork, -which had been put together with so much labour at Vienna[1] and -Aix-la-Chapelle,[2] began to gape. Greece struggled with some success -to free herself from the Turk,[3] and Belgium broke away from -Holland,[4] as at a much later date Norway severed her union with -Sweden.[5] In 1848 there were revolutions all over Europe, the objects -of which were the setting up of parliamentary systems. In all -directions it seemed as if the dynastic stitches were coming undone. -Italy dreamed of union and finally achieved it,[6] expelling the -Austrian encroachers--though not by peaceful persuasion--and -disordering still further the neatly sewn handiwork of Talleyrand, -Metternich, and Castlereagh. Finally, the Balkans began to dream of -Slav destinies, unrealisable either under the auspices of the Sublime -Porte or in tutelage to the Habsburgs.[7] - -[Sidenote: MAKING OF THE GERMAN UNION] - -But of all the nations which have dreamed since days long before -Napoleon, none has dreamed more {89} nobly or more persistently than -Germany. For the first half of the nineteenth century it seemed as if -the Germans were satisfied to behold a vision without attempting to -turn it into a reality. Their aspirations issued in no effective -action. They dreamed of union between their many kingdoms, -principalities, and duchies, and of building up a firm empire against -which all enemies would beat in vain; but until 1864 they had gone but -a few steps towards the achievement of this end. - -Then within a period of seven years, Prussia, the most powerful of the -German states, planned, provoked, and carried to a successful issue -three wars of aggression. By a series of swift strokes, the genius of -Bismarck snatched Schleswig-Holstein from the Danes, beat down the -pretensions of Austria to the leadership of the Teutonic races, and -wrested the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from France. When Denmark -was invaded by Germanic armies in February 1864, the vision of unity -seemed as remote as ever; by January 1871 it was fully achieved. When -at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, in the stately palace of the -Bourbons, King William accepted from the hands of his peers--the -sovereign rulers of Germany--an imperial crown, the dream of centuries -was fulfilled. - -Austria, indeed, stood aloof; but both by reason of her geographical -situation and the heterogeneous ancestry of her people that was a -matter only of small account. Union was, for all practical purposes -complete. And what made the achievement all the more marvellous was -the fact, that the vision had been realised by methods which had no -place in the gentle speculations of those, who had cherished the {90} -hope of unity with the most fervent loyalty. It had been accomplished -by the Prussians, who of all races between the Alps and the Baltic, -between the mountain barriers of Burgundy and the Polish Marshes, are -the least German in blood,[8] and who of all Germans dream the least. -It had been carried through, not by peaceful persuasion, nor on any -principles of Liberalism, nor in any of the ways foreseen by the -philosophers and poets who had beheld visions of the millennium. Union -was the triumph of craft and calculation, courage and resolve, 'blood -and iron.' - -The world in general, whose thoughts at this time were much more -congenially occupied with International Exhibitions, and Peace -Societies, and the ideals of Manchester statesmanship, was inclined to -regard the whole of this series of events as an anachronism--as the -belated offspring of 'militarism' and 'feudalism.' These were well -known to be both in their dotage; they could not possibly survive for -many years. What had happened, therefore, did not startle mankind -simply because the nature of it was not understood. The spirit of the -age, wholly possessed, as it was, by an opposite set of ideas, was -unable to comprehend, to believe in, or even to consider with patience, -phenomena which, according to prevailing theories, had no reasonable -basis of existence. - -In some quarters, indeed, efforts were made to gloss over the -proceedings of Prince Bismarck, and to fit them into the fashionable -theory of a universe, flowing with the milk of human kindness and the -{91} honey of material prosperity. It was urged that the Germans were -a people, pure in their morals, industrious in their habits, the -pioneers of higher education and domestic economy. For the most part, -British and American public opinion was inclined to regard these -various occurrences and conquests as a mediaeval masquerade, in rather -doubtful taste, but of no particular significance and involving no -serious consequences. Even in that enlightened age, however, there -were still a few superstitious persons who saw ghosts. To their eyes -the shade of Richard Cobden seemed in some danger of being eclipsed in -the near future by that of Niccolo Machiavelli; though the former had -died in great honour and prestige only a few years earlier, while the -latter had been dead, discredited, and disavowed for almost as many -centuries. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN PROSPERITY AFTER UNION] - -After 1870 Germany entered upon a period of peaceful prosperity. -Forges clanged, workshops throbbed, looms hummed, and within twenty -years, the ebb of emigration had entirely ceased. Indeed, not only was -there work in the Fatherland for all its sons, but for others besides; -so that long before another twenty years had passed away, the tide had -turned and immigrants were pouring in. - -At first the larger part of German exports was cheap and nasty, with a -piratical habit of sailing under false colours, and simulating -well-known British and other national trade-marks. But this was a -brief interlude. The sagacity, thoroughness, and enterprise of -manufacturers and merchants soon guided their steps past this dangerous -quicksand, and the label _made in Germany_ ceased to be a reproach. - -{92} - -Students and lovers of truth laboured at discovery; and hard upon their -heels followed a crowd of practical inventors--the gleaners, -scavengers, and rag-pickers of science. Never had the trade of any -country thriven with a more wonderful rapidity. Though still of -necessity a borrower by very reason of her marvellous expansion, -Germany nevertheless began to make her influence felt in the financial -sphere. Her own ships carried her products to the ends of the earth, -and fetched home raw materials in exchange. And not only this, her -merchant fleets began to enter into successful competition for the -carrying trade of the world, even with the Mistress of the Seas herself. - -[Sidenote: LIFE'S WORK OF BISMARCK] - -For a score of years after the fall of Paris, Germany found but little -time for dreaming. Meanwhile, by an astute if somewhat tortuous -policy, and under the impenetrable shield of the finest army in Europe, -Bismarck kept safe the empire which he had founded. He declined to be -drawn into adventures either at home or abroad, either in the new world -or the old. He opposed the colonial aspirations of a few visionaries, -who began to make some noise towards the end of his long reign, and -silenced them with some spacious but easy acquisitions in Africa and -the East. He consolidated the Prussian autocracy, and brought its -servant, the bureaucracy, to the highest pitch of efficiency. He -played with the political parties in the Reichstag as if they had been -a box of dominoes, combining them into what patterns he pleased. At -the same time he fostered the national well-being with ceaseless -vigilance, and kept down popular discontent by the boldness and -thoroughness of his social legislation. But for Bismarck himself {93} -the age of adventure was past. It was enough that by the labours of an -arduous lifetime, he had made of Germany a puissant state, in which all -her children, even the most restless, could find full scope for their -soaring ambitions. - - - -[1] 1814. - -[2] 1818. - -[3] 1821-1829. - -[4] 1830. - -[5] 1905. - -[6] 1859-1861. - -[7] 1875-1878. - -[8] The admixture of Slavonic and Wendish blood in the Prussian stock -is usually calculated by ethnologists at about half and half. - - - - -{94} - -CHAPTER II - -AFTER BISMARCK - -With the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, Germany entered upon a new -phase. Then once again her people began to dream, and this time -furiously. They had conquered in war. They had won great victories in -peace. According to their own estimate they were the foremost thinkers -of the world. They found themselves impelled by a limitless ambition -and a superb self-confidence. But the vision which now presented -itself to their eyes was disordered and tumultuous. Indeed it was less -dream than nightmare; and in some degree, no doubt, it owed its origin, -like other nightmares, to a sudden surfeit--to a glut of material -prosperity.[1] - -Why did Germany with her larger population still lag behind Britain in -commerce and shipping? Surely the reason could only be that Britain, -at every turn, sought to cripple the enterprise of her young rival. -Why had Britain a great and thriving colonial empire, while Germany had -only a few tracts of tropical jungle and light soil, not particularly -prosperous or promising? The reason could only be that, out of -jealousy, Britain had obstructed Teutonic acquisition. Why was Germany -tending {95} to become more and more isolated and unpopular in Europe? -The reason could only be that the crafty and unscrupulous policy of -Britain had intrigued, with some success, for her political ostracism. - -[Illustration: GERMAN NIGHTMARES] - -It is useless to argue with a man in a nightmare. He brushes reason -aside and cares not for facts. But to seekers after truth it was -obvious, that so far from making any attack upon German commerce, -Britain, by adhering to her system of free trade at home and in her -dependencies, had conferred a boon immeasurable on this new and eager -competitor. So far from hindering Germany's acquisition of colonies, -Britain had been careless and indifferent in the matter; perhaps too -much so for the security of some of her own possessions. It was -Bismarck, much more than Britain, who had put obstacles in the way of -German colonial expansion. With a sigh of relief (as we may imagine) -this great statesman saw the partition of the vacant territories of the -world completed, and his fellow-countrymen thereby estopped from -wasting their substance, and dissipating their energies, in costly and -embarrassing adventures. So far from holding aloof from Germany or -attempting to isolate her among European nations, we had persisted in -treating her with friendliness, long after she had ceased to be -friendly. One of our leading statesmen had even gone the length of -suggesting an alliance, and had been denounced immediately by the whole -German press, although it was understood at the time that he had spoken -with the august encouragement of the Kaiser and his Chancellor.[2] It -was Germany herself, deprived of the guidance of Bismarck, who by -blustering at {96} her various neighbours, and threatening them in -turn, had aroused their suspicions and achieved her own isolation. - -The grievances against Britain which figured in the phantasmagoria of -the German nightmare were obviously tinged with envy. There were other -grievances against France, and these were tinged with annoyance. For -France, although she had been beaten on to her knees, had nevertheless -had the impudence to make a successful recovery. There were also -grievances against Russia, and these were tinged with fear. Her vast -adjacent territories and teeming population, her social and industrial -progress, the reformation of her government, and the rapid recuperation -of her military and naval power, constituted in German eyes the gravest -menace of all. - -Self-confidence and ambition were the original stuff--the warp and the -weft--of which the German dream was made; but these admirable and -healthy qualities rapidly underwent a morbid deterioration. Ambition -degenerated into groundless suspicion, and self-confidence into -arrogance. It was a considerable time, however, before Germany was -realised to have become a public danger by reason of her mental -affliction. Until her prophets and high priests began preaching from -the housetops as a divine ordinance, that Germany was now so great, -prosperous, and prolific as to need the lands of her neighbours for her -expansion, her symptoms were not generally recognised. It was not -really pressure of population, but only the oppression of a nightmare -which had brought her to this restless and excited condition. In terms -of psychology, the disease from which Germany has been suffering of -late years is {97} known as megalomania, in the slang of the -street-corner as madness of the swollen head. - -The dreams of a nation may be guided well or ill by statesmen, or they -may be left altogether unguided. The dreams of Italy under Cavour, and -those of Germany under Bismarck, were skilfully fostered and directed -with great shrewdness to certain practical ends. But in considering -the case of Germany under William the Second, our feeling is that -although popular imaginings have been controlled from above with even -greater solicitude than before, the persons who inspired and regulated -them have been lacking in the sense of proportion. The governing power -would seem to have been the victim of changing moods, conflicting -policies, and disordered purposes. - - -[Sidenote: TWO FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS] - -When we piece together the various schemes for the aggrandisement of -the Fatherland, which German writers have set forth with increasing -boldness and perfect gravity during the past ten years, we are -confronted with an immense mosaic--a conception of the most grandiose -character. On examination each of these projects is found to be based -upon two fundamental assumptions:--The first, that the present -boundaries of Germany and her possessions overseas are too narrow to -contain the legitimate aspirations of the German race:--The second that -it is the immediate interest of Germany, as well as a duty which she -owes to posterity, to remedy this deficiency, by taking from her -neighbours by force what she requires for her own expansion. There is -a third assumption, not however of a political so much as an ethical -character, which is stated with {98} equal frankness and -conviction--that war on an extensive scale is necessary, from time to -time, in order to preserve the vigour of the German people and their -noble spirit. - -One school of dreamers, with its gaze fixed upon the Atlantic -trade-routes, insists upon the absurdity of resting content with a -western sea-board of some two hundred miles. The estuaries of the Elbe -and the Weser alone are exclusively German; that of the Ems is shared -with the Dutch; while the far more valuable harbour-mouths of the Rhine -and the Scheldt are in the possession of Holland and Belgium. Put into -plain language what this means is, that both Holland and Belgium must -be incorporated in the German Empire; if by treaty, so much the better -for all parties concerned; but if diplomacy should fail to accomplish -the desired absorption, then it must be brought about by war. Nor has -it been overlooked, that in order to complete the rectification, and to -secure the keys of the Baltic, it would be necessary to 'admit' Denmark -also into the privileges of the Germanic Empire. - -Another school looks to the south-east and broods upon the day, not far -distant, when the Germans of Austria-Hungary--a small but dominating -minority of the whole population--will be driven, by reasons of -self-defence, to seek a federal inclusion in the Empire of the -Hohenzollerns. And it is surmised that for somewhat similar reasons -the Magyars of Hungary will at the same time elect to throw in their -lot with Teutons rather than with Slavs. - -When that day arrives, however, it is not merely the German and Magyar -territories of the Habsburg Emperor-King which will need to be -incorporated {99} in the Hohenzollern Empire, but the whole congeries -of nations which at present submits, more or less reluctantly, to the -rule of Vienna and Buda-Pest. There must be no break-up of the empire -of Francis Joseph, no sentimental sacrifice to the mumbo-jumbos of -nationality. The Italians of Trieste and Fiume, the Bohemians, the -Croats, the Serbs, the Roumanians of Transylvania, and the Poles of -Galicia must all be kept together in one state, even more firmly than -they are to-day. The Germans of Austria will not be cordially -welcomed, unless they bring this dowry with them to the altar of -imperial union. - -[Sidenote: THE AUSTRIAN DOWRY] - -But to clear eyes, looking into the future, more even than this appears -to be necessary. Austria will be required to bring with her, not -merely all her present possessions, but also her reversionary -prospects, contingent remainders, and all and sundry her rights of -action throughout the whole Balkan peninsula, which sooner or later -must either accept the hegemony of the German Empire or submit to -annexation at the sword's point. Advantageous as it would be for the -Fatherland to obtain great harbours for her commerce at the head of the -Adriatic, these acquisitions might easily become valueless in practice -if some rival barred the right of entry through the Straits of Otranto. -Salonica again, in her snug and sheltered corner of the Aegean, is -essential as the natural entrepôt for the trade of Asia Minor and the -East; while there can be no hope, until the mouths of the Danube, as -well as the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, are firmly held, of turning -the Black Sea into a Germanic lake. - -The absorption of the Balkan peninsula, involving {100} as it must the -occupation of Constantinople and European Turkey, would carry with it, -as a natural consequence, the custody of the Sultan and the control of -his Asiatic dominions. These vast territories which extend from Smyrna -to the Caucasus, from Syria to the Persian Gulf, from the Black Sea to -the Gulf of Aden, contain some of the richest and most fertile tracts -upon the surface of the globe. Massacre, misrule, and oppression have -indeed converted the greater part of these regions into a state hardly -to be distinguished from the barest deserts of Arabia. But a culture -which has lapsed through long neglect may be reclaimed by new -enterprise. All that is required to this end is such shelter and -encouragement as a stable government would afford. - -What more suitable instrument for this beneficent recovery than the -peculiar genius of the Teuton race? Would not the whole world gain by -the substitution of settled order for a murderous anarchy, of tilth and -industry for a barren desolation? The waters of Tigris and Euphrates -are still sweet. It needs but the energy and art of man to lead them -in channelled courses, quenching the longings of a thirsty land, and -filling the Mesopotamian waste with the music of a myriad streams. The -doom of Babylon is no curse eternal. It awaits but the sword of -Siegfried to end the slumbers of two thousand years. Where great -cities and an ancient civilisation lie buried under drifted sand, great -cities may be raised once more, the habitations of a hardier race, the -seminaries of a nobler civilisation. - -This vision, more fanciful and poetically inspired than the rest, has -already advanced some considerable {101} way beyond the frontiers of -dreamland. When the Turko-Russian War came to an end[3] the influence -of Germany at Constantinople was as nearly as possible nil; and so long -as Bismarck remained in power, no very serious efforts were made to -increase it. But from the date of Bismarck's dismissal[4] down to the -present day, it has been the steady aim of German policy to control the -destinies of the Turkish Empire. These attempts have been persistent, -and in the main successful. - -[Sidenote: THE WOOING OF TURKEY] - -It mattered not what dubious personage or party might happen to be in -the ascendant at Stamboul, the friendship of Germany was always -forthcoming. It was extended with an equal cordiality to Abdul Hamid; -to the Young Turks when they overthrew Abdul Hamid; to the -Reactionaries when they overthrew the Young Turks; to the Young Turks -again when they compounded matters with the Reactionaries. The -largesse of Berlin bankers refreshed the empty treasuries of each -despot and camarilla in turn, so soon as proofs could be produced of -positive, or even of presumptive predominance. At the same time the -makers of armaments, at Essen and elsewhere, looked to it, that a -sufficient portion of these generous loans was paid in kind, and that -the national gain was not confined to high policy and high finance. -The reform of the Turkish army was taken in hand zealously by Prussian -soldiers. Imperial courtesies cemented the bricks which usury, -commerce, and diplomacy had laid so well. At a time when the late -Sultan was ill-regarded by the whole of Europe, on account of his -supposed complicity in Armenian massacres, the {102} magnanimity of the -Kaiser took pity on the pariah, and a visit of honour to the Bosphorus -formed an incident in the Hohenzollern pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre. - -The harvest of these endeavours was reaped at a later date in the form -of vast concessions for lines of railway running through Asia Minor to -the Persian Gulf. It is needless to enter here into a discussion of -the famous and still unsettled controversy regarding the Baghdad route, -except to say that this project for the benefit, not merely of Turkey, -but of the whole human race, was to be realised under German direction -and according to German plans and specifications; it was to be -administered under German control; but it was to be paid for in the -main out of the savings of England and France. - -The scheme was no less bold than ingenious. Obligations were imposed -upon Turkey which it was clearly impossible for Turkey to discharge. -In the event of her failure it was likely to go hard with the original -shareholders, and somewhat hard with the Sublime Porte itself; but on -the other hand it was not likely to go hard with Germany, or to involve -her in anything more irksome than a labour of love--a protectorate over -Asia Minor and Arabia.[5] - -These are the main dreams which German writers, with a genuine -enthusiasm and an engaging frankness, have set out in the pages of -books and periodicals--the North Sea dream, the Austrian dream, the -Balkan dream, and the Levantine dream. But these dreams by no means -exhaust the Teuton fancy. - -Wars are contemplated calmly as inevitable {103} incidents in the -acquisition of world-power--war with France, war with England, war -either of army corps or diplomacy with Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. -And as victory is also contemplated, just as confidently, various -bye-products of considerable value are likely to be secured during the -process, and as a result. - -[Sidenote: ACQUISITION OF AFRICA] - -The greater part of north-western Africa, which lies along the -seaboards of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, is under the French -flag. The greater part of eastern Africa from Alexandria to Capetown -is in the hands of the British. The central region of Africa is -Belgian. In the north there is Tripoli which is now Italian; and in -various quarters patches and scattered islands which are Portuguese. -The former might be tolerated as a harmless enclave; the latter might -readily be acquired by compulsory purchase. What would then remain of -the Dark Continent is already German. So that, as the results of the -wars and victories which are considered by German thinkers to be -inevitable, the whole of Africa would shortly pass into German hands. - -With the destinies of Africa in the keeping of a virile race, -accustomed to face great problems in no piecemeal fashion, but as a -whole, vast transformations must ensue. Before their indomitable will -and scientific thoroughness, the dusky savage will lay aside his -ferocity, and toil joyously at the arts of peace. Under an -indefatigable and intelligent administration, desert, jungle, forest, -and swamp will yield their appropriate harvests. Timber, oil, cotton, -rubber, tea, coffee, and every variety of raw material will gradually -become available in limitless supplies. Jewels and precious metals -will {104} be dug out of the bowels of the earth. Flocks and herds -will roam in safety over the rich uplands--no robber bands to drive -them off; no wild beasts to tear them limb from limb; no murrain or -envenomed fly to strike them down by tens of thousands. For as the -armies of the Kaiser are invincible against all human foes, so also are -his men of science invincible, in their ceaseless war against disease -of man and beast. In the end they also will conquer in their own -sphere, no less certainly than the soldier in his; for their courage is -as high and their devotion faces death, or worse than death, with -equanimity. - -The Dark Continent, which in all its history has never known either -peace or order, will then at last know both. Even the stiff-necked -Africander, jealous of his antique shibboleths of freedom, will not -refuse incorporation in an Empire to which the land of his forefathers -will already have become bound in federal ties. And the dowry which -Holland is expected to bring with her, will be not only the good will -of the South African Dutch, but the rich islands of the East, where -merchant-adventurers planted her flag, in days when the fleets of -Rotterdam disputed, not unsuccessfully, with London herself the primacy -of the seas. - -[Sidenote: THE EASTERN DREAM] - -Finally, there is the dream of the farthest East. This is of such -simple grandeur that it may be stated in a few sentences. When the war -between China and Japan came to an end in 1895 Germany, acting in -concert with France and Russia, forced the victorious troops of the -Mikado to forgo all the fruits of their conquest. When three years -later Germany herself seized upon the reversion of Kiao-Chau, she {105} -saw a vision of an empire, greater than that which had been secured to -her envied rival by the daring of Clive and the forethought of Warren -Hastings. If England could hold and rule India, a mightier than -England could surely hold and rule China, containing though it does a -full quarter of the human race. - - - -[1] "L'Allemand est né bête; la civilisation l'a, rendu -méchant."--HEINE. - -[2] Mr. Chamberlain at Leicester on November 30, 1899. - -[3] March 1878. Treaty of Berlin, July 1878. - -[4] 1890. - -[5] Cf. _The Anglo-German Problem_, by C. Sarolea, p. 247, and -following. - - - - -{106} - -CHAPTER III - -THE GERMAN PROJECT OF EMPIRE - -The German project of empire is a gorgeous fabric. The weft of it is -thread of gold, but the warp of it has been dipped in the centaur's -blood. It is the pride of its possessor; but it is likely to be his -undoing. It ravishes his fancy with the symmetry and vastness of the -pattern; yet these very two qualities, which so much excite his -admiration, have shown themselves in the past singularly unpropitious -to high imperial adventures. - -No man of action worthy of the name will ever take history for his -guide. He would rightly refuse to do so, even were it possible, which -it is not, to write history truthfully. But with all their -deficiencies, history books have certain sibylline qualities which make -them worth consulting upon occasions; and as to symmetry and vastness -this oracle, if consulted, would speak clearly enough. Of all false -enticements which have lured great princes to their ruin, these two -have the biggest tale of victims to their score. - -[Sidenote: SYMMETRY AND VASTNESS] - -The British Empire, like the Roman, built itself slowly. It was the -way of both nations to deal with needs as needs occurred, and not -before. Neither of them charted out their projects in advance, {107} -thereafter working to them, like Lenôtre, when he laid out the gardens -of Versailles. On the contrary, a strip was added here, a kingdom -there, as time went on, but not in accordance with any plan or system. -In certain cases, no doubt, the reason for annexation was a simple -desire for possession. But much more often the motive was apprehension -of one kind or another. Empire-builders have usually achieved empire -as an accident attending their search after security--security against -the ambition of a neighbour, against lawless hordes which threaten the -frontier, against the fires of revolution and disorder spreading from -adjacent territories. Britain, like Rome before her, built up her -empire piecemeal; for the most part reluctantly; always reckoning up -and dreading the cost, labour, and burden of it; hating the -responsibility of expansion, and shouldering it only when there seemed -to be no other course open to her in honour or safety. Symmetry did -not appeal to either of these nations any more than vastness. Their -realms spread out and extended, as chance and circumstances willed they -should, like pools of water in the fields when floods are out. - -We cannot but distrust the soundness of recent German policy, with its -grandiose visions of universal empire, if we consider it in the light -of other things which happened when the world was somewhat younger, -though possibly no less wise. The great imaginative conquerors, though -the fame of their deeds still rings down the ages, do not make so brave -a show, when we begin to examine into the permanency of their -achievements. The imperial projects of Alexander, of the Habsburgs, -the Grand Monarque, and Napoleon--each of whom drew out {108} a vast -pattern and worked to it--are not among those things which can be said -with any justice to have endured. None of them were ever fully -achieved; while some were broken in pieces, even during the lifetimes -of their architects. - -To treat the whole world as if it were a huge garden, for which one -small race of men, who have worked busily in a single corner of it, can -aspire to make and carry out an all-comprehending plan, is in reality a -proof of littleness and not largeness of mind. Such vaulting ambitions -are the symptoms of a dangerous disease, to be noted and distrusted. -And none ever noted these tendencies more carefully or distrusted them -more heartily than the two greatest statesmen whom Prussia has -produced. Frederick the Great rode his own Pegasus-vision on curb and -martingale. The Great Bismarck reined back the Pegasus-vision of his -fellow-countrymen on to its haunches with an even sterner hand. "One -cannot," so he wrote in later years--"one cannot see the cards of -Providence so closely as to anticipate historical development according -to one's own calculation." - -[Sidenote: MASTERY OF THE WORLD] - -Those very qualities of vastness and symmetry which appear to have such -fatal attraction for the pedantocracy repel the practical statesman; -and woe to the nation which follows after the former class rather than -the latter, when the ways of the two part company! To the foreign -observer it seems as if Germany, for a good many years past, has been -making this mistake. Perhaps it is her destiny so to do. Possibly the -reigns of Frederick and Bismarck were only interludes. For Germany -followed the pedantocracy during a century or more, {109} while it -preached political inaction and contentment with a shorn and parcelled -Fatherland. She was following it still, when Bismarck turned -constitutionalism out of doors and went his own stern way to union. -And now once again she seems to be marching in a fatal procession after -the same Pied Pipers, who this time are engaged, with a surpassing -eloquence and fervour, in preaching discontent with the narrow limits -of a united empire, and in exhorting their fellow-countrymen to proceed -to the Mastery of the World. - -Among an imaginative race like the Germans, those who wield the weapons -of rhetoric and fancy are only too likely to get the better of those -surer guides, who know from hard experience that the world is a diverse -and incalculable place, where no man, and no acre of land, are -precisely the same as their next-door neighbours, where history never -repeats itself, and refuses always--out of malice or disdain--to travel -along the way which ingenious Titans have charted for it. But it is -not every generation which succeeds in producing a Frederick the Great -or a Bismarck, to tame the dreamers and use them as beasts of draught -and burden. - -The complete mosaic of the German vision is an empire incomparably -greater in extent, in riches, and in population, than any which has yet -existed since the world first began to keep its records. Visionaries -are always in a hurry. This stupendous rearrangement of the Earth's -surface is confidently anticipated to occur within the first half of -the present century. It is to be accomplished by a race distinguished -for its courage, industry, and devotion,--let us admit so much without -grudging. {110} But in numbers--even if we count the Teutons of the -Habsburg Empire along with those of the Hohenzollern--it amounts upon -the highest computation to less than eighty millions. This is the -grain of mustard-seed which is confidently believed to have in it 'the -property to get up and spread,' until within little more than a -generation, it will dominate and control more than seven hundred -millions of human souls. - -Nor to German eyes, which dwell lovingly, and apparently without -misgiving, upon this appalling prospect of symmetry and vastness, are -these the sum total of its attractions. The achievement of their -vision would bring peace to mankind. For there would then be but two -empires remaining, which need give the overlords of the world the -smallest concern. Of these Russia, in their opinion, needs a century -at least in which to emerge out of primitive barbarism and become a -serious danger; while in less than a century, the United States must -inevitably crumble to nonentity, through the worship of false gods and -the corruption of a decadent democracy. Neither of these two empires -could ever hope to challenge the German Mastery of the World. - -In South America as in North, there is already a German garrison, -possessing great wealth and influence. And in the South, at any rate, -it may well become, very speedily, an imperative obligation on the -Fatherland to secure, for its exiled children, more settled conditions -under which to extend the advantages of German commerce and Kultur. -President Monroe has already been dead a hundred years or more. -According to the calculations of the pedantocracy, his famous doctrine -will need some stronger {111} backing than the moral disapprobation of -a hundred millions of materially-minded and unwarlike people, in order -to withstand the pressure of German diplomacy, if it should summon -war-ships and transports to its aid. - -[Sidenote: UNIVERSAL PEACE] - -So in the end we arrive at an exceedingly strange conclusion. For that -very thing, which the philanthropists have all these years been vainly -endeavouring to bring about by means of congresses of good men, and -resolutions which breathe a unanimity of noble aspirations, may be -achieved in a single lifetime by a series of bold strokes with the -German sword. Then at last Universal Peace will have been secured. - -At this point the Prussian professor and the pacifist apostle, who -turned their backs upon one another so angrily at the beginning, and -started off, as it seemed, in opposite directions, are confronting one -another unexpectedly at the other side of the circle of human -endeavour. They ought surely to shake hands; for each, if he be -honest, will have to own himself the convert of the other. "You admit -then after all," cries the triumphant Pacifist, "that Peace is the real -end of human endeavour!" "Whether or no," grunts the other in reply, -"this at any rate was the only road to it." - -One wonders--will the Pacifist be content? He has reached his goal -sure enough; though by means which he has been accustomed to denounce -as the end of all true morality? Will the Professor, on the other -hand, be well pleased when he discovers that by the very triumph of his -doctrines he has made war for ever impossible,--manliness, therefore, -and all true virtue likewise impossible,--thereby damning {112} the -souls of posterity to the end of time? "To put questions in this -quarter with a hammer, and to hear perchance that well-known hollow -sound which tells of blown-out frogs"[1]--this is a joy, no doubt; and -it is all we are ever likely to arrive at by the cross-examination of -dreamers. - - - -[1] Nietzsche, _The Twilight of Idols_. - - - - -{113} - -CHAPTER IV - -THE NEW MORALISTS - -The dream of German expansion, as year by year it took firmer hold upon -the popular imagination, produced, as might have been expected, a -desire that it might be realised. From the stage of vague and ardent -longing it was but a short way to the next, where a determined will -began to put forth efforts towards achievement. But as mankind in the -mass, whether in Germany or England, is still to some extent hampered -by human nature, by a number of habits, traditions, and instincts, and -by various notions of good and evil, justice and injustice--which the -subtlest philosophers and most eloquent rhetoricians have not yet -succeeded in eradicating--a need was felt for what the text-books in -their solemn nomenclature call _an ethical basis_. In plain words, the -German people wanted to have right on their side--if possible, -old-fashioned, Sunday-school, copy-book Right. Failing that, even such -a plea as the wolf maintained against the lamb would be a great deal -better than nothing. - -This tendency in a nation to look about for justification and a -righteous plea, when it is preparing to possess itself of property -belonging to its neighbours, is for the most part a subconscious -process, not only {114} among the common people, but also among the -leaders themselves. It resembles the instinct among hens which -produces in them an appetite for lime when the season has come to begin -laying. It was through some natural impulse of this sort, and not -through mere cynicism, hypocrisy, or cool calculation, that German -publicists discovered all the grievances which have been already -touched upon. For even if the possession of these grievances did not -altogether give the would-be aggressors right up to the point of -righteousness, it certainly put their neighbours in the wrong, and -branded the French dove and the British lamb with turpitude in the eyes -of the German people. The grievances against France were, that -although she had been vanquished in 1870, although her population had -actually decreased since that date, and although therefore she had -neither the right to nor any need for expansion, she had nevertheless -expanded in Africa as well as in the East, to a far greater extent than -Germany herself, the victorious power, whose own population had -meanwhile been increasing by leaps and bounds. - -[Sidenote: GRIEVANCES AGAINST ENGLAND] - -The grievances against Britain were that she was supposed to have made -war upon German trade, to have prevented her young rival from acquiring -colonies, and to have intrigued to surround the Teuton peoples with a -ring of foes. Britain had helped France to occupy and hold her new -territories. Britain had been mainly responsible for the diplomatic -defeat of Germany at Algeciras in 1905 and again over Agadir in 1911. -Moreover when Germany, during the South African war, had attempted, in -the interests of international morality, to combine the nations against -us, we had foiled her high-minded {115} and unselfish endeavours. When -at an earlier date she had sought, by the seizure of Kiao-Chau and by a -vigorous concentration, to oust British influence and trade from their -position of predominance in China, we had countered her efforts by the -occupation of Wei-hai-wei and the Japanese alliance. - -As regards command of the sea we had likewise frustrated German -ambitions. After a certain amount of vacillation, and a somewhat -piteous plea for a general diminution of armaments--backed up by an -arrest of our own, which Germany interpreted, perhaps not unnaturally, -as a throwing up of the sponge and beginning of the end of our naval -supremacy--we had actually had the treachery (for it was nothing less) -to upset all her calculations, and turn all her efforts and -acceleration to foolishness, by resuming the race for sea-power with -redoubled energy. And although to our own eyes, and even possibly to -the eyes of impartial observers, none of these doings of ours--in so -far as they were truly alleged--could be rightly held to constitute any -real grievance, that consideration was irrelevant. For when a man is -in search of a grievance he will find it, if he be earnest enough, in -the mere fact that his intended adversary stammers, or has a wart upon -his nose. - -German statesmen were happy in having established these grievances to -their own satisfaction; but something more was necessary in order that -their morality might rest upon a sure foundation. German policy must -be absolutely right, and not merely relatively right by contrast with -those neighbours whose power she sought to overthrow, and whose -territories she wished to annex. And although this {116} effort to -establish German policy on the principle of Right involved a recasting -of Christian morality, it was not shirked on that account. On the -contrary it was undertaken in a most energetic spirit. - -The first great influence in this readjustment of popular conceptions -of right and wrong was the historian Heinrich von Treitschke.[1] He -boldly differentiated the moral obligations of the private individual -from those of a government charged with the destinies of a nation.[2] -The duties of a man to his family, neighbours, and society Treitschke -left undisturbed. In this sphere of human life the teaching of the -Sermon on the Mount not only remained unchallenged, but was upheld and -reinforced. Statecraft, however, fell under a different category. - -[Sidenote: THE STATE IS POWER] - -The true principle of private conduct was Love for one's Neighbour, but -the true principle of the state was Power. The duty of a virtuous -ruler was to seek power, more power, and always more power, on behalf -of the nation he was called upon to govern. The internal power of the -state over the action of its own subjects was absolute, and it was a -duty owed by each generation of rulers to posterity, to see to it that -in their own time, the external power of the {117} state was increased -at the expense of its neighbours.[3] To secure this end wars were -inevitable; and despite the sufferings which wars entailed, they were -far from regrettable, for the reason that they preserved the vigour, -unity, and devotion of the race, while stimulating the virtues of -courage and self-sacrifice among private citizens.[4] - -Nations, he maintained, cannot safely stand still. They must either -increase their power or lose it, expand their territories or be -prepared to see them shorn away. No growth of spiritual force or -material well-being within the state will preserve it, if it fails to -extend its authority and power among its neighbours. Feelings of -friendliness, chivalry, and pity are absurd as between nations. To -speak even of justice in such a connection is absurd. Need and Might -together constitute Right. Nor ought the world to regret the eating-up -of weak nations by the strong, of small nations by the great, -because--a somewhat bold conclusion--great and powerful nations alone -are capable of producing what the world requires in thought, art, -action, and virtue. For how can these things flourish nobly in a -timid, cowering state, which finds itself driven by force of -circumstances to make-believes and fictions, to {118} the meanest -supplications and to devices of low cunning, in order to preserve an -independence which, as it can only exist on sufferance, is nothing -better than a sham?[5] - -As the Hohenzollerns, the noblest and most capable of modern dynasties, -had never been content merely to reign, but had always maintained their -'divine right' of ruling and dominating the Prussian Kingdom--as -Prussia itself, the most manly and energetic of modern nations, had not -been content merely to serve as the figurehead of a loose -confederation, but had insisted upon becoming supreme master and -imposing its own system, policy, and ideals upon all Germany--so was it -the duty and destiny of united Germany, under these happy auspices, -having been taught and seasoned by long centuries of stern and painful -apprenticeship, to issue forth in the meridian vigour of her age and -seize upon the Mastery of the World. - -[Sidenote: FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE] - -If Treitschke, the eloquent historian, succeeded to his own -satisfaction and that of a very large proportion of German statesmen, -soldiers, intellectuals, and publicists in taking high policy -altogether out of the jurisdiction of Christian morals, Friedrich -Wilhelm Nietzsche,[6] the even more eloquent and infinitely more subtle -poet-philosopher, made a cleaner and {119} bolder cut, and got rid of -Christian morality even in the sphere of private conduct. - -Nietzsche was but little interested or concerned in the practical -problems of statecraft which engrossed the patriotic mind of -Treitschke. The destinies of the German nation were for him a small -matter in comparison with those of the human race. But nevertheless -his vigorously expressed contempt for the English, their ways of life -and thought, the meanness of their practical aims, and the degradation -of their philosophic ideals,[7] was comforting to his -fellow-countrymen, who were relieved to find that the nation whom they -desired to despoil was so despicable and corrupt. This train of -argument was deceptive and somewhat dangerous; for it led his German -readers to overlook the fact, that the broad front of his attack aimed -at enveloping and crushing the cherished traditions of the Teuton race -no less than those of the Anglo-Saxon.[8] - -{120} - -Nietzsche's derision and dislike of the Prussian spirit, of militarism, -and of what he conceived to be the spurious principle of nationality, -his vague, disinterested cosmopolitanism or Europeanism, are as the -poles apart from the aims and ideas of Treitschke and the German -patriots.[9] Nietzsche is not concerned to evolve a sovereign and -omnipotent state, but a high overmastering type of man, who shall -inherit the earth and dominate--not for their good, but for his -own--the millions who inhabit it. His ideal is a glorious aristocracy -of intellect, beauty, courage, self-control, felicity, and power, -scornfully smiling, exuberantly vital. The evolution, ever higher and -higher, of this fine oligarchy of super-men is the one absolute end of -human endeavour. The super-men will use and direct the force and -instincts of 'the herd'--even the capacities of kings, soldiers, -law-givers, {121} and administrators--to make the world a fit place for -their own development. The millions of slaves are to be considered -merely as a means to this end. Concern about them for their own sakes, -above all pity for their sufferings, or regard on the part of the -super-men for their resentment--except to guard against it--is a -mistake. The serenity of the superman must not allow itself to be -disturbed and distracted by any such considerations. It is for him to -take what he needs or desires, to impose order on the world, so that it -may be a fit environment for the evolution of his own caste, and, so -far as he can compass it, to live like the gods.[10] - -[Sidenote: THE BLONDE BRUTE] - -It is clear that although Nietzsche chaunts a pæan in admiration of -"the magnificent blonde brute, avidly rampant for spoil and -victory,"[11] and although he is constantly found, as it were, humming -this refrain, he had no intention of taking the Prussian as his ideal -type--still less of personifying Prussia itself as a super-state -engaged in a contest for supremacy with a herd of inferior nations. He -does not trouble himself in the least about nations, but only about -individual men. Yet, like others who have had the gift of memorable -speech, he might {122} well marvel, were he still alive, at the -purposes to which his words have been turned by orators and -journalists, desirous to grind an edge on their own blunt axes. - -General von Bernhardi[12] may be taken as a type of the sincere but -unoriginal writer who turns all texts to the support of his own sermon. -He is an honest, literal fellow. In spite of all his ecstatic flights -of rhetoric he is never at all in the clouds--never any farther from -the earth's surface than hopping distance. Notwithstanding, he quietly -appropriates any Nietzschean aphorisms the sound and shape of which -appear to suit his purpose, and uses them to drive home his very simple -and concrete proposition that it is the duty of Germany to conquer the -world. - -One imagines from his writings that Bernhardi has no quarrel with -Christianity, no wish whatsoever to overturn our accepted notions of -morality. He is merely a soldier with a fixed idea, and he is very -much in earnest. His literary methods remind one somewhat of the -starlings in spring-time, perched on the backs of sheep and cattle, -picking off the loose hairs to line their nests. This is the highly -practical and soldierly use to which he puts philosophers, poets, and -men of letters generally--laying them under contribution to garnish his -discourse. - -[Sidenote: INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY] - -It is probably true that the average soldier who fought on the German -side at Ypres and elsewhere {123} was hardly more conversant with the -writings of Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi than the average -British soldier opposed to him was with those of Herbert Spencer, Mr. -Bernard Shaw, and Mr. Norman Angell. It is very unlikely, however, -that the battle of Ypres would ever have been fought had it not been -for the ideas which sprang from these and similar sources. The -influence of the written and spoken word upon German policy and action -is glaringly manifest.[13] It inspired and supported the high -bureaucrats at Berlin, and had equally to do, if indirectly, with the -marching of the humblest raw recruits shoulder to shoulder to be shot -down on the Menin Road. For by a process of percolation through the -press and popular literature, the doctrines of these teachers--diluted -somewhat, it is true, and a good deal disguised and perverted--had -reached a very wide audience. Though the names of these authors were -for the most part unknown, though their opinions had never been either -understood or accepted by the common people, the effects of their -teaching had made themselves felt in every home in Germany. - -The German private soldier would not have been shot down unless these -eloquent sermons had been preached. None the less, he had never -grasped or understood, far less had he adhered to and professed, the -cardinal doctrines which they contained. He still believed in the -old-fashioned morality, and thought that states as well as individual -men were bound to act justly. It was this faith which gave {124} him -his strength, and made him die gladly. For he believed that Germany -had acted justly, the Allies unjustly, that it was his task, along with -other good men and true, to win victory for his Emperor and safety for -his Fatherland, and to crush the treacherous and malignant aggressors. - -In spite of all this preliminary discoursing which had been going on -for many years past, like artillery preparation before an infantry -attack--about world-power, will-to-power, and all the rest of -it--nothing is more remarkable than the contrast presented, immediately -after war broke out, between the blatancy of those writers who had -caused the war and the bleating of those (in many cases the same) who -sought to justify Germany's part in it to their countrymen and the -world. - -On the enlightened principles of Treitschke and Bernhardi, Britain -would have acted not only wisely, but in the strictest accordance with -her duty to her own state, had she indeed contrived and compassed this -war, believing circumstances to be favourable for herself and -unfavourable for Germany. Not another shred of right or reason was -required.[14] But when war actually burst out, all these new-fangled -doctrines went by the board. Though the ink was hardly dry upon -Bernhardi's latest exhortation--of which several hundred thousand -copies had been sold, and in which he urged his fellow-countrymen to -watch their time and make war when it suited them, without remorse and -no matter on what {125} plea--in spite of this fact, there was a -singular lack of Stoicism among 'the brethren' when war was declared -against Russia and France. When Britain joined in, and when things -began to go less well than had been expected, Stoicism entirely -disappeared. Indeed there is something highly ludicrous, at the same -time painful--like all spectacles of human abasement--in the chorus of -whines and shrill execration, which at once went up to heaven from that -very pedantocracy whose leaders, so short a time before, had been -preaching that, as between the nations of the earth, Might is Right, -and Craft is the trusty servant of Might.[15] - -[Sidenote: APOSTASY WHEN WAR CAME] - -These scolding fakirs were of an infinite credulity, inasmuch as they -believed that Sir Edward Grey was the reincarnation of Machiavelli. -Yet on their own principles, what was there in this discovery to be in -the least shocked at? British statesmen (it is hardly necessary to -repeat it) had not walked in the footsteps of the Florentine; had not -provoked the war; had not wished for it; had tried with all their might -to prevent it; but if they had done the very reverse, would they not -merely have been {126} taking a leaf out of the sacred book of the -pedantocracy--out of Bernhardi's book, out of Nietzsche's book, out of -Treitschke's book? Why, then, all these unpleasant howlings and -ravings? - -The answers are not hard to find. The careful plans and theories of -the German bureaucrats had been turned topsy-turvy because England had -joined in the war when, according to the calculations of the augurs, -she should have remained neutral. That mistake must have been -sufficiently annoying in itself to disturb the equanimity even of -professional philosophers. And further, in spite of all the ingenious, -eloquent, and sophistical exhortations of the prophets, the old -morality still kept its hold upon the hearts of men. When trouble -arose they turned to it instinctively--priesthood as well as -people--and the later gospel fell flat like a house of cards. -Immediately war came there was an appeal to old-fashioned justice, and -the altars of the little, new-fangled, will-to-power gods were deserted -by their worshippers. - -When statesmen are laying out policies, and moralists are setting up -systems, it is worth their while to make certain that they are not, in -fact, engaged upon an attempt to make water flow uphill; above all, -that their ingenious new aqueducts will actually hold water, which in -this instance they certainly did not. - - - -[1] Heinrich von Treitschke, son of a Saxon general of -Bohemian-Slavonic origin; born at Dresden 1834. Deafness following -upon a fever in childhood prevented him from adopting the profession of -arms; 1858-1863 lectured on history at Leipzig; 1863-1866 professor at -Freiburg; 1866-1874 professor at Heidelberg; 1874 until his death in -1896 professor of history and politics at Berlin. - -[2] "Thus it follows from this, that we must distinguish between public -and private morality. The order of rank of the various duties must -necessarily be for the State, as it is power, quite other than for -individual men. A whole series of these duties, which are obligatory -on the individual, are not to be thought of in any case for the State. -To maintain itself counts for it always as the highest commandment; -that is absolutely moral for it. And on that account we must declare -that of all political sins that of weakness is the most reprehensible -and the most contemptible; it is in politics the sin against the Holy -Ghost...."--_Selections_, p. 32. - -[3] "That must not hinder us from declaring joyfully that the gifted -Florentine, with all the vast consequence of his thinking, was the -first to set in the centre of all politics the great thought: _The -State is power_. For that is the truth; and he who is not man enough -to look this truth in the face ought to keep his hands off -politics."--_Ibid._ p. 28. - -[4] "... to the historian who lives in the world of will it is -immediately clear that the demand for a perpetual peace is thoroughly -reactionary; he sees that with war all movement, all growth, must be -struck out of history. It has always been the tired, unintelligent, -and enervated periods that have played with the dream of perpetual -peace...."--_Selections_, p. 25. - -"It is precisely political idealism that demands wars, while -materialism condemns them. What a perversion of morality to wish to -eliminate heroism from humanity!"--_Ibid._ p. 24. - -[5] "... if we survey history in the mass, it is clear that all real -masterpieces of poetry and art arose upon the soil of great -nationalities;" and "The poet and artist must be able to react upon a -great nation. When did a masterpiece ever arise among a petty little -nation?"--_Ibid._ p. 19. - -[6] Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, son of a village pastor of Polish -ancestry; born at Röcken in Saxony 1844; served in the German army for -a few months in 1867; injured in mounting his horse; 1869-1879 -professor of classical philology at Bale which entailed naturalisation -as a Swiss subject; served in ambulance in war of 1870-1871; 1879-1889 -in bad health, wrote and travelled; 1889 became insane and remained so -till his death in 1900. - -[7] "What is lacking in England, and has always been lacking, that -half-actor and rhetorician knew well enough, the absurd muddlehead, -Carlyle, who sought to conceal under passionate grimaces what he knew -about himself: namely, what was lacking in Carlyle, real _power_ of -intellect, real _depth_ of intellectual perception, in short, -philosophy."--_Beyond Good and Evil_, p. 210. - -"The Englishman, more gloomy, sensual, headstrong, and brutal than the -German--is for that very reason, as the baser of the two, also the most -pious."--_Ibid._ p. 211. - -"The English coarseness and rustic demureness is still more -satisfactorily disguised by Christian pantomime, and by praying and -psalm-singing (or, more correctly, it is thereby explained and -differently expressed); and for the herd of drunkards and rakes who -formerly learned moral grunting under the influence of Methodism (and -more recently as the 'Salvation Army'), a penitential fit may really be -the relatively highest manifestation of 'humanity' to which they can be -elevated."--_Ibid._ p. 211. - -"The European ignobleness, the plebeianism of modern ideas, is -England's work and invention."--_Ibid._ p. 213. - -[8] "I believe only in French culture, and regard everything else in -Europe which calls itself 'culture' as a misunderstanding. I do not -even take the German kind into consideration.... The few instances of -higher culture with which I have met in Germany were all French in -their origin."--_Ecce Homo_, p. 27. - -"Wherever Germany extends her sway, she _ruins_ culture."--_Ibid._ p. -38. - -"Culture and the state are antagonists: a 'culture-state' is merely a -modern idea. The one lives upon the other, the one flourishes at the -expense of the other. All great periods of culture have been periods -of political decline; that which was great from the standpoint of -culture was always unpolitical--even anti-political.... In the history -of European culture the rise of the (German) Empire signifies, above -all, a displacement of the centre of gravity. Everywhere people are -already aware of this: in things that really matter--and these after -all constitute culture--the Germans are no longer worth considering.... -The fact that there is no longer a single German philosopher worth -mentioning is an increasing wonder."--_The Twilight of the Idols_, p. -54. - -"Every great crime against culture for the last four centuries lies on -their [the German] conscience.... It was the Germans who caused Europe -to lose the fruits, the whole meaning of her last period of -greatness--the period of the Renaissance...."--_Ecce Homo_, p. 124. - -"The future of German culture rests with the sons of Prussian -officers."--_The Genealogy of Morals_, p. 222. - -"If any one wishes to see the 'German soul' demonstrated _ad oculos_, -let him only look at German taste, at German arts and manners: what -boorish indifference to 'taste'!"--_The Antichrist_. - -[9] "What quagmires and mendacity there must be about if it is -possible, in the modern European hotchpotch, to raise questions of -race." - -A Nation--"Men who speak one language and read the same -newspapers."--_The Genealogy of Morals_, p. 226. - -[10] "A boldly daring, splendidly overbearing, high-flying, and -aloft-up-dragging class of higher men, who had first to teach their -century--and it is the century of the _masses_--the conception 'higher -man.'"--_Beyond Good and Evil_, p. 219. - -"This man of the future, this tocsin of noon and of the great verdict, -which renders the will again free, who gives back to the world its goal -and to man his hope, this Antichrist and Antinihilist, this conqueror -of God and of Nothingness--_he must one day come_."--_The Genealogy of -Morals_, p. 117. - -[11] "The blonde beast that lies at the core of all aristocratic -races."--_The Genealogy of Morals_, p. 42. - -"The profound, icy mistrust which the German provokes, as soon as he -arrives at power,--even at the present time,--is always still an -aftermath of that inextinguishable horror with which for whole -centuries Europe has regarded the wrath of the blonde Teuton -beast."--_Ibid._ - -[12] Friedrich von Bernhardi: born 1849 at St. Petersburg, where his -father Theodor von Bernhardi was a Councillor of the Prussian Legation; -entered a Hussar regiment in 1869; military attaché at Berne in 1881; -in 1897 he was chief of the General Staff of the 16th Army Corps; in -1908 he was appointed commander of the 7th Army Corps; retired in the -following year. He was a distinguished cavalry general, and is -probably the most influential German writer on current -politico-military problems. - -[13] Probably not less so upon British policy and inaction. As water -is the result of blending oxygen and hydrogen in certain proportions, -so is the present war the resultant of German militarism and British -anti-militarism in combination. - -[14] "Every State has as sovereign the undoubted right to declare war -when it chooses, consequently every State is in the position of being -able to cancel any treaties which have been concluded."--Treitschke, -_Selections_, p. 15. - -"It is not only the right, but the moral and political duty of the -statesman to bring about a war."--Bernhardi, _Germany and the Next -War_, p. 41 - -[15] Towards the end of March 1915 General von Bernhardi published in -the _New York Sun_ an article the object of which was to explain to the -American people how much his previous writings had been misunderstood -and perverted by the malice of the enemy. Long before this date, -however, there was strong presumptive evidence that the distinguished -military author was unfavourably regarded by the Super-men at Berlin. -He had been useful before the war for preparing the Teutonic youth for -Armageddon; but after hostilities began it was discovered that, so far -as neutral opinion was concerned, it would have been better had he been -wholly interdicted from authorship under the national -motto--_verboten_. As to the tenour of imperial communications to the -popular fire-eating publicist during the winter 1914-1915, might we -venture to paraphrase them into the vulgar vernacular as -follows?--"We've got to thank you and your damned books, more than -anything else, for the present mess with America. Get busy, and -explain them all away if you can."--Any one of the labours of Hercules -was easier. - - - - -{127} - -CHAPTER V - -THE STATECRAFT OF A PRIESTHOOD - -The thoroughness and efficiency of the Germans are admitted even by -hostile critics. In the practical sphere they have excelled in -military preparations, in the encouragement of industry, and in the -organisation of finance. But they have achieved an even more -remarkable success than any of these; for they have so arranged their -educational system that it is drilled hardly less admirably than their -army.[1] From the primary schools to the universities everything is -ordered, so that the plastic mind of youth is forced into a political -mould which suits the purposes of government. Patriotism of the -pattern approved by the authorities is inculcated directly or -indirectly in every class-room. While thought is left ostentatiously -free in regard to private morals and religious foundations, the duties -of the citizen to the state, the duties of the state to posterity, the -relations of Germany to the outside world, are subjects upon which -independent speculation is not tolerated. - -{128} - -Even schoolmasters and professors have their ambitions; but unless they -contribute their quota to the support of imperial ideals, their careers -are unlikely to prosper. It is not enough that a lecturer should not -run counter to state policy; he must actively promote its ends before -he can hope to be transferred to a sphere of greater dignity and -influence. Pedagogy is a branch of the Civil Service just as much as -the Treasury or the Public Health Department. Teachers from the lowest -to the highest grades are the stipendiaries of the bureaucracy. If -they render useful services they are promoted. If they fail to render -useful services they are passed over. If they indulge in dangerous -speculations they are sent adrift. Not merely the army, but the whole -German nation, is disciplined, during the period of its impressionable -youth, with the object of inclining its mind to support state policy -through thick and thin. - -The schools feed the universities; the universities feed the press, the -learned professions, and the higher grades in industry and finance. -Private conversation, as well as what is published in newspapers, -magazines, and books, bears the impress of the official mint to a -degree unthinkable in England or America, Russia or France. Theories -of politics are devised by ingenious sophists, exactly as the machinery -at Essen is contrived by engineers--for the express purpose of -forwarding Prussian policy. History is twisted and distorted in order -to prepare the way for imperial ambitions by justifying them in advance. - -It is a signal triumph for the thoroughness of German methods that all -the thinkers, dreamers, {129} poets, and prophets, with but a few -exceptions, should have been commandeered and set to work thinking, -dreaming, poetising, and prophesying to the glory of the Kaiser, and -his army, and his navy, and his counsellors, and his world policy, and -the conquests and expansion which are entailed therein. - -[Sidenote: MOBILISATION OF INTELLECTUALS] - -It is somewhat startling, however, to find the intellectuals thus -mobilised, and all but unanimous, on the official side; for hitherto in -history they have rarely agreed among themselves, and the greater part -have usually favoured the Opposition rather than the Government. Nor -does this close alliance between learning and the bureaucracy seem -altogether satisfactory. For thought loses its fine edge when it is -set to cut millstones of state. It loses its fine temper in the red -heat of political controversy. By turning utilitarian it ceases to be -universal; and what is perhaps even worse, it ceases to be free. It -tends more and more to become the mere inventor of things which will -sell at a profit; less and less the discoverer of high principles which -the gods have hidden out of sight. It would hardly be possible to -imagine a more complete reversal of attitude than that which has -occurred in Germany between the beginning of the nineteenth century and -the present time; and though this change may serve admirably the -immediate purposes of the state, it does not augur well for the future -of German thought. - -The similarities and contrasts of history are interesting to -contemplate. In the ferment of thought and action which occurred in -France during the generation preceding the battle of Valmy, and that -other which has been going on in Germany in the {130} generation -preceding the battle of the Marne, there are various likenesses and -unlikenesses. In France before the Revolution, as in Germany to-day, a -bureaucracy, responsible solely to the monarch, directed policy and -controlled administration. But in France this bureaucracy was -incompetent, unpractical, and corrupt. Its machinery was clogged with -dead matter of every kind, with prejudices, traditions, and statutes, -many of which had outlived their original purposes. The _Struldbrugs_, -discovered by Gulliver during his voyages, were a race of men whose -mortal souls were incased in immortal bodies. The French monarchy was -of this nature, and the soul of it was long since dead. Inefficiency -was everywhere apparent; and, as a natural consequence, the whole -system had become a butt, at which each brilliant writer in turn -levelled his darts of derision and contempt. - -In Germany, although the political mechanism is the same, the -conditions are diametrically the opposite. The bureaucracy and the -monarchy which it supports, have proved themselves highly efficient and -adaptive. The arrangement has worked with a marvellous success. It -has cherished the material, if not the spiritual, well-being of the -people. The wealth-producing and belly-filling activities of the race -have been stimulated to an extent never yet attained by any form of -government, either popular or despotic. Administration has been -honest, thrifty, and singularly free from the usual dull negatives of -officialdom and the pedantries of red tape. In all directions -industrial prosperity has increased, under the fostering care of the -state, by leaps and bounds. Anything more remote from the bankrupt -empire of {131} Louis XVI. it would be impossible to conceive. And as -a natural consequence, brilliant German writers have for the most -part[2] spent their forces of rhetoric and fancy in idealising the -grandeur and nobility of an order of things, under which resources, -comfort, and luxury have expanded with such amazing strides. - -[Sidenote: IDEAS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION] - -In the case of France the aim of the intellectuals was to pull down -existing institutions, in that of Germany it has been to bolster them -up, to extend and develop them to their logical conclusions. But the -second were no less agents of destruction than the first. Each alike, -as a condition of success, required that a new order of moral and -political ideas should be set up; each attained a certain measure of -success; and the results which followed were those which usually -follow, when new wine is poured into old bottles. - -The ideas of the French Revolution cast themselves into the mould of -republicanism. A picture wholly imaginary and fictitious was drawn of -the institutions of Greece and Rome in ancient days. _Liberty_, -_Equality_, and _Fraternity_ were believed to have been the foundations -of these famous states. Patriots on the banks of the Seine conceived -themselves to be re-incarnations of Aristides and the Gracchi, of -Pericles, of one Brutus or the other--it mattered little which. -Political idealism passed rapidly into a kind of religious fervour. - -The German masquerade is very different from this, but it is no less a -masquerade. What covers the new faith, indeed, is not plumage borrowed -from the Greeks and Romans, but habiliments which are supposed to have -clad the heroic forms of ancestral Teutons. The student on his way to -doctor's degree--the {132} intelligent clerk scanning the high-road to -fortune from the eminence of office-stool--dream in their pensive -leisure to emulate the heroes of Asgard, to merit and enjoy the glories -of Valhalla. But the noble shapes and gorgeous colourings in which the -modern young German of honest, sober, and industrious character has -chosen to see his destiny prefigured, are no less imaginary and -fictitious than those others, with which eloquent notaries'-clerks, and -emancipated, unfrocked priests, decked themselves out for the -admiration of the Paris mob. In Germany as in France political -idealism passed into a kind of religious fervour, which inspired men to -a mimicry of old-Wardour-Street shams, and led them to neglect the -development of their own true natures. - - -During quiet times that stream of events, which we are wont to call -human progress, is occupied incessantly in throwing up dams, of one -sort or another, throughout the world. Tree-trunks and logs, which -have been swept down by former floods of conquest and invasion, jam at -some convenient rocky angle, as the river falls to its normal level. -Against these obstacles the drift and silt of habit, custom, law, -convention, prejudice, and tradition slowly collect, settle, and -consolidate. An embankment is gradually formed, and the waters are -held up behind it ever higher and higher. The tribal pool becomes a -pond or nation; and this again, if conditions remain favourable--for so -long, that is to say, as there are no more raging and destructive -floods,--extends into a lake or inland sea of empire.... "See," cry -the optimists, "see what a fine, smooth, silvery sheet of civilisation, -culture, wealth, happiness, comfort, and {133} what not besides, where -formerly there was but an insignificant torrent brawling in the gorge!" -... But the pessimists, as is their nature, shake their heads, talk -anxiously of the weight of waters which are banking up behind, and of -the unreliable character of the materials out of which the dam has -grown. "Some day," they warn us, "the embankment will burst under the -heavy pressure; or, more likely still, some ignorant, heedless, or -malicious person will begin to fiddle and tamper with the casual -structure; and then what may we expect?" - -[Sidenote: RECENT ANXIETIES] - -There has been considerable nervousness of late among rulers of nations -as to the soundness of their existing barrages. For the most part, -however, they have concerned themselves with internal dangers--with -watching propagandists of the socialist persuasion--with keeping these -under a kind of benevolent police supervision, and in removing -ostentatiously from time to time the more glaring of their alleged -grievances. This procedure has been quite as noticeable in the case of -autocracies, as in countries which enjoy popular institutions. - -Treitschke and Bernhardi--even Nietzsche himself--valued themselves far -more highly as builders-up than as pullers-down. It is always so with -your inspired inaugurators of change. It was so with Rousseau and -those other writers, whose thoughts, fermenting for a generation in the -minds of Frenchmen, brought about the Revolution. The intellectuals of -the eighteenth century, like those of the nineteenth, aimed at getting -rid of a great accumulation of insanitary rubbish. But this was only a -troublesome preliminary, to be hurried through with as quickly as -possible, in order that the much greater {134} work of construction -might proceed upon the cleared site. - -Treitschke made a hole in the German dam when he cut an ancient -commonplace in two, and tore out the one half of it. Nietzsche turned -the hole into a much vaster cavity by pulling out the other half. -Bernhardi and the pedantocracy worked lustily at the business, with the -result that a great part of the sticks, stones, and mud of tradition -are now dancing, rumbling, and boiling famously in the flood. Whether -they have injured our dam as well as their own, we are hardly as yet in -a position to judge. - -The profounder spirit of Nietzsche realised clearly enough the -absurdity of supposing that the conflicting beliefs and aspirations of -mankind could all be settled and squared in a few bustling -decades--that the contradictions, paradoxes, and antinomies of national -existence could be written off with a few bold strokes of the sword, -and the world started off on the road to perfection, like a brisk -debtor who has purged his insolvency in the Bankruptcy Court. But the -enthusiasm of Treitschke and Bernhardi made them blind to these -considerations. Had not the formula been discovered, which would -overcome every obstacle--that stroke of genius, the famous bisection of -the commonplace? For private conduct, the Sermon on the Mount; for -high statecraft, Machiavelli's _Prince_! Was ever anything simpler, -except perhaps the way of Columbus with the egg? - - -When we push our examination further, into the means which Germany has -been urged by her great thinkers to employ in preparing for this -premeditated war, for provoking it when the season should be ripe, -{135} and for securing victory and spoils, we are struck more than ever -by the gulf which separates the ideas of the German pedantocracy from -those of the rest of the world. Nor can we fail to be impressed by the -matter-of-fact and businesslike way in which the military and civil -powers have set to work to translate those notions into practice. - -[Sidenote: A POLITICAL PRIESTHOOD] - -No kind of priesthood has ever yet exercised a great and direct -influence upon national policy without producing calamity. And by an -ill fate, it has always been the nature of these spiritual guides to -clutch at political power whenever it has come within their reach. - -Of all classes in the community who are intellectually capable of -having ideas upon public affairs, a priesthood--or what is the same -thing, a pedantocracy--is undoubtedly the most mischievous, if it -succeeds in obtaining power. It matters not a whit whether they -thunder forth their edicts and incitements from church pulpits or -university chairs, whether they carry their sophistical projects up the -back stairs of Catholic King or Lutheran Kaiser, whether, having shaved -their heads and assumed vows of celibacy, they dwell in ancient -cloisters, or, having taken unto themselves wives and begotten -children, they keep house in commonplace villa residences. None of -these differences is essential, or much worth considering. The one -class is as much a priesthood as the other, and the evils which proceed -from the predominance of the one, and the other, are hardly -distinguishable. - -They stand ostentatiously aloof from the sordid competitions of worldly -business. They have forsworn, or at any rate forgone, the ordinary -prizes of {136} wealth and position. And for these very reasons they -are ill equipped for guiding practical affairs. Their abstinences are -fatal impediments, and render them apt to leave human nature out of -their reckoning. They are wanting in experience of the difficulties -which beset ordinary men, and of the motives which influence them. -Knowing less of such matters (for all their book learning) than any -other class of articulately-speaking men, they find it by so much the -easier to lay down rules and regulations for the government of the -world. - -To a priesthood, whether ecclesiastical or academic, problems of -politics and war present themselves for consideration in an engaging -simplicity. They evolve theories of how people live, of how they ought -to live; and both sets of theories are mainly cobwebs. There is no -place in their philosophy for anything which is illogical or untidy. -Ideas of compromise and give-and-take, are abominations in priestly -eyes--at any rate when they are engaged in contemplation of worldly -affairs. And seeing that the priesthood aspires, nevertheless, to -govern and direct a world which is illogical and needs humouring, there -is nothing wonderful, if when it has achieved power, it should blunder -on disaster in the name of principle, and incite men to cruelties in -the name of humanity. 'Clericalism,' said a French statesman, and -English statesmen have echoed his words--'Clericalism is the enemy.' -And this is right, whether the priesthood be that of Rome or John -Calvin, of economic professors expounding Adam Smith in the interests -of Manchester, or history professors improving upon Treitschke in the -interests of the Hohenzollern dynasty. - -{137} - -[Sidenote: PRIESTS AND LAWYERS] - -Priests and professors when they meddle in politics are always the -same. They sit in their studies or cells, inventing fundamental -principles; building thereon great edifices of reasoned or sentimental -brickwork which splits in the sun and crumbles in the storm. -Throughout the ages, as often as they have left their proper sphere, -they have been subject to the same angry enthusiasms and savage -obstinacies. Their errors of judgment have been comparable only to -their arrogance. Acts of cruelty and treachery, meanness and -dishonour,[3] which would revolt the ordinary German or Englishman, -commend themselves readily, on grounds of sophistry or logic, to these -morbid ascetics, so soon as they begin busying themselves with the -direction of public affairs. - -It would be unfair to judge any country by its political professors. -At the same time, if any country is so foolish as to follow such -guides, there is a probability of mischief in national--still more in -international--affairs. For they are as innocent as the lawyers -themselves, of any knowledge of the real insides of things. They -differ of course from the lawyers in many ways. They are ever for -making changes for the sake of symmetry; while the man of law is for -keeping as he is until the last moment; or at any rate until it is -clearly his interest to budge. A priesthood has a burning faith in its -own hand-wrought idols; the lawyer on the contrary, does not go readily -to the stake, does not catch fire easily, being rather of the nature of -asbestos. When lawyers monopolise political power--even when they -merely {138} preponderate, as of late years they have seemed to do more -and more in all democratic countries, whether of the monarchical or -republican type--they invariably destroy by insensible gradations that -which is most worth preserving in man or state, the soul. But they do -not bring on sudden catastrophe as a priesthood does; their method is -to strangle slowly like ivy. - -In England, nowadays--indeed ever since the 'eighties, when professors -of Political Economy became discredited as political guides--there are -not many evidences of priestly influence. Certainly there is nothing -of an organised kind. What exists is erratic and incalculable. There -is much clamour; but it is contradictory, spasmodic, and inconstant, -without any serious pretence, either of learning or science, to support -it. Each of our prophets is in business for himself. There is no -tinge of Erastianism about any of them. For the most part they are the -grotesques and _lions comiques_ of the world of letters, who prophesy -standing on their heads, or grinning through horse-collars, and -mistaking always "the twinkling of their own sophisticated minds for -wisdom." - -Alliance between a priesthood and a bureaucracy tends gradually to -produce, as in the case of China, an oppressive uniformity--not unlike -that aimed at by the more advanced socialists--where every fresh -innovation is a restriction hampering the natural bent. On the other -hand an alliance between a priesthood and a military caste--especially -when the bureaucracy is ready to act in sympathy--is one of the -commonest causes of international convulsions. - -{139} - -[Sidenote: PRIESTS AND SOLDIERS] - -Oddly enough, the soldier, who affects to despise men of words and -make-believes, and who on this account has an instinctive dislike and -distrust of the lawyer--so violent indeed that it often puts him in the -wrong, and leaves him at the mercy of the object of his contempt--is -dangerously apt to become the tool of anything which bears a likeness -to Peter the Hermit. It is not really the lawyer's confidence in the -efficacy of words which revolts the soldier, nearly so much as the kind -of words used, the temperament of him who uses them, and the character -of the make-believes which it is sought to establish. The -unworldliness, simplicity, idealism, and fervour of the priesthood make -strong appeals to a military caste, which on the contrary is repelled -by what it conceives to be the cynicism, opportunism, and self-seeking -of lawyer statecraft. - -More especially is it difficult for the military caste to resist the -influence of the priesthood when, as in Germany of recent years, they -have insisted upon giving the warrior the most important niche in their -temple, and on burning incense before him day and night. Working -industriously in their studies and laboratories they have found moral -justification for every course, however repugnant to established ideas, -which may conceivably make it easier to attain victory and conquest. -The soldier might have scruples about doing this or that; but when he -is assured by inspired intellectuals, that what would best serve his -military ends is also the most moral course of action, how can -he--being a man of simple mind--presume to doubt it; though he may -occasionally shudder as he proceeds to put it into execution? - -{140} - -German thoroughness is an admirable quality, but even thoroughness may -be carried to extremes which are absurd, or something worse. - -No nation has a right to complain if another chooses to drill armies, -build fleets, accumulate stores of treasure, weapons, and material; nor -is it incumbent upon any nation to wear its heart upon its sleeve, or -to let the whole world into its secrets, military or political. In so -far as Germany has acted upon these principles she was well within her -rights. As a result we have suffered heavily; but we must blame -ourselves for being ill-prepared; we have no justification for -complaining because Germany was well-prepared. - -There are some kinds of preparation, however, which it does not seem -possible to justify, if the world is to consist as heretofore of a -large number of independent states, between whose citizens it is -desirable to maintain a certain friendliness and freedom of -intercourse. German activities in various directions, for many years -before war broke out, make one wonder what state of things was -contemplated by German statesmen, as likely to prevail when war should -be over. What, for instance, is to be the status of Germans visiting -or residing in other countries--seeking to trade with them--to borrow -money from them--to interchange with them the civilities of ordinary -life, or those more solemn courtesies which are practised by societies -of learning and letters? Will the announcement _civis Germanicus sum_ -be enough henceforth to secure the stranger a warm welcome and respect? -Or will such revelation of his origin be more likely to lead to his -speedy re-embarkation for the land of his nativity? - -{141} - -[Sidenote: GERMAN AGENCIES] - -Spying has always been practised since the beginning of time; but it -has rarely been conducted in such a manner as to produce general -uneasiness, or any sensible restraint upon private relations. -Logically, it would be unfair to condemn recent German enterprises in -this direction, seeing that she has only extended an accepted nuisance -on to a much vaster scale. But here again logic is a misleading guide. -There is something in the very scale of German espionage which has -changed the nature of this institution. It has grown into a huge -organised industry for the debauching of vain, weak, and greedy -natures; for turning such men--for the most part without their being -aware of it--into German agents. The result of Teutonic thoroughness -in this instance is a domestic intrusion which is odious, as well as a -national menace which cannot be disregarded. Many of these hostile -agencies may surely be termed treacherous, seeing that they have aimed, -under the guise of friendly intercourse, at forwarding schemes of -invasion and conquest. - -We are familiar enough with the vain purse-proud fellow, who on the -strength of a few civil speeches from the Kaiser--breathing friendship -and the love of peace--has thenceforward flattered himself that his -mission in life was to eradicate suspicion of German intentions from -the minds of his British fellow-countrymen. This is the unconscious -type of agent, useful especially in sophisticated circles, and among -our more advanced politicians of anti-militarist sympathies. - -Then we have the naturalised, or unnaturalised, magnate of finance or -industry, to whom business prosperity is the great reality of life, -politics and {142} patriotism being by comparison merely things of the -illusory sort. It would cause him no very bitter anguish of heart to -see England humiliated and her Empire dissolved, providing his own -cosmopolitan undertakings continued to thrive undisturbed by horrid -war. He, also, has very likely been the recipient of imperial -suavities. In addition to this, however, he has been encouraged to -imagine that he enjoys in a peculiar degree the confidence of the -German Foreign Office. The difficulties which so shrewd a fellow must -have in believing in the innocence of German intentions must be -considerable at the outset; but they are worn away by the constant -erosion of his private interests. Britain must not cross -Germany:--that is his creed in a nutshell. This is the semi-conscious -type of agent; and he carries great weight in business circles, and -even sometimes in circles much higher than those frequented by the -money-changers. - -We may resent such influences as these, now that we have become more or -less sensible of the effect which they have had during recent years in -hindering our preparations for defence; but here we cannot fairly -charge Germany with any breach of custom and tradition. We must blame -ourselves for having given heed to their counsellors. But it is -different when we come to such things as the wholesale corruption of -the subjects of friendly nations--a network of careful intrigue for the -promotion of rebellion--lavish subsidies and incitements for the -purpose of fostering Indian unrest, Egyptian discontent, and South -African treason--the supply of weapons and munitions of war on the -shortest notice, and most favourable terms, to any one and every one -who {143} seems inclined to engage in civil war in Ireland or elsewhere. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN METHODS AT WORK] - -The whole of this procedure has been justified in advance and advocated -in detail by Bernhardi and the priesthood. Belgium, France, Russia, -and Britain are doubtless peculiarly alive to the iniquity of these -practices, for the reason that their moral judgment has been sharpened -by personal suffering. But they do not denounce the system solely -because they themselves have been injured by it, but also because it -seems to them to be totally at variance with all recent notions -regarding the comity of nations. If we may use such an old-fashioned -term, it appears to us to be wrong. - -If methods such as these are henceforth to be practised by the world in -general, must not all international communion become impossible, as -much in time of peace as during a war? Indeed must not human existence -itself become almost intolerable? Friendliness, hospitality, -courtesies of every sort, between men and women of one country and -those of another, must cease absolutely, if the world should become a -convert to these German doctrines. Travel must cease; for no one likes -to be stripped naked and searched at every frontier. Trade and -financial operations must also be restricted, one would imagine, to -such an extent that ultimately they will wither and die. - -And if the world in general after the war is ended does not become a -convert to these German doctrines of treacherous preparation, made in -friendly territories during time of peace, what then will be its -attitude towards Germany and the Germans; for they presumably have no -intention of abandoning these {144} practices? It is an unpleasant -problem, but it will have to be faced sooner or later. - -For obviously, although every sensible man believes, and many of us -know by actual experience, that the instincts of Germans, in all -private relations, are as loyal and honourable as those of most other -races which inhabit the earth, no nation can afford any longer to have -dealings with them on equal terms, if they have decided to allow their -instincts to be used and abused, over-ridden and perverted, by a -bureaucracy whose ideal is thoroughness, and by a priesthood which has -invented a new system of morals to serve a particular set of ends. Not -only the allied nations which are at present at war with Germany, but -any country whose interests may conceivably, at any future time, come -into conflict with those of that far-sighted empire, will be forced in -self-defence to take due precautions. It is clear enough that more -efficacious means than mere scraps of naturalisation paper will be -needed to secure mankind against the abuse of its hospitality by -Teutonic theorists. - -[Sidenote: THE GERMAN CREED] - -The whole of this strange system, those methods which, even after -somewhat painful experience of their effects, we are still inclined in -our less reflective moments to regard as utterly incredible--is it -possible to summarise them in a few sentences? What are the accepted -maxims, the orthodox formulas of Prussian statecraft? - -Power, more power, world-power; these according to German theory, as -well as practice, should be the dominant principles of the state. - -When a nation desires territories belonging to its neighbours, let it -take them, if it is strong enough. {145} No further justification is -needed than mere appetite for possession, and the strength to satisfy -it. - -War is in itself a good thing and not a bad. Like a purge, or a course -of the waters of Aix, it should be taken, every half-century or so, by -all nations which aim at preserving the vigour of their constitutions. - -During the intervening periods the chief duty of the state is to -prepare for war, so that when it comes, victory, and with it benefits -of the material, as well as of the spiritual sort, may be secured. - -No means which will help to secure victory are immoral, whether in the -years preceding the outbreak of hostilities, or afterwards, when the -war is in full course. If the state, aided by its men of science, -could find any safe and secret means of sending a plague, as an advance -guard, to ravage the enemy, where is the objection? The soul of a -Prussian soldier might revolt against this form of warfare, but at what -point would it conflict with the teachings of the priesthood? Nor can -we imagine, were the thing possible, that the bureaucracy would allow -itself to be hampered by any scruples. - -As to the declaration of war, let it be made when the state is in a -strong position and its prey in a weak one. This is the all-important -consideration. The actual pretext is only a secondary matter, though -worthy of attention for the effect it may have on the action of -neutrals. And as war is a game of chance, it is wise and right to -'correct fortune,' so far as this can be accomplished during years of -peace and under the cloak of amity, by the aid of spies, secret agents, -accomplices, traitors, rebels, and what not besides. - -The state which has evolved this system and laid {146} down these -rules, without the least attempt at secrecy or concealment, is the most -efficient machine of the fighting and administrative kind at present -existing in the world--perhaps which has ever existed in the world. -But as you increase the size, power, and complexity of a machine there -are obvious dangers unless you can also increase the calibre of the men -who have to drive and direct it. This is a much more difficult problem -than the other; and there is no evidence to show that it has been -solved in the case of Germany. The more powerful the machine, the -greater is apt to be the disaster if it is mishandled. - -In history the blunders of bureaucracy are a by-word. They have been -great and many, even when, as in Germany to-day, the bureaucracy is in -the full vigour of its age, and in the first flower of uprightness; for -a bureaucracy, in order to retain its efficiency, must remain -incorruptible, and that is one of the hardest things to secure. - -As for the priesthoods, if they are to be of any use, their faith must -burn brightly. And the faith of a priesthood is very apt to burn -itself out--very apt also to set fire to other things during the -process; even to the edifice of popular virtue and the imperial purple -itself, which things--unlike the Phoenix, the Salamander, and the -Saint--are none the better or stronger for being burned. - - -We are constantly being told by high authorities that the moral -objective of the present war is 'to put down militarism,' and 'abolish -it' off the face of the earth. There are few of us who do not wish -that this aim may be crowned with success; but militarism is a tough -weed to kill, and something {147} more than the mere mowing of it down -by some outside scythesman will be necessary, one imagines, in order to -get rid of it. - -[Sidenote: MAIN OBJECT OF THE WAR] - -The true moral objective of the war is something much more important -than this. A blacker evil than militarism is that violation of private -trust and public honour which is known as the Prussian System, and -which has recently been 'marching through rapine, to the -disintegration,' not of a single nation, or group of nations, but of -the whole fabric of human society, including its own. It is an -elaborate contrivance of extreme artificiality, a strange perversion of -the nature of man. These are its inherent weaknesses; and fortunately, -by reason of them, it is more vulnerable to hard blows than militarism -which, with all its vices, and extravagancies, is rooted in instincts -which are neither depraved nor ignoble. - -Militarism might continue to thrive under adversity, and after the -heaviest defeat, as it has done in times past; but the life of the -Prussian System--that joint invention of the most efficient bureaucracy -in the world, and of a priesthood whose industry can only be matched by -its sycophancy and conceit--hangs upon the thread of success. Like the -South Sea Bubble, or any of those other impostures of the financial -sort, which have temporarily beguiled the confidence of mankind, it -must collapse utterly under the shock of failure. It depends entirely -on credit, and its powers of recuperation are nil. When its assets are -disclosed, the characters of its promoters will be understood. The -need, therefore, is to bring it at all costs to a complete -demonstration of failure. - -{148} - -We have been urged by our own anti-militarists not to inflict suffering -and humiliation on Germany. But this is not a matter of the slightest -importance one way or the other. It has but little to do with the -issue which it is our business to settle, if we have the good fortune -to come out victorious from the present struggle. To set up the -suffering and humiliation of Germany as the object of high policy would -cover the Allies with contempt; but to shrink from such things, if they -should happen to stand between the Allies and the utter moral -bankruptcy of the Prussian System, would overwhelm them with a burden -far heavier and more shameful than contempt. - - - -[1] "We may declare that the problem of training in arms and turning to -real account the energies of the nation was first undertaken in -thorough earnestness by Germany. _We possess in our army a -characteristic, necessary continuation of the school-system_. For many -men there is no better means of training; for them drilling, compulsory -cleanliness, and severe discipline are physically and morally -indispensable in a time like ours, which unchains all -spirits."--Treitschke, _Selections_, pp. 106-107. - -[2] Nietzsche is one of the rare exceptions. - -[3] Cf. Professor Kuno Meyer, _Times_, December 24, 1914, and March 8, -1915. - - - - -{149} - -CHAPTER VI - -THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE - -A German might fairly contend that British criticism of his moral ideas -and political system is tainted throughout by ignorance and prejudice, -and that all our talk of autocracy, bureaucracy, pedantocracy, military -caste, and sham constitutionalism is merely an attempt to avoid the -real issue by calling things, which we happen to dislike, by bad names. -Political institutions, he might insist, must be judged by their -fruits. If this test were applied, Germany in his opinion would have -nothing to fear in any comparison. - -"We Germans," writes a correspondent, the Freiherr von Hexenküchen,[1] -"are not inferior in intelligence or education to any other race. Had -this been so, we could never have reached, in so short a period as four -decades, the proud position which we now occupy in science, invention, -manufacture, commerce, finance, and administration.[2] {150} -Consequently, if we are well content to live under the institutions we -possess, this cannot be put down either to our want of enterprise or to -the dulness of our understandings. - -"Our people have already shown that they are willing to fight and die -for these very institutions which you Englishmen affect to regard with -so much contempt. Possibly your people are equally willing to fight -and die for theirs. I do not deny this; but it is not yet proved; it -remains to be proved. - -"I do not assert that your people are inferior to mine in their -readiness to fight and die when they are actually faced with a great -national danger. But I do claim that mine are superior to yours in the -constancy of their devotion to duty. For a hundred years past--not -only in periods of stress and danger, which stirred the national -imagination, but equally in times of peace and prosperity, which always -tend to encourage the growth of comfort and the love of ease--each -succeeding generation has been found willing to train itself in the use -of arms, so as to be prepared, if occasion should arise, to defend the -Fatherland. - -"When the present war broke out was there a firmer loyalty or a more -patriotic response to the call to arms among your people or among mine? -Will your people fight and suffer more gladly for their 'democratic' -ideals than mine will for their Kaiser and Fatherland? ... Surely, upon -your own principles no comparison should be possible between the warmth -of your devotion and the tepidity of ours. - -"Is our system really so reactionary and mechanical as you imagine? In -an age which has learned {151} as its special lesson the advantages, in -ordinary business affairs of life, of organisation, thoroughness, long -views, reticence, and combined effort, guided by a strong central -control, is it reaction, or is it progress, to aim at applying the same -principles to the greatest, most complex, and infinitely most important -of all businesses--that of government itself? Can a nation hope to -survive which refuses, in the name of freedom, to submit to control in -these respects, if it should be faced by competition with another, -which has been wise enough to employ quiet experts instead of -loquacious amateurs--any more than a cotton mill could escape -bankruptcy were it managed on a system of party government? - -"Our civil service, which you are pleased to describe as a Bureaucracy, -is distinguished among all others existing at the present time, by the -calibre of its members, by its efficiency and honesty, by its poverty, -and not less by the honour in which it is held notwithstanding its -poverty. You laugh at our love for calling men, and also their wives, -by the titles of their various offices--Herr this and Frau that, from -the humblest inspector of drains to the Imperial Chancellor himself! -And no doubt there is a ludicrous side to this practice. But it marks -at least one important thing--that membership of our civil service is -regarded as conferring honour. So far, we have succeeded in -maintaining public officials of all grades in higher popular respect -than men who devote their lives to building up private fortunes, and -also to those others who delight and excel in interminable debate. - -"You are used to boast, and I daresay rightly {152} of the personal -honesty and pecuniary disinterestedness of your politicians; and you -assume as a matter of course that your civil servants, with such high -standards and examples ever before their eyes, are likewise -incorruptible. We invert this order. With us the honour of our civil -servants is the chief thing; we assume that our politicians must follow -suit. They are probably as upright as your own, thanks partly to -tradition, but also to the vigilance of their superiors, the -professionals, who carry on the actual business of government. With -you the fame of the showy amateur fills the mouths of the public. We, -on the contrary, exalt the expert, the man who has been trained to the -job he undertakes. In so doing we may be reactionaries and you may be -progressives; but the progress of Germany since 1870--a progress in -which we are everywhere either already in front of you, or else -treading closely on your heels--does not seem to furnish you with a -conclusive argument. - -"As for what you call our Pedantocracy, meaning thereby our professors -and men of letters, it is true that these exercise a great influence -upon public opinion. We have always respected learning and thought. -It is in the German nature so to do. I admit that our learned ones are -rather too much inclined to imagine, that because they are students of -theory, they are therefore qualified to engage in practice. They are -apt to offer their advice and service officiously, and occasionally in -a ridiculous manner. But, if my recollection of the English newspapers -be correct, this is no more so with us than with you. There is -apparently something in the professorial nature which impels men of -this {153} calling to the drafting of manifestoes and the signing of -round-robins in times of excitement. They may be officious and absurd, -but they are not wholly despicable, since they act thus quite as much -from earnestness as from vanity. If our academicians on such occasions -mislead more people than your own it is due to their virtues, to the -greater zeal and success with which they have won the confidence of -their former pupils.[3] - -[Sidenote: THE MILITARY CASTE] - -"You are fond of sneering at our Military Caste and attribute to it the -most malign influence upon public affairs. But there again, believe -me, you exaggerate. Our officers are undoubtedly held in great -respect, even in some awe. And the reason is that they are known to be -brave, and like those you call the bureaucracy, to have preferred -comparative poverty in the public service to the pursuit of riches. To -say that they have no influence upon policy would of course be absurd. -It is inevitable that in the present state of the world, soldiers will -always have great influence in certain departments of public affairs. -This must be so in any country {154} which is not plunged in dreams. -For it is their business to guarantee national security, and to keep -watch over the growth of military strength among the neighbours and -rivals of Germany. If the general staff foresees dangers, and can give -reasonable grounds for its anticipations, it is clear that the military -view must carry weight with the Kaiser and his ministers. And surely -there can be no question that this is right. - -"The officers of the German Army are a caste, if you like to put it -that way. But in every form of government under the sun, unless -conceivably in some tiny oriental despotism, the predominance of a -certain caste, or the competition between different castes, is -absolutely essential to the working of the machinery. - -"It is not regrettable in our opinion if a caste, which has -considerable weight in public affairs, is a manly one, contemptuous of -wealth and sophistry, ready always to risk its own life for the faith -which is in it. The influence of a military caste may have its -drawbacks; but at any rate it has kept the peace in Germany for not far -short of half a century--kept it successfully until, as some people -have thought, the professors acquired too large a share of power. - -"Is it so certain, moreover, that the lawyer caste, the -self-advertising caste, and the financial caste are not all of them a -great deal worse, even a great deal more dangerous to peace? Is a -country any more likely to be safe, happy, and prosperous under the -régime of a talking caste--of windbags resourcefully keeping their -bellows full of air, and wheedling the most numerous with transparent -{155} falsehoods--than where civil servants of tried wisdom and -experience are responsible for carrying on affairs of state, aided at -their high task by sober military opinion?[4] - -"As for our Kaiser, whom you regard as a crafty and ambitious tyrant, -he appears in our view as the incarnation of patriotic duty, burdened -though not overwhelmed by care--a lover of peace, so long as peace may -be had with honour and safety; but if this may not be, then a stern, -though reluctant, drawer of the sword. It is true that the Kaiser's -government is in many important respects a purely personal government. -His is the ultimate responsibility for high policy. He fulfils the -function in our system of that strong central power, without which the -most ingeniously constructed organisation is but impotence. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN SELF-KNOWLEDGE] - -"The German people are ahead of the English and the Americans in -self-knowledge; for they realise that there are many things -appertaining to government, which cannot be discussed in the -newspapers, or on the platform, any more than the policy and conduct of -a great business can be made known in advance to the staff, and to -trade competitors all over the world. And so, believing the Kaiser's -government to be honest, capable, and devoted to the public weal, the -German people trust it without reservation to decide when action shall -be taken in a variety of spheres. - -"This system of ours which is founded in reason, and in experience of -modern conditions, and which {156} is upheld by the unfaltering -confidence of a great people, you are wont to condemn as tyrannical and -reactionary. But can democracy stand against it?--Democracy infirm of -purpose, jealous, grudging, timid, changeable, unthorough, unready, -without foresight, obscure in its aims, blundering along in an age of -lucidity guided only by a faltering and confused instinct! Given -anything like an equal contest, is it conceivable that such an -undisciplined chaos can prevail against the Hohenzollern Empire? - -"Of late your newspapers have been busily complaining of what they call -'German lies,' 'boastfulness,' and 'vulgar abuse.' They have taunted -our government with not daring to trust the people. Our Headquarters -bulletins have been vigorously taken to task by the Allies on these and -other grounds. - -"But all nations will acclaim their victories louder than they will -trumpet their defeats. This is in human nature. No official -communiqué will ever be a perfect mirror of truth. It will never give -the whole picture, but only a part; and by giving only a part it will -often mislead. Were we to believe literally what the various -governments have hitherto given out as regards their respective -advances, the Germans by this time might perhaps have been at Moscow in -the East and somewhere about the Azores in the West. But by the same -token the Russians should have been on the Rhine and the French and -English Allies at Berlin. - -"I read your newspapers, and I read our own. I do not think our -journalists, though they do their best, can fairly claim to excel yours -in the contest {157} of boastfulness and vulgar abuse. And as regards -the utterances of responsible public men in our two countries, can you -really contend that we Germans are more open to the reproach of -vainglorious and undignified speech than the British? Our Kaiser -denies having used the words, so often attributed to him in your press, -about 'General French's contemptible little army,' and in Germany we -believe his denial. But even if he did in fact utter this expression, -is it not quite as seemly and restrained as references to 'digging rats -out of a hole'--as applied to our gallant navy--or to that later -announcement from the same quarter which was recently addressed to the -Mayor of Scarborough about 'baby-killers'? Such expressions are -regrettable, no doubt, but not of the first importance. They are a -matter of temperament. An ill-balanced, or even a very highly-strung -nature, will be betrayed into blunders of this sort more readily than -the phlegmatic person, or one whose upbringing has been in circles -where self-control is the rule of manners. - -[Sidenote: TRUST IN THE PEOPLE] - -"But what puzzles us Germans perhaps more than any of your other -charges against us is, when you say that our rulers do not trust the -people as the British Government does. - -"You accuse our War Office of publishing accounts of imaginary -victories to revive our drooping confidence, and of concealing actual -disasters lest our country should fall into a panic of despondency. -There was surely nothing imaginary about the fall of Liège, Namur, -Maubeuge, Laon, or La Fere. The engagements before Metz, at Mons, -Charleroi, and Amiens, the battles of Lodz and Lyck, were {158} not -inconsiderable successes for German arms, or at the very least for -German generalship. The victory of Tannenberg was among the greatest -in history, reckoning in numbers alone. Our government made no secret -of the German retirement--retreat if you prefer the term--from the -Marne to the Aisne, or of that other falling back after the first -attempt on Warsaw. Naturally they laid less emphasis on reverses than -on conquests, but what government has ever acted otherwise? Certainly -not the French, or the Russian, or your own. And what actual disasters -have we concealed? In what respect, as regards the conduct of this -war, have we, the German people, been trusted less than yours? - -"I am especially interested, I confess, as a student of British -politics, in this matter of 'trusting the people.' All your great -writers have led me to believe that here lies the essential difference -between your system and ours, and that the great superiority of yours -to ours is demonstrated in the confidence which your statesmen never -hesitate to place in the wisdom, fortitude, and patriotism of the -people. Frankly, I do not understand it. Trust must surely have some -esoteric meaning when applied to your populace which foreigners are -unable to apprehend. I can discover no other sense in your phrase -about 'trusting the people,' than that they are trusted not to find out -their politicians. It certainly cannot be believed that you trust your -people to hear the truth; for if so why has your government practised -so rigorous an economy of this virtue, doling it out very much as we -have lately been doing with our wheat and potatoes? - -{159} - -[Sidenote: THE BRITISH PRESS BUREAU] - -"Has your government not concealed actual disaster--concealed it from -their own people, though from no one else; for all the world was on the -broad grin? Everybody knew of your misfortune save a certain large -portion of the British public. The motive of your government could not -have been to hide it away from the Germans, or the Austrians, or from -neutrals, for the illustrated papers all over the globe, even in your -own colonies, contained pictures reproduced from photographs of the -occurrence. It was only possible to muzzle the press and blindfold the -people of the United Kingdom, and these things your government did; -acting no doubt very wisely. - -"Again after the great German victory over the Russians at Tannenberg -in September last, an official bulletin of simple and conspicuous -candour was published at Petrograd which confirmed in most of the . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - -"Why did your Press Bureau during the heavy fighting from the middle of -October to the middle of November persist in maintaining that 'the -British are still gaining ground.' The British resistance from the -beginning to the end of the four weeks' battle round Ypres is not -likely to be forgotten by our German soldiers, still less to be -belittled by them. {160} It was surely a great enough feat of arms to -bear the light of truth. But. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . - -"But is the same true of the British people? Can they be trusted to -bear the light of truth? - -"You cannot wonder if we Germans, and for that matter the whole world, -have drawn certain conclusions from these and other incidents. We do -not doubt that your ministers have acted wisely in suppressing bad -tidings; but why should they have taken all those pains and endured the -derision, while incurring the distrust, of foreign countries--a -material injury, mind you, and not merely a sentimental one--unless -they had known, only too well, that publication of this or that piece -of news would have too painfully affected the nerves of your people? -Concealment of checks, reverses, and disasters which had not already -become known to the Austrians and ourselves might have served a useful -military purpose; but what purpose except that of a sedative for -British public opinion could be served by the concealment of such -matters when we, your enemies, knew them already? Have you ever -thought of asking your American friends in what order they would place -the candour of the official communications which emanate from Berlin, -Petrograd, Paris, and London? - -"Shortly before Christmas one of your legal ministers, who, I -understand, is specially responsible for looking after the Press -Bureau, explained to the House of Commons the principles by which he -had been guided in the suppression of news and comment. He should -refuse, he said, to publish any criticism {161} which might tend to -disturb popular confidence in the Government, or which might cause the -people of England to think that their affairs were in a really serious -state. On practical grounds there is no doubt something to be said for -such a policy; but (will you tell me?) has any autocratic government -ever laid down a more drastic rule for blindfolding the people in order -to preserve its own existence?[5] - -[Sidenote: BRITISH PATRIOTISM] - -"Pondering upon these things, I scratch my head and marvel what you can -possibly have had in yours, when you used to assure us that the -surpassing merit of the English political system was that it trusted -the people, the inherent weakness of ours, the Austrian, and the -Russian that they did not. - -"Your Prime Minister, speaking in the early autumn, thus adjured the -men of Wales:--'Be worthy of those who went before you, and leave to -your children the richest of all inheritances, the memory of fathers -who, in a great cause, put self-sacrifice before ease, and honour above -life itself.' These are noble words, of Periclean grandeur. But have -they met with a general response? Are these sentiments prevalent -outside government circles, among those--the bulk of your people--who -do not come under the direct influence of ministerial inspiration and -example? If so, why then {162} have your rulers not screwed up their -courage to call for national service? Why do they still continue to -depend for their recruits upon sensational advertisements, newspaper -puffs, oratorical entreaties, and private influence of a singularly -irregular sort? - -"Is not this the reason?--Your government is afraid--even in this great -struggle, where (as they put it) your future existence as a nation is -at stake--that the English people--or at any rate so large a proportion -of them, as if rendered uncomfortable could create a political -disturbance--is not even yet prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. -And so, to the amazement of us Germans, you let the older men, with -families dependent on them, go forth to the war, urged on by a high -sense of duty, while hundreds of thousands of young unmarried men are -still allowed to stay at home. - -[Sidenote: COMPARISON OF RECRUITING] - -"You are still, it would appear, enamoured of your voluntary system. -You have not yet abandoned your belief that it is the duty of the man, -who possesses a sense of duty, to protect the skin, family, and -property of the man who does not. To us this seems a topsy-turvy -creed, and not more topsy-turvy than contemptible. In Germany and -France--where for generations past the doctrine of private sacrifice -for the public weal is ingrained, and has been approved in principle -and applied in practice with unfaltering devotion--a 'voluntary' system -might conceivably have some chance of providing such an army as you are -in search of. But to the United Kingdom surely it is singularly -inapplicable? Let me illustrate my meaning by a comparison. - -{163} - -"Our Kaiser in his New Year's message--which in Germany we all read -with enthusiasm, and considered very noble and appropriate--summed up -the military situation by saying that after five months' hard and hot -fighting the war was still being waged almost everywhere off German -soil, and on the enemies' territories. And he summed up the domestic -situation by saying (and this, believe me, is true) that our nation -stands in unexampled harmony, prepared to sacrifice its heart's blood -for the defence of the Fatherland. Another three months have passed -away, and these statements still hold good. - -"The point to which I chiefly wish to call your attention is one of -numbers, and I will take my estimates of numbers from your own most -famous newspaper experts. - -"Your claim, as I understand it, is that on New Year's Day 1915 you -had--exclusive of Indian troops and Dominion contingents--between -2,000,000 and 2,500,000 men training and in the field. - -"Germany alone (here again I quote your English experts), without -reckoning Austria, has actually put into the field during the past five -months 5,000,000 men. Of these it is stated by your newspapers that -she has lost in round figures 1,500,000, who have either been killed, -or taken prisoners, or are too severely wounded to return as yet to the -fighting line. But in spite of this depletion, your military -statisticians tell us that Germany and her ally, at New Year's Day, -still outnumbered the Allies on both the Eastern and the Western -frontier. - -"The same high authorities tell us further, that {164} during this -period of five months, the German Government has called upon the civil -population, has appealed to able-bodied men who had previously been -exempt from military service, and that by this means it has obtained, -and has been engaged in training, arming, and equipping another -4,000,000 or 4,500,000 who, it is anticipated, will become available -for war purposes in new formations, during the spring and summer of the -present year. - -"Our Government, therefore, according to your own account, has not been -afraid to ask the civil population to serve, and this is the response. -Does it look as if the national spirit had been quenched under our -autocratic system? - -"Out of our whole population of sixty-five millions we have apparently -raised for military service on land and naval service at sea, between -9,000,000 and 11,000,000 men since this war began. Out of your whole -population of forty-five millions you have succeeded in raising for -these same purposes only something between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000 men. -And in your case, be it observed, in order to attract recruits, you -have offered good wages and munificent separation allowances; while in -our case men serve without pay. - -"This numerical comparison is worth carrying a stage further. Germany -and her ally have between them a total population of 115,000,000. The -United Kingdom (including the people of European stock who inhabit the -various Dominions), France, Russia, Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro -number in round figures about 280,000,000. Roughly speaking, these are -odds of seven to three against us. And I am leaving out of account all -the non-European races--the {165} Turks on the one side, the Japanese -and the Indians on the other. If these were included the odds would be -much heavier. - -"And yet our Kaiser spoke but the simple truth, when he told us on New -Year's Day that, after five months of war, the German armies were -almost everywhere on the territories of their enemies. We are not only -keeping you back and defying all your efforts to invade us; but like -the infant Hercules, we have gripped you by your throats, and were -holding you out at arm's length! - -[Sidenote: METHODS OF RECRUITING] - -"I do not of course pretend to look at this matter except from the -German standpoint; but is there any flaw in my reasoning, is there -anything at all unfair, if I thus sum up my conclusions?--By Midsummer -next--after stupendous efforts of the oratorical and journalistic -kind--after an enormous amount of shouting, music-hall singing, cinema -films, and showy advertising of every description--after making great -play with the name and features of a popular field-marshal, in a manner -which must have shocked both his natural modesty and soldierly -pride--after all this you expect, or say you expect, that you will -possess between two and two-and-a-half millions of men trained, armed, -equipped, and ready to take the field. - -"As against this, during the same period, and out of the less military -half of our male population, without any shouting or advertising to -speak of, we shall have provided approximately double that number. We -have raised these new forces quietly, without any fuss, and without a -word of protest from any of our people. We are training them without -any serious difficulty. We are arming {166} them, equipping them, -clothing them, and housing them without any difficulty at all. - -"To conclude this interesting contrast, may I ask you--is it true, as -the French newspapers allege, that you are about to invite, or have -already invited, your Japanese Allies to send some portion of their -Army to European battlefields? With what face can you make this appeal -when you have not yet called upon your own people to do, what every -other people engaged in the present struggle, has already done? - -"After you have pondered upon this strange and startling contrast, will -you still hold to the opinion that the German system--which you have -affected to despise, on the ground that it does not rest upon what you -are pleased to term 'a popular basis'--is at any point inferior to your -own in its hold upon the hearts of the people? - -"What is meant by the phrase--'a popular basis'? Is it something -different from the support of the people, the will of the people, the -devotion of the people? And if it is different, is it better--judging, -that is, by its results in times of trouble--or is it worse?" - -So the cultured Freiherr, watching democracy at work in Britain, its -ancient home, concludes with this question--"Is this timid, jealous, -and distracted thing possessed of any real faith in itself; and if so, -will it fight for its faith to the bitter end? Is the British system -one which even the utmost faith in it can succeed in propping up? Does -it possess any inherent strength; or is it merely a thing of -paste-board and make-believe, fore-ordained to perish?" - - - -[1] This letter, which is dated April 1, 1915, arrived at its -destination (via Christiania and Bergen) about ten days later. It had -not the good fortune, however, to escape the attentions of the Censor, -the ravages of whose blacking-brush will be noted in the abrupt -termination of sundry paragraphs. - -[2] "The empires which during the past forty years have made the -greatest relative material progress are undoubtedly Germany and -Japan--neither of them a democracy, but both military states." - -[3] It is not quite clear to what incidents the Freiherr is referring. -He may be thinking of a certain round-robin which appeared a few days -before the war, giving a most handsome academic testimonial of humanity -and probity to the German system; or he may have in mind a later -manifestation in February last, when there suddenly flighted into the -correspondence columns of the _Nation_ a 'gaggle' of university geese, -headed appropriately enough by a Professor of Political Economy, by -name Pigou, who may be taken as the type of that peculiarly British -product, the unemotional sentimentalist. To this 'gaggle' of the -heavier fowls there succeeded in due course a 'glory' of poetical and -literary finches, twittering the same tune--the obligation on the -Allies not to inflict suffering and humiliation on Germany--on Germany, -be it remembered, as yet unbeaten, though this was rather slurred over -in their spring-song of lovingkindness. The Freiherr, plunged in his -heathen darkness, no doubt still believed Germany to be not only -unbeaten but victorious, and likely to continue on the same course. He -must therefore have been somewhat puzzled by so much tender concern on -the part of our professors, etc. for sparing his feelings at the end of -the war. - -[4] Comment has already been made on the difficulty each nation has in -understanding the spirit of the institutions of its neighbours. If -this is borne in mind these depreciatory references of the Freiherr may -be forgiven. - -[5] I have had considerable difficulty in discovering the basis of this -extraordinary charge. It seems to consist of the following passage -from a speech by Sir Stanley Buckmaster, the Solicitor-General and -Chairman of the Press Bureau on November 12, 1914. It is distressing -to see how far national prejudice is apt to mislead a hostile critic -like the Freiherr von Hexenküchen: "Criticism of the Government, or of -members of the Government, is not that which I have ever stopped, -except when such criticism is of such a character that it might destroy -public confidence in the Government, which at this moment is charged -with the conduct of the war, or might in any way weaken the confidence -of the people in the administration of affairs, or otherwise cause -distress or disturbance amongst people in thinking their affairs were -in a really serious state." - - - - -{167} - -CHAPTER VII - -THE CONFLICT OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS - -The Freiherr's discourse raises a large number of questions, some of -them unarguable. Others again are too much so; for if once started -upon, argument with regard to them need never end. Some of his -contentions have already been dealt with in previous chapters; some on -the other hand, such as the British methods of recruiting, will be -considered later on. It must, however, be admitted that his taunts and -criticisms do not all rebound with blunted points from our shield of -self-complacency; some, if only a few, get home and rankle. - -We are challenged to contrast our faith in our own political -institutions with that of the Germans in theirs; also to measure the -intrinsic strength of that form of political organisation called -'democracy' against that other form which is known as 'autocracy.' - -The German state is the most highly developed and efficient type of -personal monarchy at present known to the world. Its triumphs in -certain directions have been apparent from the beginning. It would be -sheer waste of time to dispute the fact that Germany was incomparably -better prepared, organised, and educated for this war--the purpose of -which was the spoliation of her {168} neighbours--than any of her -neighbours were for offering resistance. - -But what the Freiherr does not touch upon at all is the conflict -between certain underlying ideas of right and wrong--old ideas, which -are held by Russia, France, and ourselves, and which now find -themselves confronted by new and strange ideas which have been -exceedingly prevalent among the governing classes in Germany for many -years past. He does not raise _this_ issue, any more than his -fellow-countrymen now raise it either in America or at home. It is -true that there was a flamboyant outburst from a few faithful -Treitschkians and Nietzschians, both in prose and poetry, during those -weeks of August and September which teemed with German successes; but -their voices soon sank below audibility--possibly by order -_verboten_--in a swiftly dying fall. We, however, cannot agree to let -this aspect of the matter drop, merely because patriotic Germans happen -to have concluded that the present time is inopportune for the -discussion of it. - -There are two clear and separate issues. From the point of view of -posterity the more important of these, perhaps, may prove to be this -conflict in the region of moral ideas. From the point of view of the -present generation, however, the chief matter of practical interest is -the result of a struggle for the preservation of our own institutions, -against the aggression of a race which has not yet learned the last and -hardest lesson of civilisation--how to live and let live. - -[Sidenote: DEMOCRACY] - -The present war may result in the bankruptcy of the Habsburg and -Hohenzollern dynasties. It is very desirable, however, to make clear -the fact {169} that the alternative is the bankruptcy of 'democracy.' -Our institutions are now being subjected to a severer strain than they -have ever yet experienced. Popular government is standing its trial. -It will be judged by the result; and no one can say that this is an -unfair test to apply to human institutions. - -No nation, unless it be utterly mad, will retain a form of government -which from some inherent defect is unable to protect itself against -external attack. Is democratic government capable of looking ahead, -making adequate and timely preparation, calling for and obtaining from -its people the sacrifices which are necessary in order to preserve -their own existence? Can it recover ground which has been lost, and -maintain a long, costly, and arduous struggle, until, by victory, it -has placed national security beyond the reach of danger? - -Defeat in the present war would shake popular institutions to their -foundations in England as well as France; possibly also in regions -which are more remote than either of these. But something far short of -defeat--anything indeed in the nature of a drawn game or -stalemate--would assuredly bring the credit of democracy so low that it -would be driven to make some composition with its creditors. - - -Words, like other currencies, have a way of changing their values as -the world grows older. Until comparatively recent times 'democracy' -was a term of contempt, as 'demagogue' still is to-day. - -The founders of American Union abhorred 'Democracy,'[1] and took every -precaution which occurred to them in order to ward it off. Their aim -was {170} 'Popular,' or 'Representative Government'--a thing which they -conceived to lie almost at the opposite pole. Their ideal was a state, -the citizens of which chose their leaders at stated intervals, and -trusted them. Democracy, as it appeared in their eyes, was a political -chaos where the people chose its servants, and expected from them only -servility. There was an ever-present danger, calling for stringent -safeguards, that the first, which they esteemed the best of all -constitutional arrangements, would degenerate into the second, which -they judged to be the worst. - -Until times not so very remote it was only the enemies of -Representative Government, or its most cringing flatterers, who spoke -of it by the title of Democracy. Gradually, however, in the looseness -of popular discussions, the sharpness of the original distinction wore -off, so that the ideal system and its opposite--the good and the -evil--are now confounded together under one name. There is no use -fighting against current terminology; but it is well to bear in mind -that terminology has no power to alter facts, and that the difference -between the two principles still remains as wide as it was at the -beginning. - -When a people becomes so self-complacent that it mistakes its own -ignorance for omniscience--so jealous of authority and impatient of -contradiction that it refuses to invest with more than a mere shadow of -power those whose business it is to govern--when the stock of -leadership gives out, or remains hidden and undiscovered under a litter -of showy refuse--when those who succeed in pushing themselves to the -front are chiefly concerned not to lead, but merely to act the parts of -leaders 'in silver slippers and amid applause'--when the chiefs of -parties are {171} so fearful of unpopularity that they will not assert -their own opinions, or utter timely warnings, or proclaim what they -know to be the truth--when such things as these come to pass the nation -has reached that state which was dreaded by the framers of the American -Constitution, and which--intending to warn mankind against it--they -branded as 'Democracy.' - - -[Sidenote: DANGERS OF SELF-CRITICISM] - -Self-criticism makes for health in a people; but it may be overdone. -If it purges the national spirit it is good; but if it should lead to -pessimism, or to some impatient breach with tradition, it is one of the -worst evils. One is conscious of a somewhat dangerous tendency in -certain quarters at the present time to assume the worst with regard to -the working of our own institutions. - -Critics of this school have pointed out (what is undoubtedly true) that -Germany has been far ahead of us in her preparations. Every month -since war began has furnished fresh evidence of the far-sightedness, -resourcefulness, thoroughness, and efficiency of all her military -arrangements. Her commercial and financial resources have also been -husbanded, and organised in a manner which excites our unwilling -admiration. And what perhaps has been the rudest shock of all, is the -apparent unity and devotion of the whole German people, in support of a -war which, without exaggeration, may be said to have cast the shadow of -death on every German home. - -These critics further insist that our own nation has not shown itself -more loyal, and that it did not rouse itself to the emergency with -anything approaching the same swiftness. Timidity and a wilful {172} -self-deception, they say, have marked our policy for years before this -war broke out. They marked it again when the crisis came upon us. -Have they not marked it ever since war began? And who can have -confidence that they will not continue to mark it until the end, -whatever the end may be? - -The conclusion therefore at which our more despondent spirits have -arrived, is that the representative system has already failed us--that -it has suffered that very degradation which liberal minds of the -eighteenth century feared so much. How can democracy in the bad -sense--democracy which has become decadent--which is concerned mainly -with its rights instead of with its duties--with its comforts more than -with the sacrifices which are essential to its own preservation--how -can such a system make head against an efficient monarchy sustained by -the enthusiastic devotion of a vigorous and intelligent people? - -It does not seem altogether wise to despair of one's own institutions -at the first check. Even democracy, in the best sense, is not a -flawless thing. Of all forms of government it is the most delicate, -more dependent than any other upon the supply of leaders. There are -times of dearth when the crop of leadership is a short one. Nor are -popular institutions, any more than our own vile bodies, exempt from -disease. Disease, however, is not necessarily fatal. The patient may -recover, and in the bracing air of a national crisis, such as the -present, conditions are favourable for a cure. - -And, after all, we may remind these critics that in 1792 democracy did -in fact make head pretty successfully against monarchy. Though it was -miserably unprovided, untrained, inferior to its enemies in everything -{173} save spirit and leadership, the states of Europe -nevertheless--all but England--went down before it, in the years which -followed, like a row of ninepins. Then as now, England, guarded by -seas and sea-power, had a breathing-space allowed her, in which to -adjust the spirit of her people to the new conditions. That Germany -will not conquer us with her arms we may well feel confident. But -unless we conquer her with _our arms_--and this is a much longer -step--there is a considerable danger that she may yet conquer us with -_her ideas_. In that case the world will be thrown back several -hundred years; and the blame for this disaster, should it occur, will -be laid--and laid rightly--at the door of Democracy, because it vaunted -a system which it had neither the fortitude nor the strength to uphold. - - -[Sidenote: IRRECONCILABLE OPPOSITIONS] - -When we pass from the conflict between systems of government, and come -to the other conflict of ideas as to right and wrong, we find ourselves -faced with an antagonism which is wholly incapable of accommodation. -In this war the stakes are something more than any of the material -interests involved. It is a conflict where one faith is pitted against -another. No casuistry will reconcile the ideal which inspires English -policy with the ideal which inspires German policy. There is no -sense--nothing indeed but danger--in arguing round the circle to prove -that the rulers of these two nations are victims of some frightful -misunderstanding, and that really at the bottom of their hearts they -believe the same things. This is entirely untrue: they believe quite -different things; things indeed which are as nearly as possible -opposites. - -{174} - -Our own belief is old, ingrained, and universal. It is accepted -equally by the people and their rulers. We have held it so long that -the articles of our creed have become somewhat blurred in -outline--overgrown, like a memorial tablet, by moss and lichen. - -In the case of our enemy the tablet is new and the inscription sharp. -He who runs may read it in bold clear-cut lettering. But the belief of -the German people in the doctrine which has been carved upon the stone -is not yet universal, or anything like universal. It is not even -general. It is fully understood and accepted only in certain strata of -society; but it is responsible, without a doubt, for the making in cold -blood of the policy which has led to this war. When the hour struck -which the German rulers deemed favourable for conquest, war, according -to their creed, became the duty as well as the interest of the -Fatherland. - -But so soon as war had been declared, the German people were allowed -and even encouraged to believe that the making of war from motives of -self-interest was a crime against humanity--the Sin against the Holy -Ghost. They were allowed and encouraged to believe that the Allies -were guilty of this crime and sin. And not only this, but war itself, -which had been hymned in so many professorial rhapsodies, as a noble -and splendid restorer of vigour and virtue, was now execrated with -wailing and gnashing of teeth, as the most hideous of all human -calamities. - -It is clear from all this that the greater part of the German people -regarded war in exactly the same light as the whole of the English -people did. In itself it was a curse; and the man who deliberately -contrived it for his own ends, or even for those of his {175} country, -was a criminal. The German people applied the same tests as we did, -and it is not possible to doubt that in so doing they were perfectly -sincere. They acted upon instinct. They had not learned the later -doctrines of the pedantocracy, or how to steer by a new magnetic pole. -They still held by the old Christian rules as to duties which exist -between neighbours. To their simple old-fashioned loyalty what their -Kaiser said must be the truth. And what their Kaiser said was that the -Fatherland was attacked by treacherous foes. That was enough to banish -all doubts. For the common people that was the reality and the only -reality. Phrases about world-power and will-to-power--supposing they -had ever heard or noticed them--were only mouthfuls of strange words, -such as preachers of all kinds love to chew in the intervals of their -discourses. - -[Sidenote: APOSTASY OF THE PRIESTHOOD] - -When the priests and prophets found themselves at last confronted by -those very horrors which they had so often invoked, did their new-found -faith desert them, or was it only that their tongues, for some reason, -refused to speak the old jargon? Judging by their high-flown -indignation against the Allies it would rather seem as if, in the day -of wrath, they had hastily abandoned sophistication for the pious -memories of their unlettered childhood. Their apostasy was too well -done to have been hypocrisy. - -With the rulers it was different. They knew clearly enough what they -had done, what they were doing, and what they meant to do. When they -remained sympathetically silent, amid the popular babble about the -horrors of war and iniquity of peace-breakers, their tongues were not -paralysed by remorse--they were merely in their cheeks. Their {176} -sole concern was to humour public opinion, the results of whose -disapproval they feared, quite as much as they despised its judgment. - -That war draws out and gives scope to some of the noblest human -qualities, which in peace-time are apt to be hidden out of sight, no -one will deny. That it is a great getter-rid of words and phrases, -which have no real meaning behind them--that it is a great winnower of -true men from shams, of staunch men from boasters and blowers of their -own trumpets--that it is a great binder-together of classes, a great -purifier of the hearts of nations, there is no need to dispute. -Occasionally, though very rarely, it has proved itself to be a great -destroyer of misunderstanding between the combatants themselves. - -But although the whole of this is true, it does not lighten the guilt -of the deliberate peace-breaker. Many of the same benefits, though in -a lesser degree, arise out of a pestilence, a famine, or any other -great national calamity; and it is the acknowledged duty of man to -strive to the uttermost against these and to ward them off with all his -strength. It is the same with war. To argue, as German intellectuals -have done of late, that in order to expand their territories they were -justified in scattering infection and deliberately inviting this -plague, that the plague itself was a thing greatly for the advantage of -the moral sanitation of the world--all this is merely the casuistry of -a priesthood whom the vanity of rubbing elbows with men of action has -beguiled of their salvation. - -[Sidenote: THE ARROGANCE OF PEDANTS] - -Somewhere in one of his essays Emerson introduces an interlocutor whom -he salutes as 'little Sir.' One feels tempted to personify the whole -corporation of German pedants under the same title. When they {177} -talk so vehemently and pompously about the duty of deliberate -war-making for the expansion of the Fatherland, for the fulfilment of -the theory of evolution, even for the glory of God on high, our minds -are filled with wonder and a kind of pity. - -Have they ever seen war except in their dreams, or a countryside in -devastation? Have they ever looked with their own eyes on shattered -limbs, or faces defaced, of which cases, and the like, there are -already some hundreds of thousands in the hospitals of Europe, and may -be some millions before this war is ended? Have they ever -reckoned--except in columns of numerals without human meaning--how many -more hundreds of thousands, in the flower of their age, have died and -will die, or--more to be pitied--will linger on maimed and impotent -when the war is ended? Have they realised any of these things, except -in diagrams, and curves, and statistical tables, dealing with the -matter--as they would say themselves, in their own dull and dry -fashion--'under its broader aspects'--in terms, that is, of population, -food-supply, and economic output? - -Death, and suffering of many sorts occur in all wars--even in the most -humane war. And this is not a humane war which the pedants have let -loose upon us. Indeed, they have taught with some emphasis that -humanity, under such conditions, is altogether a mistake. - -"Sentimentality!" cries the 'little Sir' impatiently, "sickly -sentimentality! In a world of men such things must be. God has -ordained war." - -Possibly. But what one feels is that the making of war is the Lord's -own business and not the 'little Sir's.' It is the Lord's, as -vengeance is, and {178} earthquakes, floods, and droughts; not an -office to be undertaken by mortals. - -The 'little Sir,' however, has devised a new order for the world, and -apparently he will never rest satisfied until Heaven itself conforms to -his initiative. He is audacious, for like the Titans he has challenged -Zeus. But at times we are inclined to wonder--is he not perhaps trying -too much? Is he not in fact engaged in an attempt to outflank -Providence, whose pivot is infinity? And for this he is relying solely -upon the resources of his own active little finite mind. He presses -his attack most gallantly against human nature--back and forwards, up -and down--but opposing all his efforts is there not a screen of -adamantine crystal which cannot be pierced, of interminable superficies -which cannot be circumvented? Is he not in some ways like a wasp, -which beats itself angrily against a pane of glass? - - - -[1] Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Jay. - - - - -PART III - -THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY - - - -I saw then in my dream that he went on _thus_, even until he came at a -bottom, where he saw, a little out of the way, three Men fast asleep -with Fetters upon their heels. - -The name of the one was _Simple_, another _Sloth_, and the third -_Presumption_. - -_Christian_ then seeing them lie in this case, went to them, if -Peradventure he might awake them. And cried, you are like them that -sleep on the top of a Mast, for the dead Sea is under you, a Gulf that -hath no bottom. Awake therefore and come away; be willing also, and I -will help you off with your Irons. He also told them, If he that goeth -about like a _roaring Lion_ comes by, you will certainly become a prey -to his teeth. - -With that they lookt upon him, and began to reply in this sort: -_Simple_ said, _I see no danger_; _Sloth_ said, _Yet a little more -sleep_; and _Presumption_ said, _Every Vat must stand upon his own -bottom_. And so they lay down to sleep again, and _Christian_ went on -his way. - -_The Pilgrim's Progress_. - - - - -{181} - -CHAPTER I - -A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD - -(_January_ 1901-_July_ 1914) - -It is not true to say that this is a war between the rival principles -of democracy and autocracy. A too great absorption in our own -particular sector of the situation has led certain writers to put -forward, as a general explanation, this formula which is not only -inadequate, but misleading. The real issue is something wider and -deeper than a struggle between forms of government. It is concerned -with the groundwork of human beliefs. - -And yet it is unquestionably true to say, that by reason of Germany's -procedure, this war is being waged against democracy--not perhaps by -intention, but certainly in effect. For if the Allies should be -defeated, or even if they should fail to conquer their present enemies, -the result must necessarily be wounding to the credit of popular -institutions all the world over, fatal to their existence in Europe at -any rate, fatal conceivably at no long distance of time to their -existence elsewhere than in Europe. For mankind, we may be sure, is -not going to put up with any kind of government merely because it is -ideally beautiful. No system will be tolerated {182} indefinitely -which does not enable the people who live under it to protect -themselves from their enemies. The instinct of self-preservation will -drive them to seek for some other political arrangement which is -competent, in the present imperfect condition of the world, to provide -the first essential of a state, which is Security. - -But although the whole fabric of democracy is threatened by this war, -the principle of autocracy is not challenged by it either directly or -indirectly. France and England are not fighting against personal -monarchy any more than Russia is fighting against popular government. -So far as the forms of constitutions are concerned each of the Allies -would be well content to live and let live. They are none of them -spurred on by propagandist illusions like the armies of the First -Republic. Among Russians, devotion to their own institutions, and -attachment to the person of their Emperor are inspired not merely by -dictates of political expediency and patriotism, but also by their -sense of religious duty.[1] It is inconceivable that the national -spirit of Russia could ever have been roused to universal enthusiasm -merely in order to fight the battles of democracy. And yet Russia is -now ranged side by side with the French Republic and the British -Commonwealth in perfect unison. What has induced her to submit to -sacrifices--less indeed than those of Belgium, but equal to those of -France, and much greater so far than our own--unless some issue was at -stake wider and deeper even than the future of popular government? - -The instincts of a people are vague and obscure. The reasons which are -put forward, the motives {183} which appear upon the surface, the -provocations which lead to action, the immediate ends which are sought -after and pursued, rarely explain the true causes or proportions of any -great national struggle. But for all that, the main issue, as a rule, -is realised by the masses who are engaged, although it is not realised -through the medium of coherent argument or articulate speech. - -The present war is a fight, not between democracy and autocracy, but -between the modern spirit of Germany and the unchanging spirit of -civilisation. And it is well to bear in mind that the second of these -is not invincible. It has suffered defeat before now, at various -epochs in the world's history, when attacked by the same forces which -assail it to-day. Barbarism is not any the less barbarism because it -employs weapons of precision, because it avails itself of the -discoveries of science and the mechanism of finance, or because it -thinks it worth while to hire bands of learned men to shriek pæans in -its praise and invectives against its victims. Barbarism is not any -the less barbarism because its methods are up to date. It is known for -what it is by the ends which it pursues and the spirit in which it -pursues them. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN MATERIALISM] - -The modern spirit of Germany is materialism in its crudest form--the -undistracted pursuit of wealth, and of power as a means to wealth. It -is materialism, rampant and self-confident, fostered by the -state--subsidised, regulated, and, where thought advisable, controlled -by the state--supported everywhere by the diplomatic resources of the -state--backed in the last resort by the fleets and armies of the state. -It is the most highly organised machine, {184} the most deliberate and -thorough-going system, for arriving at material ends which has ever yet -been devised by man. It is far more efficient, but not a whit less -material, than 'Manchesterism' of the Victorian era, which placed its -hopes in 'free' competition, and also than that later development of -trusts and syndicates--hailing from America--which aims at levying -tribute on society by means of 'voluntary' co-operation. And just as -the English professors, who fell prostrate in adoration before the -prosperity of cotton-spinners, found no difficulty in placing -self-interest upon the loftiest pedestal of morality, so German -professors have succeeded in erecting for the joint worship of the -Golden Calf and the War-god Wotun, high twin altars which look down -with pity and contempt upon the humbler shrines of the Christian faith. - -The morality made in Manchester has long ago lost its reputation. That -which has been made in Germany more recently must in the end follow -suit; for, like its predecessor, it is founded upon a false conception -of human nature and cannot endure. But in the interval, if it be -allowed to triumph, it may work evil, in comparison with which that -done by our own devil-take-the-hindmost philosophers sinks into -insignificance. - -[Sidenote: WANT OF A NATIONAL POLICY] - -Looking at the present war from the standpoint of the Allies, the -object of it is to repel the encroachments of materialism, working its -way through the ruin of ideas, which have been cherished always, save -in the dark ages when civilisation was overwhelmed by barbarism. -Looking at the matter from our own particular standpoint, it is also -incidentally a struggle for the existence of democracy. The chief -question {185} we have to ask ourselves is whether our people will -fight for their faith and traditions with the same skill and courage as -the Germans for their material ends? Will they endure sacrifices with -the same fortitude as France and Russia? Will they face the inevitable -eagerly and promptly, or will they play the laggard and by delay ruin -all--themselves most of all? ... This war is not going to be won for us -by other people, or by some miraculous intervention of Providence, or -by the Germans running short of copper, or by revolutions in Berlin, -nor even by the break-up of the Austrian Empire. In order to win it we -shall have to put out our full strength, to organise our resources in -men and material as we have never done before during the whole of our -history. We have not accomplished these things as yet, although we -have expressed our determination, and are indeed willing to attempt -them. We were taken by surprise, and the immediate result has been a -great confusion, very hard to disentangle. - -Considering how little, before war began, our people had been taken -into the confidence of successive governments, as to the relations of -the British Empire with the outside world; how little education of -opinion there had been, as to risks, and dangers, and means of defence; -how little leading and clear guidance, both before and since, as to -duties--considering all these omissions one can only marvel that the -popular response has been what it is, and that the confusion was not -many times worse. - -What was the mood of the British race when this war broke upon them so -unexpectedly? To what extent were they provided against it in a -material sense? And still more important, how far were {186} their -minds and hearts prepared to encounter it? It is important to -understand those things, but in order to do this it is necessary to -look back over a few years. - - -By a coincidence which may prove convenient to historians, the end of -the nineteenth century marked the beginning of a new epoch[2]--an -interlude, of brief duration as it proved--upon which the curtain was -rung down shortly before midnight on the 4th of August 1914. - -Between these two dates, in a space of something over thirteen years, -events had happened in a quick succession, both within the empire and -abroad, which disturbed or dissolved many ancient understandings. The -spirit of change had been busy with mankind, and needs unknown to a -former generation had grown clamorous. Objects of hope had presented -themselves, driving old ideas to the wall, and unforeseen dangers had -produced fresh groupings, compacts, and associations between states, -and parties, and individual men. - -In Europe during this period the manifest determination of Germany to -challenge the naval supremacy of Britain, by the creation of a fleet -designed and projected as the counterpart of her overwhelming army, had -threatened the security of the whole continent, and had put France, -Russia, and England upon terms not far removed from those of an -alliance. The gravity of this emergency had induced our politicians to -exclude, for the time being, this department of public affairs from the -bitterness of their party struggles; and it had also drawn {187} the -governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions into relations -closer than ever before, for the purpose of mutual defence.[3] - -[Sidenote: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EAST] - -In the meanwhile there had been developments even more startling in the -hitherto unchanging East. Japan, as the result of a great war,[4] had -become a first-class power, redoubtable both by sea and land. China, -the most populous, the most ancient, and the most conservative of -despotisms, had suddenly sought her salvation under the milder -institutions of a republic.[5] - -The South African war, ended by the Peace of Pretoria, had paved the -way for South African Union.[6] The achievement of this endeavour had -been applauded by men of all parties; some finding in it a welcome -confirmation of their theories with regard to liberty and -self-government; others again drawing from it encouragement to a still -bolder undertaking. For if South Africa had made a precedent, the -existing state of the world had supplied a motive, for the closer union -of the empire. - -Within the narrower limits of the United Kingdom changes had also -occurred within this period which, from another point of view, were -equally momentous. In 1903 Mr. Chamberlain had poured new wine into -old bottles, and in so doing had hastened the inevitable end of -Unionist predominance by changing on a sudden the direction of party -policy. In the unparalleled defeat which ensued two and a half years -later the Labour party appeared for the first time, formidable both in -numbers and ideas. - -A revolution had likewise been proceeding in {188} our institutions as -well as in the minds of our people. The balance of the state had been -shifted by a curtailment of the powers of the House of Lords[7]--the -first change which had been made by statute in the fundamental -principle of the Constitution since the passing of the Act of -Settlement.[8] In July 1914 further changes of a similar character, -hardly less important under a practical aspect, were upon the point of -receiving the Royal Assent.[9] - -Both these sets of changes--that which had been already accomplished -and the other which was about to pass into law--had this in common, -that even upon the admissions of their own authors they were -incomplete. Neither in the Parliament Act nor in the Home Rule Act was -there finality. The composition of the Second Chamber had been set -down for early consideration, whilst a revision of the constitutional -relations between England, Scotland, and Wales was promised so soon as -the case of Ireland had been dealt with. - -It seemed as if the modern spirit had at last, in earnest, opened an -inquisition upon the adequacy of our ancient unwritten compact, which -upon the whole, had served its purpose well for upwards of two hundred -years. It seemed as if that compact were in the near future to be -tested thoroughly, and examined in respect of its fitness for dealing -with the needs of the time--with the complexities and the vastness of -the British Empire--with the evils which prey upon us from within, and -with the dangers which threaten us from without. - -Questioners were not drawn from one party alone. {189} They were -pressing forwards from all sides. It was not merely the case of -Ireland, or the powers of the Second Chamber, or its composition, or -the general congestion of business, or the efficiency of the House of -Commons: it was the whole machinery of government which seemed to need -overhauling and reconsideration in the light of new conditions. Most -important of all these constitutional issues was that which concerned -the closer union of the Empire. - -[Sidenote: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES] - -It was little more than eighty years since the Iron Duke had described -the British Constitution as an incomparably devised perfection which -none but a madman would seek to change. That was not now the creed of -any political party or indeed of any thinking man. No one was -satisfied with things as they were. Many of the most respectable old -phrases had become known for empty husks, out of which long since had -dropped whatever seed they may originally have contained. Many of the -old traditions were dead or sickly, and their former adherents were now -wandering at large, like soldiers in the middle ages, when armies were -disbanded in foreign parts, seeking a new allegiance, and constituting -in the meanwhile a danger to security and the public peace. - -And also, within this brief period, the highest offices had become -vacant, and many great figures had passed from the scene. Two -sovereigns had died full of honour. Two Prime Ministers had also died, -having first put off the burden of office, each at the zenith of his -popularity. Of the two famous men upon the Unionist side who remained -when Lord Salisbury tendered his resignation, the one since 1906 had -been wholly withdrawn from public life, {190} while the other, four -years later, had passed the leadership into younger hands.[10] - -There is room for an almost infinite variety of estimate as to the -influence which is exercised by pre-eminent characters upon public -affairs and national ideals. The verdict of the day after is always -different from that of a year after. The verdict of the next -generation, while differing from both, is apt to be markedly different -from that of the generation which follows it. The admiration or -censure of the moment is followed by a reaction no less surely than the -reaction itself is followed by a counter-reaction. Gradually the -oscillations become shorter, as matters pass out of the hands of -journalists and politicians into those of the historian. Possibly -later judgments are more true. We have more knowledge, of a kind. -Seals are broken one by one, and we learn how this man really thought -and how the other acted, in both cases differently from what had been -supposed. We have new facts submitted to us, and possibly come nearer -the truth. But while we gain so much, we also lose in other -directions. We lose the sharp savour of the air. The keen glance and -alert curiosity of contemporary vigilance are lacking. Conditions and -circumstances are no longer clear, and as generation after generation -passes away they become more dim. The narratives of the great -historians and novelists are to a large extent either faded or false. -We do not trust the most vivid presentments written by the man of -genius in his study a century after the event, while we know well that -even the shrewdest of contemporaneous observers is certain to omit many -{191} of the essentials. If Macaulay is inadequate in one direction, -Pepys is equally inadequate in another. And if the chronicler at the -moment, and the historian in the future are not to be wholly believed, -the writer who comments after a decade or less upon things which are -fresh in his memory is liable to another form of error; for either he -is swept away by the full current of the reaction, or else his -judgments are embittered by a sense of the hopelessness of swimming -against it. - -[Sidenote: DEATH OF QUEEN VICTORIA] - -This much, however, may be said safely--that the withdrawal of any -pre-eminent character from the scene, whether it be Queen Victoria or -King Edward, Lord Salisbury or Mr. Chamberlain, produces in a greater -or less degree that same loosening of allegiance and disturbance of -ideas, which are so much dreaded by the conservative temperament from -the removal of an ancient institution. For a pre-eminent character is -of the same nature as an institution. The beliefs, loyalties, and -ideals of millions were attached to the personality of the Queen. The -whole of that prestige which Queen Victoria drew from the awe, -reverence, affection, and prayers of her people could not be passed -along with the crown to King Edward. The office of sovereign was for -the moment stripped and impoverished of some part of its strength, and -was only gradually replenished as the new monarch created a new, and to -some extent a different, loyalty of his own. So much is a truism. -But, when there is already a ferment in men's minds, the disappearance -in rapid succession of the pre-eminent characters of the age helps on -revolution by putting an end to a multitude of customary attachments, -and by setting sentiments adrift to wander in search of new heroes. - -{192} - -A change of some importance had also come over the character of the -House of Commons. The old idea that it was a kind of grand jury of -plain men, capable in times of crisis of breaking with their parties, -had at last finally disappeared. In politics there was no longer any -place for plain men. The need was for professionals, and professionals -of this sort, like experts in other walks of life, were worthy of their -hire. - -The decision to pay members of Parliament came as no surprise. The -marvel was rather that it had not been taken at an earlier date, seeing -that for considerably more than a century this item had figured in the -programmes of all advanced reformers. The change, nevertheless, when -it came, was no trivial occurrence, but one which was bound -fundamentally to affect the character of the popular assembly; whether -for better or worse was a matter of dispute. - -Immense, however, as were the possibilities contained in the conversion -of unpaid amateurs into professional and stipendiary politicians, what -excited even more notice at the time than the thing itself, were the -means by which it was accomplished. No attempt was made to place this -great constitutional reform definitely and securely upon the statute -book. To have followed this course would have meant submitting a bill, -and a bill would have invited discussion at all its various stages. -Moreover, the measure might have been challenged by the House of Lords, -in which case delay would have ensued; and a subject, peculiarly -susceptible to malicious misrepresentation, would have been -kept--possibly for so long as three years--under the critical eyes of -public opinion. {193} Apparently this beneficent proposal was one of -those instances, so rare in modern political life, where neither -publicity nor advertisement was sought. On the contrary, the object -seemed to be to do good by stealth; and for this purpose a simple -financial resolution was all that the law required. The Lords had -recently been warned off and forbidden to interfere with money matters, -their judgment being under suspicion, owing to its supposed liability -to be affected by motives of self-interest. The House of Commons was -therefore sole custodian of the public purse; and in this capacity its -members were invited to vote themselves four hundred pounds a year all -round, as the shortest and least ostentatious way of raising the -character and improving the quality of the people's representatives. - -[Sidenote: CHANGE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS] - -Even by July 1914 the effect of this constitutional amendment upon our -old political traditions had become noticeable in various directions. -But the means by which it was accomplished are no less worthy of note -than the reform itself, when we are endeavouring to estimate the -changes which have come over Parliament during this short but -revolutionary epoch. The method adopted seemed to indicate a novel -attitude on the part of members of the House of Commons towards the -Imperial Exchequer, on the part of the Government towards members of -the House of Commons, and on the part of both towards the people whom -they trusted. It was adroit, expeditious, and businesslike; and to -this extent seemed to promise well for years to come, when the -professionals should have finally got rid of the amateurs, and taken -things wholly into their own hands. Hostile critics, it is true, -denounced the {194} reform bluntly as corruption, and the method of its -achievement as furtive and cynical; but for this class of persons no -slander is ever too gross--_They have said. Quhat say they? Let them -be saying_. - - -The party leaders were probably neither worse men nor better than they -had been in the past; but they were certainly smaller; while on the -other hand the issues with which they found themselves confronted were -bigger. - -Great characters are like tent-pegs. One of their uses is to prevent -the political camp from being blown to ribbons. Where they are too -short or too frail, we may look for such disorders as have repeated -themselves at intervals during the past few years. A blast of anger or -ill-temper has blown, or a gust of sentiment, or even a gentle zephyr -of sentimentality, and the whole scene has at once become a confusion -of flapping canvas, tangled cordage, and shouting, struggling humanity. -Such unstable conditions are fatal to equanimity; they disturb the -fortitude of the most stalwart follower, and cause doubt and distrust -on every hand. - -Since the Liberal Government came into power in the autumn of 1905, -neither of the great parties had succeeded in earning the respect of -the other; and as the nature of man is not subject to violent -fluctuations, it may safely be concluded that this misfortune had been -due either to some defect or inadequacy of leadership, or else to -conditions of an altogether extraordinary character. - -During these ten sessions the bulk of the statute book had greatly -increased, and much of this increase was no doubt healthy tissue. This -period, notwithstanding, {195} will ever dwell in the memory as a -squalid episode. Especially is this the case when we contrast the high -hopes and promises, not of one party alone, with the results which were -actually achieved. - -[Sidenote: DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIP] - -Democracy, if the best, is also the most delicate form of human -government. None suffers so swiftly or so sorely from any shortage in -the crop of character. None is so dependent upon men, and so little -capable of being supported by the machine alone. When the leading of -parties is in the hands of those who lack vision and firmness, the -first effect which manifests itself is that parties begin to slip their -principles. Some secondary object calls for and obtains the sacrifice -of an ideal. So the Unionists in 1909 threw over the order and -tradition of the state, the very ark of their political covenant, when -they procured the rejection of the Budget by the House of Lords. So -the Liberal Government in 1910, having solemnly undertaken to reform -the constitution--a work not unworthy of the most earnest -endeavour--went back upon their word, and abandoned their original -purpose. For one thing they grew afraid of the clamour of their -partisans. For another they were tempted by the opportunity of -advantages which--as they fondly imagined--could be easily and safely -secured during the interval while all legislative powers were -temporarily vested in the Commons. Nor were these the only instances -where traditional policy had been diverted, and where ideals had been -bargained away, in the hope that thereby objects of a more material -sort might be had at once in exchange. - -The business of leadership is to prevent the abandonment of the long -aim for the sake of the short. The rank and file of every army is at -all times most {196} dangerously inclined to this fatal temptation, not -necessarily dishonestly, but from a lack of foresight and sense of -proportion. - -Some dim perception of cause and effect had begun to dawn during the -years 1912 and 1913 upon the country, and even upon the more sober -section of the politicians. An apprehension had been growing rapidly, -and defied concealment, that the country was faced by a very formidable -something, to which men hesitated to give a name, but which was clearly -not to be got rid of by the customary methods of holding high debates -about it, and thereafter marching into division lobbies. While in -public, each party was concerned to attribute the appearance of this -unwelcome monster solely to the misdeeds of their opponents, each party -knew well enough in their hearts that the danger was due at least in -some measure to their own abandonment of pledges, principles, and -traditions. - -At Midsummer 1914 most people would probably have said that the -immediate peril was Ireland and civil war. A few months earlier many -imagined that trouble of a more general character was brewing between -the civil and military powers, and that an issue which they described -as that of 'the Army versus the People' would have to be faced. A few -years earlier there was a widespread fear that the country might be -confronted by some organised stoppage of industry, and that this would -lead to revolution. Throughout the whole of this period of fourteen -years the menace of war with Germany had been appearing, and -disappearing, and reappearing, very much as a whale shows his back, -dives, rises at some different spot, and dives again. For the moment, -{197} however, this particular anxiety did not weigh heavily on the -public mind. The man in the street had been assured of late by the -greater part of the press and politicians--even by ministers -themselves--that our relations with this formidable neighbour were -friendlier and more satisfactory than they had been for some -considerable time. - - -[Sidenote: MR. ASQUITH'S PRE-EMINENCE] - -At Midsummer 1914, that is to say about six weeks before war broke out, -the pre-eminent character in British politics was the Prime Minister. -No other on either side of the House approached him in prestige, and so -much was freely admitted by foes as well as friends. - -When we are able to arrive at a fair estimate of the man who is -regarded as the chief figure of his age, we have an important clue to -the aspirations and modes of thought of the period in which he lived. -A people may be known to some extent by the leaders whom it has chosen -to follow. - -Mr. Asquith entered Parliament in 1886, and before many months had -passed his reputation was secure. Mr. Gladstone, ever watchful for -youthful talent, promoted him at a bound to be Home Secretary, when the -Cabinet of 1892 came into precarious existence. No member of this -government justified his selection more admirably. But the period of -office was brief. Three years later, the Liberal party found itself -once again in the wilderness, where it continued to wander, rent by -dissensions both as to persons and principles, for rather more than a -decade. - -When Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman returned to office in the autumn of -1905, Mr. Asquith became {198} Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was -speedily accepted as the minister next in succession to his chief. He -was then just turned fifty, so that, despite the delays which had -occurred, it could not be said that fortune had behaved altogether -unkindly. Two and a half years later, in April 1908, he succeeded to -the premiership without a rival, and without a dissentient voice. - -The ambition, however, which brought him so successfully to the highest -post appeared to have exhausted a great part of its force in -attainment, and to have left its possessor without sufficient energy -for exercising those functions which the post itself required. The -career of Mr. Asquith in the highest office reminds one a little of the -fable of the Hare and the Tortoise. In the race which we all run with -slow-footed fate, he had a signal advantage in the speed of his -intellect, in his capacity for overtaking arrears of work which would -have appalled any other minister, and for finding, on the spur of the -moment, means for extricating his administration from the most -threatening positions. But of late, like the Hare, he had come to -believe himself invincible, and had yielded more and more to a drowsy -inclination. He had seemed to fall asleep for long periods, apparently -in serene confidence that, before the Tortoise could pass the -winning-post, somebody or something--in all probability the Unionist -party with the clamour of a premature jubilation--would awaken him in -time to save the race. - -So far as Parliament was concerned, his confidence in his own qualities -was not misplaced. Again and again, the unleadered energies or -ungoaded indolence of his colleagues landed the Government {199} in a -mess. But as often as this happened Mr. Asquith always advanced upon -the scene and rescued his party, by putting the worst blunder in the -best light. He obligingly picked his stumbling lieutenants out of the -bogs into which--largely, it must be admitted, for want of proper -guidance from their chief--they had had the misfortune to fall. Having -done this in the most chivalrous manner imaginable, he earned their -gratitude and devotion. In this way he maintained a firm hold upon the -leadership; if indeed it can properly be termed leadership to be the -best acrobat of the troupe, and to step forward and do the feats after -your companions have failed, and the audience has begun to 'boo.' - -[Sidenote: WAIT AND SEE] - -Some years ago Mr. Asquith propounded a maxim--_wait-and-see_--which -greatly scandalised and annoyed the other side. This formula was the -perfectly natural expression of his character and policy. In the -peculiar circumstances of the case it proved itself to be a successful -parliamentary expedient. Again and again it wrought confusion among -his simple-minded opponents, who--not being held together by any firm -authority--followed their own noses, now in one direction, now in -another, upon the impulse of the moment. It is probable that against a -powerful leader, who had his party well in hand, this policy of -makeshift and delay would have brought its author to grief. But -Unionists were neither disciplined nor united, and they had lacked -leadership ever since they entered upon opposition. - -For all its excellency, Mr. Asquith's oratory never touched the heart. -And very rarely indeed did it succeed in convincing the cool judgment -of people who had experience at first hand of the matters {200} under -discussion. There was lacking anything in the nature of a personal -note, which might have related the ego of the speaker to the sentiments -which he announced so admirably. Also there was something which -suggested that his knowledge had not been gained by looking at the -facts face to face; but rather by the rapid digestion of minutes and -memoranda, which had been prepared for him by clerks and secretaries, -and which purported to provide, in convenient tabloids, all that it was -necessary for a parliamentarian to know. - -The style of speaking which is popular nowadays, and of which Mr. -Asquith is by far the greatest master, would not have been listened to -with an equal favour in the days of our grandfathers. In the -Parliaments which assembled at Westminster in the period between the -passing of the Reform Bill and the founding of the Eighty Club,[11] the -country-gentlemen and the men-of-business--two classes of humanity who -are constantly in touch with, and drawing strength from, our mother -earth of hard fact[12]--met and fought out their differences during two -generations. In that golden age it was all but unthinkable that a -practising barrister should ever have become Prime Minister. The legal -profession at this time had but little influence in counsel; still less -in Parliament and on the platform. The middle classes were every whit -as jealous and distrustful {201} of the intervention of the -lawyer-advocate in public affairs as the landed gentry themselves. But -in the stage of democratic evolution, which we entered on the morrow of -the Mid-Lothian campaigns, and in which we still remain, the popular, -and even the parliamentary, audience has gradually ceased to consist -mainly of country-gentlemen interested in the land, and of the -middle-classes who are engaged in trade. It has grown to be at once -less discriminating as to the substance of speeches, and more exacting -as to their form. - -[Sidenote: POLITICAL LAWYERS] - -A representative assembly which entirely lacked lawyers would be -impoverished; but one in which they are the predominant, or even a very -important element, is usually in its decline. It is strange that an -order of men, who in their private and professional capacities are so -admirable, should nevertheless produce baleful effects when they come -to play too great a part in public affairs. Trusty friends, delightful -companions, stricter perhaps than any other civil profession in all -rules of honour, they are none the less, without seeking to be so, the -worst enemies of representative institutions. The peculiar danger of -personal monarchy is that it so easily submits to draw its inspiration -from an adulatory priesthood, and the peculiar danger of that modern -form of constitutional government which we call democracy, is that -lawyers, with the most patriotic intentions, are so apt to undo it. - -Lawyers see too much of life in one way, too little in another, to make -them safe guides in practical matters. Their experience of human -affairs is made up of an infinite number of scraps cut out of other -people's lives. They learn and do hardly anything {202} except through -intermediaries. Their clients are introduced, not in person, but in -the first instance, on paper--through the medium of solicitors' -'instructions.' Litigants appear at consultations in their counsel's -chambers under the chaperonage of their attorneys; their case is -considered; they receive advice. Then perhaps, if the issue comes into -court, they appear once again, in the witness-box, and are there -examined, cross-examined, and re-examined under that admirable system -for the discovery of truth which is ordained in Anglo-Saxon countries, -and which consists in turning, for the time being, nine people in every -ten out of their true natures into hypnotised rabbits. Then the whole -thing is ended, and the client disappears into the void from whence he -came. What happens to him afterwards seldom reaches the ears of his -former counsel. Whether the advice given to him in consultation has -proved right or wrong in practice, rarely becomes known to the great -man who gave it. - -Plausibility, an alert eye for the technical trip or fall--the great -qualities of an advocate--do not necessarily imply judgment of the most -valuable sort outside courts of law. The farmer who manures, ploughs, -harrows, sows, and rolls in his crop is punished in his income, if he -has done any one of these things wrongly, or at the wrong season. The -shopkeeper who blunders in his buying or his selling, or the -manufacturer who makes things as they should not be made, suffers -painful consequences to a certainty. His error pounds him relentlessly -on the head. Not so the lawyer. His errors for the most part are -visited on others. His own success or non-success is largely a matter -of words and pose. If he is confident and {203} adroit, the dulness of -the jury or the senility of the bench can be made to appear, in the -eyes of the worsted client, as the true causes of his defeat. And the -misfortune is that in politics, which under its modern aspect is a -trade very much akin to advocacy, there is a temptation, with all but -the most patriotic lawyers, to turn to account at Westminster the skill -which they have so laboriously acquired in the Temple. - -Of course there have been, and will ever be, exceptions. Alexander -Hamilton was a lawyer, though he was a soldier in the first instance. -Abraham Lincoln was a lawyer. But we should have to go back to the -'glorious revolution' of 1688 before we could find a parallel to either -of these two in our own history. Until the last two decades England -has never looked favourably on lawyer leaders. This was regarded by -some as a national peculiarity; by others as a safeguard of our -institutions. But by the beginning of the twentieth century it was -clear that lawyers had succeeded in establishing their predominance in -the higher walks of English politics, as thoroughly as they had already -done wherever parliamentary government exists throughout the world. - -[Sidenote: MR. ASQUITH'S ORATORY] - -During this epoch, when everything was sacrificed to perspicuity and -the avoidance of boredom, Mr. Asquith's utterances led the fashion. -His ministry was composed to a large extent of politicians bred in the -same profession and proficient in the same arts as himself; but he -towered above them all, the supreme type of the lawyer-statesman. - -His method was supremely skilful. In its own way it had the charm of -perfect artistry, even though {204} the product of the art was hardly -more permanent than that of the _cordon bleu_ who confections ices in -fancy patterns. And not only was the method well suited to the taste -of popular audiences, but equally so to the modern House of Commons. -That body, also, was now much better educated in matters which can be -learned out of newspapers and books; far more capable of expressing its -meanings in well-chosen phrases arranged in a logical sequence; far -more critical of words--if somewhat less observant of things--than it -was during the greater part of the reign of Queen Victoria. - -To a large extent the House of Commons consisted of persons with whom -public utterance was a trade. There were lawyers in vast numbers, -journalists, political organisers, and professional lecturers on a -large variety of subjects. And even among the labour party, where we -might have expected to find a corrective, the same tendency was at -work, perhaps as strongly as in any other quarter. For although few -types of mankind have a shrewder judgment between reality and dialectic -than a thoroughly competent 'workman,' labour leaders were not chosen -because they were first-class workmen, but because they happened to be -effective speakers on the platform or at the committee table. - -To a critic, looking on at the play from outside, Mr. Asquith's oratory -appeared to lack heart and the instinct for reality; his leadership, -the qualities of vigilance, steadfastness, and authority. He did not -prevail by personal force, but by adroit confutation. His debating, as -distinguished from his political, courage would have been admitted with -few reservations even by an opponent. {205} Few were so ready to meet -their enemies in the gate of discussion. Few, if any, were so capable -of retrieving the fortunes of their party--even when things looked -blackest--if it were at all possible to accomplish this by the weapons -of debate. But the medium must be debate--not action or counsel--if -Mr. Asquith's pre-eminence was to assert itself. In debate he had all -the confidence and valour of the _maître d'armes_, who knows himself to -be the superior in skill of any fencer in his own school. - -[Sidenote: HIS CHARACTER] - -Next to Lord Rosebery he was the figure of most authority among the -Liberal Imperialists, and yet this did not sustain his resolution when -the Cabinet of 1905 proceeded to pare down the naval estimates. He was -the champion of equal justice, as regards the status of Trades Unions, -repelling the idea of exceptional and favouring legislation with an -eloquent scorn. Yet he continued to hold his place when his principles -were thrown overboard by his colleagues in 1906. Again when he met -Parliament in February 1910 he announced his programme with an air of -heroic firmness.[13] It is unnecessary to recall the particulars of -this episode, and how he was upheld in his command only upon condition -that he would alter his course to suit the wishes of mutineers. And in -regard to the question of Home Rule, his treatment of it from first to -last had been characterised by the virtues of patience and humility, -rather than by those of prescience or courage. - -A 'stellar and undiminishable' something, around which the qualities -and capacities of a man revolve obediently, and under harmonious -restraint--like {206} the planetary bodies--is perhaps as near as we -can get to a definition of human greatness. But in the case of Mr. -Asquith, for some years prior to July 1914, the central force of his -nature had seemed inadequate for imposing the law of its will upon -those brilliant satellites his talents. As a result, the solar system -of his character had fallen into confusion, and especially since the -opening of that year had appeared to be swinging lop-sided across the -political firmament hastening to inevitable disaster. - - - -[1] Cf. 'Russia and her Ideals,' _Round Table_, December 1914. - -[2] Queen Victoria died on January 22, 1901. - -[3] Imperial Conference on Defence, summer of 1909. - -[4] 1904-1905. - -[5] 1911. - -[6] May 1902. - -[7] Parliament Act became law August 1911. - -[8] 1689. - -[9] Home Rule Bill became law August 1914. - -[10] Mr. Chamberlain died July 2, 1914; Mr. Balfour resigned the -leadership of the Unionist party on November 8, 1911. - -[11] 1832-1880. - -[12] They had an excellent sense of reality as regards their own -affairs, and there between them covered a fairly wide area; but they -were singularly lacking either in sympathy or imagination with regard -to the affairs of other nations and classes. Their interest in the -poor was confined for the most part to criticism of _one another_ with -regard to conditions of labour. The millowners thought that the -oppression of the peasantry was a scandal; while the landowners -considered that the state of things prevailing in factories was much -worse than slavery. Cf. Disraeli's _Sybil_. - -[13] _I.e._ curtailment of the powers of the House of Lords and its -reform. Only the first was proceeded with. - - - - -{207} - -CHAPTER II - -THREE GOVERNING IDEAS - -At the death of Queen Victoria the development of the British -Commonwealth entered upon a new phase. The epoch which followed has no -precedent in our own previous experience as a nation, nor can we -discover in the records of other empires anything which offers more -than a superficial and misleading resemblance to it. The issues of -this period presented themselves to different minds in a variety of -different lights; but to all it was clear that we had reached one of -the great turning-points in our history. - -The passengers on a great ocean liner are apt to imagine, because their -stomachs are now so little troubled by the perturbation of the waves, -that it no longer profits them to offer up the familiar prayer 'for -those in peril on the sea.' It is difficult for them to believe in -danger where everything appears so steady and well-ordered, and where -they can enjoy most of the distractions of urban life, from a -cinematograph theatre to a skittle-alley, merely by descending a gilded -staircase or crossing a brightly panelled corridor. But this agreeable -sense of safety is perhaps due in a greater degree to fancy, than to -the changes which have taken place in the essential facts. As dangers -have been diminished in one direction {208} risks have been incurred in -another. A blunder to-day is more irreparable than formerly, and the -havoc which ensues upon a blunder is vastly more appalling. An error -of observation or of judgment--the wrong lever pulled or the wrong -button pressed--an order which miscarries or is overlooked--and twenty -thousand tons travelling at twenty knots an hour goes to the bottom, -with its freight of humanity, merchandise, and treasure, more easily, -and with greater speed and certainty, than in the days of the old -galleons--than in the days when Drake, in the _Golden Hind_ of a -hundred tons burden, beat up against head winds in the Straits of -Magellan, and ran before the following gale off the Cape of Storms. - -Comfort, whether in ships of travel or of state, is not the same thing -as security. It never has been, and it never will be. - -The position after Queen Victoria's death also differed from all -previous times in another way. After more than three centuries of -turmoil and expansion, the British race had entered into possession of -an estate so vast, so rich in all natural resources, that a sane mind -could not hope for, or even dream of, any further aggrandisement. -Whatever may be the diseases from which the British race suffered -during the short epoch between January 1901 and July 1914, megalomania -was certainly not one of them. - -The period of acquisition being now acknowledged at an end, popular -imagination became much occupied with other things. It assumed, too -lightly and readily perhaps, that nothing was likely to interfere with -our continuing to hold what we had got. If there was not precisely a -law of nature, which precluded the possessions of the British Empire -from ever being {209} taken away, at any rate there was the law of -nations. The public opinion of the world would surely revolt against -so heinous a form of sacrilege. Having assumed so much, placidly and -contentedly, and without even a tremor either as to the good-will or -the potency of the famous Concert of Europe, the larger part of public -opinion tended to become more and more engrossed in other problems. It -began to concern itself earnestly with _the improvement of the -condition of the people_, and with _the reform and consolidation of -institutions_. Incidentally, and as a part of each of these -endeavours, the development of an estate which had come, mainly by -inheritance, into the trusteeship of the British people, began -seriously to occupy their thoughts. - -[Sidenote: SOCIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM] - -These were problems of great worth and dignity, but nevertheless there -was one condition of their successful solution, which ought to have -been kept in mind, but which possibly was somewhat overlooked. If we -allowed ourselves to be so much absorbed by these two problems that we -gave insufficient heed to our defences, it was as certain as any human -forecast could be, that the solution of a great deal, which was -perplexing us in the management of our internal affairs, would be -summarily taken out of the hands of Britain and her Dominions and -solved according to the ideas of strangers. - -If we were to bring our policy of social and constitutional improvement -and the development of our estate to a successful issue, we must be -safe from interruption from outside. We must secure ourselves against -foreign aggression; for we needed time. Our various problems could not -be solved in a day or even in a generation. The most urgent {210} of -all matters was _security_, for it was the prime condition of all the -rest. - -We desired, not merely to hold what we had got, but to enjoy it, and -make it fructify and prosper, in our own way, and under our own -institutions. For this we needed peace within our own sphere; and -therefore it was necessary that we should be strong enough to enforce -peace. - - -During the post-Victorian period--this short epoch of transition--there -were therefore three separate sets of problems which between them -absorbed the energies of public men and occupied the thoughts of all -private persons, at home and in the Dominions, to whom the present and -future well-being of their country was a matter of concern. - -The first of these problems was _Defence_: How might the British -Commonwealth, which held so vast a portion of the habitable globe, and -which was responsible for the government of a full quarter of all the -people who dwelt thereon--how might it best secure itself against the -dangers which threatened it from without? - -The second was the problem of _the Constitution_: How could we best -develop, to what extent must we remake or remould, our ancient -institutions, so as to fit them for those duties and responsibilities -which new conditions required that they should be able to perform? -Under this head we were faced with projects, not merely of local -self-government, of 'Home Rule,' and of 'Federalism'; not merely with -the working of the Parliament Act, with the composition, functions, and -powers of the Second Chamber, with the Referendum, the Franchise, and -{211} such like; but also with that vast and even more perplexing -question--what were to be the future relations between the Mother -Country and the self-governing Dominions on the one hand, and between -these five democratic nations and the Indian Empire and the -Dependencies upon the other? - -For the third set of problems no concise title has yet been found. -_Social Reform_ does not cover it, though perhaps it comes nearer doing -so than any other. The matters involved here were so multifarious and, -apparently at least, so detached one from another--they presented -themselves to different minds at so many different angles and under -such different aspects--that no single word or phrase was altogether -satisfactory. But briefly, what all men were engaged in searching -after--the Labour party, no more and no less than the Radicals and the -Tories--was how we could raise the character and material conditions of -our people; how by better organisation we could root out needless -misery of mind and body; how we could improve the health and the -intelligence, stimulate the sense of duty and fellowship, the -efficiency and the patriotism of the whole community. - -Of these three sets of problems with which the British race has -recently been occupying itself, this, the third, is intrinsically by -far the most important. - -[Sidenote: IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL REFORM] - -It is the most important because it is an end in itself whereas the -other two are only the means for achieving this end. Security against -foreign attack is a desirable and worthy object only in order to enable -us to approach this goal. A strong and flexible constitution is an -advantage only because we believe it will enable us to achieve our -objects, better and more quickly, than if we are compelled to go on -working {212} under a system which has become at once rigid and -rickety. But while we were bound to realise the superior nature of the -third set of problems, we should have been careful at the same time to -distinguish between two things which are very apt to be confused in -political discussions--_ultimate importance_ and _immediate urgency_. - -We ought to have taken into our reckoning both the present state of the -world and the permanent nature of man--all the stuff that dreams and -wars are made on. We desired peace. We needed peace. Peace was a -matter of life and death to all our hopes. If defeat should once break -into the ring of our commonwealth--scattered as it is all over the -world, kept together only by the finest and most delicate -attachments--it must be broken irreparably. Our most immediate -interest was therefore to keep defeat, and if possible, war, from -bursting into our sphere--as Dutchmen by centuries of laborious -vigilance have kept back the sea with dikes. - -The numbers of our people in themselves were no security; nor our -riches; nor even the fact that we entertained no aggressive designs. -For as it was said long ago, 'it never troubles a wolf how many the -sheep be.' They find no salvation in their heavy fleeces and their fat -haunches; nor even in the meekness of their hearts, and in their -innocence of all evil intentions. - - -The characteristic of this period may be summed up in one short -sentence; the vast majority of the British people were bent and -determined--as they had never been bent and determined before--upon -leaving their country better than they had found it. - -{213} - -To some this statement will seem a paradox. "Was there ever a time," -they may ask, "when there had been so many evidences of popular unrest, -discontent, bitterness and anger; or when there had ever appeared to be -so great an inclination, on the one hand to apathy and cynicism, on the -other hand to despair?" - -[Sidenote: THE RESULTS OF CONFUSION] - -Were all this true, it would still be no paradox; but only a natural -consequence. Things are very liable to slip into this state, when men -who are in earnest--knowing the facts as they exist in their respective -spheres; knowing the evils at first hand; believing (very often with -reason) that they understand the true remedies--find themselves -baulked, and foiled, and headed off at every turn, their objects -misconceived and their motives misconstrued, and the current of their -wasted efforts burying itself hopelessly in the sand. Under such -conditions as these, public bodies and political parties -alike--confused by the multitude and congestion of issues--are apt to -bestow their dangerous attentions, now on one matter which happens to -dart into the limelight, now upon another; but in the general hubbub -and perplexity they lose all sense, both of true proportion and natural -priority. Everything is talked about; much is attempted in a -piecemeal, slap-dash, impulsive fashion; inconsiderably little is -brought to any conclusion whatsoever; while nothing, or next to -nothing, is considered on its merits, and carried through thoughtfully -to a clean and abiding settlement.... The word 'thorough' seemed to -have dropped out of the political vocabulary. In an age of specialism -politics alone was abandoned to the Jack-of-all-trades. - -{214} - -This phenomenon--the depreciated currency of public character--was not -peculiar to one party more than another. It was not even peculiar to -this particular time. It has shown itself at various epochs--much in -the same way as the small-pox and the plague--when favoured by -insanitary conditions. The sedate Scots philosopher, Adam Smith, -writing during the gloomy period which fell upon England after the -glory of the great Chatham had departed, could not repress his -bitterness against "that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a -statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary -fluctuations of affairs." It would seem as if the body politic is not -unlike the human, and becomes more readily a prey to vermin, when it -has sunk into a morbid condition. - - -Popular judgment may be trusted as a rule, and in the long run, to -decide a clear issue between truth and falsehood, and to decide it in -favour of the former. But it becomes perplexed, when it is called upon -to discriminate between the assurances of two rival sets of showmen, -whose eagerness to outbid each other in the public favour leaves -truthfulness out of account. In the absence of gold, one brazen -counterfeit rings very much like another. People may be suspicious of -both coins; but on the whole their fancy is more readily caught by the -optimist effigy than the pessimist. They may not place entire trust in -the 'ever-cheerful man of sin,' with his flattery, his abounding -sympathy, his flowery promises, and his undefeated hopefulness; but -they prefer him at any rate to 'the melancholy Jaques,' booming -maledictions with a mournful {215} constancy, like some bittern in the -desolation of the marshes. - -So far as principles were concerned most of the trouble was -unnecessary. Among the would-be reformers--among those who sincerely -desired to bring about efficiency within their own spheres--there was -surprisingly little that can truly be called antagonism. But -competition of an important kind--competition for public attention and -priority of treatment--had produced many of the unfortunate results of -antagonism. It was inevitable that this lamentable state of things -must continue, until it had been realised that one small body of men, -elected upon a variety of cross issues, could not safely be left in -charge of the defence of the Empire, the domestic welfare of the United -Kingdom, and the local government of its several units. - -[Sidenote: ARTIFICIAL ANTAGONISMS] - -It was not merely that the various aims were not opposed to one -another; they were actually helpful to one another. Often, indeed, -they were essential to the permanent success of one another. The man -who desired to improve the conditions of the poor was not, therefore, -the natural enemy of him who wanted to place the national defences on a -secure footing. And neither of these was the natural enemy of others -who wished to bring about a settlement of the Irish question, or of the -Constitutional question, or of the Imperial question. But owing partly -to the inadequacy of the machinery for giving a free course to these -various aspirations--partly to the fact that the machinery itself was -antiquated, in bad repair, and had become clogged with a variety of -obstructions--there was an unfortunate tendency on the part of every -one who had any particular object very much {216} at heart, to regard -every one else who was equally concerned about any other object as an -impediment in his path. - - -The need of the time, of course, was leadership--a great man--or better -still two great men, one on each side--like the blades of a pair of -scissors--to cut a way out of the confusion by bringing their keen -edges into contact. But obviously, the greater the confusion the -harder it is for leadership to assert itself. We may be sure enough -that there were men of character and capacity equal to the task if only -they could have been discovered. But they were not discovered. - -There were other things besides the confusion of aims and ideas which -made it hard for leaders to emerge. The loose coherency of parties -which prevailed during the greater part of the nineteenth century had -given place to a set of highly organised machines, which employed -without remorse the oriental method of strangulation, against -everything in the nature of independent effort and judgment. The -politician class had increased greatly in numbers and influence. The -eminent and ornamental people who were returned to Westminster filled -the public eye, but they were only a small proportion of the whole; nor -is it certain that they exercised the largest share of authority. When -in the autumn of 1913 Sir John Brunner determined to prevent Mr. -Churchill from obtaining the provisions for the Navy which were judged -necessary for the safety of the Empire, the method adopted was to raise -the National Liberal Federation against the First Lord of the -Admiralty, and through the agency of that powerful organisation to -bring pressure to bear {217} upon the country, members of Parliament, -and the Cabinet itself. - -[Sidenote: BAD MONEY DRIVES OUT GOOD] - -It is unpopular to say that the House of Commons has deteriorated in -character, but it is true. An assembly, the members of which cannot -call their souls their own, will never tend in an upward direction. -The machines which are managed with so much energy and skill by the -external parasites of politics, have long ago taken over full -responsibility for the souls of their nominees. According to -'Gresham's law,' bad money, if admitted into currency, will always end -by driving out good. A similar principle has been at work for some -time past in British public life, by virtue of which the baser kind of -politicians, having got a footing, are driving out their betters at a -rapid pace. Few members of Parliament will admit this fact; but they -are not impartial judges, for every one is naturally averse from -disparaging an institution to which he belongs. - -During the nineteenth century, except at the very beginning, and again -at the very end of it, very few people ever thought of going into -Parliament, or even into politics, in order that they might thrive -thereby, or find a field for improving their private fortunes. This -cannot be said with truth of the epoch which has just ended. There has -been a change both in tone and outlook during the last thirty years. -Things have been done and approved by the House of Commons, elected in -December 1910, which it is quite inconceivable that the House of -Commons, returned in 1880, would ever have entertained. The -Gladstonian era had its faults, but among them laxity in matters of -finance did not figure. Indeed private members, as well as statesmen, -not infrequently {218} crossed the border-line which separates purism -from pedantry; occasionally they carried strictness to the verge of -absurdity; but this was a fault in the right direction--a great -safeguard to the public interest, a peculiarly valuable tendency from -the standpoint of democracy. - -A twelvemonth ago a number of very foolish persons were anxious to -persuade us that the predominant issue was the Army _versus_ the -People. But even the crispness of the phrase was powerless to convince -public opinion of so staggering an untruth. The predominant issue at -that particular moment was only what it had been for a good many years -before--the People _versus_ the Party System. - -[Sidenote: NEED OF RICH MEN] - -What is apt to be ignored is, that with the increase of wealth on the -one hand, and the extension of the franchise on the other, the Party -System has gradually become a vested interest upon an enormous -scale,--like the liquor trade of which we hear so much, or the _haute -finance_ of which perhaps we hear too little. Rich men are required in -politics, for the reason that it is necessary to feed and clothe the -steadily increasing swarms of mechanics who drive, and keep in repair, -and add to, that elaborate machinery by means of which the Sovereign -People is cajoled into the belief that its Will prevails. From the -point of view of the orthodox political economist these workers are as -unproductive as actors, bookmakers, or golf professionals; but they -have to be paid, otherwise they would starve, and the machines would -stop. So long as there are plenty of rich men who desire to become -even richer, or to decorate their names with titles, or to move in -shining circles, this is not at all likely to occur, unless the Party -System {219} suddenly collapsed, in which case there would be acute -distress. - -There are various grades of these artisans or mechanicians of politics, -from the professional organiser or agent who, upon the whole, is no -more open to criticism than any other class of mankind which works -honestly for its living--down to the committee-man who has no use for a -candidate unless he keeps a table from which large crumbs fall in -profusion. The man who supplements his income by means of politics is -a greater danger than the other who openly makes politics his vocation. -The jobbing printer, enthusiastically pacifist or protectionist, well -paid for his hand-bills, and aspiring to more substantial contracts; -the smart, ingratiating organiser, or hustling, bustling journalist, -who receives a complimentary cheque, or a bundle of scrip, or a seat on -a board of directors from the patron whom he has helped to win an -election--very much as at ill-regulated shooting parties the -head-keeper receives exorbitant tips from wealthy sportsmen whom he has -placed to their satisfaction--all these are deeply interested in the -preservation of the Party System. Innocent folk are often heard -wondering why candidates with such strange names--even stranger -appearance--accents and manner of speech which are strangest of -all--are brought forward so frequently to woo the suffrages of urban -constituencies. Clearly they are not chosen on account of their -political knowledge; for they have none. There are other aspirants to -political honours who, in comeliness and charm of manner, greatly excel -them; whose speech is more eloquent, or at any rate less -unintelligible. Yet London caucuses in particular have {220} a great -tenderness for these bejewelled patriots, and presumably there must be -reasons for the preference which they receive. One imagines that in -some inscrutable way they are essential props of the Party System in -its modern phase. - -The drawing together of the world by steam and electricity has brought -conspicuous benefits to the British Empire. The five self-governing -nations of which it is composed come closer together year by year. -Statesmen and politicians broaden the horizons of their minds by swift -and easy travel. But there are drawbacks as well as the reverse under -these new conditions. To some extent the personnel of democracy has -tended to become interchangeable, like the parts of a bicycle; and -public characters are able to transfer their activities from one state -to another, and even from one hemisphere to another, without a great -deal of difficulty. This has certain advantages, but possibly more -from the point of view of the individual than from that of the -Commonwealth. After failure in one sphere there is still hope in -another. Mr. Micawber, or even Jeremy Diddler, may go the round, using -up public confidence at one resting-place after another. For the Party -System is a ready employer, and providing a man has a glib tongue, a -forehead of brass, or an open purse, a position will be found for him -without too much enquiry made into his previous references. - -[Sidenote: LAWYERISM AND LEADERSHIP] - -In a world filled with confusion and illusion the Party System has -fought at great advantage. Indeed it is generally believed to be so -firmly entrenched that nothing can ever dislodge it. There are -dangers, however, in arguing too confidently from use and wont. -Conspicuous failure or disaster might bring {221} ruin on this revered -institution, as it has often done in history upon others no less -venerable. The Party System has its weak side. Its wares are mainly -make-believes, and if a hurricane happens to burst suddenly, the caucus -may be left in no better plight than Alnaschar with his overturned -basket. The Party System is not invulnerable against a great man or a -great idea. But of recent years it has been left at peace to go its -own way, for the reason that no such man or idea has emerged, around -which the English people have felt that they could cluster confidently. -There has been no core on which human crystals could precipitate and -attach themselves, following the bent of their nature towards a firm -and clear belief--or towards the prowess of a man--or towards a Man -possessed by a Belief. The typical party leader during this epoch has -neither been a man in the heroic sense, nor has he had any belief that -could be called firm or clear. For the most part he has been merely a -Whig or Tory tradesman, dealing in opportunism; and for the -predominance of the Party System this set of conditions was almost -ideal. It was inconceivable that a policy of wait-and-see could ever -resolve a situation of this sort. To fall back on lawyerism was -perhaps inevitable in the circumstances; but to think that it was -possible to substitute lawyerism for leadership was absurd. - -And yet amid this confusion we were aware--even at the time--and can -see much more clearly now the interlude is ended--that there were three -great ideas running through it all, struggling to emerge, to make -themselves understood, and to get themselves realised. But -unfortunately what were realities to ordinary men were only counters -according {222} to the reckoning of the party mechanicians. The -_first_ aim and the _second_--the improvement of the organisation of -society and the conditions of the poor--the freeing of local -aspirations and the knitting together of the empire--were held in -common by the great mass of the British people, although they were -viewed by one section and another from different angles of vision. The -_third_ aim, however--the adequate defence of the empire--was not -regarded warmly, or even with much active interest, by any organised -section. The people who considered it most earnestly were not engaged -in party politics. The manipulators of the machines looked upon the -_first_ and the _second_ as means whereby power might be gained or -retained, but they looked askance upon the _third_ as a perilous -problem which it was wiser and safer to leave alone. The great -principles with which the names--among others--of Mr. Chamberlain, Lord -Roberts, and Mr. Lloyd George are associated, were at no point opposed -one to another. Each indeed was dependent upon the other two for its -full realisation. And yet, under the artificial entanglements of the -Party System, the vigorous pursuit of any one of the three seemed to -imperil the success of both its competitors. - - - - -{223} - -CHAPTER III - -POLICY AND ARMAMENTS - -In the post-Victorian epoch, which we have been engaged in considering, -the aim of British foreign policy may be summed up in one -word--Security. It was not aggression; it was not revenge; it was not -conquest, or even expansion of territories; it was simply Security. - -It would be absurd, of course, to imagine that security is wholly, or -even mainly, a question of military preparations. "All this is but a -sheep in a lion's skin, where the people are of weak courage;" or where -for any reason, the people are divided among themselves or disaffected -towards their government. - -The defences of every nation are of two kinds, the organised and the -unorganised; the disciplined strength of the Navy and the Army on the -one hand, the vigour and spirit of the people upon the other. - -The vigour of the people will depend largely upon the conditions under -which they live, upon sufficiency of food, the healthiness or otherwise -of their employments and homes, the proper nourishment and upbringing -of their children. It is not enough that rates of wages should be -good, if those who earn them {224} have not the knowledge how to use -them to the best advantage. It is not always where incomes are lowest -that the conditions of life are worst. Measured by infant mortality, -and by the health and general happiness of the community, the crofters -of Scotland, who are very poor, seem to have learned the lesson _how to -live_ better than the highly paid workers in many of our great -manufacturing towns. - -Education--by which is meant not merely board-school instruction, but -the influence of the home and the surrounding society--is not a less -necessary condition of vigour than wages, sanitary regulations, and -such like. The spiritual as well as the physical training of children, -the nature of their amusements, the bent of their interests, the -character of their aims and ideals, at that critical period when the -boy or girl is growing into manhood or womanhood--all these are things -which conduce directly, as well as indirectly, to the vigour of the -race. They are every bit as much a part of our system of national -defence as the manoeuvring of army corps and the gun-practice of -dreadnoughts. - -The _spirit_ of the people, on the other hand, will depend for its -strength upon their attachment to their own country; upon their -affection for its customs, laws, and institutions; upon a belief in the -general fairness and justice of its social arrangements; upon the good -relations of the various classes of which society is composed. The -spirit of national unity is indispensable even in the case of the most -powerful autocracy. It is the very foundation of democracy. Lacking -it, popular government is but a house of cards, which the first serious -challenge from without, or the first strong outburst of {225} -discontent from within will bring tumbling to the ground. Such a -feeling of unity can only spring from the prevalence of an opinion -among every class of the community, that their own system, with all its -faults, is better suited to their needs, habits, and traditions than -any other, and that it is worth preserving, even at the cost of the -greatest sacrifices, from foreign conquest and interference. - -[Sidenote: A TWO-HEADED PRINCIPLE] - -While a people sapped by starvation and disease will be wanting in the -_vigour_ necessary for offering a prolonged and strenuous resistance, -so will a people, seething with class hatred and a sense of tyranny and -injustice, be wanting in the _spirit_. The problem, however, of these -unorganised defences, fundamental though it is, stands outside the -scope of the present chapter, which is concerned solely with those -defences which are organised. - - -The beginning of wisdom with respect to all problems of defence is the -recognition of the two-headed principle that _Policy depends on -Armaments just as certainly as Armaments depend on Policy_. - -The duty of the Admiralty and the War Office is to keep their armaments -abreast of the national endeavour. It is folly to do more: it is -madness to do less. The duty of the Foreign Minister is to restrain -and hold back his policy, and to prevent it from ambitiously outrunning -the capacity of the armaments which are at his disposal. If he does -otherwise the end is likely to be humiliation and disaster. - -When any nation is unable or unwilling to provide the armaments -necessary for supporting the policy which it has been accustomed to -pursue and would {226} like to maintain, it should have the sense to -abandon that policy for something of a humbler sort before the bluff is -discovered by the world.[1] - -It may possibly appear absurd to dwell with so much insistence upon a -pair of propositions which, when they are set down in black and white, -will at once be accepted as self-evident by ninety-nine men out of a -hundred. But plain and obvious as they are, none in the whole region -of politics have been more frequently ignored. These two principles -have been constantly presenting themselves to the eyes of statesmen in -a variety of different shapes ever since history began. - -It may very easily happen that the particular policy which the desire -for security requires, is one which the strength of the national -armaments at a given moment will not warrant the country in pursuing. -Faced with this unpleasant quandary, what is Government to do, if it be -convinced of the futility of trying to persuade the people to incur the -sacrifices necessary for realising the national aspirations? Is it to -give up the traditional policy, and face the various consequences which -it is reasonable to anticipate? Or is it to persevere in the policy, -and continue acting as if the forces at its disposal were sufficient -for its purpose, when in fact they are nothing of the kind? To follow -the former course {227} calls for a surrender which the spirit of the -people will not easily endure, and which may even be fatal to the -independent existence of the state. But to enter upon the latter is -conduct worthy of a fraudulent bankrupt, since it trades upon an -imposture, which, when it is found out by rival nations, will probably -be visited by still severer penalties. - -But surely Government has only to make it clear to the people that, -unless they are willing to bring their armaments abreast of their -policy, national aspirations must be baulked and even national safety -itself may be endangered. When men are made to understand these -things, will they not certainly agree to do what is necessary, though -they may give their consent with reluctance?[2] - -[Sidenote: POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES] - -It is very certain, however, that this outside view of the case -enormously underrates the difficulties which stare the politician out -of countenance. In matters of this sort it is not so easy a thing to -arrive at the truth; much less to state it with such force and -clearness that mankind will at once recognise it for truth, and what is -said to the contrary for falsehood. The intentions of foreign -governments, and the dangers arising out of that quarter, are subjects -which it is singularly difficult to discuss frankly, without incurring -the very evils which every government seeks to avoid. And if these -things are not easy to discuss, it is exceedingly easy for faction or -fanatics to misrepresent them.[3] Moreover, the lamentations of the -Hebrew prophets bear witness to the {228} deafness and blindness of -generations into whom actual experience of the evils foretold had not -already burnt the lesson which it was desired to teach. Evils which -have never been suffered are hard things to clothe with reality until -it is too late, and words, even the most eloquent and persuasive, are -but a poor implement for the task. - -The policy of a nation is determined upon, so as to accord with what it -conceives to be its honour, safety, and material interests. In the -natural course of events this policy may check, or be checked by, the -policy of some other nation. The efforts of diplomacy may be -successful in clearing away these obstructions. If so, well and good; -but if not, there is nothing left to decide the issue between the two -nations but the stern arbitrament of war. - -Moreover, diplomacy itself is dependent upon armaments in somewhat the -same sense as the prosperity of a merchant is dependent upon his credit -with his bankers. The news system of the world has undergone a -revolution since the days before steam and telegraphs. It is not -merely more rapid, but much ampler. The various governments are kept -far more fully informed of one another's affairs, and as a consequence -the great issues between nations have become clear and sharp. The most -crafty and smooth-tongued ambassador can rarely wheedle his opponents -into concessions which are contrary to their interests, unless he has -something more to rely upon than his own guile and plausibility. Army -corps and battle fleets looming in the distance are better persuaders -than the subtlest arguments and the deftest flattery. - -What, then, is the position of a statesman who {229} finds himself -confronted by a clash of policies, if, when the diplomatic deadlock -occurs, he realises that his armaments are insufficient to support his -aim? In such an event he is faced with the alternative of letting -judgment go by default, or of adding almost certain military disaster -to the loss of those political stakes for which his nation is -contending with its rival. Such a position must be ignominious in the -extreme; it might even be ruinous; and yet it would be the inevitable -fate of any country whose ministers had neglected the maxim that policy -in the last resort is dependent upon armaments. - -[Sidenote: EXAMPLE OF CHINA] - -If we are in search of an example we shall find it ready to our hand. -The Empire of China is comparable to our own at least in numbers; for -each of them contains, as nearly as may be, one quarter of the whole -human race. And as China has hitherto failed utterly to make her -armaments sufficient, under the stress of modern conditions, to support -even that meek and passive policy of possession which she has -endeavoured to pursue, so she has been compelled to watch in -helplessness while her policy has been disregarded by every adventurer. -She has been pressed by all the nations of the world and obliged to -yield to their demands. Humiliating concessions have been wrung from -her; favours even more onerous, in the shape of loans, have been forced -upon her. The resources with which nature has endowed her have been -exploited by foreigners against her will. Her lands have been shorn -from her and parcelled out among those who were strong, and who -hungered after them. This conquest and robbery has proceeded both by -wholesale and retail. {230} Because she yielded this to one claimant, -another, to keep the balance even, has insisted upon that. Safe and -convenient harbours, fortified places, islands, vast stretches of -territory, have been demanded and taken from her almost without a -struggle; and all this time she has abstained with a timid caution from -anything which can justly be termed provocation. For more than half a -century, none the less, China has not been mistress in her own house. - -The reason of this is plain enough--China had possessions which other -nations coveted, and she failed to provide herself with the armaments -which were necessary to maintain them. - -The British people likewise had possessions which other nations -coveted--lands to take their settlers, markets to buy their goods, -plantations to yield them raw materials. If it were our set -determination to hold what our forefathers won, two things were -necessary: the first, that our policy should conform to this aim; the -second, that our armaments should be sufficient to support our policy. - -A nation which desired to extend its possessions, to round off its -territories, to obtain access to the sea, would probably regard -conquest, or at all events absorption, as its highest immediate -interest. This would be the constant aim of its policy, and if its -armaments did not conform to this policy, the aim would not be -realised. Examples both of failure and success are to be found in the -history of Russia from the time of Peter the Great, and in that of -Prussia from the days of the Great Elector. - -A nation--like England or Holland in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and -eighteenth centuries--which {231} was seeking to secure against its -commercial rivals, if necessary by force of arms, new markets among -civilised but unmilitary races, would require a policy and armaments to -correspond. - -[Sidenote: BRITISH CONTENTMENT] - -The British Empire in the stage of development which it had reached at -the end of the Victorian era did not aim at acquisition of fresh -territories or new markets, save such as might be won peacefully by the -skill and enterprise of its merchants. It sought only to hold what it -already possessed, to develop its internal resources, and to retain -equal rights with its commercial rivals in neutral spheres. But in -order that those unaggressive objects might be realised, there was need -of a policy, different indeed from that of Elizabeth, of Cromwell, or -of Chatham, but none the less clear and definite with regard to its own -ends. And to support this policy there was need of armaments, suitable -in scale and character. - -It was frequently pointed out between the years 1901 and 1914 (and it -lay at the very root of the matter), that while we were perfectly -satisfied with things as they stood, and should have been more than -content--regarding the subject from the standpoint of our own -interests--to have left the map of the world for ever, as it then was -drawn, another nation was by no means so well pleased with existing -arrangements. To this envious rival it appeared that we had taken more -than our fair share--as people are apt to do who come early. We had -wider territories than we could yet fill with our own people; while our -neighbour foresaw an early date at which his race would be overflowing -its boundaries. We had limitless resources in the Dominions and -Dependencies {232} overseas, which when developed would provide a -united empire with markets of inestimable value. In these respects -Germany was in a less favourable position. Indeed, with the exceptions -of Russia and the United States, no other great Power was so -fortunately placed as ourselves; and even these two nations, although -they had an advantage over the British Empire by reason of their huge -compact and coterminous territories, still did not equal it in the -vastness and variety of their undeveloped resources. - -Clearly, therefore, the policy which the needs of our Commonwealth -required at this great turning-point in its history, was not only -something different from that of any other great Power, but also -something different from that which had served our own purposes in -times gone by. Like China, our aim was peaceful possession. Unlike -China, we ought to have kept in mind the conditions under which alone -this aim was likely to be achieved. It might be irksome and contrary -to our peaceful inclinations to maintain great armaments when we no -longer dreamed of making conquests; but in the existing state of the -world, armaments were unfortunately quite as necessary for the purpose -of enabling us to hold what we possessed, as they ever were when our -forefathers set out to win the Empire. - -[Sidenote: COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE] - -In 1904, with the object of promoting harmony between the policy and -armaments of the British Empire, Mr. Balfour created the Committee of -Imperial Defence. This was undoubtedly a step of great importance. -His purpose was to introduce a system, by means of which ministers and -high officials responsible for the Navy and Army would {233} be kept in -close touch with the trend of national policy, in so far as it might -affect the relations of the Commonwealth with foreign Powers. In like -manner those other ministers and high officials, whose business it was -to conduct our diplomacy, maintain an understanding with the Dominions, -administer our Dependencies, and govern India, would be made thoroughly -conversant with the limitations to our naval and military strength. -Having this knowledge, they would not severally embark on -irreconcilable or impracticable projects or drift unknowingly into -dangerous complications. The conception of the Committee of Imperial -Defence, therefore, was due to a somewhat tardy recognition of the -two-headed principle, that armaments are mere waste of money unless -they conform to policy, and that policy in the last resort must depend -on armaments. - -The Committee was maintained by Mr. Balfour's successors, and was not -allowed (as too often happens when there is a change of government) to -fall into discredit and disuse.[4] But in order that this body of -statesmen and experts might achieve the ends in view, it was essential -for them to have realised clearly, not only the general object of -British policy--which indeed was contained in the single word -'Security'--but also the special dangers which loomed in the near -future. They had then to consider what reciprocal obligations had -already been contracted with other nations, whose interests were to -some extent the same as our own, and what further undertakings of a -similar character it might be desirable to enter {234} into. Finally, -there were the consequences which these obligations and undertakings -would entail in certain contingencies. It was not enough merely to -mumble the word 'Security' and leave it at that. What security implied -in the then existing state of the world was a matter which required to -be investigated in a concrete, practical, and business-like way. - -Unfortunately, the greater part of these essential preliminaries was -omitted, and as a consequence, the original idea of the Committee of -Imperial Defence was never realised. Harmonious, flexible, and of -considerable utility in certain directions, it did not work -satisfactorily as a whole. The trend of policy was, no doubt, grasped -in a general way; but, as subsequent events have proved, the conditions -on which alone that line could be maintained, and the consequences -which it involved, were not at any time clearly understood and boldly -faced by this august body in its corporate capacity. - -The general direction may have been settled; but certainly the course -was not marked out; the rocks and shoals remained for the most part -uncharted. The committee, no doubt, had agreed upon a certain number -of vague propositions, as, for example, that France must not be crushed -by Germany, or the neutrality of Belgium violated by any one. They -knew that we were committed to certain obligations--or, as some people -called them, 'entanglements'--and that these again, in certain -circumstances, might commit us to others. But what the whole amounted -to was not realised in barest outline, by the country, or by -Parliament, or by the Government, or even, we may safely conjecture, by -the Committee itself. {235} We have the right to say this, because, if -British policy had been realised as a whole by the Committee of -Imperial Defence, it would obviously have been communicated to the -Cabinet, and in its broader aspects to the people; and this was never -done. It is inconceivable that any Prime Minister, who believed, as -Mr. Asquith does, in democratic principles, would have left the country -uneducated, and his own colleagues unenlightened, on a matter of so -great importance, had his own mind been clearly made up. - -[Sidenote: CONFUSION WHEN WAR OCCURRED] - -When the crisis occurred in July 1914, when Germany proceeded to -action, when events took place which for years past had been foretold -and discussed very fully on both sides of the North Sea, it was as if a -bolt had fallen from the blue. Uncertainty was apparent in all -quarters. The very thing which had been so often talked of had -happened. Germany was collecting her armies and preparing to crush -France. The neutrality of Belgium was threatened. Yet up to, and on, -Sunday, August 2, there was doubt and hesitation in the Cabinet, and -until some days later, also in Parliament and the country.[5] - -When, finally, it was decided to declare war, the course of action -which that step required still appears to have remained obscure to our -rulers. Until the Thursday following it was not decided to send the -Expeditionary Force abroad. Then, out of timidity, only two-thirds of -it were sent.[6] Transport arrangements which were all ready for -moving the whole force had to be hastily readjusted. The delay was -{236} not less injurious than the parsimony; and the combination of the -two nearly proved fatal. - -If the minds of the people and their leaders were not prepared for what -happened, if in the moral sense there was unreadiness; still more -inadequate were all preparations of the material kind--not only the -actual numbers of our Army, but also the whole system for providing -expansion, training, equipment, and munitions. It is asking too much -of us to believe that events could have happened as they did in England -during the fortnight which followed the presentation of the Austrian -Ultimatum to Servia, had the Committee of Imperial Defence and its -distinguished president taken pains beforehand to envisage clearly the -conditions and consequences involved in their policy of 'Security.' - -As regards naval preparations, things were better indeed than might -have been expected, considering the vagueness of ideas in the matter of -policy. We were safeguarded here by tradition, and the general idea of -direction had been nearly sufficient. There was always trouble, but -not as a rule serious trouble, in establishing the case for increases -necessary to keep ahead of German efforts. There had been pinchings -and parings--especially in the matter of fast cruisers, for lack of -which, when war broke out, we suffered heavy losses--but except in one -instance--the abandonment of the Cawdor programme--these had not -touched our security at any vital point. - -Thanks largely to Mr. Stead, but also to statesmen of both parties, and -to a succession of Naval Lords who did not hesitate, when occasion -required it, to risk their careers (as faithful servants ever will) -rather than certify safety where they saw danger--thanks, {237} -perhaps, most of all to a popular instinct, deeply implanted in the -British mind, which had grasped the need for supremacy at sea--our -naval preparations, upon the whole, had kept abreast of our policy for -nearly thirty years. - -As regards the Army, however, it was entirely different. There had -been no intelligent effort to keep our military strength abreast of our -policy; and as, in many instances, it would have been too bitter a -humiliation to keep our policy within the limits of our military -strength, the course actually pursued can only be described fitly as a -game of bluff. - -There had never been anything approaching agreement with regard to the -functions which the Army was expected to perform. Not only did -political parties differ one from another upon this primary and -fundamental question, but hardly two succeeding War Ministers had -viewed it in the same light. There had been schemes of a bewildering -variety; but as the final purpose for which soldiers existed had never -yet been frankly laid down and accepted, each of these plans in turn -had been discredited by attacks, which called in question the very -basis of the proposed reformation. - -[Sidenote: THE NAVAL POSITION] - -While naval policy had been framed and carried out in accordance with -certain acknowledged necessities of national existence, military policy -had been alternately expanded and deflated in order to assuage the -anxieties, while conforming to the prejudices--real or supposed--of the -British public. In the case of the fleet, we had very fortunately -arrived, more than a generation ago, at the point where it was a -question of what the country needed; as regards the {238} Army, it was -still a question of what the country would stand. But how could even a -politician know what the country would stand until the full case had -been laid before the country? How was it that while Ministers of both -parties had the courage to put the issue more or less nakedly in the -matter of ships, they grew timid as soon as the discussion turned on -army corps? If the needs of the Commonwealth were to be the touchstone -in the one case, why not also in the other? The country will stand a -great deal more than the politicians think; and it will stand almost -anything better than vacillation, evasion, and untruth. In army -matters, unfortunately, it has had experience of little else since the -battle of Waterloo. - -Mathematicians, metaphysicians, and economists have a fondness for what -is termed 'an assumption.' They take for granted something which it -would be inconvenient or impossible to prove, and thereupon proceed to -build upon it a fabric which compels admiration in a less or greater -degree, by reason of its logical consistency. There is no great harm -in this method so long as the conclusions, which are drawn from the -airy calculations of the study, are confined to the peaceful region of -their birth; but so soon as they begin to sally forth into the harsh -world of men and affairs, they are apt to break at once into shivers. -When the statesman makes an assumption he does so at his peril; or, -perhaps, to speak more correctly, at the peril of his country. For if -it be a false assumption the facts will speedily find it out, and -disasters will inevitably ensue. - -[Sidenote: TWO INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS] - -Our Governments, Tory and Radical alike, have {239} acted in recent -times as if the British Army were what their policy required it to -be--something, that is, entirely different from what it really was. -Judging by its procedure, the Foreign Office would appear to have made -the singularly bold assumption that, in a military comparison with -other nations, Britain was still in much the same relative position as -in the days of Napoleon. Sustained by this tenacious but fantastic -tradition, Ministers have not infrequently engaged in policies which -wiser men would have avoided. They have uttered protests, warnings, -threats which have gone unheeded. They have presumed to say what would -and would not be tolerated in certain spheres; but having nothing -better behind their despatches than a mere assumption which did not -correspond with the facts, they have been compelled to endure rebuffs -and humiliations. As they had not the prudence to cut their coat -according to their cloth, it was only natural that occasionally they -should have had to appear before the world in a somewhat ridiculous -guise. - -British statesmen for nearly half a century had persisted in acting -upon two most dangerous assumptions. They had assumed that one branch -of the national armaments conformed to their policy, when in fact it -did not. And they had assumed also, which is equally fatal, that -policy, if only it be virtuous and unaggressive, is in some mysterious -way self-supporting, and does not need to depend on armaments at all. - -The military preparations of Britain were inadequate to maintain the -policy of Security, which British Governments had nevertheless been -engaged in pursuing for many years prior to the outbreak of {240} the -present war.[7] On the other hand, the abandonment of this policy was -incompatible with the continuance of the Empire. We could not hope to -hold our scattered Dependencies and to keep our Dominions safe against -encroachments unless we were prepared to incur the necessary sacrifices. - - - -[1] American writers have urged criticism of this sort against the -armaments of the U.S.A., which they allege are inadequate to uphold the -policy of the 'Monroe Doctrine.' The German view of the matter has -been stated by the Chancellor (April 7, 1913) when introducing the Army -Bill:--"History knows of no people which came to disaster because it -had exhausted itself in the making of its defences; but history knows -of many peoples which have perished, because, living in prosperity and -luxury, they neglected their defences. A people which thinks that it -is not rich enough to maintain its armaments shows merely that it has -played its part." - -[2] So the argument runs, and the course of our naval policy since Mr. -Stead's famous press campaign in 1884 will be cited as an encouragement. - -[3] _E.g._ in the winter of 1908 and spring of 1909, when an -influential section of the supporters of the present Cabinet chose to -believe the false assurances of the German Admiralty, and freely -accused their own Government of mendacity. - -[4] Innovations of this particular sort have possibly a better chance -of preserving their existence than some others. 'Boards are screens,' -wrote John Stuart Mill, or some other profound thinker; and in politics -screens are always useful. - -[5] This is obvious from the White Paper without seeking further -evidence in the ministerial press or elsewhere. - -[6] Of the six infantry divisions included in the Expeditionary Force -only four were sent in the first instance; a fifth arrived about August -24; a sixth about mid-September. - -[7] "Our Army, as a belligerent factor in European politics, is almost -a negligible quantity. This Empire is at all times practically -defenceless beyond its first line. Such an Empire invites war. Its -assumed security amid the armaments of Europe, and now of Asia, is -insolent and provocative" (Lord Roberts, October 22, 1912). Nothing -indeed is more insolent and provocative, or more likely to lead to a -breach of the peace, than undefended riches among armed men. - - - - -{241} - -CHAPTER IV - -THE BALANCE OF POWER - -During the whole period of rather more than thirteen years--which has -been referred to in previous pages as the post-Victorian epoch, and -which extended roughly from January 1901, when Queen Victoria died, to -July 1914, when war was declared--the British Army remained inadequate -for the purpose of upholding that policy which British statesmen of -both parties, and the British people, both at home and in the -Dominions, were engaged in pursuing--whether they knew it or not--and -were bound to pursue, unless they were prepared to sacrifice their -independence. - -The aim of that policy was the security of the whole empire. This much -at any rate was readily conceded on all hands. It was not enough, -however, that we approved the general aim of British policy. A broad -but clear conception of the means by which our Government hoped to -maintain this policy, and the sacrifices which the country would have -to make in order to support this policy, was no less necessary. So -soon, however, as we began to ask for further particulars, we found -ourselves in the region of acute controversy. 'Security' was a -convenient political formula, which could be accepted as readily by the -{242} man who placed his trust in international law, as by his -neighbour who believed in battle fleets and army corps. - -In considering this question of security we could not disregard Europe, -for Europe was still the storm-centre of the world. We could not -afford to turn a blind eye towards the ambitions and anxieties of the -great continental Powers. We were bound to take into account not only -their visions but their nightmares. We could not remain indifferent to -their groupings and alliances, or to the strength and dispositions of -their armaments. - -That the United Kingdom was a pair of islands lying on the western edge -of Europe, and that the rest of the British Empire was remote, and -unwilling to be interested in the rivalries of the Teuton, Slav, and -Latin races, did not affect the matter in the least. Nowadays no -habitable corner of the earth is really remote; and as for willingness -or unwillingness to be interested, that had nothing at all to do with -the question. For it was clear that any Power, which succeeded in -possessing itself of the suzerainty of Europe, could redraw the map of -the world at its pleasure, and blow the Monroe Doctrine, no less than -the British Empire, sky-high. - -Looking across thousands of leagues of ocean, it was difficult for the -Dominions and the United States to understand how their fortunes, and -the ultimate fate of their cherished institutions, could possibly be -affected by the turmoil and jealousies of--what appeared in their eyes -to be--a number of reactionary despotisms and chauvinistic democracies. -Even the hundred and twenty leagues which separate Hull from Emden, or -the seven which divide Dover from Calais, were enough to convince many -people {243} in the United Kingdom that we could safely allow Europe to -'stew in her own juice.' But unfortunately for this theory, unless a -great continental struggle ended like the battle of the Kilkenny cats, -the outside world was likely to find itself in an awkward predicament, -when the conqueror chose to speak with it in the gates, at a time of -his own choosing. - -British policy since 1901 had tended, with ever increasing -self-consciousness, towards the definite aim of preventing Germany from -acquiring the suzerainty of Western Europe. It was obvious that German -predominance, if secured, must ultimately force the other continental -nations, either into a German alliance, or into a neutrality favourable -to German interests. German policy would then inevitably be directed -towards encroachments upon British possessions. Germany had already -boldly proclaimed her ambitions overseas. Moreover, she would find it -pleasanter to compensate, and soothe the susceptibilities of those -nations whom she had overcome in diplomacy or war, and to reward their -subsequent services as allies and friendly neutrals, by paying them out -of our property rather than out of her own. For this reason, if for no -other, we were deeply concerned that Germany should not dominate Europe -if we could help it. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN AIMS] - -During this period, on the other hand, Germany appeared to be setting -herself more and more seriously to acquire this domination. Each -succeeding year her writers expressed themselves in terms of greater -candour and confidence. Her armaments were following her policy. The -rapid creation of a fleet--the counterpart of the greatest army in -Europe--and the recent additions to the striking power of her {244} -already enormous army could have no other object. Certainly from 1909 -onwards, it was impossible to regard German preparations as anything -else than a challenge, direct or indirect, to the security of the -British Empire. - -Consequently the direction of British policy returned, gradually, -unavowedly, but with certainty, to its old lines, and became once more -concerned with the maintenance of the _Balance of Power_ as the prime -necessity. The means adopted were the Triple Entente between Britain, -France, and Russia. The object of this understanding was to resist the -anticipated aggressions of the Triple Alliance, wherein Germany was the -predominant partner. - -[Sidenote: DERELICT MAXIMS] - -The tendency of phrases, as they grow old, is to turn into totems, for -and against which political parties, and even great nations, fight -unreasoningly. But before we either yield our allegiance to any of -these venerable formulas, or decide to throw it out on the scrap-heap, -there are advantages in looking to see whether or not there is some -underlying meaning which may be worth attending to. It occasionally -happens that circumstances have changed so much since the original idea -was first crystallised in words, that the old saying contains no value -or reality whatsoever for the present generation. More often, however, -there is something of permanent importance behind, if only we can -succeed in tearing off the husk of prejudice in which it has become -encased. So, according to Disraeli, "the _divine right_ of Kings may -have been a plea for feeble tyrants, but the divine right of government -is the keystone of human progress." For many years the phrase _British -interests_, which used to figure so largely in speeches {245} and -leading articles, has dropped out of use, because it had come to be -associated unfavourably with bond-holders' dividends. The fact that it -also implied national honour and prestige, the performance of duties -and the burden of responsibilities was forgotten. Even the doctrine of -_laissez faire_, which politicians of all parties have lately agreed to -abjure and contemn, has, as regards industrial affairs, a large kernel -of practical wisdom and sound policy hidden away in it. But of all -these derelict maxims, that which until quite recently, appeared to be -suffering from the greatest neglect, was the need for maintaining the -_Balance of Power_ in Europe. For close on two generations it had -played no overt part in public controversy, except when some Tory -matador produced it defiantly as a red rag to infuriate the Radical -bull. - -If this policy of the maintenance of the _Balance of Power_ has been -little heard of since Waterloo, the reason is that since then, until -quite recently, the _Balance of Power_ has never appeared to be -seriously threatened.[1] And because the policy of maintaining this -balance was in abeyance, many people have come to believe that it was -discredited. Because it was not visibly and actively in use it was -supposed to have become entirely useless. - -This policy can never become useless. It must inevitably come into -play, so soon as any Power appears to be aiming at the mastery of the -continent. It will ever remain a matter of life or death, to the -United Kingdom and to the British Empire, that no continental state -shall be allowed to obtain {246} command, directly or indirectly, of -the resources, diplomacy, and armaments of Europe. - -In the sixteenth century we fought Philip of of Spain to prevent him -from acquiring European predominance. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, -and nineteenth centuries we fought Louis XIV., Louis XV., and Napoleon -for the same reason. In order to preserve the balance of power, and -with it our own security, it was our interest under Elizabeth to -prevent the Netherlands from being crushed by Spain. Under later -monarchs it was our interest to prevent the Netherlands, the lesser -German States, Prussia, Austria, and finally the whole of Europe from -being crushed by France. And we can as ill afford to-day to allow -France to be crushed by Germany, or Holland and Belgium to fall into -her power. The wheel has come round full circle, but the essential -British interest remains constant. - -The wheel is always turning, sometimes slowly, sometimes with startling -swiftness. Years hence the present alliances will probably be -discarded. It may be that some day the danger of a European -predominance will appear from a different quarter--from one of our -present allies, or from some upstart state which may rise to power with -an even greater rapidity than the Electorate of Brandenburg. Or it may -be that before long the New World, in fact as well as phrase, may have -come in to redress the balance of the Old. We cannot say, because we -cannot foresee what the future holds in store. But from the opening of -the present century, the immediate danger came from Germany, who hardly -troubled to conceal the fact that she was aiming at predominance by -mastery of the Low Countries and by crushing France. - -{247} - -[Sidenote: CONDITIONS OF BRITISH FREEDOM] - -That this danger was from time to time regarded seriously by a section -of the British Cabinet, we know from their own statements both before -war broke out and subsequently. It was no chimera confined to the -imaginations of irresponsible and panic-stricken writers. In sober -truth the balance of power in Europe was in as much danger, and the -maintenance of it had become as supreme a British interest, under a -Liberal government at the beginning of the twentieth century, as it -ever was under a Whig government at the close of the seventeenth and -opening of the eighteenth. - -The stealthy return of this doctrine into the region of practical -politics was not due to the prejudices of the party which happened to -be in power. Quite the contrary. Most Liberals distrusted the phrase. -The whole mass of the Radicals abhorred it. The idea which lay under -and behind the phrase was nevertheless irresistible, because it arose -out of the facts. Had a Socialist Government held office, this policy -must equally have imposed itself and been accepted with a good or ill -grace, for the simple reason that, unless the balance of power is -maintained in Europe, there can be no security for British freedom, -under which we mean, with God's help, to work out our own problems in -our own way. - -English statesmen had adopted this policy in fact, if -unavowedly--perhaps even to some extent unconsciously--when they first -entered into, and afterwards confirmed, the Triple Entente. And having -once entered into the Triple Entente it was obvious that, without -risking still graver consequences, we could never resume the detached -position which we occupied before we took that step. It is difficult -to {248} believe--seeing how the danger of German predominance -threatened France and Russia as well as ourselves--that we should not -have excited the ill-will of those two countries had we refused to make -common cause by joining the Triple Entente. It was obvious, however, -to every one that we could not afterwards retire from this association -without incurring their hostility. If we had withdrawn we should have -been left, not merely without a friend in Europe, but with all the -chief Powers in Europe our enemies--ready upon the first favourable -occasion to combine against us. - -There is only one precedent in our history for so perilous a -situation--when Napoleon forced Europe into a combination against us in -1806. And this precedent, though it then threatened our Empire with -grave dangers, did not threaten it with dangers comparable in gravity -with those which menaced us a century later. - -The consequences of breaking away from the Triple Entente were -sufficiently plain. "We may build ships against one nation, or even -against a combination of nations. But we cannot build ships against -half Europe. If Western Europe, with all its ports, its harbours, its -arsenals, and its resources, was to fall under the domination of a -single will, no effort of ours would be sufficient to retain the -command of the sea. It is a balance of power on the continent, which -alone makes it possible for us to retain it. Thus the maintenance of -the balance of power is vital to our superiority at sea, which again is -vital to the security of the British Empire."[2] - -{249} - -Security in the widest sense was the ultimate end of our -policy--security of mind, security from periodic panic, as well as -actual military security. Looked at more closely, the immediate end -was defence--the defence of the British Empire and of the United -Kingdom. - -[Sidenote: DEFENCE AND INVASION] - -In the existing condition of the world a policy of 'splendid isolation' -was no longer possible. Conditions with which we are familiar in -commercial affairs, had presented themselves in the political sphere, -and co-operation on a large scale had become necessary in order to -avoid bankruptcy. England had entered into the Triple Entente because -her statesmen realised, clearly or vaguely, that by doing so we should -be better able to defend our existence, and for no other reason. - -After 1911 it must have been obvious to most people who considered the -matter carefully that in certain events the Triple Entente would become -an alliance. It is the interest as well as the duty of allies to stand -by one another from first to last, and act together in the manner most -likely to result in victory for the alliance. What then was the manner -of co-operation most likely to result in victory for that alliance -which lay dormant under the Triple Entente? - -But first of all, to clear away one obscurity--_Invasion_ was not our -problem; _Defence_ was our problem; for the greater included the less. - -The word 'defence' is apt to carry different meanings to different -minds. The best defence of England and British interests, at any given -time, may or may not consist in keeping our main army in the United -Kingdom and waiting to be attacked here. It all depends upon the -special circumstances {250} of each case. The final decision must be -governed by one consideration, and one only--how to strike the -speediest, heaviest, and most disabling blow at the aggressor. If by -keeping our army in England and endeavouring to lure the enemy into our -toils, that end is most likely to be accomplished, then it is obviously -best to keep our army here. If by sending it into the north of France -to combine with the French the supreme military object has a superior -chance of being achieved, then it is best to send it into the north of -France. - -A defensive war cannot be defined and circumscribed as a war to drive -out invaders, or even to prevent the landing of invaders. The best way -to defend your castle may be to man the walls, to fall upon the enemy -at the ford, to harry his lands, or even to attack him in his castle. -There is no fixed rule. The circumstances in each case make the rule. - -[Sidenote: CO-OPERATION WITH FRANCE] - -A war is not less a defensive war if you strike at your enemy in his -own territory, or if you come to the aid of your ally, whose territory -has been invaded or is threatened. In the circumstances which -prevailed for a considerable number of years prior to the outbreak of -the present war, it gradually became more and more obvious, that our -soundest defence would be joint action with France upon her -north-eastern frontier. For there, beyond any doubt, would Germany's -supreme effort be made against the Triple Entente. If the attack -failed at that point, it would be the heaviest and most disabling blow -which our enemy could suffer. If, on the other hand, it succeeded, -France and England would have to continue the struggle on terms -immensely less favourable. - -{251} - -This opinion was not by any means unanimously or clearly held; but -during the summer of 1911 and subsequently, it was undoubtedly the -hypothesis upon which those members of our Government relied, who were -chiefly responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. Unfortunately -Parliament and the country had never accepted either the policy or its -consequences; they had never been asked to accept either the one or the -other; nor had they been educated with a view to their acceptance. - -At that time the error was exceedingly prevalent, that it is a more -comfortable business fighting in your own country than in somebody -else's. From this it followed that it would be folly to engage in what -were termed disapprovingly 'foreign adventures,' and that we should be -wise to await attack behind our own shores. Recent events have wrought -such a complete and rapid conversion from this heresy, that it is no -longer worth while wasting words in exposing it. It is necessary, -however, to recall how influential this view of the matter was, not -only up to the declaration of war, but even for some time afterwards. - -As to the precise form of co-operation between the members of the -Triple Entente in case of war, there could be no great mystery. It was -obvious to any one who paid attention to what happened during the -summer and autumn of 1911, that in the event of Germany attacking -France over the Agadir dispute, we had let it be understood and -expected, that we should send our Expeditionary Force across the -Channel to co-operate with the French army on the north-eastern -frontier. - - - -[1] It can hardly be overlooked, however, that this principle, rightly -or wrongly interpreted, had something to do with the Crimean War -(1854-56) and with the British attitude at the Congress of Berlin -(1878). - -[2] Viscount Milner in the _United Service Magazine_, January 1912. - - - - -{252} - -CHAPTER V - -THE MILITARY SITUATION - -(August 1911) - -The full gravity of the Agadir incident, though apparent to other -nations, was never realised by the people of this country. The crisis -arose suddenly in July 1911. Six weeks later it had subsided; but it -was not until well on in the autumn that its meanings were grasped, -even by that comparatively small section of the public who interest -themselves in problems of defence and foreign affairs. From October -onwards, however, an increasing number began to awake to the fact, that -war had only been avoided by inches, and to consider seriously--many of -them for the first time in their lives--what would have happened if -England had become involved in a European conflict. - -[Sidenote: THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE] - -From various official statements, and from discussions which from time -to time had taken place in Parliament, it was understood that our -'Expeditionary Force' consisted of six infantry divisions, a cavalry -division, and army troops;[1] also that the national resources -permitted of this force being kept up to full strength for a period of -at least six months, after making all reasonable deductions for the -wastage of {253} war. Was this enough? Enough for what? ... To uphold -British policy; to preserve Imperial security; to enable the Triple -Entente to maintain the balance of power in Europe. These were vague -phrases; what did they actually amount to? ... The adequacy or -inadequacy of such an army as this for doing what was required of -it--for securing speedy victory in event of war--or still better for -preserving peace by the menace which it opposed to German schemes of -aggression--can only be tested by considering the broad facts with -regard to numbers, efficiency, and readiness of all the armies which -would be engaged directly, or indirectly, in a European struggle. - -War, however, had been avoided in 1911, and not a few people were -therefore convinced that the menace of the available British army, -together with the other consequences to be apprehended from the -participation of this country, had been sufficient to deter Germany -from pursuing her schemes of aggression, if indeed she had actually -harboured any notions of the kind. But others, not altogether -satisfied with this explanation and conclusion, were inclined to press -their enquiries somewhat further. Supposing war had actually been -declared, would the British force have been sufficient--acting in -conjunction with the French army--to repel a German invasion of France -and Belgium, to hurl back the aggressors and overwhelm them in defeat? -Would it have been sufficient to accomplish the more modest aim of -holding the enemy at his own frontiers, or even--supposing that by a -swift surprise he had been able to overrun Belgium--at any rate to keep -him out of France? - -{254} - -When people proceeded to seek for answers to these questions, as many -did during the year 1912, they speedily discovered that, in -considerations of this sort, the governing factor is numbers--the -numbers of the opposing forces available at the outbreak of war and in -the period immediately following. The tremendous power of national -spirit must needs be left out of such calculations as a thing -immeasurable, imponderable, and uncertain. It was also unsafe to -assume that the courage, intelligence, efficiency, armament, transport, -equipment, supplies, and leadership of the German and Austrian armies -would be in any degree inferior to those of the Triple Entente. -Certain things had to be allowed for in a rough and ready way;[2] but -the main enquiry was forced to concern itself with numerical strength. - -There was not room for much disagreement upon the broad facts of the -military situation, among soldiers and civilians who, from 1911 -onwards, gave themselves to the study of this subject at the available -sources of information; and their estimates have been confirmed, in the -main, by what has happened since war began. The Intelligence -departments of London, Paris, and Petrograd--with much ampler means of -knowledge at their disposal--can have arrived at no other conclusions. -What the English War Office knew, the Committee of Imperial Defence -likewise knew; and the leading members of the Cabinet, if not the whole -Government, must be presumed to have been equally well informed. - -It was assumed in these calculations, that in case of tension between -the Triple Entente and the Triple {255} Alliance, the latter would not -be able--in the first instance at all events--to bring its full -strength into the struggle. For unless Germany and Austria managed -their diplomacy before the outbreak of hostilities with incomparable -skill, it seemed improbable that the Italian people would consent to -engage in a costly, and perhaps ruinous, war--a war against France, -with whom they had no quarrel; against England, towards whom they had -long cherished feelings of friendship; on behalf of the Habsburg -Empire, which they still regarded--and not altogether -unreasonably--with suspicion and enmity. - -[Sidenote: NEUTRALITY OF ITALY] - -But although the neutrality of Italy might be regarded as a likelihood -at the opening of the war, it could not be reckoned on with any -certainty as a permanent condition. For as no one can forecast the -course of a campaign, so no one can feel secure that the unexpected may -not happen at any moment. The consequences of a defeat in this quarter -or in that, may offer too great temptations to the cupidity of -onlookers; while diplomacy, though it may have bungled in the -beginning, is sure to have many opportunities of recovering its -influence as the situation develops. Consequently, unless and until -Italy actually joined in the struggle on the side of the Triple -Entente, a considerable section of the French army would, in common -prudence, have to be left on guard upon the Savoy frontier. - -In a war brought on by the aggressive designs of Germany, the only -nations whose participation could be reckoned on with certainty--and -this only supposing that Britain stood firmly by the policy upon which -her Government had embarked--were Russia, {256} France, and ourselves -on the one side, Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. - -It would certainly be necessary for Germany, as well as Austria, to -provide troops for coast defences, and also for the frontiers of -neutral countries, which might have the temptation, in certain -circumstances, to deneutralise themselves at an inconvenient moment, if -they were left unwatched. On the north and west were Denmark, Holland, -and Belgium, each of which had a small field army, besides garrison and -fortress troops which might be turned to more active account upon an -emergency. On the south and east were Montenegro, Servia, and -Roumania, whose military resources were on a considerable scale, and -whose neutrality was not a thing altogether to be counted on, even -before the Balkan war[3] had lowered the prestige of Turkey. In -addition there was Italy, who although a pledged ally in a defensive -war was not likely, for that reason, to consider herself bound to -neutrality, benevolent or otherwise, if in her judgment, the particular -contingencies which called for her support had not arisen at the outset. - -[Sidenote: SUPERIORITY OF GERMAN NUMBERS] - -After taking such precautions as seemed prudent under these heads, -Germany would then be obliged to detach for service, in co-operation -with the Austrians in Poland, and along the whole eastern border, a -sufficient number of army corps to secure substantial superiority over -the maximum forces which Russia, hampered by an inadequate railway -system and various military considerations,[4] could {257} be expected -to bring into the field and maintain there during the first few months -of the war. - - -It was reckoned[5] after taking all these things into account, that -Germany would have available, for the invasion of France, an army -consisting of some ninety divisions--roughly, rather more than a -million and three-quarters of men--and that she could maintain this -force at its full strength--repairing the wastage of war out of her -ample reserves--for a period of at least six months. It was assumed -that the Kaiser, relying upon the much slower mobilisation of Russia, -would undoubtedly decide to use the whole of this huge force in the -west, in the hope that before pressure could begin to make itself felt -in the east, France would either have been crushed, as she was in 1870, -or so much mangled that it would be possible to send reinforcements of -an overwhelming character to make victory secure in Poland. - -Against this German force of 1,800,000, France, according to the best -information available, could put into the field and maintain at full -strength for a similar period of six months about 1,300,000 men. But -this was the utmost that could be expected of the French, and the -initial discrepancy of 500,000 men was very serious. It precluded all -reasonable hope on their part of being able to take the offensive, to -which form of warfare the genius of the people was most adapted. It -would compel them to remain on the defensive, for which it was believed -at that {258} time--though wrongly, as events have proved--that they -were ill suited by temperament as well as tradition. - -If England joined in the war by land as well as sea the numerical -deficiency would be reduced to 340,000 on the arrival of our -Expeditionary Force. In this connection, as well as for other reasons, -the attitude of Holland and Belgium, and that of Germany with respect -to these two countries, were clearly matters of high importance. - -Holland had a field army of four divisions, and her interests could be -summed up in the words, 'preservation of independence.' She would -naturally wish to avoid being actively embroiled in the war on one side -or the other; and, fortunately for her, she had every reason to believe -that her neutrality would not be disturbed or questioned. Her -territories lay to one side of the probable campaign area, and -moreover, whatever might be the ulterior designs of Germany with regard -to western expansion, it was obvious that her immediate interests must -necessarily lie in Dutch neutrality, which would be infinitely more -useful to her than a Dutch alliance. For Holland holds the mouths of -the Scheldt and Rhine, and so long as she remained neutral, it was -anticipated that imports and exports would readily find their way into -and out of Germany. This advantage would cease were Britain to -establish a blockade of these inlets, as she would certainly do if they -belonged to a hostile Power. - -[Sidenote: POSITION OF BELGIUM] - -In certain respects Belgium was in the same case as Holland. She -likewise had a field army of four divisions, and her interests could be -summed up in the words, 'preservation of independence.' But {259} here -all resemblance between the two countries ended. - -Belgium was not merely the southern portion (Holland being the -northern) of that Naboth's vineyard, the possession of which German -visionaries had proclaimed to be essential to Teutonic world-power. -Belgium was more even than this. If the permanent possession of -Belgian territory was a political object in the future, temporary -occupation was no less a military necessity of the present. For in -order that Germany might benefit in full measure by her numerical -superiority, Belgian roads and railways were required, along which to -transport her troops, and Belgian hills and plains on which to deploy -them. If Germany were confined to the use of her own frontiers she -would not only lose in swiftness of attack, but her legions would be -piled up, one behind another, like a crowd coming out of a theatre. -She needed space on which to spread out her superior numbers in order -that her superior numbers might make certain of victory. - -There was an idea at this time (1911-12) that Germany would be -satisfied to keep to the south-east of the fortified line of the -Meuse--moving through Luxemburg and the mountains of the Ardennes--and -that if Belgium saw fit to yield, under protest, to _force majeure_, -the northern region, containing the great plain of Flanders and all -cities of importance, would be left inviolate. This theory was -probably erroneous, for the reason that--as the event has -shown--Germany required a greater space and more favourable ground, -than would have been provided under this arrangement, in order to bring -her great superiority to bear. - -{260} - -With the French on the other hand there was no similar advantage to be -gained by the violation of Belgian neutrality. From their point of -view the shorter the battle front could be kept the better. If Belgium -chose to range herself by the side of France as a willing ally it would -undoubtedly be a great gain; but if she chose to remain neutral the -French could have no object in invading or occupying her territories. - -It was assumed, and no doubt rightly, that, like Holland, Belgium would -prefer to remain neutral--leaving the question of future absorption to -take care of itself--provided she could do this without enduring the -humiliation of allowing foreign armies to violate her soil. For she -knew that, in the event of a French victory, her independence would -remain assured; whereas, if the Germans were successful, she would have -avoided awakening their hostility and giving them an excuse for -annexation. But even if Belgium, under gross provocation, were forced -to take sides against Germany, the deficit in numbers on the side of -the Triple Entente would only be reduced by some eighty or a hundred -thousand men. The deficit would still stand, roughly, at a quarter of -a million men. - - -[Sidenote: INADEQUACY OF BRITISH ARMY] - -In view of the foregoing considerations it was clearly absurd to think -that our own small force was at all adequate, in a military sense, to -deter Germany from engaging in a war of aggression. Had we been able, -during the years 1912 to 1914, to see into the minds of the German -General Staff we should probably have realised that this inadequacy was -even greater than it appeared. We should then have {261} known that -the numbers of the Kaiser's striking force had been carefully -understated; and that the amount of preparations in the way of material -had been hidden away with an equal industry. We should also have -learned, that the sending of our army abroad was viewed with scepticism -in German military circles, as an event hardly likely to occur. But -even if our Expeditionary Force did go, it was altogether inadequate to -redress the adverse balance; still more inadequate to bring an -immediate victory within the range of practical possibility. It was -inadequate to hold back the premeditated invasion, either at the German -frontier, or even at the French frontier. It was inadequate to make -Belgian resistance effective, even if that nation should determine to -throw in its lot with the Triple Entente. - -As a matter of the very simplest arithmetic our land forces were -inadequate for any of these purposes. They were unequal to the task of -maintaining the balance of power by giving a numerical superiority to -the armies of the Triple Entente. Our armaments therefore did not -correspond with our policy. It was clear that they would not be able -to uphold that policy if it were put to the supreme test of war. It -was impossible to abandon our policy. It was not impossible, and it -was not even in 1912 too late, to have set about strengthening our -armaments. Nothing of the kind, however, was undertaken by the -Government, whose spokesmen, official and unofficial, employed -themselves more congenially in deriding and rebuking Lord Roberts for -calling attention to the danger. - -Of course if it had been possible to place reliance upon the statement -of the English War Minister, {262} made little more than a year before -war broke out,[6] that every soldier under the voluntary system is -worth ten conscripts, we and our Allies would have been in a position -of complete security. In that case our force of 160,000 would have -been the equivalent of 1,600,000 Germans, and we should from the first -have been in a superiority of more than a million over our enemies. - -Even if we could have credited the more modest assumption of the -Attorney-General--made nearly four months after war broke out--that one -volunteer was worth three 'pressed' men, the opposing forces would have -been somewhere about an equality.[7] - -Unfortunately both these methods of ready-reckoning were at fault, -except for their immediate purpose of soothing, or deluding the -particular audiences to which they were addressed. The words were -meaningless and absurd in a military sense; though conceivably they -possessed some occult political virtue, and might help, for a time at -least, to avert the retribution which is due to unfaithful stewards. - -Both these distinguished statesmen, as well as {263} many of their -colleagues and followers, were beset by the error of false opposites. -A soldier who has enlisted voluntarily, and another who is a conscript -or 'pressed' man, have equally to fight their country's enemies when -they are ordered to do so. In both cases the particular war may be -against their consciences and judgments; and their participation in it -may therefore be involuntary. - -Of two men--equal in age, strength, training, and courage--one of whom -believes his cause to be just, while the other does not, there can be -no doubt that the former will fight better than the latter--even though -the latter was enlisted under the voluntary system while the former was -a conscript or 'pressed' man. In this sense the superiority of the -'voluntary' principle is incontestable. But is there any evidence to -show, that either the original soldiers, or the new levies, of the -German army are risking their lives in this war any less willingly than -our own countrymen, who went out with the Expeditionary Force, or those -others who have since responded to Lord Kitchener's appeal? Is there -any reason to suppose that they are fighting any less bravely and -intelligently?[8] - - -Another matter of importance in these calculations with regard to the -military strength of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance was the -time limit. - -[Sidenote: THE THREE PERIODS OF WAR] - -There are three periods in war. There is the _onset_ of war, where -swiftness of action is what tells most; there is the _grip_ of war, -where numbers of {264} trained men are what tell most; and there is the -_drag_ of war, when what tells most is the purse. - -Speaking by the book, it is of course numbers which tell all the way -through. At the beginning--in the _onset_--the aim is to hurl superior -numbers at a vital point--taking the enemy by surprise, and thereby -disordering his whole plan of campaign--very much as you knock a limpet -off a rock, with a sharp unexpected blow. - -If this effort fails to settle matters, then we are in the _grip_. -Here it is a case of sheer heavy slogging of all the available trained -troops. The weaker side is driven to the defensive. It is found -making use of every artificial and natural advantage to counteract the -superiority which threatens it, and which must speedily prevail, if -only it be superior enough. - -Finally, after a longer or shorter period of indecisive deadlock, the -time comes when trained troops and material of war accumulated in -advance begin to run short--when new levies, raised since the war broke -out, begin to take the field, well or ill equipped, well or ill armed, -as the case may be. When this stage is reached we are in the _drag_ of -war; and the side which can best afford to feed, clothe, and arm its -fresh reinforcements stands at an enormous advantage. - -In 1870 war was announced on July 15th, and formally declared on the -19th. Three weeks later, on August 6th, the important battles of -Woerth and Spicheren were won by the Germans. On September 2nd, the -issue of the war was decided, when the Emperor of the French, with his -main army, surrendered at Sedan. Metz fell in the last days of -October, and Paris on the first day of March in the {265} following -year. In that war the _onset_ settled everything. There was no real -_grip_ of the opposing forces. The German attack had been so swift, -vigorous, and successful that France was knocked out in the first round. - -[Sidenote: RESULTS OF SUCCESS IN ONSET] - -The speed with which great armies can be mobilised and hurled against -one another has not diminished in the forty odd years which have -elapsed since the _débâcle_. On the contrary, the art of war has been -largely concerned in the interval with the vital question, how to get -in the first deadly blow. - -The military view was, that probably not earlier than the fifteenth -day--certainly not later than the twenty-first--a battle would take -place which must be of the highest importance, and which might quite -well be decisive. It might make ultimate German victory only a matter -of time; or it might only determine whether the ensuing campaign was to -be waged on French or German soil--whether there was to be a German -invasion of France or a Franco-British invasion of Germany. -Consequently, if our Expeditionary Force was to render assistance at -the critical time, it must reach its position on the frontier within a -fortnight of the outbreak of war. - -As to the _drag_ of war, the Triple Entente had the advantage, if that -stage were ever reached. For the purses of England, France, and Russia -were much longer than those of Germany and Austria. It was important, -however, to remember that there would be no hope for us in the _drag_ -of war, if Germany could deliver a heavy enough blow at the beginning, -as she did in 1870. - -These were the considerations as to time, which presented themselves to -students of the military {266} situation during the breathing space -which followed upon the Agadir crisis. The substantial accuracy of -this forecast was confirmed by what happened during August and -September of last year. In 1914 war was declared by Germany on August -1st. For several days before she had been engaged actively in -mobilisation. Three weeks later three important battles--on the road -to Metz, at Charleroi, and at Mons[9]--were won by the Germans. If it -had not been for the unexpected obstacle of Liège the last two -engagements would in all probability have been fought at an even -earlier date, and in circumstances much more unfavourable to the -Franco-British forces. But in the early days of September, instead of -the crushing defeat of Sedan, there was the victory of the Marne, and -the Germans were forced to retreat to entrenched positions north of the -Aisne.[10] - -The _onset_ period was ended; but the issue had not been settled as in -1870. France and England had not been knocked out in the first round. -To this extent the supreme German endeavour had miscarried. -Nevertheless a great advantage had been secured by our enemies, -inasmuch as it was now apparent that the ensuing campaign--the _grip_ -of war--would be contested, not on German soil, but in France and -Belgium. - - -[Sidenote: LIMITATIONS OF SEA POWER] - -The value of the assistance which the British Navy would be able to -render to the cause of the Triple Entente was a consideration of the -highest importance. But while the fleet, if the national confidence in -it were justified, would render invaluable assistance to military -operations, it was necessary {267} to bear in mind--what Englishmen in -recent times have been very apt to forget--that no success at sea, -whether it consisted in the wholesale destruction of hostile ships, or -in an absolute blockade of the enemy's coast, could by itself determine -the main issue of a European contest of this character. Disaster in a -land battle could not be compensated for, nor could the balance of -power be maintained, by any naval victory. War would not be brought to -an end favourable to the Triple Entente, even by a victory as complete -as that of Trafalgar. It is also well to remember that peace came, not -after Trafalgar, but after Waterloo, nearly ten years later. - -The strange idea that the security of the British Empire can be -maintained by the Navy alone, seems to be derived by a false process of -reasoning, from the undeniable truth, that the supremacy of our Navy is -essential to our security. But though it is essential--and the first -essential--it is not the only essential of security. - -An insular Power, largely dependent on sea-borne food supplies and raw -materials for its industries--a Power which governs an empire in the -East, which has dependencies scattered in every sea, which is -politically united with immense but sparsely peopled dominions in the -four quarters of the globe--must keep command of the sea. If that -supremacy were once lost the British Empire, as an empire, would come -to an end. Its early dissolution would be inevitable. Therefore it is -true enough to say that if the German Alliance--or any other -alliance--were to win a decisive naval victory against Britain, it -would end the war completely and effectively so far as we were -concerned. - -{268} - -But the converse is not the case, and for obvious reasons. In a -contest with a continental enemy who conquers on land, while we win -victory after victory at sea, the result will not be a settlement in -our favour, but a drawn issue. And the draw will be to his advantage, -not our own. For having overthrown the balance of power by reason of -his successful campaign and invasions, he will then be free to -concentrate his whole energies upon wresting away naval supremacy from -the British Empire. In time the Sea Power which is only a Sea Power -will be overborne with numbers, and finally worsted by the victorious -Land Power. For how is it possible to fight with one hand against an -enemy with two hands? The fleets of Europe which at last must be -combined against us, if we allow any rival to obtain a European -predominance, are too heavy odds. German preparations alone were -already causing us grave anxiety nearly three years before the Agadir -crisis occurred. How then could we hope to build against the whole of -Europe? Or even against half of Europe, if the other half remained -coldly neutral? - - - -[1] In all about 160,000 men, of whom some 25,000 were non-combatants. - -[2] Such, for instance, as the fact that the time-table of German -mobilisation appeared to be somewhat more rapid than that of the -French, and much more so than that of the Russians. - -[3] The first Balkan war broke out in the autumn of 1912. - -[4] Russia had anxieties of her own with regard to the intentions of -Roumania, of Turkey in Persia and the Caucasus, and of China and Japan -in the Far East. - -[5] These calculations were worked out in various ways, but the net -results arrived at were always substantially the same. In view of the -fact that the main conclusions have been amply proved by the results of -the present war, it does not seem worth while to weary the reader with -more sums in arithmetic than are absolutely necessary. - -[6] Colonel Seely at Heanor, April 26, 1913. - -[7] Sir John Simon (Attorney-General and a Cabinet Minister), at -Ashton-under-Lyne, November 21, 1914.... This speech is instructive -reading. It is also comforting for the assurance it contains, that if -the speaker approved of our taking part in this war (as he vowed he -did) his audience might rest satisfied that it was indeed a righteous -war; seeing that war was a thing which, on principle, he (Sir John -Simon) very much reprehended. And yet we are not wholly convinced and -reassured. There is a touch of over-emphasis--as if perhaps, after -all, the orator needed the support of his own vehemence to keep him -reminded of the righteousness. The pacifist in war-paint is apt to -overact the unfamiliar part. One wonders from what sort of British -officer at the front the Attorney-General had derived the impression -that 'one' of our own voluntary soldiers--gallant fellows though they -are--is the equal of 'three' of the Germans who face him, or of the -Frenchmen who fight by his side.... This speech puts us not a little -in mind of _Evangelist's_ warning to _Christian_, with regard to _Mr. -Legality's_ fluent promises to relieve him of his burden--"There is -nothing in all this noise save a design to beguile thee of thy -salvation." - -[8] Sir John Simon clinched his arithmetical calculation of 'three' to -'one,' by stating that 'the Kaiser already knew it'; and this -reassuring statement was received with 'laughter and cheers.' The -laughter we can understand. - -[9] The battle in Northern Alsace was fought on August 21 and 22. A -French army was driven back at Charleroi on the 22nd, and the British -at Mons on the 23rd. - -[10] September 6-12. - - - - -{269} - -CHAPTER VI - -THE MILITARY SITUATION - -(August 1914) - -Such was the position of affairs at July 1911, as it appeared to the -eyes of people who--during the ensuing period--endeavoured to arrive at -an understanding of the problem without regard to the exigencies of -party politics. Between that date and July 1914, when war broke out, -various changes took place in the situation. The general effect of -these changes was adverse to Britain and her allies. - -In 1911 the German estimates provided for considerable increases, -especially in artillery and machine-guns. The peace strength of the -Army was raised. - -In the following year, 1912, further additions were made to the peace -strength, and two new army corps were formed out of existing units--one -for the Polish, the other for the French frontier. Artillery and -machine-guns were very greatly increased in the ordinary estimates of -that year, and again in those of 1913. In addition, Germany at the -same time added a squadron to her fleet in the North Sea, by arranging -to keep more ships permanently in commission. - -{270} - -[Sidenote: MILITARY INCREASES] - -But early in 1913 it became known, that the German Government was about -to introduce an Army Bill, providing for immense and sensational -additions. The sum of £50,000,000 was to be raised by loan for initial -expenditure. The increased cost of upkeep on the proposed new -establishment would amount to £9,500,000 per annum. Sixty-three -thousand more recruits were to be taken each year. The total peace -strength of the Army was to be raised by approximately 200,000 men. -Nearly four millions sterling was to be spent on aircraft, and ten and -a half on fortifications; while the war-chest was to be raised from six -to eighteen millions. Twenty-seven thousand additional horses were to -be purchased. - -These proposals were timed to take effect the same autumn; so that by -the following Midsummer (1914), the military strength of Germany would -have reaped the main benefit which was anticipated from the enormous -additions. - -It was not in the power of France to increase the actual total of her -numbers, because for many years past she had already taken every man -who was physically fit for military service. About eighty per cent of -the young Frenchmen who came each year before the revision boards had -been enlisted; whereas in Germany--up to the passing of the new Army -Law--considerably less than fifty per cent had been required to serve. -The German Army as a consequence was composed of picked men, while the -French Army contained a considerable proportion who were inferior both -in character and physique. - -But in the face of the new German menace France had to do the best she -could. She had to do it alone, for the reason that the British -Government {271} entertained conscientious and insuperable objections -to bearing its due share of the burden. - -Already, prior to the sensational expansion of Germany in 1913, France -had endeavoured to counteract the current yearly increases in the -military estimates of her neighbour, by various reorganisations and -regroupings of active units, and by improvements calculated to improve -the efficiency of the reserves. But when information was -forthcoming[1] as to the nature and extent of the developments proposed -under the German Army Bill of 1913, it was at once realised that more -drastic measures were essential to national safety. - -Before the German projects were officially announced, the French -Government took the bold step of asking the legislature to sanction a -lengthening of the period of active military service from two years to -three, and an extension of the age limit of the reserves from -forty-seven to forty-nine. Power was also taken to summon, in case of -emergency, the annual contingent of recruits a year before their due -time. Increases in artillery, engineers, railways, barrack -accommodation, and subsidiary services were asked for and obtained. -The cost of these, when the whole sum came to be calculated, was found -to amount to £32,000,000. - -Apart, therefore, from material preparations of one kind and another, -Germany was taking steps to add 200,000 men to her striking force, and -the intentions of France were approximately the same. In the {272} -case of Germany, however, the increases of strength would be operative -by Midsummer 1914, while with France they would not take effect until -two years later.[2] - -Germany, moreover, was arranging to take 63,000 more recruits annually. -France was unable to obtain any more recruits, as she already took all -that were fit to bear arms. The increase in her striking force was -made mainly at the expense of her reserves. Year by year, therefore, -the numerical inferiority of France must become more marked. - -Russia meanwhile was proceeding with her programme of military -extension and reorganisation which had been decided on after the -Japanese war. A great part of her expenditure was being devoted to the -improvement of her exceedingly defective system of railways and -communications, and to the fortification of the Gulf of Finland. - -Austria did not remain stationary in military preparations any more -than her neighbours. Her intake of recruits was 181,000 in 1912. It -was decided to raise it to 206,000 in 1913, and again to 216,000 in -1914. - -In the British Army, during this critical period, there had of course -been no increases, but the reverse. - -{273} - -The Regular Forces, which had been, reduced in 1906 by nine -battalions,[3] were in 1914 some eight thousand men under their nominal -strength. The Territorials, which had never yet reached the figure -postulated by their originator, were at this date about 47,000 short. -The Army Reserve was doomed in the near future to an automatic -shrinkage on a considerable scale, owing to the reductions which had -been effected in the Regular Forces, from which the reservists were -drawn at the expiry of their terms of service. - -Actually, therefore, the weakness of our own military position had -become more marked since 1911. Relatively it had undergone an even -greater change for the worse, owing to the stupendous German programme, -to the fact that we had lagged behind in the matter of aircraft, and -that our naval preponderance was not so great as it had been three -years earlier. - - -[Sidenote: EFFECT OF BALKAN WARS] - -The events which occurred in the Turkish peninsula between October -1912, when the first Balkan war broke out, and August 1913, when the -second was ended by the Treaty of Bucharest, were not without their -bearing upon the general balance of power in Europe. Turkey had -collapsed before the onset of {274} the allied states of Montenegro, -Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece, and this was a serious injury to German -interests. The Ottoman Empire had been warmly suitored, over a long -period of years, by the diplomacy of Berlin, with a view to -co-operation in certain contingencies. On the other hand, the result -of the second war--fomented by the intrigues of Vienna--in which -Bulgaria was finally overpowered by the other three states, destroyed -for the time being Slav solidarity, and thereby considerably relieved -the apprehensions of Austria with regard to her southern frontier and -recently annexed provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.... -Profit-and-loss accounts of this sort are impossible to work out upon -an arithmetical basis, and perhaps the chief importance of such -occurrences as these lies in the effect which they produce upon the -nerves of the onlookers. On the whole--judging by the tone of -diplomacy at the time--the Balkan series of events appeared to have -raised greater anxieties in the Chancelleries of Germany and Austria -than in any other quarter; though why this should have been so, it is -difficult to understand. - -Looking back at the Balkan struggle in the light of subsequent events, -it appears to us now a great deal less remarkable for what it actually -produced than for what it failed to produce. It failed to set Europe -in a blaze, and yet it afforded far better opportunities for doing this -than the Serajevo murders in June 1914. - -The full inner history of the negotiations between the Great Powers, -for six months prior to the Treaty of Bucharest, will be interesting -reading, if it ever sees the light. If even one of them had chosen to -work for war during this period, nothing could have {275} kept the -peace. If one or two of them had been apathetic, war must inevitably -have come of itself. But even France--who at that time was showing -signs of superficial excitement, and on that account was credited, not -only in the German press, but in a section of our own, with -chauvinistic designs--worked hard for peace. It is certain that -Germany desired peace; many well-informed people indeed believed that -at this time she desired peace more ardently than any other state. It -is true that a few days before the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, -Italy had been secretly sounded by Austria as to whether she would join -with her two allies in making an attack on Servia; but the Italian -reply being of a kind that took away all hope of securing the military -assistance of that country in the proposed adventure, the Concert of -Europe continued to perform the pacific symphony apparently in perfect -accord. - -[Sidenote: GERMANY'S TWO DATES] - -The policy of Germany, in 1912 and 1913, to preserve peace, and her -efforts--equally successful--in the following year to provoke war, were -probably due to one and the same cause. Two dates from Germany's point -of view were of supreme importance--_the summer of 1914_, when her new -military preparations would be complete, and when the Kiel -Canal--having been widened and deepened[4]--would {276} be available -for the passage of Dreadnoughts; _the summer of 1916_, by which date -the French Army increases were due to take effect, and the Russian -scheme of military reorganisation would have been carried through. -From the point of view of Berlin and Vienna war could be waged to -greatest advantage so soon as the first of these two dates had been -reached. If, however, Italy, always a doubtful participator, could -have been tempted by self-interest to make common cause with her allies -in the summer of 1913, the certainty of her adherence would have turned -the scales in favour of the earlier date. For Italy could put an army -of 700,000 men into the field; and this no doubt would have more than -compensated for the benefits which might have been lost by anticipating -the ideal moment by a year. - - - -[1] Germany took time by the forelock, and began to carry through the -contemplated programme before disclosing the terms of the Army Bill to -the legislature. Consequently her intentions were known in a general -way to every Intelligence department in Europe, long before they were -actually announced. - -[2] In going through the memoranda upon which this chapter is based, I -came across a paper written at the end of July 1913 by a retired -soldier friend, in answer to a request on my part for certain technical -information as to French and German preparations. On the margin of the -document, which gives a very full and able analysis, he had added the -following postscript as an expression of his personal opinion. -"_N.B.--Most Important_: The German Bill takes immediate effect. The -French only takes effect in 1916 because (1) the French are not going -to retain the class which finishes its service this year with the -colours; (2) comparatively few are fit for enrolment at twenty; (3) -there has been great delay in Parliament ... _A year from now will be -the critical time_. Germany will have had the full benefit from her -Bill, whereas France will have a mass of young recruits still under -instruction. The strain on officers will be tremendous in order to -knock this mass of raw men into shape." It is rarely that a prophecy -is fulfilled practically to a day. - -[3] Mr. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, in justifying this -reduction explained that 'his infantry was in excess, the artillery was -deficient.' He would rather not have cut off these nine battalions, -"but he could not use them. He had four more than he could mobilise" -(Auchterarder, December 29, 1906). In his view "the first step to -doing anything for developing the national basis of the Army was to cut -something off the Regular Forces" (Newcastle, September 15, 1906). "He -did not think Compulsory Training would be adopted in this country -until after England had been invaded once or twice" (London, December -1, 1911). The British, however, had the best reasons for feeling -secure: they "were always a nation of splendid fighters. They were -never ready, but they fought the better the less ready they were..." -(Glasgow, January 6, 1912). - -[4] On June 23, 1914, the Emperor William opened the new lock at the -North Sea end of the Kiel Canal. On the following day he performed the -same function at the Baltic end. The _Times_ correspondent remarks -that the Emperor's passage through the Canal on this occasion was of -symbolical rather than practical significance, as on the one hand -German Dreadnoughts had already used the widened passage -experimentally, while on the other hand it would be a long time before -the whole work was finished. He continues: "The extension works, which -were begun in 1907, are, however, of vast importance, especially to the -Navy. The Canal has been made two metres deeper, and has been doubled -in breadth. The places at which large ships can pass one another have -been increased in number, and at four of them Dreadnoughts can be -turned. There are now four, instead of two, at each end, which means a -great saving of time in getting a fleet through. Above all, the -distance between Kiel and Wilhelmshaven for battleship purposes is -reduced from more than 500 to only 80 nautical miles. The new locks at -Brunsbüttel and Holtenau are the largest in the world."--The _Times_, -June 25, 1914. - - - - -{277} - -CHAPTER VII - -A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS - -It may be said--up to the very outbreak of war it was said very -frequently--that the mere power and opportunity to make an outrageous -attack are nothing without the will to do so. And this is true enough. -Every barber who holds his client by the nose could cut his throat as -easily as shave his chin. Every horse could kick the groom, who rubs -him down, into the next world if he chose to do so. What sense, then, -could there be in allowing our minds to be disturbed by base suspicions -of our enterprising and cultured neighbour? What iota of proof was -there that Germany nourished evil thoughts, or was brooding on visions -of conquest and rapine? - -So ran the argument of almost the whole Liberal press; and a -considerable portion of the Unionist press echoed it. Warnings were -not heeded. They came only from unofficial quarters, and therefore -lacked authority. Only the Government could have spoken with -authority; and the main concern of members of the Government, when -addressing parliamentary or popular audiences, appeared to be to prove -that there was no need for anxiety. They went further in many -instances, and denounced {278} those persons who ventured to express a -different opinion from this, as either madmen or malefactors. -Nevertheless a good deal of proof had already been published to the -world--a good deal more was known privately to the British -Government--all of which went to show that Germany had both the will -and intention to provoke war, if a favourable opportunity for doing so -should present itself. - -For many years past--in a multitude of books, pamphlets, leading -articles, speeches, and university lectures--the Germans had been -scolding us, and threatening us with attack at their own chosen moment. -When Mr. Churchill stated bluntly, in 1912, that the German fleet was -intended as a challenge to the British Empire, he was only repeating, -in shorter form and more sober language, the boasts which had been -uttered with yearly increasing emphasis and fury, by hundreds of German -patriots and professors. - -With an engaging candour and in every fount of type, unofficial Germany -had made it abundantly clear how she intended to carry her designs into -execution--how, first of all, France was to be crushed by a swift and -overwhelming attack--how Russia was then to be punished at leisure--how -after that, some of the nations of Europe were to be forced into an -alliance against the British Empire, and the rest into a neutrality -favourable to Germany--how finally the great war, which aimed at making -an end of our existence, was to begin. And though, from time to time, -there were bland official utterances which disavowed or ignored these -outpourings, the outpourings continued all the same. And each year -they became more copious, and achieved a readier sale. - -{279} - -Those, however, who were responsible for British policy appear to have -given more credit to the assurances of German diplomacy than to this -mass of popular incitement. The British nation has always chosen to -plume itself upon the fact that the hearts of British statesmen are -stronger than their heads; and possibly their amiable credulity, in the -present instance, might have been forgiven, had their means of -ascertaining truth been confined to the statements of incontinent -publicists and responsible statesmen. But there were other proofs -available besides words of either sort. - - -[Sidenote: THE FIRST WARNING] - -The Liberal Government came into office in the autumn of 1905. -Ministers can hardly have had time to master the contents of their -various portfolios, before German aggression burst rudely in upon them. -Conceivably the too carefully calculating diplomatists of Berlin had -concluded, that the principles of the new Cabinet would tend to keep -England neutral under any provocation, and that a heaven-sent -opportunity had therefore arrived for proceeding with the first item in -their programme by crushing France. It is a highly significant fact -that early in 1906, only a few months after Sir Henry -Campbell-Bannerman's advent to power, he found himself faced with the -prospect of a European war, which was only averted when our Foreign -Minister made it clear to Germany, that in such an event this country -would range herself upon the side of France.[1] - -{280} - -This was the _first_ warning. - - -[Sidenote: THE SECOND WARNING] - -The British answer to it was to utter renewed protestations Of friendly -confidence. As an earnest of our good intentions, the shipbuilding -programme[2] of the previous Government was immediately reduced. The -burden of armaments became the burden of innumerable speeches. In -well-chosen words Germany was coaxed and cajoled to acquiesce in our -continued command of the sea; but finding in our action or inaction an -opportunity for challenging it, she turned a polite ear--but a deaf -one--and pushed forward her preparations with redoubled speed. In vain -did we on our part slow down work at our new naval base in the Firth of -Forth. In vain did we reduce our slender army to even smaller -dimensions.[3] In vain did we plead disinterestedly with Germany, for -a reduction in the pace of competition in naval armaments, on the terms -that we should be allowed to possess a fleet nearly twice as strong as -her own. For the most part, during this period, official Germany -remained discreetly silent, for the reason that silence served her -purpose best; but when the persistency of our entreaties made some sort -of {281} answer necessary, we were given to understand by unofficial -Germany--rather roughly and gruffly--that a certain class of requests -was inadmissible as between gentlemen. - -Then suddenly, having up to that time lulled ourselves into the belief -that our fine words had actually succeeded in buttering parsnips, we -awoke--in the late autumn of 1908--to the truth, and fell immediately -into a fit of panic. Panic increased during the winter and following -spring, and culminated during the summer, in an Imperial Defence -Conference with the Dominions. - -We had curtailed our shipbuilding programme and slowed down our -preparations. Thereby we had hoped to induce Germany to follow suit. -But the effect had been precisely the opposite: she had increased her -programme and speeded up her preparations. At last our Government -became alive to what was going on, and in tones of reverberant anxiety -informed an astonished nation that the naval estimates called for large -additions. - -Ministers, indeed, were between the devil and the deep sea. The -supremacy of the British Fleet was menaced; the conscience of the -Radical party was shocked--shocked not so much at the existence of the -menace as at official recognition of it, and at the cost of insuring -against it. It was so much shocked, indeed, that it took refuge in -incredulity; and--upon the strength of assurances which were of course -abundantly forthcoming from the German Admiralty, who averred upon -their honour that there had been neither addition nor -acceleration--roundly accused its own anointed ministers of bearing -false witness against an innocent neighbour. - -{282} - -None the less, large sums were voted, and the Dominions came forward -with generous contributions. - -Sir Wilfrid Laurier, indeed, who had been nourished and brought up on a -diet of dried phrases, was sceptical. To this far-sighted statesman -there appeared to be no German menace either then or subsequently. The -whole thing was a mere nightmare, disturbing the innocent sleep of -Liberalism and democracy.[4] - -This was the _second_ warning. - - -[Sidenote THE THIRD WARNING] - -The _third_ warning came in the form of subterranean rumblings, -inaudible to the general public, but clearly heard by ministerial ears. - -In July 1909, while the Imperial Conference on Defence was in session, -Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded Prince Bülow as German Chancellor. -Up to that time there had been the menace of the mailed fist, the -rattling sabre, and the shining armour. Henceforward there was the -additional menace of a diplomacy playing for time, with a careless and -unconcealed contempt for the intelligence, the courage, and the honour -of the British people and their statesmen.[5] The German Government -had clearly formed the opinion that our ministers were growing more and -more afraid of {283} asking their party to support increased naval -estimates, and that it was only necessary to go on, alternately -dangling and withdrawing illusory proposals for a naval understanding -and a general agreement, in order to steal ahead of us in the race. -Here, as in many other instances, the Germans had observed not -altogether incorrectly; but they had drawn the wrong inference from the -facts. - -During the summer and autumn of 1910 was held the famous but futile -Constitutional Conference, the primary object of which was to settle -the quarrel between the two Houses of Parliament. With steadily -increasing clumsiness, German diplomacy, through all this anxious time, -was engaged in holding out its hand and withdrawing it again; until -even men whose minds were worried with more immediate cares, could no -longer ignore the gravity of the situation. - -The Conference adjourned for the holiday season, but resumed its -sessions in October. The public assurances of those who took part in -it on both sides agree in this, that nothing except the special subject -for which it had been called into existence was ever discussed at its -meetings. But many other things were certainly discussed outside its -meetings--on the doorstep and the staircase, and in the anterooms. -Among these topics the dangers of the international situation, and the -peril of imperial security were the chief. - -In October and November 1910 there was a great secret of Polichinelle. -Conceivably we may learn from some future historian even more about it -than we knew at the time. All that need be said here with reference to -the matter is, that many persons on {284} both sides found themselves -faced with a position of affairs, where the security of the country -plainly required measures for its defence, of a character and upon a -scale, which neither political party could hope to carry through -Parliament and commend to the country, unless it were supported by the -more responsible section of its opponents. - -Neither party, however, was willing to pay the price necessary for the -support of the other, and as a consequence imperial interests suffered. -It is not necessary, however, to conclude from this lamentable failure -that a sordid spirit of faction was the explanation. In the -constitutional sphere certain principles were in conflict, which the -parties concerned had the honesty to hold by, but lacked the sympathy, -and possibly the intelligence, to adjust. The acrimony of an immediate -controversy distorted the vision of those engaged in it; so that the -proportions of domestic and foreign dangers were misjudged. - -The failure of this constitutional conference was welcomed at the time -by exultant shoutings among many, perhaps the majority, of the rank and -file of politicians upon both sides. It was not so regarded, however, -by the country, which in a remarkable degree refused to respond to the -incitements of violence and hatred with which it was plied during the -ensuing election. There was at this time, for no very definite reason, -a widespread popular uneasiness, and something approaching a general -disgust with politicians. - -Among more considerate men on both sides, the breakdown was frankly -spoken of as one of the great calamities in our political history. It -was more {285} than that. It was in reality one of the greatest which -have ever befallen Europe. - - -[Sidenote: THE FOURTH WARNING] - -During the following July (1911), while in this country we were deeply -engaged in the bitter climax of the constitutional struggle, there -sounded a _fourth_ strident warning from the gong of the German -Chancellery. - -The Agadir incident is one of the strangest which have occurred in -British history during recent years. Its full gravity was not realised -outside a very narrow circle at the time of its occurrence; and when -subsequently it became more widely understood there was a curious -conspiracy to hush it up--or, perhaps, not so much a conspiracy, as a -general instinct of concealment--a spontaneous gesture of modesty--as -if the British nation had been surprised bathing. - -At the beginning of July the German cruiser _Panther_ appeared at -Agadir in Morocco. This visit was intended and understood as a direct -challenge to France. Diplomacy was immediately in a stir. - -Three weeks later Mr. Lloyd George spoke at the Mansion House, making -it clear that England would not tolerate this encroachment. Even amid -the anger and excitement which attended the last stages of the -Parliament Bill, this statement created a deep impression throughout -the country, and a still deeper impression in other countries. - -Then the crisis appeared to fade away. Germany was supposed to have -become amenable. We returned to our internecine avocations. The -holiday season claimed its votaries, and a great railway strike upset -many of their best-laid plans. The inhabitants of the United Kingdom -are accustomed to think {286} only on certain topics during August and -September, and it is hard to break them of their habits. To reconsider -a crisis which had arisen and passed away some two and a half months -earlier, was more than could be expected of us when we returned to work -in the autumn. - -But Mr. Lloyd George's speech was capable of only one -interpretation,--if Germany had persisted in her encroachment, this -country would have gone to war in August or September 1911 in support -of France. His words had no other meaning, and every highly placed -soldier and sailor was fully aware of this fact, and made such -preparations in his own sphere as the case required. But from what has -transpired subsequently, it does not seem at all clear that more than -two or three of the Cabinet in the least realised what was happening. -Parliament did not understand the situation any more than the country -did. - -Later on, when people had time to concentrate their minds on such -matters, there was a thrill of post-dated anxiety--a perturbation and -disapproval; criticism upon various points; a transference of Mr. -McKenna from the Admiralty to the Home Office, and of Mr. Churchill -from the Home Office to the Admiralty. Indignant anti-militarists, -supporters for the most part of the Government, allowed themselves to -be mysteriously reduced to silence. Business men, who had been shocked -when they learned the truth, suffered themselves to be persuaded that -even the truth must be taken with a pinch of salt. There was, in fact, -a sort of general agreement that it was better to leave the summer -embers undisturbed, lest a greater conflagration {287} might ensue. -The attitude of the orthodox politician was that of a nervous person -who, hearing, as he imagines, a burglar in his bedroom, feels happier -and safer when he shuts his eyes and pulls the blankets over his head. - - -[Sidenote: THE FIFTH WARNING] - -A few months later, at the beginning of the following year (1912), the -_fifth_ warning of the series was delivered. - -It differed from its predecessors inasmuch as it was addressed to the -ears of the British Government alone. Neither the Opposition nor the -country heard anything of it until more than two years later--until the -battles of Alsace, of Charleroi, and of Mons had been lost--until the -battle of the Marne had been won--until the British Army was moving -north to take up a position in Flanders. Then we learned that, when -Lord Haldane had visited Berlin in the month of February 1912, he had -done so at the special request of the Kaiser, in order to consider how -Anglo-German misunderstandings might be removed. - -Lord Haldane would have acted more wisely had he stopped his journey -_en route_, and never entered Berlin at all. For, two days before the -date appointed for his visit, proposals for large increases of the -German Army and Navy were laid before the Reichstag. His mission was -to abate competition in armaments, and here was an encouraging -beginning! Was it contempt, or insolence, or a design to overawe the -supposed timidity of the emissary; or was it merely a blundering effort -to steal a march in the negotiations by facing the ambassador on his -arrival with a _fait accompli_? Possibly it was a combination of all -these; but at any rate it was {288} exceedingly clumsy, and no less -significant than clumsy. - -As to the mission--Germany was willing in a vague way to -'retard'--whatever that may mean--though not to abandon, or reduce, her -naval programme, providing the British Government would agree to remain -neutral in any war which Germany might choose to wage. France might be -crushed and Belgium annexed; but in either event England must stand -aside and wait her turn. On no other terms would the Kaiser consent to -a _rapprochement_ with this country, or allow the blessed words -'retardation of the naval programme' to be uttered by official lips. - -An undertaking of this tenor went beyond those assurances of -non-aggressive intent which Lord Haldane, on behalf of his own -Government, was fully prepared to give. We would not be a party to any -unprovoked attack on Germany--was not that sufficient? It was plainly -insufficient. It was made clear that Germany desired a free hand to -establish herself in a position of supremacy astride of Europe. So -Lord Haldane returned profitless from his wayfaring, and the British -Government was at its wits' end how to placate the implacable. - -The way they chose was well-doing, in which they wearied themselves -perhaps overmuch, especially during the Balkan negotiations. For -Germany did not want war at that time, for the reasons which have been -given already. And so, rather surlily, and with the air of one who was -humouring a crank--a pusillanimous people whose fixed idea was -pacifism--she consented that we should put ourselves to vast trouble to -keep the peace for her benefit. If {289} war had to come in the end, -it had much better have come then--so far as we were concerned--seeing -that the combined balance of naval and military power was less -unfavourable to the Triple Entente at the beginning of 1913 than it was -some fifteen months later.... This was all the notice we took of the -fifth warning. We earned no gratitude by our activities, nor added in -any way thereby to our own safety. - -[Sidenote: THE HALDANE MISSION] - -The Haldane mission is a puzzle from first to last. The Kaiser had -asked that he should be sent.... For what purpose? ... Apparently in -order to discuss the foreign policy of England and Germany. But surely -the Kaiser should have been told that we kept an Ambassador at Berlin -for this very purpose; an able man, habituated to stand in the strong -sunlight of the imperial presence without losing his head; but, above -all, qualified to converse on such matters (seeing that they lay within -his own province) far better than the most profound jurist in -Christendom. Or if our Ambassador at Berlin could not say what was -required, the German Ambassador in London might easily have paid a -visit to Downing Street; or the Foreign Ministers of the two countries -might have arranged a meeting; or even the British Premier and the -German Chancellor might have contrived to come together. Any of these -ways would have been more natural, more proper, more likely (one would -think) to lead to business, than the way which was followed. - -One guesses that the desire of the Kaiser that Lord Haldane should be -sent, was met half-way by the desire of Lord Haldane to go forth; that -there was some temperamental affinity between these {290} two -pre-eminent characters--some attraction of opposites, like that of the -python and the rabbit. - -Whatever the reasons may have been for this visit, the results of it -were bad, and indeed disastrous. To have accepted the invitation was -to fall into a German trap; a trap which had been so often set that one -might have supposed it was familiar to every Foreign Office in Europe! -Berlin has long delighted in these extra-official enterprises, -undertaken behind the backs of accredited representatives. Confidences -are exchanged; explanations are offered 'in the frankest spirit'; -sometimes understandings of a kind are arrived at. But so far as -Germany is concerned, nothing of all this is binding, unless her -subsequent interests make it desirable that it should be. The names of -the irregular emissaries, German, British, and cosmopolitan, whom the -Kaiser has sent to London and received at Berlin--unbeknown to his own -Foreign Office--since the beginning of his reign, would fill a large -and very interesting visitors' book. One would have imagined that even -so early as February 1912 this favourite device had been found out and -discredited even in Downing Street. - -Lord Haldane was perhaps even less well fitted for such an embassy by -temperament and habit of mind, than he was by position and experience. -Lawyer-statesmanship, of the modern democratic sort, is of all forms of -human agency the one least likely to achieve anything at Potsdam. The -British emissary was tireless, industrious, and equable. His -colleagues, on the other hand, were overworked, indolent, or flustered. -Ready on the shortest notice to mind everybody else's business, he was -allowed to mind far too much of it; and he appears to have {291} minded -most of it rather ill than well. He was no more suited to act for the -Foreign Office than King Alfred was to watch the housewife's cakes. - -[Sidenote: THE HALDANE MISSION] - -The man whose heart swells with pride in his own ingenuity usually -walks all his life in blinkers. It is not surprising that Lord -Haldane's visit to the Kaiser was a failure, that it awoke distrust at -the time, or that it opened the way to endless misrepresentation in the -future. What surprises is his stoicism; that he should subsequently -have shown so few signs of disappointment, distress, or mortification; -that he should have continued up to the present moment to hold himself -out as an expert on German psychology;[6] that he should be still -upheld by his journalistic admirers, to such an extent that they even -write pamphlets setting out to his credit 'what he did to thwart -Germany.'[7] - -We have been told by Mr. Asquith,[8] what was thought by the British -Government of the outcome of Lord Haldane's embassy. We have also been -informed by Germany, what was thought of it by high officials at -Berlin; what inferences they drew from these conversations; what hopes -they founded upon them. We do not know, however, what was thought of -the incident by the other two members of the Entente; how it impressed -the statesmen of Paris and Petrograd; for they must have known of the -occurrence--the English representative not being one whose comings and -goings would easily {292} escape notice. The British people were told -nothing; they knew nothing; and therefore, naturally enough, they -thought nothing about the matter. - -The British Cabinet--if Mr. Asquith's memory is to be relied on--saw -through the devilish designs of Germany so soon as Lord Haldane, upon -his return, unbosomed himself to the conclave in quaking whispers. We -know from the Prime Minister, that when he heard how the Kaiser -demanded a free hand for European conquests, as the price of a friendly -understanding with England, the scales dropped from his eyes, and he -realised at once that this merely meant the eating of us up later. But -one cannot help wondering, since Mr. Asquith was apparently so -clear-sighted about the whole matter, that he made no preparations -whatsoever--military, financial, industrial, or even naval (beyond the -ordinary routine)--against an explosion which--the mood and intentions -of Germany being what they were now recognised to be--might occur at -any moment. - -[Sidenote: COST OF AMATEUR DIPLOMACY] - -As to what Germany thought of the incident we know of course only what -the high personages at Berlin have been pleased to tell the world about -their 'sincere impressions.' They have been very busy doing this--hand -upon heart as their wont is--in America and elsewhere. According to -their own account they gathered from Lord Haldane's mission that the -British Government and people were very much averse from being drawn -into European conflicts; that we now regretted having gone quite so far -as we had done in the past, in the way of entanglements and -understandings; that while we could not stand by, if any other country -was being threatened directly on account of arrangements it {293} had -come to with England, England certainly was by no means disposed to -seek officiously for opportunities of knight-errantry. In simple words -the cases of Tangier and Agadir were coloured by a special obligation, -and were to be distinguished clearly from anything in the nature of a -general obligation or alliance with France and Russia. - -It is quite incredible that Lord Haldane ever said anything of this -kind; for he would have been four times over a traitor if he had--to -France; to Belgium; to his own country; also to Germany whom he would -thus have misled. It is also all but incredible that a single high -official at Berlin ever understood him to have spoken in this sense. -But this is what the high officials have assured their own countrymen -and the whole of the neutral world that they did understand; and they -have called piteously on mankind to witness, how false the British -Government was to an honourable understanding, so soon as trouble arose -in July last with regard to Servia. Such are some of the penalties we -have paid for the luxury of indulging in amateur diplomacy. - -The German bureaucracy, however, always presses things too far. It is -not a little like Fag in _The Rivals_--"whenever it draws on its -invention for a good current lie, it always forges the endorsements as -well as the bill." As a proof that the relations of the two countries -from this time forward were of the best, inferences have been drawn -industriously by the high officials at Berlin as to the meaning and -extent of Anglo-German co-operation during the Balkan wars; as to -agreements with regard to Africa already signed, but not published, in -which Downing {294} Street had shown itself 'surprisingly -accommodating'; as to other agreements with regard to the Baghdad -Railway, the Mesopotamian oil-fields, the navigation of the Tigris, and -access through Basra to the Persian Gulf. These agreements, the -earnest of a new _entente_ between the Teuton nations--the United -States subsequently to be welcomed in--are alleged to have been already -concluded, signed and awaiting publication when war broke out.[9] Then -trouble arises in Servia; a mere police business--nothing more--which -might have been settled in a few days or at any rate weeks, if -perfidious Albion had not seized the opportunity to work upon Muscovite -suspicions, in order to provoke a world-war for which she had been -scheming all the time! - - -[Sidenote: THE SIXTH WARNING] - -The _sixth_ warning was the enormous German Army Bill and the -accompanying war loan of 1913. By comparison, the five previous -warnings were but ambiguous whispers. And yet this last reverberation -had apparently no more effect upon the British Government than any of -the rest. - -With all these numerous premonitions the puzzle is, how any government -could have remained in doubt as to the will of Germany to wage war -whenever {295} her power seemed adequate and the opportunity favourable -for winning it. The favourite plea that the hearts of Mr. Asquith and -his colleagues were stronger than their heads does not earn much -respect. Knowing what we do of them in domestic politics, this excuse -would seem to put the quality of their heads unduly low. The true -explanation of their omissions must be sought elsewhere than in their -intellects and affections. - - -It is important to remember that none of the considerations which have -been set out in this chapter can possibly have been hidden from the -Foreign Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, the Prime Minister, the -Committee of Imperial Defence, or the inner or outer circles of the -Cabinet. Important papers upon matters of this kind go the round of -the chief ministers. Unless British public offices have lately fallen -into a state of more than Turkish indolence, of more than German -miscalculation, it is inconceivable that the true features of the -situation were not laid before ministers, dinned into ministers, proved -and expounded to ministers, by faithful officials, alive to the dangers -which were growing steadily but rapidly with each succeeding year. And -although we may only surmise the vigilant activity of these -subordinates, we do actually know, that Mr. Asquith's Government was -warned of them, time and again, by other persons unconcerned in party -politics and well qualified to speak. - -But supposing that no one had told them, they had their own wits and -senses, and these were surely enough. A body of men whose first duty -is the {296} preservation of national security--who are trusted to -attend to that task, paid for performing it, honoured under the belief -that they do attend to it and perform it--cannot plead, in excuse for -their failure, that no one had jogged their elbows, roused them from -their slumbers or their diversions, and reminded them of their duty. - -[Sidenote: INACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT] - -Mr. Asquith and his chief colleagues must have realised the -interdependence of policy and armaments; and they must have known, from -the year 1906 onwards, that on the military side our armaments were -utterly inadequate to maintain our policy. They must have known that -each year, force of circumstances was tending more and more to -consolidate the Triple Entente into an alliance, as the only means of -maintaining the balance of power, which was a condition both of the -freedom of Europe and of British security. They knew--there can be no -doubt on this point--what an immense numerical superiority of armed -forces Germany and Austria together could bring, first against France -at the _onset_ of war, and subsequently, at their leisure, against -Russia during the _grip_ of war. They knew that a British -Expeditionary Army of 160,000 men would not make good the -difference--would come nowhere near making good the difference. They -must have known that from the point of view of France and Belgium, the -special danger of modern warfare was the crushing rapidity of its -opening phase. They must have been kept fully informed of all the -changes which were taking place in the military situation upon the -continent to the detriment of the Triple Entente. They had watched the -Balkan war and measured its effects. They knew {297} the meanings of -the critical dates--1914-1916--better, we may be sure, than any section -of their fellow-countrymen. And even although they might choose to -disregard, as mere jingoism, all the boasts and denunciations of German -journalists and professors, they must surely have remembered the events -which preceded the conference at Algeciras, and those others which led -up to the Defence Conference of 1909. They can hardly have forgotten -the anxieties which had burdened their hearts during the autumn of -1910. Agadir cannot have been forgotten; the memory of Lord Haldane's -rebuff was still green; and the spectre of the latest German Army Bill -must have haunted them in their dreams. - -There is here no question of being wise after the event. The meaning -of each of these things in turn was brought home to the Prime Minister -and his chief colleagues as it occurred--firstly, we may be sure, by -their own intelligence--secondly, we may be equally sure, by the -reports of their responsible subordinates--thirdly, by persons of -knowledge and experience, who had no axe to grind or interest to serve. - -It is therefore absurd to suppose that ministers could have failed to -realise the extent of the danger, or of our unpreparedness to meet it, -unless they had purposely buried their heads in the sand. They knew -that they had not a big enough army, and that this fact might ruin -their whole policy. Why did they never say so? Why, when Lord Roberts -said so, did they treat him with contumely, and make every effort to -discredit him? Why was nothing done by them during their whole period -of office to increase the Army and thereby diminish the {298} numerical -superiority of their adversaries. On the contrary, they actually -reduced the Army, assuring the country that they had no use for so many -trained soldiers. Moreover, the timidity or secretiveness of the -Government prevented England from having, what is worth several army -corps, and what proved the salvation of France--a National Policy, -fully agreed and appealing to the hearts and consciences of the whole -people. - - -The answers to these questions must be sought in another sphere. The -political situation was one of great perplexity at home as well as -abroad, and its inherent difficulties were immeasurably increased by -the character and temperament of Mr. Asquith, by the nature no less of -his talents than of his defects. The policy of wait-and-see is not -necessarily despicable. There are periods in which it has been the -surest wisdom and the truest courage; but this was not one of those -periods, nor was there safety in dealing either with Ireland or with -Germany upon this principle. When a country is fully prepared it can -afford to wait and see if there will be a war; but not otherwise. - -Sir Edward Grey is a statesman whose integrity and disinterestedness -have never been impugned by friend or foe; but from the very beginning -of his tenure of office he has appeared to lack that supreme quality of -belief in himself which stamps the greatest foreign ministers. He has -seemed at times to hesitate, as if in doubt whether the dangers which -he foresaw with his mind's eye were realities, or only nightmares -produced by his own over-anxiety. We have a feeling also that in the -conduct of his office he had {299} played too lonely a part, and that -such advice and sympathy as he had received were for the most part of -the wrong sort. What he needed in the way of counsel and companionship -was simplicity and resolution. What he had to rely on was the very -reverse of this. - -Lord Haldane, as we have learned recently, shared largely in the work -of the Foreign Office; a man of prodigious industry, but -over-ingenious, and of a self-complacency which too readily beguiled -him into the belief that there was no opponent who could not be -satisfied, no obstacle which could not be made to vanish--by argument. - -[Sidenote: SIR EDWARD GREY'S DIFFICULTIES] - -Moreover, Sir Edward Grey had to contend against enemies within his own -household. In the Liberal party there was a tradition, which has never -been entirely shaken off, that all increase of armaments is -provocative, and that all foreign engagements are contrary to the -public interest. After the Agadir crisis he was made the object of a -special attack by a large and influential section of his own party and -press, and was roundly declared to be no longer possible as Foreign -Minister.[10] There can be no doubt that the attempt to force Sir -Edward Grey's resignation in the winter 1911-1912 was fomented by -German misrepresentation and intrigue, skilfully acting upon the -peculiar susceptibilities of radical fanaticism. Nor is there any -doubt that the attacks which were made upon the policy of Mr. -Churchill, from the autumn of 1912 onwards, were fostered by {300} the -same agency, using the same tools, and aiming at the same objects. - -The orthodoxy of Mr. Churchill was suspect on account of his Tory -ancestry and recent conversion; that of Sir Edward Grey on the ground -that he was a country gentleman, bred in aristocratic traditions, -trained in Foreign Affairs under the dangerous influences of Lord -Rosebery, and therefore incapable of understanding the democratic dogma -that loving-kindness will conquer everything, including Prussian -ambitions. - -Surely no very vivid imagination is needed to penetrate the mystery of -Cabinet discussions on defence for several years before war broke out. -Behind the Cabinet, as the Cabinet well knew, was a party, one half of -which was honestly oblivious of all danger, while the other half feared -the danger much less than it hated the only remedy. Clearly the bulk -of the Cabinet was in cordial sympathy either with one or other of -these two sections of their party. Sir Edward Grey accordingly had to -defend his policy against an immense preponderance of settled -convictions, political prejudices, and personal interests. And at the -same time he seems to have been haunted by the doubt lest, after all, -his fears were only nightmares. Mr. Churchill, there is no difficulty -in seeing, must have fought very gallantly; but always, for the reason -already given, with one hand tied behind his back. He had all his work -cut out to maintain the Navy, which was under his charge, in a state of -efficiency; and this upon the whole he succeeded in doing pretty -efficiently.[11] - -{301} - -If we may argue back from public utterances to Cabinet discussions, it -would appear that the only assistance--if indeed it deserved such a -name--which was forthcoming to these two, proceeded from Mr. Asquith -and Lord Haldane. The former was by temperament opposed to clear -decisions and vigorous action. The latter--to whom the mind of Germany -was as an open book--bemused himself, and seems to have succeeded in -bemusing his colleagues to almost as great an extent. - -In fancy, we can conjure up a scene which must have been enacted, and -re-enacted, very often at Number 10 Downing Street in recent years. We -can hear the warnings of the Foreign Minister, the urgent pleas of the -First Lord of the Admiralty, the scepticism, indifference, or hostility -expressed by the preponderant, though leaderless, majority in the -Cabinet. _Simple_ said, _I see no danger_; _Sloth_ said, _Yet a little -more sleep_; and _Presumption_ said, _Every Vat must stand upon his own -bottom_.... We can almost distinguish the tones of their Right -Honourable voices. - -[Sidenote: EXCESSIVE TIMIDITY] - -The situation was governed by an excessive timidity--by fear of -colleagues, of the caucus, of the party, and of public opinion--by fear -also of Germany. Mr. Asquith, and the Cabinet of which he was the -head, refused to look their policy between the eyes, and realise what -it was, and what were its inevitable consequences. They would not -admit that the _Balance of Power_ was an English interest, or that they -were in any way concerned in maintaining it. They would not admit that -our Entente with France and Russia was in fact an alliance. They -thought they could send British officers to arrange plans of {302} -campaign with the French General Staff--could learn from this source -all the secret hopes and anxieties of France--could also withdraw the -greater part of their fleet from the Mediterranean, under arrangement -for naval co-operation with our present ally[12]--all without -committing this country to any form of understanding! They boasted -that they had no engagements with France, which puzzled the French and -the Russians, and convinced nobody; save possibly themselves, and a -section of their own followers. They had in fact bound the country to -a course of action--in certain events which were not at all -improbable--just as surely by drifting into a committal, as if they had -signed and sealed a parchment. Yet they would not face the imperative -condition. They would not place their armaments on a footing to -correspond with their policy. - -Much of this is now admitted more or less frankly, but justification is -pleaded, in that it was essential to lead the country cautiously, and -that the Government could do nothing unless it had the people behind -it. In these sayings there is a measure of truth. But as a matter of -fact the country was not led at all. It was trapped. Never was there -the slightest effort made by any member of the Government to educate -the people with regard to the national dangers, {303} responsibilities, -and duties. When the crisis occurred the hand of the whole British -Empire was forced. There was no other way; but it was a bad way. And -what was infinitely worse, was the fact that, when war was -declared--that war which had been discussed at so many Cabinet meetings -since 1906--military preparations were found to be utterly inadequate -in numbers; and in many things other than numbers. The politician is -right in thinking that, as a rule, it is to his advantage if the people -are behind him; but there are times when we can imagine him praying -that they may not be too close. - -We have been given to understand that it was impossible for the -Government to acknowledge their policy frankly, to face the -consequences, and to insist upon the necessary preparations in men and -material being granted. It was impossible, because to have done so -would have broken the Liberal party--that great instrument for good--in -twain. The Cabinet would have fallen in ruin. The careers of its most -distinguished members would have been cut short. Consider what -sacrifices would have been contained in this catalogue of disasters. - -That is really what we are now beginning to consider, and are likely to -consider more and more as time goes on. - -[Sidenote: VALUE OF SELF-SACRIFICE] - -A great act of self-sacrifice--a man's, or a party's--may sometimes -make heedless people realise the presence of danger when nothing else -will. Suppose Mr. Asquith had said, "I will only continue to hold -office on one condition," and had named the condition--'that armaments -should correspond to policy'--the only means of safety. He might -thereupon have disappeared into the chasm; but like Curtius he {304} -might have saved the City. It would have made a great impression, Mr. -Asquith falling from office for his principles. Those passages of -Periclean spoken after war broke out, about the crime of Germany -against humanity--about sacrificing our own ease--about duty, honour, -freedom, and the like--were wonderfully moving. Would there, however, -have been occasion for them, if in the orator's own case, the sacrifice -had been made before the event instead of after it, or if he had -faithfully performed the simplest and chief of all the duties attaching -to his great position? - -The present war, as many of us thought, and still think, was not -inevitable. None have maintained this opinion in the past with greater -vehemence than the Liberal party. But the conditions on which it could -have been avoided were, that England should have been prepared, which -she was not; and that she should have spoken her intentions clearly, -which she did not. - -[Sidenote: THE PRICE PAID] - -When the war is ended, or when the tide of it has turned and begun to -sweep eastward, there will be much coming and going of the older -people, and of women, both young and old, between England and France. -They have waited, and what is it that they will then be setting forth -to see? ... From Mons to the Marne, and back again to Ypres, heaps of -earth, big and little, shapeless, nameless, numberless--the graves of -men who did not hesitate to sacrifice either their careers or their -lives when duty called them. Desolation is the heaviest sacrifice of -all; and those who will, by and by, go on this pilgrimage have suffered -it, ungrudgingly and with pride, because their country needed it. If -this war was {305} indeed inevitable there is no more to be said. But -what if it was not inevitable? What if there would have been no war at -all--or a less lingering and murderous war--supposing that those, who -from the trust reposed in them by their fellow-countrymen should have -been the first to sacrifice their careers to duty, had not chosen -instead to sacrifice duty to their careers? It was no doubt a service -to humanity to save the careers of politicians from extinction, to keep -ministers in office from year to year, to preserve the Liberal -party--that great instrument for good--unfractured. These benefits -were worth a great price; but were they worth quite so great a price as -has been paid? - - - -[1] The Editor of the _Westminster Gazette_ should be an unimpeachable -witness: "The (German) Emperor's visit to Tangier (March 1905) was -followed by a highly perilous passage of diplomacy, in which the German -Government appeared to be taking risks out of all proportion to any -interest they could have had in Morocco. The French sacrificed their -Foreign Minister (M. Delcasse) in order to keep the peace, but the -Germans were not appeased, and the pressure continued. It was the -general belief at this time, that nothing but the support which the -British government gave to the French averted a catastrophe in the -early part of 1906, or induced the Germans to accept the Algeciras -conference as the way out of a dangerous situation."--_The Foundations -of British Policy_ (p. 15), by J. A. Spender. - -[2] The Cawdor Programme. - -[3] Mr. Haldane reduced the Army by nine battalions (_i.e._ 9000 men) -in 1906. He stated that he had no use for them. This meant a great -deal more, when the reserve-making power is taken into -consideration.... "The Regular Army ... has been reduced by over -30,000 men; not only a present, but a serious prospective loss."--Lord -Roberts in the House of Lords, April 3, 1913. - -[4] Even four years later we find Sir Wilfrid Laurier wedded to the -belief that the German Emperor was one of the great men of the present -age; wonderfully endowed by intellect, character, and moral fibre; his -potent influence was always directed towards peace.--Canadian _House of -Commons Debates_, February 27, 1913, 4364. The whole of this speech -(4357-4364) in opposition to Mr. Borden's Naval Forces Bill is -interesting reading, as is also a later speech, April 7, 1913, on the -same theme (7398-7411). - -[5] _How Britain Strove for Peace_, by Sir Edward Cook: especially pp. -18-35; also _Why Britain is at War_, by the same author. These two -pamphlets are understood to be a semi-official statement authorised by -the British Government. - -[6] Lord Haldane has explained German conduct in the present war by a -sudden change of spirit, such as once befell a collie dog which owned -him as master, and which after a blameless early career, was possessed -by a fit of depravity in middle life and took to worrying sheep. Thus -in a single metaphor he extenuates the German offence and excuses his -own blindness! - -[7] "Lord Haldane: What he did to thwart Germany." Pamphlet published -by the _Daily Chronicle_. - -[8] At Cardiff, October 2, 1914. - -[9] If this were really so, it is remarkable that Germany has not -published these opiate documents, which lulled her vigilance and were -the cause of her undoing. In the _New York Evening Post_ (February 15, -1915) there is a letter signed 'Historicus' in which the German version -of the facts is not seriously questioned, although a wholly different -inference is drawn: "This extremely conciliatory attitude of England is -another proof of the pacific character of her foreign policy. But, -unfortunately, German political thought regards force as the sole -controlling factor in international relations, and cannot conceive of -concessions voluntarily made in answer to claims of a more or less -equitable nature. To the German mind such actions are infallible -indications of weakness and decadence. Apparently Grey's attitude -towards German claims in Turkey and Africa was so interpreted, and the -conclusion was rashly reached that England could be ignored in the -impending world-war." - -[10] "The time has now come to state with a clearness which cannot be -mistaken that Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary is -impossible."--_Daily News_, January 10, 1912. The _Daily News_ was not -a lonely voice speaking in the wilderness. Similar threats have been -levelled against Mr. Churchill. - -[11] It has been stated on good authority, that Mr. McKenna upheld the -national interests with equal firmness, and against equal, if not -greater opposition, while he was at the Admiralty. - -[12] A large section of the Liberal party watched with jealous anxiety -our growing intimacy with France. In 1913, however, they discovered in -it certain consolations in the withdrawal of our ships of war from the -Mediterranean; and they founded upon this a demand for the curtailing -of our own naval estimates. France according to this arrangement was -to look after British interests in the Mediterranean, Britain -presumably was to defend French interests in the Bay of Biscay and the -Channel. When, however, the war-cloud was banking up in July 1914, -these very people who had been most pleased with our withdrawal from -the Mediterranean, were those who urged most strongly that we should -now repudiate our liabilities under the arrangement. - - - - -PART IV - -DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE - - - -Now I saw still in my Dream, that they went on until they were come to -the place that _Simple_ and _Sloth_ and _Presumption_ lay and slept in, -when _Christian_ went by on Pilgrimage. And behold they were hanged up -in irons, a little way off on the other side. - -Then said _Mercy_ to him that was their Guide and Conductor, What are -those three men? And for what are they hanged there? - -GREAT-HEART: These three men were men of very bad qualities, they had -no mind to be Pilgrims themselves, and whosoever they could they -hindered. They were for sloth and folly themselves, and whoever they -could persuade with, they made so too, and withal taught them to -presume that they should do well at last. They were asleep when -_Christian_ went by, and now you go by they are hanged. - -MERCY: But could they persuade any to be of their opinion? - -GREAT-HEART: Yes, they turned several our of the way. There was -_Slow-pace_, that they persuaded to do as they. They also prevailed -with one _Short-wind_, with one _No-heart_, with one -_Linger-after-lust_, and with one _Sleepy-head_, and with a young woman -her name was _Dull_, to turn out of the way and become as they. -Besides they brought up an ill report of your Lord, persuading others -that he was a Task-master. They also brought up an evil report of the -good Land saying 'twas not half so good as some pretend it was. They -also began to vilify his Servants, and to count the very best of them -meddlesome troublesome busy-bodies. - -_The Pilgrim's Progress_. - - - - -{309} - -CHAPTER I - -THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE - -Many people who were not in the habit of concerning themselves with -party politics endeavoured, during the autumn of 1911, and from that -time forward, to straighten out their ideas on the twin problems of -Foreign Policy and Defence. They were moved thereto mainly by the -Agadir incident. Moreover, a year later, the Balkan war provided an -object lesson in the success of sudden onset against an unprepared -enemy. Gradually also, more and more attention was focussed upon the -large annual increases in preparation of the warlike sort, which -successive budgets, presented to the Reichstag, had been unable to hide -away. In addition to these, came, early in 1913, the sensational -expansion of the German military establishment and the French reply to -it, which have already been considered. - -Private enquirers of course knew nothing of Lord Haldane's rebuff at -Berlin in 1912, for that was a Government secret. Nor had they any -means of understanding more than a portion of what was actually afoot -on the Continent of Europe in the matter of armaments and military -preparations. Their sole sources of information were official papers -and public discussions. Many additional facts beyond {310} these are -brought to the notice of governments through their secret intelligence -departments. All continental powers are more or less uncandid, both as -regards the direction and the amount of their expenditure on armaments. -In the case of Germany concealment is practised on a greater scale and -more methodically than with any other. Ministers obviously knew a -great deal more than the British public; but what was known to the -man-in-the-street was sufficiently disquieting, when he set himself to -puzzle out its meanings. - -At this time (during 1912, and in the first half of 1913, until anxiety -with regard to Ireland began to absorb public attention) there was a -very widely-spread and rapidly-growing concern as to the security of -the country. For nearly seven years Lord Roberts, with quiet -constancy, had been addressing thin and, for the most part, inanimate -gatherings on the subject of National Service. Suddenly he found -himself being listened to with attention and respect by crowded -audiences. - -Lord Roberts had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief in 1904. After his -retirement, and in the same year, he revisited the South African -battlefields. During this trip, very reluctantly--for he was no lover -of change--he came to the conclusion that in existing circumstances -'national service' was a necessity. On his return to England he -endeavoured to persuade Mr. Balfour's Government to accept his views -and give effect to them. Failing in this, he resigned his seat upon -the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1905, in order that he might be -able to advocate his opinion freely. He was then in his seventy-fourth -year. It was not, however, {311} until seven years later[1] that his -words can be said to have arrested general attention. - -[Sidenote: NATIONAL ANXIETY] - -The truth was that the nation was beginning to be dissatisfied with -what it had been told by the party speakers and newspapers, on the one -side and the other, regarding the state of the national defences. It -had not even the consolation of feeling that what the one said might be -set against the other, and truth arrived at by striking a balance -between them. This method of the party system, which was supposed to -have served fairly well in other matters, failed to reassure the nation -with regard to its military preparations. The whole of this subject -was highly complicated, lent itself readily to political mystery, and -produced in existing circumstances the same apprehensions among -ordinary men as those of a nervous pedestrian, lost in a fog by the -wharf side, who finds himself beset by officious and quarrelsome touts, -each claiming permission to set him on his way. - -The nation was disquieted because it knew that it had not been told the -whole truth by either set of politicians. It suspected the reason of -this to be that neither set had ever taken pains to understand where -the truth lay. It had a notion, moreover, that the few who really -knew, were afraid--for party reasons--to speak out, to state their -conclusions, and to propose the proper remedies, lest such a course -might drive them from office, or prevent them from ever holding it. -Beyond any doubt it was true that at this time many people were -seriously disturbed by the unsatisfactory character of recent -Parliamentary discussions, and earnestly desired to know {312} the real -nature of the dangers to be apprehended, and the adequacy of our -preparations for meeting them. - -There had always been a difficulty in keeping the Army question from -being used as a weapon in party warfare. As to this--looking back over -a long period of years--there was not much to choose between the -Radicals, Liberals, or Whigs upon the one hand, and the Unionists, -Conservatives, or Tories on the other. Military affairs are -complicated and technical; and the very fact that the line of country -is so puzzling to the ordinary man had preserved it as the happy -hunting-ground of the politician. When an opportunity presented itself -of attacking the Government on its army policy, the opposition--whether -in the reign of Queen Victoria or in that of Queen Anne--rarely -flinched out of any regard for the national interest. And when -Parliamentary considerations and ingrained prejudices made it seem a -risky matter to undertake reforms which were important, or even -essential, the Government of the day just as rarely showed any -disposition to discharge this unpopular duty. - -While at times naval policy, and even foreign policy, had for years -together been removed out of the region of purely party criticism, army -policy had ever remained embarrassed by an evil tradition. From the -time of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, to the time of -Field-Marshal Sir John French--from a date, that is, only a few years -after our modern Parliamentary system was inaugurated by the 'Glorious -Revolution,' down to the present day--the characteristic of almost -every opposition with regard to this matter, had been factiousness, and -that of {313} almost every Government evasion. Neither the one side -nor the other had ever seemed able to approach this ill-fated topic -with courage or sincerity, or to view it with steady constancy from the -standpoint of the national interest. - -[Sidenote: THE BLOOD TAXES] - -For several years past the country had been watching a conspicuous -example of this ingrained habit of manoeuvring round the Army in order -to obtain party advantage. From 1912 onwards, until more interesting -perplexities provided a distraction, a great part of the Liberal press -and party had been actively engaged in the attempt to fix the Unionist -party with responsibility for the proposals of the National Service -League. The Opposition, it is hardly necessary to record, were -innocent of this charge--criminally innocent; but it was nevertheless -regarded as good party business to load them with the odium of -'conscription.' The 'blood-taxes,' as it was pointed out by one -particularly zealous journal, would be no less useful than the -'food-taxes' as an 'election cry,' which at this time--more than ever -before--appeared to have become the be-all and end-all of party -activities. - -It was obvious to the meanest capacity that these industrious -politicians were not nearly so much concerned with the demerits, real -or supposed, of National Service, as with making their opponents as -unpopular as possible. In such an atmosphere of prejudice it would -have required great courage and determination in a statesman to seek -out and proclaim the true way to security, were it national service or -anything else which entailed a sacrifice. - -Was it wonderful that when people examined the signs of the times in -the early part of 1913, {314} they should have found themselves -oppressed by feelings of doubt and insecurity? A huge German military -increase; a desperate French effort in reply; war loans (for they were -nothing else) on a vast scale in both countries--what was the meaning -of it all? To what extent was British safety jeopardised thereby? - -To these questions there was no answer which carried authority; the -official oracles were dumb. We are a democratic country, and yet none -of our rulers had ever yet spoken plainly to us. None of the -Secretaries for War, none of the Prime Ministers since the beginning of -the century, had ever stated the issue with uncompromising simplicity, -as the case required. None of them had ever taken the country into his -confidence, either as to the extent of the danger or as to the nature -of the remedy. It is necessary to assume--in the light of subsequent -events--that these statesmen had in fact realised the danger, and were -not ignorant of the preparations which were required to forestall it. -Certainly it is hard to believe otherwise; but at times, remembering -their speeches and their acts, one is inclined to give them the -benefit, if it be a benefit, of the doubt. - -[Sidenote: BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS] - -The question at issue was in reality a graver matter than the security -of the United Kingdom or the British Empire. The outlook was wider -even than this. The best guarantee for the preservation of the peace -of Europe, and of the World, would have been a British army -proportionate to our population and resources. There could be no doubt -of this. For half a century or more we had, half unconsciously, -bluffed Europe into the belief that we did in fact possess such an -army; but gradually it had become {315} plain that this was not the -case. Since the Agadir incident the real situation was apparent even -to the man in the street--in Paris, Berlin, Brussels, the Hague, -Vienna, Rome, and Petrograd--in every capital, indeed, save perhaps in -London alone. - -If England had possessed such an army as would have enabled her to -intervene with effect in European affairs, she would almost certainly -never have been called upon to intervene.[2] Peace in that case would -have preserved itself. For Europe knew--not from our professions, but -from the obvious facts, which are a much better assurance--that our -army would never be used except for one purpose only, _to maintain the -balance of Power_. She knew this to be our only serious concern; and, -except for the single nation which, at any given time, might be aiming -at predominance, it was also the most serious concern of the whole of -Europe. She knew us to be disinterested, in the diplomatic sense, with -regard to all other European matters. She knew that there was nothing -in Europe which we wished to acquire, and nothing--save in the extreme -south-west, a rock called Gibraltar, and in the Mediterranean an island -called Malta--which we held and were determined to maintain. In the -chancelleries of Europe all this was clearly recognised. And more and -more it was {316} coming to be recognised also by the organs of public -opinion on the Continent. - - -The population of France is roughly forty millions; that of Germany} -sixty-five millions; that of the United Kingdom, forty-five millions. -As regards numbers of men trained to bear arms, France by 1911 had -already come to the end of her resources; Germany had still -considerable means of expansion; Britain alone had not yet seriously -attempted to put forth her strength. Had we done so in time the effect -must have been final and decisive; there would then have been full -security against disturbance of the peace of Europe by a deliberately -calculated war. - -Europe's greatest need therefore was that Britain should possess an -army formidable not only in valour, but also in numbers: her greatest -peril lay in the fact that, as to the second of these requirements, -Britain was deficient. No power from the Atlantic seaboard to the Ural -Mountains, save that one alone which contemplated the conquest and -spoliation of its neighbours, would have been disquieted--or indeed -anything else but reassured--had the British people decided to create -such an army. For by reason of England's peculiar interests--or rather -perhaps from her lack of all direct personal interests in European -affairs, other than in peace and the balance of power--she was marked -out as the natural mediator in Continental disputes. In these high -perplexities, however, it is not the justice of the mediator which -restrains aggression, so much as the fear inspired by his fleets and -the strength of his battalions. - - - -[1] October 1913. - -[2] This view was held by no one more strongly than by Lord Roberts. -During the last five-and-twenty years the writer has probably seen as -much of soldiers as falls to the lot of most civilians, but nowhere, -during that period, from the late senior Field-Marshal downwards, has -he ever encountered that figment of the pacifist imagination of which -we read so much during 1912-1914--"a military clique which desires to -create a conscript army on the European model for purposes of -aggression on the continent of Europe." The one thought of all -soldiers was adequate defence. Their one concern was _how to prevent -war_.... M. Clemenceau once urged that Lord Roberts should receive the -Nobel Peace Prize for his advocacy of 'conscription' in England. This -proposal was made quite seriously. - - - - -{317} - -CHAPTER II - -THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY - -The doubt and anxiety of public opinion in 1912 were not allayed when -the strength and composition of the British Army came to be considered. - -Leaving out of account those troops which were recruited and maintained -in India, the Dominions, and the Dependencies, the actual number of -British regulars employed in garrison duty abroad was in round figures -125,000 men. The number in the United Kingdom was approximately the -same; but by no means the whole of these were fit to take the field. -The total strength of the _Regular Army_ in 1912-1913 might therefore -be taken at somewhere between 250,000 and 254,000 men,[1] of whom half -were permanently out of this country, while from 25,000 to 50,000 could -not be reckoned on as available in case of war, for the reason that -they were either recent recruits or 'immatures.'[2] - -{318} - -The reserves and additional troops which would be called out in the -event of a serious war were so different in character that it was -impossible simply to throw them into a single total, and draw -conclusions therefrom according to the rules of arithmetic. For when -people spoke of the _Army Reserve_, the _Special Reserve_, and the -_Territorial Army_, they were talking of three things, the values of -which were not at all comparable. The first were fully trained -fighting soldiers; the second were lads with a mere smattering of their -trade; while the third were little more than an organised schedule of -human material--mainly excellent--which would become available for -training only at the outbreak of war, and whose liability for service -was limited to home defence. The sum-total of these reserves and -additional troops was roughly 450,000 men; but this row of figures was -entirely meaningless, or else misleading, until the significance of its -various factors was grasped.[3] - -[Sidenote: THE THREE RESERVES] - -The first of these categories, the _Army Reserve_, was the only one -which could justly claim to rank as a true reserve--that is, as a -fighting force, from the outbreak of war equal in calibre to the -Continental {319} troops against which, it would be called upon to take -the field. - -The _Army Reserve_ consisted of men who had served their full time in -the _Regular Army_. They were therefore thoroughly trained and -disciplined, needing only a few days--or at most weeks--to rub the rust -off them.[4] Nominally their numbers were 137,000[5] men; but as over -8000 of these were living out of the United Kingdom the net remainder -had to be taken at something under 130,000. Moreover, as the _Army -Reserve_ depended automatically upon the strength of the _Regular -Army_, and as the strength of this had recently been reduced, it seemed -necessarily to follow that ultimately there would be a considerable -diminution. - -The second category to which the name of a reserve was given was the -_Special Reserve_. This, however, was no true reserve like the first, -for it was wholly unfit to take the field upon the outbreak of -hostilities. It was the modern substitute for the Militia, and was -under obligation to serve abroad in time of war. The term of -enlistment was six years, and the training nominally consisted of six -months in the first year, and one month in camp in each of the -succeeding years. But in practice these conditions had been greatly -relaxed. It was believed that, upon the average, the term of training -amounted to even less than the proposals of the National Service {320} -League,[6] which had been criticised from the official -standpoint--severely and not altogether unjustly--on the ground that -they would not provide soldiers fit to be drafted immediately into the -fighting line. - -Notwithstanding the inadequacy of its military education, this _Special -Reserve_ was relied upon in some measure for making up the numbers of -our Expeditionary Force[7] at the commencement of war, and individuals -from it, and even in some cases units, would therefore have been sent -out to meet the conscript armies of the Continent, to which they were -inferior, not only in length and thoroughness of training, but also in -age. It was important also to bear in mind that they would be led by -comparatively inexperienced and untrained officers. The strength of -the _Special Reserve_ was approximately 58,000[8] men, or lads. Under -the most favourable view it was a corps of apprentices whose previous -service had been of a very meagre and desultory character. - -The third category was the _Territorial Army_, whose term of service -was four years and whose military training, even nominally, only -consisted of fifteen days in camp each year, twenty drills the first -year, and ten drills each year after that. In reality this training -had, on the average, consisted of very much less. This force was not -liable for service abroad, but only for home defence. - -The minimum strength of the _Territorial Army_ {321} was estimated -beforehand by Lord Haldane at 316,000 men; but these numbers had never -been reached. The approximate strength was only 260,000 men, of whom -only about half had qualified, both by doing fifteen days in camp, and -by passing an elementary test in musketry.[9] These numbers had -recently shown a tendency to shrink rather than swell.[10] - -[Sidenote: THEIR VALUES AND TRAINING] - -The value of the _Territorial Army_, therefore, was that of excellent, -though in certain cases immature, material, available for training upon -the outbreak of war. But in spite of its high and patriotic spirit it -was wholly unfit to take the field against trained troops until it had -undergone the necessary training. - -In the event of war we could not safely reckon upon being able to -withdraw our garrisons from abroad.[11] Consequently, in the first -instance, and until the _Special Reserve_ and the _Territorial Army_ -had been made efficient, all we could reasonably depend upon for -serious military operations, either at home or abroad, were that part -of the _Regular Army_ which was in the United Kingdom, and the _Army -Reserve_. - -In round figures therefore our soldiers immediately available for a -European war (_i.e._ that portion of the _Regular Army_ which was -stationed at home and the _Army Reserve_) amounted on mobilisation to -something much under 250,000 men. Our apprentice troops (the _Special -Reserve_), who were really considerably less than _half_-made, numbered -something {322} under 60,000 men. Our _un_made raw material (the -_Territorial Army_), excellent in quality and immediately available for -training, might be taken at 260,000 men. - - -The main consideration arising out of this analysis was of course the -inadequacy of the British Army to make good the numerical deficiency of -the Triple Entente in the Western theatre during the _onset_ and the -_grip_ of war. Supposing England to be involved in a European war, -which ran its course and was brought to a conclusion with the same -swiftness which had characterised every other European war within the -last half century, how were our _half_-made and our _un_made troops to -be rendered efficient in time to effect the result in any way -whatsoever? - -[Sidenote: SCARCITY OF OFFICERS] - -There was yet another consideration of great gravity. If our full -Expeditionary Force were sent abroad we should have to strain our -resources to the utmost to bring it up to its full nominal strength and -keep it there. The wastage of war would necessarily be very severe in -the case of so small a force; especially heavy in the matter of -officers. Consequently, from the moment when this force set sail, -there would be a dearth of officers in the United Kingdom competent to -train the _Special Reserve_, the _Territorial Army_, and the raw -recruits. Every regular and reserve officer in the country would be -required in order to mobilise the Expeditionary Force, and keep it up -to its full strength during the first six months. As things then stood -there was a certainty--in case of war--of a very serious shortage of -officers of suitable experience and age to undertake the duties, which -{323} were required under our recently devised military system.[12] - -Half-made soldiers and raw material alike would therefore be left to -the instruction of amateur or hastily improvised officers--zealous and -intelligent men without a doubt; but unqualified, owing to their own -lack of experience, for training raw troops, so as to place them -rapidly on an equality with the armies to which they would find -themselves opposed. What the British system contemplated, was as if -you were to send away the headmaster, and the assistant-masters, and -the under-masters, leaving the school in charge of pupil-teachers. - -In no profession is the direct personal influence of teaching and -command more essential than in the soldier's. In none are good -teachers and leaders more able to shorten and make smooth the road to -confidence and efficiency. Seeing that we had chosen to depend so -largely upon training our army after war began, it might have been -supposed, that at least we should have taken care to provide ourselves -with a sufficient number of officers and non-commissioned officers, -under whose guidance the course of education would be made as thorough -and as short as possible. This was not the case. Indeed the reverse -was the case. Instead of possessing a large number of officers and -non-commissioned officers, beyond those actually required at the -outbreak of war for the purpose of {324} starting with, and repairing -the wastage in the Expeditionary Force, we were actually faced, as -things then stood, with a serious initial shortage of the officers -required for this one purpose alone. - -Lord Haldane in framing the army system which is associated with his -name chose to place his trust in a small, highly-trained expeditionary -force for immediate purposes, to be supplemented at a later date--if -war were obliging enough to continue for so long--by a new army of -which the _Territorials_ formed the nucleus, and which would not begin -its real training until after the outbreak of hostilities. Under the -most favourable view this plan was a great gamble; for it assumed that -in the war which was contemplated, the _onset_ and the _grip_ periods -would be passed through without crushing disaster, and that England -would, in due course, have an opportunity of making her great strength -felt in the _drag_. It will be said that Lord Haldane's assumption has -been justified by recent events, and in a sense this is true; but by -what merest hair-breadth escape, by what sacrifices on the part of our -Allies, at what cost in British lives, with what reproach to our -national good name, we have not yet had time fully to realise. - -But crediting Lord Haldane's system, if we may, with an assumption -which has been proved correct, we have reason to complain that he did -not act boldly on this assumption and make his scheme, such as it was, -complete and effective. For remember, it was contemplated that the -great new army, which was to defend the existence of the British Empire -in the final round of war, should be raised and trained upon the -voluntary principle--upon a wave of patriotic enthusiasm--after war -broke out. This new army {325} would have to be organised, clothed, -equipped, armed, and supplied with ammunition. The 'voluntary -principle' did not apply to matters of this kind. It might therefore -have been expected that stores would be accumulated, and plans worked -out upon the strictest business principles, with philosophic -thoroughness, and in readiness for an emergency which might occur at -any moment. - -[Sidenote: WANT OF STORES AND PLANS] - -Moral considerations which precluded 'conscription' did not, and could -not, apply to inanimate material of war, or to plans and schedules of -army corps and camps, or to a body of officers enlisted of their own -free will. It may have been true that to impose compulsory training -would have offended the consciences of free-born Britons; but it was -manifestly absurd to pretend that the accumulation of adequate stores -of artillery and small arms, of shells and cartridges, of clothing and -equipment, could offend the most tender conscience--could offend -anything indeed except the desire of the tax-payer to pay as few taxes -as possible. - -If the British nation chose to bank on the assumption, that it would -have the opportunity given it of 'making good' during the _drag_ of -war, it should have been made to understand what this entailed in the -matter of supplies; and most of all in reserve of officers. All -existing forces should at least have been armed with the most modern -weapons. There should have been arms and equipment ready for the -recruits who would be required, and who were relied upon to respond to -a national emergency. There should have been ample stores of every -kind, including artillery, and artillery ammunition, for that -Expeditionary Force upon which, during the first {326} six months we -had decided to risk our national safety. - -But, in fact, we were provided fully in none of these respects. And -least of all were we provided in the matter of officers. There was no -case of conscience at stake; but only the question of a vote in the -House of Commons. We could have increased our establishment of -officers by a vote; we could have laid in stores of ammunition, of -clothing, of equipment by a vote. But the vote was not asked for--it -might have been unpopular--and therefore Lord Haldane's scheme--in its -inception a gamble of the most hazardous character--was reduced to a -mere make-believe, for the reason that its originator lacked confidence -to back his own 'fancy.' - - -Looking back at the Agadir incident, it seemed plain enough, from a -soldier's point of view, that the British Expeditionary Force was -inadequate, in a purely military sense, to redress the adverse balance -against the French, and beat back a German invasion. The moral effect, -however, of our assistance would undoubtedly have been very great, in -encouraging France and Belgium by our comradeship in arms, and in -discouraging Germany, by making clear to her the firmness of the Triple -Entente. - -But by the summer of 1914--three years later--this position had -undergone a serious change. In a purely military sense, the value of -such aid as it had been in our power to send three years earlier, was -greatly diminished. The increase in the German striking force over -that of France, which had taken effect since 1911, was considerably -greater than the total numbers of the army which we held prepared {327} -for foreign service. This was fully understood abroad; and the -knowledge of it would obviously diminish the moral as well as the -material effect of our co-operation. - -[Sidenote: COST OF FULL INSURANCE] - -In order that the combined forces of France and England might have a -reasonable chance of holding their own[13] against Germany, until -Russian pressure began to tell, the smallest army which we ought to -have been able to put in the field, and maintain there for six months, -was not less than twice that of the existing Expeditionary Force. From -a soldier's point of view 320,000 men instead of 160,000 was the very -minimum with which there might be a hope of withstanding the German -onset; and for the purpose of bringing victory within sight it would -have been necessary to double the larger of these figures. In order to -reach the end in view, Britain ought to have possessed a striking force -at least half as large as that of France, in round figures between -600,000 and 750,000 men. - - -This was how the matter appeared in 1912, viewed from the standpoint of -a soldier who found himself asked to provide a force sufficient, not -for conquest--not for the purpose of changing the map of Europe to the -advantage of the Triple Entente--but merely in order to safeguard the -independence of Belgium and Holland, to prevent France from being -crushed by Germany,[14] and to preserve the security of the British -Empire. - -{328} - -The political question which presented itself to the minds of enquirers -was this--If the British nation were told frankly the whole truth about -the Army, would it not conceivably decide that complete insurance was a -better bargain than half measures? What force ought we to be prepared -to send to France during the first fortnight of war in order to make it -a moral certainty that Germany would under no circumstances venture to -attack France? - -To questions of this sort it is obviously impossible to give certain -and dogmatic answers. There are occasions when national feeling runs -away with policy and overbears considerations of military prudence. -The effects of sudden panic, of a sense of bitter injustice, of blind -pride or overweening confidence, are incalculable upon any mathematical -basis. But regarding the matter from the point of view of the Kaiser's -general staff, whose opinion is usually assumed to be a determining -factor in German enterprises, a British Expeditionary Force, amounting -to something over 600,000 men, would have been sufficient to prevent -the occurrence of a coolly calculated war. And in the event of war -arising out of some uncontrollable popular impulse, a British Army of -this size would have been enough, used with promptitude and under good -leadership, to secure the defeat of the aggressor. - -An Expeditionary Force of 320,000 men would mean fully trained reserves -of something over 210,000 in order to make good the wastage of war -during a campaign of six months. Similarly an Expeditionary Force of -600,000 would mean reserves of 400,000. In the former case a total of -530,000 trained soldiers, {329} and in the latter a total of 1,000,000, -would therefore have been required.[15] - -Even the smaller of these proposed increases in the Expeditionary Force -would have meant doubling the number of trained soldiers in the British -Army; the larger would have meant multiplying it by four. Under what -system would it be possible to achieve these results if public opinion -should decide that either of them was necessary to national security? -The answer was as easy to give as the thing itself seemed hard to carry -out. - - -[Sidenote: LIMITS OF VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT] - -It had become clear a good deal earlier than the year 1914 that the -limit of voluntary enlistment, under existing conditions, had already -been reached for the Regular as well as the _Territorial_ Army. If, -therefore, greater numbers were required they could only be provided by -some form of compulsory service. There was no getting away from this -hard fact which lay at the very basis of the situation. - -If security were the object of British policy, the Expeditionary Force -must be fully trained before war broke out. It would not serve the -purpose for which it was intended, if any part of it, or of its -reserves, needed to be taught their trade after war began. -Thoroughness of training--which must under ordinary circumstances[16] -be measured by length of {330} training--appeared to be a factor of -vital importance. Given anything like equality in equipment, -generalship, and position, men who had undergone a full two years' -course--like the conscript armies of the Continent--ought to have no -difficulty in defeating a much larger force which had less discipline -and experience. - -The lessons of the South African War were in many ways very useful; but -the praise lavishly, and justly, given to volunteer battalions by Lord -Roberts and other distinguished commanders, needed to be studied in the -light of the circumstances, and these were of a peculiar character. -For one thing our antagonists, the Boers, were not trained troops, and -moreover, their policy to a large extent was to weary us out, by -declining decisive action and engaging us in tedious pursuits. Our -volunteers, for the most part, were picked men. Although only -half-trained--perhaps in the majority of cases wholly -untrained--circumstances in this case permitted of their being given -the time necessary for gaining experience in the field before being -required to fight. This was an entirely different state of affairs -from what might be looked for in a European war, in a densely peopled -country, covered with a close network of roads and railways--a war in -which great masses of highly disciplined soldiers would be hurled -against one another systematically, upon a settled plan, until at last -superiority at one point or another should succeed in breaking down -resistance. The South African war and a European war were two things -not in the least comparable. - -[Sidenote: THE PEOPLE HAD A RIGHT TO KNOW] - -Before the nation could be expected to come to a final decision with -regard to the insurance premium {331} which it was prepared to pay, it -would require to be fully informed upon a variety of subordinate points -of much importance. Cost was a matter which could not be put lightly -on one side; our peculiar obligations in regard to foreign garrisons -was another; the nature of our industrial system was a third; and there -were many besides. But the main and governing consideration, if we -wished to retain our independence as a nation, was--what provisions -were adequate to security? The people wanted to know, and had a right -to know, the facts. And in the end, with all due regard for our -governors, and for the self-importance of political parties, it was not -either for ministers or partisans to decide this question on behalf of -the people; it was for the people, on full and honest information, to -decide it for themselves. - - - -[1] These rough totals were approximately the same in the autumn of -1912, and at the outbreak of war in July 1914. - -[2] The exact number of men who could remain in the units when -mobilised was difficult to assess, for the reason that it varied -considerably according to the trooping season, which begins in August -and ends in February. February was therefore the most unfavourable -month for comparison, and it is probably not far from the truth to say -that at that date 50,000 men out of our nominal home army were -unavailable in case of war. Under the extreme stress of circumstances, -it had recently been decided that boys of nineteen might serve in -Europe in the event of war, so that a good many 'immatures' were now -nominally 'mature.' Only nominally, however, for even a war minister -could not alter the course of nature by a stroke of the pen. - -[3] Without wearying the reader too much with figures the German -strength may be briefly indicated. That country has a population -roughly half as large again as our own (65 millions against 45). The -total of fully trained men whom the German Government could mobilise at -the declaration of war was something over 4,500,000. Of these some -2,400,000 composed the 'striking force'; the remaining 2,100,000 or -thereabouts, the reserve for making good wastage of war. But in -addition, Germany had scheduled and inscribed in her Ersatz, or -recruiting reserve, and in the Landsturm, fully 5,000,000 untrained and -partially trained men, with ample equipment and military instructors -for them all. A large proportion of these would be enrolled on -mobilisation, and would undertake garrison and other duties, for which -they would be fitted after a short period of service, thus freeing all -fully trained men for service in the field. - -[4] For purposes of immediate mobilisation, however, Continental -reservists are superior to our own, because in the British Army they -lose touch with their regiments, and in case of war will in many cases -be serving with officers and comrades whom they know nothing about; -whereas in Germany (for example) they come up for periods of training -with the regiments to which they belong. Also, at the outset, the -proportion of reservists to serving soldiers will be much greater in -our case. - -[5] This was in 1912. Their numbers appear to have increased somewhat. -In July 1914 they were something over 146,000. - -[6] Viz. four months for infantry and six for cavalry. - -[7] Twenty-seven battalions of the Special Reserve were scheduled to go -out as complete units for duty on lines of communication, etc. The -report on recruiting for 1912 says that the great majority of recruits -for the Special Reserve join between the ages of seventeen and -nineteen. It is hardly necessary to point out the folly of putting -boys of this age in a situation where they will be peculiarly liable to -disease. Continental nations employ their oldest classes of reserves -for these duties. - -[8] In July 1914 about 61,000. - -[9] _I.e._ in the autumn of 1912. They were, therefore, 56,000 short -of Lord Haldane's estimate. - -[10] Latterly there was a slight improvement in recruiting. In July -1914 the numbers (including permanent staff) were a little over -268,000--48,000 short of Lord Haldane's estimate. - -[11] The fact that in certain cases we did so withdraw our garrisons in -1914-1915 without disaster does not invalidate this calculation. - -[12] The experience of the past few months makes this criticism appear -absurd--in its _under_statement. But of course what was contemplated -in 1912-13 was not anything upon the gigantic scale of our present 'New -Army'; but only (a) the _Special Reserve_, (b) the _Territorial Army_, -possibly doubled in numbers during the first six months, and (c) fresh -recruits for the _Regular Army_ upon a very considerably enhanced -scale. But even for these purposes which were foreseen, the provision -of officers was quite inadequate; so inadequate indeed as to appear -from the soldier's point of view in the light of a parliamentary farce. - -[13] _I.e._ of holding the Germans at the French frontier and keeping -them out of Belgium should they attempt to invade that country. - -[14] At the time these totals were worked out the results appeared very -startling to the lay mind. Recent experience, however, has proved that -the soldiers who worked them out were right when they described them as -'modest estimates.' - -[15] In this calculation the wastage of war during the first six months -has been taken at two-thirds. With the smaller force of 160,000 men, -practically the whole army would be in the fighting line all the time, -and the wastage consequently would be heavier. It could not wisely be -assumed at less than three-fourths for the same period. - -[16] Obviously the better and more experienced the officers, the higher -the quality of the recruits, and the keener their spirit, the more -quickly the desired result will be achieved. The last two have been -very potent factors in the rapid education of our present 'New Army.' -In a time of abnormal patriotic impulse, the length of time required -will be much shortened. Since August 1914 the lack of experienced -officers has been the great difficulty. - - - - -{332} - -CHAPTER III - -LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS - -Lord Roberts addressed many meetings in favour of National Service -during the years which followed his return from South Africa in 1905; -but the first of his speeches to arrest widespread popular attention -was delivered in the Free Trade Hall at Manchester, on October 22, -1912. A popular audience filled the building to overflowing, listened -with respect, and appeared to accept his conclusions with enthusiasm. -His words carried far beyond the walls of the meeting-place, and caused -something approaching a sensation, or, as some thought, a scandal, in -political circles. - -Of the commentators upon this speech the greater part were Liberals, -and these condemned his utterances with unanimity in somewhat violent -language. Official Unionism was dubious, uncomfortable, and -disapproving: it remained for the most part dumb. A few voices were -raised from this quarter in open reprobation; a few others proclaimed -their independence of party discipline and hastened to approve his -sentiments. - -There was no doubt of one thing--Lord Roberts's speech had at last -aroused public interest. For the first time during the National -Service agitation {333} blood had been drawn. This was mainly due to -the object-lesson in the consequences of military unpreparedness, which -the first Balkan War was just then unfolding before the astonished eyes -of Europe. In addition, those people, who for a year past had been -puzzling their heads over the true meaning of the Agadir crisis, had -become impressed with the urgent need for arriving at a clear decision -with regard to the adequacy of our national defences. - -[Sidenote: NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE] - -The speech was a lucid and forcible statement of the need for -compulsory military training. It was interesting reading at the time -it was delivered, and in some respects it is even more interesting -to-day. It was compactly put together, not a thing of patches. A man -who read any part of it would read it all. Yet in accordance with -custom, controversy raged around three isolated passages. - -The _first_ of these runs as follows: "In the year 1912, our German -friends, I am well aware, do not--at least in sensible circles--assert -dogmatically that a war with Great Britain will take place this year or -next; but in their heart of hearts they know, every man of them, -that--just as in 1866 and just as in 1870--war will take place the -instant the German forces by land and sea are, by their superiority at -every point, as certain of victory as anything in human calculation can -be made certain. Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck. That -is the time-honoured policy of her Foreign Office. That was the policy -relentlessly pursued by Bismarck and Moltke in 1866 and 1870. It has -been her policy decade by decade since that date. It is her policy at -the present hour." - -{334} - -The _second_ passage followed upon the first: "It is an excellent -policy. It is or should be the policy of every nation prepared to play -a great part in history. Under that policy Germany has, within the -last ten years, sprung, as at a bound, from one of the weakest of naval -powers to the greatest naval power, save one, upon this globe." - -The _third_ passage came later: "Such, gentlemen, is the origin, and -such the considerations which have fostered in me the growth of this -conviction--the conviction that in some form of National Service is the -only salvation of this Nation and this Empire. The Territorial Force -is now an acknowledged failure--a failure in discipline, a failure in -numbers, a failure in equipment, a failure in energy."[1] - -The accuracy of the _first_ and _third_ of these statements now stands -beyond need of proof. It was not truer that Germany would strike so -soon as her rulers were of opinion that the propitious hour had struck, -than it was that, when the British Government came to take stock of -their resources at the outbreak of war, they would find the Territorial -Army to be lacking in the numbers, equipment, training, and discipline, -which alone could have fitted it for its appointed task--the defence of -our shores against invasion. Slowly, and under great difficulties, and -amid the gravest anxieties these defects had subsequently to be made -good, hampering the while our military operations in the critical -sphere. - -The _second_ statement was of a different character, and taken by -itself, without reference to the context, lent itself readily to -misconception as well as {335} misconstruction. A certain number of -critics, no doubt, actually believed, a still larger number affected to -believe, that Lord Roberts was here advocating the creation of a -British army, for the purpose of attacking Germany, without a shred of -justification, and at the first favourable moment. - -The whole tenor of this speech, however, from the first line to the -last, made it abundantly clear that in Lord Roberts's opinion Britain -could have neither motive nor object for attacking Germany; that the -sole concern of England and of the British Empire with regard to -Germany was, how we might defend our possessions and secure ourselves -against her schemes of aggression. - -[Sidenote: POINTS OF CRITICISM] - -Lord Roberts, however, had in fact pronounced the intentions which he -attributed to Germany to be 'an excellent policy,' and had thereby -seemed to approve, and recommend for imitation, a system which was -revolting to the conscience of a Christian community. - -The idea that Lord Roberts could have had any such thoughts in his mind -seemed merely absurd to any one who knew him; nay, it must also have -seemed inconceivable to any one who had taken the trouble to read the -speech itself in an unprejudiced mood. To an ordinary man of sense it -did not need Lord Roberts's subsequent letter of explanation[2] to set -his opinions in their true light. It was clear that his object, in -this 'peccant passage,' had merely been to avoid a pharisaical -condemnation of German methods and ambitions, and to treat that country -as a worthy, as well as a formidable, antagonist. Being a soldier, -{336} however,--not a practised platform orator alive to the dangers of -too-generous concession--he went too far. The words were unfortunately -chosen, seeing that so many critics were on the watch, not to discover -the true meaning of the speech, but to pounce on any slip which might -be turned to the disadvantage of the speaker. - -At first there was an attempt on the part of certain London[3] Liberal -journals to boycott this speech. Very speedily, however, it seemed to -dawn upon them that they had greater advantages to gain by denouncing -it. A few days later, accordingly, the torrent of condemnation was -running free. The ablest attack appeared in the _Nation_,[4] and as -this pronouncement by the leading Radical weekly was quoted with -approval by the greater part of the ministerial press throughout the -country, it may fairly be taken as representing the general view of the -party. - -[Sidenote: A RADICAL ATTACK] - -The article was headed _A Diabolical Speech_, and its contents -fulfilled the promise of the title. "There ought," said the writer, -"to be some means of bringing to book a soldier, in the receipt of -money from the State, who speaks of a friendly Power as Lord Roberts -spoke of Germany." He was accused roundly of predicting and -encouraging a vast and 'hideous conflict' between the two countries. -Lord Roberts was a 'successful'[5] {337} soldier; but 'without training -in statesmanship.' He 'had never shown any gift for it.' His was 'an -average Tory intellect.' He was a 'complete contrast to Wellington, -who possessed two great qualities; for "he set a high value on peace, -and he knew how to estimate and bow to the governing forces of national -policy.... Lord Roberts possesses neither of these attributes. He is -a mere jingo in opinion and character, and he interprets the life and -interests of this nation and this Empire by the crude lusts and fears -which haunt the unimaginative soldier's brain." - -We may pause at this breathing-place to take note of the healing -influences of time. Radical journalists of 1832, and thereabouts, were -wont to say very much the same hard things of the Duke of Wellington, -as those of 1912 saw fit to apply to Earl Roberts.... We may also -remark in passing, upon the errors to which even the most brilliant of -contemporary judgments are liable. There has never been a man in our -time who set a higher value on peace than Lord Roberts did. He -realised, however, not only the intrinsic value of peace, but its -market cost. His real crime, in the eyes of pacifists, was that he -stated publicly, as often as he had the chance, what price we must be -prepared to pay, if we wanted peace and not war. It was in this sense, -no doubt, that he did not know 'how to estimate and bow to the -governing forces of national policy.' His blunt warnings broke in -rudely and crudely upon the comfortable discourse of the three -counsellors--_Simple_, _Sloth_, and _Presumption_, who, better than any -others, were skilled in estimating the 'governing forces,' and the -advantages to be gained by bowing to them. - -{338} - -The writer in the _Nation_ then proceeded to riddle Lord Roberts's -theories of defence. "He desires us to remain a 'free nation' in the -same breath that he invites us to come under the yoke of -conscription"--intolerable, indeed, that the citizens of a free nation -should be ordered to fit themselves for defending their common -freedom--"conscription, if you please, for the unheard-of purpose of -overseas service in India and elsewhere...." This invitation does not -seem to be contained in this, or any other of Lord Roberts's speeches; -but supposing it to have been given, it was not altogether -'unheard-of,' seeing that, under the law of conscription prevalent (for -example) in Germany, conscript soldiers can be sent to Palestine, or -tropical Africa as lawfully as into Luxemburg, Poland, or France. -According to the _Nation_, the true theory of defence was Sea Power; -but this, it appeared, could not be relied on for all time.... "While -our naval monopoly--like our commercial monopoly--cannot exist for -ever, our sea power and our national security depend on our ability to -crush an enemy's fleet.... We were never so amply insured--so -over-insured--against naval disaster as we are to-day." - -[Sidenote: A LIBERAL ATTACK] - -"Lord Roberts's proposition, therefore," the writer continued, "is -merely foolish; it is his way of commending it, which is merely wicked. -He speaks of war as certain to take place 'the instant' the German -forces are assured of 'superiority at every point,' and he discovers -that the motto of German foreign policy is that _Germany strikes when -Germany's hour has struck_. Germany does not happen to have struck -anybody since 1870, and she struck then to secure national unity, and -to put an end to {339} the standing menace of French imperialism. -Since then she has remained the most peaceful and the most -self-contained, though doubtless not the most sympathetic, member of -the European family.... Germany, the target of every cheap dealer in -historic slapdash, is in substance the Germany of 1870" (_i.e._ in -extent of territory), "with a great industrial dominion superadded by -the force of science and commercial enterprise. That is the story -across which Lord Roberts scrawls his ignorant libel.... By direct -implication he invites us to do to Germany what he falsely asserts she -is preparing to do to us. These are the morals, fitter for a wolf-pack -than for a society of Christian men, commended as 'excellent policy' to -the British nation in the presence of a Bishop of the Anglican Church." - -This was very vigorous writing; nor was there the slightest reason to -suspect its sincerity. In the nature of man there is a craving to -believe; and if a man happens to have his dwelling-place in a world of -illusion and unreality, it is not wonderful that he should believe in -phantoms. The credulity of the _Nation_ might appear to many people to -amount to fanaticism; but its views were fully shared, though less -tersely stated, by the whole Liberal party, by the greater proportion -of the British people, and not inconceivably by the bulk of the -Unionist opposition as well. The Government alone, who had learned the -true facts from Lord Haldane eight months earlier, knew how near Lord -Roberts's warnings came to the mark. - -This article set the tone of criticism. The _Manchester Guardian_ -protested against the "insinuation that the German Government's views -of international {340} policy are less scrupulous and more cynical than -those of other Governments." Germany has never been accused with -justice "of breaking her word, of disloyalty to her engagements, or of -insincerity. Prussia's character among nations is, in fact, not very -different from the character which Lancashire men give to themselves as -compared with other Englishmen. It is blunt, straightforward, and -unsentimental...." How foolish, moreover, are our fears of Germany -when we come to analyse them. "We have no territory that she could -take, except, in tropical Africa, which no sane man would go to war -about. Our self-governing colonies could not in any case be held by -force; and Canada is protected in addition by the Monroe doctrine. -Egypt is not ours to cede. Malta could not be had without war with -Italy nor India without war with Russia."[6] - -This was a proud statement of the basis of British security, and one -which must have warmed the hearts, and made the blood of Cromwell and -Chatham tingle in the shades. Egypt, which we had rescued from a chaos -of civil war, bankruptcy, and corruption, which during more than thirty -years we had administered as just stewards for the benefit of her -people, which we had saved from conquest and absorption by savage -hordes--Egypt was not ours to cede. For the rest our dependencies were -not worth taking from us, while our 'colonies' could defend themselves. -By the grace of Italy's protection we should be secured in the -possession of Malta. India would be preserved to us by the goodwill of -Russia, and Canada by the strong arm of the United States.... {341} -Such at that time were the views of the Liberal journal foremost in -character and ability. - -[Sidenote: A UNIONIST ATTACK] - -Somewhat later the _Daily News_ took the field, making up for lost time -by an exuberance of misconstruction.... "The whole movement as -represented by the National Service League is definitely unmasked as an -attempt to get up, not defence, but an invasion of German territory. -This discovery, which for years has been suspected, is most valuable as -showing up the real object of the League, with its glib talk about -military calisthenics. Lord Roberts may have been indiscreet, but at -least he has made it clear that what the League wants is war."[7] - -On the same day, in order that the Liberals might not have a monopoly -of reprobation, the _Evening Standard_, in an article entitled _A Word -with Lord Roberts_, rated him soundly for having "made an attack upon -Germany and an attack upon the Territorial Force...." "It is mere -wanton mischief-making for a man with Lord Roberts's unequalled -prestige to use words which must drive every German who reads them to -exasperation." And yet no signs whatsoever were forthcoming that so -much as a single Teuton had been rendered desperate, or had taken the -words as in the least degree uncomplimentary. Up to the day of his -death--and indeed after his death[8]--Lord Roberts was almost the only -Englishman of his time of whom Germans spoke with consistent -respect.... "Do not," continues this lofty and sapient mentor, "Do not -let us talk as if the Kaiser could play the part of a Genghis Khan or -an Attila, ravening round the world at the head of armed {342} hordes -to devour empires and kingdoms."[9] And yet how otherwise has the -whole British Press been talking ever since the middle of August 1914? -If during this period of nine months, the _Evening Standard_ has kept -all reference to Attila and his Huns out of its columns, its continence -is unique. - -It would serve no useful purpose to set out further items of criticism -and abuse from the leader and correspondence columns of newspapers, or -from the speeches of shocked politicians. The _Nation_, the -_Manchester Guardian_, and the _Daily News_ are entitled, between them, -to speak for the Liberal party; and if it cannot be said that the -_Evening Standard_ is quite similarly qualified in respect of the -Unionists, there is still no doubt that the views which it expressed -with so much vigour, prescience, and felicity were held by many -orthodox members of its party. - -Colonel Bromley-Davenport, for example, who had been Financial -Secretary to the War Office in the late Unionist Government, spoke out -strongly against Lord Roberts's comments upon the efficiency of the -Territorial Force. 'Compulsory service,' in his opinion, 'was not -necessary....' And then, with a burst of illuminating candour--"Which -of the great parties in the state would take up compulsory service and -fight a general election upon it? The answer was that neither of the -parties would; and to ask for compulsory military service was like -crying for the moon."[10] The power of any proposal for winning -elections was to be the touchstone of its truth. It would be -impossible to state more concisely the attitude of the orthodox -politician. {343} Which party, indeed, we may well ask, would have -fought a general election on anything, however needful, unless it hoped -to win on it? - -[Sidenote: MINISTERIAL ATTACKS] - -The attitude of Ministers, however, with regard to Lord Roberts's -speech is much more worthy of remark than that of independent -journalists and members of Parliament. For the Government knew several -very important things which, at that time, were still hidden from the -eyes of ordinary men. - -It was eight months since Lord Haldane had returned from Germany, -concealing, under a smiling countenance and insouciant manner, a great -burden of care at his heart. If on his return he spoke cheerily on -public platforms about the kindness of his entertainment at Berlin, and -of the greatness and goodness of those with whom he had there walked -and talked, this was merely in order that his fellow-countrymen might -not be plunged in panic or despondency. He had learned the mind of -Germany, and it was no light lesson. He had imparted his dreadful -secret to his colleagues, and we have learned lately from Mr. Asquith -himself what that secret was.... The rulers of Germany, 'to put it -quite plainly,' had asked us for a free hand to overbear and dominate -the European world, whenever they deemed the opportunity favourable. -They had demanded this of the astounded British emissary, "at a time -when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and -defensive resources, and especially upon the sea." To such a demand -but one answer was possible, and that answer the British Government had -promptly given--so we are led to infer--in clear and ringing tones of -scorn.[11] - -{344} - -The Government knew for certain what nobody else did. They knew what -the aims of Germany were, and consequently they knew that Lord Roberts -had spoken nothing but the truth. - -And yet, strange to relate, within a few days we find Mr. Runciman, a -member of the Cabinet, administering a severe castigation to Lord -Roberts. The Manchester speech was "not only deplorable and -pernicious,' but likewise 'dangerous.' If it was resented in Germany, -Mr. Runciman 'would like Germany to know that it is resented no less in -England...." Lord Roberts had been a great organiser of the National -Service League, the object of which was 'practically conscription'; but -"he knows little of England, and certainly little of the North of -England, if he imagines we are ever likely to submit to -conscription"--not even apparently (for there are no reservations) as -an alternative to conquest; or as a security against murder, arson, and -rape.... "War is only inevitable when statesmen cannot find a way -round, or through, difficulties that may arise; or are so wicked that -they prefer the hellish method of war to any other method of solution; -or are so weak as to allow soldiers, armament makers, or scaremongers -to direct their policy."[12] Lord Roberts was not, of course, an -armament maker, but he was a scaremonger and a soldier, and as such had -no right to state his views as to how peace might be kept. - -When Sir Edward Grey was asked if any representation had been addressed -by Germany to the {345} Foreign Office with reference to Lord Roberts's -utterances, he deprecated, with frigid discretion, the idea that either -Government should make official representation to the other about -'unwise or provocative speeches.'[13] When Sir William Byles plied the -Secretary of State for War, Colonel Seely, with questions as to the -revocability of Lord Roberts's pension, the answer was solemn and -oracular, but no rebuke was administered to the interrogator.[14] - -[Sidenote: MR. ACLAND'S PERSISTENCY] - -But perhaps the most puzzling thing of all, is the persistency with -which Mr. Acland (Sir Edward Grey's Under-Secretary) pursued Lord -Roberts for some three weeks after the rest were finished with him. It -might have been expected that Mr. Acland's chief, who knew 'the -dreadful secret,' would have curbed his subordinate's excess of zeal. - -Mr. Acland distorted the Manchester speech into an appeal to the -British people to put themselves "in a position to strike at the -Germans, and to smash them in a time of profound peace, and without -cause." And this fanciful gloss he rightly denounces, in accents which -remind us not a little of the Reverend Robert Spalding, as 'nothing -less than a wicked proposal.'[15] ... For England to adopt compulsory -military service would be "an utterly criminal and provocative -proceeding against other countries of the world...." Here, indeed, is -much food for wonder. What single country of the world would have -regarded the adoption of national service by England as 'provocative'? -What single country, except Germany, would even have objected to it? -And what more right would Germany have had to object {346} to our -possessing a formidable army, than we had right to object to her -possessing a formidable navy? - -When some days later Mr. Acland is reproached with having -misrepresented Lord Roberts's original statement, he replies loftily -that he "was justified at the time in supposing that this was his real -meaning."[16] One wonders why. Lord Roberts had said nothing which -any careful reader of his whole speech--an Under-Secretary for Foreign -Affairs, for example, quoting and speaking with a due sense of his -great responsibilities--could conceivably have understood to bear this -interpretation. - -A fortnight later Mr. Acland returns to the charge once more. "Lord -Roberts," he says courteously, "has since explained that he did not -mean what his words seemed so plainly to mean"--that is, the smashing -of Germany in time of profound peace and without any cause.... Danger -to peace, the representative of the Foreign Office assures his -audience, "does not come from any action of His Majesty's Government. -It arises, if at all, from irresponsible utterances such as those which -we heard from Lord Roberts. I very much regret that harm must have -been done between the two countries by Lord Roberts's speech."[17] - -Although an under-secretary does not always enjoy the full confidence -of his official superior, he would presumably obey orders--even an -order to hold his tongue--if any were given. Consequently, although -Lord Haldane's dreadful secret may have been kept from Mr. Acland, as -unfit for his innocent {347} and youthful ears, it is surprising that -he was never warned of the dangers of the path in which he was so -boldly treading. The discourtesies of youth to age are not easily -forgiven, especially where they are founded upon misrepresentation, and -when, as in this case, the older man was right and the younger wrong as -to the facts. - -[Sidenote: LORD ROBERTS WAS RIGHT] - -It will be said--it has indeed been already said--by way of excuse for -the reticence of the Government with regard to the intentions, which -German statesmen revealed to Lord Haldane, at Berlin, in February -1912--that by keeping back from the country the knowledge which members -of the Cabinet possessed, they thereby prevented an outbreak of passion -and panic which might have precipitated war. This may be true or -untrue; it can neither be proved nor controverted; but at any rate it -was not in accordance with the principle of trusting the people; nor -would it have prevented the Government and their supporters--when war -broke out--from making amends to Lord Roberts and others whom, on -grounds of high policy, they had felt themselves obliged, in the past -to rebuke unjustly and to discredit without warrant in the facts. This -course was not impossible. Peel, a very proud man, made amends to -Cobden, and his memory does not stand any the lower for it. - -With regard to those journalists and private politicians whose mistakes -were not altogether their own fault--being due in part at least, to the -concealment of the true facts which the Government had practised--it -would not have been in the least wounding to their honour to express -regret, that they had been unwittingly the means of misleading the -people, and traducing those who were endeavouring to lead {348} it -right. In their patriotic indignation some of these same journalists -and politicians had overstepped the limits of what is justifiable in -party polemics. They had attacked the teaching at the Military -Colleges, because it sought to face the European situation frankly, and -to work out in the lecture-room the strategical and tactical -consequences which, in case of war, might be forced upon us by our -relations with France and Russia. It would have done these high-minded -journalists no harm in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, had they -acknowledged frankly that when in former days they had denounced the -words of Lord Roberts as 'wicked' and his interpretation of the -situation as inspired by "the crude lusts and fears which haunt the -unimaginative soldier's brain"--when they had publicly denounced as 'a -Staff College Cabal' teachers who were only doing their duty--they had -unwittingly been guilty of a cruel misjudgment. - -[Sidenote: FAILURE TO MAKE AMENDS] - -It is not a little remarkable that in 1912--indeed from 1905 to -1914--Lord Roberts, who, according to the Nation, possessed but 'an -average Tory intellect,' should have trusted the people, while a -democratic Government could not bring itself to do so. The Cabinet, -which knew the full measure of the danger, concealed it out of a -mistaken notion of policy. Their henchmen on the platform and in the -press did not know the full measure of the danger. They acted either -from natural prejudice, or official inspiration--possibly from a -mixture of both--when they made light of the danger and held up to -scorn any one who called attention to it. The whole body of -respectable, word-worshipping, well-to-do Liberals and Conservatives, -whom nothing could stir out of {349} their indifference and scepticism, -disapproved most strongly of having the word 'danger' so much as -mentioned in their presence. The country would to-day forgive all of -these their past errors more easily if, when the crisis came, they had -acted a manly part and had expressed regret. But never a word of the -sort from any of these great public characters! - - - -[1] Manchester, October 22, 1912. Quoted from _Lord Roberts's Message -to the Nation_ (Murray), pp. 4-6 and p. 12. The date, however, is -there given wrongly as October 25. - -[2] _Manchester Guardian_, November 5, 1912. - -[3] This was not so, however, with the Liberal newspaper of greatest -influence in the United Kingdom--the _Manchester Guardian_--which gave -a full and prominent report of Lord Roberts's meeting. This journal is -honourably free from any suspicion of using the suppression of news as -a political weapon. - -[4] October 26, 1912. Like the _Manchester Guardian_, the _Nation_ -made no attempt to boycott the speech. - -[5] 'Successful,' not 'distinguished' or 'able' is the word. The -amiable stress would appear to be on luck rather than merit. - -[6] _Manchester Guardian_, October 28, 1912. - -[7] _Daily News_, October 30, 1912. - -[8] See Preface. - -[9] _Evening Standard_, October 30, 1912. - -[10] _Morning Post_, October 30, 1912. - -[11] Mr. Asquith at Cardiff, October 2, 1914. - -[12] Mr. Runciman at Elland, _Manchester Guardian_, October 26, 1912. -Sir Walter Runciman, the father of this speaker, appears to be made of -sterner stuff. After the Scarborough raid he denounced the Germans as -"heinous polecats." - -[13] _Times_, Parliamentary Report, October 30, 1912. - -[14] _Ibid_. November 1, 1912. - -[15] Mr. Acland at Taunton, the _Times_, November 5, 1912. - -[16] Letter in the _Times_, November 11, 1912. - -[17] Mr. Acland at Rochdale, the _Times_, November 25, 1912. - - - - -{350} - -CHAPTER IV - -LORD KITCHENER'S TASK - -Lord Roberts had been seeking for seven years to persuade the nation to -realise that it was threatened by a great danger; that it was -unprepared to encounter the danger; that by reason of this -unpreparedness, the danger was brought much nearer. Until October -1912, however, he had failed signally in capturing the public ear. The -people would not give him their attention either from favour or -indignation. The cause of which he was the advocate appeared to have -been caught in an academic backwater. - -But from that time forward, Lord Roberts had no reason to complain of -popular neglect. Overcoming his natural disinclination to platform -oratory and political agitation, sacrificing his leisure, putting a -dangerous strain upon his physical strength, he continued his -propaganda at a series of great meetings in the industrial centres. -Everywhere he was listened to with respect, and apparently with a great -measure of agreement. Only on one occasion was he treated with -discourtesy, and that was by a civic dignitary and not by the audience. -But he had now become an important figure in the political conflict, -and he had to take the consequences, in a stream of abuse and -misrepresentation from the party which {351} disapproved of his -principles; while he received but little comfort from the other party, -which lived in constant terror lest it might be thought to approve of -them. Lord Roberts's advocacy of national service continued up to the -autumn of 1913, when the gravity of the situation in Ireland made it -impossible to focus public interest on any other subject. - -[Sidenote: TRIUMPH OF VOLUNTARY SYSTEM] - -After the present war had run its course for a month or two, the minds -of many people reverted to what Lord Roberts had been urging upon his -fellow-countrymen for nine years past. His warnings had come true; -that at any rate was beyond doubt. The intentions which he had -attributed to Germany were clearly demonstrated, and likewise the -vastness and efficiency of her military organisation. The inadequacy -of British preparations was made plain. They were inadequate in the -sense that they had failed to deter the aggressor from a breach of the -peace, and they had been equally inadequate for withstanding his -_onset_. The deficiencies of the Territorial Army in numbers, -discipline, training, and equipment had made it impossible to entrust -it with the responsibility of Home Defence immediately upon the -outbreak of war. As a consequence of this, the whole of the Regular -Army could not be released for foreign service, although Sir John -French's need of reinforcements was desperate. Notwithstanding, -however, that Lord Roberts's warnings had come true, many people -professed to discover in what had happened a full justification--some -even went so far as to call it a 'triumph'--for the voluntary system. - -Even after the first battle of Ypres, those who held such views had no -difficulty in finding evidences {352} of their truth on all hands. -They found them in the conduct of our army in France, and in the -courage and devotion with which it had upheld the honour of England -against overwhelming odds. They found it in the response to Lord -Kitchener's call for volunteers, and in the eagerness and spirit of the -New Army. They found it in our command of the sea, in the spirit of -the nation, and in what they read in their newspapers about the -approval and admiration of the world. - -In the short dark days of December and January we were cheered by many -bold bills and headlines announcing what purported to be victories; and -we were comforted through a sad Christmastide by panegyrics on British -instinct, pluck, good-temper, energy, and genius for muddling through. -Philosophic commentators pointed out that, just as Germany was becoming -tired out and short of ammunition, just as she was bringing up troops -of worse and worse quality, we should be at our very best, wallowing in -our resources of men and material of war. Six months, a year, eighteen -months hence--for the estimates varied--Britain would be invincible. -Economic commentators on the other hand impressed upon us how much -better it was to pay through the nose now, than to have been bleeding -ourselves white as the Germans, the French, and the Russians were -supposed (though without much justification) to have been doing for a -century. - -To clinch the triumph of the voluntary system--when the Hour came the -Man came with it. - -[Sidenote: LORD KITCHENER'S APPOINTMENT] - -Many of these things were truly alleged. Lord Kitchener at any rate -was no mirage. The gallantry of our Army was no illusion; indeed, its -heroism {353} was actually underrated, for the reason that the extent -of its peril had never been fully grasped. Although British commerce -had suffered severely from the efforts of a few bold raiders, the -achievements of our Navy were such that they could quite fairly be -described, as having secured command of the sea.[1] The German fleet -was held pretty closely within its harbours. We had been able to move -our troops and munitions of war wherever we pleased, and so far, -without the loss of a ship, or even of a man. Submarine piracy--a -policy of desperation--had not then begun. The quality of the New -Army, the rapidity with which its recruits were being turned into -soldiers, not only impressed the public, but took by complete surprise -the severest of military critics. - -This is not the place for discussing how Lord Kitchener came to be -appointed Secretary of State for War, or to attempt an estimate of his -character and career.[2] He was no politician, but a soldier {354} and -an administrator. He was in his sixty-fifth year, and since he had -left the Royal Military Academy in 1871, by far the greater part of his -work had been done abroad--in the Levant, Egypt, South Africa, and -India.[3] In no case had he ever failed at anything he had undertaken. -The greater part of his work had been completely successful; much of it -had been brilliantly successful. He believed in himself; the country -believed in him; foreign nations believed in him. No appointment could -have produced a better effect upon the hearts of the British people and -upon those of their Allies. The nation felt--if we may use so homely -an image in this connection--that Lord Kitchener was holding its hand -confidently and reassuringly in one of his, while with the other he had -the whole race of politicians firmly by the scruff, and would see to it -that there was no nonsense or trouble in that quarter. - -It is no exaggeration to say that from that time to this,[4] Lord -Kitchener's presence in the Cabinet {355} has counted for more with the -country, than that of any other minister, or indeed than all other -ministers put together. That in itself proves his possession of very -remarkable qualities; for nine such months of public anxiety and -private sorrow, as England has lately known, will disturb any -reputation which is not firmly founded upon merit. During this time we -have seen other reputations come and go; popularities made, and unmade, -and remade. We have seen great figures all but vanish into the mist of -neglect. But confidence in Lord Kitchener has remained constant -through it all. Things may have gone wrong; the Government may have -made mistakes; even the War Office itself may have made mistakes; yet -the faith of the British people in the man of their choice has never -been shaken for an instant. - -[Sidenote: HIS GRASP OF ESSENTIALS] - -The highest of all Lord Kitchener's merits is, that being suddenly -pitchforked into office by an emergency, he nevertheless grasped at -once the two or three main features of the situation, and turned the -whole force of his character to dealing with them, letting the smaller -matters meanwhile fall into line as best they might. He grasped the -dominating factor--that it was essential to subordinate every military -and political consideration to supporting France, whose fight for her -own existence was equally a fight for the existence of the British -Empire. He grasped the urgent need for the enrolment of many hundreds -of thousands of men fit for making into soldiers, if we were to win -this fight and not lose it. He grasped the need for turning these -recruits into soldiers at a pace which hardly a single military expert -believed to be possible. He may, or may {356} not, have fully grasped -at the beginning, the difficulties--mainly owing to dearth of -officers--with which he was faced: but when he did grasp them, by some -means or another, he succeeded in overcoming them. - -It is dangerous to speak of current events in confident superlatives; -but one is tempted to do so with regard to the training of the New -Army. Even the most friendly among expert critics believed that what -Lord Kitchener had undertaken was a thing quite impossible to do in the -prescribed time. Yet he has done it. And not only the friendly, but -also the severest critics, have admitted that the New Army is already -fit to face any continental army, and that, moreover, to all -appearance, it is one of the finest armies in history. The sternest -proof is yet to come; but it is clear that something not far short of a -miracle has been accomplished. - -If we search for an explanation of the miracle, we find it quite as -much in Lord Kitchener's character as in his methods. Fortunately what -was so painfully lacking in the political sphere was present in the -military--Leadership. - -[Sidenote: HIS DISADVANTAGES] - -Despite the support which Lord Kitchener derived from the public -confidence he laboured under several very serious disadvantages. A man -cannot spend almost the whole of his working life out of England, and -then return to it at the age of sixty-four, understanding all the -conditions as clearly as if he had never left it. Lord Kitchener was -ignorant not only of English political conditions, but also of English -industrial conditions, which in a struggle like the present are -certainly quite as important as the other. He may well have consoled -himself, however, with the reflection that, although he himself was -{357} lacking in knowledge, his colleagues were experts in both of -these spheres. - -It was inevitable that Lord Kitchener must submit to the guidance of -Ministers in the political sphere, providing they agreed with his main -objects--the unflinching support of France, and the creation of the New -Army. - -In the industrial sphere, on the other hand, it was the business of -Ministers, not merely to keep themselves in touch with Lord Kitchener's -present and future needs, and to offer their advice and help for -satisfying them, but also to insist upon his listening to reason, if in -his urgent need and unfamiliarity with the business world, he was seen -to be running upon danger in any direction. - -It is impossible to resist the impression that, while his colleagues -held Lord Kitchener very close by the head as to politics, and -explained to him very clearly what they conceived the people would -stand and would not stand, they did not show anything like the same -vigilance or determination in keeping him well advised as to the means -of procuring the material of war. - - - -[1] Partly by good fortune, but mainly owing to the admirable -promptitude and skill with which our naval resources were handled, the -bulk of the German fleet was imprisoned from the outset. We did not -experience anything like the full effect of our unpreparedness. If Mr. -Churchill had not taken his decision on the day following the delivery -of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia (July 24) by postponing the -demobilisation of the Fleet--to the great scandal of his own party, -when the facts first became known--there would have been a very -different tale to tell as regards the fate of the British merchant -service on the high seas. - -[2] Critics of the present Government, such as the editor of the -_National Review_, have maintained that Lord Kitchener was forced upon -an unwilling Cabinet by the pressure of public opinion; that although -he was in England throughout the crisis he was allowed to make all his -preparations for returning to Egypt, and was only fetched back as he -was on the point of stepping aboard the packet; that the well-known -form of Lord Haldane had been seen at the War Office, and that if the -Lord Chancellor had, as was intended, relinquished his legal position -in order to become Secretary of State for War, we should probably not -have sent abroad our Expeditionary Force. It is undeniable that during -Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday (August 2, 3, and 4) London was buzzing -with a strange rumour (which was fathered altogether falsely upon the -French Ambassador) that France did not ask for or require our -assistance on land; but only at sea. If this were so the absurdity of -sending our Expeditionary Force would have been obvious. It is -noteworthy that a usually well-inspired section of the Ministerial -Press--even after they had reluctantly accepted war as inevitable--were -still maintaining stoutly, even so late as Tuesday and Wednesday (4th -and 5th), that the Expeditionary Force should not be allowed to cross -the channel. Lord Kitchener was appointed on the Thursday, and the -Expeditionary Force began to go abroad the following week. The chapter -of English political history which begins with the presentation of the -Austrian ultimatum to Servia on the 23rd of July, and ends with the -appointment of Lord Kitchener on the 6th of August, will no doubt prove -to be one of the most interesting in our annals. Whether it will prove -to be one of the most glorious or one of the most humiliating -exhibitions of British statesmanship we cannot say until we possess -fuller knowledge than we do at present of the attitude of ministers at -the Cabinets of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday (July 31, August 1 and 2). - -[3] Palestine, 1874-1878; Cyprus, 1878-1882; Egypt, 1882-1899; South -Africa, 1899-1902; India, 1902-1909; Egypt, 1911-1914. Only during the -years 1871-1874 and 1909-1911 does Lord Kitchener appear to have been -freed from foreign service, and during a part of the latter interval he -was travelling in China and Japan. - -[4] End of May 1915. - - - - -{358} - -CHAPTER V - -MATERIAL OF WAR - -As regards the business world the position at this time[1] was a -singularly difficult one. Within a few days of the outbreak of war, -orders from all parts of the globe were forthcoming, on so vast a scale -that the ordinary means of coping with them were wholly inadequate. It -was not possible to walk out of the War Office and buy what was wanted -in the shops. In a very brief period the whole industrial system of -the United Kingdom was congested with orders. - -In Lord Kitchener's former experience of military and civil -administration the difficulty had usually been to get the money he -needed, in order to carry out his reforms and undertakings. But here -was a case where he could have all the money he chose to ask for; it -was the commodities themselves which could not be had either for money -or love. - -[Sidenote: ORGANISATION OF RESOURCES] - -When war broke out the industries of France and Belgium were -paralysed--the former temporarily, the latter permanently. We could -buy nothing in France; France, on the other hand, was buying eagerly in -England. And so was Russia, not herself as yet a great industrial -producer. And so were Belgium, {359} Servia, Italy, Roumania, Greece, -Japan--indeed the whole world, more or less--belligerents and neutrals -alike--except the two Powers with which we were at war. All these -competitors were in the field against the War Office, running up -prices, and making the fortunes of enterprising middlemen, who flocked -to the feast, like vultures from all corners of the sky. The -industrial situation, therefore, needed the sternest regulation, and -needed it at once. For it was essential to secure our own -requirements, and to make certain that our Allies secured theirs, at a -fair price and in advance of all other purchasers. - -Moreover, it was obviously necessary to look an immense way ahead, -especially as regards munitions of war; to aid with loans, and -encourage with orders, firms able and willing to make what was -required. It was essential that makers of arms and supplies should be -stimulated to undertake vast increases of their staff and plant. -Before the battle of the Marne was ended it was known, only too well, -that every nation in Europe--with the single exception of Germany--had -grossly underestimated the expenditure of artillery ammunition under -conditions of modern warfare. It was of the most immediate urgency to -concert with our Allies, and with our manufacturers, in order to set -this trouble right. It was as necessary for the Allies to organise -their resources as it was for them to organise their armies. The -second, indeed, was impossible without the first, as Germany well knew, -and in her own case had already practised. - -Finally, there was the problem--half industrial, half political--of -labour; its hours, conditions, and remuneration. Without the utmost -vigilance and {360} sympathy, without a constant inspiration of duty, -without political leadership which appealed to the imagination and -heart of the people, there were bound to be endless troubles and -confusion; there were bound to be disputes, quarrels, stoppages, and -strikes. - -The prices of certain munitions and materials were almost anything the -makers liked to name. Money was flying about, and everybody was aware -of it. Human nature was sorely tempted. The future was anxious and -uncertain. People dependent for a living on their own exertions, were -beset with a dangerous inclination to hold out their pitchers, in the -hopes of catching some portion of the golden shower while it lasted. -The idea that workmen were, on the average, any greedier than their -masters is only held by persons who have little knowledge of the facts. -Cost of living had risen rapidly; this might have been foreseen from -the beginning, as well as the dangers which it contained. - -In such circumstances as these the baser appetites of mankind are -always apt to break loose and gain the upper hand, unless there is a -firm leadership of the nation. That is where the statesman should come -in, exercising a sagacious control upon the whole organisation of -industry; impressing on masters the need for patience and sympathy; on -their men the need for moderation; on all the need for sacrifices. - -During the months of February, March, and April 1915 there was a loud -outcry, led by a member of the Government, deploring the lack of -munitions of war, and attributing the deficiency to a want of industry -and energy on the part of a {361} section of the working classes. -Their frequent abstentions were condemned, and drunkenness was alleged -to have been, in many cases, a contributory cause. - -[Sidenote: MINISTERIAL INCONSISTENCIES] - -Then Mr. Asquith came forward and astonished the world by denying -stoutly that there was, or ever had been, any deficiency in munitions -of war.[2] He assured the country that so long ago as September he had -"appointed a committee ... to survey the situation."[3] He said -nothing about irregularity of work, or about drunkenness as a cause of -it. On the contrary, he produced the impression that the Army was as -well provided as it could be, and that the behaviour of the whole world -of industry had {362} been as impeccable as the foresight and energy of -the Government. - -The country found it difficult to reconcile these various statements -one with another. It found it still more difficult to reconcile Mr. -Asquith's assurances with what it had heard, not only from other -Ministers, but from generals in their published communications. -Private letters from the front for months past had told a very -different story from that which was told, in soothing tones, to the -Newcastle audience. These had laid stress upon the heavy price paid in -casualties, and the heavy handicap imposed on military operations, -owing to shortage of artillery ammunition. The appointment of the -Committee alone was wholly credited; the rest of these assurances were -disbelieved. - -[Sidenote: COMPLAINTS ABOUT MUNITIONS] - -Indeed it was impossible to doubt that there had been miscalculation -and want of foresight in various directions; and it would have been -better to admit it frankly. The blame, however, did not rest upon Lord -Kitchener's shoulders, but upon those of his colleagues. They -understood the industrial conditions of the United Kingdom; he did not -and could not; and they must have been well aware of this fact. It was -not Lord Kitchener's business, nor had he the time, to make himself -familiar with those matters which are so well understood by the Board -of Trade, the Local Government Board, and the Treasury. His business -was to help France, to get recruits as best he could, to train them as -soon as he could, and to send them out to beat the Germans. It was the -business of the Government--expert in British political and industrial -conditions--to put him in the way of getting his recruits, and the -equipment, {363} supplies, and munitions of war which were necessary -for making them effective.[4] - - - -[1] I am specially referring to August-December 1914. - -[2] "I saw a statement the other day _that the operations not only of -our Army but of our Allies were being crippled, or at any rate -hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition_. There -is not a word of truth in that statement. I say there is not a word of -truth in that statement which is the more mischievous because if it -were believed, it is calculated to dishearten our troops, to discourage -our Allies, and to stimulate the hopes and activities of our enemies. -Nor is there any more truth in the suggestion that the Government, of -which I am the head, have only recently become alive to the importance -and the urgency of these matters. On the contrary, in the earliest -days of the war, when some of our would-be instructors were thinking of -quite other things, they were already receiving our anxious attention, -and as far back, I think, as the month of September I appointed a -Committee of the Cabinet, presided over by Lord Kitchener, to survey -the situation from this point of view--a Committee whose labours and -inquiries resulted in a very substantial enlargement both on the field -and of machinery of supply.... - -"No, the urgency of the situation--and, as I shall show, the urgency is -great--can be explained without any resort to recrimination or to -blame. It is due, in the main, to two very obvious causes. It is due, -first of all, to the unprecedented scale upon which ammunition on both -sides has been, and is being, expended. _It not only goes far beyond -all previous experience, but it is greatly in advance of the forecasts -of the best experts_."--Mr. Asquith at Newcastle, April 20, 1915. - -[3] There has certainly been no lack of appointments either of -committees or individuals. So lately as the 7th of April the -newspapers announced a War Office Committee "to secure that the supply -of munitions of war shall be sufficient to meet all requirements." -About a week later came the announcement of a still more august -committee--'The Output Committee'--with Mr. Lloyd-George as Chairman -and Mr. Balfour as a member of it. If war could be won by appointing -committees and creating posts, victory ought long ago to have been -secured. - -[4] Since this chapter was printed (May 1915) public opinion has been -somewhat distracted by a sensational wrangle as to whether or not the -right kind of ammunition had been supplied. These are technical -matters upon which the ordinary man is no judge. The main point is -that--certainly until quite recently--enough ammunition was not -supplied; nor anything like enough; and this was due to the failure to -look far enough ahead in the early days of the war; and to organise our -industrial system to meet the inevitable requirements. - - - - -{364} - -CHAPTER VI - -METHODS OF RECRUITING - -If Lord Kitchener is not to be held primarily responsible for the delay -in providing war material, just as little is he to be blamed for the -methods of recruiting. For he had to take what the politicians told -him. He had to accept their sagacious views of what the people would -stand; of 'what they would never stand'; of what 'from the House of -Commons' standpoint' was practicable or impracticable. - -Lord Kitchener wanted men. During August and September he wanted them -at once--without a moment's delay. Obviously the right plan was to ask -in a loud voice who would volunteer; to take as many of these as it was -possible to house, clothe, feed, and train; then to sit down quietly -and consider how many more were likely to be wanted, at what dates, and -how best they could be got. But as regards the first quarter of a -million or so, which there were means for training at once, there was -only one way--to call loudly for volunteers. The case was one of -desperate urgency, and as things then stood, it would have been the -merest pedantry to delay matters until a system, for which not even a -scheme or skeleton existed before the emergency arose, had been -devised. The rough and ready {365} method of calling out loudly was -open to many objections on the score both of justice and efficiency, -but the all-important thing was to save time. - -[Sidenote: NEED FOR A SYSTEM] - -Presumably, by and by, when the first rush was over, the Cabinet did -sit down round a table to talk things over. We may surmise the -character of the conversation which was then poured into Lord -Kitchener's ears--how England would never stand this or that; how no -freeborn Englishman--especially north of the Humber and the Trent,[1] -whence the Liberal party drew its chief support--would tolerate being -tapped on the shoulder and told to his face by Government what his duty -was; how much less would he stand being coerced by Government into -doing it; how he must be tapped on the shoulder and told by other -people; how he must be coerced by other people; how pressure must be -put on by private persons--employers by threats of dismissal--young -females of good, bad, and indifferent character by blandishments and -disdain. The fear of starvation for the freeborn Englishman and his -family--at that time a real and present danger with many minds--or the -shame of receiving a white feather, were the forces by which England -and the Empire were to be saved at this time of trial. Moreover, would -it not lead to every kind of evil if, at this juncture, the country -were to become annoyed with the Government? Better surely that it -should become annoyed with any one rather than the Government, whose -patriotic duty, therefore, was to avoid unpopularity with more devoted -vigilance than heretofore, if such a thing were possible. - -One can imagine Lord Kitchener--somewhat weary {366} of discussions in -this airy region, and sorely perplexed by all these cobwebs of the -party system--insisting doggedly that his business was to make a New -Army, and to come to the assistance of France, without a day's -unnecessary delay. He must have the men; how was he to get the men? - -And one can imagine the response. "Put your trust in us, and we will -get you the men. We will go on shouting. We will shout louder and -louder. We will paste up larger and larger pictures on the hoardings. -We will fill whole pages of the newspapers with advertisements drawn up -by the 'livest publicity artists' of the day. We will enlist the -sympathies and support of the press--for this is not an Oriental -despotism, but a free country, where the power of the press is -absolute. And if the sympathies of the press are cool, or their -support hangs back, we will threaten them with the Press Bureau. We -will tell the country-gentlemen, and the men-of-business, that it is -their duty to put on the screw; and most of these, being easily -hypnotised by the word 'duty,' will never dream of refusing. If their -action is resented, and they become disliked it will be very -regrettable; but taking a broad view, this will not be injurious to the -Liberal party in the long run. - -"Leave this little matter, Lord Kitchener, to experts. Lend your great -name. Allow us to show your effigies to the people. Consider what a -personal triumph for yourself if, at the end of this great war, we can -say on platforms that you and we together have won it on the Voluntary -System. Trust in us and our methods. We will boom your {367} New -Army, and we will see to it at the same time that the Government does -not become unpopular, and also, if possible, that the Empire is saved." - -[Sidenote: THE ADVERTISEMENT CAMPAIGN] - -So they boomed the Voluntary System and the New Army in Periclean -passages; touched with awe the solemn chords; shouted as if it had been -Jericho. - -Two specimens, out of a large number of a similar sort--the joint -handiwork apparently of the 'publicity artists,' bettering the moving -appeals of the late Mr. Barnum, and of the party managers, inspired by -the traditions of that incomparable ex-whip, Lord Murray of -Elibank--are given below.[2] It is of course impossible to do justice -here to the splendour of headlines and leaded capitals; but the nature -of the appeal will be gathered clearly enough. Briefly, the motive of -it was to avoid direct compulsion by Government--which would have -fallen equally and fairly upon all--and to substitute for this, -indirect compulsion and pressure by private individuals--which must of -necessity operate unequally, unfairly, and invidiously. To say that -this sort of thing is not compulsion, is to say what is untrue. If, as -appears to be the case, the voluntary system has broken down, and we -are to have compulsion, most honest men and women will prefer that the -compulsion should be fair rather than unfair, direct rather than -indirect, and that it should be exercised by those responsible for the -government of the country, rather than by private persons who cannot -compel, but can only penalise. - -{368} - -By these means, during the past six months, a great army has been got -together--an army great in numbers,[3] still greater in spirit; -probably one of the noblest armies ever recruited in an cause. And -Lord Kitchener has done his part by training this army with -incomparable energy, and by infusing into officers and men alike his -own indomitable resolution. - -The high quality of the New Army is due to the fact that the bulk of it -consists of two kinds of men, who of all others are the best material -for soldiers. It consists of men who love fighting for its own sake--a -small class. It also consists of men who hate fighting, but whose -sense of duty is their guiding principle--fortunately a very large -class. It consists of many others as well, driven on by divers -motives. But the spirit of the New Army--according to the {369} -accounts of those who are in the best position to judge--is the spirit -of the first two classes--of the fighters and the sense-of-duty men. -It is these who have leavened it throughout. - -[Sidenote: ITS EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION] - -This magnificent result--for it is magnificent, whatever may be thought -of the methods which achieved it--has been claimed in many -quarters--Liberal, Unionist, and non-party--as a triumph for the -voluntary system. But if we proceed to question it, how voluntary was -it really? Also how just? Did the New Army include all, or anything -like all, those whose clear duty it was to join? And did it not -include many people who ought never to have been asked to join, or even -allowed to join, until others--whose ages, occupations, and -responsibilities marked them out for the first levies--had all been -called up? - -There is also a further question--did the country, reading these -various advertisements and placards--heroic, melodramatic, pathetic, -and facetious--did the country form a true conception of the gravity of -the position? Was it not in many cases confused and perplexed by the -nature of the appeal? Did not many people conclude, that things could -not really be so very serious, if those in authority resorted to such -flamboyant and sensational methods--methods so conspicuously lacking in -dignity, so inconsistent with all previous ideas of the majesty of -Government in times of national peril? - -The method itself, no doubt, was only unfamiliar in so far as it used -the King's name. It was familiar and common enough in other -connections. But a method which might have been unexceptionable for -calling attention to the virtues of a shop, a soap, a {370} circus, or -a pill, seemed inappropriate in the case of a great nation struggling -at the crisis of its fate.[4] - -Each of us must judge from his own experience of the effect produced. -The writer has heard harsher things said of these appeals by the poor, -than by the well-to-do. The simplest and least sophisticated minds are -often the severest critics in matters of taste as well as morals. And -this was a matter of both. Among townspeople as well as countryfolk -there were many who--whether they believed or disbelieved in the urgent -need, whether they responded to the appeal or did not respond to -it--regarded the whole of this 'publicity' campaign with distrust and -dislike, as a thing which demoralised the country, which was revolting -to its honour and conscience, and in which the King's name ought never -to have been used.[5] - -{371} - -[Sidenote: ON THE WORKING CLASSES] - -On the part of the working-classes there were other objections to the -methods employed. They resented the hints and instructions which were -so obligingly given by the 'publicity artists' and the 'party managers' -to the well-to-do classes--to employers of all sorts--as to how they -should bring pressure to bear upon their dependents. And they -resented--especially the older men and those with family -responsibilities--the manner in which they were invited by means of -circulars to signify their willingness to serve--as they imagined in -the last dire necessity--and when they had agreed patriotically to do -so, found themselves shortly afterwards called upon to fulfil their -contract. For they knew that in the neighbouring village--or in the -very next house--there were men much more eligible for military {372} -service in point of age and freedom from family responsibilities, who, -not having either volunteered, or filled up the circular, were -accordingly left undisturbed to go about their daily business.[6] - - -The attitude of the country generally at the outbreak of war was -admirable. It was what it should have been--as on a ship after a -collision, where crew and passengers, all under self-command, and -without panic, await orders patiently. So the country waited--waited -for clear orders--waited to be told, in tones free from all ambiguity -and hesitation, what they were to do as classes and as individuals. -There was very little fuss or confusion. People were somewhat dazed -for a short while by the financial crisis; but the worst of that was -soon over. They then said to themselves, "Let us get on with our -ordinary work as hard as usual (or even harder), until we receive -orders from those responsible for the ship's safety, telling us what we -are to do." - -[Sidenote: BUSINESS AS USUAL] - -There was a certain amount of sparring, then and subsequently, between -high-minded journalists, who {373} were engaged in carrying on their -own _business as usual_, and hard-headed traders and manufacturers who -desired to do likewise. The former were perhaps a trifle too -self-righteous, while the latter took more credit than they deserved -for patriotism, seeing that their chief merit was common sense. To -have stopped the business of the country would have done nobody but the -Germans any good, and would have added greatly to our national -embarrassment. - -At times of national crisis, there will always be a tendency, among -most men and women, to misgivings, lest they may not be doing the full -measure of their duty. Their consciences become morbidly active; it is -inevitable that they should; indeed it would be regrettable if they did -not. People are uncomfortable, unless they are doing something they -have never done before, which they dislike doing, and which they do -less well than their ordinary work. In many cases what they are -inspired to do is less useful than would have been their ordinary work, -well and thoughtfully done. At such times as these the _Society for -Setting Everybody Right_ always increases its activities, and enrols a -large number of new members. But very soon, if there is leadership of -the nation, things fall into their proper places and proportions. -Neither business nor pleasure can be carried on as usual, and everybody -knows it. There must be great changes; but not merely for the sake of -change. There must be great sacrifices in many cases; and those who -are doing well must give a helping hand to those others who are doing -ill. But all--whether they are doing well or ill from the standpoint -of their own private interests--must be prepared to do what the leader -of the nation orders them to do. {374} This was fully recognised in -August, September, October, and November last. The country expected -orders--clear and unmistakable orders--and it was prepared to obey -whatever orders it received. - -But no orders came. Instead of orders there were appeals, warnings, -suggestions, assurances. The panic-monger was let loose with his -paint-box of horrors. The diffident parliamentarian fell to his usual -methods of soothing, and coaxing, and shaming people into doing a very -vague and much-qualified thing, which he termed their duty. But there -was no clearness, no firmness. An ordinary man will realise his duty -so soon as he receives a definite command, and not before. He received -no such command; he was lauded, lectured, and exhorted; and then was -left to decide upon his course of action by the light of his own reason -and conscience.[7] - -He was not even given a plain statement of the {375} true facts of the -situation, and then left at peace to determine what he would do. He -was disturbed in his meditations by shouting--more shouting--ever -louder and louder shouting--through some thousands of megaphones. The -nature of the appeal was emotional, confusing, frenzied, and at times -degrading. Naturally the results were in many directions most -unsatisfactory, unbusinesslike, and disorderly. The drain of -recruiting affected industries and individuals not only unequally and -unfairly, but in a way contrary to the public interest. If Government -will not exercise guidance and control in unprecedented circumstances, -it is inevitable that the country must suffer. - -[Sidenote: AN ORGIE OF SENSATIONALISM] - -To judge from the placards and the posters, the pictures and the -language, a casual stranger would not have judged that the British -Empire stood at the crisis of its fate; but rather that some World's -Fair was arriving shortly, and that these were the preliminary -flourishes. Lord Kitchener cannot have enjoyed the pre-eminence which -was allotted to him in our mural decorations, and which suggested that -he was some kind of co-equal with the famous Barnum or Lord George -Sanger. Probably no one alive hated the whole of this orgie of vulgar -sensationalism, which the timidity of the politicians had forced upon -the country, more than he did.[8] - -{376} - -Having stirred up good and true men to join the New Army, whether it -was rightly their turn or not; having got at others in whom the -voluntary spirit burned less brightly, by urging their employers to -dismiss them and their sweethearts to throw them over if they refused -the call of duty, the 'publicity artists' and the 'party managers' -between them undoubtedly collected for Lord Kitchener a very fine army, -possibly the finest raw material for an army which has ever been got -together. And Lord Kitchener, thereupon, set to work, and trained this -army as no one but Lord Kitchener could have trained it. - -These results were a source of great pride and self-congratulation -among the politicians. The voluntary principle--you see how it works! -What a triumph! What other nation could have done the same? - -Other nations certainly could not have done the same, for the reason -that there are some things which one cannot do twice over, some things -which one cannot give a second time--one's life for example, or the -flower of the manhood of a nation to be made into soldiers. - -Other nations could not have done what we were doing, because they had -done it already. They had their men prepared when the need -arose--which we had not. Other nations were engaged in holding the -common enemy at enormous sacrifices until we made ourselves ready; -until we--triumphing in our {377} voluntary system, covering ourselves -in self-praise, and declaring to the world, through the mouths of Sir -John Simon and other statesmen, that each of our men was worth at least -three of their 'pressed men' or conscripts--until we came up leisurely -with reinforcements--six, nine, or twelve months hence--supposing that -by such time, there was anything still left to come up for. If the -Germans were then in Paris, Bordeaux, Brest, and Marseilles, there -would be--temporarily at least--a great saving of mortality among the -British race. If, on the other hand, the Allies had already arrived at -Berlin without us, what greater triumph for the voluntary principle -could possibly be imagined? - -[Sidenote: A FRENCH VIEW] - -Putting these views and considerations--which have so much impressed us -all in our own recent discussions--before a French officer, I found him -obstinate in viewing the matter at a different angle. He was inclined -to lay stress on the case of Northern France, and even more on that of -Belgium, whose resistance to the German invasion we had wished for and -encouraged, and who was engaged in fighting our battles quite as much -as her own. The voluntary principle, in spite of its triumphs at -home--which he was not concerned to dispute--had not, he thought, as -yet been remarkably triumphant abroad; and nine months had gone by -since war began. - -He insisted, moreover, that for years before war was declared, our -great British statesmen could not have been ignorant of the European -situation, either in its political or its military aspects. Such -ignorance was inconceivable. They must have suspected the intentions -of Germany, and they must have known the numbers of her army. England -had common {378} interests with France. Common interests, if there be -a loyal understanding, involve equal sacrifices--equality of sacrifice -not merely when the push comes, but in advance of the crisis, in -preparation for it--a much more difficult matter. Why then had not our -Government told the British people long ago what sacrifice its safety, -no less than its honour, required of it to give? - -I felt, after talking to my friend for some time, that although he -rated our nation in some ways very highly indeed, although he was -grateful for our assistance, hopeful of the future, confident that in -Lord Kitchener we had found our man, nothing--nothing--not even -selections from Mr. Spender's articles in the _Westminster Gazette_, or -from Sir John Simon's speeches, or Sir John Brunner's assurances about -the protection afforded by international law--could induce him to share -our own enthusiasm for the voluntary system.... _The triumph of the -voluntary system_, he cried bitterly, _is a German triumph: it is the -ruin of Belgium and the devastation of France_. - -And looking at the matter from a Frenchman's point of view, there is -something to be said for his contention. - - -Apart from any objections which may exist to British methods of -recruiting since war broke out--to their injustice, want of dignity, -and generally to their demoralising effect on public opinion--there are -several still more urgent questions to be considered. Have those -methods been adequate? And if so, are they going to continue adequate -to the end? Is there, in short, any practical need for conscription? - -{379} - -We do not answer these questions by insisting that, if there had been -conscription in the past, we should have been in a much stronger -position when war broke out; or by proving to our own satisfaction, -that if we had possessed a national army, war would never have -occurred. Such considerations as these are by no means done with; they -are indeed still very important; but they lie rather aside from the -immediate question with which we are now faced, and which, for lack of -any clear guidance from those in authority, many of us have been -endeavouring of late to solve by the light of our own judgment. - -[Sidenote: NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE] - -The answer which the facts supply does not seem to be in any doubt. We -need conscription to bring this war to a victorious conclusion. We -need conscription no less in order that we may impose terms of lasting -peace. Conscription is essential to the proper organisation not only -of our manhood, but also of our national resources.[9] Judging by the -increasing size, frequency, and shrillness of recent recruiting -advertisements, conscription would seem to be equally essential in -order to secure the number of recruits necessary for making good the -wastage of war, even in the present preliminary stage of the war. And -morally, conscription is essential in order that the whole nation may -realise, before it is too late, the life-or-death nature of the present -struggle; in order also that other nations--our Allies as well as our -enemies--may understand--what they certainly do not understand at -present--that our spirit is as firm and self-sacrificing as their own. - - -The voluntary system has broken down long ago. {380} It broke down on -the day when the King of England declared war upon the Emperor of -Germany. From that moment it was obvious that, in a prolonged war, the -voluntary system could not be relied upon to give us, in an orderly and -businesslike way, the numbers which we should certainly require. It -was also obvious that it was just as inadequate for the purpose of -introducing speed, order, and efficiency into the industrial world, as -strength into our military affairs. - -So far, however, most of the accredited oracles of Government have -either denounced national military service as un-English, and a sin -against freedom; or else they have evaded the issue, consoling their -various audiences with the reflection, that it will be time enough to -talk of compulsion, when it is clearly demonstrated that the voluntary -system can no longer give us what we need. It seems improvident to -wait until the need has been proved by the painful process of failure. -The curses of many dead nations lie upon the procrastination of -statesmen, who waited for breakdown to prove the necessity of -sacrifice. Compulsion, like other great changes, cannot be -systematised and put through in a day. It needs preparation. If the -shoe begins to pinch severely in August, and we only then determine to -adopt conscription, what relief can we hope to experience before the -following midsummer? And in what condition of lameness may the British -Empire be by then? - -"But what," it may be asked, "of all the official and semi-official -statements which have been uttered in a contrary sense? Surely the -nation is bound to trust its own Government, even although no {381} -facts and figures are offered in support of their assurances." - -[Sidenote: VALUE OF OFFICIAL ASSURANCES] - -Unfortunately it is impossible to place an implicit faith in official -and semi-official statements, unless we have certain knowledge that -they are confirmed by the facts. There has been an abundance of such -statements in recent years--with regard to the innocence of Germany's -intentions--with regard to the adequacy of our own preparations--while -only a few weeks ago Mr. Asquith himself was assuring us that neither -the operations of our own army, nor those of our Allies' armies, had -ever been crippled, or even hampered, by any want of munitions. - -When, therefore, assurances flow from the same source--assurances that -there is no need for compulsory military service--that the voluntary -system has given, is giving, and will continue to give us all we -require--we may be forgiven for expressing our incredulity. Such -official and semi-official statements are not supported by any clear -proofs. They are contradicted by much that we have heard from persons -who are both honest, and in a position to know. They are discredited -by our own eyes when we read the recruiting advertisements and posters. -It seems safer, therefore, to dismiss these official and semi-official -assurances, and trust for once to our instinct and the evidence of our -own senses. It seems safer also not to wait for complete breakdown in -war, or mortifying failure in negotiations for peace, in order to have -the need for national service established beyond a doubt. - - - -[1] Cf. Mr. Runciman, _ante_, p. 344. - -[2] (A) Four questions to the women of England. - -1. You have read what the Germans have done in Belgium. Have you -thought what they would do if they invaded England? - -2. Do you realise that the safety of your Home and Children depends on -our getting more men now? - -3. Do you realise that the one word "Go" from _you_ may send another -man to fight for our King and Country? - -4. When the War is over and your husband or your son is asked 'What did -you do in the great War?'--is he to hang his head because you would not -let him go? - -Women of England do your duty! Send your men _to-day_ to join our -glorious Army. - -GOD SAVE THE KING. - -(B) Five questions to those who employ male servants. - -1. Have you a butler, groom, chauffeur, gardener, or gamekeeper serving -_you_ who, at this moment should be serving your King and Country? - -2. Have you a man serving at your table who should be serving a gun? - -3. Have you a man digging your garden who should be digging trenches? - -4. Have you a man driving your car who should be driving a transport -wagon? - -5. Have you a man preserving your game who should be helping to -preserve your Country? - -A great responsibility rests on you. Will you sacrifice your personal -convenience for your Country's need? - -Ask your men to enlist _to-day_. - -The address of the nearest Recruiting Office can be obtained at any -Post Office. - -GOD SAVE THE KING. - -[3] How many we have not been told; but that the numbers whatever they -may be do not yet reach nearly what is still required we know from the -frantic character of the most recent advertisements. - -[4] With apologies for the dialect, in which I am not an expert, I -venture to set out the gist of a reply given to a friend who set -himself to find out why recruiting was going badly in a Devonshire -village.... "We do-ant think nought, Zur, o' them advertaizements and -noospaper talk about going soldgering. When Guv'ment needs soldgers -really sore, Guv'ment'll say so clear enough, like it does when it -wants taxes--'_Come 'long, Frank Halls, you're wanted._' ... And when -Guv'ment taps Frank Halls on showlder, and sez this, I'll go right -enough; but I'll not stir foot till Guv'ment does; nor'll any man of -sense this zide Exeter." - -[5] The following letter which appeared in the _Westminster Gazette_ -(January 20, 1915), states the case so admirably that I have taken the -liberty of quoting it in full: - -"DEAR SIR--Every day you tell your readers that we are collecting -troops by means of voluntary enlistment, yet it is self-evident that -our recruiting campaign from the first has been a very noisy and a very -vulgar compulsion, which in a time of immense crisis has lowered the -dignity of our country and provoked much anxiety among our Allies. Our -national habit of doing the right thing in the wrong way has never been -exercised in a more slovenly and unjust manner. It is a crime against -morals not to use the equitable principles of national service when our -country is fighting for her life; and this obvious truth should be -recognised as a matter of course by every true democrat. A genuinely -democratic people, proud of their past history, and determined to hold -their own against Germany's blood-lust, would have divided her male -population into classes, and would have summoned each class to the -colours at a given date. Those who were essential to the leading -trades of the country would have been exempted from war service in the -field, as they are in Germany; the younger classes would have been -called up first, and no class would have been withdrawn from its civil -work until the military authorities were ready to train it. Instead of -this quiet and dignified justice, this admirable and quiet unity of a -free people inspired by a fine patriotism, we have dazed ourselves with -shrieking posters and a journalistic clamour against 'shirkers,' and -loud abuse of professional footballers; and now an advertisement in the -newspapers assures the women of England that _they_ must do what the -State declines to achieve, that they must send their men and boys into -the field since their country is fighting for her life. What -cowardice! Why impose this voluntary duty on women when the State is -too ignoble to look upon her own duty in this matter as a moral -obligation? - -"The one virtue of voluntary enlistment is that it should be -voluntary--a free choice between a soldier's life and a civilian's -life. To use moral pressure, with the outcries of public indignation, -in order to drive civilians from their work into the army--what is this -but a most undignified compulsion? And it is also a compulsion that -presses unequally upon the people, for its methods are without system. -Many families send their all into the fighting line; many decline to be -patriotic. A woman said to me yesterday: 'My husband has gone, and I -am left with his business. Why should he go? Other women in my -neighbourhood have their husbands still, and it's rubbish to say that -the country is in danger when the Government allows and encourages this -injustice in recruiting. If the country is in danger all the men -should fight--if their trade work is unnecessary to the armies." - -"This point of view is right; the wrong one is advocated by you and by -other Radicals who dislike the justice of democratic equality.--Yours -truly, WALTER SHAW SPARROW." - -[6] There have been bitter complaints of this artful way of getting -recruits, as a boy 'sniggles' trout. The following letter to the Times -(April 21, 1915) voices a very widely spread sense of injustice: - -"SIR--Will you give me the opportunity to ask a question, which I think -you will agree is important? When the Circular to Householders was -issued, many heads of families gave in their names on the assumption -that they would be called up on the last resort, and under -circumstances in which no patriotic man could refuse his help. Married -men with large families are now being called up apparently without the -slightest regard to their home circumstances. Many of the best of them -are surprised and uneasy at leaving their families, but feel bound in -honour to keep their word, some even thinking they have no choice. The -separation allowances for these families will be an immense burden on -the State, and, if the breadwinner falls, a permanent burden. Is the -need for men still so serious and urgent as to justify this? If it is, -then I for one, who have up to now hoped that the war might be put -through without compulsion, feel that the time has come to 'fetch' the -unmarried shirkers, and I believe there is a wide-spread and growing -feeling to that effect.--I am, Sir, etc., CHARLES G. E. WELBY." - -[7] An example of the apparent inability of the Government to do -anything thoroughly or courageously is found in a circular letter to -shopkeepers and wholesale firms, which was lately sent out by the Home -Secretary and the President of the Board of Trade. The object of this -enquiry--undertaken at leisure, nine months after the outbreak of -war--is to obtain information as to the number of men of military age, -who are still employed in these particular trades, and as to the -willingness of their employers to spare them if required, and to -reinstate them at the end of the war, etc., etc. - -The timid futility of this attempt at organising the resources of the -country is shown _first_ by the fact that it left to the option of each -employer whether he will reply or not. Businesses which do not wish to -have their employees taken away need not give an answer. It is -compulsory for individuals to disclose all particulars of their income; -why, therefore, need Government shrink from making it compulsory upon -firms to disclose all particulars of their staffs? ... The _second_ -vice of this application is that the information asked for is quite -inadequate for the object. Even if the enquiry were answered -faithfully by every employer and householder in the country, it would -not give the Government what they require for the purposes of -organising industry or recruiting the army.... In the _third_ place, a -certain group of trades is singled out at haphazard. If it is desired -to organise the resources of the country what is needed is a general -census of all males between 16 and 60. - -One does not know whether to marvel most at the belated timorousness of -this enquiry, or at the slatternly way in which it has been framed. - -[8] One who is no longer alive--Queen Victoria--would possibly have -hated it even more. Imagine her late Majesty's feelings on seeing the -walls of Windsor plastered with the legend--'_Be a sport: Join -to-day_'--and with other appeals of the same elevating character! ... -But perhaps the poster which is more remarkable than any -other--considering the source from which it springs--is one showing a -garish but recognisable portrait of Lord Roberts, with the motto, '_He -did his duty. Will you do yours?_' If the timidity of politicians is -apparent in certain directions, their courage is no less noteworthy in -others. The courage of a Government (containing as it does Mr. -Asquith, Lord Haldane, Mr. Runciman, Sir John Simon, Mr. Harcourt, and -Mr. Acland--not to mention others) which can issue such a poster must -be of a very high order indeed. One wonders, however, if this placard -would not be more convincing, and its effect even greater, were the -motto amplified, so as to tell the whole story: "_He did his duty; we -denounced him for doing it. We failed to do ours; will you, however, -do yours?_" - -[9] This aspect is very cogently stated in Mr. Shaw Sparrow's letter to -the _Westminster Gazette_ quoted on pp. 370-371. - - - - -{382} - -CHAPTER VII - -PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT - -If 'National Service,' or 'Conscription,' has actually become necessary -already, or may conceivably become so before long, it seems worth while -to glance at some of the considerations which have been urged in favour -of this system in the past, and also to examine some of the causes and -conditions which have hitherto led public opinion in the United -Kingdom, as well as in several of the Dominions, to regard the -principle of compulsion with hostility and distrust. The true nature -of what we call the 'Voluntary System,' and the reasons which have -induced a large section of our fellow-countrymen to regard it as one of -our most sacred institutions, are worth looking into, now that -circumstances may force us to abandon it in the near future. - -Beyond the question, whether the system of recruiting, which has been -employed during the present war, can correctly be described as -'voluntary,' there is the further question, whether the system, which -is in use at ordinary times, and which produces some 35,000 men per -annum, can be so described. Lord Roberts always maintained that it -could not, and that its true title was 'the Conscription of Hunger.' - -{383} - -[Sidenote: NORMAL RECRUITING METHODS] - -Any one who has watched the recruiting-sergeant at work, on a raw cold -day of winter or early spring, will be inclined to agree with Lord -Roberts. A fine, good-humoured, well-fed, well-set-up fellow, in a -handsome uniform, with rows of medals which light up the mean and dingy -street, lays himself alongside some half-starved poor devil, down in -his luck, with not a rag to his back that the north wind doesn't blow -through. The appetites and vanities of the latter are all of them -morbidly alert--hunger, thirst, the desire for warmth, and to cut a -smart figure in the world. The astute sergeant, though no professor of -psychology, understands the case thoroughly, as he marks down his man. -He greets him heartily with a 'good day' that sends a glow through him, -even before the drink at the Goat and Compasses, or Green Dragon has -been tossed off, and the King's shilling accepted. - -Not that there is any need for pity or regret. These young men with -empty bellies, and no very obvious way of filling them, except by -violence--these lads with gloom at their hearts, in many cases with a -burden of shame weighing on them at having come into such a forlorn -pass--in nine cases out of ten enlistment saves them; perhaps in more -even than that. - -But talk about compulsion and the voluntary principle! What strikes -the observer most about such a scene as this is certainly not anything -which can be truly termed 'voluntary.' If one chooses to put things -into ugly words--which is sometimes useful, in order to give a shock to -good people who are tending towards self-righteousness in their worship -of phrases--this is the compulsion of hunger and {384} misery. It -might even be contended that it was not only compulsion, but a mean, -sniggling kind of compulsion, taking advantage of a starving man. - -The law is very chary of enforcing promises made under duress. If a -man dying of thirst signs his birthright away, or binds himself in -service for a term of years, in exchange for a glass of water, the ink -and paper have no validity. But the recruit is firmly bound. He has -made a contract to give his labour, and to risk his life for a long -period of years, at a wage which is certainly below the market rate; -and he is held to it. Things much more 'voluntary' than this have been -dubbed 'slavery,' and denounced as 'tainted with servile conditions.' -And the loudest denunciators have been precisely those -anti-militarists, who uphold our 'voluntary' system with the hottest -fervour, while reprobating 'compulsion' with the utmost horror. - -[Sidenote: MORAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS] - -We have heard much caustic abuse of the National Service League. It -has been accused of talking 'the cant of compulsion'; by which has been -meant that certain of its members have put in the forefront of their -argument the moral and physical advantages which they imagine universal -military training would confer upon the nation. Some may possibly have -gone too far, and lost sight of the need of the nation, in their -enthusiasm for the improvement of the individual. But if occasionally -their arguments assume the form of cant, can their lapse be compared -with the cant which tells the world smugly that the British Army is -recruited on the voluntary principle? - -The 'economic argument,' as it is called, is another example. The -country would be faced with {385} ruin, we are told, if every -able-bodied man had to give 'two of the best years of his life,'[1] and -a week or two out of each of the ensuing seven, to 'unproductive' -labour. Sums have been worked out the to hundreds of millions -sterling, with the object of showing that the national loss, during a -single generation, would make the national debt appear insignificant. -How could Britain maintain her industrial pre-eminence weighted with -such a handicap? - -One answer is that Britain, buoyed up though she has been by her -voluntary system, has not lately been outstripping those of her -competitors who carried this very handicap which it is now proposed -that she should carry; that she has not even been maintaining her -relative position in the industrial world in comparison, for example, -with Germany. - -But there is also another answer. If you take a youth at the plastic -age when he has reached manhood, feed him on wholesome food, subject -him to vigorous and varied exercise, mainly in the open air, discipline -him, train him to co-operation with his fellows, make him smart and -swift in falling-to at whatever work comes under his hand, you are -thereby giving him precisely what, for his own sake and that of the -country, is most needed at the present time. You are giving him the -chance of developing his bodily strength under healthy conditions, and -you are giving him a general education and moral training which, in the -great majority of cases, will be of great value to him in all his after -life. - -It is the regret of every one, who has studied our industrial system -from within, that men wear out too {386} soon. By the time a man -reaches his fortieth year--often earlier--he is too apt, in many -vocations, to be an old man; and for that reason he is in danger of -being shoved out of his place by a younger generation. - -This premature and, for the most part, unnecessary ageing is the real -economic loss. If by taking two years out of a man's life as he enters -manhood, if by improving his physique and helping him to form healthy -habits, you can thereby add on ten or fifteen years to his industrial -efficiency, you are not only contributing to his own happiness, but are -also adding enormously to the wealth and prosperity of the country. -Any one indeed, who chooses to work out sums upon this hypothesis, will -hardly regard the national debt as a large enough unit for comparison. -The kernel of this matter is, that men wear out in the working classes -earlier than in others, mainly because they have no break, no rest, no -change, from the day they leave school to take up a trade, till the day -when they have to hand in their checks for good and all. It is not -effort, but drudgery, which most quickly ages a man. It is the -rut--straight, dark, narrow, with no horizons, and no general view of -the outside world--which is the greatest of social dangers. More than -anything else it tends to narrowness of sympathy and bitterness of -heart. - -[Sidenote: UNDER-RATING OF CONSCRIPT ARMIES] - -It would be cant to claim that universal military training will get rid -of this secular evil; but to say that it will help to diminish it is -merely the truth. The real 'cant' is to talk about the economic loss -under conscription; for there would undoubtedly be an immense economic -gain. - -But indeed the advocacy of the voluntary system {387} is stuffed full -of cant.... We are all proud of our army; and rightly so. But the -opponents of universal military service go much further in this -direction than the soldiers themselves. They contrast our army, to its -enormous advantage, with the conscript armies of the continent, which -they regard as consisting of vastly inferior fighting men--of men, in a -sense despicable, inasmuch as their meek spirits have submitted tamely -to conscription. - -Colonel Seely, who, when he touches arithmetic soars at once into the -region of poetry, has pronounced confidently that one of our voluntary -soldiers is worth ten men whom the law compels to serve. Sir John -Simon was still of opinion--even after several months of war--that one -of our volunteers was worth at least three conscripts; and he was -convinced that the Kaiser himself already knew it. What a splendid -thing if Colonel Seely were right, or even if Sir John Simon were right! - -But is either of them right? So far as our voluntary army is -superior--and it was undoubtedly superior in certain respects at the -beginning of the war--it was surely not because it was a 'voluntary' -army; but because, on the average, it had undergone a longer and more -thorough course of training than the troops against which it was called -upon to fight. Fine as its spirit was, and high as were both its -courage and its intelligence, who has ever heard a single soldier -maintain that--measured through and through--it was in those respects -superior to the troops alongside which, or against which it fought? - -As the war has continued month after month, and men with only a few -months' training have been {388} drafted across the Channel to supply -the British wastage of war, even this initial superiority which came of -longer and more thorough training has gradually been worn away. A time -will come, no doubt--possibly it has already come--when Germany, having -used up her trained soldiers of sound physique, has to fall back upon -an inferior quality. But that is merely exhaustion. It does not prove -the superiority of the voluntary system. It does not affect the -comparison between men of equal stamina and spirit--one set of whom has -been trained beforehand in arms--the other not put into training until -war began. - -Possibly Colonel Seely spoke somewhat lightly and thoughtlessly in -those serene days before the war-cloud burst; but Sir John Simon spoke -deliberately--his was the voice of the Cabinet, after months of grim -warfare. To describe his utterances as cant does not seem unjust, -though possibly it is inadequate. We are proud of our army, not merely -because of its fine qualities, but for the very fact that it is what we -choose to call a 'voluntary' army. But what do they say of it in -foreign countries? What did the whole of Europe say of it during the -South African War? What are the Germans saying of it now? - -Naturally prejudice has led them to view the facts at a different -angle. They have seldom referred to the 'voluntary' character of our -army. That was not the aspect which attracted their attention, so much -as the other aspect, that our soldiers received pay, and therefore, -according to German notions, 'fought for hire.' At the time of the -South African War all continental nations said of our army what {389} -the Germans still say--not that it was a 'voluntary' army, but that it -was a 'mercenary' army; and this is a much less pleasant-sounding -term.[2] - -[Sidenote: THE CANT OF MILITARISM] - -In this accusation we find the other kind of cant--the cant of -militarism. For if ours is a mercenary army, so is their own, in so -far as the officers and non-commissioned officers are concerned. But -as a matter of fact no part, either of our army or the existing German -army, can with any truth be described as 'mercenaries'; for this is a -term applicable only to armies--much more common in the past in Germany -than anywhere else--who were hired out to fight abroad in quarrels -which were not their own. - -But although this German accusation against the character of our troops -is pure cant, it would not be wholly so were it levelled against the -British people. Not our army, but we ourselves, are the true -mercenaries; because we pay others to do for us what other nations do -for themselves. In German eyes--and perhaps in other eyes as well, -which are less willing to see our faults--this charge against the -British people appears maintainable. It is incomprehensible to other -nations, why we should refuse to recognise that it is any part of our -duty, _as a people_, to defend our country; why we will not admit the -obligation either to train ourselves to arms in time of peace, or to -risk our lives in time of war; why we hold obstinately to it that such -things are no part of {390} our duty as a people, but are only the duty -of private individuals who love fighting, or who are endowed with more -than the average sense of duty. - -"As for you, the great British People," writes Hexenküchen -contemptuously, "you merely fold your hands, and say self-righteously, -that your duty begins and ends with paying certain individuals to fight -for you--individuals whose personal interest can be tempted with -rewards; whose weakness of character can be influenced by taunts, and -jeers, and threats of dismissal; or who happen to see their duty in a -different light from the great majority which calls itself (and is _par -excellence_) the British People...." This may be a very prejudiced -view of the matter, but it is the German view. What they really mean -when they say that England is to be despised because she relies upon a -mercenary army, is that England is to be despised because, being -mercenary, she relies upon a professional army. The taunt, when we -come to analyse it, is found to be levelled, not against the hired, but -against the hirers; and although we may be very indignant, it is not -easy to disprove its justice. - - -The British nation, if not actually the richest, is at any rate one of -the richest in the world. It has elected to depend for its safety upon -an army which cannot with justice be called either 'voluntary' or -'mercenary,' but which it is fairly near the truth to describe as -'professional.' The theory of our arrangement is that we must somehow, -and at the cheapest rate, contrive to tempt enough men to become -professional soldiers to ensure national safety. Accordingly we offer -such inducements to take up {391} the career of arms--instead of the -trades of farm labourer, miner, carpenter, dock hand, shopkeeper, -lawyer, physician, or stockbroker--as custom and the circumstances of -the moment appear to require. - -In an emergency we offer high pay and generous separation allowances to -the private soldier. In normal times we give him less than the market -rate of wages. - -[Sidenote: PAY OF THE BRITISH ARMY] - -The pay of junior or subaltern officers is so meagre that it cannot, by -any possibility, cover the expenses which Government insists upon their -incurring. Captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels are paid much -less than the wages of foremen or sub-managers in any important -industrial undertaking. Even for those who attain the most brilliant -success in their careers, there are no prizes which will stand -comparison for a moment with a very moderate degree of prosperity in -the world of trade or finance. They cannot even be compared with the -prizes open to the bar or the medical profession. - -Hitherto we have obtained our officers largely owing to a firmly rooted -tradition among the country gentlemen and the military -families--neither as a rule rich men, or even very easy in their -circumstances as things go nowadays--many of them very poor--a -tradition so strong that it is not cant, but plain truth, to call it -sense of duty. There are other motives, of course, which may lead a -boy to choose this profession--love of adventure, comparative freedom -from indoor life, pleasant comradeship, and in the case of the middle -classes, recently risen to affluence, social aspirations. But even in -the last there is far more good than harm; though in anti-militarist -circles it is the unworthy aim which is usually dwelt upon with {392} a -sneering emphasis. For very often, when a man has risen from humble -circumstances to a fortune, he rejoices that his sons should serve the -state, since it is in his power to make provision. The example of his -neighbours, whose ancestors have been living on their acres since the -days of the Plantagenets or the Tudors, is a noble example; and he is -wise to follow it. - -In the case of the rank and file of our army, a contract for a term of -years (with obligations continuing for a further term of years) is -entered into, and signed, under the circumstances which have already -been considered. We are faced here with a phenomenon which seems -strange in an Age which has conceded the right to 'down tools,' even -though by so doing a solemn engagement is broken--in an Age which has -become very fastidious about hiring agreements of most kinds, very -suspicious of anything suggestive of 'servile conditions' or 'forced -labour,' and which deprecates the idea of penalising breach of -contract, on the part of a workman, even by process in the civil courts. - -As regards a private soldier in the British army, however, the Age -apparently has no such compunctions. His contract has been made under -duress. Its obligations last for a long period of years. The pay is -below the ordinary market rates. Everything in fact which, in equity, -would favour a revision, pleads in favour of the soldier who demands to -be released. But let him plead and threaten as he please, he is not -released. It is not a case of suing him for damages in the civil -courts, but of dealing with him under discipline and mutiny acts, the -terms of which are simple and drastic--in {393} peace time -imprisonment, in war time death. Without these means of enforcing the -'voluntary' system the British people would not feel themselves safe. - -This phenomenon seems even stranger, when we remember that a large and -influential part of the British people is not only very fastidious as -to the terms of all other sorts of hiring agreements, as to rates of -pay, and as to the conditions under which such contracts have been -entered into--that it is not only most tender in dealing with the -breach of such agreements--but that it also regards the object of the -agreement for military service with particular suspicion. This section -of the British people is anti-militarist on conscientious grounds. One -would have thought, therefore, that it might have been more than -usually careful to allow the man, who hires himself out for lethal -purposes, to have the benefit of second thoughts; or even of third, -fourth, and fifth thoughts. For he, too, may develop a conscience when -his belly is no longer empty. But no: to do this would endanger the -'voluntary' system. - -[Sidenote: THE ANTI-MILITARIST CONSCIENCE] - -This anti-militarist section of the British people is composed of -citizens who, if we are to believe their own professions, love peace -more than other men love it, and hate violence as a deadly sin. They -are determined not to commit this deadly sin themselves; but being -unable to continue in pursuit of their material and spiritual affairs, -unless others will sin in their behalf, they reluctantly agree to -hire--at as low a price as possible--a number of wild fellows from the -upper classes and wastrels from the lower classes--both of whom they -regard as approximating to the reprobate type--to defend their -property, to keep {394} their lives safe, to enforce their Will as it -is declared by ballot papers and House of Commons divisions, and to -allow them to continue their careers of beneficent self-interest -undisturbed. - -But for all that, we are puzzled by the rigour with which the contract -for military service is enforced, even to the last ounce of the pound -of flesh. Not a murmur of protest comes from this section of the -British people, although it has professed to take the rights of the -poorer classes as its special province. The explanation probably is -that, like King Charles I., they have made a mental reservation, and -are thus enabled to distinguish the case of the soldier from that of -his brother who engages in a civil occupation. - -Roughly speaking, they choose to regard the civilian as virtuous, while -the soldier, on the other hand, cannot safely be presumed to be -anything of the sort. Sometimes indeed--perhaps more often than -not--he appears to them to be distinctly unvirtuous. The presumption -is against him; for if he were really virtuous, how could he ever have -agreed to become a soldier, even under pressure of want? For -regulating the service of such men as these force is a regrettable, but -necessary, instrument. The unvirtuous man has agreed to sin, and the -virtuous man acts justly in holding him to his bargain. If a soldier -develops a conscience, and insists on 'downing tools' it is right to -imprison him; even in certain circumstances to put him against a wall -and shoot him. - -These ideas wear an odd appearance when we come to examine them -closely, and yet not only did they exist, but they were actually very -prevalent down to the outbreak of the present war. They {395} seem to -be somewhat prevalent, even now, in various quarters. But surely it is -strange that virtuous citizens should need the protection of unvirtuous -ones; that they should underpay; that they should adopt the methods of -'forced labour' as a necessary part of the 'voluntary system'; that -they should imprison and shoot men for breach of hiring -agreements--hiring agreements for long periods of years, entered into -under pressure of circumstances. - -[Sidenote: ANTI-MILITARIST CONFIDENCE] - -But there is a thing even stranger than any of these. Considering how -jealous the great anti-militarist section of our fellow-countrymen is -of anything which places the army in a position to encroach upon, or -overawe, the civil power, it seems very remarkable that they should -nevertheless have taken a large number of men--whose morals, in their -view, were below rather than above the average--should have armed them -with rifles and bayonets, and spent large sums of money in making them -as efficient as possible for lethal purposes, while refusing firmly to -arm _themselves_ with anything but ballot-boxes, or to make themselves -fit for any form of self-defence. - -It seems never to have crossed the minds of the anti-militarist section -that those whom they thus regard--if not actually with moral -reprehension, at any rate somewhat askance--might perhaps some day -discover that there were advantages in being armed, and in having -become lethally efficient; that having studied the phenomena of -strikes, and having there seen force of various kinds at work--hiring -agreements broken, combinations to bring pressure on society -successful, rather black things occasionally hushed up and -forgiven--soldiers might draw their own conclusions. Having grown -tired of pay lower {396} than the market rate, still more tired of -moral lectures about the wickedness of their particular trade, and of -tiresome old-fashioned phrases about the subordination of the military -to the civil power--what if they, like other trades and classes, should -begin to consider the propriety of putting pressure on society, since -such pressure appears nowadays to be one of the recognised instruments -for redress of wrongs? ... Have not professional soldiers the power to -put pressure on society in the twentieth century, just as they have -done, again and again, in past times in other kingdoms and democracies, -where personal freedom was so highly esteemed, that even the freedom to -abstain from defending your country was respected by public opinion and -the laws of the land? - -But nonsense! In Germany, France, Russia, Austria, Italy, and other -conscript countries armies are hundreds of times stronger than our own, -while the soldiers in these cases are hardly paid enough to keep a -smoker in pipe-tobacco. And yet they do not think of putting pressure -on society, or of anything so horrible. This of course is true; but -then, in these instances, the Army is only Society itself passing, as -it were, like a may-fly, through a certain stage in its life-history. -Army and Society in the conscript countries are one and the same. A -man does not think of putting undue pressure upon himself. But in our -case the Army and Society are not one and the same. Their relations -are those of employer and employed, as they were in Rome long ago; and -as between employer and employed, there are always apt to be questions -of pay and position. - -It is useful in this connection to think a little of Rome with its -'voluntary' or 'mercenary' or {397} 'professional' army--an army -underpaid at first, afterwards perhaps somewhat overpaid, when it -occurred to its mind to put pressure on society. - -But Rome in the first century was a very different place from England -in the twentieth. Very different indeed! The art and rules of war -were considerably less of an expert's business than they are to-day. -Two thousand years ago--weapons being still somewhat -elementary--gunpowder not yet discovered--no railway trains and tubes, -and outer and inner circles, which now are as necessary for feeding -great cities as arteries and veins for keeping the human heart -going--private citizens, moreover, being not altogether unused to -acting with violence in self-defence--it might have taken, perhaps, -100,000 disciplined and well-led reprobates a week or more to hold the -six millions of Greater London by the throat. To-day 10,000 could do -this with ease between breakfast and dinner-time. Certainly a -considerable difference--but somehow not a difference which seems -altogether reassuring. - -Since the days of Oliver Cromwell the confidence of the -anti-militarists in the docility of the British Army has never -experienced any serious shock. But yet, according to the theories of -this particular school, why should our army alone, of all trades and -professions, be expected not to place its own class interests before -those of the country? - -[Sidenote: ARMIES AS LIBERATORS] - -When professional armies make their first entry into practical politics -it is almost always in the role of liberators and defenders of justice. -An instance might easily occur if one or other set of politicians, in a -fit of madness or presumption, were to ask, or order, the British Army -to undertake certain {398} operations against a section of their -fellow-countrymen, which the soldiers themselves judged to be contrary -to justice and their own honour. - -Something of this kind very nearly came to pass in March 1914. The -Curragh incident, as it was called, showed in a flash what a perilous -gulf opens, when a professional army is mishandled. Politicians, who -have come by degrees to regard the army--not as a national force, or -microcosm of the people, but as an instrument which electoral success -has placed temporarily in their hands, and which may therefore be used -legitimately for forwarding their own party ends--have ever been liable -to blunder in this direction. - -Whatever may have been the merits of the Curragh case, the part which -the British Army was asked and expected to play on that occasion, was -one which no democratic Government would have dared to order a -conscript army to undertake, until it had been ascertained, beyond any -possibility of doubt, that the country as a whole believed extreme -measures to be necessary for the national safety. - -If professional soldiers, however high and patriotic their spirit, be -treated as mercenaries--as if, in their dealings with their -fellow-countrymen, they had neither souls nor consciences--it can be no -matter for surprise if they should come by insensible degrees to think -and act as mercenaries.... One set or other of party politicians--the -occurrence is quite as conceivable in the case of a Unionist Government -as in that of a Liberal--issues certain orders, which it would never -dare to issue to a conscript army, and these orders, to its immense -surprise, are not obeyed. Thereupon a Government, which only the day -before {399} seemed to be established securely on a House of Commons -majority and the rock of tradition, is seen to be powerless. The army -in its own eyes--possibly in that of public opinion also--has stood -between the people and injustice. It has refused to be made the -instrument for performing an act of tyranny and oppression. Possibly -in sorrow and disgust it dissolves itself and ceases to exist. -Possibly, on the other hand, it glows with the approbation of its own -conscience; begins to admire its own strength, and not improbably to -wonder, if it might not be good for the country were soldiers to put -forth their strong arm rather more often, in order to restrain the -politicians from following evil courses. This of course is the end of -democracy and the beginning of militarism. - -An army which starts by playing the popular role of benefactor, or -liberator, will end very speedily by becoming the instrument of a -military despotism. We need look no farther back than Cromwell and his -major-generals for an example. We have been in the habit of regarding -such contingencies as remote and mediaeval; none the less we had all -but started on this fatal course in the spring and summer of last year. -We were then saved, not by the wisdom of statesmen--for these only -increased the danger by the spectacle which they afforded of timidity, -temper, and equivocation--but solely by the present war which, though -it has brought us many horrors, has averted, for a time at least, what -is infinitely the worst of all. - -[Sidenote: SERVICE AND SUFFRAGE] - -The conclusion is plain. A democracy which asserts the right of -manhood suffrage, while denying the duty of manhood service, is living -in a fool's paradise. - -{400} - -A democracy which does not fully identify itself with its army, which -does not treat its army with honour and as an equal, but which treats -it, on the contrary, as ill-bred and ill-tempered people treat their -servants--with a mixture, that is, of fault-finding and -condescension--is following a very perilous path. - -An army which does not receive the treatment it deserves, and which at -the same time is ordered by the politicians to perform services which, -upon occasions, it may hold to be inconsistent with its honour, is a -danger to the state. - -A democracy which, having refused to train itself for its own defence, -thinks nevertheless that it can safely raise the issue of 'the Army -versus the People,' is mad. - - - -[1] This was the German period of training for infantry. The National -Service League proposal was four months. - -[2] The pay of the French private soldier is, I understand, about a -sou--a halfpenny--a day. In his eyes the British soldier in the next -trench, who receives from a shilling to eighteenpence a day--and in the -case of married men a separation allowance as well--must appear as a -kind of millionaire. During the South African War the pay of certain -volunteer regiments reached the preposterous figure of five shillings a -day for privates. Men serving with our army as motor drivers--in -comparative safety--receive something like six shillings or seven and -sixpence a day. - - - - -{401} - -CHAPTER VIII - -SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS - -Prior to the present war the chief bugbears encountered by Lord -Roberts, and indeed by all others whose aim it was to provide this -country with an army numerically fit to support its policy, were the -objections, real or imaginary, of the British race to compulsory -service, and more particularly to compulsory service in foreign lands. -These prejudices were true types of the bugbear; for they were born out -of opinion and not out of the facts. - -The smaller fry of politicians, whose fears--like those of the -monkeys--are more easily excited by the front-row of things which are -visible, than by the real dangers which lurk behind in the shadow, are -always much more terrified of opinion than of the facts. This is -precisely why most politicians remain all their lives more unfit than -any other class of man for governing a country. Give one of these his -choice--ask him whether he will prefer to support a cause where the -facts are with him, but opinion is likely for many years to be running -hard against him, or another cause where these conditions are -reversed--of course he will never hesitate a moment about choosing the -latter. And very probably his manner {402} of answering will indicate, -that he thinks you insult his intelligence by asking such a question. - -It is only the very rare type of big, patient politician, who realises -that the facts cannot be changed by opinion, and that in the end -opinion must be changed by the facts, if the two happen to be opposed. -Such a one chooses accordingly, to follow the facts in spite of -unpopularity. - -The little fellows, on the contrary, with their large ears glued -anxiously to the ground, keep ever muttering to themselves, and -chaunting in a sort of rhythmical chorus, the most despicable -incantation in the whole political vocabulary:--"We who aspire to be -leaders of the People must see to it that we are never in advance of -the People.... The People will never stand this: the People will never -stand that.... Away with it therefore; and if possible attach it like -a mill-stone round the necks of our enemies." - -Of course they are quite wrong. The People will stand anything which -is necessary for the national welfare, if the matter is explained to -them by a big enough man in accents of sincerity. - - -A defensive force which will on no account cross the frontier is no -defensive force at all. It is only a laughing-stock. - -A frontier is sometimes an arbitrary line drawn across meadow and -plough; sometimes a river; sometimes a mountain range; sometimes, as -with ourselves, it is a narrow strip of sea--a 'great ditch,' as -Cromwell called it contemptuously. - -The awful significance, however, of the word 'frontier' seems to deepen -and darken as we pass {403} from the first example to the fourth. And -there is apparently something more in this feeling than the terrors of -the channel crossing or of a foreign language. Territorials may be -taken to Ireland, which is a longer sea-journey than from Dover to -Calais; but to be 'butchered abroad'--horrible! - -It is horrible enough to be butchered anywhere, but why more horrible -in the valley of the Rhine than in that of the Thames? If national -safety demands butchery, as it has often done in the past, surely the -butchery of 50,000 brave men on the borders of Luxemburg is a less evil -than the butchery of twice that number in the vicinity of Norwich? And -if we are to consider national comfort as well as safety, it is surely -wise to follow the German example and fight in any man's country rather -than in our own. The only question of real importance is this:--At -what place will the sacrifice of life be most effective for the defence -of the country? If we can answer that we shall know also where it will -be lightest.[1] - - -[Sidenote: THE HONOUR OF THE ARMY] - -The school of political thought which remained predominant throughout -the great industrial epoch (1832-1886) bitterly resented the -assumption, made by certain classes, that the profession of arms was -more honourable in its nature, than commerce and other peaceful -pursuits. The destruction of this supposed fallacy produced a great -literature, and even a considerable amount of poetry. It was a -frequent theme at the opening of literary institutes and technical -colleges, and also at festivals of chambers of commerce {404} and -municipalities. Professors of Political Economy expounded the true -doctrine with great vehemence, and sermons were preached without number -upon the well-worn text about the victories of peace. - -This reaction was salutary up to a point. It swept away a vast -quantity of superannuated rubbish. International relations were at -this time just as much cumbered with old meaningless phrases of a -certain sort, in which vainglory was the chief ingredient, as they have -recently been cumbered with others of a different sort in which -indolence was the chief ingredient. Inefficiency, indifference, -idleness, trifling, and extravagance were a standing charge against -soldiers as a class; and though they were never true charges against -the class, they were true, for two generations following after -Waterloo, against a large number of individuals. But this reaction, -like most other reactions, swept away too much. - -[Sidenote: THE PROFESSION OF ARMS] - -A mercenary soldiery which looks to enrich itself by pay and plunder is -an ignoble institution. It has no right to give itself airs of honour, -and must be judged like company promotion, trusts, or any of the many -other predatory professions of modern times. It is also a national -danger, inasmuch as its personal interest is to foment wars. The -British Army has never been open to this charge in any period of its -history. - -A profession in which it is only possible, by the most severe -self-denial and economy, for an officer--even after he has arrived at -success--to live on his pay, to marry, and to bring up a family, can -hardly be ranked as a money-making career. Pecuniary motives, indeed, -were never the charge against 'the military' except among the -stump-orator class. But {405} professional indifference and -inefficiency were, at that particular time, not only seriously alleged, -but were also not infrequently true. It was a good thing that -slackness should be swept away. That it has been swept away pretty -thoroughly, every one who has known anything about the Army for a -generation past, is well aware. - -But the much-resented claim to a superiority in the matter of honour is -well founded, and no amount of philosophising or political-economising -will ever shake it. Clearly it is more honourable for a man to risk -his life, and what is infinitely more important--his reputation and his -whole future career--in defence of his country, than it is merely to -build up a competency or a fortune. The soldier's profession is beset -by other and greater dangers than the physical. Money-making pursuits -are not only safer for the skin, but in them a blunder, or even a -series of blunders, does not banish the hope of ultimate success. The -man of business has chances of retrieving his position. Many bankrupts -have died in affluence. In politics, a man with a plausible tongue and -a certain quality of courage, will usually succeed in eluding the -consequences of his mistakes, by laying the blame on other people's -shoulders. But the soldier is rarely given a second chance; and he may -easily come down at the first chance, through sheer ill-luck, and not -through any fault of his own. Such a profession confers honour upon -its members. - -Law, trade, and finance are not in themselves, as was at one time -thought, dishonourable pursuits; but neither are they in themselves -honourable. They are neither the one nor the other. It casts no slur -upon a man to be a lawyer, a tradesman, or a banker; {406} but neither -does it confer upon him any honour. But military service does confer -an honour. The devotion, hardship, and danger of the soldier's life -are not rewarded upon a commercial basis, or reckoned in that currency. - -Some people are inclined to mock at the respect--exaggerated as they -think--which is paid by conscript countries to their armies. For all -its excesses and absurdities, this respect is founded upon a true -principle--a truer principle of conduct than our own. In countries -where most of the able-bodied men have given some years of their lives -gratuitously to the service of their country, the fact is brought home -to them, that such service is of a different character from the -benefits which they subsequently confer upon the State by their -industry and thrift, or by growing rich. - -[Sidenote: A THEORY OF BRITISH FREEDOM] - -From the national point of view, it is ennobling that at some period of -their lives the great majority of citizens should have served the -commonwealth disinterestedly. This after all is the only principle -which will support a commonwealth. For a commonwealth will not stand -against the shocks, which history teaches us to beware of, merely by -dropping papers, marked with a cross, into a ballot-box once every five -years, or even oftener. It will not stand merely by taking an -intelligent interest in events, by attending meetings and reading the -newspapers, and by indulging in outbursts of indignation or enthusiasm. -It will only stand by virtue of personal service, and by the readiness -of the whole people, generation by generation, to give their lives -and--what is much harder to face--the time and irksome preparation -which are necessary for making the {407} sacrifice of their -lives--should it be called for--effective for its purpose. - -If the mass of the people, even when they have realised the need, will -not accept the obligation of national service they must be prepared to -see their institutions perish, to lose control of their own destinies, -and to welcome another master than Democracy, who it may well be, will -not put them to the trouble of dropping papers, marked with a cross, -into ballot-boxes once in five years, or indeed at all. For a State -may continue to exist even if deprived of ballot-boxes; but it is -doomed if its citizens will not in time prepare themselves to defend it -with their lives. - -The memories of the press-gang and the militia ballot are dim. Both -belong to a past which it is the custom to refer to with reprobation. -Both were inconsistent with equal comradeship between classes; with -justice, dignity, honour, and the unity of the nation; and on these -grounds they are rightly condemned. - -But the press-gang and the militia ballot have been condemned, and are -still condemned, upon other grounds which do not seem so firm. Both -have been condemned as contravening that great and laudable principle -of British freedom which lays it down that those who like fighting, or -prefer it to other evils--like starvation and imprisonment--or who can -be bribed, or in some other way persuaded to fight, should enjoy the -monopoly of being 'butchered,' both abroad and at home. And it has -been further maintained by those who held these views, that people who -do not like fighting, but choose rather to stay at home talking, -criticising, enjoying {408} fine thrills of patriotism, making money, -and sleeping under cover, have some kind of divine right to go on -enjoying that form of existence undisturbed. Since the Wars of the -Roses the latter class has usually been in a great majority in England. -Even during the Cromwellian Civil War the numbers of men, capable of -bearing arms, who actually bore them, was only a smallish fraction of -the entire population. - -The moral ideals of any community, like other things, are apt to be -settled by numbers. With the extension of popular government, and the -increase of the electorate, this tendency will assert itself more and -more. But providing the people are dealt with plainly and frankly, -without flattery or deceit--like men and not as if they were greedy -children--the moral sense of a democracy will probably be sounder and -stronger than that of any other form of State. - -Even in England, however, there have been lapses, during which the -people have not been so treated, and the popular spirit has sunk, owing -to mean leadership, into degradation. During the whole of the -industrial epoch the idea steadily gained in strength, that those whose -battles were fought for them by others, approached more nearly to the -type of the perfect citizen than those others who actually fought the -battles; that the protected were worthier than the protectors. - -According to this view the true meaning of 'freedom' was exemption from -personal service. The whole duty of the virtuous citizen with regard -to the defence of his country began and ended with paying a policeman. -With the disappearance of imminent and visible danger, the reprobate -qualities of the soldier became speedily a pain and a scandal {409} to -godly men. In time of peace he was apt to be sneered at and decried as -an idler and a spendthrift, who would not stand well in a moral -comparison with those steady fellows, who had remained at home, working -hard at their vocations and investing their savings. - -[Sidenote: NINETEENTH CENTURY NOTIONS] - -The soldier, moreover, according to Political Economy, was occupied in -a non-productive trade, and therefore it was contrary to the principles -of that science to waste more money upon him than could be avoided. -Also it was prudent not to show too much gratitude to those who had -done the fighting, lest they should become presumptuous and formidable. - -This conception of the relations between the army and the civilian -population has been specially marked at several periods in our -history--after the Cromwellian wars; after the Marlborough wars; after -1757; but during the half century which followed Waterloo it seemed to -have established itself permanently as an article of our political -creed. - -After 1815 there was an utter weariness of fighting, following upon -nearly a quarter of a century of war. The heroism of Wellington's -armies was still tainted in the popular memory by the fact that the -prisons had been opened to find him recruits. The industrial expansion -and prodigious growth of material wealth absorbed men's minds. -Middle-class ideals, middle-class prosperity, middle-class irritation -against a military caste which, in spite of its comparative poverty, -continued with some success to assert its social superiority, combined -against the army in popular discussions. The honest belief that wars -were an anachronism, and that the world was now {410} launched upon an -interminable era of peace, clothed the nakedness of class prejudice -with some kind of philosophic raiment. Soldiers were no longer needed; -why then should they continue to claim the lion's share of honourable -recognition? - - -Up to August 1914 the chief difficulties in the way of army reformers -were how to overcome the firmly-rooted ideas that preparations for war -upon a great scale were not really necessary to security, and that, on -those rare occasions when fighting might be necessary, it should not be -undertaken by the most virtuous class of citizens, but by others whose -lives had a lower value. If the citizen paid it was enough; and he -claimed the right to grumble even at paying. This was the old Liberal -faith of the eighteen-fifties, and it remained the faith of the -straitest Radical sect, until German guns began to batter down the -forts of Liège. - -[Sidenote: A CHANGE OF TONE] - -But any one who remembers the state of public opinion between 1870 and -1890, or who has read the political memoirs of that time, will realise -that a change has been, very slowly and gradually, stealing over public -opinion ever since the end of that epoch. In those earlier times the -only danger which disturbed our national equanimity, and that only very -slightly, was the approach of Russia towards the north-western frontier -of India. The volunteer movement came to be regarded more and more by -ordinary people in the light of a healthy and manly recreation, rather -than as a duty. A lad would make his choice, very much as if -volunteering were on a par with rowing, sailing, hunting, or polo. It -is probably no exaggeration to say that nine volunteers out of every -ten, who {411} enrolled themselves between 1870 and 1890, never -believed for a single moment that there was a chance of the country -having need of their services. Consequently, except in the case of a -few extreme enthusiasts, it never appeared that there was anything -unpatriotic in not joining the volunteers. - -One has only to compare this with the attitude which has prevailed -since the Territorial Army came into existence, to realise that there -has been a stirring of the waters, and that in certain quarters a -change had taken place in the national mood. With regard to the -Territorials the attitude of those who joined, of those who did not -join, of the politicians, of the press, of public opinion generally was -markedly different from the old attitude. It was significant that a -man who did not join was often disposed to excuse and to justify his -abstention. The conditions of his calling, or competing duties made it -impossible for him; or the lowness of his health, or the highness of -his principles in some way interfered. There was a tendency now to -explain what previously would never have called for any explanation. - -The causes of this change are not less obvious than its symptoms. It -is an interesting coincidence that Lord Kitchener had a good deal to do -with it. The destruction of the bloodthirsty tyranny of the Khalifa -(1898), and the rescue of a fertile province from waste, misery, and -massacre, caused many people to look with less disapproving eyes than -formerly upon the profession of the soldier. The long anxieties of the -South African War, and the levies of volunteers from all parts of the -Empire, who went out to take a share in it, forced men to think not -only more kindly of soldiers, but also to think {412} of war itself no -longer as an illusion but as a reality.[2] - -The events which happened during the last decade--the creation of the -German Navy--the attempt and failure of the British Government to abate -the rivalry in armaments--the naval panic and the hastily summoned -Defence Conference in 1909--the Russo-Japanese war--the Agadir -crisis--the two Balkan wars--the military competition between Germany -and France--all these combined to sharpen the consciousness of danger -and to draw attention to the need for being prepared against it. - - -These events, which crowded the beginning of the twentieth century, -stirred and troubled public opinion in a manner which not only Mr. -Cobden, who died in 1865, but almost equally Mr. Gladstone, who -survived him by more than thirty years, would have utterly refused to -credit. Both these statesmen had been convinced that the world was -moving steadily towards a settled peace, and that before another -century had passed away--possibly even in a single generation--their -dreams of general disarmament would be approaching fulfilment. - -And to a certain extent our own generation remains still affected by -the same notions. Amid the thunders of more than a thousand miles of -battle we still find ourselves clinging tenaciously to the belief, that -the world has entered suddenly, and unexpectedly, upon an abnormal -period which, from {413} its very nature, can only be of very brief -duration. This comforting conviction does not appear to rest upon -solid grounds. In the light of history it would not seem so certain -that we have not passed out of an abnormal period into the normal--if -lamentable--condition when a nation, in order to maintain its -independence, must be prepared at any moment to fight for its life. - -It would be profitless to pursue these speculations. It is enough for -our own generation that we now find ourselves in a situation of the -gravest danger; and that it depends upon the efforts which we as a -nation put forth, more than upon anything else, whether the danger will -pass away or settle down and become chronic. - - -[Sidenote: NATURE OF GERMAN ENMITY] - -Although we failed to perceive or acknowledge the danger until some -nine months ago, it had been there for at least fifteen years, probably -for twice that number. - -German antagonism to England has been compounded of envy of our -possessions, contempt for our character, and hatred of our good -fortune. What galled our rival more than anything else, was the fact -that we enjoyed our prosperity, and held our vast Empire, upon too easy -terms. The German people had made, and were continuing to make, -sacrifices to maintain their position in the world, while the British -people in their view were making none. And if we measure national -sacrifices by personal service, and not merely in money payments, it is -difficult to see what answer is to be given to this charge. - -It is clear that unless the result of this war be to {414} crush -Germany as completely as she herself hoped at the beginning of it, to -crush France, our own danger will remain, unless Germany's chief -grievance against us is meanwhile removed. It is not a paradox, but -merely a statement of plain fact, to say that Germany's chief grievance -against ourselves was, that we were not prepared to withstand her -attack. Her hatred, which has caused, and still causes us so much -amazement, was founded upon the surest of foundations--a want of -respect. The Germans despised a nation which refused to recognise that -any obligation rested on its citizens, to fit themselves, by serious -training, for defence of their inheritance. And they will continue to -despise us when this war is over if we should still fail to recognise -this obligation. Despising us, they will continue also to hate us; the -peace of the world will still be endangered; and we shall not, after -all our sacrifices, have reached the security at which we aimed. - - -[Sidenote: HEART-SEARCHINGS] - -We may end this war without winning it, and at the same time without -being defeated. And although it appears to be still believed by some -persons that we can win, in some sort of fashion, without accepting the -principle of national service, even those who entertain this dangerous -confidence will hardly dare to deny that, after a war which ends -without a crowning victory, we shall have to accept conscription at -once upon the signature of peace. - -For it should be remembered that we have other things to take into -account besides the mood of Germany. If we stave off defeat, only with -the assistance of allies--all of whom have long ago adopted universal -military service in its most rigorous {415} form--we shall have to -reckon with their appraisement of the value of our assistance. If we -are to judge by Germany's indomitable enterprise during the past two -generations, she is likely to recover from the effects of this war at -least as rapidly as ourselves. And when she has recovered, will she -not hunger again for our possessions, as eagerly as before, if she sees -them still inadequately guarded? And maybe, when that time comes, -there may be some difficulty in finding allies. For a Power which -declines to recognise the obligation of equal sacrifices, which refuses -to make preparations in time of peace, and which accordingly, when war -occurs, is ever found unready, is not the most eligible of comrades in -arms. - - -In a recent letter the Freiherr von Hexenküchen refers, in his sour -way, to some of the matters which have been discussed in this -chapter.... "The British People," he writes, "appear to be mightily -exercised just now about their own and their neighbours' consciences; -about what they may or may not do with decency; about whether or no -football matches are right; or race-meetings; or plays, music-hall -entertainments, concerts, the purchase of new clothes, and the drinking -of alcohol; whether indeed any form of enjoyment or cheerfulness ought -to be tolerated in present circumstances. - -"But although you vex yourselves over these and other problems of a -similar kind, you never seem to vex yourselves about the abscess at the -root of the tooth. - -"The Holy Roman Empire, which was not holy, nor Roman, nor yet an -empire, reminds me not a little of your so-called voluntary military -system, {416} which is not voluntary, nor military, nor yet a system. -It is only a chaos, a paradox, and a laughing-stock to us Germans. - -"It is our army, and not yours, which really rests on a voluntary -basis. Our whole people for a century past have voluntarily accepted -the obligation of universal military service. Those amongst us who -have raised objections to this system are but an inconsiderable -fraction; negligible at any time, but in this or any other great -crisis, not merely negligible, but altogether invisible and inaudible. - -"Our people desire their army to be as it is, otherwise it would not be -as it is. No Kaiser, or Bureaucracy, or General Staff could impose -such a system against the public will and conscience. Your people, on -the other hand, have refused _as a people_ to accept the military -obligation. By various devices they endeavour to fix the burden on the -shoulders of individuals. Is this the true meaning of the word -'voluntary'--_to refuse?_ ... Sir, I desire to be civil; but was there -ever a more conspicuous instance of cant in the whole history of the -world, than your self-righteous boastings about your 'voluntary' -military system? - -"You may wonder why I bracket these two things together--your -soul-searchings about amusements of all kinds, and your nonsensical -panegyrics on the voluntary' principle.... To my eyes they are very -closely connected. - -[Sidenote: THE DUTY OF CHEERFULNESS] - -"Cheerfulness is a duty in time of war. Every man or woman who smiles, -and keeps a good heart, and goes about his or her day's work gaily, -helps by so much to sustain the national spirit. Not good, but harm, -is done to the conduct of the war, {417} by moping and brooding over -casualty lists, and by speculations as to disasters which have -occurred, or are thought to be imminent. But there is one essential -preliminary to national cheerfulness--before a nation can be cheerful -it must have a good conscience; and it cannot have a good conscience -unless it has done its duty. - -"Your nation has a bad conscience. The reason is that, _as a nation_, -it has not done its duty. This may be the fault of the leaders who -have not dared to speak the word of command. But the fact remains, -that you well know--or at any rate suspect in your hearts--that you -have not done your whole duty. And consequently you cannot be really -cheerful about anything. As you go about your daily work or -recreations, you are all the while looking back over your shoulders -with misgiving. _As a nation_ you have not--even yet--dedicated -yourselves to this war. When you have done so--if ever you do--your -burden of gloom and mistrust will fall from your back, like that of -_Christian_ as he passed along the highway, which is fenced on either -side with the Wall that is called _Salvation_." - - -In the great American Civil War, the Southern States, which aimed at -breaking away from the Union, adopted conscription within a year from -the beginning. They were brave fighters; but they were poor, and they -were in a small minority. The Northern States--confident in their -numbers and wealth--relied at first upon the voluntary system. It gave -them great and gallant armies; but these was not enough; and as months -went by President Lincoln realised that they were not enough. - -{418} - -Disregarding the entreaties of his friends, to beware of asking of the -people 'what the people would never stand,' disregarding the clamours -of his enemies about personal freedom, he insisted upon conscription, -believing that by these means alone the Union could be saved. And what -was the result? A section of the press foamed with indignation. Mobs -yelled, demonstrated, and in their illogical fury, lynched negroes, -seeing in these unfortunates the cause of all their troubles. But the -mobs were not the American people. They were only a noisy and -contemptible minority of the American people, whose importance as well -as courage had been vastly over-rated. The quiet people were in deadly -earnest, and they supported their President.[3] - -[Sidenote: LINCOLN AND CONSCRIPTION] - -But the task which Lincoln set himself was one of the hardest that a -democratic statesman ever undertook. The demand which he determined to -make, and did make, may well have tried his heart as he sat alone in -the night watches. For compulsion was a violation of the habits and -prejudices of the old American stock, while it was even more -distasteful to new immigrants. It was contrary to the traditions and -theories of the Republic, and, as many thought, to its fundamental -principles. It was open to scornful attack on grounds of sentiment. -Against a foe who were so weak, both in numbers and wealth, how -humiliating to be driven to such desperate measures! But most of -all--outweighing all other considerations--this war of North and South -was not only war, but civil war. Families and lifelong friendships -were divided. What compulsion meant, therefore, in this case was, that -brothers were to be forced to {419} kill brothers, husbands were to be -sent out to slay the kinsmen of their wives, or--as they marched with -Sherman through Georgia--to set a light with their own hands to the old -homesteads where they had been born. Between the warring States there -were no differences of blood, tradition, or religion; or of ideas of -right and wrong; no hatred against a foreign race; only an acute -opposition of political ideals. Compulsion, therefore, was a great -thing to ask of the American people. But the American people are a -great people, and they understood. And Lincoln was a great man,--one -of the greatest, noblest, and most human in the whole of history,--and -he did not hesitate to ask, to insist, and to use force. What the end -was does not need to be stated here; except merely this, that a -lingering and bloody war was thereby greatly shortened, and that the -Union was saved. - -The British Government and people are faced to-day with some, but not -all--and not the greatest--of Lincoln's difficulties. Our traditions -and theories are the same, to a large extent, as those which prevailed -in America in 1863. But unlike the North we have had recent experience -of war, and also of the sacrifices which war calls for from the -civilian population. By so much the shock of compulsion would find us -better prepared. - -But the other and much greater difficulties which beset Lincoln do not -exist in the case of the British Government. We are not fighting -against a foe inferior in numbers, but against one who up till now has -been greatly superior in numbers--who has also been greatly superior in -equipment, and preparation, and in deeply-laid plans. We are fighting -against {420} a foe who has invaded and encroached; not against one who -is standing on the defensive, demanding merely to be let go free. The -family affections and friendships which would be outraged by -conscription in this war against Germany are inconsiderable; mere dust -in the balance. The present war is waged against a foreign nation; it -is not civil war. It is waged against an enemy who plainly seeks, not -his own freedom, but our destruction, and that of our Allies. It is -waged against an enemy who by the treacherous thoroughness of his -peace-time preparations, appears to our eyes to have violated good -faith as between nations, as in the conduct of the campaign he has -disregarded the obligations of our common humanity, We may be wrong; we -may take exaggerated views owing to the bitterness of the struggle; but -such is our mind upon the matter. - -Lincoln's task would have been light had such been the mind of the -Northern States half a century ago, and had he been faced with nothing -more formidable than the conditions which prevail in England to-day. -It does not need the courage of a Lincoln to demand from our people a -sacrifice, upon which the safety of the British Empire depends, even -more certainly, than in 1863 did that of the American Union. - - - -[1] Once more it is desirable to correct the erroneous impression that -the conscript armies of continental powers are under no liability to -serve outside their own territories or overseas. - -[2] Influences of another kind altogether had much to do with the -cleansing of public opinion--the writings of Henley, of Mahan, and of -Mr. Rudyard Kipling. Though not so well known as the works of these, -Henderson's _Life of Stonewall Jackson_ has nevertheless changed many -courses of thought, and its indirect effect in removing false standards -has been very great. I can never sufficiently acknowledge my personal -debt to these four. - -[3] Cf. _Round Table_, March 1915, 'The Politics of War.' - - - - -{421} - -CHAPTER IX - -THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR - -If in the foregoing pages the Liberal party has come in for the larger -share of criticism, the reason is, that during the ten critical years, -while dangers were drawing to a head, a Liberal Government chanced to -be in power. That things would have been managed better and more -courageously had the Unionists been in power may be doubted; and -certainly it is no part of my present task to champion any such theory. - -The special type of politician whose influence has wrought so much evil -of late is no peculiar product of the Liberal party. He is the product -of the party system in its corrupt decadence. You find him in the -ranks of the Opposition as well as in those of the Ministerialists, -just as you find good and true men in both. In this last lies our -hope. In our present trouble good and true men have a chance of taking -things into their own hands, which has been denied to them for many -generations. - - -This book has been written to establish the _Need_ for National -Service, in order that the British Empire may maintain itself securely -in the present {422} circumstances of the world. If this contention be -true it is obvious that a corresponding _Duty_ lies upon the whole -nation to accept the burden of military service. - -Neither need nor duty has ever been made clear to the British people by -their leaders. Owing to the abuses of the party system, increasing -steadily over a considerable period of years, a certain type of -politician has been evolved, and has risen into great prominence--a -type which does not trust the people, but only fears them. In order to -maintain themselves and their parties in power, politicians of this -type have darkened the eyes and drugged the spirit of the nation. - - -It is no part of the plan of this volume to offer criticisms upon the -naval and military aspects of the present war, or upon the wisdom or -unwisdom of the operations which have been undertaken by land and sea. -All that need be said in this connection may be put into a very few -words. - -As we read and re-read British history we cannot but be impressed with -the fact that our leading statesmen, misled by the very brilliancy of -their intellectual endowments, have always been prone to two errors of -policy, which the simpler mind of the soldier instinctively avoids. -They have ever been too ready to conclude prematurely that a certain -line of obstacles is so formidable that it cannot be forced; and they -have also ever been too ready to accept the notion, that there must -surely be some ingenious far way round, by which they may succeed in -circumventing the infinite. - -[Sidenote: MAIN PRINCIPLE OF STRATEGY] - -The defect of brilliant brains is not necessarily a {423} want of -courage--daring there has usually been in plenty--but they are apt to -lack fortitude. They are apt to abandon the assault upon positions -which are not really invulnerable, and to go off, chasing after -attractive butterflies, until they fall into quagmires. Dispersion of -effort has always been the besetting sin of British statesmen and the -curse of British policy. There is no clearer example of this than the -case of William Pitt the Younger, who went on picking up sugar islands -all over the world, when he ought to have been giving his whole -strength to beating Napoleon. - -Very few obstacles are really insurmountable, and it is usually the -shortest and the safest course to stick to what has been already begun. -Especially is this the case when your resources in trained soldiers and -munitions of war are painfully restricted. At the one point, where you -have decided to attack, the motto is _push hard_; and at all others, -where you may be compelled to defend yourselves, the motto is _hold -fast_. - -The peril of British war councils in the past has always been (and -maybe still is) the tendency of ingenious argument to get the better of -sound judgment. In the very opposite of this lies safety. We find the -true type of high policy, as well as of successful campaigning, in the -cool and patient inflexibility of Wellington, holding fast by one main -idea, forcing his way over one obstacle after another which had been -pronounced invincible--through walled cities; into the deep valleys of -the Pyrenees; across the Bidassoa--till from the crests of the Great -Rhune and the Little his soldiers looked down at last upon the plains -of France. - -{424} - -Our most urgent problem with regard to the present war, is how we may -win it most thoroughly; but, in addition to this, there are two -questions which have recently engaged a good deal of public attention. -There is a _Political_ question--what sort of European settlement is to -take place after the war? And there is also a _Criminal_ -question--what sort of punishment shall be meted out, if crimes, -contrary to the practice of war among civilised and humane states, have -been committed by our antagonists? - -I have not attempted to deal with either of these. They do not seem to -be of extreme urgency; for unless, and until, we win the war it is -somewhat idle to discuss the ultimate fate of Europe or the penalty of -evil deeds. You cannot restore stolen property until you have -recovered it, and you cannot punish a malefactor, nor is it very -convenient even to try him, while he is still at large. If that be -true, which was said of old by a great king--_I do not make peace with -barbarians but dictate the terms of their surrender_--we are still a -long way from that. - -I have not occupied myself therefore with what are termed 'German -atrocities.' So far as this matter is concerned, I am satisfied to let -it rest for the present upon the German statement of intentions before -war began,[1] and upon the proclamations which {425} have been issued -subsequently, with the object of justifying their mode of operations by -sea and land. The case against Germany on her own admission, is quite -strong enough without opening a further inquisition under this -heading.[2] - - -[Sidenote: WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING ABOUT] - -It is essential, however, to realise the falsities and perversities -upon which the great fabric of German policy is founded; for otherwise -we shall never understand either the nature of the enemy with whom we -are at present engaged, or the full extent of the danger by which, not -only we, but civilisation itself is now threatened. It is essential -that the whole British race should understand the nature of the evils -_against_ which they are fighting--the ambitions of Germany--the -ruthless despotism of the Prussian system--the new theories of right -and wrong which have been evolved by thinkers who have been paid, -promoted, and inspired by the State, in order to sanctify the imperial -policy of spoliation. - -It is also essential for us to realise the nature of those things _for_ -which we are fighting--what we shall save and secure for our posterity -in case of victory; what we stand to lose in event of defeat. The -preservation or ruin of our inheritance, spiritual and material--the -maintenance or overthrow of our {426} institutions, traditions, and -ideas--the triumph, of these, or the supplanting of them by a wholly -different order, which to our eyes wears the appearance of a vast -machine under the control of savages--are the main issues of the -present war. And when now at last, we face them squarely, we begin to -wonder, why of late years, we have been wont to treat problems of -national defence and imperial security with so much levity and -indifference. - -It is profitable to turn our eyes from the contemplation of German -shortcomings inwards upon our own. If we have been guilty as a people -during recent times of weakness, blindness, indolence, or cowardice, we -should face these facts squarely, otherwise there is but a poor chance -of arriving at better conditions. If we have refused to listen to -unpleasant truths, and to exchange a drowsy and dangerous comfort -against sacrifices which were necessary for security, it is foolish to -lay the whole blame upon this or that public man, this or that -government. For, after all, both public men and governments were our -own creation; we chose them because we liked them; because it gave us -pleasure and consolation to listen to their sayings; because their -doings and their non-doings, their un-doings and their mis-doings were -regarded with approval or indifference by the great bulk of our people. - -It would be wise also to take to heart the lesson, plainly written -across the record of the last nine months, that the present confusion -of our political system is responsible, as much as anything--perhaps -more than anything--for the depreciated currency of public character. -The need is obvious for a Parliament and a Government chosen by the -Empire, {427} responsible to the Empire, and charged with the security -of the Empire, and with no other task. - - -[Sidenote: CAUSES OF WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH] - -Why we are fighting at all is one of our problems; why we are finding -it so hard to win is another. In what does the main strength of our -enemies consist? And in what does our own chief weakness consist? - -To say that our weakness is to be sought in our own vices, and the -strength of our enemies in their virtues, is of course a commonplace. -But one has only to open the average newspaper to realise the need for -restating the obvious. For there the contrary doctrine is set forth -daily and weekly with a lachrymose insistency--that our hands are -weakened because we are so good; that the Germans fight at an enormous -advantage because they are so wicked and unscrupulous. - -But the things which we are finding hardest to overcome in our foes are -not the immoral gibberings of professors, or the blundering cynicism of -the German Foreign Office, or the methodical savagery of the General -Staff, whether in Belgium or on the High Seas. These are sources of -weakness and not of strength; and even at the present stage it is clear -that, although they have inflicted immeasurable suffering, they have -done the German cause much more harm than good. - -Our real obstacles are the loyalty, the self-sacrifice, and the -endurance of the German people. - -The causes of British weakness are equally plain. Our indolence and -factiousness; our foolish confidence in cleverness, manoeuvres, and -debate for overcoming obstacles which lie altogether outside that -region of human endeavour; our absorption as {428} thrilled spectators -in the technical game of British politics[3]--these vices and others of -a similar character, which, since the beginning of the war we have been -struggling--like a man awakening from a nightmare--to shake off, are -still our chief difficulties. It is a hard job to get rid of them, and -we are not yet anything like halfway through with it. - -It must be clear to every detached observer, that the moral strength of -England in the present struggle--like that of France--does not lie in -Government or Opposition, but in the spirit of the people; that this -spirit has drawn but little support, in the case of either country, -from the leadership and example of the politicians; and that there is -little cause in either case to bless or praise them for the fidelity of -their previous stewardship. In the case of France this national spirit -was assured at the beginning; in our own case the process of awakening -has proceeded much more slowly. - - -[Sidenote: ILLUSIONS OF SUCCESS] - -It is essential to put certain notions out of our heads and certain -other notions into them. From the beginning of the war, a large part -of the press--acting, we are entitled to suppose, in patriotic -obedience to the directions of the Press Bureau--has fostered ideas -which do not correspond with the facts. Information has been doled out -and presented in such a way as to destroy all sense of proportion in -the public mind. - -It is not an uncommon belief,[4] for example, that we with our -Allies--ever since the first onset, when, {429} being virtuously -unprepared, we were pushed back some little distance--have been doing -much better than the Germans; that for months past our adversaries have -been in a desperate plight--lacking ammunition, on the verge of -bankruptcy and starvation, and thoroughly discouraged. - -There is also a tendency to assume--despite Lord Kitchener's grave and -repeated warnings to the contrary--that the war is drawing rapidly to a -conclusion, and that, even if we may have to submit to some -interruption of our usual summer holidays, at any rate we shall eat our -Christmas dinners in an atmosphere of peace and goodwill. - -The magnitude of the German victories, both in the East and West, -during the earlier stages of the war, is not realised even now by the -great majority of our fellow-countrymen; while the ruinous consequences -of these victories to our Allies--the occupation of Belgium, of a large -part of northern France, and of Western Poland--is dwelt on far too -lightly. Nor is it understood by one man in a hundred, that up to the -end of last year, British troops were never holding more than thirty -miles, out of that line of nearly five hundred which winds, like a -great snake, from Nieuport to the Swiss frontier. On the contrary, it -is quite commonly believed that we have been doing our fair share of -the fighting--or even more--by land as well as sea. - -A misleading emphasis of type and comment, together with a dangerous -selection of items of news, are responsible for these illusions; while -the prevalence of these illusions is largely responsible for many of -our labour difficulties. - -Such dreams of inevitable and speedy victory {430} are no doubt very -soothing to indolent and timid minds, but they do not make for a -vigorous and resolute spirit in the nation, upon which, more than upon -anything else, the winning of this war depends. - - -In some quarters there appears still to linger a ridiculous idea that -we went into this war, out of pure chivalry, to defend Belgium.[5] We -went into it to defend our own existence, and for no other reason. We -made common cause with Allies who were menaced by the same danger as -ourselves; but these, most fortunately, had made their preparations -with greater foresight than we had done. The actual fighting has taken -place, so far, in their territories and not in ours; but the issue of -this war is not one whit less a matter of life-or-death for us, than it -is for them. - -[Sidenote: DEMOCRACY NOT INVINCIBLE] - -Quite recently I have seen our present situation described glowingly -and self-complacently as the 'triumph of the voluntary system.' I must -be blind of both eyes, for I can perceive no 'triumph' and no -'voluntary' system. I have seen the territories of our Allies seized, -wasted, and held fast by an undefeated enemy. I have seen our small -army driven back; fighting with as much skill and bravery as ever in -its history; suffering losses unparalleled in its history; holding its -own in the end, but against what overwhelming numbers and by what -sacrifices! The human triumph is apparent enough; but not that of any -system, voluntary or otherwise. Neither in this record of nine months' -'hard and hot fighting' on land, nor in {431} the state of things which -now exists at the end of it all, is there a triumph for anything, or -any one, save for a few thousands of brave men, who were left to hold -fast as best they could against intolerable odds. - - -Certain contemporary writers appear to claim more for that form of -representative government, which we are in the habit of calling -'democracy,' than it is either safe to count on, or true to assert. In -their eyes democracy seems to possess a superiority in all the higher -virtuous qualities--'freedom,' in particular--and also an inherent -strength which--whatever may be the result of the present war--makes -the final predominance of British institutions only a matter of time.[6] - -I do not hold with either of these doctrines. Universal superiority in -virtue and strength is too wide a claim to put forward for any system -of government. And 'freedom' is a very hard thing to define. - -It is not merely that the form of constitution, which we call -'democracy,' is obviously not the best fitted for governing an -uncivilised or half-civilised people. There are considerations which -go much deeper than that--considerations of race, religion, -temperament, and tradition. As it has been in the past, so conceivably -it may be again in the future, that a people, which is in the highest -degree civilised and humane, will seek to realise its ideals of freedom -in some other sphere than the control of policy and legislation -according to the electoral verdicts of its {432} citizens. It is even -possible that its national aspirations may regard some other end as a -higher good even than freedom. We cannot speak with certainty as to -the whole human race, but only with regard to ourselves and certain -others, who have been bred in the same traditions. - -If a personal and autocratic government--the German for example--is -able to arouse and maintain among its people a more ardent loyalty, a -firmer confidence, a more constant spirit of self-sacrifice (in time of -peace as well as war), I can see no good reason for the hope, that -democracy, merely because, in our eyes, it approaches more nearly to -the ideal of the Christian Commonwealth, will be able to maintain -itself against the other. A highly centralised system of government -has great natural advantages both for attack and defence; and if in -addition it be supported by a more enduring fortitude, and a more -self-denying devotion, on the part of the people, it seems almost -incredible that, in the end, it will not prevail over other forms of -government which have failed to enlist the same support. - -The strength of all forms of government alike, whether against foreign -attack or internal disintegration, must depend in the long last upon -the spirit of the people; upon their determination to maintain their -own institutions; upon their willingness to undertake beforehand, as -well as during the excitement of war, those labours and sacrifices -which are necessary for security. The spirit is everything. And in -the end that spirit which is strongest is likely to become predominant, -and to impose its own forms, systems, and ideas upon civilised and -uncivilised nations alike. - -{433} - -A considerable part of the world--though it may have adopted patterns -of government which are either avowedly democratic or else are -monarchies of the constitutional sort (in essence the same)--is by no -means wedded to popular institutions; has no deep-rooted traditions to -give them support; could easily, therefore, and without much loss of -self-respect, abandon them and submit to follow new fashions. But with -the United Kingdom, the self-governing Dominions, and the United States -it is altogether different. - -To exchange voluntarily, merely because circumstances rendered it -expedient to do so, a system which is the only one consistent with our -notions of freedom would be an apostasy. It would mean our immediate -spiritual ruin, and for that reason also our ultimate material ruin. -On the other hand, to continue to exist on sufferance, without a voice -in the destinies of the world, would be an even deeper degradation. To -be conquered outright, and absorbed, would be an infinitely preferable -fate to either of these. - - -[Sidenote: NEED OF LEADERSHIP] - -The nations of the world have one need in common--Leadership. The -spirit of the people can do much, but it cannot do everything. In the -end that form of government is likely to prevail which produces the -best and most constant supply of leaders. On its own theories, -democracy of the modern type ought to out-distance all competitors; -under this system capacity, probity, and vigour should rise most easily -to the top. - -In practice, however, democracy has come under the thumb of the Party -System, and the Party System has reached a very high point of -efficiency. It has {434} bettered the example of the hugest mammoth -store in existence. It has elaborated machinery for crushing out -independent opinion and for cramping the characters of public men. In -commending its wares it has become as regardless of truth as a vendor -of quack medicines. It pursues corruption as an end, and it freely -uses corruption--both direct and indirect--as the means by which it may -attain its end. If the Party System continues to develop along its -present lines, it may ultimately prove as fatal to the principle of -democracy as the ivy which covers and strangles the elm-trees in our -hedgerows. - -Leadership is our greatest present need, and it is there that the Party -System has played us false. To manipulate its vast and intricate -machinery there arose a great demand for expert mechanicians, and these -have been evolved in a rich profusion. But in a crisis like the -present, mechanicians will not serve our purpose. The real need is a -Man, who by the example of his own courage, vigour, certainty, and -steadfastness will draw out the highest qualities of the people; whose -resolute sense of duty will brush opportunism aside; whose sympathy and -truthfulness will stir the heart and hold fast the conscience of the -nation. Leadership of this sort we have lacked. - -The Newcastle speech with its soft words and soothing optimism was not -leadership. It does not give confidence to a horse to know that he has -a rider on his back who is afraid of him. - -[Sidenote: NEED FOR FRANKNESS] - -It is idle at this stage to forecast the issue of the present war. -Nevertheless we seem at last to have begun to understand that there is -but a poor chance of winning it under rulers who are content to wait -and see if by some miracle the war will win itself; {435} or if by -another miracle our resources of men and material will organise -themselves. Since the battle of the Marne many sanguine expectations -of a speedy and victorious peace have fallen to the ground. The -constant burden of letters from soldiers at the front is that the -war--so far as England is concerned--is only just beginning. And yet, -in spite of all these disappointments and warnings, the predominant -opinion in official circles is still, apparently, as determined as ever -to wait and see _what the people will stand_, although it is -transparently clear what they ought to stand, and must stand, if they -are to remain a people. - -We cannot forecast with certainty the issue of the present war, but -hope nevertheless refuses to be bound. There is a false hope and a -true one. There may be consolation for certain minds, but there is no -safety for the nation, in the simple faith that democracy is in its -nature invincible. Democracy is by no means invincible. On the -contrary, it fights at a disadvantage, both by reason of its -inferiority in central control, and because it shrinks from -ruthlessness. Nevertheless we may believe as firmly as those who hold -this other opinion that in the end it will conquer. Before this can -happen it must find a leader who is worthy of its trust. - - -Since August 1914 we have learned many things from experience which we -previously refused to credit upon any human authority. We are not -altogether done with the past; for it contains lessons and -warnings--about men as well as things--which it would be wasteful to -forget. But our main concern is with the present. And we are also -treading very {436} close on the heels of the future, when--as we -trust--the resistance of our enemies will be beginning to flag; when -the war will be drawing to an end; afterwards through anxious years -(how many we cannot guess) when the war has ended, and when the object -of our policy will be to keep the peace which has been so dearly bought. - -Lord Roberts was right in his forecast of the danger; nor was he less -right in his perception of England's military weakness and general -unpreparedness for war. But was he also right as to the principle of -the remedy which he proposed? And even if he were right as things -stood when he uttered his warnings, is his former counsel still right -in our present circumstances, and as we look forward into the future? -Is it now necessary for us to accept in practice what has always been -admitted in the vague region of theory--that an obligation lies upon -every citizen, during the vigour of his age, to place his services, and -if need be his life, at the disposal of that state under whose shelter -he and all those who are most dear to him have lived? - -[Sidenote: THE PEOPLE WILL NOT FLINCH] - -There is always danger in treating a free people like children; in -humouring them, and coaxing them, and wheedling them with half-truths; -in asking for something less than is really needed, from fear that to -ask for the whole would alarm them too much; with the foolish hope that -when the first demand has been granted it will then be easy enough to -make them understand how much more is still necessary to complete the -fabric of security; that having deceived them once, it will be all the -easier to deceive them again. - -As we look back over our country's history we {437} find that it was -those men who told the people the whole truth--or what, at least, they -themselves honestly believed to be the whole truth--who most often -succeeded in carrying their proposals through. In these matters, which -touch the very life and soul of the nation, all artifice is out of -place. The power of persuasion lies in the truthfulness of the -advocate, no less than in the truth of his plea. If the would-be -reformer is only half sincere, if from timidity or regard for popular -opinion he chooses to tell but half his tale--selecting this, -suppressing that, postponing the other to a more propitious season--he -loses by his misplaced caution far more than half his strength. When -there is a case to be laid before the British People it is folly to do -it piecemeal, by astute stages of pleading, and with subtle -reservations. If the whole case can be put unflinchingly it is not the -People who will flinch. The issue may be left with safety to a -tribunal which has never yet failed in its duty, when rulers have had -the courage to say where its duty lay. - - - -[1] "A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the -combatants of the enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it -will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual and -material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims, such as the -protection of men and their goods, can only be taken into consideration -in so far as the nature and object of the war permit. - -"International Law is in no way opposed to the exploitation of the -crimes of third parties (assassination, incendiarism, robbery, and the -like) to the prejudice of the enemy.... The necessary aim of war gives -the belligerent the right and imposes on him the duty, according to -circumstances, the duty not to let slip the important, it may be the -decisive advantages to be gained by such means."--_The German War -Book_, issued by the Great General Staff. - -[2] Clearly, however, when it comes to the discussion of terms of -peace, not only the political question, but also the criminal question, -will have to be remembered. Oddly enough the 'pacifist' section, which -has already been clamorous for putting forward peace proposals, seems -very anxious that we should forget, or at any rate ignore, the criminal -question--odd, because 'humanity' is the stuff they have set up their -bills to trade in. - -[3] In reality, as regards party politics, we have been for years past -very like those shouting, cigarette-smoking, Saturday crowds at -football matches whom we have lately been engaged in reproving so -virtuously. - -[4] Certainly up to April 1915 it was not an uncommon belief. - -[5] Mr. Lloyd George, _Pearson's Magazine_, March 1915. - -[6] These views are very prevalent among Liberal writers, and they are -clearly implied, if not quite so openly expressed, by Conservatives. -They seem to be assumed in one of the ablest articles which has yet -been written upon the causes of the present war--'The Schism of Europe' -(_Round Table_, March 1915). - - - -THE END - - - -_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_. - - - - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Ordeal by Battle, by Frederick Scott Oliver - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ORDEAL BY BATTLE *** - -***** This file should be named 54776-8.txt or 54776-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/7/7/54776/ - -Produced by Al Haines -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Ordeal by Battle - -Author: Frederick Scott Oliver - -Release Date: May 24, 2017 [EBook #54776] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ORDEAL BY BATTLE *** - - - - -Produced by Al Haines - - - - - -</pre> - - -<h1> -<br /><br /> - ORDEAL BY BATTLE<br /> -</h1> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - BY<br /> -</p> - -<p class="t2b"> - FREDERICK SCOTT OLIVER<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="intro"> -With that they looked upon him, and began to reply -in this sort: SIMPLE said, <i>I see no danger</i>; SLOTH said, -<i>Yet a little more sleep</i>; and PRESUMPTION said, <i>Every Vat -must stand upon his own bottom</i>. And so they lay down -to sleep again, and CHRISTIAN went on his way. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -<i>The Pilgrim's Progress</i>. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED<br /> - ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON<br /> - 1915<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> -COPYRIGHT -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - TO<br /> - THE MEMORY OF<br /> -<br /> - HUGH DAWNAY<br /> -<br /> - COMMANDING THE 2ND LIFE GUARDS<br /> - WHO WAS KILLED AT ZWARTELEEN ON THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER 1914<br /> - AND OF<br /> -<br /> - JOHN GOUGH, V.C.<br /> -<br /> - CHIEF OF THE STAFF OF THE FIRST ARMY<br /> - WHO FELL NEAR ESTAIRES ON THE 20TH OF FEBRUARY 1915<br /> -<br /> - THEY WERE BROTHER-OFFICERS OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE<br /> - AND THOSE WHO KNEW THEM BOTH<br /> - WILL ALWAYS THINK OF THEM TOGETHER<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <i>Works by the Same Author</i><br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - ALEXANDER HAMILTON (An Essay on American Union).<br /> - LIBRARY EDITION. Messrs. CONSTABLE & Co., London.<br /> - LIBRARY EDITION. Messrs. G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York.<br /> - POPULAR EDITION. Messrs. THOS. NELSON & SONS.<br /> -<br /> - FEDERALISM AND HOME RULE (Letters of Pacificus).<br /> -<br /> - THE ALTERNATIVES TO CIVIL WAR.<br /> -<br /> - WHAT FEDERALISM IS NOT.<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - MR. JOHN MURRAY, LONDON.<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED<br /> - LONDON * BOMBAY * CALCUTTA<br /> - MELBOURNE<br /> -<br /> - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY<br /> - NEW YORK * BOSTON * CHICAGO<br /> - DALLAS * SAN FRANCISCO<br /> -<br /> - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.<br /> - TORONTO<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap00b"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pix"></a>ix}</span></p> - -<h3> -PREFACE -</h3> - -<p> -It is hardly necessary to plead, in extenuation of -those many faults which any impartial reader will -discover in the following pages, the impossibility of -discussing events which are unfolding themselves -around us, in the same detached spirit as if we were -dealing with past history. The greater part of this -volume has been written in haste, and no one is more -alive to its shortcomings than the author himself. -</p> - -<p> -Faults of style are a small matter, and will be -easily forgiven. It has not been the aim to produce -a work of literary merit, but solely to present a -certain view of public affairs. It is to be hoped -that actual errors of fact are rare. Inconsistencies -however—or apparent inconsistencies—cannot be -altogether avoided, even by careful revision. But -the greatest difficulty of all is to keep a true sense -of proportion. -</p> - -<p> -In Part I.—<i>The Causes of War</i>—an attempt has -been made to state, very briefly, why it has hitherto -proved impossible to eliminate the appeal to arms -from human affairs; to set out the main incidents -which occurred at the opening of the present European -struggle; to explain the immediate occasions, as -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Px"></a>x}</span> -well as the more permanent and deep-seated causes, -of this conflict; to consider some of the most glaring -miscalculations which have arisen out of -misunderstanding between nations. -</p> - -<p> -In Part II.—<i>The Spirit of German Policy</i>—an -attempt has been made to understand the ambitions -of our chief antagonist, and to trace the manner in -which these ambitions have been fostered, forced, -and corrupted by a priesthood of learned men. The -relations which exist between this Pedantocracy -and the Bureaucracy, the Army, the Rulers, and the -People of Germany have been examined. It would -appear that under an academic stimulus, healthy -national ambitions have become morbid, have -resulted in the discovery of imaginary grievances, and -have led the Governing Classes of Germany to adopt -a new code of morals which, if universally adhered -to, would make an end of human society. On the -other hand, it would also appear that the German -People have accepted the policy of their rulers, -without in any way accepting, or even understanding, -the morality upon which this policy is founded. It -is also important for us to realise the nature of the -judgment—not altogether unjustified—which our -enemies have passed upon the British character, -and upon our policy and institutions. -</p> - -<p> -In Part III.—<i>The Spirit of British Policy</i>—our -own political course since the beginning of the century -has been considered—the difficulties arising out of -the competition for priority between aims which are -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxi"></a>xi}</span> -not in themselves antagonistic: between Social -Reform, Constitutional Reform, and Imperial -Defence—the confusion which has resulted from the -inadequacy of one small parliament, elected upon a -large variety of cross issues, for dealing with these -diverse needs—the lowering of the tone of public -life, the depreciation in the character of public men, -which have come about owing to these two causes, -and also to a third—the steadily increasing tyranny -and corruption of the party machines. -</p> - -<p> -The aim of British Foreign Policy has been -simply—Security. Yet we have failed to achieve Security, -owing to our blindness, indolence, and lack of -leadership. We have refused to realise that we were not -living in the Golden Age; that Policy at the last -resort depends on Armaments; that Armaments, -to be effective for their purpose, must correspond -with Policy. Political leaders of all parties up to -the outbreak of the present war ignored these -essentials; or if they were aware of them, in the -recesses of their own consciousness, they failed to -trust the People with a full knowledge of the dangers -which threatened their Security, and of the means -by which alone these dangers could be withstood. -</p> - -<p> -The titles of Parts II. and III. are similar—<i>The -Spirit of German Policy</i> and <i>The Spirit of British -Policy</i>; but although the titles are similar the treatment -is not the same. Confession of a certain failure -in proportion must be made frankly. The two -pieces do not balance. German Policy is viewed -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxii"></a>xii}</span> -from without, at a remote distance, and by an enemy. -It is easier in this case to present a picture which is -clear, than one which is true. British Policy, on the -of other hand, is viewed from within. If likewise it -is tinged with prejudice, the prejudice is of a different -character. Both Parts, I fear, diverge to a greater -or less extent from the main purpose of the book. -Mere excision is easy; but compression is a difficult -and lengthy process, and I have not been able to -carry it so far as I could have wished. -</p> - -<p> -In Part IV.—<i>Democracy and National Service</i>—an -attempt has been made to deal with a problem -which faces us at the moment. Democracy is not -unlike other human institutions: it will not stand -merely by its own virtue. If it lacks the loyalty, -courage, and strength to defend itself when attacked, -it must perish as certainly as if it possessed no virtue -whatsoever. Manhood suffrage implies manhood -service. Without the acceptance of this principle -Democracy is merely an imposture. -</p> - -<p> -I prefer 'National Service' to 'Conscription,' -not because I shrink from the word 'Conscription,' -but because 'National Service' has a wider sweep. -The greater includes the less. It is not only military -duties which the State is entitled to command its -citizens to perform unquestioningly in times of -danger; but also civil duties. It is not only men -between the ages of twenty and thirty-eight to whom -the State should have the right to give orders; but -men and women of all ages. Under conditions of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxiii"></a>xiii}</span> -modern warfare it is not only armies which need to -be disciplined; but whole nations. The undisciplined -nation, engaged in anything like an equal contest -with a disciplined nation, will be defeated. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> -The Coalition Government -</p> - -<p> -This volume was in type before the Coalition -Government was formed; but there is nothing in it -which I wish to change in view of that event. This -book was not undertaken with the object of helping -the Unionists back into power, or of getting the -Liberals out of power. -</p> - -<p> -The new Cabinet contains those members of the -late one in whom the country has most confidence. -Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, -and Mr. Churchill have all made mistakes. In a -great crisis it is the bigger characters who are most -liable to make mistakes. Their superiority impels -them to take risks which the smaller men, playing -always for safety, are concerned to avoid. -</p> - -<p> -The present Ministry also contains representatives -of that class of politicians which, according to the -view set forth in the following pages, is primarily -responsible for our present troubles. Lawyer-statesmanship, -which failed to foresee the war, to prepare -against it, and to conduct it with energy and -thoroughness when it occurred, still occupies a large -share of authority. Possibly ministers of this school -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxiv"></a>xiv}</span> -will now walk in new ways. In any case, they are -no longer in a position of dangerous predominance. -</p> - -<p> -The Coalition Government, having wisely refused -to part with any of those men who rose to the -emergency, and having received an infusion of new -blood (which may be expected to bring an accession -of vigour) starts upon its career with the goodwill -and confidence of the People. -</p> - -<p> -What has happened, however, is a revolution -upon an unprecedented scale—one which is likely to -have vast consequences in the future. The country -realises this fact, and accepts it as a matter of -course—accepts it indeed with a sigh of relief. But in -other quarters, what has just happened is hardly -realised at all—still less what it is likely to lead to -in the future. -</p> - -<p> -During the 'Cabinet Crisis' one read a good deal -of stuff in the newspapers, and heard still more by -word of mouth, which showed how far, during the -past nine months, public opinion has moved away -from the professionals of politics; how little account -it takes of them; also how much these gentlemen -themselves mistake the meaning of the present -situation. -</p> - -<p> -In political circles one has heard, and read, very -frequently of late, expressions of regret—on the one -hand that Unionists should have come to the assistance -of a discredited and bankrupt administration—on -the other hand that a government, secure in the -confidence of the country, should, through a mistaken -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxv"></a>xv}</span> -sense of generosity, have admitted its opponents -to a share in the glory and prestige of office. One -has read, and heard, cavillings at the idea of -appointing this, or that, public character to this, or that, -office, as a thing beyond what this, or that, party -'could fairly be expected to stand.' Reports have -appeared of meetings of 'a hundred' perturbed -Liberals; and very possibly meetings, though -unreported, of equally perturbed Unionists have also -been held. An idea seems still to be prevalent in -certain quarters, that what has just occurred is -nothing more important than an awkward and -temporary disarrangement of the party game; and -that this game will be resumed, with all the old -patriotism and good feeling, so soon as war is ended. -But this appears to be a mistaken view. You -cannot make a great mix-up of this sort without -calling new parties into existence. When men are -thrown into the crucible of a war such as this, the -true ore will tend to run together, the dross to cake -upon the surface. No matter to what parties they -may have originally owed allegiance, the men who -are in earnest, and who see realities, cannot help but -come together. May be for several generations the -annual festivals of the National Liberal Federation -and the Union of Conservative Associations will -continue to be held, like other picturesque survivals -of ancient customs. When Henry VII. was crowned -at Westminster, the Wars of the Roses ended; the old -factions of York and Lancaster were dissolved, and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxvi"></a>xvi}</span> -made way for new associations. Something of the -same sort has surely happened during the past -month—Liberal and Conservative, Radical and Tory -have ceased for the present to be real divisions. They -had recently become highly artificial and confusing; -now they are gone—it is to be hoped for ever. -</p> - -<p> -Will the generation which is fighting this war—such -of them as may survive—be content to go back -to the old barren wrangle when it is done? Will -those others who have lost husbands, sons, brothers, -friends—all that was dearest to them except the -honour and safety of their country—will they be -found willing to tolerate the idea of trusting their -destinies ever again to the same machines, to be driven -once more to disaster by the same automatons? -To all except the automatons themselves—who share -with the German Supermen the credit of having made -this war—any such resumption of business on -old-established lines appears incredible. There is -something pathetic in the sight of these huckstering -sentimentalists still crying their stale wares and -ancient make-believes at the street corners, while -their country is fighting for its life. They remind -one, not a little, of those Pardoners of the fourteenth -century who, as we read in history books, continued -to hawk their <i>Indulgences</i> with unabated industry -during the days of the <i>Black Death</i>. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxvii"></a>xvii}</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is necessary to offer a few words of explanation -as to how this book came to be written. During -the months of November and December 1912 and -January 1913, various meetings and discussions took -place under Lord Roberts's roof and elsewhere, between -a small number of persons, who held widely different -views, and whose previous experience and training -had been as different as were their opinions. -</p> - -<p> -Our efforts were concerned with endeavouring -to find answers to several questions which had never -been dealt with candidly, clearly, and comprehensively -in the public statements of political leaders. It -was clear that there was no 'national' policy, which -the British people had grasped, accepted, and -countersigned, as was the case in France. But some kind -of British policy there must surely be, notwithstanding -the fact it had never been disclosed. What -were the aims of this policy? With what nation or -nations were these aims likely to bring us into -collision? What armaments were necessary in order -to enable us to uphold this policy and achieve these -aims? How, and when, and where would our -armaments be required in the event of war? -Assuming (as we did in our discussions) that our naval -forces were adequate, was the same statement true -of our military forces? And if it were not true, -by what means could the necessary increases be -obtained? -</p> - -<p> -The final conclusion at which we arrived was -that National Service was essential to security. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxviii"></a>xviii}</span> -Under whatever aspect we regarded the problem we -always returned—even those of us who were most -unwilling to travel in that direction—to the same -result. So long as Britain relied solely upon the -voluntary principle, we should never possess either -the Expeditionary Force or the Army for Home -Defence which were requisite for safety. -</p> - -<p> -It fell to me during the winter 1912-1913 to draft -the summary of our conclusions. It was afterwards -decided—in the spring of 1913—that this private -Memorandum should be recast in a popular form -suitable for publication. I was asked to undertake -this, and agreed to do so. But I underestimated -both the difficulties of the task and the time which -would be necessary for overcoming them. -</p> - -<p> -When we met again, in the autumn of that year, -the work was still far from complete, and by that -time, not only public attention, but our own, had -become engrossed in other matters. The Irish -controversy had entered upon a most acute and -dangerous stage. Lord Roberts put off the meetings -which he had arranged to address during the ensuing -months upon National Service, and threw his whole -energies into the endeavour to avert the schism -which threatened the nation, and to find a way to -a peaceful settlement. Next to the security and -integrity of the British Empire I verily believe that -the thing which lay nearest his heart was the happiness -and unity of Ireland. -</p> - -<p> -It is needless to recall how, during the ensuing -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxix"></a>xix}</span> -months, affairs in Ireland continued to march from -bad to worse—up to the very day when the menace -of the present war suddenly arose before the eyes of -Europe. -</p> - -<p> -During August 1914 I went through the old drafts -and memoranda which had now been laid aside for -nearly a year. Although that very thing had -happened which it had been the object of our efforts -to avert, it seemed to me that there might be -advantages in publishing some portion of our conclusions. -The form, of course, would have to be entirely -different; for the recital of prophecies which had -come true, though it might have possessed a certain -interest for the prophets themselves, could have but -little for the public. -</p> - -<p> -Early in September I consulted Lord Roberts, -and also such of my friends, who had originally worked -with me, as were still within reach. Finding that -their opinion agreed with my own upon the desirability -of publication, I laid out a fresh scheme, and -set to for a third time at the old task. But as the -work grew, it became clear that it would contain but -little of the former Memorandum, and much which -the former Memorandum had never contemplated. -So many of our original conclusions, laboriously -hammered out to convince the public in the spring -of the year 1913, had become by the autumn of 1914, -the most trite of commonplaces. And as for the -practical scheme which we had evolved—endeavouring -to keep our demands at the most modest -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxx"></a>xx}</span> -minimum—it was interesting chiefly by reason of its triviality -when contrasted with the scale of warlike preparations -upon which the Government was now engaged. -Practically, therefore, the whole of the present -volume is new—not merely redrafted, but for the -most part new in substance. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> -The author's acknowledgements. -</p> - -<p> -I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the -friends with whom I have studied the problems of -policy and defence for some years past. The -responsibility for the contents and publication of the -present volume is mine alone; but I have used their -ideas without hesitation, and have drawn largely -upon the notes and memoranda which they drafted -for my assistance. I wish also to thank several -others—one in chief—for the kindness with which, -upon the present occasion, they have given me help -and criticism as these pages were passing through -the press. -</p> - -<p> -There is also another source to which I wish here -gratefully to confess my obligations. During the -past five years there have appeared in <i>The Round -Table</i> certain articles upon the relations of England -with Germany[<a id="chap00bfn1text"></a><a href="#chap00bfn1">1</a>] which have been characterised by -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxi"></a>xxi}</span> -a remarkable degree of prescience and sanity. At -a certain point, however, there is a difference between -the views expressed in <i>The Round Table</i> and those -expressed in the following pages—a difference of -stress and emphasis perhaps, rather than of fundamental -opinion, but still a difference of some importance. -I have dealt with this in the concluding -chapter. -</p> - -<p> -I should like to make one other acknowledgment -of a different kind. I have known the editor of <i>The -National Review</i> from a date long before he assumed -his onerous office—from days when we were -freshmen together by the banks of the Cam. During a -period of upwards of thirty years, I cannot remember -that I have ever had the good fortune to see absolutely -eye to eye with Mr. Maxse upon any public question. -Even now I do not see eye to eye with him. In all -probability I never shall. At times his views have -been in sharp opposition to my own. But for these -very reasons—if he will not resent it as an -impertinence—I should like to say here how greatly I -respect him for three qualities, which have been none -too common among public men in recent times—first, -for the clearness with which he grasps and -states his beliefs; secondly, for the courageous -constancy with which he holds to them through -good and evil report; thirdly, for the undeviating -integrity of his public career. Next to Lord Roberts, -he did more perhaps than any other—though -unavailingly—to arouse public opinion to the dangers -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxii"></a>xxii}</span> -which menaced it from German aggression, to call -attention to the national unpreparedness, and to -denounce the blindness and indolence which treated -warnings with derision. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> -Lord Roberts. -</p> - -<p> -Lord Roberts's responsibility for the contents -of this volume, as for its publication at the present -time, is nil. And yet it would never have been -undertaken in the first instance except at his wish, -nor re-undertaken in September last without his -encouragement. There are probably a good many -besides myself who owe it to his inspiration, that -they first made a serious attempt to study policy -and defence as two aspects of a single problem. I -also owe to him many things besides this. -</p> - -<p> -The circumstances of Lord Roberts's death were -befitting his character and career. The first great -battle of Ypres was ended. The British line had held -its own against tremendous odds of men and guns. He -had no doubt of the ultimate result of the war, and -during his visit to France and Flanders inspired all -who saw him by the quiet confidence of his words and -manner. After the funeral service at Headquarters a -friend of his and mine wrote to me describing the scene. -The religious ceremony had taken place in the entrance -hall of the Maine at St. Omer. It was a day of -storms; but as the coffin was borne out "the sun -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxiii"></a>xxiii}</span> -appeared, and made a magnificent rainbow on a -great black block of cloud across the square; and -an airman flew across from the rainbow into the -sunlight." -</p> - -<p> -If I were asked to name Lord Roberts's highest -intellectual quality I should say unhesitatingly that -it was his instinct. And if I were asked to name -his highest moral quality I should say, also -unhesitatingly, that it was the unshakeable -confidence with which he trusted his instinct. But the -firmness of his trust was not due in the least to -self-conceit, or arrogance, or obstinacy. He obeyed his -instinct as he obeyed his conscience—humbly and -devoutly. The dictates of both proceeded from the -same source. It was not his own cleverness which -led him to his conclusions, but the hand of Providence -which drew aside a veil, and enabled him to see the -truth. What gave him his great strength in counsel, -as in the field, was the simple modesty of his -confidence. -</p> - -<p> -He was a poor arguer; I think argument was -painful to him; also that he regarded it as a sad -waste of the short span of human life. It was not -difficult to out-argue him. Plausible and -perspicacious persons often left him, after an -interview, under the firm impression that they had -convinced him. But as a rule, he returned on the -morrow to his old opinion, unless his would-be -converters had brought to his notice new facts as -well as new arguments. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxiv"></a>xxiv}</span> -</p> - -<p> -He arrived at an opinion neither hastily nor slowly, -but at a moderate pace. He had the gift of stating -his conclusion with admirable lucidity; and if he -thought it desirable, he gave the reasons for his view -of the matter with an equal clearness. But his -reasons, like his conclusion, were in the nature of -statements; they were not stages in an argument. -There are as many unanswerable reasons to be given -for as against most human decisions. Ingenuity and -eloquence are a curse at councils of war, and state, -and business. Indeed, wherever action of any kind -has to be determined upon they are a curse. It was -Lord Roberts's special gift that, out of the medley of -unanswerable reasons, he had an instinct for selecting -those which really mattered, and keeping his -mind close shut against the rest. -</p> - -<p> -It is superfluous to speak of his courtesy of manner -and kindness of heart, or of his unflagging devotion—up -till the very day of his death—to what he regarded -as his duty. There is a passage in Urquhart's -translation of <i>Rabelais</i> which always recalls him to my -mind:—<i>He was the best little great good man that ever -girded a sword on his side; he took all things in good -part, and interpreted every action in the best sense</i>. -In a leading German newspaper there appeared, -a few days after his death, the following reference -to that event:—"It was not given to Lord Roberts -to see the realisation of his dreams of National -Service; but the blows struck on the Aisne -were hammer-strokes which might after a long -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxv"></a>xxv}</span> -time and bitter need produce it. Lord Roberts -was an honourable and, through his renown, a -dangerous enemy ... personally an extraordinarily -brave enemy. Before such a man we lower our -swords, to raise them again for new blows dealt -with the joy of conflict." -</p> - -<p> -Nor was this the only allusion of the kind which -figured in German newspapers 'to the journey of -an old warrior to Walhalla,' with his final mission -yet unaccomplished, but destined to be sooner or -later accomplished, if his country was to survive. -In none of these references, so far as I have been -able to discover, was there the least trace of malice -against the man who had warned his fellow-countrymen, -more clearly than any other, against -the premeditated aggression of Germany. This -seems very strange when we recollect how, for -nearly two years previously, a large section of the -British nation had been engaged in denouncing -Lord Roberts for the outrageous provocations which -he was alleged to have offered to Germany—in -apologising to Germany for his utterances—in -suggesting the propriety of depriving him of his -pension in the interests of Anglo-German amity. -What this section has itself earned in the matter of -German gratitude we know from many hymns and -other effusions of hate. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxvi"></a>xxvi}</span> -</p> - -<p class="t3b"> -Hugh Dawnay and John Gough. -</p> - -<p> -I have dedicated this volume to the memory of -John Gough and Hugh Dawnay, not solely on grounds -of friendship, but also because from both I received, -at different times, much help, advice, and -criticism—from the latter when the original Memorandum -was in course of being drafted—from both when it -was being reconsidered with a view to publication. -Whether either of them would agree with the statement -in its present form is more than I can venture -to say, and I have no intention of claiming their -authority for conclusions which were never seen by -them in final shape. -</p> - -<p> -In the first instance (November 1912-March 1913) -Dawnay[<a id="chap00bfn2text"></a><a href="#chap00bfn2">2</a>] and I worked together. His original notes -and memoranda are to a large extent incorporated -in Parts III. and IV.—so closely, however, that -I cannot now disentangle his from my own. The -calculations as to numbers and probable distribution -of the opposing forces, were almost entirely his. I -have merely endeavoured here—not so successfully -as I could wish—to bring them up to the date of the -outbreak of war. -</p> - -<p> -Dawnay took out his squadron of the 2nd Life -Guards to France early in August. Already, however, -he had been appointed to the Headquarters General -Staff, on which he served with distinction, until -early in October, when he succeeded to the command -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxvii"></a>xxvii}</span> -of his regiment. He fell at Zwarteleen near Ypres -on the 6th of November 1914—one of the most -anxious days during the four weeks' battle. -</p> - -<p> -His friends have mourned his death, but none -of them have grudged it; for he died, not merely -as a brave man should—in the performance of his -duty—but after having achieved, with consummate -skill and daring, his part in an action of great -importance. On the afternoon of this day General -Kavanagh's Brigade of Household Cavalry[<a id="chap00bfn3text"></a><a href="#chap00bfn3">3</a>]—summoned -in haste—dismounted, and threw back a -German attack which had partially succeeded in -piercing the allied line at the point of junction between -the French and English forces. This successful -counter-attack saved the right flank of Lord Cavan's -Guards' Brigade from a position of extreme danger, -which must otherwise, almost certainly, have resulted -in a perilous retreat. The whole of this Homeric -story is well worth telling, and some day it may be -told; but this is not the place. -</p> - -<p> -Dawnay was fortunate inasmuch as he lost his -life, not as so many brave men have done in this -war—and in all others—by a random bullet, or as the -result of somebody's blunder, or in an attempt which -failed. On the contrary he played a distinguished, -and possibly a determining part, in an action which -succeeded, and the results of which were fruitful. -</p> - -<p> -He was not merely a brave and skilful soldier -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxviii"></a>xxviii}</span> -when it came to push of pike, but a devoted student -of his profession in times of peace. The mixture -of eagerness and patience with which he went about -his work reminded one, not a little, of that same -combination of qualities as it is met with sometimes -among men of science. -</p> - -<p> -Hunting accidents, the privations of Ladysmith -followed by enteric, divers fevers contracted in -hot climates, and the severity of a campaign in -Somaliland, had severely tried his constitution—which -although vigorous and athletic was never robust—and -had increased a tendency to headaches and -neuralgia to which he had been subject ever since -boyhood. Yet he treated pain always as a despicable -enemy, and went about his daily business as -indefatigably when he was in suffering, as when he was -entirely free from it, which in later years was but rarely. -</p> - -<p> -Dawnay had a very quick brain, and held his -views most positively. It was sometimes said of him -that he did not suffer fools gladly, and this was true -up to a point. He was singularly intolerant of -presumptuous fools, who laid down the law about -matters of which they were wholly ignorant, or -who—having acquired a smattering of second-hand -knowledge—proceeded to put their ingenious and sophistical -theories into practice. But for people of much -slower wits than himself—if they were trying honestly -to arrive at the truth—he was usually full of -sympathy. His tact and patience upon great occasions -were two of his noblest qualities. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxix"></a>xxix}</span> -</p> - -<p> -In some ways he used to remind me, not a little, -of Colonel Henry Esmond of Castlewood, Virginia. -In both there was the same hard core of resistance -against anything, which appeared to challenge certain -adamantine principles concerning conduct befitting -a gentleman. On such matters he was exceedingly -stiff and unyielding. And he resembled the friend -of Lord Bolingbroke, and General Webb, and Dick -Steele also in this, that he was addicted to the figure -of irony when crossed in discussion. One imagines, -however, that Colonel Esmond must have kept his -countenance better, and remained imperturbably -grave until his shafts had all gone home. In -Dawnay's case the sight of his opponent's lengthening -face was, as a rule, too much for his sense of humour, -and the attack was apt to lose some of its force—certainly -all its fierceness—in a smile which reminded -one of Carlyle's description—'sunlight on the sea.' -</p> - -<p> -The following extract from a letter written by -one of his friends who had attended the War Service -at St. Paul's gives a true picture: "A sudden vision -arose in my imagination of Hugh Dawnay striding -down the choir, in full armour, like St. Michael—with -his head thrown back, and that extraordinary -expression of resolution which he always seemed to -me to possess more than any one I have ever seen. -His wide-apart eyes had more of the spirit of truth -in them than almost any—also an intolerance of -falsehood—or rather perhaps a disbelief in its -existence...." This is true. He was one of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxx"></a>xxx}</span> -that race of men whose recumbent figures are seen -in our old churches and cathedrals, with hands -clasping crusaders' swords against their breasts, -their hounds couching at their feet. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -In physique and temperament Hugh Dawnay -and John Gough[<a id="chap00bfn4text"></a><a href="#chap00bfn4">4</a>] were in most respects as unlike a -pair of friends as ever walked this earth; but we -might have searched far before we could have found -two minds which, on most matters connected with -their profession, were in more perfect accord. Dawnay, -younger by four years, had served under Gough in -trying times, and regarded him (an opinion which -is very widely shared by seniors as well as juniors) -as one of the finest soldiers of his age. Though -Dawnay was slender and of great height, while -Gough was rather below the middle stature, broad -and firmly knit, there was one striking point of -physical resemblance between them, in the way their -heads were set upon their shoulders. There was -something in the carriage of both which seemed to -take it for granted that they would be followed -wherever they might chose to lead. In Lord Roberts, -and also in a strikingly different -character—Mr. Chamberlain—there was the same poise, the same -stable equilibrium, without a trace in it of -self-consciousness or constraint. It may be that the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxxi"></a>xxxi}</span> -habit of command induces this bearing in a man; -or it may be that there is something in the nature of -the man who bears himself thus which forces him -to become a leader. -</p> - -<p> -Gough took no part in the preparation of the -original Memorandum; but in March 1913 he -discussed it with me[<a id="chap00bfn5text"></a><a href="#chap00bfn5">5</a>] and made various criticisms -and suggestions, most of which have been incorporated -here. His chief concern with regard to all proposals -for a National Army was, that the period of training -should be sufficient to allow time for turning the -average man into a soldier who had full confidence -in himself. "When war breaks out"—I can hear his -words—"it's not recruits we want: it's soldiers we -want: that is, if our object is to win the war as -speedily as possible, and to lose as few lives as -possible." Under normal peace conditions he put -this period at a minimum of two years for infantry; -but of course he would have admitted—and did, -in fact, admit when I saw him last December—that -under the stress and excitement of war the term might -be considerably shortened. -</p> - -<p> -His chief concern in 1913 was with regard to -shortage of officers. He criticised with great severity -the various recent attempts at reforming our military -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxxii"></a>xxxii}</span> -system, not only on the ground that we had chosen -to rely upon training our national forces after war -had actually broken out (in his view a most disastrous -decision); but also because we had not taken care -to provide ourselves against the very emergency -which was contemplated, by having a reserve of -officers competent to undertake the training of the -new army in case of need. -</p> - -<p> -I went to see him at Aldershot on the Friday -before war was declared, and found, as I expected, -that he regarded it as inevitable. He had undergone -a very severe operation in the early summer, and was -still quite unfit to stand the strain of hard exercise. -It had been arranged that we were to go together, -a few days later, to Sweden, for six weeks' shooting -and fishing in the mountains. He was very anxious -to return to England for the September manoeuvres. -His surgeon,[<a id="chap00bfn6text"></a><a href="#chap00bfn6">6</a>] however, forbade this, on the ground -that even by that time he would not be fit to sit -for a whole day in the saddle. -</p> - -<p> -He was in two moods on this occasion. He was as -light-hearted as a boy who is unexpectedly released -from school; the reason being that the Army Medical -Officer had that morning passed him as physically fit -to go abroad with Sir Douglas Haig, to whom he had -acted as Senior Staff Officer since the previous autumn. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxxiii"></a>xxxiii}</span> -</p> - -<p> -His other mood was very different. The war -which he had foreseen and dreaded, the war which -in his view might have been avoided upon one -condition, and one only—if England had been -prepared—had come at last. I don't think I have ever known -any one—certainly never any anti-militarist—whose -hatred and horror of war gave the same impression -of intensity and reality as his. Not metaphorically, -but as a bare fact, his feelings with regard to it were -too deep for words; he would suddenly break off -speaking about things which had occurred in his -own experience; in particular, about loss of friends -and comrades. He was an Irishman, and had not -the impassive coldness of some of the great soldiers. -But most of all he hated war when it was not -inevitable—when with foresight and courage it might -have been averted—as in his opinion this war might -have been. -</p> - -<p> -In radium there is said to be a virtue which -enables it to affect adjacent objects with its own -properties, and to turn them, for a time, and for -certain purposes, into things of the same nature -as itself. Certain rare human characters possess a -similar virtue; but although I have met with several -of these in my life, there is none of them all who -seemed to me to possess this quality in quite so high -a degree as Gough. He was an alchemist who made -fine soldiers out of all sorts and conditions of men, -and whose spirit turned despondency out of doors. -</p> - -<p> -The clearness of his instinct and the power of his -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxxiv"></a>xxxiv}</span> -mind were not more remarkable than his swiftness -of decision and indomitable will. There are -scores—probably hundreds—of young officers who fought -by his side, or under him, at Ypres and elsewhere, -who years hence, when they are themselves -distinguished—perhaps great and famous—and come, -in the evening of their days, to reckon up and -consider the influences which have shaped their careers, -will place his influence first. And there are boys -looking forward to the day when they shall be old -enough to serve in the King's Army, chiefly from -the love and honour in which they held this hero, -with his winning smile and superb self-confidence. -</p> - -<p> -He has left behind him a tradition, if ever man -did. You will find it everywhere, among young and -old—among all with whom he ever came into touch. -Nor is the tradition which he has left merely among -soldiers and with regard to the art of war, but also -in other spheres of private conduct and public life. -He had strong prejudices as well as affections, which -made him sometimes judge men unfairly, also on -the other hand too favourably; but he banished -all meanness from his neighbourhood, all thoughts -of self-interest and personal advancement. Duty, -discipline, self-discipline, and the joy of life—these -were the rules he walked by; and if you found -yourself in his company you had perforce to walk with -him, keeping up with his stride as best you could. -</p> - -<p> -We value our friends for different qualities, and -would have their tradition fulfil itself in different -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="Pxxxv"></a>xxxv}</span> -ways. Those of us who counted these two—'Johnnie' -Gough and Hugh Dawnay—among our friends will -wish that our sons may be like them, and follow -in their footsteps. -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> -F.S.O. -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> -CHECKENDON COURT, OXFORDSHIRE,<br /> -1st June 1915. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap00bfn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap00bfn1text">1</a>] <i>The Round Table</i> (quarterly Review). -Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Of the -articles referred to the chief are: -'Anglo-German Rivalry' (November -1910); 'Britain, France, and Germany' (December 1911); -'The Balkan -War and the Balance of Power' (June 1913); -'Germany and the Prussian -Spirit' (September 1914); -'The Schism of Europe' (March 1915). It is -to be hoped that these and some others may -be republished before long in -more permanent form. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap00bfn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap00bfn2text">2</a>] Major the Hon. Hugh Dawnay, D.S.O., <i>b.</i> 1875; -educated Eton and -Sandhurst; Rifle Brigade, 1895; Nile Campaign -and Omdurman, 1898; -South Africa, 1899-1900; Somaliland, 1908-1910; -2nd Life Guards, 1912; -France, August-November 1914. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap00bfn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap00bfn3text">3</a>] This Brigade was known during the battle -of Ypres as 'the Fire -Brigade,' for the reason that it was -constantly being called up on a sudden -to extinguish unforeseen conflagrations. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap00bfn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap00bfn4text">4</a>] Brigadier-General John Edmund Gough, -V.C., C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C. to -the King; <i>b.</i> 1871; educated Eton and -Sandhurst; Rifle Brigade, 1892; -British Central Africa, 1896-1897; -Nile Campaign and Omdurman, 1898; -South Africa, 1899-1902; Somaliland, -1902-1903 and 1908-1909; France, -August 1914-February 1915. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap00bfn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap00bfn5text">5</a>] At St. Jean de Luz, when he was endeavouring, -though not very -successfully, to shake off the after-effects -of his last Somaliland campaign. -He was then engaged in correcting the proofs -of the volume of his Staff -College lectures which was subsequently published -under the title <i>Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville</i> (Rees)—a -most vivid and convincing narrative. -In the intervals of work and golf he spent much -of his time in visiting -Wellington's adjacent battlefields -and studying his passage of the Bidassoa -and forcing of the Pyrenees. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap00bfn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap00bfn6text">6</a>] Gough's many friends will ever feel a -double debt of gratitude to that -distinguished surgeon, Sir Berkeley Moynihan, -who by this operation -restored him, after several years of ill-health -and suffering, almost to -complete health; and who once again—when -by a strange coincidence of -war he found his former patient lying -in the hospital at Estaires the day -after he was brought in wounded—came -to his aid, and all but achieved -the miracle of saving his life. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap00c"></a></p> - -<p class="t2"> - ORDEAL BY BATTLE -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> -PART I -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <a href="#chap0100">THE CAUSES OF WAR</a><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - PART II<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <a href="#chap0200">THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY</a><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - PART III<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <a href="#chap0300">THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY</a><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - PART IV<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <a href="#chap0400">DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE</a><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - TABLE OF CONTENTS<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - <a href="#chap0100">PART I</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3b"> - THE CAUSES OF WAR<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0101">CHAPTER I</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - PEACE AND WAR<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1"> </span><span class="content2">PAGE</span><br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Peace is the greatest of British interests </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P3">3</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Peaceful intentions will not ensure peace </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P4">4</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Futility of Pacifism </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P6">6</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Causes of wars in general </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P8">8</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Causes of the American Civil War </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P10">10</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Influence of ideas of duty and self-sacrifice </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P11">11</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0102">CHAPTER II</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE OUTBREAK OF WAR<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">July-August 1914 </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P13">13</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Reality or illusion </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P15">15</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Serajevo murders </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P16">16</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Austria and Servia </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P17">17</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">English efforts to preserve peace </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P18">18</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Mobilisation in Germany and Russia </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P19">19</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Questions of neutrality </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P19">19</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German Army enters Luxemburg, Belgium, and France </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P20">20</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">General conflagration </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P20">20</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0103">CHAPTER III</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - WHO WANTED WAR?<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Why did war occur? </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P22">22</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Servia did not want war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P22">22</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Neither did Russia or France </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P23">23</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Nor Belgium or England </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P25">25</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Austria wanted war with Servia alone </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P26">26</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Germany encouraged Austria to bring on war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P29">29</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Germany desired war believing that England would remain neutral </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P29">29</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Austrian eleventh-hour efforts for peace frustrated by Germany </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P30">30</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Sir Edward Grey's miscalculation </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P31">31</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">M. Sazonof thought war could have been avoided by plain speaking </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P32">32</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Sir Edward Grey's reasons against plain speaking </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P33">33</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Which was right? </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P34">34</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0104">CHAPTER IV</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE PENALTY OF NEGLIGENCE<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Was war inevitable? </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P36">36</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Not if England had been prepared morally and materially </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P37">37</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Previous apprehensions of war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P38">38</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Peculiar characteristics of German animosity </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P39">39</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">British public opinion refused to treat it seriously </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P40">40</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0105">CHAPTER V</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Who actually caused the conflagration? </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P42">42</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Influence of the Professors, Press, and People of Germany </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P43">43</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Influence of the Court, Army, and Bureaucracy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P44">44</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Various political characters </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P46">46</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Kaiser </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P48">48</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">There was no master-spirit </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P51">51</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0106">CHAPTER VI</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Hero-worship and sham super-men </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P53">53</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Blunders of Bureaucracy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P55">55</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to the time-table of the war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P55">55</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to the quality of the French Army </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P55">55</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to the opinion of the world </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P56">56</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to the treatment of Belgium </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P57">57</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to British neutrality </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P58">58</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to the prevalence of Pacifism in England </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P59">59</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to Civil War in Ireland </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P62">62</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to rebellion in South Africa </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P64">64</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to Indian sedition </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P65">65</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">As to the spirit of the self-governing Dominions </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P67">67</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Lack of instinct and its consequences </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P67">67</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0107">CHAPTER VII</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - INTERNATIONAL ILL-WILL<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Great events do not proceed from small causes </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P69">69</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German hatred of England </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P70">70</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">This is the German people's war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P71">71</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Their illusion that England brought it about </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P73">73</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Difficulties in the way of international understandings </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P73">73</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">British and German diplomacy compared </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P74">74</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German distrust and British indifference </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P78">78</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">British policy as it appears to German eyes </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P79">79</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Vacillation mistaken for duplicity </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P80">80</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German policy as it appears to British eyes </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P81">81</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - <a href="#chap0200">PART II</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3b"> - THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0201">CHAPTER I</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE BISMARCKIAN EPOCH<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">National dreams </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P87">87</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">1789 and after </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P87">87</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The first German dream—Union </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P88">88</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">How it was realised </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P89">89</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">What the world thought of it </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P90">90</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Material development in Germany </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P91">91</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The peace policy of Bismarck </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P92">92</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0202">CHAPTER II</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - AFTER BISMARCK<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Nightmares and illusions </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P94">94</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Grievances against England, France, and Russia </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P96">96</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The second German dream—Mastery of the World </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P97">97</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Absorption of Belgium, Holland, and Denmark </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P98">98</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Austro-Hungarian inheritance </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P98">98</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Balkan peninsula </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P99">99</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Turkey in Asia </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P100">100</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German diplomacy at Constantinople </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P101">101</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Baghdad Railway </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P102">102</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The hoped-for fruits of 'inevitable' wars </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P103">103</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The possession of Africa </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P103">103</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Chinese Empire </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P104">104</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0203">CHAPTER III</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE GERMAN PROJECT OF EMPIRE<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Qualities of the German vision </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P106">106</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Symmetry and vastness are dangerous ideals </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P107">107</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Frederick the Great and Bismarck </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P108">108</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German predisposition to follow dreamers </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P108">108</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Grotesque proportions of the Second German dream </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P109">109</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The two Americas </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P110">110</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Pacifism and Militarism meet at infinity </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P111">111</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0204">CHAPTER IV</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE NEW MORALISTS<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Germany goes in search of an ethical basis </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P113">113</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Special grievances against France and England </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P114">114</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German thinkers recast Christian morals </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P115">115</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Heinrich von Treitschke </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P116">116</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1"><i>The principle of the state is power</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P117">117</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P118">118</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His contempt for British and Prussian ideals </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P119">119</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">General von Bernhardi </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P122">122</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">New morality never accepted by the German people </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P123">123</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Thrown over even by 'the brethren' when war occurred </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P124">124</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Causes of this apostasy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P126">126</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0205">CHAPTER V</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE STATECRAFT OF A PRIESTHOOD<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">German education a drill system </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P127">127</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Intellectuals are ranged on the government side </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P128">129</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Eighteenth-century France and modern Germany </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P129">129</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Contrast between their bureaucracies </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P130">130</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Between the attitude of their intellectuals </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P131">131</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Between their fashions of fancy dress </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P131">131</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Dangers to civilisation from within and without </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P132">132</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Political thinkers are usually destructive </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P133">133</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Unfitness of priesthoods for practical affairs </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P135">135</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Contrast between priests and lawyers </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P137">137</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Natural affinity between soldiers and priests </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P139">139</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Unforeseen consequences of German thoroughness </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P140">140</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">May lead ultimately to ostracism of Germany </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P140">140</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Types of German agents </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P141">141</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Treacherous activities in time of peace </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P142">142</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The German political creed </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P144">144</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The true aim of this war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P146">146</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0206">CHAPTER VI</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Intelligence and enterprise of the Germans </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P149">149</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">They are nevertheless devoted to their own institutions </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P150">150</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German system is not reactionary but the reverse </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P151">151</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Experts are honoured and trusted </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P151">151</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German esteem for men of learning </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P152">152</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And for the military caste </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P153">153</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And for their Kaiser </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P155">155</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German contempt for party government </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P156">156</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And for the character of British official news </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P157">157</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And for the failure of the British Government to trust the people </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P160">160</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And for its fear of asking the people to make sacrifices </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P161">161</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And for the voluntary system </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P162">162</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Their pride in the successes of German arms </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P163">163</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And in the number and spirit of their new levies </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P163">163</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Which they contrast with British recruiting </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P164">164</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The methods of which they despise </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P165">165</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">What is meant by 'a popular basis' of government? </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P166">166</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0207">CHAPTER VII</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE CONFLICTS OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Two issues between England and Germany </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P167">167</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Democracy cannot endure unless capable of self-defence </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P168">168</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Democracy good and bad </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P169">169</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Self-criticism may be carried too far </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P171">171</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The two dangers of democracy—German <i>Arms</i> and German <i>Ideas</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P173">173</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Fundamental opposition between the spirit of German policy and our own </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P173">173</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German people have not accepted the moral ideas of their priesthood </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P174">174</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Recantation among 'the brethren' themselves on outbreak of war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P175">175</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The cult of war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P176">176</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - <a href="#chap0300">PART III</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3b"> - THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0301">CHAPTER I</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (JANUARY 1901-JULY 1914)<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">In this war Democracy is fighting for its existence </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P181">181</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Against highly organised materialism </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P183">183</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The opening of the twentieth century </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P186">186</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Spirit of constitutional change </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P188">188</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Disappearance of great figures from the scene </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P189">189</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Change in character of the House of Commons </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P192">192</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Dearth of leadership </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P194">194</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Consequent demoralisation of parties </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P195">195</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And widespread anxiety </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P196">196</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Pre-eminence of Mr. Asquith </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P197">197</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His Parliamentary supremacy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P198">198</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His maxim—<i>wait-and-see</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P199">199</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Character of his oratory </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P199">199</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Increasing prominence of lawyers in politics </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P20">200</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Their influence on Parliamentary institutions and national policy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P201">201</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Mr. Asquith's limitations </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P203">203</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0302">CHAPTER II</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THREE GOVERNING IDEAS<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Situation at the death of Queen Victoria </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P207">207</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Comfort and security are not synonymous </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P208">208</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Two problems absorbed public attention </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P209">209</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Social and Constitutional Reform </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P209">209</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">A third problem, security, was overlooked </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P210">210</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Social Reform intrinsically the most important </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P211">211</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The urgent need of peace </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P212">212</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Earnestness of public opinion </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P212">212</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">How it was baulked by circumstances </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P213">213</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Limitations of popular judgment </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P214">214</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Want of leadership </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P216">216</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Strangulation of sincerity by party system </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P218">218</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The artificial opposition of three great ideas </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P221">221</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0303">CHAPTER III</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - POLICY AND ARMAMENTS<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">The aim of British policy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P223">223</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Organised and unorganised defences </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P223">223</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Policy depends on armaments, armaments on policy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P225">225</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Difficulty of keeping these principles in mind </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P226">226</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Diplomacy to-day depends more than ever on armaments </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P228">228</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The sad example of China </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P229">229</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Policy should conform to national needs </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P230">230</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Dangers threatening British security (1901-1914) </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P231">231</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Committee of Imperial Defence </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P232">232</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Reasons of its comparative failure </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P234">234</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Parliament and the people were left uneducated </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P235">235</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Naval preparations were adequate </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P236">236</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Military preparations were absurdly inadequate </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P237">237</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Our Foreign policy rested on an entirely false assumption as regards the adequacy of our Army </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P238">238</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0304">CHAPTER IV</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE BALANCE OF POWER<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Security required that we should take account of Europe </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P241">241</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German aim—the suzerainty of Western Europe </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P243">243</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Maintenance of the <i>Balance of Power</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P244">244</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">This is the unalterable condition of British security </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P245">245</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">This need produced the Triple Entente </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P247">247</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Splendid isolation no longer compatible with security </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P249">249</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Meaning of a defensive war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P249">249</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Defence of north-eastern frontier of France essential to British security </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P250">250</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0305">CHAPTER V</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1911)<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">The British 'Expeditionary Force' </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P252">252</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Numbers as a test of adequacy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P253">253</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Relations of Italy with Germany and Austria in event of war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P254">254</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Troops for defence of coasts and neutral frontiers </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P256">256</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Germany must hold Russia in check with superior numbers </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P256">256</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Germany would then endeavour to crush France </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P257">257</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Having a superiority of 500,000 men available for this purpose </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P257">257</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Why neutrality of Holland was a German interest </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P258">258</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Why neutrality of Belgium was an obstacle to Germany </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P259">259</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Inadequacy of our own Army to turn the scales </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P260">260</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Our armaments did not correspond with our policy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P261">261</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Ministerial confidence in the 'voluntary system' </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P261">261</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Three periods of war—the <i>onset</i>, the <i>grip</i>, and the <i>drag</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P263">263</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">In 1870 the <i>onset</i> decided the issue </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P264">264</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">By 1914 the power of swift attack had increased </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P265">265</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Forecasts confirmed by experience (Aug.-Sept. 1914) </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P266">266</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Immense value of British sea-power </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P266">266</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">No naval success, however, can win a European war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P267">267</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Naval supremacy not the only essential to British security </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P268">268</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0306">CHAPTER VI</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1914)<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Changes between August 1911 and August 1914 </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P269">269</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Sensational German increases in 1913 took full effect within a year </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P270">270</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Inability of France to counter this effort unaided </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P270">270</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">French increase could not take effect till 1916 </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P271">271</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Russian and Austrian increases </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P272">272</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">No attempt to increase British Army though it is below strength </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P273">273</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Balkan wars (1912-1913) </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P273">273</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Their effect on <i>Balance of Power</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P274">274</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Reasons why they did not lead to general conflagration </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P275">275</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Germany's two dates: June 1914-June 1916 </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P275">275</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0307">CHAPTER VII</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Why should we suspect Germany of evil intentions? </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P277">277</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The German Fleet was a challenge to British security </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P278">278</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Candour of German publicists </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P278">278</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">British Government finds comfort in official assurances of Berlin </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P279">279</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Disregarded warnings </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P279">279</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1"><i>First Warning</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P279">279</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">(1905-1906) Morocco incident </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P270">279</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">After which British naval programme was reduced </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P280">280</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1"><i>Second Warning</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P281">281</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">(1908-1909) Secret acceleration and increase of German naval programme </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P281">281</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Imperial Defence Conference </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P281">281</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1"><i>Third Warning</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P282">282</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">(1910) German sincerity under suspicion </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P282">282</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Constitutional Conference </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P283">283</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Secret de Polichinelle </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P283">283</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Failure of British Government to trust the people </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P284">284</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1"><i>Fourth Warning</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P285">285</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">(1911) The Agadir incident </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P285">285</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Mr. Lloyd George's speech </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P285">285</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Consequences of various kinds </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P286">286</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1"><i>Fifth Warning</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P287">287</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">(1912) Lord Haldane's rebuff </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P287">287</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Menacing nature of German proposals </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P288">288</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Dangers of amateur diplomacy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P289">289</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">German love of irregular missions </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P290">290</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1"><i>Sixth Warning</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P294">294</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">(1913) German Army Bill and War Loan </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P294">294</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">British Government ignore the danger </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P295">295</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Neglect military preparations </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P297">297</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Shrink from speaking plainly to the people </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P298">298</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Difficulties of Sir Edward Grey </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P298">298</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Enemies in his own household </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P299">299</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Radical attacks on Foreign Secretary and First Lord of Admiralty fomented by Germany </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P299">299</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Attitude of a leaderless Cabinet </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P300">300</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Parallelogram of fears determines drift of policy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P301">301</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Evil effects of failure to educate public opinion </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P302">302</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Danger of breaking the Liberal party </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P303">303</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Occasional efficacy of self-sacrifice </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P303">303</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">War not inevitable had England been prepared </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P304">304</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3b"> - <a href="#chap0400">PART IV</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3b"> - DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE<br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0401">CHAPTER I</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Public opinion puzzled by military problems </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P309">309</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The nation's growing anxiety and distrust (1909-1914) </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P310">310</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Army affairs a shuttlecock in the political game </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P312">312</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">'The blood taxes' </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P313">313</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The nation realised it had not been treated with candour </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P313">313</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Powerful British Army the best guarantee for European peace </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P314">314</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Alone among European nations Britain had not an army commensurate to her population, policy, and resources </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P316">316</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0402">CHAPTER II</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">The <i>Regular Army</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P317">317</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Three classes of reserves </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P318">318</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The <i>Army Reserve</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P318">318</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The <i>Special Reserve</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P319">319</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The <i>Territorial Army</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P320">320</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P321">321</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">These were inadequate to redress the balance against the Triple Entente </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P322">322</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">In the <i>onset</i> period untrained and half-trained troops were of no use </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P322">322</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P323">323</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P324">324</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P326">326</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914 </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P326">326</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Size of British striking force necessary as complete were of against a coolly calculated war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P327">327</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Reserves required behind this striking force </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P328">328</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">South African War no precedent for a European war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P330">330</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0403">CHAPTER III</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912) </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P332">332</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P332">332</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Attack concentrated on three passages </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P333">333</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Two of these have been proved true by events </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P334">334</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The other was misinterpreted by its critics </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P335">335</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Liberal criticism </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P336">336</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Unionist criticism </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P341">341</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Ministerial rebukes </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P343">343</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of these attacks </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P347">347</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0404">CHAPTER IV</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - LORD KITCHENER'S TASK<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">All Lord Roberts's warnings were proved true </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P350">350</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Many people nevertheless still believed that the voluntary system was a success </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P351">351</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P353">353</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His previous record of success </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P354">354</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His hold on public confidence </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P354">354</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His grasp of the simple essentials </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P355">355</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His determination to support France and make a New Army </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P355">355</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His remarkable achievements </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P356">356</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His want of knowledge of British political and industrial conditions </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P356">356</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His colleagues, however, understood these thoroughly </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P357">357</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0405">CHAPTER V</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - MATERIAL OF WAR<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Industrial congestion at the outbreak of war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P358">358</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Need for looking far ahead and organising production of war material </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P359">359</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The danger of labour troubles </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P360">360</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Outcry about shortage of supplies </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P360">360</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Official denials were disbelieved </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P361">361</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0406">CHAPTER VI</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - METHODS OF RECRUITING<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">The first need was men </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P364">364</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">A call for volunteers the only way of meeting it </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P364">364</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The second need was a system to provide men as required over the period of the war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P365">365</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">No system was devised </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P365">365</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Government shrank from exercising its authority </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P366">366</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Trusted to indirect pressure </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P366">366</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And sensational appeals </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P367">367</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">They secured a new army of the highest quality </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P368">368</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">But they demoralised public opinion by their methods </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P369">369</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Public opinion at the outbreak of war was admirable </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P372">372</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">It was ready to obey orders </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P373">373</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">No orders came </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P374">374</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The triumph of the voluntary system </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P376">376</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">From the point of view of a Belgian or a Frenchman the triumph is not so clear </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P377">377</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The voluntary system is inadequate to our present situation </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P379">379</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Folly of waiting for disaster to demonstrate the necessity of National Service </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P381">380</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0407">CHAPTER VII</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">British methods of recruiting in normal times </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P382">382</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1"><i>The Conscription of Hunger</i> </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P382">382</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The cant of the voluntary principle </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P384">384</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The 'economic' fallacy </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P385">385</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The fallacy of underrating the moral of conscript armies </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P387">387</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The army which we call 'voluntary' our enemies call 'mercenary' </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P388">389</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">'Mercenary' describes not the British Army but the British People </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P389">389</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The true description of the British Army is 'Professional' </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P390">390</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The theory of the British Army </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P391">391</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">That officers should pay for the privilege of serving </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P391">391</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">That the rank and file should contract for a term of years </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P392">392</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Under pressure of want </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P392">392</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">At pay which is below the market rate </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P392">392</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">This contract is drastically enforced </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P393">393</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">With the full approval of anti-militarist opinion </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P393">393</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Inconsistencies of the anti-militarists </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P394">394</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Their crowning inconsistency </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P395">395</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Other industries put pressure on society </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P396">396</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Why should not a professional army? </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P396">396</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The example of Rome </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P397">397</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">A professional army when it first interferes in politics usually does so as a liberator </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P397">397</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Then military despotism follows speedily </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P399">399</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">A fool's paradise </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P399">399</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0408">CHAPTER VIII</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">Bugbears </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P401">401</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Conflict of 'opinion' with 'the facts' </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P402">402</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">An army is no defence unless it is available for service abroad </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P402">402</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Industrial Epoch (1832-1886) </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P403">403</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Its grudging attitude towards the Army </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P403">403</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Honour paid by conscript nations to their armies </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P406">406</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Democracy cannot subsist without personal service </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P406">406</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">During the Industrial Epoch exemption from Personal Service was regarded as the essence of Freedom </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P408">408</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">War was regarded as an anachronism </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P409">409</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Since 1890 there has been a slow but steady reaction from these ideas </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P410">410</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Volunteer movement and Territorial Army compared </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P411">411</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Effect of the Soudan campaign and South African War </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P411">411</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Effect of more recent events </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P412">412</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Have we passed out of a normal condition into an abnormal one, or the reverse? </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P412">412</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Germany's great grievance against Britain: we thought to hold our Empire without sacrifices </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P413">413</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The Freiherr von Hexenküchen's views—</span><br /> - <span class="content1"> (1) On our present case of conscience </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P416">416</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1"> (2) On our voluntary system </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P416">416</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The American Civil War </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P417">417</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Lincoln insisted on conscription (1863) </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P418">418</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">His difficulties </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P418">418</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Results of his firmness </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P419">419</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Difference in our own case </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P419">419</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Our need for conscription is much greater </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P419">419</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">It is also far easier for our Government to enforce it </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P420">420</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> - <a href="#chap0409">CHAPTER IX</a><br /> -</p> - -<p class="t3"> - THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR<br /> -</p> - -<p class="noindent"> - <span class="content1">The objects of this book </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P421">421</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Criticism of naval and military strategy is no part of its purpose </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P422">422</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Nor the ultimate political settlement of Europe </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P424">424</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Nor an inquisition into 'German atrocities' </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P424">424</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">But the basis of Germany's policy must be understood </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P425">425</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">And what we are fighting for and against </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P425">425</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The causes of German strength </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P427">427</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The causes of British weakness </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P427">427</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Illusions as to the progress of the war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P428">428</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The real cause of our going to war </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P430">430</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Democracy is not by its nature invincible </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P431">431</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">Leadership is our chief need </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P433">433</a></span><br /> - <span class="content1">The folly of telling half-truths to the People </span><span class="content2"><a href="#P435">435</a></span><br /> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0100"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P1"></a>1}</span></p> - -<h2> -PART I -<br /> -THE CAUSES OF WAR -</h2> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P2"></a>2}</span></p> - -<p class="intro"> -Then <i>Apollyon</i> strodled quite over the whole breadth of the -way, and said, I am void of fear in this matter, prepare thyself -to die; for I swear by my infernal Den, that thou shalt go no -further; here will I spill thy soul. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -And with that he threw a flaming Dart at his breast, but -<i>Christian</i> had a shield in his hand, with which he caught it, and -so prevented the danger of that. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -Then did <i>Christian</i> draw, for he saw 'twas time to bestir him: -and <i>Apollyon</i> as fast made at him, throwing Darts as thick as Hail; -by the which, notwithstanding all that <i>Christian</i> could do to -avoid it, <i>Apollyon</i> wounded him in his <i>head</i>, his <i>hand</i>, and <i>foot</i>: -this made <i>Christian</i> give a little back; <i>Apollyon</i> therefore -followed his work amain, and <i>Christian</i> again took courage, and -resisted as manfully as he could. This sore Combat lasted for -above half a day, even till <i>Christian</i> was almost quite spent; -for you must know that <i>Christian</i>, by reason of his wounds, must -needs grow weaker and weaker. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -Then <i>Apollyon</i> espying his opportunity, began to gather up -close to <i>Christian</i>, and wrestling with him, gave him a dreadful -fall; and with that <i>Christian's</i> sword flew out of his hand. -Then said <i>Apollyon, I am sure of thee now</i>: and with that he had -almost pressed him to death, so that <i>Christian</i> began to despair -of life. But as God would have it, while Apollyon was fetching -of his last blow, thereby to make a full end of this good man, -<i>Christian</i> nimbly reached out his hand for his Sword, and caught -it, saying, <i>Rejoice not against me, O mine enemy! when I fall -I shall arise</i>; and with that gave him a deadly thrust, which -made him give back, as one that had received his mortal wound: -<i>Christian</i> perceiving that, made at him again, saying, <i>Nay, in all -these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved -us</i>. And with that <i>Apollyon</i> spread forth his dragon's wings, -and sped him away, that <i>Christian</i> for a season saw him no more. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -In this Combat no man can imagine, unless he had seen and -heard as I did, what yelling and hideous roaring, <i>Apollyon</i> made -all the time of the fight; he spake like a Dragon.... -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -<i>The Pilgrim's Progress.</i> -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0101"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P3"></a>3}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER I -<br /> -PEACE AND WAR -</h3> - -<p> -It is a considerable number of years since the most -distinguished Tory statesman of his time impressed -upon his fellow-countrymen as a maxim of policy, -that <i>Peace is the greatest of British interests</i>. There -was an unexpectedness about Lord Salisbury's words, -coming as they did from the leader of a party which -had hitherto lain under suspicion of jingoism, which -gave the phrase almost the colour of an epigram. -The truth of the saying, however, gradually became -manifest to all men; and thereupon a new danger -arose out of this very fact. -</p> - -<p> -As a nation we are in some ways a great deal -too modest; or it may be, looking at the matter -from a critical standpoint, too self-centred. We -have always been inclined to assume in our calculations -that we ourselves are the only possible disturbers -of the peace, and that if we do not seek war, or -provoke it, no other Power will dream of forcing war -upon us. This unfortunately has rarely been the -case; and those persons who, in recent times, have -refused most scornfully to consider the lessons of -past history, have now at last learned from a sterner -schoolmaster the falseness of their favourite doctrine. -</p> - -<p> -The United Kingdom needed and desired peace, so -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P4"></a>4}</span> -that it might proceed undistracted, and with firm -purpose, to set its house in order. The Dominions -needed peace, so that they might have time to people -their fertile but empty lands, to strike deep roots -and become secure. To the Indian Empire and the -Dependencies peace was essential, if a system of -government, which aimed, not unsuccessfully, at -giving justice and fostering well-being, was to -maintain its power and prestige unshaken. The whole -British race had nothing material to gain by war, -but much to lose, much at any rate which would be -put in jeopardy by war. In spite of all these weighty -considerations which no man of sense and knowledge -will venture to dispute, we should have been wiser -had we taken into account the fact, that they did not -apply to other nations, that in the main they affected -ourselves alone, and that our case was no less singular -than, in one sense at all events, it was fortunate. -</p> - -<p> -We did not covet territory or new subjects. Still -less were we likely to engage in campaigns out of a -thirst for glory. In the latter particular at least we -were on a par with the rest of the world. The cloud -of anxiety which for ten or more years has brooded -over the great conscript nations, growing steadily -darker, contained many dangers, but among these -we cannot reckon such antiquated motives as trivial -bravado, light-hearted knight-errantry, or the vain -pursuit of military renown. -</p> - -<p> -What is called in history books 'an insult' seemed -also to have lost much of its ancient power for plunging -nations into war. The Chancelleries of Europe had -grown cautious, and were on the watch against being -misled by the emotions of the moment. A sensational -but unintended injury was not allowed to drive us -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P5"></a>5}</span> -into war with Russia in 1904, and this precedent -seemed of good augury. Moreover, when every -statesman in Europe was fully alive to the electric -condition of the atmosphere, a deliberate insult was -not very likely to be offered from mere ill-manners -or in a fit of temper, but only if there were some -serious purpose behind it, in which case it would fall -under a different category. -</p> - -<p> -Fear was a great danger, and everybody knew it -to be so—fear lest this nation, or that, might be -secretly engaged in strengthening its position in order -to crush one of its neighbours at some future date, -unless that neighbour took time by the forelock and -struck out forthwith. Among the causes which -might bring about a surprise outbreak of war this was -the most serious and probable. It was difficult to -insure against it. But though perilous in the extreme -while it lasts, panic is of the nature of an epidemic: -it rages for a while and passes away. It had been -raging now with great severity ever since 1909,[<a id="chap0101fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0101fn1">1</a>] and -by midsummer 1914 optimists were inclined to seek -consolation in the thought that the crisis must surely -be over. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DANGERS TO PEACE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -More dangerous to peace in the long run even than -fear, were certain aims and aspirations, which from -one standpoint were concrete and practical, but -regarded from another were among the cloudiest of -abstractions—'political interests,' need of new -markets, hunger for fresh territory to absorb the -outflow of emigrants, and the like; on the other -hand, those hopes and anxieties which haunt the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P6"></a>6}</span> -imaginations of eager men as they look into the -future, and dream dreams and see visions of a grand -national fulfilment. -</p> - -<p> -If the British race ever beheld a vision of this sort, -it had been realised already. We should have been -wise had we remembered that this accomplished -fact, these staked-out claims of the British Empire, -appeared to fall like a shadow across visions seen -by other eyes, blotting out some of the fairest hopes, -and spoiling the noble proportions of the patriot's -dream. -</p> - -<p> -There is a region where words stumble after truth, -like children chasing a rainbow across a meadow to -find the pot of fairy gold. Multitudinous volumes -stuffed with the cant of pacifism and militarism will -never explain to us the nature of peace and war. But -a few bars of music may sometimes make clear things -which all the moralists, and divines, and philosophers—even -the poets themselves for the most part, though -they come nearer to it at times than the rest—have -struggled vainly to show us in their true proportions. -The songs of a nation, its national anthems—if they -be truly national and not merely some commissioned -exercise—are better interpreters than state papers. -A man will learn more of the causes of wars, perhaps -even of the rights and wrongs of them, by listening -to the burst and fall of the French hymn, the ebb -and surge of the Russian, in Tschaikovsky's famous -overture, than he ever will from books or speeches, -argument or oratory. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -IMPOTENCE OF LOGIC -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Yet there are people who think it not impossible -to prove to mankind by logical processes, that the -loss which any great nation must inevitably sustain -through war, will far outweigh any advantages which -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P7"></a>7}</span> -can ensue from it, even if the arms of the conqueror -were crowned with victories greater than those of -Caesar or Napoleon. They draw us pictures of the -exhaustion which must inevitably follow upon such -a struggle conducted upon the modern scale, of the -stupendous loss of capital, destruction of credit, -paralysis of industry, arrest of progress in things -spiritual as well as temporal, the shock to civilisation, -and the crippling for a generation, probably for -several generations, possibly for ever, of the victorious -country in its race with rivals who have wisely stood -aside from the fray. These arguments may conceivably -be true, may in no particular be over-coloured, -or an under-valuation, either of the good which has -been attained by battle, or of the evils which have -been escaped. But they would be difficult to -establish even before an unbiassed court, and they are -infinitely more difficult to stamp upon popular -belief. -</p> - -<p> -It is not sufficient either with statesmen or -peoples to set before them a chain of reasoning which -is logically unanswerable. Somehow or other the -new faith which it is desired to implant, must be -rendered independent of logic and unassailable by -logic. It must rise into a higher order of convictions -than the intellectual before it can begin to operate -upon human affairs. For it is matched against -opinions which have been held and acted upon so -long, that they have become unquestionable save -in purely academic discussions. At those decisive -moments, when action follows upon thought like a -flash, conclusions which depend upon a train of -reasoning are of no account: instinct will always -get the better of any syllogism. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P8"></a>8}</span> -</p> - -<p> -So when nations are hovering on the brink of war, -it is impulse, tradition, or some stuff of the -imagination—misused deliberately, as sometimes happens, -by crafty manipulators—which determines action -much more often than the business calculations of -shopkeepers and economists. Some cherished -institution seems to be threatened. Some nationality -supposed—very likely erroneously—to be of the same -flesh and blood as ourselves, appears—very likely -on faulty information—to be unjustly oppressed. -Two rival systems of civilisation, of morals, of religion, -approach one another like thunder-clouds and come -together in a clash. Where is the good at such times -of casting up sums, and exhibiting profit-and-loss -accounts to the public gaze? People will not listen, -for in their view considerations of prosperity and -the reverse are beside the question. Wealth, comfort, -even life itself, are not regarded; nor are the possible -sufferings of posterity allowed to count any more than -the tribulations of to-day. In the eyes of the people -the matter is one of duty not of interest. When men -fight in this spirit the most lucid exposition of material -drawbacks is worse than useless; for the national -mood, at such moments, is one of self-sacrifice. The -philosopher, or the philanthropist, is more likely to -feed the flames than to put them out when he proves -the certainty of loss and privation, and dwells upon -the imminent peril of ruin and destruction. -</p> - -<p> -The strength of the fighter is the strength of his -faith. Each new Gideon who goes out against the -Midianites fancies that the sword of the Lord is in -his hand. He risks all that he holds dear, in order -that he may pull down the foul images of Baal and -build up an altar to Jehovah, in order that his race -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P9"></a>9}</span> -may not be shorn of its inheritance, in order that it -may hold fast its own laws and institutions, and not -pass under the yoke of the Gentiles. This habit of -mind is unchanging throughout the ages. What -moved men to give their lives at Marathon moved -them equally, more than a thousand years later, to -offer the same sacrifice under the walls of Tours. -It is still moving them, after yet another thousand -years and more have passed away, in the plains of -Flanders and the Polish Marshes. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE MOTIVES OF NATIONS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When the Persian sought to force the dominion -of his ideals upon the Greek, the states of Hellas made -head against him from the love and honour in which -they held their own. When the successors of the -Prophet, zealous for their faith, confident in the -protection of the One God, drove the soldiers of the -Cross before them from the passes of the Pyrenees to -the vineyards of Touraine, neither side would have -listened with any patience to a dissertation upon the -inconveniences resulting from a state of war and upon -the economic advantages of peace. It was there one -faith against another, one attitude towards life against -another, one system of manners, customs, and laws -against another. When a collision occurs in this region -of human affairs there is seldom room for compromise -or adjustment. Things unmerchantable cannot be -purchased with the finest of fine gold. -</p> - -<p> -In these instances, seen by us from far off, the truth -of this is easily recognised. But what some of our -recent moralists have overlooked, is the fact that -forces of precisely the same order exist in the world -of to-day, and are at work, not only among the fierce -Balkan peoples, in the resurgent empire of Japan, -and in the great military nations—the French, the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P10"></a>10}</span> -Germans, and the Russians—but also in America -and England. The last two pride themselves upon -a higher civilisation, and in return are despised by -the prophets of militarism as worshippers of material -gain. The unfavourable and the flattering estimate -agree, however, upon a single point—in assuming that -our own people and those of the United States are -unlikely to yield themselves to unsophisticated -impulse. This assumption is wholly false. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -VIRTUES OF THE WAR SPIRIT -</span> -</p> - -<p> -If we search carefully, we shall find every where -underlying the great struggles recorded in past history, -no less than those which have occurred, and are now -occurring, in our own time, an antagonism of one -kind or another between two systems, visions, or -ideals, which in some particular were fundamentally -opposed and could not be reconciled. State papers -and the memoranda of diplomatists, when in due -course they come to light, are not a little apt to -confuse the real issues, by setting forth a diary of minor -incidents and piquant details, not in their true -proportions, but as they appeared at the moment of their -occurrence to the eyes of harassed and suspicious -officials. But even so, all the emptying of desks and -pigeon-holes since the great American Civil War, has -not been able to cover up the essential fact, that in -this case a million lives were sacrificed by one of the -most intelligent, humane, and practical nations upon -earth, and for no other cause than that there was an -irreconcilable difference amongst them, with regard -to what St. Paul has called 'the substance of things -hoped for.' On the one side there was an ideal of -Union and a determination to make it prevail: on -the other side there was an ideal of Independence -and an equal determination to defend it whatsoever -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P11"></a>11}</span> -might be the cost. If war on such grounds be possible -within the confines of a single nation, nurtured in -the same traditions, and born to a large extent of the -same stock, how futile is the assurance that economic -and material considerations will suffice to make war -impossible between nations, who have not even the -tie of a common mother-tongue! -</p> - -<p> -A collision may occur, as we know only too well, -even although one of two vessels be at anchor, if it -happens to lie athwart the course of the other. It -was therefore no security against war that British -policy did not aim at any aggrandisement or seek for -any territorial expansion. The essential questions -were—had we possessions which appeared to obstruct -the national aspirations and ideals of others; and -did these others believe that alone, or in alliance, -they had the power to redress the balance? -</p> - -<p> -The real difficulty which besets the philanthropist -in his endeavour to exorcise the spirit of war is caused, -not by the vices of this spirit, but by its virtues. In -so far as it springs from vainglory or cupidity, it is -comparatively easy to deal with. In so far as it is -base, there is room for a bargain. It can be -compounded with and bought off, as we have seen before -now, with some kind of material currency. It will -not stand out for very long against promises of -prosperity and threats of dearth. But where, as at -most crises, this spirit is not base, where its impulse -is not less noble, but more noble than those which -influence men day by day in the conduct of their -worldly affairs, where the contrast which presents -itself to their imagination is between duty on the -one hand and gain on the other, between self-sacrifice -and self-interest, between their country's need and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P12"></a>12}</span> -their own ease, it is not possible to quench the fires -by appeals proceeding from a lower plane. The -philanthropist, if he is to succeed, must take still -higher ground, and higher ground than this it is not -a very simple matter to discover. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0101fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0101fn1text">1</a>] The increase and acceleration of German -shipbuilding was discovered -by the British Government in the autumn of 1908, -and led to the Imperial -Defence Conference in the summer of the following year. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0102"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P13"></a>13}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER II -<br /> -THE OUTBREAK OF WAR -</h3> - -<p> -When war came, it came suddenly. A man who -had happened to fall sick of a fever on St. Swithin's -day 1914, but was so far on the way to convalescence -four weeks later as to desire news of the outside -world, must have been altogether incredulous of the -tidings which first greeted his ears. -</p> - -<p> -When he fell ill the nations were at peace. The -townspeople of Europe were in a holiday humour, -packing their trunks and portmanteaus for 'land -travel or sea-faring.' The country people were -getting in their harvest or looking forward hopefully -to the vintage. Business was prosperous. Credit -was good. Money, in banking phraseology, was -'cheap.' The horror of the Serajevo assassinations -had already faded almost into oblivion. At the -worst this sensational event was only an affair of -police. Such real anxiety as existed in the United -Kingdom had reference to Ireland. -</p> - -<p> -We can imagine the invalid's first feeble question -on public affairs:—'What has happened in Ulster?'—The -answer, 'Nothing has happened in Ulster.'—The -sigh of relief with which he sinks back on his pillows. -</p> - -<p> -When, however, they proceed to tell him what -has happened, elsewhere than in Ulster, during the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P14"></a>14}</span> -four weeks while they have been watching by his -bedside, will he not fancy that his supposed recovery is -only an illusion, and that he is still struggling with -the phantoms of his delirium? -</p> - -<p> -For what will they have to report? That the -greater part of the world which professes Christianity -has called out its armies; that more than half Europe -has already joined battle; that England, France, -Russia, Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro on the one -side are ranged against Germany and Austria on the -other. Japan, they will tell him, is upon the point of -declaring war. The Turk is wondering if, and when, -he may venture to come in; while the Italian, the -Roumanian, the Bulgar, the Greek, the Dutchman, the -Dane, and the Swede are reckoning no less anxiously -for how short or long a period it may still be safe for -them to stand out. Three millions of men, or -thereabouts—a British Army included—are advancing -against one another along the mountain barriers of -Luxemburg, Lorraine, and Alsace. Another three -millions are engaged in similar evolutions among the -lakes of East Prussia, along the river-banks of Poland, -and under the shadow of the Carpathians. A large -part of Belgium is already devastated, her villages -are in ashes or flames, her eastern fortresses invested, -her capital threatened by the invader. -</p> - -<p> -Nine-tenths or more of the navies of the world -are cleared for action, and are either scouring the -seas in pursuit, or are withdrawn under the shelter -of land-batteries watching their opportunity for a -stroke. Air-craft circle by day and night over the -cities, dropping bombs, with a careless and impartial -aim, upon buildings both private and public, both -sacred and profane, upon churches, palaces, hospitals, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P15"></a>15}</span> -and arsenals. The North Sea and the Baltic are -sown with mines. The trade of the greater part -of industrial Europe is at a standstill; the rest is -disorganised; while the credit and finances, not merely -of Europe, but of every continent, are temporarily -in a state either of chaos or paralysis. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -A NIGHTMARE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -To the bewildered convalescent all this may well -have seemed incredible. It is hardly to be wondered -at if he concluded that the fumes of his fever were -not yet dispersed, and that this frightful phantasmagoria -had been produced, not by external realities, -but by the disorders of his own brain. -</p> - -<p> -How long it might have taken to convince him -of the truth and substance of these events we may -judge from our own recent experience. How long -was it after war broke out, before even we, who had -watched the trouble brewing through all its stages, -ceased to be haunted, even in broad daylight, by the -feeling that we were asleep, and that the whole thing -was a nightmare which must vanish when we awoke? -We were faced (so at least it seemed at frequent -moments) not by facts, but by a spectre, and one by -no means unfamiliar—the spectre of Europe at -war, so long dreaded by some, so scornfully derided -by others, so often driven away, of late years so -persistently reappearing. But this time the thing -refused to be driven away. It sat, hunched up, with -its head resting on its hands, as pitiless and inhuman -as one of the gargoyles on a Gothic cathedral, staring -through us, as if we were merely vapour, at something -beyond. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -So late as Wednesday, July 29—the day on -which Austria declared war on Servia—there was -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P16"></a>16}</span> -probably not one Englishman in a hundred who -believed it possible that, within a week, his own -country would be at war; still less, that a few days -later the British Army would be crossing the Channel -to assist France and Belgium in repelling a German -invasion. To the ordinary man—and not merely -to the ordinary man, but equally to the press, and the -great majority of politicians—such things were -unthinkable until they occurred. Unfortunately, the -inability to think a thing is no more a protection -against its occurrence than the inability to see a thing -gives security to the ostrich. -</p> - -<p> -The sequence of events which led up to the -final disaster is of great importance, although very -far from being in itself a full explanation of the -causes. -</p> - -<p> -On June 28, 1914, the heir to the throne of -Austria-Hungary, together with his consort, was murdered -by a young Bosnian at Serajevo, not far distant from -the southern frontier. The Imperial authorities -instituted a secret enquiry into the circumstances of -the plot, as a result of which they professed to have -discovered that it had been hatched at Belgrade, -that Government officials were implicated in it, and -that so far from being reprobated, it was approved -by Servian public opinion.[<a id="chap0102fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn1">1</a>] -</p> - -<p> -On Thursday, July 23—a month after the tragedy—Austria -suddenly delivered an ultimatum to Servia, -and demanded an acceptance of its terms within -forty-eight hours. The demands put forward were -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P17"></a>17}</span> -harsh, humiliating, and unconscionable. They were -such as could not have been accepted, as they stood, -by any nation which desired to preserve a shred of -its independence. They had been framed with the -deliberate intention, either of provoking a refusal -which might afford a pretext for war, or of procuring -an acceptance which would at once reduce the Servian -Kingdom to the position of a vassal. Even in Berlin -it was admitted[<a id="chap0102fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn2">2</a>] that this ultimatum asked more -than it was reasonable to expect Servia to yield. -But none the less, there can be but little doubt that -the German ambassador at Vienna saw and approved -the document before it was despatched, and it seems -more than likely that he had a hand in drafting it. -It also rests on good authority that the German -Kaiser was informed beforehand of the contents, -and that he did not demur to its presentation.[<a id="chap0102fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn3">3</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE SERVIAN REPLY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -On the evening of Saturday, July 25, the Servian -Government, as required, handed in its answer. The -purport of this, when it became known to the world, -excited surprise by the humility of its tone and the -substance of its submission. Almost everything that -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P18"></a>18}</span> -Austria had demanded was agreed to. What remained -outstanding was clearly not worth quarrelling -about, unless a quarrel were the object of the -ultimatum. The refusal, such as it was, did not close -the door, but, on the contrary, contained an offer -to submit the subjects of difference to the Hague -Convention.[<a id="chap0102fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn4">4</a>] -</p> - -<p> -The document was a lengthy one. The Austrian -minister at Belgrade nevertheless found time to -read it through, to weigh it carefully, to find it -wanting, to ask for his passports, and to catch his train, -all within a period not exceeding three-quarters of -an hour from the time at which it was put into his -hands.[<a id="chap0102fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn5">5</a>] -</p> - -<p> -When these occurrences became known, the -English Foreign Minister immediately made proposals -for a conference between representatives of Germany, -France, Italy, and Great Britain, with the object -of discovering some means of peaceful settlement.[<a id="chap0102fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn6">6</a>] -France and Italy promptly accepted his invitation.[<a id="chap0102fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn7">7</a>] -Germany, while professing to desire mediation, did -not accept it.[<a id="chap0102fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn8">8</a>] Consequently Sir Edward Grey's -effort failed; and before he was able to renew it in -any more acceptable form, Austria, acting with a -promptitude almost unique in her annals, declared -war upon Servia, and hostilities began. -</p> - -<p> -It is unnecessary to enter here into an examination -of the feverish and fruitless attempts to preserve -peace, which were made in various quarters during -the next four and twenty hours. They present a -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P19"></a>19}</span> -most pathetic appearance, like the efforts of a crew, -sitting with oars unshipped, arguing, exhorting, and -imploring, while their boat drifts on to the smooth -lip of the cataract. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MOBILIZATION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Russia ordered the mobilisation of her Southern -armies, alleging that she could not stand by while -a Slav nation was being crushed out of existence, -despite the fact that it had made an abject -submission for an unproved offence.[<a id="chap0102fn9text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn9">9</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Subsequently, on Friday, July 31, Russia—having, -as she considered, reasons for believing that -Germany was secretly mobilising her whole -forces—proceeded to do likewise.[<a id="chap0102fn10text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn10">10</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Germany simultaneously declared 'a state of war' -within her own territories, and a veil instantly fell -upon all her internal proceedings. She demanded -that Russia should cease her mobilisation, and as -no answer which satisfied her was forthcoming, but -only an interchange of telegrams between the two -sovereigns—disingenuous on the one side and not -unreasonably suspicious on the other—Germany -declared war on Russia on Saturday, August 1. -</p> - -<p> -On Saturday and Sunday, war on a grand scale -being by this time certain, the chief interest centred -in questions of neutrality. Germany enquired of -France whether she would undertake to stand -aside—knowing full well beforehand that the terms of the -Dual Alliance compelled the Republic to lend assistance -if Russia were attacked by more than one power. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P20"></a>20}</span> -Sir Edward Grey enquired of France and Germany -if they would undertake to respect the integrity of -Belgium. France replied in the affirmative. Germany -declined to commit herself, and this was rightly -construed as a refusal.[<a id="chap0102fn11text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn11">11</a>] -</p> - -<p> -While this matter was still the subject of -diplomatic discussion the German Army advanced into -the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and was correctly -reported as having entered Belgian territory near -Liège and French territory near Cirey. -</p> - -<p> -On the evening of Sunday, August 2, the German -Government presented an ultimatum to Belgium[<a id="chap0102fn12text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn12">12</a>] -demanding free passage for its troops, thereby -putting its intentions beyond all doubt. -</p> - -<p> -On the same day Italy issued a declaration of -neutrality, making it clear that, although a member -of the Triple Alliance, she did not consider herself -bound to support her allies in a war of aggression.[<a id="chap0102fn13text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn13">13</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Meanwhile Germany had been making enquiries -as to the attitude of England, and, startled to discover -that this country might not be willing tamely to -submit to the violation of Belgium and invasion of -France, proceeded to state, under cross-examination, -the price she was prepared to pay, or at any -rate to promise, for the sake of securing British -neutrality.[<a id="chap0102fn14text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn14">14</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ENGLAND DECLARES WAR -</span> -</p> - -<p> -On Tuesday, August 4, the British Ambassador -at Berlin presented an ultimatum which demanded -an assurance, before midnight, that the integrity of -Belgium would not be violated. The answer was -given informally at a much earlier hour by the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P21"></a>21}</span> -bombardment of Liège; and shortly before midnight -England declared war on Germany.[<a id="chap0102fn15text"></a><a href="#chap0102fn15">15</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Two days later Austria declared herself to be at -war with Russia, and within a week from that date -Great Britain and France issued a similar declaration -against Austria. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn1text">1</a>] There is perhaps as much reason, -certainly no more, for believing that -an official clique at Belgrade plotted -the Serajevo murders, as that an -official clique at Vienna connived at them, -by deliberately withdrawing -police protection from the unfortunate -and unpopular Archduke on the -occasion of his visit to a notorious hotbed of sedition. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn2text">2</a>] Herr von Jagow "also admitted that the Servian Government could not -swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.... He repeated very -earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all the contents -of that note, he had in fact no such knowledge."—Sir H. Rumbold at -Berlin to Sir Edward Grey (White Paper, No. 18). -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn3text">3</a>] "Although I am unable to verify it, -I have private information that -the German Ambassador (<i>i.e.</i> at Vienna) -knew the text of the Austrian -ultimatum to Servia before it was -despatched and telegraphed it to the -German Emperor. I know from the German -Ambassador himself that he -endorses every line of it."—British -Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward -Grey (White Paper, No. 95). (Cf. also -White Book, Nos. 95 and 141; -French Yellow Book, No. 87; Russian Orange Book, No. 41.) -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"The German Ambassador (<i>i.e.</i> in London) -read me a telegram from -the German Foreign Office saying that his -Government had not known -beforehand, and had no more than other -Powers to do with the stiff terms -of the Austrian note to Servia."—Sir -Edward Grey to the British -Ambassador in Berlin (White Paper, No. 25). -(Cf. also French Yellow Book, -Nos. 17, 30, 36, 41, 57, and 94.) -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn4text">4</a>] Last paragraph of Reply of Servian Government -to Austro-Hungarian note. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn5text">5</a>] White Paper, Nos. 20 and 23. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn6text">6</a>] White Paper, No. 36. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn7text">7</a>] White Paper, Nos. 35, 42, and 52. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn8text">8</a>] White Paper, Nos. 43 and 71. Cf. also German White Book, -Nos. 12 and 15. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn9"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn9text">9</a>] White Paper, No. 113; Russian Orange Book, No. 77; French -Yellow Book, No. 95. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn10"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn10text">10</a>] These suspicions were well founded. -German mobilisation began at -least two days earlier (White Paper, No. 113; French Yellow Book, -Nos. 60, 88, 89, and 106). -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn11"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn11text">11</a>] White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, and 125. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn12"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn12text">12</a>] Belgian Grey Book, No. 20; French Yellow Book, No. 141. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn13"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn13text">13</a>] White Paper, No. 152; French Yellow Book, No. 124. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn14"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn14text">14</a>] White Paper, Nos. 85 and 123. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0102fn15"></a> -[<a href="#chap0102fn15text">15</a>] "I found the Chancellor very agitated. -His Excellency at once -began a harangue which lasted for about -twenty minutes. He said that -the step taken by His Majesty's Government -was terrible to a degree: -just for a word—'neutrality,' -a word which in war time had so often been -disregarded—just for a scrap of paper -Great Britain was going to make -war on a kindred nation, -who desired nothing better than to be friends -with her."—British Ambassador at -Berlin to Sir Edward Grey (White -Paper, No. 160). -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0103"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P22"></a>22}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER III -<br /> -WHO WANTED WAR? -</h3> - -<p> -Such is the chronological order of events; but on -the face of it, it explains little of the underlying -causes of this conflagration. Why with the single -exception of Italy had all the great naval and military -powers of Europe, together with several smaller -nations, suddenly plunged into war? Which of -the combatants wanted war? ... To the latter -question the answer can be given at once and with -certainty—save Germany and Austria no nation -wanted war, and even Germany and Austria did not -want <i>this</i> war. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DESIRE FOR PEACE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Whatever opinion we may entertain of the Servian -character or of her policy in recent times, it is at -all events certain that she did not desire war with -Austria. That she submitted to the very depths of -humiliation in order to avoid war cannot be doubted -by any one who has read her reply to the demands -put forward by Vienna. Only a few months since, -she had emerged from two sanguinary wars—the first -against Turkey and the second against Bulgaria—and -although victory had crowned her arms in both -of these contests, her losses in men and material had -been very severe. -</p> - -<p> -That Russia did not desire war was equally plain. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P23"></a>23}</span> -She was still engaged in repairing the gigantic losses -which she had sustained in her struggle with Japan. -At least two years must elapse before her new fleet -would be in a condition to take the sea, and it was -generally understood that at least as long a period -would be necessary, in order to carry through the -scheme of reorganisation by which she hoped to place -her army in a state of efficiency. Whatever might -be the ultimate designs of Russia, it was altogether -incredible that she would have sought to bring about -a war, either at this time or in the near future. -</p> - -<p> -Russia, like England, had nothing to gain by war. -Her development was proceeding rapidly. For years -to come her highest interest must be peace. A -supreme provocation was necessary in order to make -her draw the sword. Such a provocation had been -given in 1909 when, ignoring the terms of the Treaty -of Berlin, Austria had formally annexed the provinces -of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But at that time -Russia's resources were not merely unprepared; -they were utterly exhausted. Menaced simultaneously -by Vienna and Berlin, she had been forced on -that occasion to stand by, while her prestige in the -Balkan peninsula suffered a blow which she was -powerless to ward off. Now a further encroachment -was threatened from the same quarters. A Serb -power which looked to St. Petersburg[<a id="chap0103fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn1">1</a>] for protection -was to be put under the heel of Austria. -</p> - -<p> -Nor can any one believe that France wanted war. -It is true that for a year, or rather more, after the -Agadir episode[<a id="chap0103fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn2">2</a>] the spirit of France was perturbed. -But no Foreign Office in the world—least of all that -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P24"></a>24}</span> -of Germany—was so ill-informed as to believe that -the sporadic demonstrations, which occurred in the -press and elsewhere, were caused by any eagerness -for adventure or any ambition of conquest. They -were due, as every calm observer was aware, to one -thing and one thing only—the knowledge that the -Republic had come to the very end of her human -resources; that all her sons who were capable of -bearing arms had already been enrolled in her army; -that she could do nothing further to strengthen her -defences against Germany, who up to that time, had -taken for military training barely one half of her -available male population, and who was now engaged -in increasing her striking power both by land and sea. -The cause of this restlessness in France was the -fear that Germany was preparing an invincible -superiority and would strike so soon as her weapon was -forged. If so, would it not be better for France to -strike at once, while she had still a fighting chance, -and before she was hopelessly outnumbered? But -this mood, the product of anxiety and suspense, -which had been somewhat prevalent in irresponsible -quarters during the autumn of 1912 and the early -part of the following year, had passed away. Partly -it wore itself out; partly popular interest was diverted -to other objects of excitement. -</p> - -<p> -France, during the twelve months preceding -Midsummer 1914, had been singularly quiescent as -regards foreign affairs. Her internal conditions -absorbed attention. Various events had conspired -to disturb public confidence in the fidelity of her -rulers, and in the adequacy of their military -preparations. The popular mood had been sobered, -disquieted, and scandalised to such a point that war, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P25"></a>25}</span> -so far from being sought after, was the thing of all -others which France most wished to avoid. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE CASE OF BELGIUM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is unnecessary to waste words in establishing -the aversion of Belgium from war. There was -nothing which she could hope to gain by it in any -event. Suffering and loss—how great suffering and -loss even Belgium herself can hardly have foreseen—were -inevitable to her civil population, as well as to -her soldiers, whether the war went well or ill. Her -territory lay in the direct way of the invaders, and -was likely, as in times past, to become the 'cockpit -of Europe.' She was asked to allow the free passage -of the Germanic forces. She was promised restoration -of her independence and integrity at the end of -the war. But to grant this arrogant demand would -have been to destroy her dynasty and wreck her -institutions; for what King or Constitution could -have withstood the popular contempt for a -government which acquiesced in national degradation? -And to believe the promise, was a thing only possible -for simpletons; for what was such an assurance -worth, seeing that, at the very moment of the offer, -Germany was engaged in breaking her former -undertaking, solemnly guaranteed and recorded, that -the neutrality of Belgium should be respected? -That the sympathies of Belgium would have been -with France in any event cannot of course be doubted; -for a French victory threatened no danger, whereas -the success of German arms was a menace to her -independence, and a prelude to vassalage or -absorption in the Empire. -</p> - -<p> -Neither the British people nor their Government -wanted war. In the end they accepted it reluctantly, -and only after most strenuous efforts had been made -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P26"></a>26}</span> -to prevent its occurrence. To the intelligent foreign -observer, however unfriendly, who has a thorough -understanding of British interests, ideas, and habits -of mind this is self-evident. He does not need a -White Paper to prove it to him. -</p> - -<p> -It is clear that Austria wanted war—not this war -certainly, but a snug little war with a troublesome -little neighbour, as to the outcome of which, with the -ring kept, there could be no possibility of doubt. -She obviously hoped that indirectly, and as a sort of -by-product of this convenient little war, she would -secure a great victory of the diplomatic sort over -her most powerful neighbour—a matter of infinitely -more consequence to her than the ostensible object of -her efforts. -</p> - -<p> -The crushing of Servia would mean the humiliation -of Russia, and would shake, for a second time within -five years, the confidence of the Balkan peoples in -the power of the Slav Empire to protect its kindred -and co-religionists against the aggression of the -Teutons and Magyars. Anything which would lower -the credit of Russia in the Balkan peninsula would -be a gain to Austria. To her more ambitious -statesmen such an achievement might well seem to open -the way for coveted expansions towards the Aegean -Sea, which had been closed against her, to her great -chagrin, by the Treaty of Bucharest.[<a id="chap0103fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn3">3</a>] To others, -whose chief anxiety was to preserve peace in their own -time, and to prevent the Austro-Hungarian State -from splitting asunder, the repression of Servia seemed -to promise security against the growing unrest and -discontent of the vast Slav population which was -included in the Empire. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P27"></a>27}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -AUSTRIAN ILL-FORTUNE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -For something nearer two centuries than one the -Austro-Hungarian Empire has been miscalculating -and suffering for its miscalculations, until its blunders -and ill-fortune have become a byword. Scheming -ever for safety, Austria has never found it. The -very modesty of her aim has helped to secure its own -defeat. Her unvarying method has been a timid and -unimaginative repression. In politics, as in most -other human affairs, equilibrium is more easily -attained by moving forward than by standing still. -Austria has sought security for powers, and systems, -and balances which were worn out, unsuited to our -modern world, and therefore incapable of being -secured at all. The more she has schemed for safety -the more precarious her integrity has become. There -are things which scheming will never accomplish—things -which for their achievement need a change of -spirit, some new birth of faith or freedom. But in -Vienna change in any direction is ill-regarded, and -new births are ever more likely to be strangled in -their cradles than to arrive at maturity. -</p> - -<p> -Distracted by the problem of her divers, discordant, -and unwelded[<a id="chap0103fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn4">4</a>] races, Austria has always inclined to -put her trust in schemers who were able to produce -some plausible system, some ingenious device, some -promising ladder of calculation, or miscalculation, for -reaching the moon without going through the clouds. -In the present case there can be no doubt that she -allowed herself to be persuaded by her German -neighbours that Russia was not in a position to make -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P28"></a>28}</span> -an effective fight, and would therefore probably stand -by, growling and showing her teeth. Consequently -it was safe to take a bold line; to present Servia -with an ultimatum which had been made completely -watertight against acceptance of the unconditional -and immediate kind; to reject any acceptance which -was not unconditional and immediate; to allow the -Government of King Peter no time for second thoughts, -the European Powers no time for mediation, her own -Minister at Belgrade time only to give one hasty -glance at the reply, call for his passports, and catch -his train. So far as poor humanity can make certain -of anything, Austria, with German approval and -under German guidance, made certain of war with -Servia. -</p> - -<p> -But the impression produced, when this matter -first began to excite public attention, was somewhat -different. Foreign newspaper correspondents at -Vienna and Berlin were specially well cared for after -the Serajevo murders, and when the ultimatum was -delivered, they immediately sent to England and -elsewhere accounts of the position which made it -appear, that the Austrian Government and people, -provoked beyond endurance by the intrigues of -Servia, had acted impetuously, possibly unwisely, -but not altogether inexcusably. -</p> - -<p> -At this stage the idea was also sedulously put -about that the Kaiser was behaving like a gentleman. -It was suggested that Germany had been left very -much in the dark until the explosion actually occurred, -and that she was now paying the penalty of loyalty -to an indiscreet friend, by suffering herself to be -dragged into a quarrel in which she had neither -interest nor concern. In these early days, when -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P29"></a>29}</span> -Sir Edward Grey was striving hopefully, if -somewhat innocently, after peace, it was assumed by -the world in general, that Germany, for her own -reasons, must desire, at least as ardently as the British -Foreign Minister, to find a means of escape from an -exceedingly awkward position, and that she would -accordingly use her great influence with her ally to -this end. If there had been a grain of truth in this -assumption, peace would have been assured, for -France and Italy had already promised their support. -But this theory broke down very speedily; and as -soon as the official papers were published, it was -seen never to have rested on the smallest basis of -fact. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMANY USES AUSTRIA -</span> -</p> - -<p> -So far from Germany having been dragged in -against her will, it was clear that from the beginning -she had been using Austria as an agent, who was -not unwilling to stir up strife, but was only -half-conscious of the nature and dimensions of the contest -which was bound to follow. It is not credible that -Germany was blind to the all-but-inevitable results -of letting Austria loose to range around, of hallooing -her on, and of comforting her with assurances of loyal -support. But it may well be believed that Austria -herself did not see the situation in the same clear -light, and remained almost up to the last, under the -delusion, which had been so industriously fostered -by the German ambassador at Vienna, that Russia -could not fight effectively and therefore would -probably choose not to fight at all. -</p> - -<p> -But although Austria may have had no adequate -conception of the consequences which her action -would bring about, it is certain that Germany -foresaw them, with the single exception of British -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P30"></a>30}</span> -intervention; that what she foresaw she also desired; and -further, that at the right moment she did her part, -boldly but clumsily, to guard against any miscarriage -of her schemes. -</p> - -<p> -Germany continued to make light of all apprehensions -of serious danger from St. Petersburg; -but at the eleventh hour Austria appears suddenly -to have realised for herself the appalling nature -of the catastrophe which impended. Something -happened; what it was we do not know, and the -present generation will probably never know. We -may conjecture, however—but it is only conjecture—that -by some means or other the intrigues of -the war cabal at Vienna—the instrument of German -policy, owing more fealty to the Kaiser than to -their own Emperor—had been unmasked. In hot -haste they were disavowed, and Austria opened -discussions with Russia 'in a perfectly friendly -manner,'[<a id="chap0103fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn5">5</a>] and with good hopes of success, as to how -the catastrophe might still be averted. -</p> - -<p> -On Thursday, July 30, we are informed, the -tension between Vienna and St. Petersburg had -greatly relaxed. An arrangement compatible with -the honour and interests of both empires seemed -almost in sight when, on the following day, Germany -suddenly intervened with ultimatums to France and -Russia, of a kind to which only one answer was -possible. The spirit of the Ems telegram[<a id="chap0103fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn6">6</a>] had -inebriated a duller generation. "A few days' delay," -our Ambassador at Vienna concludes, "might in all -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P31"></a>31}</span> -probability have saved Europe from one of the -greatest calamities in history."[<a id="chap0103fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn7">7</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -SIR EDWARD GREY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -As we turn over the official pages in which the -British Government has set out its case, we are -inclined to marvel—knowing what we now know—that -our Foreign Minister should have shown so -much zeal and innocence in pleading the cause of -peace on high grounds of humanity, and with a faith, -apparently unshaken to the last, that in principle -at least, the German Government were in full -agreement with his aims. The practical disadvantages -of being a gentleman are that they are apt to make -a man too credulous and not sufficiently inquisitive. -Sir Edward Grey acted according to his nature. -His miscalculation was one which his fellow-countrymen -have not hesitated to forgive. But clearly he -misjudged the forces which were opposed to him. -He was deceived by hollow assurances. He beat -hopefully, but vainly and pathetically, against a -door which was already barred and bolted, and -behind which (could he but have seen) the Kaiser, -with his Ministers and Staff, was wholly absorbed in -the study of war maps and tables of mobilisation. -</p> - -<p> -Sir Edward Grey failed to prevent war, and in -the circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at. -But if he failed in one direction he succeeded in -another. His whole procedure from first to last -was so transparently disinterested and above board -that, when war did actually come upon us, it found -us, not merely as a nation, but also as an Empire, -more united than we have ever been at any crisis, -since the Great Armada was sighted off Plymouth -Sound. English people felt that whatever else there -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P32"></a>32}</span> -might be to reproach themselves with, they at any -rate went into the fight with clean hands. What is -even more remarkable, the people of all neutral -countries, with the possible exception of the rigid -moralists of Constantinople, appeared for once to -share the same opinion. -</p> - -<p> -This was a great achievement; nearly, but not -quite, the greatest of all. To have prevented war -would have been a greater achievement still.... -But was war inevitable? Or was M. Sazonof right, -when he said to our Ambassador, on the morning of -the day when Servia replied to the Austrian -ultimatum,[<a id="chap0103fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn8">8</a>] that if Britain then took her stand firmly -with France and Russia there would be no war; but -that if we failed them then, rivers of blood would -flow, and in the end we should be dragged into war?[<a id="chap0103fn9text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn9">9</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Sir Edward Grey refused to take this course. He -judged that a pronouncement of such a character -would appear in the light of a menace to the -governments of Germany and Austria, and also to public -opinion in those countries; that it would only stiffen -their backs; that a more hopeful way of proceeding -was for England to deal with Germany as a friend, -letting it be understood that if our counsels of -moderation were disregarded, we might be driven most -reluctantly into the camp of her enemies. To this, -when it was urged by our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, -the Russian Minister only replied—and the -words seem to have in them a note of tragedy and -weariness, as if the speaker well knew that he was -talking to deaf ears—that unfortunately Germany -was convinced that she could count upon the neutrality -of Britain.[<a id="chap0103fn10text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn10">10</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P33"></a>33}</span> -</p> - -<p> -The alternative was to speak out as Mr. Lloyd -George spoke at the time of the Agadir crisis, 'to -rattle the sabre,' and to take our stand 'in shining -armour' beside the other two members of the Entente. -</p> - -<p> -Sir Edward Grey believed that this procedure would -not have the effect desired, but the reverse. Further, -it would have committed this country to a policy -which had never been submitted to it, and which it -had never considered, far less approved, even in -principle. The Agadir precedent could be -distinguished. There the danger which threatened -France arose directly out of treaty engagements -with ourselves. Here there was no such particular -justification, but a wide general question of the safety -of Europe and the British Empire. -</p> - -<p> -With regard to this wider question, notwithstanding -its imminence for a good many years, the British -Empire had not made up its mind, nor indeed had -it ever been asked to do so by those in authority. -Sir Edward Grey appears to have thought that, on -democratic principles, he had not the right to make -such a pronouncement as M. Sazonof desired; and -that even if this pathway might have led to peace, it -was one which he could not tread. -</p> - -<p> -The one alternative was tried, and failed. We -proffered our good offices, we urged our counsels of -moderation, all in vain. That, at any rate, is among -the certainties. And it is also among the certainties -that, although this alternative failed, it brought us -two signal benefits, in the unity of our own people and -the goodwill of the world. -</p> - -<p> -About the other alternative, which was not tried, -we cannot of course speak with the same sureness. -If Sir Edward Grey had taken the step which -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P34"></a>34}</span> -M. Sazonof desired him to take, he would at once have -been vehemently opposed and denounced by a very -large body of his own fellow-countrymen, who, never -having been taken frankly into the confidence of -the Government with regard to the foundations of -British policy, were at this early stage of the -proceedings almost wholly ignorant of the motives and -issues involved. This being so, if war had ensued, -we should then have gone into it a divided instead -of a united nation. On the other hand, if peace had -ensued, it must have been a patched-up ill-natured -peace; and it is not improbable that Sir Edward -Grey would have been driven from office by enemies -in his own household, playing the game of Germany -unconsciously, as on previous occasions, and would -have brought the Cabinet down with him in his fall. -For at this time, owing to domestic difficulties, the -Government stood in a very perilous position, and it -needed only such a mutiny, as a bold departure in -foreign affairs would almost certainly have provoked -among the Liberal party, to bring Mr. Asquith's -government to an end. -</p> - -<p> -As one reads and re-reads the official documents -in our present twilight, it is difficult to resist the -conclusion that on the main point Sir Edward Grey -was wrong and M. Sazonof right. Germany, with -her eyes wide open, had determined on war with -Russia and France, unless by Russia's surrender of -her prestige in the Balkans—a surrender in its way -almost as abject as that which had already been -demanded of Servia—the results of victory could be -secured without recourse to arms. Germany, -nevertheless, was not prepared for war with Britain. She -was reckoning with confidence on our standing aside, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P35"></a>35}</span> -on our unwillingness and inability to intervene.[<a id="chap0103fn11text"></a><a href="#chap0103fn11">11</a>] If it -had been made clear to her, that in case she insisted -on pressing things to extremity, we should on no -account stand aside, she might then have eagerly -forwarded, instead of deliberately frustrating, -Austria's eleventh-hour negotiations for an -accommodation with St. Petersburg. -</p> - -<p> -No one, except Germans, whose judgments, naturally -enough, are disordered by the miscarriage of -their plans, has dreamed of bringing the charge -against Sir Edward Grey that he wished for war, or -fomented it, or even that through levity or want of -vigilance, he allowed it to occur. The criticism is, -that although his intentions were of the best, and -his industry unflagging, he failed to realise the -situation, and to adopt the only means which might -have secured peace. -</p> - -<p> -The charge which is not only alleged, but established -against Austria is of a wholly different order. -It is that she provoked war—blindly perhaps, and -not foreseeing what the war would be, but at any -rate recklessly and obstinately. -</p> - -<p> -The crime of which Germany stands accused is -that she deliberately aimed at war, and that when -there seemed a chance of her plan miscarrying, she -promptly took steps to render peace impossible. -Among neutral countries is there one, the public -opinion of which has acquitted her? And has not -Italy, her own ally, condemned her by refusing -assistance on the ground that this war is a war of -German aggression? -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn1text">1</a>] The name of the Russian capital was -not changed until after the -declaration of war, and therefore St. Petersburg -is used in this chapter -instead of Petrograd. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn2text">2</a>] July-September 1911. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn3text">3</a>] August 1913. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn4text">4</a>] The total population of the -Austro-Hungarian Empire, including -Bosnia-Herzegovina, is roughly 50 millions. -Of these 11 millions are -Germans and 10 millions Magyars. -About 24 millions are composed of a -strange variety of Slav races. -The remaining 5 millions consist of Italians, -Roumanians, and Jews. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn5text">5</a>] White Paper, No. 161. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn6text">6</a>] A harmless and unprovocative telegram -from the King of Prussia to -Bismarck in July 1870 was, by the latter, -so altered in tone that when -published it achieved the intention of its editor -and served as 'a red rag -to the Gallic bull' and brought -about the declaration of war by Napoleon III.—Bismarck's -<i>Reflections and Reminiscences</i>, vol. ii. p. 100. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn7text">7</a>] White Paper, No. 161. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn8text">8</a>] Saturday, July 25. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn9"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn9text">9</a>] White Paper, No. 17. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn10"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn10text">10</a>] Ibid. Nos. 17 and 44. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0103fn11"></a> -[<a href="#chap0103fn11text">11</a>] A proof of this is the outburst -of hatred in Germany against England -so soon as we ranged ourselves with France and Russia. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0104"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P36"></a>36}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER IV -<br /> -THE PENALTY OF NEGLIGENCE -</h3> - -<p> -The East has been drawn into the circle of this -war as well as the West, the New World as well as -the Old; nor can any man feel certain, or even -hopeful, that the conflagration will be content to -burn itself out where it is now raging, and will not -spread across further boundaries.... It is therefore -no matter of surprise that people should be asking -themselves—"Of what nature is this war? Is it -one of those calamities, like earthquake or tempest, -drought or flood, which lawyers describe as 'the -act of God'? Or is it a thing which, having been -conceived and deliberately projected by the wit of -man, could have been averted by human courage -and judgment? Was this war, or was it not, -inevitable?" ... To which it may be answered, that -no war is inevitable until it occurs; and then every -war is apt to make pretensions to that character. -</p> - -<p> -In old times it was the Fates, superior even to -Zeus, who decreed wars. In later days wars were -regarded as the will of God. And to-day professional -interpreters of events are as ready as ever with -explanations why this war was, in the nature of things, -unavoidable. Whether the prevailing priesthood -wears white robes and fillets, or rich vestments, or -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P37"></a>37}</span> -cassocks and Geneva bands, or the severer modern -garb of the professor or politician, it appears to be -equally prone to dogmatic blasphemy. There is no -proof that this war was pre-ordained either by a -Christian God or by the laws of Pagan Nature. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -WAS WAR INEVITABLE? -</span> -</p> - -<p> -One may doubt if any war is inevitable. If -statesmen can gain time the chances are that they -will gain peace. This was the view of public opinion -throughout the British Empire down to July 1914. -It was in a special sense the view of the Liberal party; -and their view was endorsed, if not by the whole body -of Unionists, at any rate by their leader, in terms which -admitted of no misunderstanding.[<a id="chap0104fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0104fn1">1</a>] It is also the point -of view from which this book is written.... This -war was not inevitable; it could have been avoided, -but on one condition—<i>if England had been prepared</i>. -</p> - -<p> -England was not prepared either morally or -materially. Her rulers had left her in the dark as -to the dangers which surrounded her. They had -neglected to make clear to her—probably even to -themselves—the essential principles of British policy, -and the sacrifices which it entailed. They had -failed to provide armaments to correspond with -this policy. When the crisis arose their hands -were tied. They had to sit down hurriedly, and -decipher their policy, and find out what it meant. -Still more hurriedly they had to get it approved, -not merely by their fellow-countrymen, but by their -own colleagues—a work, if rumour[<a id="chap0104fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0104fn2">2</a>] speaks truly, of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P38"></a>38}</span> -considerable difficulty. Then they found that one -of the main supports was wanting; and they had -to set to work frantically to make an army adequate -to their needs. -</p> - -<p> -But it was too late. By this time their policy -had fallen about their ears in ruins. For their policy -was the neutrality of Belgium, and that was already -violated. Their policy was the defence of France, -and invasion had begun. Their policy was peace, -and peace was broken. The nation which would enjoy -peace must be strong enough to enforce peace. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The moods of nations pass like clouds, only more -slowly. They bank up filled with menace; we -look again and are surprised to find that they have -melted away as silently and swiftly as they came. -One does not need to be very old to recall various -wars, deemed at one time or another to be inevitable, -which never occurred. In the 'sixties' war with the -second Empire was judged to be inevitable; and along -our coasts dismantled forts remain to this day as -monuments of our fathers' firm belief in the imminence -of an invasion. In the 'seventies,' and indeed until -we had entered the present century, war with Russia -was regarded as inevitable by a large number of -well-informed people; and for a part of this period -war with the French Republic was judged to be no -less so. Fortune on the whole was favourable. -Circumstances changed. The sense of a common -danger healed old antagonisms. Causes of chronic -irritation disappeared of themselves, or were removed -by diplomatic surgery. And with the disappearance -of these inflammatory centres, misunderstandings, -prejudices, and suspicions began to vanish also. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P39"></a>39}</span> -Gradually it became clear, that what had been -mistaken on both sides for destiny was nothing more -inexorable than a fit of temper, or a conflict of -business interests not incapable of adjustment. And -in a sense the German menace was less formidable -than any of these others, for the reason that it was -a fit of temper on one side only—a fit of temper, or -megalomania. We became fully conscious of the -German mood only after the end of the South African -War, when its persistence showed clearly that it arose, -not from any sympathy with the Dutch, but from some -internal cause. When this cause was explained to us -it seemed so inadequate, so absurd, so unreal, so -contrary to the facts, that only a small fraction of our -nation ever succeeded in believing that it actually -existed. We had been taught by Carlyle, that while -the verities draw immortal life from the facts to -which they correspond, the falsities have but a -phenomenal existence, and a brief influence over -the minds of men. Consequently the greater part -of the British people troubled their heads very little -about this matter, never thought things would come -to a crisis, or lead to serious mischief; but trusted -always that, in due time, the ridiculous illusions of -our neighbours would vanish and die of their own -inanity. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMAN JEALOUSY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -We listened with an equal wonder and weariness -to German complaints that we were jealous of her -trade and bent on strangling it; that we grudged -her colonial expansion, and were intriguing all the -world over to prevent it; that we had isolated her -and ringed her round with hostile alliances. We -knew that these notions were all entirely false. We -knew that, so far from hampering German commerce, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P40"></a>40}</span> -our Free Trade system in the United Kingdom, in -the Dependencies, and in the Indian Empire had -fostered it and helped its rapid and brilliant success -more than any other external factor. -</p> - -<p> -For fully thirty years from 1870—during which -period what remained of the uncivilised portions of -the world was divided up, during which period also -Germany was the most powerful nation in Europe, -and could have had anything she wanted of these -new territories almost for the asking—Bismarck and -the statesmen of his school, engrossed mainly in the -European situation, set little store by colonies, -thought of them rather as expensive and dangerous -vanities, and abstained deliberately from taking an -energetic part in the scramble. We knew, that in Africa -and the East, Germany had nevertheless obtained -considerable possessions, and that it was, primarily -her own fault that she had not obtained more. We -assumed, no doubt very foolishly, that she must -ultimately become aware of her absurdity in blaming -us for her own neglect. We forgot human nature, -and the apologue of the drunkard who cursed the -lamp-post for its clumsiness in getting in his way. -</p> - -<p> -The British people knew that Germany was -talking nonsense; but unfortunately they never fully -realised that she was sincere, and meant all the -things she said. They thought she only half believed -in her complaints, as a man is apt to do when -ill-temper upsets his equanimity. They were confident -that in the end the falsities would perish and the -verities remain, and that in the fulness of time the -two nations would become friends. -</p> - -<p> -As to this last the British people probably judged -correctly; but they entirely overlooked the fact, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P41"></a>41}</span> -that if truth was to be given a chance of prevailing -in the end, it was important to provide against -mischief which might very easily occur in the meantime. -Nor did their rulers, whose duty it was, ever -warn them seriously of this necessity. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DANGERS OF ILL-TEMPER -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When a man works himself up into a rage and -proceeds to flourish a loaded revolver, something -more is necessary for the security of the bystanders -than the knowledge that his ill-temper does not -rest upon a reasonable basis. War was not -inevitable, certainly; but until the mood of Germany -changed, it was exceedingly likely to occur unless -the odds against the aggressor were made too -formidable for him to face. None of the governments, -however, which have controlled our national destinies -since 1900, ever developed sufficient energy to realise -the position of affairs, or ever mustered up courage -to tell the people clearly what the risks were, to state -the amount of the premium which was required to -cover the risks, and to insist upon the immediate -duty of the sacrifice which imperial security -inexorably demanded. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0104fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0104fn1text">1</a>] "I hear it also constantly said—there -is no use shutting our eyes or -ears to obvious facts—that owing to divergent -interests, war some day or -other between this country and Germany is inevitable. -I never believe in -these inevitable wars."—Mr. Bonar Law -in <i>England and Germany</i>. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0104fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0104fn2text">2</a>] Rumour finds confirmation in the White Paper; -also in an interview -with Mr. Lloyd George, reported in -<i>Pearson's Magazine</i>, March 1915, p. 265, col. ii. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0105"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P42"></a>42}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER V -<br /> -PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY -</h3> - -<p> -Although in a technical sense the present war was -brought on by Austrian diplomacy, no one, in England -at least, is inclined to rate the moral responsibility -of that empire at the highest figure. It is in -Germany that we find, or imagine ourselves to have -found, not only the true and deep-seated causes of -the war, but the immediate occasions of it. -</p> - -<p> -Not the least of our difficulties, however, is to -decide the point—Who is Germany? Who was -her man of business? Who acted for her in the -matter of this war? Who pulled the wires, or -touched the button that set the conflagration blazing? -Was this the work of an individual or a camarilla? -Was it the result of one strong will prevailing, or of -several wills getting to loggerheads—wills not -particularly strong, but obstinate, and flustered by internal -controversy and external events? What actually -happened—was it meant by the 'super-men' to -happen, or did it come as a shock—not upon -'supermen' at all—but upon several groups of surprised -blunderers? These questions are not likely to be -answered for a generation or more—until, if ever, -the archives of Vienna and Berlin give up their -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P43"></a>43}</span> -secrets—and it would therefore be idle to waste too -much time in analysis of the probabilities. -</p> - -<p> -The immediate occasion of the catastrophe has -been variously attributed to the German court, army, -bureaucracy, professors, press, and people. If we are -looking only for a single thing—the hand which lit the -conflagration—and not for the profounder and more -permanent causes and origins of the trouble, we can at -once dismiss several of these suspects from the dock. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MEN OF LETTERS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Men of learning and letters, professors of every -variety—a class which has been christened 'the -Pedantocracy' by unfriendly critics—may be all -struck off the charge-sheet as unconcerned in the -actual delinquency of arson. -</p> - -<p> -In fact, if not in name, these are a kind of priesthood, -and a large part of their lives' work has been -to spread among German youth the worship of the -State under Hohenzollern kingship. It is impossible -of course to make 'a silk purse out of a sow's ear,' -a religion out of a self-advertising dynasty, or a god -out of a machine. Consequently, except for mischief, -their efforts have been mainly wasted. Over a long -period of years, however, they have been engaged in -heaping up combustibles. They have filled men's -minds to overflowing with notions which are very -liable to lead to war, and which indeed were designed -for no other purpose than to prepare public opinion -for just such a war as this. Their responsibility -therefore is no light one, and it will be dealt with -later. But they are innocent at all events of -complicity in this particular exploit of fire-raising; and -if, after the event, they have sought to excuse, -vindicate, and uphold the action of their rulers it would -be hard measure to condemn them for that. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P44"></a>44}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Nor did the press bring about the war. In other -countries, where the press is free and irresponsible, it -has frequently been the prime mover in such mischief; -but never in Germany. For in Germany the press is -incapable of bringing about anything of the political -kind, being merely an instrument and not a principal. -</p> - -<p> -Just as little can the charge of having produced -the war be brought against the people. In other -countries, where the people are used to give marching -orders to their rulers, popular clamour has led to -catastrophe of this kind more frequently than any -other cause. But this, again, has never been so in -Germany. The German people are sober, steadfast, -and humble in matters of high policy. They have -confidence in their rulers, believe what they are told, -obey orders readily, but do not think of giving them. -When war was declared, all Germans responded to the -call of duty with loyalty and devotion. Nay, having -been prepared for at least a generation, they welcomed -war with enthusiasm. According to the lights which -were given them to judge by, they judged every whit -as rightly as our own people. The lights were false -lights, hung out deliberately to mislead them and to -justify imperial policy. But this was no fault of -theirs. Moreover, the judgment which they came -to with regard to the war was made after the event, -and cannot therefore in any case be held responsible -for its occurrence. This is a people's war surely -enough, but just as surely, the people had no hand -in bringing it about. -</p> - -<p> -The circle of the accused is therefore narrowed -down to the Court, the Army, and the Bureaucracy. -And there we must leave it for the present—a joint -indictment against all three. But whether these -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P45"></a>45}</span> -parties were guilty, all three in equal measure, we -cannot conjecture with the least approach to certainty. -Nor can we even say precisely of what they were -guilty—of misunderstanding—of a quarrel among -themselves—of a series of blunders—or of a crime so -black and deliberate, that no apologist will be able -ever to delete it from the pages of history. On all -this posterity must be left to pronounce. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMAN MILITARY OPINION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is only human nevertheless to be curious about -personalities. Unfortunately for the satisfaction of -this appetite, all is darkness as to the German Army. -We may suspect that the Prussian junker, or country -gentleman, controls and dominates it. But even as -to this we may conceivably be wrong. The military -genius of some Hanoverian, Saxon, or Bavarian -may possess the mastery in council. As to the real -heads of the army, as to their individual characters, -and their potency in directing policy we know nothing -at all. After nine months of war, we have arrived -at no clear notion, even with regard to their relative -values as soldiers in the field. We have even less -knowledge as to their influence beforehand in shaping -and deciding the issues of war and peace. -</p> - -<p> -This much, however, we may reasonably deduce -from Bernhardi and other writers—that military -opinion had been anxious for some considerable -number of years past, and more particularly since -the Agadir incident,[<a id="chap0105fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0105fn1">1</a>] lest war, which it regarded as -ultimately inevitable, should be delayed until the -forces ranged against Germany, especially upon her -Eastern frontier, were too strong for her to cope with. -</p> - -<p> -In the pages of various official publications, and -in newspaper reports immediately before and after -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P46"></a>46}</span> -war began, we caught glimpses of certain characters -at work; but these were not professional soldiers; -they were members of the Court and the Bureaucracy. -</p> - -<p> -Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, -comes upon the scene—a harassed and indignant -official—sorely flustered—not by any means master -of his temper—not altogether certain of his -facts—in considerable doubt apparently as to whether -things have not passed behind his back which he -ought to have been told of by higher powers, but -was not. He appears to us as a diligent and faithful -servant,—one who does not seek to impose his own -decisions, but to excuse, justify, and carry out, -if he can, decisions which have been made by others, -more highly placed and greedier of responsibility -than himself. -</p> - -<p> -Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Minister, is much -affected. He drops tears—or comes somewhere near -dropping them—over the lost hopes of a peaceful -understanding between England and Germany. We -can credit the sincerity of his sorrow all the more -easily, for the reason that Herr von Jagow behaves -throughout the crisis as the courteous gentleman; -while others, who by position were even greater -gentlemen, forget momentarily, in their excitement, -the qualities which are usually associated with that -title. -</p> - -<p> -Then there is the German Ambassador at -Vienna—obviously a firebrand—enjoying, one imagines, -the confidence of the war parties in both capitals: -also apparently a busy intriguer. The documents -show him acting behind the back of the Berlin Foreign -Office, and communicating direct with the Kaiser. -</p> - -<p> -We gather very clearly that he egged on the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P47"></a>47}</span> -statesmen of Vienna, with great diligence and success, -to press Servia to extremes, and to shear time so -short that peace-makers had nothing left to catch -hold of. Russia, he assured them, would never -carry her opposition to the point of war. Even if -she did so, he argued with much plausibility, she -would be negligible. For she stood midway in a -great military and naval reformation, than which -no situation is more deplorable for the purposes of -carrying on a campaign. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -PRINCE LICHNOWSKY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador -in London, took his departure at the outbreak -of war, he probably left no single enemy behind him. -A simple, friendly, sanguine figure, with a pardonable -vanity which led him to believe the incredible. He -produced what is called in the cant of the day 'an -atmosphere,' mainly in drawing-rooms and newspaper -offices, but occasionally, one conjectures, even in -Downing Street itself. His artistry was purely in -air and touched nothing solid. He was useful to -his employers, mainly because he put England off -her guard. He would not have been in the least -useful if he had not been mainly sincere. -</p> - -<p> -But though he was useful to German policy, he -was not trusted by the powers in Berlin to attend to -their business at the Court of St. James's except -under strict supervision. What precisely were the -duties of Baron von Kuhlmann, Councillor to the -Embassy? He was always very cheerful, and obliging, -and ready to smooth any little difficulty out -of the way. On the other hand, he was also very -deft at inserting an obstacle with an air of perfect -innocence, which imposed on nearly every one—even -occasionally on the editors of newspapers. For -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P48"></a>48}</span> -some reason, however, very few people were willing -to accept this plausible diplomatist's assurances -without a grain or two of salt. Indeed quite a large -number were so misled by their prejudices against -him, that they were convinced his prime vocation -was that of a spy—a spy on the country to which he -was accredited and on the Ambassador under whom -he served.[<a id="chap0105fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0105fn2">2</a>] -</p> - -<p> -We know more of the Kaiser than of any of these -others, and we have known him over a much longer -period. And yet our knowledge of him has never -enabled us to forecast his actions with any certainty. -British ministers and diplomatists, whose business it -is to gauge, not only the muzzle-velocity of eminent -characters, but also the forces of their recoil, never -seem to have arrived at any definite conclusions with -regard to this baffling personality. Whatever he -did or did not do, they were always surprised by it, -which gives us some measure of their capacity if not -of his. -</p> - -<p> -The Kaiser is pre-eminently a man of moods. -At one time he is Henry the Fifth, at another Richard -the Second. Upon occasions he appears as Hamlet, -cursing fate which impels him to make a decision. -Within the same hour he is Autolycus crying up his -wares with an unfeigned cheerfulness. He is possessed -by the demon of quick-change and restlessness. We -learn on good authority that he possesses an almost -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P49"></a>49}</span> -incredible number of uniforms which he actually -wears, and of royal residences which he occasionally -inhabits. He clothes himself suitably for each brief -occasion, and sleeps rarely, if reports can be believed, -for more than two nights together under the same -roof. He is like an American millionaire in his -fondness for rapid and sudden journeys, and like a -democratic politician in his passion for speech-making. -</p> - -<p> -The phenomena of the moment—those which -flicker upon the surface of things—engage his eager -and vivacious interest. Upon such matters his -commentaries are often apt and entertaining. But -when he attempts to deal with deeper issues, and with -the underlying principles and causes of human action, -his utterances immediately lose the mind's attention -and keep hold only of the ear's, by virtue of a certain -resonance and blatancy. When the Kaiser discourses -to us, as he often does, upon the profundities of -politics, philosophy, and religion, he falls instantly into -set forms, which express nothing that is living and -real. He would have the world believe, and doubtless -himself sincerely believes, that he has plunged, like -a pearl-diver, into the deeps, and has returned thence -laden with rich treasures of thought and experience. -But in truth he has never visited this region at all, -being of a nature far too buoyant for such enterprises. -He has not found truth, but only remembered phrases. -</p> - -<p> -The Kaiser is frequently upbraided for his charm -of manner by people who have come under its influence -and been misled. One of the commonest accusations -against him is that of duplicity; but indeed it -seems hardly more just to condemn him for duplicity -than it would be to praise him for sincerity. He is -a man dangerous to have dealings with, but this -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P50"></a>50}</span> -is owing to the irresponsible effervescence of his -ideas. At any given moment he probably means -the greater part of what he says; but the image -of one moment is swiftly expelled and obliterated -by that of the next. The Kaiser's untrustworthiness -arises not from duplicity, so much as from the -quickness of his fancy, the shallowness of his judgment, -and the shortness of his memory. That his -communications frequently produce the same effects as -duplicity, is due to the fact that he recognises no -obligation either to stand by his word, or to correct -the impression which his hasty assurances may have -produced in the mind of his interlocutor. The -statesman who is won over to-day by his advocacy -of an English alliance, is astounded on the morrow -to find him encouraging an English pogrom.[<a id="chap0105fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0105fn3">3</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P51"></a>51}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE IDEA OF ANTICHRIST -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When a violent convulsion shakes the world -people immediately begin to look about them for some -mighty and malevolent character who can be held -responsible for it. To the generations which knew -them, Cromwell, Napoleon, and Bismarck all figured -as Antichrist. But in regard to the policy which -produced the present war, of what man can it be said -truly, either that he controlled that policy, or that he -brought about the results which he aimed at? Which -of the great personages concerned possesses the -sublime qualities of the spirit of evil?[<a id="chap0105fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0105fn4">4</a>] -</p> - -<p> -It is conceivable, though very unlikely, that -behind the scenes there was some strong silent man -who worked the others like puppets on a string; but -among those who have made themselves known to -us in the pages of White Papers and the like, there -is none whose features bear the least resemblance -to our conception of Antichrist; none who had firm -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P52"></a>52}</span> -control of events, or even of himself. There is none -of whom it is possible to say truly that he achieved -the results at which he aimed. -</p> - -<p> -It is clear that the war which the joint efforts -of these great personages brought into existence was -a monstrous birth, and that it filled those who were -responsible for it with dismay, only a degree less -than it shocked other people. For proof of this, it -is unnecessary to look further than the miscalculations -of the political kind which became recognised for -such within a few weeks after war was declared. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0105fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0105fn1text">1</a>] July 1911. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0105fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0105fn2text">2</a>] Prussian policy appears to be modelled -upon the human body. -Just as man is endowed with a duality of certain -organs—eyes, nostrils, -lungs, kidneys, etc.—so Prussian policy appears -to proceed upon the -principle of a double diplomatic representation, -two separate Foreign -Office departments, etc., etc. -It is no doubt an excellent plan to have a -second string to your bow; -but it is not yet clear how far this can be carried -with advantage in delicate negotiations -without destroying confidence in -your sincerity. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0105fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0105fn3text">3</a>] A labour leader, highly impressed -by the spectacle, gave a vivid -description of an equestrian parade through -the streets of Berlin after the -declaration of war—the Kaiser in helmet of gold, -seated on his white -charger, frowning terribly, in a kind of immobility, -as if his features had -been frozen into this dramatically -appropriate expression—following -behind him in a carriage the Crown Prince -and Princess, all vivacity and -smiles, and bows to this side and the -other—a remarkable contrast! -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -It is interesting to contrast the ornate -and flamboyant being whom -we know as Kaiser Wilhelm the Second with -Carlyle's famous description of -the great Frederick:— -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"A highly interesting lean little old man, -of alert though slightly stooping -figure; whose name among strangers -was King Friedrich the Second, or -Frederick the Great of Prussia, -and at home among the common people, -who much loved and esteemed him, -was <i>Vater Fritz</i>,—Father Fred,—a -name of familiarity which had not -bred contempt in that instance. He is -a King every inch of him, though -without the trappings of a King. -Presents himself in a Spartan simplicity -of vesture; no crown but an old -military cocked-hat,—generally old, -or trampled and kneaded into -absolute <i>softness</i>, if new;—no sceptre -but one like Agamemnon's, a -walking-stick cut from the woods, which -serves also as a riding-stick -(with which he hits the horse -'between the ears' say authors);—and for -royal robes, a mere soldier's blue coat -with red facings, coat likely to be -old, and sure to have a good deal -of Spanish snuff on the breast of it; -rest of the apparel dim, unobtrusive -in colour or cut, ending in high -over-knee military boots, which may -be brushed (and, I hope, kept soft -with an underhand suspicion of oil), -but are not permitted to be blackened -or varnished; Day and Martin with their soot-pots forbidden to -approach. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"The man is not of godlike physiognomy, -any more than of imposing -stature or costume; close-shut mouth with -thin lips, prominent jaws and -nose, receding brow, by no means of -Olympian height; head, however, is -of long form, and has superlative gray eyes in it. -Not what is called a -beautiful man; nor yet, by all appearance, -what is called a happy. On -the contrary, the face bears evidence -of many sorrows, as they are termed, -of much hard labour done in this world; -and seems to anticipate nothing -but more still coming. -Quiet stoicism, capable enough of what joy there -were, but not expecting any worth mention; -great unconscious and some -conscious pride, well tempered with a -cheery mockery of humour,—are -written on that old face; which carries -its chin well forward, in spite of -the slight stoop about the neck; snuffy -nose rather flung into the air -under its old cocked hat,—like an old -snuffy lion on the watch; and -such a pair of eyes as no man or lion -or lynx of that century bore elsewhere, -according to all the testimony we -have."—Carlyle, <i>History of Frederick -the Great</i>, Bk. I. chap. i. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0105fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0105fn4text">4</a>] A friend who has been kind enough -to read the proofs of this volume -takes exception to the rating of Antichrist. -The Devil, he maintains, is not -at all a clever or profound spirit, -though he is exceedingly industrious. The -conception of him in the old Mystery Plays, -where he figures as a kind of -butt, whose elaborate and painfully -constructed schemes are continually -being upset owing to some ridiculous -oversight, or by some trivial accident, -is the true Satan; the Miltonic idea is -a poetical myth, not in the least -borne out by human experience. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0106"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P53"></a>53}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VI -<br /> -GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS -</h3> - -<p> -In the world's play-house there are a number of -prominent and well-placed seats, which the instinct -of veneration among mankind insists on reserving -for Super-men; and as mankind is never content -unless the seats of the super-men are well filled, 'the -Management'—in other words, the press, the publicists, -and other manipulators of opinion—have to -do the best they can to find super-men to sit in them. -When that is impossible, it is customary to burnish -up, fig out, and pass off various colourable substitutes -whom it is thought, may be trusted to comport -themselves with propriety until the curtain falls. But -those resplendent creatures whom we know so well -by sight and fame, and upon whom all eyes and -opera-glasses are directed during the <i>entr'-actes</i>, are -for the most part not super-men at all, but merely -what, in the slang of the box-office, is known as -'paper.' Indeed there have been long periods, even -generations, during which the supposed super-men -have been wholly 'paper.' -</p> - -<p> -Of course so long as the super-men substitutes -have only to walk to their places, to bow, smile, -frown, overawe, and be admired, everything goes -safely enough. The audience is satisfied and the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P54"></a>54}</span> -'management' rubs its hands. But if anything has -to be done beyond this parade business, if the -unexpected happens, if, for instance, there is an alarm -of fire—in which case the example set by the -super-creatures might be of inestimable assistance—the -'paper' element is certain to crumple up, according -to the laws of its nature, being after all but dried pulp. -Something of this kind appears to have happened -in various great countries during the weeks which -immediately preceded and followed the outbreak of -war, and in none was the crumpling up of the -supermen substitutes more noticeable than in Germany. -</p> - -<p> -The thoroughness of the German race is no empty -boast. All the world knows as much by experience -in peace as well as war. Consequently, people had -said to themselves: "However it may be with other -nations, in Germany at all events the strings of -foreign policy are firmly held in giant fingers." But -as day succeeded day, unmasking one miscalculation -after another, it became clear that there must -have been at least as much 'paper' in the political -high places of Germany as elsewhere. -</p> - -<p> -Clearly, although this war was made in Germany, -it did not at all follow the course which had been -charted for it in the official forecasts. For the -German bureaucracy and general staff had laid their -plans to crush France at the first onset—to crush her -till the bones stuck out through her skin. And they -had reckoned to out-general Russia and roll back her -multitudes, as yet unorganised—so at least it was -conceived—in wave upon wave of encroaching defeat. -</p> - -<p> -Having achieved these aims before the fall of the -leaf, Germany would have gained thereby another -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P55"></a>55}</span> -decade for the undisturbed development of wealth -and world-power. Under Prussian direction the -power of Austria would then be consolidated within -her own dominions and throughout the Balkan -Peninsula. At the end of this interval of vigorous -recuperation, or possibly earlier, Germany would -attack England, and England would fall an easy prey. -For having stood aside from the former struggle she -would be without allies. Her name would stink in -the nostrils of Russia and France; and indeed to the -whole world she would be recognised for what she -was—a decadent and coward nation. Even her -own children would blush for her dishonour. -</p> - -<p> -That these were the main lines of the German -forecast no man can doubt, who has watched and -studied the development of events; and although -it is as yet too early days to make sure that nothing -of all this vast conception will ever be realised, much -of it—the time-table at all events—has certainly -miscarried for good and all. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE TIME-TABLE MISCARRIES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -According to German calculations England would -stand aside; but England took part. Italy would -help her allies; but Italy refused. Servia was a -thing of naught; but Servia destroyed several army -corps. Belgium would not count; and yet Belgium -by her exertions counted, if for nothing more, for the -loss of eight precious days, while by her sufferings -she mobilised against the aggressor the condemnation -of the whole world. -</p> - -<p> -The Germans reckoned that the army of France -was terrible only upon paper. Forty-five years of -corrupt government and political peculation must, -according to their calculations, have paralysed the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P56"></a>56}</span> -general staff and betrayed the national spirit. The -sums voted for equipment, arms, and ammunition -must assuredly have been spirited away, as under -The Third Empire, into the pockets of ministers, -senators, deputies, and contractors. The results of -this régime would become apparent, as they had done -in 1870, only in the present case sooner. -</p> - -<p> -War was declared by the Third Napoleon at -mid-July, by William the Second not until August -1; but Sedan or its equivalent would occur, -nevertheless, in the first days of September, in 1914 as in -1870. In the former contest Paris fell at the end of -six months; in this one, with the aid of howitzers, it -would fall at the end of six weeks. -</p> - -<p> -Unfortunately for this confident prediction, -whatever may have been the deficiency in the French -supplies, however dangerous the consequent hitches -in mobilisation, things fell out quite differently. -The spirit of the people of France, and the devotion -of her soldiers, survived the misfeasances of the -politicians, supposing indeed that such crimes had -actually been committed. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -It was a feature of Bismarck's diplomacy that -he put a high value upon the good opinion of -the world, and took the greatest pains to avoid its -condemnation. In 1870, as we now know, he schemed -successfully, to lure the government of Napoleon the -Third into a declaration of war, thereby saddling the -French government with the odium which attaches to -peace-breakers.[<a id="chap0106fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0106fn1">1</a>] But in the case of the present war, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P57"></a>57}</span> -which, as it out-Bismarcked Bismarck in deliberate -aggressiveness, stood all the more in need of a tactful -introduction to the outside world, the precautions -of that astute statesman were neglected or despised. -From the beginning all neutral nations were resentful -of German procedure, and after the devastation of -Belgium and the destruction of Louvain, the spacious -morality of the Young Turks alone was equal to the -profession of friendship and admiration. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -CRUELTIES IN BELGIUM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The objects which Germany sought to gain by the -cruelties perpetrated, under orders, by her soldiers in -Belgium and Northern France are clear enough. -These objects were certainly of considerable value in a -military as well as in a political sense. One wonders, -however, if even Germany herself now considers them -to have been worth the abhorrence and disgust which -they have earned for her throughout the civilised -world. -</p> - -<p> -In nothing is the sham super-man more easily -detected than in the confidence and self-complacency -with which he pounces upon the immediate small -advantage, regardless of the penalty he will have to -pay in the future. By spreading death and devastation -broadcast in Belgium the Germans hoped to attain -three things, and it is not impossible that they have -succeeded in attaining them all. They sought to -secure their communications by putting the fear of -death, and worse than death, into the hearts of the civil -population. They sought to send the countryside -fleeing terror-stricken before their advance, choking -and cumbering the highways; than which nothing is -ever more hampering to the operations of an army in -retreat, or more depressing to its spirits. But chiefly -they desired to set a ruthless object-lesson before the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P58"></a>58}</span> -eyes of Holland, in order to show her the consequences -of resistance; so that when it came to her turn to -answer a summons to surrender she might have the -good sense not to make a fuss. They desired in their -dully-calculating, official minds that Holland might -never forget the clouds of smoke, from burning villages -and homesteads, which the August breezes carried far -across her frontiers; the sights of horror, the tales of -suffering and ruin which tens of thousands of starved, -forlorn, and hurrying fugitives brought with them -when they came seeking sanctuary in her territories. -But if the Germans gained all this, and even if -they gained in addition the loving admiration of -the Young Turks, was it worth while to purchase -these advantages at such a price? It seems a poor -bargain to save your communications, if thereby you -lose the good opinion of the whole world. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -What is of most interest to ourselves, however, -in the long list of miscalculations, is the confidence -of Germany that Britain would remain neutral. For -a variety of reasons which satisfied the able bureaucrats -at Berlin, it was apparently taken for granted by -them that we were determined to stand out; and -indeed that we were in no position to come in even if -we would. We conjecture that the reports of German -ambassadors, councillors, consuls, and secret service -agents must have been very certain and unanimous -in this prediction. -</p> - -<p> -According to the German theory, the British race, -at home and abroad, was wholly immersed in gain, -and in a kind of pseudo-philanthropy—in making -money, and in paying blackmail to the working-classes -in order to be allowed to go on making money. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P59"></a>59}</span> -Our social legislation and our 'People's Budgets' were -regarded in Germany with contempt, as sops and -shams, wanting in thoroughness and tainted with -hypocrisy. -</p> - -<p> -English politicians, acting upon the advice of -obliging financiers, had been engaged during recent -years (so grossly was the situation misjudged by our -neighbours) in imposing taxation which hit the -trader, manufacturer, and country-gentleman as hard -as possible; which also hit the working-class hard, -though indirectly; but which left holes through which -the financiers themselves—by virtue of their -international connections and affiliations—could glide -easily into comparative immunity. -</p> - -<p> -From these faulty premisses, Germans concluded -that Britain was held in leading-strings by certain -sentimentalists who wanted vaguely to do good; and -that these sentimentalists, again, were helped and -guided by certain money-lenders and exploiters, who -were all very much in favour of paying ransom out -of other people's pockets. A nation which had come -to this pass would be ready enough to sacrifice future -interests—being blind to them—for the comforts of -a present peace. -</p> - -<p> -The Governments of the United Kingdom and the -Dominions were largely influenced—so it was believed -at Berlin—by crooks and cranks of various sorts, by -speculators and 'speculatists,'[<a id="chap0106fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0106fn2">2</a>] many of them of foreign -origin or descent—who preached day in and day out -the doctrine that war was an anachronism, <i>vieux jeu</i>, -even an impossibility in the present situation of the -world. -</p> - -<p> -</p> - -<p> -<a id="chap0106fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0106fn2text">2</a>] 'Speculatists' was a term used -by contemporary American writers -to describe the eloquent theorists -who played so large a part in the French -Revolution. -</p> - -<p> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P60"></a>60}</span> -</p> - -<p> -The British Government appeared to treat these -materially-minded visionaries with the highest favour. -Their advice was constantly sought; they were -recipients of the confidences of Ministers; they -played the part of Lords Bountiful to the party -organisations; they were loaded with titles, if not -with honour. Their abhorrence of militarism knew -no bounds, and to a large extent it seemed to German, -and even to English eyes, as if they carried the -Cabinet, the party-machine, and the press along -with them. -</p> - -<p> -'Militarism,' as used by these enthusiasts, was a -comprehensive term. It covered with ridicule and -disrepute even such things as preparation for the -defence of the national existence. International -law was solemnly recommended as a safer defence -than battleships. -</p> - -<p> -Better certainly, they allowed, if militarism could -be rooted out in all countries; but at any rate England, -the land of their birth or adoption, must be saved -from the contamination of this brutalising idea. In -their anxiety to discredit Continental exemplars -they even went so far as to evolve an ingenious -theory, that foreign nations which followed in the -paths of militarism, did so at serious loss to -themselves, but with wholly innocent intentions. More -especially, they insisted, was this true in the case of -Germany. -</p> - -<p> -The Liberal party appeared to listen to these -opinions with respect; Radicals hailed them with -enthusiasm; while the Labour party was at one time -so much impressed, as to propose through some of its -more progressive spirits that, in the exceedingly -unlikely event of a German landing, working-men -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P61"></a>61}</span> -should continue steadily at their usual labours and -pay no heed to the military operations of the -invaders. -</p> - -<p> -In Berlin, apparently, all this respect and -enthusiasm for pacifism, together with the concrete -proposals for putting its principles into practice, -were taken at their face value. There at any rate -it was confidently believed that the speculators and -the 'speculatists' had succeeded in changing or erasing -the spots of the English leopard. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ERRORS OF INFERENCE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -But in order to arrive at such a conclusion as this -the able German bureaucrats must have understood -very little, one would think, of human nature in -general, and of British human nature in particular. -Clearly they built more hopes on our supposed -conversion to pacifism than the foundations would stand. -They were right, of course, in counting it a benefit -to themselves that we were unprepared and -unsuspicious of attack; that we had pared down our -exiguous army and stinted our navy somewhat beyond -the limits of prudence. They were foolish, however, -not to perceive that if the British people found -themselves confronted with the choice, between a war -which they believed to be righteous, and a peace -which they saw clearly would not only be wounding -to their own honour but ruinous to their security, all -their fine abstract convictions would go by the board; -that party distinctions would then for the time being -disappear, and the speculators and the 'speculatists' -would be interned in the nethermost pit of national -distrust.... In so far, therefore, as the Germans -reckoned on our unpreparedness they were wise; -but in counting upon British neutrality they were -singularly wide of the mark. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P62"></a>62}</span> -</p> - -<p> -One imagines that among the idealists of Berlin -there must surely have been a few sceptics who did -not altogether credit this wholesale conversion and -quakerisation of the British race. But for these -doubters, if indeed they existed, there were other -considerations of a more practical kind which seemed -to indicate that Britain must certainly stand aside. -</p> - -<p> -The first and most important of these was the -imminence of civil war in Ireland. If Prince -Lichnowsky and Baron von Kuhlmann reported that this -had become inevitable, small blame to their -perspicacity! For in this their judgment only tallied -with that of most people in the United Kingdom who -had any knowledge of the true facts. -</p> - -<p> -In March an incident occurred among the troops -stationed in Ireland which must have given comfort -at Berlin, even in greater measure than it caused -disquiet at home. For it showed in a vivid flash -the intrinsic dangers of the Irish situation, and the -tension, almost to breaking-point, which existed -between the civil authorities and the fighting services. -</p> - -<p> -It also showed, what in the circumstances must -have been peculiarly reassuring to the German -Government, that our Navy and Army were under -the charge of Ministers whose judgments were apt -to be led captive by their tempers. Although the -Secretary of State for War did not remain in office -for many days to encourage the hearts of the general -staff at Berlin, his important post was never filled. -It was only occupied and kept warm by the Prime -Minister, whose labours and responsibilities—according -to the notions of the Germans, who are a painstaking -and thorough people—were already enough -for one man to undertake. Moreover, the First -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P63"></a>63}</span> -Lord of the Admiralty had not resigned; and it -was perhaps natural, looking at what had just -happened, to conclude that he would be wholly -incapable of the sound and swift decision by which -a few months later he was destined to atone for his -recent blunder. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE DUBLIN RIOT -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Moreover, although the Curragh incident, as it -was called, had been patched over in a sort of way, -the danger of civil war in Ireland had not diminished -in the least by Midsummer. Indeed it had sensibly -increased. During the interval large quantities of -arms and ammunition had been imported by Ulstermen -in defiance of the Government, and Nationalists -were eagerly engaged in emulating their example. -The emergency conference of the leaders of parties -which the King, acting upon the desperate advice -of his Ministers, had called together at Buckingham -Palace ended in complete failure. -</p> - -<p> -On Monday the 27th of July readers of the morning -newspapers, looking anxiously for news of the Servian -reply to the Austrian ultimatum, found their eyes -distracted by even blacker headlines, which announced -that a Scots regiment had fired on a Dublin mob. -</p> - -<p> -How the bureaucrats of Berlin must have rubbed -their hands and admired their own prescience! Civil -war in Ireland had actually begun, and in the very -nick of time! And this occurrence, no less dramatic -than opportune, was a triumph not merely for German -foresight but for German contrivance—like a good -many other things, indeed, which have taken place -of late. When the voyage of the good ship <i>Fanny</i>, -which in April carried arms to the coast of Antrim, -comes to be written, and that of the anonymous yacht -which sailed from German waters, transhipped its -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P64"></a>64}</span> -cargo in the channel, whence it was safely conveyed -by another craft to Dublin Bay to kindle this blaze -in July—when these narratives are set out by some -future historian, as they deserve to be, but not until -then, it will be known how zealously, benevolently, -and impartially our loyal and kindly Teuton cousins -forwarded and fomented the quarrel between -Covenanter and Nationalist. What the German bureaucrats, -however, with all their foresight, apparently -did not in the least foresee, was that the wound which -they had intentionally done so much to keep open, -they would speedily be helping unintentionally to -heal. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -With regard to South Africa, German miscalculation -and intrigue pursued a somewhat similar course, -though with little better results. It was assumed -that South Africa, having been fully incorporated -in the Empire as a self-governing unit only twelve -years earlier, and as the result of a prolonged and -sanguinary war, must necessarily be bent on severing -the British connection at the earliest opportunity. -The Dutch, like the frogs in the fable, were imagined -to be only awaiting a favourable moment to exchange -the tyranny of King Log for the benevolent rule of -King Stork. -</p> - -<p> -In these forecasts, however, various considerations -were overlooked. In the first place, the -methods of incorporation pursued by the British in -South Africa were as nearly as possible the opposite -of those adopted by Prussia in Poland, in -Schleswig-Holstein, and in Alsace-Lorraine. In many quarters -there were doubtless bitter memories among the Dutch, -and in some others disappointed ambition still ached; -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P65"></a>65}</span> -but these forces were not enough to plunge into serious -civil war two races which, after nearly a century -of strife and division, had but a few years before -entered into a solemn and voluntary covenant to make -a firm union, and dwell henceforth in peace one with -another. What object could there be for Dutchmen -to rise in rebellion against a government, which -consisted almost exclusively of Dutch statesmen, -and which had been put in office and was kept there -by the popular vote? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MISTAKES AS TO DUTCH -</span> -</p> - -<p> -What German intrigue and bribery could do it -did. But Dutchmen whose recollections went back -so far as twenty years were little likely to place -excessive confidence in the incitements and -professions of Berlin. They remembered with what busy -intrigues Germany had in former times encouraged -their ambitions, with what a rich bribery of promises -she had urged them on to war, with what cold indifference, -when war arose, she had left them to their fate. -They also remembered how, when their aged President, -an exiled and broken-hearted man, sought an interview -with the great sovereign whose consideration -for him in his more prosperous days had never lacked -for warmth, he received for an answer, that Berlin -was no place for people who had been beaten to come -whining, and was turned from the door. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -In India, as in South Africa, Germany entertained -confident hopes of a successful rising. Had not the -Crown Prince, a shrewd judge, visited there a few -years earlier and formed his own estimate of the -situation? Was there not a widely spread network -of sedition covering the whole of our Eastern Empire, -an incendiary press, and orators who openly counselled -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P66"></a>66}</span> -violence and preached rebellion? Had not riots -been increasing rapidly in gravity and number? -Had not assassins been actively pursuing their trade? -Had not a ship-load of Indians just been refused -admission to Canada, thereby causing a not unnatural -outburst of indignation? -</p> - -<p> -How far German statesmen had merely foreseen -these things, how far they had actually contrived -them, we are as yet in ignorance; but judging by -what has happened in other places—in Ireland, -South Africa, Belgium, and France—it would -surprise no one to learn that the bombs which -were thrown at the Viceroy and his wife with tragic -consequences owed something to German teaching. -It is unlikely that German emissaries had been less -active in fomenting unrest in India than elsewhere -among the subjects of nations with which they were -ostensibly at peace; while the fact that the Crown -Prince had but recently enjoyed the hospitality of -the Viceregal Court was only a sentimental consideration -unworthy of the attention of super-men. -</p> - -<p> -Moreover, it had for long been abundantly clear, -on <i>a priori</i> grounds, to thinkers like Treitschke and -Bernhardi that India was already ripe for rebellion -on a grand scale. There are but two things which -affect the Indian mind with awe and submission—a -sublime philosophy and a genius for war. The -English had never been philosophers, and they had -ceased to be warriors. How, then, could a race which -worshipped only soldiers and sages be expected to -reverence and obey a garrison of clerks and -shopkeepers? A war between England and Germany -would provide an opportunity for making an end for -ever of the British Raj. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P67"></a>67}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MISTAKES AS TO DOMINIONS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The self-governing Dominions were believed to -be affected with the same decadent spirit and fantastic -illusions as their Mother Country; only with them -these cankers had spread more widely, were more -logically followed out in practice, and less tempered -and restrained by aristocratic tradition. Their -eloquent outpourings of devotion and cohesion were -in reality quite valueless; merely what in their own -slang is known as 'hot air.' They hated militarism -in theory and practice, and they loved making money -with at least an equal fervour. Consequently, it was -absurd to suppose that their professions of loyalty -would stand the strain of a war, by which not only -their national exchequers, but the whole mass of the -people must inevitably be impoverished, in which -the manhood of the Dominions would be called on -for military service, and their defenceless territories -placed in danger of invasion. -</p> - -<p> -It was incredible to the wise men at Berlin that -the timid but clear minds of English Statesmen had -not appreciated these obvious facts. War, therefore, -would be avoided as long as possible. And when -at a later date, war was forced by Germany upon the -pusillanimous islanders, the Dominions would -immediately discern various highly moral pleas for -standing aloof. Germany, honouring these pleas -for the time being with a mock respect, would defer -devouring the Dominions until she had digested the -more serious meal. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -It will be seen from all this how good the grounds -were on which the best-informed and most efficient -bureaucracy in the world decided that the British -Empire would remain neutral in the present war. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P68"></a>68}</span> -Looked at from the strictly intellectual standpoint, -the reasons which satisfied German Statesmen with -regard to Britain's neutrality were overwhelming, and -might well have convinced others, of a similar outlook -and training, who had no personal interest whatsoever -in coming to one conclusion rather than another. -</p> - -<p> -None the less the judgment of the Kaiser and his -Ministers was not only bad, but inexcusably bad. -We expect more from statesmen than that they -should arrive at logical conclusions. Logic in such -cases is nothing; all that matters is to be right; -but unless instinct rules and reason serves, right -judgment will rarely be arrived at in such matters as -these. If a man cannot feel as well as reason, if he -cannot gauge the forces which are at work among the -nations by some kind of second-sight, he has no title -to set up his bills as a statesman. It is incredible -that Lincoln, Cavour, or Bismarck would ever have -blundered into such a war as this, under the delusion -that Britain could remain neutral even if she would. -Nor would any of these three have been so far out in -his reckoning as to believe, that the immediate effect -of such a war, if Britain joined in it, would be the -disruption of her empire. They might have calculated -that in the event of the war being prolonged and -disastrous to England, disintegration would in the -end come about; but without stopping to reason -the matter out, they would have known by instinct, -that the first effect produced by such a war would -be a consolidation and knitting together of the loose -Imperial fabric, and a suspension, or at least a -diminution, of internal differences. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0106fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0106fn1text">1</a>] British public opinion in regard -to that war was divided roughly -according to party lines, -the Conservatives favouring France on sentimental -grounds, the Liberals favouring Germany -as a highly-educated, peace-loving people -who had been wantonly attacked. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0107"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P69"></a>69}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VII -<br /> -INTERNATIONAL ILL-WILL -</h3> - -<p> -In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made -to consider the series of events which immediately -preceded the recent outbreak of war. But the most -complete account of moves and counter-moves, and -of all the pretexts, arguments, demands, and appeals -which were put forward by the various governments -concerned, with the object of forcing on, justifying, -circumscribing, or preventing the present struggle, -can never give us the true explanation of why it -occurred. For this we must look much further back -than Midsummer last, and at other things besides -the correspondence between Foreign Ministers and -Ambassadors. -</p> - -<p> -Nobody in his senses believes that Europe is at -present in a convulsion because the heir-presumptive to -the throne of Austria was murdered at Serajevo on the -28th of June. This event was tragic and deplorable, -but it was merely a spark—one of that cloud of sparks -which is always issuing from the chimney-stack of -the European furnace. This one by ill-luck happened -to fall upon a heap of combustibles, and set it in a -blaze. -</p> - -<p> -Great events, as the Greeks discovered several -thousand years ago, do not spring from small causes, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P70"></a>70}</span> -though more often than not they have some trivial -beginning. How came it that so much inflammable -material was lying ready to catch fire? -</p> - -<p> -To answer this question truthfully we need more -knowledge of men and things than is given in those -books, of varying hue, which the Chancelleries of Europe -have published to explain their causes of action. The -official sources provide much valuable information; -but they will never explain to us why public opinion -in Germany, ever since the beginning of the present -century, has been inflamed with hatred against this -country. Nor will they ever give us any clear idea as -to what extent, and where, the practical aims and -policies of that nation and our own were in conflict. -</p> - -<p> -According to the state papers, it would appear -that Russia was drawn into this war because of Servia, -and France because of Russia, and Belgium because of -France, and we ourselves because of Belgium; but -it may well be doubted if even the first of this row -of ninepins would have been allowed to fall, had it -not been for the feelings which the German people -and their rulers entertained towards Britain. -</p> - -<p> -It is always hard for a man to believe in the -sincerity, friendliness, and peaceful intentions of one -against whom he is himself engaged in plotting an -injury. German distrust of England was based upon -the surest of all foundations—upon her own fixed -and envious determination to overthrow our empire -and rob us of our property. Her own mind being -filled with this ambition, how could she be otherwise -than incredulous of our expressions of goodwill? -How could she conceive that we were so blind as not -to have penetrated her thoughts, so deaf as not to -have heard the threats which her public characters -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P71"></a>71}</span> -were proclaiming so openly? Consequently when -British Statesmen uttered amiable assurances they -were judged guilty of a treacherous dissimulation.... -One can only shrug one's shoulders, marvelling at -the nightmares and suspicions which a bad conscience -is capable of producing even among intelligent people. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE DANGER POINT -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It has been the fashion for half a century or more -to talk of the Balkans as the danger-point of European -peace. In a sense this is true. The crust is very -thin in that region, and violent eruptions are of -common occurrence. But the real danger of upheaval -comes, not so much from the thinness of the crust, -as from the violence of the subterranean forces. -Of these, by far the most formidable in recent times -have been the attitude of public opinion in Germany -towards England—the hatred of England which has -been sedulously and systematically inculcated among -the people of all ranks—the suspicions of our policy -which have been sown broadcast—the envy of our -position in the world which has been instilled, without -remission, by all and sundry the agencies and -individuals subject to the orders and inspiration of -government. An obsession has been created, by -these means, which has distorted the whole field of -German vision. National ill-will accordingly has -refused to yield to any persuasion. Like its contrary, -the passion of love, it has burned all the more -fiercely, being unrequited. -</p> - -<p> -The fact which it is necessary to face, fairly and -squarely, is that we are fighting the whole German -people. We may blame, and blame justly, the -Prussian junkers, the German bureaucracy, the -Kaiser himself, for having desired this war, schemed -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P72"></a>72}</span> -for it, set the match to it by intention or through -a blunder; but to regard it as a Kaiser's war, or a -junkers' war, or a bureaucrats' war is merely to -deceive ourselves. It is a people's war if ever there -was one. It could not have been more a people's -war than it is, even if Germany had been a democracy -like France or England. -</p> - -<p> -The Kaiser, as regards this matter, is the mirror -of his people. The Army and the Navy are his -trusted servants against whom not a word will be -believed. The wisdom of the bureaucracy is -unquestioned. In matters of faith the zealous eloquence -of the learned men is wholly approved. All classes -are as one in devotion, and are moved by the -same spirit of self-sacrifice. Hardly a murmur of -criticism has been heard, even from the multitudes -who at other times march under the red flag of -Socialism. -</p> - -<p> -Although a German panic with regard to Russia -may have been the proximate occasion of this war, -the force which most sustains it in its course is -German hatred of England. We must recognise this -fact with candour, however painful it may be. And -we must also note that, during the past nine months, -the feelings against England have undergone a change -by no means for the better. -</p> - -<p> -At the beginning the German people, if we may -judge from published utterances, were convinced -that the war had been engineered by Russia, and -that England had meanly joined in it, because she -saw her chance of crushing a dangerous and envied -rival. -</p> - -<p> -Two months later, however, it was equally clear -that the German people were persuaded—Heaven -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P73"></a>73}</span> -knows how or why!—that the war had been engineered -by England, who was using France and Russia as -her tools. Behind Russia, France, Belgium, Servia, -and Japan—according to this view—stood -Britain—perfidious throughout the ages—guiding her -puppets with indefatigable skill to the destruction -of German trade, colonies, navy, and world-power. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -FANTASTIC ERRORS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Confiding Germany, in spite of all her unremitting -abuse of Britain, had apparently, for some reason, -really believed her to be a friend and a fellow Teuton! -Could any treachery have been blacker than our -own in outraging these family affections? And for -Britain to support the Slav and the Celt against the -Teuton, was judged to be the worst treachery of -all—race treachery—especially by the Prussians, who, -having forgotten that they themselves are half Slavs, -seemed also to have forgotten that the British are -largely Celts. -</p> - -<p> -Every Englishman, whether he be an admirer -of Sir Edward Grey's administration of Foreign -Affairs or not, knows these dark suspicions to be -merely nonsense. He knows this as one of the -common certainties of existence—just as he knows -that ginger is hot i' the mouth. Every Englishman -knows that Sir Edward Grey, his colleagues, his -advisers, his supporters in Parliament and out of -it, and the whole British race throughout the world, -hated the idea of war, and would have done—and -in fact did, so far as in them lay—everything they -could think of to avert it. Yet the German people -do not at present believe a single word of this; and -there must be some reason for their disbelief as for -other things. -</p> - -<p> -Unfortunately the nations of the world never -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P74"></a>74}</span> -see one another face to face. They carry on their -intercourse, friendly and otherwise, by high-angle -fire, from hidden batteries of journalistic howitzers. -Sometimes the projectiles which they exchange are -charged with ideal hate which explodes and kills; -at others with ideal love and admiration which -dissolve in golden showers, delightful and amazing to -behold. But always the gunners are invisible to -each other, and the ideal love and admiration are -often as far removed from the real merits of their -objective as the ideal hate. -</p> - -<p> -That there was no excuse, beyond mere fancy -on Germany's part, for her distrust of British policy, -no one, unless he were wholly ignorant of the facts, -would dream of maintaining. During the years -which have passed since 1870, our intentions have -very rarely been unfriendly. Still more rarely, -however, have we ever shown any real comprehension of -the German point of view. Never have we made -our policy clear. The last is hardly to be wondered -at, seeing that we had not ourselves taken the pains -to understand it. -</p> - -<p> -On occasions, it is true, we have been effusive, -and have somewhat overstepped the limits of dignity, -plunging into a gushing sentimentality, or else -wheedling and coaxing, with some material object—the -abatement of naval expenditure, for example—showing -very plainly through our blandishments. -And as our methods at these times have been lacking -in self-respect, it is not wonderful if they have -earned little or no respect from others. Our -protestations that we were friends, our babble about -blood-relationship, were suspected to have their origin in -timidity; our appeals for restriction of armaments, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P75"></a>75}</span> -to our aversion from personal sacrifice and our senile -penuriousness. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -FAULTS OF ENGLISH METHODS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Until lately these lapses into excessive amiability, -it must be allowed, were not very frequent. The -main excuse for German suspicion is to be found -elsewhere—in the dilatoriness of our foreign policy—in -its inability to make up its mind—in its changeability -after its mind might have been supposed -made up—in its vagueness with regard to the nature -of our obligations towards other powers—whom we -would support, and to what extent, and upon what -pleas. -</p> - -<p> -Irritation on the part of Germany would have -been natural in these circumstances, even if she had -not been in the mood to suspect dark motives in the -background. From the days of Lord Granville to -those of Sir Edward Grey, we had been dealing with -a neighbour who, whatever her failings might be, -was essentially businesslike in her methods. We, -on the other hand, continued to exhibit many of -those faults which are most ill-regarded by business -men. We would not say clearly what regions came -within our sphere of influence. We would not say -clearly where Germany might go and where we -should object to her going; but wherever she went, -we were apt after the event to grumble and make -trouble. -</p> - -<p> -The delay and indecision which marked Lord -Granville's dealings with Bismarck over the partition -of Africa were both bad manners in the international -sense, and bad policy. The neglect of Sir Edward -Grey, after Agadir, to make clear to his fellow-countrymen, -and to the world at large, the nature and extent -of our obligations to France, was bad business. Next -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P76"></a>76}</span> -to the British people and our present allies, Germany -had the best reason to complain of this procedure, -or rather of this failure to proceed. -</p> - -<p> -The blame for this unfortunate record rests mainly -upon our political system, rather than on individuals. -We cannot enjoy the benefits of the most highly -developed party system in the world, without losing -by it in various directions. A change of Government, -actual or impending, has more often been the -cause of procrastination and uncertainty than change -in the mind of the Foreign Minister. There are people -who assure us that this must always be so, that it -is one of the inherent weaknesses of party government, -and even of democracy itself. This is not -altogether true. It is true, however, that whereas -statesmen may be reticent and keep their own counsel -under an autocracy, they are bound to be frank, and -simple, and outspoken as to their aims, where their -power is drawn directly from popular support. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -BAD DIPLOMACY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The criticism against British foreign policy for -upwards of a century, is that it has aimed at managing -our international relations on a system of hoodwinking -the people, which is altogether incompatible with -the nature of our institutions. The evils which -have resulted from this mistake are not confined to -ourselves, but have reacted abroad. "With whom," -we can imagine some perplexed foreign Chancellor -asking himself—"with whom does power really -rest in England? With the Government or with -the people? With which of these am I to deal? -To which must I address myself? As regards -France there is little difficulty, for her policy is -national, and agreed on all hands. But in England, -so far as we can judge, the people have no idea of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P77"></a>77}</span> -being dragged under any circumstances into a -European war; while on the other hand, the -Government is obviously drifting, consciously or -unconsciously, into continental relations which, in certain -events, can lead to no other result...." Nor is -it surprising that under these conditions German -diplomacy should have directed itself of late, with -much industry, to the cultivation of public opinion -in this country, and should at times have treated our -Government with scant respect. -</p> - -<p> -The fact is that the two nations, which had most -to gain by clear-sighted and tactful foreign policy, -were perhaps of all nations in the world the least -well served in that particular. English relations -with Germany have for many years past been more -mismanaged than anything except German relations -with England. In their mutual diplomacy the fingers -of both nations have been all thumbs. -</p> - -<p> -It is not to be wondered at that two characters -so antagonistic in their natures and methods as -English and German foreign policy should have come -to regard one another as impossible. The aggressive -personage who does know his own mind, and the -vague, supercilious personage who does not, have -only one point in common—that they understand -and care very little about the feelings of other people. -But although this is a point in common, it is anything -but a point of agreement.[<a id="chap0107fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0107fn1">1</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P78"></a>78}</span> -The causes of what has happened will never be -clear to us unless we can arrive at some understanding -of the ideas, aspirations, and dreams which have filled -the minds of the German people and our own during -recent years. On logical grounds we must consider -the case of Germany first, for the reason that all -the warmth of enmity has proceeded from her side, -and, until recent events suddenly aroused the Old -Adam in us, the uncharitable sentiments of our -neighbours were not at all cordially reciprocated -over here. -</p> - -<p> -As in romantic drama, according to the cynics, -there is usually one who loves and another who -allows itself to be loved, so in this case there was -one who hated and another who allowed itself to be -hated. The British nation could not understand -why the Germans were so angry and suspicious. -Nor would it trouble to understand. It was bored -with the whole subject; and even the irritation -which it felt at having to find huge sums annually -for the Navy did not succeed in shaking it out of its -boredom. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -INTERNATIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The most careful analysis of our thoughts about -Germany would do little to explain matters, because, -as it happened, by far the greater part of our -thoughts was occupied with other things. Indeed we -thought about Germany as little as we could help -thinking; and although we regretted her annoyance, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P79"></a>79}</span> -our consciences absolved us from any responsibility -for it. -</p> - -<p> -It was entirely different with Germany. For -many years past she had been more occupied with -her grievances against Britain, and with the -complications and dangers which would beset any attempt -at redress, than with any other single subject; or -indeed, so it would appear, with all other subjects -put together. -</p> - -<p> -It is important to understand the German point -of view, but it is difficult. For at once we are faced -with the eternal obstacle of the foreigner, who sets out -in search of a simple explanation. The mind of the -ordinary man, like that of the philosopher, is -hypnotised by a basic assumption of the One-ness of Things. -He wants to trace all trouble to a single root, as if -it were a corn and could be extracted. But in an -enquiry like the present we are confronted at every -turn with the Two-ness of Things, or indeed with the -Multiplicity of Things. -</p> - -<p> -We have only to read a few pages of any German -book on England to see that the other party to the -dispute is confronted with exactly the same difficulty. -We are amazed, and perhaps not altogether chagrined, -to discover that, to German eyes, British policy -appears to be a thing of the most rigorous consistency. -It is deliberate, far-sighted, and ruthless. It -is pursued with constancy from decade to decade—nay -from century to century—never faltering, never -retreating, but always going forward under Whig and -Tory, Liberal and Conservative alike, to the same -goal. And we of course know, if we know anything, -that this picture, though very flattering to our -political instinct, is untrue. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P80"></a>80}</span> -</p> - -<p> -If Englishmen know anything at all, they know -that the foreign policy of this country during the -last fifty years—under Lord Beaconsfield, and -Mr. Gladstone, Lord Salisbury, and Mr. Asquith—has -been at times a series of the most eccentric wobbles -and plunges, like a kite which is drawn at the wrong -angle to the wind. Nay, even as regards our -participation in this very War—which in the German -White Book is asserted to have been preconceived -and undertaken by us with a craft and coolness -worthy of Machiavelli himself—we can see from -our own White Paper that the final decision wavered -this way and the other, from day to day during the -critical week, neither the Cabinet nor public opinion -being clear and unanimous as to the course which -ought to be pursued. -</p> - -<p> -Vacillation in national policy usually appears to -hostile observers in the light of perfidy. And it -must be admitted that there is good excuse for the -mistake, seeing that weakness in such high matters -is quite as likely to injure everybody concerned as -wickedness itself. -</p> - -<p> -Assuredly no sensible person who was required -to make a defence of British foreign policy, either -during the century which has passed since the battle -of Waterloo, or in the much shorter period since the -death of Queen Victoria, would ever dream of doing -so on the ground that its guiding principles have -been consistency and singleness of purpose. These, -indeed, are almost the last virtues he would think -of claiming for it. And yet these are the very -qualities which foreign nations are inclined to attribute -to British statesmen, by way of praise or blame. -Our failures are apt to be overlooked by outside -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P81"></a>81}</span> -observers; our successes on the other hand are plain -and memorable. Other nations assume that because -we have happened to achieve some particular result, -we must therefore have deliberately and patiently -set out to achieve it. Much more often this result -has been due either to pure good luck or else to some -happy inspiration of the moment. -</p> - -<p> -A wise apologist for our foreign policy would at -once concede that it has frequently been characterised -by feebleness and indecision, and almost -always by a want of clear perception of the end in -view; but he could contend with justice that upon -the whole, for upwards of a century, it has meant -well by other nations, and that accusations of -far-sighted duplicity are purely ridiculous. -</p> - -<p> -Our own temptation on the other hand is to -visualise a single, gross, overbearing, and opinionated -type of the Teuton species. We tend to ignore -important differences; and because German public -opinion appears to be unanimous in regard to the -present War, we are apt to overlook the fact that -the love and admiration of the Bavarian and the -Saxon for the Prussian are probably some degrees -less cordial than those which the men of Kerry -and Connemara entertain for the Belfast Covenanters. -And we incline also to forget, that though opinion in -Germany in favour of war became solid so soon as -war was apprehended, and certainly before it was -declared, it is exceedingly unlikely, that even in -governing circles, there was an equal unanimity as -to the procedure which led up to the climax. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE TRIANGLE OF FORCES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -If it were really so, the case is unique in history, -which shows us at every other crisis of this sort always -the same triangle of forces—a War party, a Peace -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P82"></a>82}</span> -party, and a Wait-and-See party; each of them -pulling vigorously in its own direction; each intriguing -against, and caballing with, the other two by turns; -until at last the group, still struggling, falls back on -the side of safety or, as in the recent instance, pitches -over the edge of the precipice. -</p> - -<p> -It would be very hard to persuade any student -of history that something of this sort was not -occurring both in Vienna and Berlin during the months of -June and July 1914. While he would admit to more -than a suspicion that intelligences had been passing -for a considerably longer period—for a year at -least[<a id="chap0107fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0107fn2">2</a>]—between the War parties in these two capitals, he -would be inclined to take the view, that in the last -stage of all, the Berlin group went staggering to -perdition, dragging after it the Vienna group, which -by that time was struggling feebly in the opposite -direction. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -LIMITS OF ENQUIRY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When we come to consider the German case it -is wise to bear in mind the erroneous judgments -which foreigners have passed upon ourselves. It -is probable that the One-ness of things which we -discover in their actions is to some extent an illusion, -like that which they have discovered in our own. -Indeed it is a fruitless task to hunt for logic and -consistency in things which, in their nature, are neither -logical nor consistent. For most of us, who have -but a limited range of German books, state papers, -journalism, and acquaintances to judge from, it would -be vain and foolish to pretend that in a chapter, or -a volume, we can lay bare the German attitude of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P83"></a>83}</span> -mind. The most we can hope to do is to illuminate -this complex subject at certain points; and these -for the most part are where the edges rub, and where -German policy and temperament have happened to -come into conflict with our own. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0107fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0107fn1text">1</a>] If we may offer a very homely simile—German -policy may be compared -to a rude heavy fellow, who comes shoving -his way into a crowded bus, -snorting aggressively, treading -on everybody's corns, poking his umbrella -into people's eyes, and finally plumping -himself down without a word of -regret or apology, between the two meekest -and most helpless-looking of -the passengers. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -British diplomacy, on the other hand, -bears a close resemblance to a -nuisance, equally well known to the bus public, -and no less dreaded. It -reminds us constantly of that dawdling, -disobliging female who never can -make up her mind, till the bus has actually -started, whether she wants to -go to Shepherd's Bush or the Mansion House. -If she has taken a seat -she insists on stopping the conveyance -in order to get out. If she has -remained gaping on the pavement she hails -it in order to get in. She cares -nothing about the inconvenience caused -thereby to other passengers, who -do know whither they want to be conveyed, -and desire to arrive at their -destination as quickly as possible. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0107fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0107fn2text">2</a>] We have recently learned from Signor Giolitti, -ex-Premier of Italy, -that in August 1913 the Foreign Minister, -the late Marquis di San Giuliano, -was sounded by Austria-Hungary -as to whether he would join in an attack -upon Servia. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0200"></a></p> - -<h2> -PART II -<br /> -THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY -</h2> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="intro"> -CHRISTIAN: Met you with nothing else in that Valley? -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -FAITHFUL: Yes, I met with <i>Shame</i>. But of all the Men I -met with in my Pilgrimage, he I think bears the wrong -name: ... this boldfaced <i>Shame</i>, would never have done. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -CHRISTIAN: Why, what did he say to you? -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -FAITHFUL: What! Why he objected against Religion itself; he -said it was a pitiful low sneaking business for a Man to mind Religion; -he said that a tender conscience was an unmanly thing, and that -for a Man to watch over his words and ways, so as to tye up himself -from that hectoring liberty that the brave spirits of the times -accustom themselves unto, would make me the Ridicule of the times. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -He objected also, that but few of the Mighty, Rich, or Wise, -were ever of my opinion; nor any of them, neither, before they -were perswaded to be Fools, and to be of a voluntary fondness to -venture the loss of all, <i>for no body else knows what</i>. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -Yea, he did hold me to it at that rate also about a great many -more things than here I relate; as, that it was a <i>shame</i> -... to ask my neighbour forgiveness for petty faults, or to make -restitution where I had taken from any. He said also that -Religion made a man grow strange to the great because of a few vices -(which he called by finer names).... -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -<i>The Pilgrim's Progress</i>. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0201"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P87"></a>87}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER I -<br /> -THE BISMARCKIAN EPOCH -</h3> - -<p> -All nations dream—some more than others; while -some are more ready than others to follow their -dreams into action. Nor does the prevalence, or -even the intensity, of these national dreams seem to -bear any fixed relation to the strength of will which -seeks to turn them into achievement. -</p> - -<p> -After 1789 there was a great deal of dreaming -among the nations of Europe. At the beginning of -it all was revolutionary France, who dreamed of -offering freedom to all mankind. A few years later, an -altogether different France was dreaming furiously -of glory for her own arms. In the end it was still -France who dreamed; and this time she sought to -impose the blessings of peace, order, and uniformity -upon the whole world. Her first dream was realised -in part, the second wholly; but the third ended in -ruin. -</p> - -<p> -Following upon this momentous failure came a -short period when the exhausted nations slept much -too soundly to dream dreams. During this epoch -Europe was parcelled out artificially, like a patch-work -quilt, by practical and unimaginative diplomatists, -anxious certainly to take securities for a lasting -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P88"></a>88}</span> -peace, but still more anxious to bolster up the ancient -dynasties. -</p> - -<p> -Against their arbitrary expedients there was -soon a strong reaction, and dreaming began once -more among the nations, as they turned in their sleep, -and tried to stretch their hampered limbs. At the -beginning their dreaming was of a mild and somewhat -futile type. It called itself 'liberalism'—a name -coined upon the continent of Europe. It aimed by -methods of peaceful persuasion, at reaching the -double goal of nationality as the ideal unit of the state, -and popular representation as the ideal system of -government. Then the seams of the patchwork, -which had been put together with so much labour -at Vienna[<a id="chap0201fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0201fn1">1</a>] and Aix-la-Chapelle,[<a id="chap0201fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0201fn2">2</a>] began to gape. -Greece struggled with some success to free herself -from the Turk,[<a id="chap0201fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0201fn3">3</a>] and Belgium broke away from -Holland,[<a id="chap0201fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0201fn4">4</a>] as at a much later date Norway severed -her union with Sweden.[<a id="chap0201fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0201fn5">5</a>] In 1848 there were -revolutions all over Europe, the objects of which were the -setting up of parliamentary systems. In all directions -it seemed as if the dynastic stitches were coming -undone. Italy dreamed of union and finally achieved -it,[<a id="chap0201fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0201fn6">6</a>] expelling the Austrian encroachers—though not -by peaceful persuasion—and disordering still further -the neatly sewn handiwork of Talleyrand, Metternich, -and Castlereagh. Finally, the Balkans began to -dream of Slav destinies, unrealisable either under -the auspices of the Sublime Porte or in tutelage to -the Habsburgs.[<a id="chap0201fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0201fn7">7</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MAKING OF THE GERMAN UNION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -But of all the nations which have dreamed since -days long before Napoleon, none has dreamed more -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P89"></a>89}</span> -nobly or more persistently than Germany. For the -first half of the nineteenth century it seemed as if -the Germans were satisfied to behold a vision without -attempting to turn it into a reality. Their aspirations -issued in no effective action. They dreamed -of union between their many kingdoms, principalities, -and duchies, and of building up a firm empire against -which all enemies would beat in vain; but until -1864 they had gone but a few steps towards the -achievement of this end. -</p> - -<p> -Then within a period of seven years, Prussia, the -most powerful of the German states, planned, -provoked, and carried to a successful issue three wars -of aggression. By a series of swift strokes, the -genius of Bismarck snatched Schleswig-Holstein from -the Danes, beat down the pretensions of Austria to -the leadership of the Teutonic races, and wrested the -provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from France. -When Denmark was invaded by Germanic armies -in February 1864, the vision of unity seemed as -remote as ever; by January 1871 it was fully achieved. -When at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, in the -stately palace of the Bourbons, King William -accepted from the hands of his peers—the sovereign -rulers of Germany—an imperial crown, the dream -of centuries was fulfilled. -</p> - -<p> -Austria, indeed, stood aloof; but both by reason -of her geographical situation and the heterogeneous -ancestry of her people that was a matter only of -small account. Union was, for all practical purposes -complete. And what made the achievement all the -more marvellous was the fact, that the vision had -been realised by methods which had no place in the -gentle speculations of those, who had cherished the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P90"></a>90}</span> -hope of unity with the most fervent loyalty. It -had been accomplished by the Prussians, who of all -races between the Alps and the Baltic, between the -mountain barriers of Burgundy and the Polish -Marshes, are the least German in blood,[<a id="chap0201fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0201fn8">8</a>] and who of -all Germans dream the least. It had been carried -through, not by peaceful persuasion, nor on any -principles of Liberalism, nor in any of the ways -foreseen by the philosophers and poets who had -beheld visions of the millennium. Union was the -triumph of craft and calculation, courage and resolve, -'blood and iron.' -</p> - -<p> -The world in general, whose thoughts at this time -were much more congenially occupied with International -Exhibitions, and Peace Societies, and the -ideals of Manchester statesmanship, was inclined to -regard the whole of this series of events as an -anachronism—as the belated offspring of 'militarism' -and 'feudalism.' These were well known to be both -in their dotage; they could not possibly survive for -many years. What had happened, therefore, did not -startle mankind simply because the nature of it was -not understood. The spirit of the age, wholly -possessed, as it was, by an opposite set of ideas, -was unable to comprehend, to believe in, or even -to consider with patience, phenomena which, according -to prevailing theories, had no reasonable basis -of existence. -</p> - -<p> -In some quarters, indeed, efforts were made to -gloss over the proceedings of Prince Bismarck, and -to fit them into the fashionable theory of a universe, -flowing with the milk of human kindness and the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P91"></a>91}</span> -honey of material prosperity. It was urged that -the Germans were a people, pure in their morals, -industrious in their habits, the pioneers of higher -education and domestic economy. For the most -part, British and American public opinion was -inclined to regard these various occurrences and -conquests as a mediaeval masquerade, in rather doubtful -taste, but of no particular significance and involving -no serious consequences. Even in that enlightened -age, however, there were still a few superstitious -persons who saw ghosts. To their eyes the shade of -Richard Cobden seemed in some danger of being -eclipsed in the near future by that of Niccolo -Machiavelli; though the former had died in great honour -and prestige only a few years earlier, while the latter -had been dead, discredited, and disavowed for almost -as many centuries. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMAN PROSPERITY AFTER UNION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -After 1870 Germany entered upon a period of -peaceful prosperity. Forges clanged, workshops -throbbed, looms hummed, and within twenty years, -the ebb of emigration had entirely ceased. Indeed, -not only was there work in the Fatherland for all its -sons, but for others besides; so that long before -another twenty years had passed away, the tide -had turned and immigrants were pouring in. -</p> - -<p> -At first the larger part of German exports was -cheap and nasty, with a piratical habit of sailing -under false colours, and simulating well-known British -and other national trade-marks. But this was a -brief interlude. The sagacity, thoroughness, and -enterprise of manufacturers and merchants soon -guided their steps past this dangerous quicksand, -and the label <i>made in Germany</i> ceased to be a reproach. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P92"></a>92}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Students and lovers of truth laboured at discovery; -and hard upon their heels followed a crowd -of practical inventors—the gleaners, scavengers, and -rag-pickers of science. Never had the trade of any -country thriven with a more wonderful rapidity. -Though still of necessity a borrower by very reason -of her marvellous expansion, Germany nevertheless -began to make her influence felt in the financial -sphere. Her own ships carried her products to the -ends of the earth, and fetched home raw materials -in exchange. And not only this, her merchant -fleets began to enter into successful competition -for the carrying trade of the world, even with the -Mistress of the Seas herself. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -LIFE'S WORK OF BISMARCK -</span> -</p> - -<p> -For a score of years after the fall of Paris, Germany -found but little time for dreaming. Meanwhile, by -an astute if somewhat tortuous policy, and under -the impenetrable shield of the finest army in Europe, -Bismarck kept safe the empire which he had founded. -He declined to be drawn into adventures either at -home or abroad, either in the new world or the old. -He opposed the colonial aspirations of a few -visionaries, who began to make some noise towards the -end of his long reign, and silenced them with some -spacious but easy acquisitions in Africa and the -East. He consolidated the Prussian autocracy, and -brought its servant, the bureaucracy, to the highest -pitch of efficiency. He played with the political -parties in the Reichstag as if they had been a box of -dominoes, combining them into what patterns he -pleased. At the same time he fostered the national -well-being with ceaseless vigilance, and kept down -popular discontent by the boldness and thoroughness -of his social legislation. But for Bismarck himself -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P93"></a>93}</span> -the age of adventure was past. It was enough -that by the labours of an arduous lifetime, he had -made of Germany a puissant state, in which all her -children, even the most restless, could find full scope -for their soaring ambitions. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0201fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0201fn1text">1</a>] 1814. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0201fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0201fn2text">2</a>] 1818. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0201fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0201fn3text">3</a>] 1821-1829. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0201fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0201fn4text">4</a>] 1830. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0201fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0201fn5text">5</a>] 1905. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0201fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0201fn6text">6</a>] 1859-1861. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0201fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0201fn7text">7</a>] 1875-1878. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0201fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0201fn8text">8</a>] The admixture of Slavonic and Wendish blood -in the Prussian stock -is usually calculated by ethnologists at about half and half. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0202"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P94"></a>94}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER II -<br /> -AFTER BISMARCK -</h3> - -<p> -With the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, Germany -entered upon a new phase. Then once again her -people began to dream, and this time furiously. -They had conquered in war. They had won great -victories in peace. According to their own estimate -they were the foremost thinkers of the world. They -found themselves impelled by a limitless ambition -and a superb self-confidence. But the vision which -now presented itself to their eyes was disordered and -tumultuous. Indeed it was less dream than -nightmare; and in some degree, no doubt, it owed its -origin, like other nightmares, to a sudden -surfeit—to a glut of material prosperity.[<a id="chap0202fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0202fn1">1</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Why did Germany with her larger population still -lag behind Britain in commerce and shipping? -Surely the reason could only be that Britain, at -every turn, sought to cripple the enterprise of her -young rival. Why had Britain a great and thriving -colonial empire, while Germany had only a few tracts -of tropical jungle and light soil, not particularly -prosperous or promising? The reason could only -be that, out of jealousy, Britain had obstructed -Teutonic acquisition. Why was Germany tending -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P95"></a>95}</span> -to become more and more isolated and unpopular -in Europe? The reason could only be that the -crafty and unscrupulous policy of Britain had intrigued, -with some success, for her political ostracism. -</p> - -<p> -It is useless to argue with a man in a nightmare. -He brushes reason aside and cares not for facts. -But to seekers after truth it was obvious, that so far -from making any attack upon German commerce, -Britain, by adhering to her system of free trade at -home and in her dependencies, had conferred a boon -immeasurable on this new and eager competitor. -So far from hindering Germany's acquisition of -colonies, Britain had been careless and indifferent -in the matter; perhaps too much so for the security -of some of her own possessions. It was Bismarck, -much more than Britain, who had put obstacles in the -way of German colonial expansion. With a sigh of -relief (as we may imagine) this great statesman -saw the partition of the vacant territories of the -world completed, and his fellow-countrymen thereby -estopped from wasting their substance, and -dissipating their energies, in costly and embarrassing -adventures. So far from holding aloof from -Germany or attempting to isolate her among European -nations, we had persisted in treating her with -friendliness, long after she had ceased to be friendly. One -of our leading statesmen had even gone the length -of suggesting an alliance, and had been denounced -immediately by the whole German press, although -it was understood at the time that he had spoken -with the august encouragement of the Kaiser and -his Chancellor.[<a id="chap0202fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0202fn2">2</a>] It was Germany herself, deprived -of the guidance of Bismarck, who by blustering at -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P96"></a>96}</span> -her various neighbours, and threatening them in -turn, had aroused their suspicions and achieved her -own isolation. -</p> - -<p> -The grievances against Britain which figured -in the phantasmagoria of the German nightmare -were obviously tinged with envy. There were other -grievances against France, and these were tinged -with annoyance. For France, although she had -been beaten on to her knees, had nevertheless had -the impudence to make a successful recovery. There -were also grievances against Russia, and these were -tinged with fear. Her vast adjacent territories and -teeming population, her social and industrial progress, -the reformation of her government, and the rapid -recuperation of her military and naval power, -constituted in German eyes the gravest menace of all. -</p> - -<p> -Self-confidence and ambition were the original -stuff—the warp and the weft—of which the German -dream was made; but these admirable and healthy -qualities rapidly underwent a morbid deterioration. -Ambition degenerated into groundless suspicion, and -self-confidence into arrogance. It was a considerable -time, however, before Germany was realised -to have become a public danger by reason of her -mental affliction. Until her prophets and high priests -began preaching from the housetops as a divine -ordinance, that Germany was now so great, prosperous, -and prolific as to need the lands of her neighbours -for her expansion, her symptoms were not generally -recognised. It was not really pressure of population, -but only the oppression of a nightmare which -had brought her to this restless and excited -condition. In terms of psychology, the disease from -which Germany has been suffering of late years is -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P97"></a>97}</span> -known as megalomania, in the slang of the -street-corner as madness of the swollen head. -</p> - -<p> -The dreams of a nation may be guided well or ill -by statesmen, or they may be left altogether unguided. -The dreams of Italy under Cavour, and those of -Germany under Bismarck, were skilfully fostered -and directed with great shrewdness to certain -practical ends. But in considering the case of -Germany under William the Second, our feeling is -that although popular imaginings have been -controlled from above with even greater solicitude than -before, the persons who inspired and regulated them -have been lacking in the sense of proportion. The -governing power would seem to have been the victim -of changing moods, conflicting policies, and -disordered purposes. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -TWO FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When we piece together the various schemes for -the aggrandisement of the Fatherland, which German -writers have set forth with increasing boldness and -perfect gravity during the past ten years, we are -confronted with an immense mosaic—a conception -of the most grandiose character. On examination -each of these projects is found to be based upon two -fundamental assumptions:—The first, that the present -boundaries of Germany and her possessions overseas -are too narrow to contain the legitimate aspirations -of the German race:—The second that it is the -immediate interest of Germany, as well as a duty -which she owes to posterity, to remedy this -deficiency, by taking from her neighbours by force -what she requires for her own expansion. There -is a third assumption, not however of a political so -much as an ethical character, which is stated with -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P98"></a>98}</span> -equal frankness and conviction—that war on an -extensive scale is necessary, from time to time, in -order to preserve the vigour of the German people -and their noble spirit. -</p> - -<p> -One school of dreamers, with its gaze fixed upon -the Atlantic trade-routes, insists upon the absurdity -of resting content with a western sea-board of some -two hundred miles. The estuaries of the Elbe and -the Weser alone are exclusively German; that of -the Ems is shared with the Dutch; while the far -more valuable harbour-mouths of the Rhine and the -Scheldt are in the possession of Holland and Belgium. -Put into plain language what this means is, that -both Holland and Belgium must be incorporated -in the German Empire; if by treaty, so much the -better for all parties concerned; but if diplomacy -should fail to accomplish the desired absorption, then -it must be brought about by war. Nor has it been -overlooked, that in order to complete the rectification, -and to secure the keys of the Baltic, it would be -necessary to 'admit' Denmark also into the privileges -of the Germanic Empire. -</p> - -<p> -Another school looks to the south-east and broods -upon the day, not far distant, when the Germans of -Austria-Hungary—a small but dominating minority -of the whole population—will be driven, by reasons -of self-defence, to seek a federal inclusion in the -Empire of the Hohenzollerns. And it is surmised -that for somewhat similar reasons the Magyars of -Hungary will at the same time elect to throw in their -lot with Teutons rather than with Slavs. -</p> - -<p> -When that day arrives, however, it is not merely -the German and Magyar territories of the Habsburg -Emperor-King which will need to be incorporated -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P99"></a>99}</span> -in the Hohenzollern Empire, but the whole congeries -of nations which at present submits, more or less -reluctantly, to the rule of Vienna and Buda-Pest. -There must be no break-up of the empire of Francis -Joseph, no sentimental sacrifice to the mumbo-jumbos -of nationality. The Italians of Trieste and -Fiume, the Bohemians, the Croats, the Serbs, the -Roumanians of Transylvania, and the Poles of -Galicia must all be kept together in one state, even -more firmly than they are to-day. The Germans -of Austria will not be cordially welcomed, unless they -bring this dowry with them to the altar of imperial -union. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE AUSTRIAN DOWRY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -But to clear eyes, looking into the future, more -even than this appears to be necessary. Austria -will be required to bring with her, not merely all -her present possessions, but also her reversionary -prospects, contingent remainders, and all and sundry -her rights of action throughout the whole Balkan -peninsula, which sooner or later must either accept -the hegemony of the German Empire or submit -to annexation at the sword's point. Advantageous -as it would be for the Fatherland to obtain great -harbours for her commerce at the head of the Adriatic, -these acquisitions might easily become valueless -in practice if some rival barred the right of entry -through the Straits of Otranto. Salonica again, -in her snug and sheltered corner of the Aegean, is -essential as the natural entrepôt for the trade of -Asia Minor and the East; while there can be no -hope, until the mouths of the Danube, as well as the -Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, are firmly held, of -turning the Black Sea into a Germanic lake. -</p> - -<p> -The absorption of the Balkan peninsula, involving -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P100"></a>100}</span> -as it must the occupation of Constantinople and -European Turkey, would carry with it, as a natural -consequence, the custody of the Sultan and the -control of his Asiatic dominions. These vast -territories which extend from Smyrna to the Caucasus, -from Syria to the Persian Gulf, from the Black Sea -to the Gulf of Aden, contain some of the richest -and most fertile tracts upon the surface of the globe. -Massacre, misrule, and oppression have indeed -converted the greater part of these regions into a state -hardly to be distinguished from the barest deserts -of Arabia. But a culture which has lapsed through -long neglect may be reclaimed by new enterprise. -All that is required to this end is such shelter -and encouragement as a stable government would -afford. -</p> - -<p> -What more suitable instrument for this beneficent -recovery than the peculiar genius of the Teuton -race? Would not the whole world gain by the -substitution of settled order for a murderous anarchy, -of tilth and industry for a barren desolation? The -waters of Tigris and Euphrates are still sweet. It -needs but the energy and art of man to lead them in -channelled courses, quenching the longings of a -thirsty land, and filling the Mesopotamian waste -with the music of a myriad streams. The doom of -Babylon is no curse eternal. It awaits but the sword -of Siegfried to end the slumbers of two thousand -years. Where great cities and an ancient civilisation -lie buried under drifted sand, great cities may be -raised once more, the habitations of a hardier race, -the seminaries of a nobler civilisation. -</p> - -<p> -This vision, more fanciful and poetically inspired -than the rest, has already advanced some considerable -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P101"></a>101}</span> -way beyond the frontiers of dreamland. When -the Turko-Russian War came to an end[<a id="chap0202fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0202fn3">3</a>] the -influence of Germany at Constantinople was as nearly -as possible nil; and so long as Bismarck remained -in power, no very serious efforts were made to -increase it. But from the date of Bismarck's dismissal[<a id="chap0202fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0202fn4">4</a>] -down to the present day, it has been the steady aim -of German policy to control the destinies of the -Turkish Empire. These attempts have been -persistent, and in the main successful. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE WOOING OF TURKEY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It mattered not what dubious personage or party -might happen to be in the ascendant at Stamboul, -the friendship of Germany was always forthcoming. -It was extended with an equal cordiality to Abdul -Hamid; to the Young Turks when they overthrew -Abdul Hamid; to the Reactionaries when they -overthrew the Young Turks; to the Young -Turks again when they compounded matters with -the Reactionaries. The largesse of Berlin bankers -refreshed the empty treasuries of each despot and -camarilla in turn, so soon as proofs could be produced -of positive, or even of presumptive predominance. -At the same time the makers of armaments, -at Essen and elsewhere, looked to it, that a sufficient -portion of these generous loans was paid in kind, -and that the national gain was not confined to high -policy and high finance. The reform of the Turkish -army was taken in hand zealously by Prussian -soldiers. Imperial courtesies cemented the bricks -which usury, commerce, and diplomacy had laid -so well. At a time when the late Sultan was -ill-regarded by the whole of Europe, on account of his -supposed complicity in Armenian massacres, the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P102"></a>102}</span> -magnanimity of the Kaiser took pity on the pariah, -and a visit of honour to the Bosphorus formed an -incident in the Hohenzollern pilgrimage to the -Holy Sepulchre. -</p> - -<p> -The harvest of these endeavours was reaped at -a later date in the form of vast concessions for lines -of railway running through Asia Minor to the Persian -Gulf. It is needless to enter here into a discussion -of the famous and still unsettled controversy -regarding the Baghdad route, except to say that this -project for the benefit, not merely of Turkey, but -of the whole human race, was to be realised under -German direction and according to German plans -and specifications; it was to be administered under -German control; but it was to be paid for in the main -out of the savings of England and France. -</p> - -<p> -The scheme was no less bold than ingenious. Obligations -were imposed upon Turkey which it was clearly -impossible for Turkey to discharge. In the event -of her failure it was likely to go hard with the original -shareholders, and somewhat hard with the Sublime -Porte itself; but on the other hand it was not likely -to go hard with Germany, or to involve her in -anything more irksome than a labour of love—a -protectorate over Asia Minor and Arabia.[<a id="chap0202fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0202fn5">5</a>] -</p> - -<p> -These are the main dreams which German writers, -with a genuine enthusiasm and an engaging frankness, -have set out in the pages of books and periodicals—the -North Sea dream, the Austrian dream, the -Balkan dream, and the Levantine dream. But -these dreams by no means exhaust the Teuton -fancy. -</p> - -<p> -Wars are contemplated calmly as inevitable -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P103"></a>103}</span> -incidents in the acquisition of world-power—war -with France, war with England, war either of army -corps or diplomacy with Belgium, Holland, and -Denmark. And as victory is also contemplated, just -as confidently, various bye-products of considerable -value are likely to be secured during the process, -and as a result. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ACQUISITION OF AFRICA -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The greater part of north-western Africa, which -lies along the seaboards of the Mediterranean and -the Atlantic, is under the French flag. The greater -part of eastern Africa from Alexandria to Capetown -is in the hands of the British. The central region of -Africa is Belgian. In the north there is Tripoli -which is now Italian; and in various quarters patches -and scattered islands which are Portuguese. The -former might be tolerated as a harmless enclave; -the latter might readily be acquired by compulsory -purchase. What would then remain of the Dark -Continent is already German. So that, as the results -of the wars and victories which are considered by -German thinkers to be inevitable, the whole of -Africa would shortly pass into German hands. -</p> - -<p> -With the destinies of Africa in the keeping of -a virile race, accustomed to face great problems in -no piecemeal fashion, but as a whole, vast -transformations must ensue. Before their indomitable -will and scientific thoroughness, the dusky savage -will lay aside his ferocity, and toil joyously at the -arts of peace. Under an indefatigable and intelligent -administration, desert, jungle, forest, and -swamp will yield their appropriate harvests. Timber, -oil, cotton, rubber, tea, coffee, and every variety of -raw material will gradually become available in -limitless supplies. Jewels and precious metals will -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P104"></a>104}</span> -be dug out of the bowels of the earth. Flocks and -herds will roam in safety over the rich uplands—no -robber bands to drive them off; no wild beasts to -tear them limb from limb; no murrain or envenomed -fly to strike them down by tens of thousands. For -as the armies of the Kaiser are invincible against -all human foes, so also are his men of science -invincible, in their ceaseless war against disease of man -and beast. In the end they also will conquer in -their own sphere, no less certainly than the soldier -in his; for their courage is as high and their -devotion faces death, or worse than death, with -equanimity. -</p> - -<p> -The Dark Continent, which in all its history has -never known either peace or order, will then at last -know both. Even the stiff-necked Africander, -jealous of his antique shibboleths of freedom, will -not refuse incorporation in an Empire to which the -land of his forefathers will already have become bound -in federal ties. And the dowry which Holland is -expected to bring with her, will be not only the good -will of the South African Dutch, but the rich islands -of the East, where merchant-adventurers planted -her flag, in days when the fleets of Rotterdam -disputed, not unsuccessfully, with London herself the -primacy of the seas. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE EASTERN DREAM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Finally, there is the dream of the farthest East. -This is of such simple grandeur that it may be stated -in a few sentences. When the war between China -and Japan came to an end in 1895 Germany, acting -in concert with France and Russia, forced the -victorious troops of the Mikado to forgo all the fruits of -their conquest. When three years later Germany -herself seized upon the reversion of Kiao-Chau, she -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P105"></a>105}</span> -saw a vision of an empire, greater than that which -had been secured to her envied rival by the daring of -Clive and the forethought of Warren Hastings. If -England could hold and rule India, a mightier than -England could surely hold and rule China, containing -though it does a full quarter of the human race. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0202fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0202fn1text">1</a>] "L'Allemand est né bête; -la civilisation l'a, rendu méchant."—HEINE. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0202fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0202fn2text">2</a>] Mr. Chamberlain at Leicester on November 30, 1899. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0202fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0202fn3text">3</a>] March 1878. Treaty of Berlin, July 1878. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0202fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0202fn4text">4</a>] 1890. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0202fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0202fn5text">5</a>] Cf. <i>The Anglo-German Problem</i>, by C. Sarolea, -p. 247, and following. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0203"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P106"></a>106}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER III -<br /> -THE GERMAN PROJECT OF EMPIRE -</h3> - -<p> -The German project of empire is a gorgeous fabric. -The weft of it is thread of gold, but the warp of it -has been dipped in the centaur's blood. It is the -pride of its possessor; but it is likely to be his -undoing. It ravishes his fancy with the symmetry -and vastness of the pattern; yet these very two -qualities, which so much excite his admiration, have -shown themselves in the past singularly unpropitious -to high imperial adventures. -</p> - -<p> -No man of action worthy of the name will ever -take history for his guide. He would rightly refuse -to do so, even were it possible, which it is not, to -write history truthfully. But with all their deficiencies, -history books have certain sibylline qualities -which make them worth consulting upon occasions; -and as to symmetry and vastness this oracle, if -consulted, would speak clearly enough. Of all false -enticements which have lured great princes to their -ruin, these two have the biggest tale of victims to -their score. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -SYMMETRY AND VASTNESS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The British Empire, like the Roman, built itself -slowly. It was the way of both nations to deal -with needs as needs occurred, and not before. Neither -of them charted out their projects in advance, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P107"></a>107}</span> -thereafter working to them, like Lenôtre, when he laid -out the gardens of Versailles. On the contrary, a -strip was added here, a kingdom there, as time went -on, but not in accordance with any plan or system. -In certain cases, no doubt, the reason for annexation -was a simple desire for possession. But much -more often the motive was apprehension of one kind -or another. Empire-builders have usually achieved -empire as an accident attending their search after -security—security against the ambition of a -neighbour, against lawless hordes which threaten the -frontier, against the fires of revolution and disorder -spreading from adjacent territories. Britain, like -Rome before her, built up her empire piecemeal; -for the most part reluctantly; always reckoning up -and dreading the cost, labour, and burden of it; -hating the responsibility of expansion, and shouldering -it only when there seemed to be no other course -open to her in honour or safety. Symmetry did not -appeal to either of these nations any more than -vastness. Their realms spread out and extended, as -chance and circumstances willed they should, like -pools of water in the fields when floods are out. -</p> - -<p> -We cannot but distrust the soundness of recent -German policy, with its grandiose visions of universal -empire, if we consider it in the light of other things -which happened when the world was somewhat -younger, though possibly no less wise. The great -imaginative conquerors, though the fame of their -deeds still rings down the ages, do not make so brave -a show, when we begin to examine into the -permanency of their achievements. The imperial -projects of Alexander, of the Habsburgs, the Grand -Monarque, and Napoleon—each of whom drew out -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P108"></a>108}</span> -a vast pattern and worked to it—are not among those -things which can be said with any justice to have -endured. None of them were ever fully achieved; -while some were broken in pieces, even during the -lifetimes of their architects. -</p> - -<p> -To treat the whole world as if it were a huge -garden, for which one small race of men, who have -worked busily in a single corner of it, can aspire to -make and carry out an all-comprehending plan, is -in reality a proof of littleness and not largeness of -mind. Such vaulting ambitions are the symptoms -of a dangerous disease, to be noted and distrusted. -And none ever noted these tendencies more carefully -or distrusted them more heartily than the two greatest -statesmen whom Prussia has produced. Frederick -the Great rode his own Pegasus-vision on curb and -martingale. The Great Bismarck reined back the -Pegasus-vision of his fellow-countrymen on to its -haunches with an even sterner hand. "One -cannot," so he wrote in later years—"one cannot see -the cards of Providence so closely as to anticipate -historical development according to one's own -calculation." -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MASTERY OF THE WORLD -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Those very qualities of vastness and symmetry -which appear to have such fatal attraction for the -pedantocracy repel the practical statesman; and -woe to the nation which follows after the former -class rather than the latter, when the ways of the -two part company! To the foreign observer it -seems as if Germany, for a good many years past, -has been making this mistake. Perhaps it is her -destiny so to do. Possibly the reigns of Frederick -and Bismarck were only interludes. For Germany -followed the pedantocracy during a century or more, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P109"></a>109}</span> -while it preached political inaction and contentment -with a shorn and parcelled Fatherland. She was -following it still, when Bismarck turned constitutionalism -out of doors and went his own stern way to -union. And now once again she seems to be marching -in a fatal procession after the same Pied Pipers, -who this time are engaged, with a surpassing -eloquence and fervour, in preaching discontent with -the narrow limits of a united empire, and in exhorting -their fellow-countrymen to proceed to the Mastery -of the World. -</p> - -<p> -Among an imaginative race like the Germans, -those who wield the weapons of rhetoric and fancy -are only too likely to get the better of those surer -guides, who know from hard experience that the -world is a diverse and incalculable place, where no -man, and no acre of land, are precisely the same as -their next-door neighbours, where history never -repeats itself, and refuses always—out of malice or -disdain—to travel along the way which ingenious -Titans have charted for it. But it is not every -generation which succeeds in producing a Frederick -the Great or a Bismarck, to tame the dreamers and -use them as beasts of draught and burden. -</p> - -<p> -The complete mosaic of the German vision is an -empire incomparably greater in extent, in riches, -and in population, than any which has yet existed -since the world first began to keep its records. -Visionaries are always in a hurry. This stupendous -rearrangement of the Earth's surface is confidently -anticipated to occur within the first half of the -present century. It is to be accomplished by a -race distinguished for its courage, industry, and -devotion,—let us admit so much without grudging. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P110"></a>110}</span> -But in numbers—even if we count the Teutons of -the Habsburg Empire along with those of the -Hohenzollern—it amounts upon the highest computation -to less than eighty millions. This is the grain of -mustard-seed which is confidently believed to have -in it 'the property to get up and spread,' until -within little more than a generation, it will dominate -and control more than seven hundred millions of -human souls. -</p> - -<p> -Nor to German eyes, which dwell lovingly, and -apparently without misgiving, upon this appalling -prospect of symmetry and vastness, are these the -sum total of its attractions. The achievement of -their vision would bring peace to mankind. For -there would then be but two empires remaining, -which need give the overlords of the world the smallest -concern. Of these Russia, in their opinion, needs a -century at least in which to emerge out of primitive -barbarism and become a serious danger; while in -less than a century, the United States must inevitably -crumble to nonentity, through the worship of false -gods and the corruption of a decadent democracy. -Neither of these two empires could ever hope to -challenge the German Mastery of the World. -</p> - -<p> -In South America as in North, there is already -a German garrison, possessing great wealth and -influence. And in the South, at any rate, it may well -become, very speedily, an imperative obligation on -the Fatherland to secure, for its exiled children, more -settled conditions under which to extend the -advantages of German commerce and Kultur. President -Monroe has already been dead a hundred years or -more. According to the calculations of the pedantocracy, -his famous doctrine will need some stronger -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P111"></a>111}</span> -backing than the moral disapprobation of a hundred -millions of materially-minded and unwarlike people, in -order to withstand the pressure of German diplomacy, -if it should summon war-ships and transports to its -aid. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -UNIVERSAL PEACE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -So in the end we arrive at an exceedingly strange -conclusion. For that very thing, which the -philanthropists have all these years been vainly -endeavouring to bring about by means of congresses -of good men, and resolutions which breathe a -unanimity of noble aspirations, may be achieved in a -single lifetime by a series of bold strokes with the -German sword. Then at last Universal Peace will -have been secured. -</p> - -<p> -At this point the Prussian professor and the -pacifist apostle, who turned their backs upon one -another so angrily at the beginning, and started off, -as it seemed, in opposite directions, are confronting -one another unexpectedly at the other side of the -circle of human endeavour. They ought surely to -shake hands; for each, if he be honest, will have -to own himself the convert of the other. "You -admit then after all," cries the triumphant Pacifist, -"that Peace is the real end of human endeavour!" "Whether -or no," grunts the other in reply, "this -at any rate was the only road to it." -</p> - -<p> -One wonders—will the Pacifist be content? He -has reached his goal sure enough; though by means -which he has been accustomed to denounce as the -end of all true morality? Will the Professor, on the -other hand, be well pleased when he discovers that -by the very triumph of his doctrines he has made -war for ever impossible,—manliness, therefore, and -all true virtue likewise impossible,—thereby damning -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P112"></a>112}</span> -the souls of posterity to the end of time? "To put -questions in this quarter with a hammer, and to -hear perchance that well-known hollow sound -which tells of blown-out frogs"[<a id="chap0203fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0203fn1">1</a>]—this is a joy, -no doubt; and it is all we are ever likely to arrive -at by the cross-examination of dreamers. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0203fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0203fn1text">1</a>] Nietzsche, <i>The Twilight of Idols</i>. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0204"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P113"></a>113}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER IV -<br /> -THE NEW MORALISTS -</h3> - -<p> -The dream of German expansion, as year by year -it took firmer hold upon the popular imagination, -produced, as might have been expected, a desire -that it might be realised. From the stage of vague -and ardent longing it was but a short way to the next, -where a determined will began to put forth efforts -towards achievement. But as mankind in the mass, -whether in Germany or England, is still to some -extent hampered by human nature, by a number -of habits, traditions, and instincts, and by various -notions of good and evil, justice and injustice—which -the subtlest philosophers and most eloquent rhetoricians -have not yet succeeded in eradicating—a need -was felt for what the text-books in their solemn -nomenclature call <i>an ethical basis</i>. In plain words, -the German people wanted to have right on their -side—if possible, old-fashioned, Sunday-school, -copy-book Right. Failing that, even such a plea as the -wolf maintained against the lamb would be a great -deal better than nothing. -</p> - -<p> -This tendency in a nation to look about for justification -and a righteous plea, when it is preparing to -possess itself of property belonging to its neighbours, -is for the most part a subconscious process, not only -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P114"></a>114}</span> -among the common people, but also among the -leaders themselves. It resembles the instinct among -hens which produces in them an appetite for lime -when the season has come to begin laying. It was -through some natural impulse of this sort, and not -through mere cynicism, hypocrisy, or cool calculation, -that German publicists discovered all the grievances -which have been already touched upon. For even -if the possession of these grievances did not altogether -give the would-be aggressors right up to the point of -righteousness, it certainly put their neighbours in the -wrong, and branded the French dove and the British -lamb with turpitude in the eyes of the German people. -The grievances against France were, that although -she had been vanquished in 1870, although her -population had actually decreased since that date, and -although therefore she had neither the right to nor any -need for expansion, she had nevertheless expanded in -Africa as well as in the East, to a far greater extent -than Germany herself, the victorious power, whose -own population had meanwhile been increasing by -leaps and bounds. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GRIEVANCES AGAINST ENGLAND -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The grievances against Britain were that she -was supposed to have made war upon German trade, -to have prevented her young rival from acquiring -colonies, and to have intrigued to surround the -Teuton peoples with a ring of foes. Britain had -helped France to occupy and hold her new territories. -Britain had been mainly responsible for the -diplomatic defeat of Germany at Algeciras in 1905 and -again over Agadir in 1911. Moreover when Germany, -during the South African war, had attempted, in the -interests of international morality, to combine the -nations against us, we had foiled her high-minded -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P115"></a>115}</span> -and unselfish endeavours. When at an earlier date -she had sought, by the seizure of Kiao-Chau and -by a vigorous concentration, to oust British influence -and trade from their position of predominance in -China, we had countered her efforts by the occupation -of Wei-hai-wei and the Japanese alliance. -</p> - -<p> -As regards command of the sea we had likewise -frustrated German ambitions. After a certain amount -of vacillation, and a somewhat piteous plea for a -general diminution of armaments—backed up by -an arrest of our own, which Germany interpreted, -perhaps not unnaturally, as a throwing up of the -sponge and beginning of the end of our naval -supremacy—we had actually had the treachery (for it -was nothing less) to upset all her calculations, and -turn all her efforts and acceleration to foolishness, -by resuming the race for sea-power with redoubled -energy. And although to our own eyes, and even -possibly to the eyes of impartial observers, none of -these doings of ours—in so far as they were truly -alleged—could be rightly held to constitute any real -grievance, that consideration was irrelevant. For -when a man is in search of a grievance he will find -it, if he be earnest enough, in the mere fact that his -intended adversary stammers, or has a wart upon -his nose. -</p> - -<p> -German statesmen were happy in having established -these grievances to their own satisfaction; -but something more was necessary in order that their -morality might rest upon a sure foundation. German -policy must be absolutely right, and not merely -relatively right by contrast with those neighbours -whose power she sought to overthrow, and whose -territories she wished to annex. And although this -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P116"></a>116}</span> -effort to establish German policy on the principle -of Right involved a recasting of Christian morality, -it was not shirked on that account. On the -contrary it was undertaken in a most energetic spirit. -</p> - -<p> -The first great influence in this readjustment -of popular conceptions of right and wrong was -the historian Heinrich von Treitschke.[<a id="chap0204fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn1">1</a>] He boldly -differentiated the moral obligations of the private -individual from those of a government charged with -the destinies of a nation.[<a id="chap0204fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn2">2</a>] The duties of a man to -his family, neighbours, and society Treitschke left -undisturbed. In this sphere of human life the -teaching of the Sermon on the Mount not only -remained unchallenged, but was upheld and reinforced. -Statecraft, however, fell under a different category. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE STATE IS POWER -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The true principle of private conduct was Love -for one's Neighbour, but the true principle of the -state was Power. The duty of a virtuous ruler was -to seek power, more power, and always more power, -on behalf of the nation he was called upon to govern. -The internal power of the state over the action of its -own subjects was absolute, and it was a duty owed -by each generation of rulers to posterity, to see to -it that in their own time, the external power of the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P117"></a>117}</span> -state was increased at the expense of its neighbours.[<a id="chap0204fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn3">3</a>] To -secure this end wars were inevitable; and despite -the sufferings which wars entailed, they were far from -regrettable, for the reason that they preserved the -vigour, unity, and devotion of the race, while stimulating -the virtues of courage and self-sacrifice among -private citizens.[<a id="chap0204fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn4">4</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Nations, he maintained, cannot safely stand -still. They must either increase their power or lose -it, expand their territories or be prepared to see them -shorn away. No growth of spiritual force or material -well-being within the state will preserve it, if it fails -to extend its authority and power among its neighbours. -Feelings of friendliness, chivalry, and pity -are absurd as between nations. To speak even of -justice in such a connection is absurd. Need and -Might together constitute Right. Nor ought the -world to regret the eating-up of weak nations by the -strong, of small nations by the great, because—a -somewhat bold conclusion—great and powerful -nations alone are capable of producing what the -world requires in thought, art, action, and virtue. -For how can these things flourish nobly in a timid, -cowering state, which finds itself driven by force -of circumstances to make-believes and fictions, to -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P118"></a>118}</span> -the meanest supplications and to devices of low -cunning, in order to preserve an independence which, -as it can only exist on sufferance, is nothing better -than a sham?[<a id="chap0204fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn5">5</a>] -</p> - -<p> -As the Hohenzollerns, the noblest and most capable -of modern dynasties, had never been content merely -to reign, but had always maintained their 'divine -right' of ruling and dominating the Prussian -Kingdom—as Prussia itself, the most manly and energetic -of modern nations, had not been content merely to -serve as the figurehead of a loose confederation, but -had insisted upon becoming supreme master and -imposing its own system, policy, and ideals upon -all Germany—so was it the duty and destiny of united -Germany, under these happy auspices, having been -taught and seasoned by long centuries of stern and -painful apprenticeship, to issue forth in the meridian -vigour of her age and seize upon the Mastery of the -World. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -If Treitschke, the eloquent historian, succeeded -to his own satisfaction and that of a very large -proportion of German statesmen, soldiers, intellectuals, -and publicists in taking high policy altogether out of -the jurisdiction of Christian morals, Friedrich Wilhelm -Nietzsche,[<a id="chap0204fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn6">6</a>] the even more eloquent and infinitely -more subtle poet-philosopher, made a cleaner and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P119"></a>119}</span> -bolder cut, and got rid of Christian morality even in -the sphere of private conduct. -</p> - -<p> -Nietzsche was but little interested or concerned -in the practical problems of statecraft which engrossed -the patriotic mind of Treitschke. The destinies of -the German nation were for him a small matter in -comparison with those of the human race. But -nevertheless his vigorously expressed contempt for -the English, their ways of life and thought, the -meanness of their practical aims, and the degradation -of their philosophic ideals,[<a id="chap0204fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn7">7</a>] was comforting to his -fellow-countrymen, who were relieved to find that the -nation whom they desired to despoil was so despicable -and corrupt. This train of argument was deceptive -and somewhat dangerous; for it led his German -readers to overlook the fact, that the broad front -of his attack aimed at enveloping and crushing the -cherished traditions of the Teuton race no less than -those of the Anglo-Saxon.[<a id="chap0204fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn8">8</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P120"></a>120}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Nietzsche's derision and dislike of the Prussian -spirit, of militarism, and of what he conceived to -be the spurious principle of nationality, his vague, -disinterested cosmopolitanism or Europeanism, are as -the poles apart from the aims and ideas of Treitschke -and the German patriots.[<a id="chap0204fn9text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn9">9</a>] Nietzsche is not concerned -to evolve a sovereign and omnipotent state, but a -high overmastering type of man, who shall inherit -the earth and dominate—not for their good, but for -his own—the millions who inhabit it. His ideal is -a glorious aristocracy of intellect, beauty, courage, -self-control, felicity, and power, scornfully smiling, -exuberantly vital. The evolution, ever higher and -higher, of this fine oligarchy of super-men is the one -absolute end of human endeavour. The super-men -will use and direct the force and instincts of 'the -herd'—even the capacities of kings, soldiers, law-givers, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P121"></a>121}</span> -and administrators—to make the world a fit -place for their own development. The millions of -slaves are to be considered merely as a means to this -end. Concern about them for their own sakes, above -all pity for their sufferings, or regard on the part of -the super-men for their resentment—except to guard -against it—is a mistake. The serenity of the -superman must not allow itself to be disturbed and -distracted by any such considerations. It is for him -to take what he needs or desires, to impose order -on the world, so that it may be a fit environment for -the evolution of his own caste, and, so far as he can -compass it, to live like the gods.[<a id="chap0204fn10text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn10">10</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE BLONDE BRUTE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is clear that although Nietzsche chaunts a pæan -in admiration of "the magnificent blonde brute, -avidly rampant for spoil and victory,"[<a id="chap0204fn11text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn11">11</a>] and although -he is constantly found, as it were, humming this -refrain, he had no intention of taking the Prussian -as his ideal type—still less of personifying Prussia -itself as a super-state engaged in a contest for -supremacy with a herd of inferior nations. He does -not trouble himself in the least about nations, but -only about individual men. Yet, like others who -have had the gift of memorable speech, he might -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P122"></a>122}</span> -well marvel, were he still alive, at the purposes -to which his words have been turned by orators and -journalists, desirous to grind an edge on their own -blunt axes. -</p> - -<p> -General von Bernhardi[<a id="chap0204fn12text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn12">12</a>] may be taken as a type -of the sincere but unoriginal writer who turns all -texts to the support of his own sermon. He is an -honest, literal fellow. In spite of all his ecstatic -flights of rhetoric he is never at all in the -clouds—never any farther from the earth's surface than -hopping distance. Notwithstanding, he quietly -appropriates any Nietzschean aphorisms the sound and -shape of which appear to suit his purpose, and uses -them to drive home his very simple and concrete -proposition that it is the duty of Germany to conquer -the world. -</p> - -<p> -One imagines from his writings that Bernhardi -has no quarrel with Christianity, no wish whatsoever -to overturn our accepted notions of morality. He -is merely a soldier with a fixed idea, and he is very -much in earnest. His literary methods remind one -somewhat of the starlings in spring-time, perched on -the backs of sheep and cattle, picking off the loose -hairs to line their nests. This is the highly practical -and soldierly use to which he puts philosophers, -poets, and men of letters generally—laying them under -contribution to garnish his discourse. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is probably true that the average soldier who -fought on the German side at Ypres and elsewhere -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P123"></a>123}</span> -was hardly more conversant with the writings of -Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi than the -average British soldier opposed to him was with those -of Herbert Spencer, Mr. Bernard Shaw, and Mr. Norman -Angell. It is very unlikely, however, that -the battle of Ypres would ever have been fought had -it not been for the ideas which sprang from these -and similar sources. The influence of the written -and spoken word upon German policy and action is -glaringly manifest.[<a id="chap0204fn13text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn13">13</a>] It inspired and supported the -high bureaucrats at Berlin, and had equally to do, -if indirectly, with the marching of the humblest raw -recruits shoulder to shoulder to be shot down on the -Menin Road. For by a process of percolation through -the press and popular literature, the doctrines of -these teachers—diluted somewhat, it is true, and a -good deal disguised and perverted—had reached a -very wide audience. Though the names of these -authors were for the most part unknown, though -their opinions had never been either understood or -accepted by the common people, the effects of their -teaching had made themselves felt in every home in -Germany. -</p> - -<p> -The German private soldier would not have been -shot down unless these eloquent sermons had been -preached. None the less, he had never grasped or -understood, far less had he adhered to and professed, -the cardinal doctrines which they contained. He -still believed in the old-fashioned morality, and -thought that states as well as individual men were -bound to act justly. It was this faith which gave -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P124"></a>124}</span> -him his strength, and made him die gladly. For he -believed that Germany had acted justly, the Allies -unjustly, that it was his task, along with other good -men and true, to win victory for his Emperor and -safety for his Fatherland, and to crush the -treacherous and malignant aggressors. -</p> - -<p> -In spite of all this preliminary discoursing which -had been going on for many years past, like artillery -preparation before an infantry attack—about world-power, -will-to-power, and all the rest of it—nothing -is more remarkable than the contrast presented, -immediately after war broke out, between the blatancy -of those writers who had caused the war and the -bleating of those (in many cases the same) who -sought to justify Germany's part in it to their -countrymen and the world. -</p> - -<p> -On the enlightened principles of Treitschke and -Bernhardi, Britain would have acted not only wisely, -but in the strictest accordance with her duty to her -own state, had she indeed contrived and compassed -this war, believing circumstances to be favourable -for herself and unfavourable for Germany. Not -another shred of right or reason was required.[<a id="chap0204fn14text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn14">14</a>] But -when war actually burst out, all these new-fangled -doctrines went by the board. Though the ink was -hardly dry upon Bernhardi's latest exhortation—of -which several hundred thousand copies had been -sold, and in which he urged his fellow-countrymen -to watch their time and make war when it suited -them, without remorse and no matter on what -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P125"></a>125}</span> -plea—in spite of this fact, there was a singular lack of -Stoicism among 'the brethren' when war was declared -against Russia and France. When Britain joined in, -and when things began to go less well than had been -expected, Stoicism entirely disappeared. Indeed -there is something highly ludicrous, at the same -time painful—like all spectacles of human -abasement—in the chorus of whines and shrill execration, -which at once went up to heaven from that very -pedantocracy whose leaders, so short a time before, -had been preaching that, as between the nations of -the earth, Might is Right, and Craft is the trusty -servant of Might.[<a id="chap0204fn15text"></a><a href="#chap0204fn15">15</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -APOSTASY WHEN WAR CAME -</span> -</p> - -<p> -These scolding fakirs were of an infinite credulity, -inasmuch as they believed that Sir Edward Grey -was the reincarnation of Machiavelli. Yet on their -own principles, what was there in this discovery to -be in the least shocked at? British statesmen (it -is hardly necessary to repeat it) had not walked in -the footsteps of the Florentine; had not provoked -the war; had not wished for it; had tried with all -their might to prevent it; but if they had done the -very reverse, would they not merely have been -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P126"></a>126}</span> -taking a leaf out of the sacred book of the -pedantocracy—out of Bernhardi's book, out of Nietzsche's -book, out of Treitschke's book? Why, then, all -these unpleasant howlings and ravings? -</p> - -<p> -The answers are not hard to find. The careful -plans and theories of the German bureaucrats had been -turned topsy-turvy because England had joined in the -war when, according to the calculations of the augurs, -she should have remained neutral. That mistake -must have been sufficiently annoying in itself to -disturb the equanimity even of professional philosophers. -And further, in spite of all the ingenious, eloquent, -and sophistical exhortations of the prophets, the -old morality still kept its hold upon the hearts -of men. When trouble arose they turned to it -instinctively—priesthood as well as people—and -the later gospel fell flat like a house of cards. -Immediately war came there was an appeal to -old-fashioned justice, and the altars of the little, -new-fangled, will-to-power gods were deserted by -their worshippers. -</p> - -<p> -When statesmen are laying out policies, and -moralists are setting up systems, it is worth their -while to make certain that they are not, in fact, -engaged upon an attempt to make water flow uphill; -above all, that their ingenious new aqueducts will -actually hold water, which in this instance they -certainly did not. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn1text">1</a>] Heinrich von Treitschke, son of a Saxon general -of Bohemian-Slavonic -origin; born at Dresden 1834. -Deafness following upon a fever in childhood -prevented him from adopting the profession -of arms; 1858-1863 lectured -on history at Leipzig; 1863-1866 professor -at Freiburg; 1866-1874 -professor at Heidelberg; 1874 until his death -in 1896 professor of history -and politics at Berlin. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn2text">2</a>] "Thus it follows from this, -that we must distinguish between public -and private morality. -The order of rank of the various duties must -necessarily be for the State, -as it is power, quite other than for individual -men. A whole series of these duties, -which are obligatory on the individual, -are not to be thought of in any case -for the State. To maintain itself -counts for it always as the highest -commandment; that is absolutely -moral for it. And on that account -we must declare that of all political -sins that of weakness is the most -reprehensible and the most contemptible; -it is in politics the sin against -the Holy Ghost...."—<i>Selections</i>, p. 32. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn3text">3</a>] "That must not hinder us from -declaring joyfully that the gifted -Florentine, with all the vast consequence -of his thinking, was the first -to set in the centre of all politics the great thought: -<i>The State is power</i>. -For that is the truth; and he who is not man -enough to look this truth -in the face ought to keep his hands -off politics."—<i>Ibid.</i> p. 28. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn4text">4</a>] "... to the historian who lives -in the world of will it is immediately -clear that the demand for a perpetual peace -is thoroughly reactionary; -he sees that with war all movement, all growth, -must be struck out of -history. It has always been the tired, -unintelligent, and enervated -periods that have played with the dream of perpetual -peace...."—<i>Selections</i>, p. 25. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"It is precisely political idealism that -demands wars, while materialism -condemns them. What a perversion of morality -to wish to eliminate -heroism from humanity!"—<i>Ibid.</i> p. 24. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn5text">5</a>] "... if we survey history in the mass, -it is clear that all real -masterpieces of poetry and art arose upon -the soil of great nationalities;" and -"The poet and artist must be able to -react upon a great nation. When -did a masterpiece ever arise among a -petty little nation?"—<i>Ibid.</i> p. 19. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn6text">6</a>] Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, -son of a village pastor of Polish ancestry; -born at Röcken in Saxony 1844; -served in the German army for a few -months in 1867; injured in mounting his horse; -1869-1879 professor of -classical philology at Bale which entailed -naturalisation as a Swiss subject; -served in ambulance in war of 1870-1871; -1879-1889 in bad health, wrote -and travelled; 1889 became insane and -remained so till his death in 1900. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn7text">7</a>] "What is lacking in England, -and has always been lacking, that -half-actor and rhetorician knew well enough, -the absurd muddlehead, -Carlyle, who sought to conceal under -passionate grimaces what he knew -about himself: namely, what was lacking -in Carlyle, real <i>power</i> of intellect, -real <i>depth</i> of intellectual perception, -in short, philosophy."—<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>, p. 210. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"The Englishman, more gloomy, sensual, -headstrong, and brutal than -the German—is for that very reason, -as the baser of the two, also the -most pious."—<i>Ibid.</i> p. 211. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"The English coarseness and rustic demureness -is still more satisfactorily -disguised by Christian pantomime, -and by praying and psalm-singing (or, -more correctly, it is thereby explained -and differently expressed); and -for the herd of drunkards and rakes -who formerly learned moral grunting -under the influence of Methodism -(and more recently as the 'Salvation -Army'), a penitential fit may really -be the relatively highest manifestation -of 'humanity' to which they can be elevated."—<i>Ibid.</i> p. 211. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"The European ignobleness, -the plebeianism of modern ideas, is -England's work and invention."—<i>Ibid.</i> p. 213. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn8text">8</a>] "I believe only in French culture, -and regard everything else in -Europe which calls itself 'culture' -as a misunderstanding. I do not -even take the German kind into consideration.... -The few instances -of higher culture with which I have met -in Germany were all French in -their origin."—<i>Ecce Homo</i>, p. 27. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"Wherever Germany extends her sway, -she <i>ruins</i> culture."—<i>Ibid.</i> p. 38. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"Culture and the state are antagonists: -a 'culture-state' is merely a -modern idea. The one lives upon the other, -the one flourishes at the -expense of the other. -All great periods of culture have been periods of -political decline; that which was great -from the standpoint of culture -was always unpolitical—even anti-political.... -In the history of European culture the rise -of the (German) Empire signifies, above all, a displacement -of the centre of gravity. -Everywhere people are already aware of -this: in things that really matter—and -these after all constitute culture—the Germans -are no longer worth considering.... The fact that there -is no longer a single German philosopher -worth mentioning is an increasing -wonder."—<i>The Twilight of the Idols</i>, p. 54. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"Every great crime against culture -for the last four centuries lies on -their [the German] conscience.... -It was the Germans who caused -Europe to lose the fruits, the whole meaning -of her last period of greatness—the -period of the Renaissance...."—<i>Ecce Homo</i>, p. 124. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"The future of German culture rests -with the sons of Prussian officers."—<i>The -Genealogy of Morals</i>, p. 222. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"If any one wishes to see the 'German soul' -demonstrated <i>ad oculos</i>, -let him only look at German taste, -at German arts and manners: what -boorish indifference to 'taste'!"—<i>The Antichrist</i>. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn9"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn9text">9</a>] "What quagmires and mendacity -there must be about if it is possible, -in the modern European hotchpotch, -to raise questions of race." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -A Nation—"Men who speak one language -and read the same newspapers."—<i>The -Genealogy of Morals</i>, p. 226. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn10"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn10text">10</a>] "A boldly daring, splendidly overbearing, -high-flying, and aloft-up-dragging class of higher men, -who had first to teach their century—and -it is the century of the <i>masses</i>—the -conception 'higher man.'"—<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>, p. 219. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"This man of the future, this tocsin of -noon and of the great verdict, -which renders the will again free, -who gives back to the world its goal -and to man his hope, this Antichrist and -Antinihilist, this conqueror of -God and of Nothingness—<i>he must one day -come</i>."—<i>The Genealogy of Morals</i>, p. 117. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn11"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn11text">11</a>] "The blonde beast that lies at the core -of all aristocratic races."—<i>The Genealogy of Morals</i>, p. 42. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"The profound, icy mistrust which -the German provokes, as soon as -he arrives at power,—even at the present -time,—is always still an aftermath of that -inextinguishable horror with which for whole centuries -Europe has regarded the wrath -of the blonde Teuton beast."—<i>Ibid.</i> -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn12"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn12text">12</a>] Friedrich von Bernhardi: born 1849 -at St. Petersburg, where his -father Theodor von Bernhardi -was a Councillor of the Prussian Legation; -entered a Hussar regiment in 1869; -military attaché at Berne in 1881; -in 1897 he was chief of the General -Staff of the 16th Army Corps; in 1908 -he was appointed commander of the 7th Army Corps; -retired in the following -year. He was a distinguished cavalry general, -and is probably the most -influential German writer on current -politico-military problems. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn13"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn13text">13</a>] Probably not less so upon British -policy and inaction. As water is -the result of blending oxygen and hydrogen -in certain proportions, so is -the present war the resultant of -German militarism and British anti-militarism -in combination. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn14"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn14text">14</a>] "Every State has as sovereign -the undoubted right to declare war -when it chooses, consequently every State -is in the position of being able -to cancel any treaties which have been -concluded."—Treitschke, <i>Selections</i>, p. 15. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"It is not only the right, but the moral -and political duty of the statesman to -bring about a war."—Bernhardi, <i>Germany -and the Next War</i>, p. 41 -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0204fn15"></a> -[<a href="#chap0204fn15text">15</a>] Towards the end of March 1915 -General von Bernhardi published in -the <i>New York Sun</i> an article the object -of which was to explain to the -American people how much his previous -writings had been misunderstood -and perverted by the malice of the enemy. -Long before this date, however, -there was strong presumptive evidence -that the distinguished military -author was unfavourably regarded by the -Super-men at Berlin. He had -been useful before the war for preparing -the Teutonic youth for Armageddon; -but after hostilities began it was -discovered that, so far as neutral -opinion was concerned, -it would have been better had he been wholly -interdicted from authorship -under the national motto—<i>verboten</i>. As to -the tenour of imperial communications -to the popular fire-eating publicist -during the winter 1914-1915, might we -venture to paraphrase them into the -vulgar vernacular as follows?—"We've -got to thank you and your damned -books, more than anything else, -for the present mess with America. Get -busy, and explain them all away if you -can."—Any one of the labours of -Hercules was easier. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0205"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P127"></a>127}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER V -<br /> -THE STATECRAFT OF A PRIESTHOOD -</h3> - -<p> -The thoroughness and efficiency of the Germans are -admitted even by hostile critics. In the practical -sphere they have excelled in military preparations, -in the encouragement of industry, and in the -organisation of finance. But they have achieved an even -more remarkable success than any of these; for -they have so arranged their educational system that -it is drilled hardly less admirably than their army.[<a id="chap0205fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0205fn1">1</a>] From -the primary schools to the universities everything -is ordered, so that the plastic mind of youth is -forced into a political mould which suits the purposes -of government. Patriotism of the pattern approved -by the authorities is inculcated directly or indirectly -in every class-room. While thought is left -ostentatiously free in regard to private morals and -religious foundations, the duties of the citizen to the -state, the duties of the state to posterity, the relations -of Germany to the outside world, are subjects upon -which independent speculation is not tolerated. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P128"></a>128}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Even schoolmasters and professors have their -ambitions; but unless they contribute their quota -to the support of imperial ideals, their careers are -unlikely to prosper. It is not enough that a lecturer -should not run counter to state policy; he must -actively promote its ends before he can hope to be -transferred to a sphere of greater dignity and -influence. Pedagogy is a branch of the Civil Service -just as much as the Treasury or the Public Health -Department. Teachers from the lowest to the highest -grades are the stipendiaries of the bureaucracy. If -they render useful services they are promoted. If -they fail to render useful services they are passed -over. If they indulge in dangerous speculations -they are sent adrift. Not merely the army, but the -whole German nation, is disciplined, during the -period of its impressionable youth, with the object -of inclining its mind to support state policy through -thick and thin. -</p> - -<p> -The schools feed the universities; the universities -feed the press, the learned professions, and the -higher grades in industry and finance. Private -conversation, as well as what is published in -newspapers, magazines, and books, bears the impress of -the official mint to a degree unthinkable in England -or America, Russia or France. Theories of politics -are devised by ingenious sophists, exactly as the -machinery at Essen is contrived by engineers—for the -express purpose of forwarding Prussian policy. -History is twisted and distorted in order to prepare -the way for imperial ambitions by justifying them -in advance. -</p> - -<p> -It is a signal triumph for the thoroughness of -German methods that all the thinkers, dreamers, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P129"></a>129}</span> -poets, and prophets, with but a few exceptions, -should have been commandeered and set to work -thinking, dreaming, poetising, and prophesying to -the glory of the Kaiser, and his army, and his -navy, and his counsellors, and his world policy, and -the conquests and expansion which are entailed -therein. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MOBILISATION OF INTELLECTUALS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is somewhat startling, however, to find the -intellectuals thus mobilised, and all but unanimous, on -the official side; for hitherto in history they have -rarely agreed among themselves, and the greater part -have usually favoured the Opposition rather than the -Government. Nor does this close alliance between -learning and the bureaucracy seem altogether -satisfactory. For thought loses its fine edge when it is -set to cut millstones of state. It loses its fine temper -in the red heat of political controversy. By turning -utilitarian it ceases to be universal; and what is -perhaps even worse, it ceases to be free. It tends -more and more to become the mere inventor of -things which will sell at a profit; less and less the -discoverer of high principles which the gods have -hidden out of sight. It would hardly be possible -to imagine a more complete reversal of attitude -than that which has occurred in Germany between -the beginning of the nineteenth century and the -present time; and though this change may serve -admirably the immediate purposes of the state, it -does not augur well for the future of German thought. -</p> - -<p> -The similarities and contrasts of history are -interesting to contemplate. In the ferment of thought -and action which occurred in France during the -generation preceding the battle of Valmy, and that -other which has been going on in Germany in the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P130"></a>130}</span> -generation preceding the battle of the Marne, there -are various likenesses and unlikenesses. -In France before the Revolution, as in Germany -to-day, a bureaucracy, responsible solely to the -monarch, directed policy and controlled administration. -But in France this bureaucracy was incompetent, -unpractical, and corrupt. Its machinery -was clogged with dead matter of every kind, with -prejudices, traditions, and statutes, many of which -had outlived their original purposes. The -<i>Struldbrugs</i>, discovered by Gulliver during his voyages, -were a race of men whose mortal souls were incased -in immortal bodies. The French monarchy was of -this nature, and the soul of it was long since dead. -Inefficiency was everywhere apparent; and, as a -natural consequence, the whole system had become -a butt, at which each brilliant writer in turn levelled -his darts of derision and contempt. -</p> - -<p> -In Germany, although the political mechanism -is the same, the conditions are diametrically the -opposite. The bureaucracy and the monarchy which -it supports, have proved themselves highly efficient -and adaptive. The arrangement has worked with -a marvellous success. It has cherished the material, -if not the spiritual, well-being of the people. The -wealth-producing and belly-filling activities of the -race have been stimulated to an extent never yet -attained by any form of government, either popular -or despotic. Administration has been honest, thrifty, -and singularly free from the usual dull negatives of -officialdom and the pedantries of red tape. In all -directions industrial prosperity has increased, under -the fostering care of the state, by leaps and bounds. -Anything more remote from the bankrupt empire of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P131"></a>131}</span> -Louis XVI. it would be impossible to conceive. And -as a natural consequence, brilliant German writers -have for the most part[<a id="chap0205fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0205fn2">2</a>] spent their forces of rhetoric -and fancy in idealising the grandeur and nobility of -an order of things, under which resources, comfort, -and luxury have expanded with such amazing strides. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -IDEAS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -In the case of France the aim of the intellectuals -was to pull down existing institutions, in that of -Germany it has been to bolster them up, to extend -and develop them to their logical conclusions. But -the second were no less agents of destruction than the -first. Each alike, as a condition of success, required -that a new order of moral and political ideas should be -set up; each attained a certain measure of success; and -the results which followed were those which usually -follow, when new wine is poured into old bottles. -</p> - -<p> -The ideas of the French Revolution cast themselves -into the mould of republicanism. A picture -wholly imaginary and fictitious was drawn of the -institutions of Greece and Rome in ancient days. -<i>Liberty</i>, <i>Equality</i>, and <i>Fraternity</i> were believed to -have been the foundations of these famous states. -Patriots on the banks of the Seine conceived -themselves to be re-incarnations of Aristides and the -Gracchi, of Pericles, of one Brutus or the other—it -mattered little which. Political idealism passed -rapidly into a kind of religious fervour. -</p> - -<p> -The German masquerade is very different from this, -but it is no less a masquerade. What covers the new -faith, indeed, is not plumage borrowed from the Greeks -and Romans, but habiliments which are supposed -to have clad the heroic forms of ancestral Teutons. -The student on his way to doctor's degree—the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P132"></a>132}</span> -intelligent clerk scanning the high-road to fortune -from the eminence of office-stool—dream in their -pensive leisure to emulate the heroes of Asgard, to -merit and enjoy the glories of Valhalla. But the -noble shapes and gorgeous colourings in which the -modern young German of honest, sober, and -industrious character has chosen to see his destiny -prefigured, are no less imaginary and fictitious than -those others, with which eloquent notaries'-clerks, -and emancipated, unfrocked priests, decked -themselves out for the admiration of the Paris mob. In -Germany as in France political idealism passed into -a kind of religious fervour, which inspired men to a -mimicry of old-Wardour-Street shams, and led them -to neglect the development of their own true natures. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -During quiet times that stream of events, which -we are wont to call human progress, is occupied -incessantly in throwing up dams, of one sort or another, -throughout the world. Tree-trunks and logs, which -have been swept down by former floods of conquest -and invasion, jam at some convenient rocky angle, as -the river falls to its normal level. Against these -obstacles the drift and silt of habit, custom, law, -convention, prejudice, and tradition slowly collect, -settle, and consolidate. An embankment is gradually -formed, and the waters are held up behind it ever -higher and higher. The tribal pool becomes a pond -or nation; and this again, if conditions remain -favourable—for so long, that is to say, as there are no -more raging and destructive floods,—extends into a -lake or inland sea of empire.... "See," cry the -optimists, "see what a fine, smooth, silvery sheet of -civilisation, culture, wealth, happiness, comfort, and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P133"></a>133}</span> -what not besides, where formerly there was but an -insignificant torrent brawling in the gorge!" ... But -the pessimists, as is their nature, shake their -heads, talk anxiously of the weight of waters which -are banking up behind, and of the unreliable character -of the materials out of which the dam has grown. -"Some day," they warn us, "the embankment -will burst under the heavy pressure; or, more likely -still, some ignorant, heedless, or malicious person -will begin to fiddle and tamper with the casual -structure; and then what may we expect?" -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -RECENT ANXIETIES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -There has been considerable nervousness of late -among rulers of nations as to the soundness of their -existing barrages. For the most part, however, they -have concerned themselves with internal dangers—with -watching propagandists of the socialist -persuasion—with keeping these under a kind of benevolent -police supervision, and in removing ostentatiously -from time to time the more glaring of their alleged -grievances. This procedure has been quite as noticeable -in the case of autocracies, as in countries which -enjoy popular institutions. -</p> - -<p> -Treitschke and Bernhardi—even Nietzsche himself—valued -themselves far more highly as builders-up -than as pullers-down. It is always so with your -inspired inaugurators of change. It was so with -Rousseau and those other writers, whose thoughts, -fermenting for a generation in the minds of Frenchmen, -brought about the Revolution. The intellectuals -of the eighteenth century, like those of the nineteenth, -aimed at getting rid of a great accumulation of -insanitary rubbish. But this was only a troublesome -preliminary, to be hurried through with as -quickly as possible, in order that the much greater -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P134"></a>134}</span> -work of construction might proceed upon the cleared -site. -</p> - -<p> -Treitschke made a hole in the German dam when -he cut an ancient commonplace in two, and tore out -the one half of it. Nietzsche turned the hole into a -much vaster cavity by pulling out the other half. -Bernhardi and the pedantocracy worked lustily at the -business, with the result that a great part of the -sticks, stones, and mud of tradition are now dancing, -rumbling, and boiling famously in the flood. Whether -they have injured our dam as well as their own, we -are hardly as yet in a position to judge. -</p> - -<p> -The profounder spirit of Nietzsche realised clearly -enough the absurdity of supposing that the -conflicting beliefs and aspirations of mankind could all -be settled and squared in a few bustling decades—that -the contradictions, paradoxes, and antinomies -of national existence could be written off with a few -bold strokes of the sword, and the world started off -on the road to perfection, like a brisk debtor who -has purged his insolvency in the Bankruptcy Court. -But the enthusiasm of Treitschke and Bernhardi -made them blind to these considerations. Had not -the formula been discovered, which would overcome -every obstacle—that stroke of genius, the famous -bisection of the commonplace? For private conduct, -the Sermon on the Mount; for high statecraft, -Machiavelli's <i>Prince</i>! Was ever anything simpler, -except perhaps the way of Columbus with the egg? -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -When we push our examination further, into the -means which Germany has been urged by her great -thinkers to employ in preparing for this premeditated -war, for provoking it when the season should be ripe, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P135"></a>135}</span> -and for securing victory and spoils, we are struck -more than ever by the gulf which separates the ideas -of the German pedantocracy from those of the rest -of the world. Nor can we fail to be impressed by -the matter-of-fact and businesslike way in which the -military and civil powers have set to work to -translate those notions into practice. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -A POLITICAL PRIESTHOOD -</span> -</p> - -<p> -No kind of priesthood has ever yet exercised a -great and direct influence upon national policy -without producing calamity. And by an ill fate, it has -always been the nature of these spiritual guides to -clutch at political power whenever it has come within -their reach. -</p> - -<p> -Of all classes in the community who are intellectually -capable of having ideas upon public affairs, a -priesthood—or what is the same thing, a pedantocracy—is -undoubtedly the most mischievous, if it succeeds in -obtaining power. It matters not a whit whether -they thunder forth their edicts and incitements from -church pulpits or university chairs, whether they -carry their sophistical projects up the back stairs of -Catholic King or Lutheran Kaiser, whether, having -shaved their heads and assumed vows of celibacy, -they dwell in ancient cloisters, or, having taken unto -themselves wives and begotten children, they keep -house in commonplace villa residences. None of -these differences is essential, or much worth -considering. The one class is as much a priesthood as -the other, and the evils which proceed from the -predominance of the one, and the other, are hardly -distinguishable. -</p> - -<p> -They stand ostentatiously aloof from the sordid -competitions of worldly business. They have forsworn, -or at any rate forgone, the ordinary prizes of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P136"></a>136}</span> -wealth and position. And for these very reasons -they are ill equipped for guiding practical affairs. -Their abstinences are fatal impediments, and render -them apt to leave human nature out of their reckoning. -They are wanting in experience of the difficulties -which beset ordinary men, and of the motives which -influence them. Knowing less of such matters (for -all their book learning) than any other class of -articulately-speaking men, they find it by so much the easier -to lay down rules and regulations for the government -of the world. -</p> - -<p> -To a priesthood, whether ecclesiastical or -academic, problems of politics and war present -themselves for consideration in an engaging -simplicity. They evolve theories of how people live, -of how they ought to live; and both sets of theories -are mainly cobwebs. There is no place in their -philosophy for anything which is illogical or untidy. -Ideas of compromise and give-and-take, are -abominations in priestly eyes—at any rate when they -are engaged in contemplation of worldly affairs. -And seeing that the priesthood aspires, nevertheless, -to govern and direct a world which is illogical and -needs humouring, there is nothing wonderful, if when -it has achieved power, it should blunder on disaster -in the name of principle, and incite men to cruelties -in the name of humanity. 'Clericalism,' said a -French statesman, and English statesmen have -echoed his words—'Clericalism is the enemy.' And -this is right, whether the priesthood be that of Rome -or John Calvin, of economic professors expounding -Adam Smith in the interests of Manchester, or -history professors improving upon Treitschke in the -interests of the Hohenzollern dynasty. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P137"></a>137}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -PRIESTS AND LAWYERS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Priests and professors when they meddle in -politics are always the same. They sit in their -studies or cells, inventing fundamental principles; -building thereon great edifices of reasoned or -sentimental brickwork which splits in the sun and crumbles -in the storm. Throughout the ages, as often as -they have left their proper sphere, they have been -subject to the same angry enthusiasms and savage -obstinacies. Their errors of judgment have been -comparable only to their arrogance. Acts of cruelty -and treachery, meanness and dishonour,[<a id="chap0205fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0205fn3">3</a>] which would -revolt the ordinary German or Englishman, -commend themselves readily, on grounds of sophistry -or logic, to these morbid ascetics, so soon as they -begin busying themselves with the direction of public -affairs. -</p> - -<p> -It would be unfair to judge any country by its -political professors. At the same time, if any country -is so foolish as to follow such guides, there is a probability -of mischief in national—still more in international—affairs. -For they are as innocent as the lawyers -themselves, of any knowledge of the real insides of -things. They differ of course from the lawyers in -many ways. They are ever for making changes for -the sake of symmetry; while the man of law is for -keeping as he is until the last moment; or at any -rate until it is clearly his interest to budge. A -priesthood has a burning faith in its own hand-wrought -idols; the lawyer on the contrary, does -not go readily to the stake, does not catch fire easily, -being rather of the nature of asbestos. When lawyers -monopolise political power—even when they merely -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P138"></a>138}</span> -preponderate, as of late years they have seemed to -do more and more in all democratic countries, -whether of the monarchical or republican type—they -invariably destroy by insensible gradations -that which is most worth preserving in man or state, -the soul. But they do not bring on sudden -catastrophe as a priesthood does; their method is to -strangle slowly like ivy. -</p> - -<p> -In England, nowadays—indeed ever since the -'eighties, when professors of Political Economy -became discredited as political guides—there are not -many evidences of priestly influence. Certainly there -is nothing of an organised kind. What exists is -erratic and incalculable. There is much clamour; -but it is contradictory, spasmodic, and inconstant, -without any serious pretence, either of learning or -science, to support it. Each of our prophets is in -business for himself. There is no tinge of Erastianism -about any of them. For the most part they -are the grotesques and <i>lions comiques</i> of the -world of letters, who prophesy standing on their -heads, or grinning through horse-collars, and mistaking -always "the twinkling of their own sophisticated minds -for wisdom." -</p> - -<p> -Alliance between a priesthood and a bureaucracy -tends gradually to produce, as in the case of China, -an oppressive uniformity—not unlike that aimed at -by the more advanced socialists—where every -fresh innovation is a restriction hampering the -natural bent. On the other hand an alliance between -a priesthood and a military caste—especially when -the bureaucracy is ready to act in sympathy—is -one of the commonest causes of international -convulsions. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P139"></a>139}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -PRIESTS AND SOLDIERS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Oddly enough, the soldier, who affects to despise -men of words and make-believes, and who on this -account has an instinctive dislike and distrust of -the lawyer—so violent indeed that it often puts him -in the wrong, and leaves him at the mercy of the -object of his contempt—is dangerously apt to become -the tool of anything which bears a likeness to Peter -the Hermit. It is not really the lawyer's confidence -in the efficacy of words which revolts the soldier, -nearly so much as the kind of words used, the -temperament of him who uses them, and the character -of the make-believes which it is sought to establish. -The unworldliness, simplicity, idealism, and fervour -of the priesthood make strong appeals to a military -caste, which on the contrary is repelled by what it -conceives to be the cynicism, opportunism, and -self-seeking of lawyer statecraft. -</p> - -<p> -More especially is it difficult for the military caste -to resist the influence of the priesthood when, as in -Germany of recent years, they have insisted upon -giving the warrior the most important niche in their -temple, and on burning incense before him day and -night. Working industriously in their studies and -laboratories they have found moral justification for -every course, however repugnant to established ideas, -which may conceivably make it easier to attain -victory and conquest. The soldier might have -scruples about doing this or that; but when he is -assured by inspired intellectuals, that what would -best serve his military ends is also the most moral -course of action, how can he—being a man of -simple mind—presume to doubt it; though he may -occasionally shudder as he proceeds to put it into -execution? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P140"></a>140}</span> -</p> - -<p> -German thoroughness is an admirable quality, -but even thoroughness may be carried to extremes -which are absurd, or something worse. -</p> - -<p> -No nation has a right to complain if another -chooses to drill armies, build fleets, accumulate stores -of treasure, weapons, and material; nor is it -incumbent upon any nation to wear its heart upon its -sleeve, or to let the whole world into its secrets, -military or political. In so far as Germany has -acted upon these principles she was well within her -rights. As a result we have suffered heavily; but -we must blame ourselves for being ill-prepared; -we have no justification for complaining because -Germany was well-prepared. -</p> - -<p> -There are some kinds of preparation, however, -which it does not seem possible to justify, if the -world is to consist as heretofore of a large number -of independent states, between whose citizens it -is desirable to maintain a certain friendliness and -freedom of intercourse. German activities in various -directions, for many years before war broke out, -make one wonder what state of things was contemplated -by German statesmen, as likely to prevail -when war should be over. What, for instance, -is to be the status of Germans visiting or residing -in other countries—seeking to trade with them—to -borrow money from them—to interchange with -them the civilities of ordinary life, or those more -solemn courtesies which are practised by societies of -learning and letters? Will the announcement <i>civis -Germanicus sum</i> be enough henceforth to secure the -stranger a warm welcome and respect? Or will such -revelation of his origin be more likely to lead to his -speedy re-embarkation for the land of his nativity? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P141"></a>141}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMAN AGENCIES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Spying has always been practised since the -beginning of time; but it has rarely been conducted in -such a manner as to produce general uneasiness, or -any sensible restraint upon private relations. -Logically, it would be unfair to condemn recent German -enterprises in this direction, seeing that she has only -extended an accepted nuisance on to a much vaster -scale. But here again logic is a misleading guide. -There is something in the very scale of German -espionage which has changed the nature of this -institution. It has grown into a huge organised -industry for the debauching of vain, weak, and greedy -natures; for turning such men—for the most part -without their being aware of it—into German agents. -The result of Teutonic thoroughness in this instance -is a domestic intrusion which is odious, as well as a -national menace which cannot be disregarded. Many -of these hostile agencies may surely be termed -treacherous, seeing that they have aimed, under the -guise of friendly intercourse, at forwarding schemes -of invasion and conquest. -</p> - -<p> -We are familiar enough with the vain purse-proud -fellow, who on the strength of a few civil speeches -from the Kaiser—breathing friendship and the love of -peace—has thenceforward flattered himself that his -mission in life was to eradicate suspicion of German -intentions from the minds of his British -fellow-countrymen. This is the unconscious type of agent, -useful especially in sophisticated circles, and among -our more advanced politicians of anti-militarist -sympathies. -</p> - -<p> -Then we have the naturalised, or unnaturalised, -magnate of finance or industry, to whom business -prosperity is the great reality of life, politics and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P142"></a>142}</span> -patriotism being by comparison merely things of the -illusory sort. It would cause him no very bitter -anguish of heart to see England humiliated and her -Empire dissolved, providing his own cosmopolitan -undertakings continued to thrive undisturbed by -horrid war. He, also, has very likely been the -recipient of imperial suavities. In addition to this, -however, he has been encouraged to imagine that -he enjoys in a peculiar degree the confidence of the -German Foreign Office. The difficulties which so -shrewd a fellow must have in believing in the -innocence of German intentions must be considerable -at the outset; but they are worn away by the -constant erosion of his private interests. Britain -must not cross Germany:—that is his creed in a -nutshell. This is the semi-conscious type of agent; -and he carries great weight in business circles, and -even sometimes in circles much higher than those -frequented by the money-changers. -</p> - -<p> -We may resent such influences as these, now that -we have become more or less sensible of the effect -which they have had during recent years in hindering -our preparations for defence; but here we cannot -fairly charge Germany with any breach of custom -and tradition. We must blame ourselves for having -given heed to their counsellors. But it is different -when we come to such things as the wholesale -corruption of the subjects of friendly nations—a network -of careful intrigue for the promotion of rebellion—lavish -subsidies and incitements for the purpose of -fostering Indian unrest, Egyptian discontent, and -South African treason—the supply of weapons and -munitions of war on the shortest notice, and most -favourable terms, to any one and every one who -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P143"></a>143}</span> -seems inclined to engage in civil war in Ireland or -elsewhere. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMAN METHODS AT WORK -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The whole of this procedure has been justified -in advance and advocated in detail by Bernhardi -and the priesthood. Belgium, France, Russia, and -Britain are doubtless peculiarly alive to the iniquity -of these practices, for the reason that their moral -judgment has been sharpened by personal suffering. -But they do not denounce the system solely because -they themselves have been injured by it, but also -because it seems to them to be totally at variance -with all recent notions regarding the comity of -nations. If we may use such an old-fashioned term, -it appears to us to be wrong. -</p> - -<p> -If methods such as these are henceforth to be -practised by the world in general, must not all -international communion become impossible, as much in -time of peace as during a war? Indeed must not -human existence itself become almost intolerable? -Friendliness, hospitality, courtesies of every sort, -between men and women of one country and those -of another, must cease absolutely, if the world should -become a convert to these German doctrines. Travel -must cease; for no one likes to be stripped naked -and searched at every frontier. Trade and financial -operations must also be restricted, one would imagine, -to such an extent that ultimately they will wither -and die. -</p> - -<p> -And if the world in general after the war is ended -does not become a convert to these German doctrines -of treacherous preparation, made in friendly territories -during time of peace, what then will be its attitude -towards Germany and the Germans; for they presumably -have no intention of abandoning these -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P144"></a>144}</span> -practices? It is an unpleasant problem, but it will -have to be faced sooner or later. -</p> - -<p> -For obviously, although every sensible man -believes, and many of us know by actual experience, -that the instincts of Germans, in all private -relations, are as loyal and honourable as those of most -other races which inhabit the earth, no nation can -afford any longer to have dealings with them on -equal terms, if they have decided to allow their -instincts to be used and abused, over-ridden and -perverted, by a bureaucracy whose ideal is thoroughness, -and by a priesthood which has invented a new -system of morals to serve a particular set of ends. -Not only the allied nations which are at present at war -with Germany, but any country whose interests may -conceivably, at any future time, come into conflict -with those of that far-sighted empire, will be forced -in self-defence to take due precautions. It is clear -enough that more efficacious means than mere scraps -of naturalisation paper will be needed to secure -mankind against the abuse of its hospitality by -Teutonic theorists. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE GERMAN CREED -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The whole of this strange system, those methods -which, even after somewhat painful experience of -their effects, we are still inclined in our less reflective -moments to regard as utterly incredible—is it possible -to summarise them in a few sentences? What are -the accepted maxims, the orthodox formulas of -Prussian statecraft? -</p> - -<p> -Power, more power, world-power; these according -to German theory, as well as practice, should be -the dominant principles of the state. -</p> - -<p> -When a nation desires territories belonging to its -neighbours, let it take them, if it is strong enough. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P145"></a>145}</span> -No further justification is needed than mere appetite -for possession, and the strength to satisfy it. -</p> - -<p> -War is in itself a good thing and not a bad. Like -a purge, or a course of the waters of Aix, it should be -taken, every half-century or so, by all nations which -aim at preserving the vigour of their constitutions. -</p> - -<p> -During the intervening periods the chief duty of -the state is to prepare for war, so that when it -comes, victory, and with it benefits of the material, -as well as of the spiritual sort, may be secured. -</p> - -<p> -No means which will help to secure victory are -immoral, whether in the years preceding the outbreak -of hostilities, or afterwards, when the war is in full -course. If the state, aided by its men of science, -could find any safe and secret means of sending a -plague, as an advance guard, to ravage the enemy, -where is the objection? The soul of a Prussian -soldier might revolt against this form of warfare, but -at what point would it conflict with the teachings of -the priesthood? Nor can we imagine, were the thing -possible, that the bureaucracy would allow itself to -be hampered by any scruples. -</p> - -<p> -As to the declaration of war, let it be made when -the state is in a strong position and its prey in a -weak one. This is the all-important consideration. -The actual pretext is only a secondary matter, though -worthy of attention for the effect it may have on the -action of neutrals. And as war is a game of chance, -it is wise and right to 'correct fortune,' so far as -this can be accomplished during years of peace and -under the cloak of amity, by the aid of spies, secret -agents, accomplices, traitors, rebels, and what not -besides. -</p> - -<p> -The state which has evolved this system and laid -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P146"></a>146}</span> -down these rules, without the least attempt at secrecy -or concealment, is the most efficient machine of the -fighting and administrative kind at present existing -in the world—perhaps which has ever existed in the -world. But as you increase the size, power, and -complexity of a machine there are obvious dangers -unless you can also increase the calibre of the men -who have to drive and direct it. This is a much -more difficult problem than the other; and there is -no evidence to show that it has been solved in the -case of Germany. The more powerful the machine, -the greater is apt to be the disaster if it is mishandled. -</p> - -<p> -In history the blunders of bureaucracy are a -by-word. They have been great and many, even when, -as in Germany to-day, the bureaucracy is in the full -vigour of its age, and in the first flower of uprightness; -for a bureaucracy, in order to retain its efficiency, -must remain incorruptible, and that is one of the -hardest things to secure. -</p> - -<p> -As for the priesthoods, if they are to be of any use, -their faith must burn brightly. And the faith of a -priesthood is very apt to burn itself out—very apt -also to set fire to other things during the process; -even to the edifice of popular virtue and the imperial -purple itself, which things—unlike the Phoenix, the -Salamander, and the Saint—are none the better or -stronger for being burned. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -We are constantly being told by high authorities -that the moral objective of the present war is 'to -put down militarism,' and 'abolish it' off the face -of the earth. There are few of us who do not wish -that this aim may be crowned with success; but -militarism is a tough weed to kill, and something -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P147"></a>147}</span> -more than the mere mowing of it down by some -outside scythesman will be necessary, one imagines, -in order to get rid of it. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MAIN OBJECT OF THE WAR -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The true moral objective of the war is something -much more important than this. A blacker evil than -militarism is that violation of private trust and -public honour which is known as the Prussian -System, and which has recently been 'marching -through rapine, to the disintegration,' not of a single -nation, or group of nations, but of the whole fabric -of human society, including its own. It is an -elaborate contrivance of extreme artificiality, a -strange perversion of the nature of man. These are -its inherent weaknesses; and fortunately, by reason -of them, it is more vulnerable to hard blows than -militarism which, with all its vices, and extravagancies, -is rooted in instincts which are neither -depraved nor ignoble. -</p> - -<p> -Militarism might continue to thrive under adversity, -and after the heaviest defeat, as it has done in -times past; but the life of the Prussian System—that -joint invention of the most efficient bureaucracy -in the world, and of a priesthood whose industry -can only be matched by its sycophancy and -conceit—hangs upon the thread of success. Like -the South Sea Bubble, or any of those other -impostures of the financial sort, which have temporarily -beguiled the confidence of mankind, it must collapse -utterly under the shock of failure. It depends -entirely on credit, and its powers of recuperation are -nil. When its assets are disclosed, the characters of -its promoters will be understood. The need, therefore, -is to bring it at all costs to a complete demonstration -of failure. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P148"></a>148}</span> -</p> - -<p> -We have been urged by our own anti-militarists -not to inflict suffering and humiliation on Germany. -But this is not a matter of the slightest importance -one way or the other. It has but little to do with the -issue which it is our business to settle, if we have the -good fortune to come out victorious from the present -struggle. To set up the suffering and humiliation of -Germany as the object of high policy would cover -the Allies with contempt; but to shrink from such -things, if they should happen to stand between the -Allies and the utter moral bankruptcy of the Prussian -System, would overwhelm them with a burden far -heavier and more shameful than contempt. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0205fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0205fn1text">1</a>] "We may declare that the problem -of training in arms and turning -to real account the energies -of the nation was first undertaken in thorough -earnestness by Germany. -<i>We possess in our army a characteristic, necessary -continuation of the school-system</i>. -For many men there is no better means -of training; for them drilling, -compulsory cleanliness, and severe discipline -are physically and morally indispensable -in a time like ours, which unchains -all spirits."—Treitschke, <i>Selections</i>, pp. 106-107. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0205fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0205fn2text">2</a>] Nietzsche is one of the rare exceptions. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0205fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0205fn3text">3</a>] Cf. Professor Kuno Meyer, <i>Times</i>, December 24, 1914, -and March 8, 1915. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0206"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P149"></a>149}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VI -<br /> -THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE -</h3> - -<p> -A German might fairly contend that British -criticism of his moral ideas and political system is -tainted throughout by ignorance and prejudice, -and that all our talk of autocracy, bureaucracy, -pedantocracy, military caste, and sham constitutionalism -is merely an attempt to avoid the real issue by -calling things, which we happen to dislike, by bad -names. Political institutions, he might insist, must -be judged by their fruits. If this test were applied, -Germany in his opinion would have nothing to fear -in any comparison. -</p> - -<p> -"We Germans," writes a correspondent, the -Freiherr von Hexenküchen,[<a id="chap0206fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0206fn1">1</a>] "are not inferior in -intelligence or education to any other race. Had -this been so, we could never have reached, in so -short a period as four decades, the proud position -which we now occupy in science, invention, -manufacture, commerce, finance, and administration.[<a id="chap0206fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0206fn2">2</a>] -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P150"></a>150}</span> -Consequently, if we are well content to live under -the institutions we possess, this cannot be put down -either to our want of enterprise or to the dulness -of our understandings. -</p> - -<p> -"Our people have already shown that they are -willing to fight and die for these very institutions -which you Englishmen affect to regard with so much -contempt. Possibly your people are equally willing -to fight and die for theirs. I do not deny this; -but it is not yet proved; it remains to be proved. -</p> - -<p> -"I do not assert that your people are inferior to -mine in their readiness to fight and die when they -are actually faced with a great national danger. -But I do claim that mine are superior to yours in -the constancy of their devotion to duty. For a -hundred years past—not only in periods of stress -and danger, which stirred the national imagination, -but equally in times of peace and prosperity, which -always tend to encourage the growth of comfort and -the love of ease—each succeeding generation has -been found willing to train itself in the use of arms, -so as to be prepared, if occasion should arise, to -defend the Fatherland. -</p> - -<p> -"When the present war broke out was there a -firmer loyalty or a more patriotic response to the -call to arms among your people or among mine? -Will your people fight and suffer more gladly for -their 'democratic' ideals than mine will for their -Kaiser and Fatherland? ... Surely, upon your -own principles no comparison should be possible -between the warmth of your devotion and the -tepidity of ours. -</p> - -<p> -"Is our system really so reactionary and mechanical -as you imagine? In an age which has learned -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P151"></a>151}</span> -as its special lesson the advantages, in ordinary -business affairs of life, of organisation, thoroughness, -long views, reticence, and combined effort, guided -by a strong central control, is it reaction, or is it -progress, to aim at applying the same principles to -the greatest, most complex, and infinitely most -important of all businesses—that of government -itself? Can a nation hope to survive which refuses, -in the name of freedom, to submit to control in -these respects, if it should be faced by competition -with another, which has been wise enough to employ -quiet experts instead of loquacious amateurs—any -more than a cotton mill could escape bankruptcy -were it managed on a system of party -government? -</p> - -<p> -"Our civil service, which you are pleased to -describe as a Bureaucracy, is distinguished among -all others existing at the present time, by the calibre -of its members, by its efficiency and honesty, by its -poverty, and not less by the honour in which it is -held notwithstanding its poverty. You laugh at -our love for calling men, and also their wives, by -the titles of their various offices—Herr this and Frau -that, from the humblest inspector of drains to the -Imperial Chancellor himself! And no doubt there -is a ludicrous side to this practice. But it marks -at least one important thing—that membership -of our civil service is regarded as conferring honour. -So far, we have succeeded in maintaining public -officials of all grades in higher popular respect than -men who devote their lives to building up private -fortunes, and also to those others who delight -and excel in interminable debate. -</p> - -<p> -"You are used to boast, and I daresay rightly -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P152"></a>152}</span> -of the personal honesty and pecuniary disinterestedness -of your politicians; and you assume as a matter -of course that your civil servants, with such high -standards and examples ever before their eyes, are -likewise incorruptible. We invert this order. With -us the honour of our civil servants is the chief thing; -we assume that our politicians must follow suit. -They are probably as upright as your own, thanks -partly to tradition, but also to the vigilance of their -superiors, the professionals, who carry on the actual -business of government. With you the fame of -the showy amateur fills the mouths of the public. -We, on the contrary, exalt the expert, the man -who has been trained to the job he undertakes. In -so doing we may be reactionaries and you may be -progressives; but the progress of Germany since -1870—a progress in which we are everywhere either -already in front of you, or else treading closely on -your heels—does not seem to furnish you with a -conclusive argument. -</p> - -<p> -"As for what you call our Pedantocracy, meaning -thereby our professors and men of letters, it is true -that these exercise a great influence upon public -opinion. We have always respected learning and -thought. It is in the German nature so to do. I -admit that our learned ones are rather too much -inclined to imagine, that because they are students -of theory, they are therefore qualified to engage in -practice. They are apt to offer their advice and -service officiously, and occasionally in a ridiculous -manner. But, if my recollection of the English -newspapers be correct, this is no more so with us -than with you. There is apparently something -in the professorial nature which impels men of this -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P153"></a>153}</span> -calling to the drafting of manifestoes and the -signing of round-robins in times of excitement. -They may be officious and absurd, but they are not -wholly despicable, since they act thus quite as much -from earnestness as from vanity. If our academicians -on such occasions mislead more people than -your own it is due to their virtues, to the greater -zeal and success with which they have won the -confidence of their former pupils.[<a id="chap0206fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0206fn3">3</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE MILITARY CASTE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -"You are fond of sneering at our Military Caste -and attribute to it the most malign influence upon -public affairs. But there again, believe me, you -exaggerate. Our officers are undoubtedly held in -great respect, even in some awe. And the reason -is that they are known to be brave, and like those -you call the bureaucracy, to have preferred -comparative poverty in the public service to the pursuit -of riches. To say that they have no influence upon -policy would of course be absurd. It is inevitable -that in the present state of the world, soldiers will -always have great influence in certain departments -of public affairs. This must be so in any country -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P154"></a>154}</span> -which is not plunged in dreams. For it is their -business to guarantee national security, and to keep -watch over the growth of military strength among -the neighbours and rivals of Germany. If the -general staff foresees dangers, and can give reasonable -grounds for its anticipations, it is clear that the -military view must carry weight with the Kaiser -and his ministers. And surely there can be no -question that this is right. -</p> - -<p> -"The officers of the German Army are a caste, -if you like to put it that way. But in every form -of government under the sun, unless conceivably -in some tiny oriental despotism, the predominance -of a certain caste, or the competition between -different castes, is absolutely essential to the working -of the machinery. -</p> - -<p> -"It is not regrettable in our opinion if a caste, -which has considerable weight in public affairs, is -a manly one, contemptuous of wealth and sophistry, -ready always to risk its own life for the faith which -is in it. The influence of a military caste may have -its drawbacks; but at any rate it has kept the -peace in Germany for not far short of half a -century—kept it successfully until, as some people have -thought, the professors acquired too large a share -of power. -</p> - -<p> -"Is it so certain, moreover, that the lawyer -caste, the self-advertising caste, and the financial -caste are not all of them a great deal worse, even a -great deal more dangerous to peace? Is a country -any more likely to be safe, happy, and prosperous -under the régime of a talking caste—of windbags -resourcefully keeping their bellows full of air, and -wheedling the most numerous with transparent -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P155"></a>155}</span> -falsehoods—than where civil servants of tried -wisdom and experience are responsible for carrying -on affairs of state, aided at their high task by sober -military opinion?[<a id="chap0206fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0206fn4">4</a>] -</p> - -<p> -"As for our Kaiser, whom you regard as a crafty -and ambitious tyrant, he appears in our view as -the incarnation of patriotic duty, burdened though -not overwhelmed by care—a lover of peace, so long -as peace may be had with honour and safety; but -if this may not be, then a stern, though reluctant, -drawer of the sword. It is true that the Kaiser's -government is in many important respects a purely -personal government. His is the ultimate responsibility -for high policy. He fulfils the function in -our system of that strong central power, without -which the most ingeniously constructed organisation -is but impotence. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMAN SELF-KNOWLEDGE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -"The German people are ahead of the English -and the Americans in self-knowledge; for they -realise that there are many things appertaining -to government, which cannot be discussed in the -newspapers, or on the platform, any more than the -policy and conduct of a great business can be made -known in advance to the staff, and to trade -competitors all over the world. And so, believing the -Kaiser's government to be honest, capable, and -devoted to the public weal, the German people -trust it without reservation to decide when action -shall be taken in a variety of spheres. -</p> - -<p> -"This system of ours which is founded in reason, -and in experience of modern conditions, and which -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P156"></a>156}</span> -is upheld by the unfaltering confidence of a great -people, you are wont to condemn as tyrannical and -reactionary. But can democracy stand against -it?—Democracy infirm of purpose, jealous, grudging, -timid, changeable, unthorough, unready, without -foresight, obscure in its aims, blundering along in -an age of lucidity guided only by a faltering and -confused instinct! Given anything like an equal -contest, is it conceivable that such an undisciplined -chaos can prevail against the Hohenzollern -Empire? -</p> - -<p> -"Of late your newspapers have been busily -complaining of what they call 'German lies,' -'boastfulness,' and 'vulgar abuse.' They have taunted -our government with not daring to trust the people. -Our Headquarters bulletins have been vigorously -taken to task by the Allies on these and other -grounds. -</p> - -<p> -"But all nations will acclaim their victories louder -than they will trumpet their defeats. This is in -human nature. No official communiqué will ever -be a perfect mirror of truth. It will never give the -whole picture, but only a part; and by giving only -a part it will often mislead. Were we to believe -literally what the various governments have hitherto -given out as regards their respective advances, the -Germans by this time might perhaps have been at -Moscow in the East and somewhere about the -Azores in the West. But by the same token the -Russians should have been on the Rhine and the -French and English Allies at Berlin. -</p> - -<p> -"I read your newspapers, and I read our own. -I do not think our journalists, though they do their -best, can fairly claim to excel yours in the contest -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P157"></a>157}</span> -of boastfulness and vulgar abuse. And as regards -the utterances of responsible public men in our -two countries, can you really contend that we -Germans are more open to the reproach of -vainglorious and undignified speech than the British? -Our Kaiser denies having used the words, so often -attributed to him in your press, about 'General -French's contemptible little army,' and in Germany -we believe his denial. But even if he did in fact -utter this expression, is it not quite as seemly and -restrained as references to 'digging rats out of -a hole'—as applied to our gallant navy—or to that -later announcement from the same quarter which -was recently addressed to the Mayor of Scarborough -about 'baby-killers'? Such expressions are -regrettable, no doubt, but not of the first importance. -They are a matter of temperament. An ill-balanced, -or even a very highly-strung nature, will be betrayed -into blunders of this sort more readily than the -phlegmatic person, or one whose upbringing has -been in circles where self-control is the rule of -manners. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -TRUST IN THE PEOPLE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -"But what puzzles us Germans perhaps more than -any of your other charges against us is, when you -say that our rulers do not trust the people as the -British Government does. -</p> - -<p> -"You accuse our War Office of publishing accounts -of imaginary victories to revive our drooping -confidence, and of concealing actual disasters lest our -country should fall into a panic of despondency. -There was surely nothing imaginary about the fall -of Liège, Namur, Maubeuge, Laon, or La Fere. -The engagements before Metz, at Mons, Charleroi, -and Amiens, the battles of Lodz and Lyck, were -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P158"></a>158}</span> -not inconsiderable successes for German arms, -or at the very least for German generalship. -The victory of Tannenberg was among the greatest -in history, reckoning in numbers alone. Our -government made no secret of the German -retirement—retreat if you prefer the term—from the -Marne to the Aisne, or of that other falling back -after the first attempt on Warsaw. Naturally they -laid less emphasis on reverses than on conquests, -but what government has ever acted otherwise? -Certainly not the French, or the Russian, or your -own. And what actual disasters have we concealed? -In what respect, as regards the conduct of this war, -have we, the German people, been trusted less than -yours? -</p> - -<p> -"I am especially interested, I confess, as a student -of British politics, in this matter of 'trusting the -people.' All your great writers have led me to -believe that here lies the essential difference between -your system and ours, and that the great superiority -of yours to ours is demonstrated in the confidence -which your statesmen never hesitate to place in -the wisdom, fortitude, and patriotism of the people. -Frankly, I do not understand it. Trust must surely -have some esoteric meaning when applied to your -populace which foreigners are unable to apprehend. -I can discover no other sense in your phrase about -'trusting the people,' than that they are trusted -not to find out their politicians. It certainly -cannot be believed that you trust your people to -hear the truth; for if so why has your government -practised so rigorous an economy of this virtue, -doling it out very much as we have lately been doing -with our wheat and potatoes? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P159"></a>159}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE BRITISH PRESS BUREAU -</span> -</p> - -<p> -"Has your government not concealed actual -disaster—concealed it from their own people, though -from no one else; for all the world was on the broad -grin? Everybody knew of your misfortune save -a certain large portion of the British public. The -motive of your government could not have been -to hide it away from the Germans, or the Austrians, -or from neutrals, for the illustrated papers all -over the globe, even in your own colonies, contained -pictures reproduced from photographs of the occurrence. -It was only possible to muzzle the press and -blindfold the people of the United Kingdom, and -these things your government did; acting no doubt -very wisely. -</p> - -<p> -"Again after the great German victory over the -Russians at Tannenberg in September last, an -official bulletin of simple and conspicuous candour -was published at Petrograd which confirmed in most -of the . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . -</p> - -<p> -"Why did your Press Bureau during the heavy -fighting from the middle of October to the middle of -November persist in maintaining that 'the British -are still gaining ground.' The British resistance -from the beginning to the end of the four weeks' battle -round Ypres is not likely to be forgotten by our -German soldiers, still less to be belittled by them. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P160"></a>160}</span> -It was surely a great enough feat of arms to bear the -light of truth. But. . . . . -. . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . -</p> - -<p> -"But is the same true of the British people? -Can they be trusted to bear the light of truth? -</p> - -<p> -"You cannot wonder if we Germans, and for that -matter the whole world, have drawn certain -conclusions from these and other incidents. We do -not doubt that your ministers have acted wisely -in suppressing bad tidings; but why should they -have taken all those pains and endured the derision, -while incurring the distrust, of foreign countries—a -material injury, mind you, and not merely a -sentimental one—unless they had known, only too -well, that publication of this or that piece of news -would have too painfully affected the nerves of your -people? Concealment of checks, reverses, and -disasters which had not already become known -to the Austrians and ourselves might have served a -useful military purpose; but what purpose except -that of a sedative for British public opinion could -be served by the concealment of such matters when -we, your enemies, knew them already? Have you -ever thought of asking your American friends in -what order they would place the candour of the -official communications which emanate from Berlin, -Petrograd, Paris, and London? -</p> - -<p> -"Shortly before Christmas one of your legal -ministers, who, I understand, is specially responsible -for looking after the Press Bureau, explained to the -House of Commons the principles by which he had -been guided in the suppression of news and comment. -He should refuse, he said, to publish any criticism -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P161"></a>161}</span> -which might tend to disturb popular confidence in -the Government, or which might cause the people -of England to think that their affairs were in a -really serious state. On practical grounds there is no -doubt something to be said for such a policy; but -(will you tell me?) has any autocratic government -ever laid down a more drastic rule for blindfolding -the people in order to preserve its own existence?[<a id="chap0206fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0206fn5">5</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -BRITISH PATRIOTISM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -"Pondering upon these things, I scratch my -head and marvel what you can possibly have had -in yours, when you used to assure us that the -surpassing merit of the English political system was -that it trusted the people, the inherent weakness of -ours, the Austrian, and the Russian that they did not. -</p> - -<p> -"Your Prime Minister, speaking in the early -autumn, thus adjured the men of Wales:—'Be -worthy of those who went before you, and leave to -your children the richest of all inheritances, the -memory of fathers who, in a great cause, put -self-sacrifice before ease, and honour above life -itself.' These are noble words, of Periclean grandeur. -But have they met with a general response? Are -these sentiments prevalent outside government -circles, among those—the bulk of your people—who -do not come under the direct influence of ministerial -inspiration and example? If so, why then -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P162"></a>162}</span> -have your rulers not screwed up their courage -to call for national service? Why do they still -continue to depend for their recruits upon sensational -advertisements, newspaper puffs, oratorical -entreaties, and private influence of a singularly -irregular sort? -</p> - -<p> -"Is not this the reason?—Your government is -afraid—even in this great struggle, where (as they -put it) your future existence as a nation is at -stake—that the English people—or at any rate so large a -proportion of them, as if rendered uncomfortable -could create a political disturbance—is not even yet -prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. And -so, to the amazement of us Germans, you let the -older men, with families dependent on them, go -forth to the war, urged on by a high sense of duty, -while hundreds of thousands of young unmarried -men are still allowed to stay at home. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -COMPARISON OF RECRUITING -</span> -</p> - -<p> -"You are still, it would appear, enamoured of -your voluntary system. You have not yet abandoned -your belief that it is the duty of the man, who -possesses a sense of duty, to protect the skin, family, -and property of the man who does not. To us -this seems a topsy-turvy creed, and not more -topsy-turvy than contemptible. In Germany and -France—where for generations past the doctrine of -private sacrifice for the public weal is ingrained, -and has been approved in principle and applied in -practice with unfaltering devotion—a 'voluntary' -system might conceivably have some chance of -providing such an army as you are in search of. But -to the United Kingdom surely it is singularly -inapplicable? Let me illustrate my meaning by a -comparison. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P163"></a>163}</span> -</p> - -<p> -"Our Kaiser in his New Year's message—which -in Germany we all read with enthusiasm, and -considered very noble and appropriate—summed up the -military situation by saying that after five months' -hard and hot fighting the war was still being -waged almost everywhere off German soil, and on -the enemies' territories. And he summed up the -domestic situation by saying (and this, believe me, -is true) that our nation stands in unexampled -harmony, prepared to sacrifice its heart's blood for -the defence of the Fatherland. Another three -months have passed away, and these statements -still hold good. -</p> - -<p> -"The point to which I chiefly wish to call your -attention is one of numbers, and I will take my -estimates of numbers from your own most famous -newspaper experts. -</p> - -<p> -"Your claim, as I understand it, is that on New -Year's Day 1915 you had—exclusive of Indian troops -and Dominion contingents—between 2,000,000 and -2,500,000 men training and in the field. -</p> - -<p> -"Germany alone (here again I quote your English -experts), without reckoning Austria, has actually -put into the field during the past five months -5,000,000 men. Of these it is stated by your -newspapers that she has lost in round figures 1,500,000, -who have either been killed, or taken prisoners, -or are too severely wounded to return as yet to -the fighting line. But in spite of this depletion, -your military statisticians tell us that Germany -and her ally, at New Year's Day, still outnumbered -the Allies on both the Eastern and the Western -frontier. -</p> - -<p> -"The same high authorities tell us further, that -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P164"></a>164}</span> -during this period of five months, the German -Government has called upon the civil population, -has appealed to able-bodied men who had previously -been exempt from military service, and that by -this means it has obtained, and has been engaged in -training, arming, and equipping another 4,000,000 -or 4,500,000 who, it is anticipated, will become -available for war purposes in new formations, during -the spring and summer of the present year. -</p> - -<p> -"Our Government, therefore, according to your -own account, has not been afraid to ask the civil -population to serve, and this is the response. Does -it look as if the national spirit had been quenched -under our autocratic system? -</p> - -<p> -"Out of our whole population of sixty-five millions -we have apparently raised for military service on -land and naval service at sea, between 9,000,000 and -11,000,000 men since this war began. Out of your -whole population of forty-five millions you have -succeeded in raising for these same purposes only -something between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000 men. -And in your case, be it observed, in order to attract -recruits, you have offered good wages and munificent -separation allowances; while in our case men serve -without pay. -</p> - -<p> -"This numerical comparison is worth carrying a -stage further. Germany and her ally have between -them a total population of 115,000,000. The United -Kingdom (including the people of European stock -who inhabit the various Dominions), France, Russia, -Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro number in round -figures about 280,000,000. Roughly speaking, these -are odds of seven to three against us. And I am -leaving out of account all the non-European races—the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P165"></a>165}</span> -Turks on the one side, the Japanese and the -Indians on the other. If these were included the -odds would be much heavier. -</p> - -<p> -"And yet our Kaiser spoke but the simple -truth, when he told us on New Year's Day that, -after five months of war, the German armies were -almost everywhere on the territories of their enemies. -We are not only keeping you back and defying -all your efforts to invade us; but like the infant -Hercules, we have gripped you by your throats, and -were holding you out at arm's length! -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -METHODS OF RECRUITING -</span> -</p> - -<p> -"I do not of course pretend to look at this matter -except from the German standpoint; but is there -any flaw in my reasoning, is there anything at all -unfair, if I thus sum up my conclusions?—By -Midsummer next—after stupendous efforts of the -oratorical and journalistic kind—after an enormous -amount of shouting, music-hall singing, cinema films, -and showy advertising of every description—after -making great play with the name and features of a -popular field-marshal, in a manner which must have -shocked both his natural modesty and soldierly -pride—after all this you expect, or say you expect, -that you will possess between two and two-and-a-half -millions of men trained, armed, equipped, and ready -to take the field. -</p> - -<p> -"As against this, during the same period, and -out of the less military half of our male population, -without any shouting or advertising to speak of, -we shall have provided approximately double that -number. We have raised these new forces quietly, -without any fuss, and without a word of protest -from any of our people. We are training them -without any serious difficulty. We are arming -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P166"></a>166}</span> -them, equipping them, clothing them, and housing -them without any difficulty at all. -</p> - -<p> -"To conclude this interesting contrast, may I -ask you—is it true, as the French newspapers allege, -that you are about to invite, or have already invited, -your Japanese Allies to send some portion of their -Army to European battlefields? With what face -can you make this appeal when you have not yet -called upon your own people to do, what every other -people engaged in the present struggle, has already -done? -</p> - -<p> -"After you have pondered upon this strange and -startling contrast, will you still hold to the opinion -that the German system—which you have affected -to despise, on the ground that it does not rest upon -what you are pleased to term 'a popular basis'—is -at any point inferior to your own in its hold upon -the hearts of the people? -</p> - -<p> -"What is meant by the phrase—'a popular -basis'? Is it something different from the support -of the people, the will of the people, the devotion -of the people? And if it is different, is it -better—judging, that is, by its results in times of -trouble—or is it worse?" -</p> - -<p> -So the cultured Freiherr, watching democracy at -work in Britain, its ancient home, concludes with -this question—"Is this timid, jealous, and distracted -thing possessed of any real faith in itself; and if so, -will it fight for its faith to the bitter end? Is the -British system one which even the utmost faith in it -can succeed in propping up? Does it possess any -inherent strength; or is it merely a thing of -paste-board and make-believe, fore-ordained to perish?" -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0206fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0206fn1text">1</a>] This letter, which is dated April 1, 1915, -arrived at its destination -(via Christiania and Bergen) about ten days later. -It had not the good -fortune, however, to escape the attentions -of the Censor, the ravages of -whose blacking-brush will be noted -in the abrupt termination of sundry -paragraphs. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0206fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0206fn2text">2</a>] "The empires which during the past -forty years have made the greatest -relative material progress are undoubtedly -Germany and Japan—neither -of them a democracy, but both military states." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0206fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0206fn3text">3</a>] It is not quite clear to what incidents -the Freiherr is referring. He -may be thinking of a certain round-robin -which appeared a few days before -the war, giving a most handsome academic -testimonial of humanity and -probity to the German system; or he may have -in mind a later manifestation -in February last, when there suddenly -flighted into the correspondence -columns of the <i>Nation</i> a 'gaggle' -of university geese, headed appropriately -enough by a Professor of Political Economy, -by name Pigou, who may be -taken as the type of that peculiarly -British product, the unemotional -sentimentalist. To this 'gaggle' -of the heavier fowls there succeeded in -due course a 'glory' of poetical and -literary finches, twittering the same -tune—the obligation on the Allies not -to inflict suffering and humiliation on -Germany—on Germany, be it remembered, -as yet unbeaten, though this -was rather slurred over in their spring-song -of lovingkindness. The Freiherr, -plunged in his heathen darkness, -no doubt still believed Germany to be not -only unbeaten but victorious, -and likely to continue on the same course. -He must therefore have been somewhat -puzzled by so much tender concern -on the part of our professors, etc. for -sparing his feelings at the end of the -war. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0206fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0206fn4text">4</a>] Comment has already been made -on the difficulty each nation has -in understanding the spirit of the institutions -of its neighbours. If this -is borne in mind these depreciatory references -of the Freiherr may be -forgiven. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0206fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0206fn5text">5</a>] I have had considerable difficulty -in discovering the basis of this -extraordinary charge. -It seems to consist of the following passage from -a speech by Sir Stanley Buckmaster, -the Solicitor-General and Chairman of -the Press Bureau on November 12, 1914. -It is distressing to see how far -national prejudice is apt to mislead -a hostile critic like the Freiherr von -Hexenküchen: "Criticism of the Government, -or of members of the -Government, is not that which I have -ever stopped, except when such -criticism is of such a character that -it might destroy public confidence -in the Government, which at this moment -is charged with the conduct of -the war, or might in any way weaken the -confidence of the people in the -administration of affairs, or otherwise -cause distress or disturbance amongst -people in thinking their affairs were -in a really serious state." -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0207"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P167"></a>167}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VII -<br /> -THE CONFLICT OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS -</h3> - -<p> -The Freiherr's discourse raises a large number of -questions, some of them unarguable. Others again -are too much so; for if once started upon, argument -with regard to them need never end. Some of his -contentions have already been dealt with in previous -chapters; some on the other hand, such as the -British methods of recruiting, will be considered -later on. It must, however, be admitted that his -taunts and criticisms do not all rebound with blunted -points from our shield of self-complacency; some, if -only a few, get home and rankle. -</p> - -<p> -We are challenged to contrast our faith in our -own political institutions with that of the Germans -in theirs; also to measure the intrinsic strength of -that form of political organisation called 'democracy' -against that other form which is known as 'autocracy.' -</p> - -<p> -The German state is the most highly developed -and efficient type of personal monarchy at present -known to the world. Its triumphs in certain -directions have been apparent from the beginning. -It would be sheer waste of time to dispute the fact -that Germany was incomparably better prepared, -organised, and educated for this war—the purpose -of which was the spoliation of her -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P168"></a>168}</span> -neighbours—than any of her neighbours were for offering -resistance. -</p> - -<p> -But what the Freiherr does not touch upon at all -is the conflict between certain underlying ideas of -right and wrong—old ideas, which are held by Russia, -France, and ourselves, and which now find themselves -confronted by new and strange ideas which have been -exceedingly prevalent among the governing classes -in Germany for many years past. He does not -raise <i>this</i> issue, any more than his fellow-countrymen -now raise it either in America or at home. It is -true that there was a flamboyant outburst from a -few faithful Treitschkians and Nietzschians, both in -prose and poetry, during those weeks of August and -September which teemed with German successes; -but their voices soon sank below audibility—possibly -by order <i>verboten</i>—in a swiftly dying fall. We, -however, cannot agree to let this aspect of the matter -drop, merely because patriotic Germans happen to -have concluded that the present time is inopportune -for the discussion of it. -</p> - -<p> -There are two clear and separate issues. From -the point of view of posterity the more important -of these, perhaps, may prove to be this conflict in -the region of moral ideas. From the point of view -of the present generation, however, the chief matter -of practical interest is the result of a struggle for the -preservation of our own institutions, against the -aggression of a race which has not yet learned the -last and hardest lesson of civilisation—how to live -and let live. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DEMOCRACY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The present war may result in the bankruptcy -of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties. It -is very desirable, however, to make clear the fact -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P169"></a>169}</span> -that the alternative is the bankruptcy of -'democracy.' Our institutions are now being subjected to -a severer strain than they have ever yet experienced. -Popular government is standing its trial. It will be -judged by the result; and no one can say that this is -an unfair test to apply to human institutions. -</p> - -<p> -No nation, unless it be utterly mad, will retain -a form of government which from some inherent -defect is unable to protect itself against external -attack. Is democratic government capable of looking -ahead, making adequate and timely preparation, -calling for and obtaining from its people the sacrifices -which are necessary in order to preserve their own -existence? Can it recover ground which has been lost, -and maintain a long, costly, and arduous struggle, -until, by victory, it has placed national security -beyond the reach of danger? -</p> - -<p> -Defeat in the present war would shake popular -institutions to their foundations in England as well -as France; possibly also in regions which are more -remote than either of these. But something far short -of defeat—anything indeed in the nature of a drawn -game or stalemate—would assuredly bring the credit -of democracy so low that it would be driven to make -some composition with its creditors. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -Words, like other currencies, have a way of -changing their values as the world grows older. -Until comparatively recent times 'democracy' was -a term of contempt, as 'demagogue' still is to-day. -</p> - -<p> -The founders of American Union abhorred 'Democracy,'[<a id="chap0207fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0207fn1">1</a>] -and took every precaution which occurred -to them in order to ward it off. Their aim was -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P170"></a>170}</span> -'Popular,' or 'Representative Government'—a thing -which they conceived to lie almost at the opposite -pole. Their ideal was a state, the citizens of which -chose their leaders at stated intervals, and trusted -them. Democracy, as it appeared in their eyes, was a -political chaos where the people chose its servants, -and expected from them only servility. There was -an ever-present danger, calling for stringent -safeguards, that the first, which they esteemed the best -of all constitutional arrangements, would degenerate -into the second, which they judged to be the worst. -</p> - -<p> -Until times not so very remote it was only the -enemies of Representative Government, or its most -cringing flatterers, who spoke of it by the title of -Democracy. Gradually, however, in the looseness of -popular discussions, the sharpness of the original -distinction wore off, so that the ideal system and its -opposite—the good and the evil—are now confounded -together under one name. There is no use fighting -against current terminology; but it is well to bear -in mind that terminology has no power to alter facts, -and that the difference between the two principles -still remains as wide as it was at the beginning. -</p> - -<p> -When a people becomes so self-complacent that -it mistakes its own ignorance for omniscience—so -jealous of authority and impatient of contradiction -that it refuses to invest with more than a mere shadow -of power those whose business it is to govern—when -the stock of leadership gives out, or remains hidden -and undiscovered under a litter of showy refuse—when -those who succeed in pushing themselves to the -front are chiefly concerned not to lead, but merely -to act the parts of leaders 'in silver slippers and -amid applause'—when the chiefs of parties are -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P171"></a>171}</span> -so fearful of unpopularity that they will not assert -their own opinions, or utter timely warnings, or -proclaim what they know to be the truth—when such -things as these come to pass the nation has reached -that state which was dreaded by the framers of -the American Constitution, and which—intending -to warn mankind against it—they branded as -'Democracy.' -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DANGERS OF SELF-CRITICISM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Self-criticism makes for health in a people; but -it may be overdone. If it purges the national spirit -it is good; but if it should lead to pessimism, or to -some impatient breach with tradition, it is one of -the worst evils. One is conscious of a somewhat -dangerous tendency in certain quarters at the present -time to assume the worst with regard to the working -of our own institutions. -</p> - -<p> -Critics of this school have pointed out (what is -undoubtedly true) that Germany has been far ahead -of us in her preparations. Every month since war -began has furnished fresh evidence of the far-sightedness, -resourcefulness, thoroughness, and efficiency of -all her military arrangements. Her commercial and -financial resources have also been husbanded, and -organised in a manner which excites our unwilling -admiration. And what perhaps has been the rudest -shock of all, is the apparent unity and devotion of -the whole German people, in support of a war which, -without exaggeration, may be said to have cast the -shadow of death on every German home. -</p> - -<p> -These critics further insist that our own nation has -not shown itself more loyal, and that it did not rouse -itself to the emergency with anything approaching -the same swiftness. Timidity and a wilful -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P172"></a>172}</span> -self-deception, they say, have marked our policy for -years before this war broke out. They marked it -again when the crisis came upon us. Have they not -marked it ever since war began? And who can -have confidence that they will not continue to mark -it until the end, whatever the end may be? -</p> - -<p> -The conclusion therefore at which our more despondent -spirits have arrived, is that the representative -system has already failed us—that it has suffered -that very degradation which liberal minds of the -eighteenth century feared so much. How can -democracy in the bad sense—democracy which has become -decadent—which is concerned mainly with its rights -instead of with its duties—with its comforts more than -with the sacrifices which are essential to its own -preservation—how can such a system make head against -an efficient monarchy sustained by the enthusiastic -devotion of a vigorous and intelligent people? -</p> - -<p> -It does not seem altogether wise to despair of -one's own institutions at the first check. Even -democracy, in the best sense, is not a flawless thing. -Of all forms of government it is the most delicate, -more dependent than any other upon the supply of -leaders. There are times of dearth when the crop -of leadership is a short one. Nor are popular -institutions, any more than our own vile bodies, -exempt from disease. Disease, however, is not -necessarily fatal. The patient may recover, and in the -bracing air of a national crisis, such as the present, -conditions are favourable for a cure. -</p> - -<p> -And, after all, we may remind these critics that -in 1792 democracy did in fact make head pretty -successfully against monarchy. Though it was miserably -unprovided, untrained, inferior to its enemies in everything -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P173"></a>173}</span> -save spirit and leadership, the states of Europe -nevertheless—all but England—went down before it, -in the years which followed, like a row of ninepins. -Then as now, England, guarded by seas and sea-power, -had a breathing-space allowed her, in which to -adjust the spirit of her people to the new conditions. -That Germany will not conquer us with her arms -we may well feel confident. But unless we conquer -her with <i>our arms</i>—and this is a much longer -step—there is a considerable danger that she may yet -conquer us with <i>her ideas</i>. In that case the world -will be thrown back several hundred years; and the -blame for this disaster, should it occur, will be -laid—and laid rightly—at the door of Democracy, because -it vaunted a system which it had neither the fortitude -nor the strength to uphold. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -IRRECONCILABLE OPPOSITIONS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When we pass from the conflict between systems -of government, and come to the other conflict of -ideas as to right and wrong, we find ourselves faced -with an antagonism which is wholly incapable of -accommodation. In this war the stakes are -something more than any of the material interests -involved. It is a conflict where one faith is pitted -against another. No casuistry will reconcile the ideal -which inspires English policy with the ideal which -inspires German policy. There is no sense—nothing -indeed but danger—in arguing round the circle to -prove that the rulers of these two nations are victims -of some frightful misunderstanding, and that really at -the bottom of their hearts they believe the same -things. This is entirely untrue: they believe quite -different things; things indeed which are as nearly -as possible opposites. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P174"></a>174}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Our own belief is old, ingrained, and universal. -It is accepted equally by the people and their rulers. -We have held it so long that the articles of our creed -have become somewhat blurred in outline—overgrown, -like a memorial tablet, by moss and lichen. -</p> - -<p> -In the case of our enemy the tablet is new and the -inscription sharp. He who runs may read it in bold -clear-cut lettering. But the belief of the German -people in the doctrine which has been carved upon -the stone is not yet universal, or anything like -universal. It is not even general. It is fully -understood and accepted only in certain strata of society; -but it is responsible, without a doubt, for the making -in cold blood of the policy which has led to this war. -When the hour struck which the German rulers -deemed favourable for conquest, war, according to -their creed, became the duty as well as the interest -of the Fatherland. -</p> - -<p> -But so soon as war had been declared, the German -people were allowed and even encouraged to believe -that the making of war from motives of self-interest -was a crime against humanity—the Sin against the -Holy Ghost. They were allowed and encouraged -to believe that the Allies were guilty of this crime and -sin. And not only this, but war itself, which had -been hymned in so many professorial rhapsodies, -as a noble and splendid restorer of vigour and virtue, -was now execrated with wailing and gnashing of -teeth, as the most hideous of all human calamities. -</p> - -<p> -It is clear from all this that the greater part of -the German people regarded war in exactly the same -light as the whole of the English people did. In -itself it was a curse; and the man who deliberately -contrived it for his own ends, or even for those of his -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P175"></a>175}</span> -country, was a criminal. The German people applied -the same tests as we did, and it is not possible to doubt -that in so doing they were perfectly sincere. They -acted upon instinct. They had not learned the later -doctrines of the pedantocracy, or how to steer by -a new magnetic pole. They still held by the old -Christian rules as to duties which exist between -neighbours. To their simple old-fashioned loyalty what -their Kaiser said must be the truth. And what their -Kaiser said was that the Fatherland was attacked -by treacherous foes. That was enough to banish -all doubts. For the common people that was the -reality and the only reality. Phrases about -world-power and will-to-power—supposing they had ever -heard or noticed them—were only mouthfuls of -strange words, such as preachers of all kinds love to -chew in the intervals of their discourses. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -APOSTASY OF THE PRIESTHOOD -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When the priests and prophets found themselves -at last confronted by those very horrors which they -had so often invoked, did their new-found faith -desert them, or was it only that their tongues, for -some reason, refused to speak the old jargon? -Judging by their high-flown indignation against the -Allies it would rather seem as if, in the day of wrath, -they had hastily abandoned sophistication for the -pious memories of their unlettered childhood. Their -apostasy was too well done to have been hypocrisy. -</p> - -<p> -With the rulers it was different. They knew -clearly enough what they had done, what they were -doing, and what they meant to do. When they -remained sympathetically silent, amid the popular -babble about the horrors of war and iniquity of -peace-breakers, their tongues were not paralysed by -remorse—they were merely in their cheeks. Their -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P176"></a>176}</span> -sole concern was to humour public opinion, the -results of whose disapproval they feared, quite as -much as they despised its judgment. -</p> - -<p> -That war draws out and gives scope to some of -the noblest human qualities, which in peace-time are -apt to be hidden out of sight, no one will deny. That -it is a great getter-rid of words and phrases, which -have no real meaning behind them—that it is a great -winnower of true men from shams, of staunch men -from boasters and blowers of their own trumpets—that -it is a great binder-together of classes, a great -purifier of the hearts of nations, there is no need -to dispute. Occasionally, though very rarely, it -has proved itself to be a great destroyer of -misunderstanding between the combatants themselves. -</p> - -<p> -But although the whole of this is true, it does -not lighten the guilt of the deliberate peace-breaker. -Many of the same benefits, though in a lesser degree, -arise out of a pestilence, a famine, or any other great -national calamity; and it is the acknowledged duty -of man to strive to the uttermost against these and -to ward them off with all his strength. It is the same -with war. To argue, as German intellectuals have -done of late, that in order to expand their territories -they were justified in scattering infection and deliberately -inviting this plague, that the plague itself was -a thing greatly for the advantage of the moral sanitation -of the world—all this is merely the casuistry of -a priesthood whom the vanity of rubbing elbows -with men of action has beguiled of their salvation. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE ARROGANCE OF PEDANTS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Somewhere in one of his essays Emerson introduces -an interlocutor whom he salutes as 'little Sir.' One -feels tempted to personify the whole corporation of -German pedants under the same title. When they -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P177"></a>177}</span> -talk so vehemently and pompously about the duty -of deliberate war-making for the expansion of the -Fatherland, for the fulfilment of the theory of -evolution, even for the glory of God on high, our minds -are filled with wonder and a kind of pity. -</p> - -<p> -Have they ever seen war except in their dreams, -or a countryside in devastation? Have they ever -looked with their own eyes on shattered limbs, or -faces defaced, of which cases, and the like, there are -already some hundreds of thousands in the hospitals -of Europe, and may be some millions before this war -is ended? Have they ever reckoned—except in -columns of numerals without human meaning—how -many more hundreds of thousands, in the flower of -their age, have died and will die, or—more to be -pitied—will linger on maimed and impotent when the war -is ended? Have they realised any of these things, -except in diagrams, and curves, and statistical tables, -dealing with the matter—as they would say -themselves, in their own dull and dry fashion—'under -its broader aspects'—in terms, that is, of population, -food-supply, and economic output? -</p> - -<p> -Death, and suffering of many sorts occur in all -wars—even in the most humane war. And this is -not a humane war which the pedants have let loose -upon us. Indeed, they have taught with some -emphasis that humanity, under such conditions, is -altogether a mistake. -</p> - -<p> -"Sentimentality!" cries the 'little Sir' -impatiently, "sickly sentimentality! In a world of -men such things must be. God has ordained war." -</p> - -<p> -Possibly. But what one feels is that the making -of war is the Lord's own business and not the 'little -Sir's.' It is the Lord's, as vengeance is, and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P178"></a>178}</span> -earthquakes, floods, and droughts; not an office to be -undertaken by mortals. -</p> - -<p> -The 'little Sir,' however, has devised a new order -for the world, and apparently he will never rest -satisfied until Heaven itself conforms to his initiative. -He is audacious, for like the Titans he has challenged -Zeus. But at times we are inclined to wonder—is he -not perhaps trying too much? Is he not in fact -engaged in an attempt to outflank Providence, whose -pivot is infinity? And for this he is relying solely -upon the resources of his own active little finite mind. -He presses his attack most gallantly against human -nature—back and forwards, up and down—but -opposing all his efforts is there not a screen of -adamantine crystal which cannot be pierced, of -interminable superficies which cannot be -circumvented? Is he not in some ways like a wasp, which -beats itself angrily against a pane of glass? -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0207fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0207fn1text">1</a>] Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Jay. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0300"></a></p> - -<h2> -PART III -<br /> -THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY -</h2> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="intro"> -I saw then in my dream that he went on <i>thus</i>, even until he -came at a bottom, where he saw, a little out of the way, three Men -fast asleep with Fetters upon their heels. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -The name of the one was <i>Simple</i>, another <i>Sloth</i>, and the third -<i>Presumption</i>. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -<i>Christian</i> then seeing them lie in this case, went to them, if -Peradventure he might awake them. And cried, you are like them -that sleep on the top of a Mast, for the dead Sea is under you, a -Gulf that hath no bottom. Awake therefore and come away; be -willing also, and I will help you off with your Irons. He also -told them, If he that goeth about like a <i>roaring Lion</i> comes by, -you will certainly become a prey to his teeth. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -With that they lookt upon him, and began to reply in this -sort: <i>Simple</i> said, <i>I see no danger</i>; <i>Sloth</i> said, <i>Yet a little more -sleep</i>; and <i>Presumption</i> said, <i>Every Vat must stand upon his own -bottom</i>. And so they lay down to sleep again, and <i>Christian</i> went -on his way. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -<i>The Pilgrim's Progress</i>. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0301"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P181"></a>181}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER I -<br /> -A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD -</h3> - -<p class="t3"> -(<i>January</i> 1901-<i>July</i> 1914) -</p> - -<p> -It is not true to say that this is a war between -the rival principles of democracy and autocracy. A -too great absorption in our own particular sector of -the situation has led certain writers to put forward, -as a general explanation, this formula which is not -only inadequate, but misleading. The real issue is -something wider and deeper than a struggle between -forms of government. It is concerned with the -groundwork of human beliefs. -</p> - -<p> -And yet it is unquestionably true to say, that by -reason of Germany's procedure, this war is being -waged against democracy—not perhaps by intention, -but certainly in effect. For if the Allies should be -defeated, or even if they should fail to conquer their -present enemies, the result must necessarily be -wounding to the credit of popular institutions all -the world over, fatal to their existence in Europe at -any rate, fatal conceivably at no long distance of -time to their existence elsewhere than in Europe. -For mankind, we may be sure, is not going to put -up with any kind of government merely because it -is ideally beautiful. No system will be tolerated -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P182"></a>182}</span> -indefinitely which does not enable the people who live -under it to protect themselves from their enemies. -The instinct of self-preservation will drive them to -seek for some other political arrangement which is -competent, in the present imperfect condition of the -world, to provide the first essential of a state, which -is Security. -</p> - -<p> -But although the whole fabric of democracy is -threatened by this war, the principle of autocracy is -not challenged by it either directly or indirectly. -France and England are not fighting against personal -monarchy any more than Russia is fighting against -popular government. So far as the forms of -constitutions are concerned each of the Allies would be -well content to live and let live. They are none of -them spurred on by propagandist illusions like the -armies of the First Republic. Among Russians, -devotion to their own institutions, and attachment -to the person of their Emperor are inspired not merely -by dictates of political expediency and patriotism, -but also by their sense of religious duty.[<a id="chap0301fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn1">1</a>] It is -inconceivable that the national spirit of Russia could -ever have been roused to universal enthusiasm merely -in order to fight the battles of democracy. And yet -Russia is now ranged side by side with the French -Republic and the British Commonwealth in perfect -unison. What has induced her to submit to -sacrifices—less indeed than those of Belgium, but equal to -those of France, and much greater so far than our -own—unless some issue was at stake wider and deeper -even than the future of popular government? -</p> - -<p> -The instincts of a people are vague and obscure. -The reasons which are put forward, the motives -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P183"></a>183}</span> -which appear upon the surface, the provocations -which lead to action, the immediate ends which are -sought after and pursued, rarely explain the true -causes or proportions of any great national struggle. -But for all that, the main issue, as a rule, is realised -by the masses who are engaged, although it is not -realised through the medium of coherent argument -or articulate speech. -</p> - -<p> -The present war is a fight, not between democracy -and autocracy, but between the modern spirit of -Germany and the unchanging spirit of civilisation. -And it is well to bear in mind that the second of these -is not invincible. It has suffered defeat before now, -at various epochs in the world's history, when attacked -by the same forces which assail it to-day. Barbarism -is not any the less barbarism because it employs -weapons of precision, because it avails itself of the -discoveries of science and the mechanism of finance, -or because it thinks it worth while to hire bands of -learned men to shriek pæans in its praise and -invectives against its victims. Barbarism is not -any the less barbarism because its methods are -up to date. It is known for what it is by the ends -which it pursues and the spirit in which it pursues -them. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMAN MATERIALISM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The modern spirit of Germany is materialism in -its crudest form—the undistracted pursuit of wealth, -and of power as a means to wealth. It is materialism, -rampant and self-confident, fostered by the -state—subsidised, regulated, and, where thought -advisable, controlled by the state—supported everywhere -by the diplomatic resources of the state—backed -in the last resort by the fleets and armies of -the state. It is the most highly organised machine, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P184"></a>184}</span> -the most deliberate and thorough-going system, for -arriving at material ends which has ever yet been -devised by man. It is far more efficient, but not a -whit less material, than 'Manchesterism' of the -Victorian era, which placed its hopes in 'free' -competition, and also than that later development of -trusts and syndicates—hailing from America—which -aims at levying tribute on society by means of -'voluntary' co-operation. And just as the English -professors, who fell prostrate in adoration before the -prosperity of cotton-spinners, found no difficulty in -placing self-interest upon the loftiest pedestal of -morality, so German professors have succeeded in -erecting for the joint worship of the Golden Calf and -the War-god Wotun, high twin altars which look -down with pity and contempt upon the humbler -shrines of the Christian faith. -</p> - -<p> -The morality made in Manchester has long ago -lost its reputation. That which has been made in -Germany more recently must in the end follow suit; -for, like its predecessor, it is founded upon a false -conception of human nature and cannot endure. -But in the interval, if it be allowed to triumph, it -may work evil, in comparison with which that done -by our own devil-take-the-hindmost philosophers -sinks into insignificance. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -WANT OF A NATIONAL POLICY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Looking at the present war from the standpoint -of the Allies, the object of it is to repel the -encroachments of materialism, working its way through the -ruin of ideas, which have been cherished always, save -in the dark ages when civilisation was overwhelmed -by barbarism. Looking at the matter from our own -particular standpoint, it is also incidentally a struggle -for the existence of democracy. The chief question -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P185"></a>185}</span> -we have to ask ourselves is whether our people will -fight for their faith and traditions with the same -skill and courage as the Germans for their material -ends? Will they endure sacrifices with the same -fortitude as France and Russia? Will they face the -inevitable eagerly and promptly, or will they play -the laggard and by delay ruin all—themselves most -of all? ... This war is not going to be won for us -by other people, or by some miraculous intervention -of Providence, or by the Germans running short of -copper, or by revolutions in Berlin, nor even by the -break-up of the Austrian Empire. In order to win it -we shall have to put out our full strength, to organise -our resources in men and material as we have never -done before during the whole of our history. We -have not accomplished these things as yet, although -we have expressed our determination, and are indeed -willing to attempt them. We were taken by surprise, -and the immediate result has been a great confusion, -very hard to disentangle. -</p> - -<p> -Considering how little, before war began, our -people had been taken into the confidence of -successive governments, as to the relations of the British -Empire with the outside world; how little education -of opinion there had been, as to risks, and dangers, -and means of defence; how little leading and clear -guidance, both before and since, as to duties—considering -all these omissions one can only marvel that -the popular response has been what it is, and that -the confusion was not many times worse. -</p> - -<p> -What was the mood of the British race when this -war broke upon them so unexpectedly? To what -extent were they provided against it in a material -sense? And still more important, how far were -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P186"></a>186}</span> -their minds and hearts prepared to encounter it? -It is important to understand those things, but in -order to do this it is necessary to look back over a -few years. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -By a coincidence which may prove convenient to -historians, the end of the nineteenth century marked -the beginning of a new epoch[<a id="chap0301fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn2">2</a>]—an interlude, of brief -duration as it proved—upon which the curtain was -rung down shortly before midnight on the 4th of -August 1914. -</p> - -<p> -Between these two dates, in a space of something -over thirteen years, events had happened in a quick -succession, both within the empire and abroad, -which disturbed or dissolved many ancient -understandings. The spirit of change had been busy with -mankind, and needs unknown to a former generation -had grown clamorous. Objects of hope had presented -themselves, driving old ideas to the wall, and -unforeseen dangers had produced fresh groupings, -compacts, and associations between states, and -parties, and individual men. -</p> - -<p> -In Europe during this period the manifest -determination of Germany to challenge the naval -supremacy of Britain, by the creation of a fleet -designed and projected as the counterpart of her -overwhelming army, had threatened the security of -the whole continent, and had put France, Russia, and -England upon terms not far removed from those of an -alliance. The gravity of this emergency had induced -our politicians to exclude, for the time being, this -department of public affairs from the bitterness -of their party struggles; and it had also drawn -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P187"></a>187}</span> -the governments of the United Kingdom and the -Dominions into relations closer than ever before, for -the purpose of mutual defence.[<a id="chap0301fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn3">3</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EAST -</span> -</p> - -<p> -In the meanwhile there had been developments -even more startling in the hitherto unchanging East. -Japan, as the result of a great war,[<a id="chap0301fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn4">4</a>] had become a -first-class power, redoubtable both by sea and land. -China, the most populous, the most ancient, and the -most conservative of despotisms, had suddenly sought -her salvation under the milder institutions of a -republic.[<a id="chap0301fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn5">5</a>] -</p> - -<p> -The South African war, ended by the Peace of -Pretoria, had paved the way for South African Union.[<a id="chap0301fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn6">6</a>] -The achievement of this endeavour had been applauded -by men of all parties; some finding in it a -welcome confirmation of their theories with regard -to liberty and self-government; others again drawing -from it encouragement to a still bolder undertaking. -For if South Africa had made a precedent, the existing -state of the world had supplied a motive, for the -closer union of the empire. -</p> - -<p> -Within the narrower limits of the United Kingdom -changes had also occurred within this period which, -from another point of view, were equally momentous. -In 1903 Mr. Chamberlain had poured new wine into -old bottles, and in so doing had hastened the -inevitable end of Unionist predominance by changing -on a sudden the direction of party policy. In the -unparalleled defeat which ensued two and a half -years later the Labour party appeared for the first -time, formidable both in numbers and ideas. -</p> - -<p> -A revolution had likewise been proceeding in -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P188"></a>188}</span> -our institutions as well as in the minds of our people. -The balance of the state had been shifted by a -curtailment of the powers of the House of Lords[<a id="chap0301fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn7">7</a>]—the -first change which had been made by statute in the -fundamental principle of the Constitution since the -passing of the Act of Settlement.[<a id="chap0301fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn8">8</a>] In July 1914 -further changes of a similar character, hardly less -important under a practical aspect, were upon the -point of receiving the Royal Assent.[<a id="chap0301fn9text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn9">9</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Both these sets of changes—that which had been -already accomplished and the other which was about -to pass into law—had this in common, that even -upon the admissions of their own authors they were -incomplete. Neither in the Parliament Act nor in -the Home Rule Act was there finality. The -composition of the Second Chamber had been set down -for early consideration, whilst a revision of the -constitutional relations between England, Scotland, -and Wales was promised so soon as the case of Ireland -had been dealt with. -</p> - -<p> -It seemed as if the modern spirit had at last, in -earnest, opened an inquisition upon the adequacy of -our ancient unwritten compact, which upon the -whole, had served its purpose well for upwards of -two hundred years. It seemed as if that compact -were in the near future to be tested thoroughly, and -examined in respect of its fitness for dealing with the -needs of the time—with the complexities and the -vastness of the British Empire—with the evils which -prey upon us from within, and with the dangers which -threaten us from without. -</p> - -<p> -Questioners were not drawn from one party alone. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P189"></a>189}</span> -They were pressing forwards from all sides. It was -not merely the case of Ireland, or the powers of the -Second Chamber, or its composition, or the general -congestion of business, or the efficiency of the House -of Commons: it was the whole machinery of government -which seemed to need overhauling and reconsideration -in the light of new conditions. Most -important of all these constitutional issues was that -which concerned the closer union of the Empire. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It was little more than eighty years since the Iron -Duke had described the British Constitution as an -incomparably devised perfection which none but a -madman would seek to change. That was not now the -creed of any political party or indeed of any thinking -man. No one was satisfied with things as they were. -Many of the most respectable old phrases had become -known for empty husks, out of which long since -had dropped whatever seed they may originally -have contained. Many of the old traditions were -dead or sickly, and their former adherents were -now wandering at large, like soldiers in the middle -ages, when armies were disbanded in foreign parts, -seeking a new allegiance, and constituting in the -meanwhile a danger to security and the public -peace. -</p> - -<p> -And also, within this brief period, the highest -offices had become vacant, and many great figures -had passed from the scene. Two sovereigns had -died full of honour. Two Prime Ministers had also -died, having first put off the burden of office, each at -the zenith of his popularity. Of the two famous men -upon the Unionist side who remained when Lord -Salisbury tendered his resignation, the one since -1906 had been wholly withdrawn from public life, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P190"></a>190}</span> -while the other, four years later, had passed the -leadership into younger hands.[<a id="chap0301fn10text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn10">10</a>] -</p> - -<p> -There is room for an almost infinite variety of -estimate as to the influence which is exercised by -pre-eminent characters upon public affairs and -national ideals. The verdict of the day after is always -different from that of a year after. The verdict of -the next generation, while differing from both, is apt -to be markedly different from that of the generation -which follows it. The admiration or censure of the -moment is followed by a reaction no less surely than -the reaction itself is followed by a counter-reaction. -Gradually the oscillations become shorter, as matters -pass out of the hands of journalists and politicians -into those of the historian. Possibly later judgments -are more true. We have more knowledge, of a kind. -Seals are broken one by one, and we learn how this -man really thought and how the other acted, in both -cases differently from what had been supposed. We -have new facts submitted to us, and possibly come -nearer the truth. But while we gain so much, we -also lose in other directions. We lose the sharp -savour of the air. The keen glance and alert curiosity -of contemporary vigilance are lacking. Conditions -and circumstances are no longer clear, and as -generation after generation passes away they become more -dim. The narratives of the great historians and -novelists are to a large extent either faded or false. -We do not trust the most vivid presentments written -by the man of genius in his study a century after the -event, while we know well that even the shrewdest of -contemporaneous observers is certain to omit many -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P191"></a>191}</span> -of the essentials. If Macaulay is inadequate in one -direction, Pepys is equally inadequate in another. -And if the chronicler at the moment, and the historian -in the future are not to be wholly believed, the writer -who comments after a decade or less upon things -which are fresh in his memory is liable to another -form of error; for either he is swept away by the full -current of the reaction, or else his judgments are -embittered by a sense of the hopelessness of swimming -against it. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DEATH OF QUEEN VICTORIA -</span> -</p> - -<p> -This much, however, may be said safely—that the -withdrawal of any pre-eminent character from the -scene, whether it be Queen Victoria or King Edward, -Lord Salisbury or Mr. Chamberlain, produces in a -greater or less degree that same loosening of allegiance -and disturbance of ideas, which are so much dreaded -by the conservative temperament from the removal -of an ancient institution. For a pre-eminent -character is of the same nature as an institution. The -beliefs, loyalties, and ideals of millions were attached -to the personality of the Queen. The whole of that -prestige which Queen Victoria drew from the awe, -reverence, affection, and prayers of her people could -not be passed along with the crown to King Edward. -The office of sovereign was for the moment stripped -and impoverished of some part of its strength, and -was only gradually replenished as the new monarch -created a new, and to some extent a different, loyalty -of his own. So much is a truism. But, when there -is already a ferment in men's minds, the disappearance -in rapid succession of the pre-eminent characters of -the age helps on revolution by putting an end to a -multitude of customary attachments, and by setting -sentiments adrift to wander in search of new heroes. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P192"></a>192}</span> -</p> - -<p> -A change of some importance had also come over -the character of the House of Commons. The old -idea that it was a kind of grand jury of plain men, -capable in times of crisis of breaking with their parties, -had at last finally disappeared. In politics there -was no longer any place for plain men. The need -was for professionals, and professionals of this sort, -like experts in other walks of life, were worthy of -their hire. -</p> - -<p> -The decision to pay members of Parliament came -as no surprise. The marvel was rather that it -had not been taken at an earlier date, seeing that -for considerably more than a century this item had -figured in the programmes of all advanced reformers. -The change, nevertheless, when it came, was no -trivial occurrence, but one which was bound -fundamentally to affect the character of the popular -assembly; whether for better or worse was a matter -of dispute. -</p> - -<p> -Immense, however, as were the possibilities -contained in the conversion of unpaid amateurs into -professional and stipendiary politicians, what excited -even more notice at the time than the thing itself, -were the means by which it was accomplished. No -attempt was made to place this great constitutional -reform definitely and securely upon the statute book. -To have followed this course would have meant submitting -a bill, and a bill would have invited discussion -at all its various stages. Moreover, the measure -might have been challenged by the House of Lords, -in which case delay would have ensued; and a subject, -peculiarly susceptible to malicious misrepresentation, -would have been kept—possibly for so long as three -years—under the critical eyes of public opinion. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P193"></a>193}</span> -Apparently this beneficent proposal was one of those -instances, so rare in modern political life, where -neither publicity nor advertisement was sought. On -the contrary, the object seemed to be to do good -by stealth; and for this purpose a simple financial -resolution was all that the law required. The Lords -had recently been warned off and forbidden to -interfere with money matters, their judgment being -under suspicion, owing to its supposed liability to -be affected by motives of self-interest. The House -of Commons was therefore sole custodian of the -public purse; and in this capacity its members were -invited to vote themselves four hundred pounds a -year all round, as the shortest and least ostentatious -way of raising the character and improving the -quality of the people's representatives. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -CHANGE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Even by July 1914 the effect of this constitutional -amendment upon our old political traditions had -become noticeable in various directions. But the -means by which it was accomplished are no less -worthy of note than the reform itself, when we are -endeavouring to estimate the changes which have -come over Parliament during this short but -revolutionary epoch. The method adopted seemed to -indicate a novel attitude on the part of members -of the House of Commons towards the Imperial -Exchequer, on the part of the Government towards -members of the House of Commons, and on the part -of both towards the people whom they trusted. It -was adroit, expeditious, and businesslike; and to this -extent seemed to promise well for years to come, -when the professionals should have finally got rid of -the amateurs, and taken things wholly into their -own hands. Hostile critics, it is true, denounced the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P194"></a>194}</span> -reform bluntly as corruption, and the method of its -achievement as furtive and cynical; but for this -class of persons no slander is ever too gross—<i>They -have said. Quhat say they? Let them be saying</i>. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The party leaders were probably neither worse -men nor better than they had been in the past; but -they were certainly smaller; while on the other hand -the issues with which they found themselves -confronted were bigger. -</p> - -<p> -Great characters are like tent-pegs. One of their -uses is to prevent the political camp from being -blown to ribbons. Where they are too short or too -frail, we may look for such disorders as have repeated -themselves at intervals during the past few years. -A blast of anger or ill-temper has blown, or a gust of -sentiment, or even a gentle zephyr of sentimentality, -and the whole scene has at once become a confusion -of flapping canvas, tangled cordage, and shouting, -struggling humanity. Such unstable conditions are -fatal to equanimity; they disturb the fortitude of -the most stalwart follower, and cause doubt and -distrust on every hand. -</p> - -<p> -Since the Liberal Government came into power -in the autumn of 1905, neither of the great parties -had succeeded in earning the respect of the other; -and as the nature of man is not subject to violent -fluctuations, it may safely be concluded that this -misfortune had been due either to some defect or -inadequacy of leadership, or else to conditions of an -altogether extraordinary character. -</p> - -<p> -During these ten sessions the bulk of the statute -book had greatly increased, and much of this increase -was no doubt healthy tissue. This period, notwithstanding, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P195"></a>195}</span> -will ever dwell in the memory as a squalid -episode. Especially is this the case when we contrast -the high hopes and promises, not of one party alone, -with the results which were actually achieved. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIP -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Democracy, if the best, is also the most delicate -form of human government. None suffers so swiftly -or so sorely from any shortage in the crop of character. -None is so dependent upon men, and so little capable -of being supported by the machine alone. When -the leading of parties is in the hands of those who -lack vision and firmness, the first effect which manifests -itself is that parties begin to slip their principles. -Some secondary object calls for and obtains the -sacrifice of an ideal. So the Unionists in 1909 threw -over the order and tradition of the state, the very -ark of their political covenant, when they procured -the rejection of the Budget by the House of Lords. -So the Liberal Government in 1910, having solemnly -undertaken to reform the constitution—a work not -unworthy of the most earnest endeavour—went back -upon their word, and abandoned their original -purpose. For one thing they grew afraid of the clamour -of their partisans. For another they were tempted -by the opportunity of advantages which—as they -fondly imagined—could be easily and safely secured -during the interval while all legislative powers were -temporarily vested in the Commons. Nor were -these the only instances where traditional policy had -been diverted, and where ideals had been bargained -away, in the hope that thereby objects of a more -material sort might be had at once in exchange. -</p> - -<p> -The business of leadership is to prevent the -abandonment of the long aim for the sake of the short. -The rank and file of every army is at all times most -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P196"></a>196}</span> -dangerously inclined to this fatal temptation, not -necessarily dishonestly, but from a lack of foresight -and sense of proportion. -</p> - -<p> -Some dim perception of cause and effect had begun -to dawn during the years 1912 and 1913 upon the -country, and even upon the more sober section of the -politicians. An apprehension had been growing -rapidly, and defied concealment, that the country -was faced by a very formidable something, to which -men hesitated to give a name, but which was clearly -not to be got rid of by the customary methods of -holding high debates about it, and thereafter marching -into division lobbies. While in public, each party -was concerned to attribute the appearance of this -unwelcome monster solely to the misdeeds of their -opponents, each party knew well enough in their -hearts that the danger was due at least in some -measure to their own abandonment of pledges, -principles, and traditions. -</p> - -<p> -At Midsummer 1914 most people would probably -have said that the immediate peril was Ireland and -civil war. A few months earlier many imagined that -trouble of a more general character was brewing -between the civil and military powers, and that an -issue which they described as that of 'the Army -versus the People' would have to be faced. A few -years earlier there was a widespread fear that the -country might be confronted by some organised -stoppage of industry, and that this would lead to -revolution. Throughout the whole of this period of -fourteen years the menace of war with Germany had -been appearing, and disappearing, and reappearing, -very much as a whale shows his back, dives, rises at -some different spot, and dives again. For the moment, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P197"></a>197}</span> -however, this particular anxiety did not weigh -heavily on the public mind. The man in the street -had been assured of late by the greater part of the -press and politicians—even by ministers themselves—that -our relations with this formidable neighbour were -friendlier and more satisfactory than they had been -for some considerable time. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MR. ASQUITH'S PRE-EMINENCE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -At Midsummer 1914, that is to say about six -weeks before war broke out, the pre-eminent character -in British politics was the Prime Minister. No other -on either side of the House approached him in -prestige, and so much was freely admitted by foes -as well as friends. -</p> - -<p> -When we are able to arrive at a fair estimate of -the man who is regarded as the chief figure of his -age, we have an important clue to the aspirations -and modes of thought of the period in which he lived. -A people may be known to some extent by the leaders -whom it has chosen to follow. -</p> - -<p> -Mr. Asquith entered Parliament in 1886, and -before many months had passed his reputation was -secure. Mr. Gladstone, ever watchful for youthful -talent, promoted him at a bound to be Home Secretary, -when the Cabinet of 1892 came into precarious -existence. No member of this government justified -his selection more admirably. But the period of -office was brief. Three years later, the Liberal -party found itself once again in the wilderness, where -it continued to wander, rent by dissensions both as -to persons and principles, for rather more than a -decade. -</p> - -<p> -When Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman returned -to office in the autumn of 1905, Mr. Asquith became -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P198"></a>198}</span> -Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was speedily -accepted as the minister next in succession to his -chief. He was then just turned fifty, so that, -despite the delays which had occurred, it could not be -said that fortune had behaved altogether unkindly. -Two and a half years later, in April 1908, he -succeeded to the premiership without a rival, and -without a dissentient voice. -</p> - -<p> -The ambition, however, which brought him so -successfully to the highest post appeared to have -exhausted a great part of its force in attainment, and -to have left its possessor without sufficient energy -for exercising those functions which the post itself -required. The career of Mr. Asquith in the highest -office reminds one a little of the fable of the Hare and -the Tortoise. In the race which we all run with -slow-footed fate, he had a signal advantage in the speed of -his intellect, in his capacity for overtaking arrears -of work which would have appalled any other minister, -and for finding, on the spur of the moment, means for -extricating his administration from the most threatening -positions. But of late, like the Hare, he had -come to believe himself invincible, and had yielded -more and more to a drowsy inclination. He had -seemed to fall asleep for long periods, apparently in -serene confidence that, before the Tortoise could -pass the winning-post, somebody or something—in -all probability the Unionist party with the clamour -of a premature jubilation—would awaken him in -time to save the race. -</p> - -<p> -So far as Parliament was concerned, his confidence -in his own qualities was not misplaced. Again -and again, the unleadered energies or ungoaded -indolence of his colleagues landed the Government -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P199"></a>199}</span> -in a mess. But as often as this happened Mr. Asquith -always advanced upon the scene and rescued his -party, by putting the worst blunder in the best light. -He obligingly picked his stumbling lieutenants out -of the bogs into which—largely, it must be admitted, -for want of proper guidance from their chief—they -had had the misfortune to fall. Having done this in -the most chivalrous manner imaginable, he earned -their gratitude and devotion. In this way he -maintained a firm hold upon the leadership; if indeed -it can properly be termed leadership to be the best -acrobat of the troupe, and to step forward and do the -feats after your companions have failed, and the -audience has begun to 'boo.' -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -WAIT AND SEE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Some years ago Mr. Asquith propounded a -maxim—<i>wait-and-see</i>—which greatly scandalised and annoyed -the other side. This formula was the perfectly natural -expression of his character and policy. In the peculiar -circumstances of the case it proved itself to be a -successful parliamentary expedient. Again and again -it wrought confusion among his simple-minded -opponents, who—not being held together by any firm -authority—followed their own noses, now in one -direction, now in another, upon the impulse of the -moment. It is probable that against a powerful -leader, who had his party well in hand, this policy of -makeshift and delay would have brought its author -to grief. But Unionists were neither disciplined nor -united, and they had lacked leadership ever since -they entered upon opposition. -</p> - -<p> -For all its excellency, Mr. Asquith's oratory never -touched the heart. And very rarely indeed did it -succeed in convincing the cool judgment of people -who had experience at first hand of the matters -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P200"></a>200}</span> -under discussion. There was lacking anything in -the nature of a personal note, which might have -related the ego of the speaker to the sentiments -which he announced so admirably. Also there was -something which suggested that his knowledge had -not been gained by looking at the facts face to face; -but rather by the rapid digestion of minutes and -memoranda, which had been prepared for him by -clerks and secretaries, and which purported to provide, -in convenient tabloids, all that it was necessary -for a parliamentarian to know. -</p> - -<p> -The style of speaking which is popular nowadays, -and of which Mr. Asquith is by far the greatest -master, would not have been listened to with an equal -favour in the days of our grandfathers. In the -Parliaments which assembled at Westminster in the -period between the passing of the Reform Bill and -the founding of the Eighty Club,[<a id="chap0301fn11text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn11">11</a>] the -country-gentlemen and the men-of-business—two classes of -humanity who are constantly in touch with, and -drawing strength from, our mother earth of hard -fact[<a id="chap0301fn12text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn12">12</a>]—met and fought out their differences during two -generations. In that golden age it was all but -unthinkable that a practising barrister should ever -have become Prime Minister. The legal profession -at this time had but little influence in counsel; still -less in Parliament and on the platform. The middle -classes were every whit as jealous and distrustful -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P201"></a>201}</span> -of the intervention of the lawyer-advocate in public -affairs as the landed gentry themselves. But in the -stage of democratic evolution, which we entered on -the morrow of the Mid-Lothian campaigns, and in -which we still remain, the popular, and even the -parliamentary, audience has gradually ceased to -consist mainly of country-gentlemen interested in the -land, and of the middle-classes who are engaged in -trade. It has grown to be at once less discriminating -as to the substance of speeches, and more exacting -as to their form. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -POLITICAL LAWYERS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -A representative assembly which entirely lacked -lawyers would be impoverished; but one in which -they are the predominant, or even a very important -element, is usually in its decline. It is strange that -an order of men, who in their private and professional -capacities are so admirable, should nevertheless -produce baleful effects when they come to play too great -a part in public affairs. Trusty friends, delightful -companions, stricter perhaps than any other civil -profession in all rules of honour, they are none the -less, without seeking to be so, the worst enemies of -representative institutions. The peculiar danger of -personal monarchy is that it so easily submits to -draw its inspiration from an adulatory priesthood, -and the peculiar danger of that modern form of -constitutional government which we call democracy, is -that lawyers, with the most patriotic intentions, are -so apt to undo it. -</p> - -<p> -Lawyers see too much of life in one way, too little -in another, to make them safe guides in practical -matters. Their experience of human affairs is made -up of an infinite number of scraps cut out of other -people's lives. They learn and do hardly anything -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P202"></a>202}</span> -except through intermediaries. Their clients are -introduced, not in person, but in the first instance, -on paper—through the medium of solicitors' -'instructions.' Litigants appear at consultations in their -counsel's chambers under the chaperonage of their -attorneys; their case is considered; they receive -advice. Then perhaps, if the issue comes into court, -they appear once again, in the witness-box, and are -there examined, cross-examined, and re-examined -under that admirable system for the discovery of -truth which is ordained in Anglo-Saxon countries, -and which consists in turning, for the time being, -nine people in every ten out of their true natures -into hypnotised rabbits. Then the whole thing is -ended, and the client disappears into the void from -whence he came. What happens to him afterwards -seldom reaches the ears of his former counsel. Whether -the advice given to him in consultation has proved -right or wrong in practice, rarely becomes known to -the great man who gave it. -</p> - -<p> -Plausibility, an alert eye for the technical trip or -fall—the great qualities of an advocate—do not -necessarily imply judgment of the most valuable -sort outside courts of law. The farmer who manures, -ploughs, harrows, sows, and rolls in his crop is punished -in his income, if he has done any one of these things -wrongly, or at the wrong season. The shopkeeper -who blunders in his buying or his selling, or the -manufacturer who makes things as they should not -be made, suffers painful consequences to a certainty. -His error pounds him relentlessly on the head. Not -so the lawyer. His errors for the most part are visited -on others. His own success or non-success is largely -a matter of words and pose. If he is confident and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P203"></a>203}</span> -adroit, the dulness of the jury or the senility of the -bench can be made to appear, in the eyes of the -worsted client, as the true causes of his defeat. And -the misfortune is that in politics, which under its -modern aspect is a trade very much akin to -advocacy, there is a temptation, with all but the most -patriotic lawyers, to turn to account at Westminster -the skill which they have so laboriously acquired in -the Temple. -</p> - -<p> -Of course there have been, and will ever be, -exceptions. Alexander Hamilton was a lawyer, -though he was a soldier in the first instance. Abraham -Lincoln was a lawyer. But we should have to go -back to the 'glorious revolution' of 1688 before we -could find a parallel to either of these two in our own -history. Until the last two decades England has -never looked favourably on lawyer leaders. This -was regarded by some as a national peculiarity; by -others as a safeguard of our institutions. But by -the beginning of the twentieth century it was clear -that lawyers had succeeded in establishing their -predominance in the higher walks of English politics, -as thoroughly as they had already done wherever -parliamentary government exists throughout the -world. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MR. ASQUITH'S ORATORY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -During this epoch, when everything was sacrificed -to perspicuity and the avoidance of boredom, -Mr. Asquith's utterances led the fashion. His ministry -was composed to a large extent of politicians bred -in the same profession and proficient in the same -arts as himself; but he towered above them all, the -supreme type of the lawyer-statesman. -</p> - -<p> -His method was supremely skilful. In its own -way it had the charm of perfect artistry, even though -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P204"></a>204}</span> -the product of the art was hardly more permanent -than that of the <i>cordon bleu</i> who confections ices in -fancy patterns. And not only was the method well -suited to the taste of popular audiences, but equally -so to the modern House of Commons. That body, -also, was now much better educated in matters which -can be learned out of newspapers and books; far -more capable of expressing its meanings in -well-chosen phrases arranged in a logical sequence; far -more critical of words—if somewhat less observant -of things—than it was during the greater part of the -reign of Queen Victoria. -</p> - -<p> -To a large extent the House of Commons consisted -of persons with whom public utterance was a trade. -There were lawyers in vast numbers, journalists, -political organisers, and professional lecturers on a -large variety of subjects. And even among the -labour party, where we might have expected to find -a corrective, the same tendency was at work, perhaps -as strongly as in any other quarter. For although -few types of mankind have a shrewder judgment -between reality and dialectic than a thoroughly -competent 'workman,' labour leaders were not -chosen because they were first-class workmen, but -because they happened to be effective speakers on -the platform or at the committee table. -</p> - -<p> -To a critic, looking on at the play from outside, -Mr. Asquith's oratory appeared to lack heart -and the instinct for reality; his leadership, the -qualities of vigilance, steadfastness, and authority. -He did not prevail by personal force, but by -adroit confutation. His debating, as distinguished -from his political, courage would have been -admitted with few reservations even by an opponent. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P205"></a>205}</span> -Few were so ready to meet their enemies in the -gate of discussion. Few, if any, were so capable of -retrieving the fortunes of their party—even when -things looked blackest—if it were at all possible to -accomplish this by the weapons of debate. But the -medium must be debate—not action or counsel—if -Mr. Asquith's pre-eminence was to assert itself. In -debate he had all the confidence and valour of the -<i>maître d'armes</i>, who knows himself to be the superior -in skill of any fencer in his own school. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -HIS CHARACTER -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Next to Lord Rosebery he was the figure of most -authority among the Liberal Imperialists, and yet -this did not sustain his resolution when the Cabinet -of 1905 proceeded to pare down the naval estimates. -He was the champion of equal justice, as regards the -status of Trades Unions, repelling the idea of -exceptional and favouring legislation with an eloquent -scorn. Yet he continued to hold his place when his -principles were thrown overboard by his colleagues -in 1906. Again when he met Parliament in February -1910 he announced his programme with an air of -heroic firmness.[<a id="chap0301fn13text"></a><a href="#chap0301fn13">13</a>] It is unnecessary to recall the -particulars of this episode, and how he was upheld -in his command only upon condition that he would -alter his course to suit the wishes of mutineers. -And in regard to the question of Home Rule, his -treatment of it from first to last had been -characterised by the virtues of patience and humility, -rather than by those of prescience or courage. -</p> - -<p> -A 'stellar and undiminishable' something, around -which the qualities and capacities of a man revolve -obediently, and under harmonious restraint—like -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P206"></a>206}</span> -the planetary bodies—is perhaps as near as we can -get to a definition of human greatness. But in the -case of Mr. Asquith, for some years prior to July 1914, -the central force of his nature had seemed inadequate -for imposing the law of its will upon those brilliant -satellites his talents. As a result, the solar system -of his character had fallen into confusion, and -especially since the opening of that year had appeared to -be swinging lop-sided across the political firmament -hastening to inevitable disaster. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn1text">1</a>] Cf. 'Russia and her Ideals,' <i>Round Table</i>, December 1914. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn2text">2</a>] Queen Victoria died on January 22, 1901. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn3text">3</a>] Imperial Conference on Defence, summer of 1909. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn4text">4</a>] 1904-1905. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn5text">5</a>] 1911. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn6text">6</a>] May 1902. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn7text">7</a>] Parliament Act became law August 1911. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn8text">8</a>] 1689. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn9"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn9text">9</a>] Home Rule Bill became law August 1914. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn10"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn10text">10</a>] Mr. Chamberlain died July 2, 1914; -Mr. Balfour resigned the leadership -of the Unionist party on November 8, 1911. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn11"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn11text">11</a>] 1832-1880. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn12"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn12text">12</a>] They had an excellent sense of reality -as regards their own affairs, and -there between them covered a fairly wide area; -but they were singularly -lacking either in sympathy or imagination -with regard to the affairs of other -nations and classes. Their interest in the poor -was confined for the most -part to criticism of <i>one another</i> with -regard to conditions of labour. The -millowners thought that the oppression -of the peasantry was a scandal; -while the landowners considered that the -state of things prevailing in -factories was much worse than slavery. Cf. Disraeli's <i>Sybil</i>. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0301fn13"></a> -[<a href="#chap0301fn13text">13</a>] <i>I.e.</i> curtailment of the powers of the House -of Lords and its reform. -Only the first was proceeded with. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0302"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P207"></a>207}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER II -<br /> -THREE GOVERNING IDEAS -</h3> - -<p> -At the death of Queen Victoria the development -of the British Commonwealth entered upon a new -phase. The epoch which followed has no precedent -in our own previous experience as a nation, nor can -we discover in the records of other empires anything -which offers more than a superficial and misleading -resemblance to it. The issues of this period presented -themselves to different minds in a variety of different -lights; but to all it was clear that we had reached -one of the great turning-points in our history. -</p> - -<p> -The passengers on a great ocean liner are apt to -imagine, because their stomachs are now so little -troubled by the perturbation of the waves, that it -no longer profits them to offer up the familiar prayer -'for those in peril on the sea.' It is difficult for them -to believe in danger where everything appears so -steady and well-ordered, and where they can enjoy -most of the distractions of urban life, from a -cinematograph theatre to a skittle-alley, merely by -descending a gilded staircase or crossing a brightly -panelled corridor. But this agreeable sense of safety -is perhaps due in a greater degree to fancy, than to the -changes which have taken place in the essential facts. -As dangers have been diminished in one direction -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P208"></a>208}</span> -risks have been incurred in another. A blunder to-day -is more irreparable than formerly, and the havoc -which ensues upon a blunder is vastly more appalling. -An error of observation or of judgment—the wrong -lever pulled or the wrong button pressed—an order -which miscarries or is overlooked—and twenty -thousand tons travelling at twenty knots an hour -goes to the bottom, with its freight of humanity, -merchandise, and treasure, more easily, and with -greater speed and certainty, than in the days of the -old galleons—than in the days when Drake, in the -<i>Golden Hind</i> of a hundred tons burden, beat up against -head winds in the Straits of Magellan, and ran before -the following gale off the Cape of Storms. -</p> - -<p> -Comfort, whether in ships of travel or of state, is -not the same thing as security. It never has been, -and it never will be. -</p> - -<p> -The position after Queen Victoria's death also -differed from all previous times in another way. -After more than three centuries of turmoil and expansion, -the British race had entered into possession of -an estate so vast, so rich in all natural resources, that -a sane mind could not hope for, or even dream of, -any further aggrandisement. Whatever may be the -diseases from which the British race suffered during -the short epoch between January 1901 and July 1914, -megalomania was certainly not one of them. -</p> - -<p> -The period of acquisition being now acknowledged -at an end, popular imagination became much occupied -with other things. It assumed, too lightly and -readily perhaps, that nothing was likely to interfere -with our continuing to hold what we had got. If there -was not precisely a law of nature, which precluded -the possessions of the British Empire from ever being -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P209"></a>209}</span> -taken away, at any rate there was the law of nations. -The public opinion of the world would surely revolt -against so heinous a form of sacrilege. Having -assumed so much, placidly and contentedly, and -without even a tremor either as to the good-will or -the potency of the famous Concert of Europe, the -larger part of public opinion tended to become more -and more engrossed in other problems. It began to -concern itself earnestly with <i>the improvement of the -condition of the people</i>, and with <i>the reform and -consolidation of institutions</i>. Incidentally, and as -a part of each of these endeavours, the development -of an estate which had come, mainly by inheritance, -into the trusteeship of the British people, began -seriously to occupy their thoughts. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -SOCIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -These were problems of great worth and dignity, but -nevertheless there was one condition of their successful -solution, which ought to have been kept in mind, -but which possibly was somewhat overlooked. If we -allowed ourselves to be so much absorbed by these two -problems that we gave insufficient heed to our defences, -it was as certain as any human forecast could be, that -the solution of a great deal, which was perplexing -us in the management of our internal affairs, would -be summarily taken out of the hands of Britain and -her Dominions and solved according to the ideas of -strangers. -</p> - -<p> -If we were to bring our policy of social and -constitutional improvement and the development -of our estate to a successful issue, we must be safe -from interruption from outside. We must secure -ourselves against foreign aggression; for we needed -time. Our various problems could not be solved -in a day or even in a generation. The most urgent -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P210"></a>210}</span> -of all matters was <i>security</i>, for it was the prime -condition of all the rest. -</p> - -<p> -We desired, not merely to hold what we had got, -but to enjoy it, and make it fructify and prosper, in -our own way, and under our own institutions. For -this we needed peace within our own sphere; and -therefore it was necessary that we should be strong -enough to enforce peace. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -During the post-Victorian period—this short epoch -of transition—there were therefore three separate -sets of problems which between them absorbed the -energies of public men and occupied the thoughts of -all private persons, at home and in the Dominions, -to whom the present and future well-being of their -country was a matter of concern. -</p> - -<p> -The first of these problems was <i>Defence</i>: How -might the British Commonwealth, which held so -vast a portion of the habitable globe, and which was -responsible for the government of a full quarter of -all the people who dwelt thereon—how might it best -secure itself against the dangers which threatened -it from without? -</p> - -<p> -The second was the problem of <i>the Constitution</i>: -How could we best develop, to what extent must we -remake or remould, our ancient institutions, so as -to fit them for those duties and responsibilities which -new conditions required that they should be able to -perform? Under this head we were faced with -projects, not merely of local self-government, of -'Home Rule,' and of 'Federalism'; not merely -with the working of the Parliament Act, with the -composition, functions, and powers of the Second -Chamber, with the Referendum, the Franchise, and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P211"></a>211}</span> -such like; but also with that vast and even more -perplexing question—what were to be the future -relations between the Mother Country and the -self-governing Dominions on the one hand, and between -these five democratic nations and the Indian Empire -and the Dependencies upon the other? -</p> - -<p> -For the third set of problems no concise title has -yet been found. <i>Social Reform</i> does not cover it, -though perhaps it comes nearer doing so than any -other. The matters involved here were so multifarious -and, apparently at least, so detached one from -another—they presented themselves to different minds at so -many different angles and under such different -aspects—that no single word or phrase was altogether -satisfactory. But briefly, what all men were engaged in -searching after—the Labour party, no more and no -less than the Radicals and the Tories—was how we -could raise the character and material conditions of -our people; how by better organisation we could root -out needless misery of mind and body; how we could -improve the health and the intelligence, stimulate -the sense of duty and fellowship, the efficiency and -the patriotism of the whole community. -</p> - -<p> -Of these three sets of problems with which the -British race has recently been occupying itself, this, -the third, is intrinsically by far the most important. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL REFORM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is the most important because it is an end in -itself whereas the other two are only the means for -achieving this end. Security against foreign attack -is a desirable and worthy object only in order to -enable us to approach this goal. A strong and flexible -constitution is an advantage only because we believe -it will enable us to achieve our objects, better and -more quickly, than if we are compelled to go on working -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P212"></a>212}</span> -under a system which has become at once rigid and -rickety. But while we were bound to realise the -superior nature of the third set of problems, we should -have been careful at the same time to distinguish -between two things which are very apt to be confused -in political discussions—<i>ultimate importance</i> -and <i>immediate urgency</i>. -</p> - -<p> -We ought to have taken into our reckoning both -the present state of the world and the permanent -nature of man—all the stuff that dreams and wars -are made on. We desired peace. We needed peace. -Peace was a matter of life and death to all our hopes. -If defeat should once break into the ring of our -commonwealth—scattered as it is all over the world, -kept together only by the finest and most delicate -attachments—it must be broken irreparably. Our -most immediate interest was therefore to keep defeat, -and if possible, war, from bursting into our sphere—as -Dutchmen by centuries of laborious vigilance have -kept back the sea with dikes. -</p> - -<p> -The numbers of our people in themselves were no -security; nor our riches; nor even the fact that -we entertained no aggressive designs. For as it was -said long ago, 'it never troubles a wolf how many the -sheep be.' They find no salvation in their heavy -fleeces and their fat haunches; nor even in the -meekness of their hearts, and in their innocence of -all evil intentions. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The characteristic of this period may be summed -up in one short sentence; the vast majority of the -British people were bent and determined—as they -had never been bent and determined before—upon -leaving their country better than they had found it. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P213"></a>213}</span> -</p> - -<p> -To some this statement will seem a paradox. -"Was there ever a time," they may ask, "when -there had been so many evidences of popular unrest, -discontent, bitterness and anger; or when there had -ever appeared to be so great an inclination, on the -one hand to apathy and cynicism, on the other -hand to despair?" -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE RESULTS OF CONFUSION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Were all this true, it would still be no paradox; -but only a natural consequence. Things are very -liable to slip into this state, when men who are -in earnest—knowing the facts as they exist in -their respective spheres; knowing the evils at first -hand; believing (very often with reason) that they -understand the true remedies—find themselves -baulked, and foiled, and headed off at every turn, -their objects misconceived and their motives -misconstrued, and the current of their wasted efforts -burying itself hopelessly in the sand. Under such -conditions as these, public bodies and political parties -alike—confused by the multitude and congestion of -issues—are apt to bestow their dangerous attentions, -now on one matter which happens to dart into the -limelight, now upon another; but in the general -hubbub and perplexity they lose all sense, both of -true proportion and natural priority. Everything -is talked about; much is attempted in a piecemeal, -slap-dash, impulsive fashion; inconsiderably little -is brought to any conclusion whatsoever; while -nothing, or next to nothing, is considered on its -merits, and carried through thoughtfully to a clean -and abiding settlement.... The word 'thorough' -seemed to have dropped out of the political vocabulary. -In an age of specialism politics alone was abandoned -to the Jack-of-all-trades. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P214"></a>214}</span> -</p> - -<p> -This phenomenon—the depreciated currency of -public character—was not peculiar to one party more -than another. It was not even peculiar to this -particular time. It has shown itself at various -epochs—much in the same way as the small-pox and -the plague—when favoured by insanitary conditions. -The sedate Scots philosopher, Adam Smith, writing -during the gloomy period which fell upon England -after the glory of the great Chatham had departed, -could not repress his bitterness against "that insidious -and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman -or politician, whose councils are directed by the -momentary fluctuations of affairs." It would seem -as if the body politic is not unlike the human, and -becomes more readily a prey to vermin, when it has -sunk into a morbid condition. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -Popular judgment may be trusted as a rule, and -in the long run, to decide a clear issue between truth -and falsehood, and to decide it in favour of the -former. But it becomes perplexed, when it is called -upon to discriminate between the assurances of two -rival sets of showmen, whose eagerness to outbid -each other in the public favour leaves truthfulness -out of account. In the absence of gold, one brazen -counterfeit rings very much like another. People -may be suspicious of both coins; but on the whole -their fancy is more readily caught by the optimist -effigy than the pessimist. They may not place -entire trust in the 'ever-cheerful man of sin,' with -his flattery, his abounding sympathy, his flowery -promises, and his undefeated hopefulness; but -they prefer him at any rate to 'the melancholy -Jaques,' booming maledictions with a mournful -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P215"></a>215}</span> -constancy, like some bittern in the desolation of the -marshes. -</p> - -<p> -So far as principles were concerned most of the -trouble was unnecessary. Among the would-be -reformers—among those who sincerely desired to -bring about efficiency within their own spheres—there -was surprisingly little that can truly be called -antagonism. But competition of an important -kind—competition for public attention and priority -of treatment—had produced many of the unfortunate -results of antagonism. It was inevitable that this -lamentable state of things must continue, until it -had been realised that one small body of men, elected -upon a variety of cross issues, could not safely be left -in charge of the defence of the Empire, the domestic -welfare of the United Kingdom, and the local -government of its several units. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ARTIFICIAL ANTAGONISMS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It was not merely that the various aims were not -opposed to one another; they were actually helpful -to one another. Often, indeed, they were essential -to the permanent success of one another. The man -who desired to improve the conditions of the poor was -not, therefore, the natural enemy of him who wanted -to place the national defences on a secure footing. -And neither of these was the natural enemy of others -who wished to bring about a settlement of the Irish -question, or of the Constitutional question, or of the -Imperial question. But owing partly to the -inadequacy of the machinery for giving a free course to -these various aspirations—partly to the fact that the -machinery itself was antiquated, in bad repair, and -had become clogged with a variety of obstructions—there -was an unfortunate tendency on the part of -every one who had any particular object very much -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P216"></a>216}</span> -at heart, to regard every one else who was equally -concerned about any other object as an impediment -in his path. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The need of the time, of course, was leadership—a -great man—or better still two great men, one on -each side—like the blades of a pair of scissors—to -cut a way out of the confusion by bringing their keen -edges into contact. But obviously, the greater the -confusion the harder it is for leadership to assert itself. We -may be sure enough that there were men of character -and capacity equal to the task if only they could have -been discovered. But they were not discovered. -</p> - -<p> -There were other things besides the confusion -of aims and ideas which made it hard for leaders to -emerge. The loose coherency of parties which -prevailed during the greater part of the nineteenth -century had given place to a set of highly organised -machines, which employed without remorse the -oriental method of strangulation, against everything -in the nature of independent effort and judgment. -The politician class had increased greatly in numbers -and influence. The eminent and ornamental people -who were returned to Westminster filled the public -eye, but they were only a small proportion of the -whole; nor is it certain that they exercised the -largest share of authority. When in the autumn -of 1913 Sir John Brunner determined to prevent -Mr. Churchill from obtaining the provisions for the -Navy which were judged necessary for the safety -of the Empire, the method adopted was to raise the -National Liberal Federation against the First Lord -of the Admiralty, and through the agency of that -powerful organisation to bring pressure to bear -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P217"></a>217}</span> -upon the country, members of Parliament, and the -Cabinet itself. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -BAD MONEY DRIVES OUT GOOD -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is unpopular to say that the House of Commons -has deteriorated in character, but it is true. An -assembly, the members of which cannot call their -souls their own, will never tend in an upward -direction. The machines which are managed with so -much energy and skill by the external parasites of -politics, have long ago taken over full responsibility -for the souls of their nominees. According to -'Gresham's law,' bad money, if admitted into currency, -will always end by driving out good. A similar -principle has been at work for some time past in -British public life, by virtue of which the baser kind -of politicians, having got a footing, are driving out -their betters at a rapid pace. Few members of -Parliament will admit this fact; but they are not -impartial judges, for every one is naturally averse -from disparaging an institution to which he belongs. -</p> - -<p> -During the nineteenth century, except at the very -beginning, and again at the very end of it, very few -people ever thought of going into Parliament, or -even into politics, in order that they might thrive -thereby, or find a field for improving their private -fortunes. This cannot be said with truth of the -epoch which has just ended. There has been a change -both in tone and outlook during the last thirty years. -Things have been done and approved by the House -of Commons, elected in December 1910, which it -is quite inconceivable that the House of Commons, -returned in 1880, would ever have entertained. The -Gladstonian era had its faults, but among them laxity -in matters of finance did not figure. Indeed private -members, as well as statesmen, not infrequently -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P218"></a>218}</span> -crossed the border-line which separates purism from -pedantry; occasionally they carried strictness to the -verge of absurdity; but this was a fault in the right -direction—a great safeguard to the public interest, -a peculiarly valuable tendency from the standpoint -of democracy. -</p> - -<p> -A twelvemonth ago a number of very foolish -persons were anxious to persuade us that the -predominant issue was the Army <i>versus</i> the People. -But even the crispness of the phrase was powerless -to convince public opinion of so staggering an -untruth. The predominant issue at that particular -moment was only what it had been for a good many -years before—the People <i>versus</i> the Party System. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NEED OF RICH MEN -</span> -</p> - -<p> -What is apt to be ignored is, that with the increase -of wealth on the one hand, and the extension of the -franchise on the other, the Party System has gradually -become a vested interest upon an enormous scale,—like -the liquor trade of which we hear so much, -or the <i>haute finance</i> of which perhaps we hear too little. -Rich men are required in politics, for the reason that -it is necessary to feed and clothe the steadily -increasing swarms of mechanics who drive, and keep -in repair, and add to, that elaborate machinery by -means of which the Sovereign People is cajoled into -the belief that its Will prevails. From the point of -view of the orthodox political economist these workers -are as unproductive as actors, bookmakers, or golf -professionals; but they have to be paid, otherwise -they would starve, and the machines would stop. -So long as there are plenty of rich men who desire -to become even richer, or to decorate their names -with titles, or to move in shining circles, this is -not at all likely to occur, unless the Party System -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P219"></a>219}</span> -suddenly collapsed, in which case there would be -acute distress. -</p> - -<p> -There are various grades of these artisans or -mechanicians of politics, from the professional -organiser or agent who, upon the whole, is no more -open to criticism than any other class of mankind -which works honestly for its living—down to the -committee-man who has no use for a candidate unless -he keeps a table from which large crumbs fall in -profusion. The man who supplements his income -by means of politics is a greater danger than the other -who openly makes politics his vocation. The jobbing -printer, enthusiastically pacifist or protectionist, well -paid for his hand-bills, and aspiring to more -substantial contracts; the smart, ingratiating organiser, -or hustling, bustling journalist, who receives a -complimentary cheque, or a bundle of scrip, or a seat on -a board of directors from the patron whom he has -helped to win an election—very much as at -ill-regulated shooting parties the head-keeper receives -exorbitant tips from wealthy sportsmen whom he -has placed to their satisfaction—all these are deeply -interested in the preservation of the Party System. -Innocent folk are often heard wondering why -candidates with such strange names—even stranger -appearance—accents and manner of speech which are -strangest of all—are brought forward so frequently -to woo the suffrages of urban constituencies. Clearly -they are not chosen on account of their political -knowledge; for they have none. There are other -aspirants to political honours who, in comeliness -and charm of manner, greatly excel them; whose -speech is more eloquent, or at any rate less -unintelligible. Yet London caucuses in particular have -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P220"></a>220}</span> -a great tenderness for these bejewelled patriots, and -presumably there must be reasons for the preference -which they receive. One imagines that in some -inscrutable way they are essential props of the Party -System in its modern phase. -</p> - -<p> -The drawing together of the world by steam and -electricity has brought conspicuous benefits to the -British Empire. The five self-governing nations of -which it is composed come closer together year by -year. Statesmen and politicians broaden the horizons -of their minds by swift and easy travel. But there -are drawbacks as well as the reverse under these new -conditions. To some extent the personnel of -democracy has tended to become interchangeable, like the -parts of a bicycle; and public characters are able to -transfer their activities from one state to another, -and even from one hemisphere to another, without a -great deal of difficulty. This has certain advantages, -but possibly more from the point of view of the -individual than from that of the Commonwealth. -After failure in one sphere there is still hope in another. -Mr. Micawber, or even Jeremy Diddler, may go the -round, using up public confidence at one resting-place -after another. For the Party System is a ready -employer, and providing a man has a glib tongue, a -forehead of brass, or an open purse, a position will -be found for him without too much enquiry made -into his previous references. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -LAWYERISM AND LEADERSHIP -</span> -</p> - -<p> -In a world filled with confusion and illusion the -Party System has fought at great advantage. Indeed -it is generally believed to be so firmly entrenched -that nothing can ever dislodge it. There are dangers, -however, in arguing too confidently from use and -wont. Conspicuous failure or disaster might bring -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P221"></a>221}</span> -ruin on this revered institution, as it has often done -in history upon others no less venerable. The Party -System has its weak side. Its wares are mainly -make-believes, and if a hurricane happens to burst -suddenly, the caucus may be left in no better plight -than Alnaschar with his overturned basket. The -Party System is not invulnerable against a great man -or a great idea. But of recent years it has been left -at peace to go its own way, for the reason that no such -man or idea has emerged, around which the English -people have felt that they could cluster confidently. -There has been no core on which human crystals -could precipitate and attach themselves, following -the bent of their nature towards a firm and clear -belief—or towards the prowess of a man—or towards -a Man possessed by a Belief. The typical party -leader during this epoch has neither been a man in -the heroic sense, nor has he had any belief that could -be called firm or clear. For the most part he has been -merely a Whig or Tory tradesman, dealing in -opportunism; and for the predominance of the Party System -this set of conditions was almost ideal. It was -inconceivable that a policy of wait-and-see could ever -resolve a situation of this sort. To fall back on -lawyerism was perhaps inevitable in the circumstances; -but to think that it was possible to substitute -lawyerism for leadership was absurd. -</p> - -<p> -And yet amid this confusion we were aware—even -at the time—and can see much more clearly -now the interlude is ended—that there were three -great ideas running through it all, struggling to -emerge, to make themselves understood, and to get -themselves realised. But unfortunately what were -realities to ordinary men were only counters according -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P222"></a>222}</span> -to the reckoning of the party mechanicians. The -<i>first</i> aim and the <i>second</i>—the improvement of the -organisation of society and the conditions of the -poor—the freeing of local aspirations and the knitting -together of the empire—were held in common by -the great mass of the British people, although they -were viewed by one section and another from different -angles of vision. The <i>third</i> aim, however—the -adequate defence of the empire—was not regarded -warmly, or even with much active interest, by any -organised section. The people who considered it -most earnestly were not engaged in party politics. -The manipulators of the machines looked upon the -<i>first</i> and the <i>second</i> as means whereby power might -be gained or retained, but they looked askance upon -the <i>third</i> as a perilous problem which it was wiser -and safer to leave alone. The great principles with -which the names—among others—of Mr. Chamberlain, -Lord Roberts, and Mr. Lloyd George are associated, -were at no point opposed one to another. Each -indeed was dependent upon the other two for its full -realisation. And yet, under the artificial entanglements -of the Party System, the vigorous pursuit of -any one of the three seemed to imperil the success -of both its competitors. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0303"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P223"></a>223}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER III -<br /> -POLICY AND ARMAMENTS -</h3> - -<p> -In the post-Victorian epoch, which we have been -engaged in considering, the aim of British foreign -policy may be summed up in one word—Security. -It was not aggression; it was not revenge; it was -not conquest, or even expansion of territories; it -was simply Security. -</p> - -<p> -It would be absurd, of course, to imagine that -security is wholly, or even mainly, a question of -military preparations. "All this is but a sheep -in a lion's skin, where the people are of weak -courage;" or where for any reason, the people are -divided among themselves or disaffected towards -their government. -</p> - -<p> -The defences of every nation are of two kinds, -the organised and the unorganised; the disciplined -strength of the Navy and the Army on the one -hand, the vigour and spirit of the people upon the -other. -</p> - -<p> -The vigour of the people will depend largely upon -the conditions under which they live, upon sufficiency -of food, the healthiness or otherwise of their -employments and homes, the proper nourishment and -upbringing of their children. It is not enough that -rates of wages should be good, if those who earn them -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P224"></a>224}</span> -have not the knowledge how to use them to the best -advantage. It is not always where incomes are -lowest that the conditions of life are worst. Measured -by infant mortality, and by the health and general -happiness of the community, the crofters of Scotland, -who are very poor, seem to have learned the lesson -<i>how to live</i> better than the highly paid workers in -many of our great manufacturing towns. -</p> - -<p> -Education—by which is meant not merely board-school -instruction, but the influence of the home and -the surrounding society—is not a less necessary -condition of vigour than wages, sanitary regulations, -and such like. The spiritual as well as the physical -training of children, the nature of their amusements, -the bent of their interests, the character of their aims -and ideals, at that critical period when the boy or -girl is growing into manhood or womanhood—all -these are things which conduce directly, as well as -indirectly, to the vigour of the race. They are every -bit as much a part of our system of national defence -as the manoeuvring of army corps and the gun-practice -of dreadnoughts. -</p> - -<p> -The <i>spirit</i> of the people, on the other hand, will -depend for its strength upon their attachment to -their own country; upon their affection for its -customs, laws, and institutions; upon a belief in the -general fairness and justice of its social arrangements; -upon the good relations of the various classes of -which society is composed. The spirit of national -unity is indispensable even in the case of the most -powerful autocracy. It is the very foundation of -democracy. Lacking it, popular government is but -a house of cards, which the first serious challenge -from without, or the first strong outburst of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P225"></a>225}</span> -discontent from within will bring tumbling to the -ground. Such a feeling of unity can only spring from -the prevalence of an opinion among every class of -the community, that their own system, with all its -faults, is better suited to their needs, habits, and -traditions than any other, and that it is worth -preserving, even at the cost of the greatest sacrifices, -from foreign conquest and interference. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -A TWO-HEADED PRINCIPLE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -While a people sapped by starvation and disease -will be wanting in the <i>vigour</i> necessary for offering -a prolonged and strenuous resistance, so will a people, -seething with class hatred and a sense of tyranny -and injustice, be wanting in the <i>spirit</i>. The problem, -however, of these unorganised defences, fundamental -though it is, stands outside the scope of the present -chapter, which is concerned solely with those defences -which are organised. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The beginning of wisdom with respect to all -problems of defence is the recognition of the -two-headed principle that <i>Policy depends on Armaments -just as certainly as Armaments depend on Policy</i>. -</p> - -<p> -The duty of the Admiralty and the War Office -is to keep their armaments abreast of the national -endeavour. It is folly to do more: it is madness -to do less. The duty of the Foreign Minister is to -restrain and hold back his policy, and to prevent -it from ambitiously outrunning the capacity of the -armaments which are at his disposal. If he does -otherwise the end is likely to be humiliation and -disaster. -</p> - -<p> -When any nation is unable or unwilling to provide -the armaments necessary for supporting the policy -which it has been accustomed to pursue and would -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P226"></a>226}</span> -like to maintain, it should have the sense to abandon -that policy for something of a humbler sort before -the bluff is discovered by the world.[<a id="chap0303fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0303fn1">1</a>] -</p> - -<p> -It may possibly appear absurd to dwell with so -much insistence upon a pair of propositions which, -when they are set down in black and white, will at -once be accepted as self-evident by ninety-nine men -out of a hundred. But plain and obvious as they -are, none in the whole region of politics have been -more frequently ignored. These two principles have -been constantly presenting themselves to the eyes of -statesmen in a variety of different shapes ever since -history began. -</p> - -<p> -It may very easily happen that the particular -policy which the desire for security requires, is -one which the strength of the national armaments -at a given moment will not warrant the country in -pursuing. Faced with this unpleasant quandary, -what is Government to do, if it be convinced of the -futility of trying to persuade the people to incur the -sacrifices necessary for realising the national -aspirations? Is it to give up the traditional policy, and -face the various consequences which it is reasonable -to anticipate? Or is it to persevere in the policy, -and continue acting as if the forces at its disposal -were sufficient for its purpose, when in fact they are -nothing of the kind? To follow the former course -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P227"></a>227}</span> -calls for a surrender which the spirit of the people -will not easily endure, and which may even be fatal -to the independent existence of the state. But to -enter upon the latter is conduct worthy of a fraudulent -bankrupt, since it trades upon an imposture, which, -when it is found out by rival nations, will probably -be visited by still severer penalties. -</p> - -<p> -But surely Government has only to make it clear -to the people that, unless they are willing to bring -their armaments abreast of their policy, national -aspirations must be baulked and even national safety -itself may be endangered. When men are made to -understand these things, will they not certainly agree -to do what is necessary, though they may give their -consent with reluctance?[<a id="chap0303fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0303fn2">2</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is very certain, however, that this outside -view of the case enormously underrates the difficulties -which stare the politician out of countenance. In -matters of this sort it is not so easy a thing to arrive -at the truth; much less to state it with such force -and clearness that mankind will at once recognise -it for truth, and what is said to the contrary for -falsehood. The intentions of foreign governments, -and the dangers arising out of that quarter, are -subjects which it is singularly difficult to discuss frankly, -without incurring the very evils which every government -seeks to avoid. And if these things are not -easy to discuss, it is exceedingly easy for faction or -fanatics to misrepresent them.[<a id="chap0303fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0303fn3">3</a>] Moreover, the -lamentations of the Hebrew prophets bear witness to the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P228"></a>228}</span> -deafness and blindness of generations into whom -actual experience of the evils foretold had not already -burnt the lesson which it was desired to teach. Evils -which have never been suffered are hard things to -clothe with reality until it is too late, and words, -even the most eloquent and persuasive, are but a -poor implement for the task. -</p> - -<p> -The policy of a nation is determined upon, so as -to accord with what it conceives to be its honour, -safety, and material interests. In the natural -course of events this policy may check, or be checked -by, the policy of some other nation. The efforts of -diplomacy may be successful in clearing away these -obstructions. If so, well and good; but if not, -there is nothing left to decide the issue between the -two nations but the stern arbitrament of war. -</p> - -<p> -Moreover, diplomacy itself is dependent upon -armaments in somewhat the same sense as the -prosperity of a merchant is dependent upon his -credit with his bankers. The news system of the -world has undergone a revolution since the days -before steam and telegraphs. It is not merely more -rapid, but much ampler. The various governments -are kept far more fully informed of one another's -affairs, and as a consequence the great issues between -nations have become clear and sharp. The most -crafty and smooth-tongued ambassador can rarely -wheedle his opponents into concessions which are -contrary to their interests, unless he has something -more to rely upon than his own guile and plausibility. -Army corps and battle fleets looming in the distance -are better persuaders than the subtlest arguments -and the deftest flattery. -</p> - -<p> -What, then, is the position of a statesman who -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P229"></a>229}</span> -finds himself confronted by a clash of policies, if, -when the diplomatic deadlock occurs, he realises -that his armaments are insufficient to support his -aim? In such an event he is faced with the -alternative of letting judgment go by default, or -of adding almost certain military disaster to the -loss of those political stakes for which his nation is -contending with its rival. Such a position must -be ignominious in the extreme; it might even be -ruinous; and yet it would be the inevitable fate -of any country whose ministers had neglected the -maxim that policy in the last resort is dependent -upon armaments. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -EXAMPLE OF CHINA -</span> -</p> - -<p> -If we are in search of an example we shall find it -ready to our hand. The Empire of China is -comparable to our own at least in numbers; for each -of them contains, as nearly as may be, one quarter -of the whole human race. And as China has hitherto -failed utterly to make her armaments sufficient, under -the stress of modern conditions, to support even -that meek and passive policy of possession which -she has endeavoured to pursue, so she has been -compelled to watch in helplessness while her policy -has been disregarded by every adventurer. She has -been pressed by all the nations of the world and -obliged to yield to their demands. Humiliating -concessions have been wrung from her; favours even -more onerous, in the shape of loans, have been -forced upon her. The resources with which nature -has endowed her have been exploited by foreigners -against her will. Her lands have been shorn from -her and parcelled out among those who were strong, -and who hungered after them. This conquest and -robbery has proceeded both by wholesale and retail. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P230"></a>230}</span> -Because she yielded this to one claimant, another, -to keep the balance even, has insisted upon that. -Safe and convenient harbours, fortified places, islands, -vast stretches of territory, have been demanded -and taken from her almost without a struggle; and -all this time she has abstained with a timid caution -from anything which can justly be termed -provocation. For more than half a century, none the -less, China has not been mistress in her own house. -</p> - -<p> -The reason of this is plain enough—China had -possessions which other nations coveted, and she -failed to provide herself with the armaments which -were necessary to maintain them. -</p> - -<p> -The British people likewise had possessions which -other nations coveted—lands to take their settlers, -markets to buy their goods, plantations to yield -them raw materials. If it were our set -determination to hold what our forefathers won, two -things were necessary: the first, that our policy -should conform to this aim; the second, that our -armaments should be sufficient to support our -policy. -</p> - -<p> -A nation which desired to extend its possessions, -to round off its territories, to obtain access to the sea, -would probably regard conquest, or at all events -absorption, as its highest immediate interest. This -would be the constant aim of its policy, and if its -armaments did not conform to this policy, the aim -would not be realised. Examples both of failure and -success are to be found in the history of Russia from -the time of Peter the Great, and in that of Prussia -from the days of the Great Elector. -</p> - -<p> -A nation—like England or Holland in the sixteenth, -seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries—which -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P231"></a>231}</span> -was seeking to secure against its commercial rivals, -if necessary by force of arms, new markets among -civilised but unmilitary races, would require a policy -and armaments to correspond. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -BRITISH CONTENTMENT -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The British Empire in the stage of development -which it had reached at the end of the Victorian -era did not aim at acquisition of fresh territories -or new markets, save such as might be won peacefully -by the skill and enterprise of its merchants. -It sought only to hold what it already possessed, to -develop its internal resources, and to retain equal -rights with its commercial rivals in neutral spheres. -But in order that those unaggressive objects might -be realised, there was need of a policy, different -indeed from that of Elizabeth, of Cromwell, or of -Chatham, but none the less clear and definite with -regard to its own ends. And to support this policy -there was need of armaments, suitable in scale and -character. -</p> - -<p> -It was frequently pointed out between the years -1901 and 1914 (and it lay at the very root of the -matter), that while we were perfectly satisfied with -things as they stood, and should have been more than -content—regarding the subject from the standpoint of -our own interests—to have left the map of the world -for ever, as it then was drawn, another nation was -by no means so well pleased with existing arrangements. -To this envious rival it appeared that we -had taken more than our fair share—as people are -apt to do who come early. We had wider territories -than we could yet fill with our own people; while -our neighbour foresaw an early date at which his race -would be overflowing its boundaries. We had limitless -resources in the Dominions and Dependencies -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P232"></a>232}</span> -overseas, which when developed would provide a -united empire with markets of inestimable value. -In these respects Germany was in a less favourable -position. Indeed, with the exceptions of Russia -and the United States, no other great Power was so -fortunately placed as ourselves; and even these -two nations, although they had an advantage over -the British Empire by reason of their huge compact -and coterminous territories, still did not equal it -in the vastness and variety of their undeveloped -resources. -</p> - -<p> -Clearly, therefore, the policy which the needs of -our Commonwealth required at this great turning-point -in its history, was not only something different -from that of any other great Power, but also -something different from that which had served our own -purposes in times gone by. Like China, our aim was -peaceful possession. Unlike China, we ought to have -kept in mind the conditions under which alone this -aim was likely to be achieved. It might be irksome -and contrary to our peaceful inclinations to maintain -great armaments when we no longer dreamed of -making conquests; but in the existing state of the -world, armaments were unfortunately quite as -necessary for the purpose of enabling us to hold what we -possessed, as they ever were when our forefathers -set out to win the Empire. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -In 1904, with the object of promoting harmony -between the policy and armaments of the British -Empire, Mr. Balfour created the Committee of -Imperial Defence. This was undoubtedly a step of -great importance. His purpose was to introduce -a system, by means of which ministers and high -officials responsible for the Navy and Army would -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P233"></a>233}</span> -be kept in close touch with the trend of national -policy, in so far as it might affect the relations of the -Commonwealth with foreign Powers. In like manner -those other ministers and high officials, whose -business it was to conduct our diplomacy, maintain an -understanding with the Dominions, administer our -Dependencies, and govern India, would be made -thoroughly conversant with the limitations to our -naval and military strength. Having this knowledge, -they would not severally embark on irreconcilable -or impracticable projects or drift unknowingly into -dangerous complications. The conception of the -Committee of Imperial Defence, therefore, was due -to a somewhat tardy recognition of the two-headed -principle, that armaments are mere waste of money -unless they conform to policy, and that policy in -the last resort must depend on armaments. -</p> - -<p> -The Committee was maintained by Mr. Balfour's -successors, and was not allowed (as too often happens -when there is a change of government) to fall into -discredit and disuse.[<a id="chap0303fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0303fn4">4</a>] But in order that this body -of statesmen and experts might achieve the ends in -view, it was essential for them to have realised clearly, -not only the general object of British policy—which -indeed was contained in the single word 'Security'—but -also the special dangers which loomed in the -near future. They had then to consider what -reciprocal obligations had already been contracted with -other nations, whose interests were to some extent -the same as our own, and what further undertakings -of a similar character it might be desirable to enter -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P234"></a>234}</span> -into. Finally, there were the consequences which -these obligations and undertakings would entail in -certain contingencies. It was not enough merely -to mumble the word 'Security' and leave it at that. -What security implied in the then existing state of -the world was a matter which required to be -investigated in a concrete, practical, and business-like -way. -</p> - -<p> -Unfortunately, the greater part of these essential -preliminaries was omitted, and as a consequence, the -original idea of the Committee of Imperial Defence -was never realised. Harmonious, flexible, and of -considerable utility in certain directions, it did not -work satisfactorily as a whole. The trend of policy -was, no doubt, grasped in a general way; but, as -subsequent events have proved, the conditions on -which alone that line could be maintained, and the -consequences which it involved, were not at any time -clearly understood and boldly faced by this august -body in its corporate capacity. -</p> - -<p> -The general direction may have been settled; but -certainly the course was not marked out; the rocks -and shoals remained for the most part uncharted. -The committee, no doubt, had agreed upon a certain -number of vague propositions, as, for example, that -France must not be crushed by Germany, or the -neutrality of Belgium violated by any one. They -knew that we were committed to certain obligations—or, -as some people called them, 'entanglements'—and -that these again, in certain circumstances, might -commit us to others. But what the whole amounted -to was not realised in barest outline, by the country, -or by Parliament, or by the Government, or even, -we may safely conjecture, by the Committee itself. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P235"></a>235}</span> -We have the right to say this, because, if British -policy had been realised as a whole by the Committee -of Imperial Defence, it would obviously have been -communicated to the Cabinet, and in its broader -aspects to the people; and this was never done. It is -inconceivable that any Prime Minister, who believed, -as Mr. Asquith does, in democratic principles, would -have left the country uneducated, and his own -colleagues unenlightened, on a matter of so great -importance, had his own mind been clearly made up. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -CONFUSION WHEN WAR OCCURRED -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When the crisis occurred in July 1914, when -Germany proceeded to action, when events took place -which for years past had been foretold and discussed -very fully on both sides of the North Sea, it was as -if a bolt had fallen from the blue. Uncertainty was -apparent in all quarters. The very thing which had -been so often talked of had happened. Germany -was collecting her armies and preparing to crush -France. The neutrality of Belgium was threatened. -Yet up to, and on, Sunday, August 2, there was -doubt and hesitation in the Cabinet, and until some -days later, also in Parliament and the country.[<a id="chap0303fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0303fn5">5</a>] -</p> - -<p> -When, finally, it was decided to declare war, the -course of action which that step required still appears -to have remained obscure to our rulers. Until the -Thursday following it was not decided to send the -Expeditionary Force abroad. Then, out of timidity, -only two-thirds of it were sent.[<a id="chap0303fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0303fn6">6</a>] Transport arrangements -which were all ready for moving the whole -force had to be hastily readjusted. The delay was -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P236"></a>236}</span> -not less injurious than the parsimony; and the -combination of the two nearly proved fatal. -</p> - -<p> -If the minds of the people and their leaders were -not prepared for what happened, if in the moral -sense there was unreadiness; still more inadequate -were all preparations of the material kind—not only -the actual numbers of our Army, but also the whole -system for providing expansion, training, equipment, -and munitions. It is asking too much of us to -believe that events could have happened as they did -in England during the fortnight which followed the -presentation of the Austrian Ultimatum to Servia, -had the Committee of Imperial Defence and its -distinguished president taken pains beforehand to -envisage clearly the conditions and consequences -involved in their policy of 'Security.' -</p> - -<p> -As regards naval preparations, things were better -indeed than might have been expected, considering -the vagueness of ideas in the matter of policy. We -were safeguarded here by tradition, and the general -idea of direction had been nearly sufficient. There -was always trouble, but not as a rule serious trouble, -in establishing the case for increases necessary to -keep ahead of German efforts. There had been -pinchings and parings—especially in the matter of -fast cruisers, for lack of which, when war broke out, -we suffered heavy losses—but except in one -instance—the abandonment of the Cawdor programme—these -had not touched our security at any vital point. -</p> - -<p> -Thanks largely to Mr. Stead, but also to -statesmen of both parties, and to a succession of Naval -Lords who did not hesitate, when occasion required -it, to risk their careers (as faithful servants ever will) -rather than certify safety where they saw danger—thanks, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P237"></a>237}</span> -perhaps, most of all to a popular instinct, -deeply implanted in the British mind, which had -grasped the need for supremacy at sea—our naval -preparations, upon the whole, had kept abreast of -our policy for nearly thirty years. -</p> - -<p> -As regards the Army, however, it was entirely -different. There had been no intelligent effort to -keep our military strength abreast of our policy; -and as, in many instances, it would have been too -bitter a humiliation to keep our policy within the -limits of our military strength, the course actually -pursued can only be described fitly as a game of -bluff. -</p> - -<p> -There had never been anything approaching -agreement with regard to the functions which the -Army was expected to perform. Not only did -political parties differ one from another upon this -primary and fundamental question, but hardly two -succeeding War Ministers had viewed it in the same -light. There had been schemes of a bewildering -variety; but as the final purpose for which soldiers -existed had never yet been frankly laid down and -accepted, each of these plans in turn had been -discredited by attacks, which called in question the very -basis of the proposed reformation. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE NAVAL POSITION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -While naval policy had been framed and carried -out in accordance with certain acknowledged necessities -of national existence, military policy had been -alternately expanded and deflated in order to assuage -the anxieties, while conforming to the prejudices—real -or supposed—of the British public. In the case -of the fleet, we had very fortunately arrived, more -than a generation ago, at the point where it was a -question of what the country needed; as regards the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P238"></a>238}</span> -Army, it was still a question of what the country -would stand. But how could even a politician know -what the country would stand until the full case had -been laid before the country? How was it that while -Ministers of both parties had the courage to put the -issue more or less nakedly in the matter of ships, -they grew timid as soon as the discussion turned on -army corps? If the needs of the Commonwealth -were to be the touchstone in the one case, why not -also in the other? The country will stand a great -deal more than the politicians think; and it will stand -almost anything better than vacillation, evasion, -and untruth. In army matters, unfortunately, it -has had experience of little else since the battle of -Waterloo. -</p> - -<p> -Mathematicians, metaphysicians, and economists -have a fondness for what is termed 'an assumption.' They -take for granted something which it would be -inconvenient or impossible to prove, and thereupon -proceed to build upon it a fabric which compels -admiration in a less or greater degree, by reason of -its logical consistency. There is no great harm in -this method so long as the conclusions, which are -drawn from the airy calculations of the study, are -confined to the peaceful region of their birth; but -so soon as they begin to sally forth into the harsh -world of men and affairs, they are apt to break at -once into shivers. When the statesman makes an -assumption he does so at his peril; or, perhaps, to -speak more correctly, at the peril of his country. -For if it be a false assumption the facts will -speedily find it out, and disasters will inevitably -ensue. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -TWO INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Our Governments, Tory and Radical alike, have -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P239"></a>239}</span> -acted in recent times as if the British Army were -what their policy required it to be—something, that -is, entirely different from what it really was. -Judging by its procedure, the Foreign Office would appear -to have made the singularly bold assumption that, -in a military comparison with other nations, Britain -was still in much the same relative position as in the -days of Napoleon. Sustained by this tenacious but -fantastic tradition, Ministers have not infrequently -engaged in policies which wiser men would have -avoided. They have uttered protests, warnings, -threats which have gone unheeded. They have -presumed to say what would and would not be -tolerated in certain spheres; but having nothing -better behind their despatches than a mere assumption -which did not correspond with the facts, they -have been compelled to endure rebuffs and -humiliations. As they had not the prudence to cut their -coat according to their cloth, it was only natural -that occasionally they should have had to appear -before the world in a somewhat ridiculous guise. -</p> - -<p> -British statesmen for nearly half a century had -persisted in acting upon two most dangerous -assumptions. They had assumed that one branch of the -national armaments conformed to their policy, when -in fact it did not. And they had assumed also, -which is equally fatal, that policy, if only it be -virtuous and unaggressive, is in some mysterious way -self-supporting, and does not need to depend on -armaments at all. -</p> - -<p> -The military preparations of Britain were -inadequate to maintain the policy of Security, which -British Governments had nevertheless been engaged -in pursuing for many years prior to the outbreak of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P240"></a>240}</span> -the present war.[<a id="chap0303fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0303fn7">7</a>] On the other hand, the abandonment -of this policy was incompatible with the -continuance of the Empire. We could not hope to hold -our scattered Dependencies and to keep our Dominions -safe against encroachments unless we were prepared -to incur the necessary sacrifices. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0303fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0303fn1text">1</a>] American writers have urged criticism -of this sort against the armaments -of the U.S.A., which they allege are inadequate -to uphold the policy -of the 'Monroe Doctrine.' The German view -of the matter has been stated -by the Chancellor (April 7, 1913) -when introducing the Army Bill:—"History -knows of no people which came to disaster because it had -exhausted itself in the making of its defences; -but history knows of many -peoples which have perished, because, -living in prosperity and luxury, -they neglected their defences. -A people which thinks that it is not rich -enough to maintain its armaments shows -merely that it has played its -part." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0303fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0303fn2text">2</a>] So the argument runs, and the course -of our naval policy since Mr. Stead's famous press -campaign in 1884 will be cited as an encouragement. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0303fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0303fn3text">3</a>] <i>E.g.</i> in the winter of 1908 and spring of 1909, -when an influential -section of the supporters of the present Cabinet -chose to believe the false -assurances of the German Admiralty, -and freely accused their own Government of mendacity. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0303fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0303fn4text">4</a>] Innovations of this particular sort -have possibly a better chance of -preserving their existence than some -others. 'Boards are screens,' wrote -John Stuart Mill, or some other profound thinker; -and in politics screens -are always useful. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0303fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0303fn5text">5</a>] This is obvious from the White Paper -without seeking further evidence -in the ministerial press or elsewhere. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0303fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0303fn6text">6</a>] Of the six infantry divisions included -in the Expeditionary Force only -four were sent in the first instance; -a fifth arrived about August 24; a -sixth about mid-September. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0303fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0303fn7text">7</a>] "Our Army, as a belligerent factor -in European politics, is almost a -negligible quantity. -This Empire is at all times practically defenceless -beyond its first line. -Such an Empire invites war. Its assumed security -amid the armaments of Europe, -and now of Asia, is insolent and provocative" -(Lord Roberts, October 22, 1912). -Nothing indeed is more insolent -and provocative, or more likely -to lead to a breach of the peace, than -undefended riches among armed men. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0304"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P241"></a>241}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER IV -<br /> -THE BALANCE OF POWER -</h3> - -<p> -During the whole period of rather more than -thirteen years—which has been referred to in previous -pages as the post-Victorian epoch, and which -extended roughly from January 1901, when Queen -Victoria died, to July 1914, when war was declared—the -British Army remained inadequate for the purpose -of upholding that policy which British statesmen of -both parties, and the British people, both at home -and in the Dominions, were engaged in pursuing—whether -they knew it or not—and were bound to -pursue, unless they were prepared to sacrifice their -independence. -</p> - -<p> -The aim of that policy was the security of the -whole empire. This much at any rate was readily -conceded on all hands. It was not enough, however, -that we approved the general aim of British policy. -A broad but clear conception of the means by which -our Government hoped to maintain this policy, and -the sacrifices which the country would have to make -in order to support this policy, was no less necessary. -So soon, however, as we began to ask for further -particulars, we found ourselves in the region of acute -controversy. 'Security' was a convenient political -formula, which could be accepted as readily by the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P242"></a>242}</span> -man who placed his trust in international law, as by his -neighbour who believed in battle fleets and army corps. -</p> - -<p> -In considering this question of security we could -not disregard Europe, for Europe was still the -storm-centre of the world. We could not afford to turn a -blind eye towards the ambitions and anxieties of -the great continental Powers. We were bound to -take into account not only their visions but their -nightmares. We could not remain indifferent to -their groupings and alliances, or to the strength and -dispositions of their armaments. -</p> - -<p> -That the United Kingdom was a pair of islands -lying on the western edge of Europe, and that the -rest of the British Empire was remote, and unwilling -to be interested in the rivalries of the Teuton, Slav, -and Latin races, did not affect the matter in the least. -Nowadays no habitable corner of the earth is really -remote; and as for willingness or unwillingness to be -interested, that had nothing at all to do with the -question. For it was clear that any Power, which -succeeded in possessing itself of the suzerainty of -Europe, could redraw the map of the world at its -pleasure, and blow the Monroe Doctrine, no less -than the British Empire, sky-high. -</p> - -<p> -Looking across thousands of leagues of ocean, it -was difficult for the Dominions and the United -States to understand how their fortunes, and the -ultimate fate of their cherished institutions, could -possibly be affected by the turmoil and jealousies -of—what appeared in their eyes to be—a number of -reactionary despotisms and chauvinistic democracies. -Even the hundred and twenty leagues which separate -Hull from Emden, or the seven which divide Dover -from Calais, were enough to convince many people -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P243"></a>243}</span> -in the United Kingdom that we could safely allow -Europe to 'stew in her own juice.' But unfortunately -for this theory, unless a great continental -struggle ended like the battle of the Kilkenny cats, the -outside world was likely to find itself in an awkward -predicament, when the conqueror chose to speak with -it in the gates, at a time of his own choosing. -</p> - -<p> -British policy since 1901 had tended, with ever -increasing self-consciousness, towards the definite aim -of preventing Germany from acquiring the suzerainty -of Western Europe. It was obvious that German -predominance, if secured, must ultimately force the -other continental nations, either into a German -alliance, or into a neutrality favourable to German -interests. German policy would then inevitably -be directed towards encroachments upon British -possessions. Germany had already boldly -proclaimed her ambitions overseas. Moreover, she -would find it pleasanter to compensate, and soothe -the susceptibilities of those nations whom she had -overcome in diplomacy or war, and to reward their -subsequent services as allies and friendly neutrals, -by paying them out of our property rather than out -of her own. For this reason, if for no other, we were -deeply concerned that Germany should not dominate -Europe if we could help it. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMAN AIMS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -During this period, on the other hand, Germany -appeared to be setting herself more and more seriously -to acquire this domination. Each succeeding year -her writers expressed themselves in terms of greater -candour and confidence. Her armaments were following -her policy. The rapid creation of a fleet—the -counterpart of the greatest army in Europe—and -the recent additions to the striking power of her -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P244"></a>244}</span> -already enormous army could have no other object. -Certainly from 1909 onwards, it was impossible to -regard German preparations as anything else than a -challenge, direct or indirect, to the security of the -British Empire. -</p> - -<p> -Consequently the direction of British policy -returned, gradually, unavowedly, but with certainty, -to its old lines, and became once more concerned with -the maintenance of the <i>Balance of Power</i> as the prime -necessity. The means adopted were the Triple -Entente between Britain, France, and Russia. The -object of this understanding was to resist the -anticipated aggressions of the Triple Alliance, wherein -Germany was the predominant partner. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DERELICT MAXIMS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The tendency of phrases, as they grow old, is to -turn into totems, for and against which political -parties, and even great nations, fight unreasoningly. -But before we either yield our allegiance to any of -these venerable formulas, or decide to throw it out -on the scrap-heap, there are advantages in looking to -see whether or not there is some underlying meaning -which may be worth attending to. It occasionally -happens that circumstances have changed so much -since the original idea was first crystallised in words, -that the old saying contains no value or reality -whatsoever for the present generation. More often, -however, there is something of permanent importance -behind, if only we can succeed in tearing off the husk -of prejudice in which it has become encased. So, -according to Disraeli, "the <i>divine right</i> of Kings -may have been a plea for feeble tyrants, but the -divine right of government is the keystone of human -progress." For many years the phrase <i>British -interests</i>, which used to figure so largely in speeches -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P245"></a>245}</span> -and leading articles, has dropped out of use, because -it had come to be associated unfavourably with -bond-holders' dividends. The fact that it also implied -national honour and prestige, the performance of -duties and the burden of responsibilities was -forgotten. Even the doctrine of <i>laissez faire</i>, which -politicians of all parties have lately agreed to abjure -and contemn, has, as regards industrial affairs, a large -kernel of practical wisdom and sound policy hidden -away in it. But of all these derelict maxims, that -which until quite recently, appeared to be suffering -from the greatest neglect, was the need for maintaining -the <i>Balance of Power</i> in Europe. For close on -two generations it had played no overt part in public -controversy, except when some Tory matador produced -it defiantly as a red rag to infuriate the -Radical bull. -</p> - -<p> -If this policy of the maintenance of the <i>Balance -of Power</i> has been little heard of since Waterloo, the -reason is that since then, until quite recently, the -<i>Balance of Power</i> has never appeared to be seriously -threatened.[<a id="chap0304fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0304fn1">1</a>] And because the policy of maintaining -this balance was in abeyance, many people have -come to believe that it was discredited. Because -it was not visibly and actively in use it was supposed -to have become entirely useless. -</p> - -<p> -This policy can never become useless. It must -inevitably come into play, so soon as any Power -appears to be aiming at the mastery of the continent. -It will ever remain a matter of life or death, to the -United Kingdom and to the British Empire, that -no continental state shall be allowed to obtain -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P246"></a>246}</span> -command, directly or indirectly, of the resources, -diplomacy, and armaments of Europe. -</p> - -<p> -In the sixteenth century we fought Philip of -of Spain to prevent him from acquiring European -predominance. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and -nineteenth centuries we fought Louis XIV., Louis -XV., and Napoleon for the same reason. In order to -preserve the balance of power, and with it our own -security, it was our interest under Elizabeth to -prevent the Netherlands from being crushed by Spain. -Under later monarchs it was our interest to prevent -the Netherlands, the lesser German States, Prussia, -Austria, and finally the whole of Europe from being -crushed by France. And we can as ill afford to-day -to allow France to be crushed by Germany, or Holland -and Belgium to fall into her power. The wheel has -come round full circle, but the essential British interest -remains constant. -</p> - -<p> -The wheel is always turning, sometimes slowly, -sometimes with startling swiftness. Years hence -the present alliances will probably be discarded. It -may be that some day the danger of a European -predominance will appear from a different quarter—from -one of our present allies, or from some upstart -state which may rise to power with an even greater -rapidity than the Electorate of Brandenburg. Or it -may be that before long the New World, in fact as well -as phrase, may have come in to redress the balance of -the Old. We cannot say, because we cannot foresee -what the future holds in store. But from the opening -of the present century, the immediate danger came -from Germany, who hardly troubled to conceal the -fact that she was aiming at predominance by mastery -of the Low Countries and by crushing France. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P247"></a>247}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -CONDITIONS OF BRITISH FREEDOM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -That this danger was from time to time regarded -seriously by a section of the British Cabinet, we -know from their own statements both before war -broke out and subsequently. It was no chimera -confined to the imaginations of irresponsible and -panic-stricken writers. In sober truth the balance -of power in Europe was in as much danger, and the -maintenance of it had become as supreme a British -interest, under a Liberal government at the beginning -of the twentieth century, as it ever was under -a Whig government at the close of the seventeenth -and opening of the eighteenth. -</p> - -<p> -The stealthy return of this doctrine into the region -of practical politics was not due to the prejudices of -the party which happened to be in power. Quite the -contrary. Most Liberals distrusted the phrase. The -whole mass of the Radicals abhorred it. The idea -which lay under and behind the phrase was nevertheless -irresistible, because it arose out of the facts. -Had a Socialist Government held office, this policy -must equally have imposed itself and been accepted -with a good or ill grace, for the simple reason that, -unless the balance of power is maintained in Europe, -there can be no security for British freedom, under -which we mean, with God's help, to work out our -own problems in our own way. -</p> - -<p> -English statesmen had adopted this policy in fact, -if unavowedly—perhaps even to some extent -unconsciously—when they first entered into, and -afterwards confirmed, the Triple Entente. And having -once entered into the Triple Entente it was obvious -that, without risking still graver consequences, we -could never resume the detached position which we -occupied before we took that step. It is difficult to -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P248"></a>248}</span> -believe—seeing how the danger of German -predominance threatened France and Russia as well as -ourselves—that we should not have excited the ill-will -of those two countries had we refused to make -common cause by joining the Triple Entente. It -was obvious, however, to every one that we could not -afterwards retire from this association without -incurring their hostility. If we had withdrawn we -should have been left, not merely without a friend in -Europe, but with all the chief Powers in Europe our -enemies—ready upon the first favourable occasion to -combine against us. -</p> - -<p> -There is only one precedent in our history for so -perilous a situation—when Napoleon forced Europe -into a combination against us in 1806. And this -precedent, though it then threatened our Empire -with grave dangers, did not threaten it with dangers -comparable in gravity with those which menaced us -a century later. -</p> - -<p> -The consequences of breaking away from the -Triple Entente were sufficiently plain. "We may -build ships against one nation, or even against a -combination of nations. But we cannot build ships -against half Europe. If Western Europe, with all -its ports, its harbours, its arsenals, and its resources, -was to fall under the domination of a single will, no -effort of ours would be sufficient to retain the -command of the sea. It is a balance of power -on the continent, which alone makes it possible -for us to retain it. Thus the maintenance of the -balance of power is vital to our superiority at sea, -which again is vital to the security of the British -Empire."[<a id="chap0304fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0304fn2">2</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P249"></a>249}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Security in the widest sense was the ultimate -end of our policy—security of mind, security from -periodic panic, as well as actual military security. -Looked at more closely, the immediate end was -defence—the defence of the British Empire and of -the United Kingdom. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DEFENCE AND INVASION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -In the existing condition of the world a policy of -'splendid isolation' was no longer possible. -Conditions with which we are familiar in commercial -affairs, had presented themselves in the political -sphere, and co-operation on a large scale had become -necessary in order to avoid bankruptcy. England -had entered into the Triple Entente because her -statesmen realised, clearly or vaguely, that by doing -so we should be better able to defend our existence, -and for no other reason. -</p> - -<p> -After 1911 it must have been obvious to most -people who considered the matter carefully that in -certain events the Triple Entente would become an -alliance. It is the interest as well as the duty of -allies to stand by one another from first to last, and -act together in the manner most likely to result in -victory for the alliance. What then was the manner -of co-operation most likely to result in victory for that -alliance which lay dormant under the Triple Entente? -</p> - -<p> -But first of all, to clear away one obscurity—<i>Invasion</i> -was not our problem; <i>Defence</i> was our -problem; for the greater included the less. -</p> - -<p> -The word 'defence' is apt to carry different -meanings to different minds. The best defence of -England and British interests, at any given time, -may or may not consist in keeping our main army -in the United Kingdom and waiting to be attacked -here. It all depends upon the special circumstances -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P250"></a>250}</span> -of each case. The final decision must be governed -by one consideration, and one only—how to strike -the speediest, heaviest, and most disabling blow at -the aggressor. If by keeping our army in England -and endeavouring to lure the enemy into our toils, -that end is most likely to be accomplished, then it is -obviously best to keep our army here. If by sending -it into the north of France to combine with the -French the supreme military object has a superior -chance of being achieved, then it is best to send it -into the north of France. -</p> - -<p> -A defensive war cannot be defined and circumscribed -as a war to drive out invaders, or even to -prevent the landing of invaders. The best way to -defend your castle may be to man the walls, to fall -upon the enemy at the ford, to harry his lands, or -even to attack him in his castle. There is no fixed -rule. The circumstances in each case make the rule. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -CO-OPERATION WITH FRANCE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -A war is not less a defensive war if you strike at -your enemy in his own territory, or if you come to -the aid of your ally, whose territory has been invaded -or is threatened. In the circumstances which -prevailed for a considerable number of years prior to -the outbreak of the present war, it gradually became -more and more obvious, that our soundest defence -would be joint action with France upon her -north-eastern frontier. For there, beyond any doubt, -would Germany's supreme effort be made against -the Triple Entente. If the attack failed at that -point, it would be the heaviest and most disabling -blow which our enemy could suffer. If, on the other -hand, it succeeded, France and England would have -to continue the struggle on terms immensely less -favourable. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P251"></a>251}</span> -</p> - -<p> -This opinion was not by any means unanimously -or clearly held; but during the summer of 1911 and -subsequently, it was undoubtedly the hypothesis -upon which those members of our Government relied, -who were chiefly responsible for the conduct of -foreign affairs. Unfortunately Parliament and the -country had never accepted either the policy or its -consequences; they had never been asked to accept -either the one or the other; nor had they been -educated with a view to their acceptance. -</p> - -<p> -At that time the error was exceedingly prevalent, -that it is a more comfortable business fighting in -your own country than in somebody else's. From -this it followed that it would be folly to engage in -what were termed disapprovingly 'foreign adventures,' -and that we should be wise to await attack -behind our own shores. Recent events have wrought -such a complete and rapid conversion from this -heresy, that it is no longer worth while wasting words -in exposing it. It is necessary, however, to recall -how influential this view of the matter was, not only -up to the declaration of war, but even for some time -afterwards. -</p> - -<p> -As to the precise form of co-operation between -the members of the Triple Entente in case of war, -there could be no great mystery. It was obvious to -any one who paid attention to what happened during -the summer and autumn of 1911, that in the event of -Germany attacking France over the Agadir dispute, -we had let it be understood and expected, that we -should send our Expeditionary Force across the -Channel to co-operate with the French army on the -north-eastern frontier. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0304fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0304fn1text">1</a>] It can hardly be overlooked, however, -that this principle, rightly or -wrongly interpreted, had something -to do with the Crimean War (1854-56) -and with the British attitude at the -Congress of Berlin (1878). -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0304fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0304fn2text">2</a>] Viscount Milner in the <i>United Service Magazine</i>, -January 1912. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0305"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P252"></a>252}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER V -<br /> -THE MILITARY SITUATION -</h3> - -<p class="t3"> -(August 1911) -</p> - -<p> -The full gravity of the Agadir incident, though -apparent to other nations, was never realised by the -people of this country. The crisis arose suddenly in -July 1911. Six weeks later it had subsided; but it -was not until well on in the autumn that its meanings -were grasped, even by that comparatively small -section of the public who interest themselves in -problems of defence and foreign affairs. From -October onwards, however, an increasing number -began to awake to the fact, that war had only been -avoided by inches, and to consider seriously—many -of them for the first time in their lives—what would -have happened if England had become involved in -a European conflict. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -From various official statements, and from -discussions which from time to time had taken place in -Parliament, it was understood that our 'Expeditionary -Force' consisted of six infantry divisions, a cavalry -division, and army troops;[<a id="chap0305fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn1">1</a>] also that the national -resources permitted of this force being kept up to -full strength for a period of at least six months, after -making all reasonable deductions for the wastage of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P253"></a>253}</span> -war. Was this enough? Enough for what? ... To -uphold British policy; to preserve Imperial -security; to enable the Triple Entente to maintain -the balance of power in Europe. These were vague -phrases; what did they actually amount to? ... The -adequacy or inadequacy of such an army as this -for doing what was required of it—for securing speedy -victory in event of war—or still better for preserving -peace by the menace which it opposed to German -schemes of aggression—can only be tested by -considering the broad facts with regard to numbers, -efficiency, and readiness of all the armies which would -be engaged directly, or indirectly, in a European -struggle. -</p> - -<p> -War, however, had been avoided in 1911, and not -a few people were therefore convinced that the -menace of the available British army, together with -the other consequences to be apprehended from the -participation of this country, had been sufficient to -deter Germany from pursuing her schemes of aggression, -if indeed she had actually harboured any notions -of the kind. But others, not altogether satisfied -with this explanation and conclusion, were inclined -to press their enquiries somewhat further. -Supposing war had actually been declared, would the -British force have been sufficient—acting in -conjunction with the French army—to repel a German -invasion of France and Belgium, to hurl back the -aggressors and overwhelm them in defeat? Would -it have been sufficient to accomplish the more modest -aim of holding the enemy at his own frontiers, or -even—supposing that by a swift surprise he had been -able to overrun Belgium—at any rate to keep him -out of France? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P254"></a>254}</span> -</p> - -<p> -When people proceeded to seek for answers to -these questions, as many did during the year 1912, -they speedily discovered that, in considerations of -this sort, the governing factor is numbers—the -numbers of the opposing forces available at the -outbreak of war and in the period immediately -following. The tremendous power of national spirit -must needs be left out of such calculations as a thing -immeasurable, imponderable, and uncertain. It was -also unsafe to assume that the courage, intelligence, -efficiency, armament, transport, equipment, supplies, -and leadership of the German and Austrian armies -would be in any degree inferior to those of the Triple -Entente. Certain things had to be allowed for in a -rough and ready way;[<a id="chap0305fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn2">2</a>] but the main enquiry was -forced to concern itself with numerical strength. -</p> - -<p> -There was not room for much disagreement upon -the broad facts of the military situation, among -soldiers and civilians who, from 1911 onwards, gave -themselves to the study of this subject at the available -sources of information; and their estimates have -been confirmed, in the main, by what has happened -since war began. The Intelligence departments of -London, Paris, and Petrograd—with much ampler -means of knowledge at their disposal—can have -arrived at no other conclusions. What the English -War Office knew, the Committee of Imperial Defence -likewise knew; and the leading members of the -Cabinet, if not the whole Government, must be -presumed to have been equally well informed. -</p> - -<p> -It was assumed in these calculations, that in case -of tension between the Triple Entente and the Triple -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P255"></a>255}</span> -Alliance, the latter would not be able—in the first -instance at all events—to bring its full strength into -the struggle. For unless Germany and Austria -managed their diplomacy before the outbreak of -hostilities with incomparable skill, it seemed -improbable that the Italian people would consent to -engage in a costly, and perhaps ruinous, war—a -war against France, with whom they had no quarrel; -against England, towards whom they had long -cherished feelings of friendship; on behalf of the -Habsburg Empire, which they still regarded—and -not altogether unreasonably—with suspicion and -enmity. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NEUTRALITY OF ITALY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -But although the neutrality of Italy might be -regarded as a likelihood at the opening of the war, -it could not be reckoned on with any certainty as a -permanent condition. For as no one can forecast -the course of a campaign, so no one can feel secure -that the unexpected may not happen at any moment. -The consequences of a defeat in this quarter or in -that, may offer too great temptations to the cupidity -of onlookers; while diplomacy, though it may have -bungled in the beginning, is sure to have many -opportunities of recovering its influence as the -situation develops. Consequently, unless and until Italy -actually joined in the struggle on the side of the -Triple Entente, a considerable section of the French -army would, in common prudence, have to be left -on guard upon the Savoy frontier. -</p> - -<p> -In a war brought on by the aggressive designs of -Germany, the only nations whose participation could -be reckoned on with certainty—and this only -supposing that Britain stood firmly by the policy upon -which her Government had embarked—were Russia, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P256"></a>256}</span> -France, and ourselves on the one side, Germany and -Austria-Hungary on the other. -</p> - -<p> -It would certainly be necessary for Germany, as -well as Austria, to provide troops for coast defences, -and also for the frontiers of neutral countries, which -might have the temptation, in certain circumstances, to -deneutralise themselves at an inconvenient moment, -if they were left unwatched. On the north and -west were Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, each -of which had a small field army, besides garrison -and fortress troops which might be turned to more -active account upon an emergency. On the south -and east were Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania, -whose military resources were on a considerable scale, -and whose neutrality was not a thing altogether to -be counted on, even before the Balkan war[<a id="chap0305fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn3">3</a>] had -lowered the prestige of Turkey. In addition there -was Italy, who although a pledged ally in a defensive -war was not likely, for that reason, to consider -herself bound to neutrality, benevolent or otherwise, -if in her judgment, the particular contingencies -which called for her support had not arisen at the -outset. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -SUPERIORITY OF GERMAN NUMBERS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -After taking such precautions as seemed prudent -under these heads, Germany would then be obliged -to detach for service, in co-operation with the -Austrians in Poland, and along the whole eastern -border, a sufficient number of army corps to secure -substantial superiority over the maximum forces -which Russia, hampered by an inadequate railway -system and various military considerations,[<a id="chap0305fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn4">4</a>] could -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P257"></a>257}</span> -be expected to bring into the field and maintain -there during the first few months of the war. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -It was reckoned[<a id="chap0305fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn5">5</a>] after taking all these things into -account, that Germany would have available, for the -invasion of France, an army consisting of some ninety -divisions—roughly, rather more than a million and -three-quarters of men—and that she could maintain -this force at its full strength—repairing the wastage of -war out of her ample reserves—for a period of at least -six months. It was assumed that the Kaiser, relying -upon the much slower mobilisation of Russia, would -undoubtedly decide to use the whole of this huge -force in the west, in the hope that before pressure -could begin to make itself felt in the east, France -would either have been crushed, as she was in 1870, -or so much mangled that it would be possible to send -reinforcements of an overwhelming character to -make victory secure in Poland. -</p> - -<p> -Against this German force of 1,800,000, France, -according to the best information available, could -put into the field and maintain at full strength for -a similar period of six months about 1,300,000 men. -But this was the utmost that could be expected of -the French, and the initial discrepancy of 500,000 -men was very serious. It precluded all reasonable -hope on their part of being able to take the offensive, -to which form of warfare the genius of the people -was most adapted. It would compel them to remain -on the defensive, for which it was believed at that -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P258"></a>258}</span> -time—though wrongly, as events have proved—that -they were ill suited by temperament as well as -tradition. -</p> - -<p> -If England joined in the war by land as well as -sea the numerical deficiency would be reduced to -340,000 on the arrival of our Expeditionary Force. -In this connection, as well as for other reasons, the -attitude of Holland and Belgium, and that of -Germany with respect to these two countries, were -clearly matters of high importance. -</p> - -<p> -Holland had a field army of four divisions, and -her interests could be summed up in the words, -'preservation of independence.' She would naturally -wish to avoid being actively embroiled in the war on -one side or the other; and, fortunately for her, she -had every reason to believe that her neutrality would -not be disturbed or questioned. Her territories lay -to one side of the probable campaign area, and -moreover, whatever might be the ulterior designs -of Germany with regard to western expansion, it was -obvious that her immediate interests must necessarily -lie in Dutch neutrality, which would be infinitely -more useful to her than a Dutch alliance. For -Holland holds the mouths of the Scheldt and Rhine, -and so long as she remained neutral, it was anticipated -that imports and exports would readily find their -way into and out of Germany. This advantage -would cease were Britain to establish a blockade of -these inlets, as she would certainly do if they belonged -to a hostile Power. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -POSITION OF BELGIUM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -In certain respects Belgium was in the same case -as Holland. She likewise had a field army of four -divisions, and her interests could be summed up in -the words, 'preservation of independence.' But -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P259"></a>259}</span> -here all resemblance between the two countries -ended. -</p> - -<p> -Belgium was not merely the southern portion -(Holland being the northern) of that Naboth's -vineyard, the possession of which German visionaries had -proclaimed to be essential to Teutonic world-power. -Belgium was more even than this. If the permanent -possession of Belgian territory was a political object -in the future, temporary occupation was no less a -military necessity of the present. For in order -that Germany might benefit in full measure by her -numerical superiority, Belgian roads and railways -were required, along which to transport her troops, -and Belgian hills and plains on which to deploy -them. If Germany were confined to the use of her -own frontiers she would not only lose in swiftness of -attack, but her legions would be piled up, one behind -another, like a crowd coming out of a theatre. She -needed space on which to spread out her superior -numbers in order that her superior numbers might -make certain of victory. -</p> - -<p> -There was an idea at this time (1911-12) that -Germany would be satisfied to keep to the south-east -of the fortified line of the Meuse—moving through -Luxemburg and the mountains of the Ardennes—and -that if Belgium saw fit to yield, under protest, to -<i>force majeure</i>, the northern region, containing the -great plain of Flanders and all cities of importance, -would be left inviolate. This theory was probably -erroneous, for the reason that—as the event has -shown—Germany required a greater space and more -favourable ground, than would have been provided -under this arrangement, in order to bring her great -superiority to bear. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P260"></a>260}</span> -</p> - -<p> -With the French on the other hand there was no -similar advantage to be gained by the violation of -Belgian neutrality. From their point of view the -shorter the battle front could be kept the better. -If Belgium chose to range herself by the side of France -as a willing ally it would undoubtedly be a great -gain; but if she chose to remain neutral the French -could have no object in invading or occupying her -territories. -</p> - -<p> -It was assumed, and no doubt rightly, that, like -Holland, Belgium would prefer to remain neutral—leaving -the question of future absorption to take care -of itself—provided she could do this without enduring -the humiliation of allowing foreign armies to violate -her soil. For she knew that, in the event of a French -victory, her independence would remain assured; -whereas, if the Germans were successful, she would -have avoided awakening their hostility and giving -them an excuse for annexation. But even if Belgium, -under gross provocation, were forced to take sides -against Germany, the deficit in numbers on the side -of the Triple Entente would only be reduced by some -eighty or a hundred thousand men. The deficit -would still stand, roughly, at a quarter of a million -men. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -INADEQUACY OF BRITISH ARMY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -In view of the foregoing considerations it was -clearly absurd to think that our own small force was -at all adequate, in a military sense, to deter Germany -from engaging in a war of aggression. Had we been -able, during the years 1912 to 1914, to see into the -minds of the German General Staff we should -probably have realised that this inadequacy was even -greater than it appeared. We should then have -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P261"></a>261}</span> -known that the numbers of the Kaiser's striking -force had been carefully understated; and that the -amount of preparations in the way of material had -been hidden away with an equal industry. We -should also have learned, that the sending of our -army abroad was viewed with scepticism in German -military circles, as an event hardly likely to occur. -But even if our Expeditionary Force did go, it was -altogether inadequate to redress the adverse balance; -still more inadequate to bring an immediate victory -within the range of practical possibility. It was -inadequate to hold back the premeditated invasion, -either at the German frontier, or even at the French -frontier. It was inadequate to make Belgian resistance -effective, even if that nation should determine -to throw in its lot with the Triple Entente. -</p> - -<p> -As a matter of the very simplest arithmetic our -land forces were inadequate for any of these purposes. -They were unequal to the task of maintaining the -balance of power by giving a numerical superiority -to the armies of the Triple Entente. Our armaments -therefore did not correspond with our policy. It -was clear that they would not be able to uphold that -policy if it were put to the supreme test of war. It -was impossible to abandon our policy. It was not -impossible, and it was not even in 1912 too late, -to have set about strengthening our armaments. -Nothing of the kind, however, was undertaken by the -Government, whose spokesmen, official and unofficial, -employed themselves more congenially in deriding -and rebuking Lord Roberts for calling attention to the -danger. -</p> - -<p> -Of course if it had been possible to place reliance -upon the statement of the English War Minister, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P262"></a>262}</span> -made little more than a year before war broke out,[<a id="chap0305fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn6">6</a>] -that every soldier under the voluntary system is -worth ten conscripts, we and our Allies would have -been in a position of complete security. In that case -our force of 160,000 would have been the equivalent -of 1,600,000 Germans, and we should from the first -have been in a superiority of more than a million -over our enemies. -</p> - -<p> -Even if we could have credited the more modest -assumption of the Attorney-General—made nearly -four months after war broke out—that one volunteer -was worth three 'pressed' men, the opposing forces -would have been somewhere about an equality.[<a id="chap0305fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn7">7</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Unfortunately both these methods of ready-reckoning -were at fault, except for their immediate purpose -of soothing, or deluding the particular audiences to -which they were addressed. The words were meaningless -and absurd in a military sense; though conceivably -they possessed some occult political virtue, and -might help, for a time at least, to avert the retribution -which is due to unfaithful stewards. -</p> - -<p> -Both these distinguished statesmen, as well as -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P263"></a>263}</span> -many of their colleagues and followers, were beset -by the error of false opposites. A soldier who has -enlisted voluntarily, and another who is a conscript -or 'pressed' man, have equally to fight their country's -enemies when they are ordered to do so. In both -cases the particular war may be against their -consciences and judgments; and their participation in it -may therefore be involuntary. -</p> - -<p> -Of two men—equal in age, strength, training, and -courage—one of whom believes his cause to be just, -while the other does not, there can be no doubt that -the former will fight better than the latter—even though -the latter was enlisted under the voluntary system -while the former was a conscript or 'pressed' man. In -this sense the superiority of the 'voluntary' principle -is incontestable. But is there any evidence to show, -that either the original soldiers, or the new levies, of the -German army are risking their lives in this war any -less willingly than our own countrymen, who went out -with the Expeditionary Force, or those others who -have since responded to Lord Kitchener's appeal? Is -there any reason to suppose that they are fighting -any less bravely and intelligently?[<a id="chap0305fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn8">8</a>] -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -Another matter of importance in these calculations -with regard to the military strength of the -Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance was the time -limit. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE THREE PERIODS OF WAR -</span> -</p> - -<p> -There are three periods in war. There is the -<i>onset</i> of war, where swiftness of action is what tells -most; there is the <i>grip</i> of war, where numbers of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P264"></a>264}</span> -trained men are what tell most; and there is the -<i>drag</i> of war, when what tells most is the purse. -</p> - -<p> -Speaking by the book, it is of course numbers -which tell all the way through. At the beginning—in -the <i>onset</i>—the aim is to hurl superior numbers -at a vital point—taking the enemy by surprise, -and thereby disordering his whole plan of campaign—very -much as you knock a limpet off a rock, with -a sharp unexpected blow. -</p> - -<p> -If this effort fails to settle matters, then we are -in the <i>grip</i>. Here it is a case of sheer heavy slogging -of all the available trained troops. The weaker side -is driven to the defensive. It is found making use of -every artificial and natural advantage to counteract -the superiority which threatens it, and which must -speedily prevail, if only it be superior enough. -</p> - -<p> -Finally, after a longer or shorter period of -indecisive deadlock, the time comes when trained -troops and material of war accumulated in advance -begin to run short—when new levies, raised since -the war broke out, begin to take the field, well or ill -equipped, well or ill armed, as the case may be. -When this stage is reached we are in the <i>drag</i> of -war; and the side which can best afford to feed, -clothe, and arm its fresh reinforcements stands at -an enormous advantage. -</p> - -<p> -In 1870 war was announced on July 15th, and -formally declared on the 19th. Three weeks later, -on August 6th, the important battles of Woerth and -Spicheren were won by the Germans. On September -2nd, the issue of the war was decided, when the -Emperor of the French, with his main army, -surrendered at Sedan. Metz fell in the last days of -October, and Paris on the first day of March in the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P265"></a>265}</span> -following year. In that war the <i>onset</i> settled -everything. There was no real <i>grip</i> of the opposing -forces. The German attack had been so swift, -vigorous, and successful that France was knocked -out in the first round. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -RESULTS OF SUCCESS IN ONSET -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The speed with which great armies can be mobilised -and hurled against one another has not diminished -in the forty odd years which have elapsed since the -<i>débâcle</i>. On the contrary, the art of war has been -largely concerned in the interval with the vital -question, how to get in the first deadly blow. -</p> - -<p> -The military view was, that probably not earlier -than the fifteenth day—certainly not later than the -twenty-first—a battle would take place which must -be of the highest importance, and which might quite -well be decisive. It might make ultimate German -victory only a matter of time; or it might only -determine whether the ensuing campaign was to be -waged on French or German soil—whether there -was to be a German invasion of France or a Franco-British -invasion of Germany. Consequently, if our -Expeditionary Force was to render assistance at the -critical time, it must reach its position on the frontier -within a fortnight of the outbreak of war. -</p> - -<p> -As to the <i>drag</i> of war, the Triple Entente had the -advantage, if that stage were ever reached. For the -purses of England, France, and Russia were much -longer than those of Germany and Austria. It was -important, however, to remember that there would -be no hope for us in the <i>drag</i> of war, if Germany -could deliver a heavy enough blow at the beginning, -as she did in 1870. -</p> - -<p> -These were the considerations as to time, which -presented themselves to students of the military -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P266"></a>266}</span> -situation during the breathing space which followed -upon the Agadir crisis. The substantial accuracy of -this forecast was confirmed by what happened during -August and September of last year. In 1914 war -was declared by Germany on August 1st. For several -days before she had been engaged actively in mobilisation. -Three weeks later three important battles—on -the road to Metz, at Charleroi, and at Mons[<a id="chap0305fn9text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn9">9</a>]—were -won by the Germans. If it had not been for the -unexpected obstacle of Liège the last two engagements -would in all probability have been fought at an even -earlier date, and in circumstances much more -unfavourable to the Franco-British forces. But in the -early days of September, instead of the crushing -defeat of Sedan, there was the victory of the Marne, -and the Germans were forced to retreat to entrenched -positions north of the Aisne.[<a id="chap0305fn10text"></a><a href="#chap0305fn10">10</a>] -</p> - -<p> -The <i>onset</i> period was ended; but the issue had -not been settled as in 1870. France and England had -not been knocked out in the first round. To this -extent the supreme German endeavour had miscarried. -Nevertheless a great advantage had been secured by -our enemies, inasmuch as it was now apparent that -the ensuing campaign—the <i>grip</i> of war—would be -contested, not on German soil, but in France and Belgium. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -LIMITATIONS OF SEA POWER -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The value of the assistance which the British -Navy would be able to render to the cause of the -Triple Entente was a consideration of the highest -importance. But while the fleet, if the national -confidence in it were justified, would render invaluable -assistance to military operations, it was necessary -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P267"></a>267}</span> -to bear in mind—what Englishmen in recent times -have been very apt to forget—that no success at sea, -whether it consisted in the wholesale destruction of -hostile ships, or in an absolute blockade of the enemy's -coast, could by itself determine the main issue of a -European contest of this character. Disaster in a -land battle could not be compensated for, nor could -the balance of power be maintained, by any naval -victory. War would not be brought to an end -favourable to the Triple Entente, even by a victory -as complete as that of Trafalgar. It is also well to -remember that peace came, not after Trafalgar, but -after Waterloo, nearly ten years later. -</p> - -<p> -The strange idea that the security of the British -Empire can be maintained by the Navy alone, seems -to be derived by a false process of reasoning, from -the undeniable truth, that the supremacy of our -Navy is essential to our security. But though it is -essential—and the first essential—it is not the only -essential of security. -</p> - -<p> -An insular Power, largely dependent on sea-borne -food supplies and raw materials for its industries—a -Power which governs an empire in the East, which -has dependencies scattered in every sea, which is -politically united with immense but sparsely peopled -dominions in the four quarters of the globe—must -keep command of the sea. If that supremacy were -once lost the British Empire, as an empire, would come -to an end. Its early dissolution would be inevitable. -Therefore it is true enough to say that if the German -Alliance—or any other alliance—were to win a -decisive naval victory against Britain, it would end the -war completely and effectively so far as we were -concerned. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P268"></a>268}</span> -</p> - -<p> -But the converse is not the case, and for obvious -reasons. In a contest with a continental enemy -who conquers on land, while we win victory after -victory at sea, the result will not be a settlement in -our favour, but a drawn issue. And the draw will -be to his advantage, not our own. For having -overthrown the balance of power by reason of his -successful campaign and invasions, he will then be -free to concentrate his whole energies upon wresting -away naval supremacy from the British Empire. In -time the Sea Power which is only a Sea Power will be -overborne with numbers, and finally worsted by the -victorious Land Power. For how is it possible to -fight with one hand against an enemy with two -hands? The fleets of Europe which at last must be -combined against us, if we allow any rival to obtain -a European predominance, are too heavy odds. -German preparations alone were already causing -us grave anxiety nearly three years before the Agadir -crisis occurred. How then could we hope to build -against the whole of Europe? Or even against -half of Europe, if the other half remained coldly -neutral? -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn1text">1</a>] In all about 160,000 men, of whom some 25,000 -were non-combatants. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn2text">2</a>] Such, for instance, as the fact that the -time-table of German mobilisation -appeared to be somewhat more rapid -than that of the French, and -much more so than that of the Russians. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn3text">3</a>] The first Balkan war broke out in the autumn of 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn4text">4</a>] Russia had anxieties of her own -with regard to the intentions of -Roumania, of Turkey in Persia and the -Caucasus, and of China and Japan -in the Far East. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn5text">5</a>] These calculations were worked out in various ways, -but the net -results arrived at were always substantially the same. -In view of the fact -that the main conclusions have been amply proved -by the results of the -present war, it does not seem worth while -to weary the reader with more -sums in arithmetic than are absolutely necessary. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn6text">6</a>] Colonel Seely at Heanor, April 26, 1913. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn7text">7</a>] Sir John Simon (Attorney-General -and a Cabinet Minister), at Ashton-under-Lyne, -November 21, 1914.... This speech is instructive reading. -It is also comforting for the assurance it contains, -that if the speaker approved -of our taking part in this war (as he vowed he did) -his audience might rest -satisfied that it was indeed a righteous war; -seeing that war was a thing which, -on principle, he (Sir John Simon) -very much reprehended. And yet we are -not wholly convinced and reassured. -There is a touch of over-emphasis—as -if perhaps, after all, the orator needed -the support of his own vehemence to -keep him reminded of the righteousness. -The pacifist in war-paint is apt -to overact the unfamiliar part. -One wonders from what sort of British -officer at the front the Attorney-General -had derived the impression that -'one' of our own voluntary soldiers—gallant -fellows though they are—is -the equal of 'three' of the Germans who face him, -or of the Frenchmen who -fight by his side.... -This speech puts us not a little in mind of <i>Evangelist's</i> -warning to <i>Christian</i>, with regard to <i>Mr. Legality's</i> -fluent promises to relieve -him of his burden—"There is nothing -in all this noise save a design to -beguile thee of thy salvation." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn8text">8</a>] Sir John Simon clinched his arithmetical -calculation of 'three' to -'one,' by stating that 'the Kaiser already knew it'; -and this reassuring -statement was received with -'laughter and cheers.' The laughter we can -understand. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn9"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn9text">9</a>] The battle in Northern Alsace -was fought on August 21 and 22. A -French army was driven back at Charleroi -on the 22nd, and the British at -Mons on the 23rd. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0305fn10"></a> -[<a href="#chap0305fn10text">10</a>] September 6-12. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0306"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P269"></a>269}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VI -<br /> -THE MILITARY SITUATION -</h3> - -<p class="t3"> -(August 1914) -</p> - -<p> -Such was the position of affairs at July 1911, -as it appeared to the eyes of people who—during the -ensuing period—endeavoured to arrive at an -understanding of the problem without regard to the -exigencies of party politics. Between that date -and July 1914, when war broke out, various changes -took place in the situation. The general effect of -these changes was adverse to Britain and her allies. -</p> - -<p> -In 1911 the German estimates provided for -considerable increases, especially in artillery and -machine-guns. The peace strength of the Army -was raised. -</p> - -<p> -In the following year, 1912, further additions -were made to the peace strength, and two new -army corps were formed out of existing units—one -for the Polish, the other for the French frontier. -Artillery and machine-guns were very greatly -increased in the ordinary estimates of that year, and -again in those of 1913. In addition, Germany at -the same time added a squadron to her fleet in -the North Sea, by arranging to keep more ships -permanently in commission. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P270"></a>270}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MILITARY INCREASES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -But early in 1913 it became known, that the -German Government was about to introduce an -Army Bill, providing for immense and sensational -additions. The sum of £50,000,000 was to be raised -by loan for initial expenditure. The increased -cost of upkeep on the proposed new establishment -would amount to £9,500,000 per annum. Sixty-three -thousand more recruits were to be taken each year. -The total peace strength of the Army was to be raised -by approximately 200,000 men. Nearly four millions -sterling was to be spent on aircraft, and ten and a -half on fortifications; while the war-chest was to be -raised from six to eighteen millions. Twenty-seven -thousand additional horses were to be purchased. -</p> - -<p> -These proposals were timed to take effect the same -autumn; so that by the following Midsummer (1914), -the military strength of Germany would have reaped -the main benefit which was anticipated from the -enormous additions. -</p> - -<p> -It was not in the power of France to increase the -actual total of her numbers, because for many years -past she had already taken every man who was -physically fit for military service. About eighty -per cent of the young Frenchmen who came each -year before the revision boards had been enlisted; -whereas in Germany—up to the passing of the new -Army Law—considerably less than fifty per cent had -been required to serve. The German Army as a -consequence was composed of picked men, while -the French Army contained a considerable proportion -who were inferior both in character and physique. -</p> - -<p> -But in the face of the new German menace France -had to do the best she could. She had to do it -alone, for the reason that the British Government -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P271"></a>271}</span> -entertained conscientious and insuperable objections -to bearing its due share of the burden. -</p> - -<p> -Already, prior to the sensational expansion of -Germany in 1913, France had endeavoured to counteract -the current yearly increases in the military estimates -of her neighbour, by various reorganisations and -regroupings of active units, and by improvements -calculated to improve the efficiency of the reserves. But -when information was forthcoming[<a id="chap0306fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0306fn1">1</a>] as to the nature -and extent of the developments proposed under the -German Army Bill of 1913, it was at once realised -that more drastic measures were essential to national -safety. -</p> - -<p> -Before the German projects were officially -announced, the French Government took the bold step -of asking the legislature to sanction a lengthening of -the period of active military service from two years to -three, and an extension of the age limit of the reserves -from forty-seven to forty-nine. Power was also taken -to summon, in case of emergency, the annual -contingent of recruits a year before their due time. -Increases in artillery, engineers, railways, barrack -accommodation, and subsidiary services were asked -for and obtained. The cost of these, when the whole -sum came to be calculated, was found to amount to -£32,000,000. -</p> - -<p> -Apart, therefore, from material preparations of -one kind and another, Germany was taking steps to -add 200,000 men to her striking force, and the -intentions of France were approximately the same. In the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P272"></a>272}</span> -case of Germany, however, the increases of strength -would be operative by Midsummer 1914, while with -France they would not take effect until two years later.[<a id="chap0306fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0306fn2">2</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Germany, moreover, was arranging to take 63,000 -more recruits annually. France was unable to obtain -any more recruits, as she already took all that were -fit to bear arms. The increase in her striking force -was made mainly at the expense of her reserves. -Year by year, therefore, the numerical inferiority of -France must become more marked. -</p> - -<p> -Russia meanwhile was proceeding with her -programme of military extension and reorganisation -which had been decided on after the Japanese war. -A great part of her expenditure was being devoted -to the improvement of her exceedingly defective -system of railways and communications, and to the -fortification of the Gulf of Finland. -</p> - -<p> -Austria did not remain stationary in military -preparations any more than her neighbours. Her -intake of recruits was 181,000 in 1912. It was -decided to raise it to 206,000 in 1913, and again to -216,000 in 1914. -</p> - -<p> -In the British Army, during this critical period, -there had of course been no increases, but the reverse. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P273"></a>273}</span> -</p> - -<p> -The Regular Forces, which had been, reduced in -1906 by nine battalions,[<a id="chap0306fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0306fn3">3</a>] were in 1914 some eight -thousand men under their nominal strength. The -Territorials, which had never yet reached the figure -postulated by their originator, were at this date -about 47,000 short. The Army Reserve was doomed -in the near future to an automatic shrinkage on a -considerable scale, owing to the reductions which had -been effected in the Regular Forces, from which the -reservists were drawn at the expiry of their terms -of service. -</p> - -<p> -Actually, therefore, the weakness of our own -military position had become more marked since -1911. Relatively it had undergone an even greater -change for the worse, owing to the stupendous -German programme, to the fact that we had lagged -behind in the matter of aircraft, and that our naval -preponderance was not so great as it had been three -years earlier. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -EFFECT OF BALKAN WARS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The events which occurred in the Turkish peninsula -between October 1912, when the first Balkan war -broke out, and August 1913, when the second was -ended by the Treaty of Bucharest, were not without -their bearing upon the general balance of power in -Europe. Turkey had collapsed before the onset of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P274"></a>274}</span> -the allied states of Montenegro, Servia, Bulgaria, -and Greece, and this was a serious injury to German -interests. The Ottoman Empire had been warmly -suitored, over a long period of years, by the diplomacy -of Berlin, with a view to co-operation in certain -contingencies. On the other hand, the result of the -second war—fomented by the intrigues of Vienna—in -which Bulgaria was finally overpowered by the other -three states, destroyed for the time being Slav -solidarity, and thereby considerably relieved the -apprehensions of Austria with regard to her southern -frontier and recently annexed provinces of Bosnia -and Herzegovina.... Profit-and-loss accounts of -this sort are impossible to work out upon an -arithmetical basis, and perhaps the chief importance of -such occurrences as these lies in the effect which they -produce upon the nerves of the onlookers. On the -whole—judging by the tone of diplomacy at the time—the -Balkan series of events appeared to have raised -greater anxieties in the Chancelleries of Germany and -Austria than in any other quarter; though why this -should have been so, it is difficult to understand. -</p> - -<p> -Looking back at the Balkan struggle in the light -of subsequent events, it appears to us now a great -deal less remarkable for what it actually produced -than for what it failed to produce. It failed to set -Europe in a blaze, and yet it afforded far better -opportunities for doing this than the Serajevo -murders in June 1914. -</p> - -<p> -The full inner history of the negotiations between -the Great Powers, for six months prior to the Treaty -of Bucharest, will be interesting reading, if it ever -sees the light. If even one of them had chosen to -work for war during this period, nothing could have -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P275"></a>275}</span> -kept the peace. If one or two of them had been -apathetic, war must inevitably have come of itself. -But even France—who at that time was showing -signs of superficial excitement, and on that account -was credited, not only in the German press, but in -a section of our own, with chauvinistic designs—worked -hard for peace. It is certain that Germany -desired peace; many well-informed people indeed -believed that at this time she desired peace more -ardently than any other state. It is true that a few -days before the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, -Italy had been secretly sounded by Austria as to -whether she would join with her two allies in making -an attack on Servia; but the Italian reply being of a -kind that took away all hope of securing the military -assistance of that country in the proposed adventure, -the Concert of Europe continued to perform the -pacific symphony apparently in perfect accord. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -GERMANY'S TWO DATES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The policy of Germany, in 1912 and 1913, to -preserve peace, and her efforts—equally successful—in -the following year to provoke war, were probably -due to one and the same cause. Two dates from -Germany's point of view were of supreme importance—<i>the -summer of 1914</i>, when her new military preparations -would be complete, and when the Kiel -Canal—having been widened and deepened[<a id="chap0306fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0306fn4">4</a>]—would -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P276"></a>276}</span> -be available for the passage of Dreadnoughts; <i>the -summer of 1916</i>, by which date the French Army -increases were due to take effect, and the Russian -scheme of military reorganisation would have been -carried through. From the point of view of Berlin -and Vienna war could be waged to greatest advantage -so soon as the first of these two dates had been -reached. If, however, Italy, always a doubtful -participator, could have been tempted by self-interest -to make common cause with her allies in the summer -of 1913, the certainty of her adherence would have -turned the scales in favour of the earlier date. For -Italy could put an army of 700,000 men into the -field; and this no doubt would have more than -compensated for the benefits which might have been -lost by anticipating the ideal moment by a year. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0306fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0306fn1text">1</a>] Germany took time by the forelock, -and began to carry through the -contemplated programme before disclosing -the terms of the Army Bill to -the legislature. Consequently her intentions -were known in a general way -to every Intelligence department in Europe, -long before they were actually -announced. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0306fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0306fn2text">2</a>] In going through the memoranda upon -which this chapter is based, I -came across a paper written at the end -of July 1913 by a retired soldier -friend, in answer to a request on my part -for certain technical information -as to French and German preparations. -On the margin of the document, -which gives a very full and able analysis, -he had added the following postscript as an expression -of his personal opinion. "<i>N.B.—Most Important</i>: -The German Bill takes immediate effect. -The French only takes effect -in 1916 because (1) the French are not -going to retain the class which -finishes its service this year with the colours; -(2) comparatively few are fit -for enrolment at twenty; -(3) there has been great delay in Parliament ... <i>A -year from now will be the critical time</i>. -Germany will have had the full -benefit from her Bill, whereas France -will have a mass of young recruits -still under instruction. -The strain on officers will be tremendous in order -to knock this mass of raw men into -shape." It is rarely that a prophecy -is fulfilled practically to a day. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0306fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0306fn3text">3</a>] Mr. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, -in justifying this reduction -explained that 'his infantry was in excess, -the artillery was deficient.' He -would rather not have cut off these -nine battalions, "but he could not use -them. He had four more than he could -mobilise" (Auchterarder, December 29, 1906). -In his view "the first step to doing -anything for developing the -national basis of the Army was -to cut something off the Regular Forces" -(Newcastle, September 15, 1906). -"He did not think Compulsory Training -would be adopted in this country -until after England had been invaded -once or twice" (London, December 1, 1911). -The British, however, had -the best reasons for feeling secure: -they "were always a nation of splendid -fighters. They were never ready, -but they fought the better the less -ready they were..." (Glasgow, January 6, 1912). -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0306fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0306fn4text">4</a>] On June 23, 1914, the Emperor William -opened the new lock at the -North Sea end of the Kiel Canal. -On the following day he performed the -same function at the Baltic end. -The <i>Times</i> correspondent remarks that -the Emperor's passage through the Canal -on this occasion was of symbolical -rather than practical significance, -as on the one hand German Dreadnoughts -had already used the widened passage -experimentally, while on the other -hand it would be a long time before -the whole work was finished. He -continues: "The extension works, -which were begun in 1907, are, however, -of vast importance, especially to the Navy. -The Canal has been -made two metres deeper, and has been doubled -in breadth. The places -at which large ships can pass one another -have been increased in number, -and at four of them Dreadnoughts can be turned. -There are now four, -instead of two, at each end, -which means a great saving of time in getting -a fleet through. Above all, -the distance between Kiel and Wilhelmshaven -for battleship purposes is reduced -from more than 500 to only 80 nautical -miles. The new locks at Brunsbüttel -and Holtenau are the largest in the -world."—The <i>Times</i>, June 25, 1914. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0307"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P277"></a>277}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VII -<br /> -A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS -</h3> - -<p> -It may be said—up to the very outbreak of war -it was said very frequently—that the mere power -and opportunity to make an outrageous attack are -nothing without the will to do so. And this is true -enough. Every barber who holds his client by the -nose could cut his throat as easily as shave his -chin. Every horse could kick the groom, who rubs -him down, into the next world if he chose to do -so. What sense, then, could there be in allowing -our minds to be disturbed by base suspicions of -our enterprising and cultured neighbour? What -iota of proof was there that Germany nourished -evil thoughts, or was brooding on visions of conquest -and rapine? -</p> - -<p> -So ran the argument of almost the whole Liberal -press; and a considerable portion of the Unionist -press echoed it. Warnings were not heeded. They -came only from unofficial quarters, and therefore -lacked authority. Only the Government could have -spoken with authority; and the main concern of -members of the Government, when addressing -parliamentary or popular audiences, appeared to be to -prove that there was no need for anxiety. They -went further in many instances, and denounced -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P278"></a>278}</span> -those persons who ventured to express a different -opinion from this, as either madmen or malefactors. -Nevertheless a good deal of proof had already -been published to the world—a good deal more was -known privately to the British Government—all of -which went to show that Germany had both the -will and intention to provoke war, if a favourable -opportunity for doing so should present itself. -</p> - -<p> -For many years past—in a multitude of books, -pamphlets, leading articles, speeches, and university -lectures—the Germans had been scolding us, and -threatening us with attack at their own chosen -moment. When Mr. Churchill stated bluntly, in -1912, that the German fleet was intended as a challenge -to the British Empire, he was only repeating, in -shorter form and more sober language, the boasts -which had been uttered with yearly increasing -emphasis and fury, by hundreds of German patriots -and professors. -</p> - -<p> -With an engaging candour and in every fount of -type, unofficial Germany had made it abundantly -clear how she intended to carry her designs into -execution—how, first of all, France was to be crushed by a -swift and overwhelming attack—how Russia was then -to be punished at leisure—how after that, some of the -nations of Europe were to be forced into an alliance -against the British Empire, and the rest into a -neutrality favourable to Germany—how finally the -great war, which aimed at making an end of our -existence, was to begin. And though, from time to -time, there were bland official utterances which -disavowed or ignored these outpourings, the outpourings -continued all the same. And each year they became -more copious, and achieved a readier sale. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P279"></a>279}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Those, however, who were responsible for British -policy appear to have given more credit to the -assurances of German diplomacy than to this mass -of popular incitement. The British nation has -always chosen to plume itself upon the fact that the -hearts of British statesmen are stronger than their -heads; and possibly their amiable credulity, in the -present instance, might have been forgiven, had -their means of ascertaining truth been confined to -the statements of incontinent publicists and responsible -statesmen. But there were other proofs available -besides words of either sort. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE FIRST WARNING -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The Liberal Government came into office in the -autumn of 1905. Ministers can hardly have had -time to master the contents of their various -portfolios, before German aggression burst rudely in -upon them. Conceivably the too carefully calculating -diplomatists of Berlin had concluded, that the -principles of the new Cabinet would tend to keep England -neutral under any provocation, and that a heaven-sent -opportunity had therefore arrived for proceeding -with the first item in their programme by crushing -France. It is a highly significant fact that early in -1906, only a few months after Sir Henry -Campbell-Bannerman's advent to power, he found himself -faced with the prospect of a European war, which -was only averted when our Foreign Minister made it -clear to Germany, that in such an event this country -would range herself upon the side of France.[<a id="chap0307fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn1">1</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P280"></a>280}</span> -</p> - -<p> -This was the <i>first</i> warning. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE SECOND WARNING -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The British answer to it was to utter renewed -protestations Of friendly confidence. As an earnest of -our good intentions, the shipbuilding programme[<a id="chap0307fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn2">2</a>] of -the previous Government was immediately reduced. -The burden of armaments became the burden -of innumerable speeches. In well-chosen words -Germany was coaxed and cajoled to acquiesce in -our continued command of the sea; but finding in our -action or inaction an opportunity for challenging it, -she turned a polite ear—but a deaf one—and pushed -forward her preparations with redoubled speed. In -vain did we on our part slow down work at our new -naval base in the Firth of Forth. In vain did we -reduce our slender army to even smaller dimensions.[<a id="chap0307fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn3">3</a>] In -vain did we plead disinterestedly with Germany, -for a reduction in the pace of competition in naval -armaments, on the terms that we should be allowed -to possess a fleet nearly twice as strong as her -own. For the most part, during this period, official -Germany remained discreetly silent, for the reason -that silence served her purpose best; but when the -persistency of our entreaties made some sort of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P281"></a>281}</span> -answer necessary, we were given to understand by -unofficial Germany—rather roughly and gruffly—that -a certain class of requests was inadmissible as -between gentlemen. -</p> - -<p> -Then suddenly, having up to that time lulled -ourselves into the belief that our fine words had -actually succeeded in buttering parsnips, we -awoke—in the late autumn of 1908—to the truth, and fell -immediately into a fit of panic. Panic increased -during the winter and following spring, and -culminated during the summer, in an Imperial Defence -Conference with the Dominions. -</p> - -<p> -We had curtailed our shipbuilding programme -and slowed down our preparations. Thereby we -had hoped to induce Germany to follow suit. But -the effect had been precisely the opposite: she had -increased her programme and speeded up her -preparations. At last our Government became alive -to what was going on, and in tones of reverberant -anxiety informed an astonished nation that the naval -estimates called for large additions. -</p> - -<p> -Ministers, indeed, were between the devil and the -deep sea. The supremacy of the British Fleet was -menaced; the conscience of the Radical party was -shocked—shocked not so much at the existence of the -menace as at official recognition of it, and at the -cost of insuring against it. It was so much shocked, -indeed, that it took refuge in incredulity; and—upon -the strength of assurances which were of course -abundantly forthcoming from the German Admiralty, -who averred upon their honour that there had -been neither addition nor acceleration—roundly -accused its own anointed ministers of bearing false -witness against an innocent neighbour. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P282"></a>282}</span> -</p> - -<p> -None the less, large sums were voted, and the -Dominions came forward with generous contributions. -</p> - -<p> -Sir Wilfrid Laurier, indeed, who had been nourished -and brought up on a diet of dried phrases, was -sceptical. To this far-sighted statesman there appeared -to be no German menace either then or subsequently. -The whole thing was a mere nightmare, -disturbing the innocent sleep of Liberalism and -democracy.[<a id="chap0307fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn4">4</a>] -</p> - -<p> -This was the <i>second</i> warning. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE THIRD WARNING -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The <i>third</i> warning came in the form of subterranean -rumblings, inaudible to the general public, but clearly -heard by ministerial ears. -</p> - -<p> -In July 1909, while the Imperial Conference on -Defence was in session, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg -succeeded Prince Bülow as German Chancellor. Up -to that time there had been the menace of the -mailed fist, the rattling sabre, and the shining -armour. Henceforward there was the additional -menace of a diplomacy playing for time, with a -careless and unconcealed contempt for the intelligence, -the courage, and the honour of the British -people and their statesmen.[<a id="chap0307fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn5">5</a>] The German Government -had clearly formed the opinion that our -ministers were growing more and more afraid of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P283"></a>283}</span> -asking their party to support increased naval -estimates, and that it was only necessary to go on, -alternately dangling and withdrawing illusory -proposals for a naval understanding and a general -agreement, in order to steal ahead of us in the race. -Here, as in many other instances, the Germans had -observed not altogether incorrectly; but they had -drawn the wrong inference from the facts. -</p> - -<p> -During the summer and autumn of 1910 was held -the famous but futile Constitutional Conference, the -primary object of which was to settle the quarrel -between the two Houses of Parliament. With -steadily increasing clumsiness, German diplomacy, -through all this anxious time, was engaged in holding -out its hand and withdrawing it again; until even -men whose minds were worried with more immediate -cares, could no longer ignore the gravity of the -situation. -</p> - -<p> -The Conference adjourned for the holiday season, -but resumed its sessions in October. The public -assurances of those who took part in it on both sides -agree in this, that nothing except the special subject -for which it had been called into existence was ever -discussed at its meetings. But many other things -were certainly discussed outside its meetings—on -the doorstep and the staircase, and in the -anterooms. Among these topics the dangers of the -international situation, and the peril of imperial -security were the chief. -</p> - -<p> -In October and November 1910 there was a great -secret of Polichinelle. Conceivably we may learn -from some future historian even more about it than -we knew at the time. All that need be said here -with reference to the matter is, that many persons on -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P284"></a>284}</span> -both sides found themselves faced with a position of -affairs, where the security of the country plainly -required measures for its defence, of a character -and upon a scale, which neither political party could -hope to carry through Parliament and commend to -the country, unless it were supported by the more -responsible section of its opponents. -</p> - -<p> -Neither party, however, was willing to pay the -price necessary for the support of the other, and -as a consequence imperial interests suffered. It is -not necessary, however, to conclude from this lamentable -failure that a sordid spirit of faction was the -explanation. In the constitutional sphere certain -principles were in conflict, which the parties -concerned had the honesty to hold by, but lacked the -sympathy, and possibly the intelligence, to adjust. -The acrimony of an immediate controversy distorted -the vision of those engaged in it; so that the -proportions of domestic and foreign dangers were -misjudged. -</p> - -<p> -The failure of this constitutional conference was -welcomed at the time by exultant shoutings among -many, perhaps the majority, of the rank and file of -politicians upon both sides. It was not so regarded, -however, by the country, which in a remarkable -degree refused to respond to the incitements of -violence and hatred with which it was plied during -the ensuing election. There was at this time, for no -very definite reason, a widespread popular uneasiness, -and something approaching a general disgust with -politicians. -</p> - -<p> -Among more considerate men on both sides, the -breakdown was frankly spoken of as one of the great -calamities in our political history. It was more -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P285"></a>285}</span> -than that. It was in reality one of the greatest which -have ever befallen Europe. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE FOURTH WARNING -</span> -</p> - -<p> -During the following July (1911), while in this -country we were deeply engaged in the bitter climax -of the constitutional struggle, there sounded a <i>fourth</i> -strident warning from the gong of the German -Chancellery. -</p> - -<p> -The Agadir incident is one of the strangest which -have occurred in British history during recent years. -Its full gravity was not realised outside a very narrow -circle at the time of its occurrence; and when -subsequently it became more widely understood there was -a curious conspiracy to hush it up—or, perhaps, not -so much a conspiracy, as a general instinct of -concealment—a spontaneous gesture of modesty—as if -the British nation had been surprised bathing. -</p> - -<p> -At the beginning of July the German cruiser -<i>Panther</i> appeared at Agadir in Morocco. This visit -was intended and understood as a direct challenge -to France. Diplomacy was immediately in a stir. -</p> - -<p> -Three weeks later Mr. Lloyd George spoke at the -Mansion House, making it clear that England would -not tolerate this encroachment. Even amid the -anger and excitement which attended the last stages -of the Parliament Bill, this statement created a deep -impression throughout the country, and a still deeper -impression in other countries. -</p> - -<p> -Then the crisis appeared to fade away. Germany -was supposed to have become amenable. We returned -to our internecine avocations. The holiday -season claimed its votaries, and a great railway strike -upset many of their best-laid plans. The inhabitants -of the United Kingdom are accustomed to think -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P286"></a>286}</span> -only on certain topics during August and September, -and it is hard to break them of their habits. To -reconsider a crisis which had arisen and passed away -some two and a half months earlier, was more than -could be expected of us when we returned to work -in the autumn. -</p> - -<p> -But Mr. Lloyd George's speech was capable of -only one interpretation,—if Germany had persisted -in her encroachment, this country would have gone -to war in August or September 1911 in support of -France. His words had no other meaning, and every -highly placed soldier and sailor was fully aware of -this fact, and made such preparations in his own -sphere as the case required. But from what has -transpired subsequently, it does not seem at all clear -that more than two or three of the Cabinet in the -least realised what was happening. Parliament did -not understand the situation any more than the -country did. -</p> - -<p> -Later on, when people had time to concentrate -their minds on such matters, there was a thrill -of post-dated anxiety—a perturbation and -disapproval; criticism upon various points; a -transference of Mr. McKenna from the Admiralty to the -Home Office, and of Mr. Churchill from the Home -Office to the Admiralty. Indignant anti-militarists, -supporters for the most part of the Government, -allowed themselves to be mysteriously reduced -to silence. Business men, who had been shocked -when they learned the truth, suffered themselves to -be persuaded that even the truth must be taken -with a pinch of salt. There was, in fact, a sort of -general agreement that it was better to leave the -summer embers undisturbed, lest a greater conflagration -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P287"></a>287}</span> -might ensue. The attitude of the orthodox -politician was that of a nervous person who, hearing, -as he imagines, a burglar in his bedroom, feels happier -and safer when he shuts his eyes and pulls the blankets -over his head. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE FIFTH WARNING -</span> -</p> - -<p> -A few months later, at the beginning of the -following year (1912), the <i>fifth</i> warning of the series -was delivered. -</p> - -<p> -It differed from its predecessors inasmuch as it -was addressed to the ears of the British Government -alone. Neither the Opposition nor the country heard -anything of it until more than two years later—until -the battles of Alsace, of Charleroi, and of Mons had -been lost—until the battle of the Marne had been -won—until the British Army was moving north to take up -a position in Flanders. Then we learned that, when -Lord Haldane had visited Berlin in the month of -February 1912, he had done so at the special request -of the Kaiser, in order to consider how Anglo-German -misunderstandings might be removed. -</p> - -<p> -Lord Haldane would have acted more wisely had -he stopped his journey <i>en route</i>, and never entered -Berlin at all. For, two days before the date appointed -for his visit, proposals for large increases of the -German Army and Navy were laid before the -Reichstag. His mission was to abate competition in -armaments, and here was an encouraging beginning! -Was it contempt, or insolence, or a design to overawe -the supposed timidity of the emissary; or was it -merely a blundering effort to steal a march in -the negotiations by facing the ambassador on his -arrival with a <i>fait accompli</i>? Possibly it was a -combination of all these; but at any rate it was -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P288"></a>288}</span> -exceedingly clumsy, and no less significant than -clumsy. -</p> - -<p> -As to the mission—Germany was willing in a -vague way to 'retard'—whatever that may -mean—though not to abandon, or reduce, her naval -programme, providing the British Government would -agree to remain neutral in any war which Germany -might choose to wage. France might be crushed -and Belgium annexed; but in either event England -must stand aside and wait her turn. On no other -terms would the Kaiser consent to a <i>rapprochement</i> -with this country, or allow the blessed words -'retardation of the naval programme' to be uttered -by official lips. -</p> - -<p> -An undertaking of this tenor went beyond those -assurances of non-aggressive intent which Lord -Haldane, on behalf of his own Government, was -fully prepared to give. We would not be a party -to any unprovoked attack on Germany—was not -that sufficient? It was plainly insufficient. It was -made clear that Germany desired a free hand to -establish herself in a position of supremacy astride -of Europe. So Lord Haldane returned profitless -from his wayfaring, and the British Government was -at its wits' end how to placate the implacable. -</p> - -<p> -The way they chose was well-doing, in which -they wearied themselves perhaps overmuch, especially -during the Balkan negotiations. For Germany did -not want war at that time, for the reasons which -have been given already. And so, rather surlily, and -with the air of one who was humouring a crank—a -pusillanimous people whose fixed idea was -pacifism—she consented that we should put ourselves to -vast trouble to keep the peace for her benefit. If -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P289"></a>289}</span> -war had to come in the end, it had much better have -come then—so far as we were concerned—seeing -that the combined balance of naval and military -power was less unfavourable to the Triple Entente -at the beginning of 1913 than it was some fifteen -months later.... This was all the notice we took -of the fifth warning. We earned no gratitude by -our activities, nor added in any way thereby to our -own safety. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE HALDANE MISSION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The Haldane mission is a puzzle from first to last. -The Kaiser had asked that he should be sent.... -For what purpose? ... Apparently in order to -discuss the foreign policy of England and Germany. -But surely the Kaiser should have been told that we -kept an Ambassador at Berlin for this very purpose; -an able man, habituated to stand in the strong -sunlight of the imperial presence without losing his -head; but, above all, qualified to converse on such -matters (seeing that they lay within his own province) -far better than the most profound jurist in Christendom. -Or if our Ambassador at Berlin could not say -what was required, the German Ambassador in London -might easily have paid a visit to Downing Street; -or the Foreign Ministers of the two countries might -have arranged a meeting; or even the British Premier -and the German Chancellor might have contrived to -come together. Any of these ways would have been -more natural, more proper, more likely (one would -think) to lead to business, than the way which was -followed. -</p> - -<p> -One guesses that the desire of the Kaiser that -Lord Haldane should be sent, was met half-way by -the desire of Lord Haldane to go forth; that there -was some temperamental affinity between these -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P290"></a>290}</span> -two pre-eminent characters—some attraction of -opposites, like that of the python and the rabbit. -</p> - -<p> -Whatever the reasons may have been for this -visit, the results of it were bad, and indeed disastrous. -To have accepted the invitation was to fall into a -German trap; a trap which had been so often set -that one might have supposed it was familiar to -every Foreign Office in Europe! Berlin has long -delighted in these extra-official enterprises, -undertaken behind the backs of accredited representatives. -Confidences are exchanged; explanations are offered -'in the frankest spirit'; sometimes understandings -of a kind are arrived at. But so far as Germany is -concerned, nothing of all this is binding, unless her -subsequent interests make it desirable that it should -be. The names of the irregular emissaries, German, -British, and cosmopolitan, whom the Kaiser has -sent to London and received at Berlin—unbeknown -to his own Foreign Office—since the beginning of his -reign, would fill a large and very interesting visitors' -book. One would have imagined that even so early -as February 1912 this favourite device had been found -out and discredited even in Downing Street. -</p> - -<p> -Lord Haldane was perhaps even less well fitted -for such an embassy by temperament and habit of -mind, than he was by position and experience. -Lawyer-statesmanship, of the modern democratic -sort, is of all forms of human agency the one least -likely to achieve anything at Potsdam. The British -emissary was tireless, industrious, and equable. -His colleagues, on the other hand, were overworked, -indolent, or flustered. Ready on the shortest notice -to mind everybody else's business, he was allowed -to mind far too much of it; and he appears to have -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P291"></a>291}</span> -minded most of it rather ill than well. He was no -more suited to act for the Foreign Office than King -Alfred was to watch the housewife's cakes. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE HALDANE MISSION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The man whose heart swells with pride in his own -ingenuity usually walks all his life in blinkers. It is -not surprising that Lord Haldane's visit to the Kaiser -was a failure, that it awoke distrust at the time, or -that it opened the way to endless misrepresentation in -the future. What surprises is his stoicism; that he -should subsequently have shown so few signs of -disappointment, distress, or mortification; that he -should have continued up to the present moment to -hold himself out as an expert on German psychology;[<a id="chap0307fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn6">6</a>] -that he should be still upheld by his journalistic -admirers, to such an extent that they even write -pamphlets setting out to his credit 'what he did to -thwart Germany.'[<a id="chap0307fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn7">7</a>] -</p> - -<p> -We have been told by Mr. Asquith,[<a id="chap0307fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn8">8</a>] what was -thought by the British Government of the outcome -of Lord Haldane's embassy. We have also been -informed by Germany, what was thought of it by -high officials at Berlin; what inferences they drew -from these conversations; what hopes they founded -upon them. We do not know, however, what was -thought of the incident by the other two members -of the Entente; how it impressed the statesmen of -Paris and Petrograd; for they must have known -of the occurrence—the English representative not -being one whose comings and goings would easily -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P292"></a>292}</span> -escape notice. The British people were told nothing; -they knew nothing; and therefore, naturally enough, -they thought nothing about the matter. -</p> - -<p> -The British Cabinet—if Mr. Asquith's memory is -to be relied on—saw through the devilish designs of -Germany so soon as Lord Haldane, upon his return, -unbosomed himself to the conclave in quaking -whispers. We know from the Prime Minister, that -when he heard how the Kaiser demanded a free hand -for European conquests, as the price of a friendly -understanding with England, the scales dropped -from his eyes, and he realised at once that this merely -meant the eating of us up later. But one cannot -help wondering, since Mr. Asquith was apparently -so clear-sighted about the whole matter, that he -made no preparations whatsoever—military, financial, -industrial, or even naval (beyond the ordinary -routine)—against an explosion which—the mood and -intentions of Germany being what they were now -recognised to be—might occur at any moment. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -COST OF AMATEUR DIPLOMACY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -As to what Germany thought of the incident we -know of course only what the high personages at -Berlin have been pleased to tell the world about -their 'sincere impressions.' They have been very -busy doing this—hand upon heart as their wont -is—in America and elsewhere. According to their own -account they gathered from Lord Haldane's mission -that the British Government and people were very -much averse from being drawn into European -conflicts; that we now regretted having gone quite -so far as we had done in the past, in the way of -entanglements and understandings; that while we -could not stand by, if any other country was being -threatened directly on account of arrangements it -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P293"></a>293}</span> -had come to with England, England certainly was -by no means disposed to seek officiously for -opportunities of knight-errantry. In simple words the -cases of Tangier and Agadir were coloured by a -special obligation, and were to be distinguished -clearly from anything in the nature of a general -obligation or alliance with France and Russia. -</p> - -<p> -It is quite incredible that Lord Haldane ever said -anything of this kind; for he would have been four -times over a traitor if he had—to France; to -Belgium; to his own country; also to Germany -whom he would thus have misled. It is also all -but incredible that a single high official at Berlin -ever understood him to have spoken in this sense. -But this is what the high officials have assured -their own countrymen and the whole of the neutral -world that they did understand; and they have -called piteously on mankind to witness, how false -the British Government was to an honourable -understanding, so soon as trouble arose in July -last with regard to Servia. Such are some of the -penalties we have paid for the luxury of indulging -in amateur diplomacy. -</p> - -<p> -The German bureaucracy, however, always presses -things too far. It is not a little like Fag in <i>The -Rivals</i>—"whenever it draws on its invention for a -good current lie, it always forges the endorsements -as well as the bill." As a proof that the relations of -the two countries from this time forward were of the -best, inferences have been drawn industriously by -the high officials at Berlin as to the meaning and -extent of Anglo-German co-operation during the -Balkan wars; as to agreements with regard to Africa -already signed, but not published, in which Downing -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P294"></a>294}</span> -Street had shown itself 'surprisingly accommodating'; -as to other agreements with regard to the Baghdad -Railway, the Mesopotamian oil-fields, the navigation -of the Tigris, and access through Basra to the Persian -Gulf. These agreements, the earnest of a new -<i>entente</i> between the Teuton nations—the United -States subsequently to be welcomed in—are alleged -to have been already concluded, signed and awaiting -publication when war broke out.[<a id="chap0307fn9text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn9">9</a>] Then trouble -arises in Servia; a mere police business—nothing -more—which might have been settled in a few days -or at any rate weeks, if perfidious Albion had not -seized the opportunity to work upon Muscovite -suspicions, in order to provoke a world-war for which -she had been scheming all the time! -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE SIXTH WARNING -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The <i>sixth</i> warning was the enormous German -Army Bill and the accompanying war loan of 1913. -By comparison, the five previous warnings were but -ambiguous whispers. And yet this last reverberation -had apparently no more effect upon the British -Government than any of the rest. -</p> - -<p> -With all these numerous premonitions the puzzle -is, how any government could have remained in -doubt as to the will of Germany to wage war whenever -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P295"></a>295}</span> -her power seemed adequate and the opportunity -favourable for winning it. The favourite plea that -the hearts of Mr. Asquith and his colleagues were -stronger than their heads does not earn much respect. -Knowing what we do of them in domestic politics, -this excuse would seem to put the quality of their -heads unduly low. The true explanation of their -omissions must be sought elsewhere than in their -intellects and affections. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -It is important to remember that none of the -considerations which have been set out in this chapter -can possibly have been hidden from the Foreign -Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, the Prime -Minister, the Committee of Imperial Defence, or -the inner or outer circles of the Cabinet. Important -papers upon matters of this kind go the round -of the chief ministers. Unless British public -offices have lately fallen into a state of more -than Turkish indolence, of more than German -miscalculation, it is inconceivable that the true -features of the situation were not laid before ministers, -dinned into ministers, proved and expounded to -ministers, by faithful officials, alive to the dangers -which were growing steadily but rapidly with each -succeeding year. And although we may only surmise -the vigilant activity of these subordinates, we do -actually know, that Mr. Asquith's Government was -warned of them, time and again, by other persons -unconcerned in party politics and well qualified to -speak. -</p> - -<p> -But supposing that no one had told them, they -had their own wits and senses, and these were surely -enough. A body of men whose first duty is the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P296"></a>296}</span> -preservation of national security—who are trusted to -attend to that task, paid for performing it, honoured -under the belief that they do attend to it and perform -it—cannot plead, in excuse for their failure, that no -one had jogged their elbows, roused them from their -slumbers or their diversions, and reminded them of -their duty. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -INACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Mr. Asquith and his chief colleagues must have -realised the interdependence of policy and -armaments; and they must have known, from the year -1906 onwards, that on the military side our armaments -were utterly inadequate to maintain our policy. -They must have known that each year, force of -circumstances was tending more and more to -consolidate the Triple Entente into an alliance, as the -only means of maintaining the balance of power, -which was a condition both of the freedom of Europe -and of British security. They knew—there can be -no doubt on this point—what an immense numerical -superiority of armed forces Germany and Austria -together could bring, first against France at the -<i>onset</i> of war, and subsequently, at their leisure, -against Russia during the <i>grip</i> of war. They -knew that a British Expeditionary Army of 160,000 -men would not make good the difference—would -come nowhere near making good the difference. -They must have known that from the point of view -of France and Belgium, the special danger of modern -warfare was the crushing rapidity of its opening -phase. They must have been kept fully informed -of all the changes which were taking place in the -military situation upon the continent to the -detriment of the Triple Entente. They had watched the -Balkan war and measured its effects. They knew -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P297"></a>297}</span> -the meanings of the critical dates—1914-1916—better, -we may be sure, than any section of their -fellow-countrymen. And even although they might -choose to disregard, as mere jingoism, all the boasts -and denunciations of German journalists and -professors, they must surely have remembered the events -which preceded the conference at Algeciras, and -those others which led up to the Defence Conference -of 1909. They can hardly have forgotten the -anxieties which had burdened their hearts during -the autumn of 1910. Agadir cannot have been -forgotten; the memory of Lord Haldane's rebuff was -still green; and the spectre of the latest German Army -Bill must have haunted them in their dreams. -</p> - -<p> -There is here no question of being wise after the -event. The meaning of each of these things in turn -was brought home to the Prime Minister and his -chief colleagues as it occurred—firstly, we may be -sure, by their own intelligence—secondly, we may -be equally sure, by the reports of their responsible -subordinates—thirdly, by persons of knowledge and -experience, who had no axe to grind or interest to -serve. -</p> - -<p> -It is therefore absurd to suppose that ministers -could have failed to realise the extent of the danger, -or of our unpreparedness to meet it, unless they -had purposely buried their heads in the sand. They -knew that they had not a big enough army, and -that this fact might ruin their whole policy. Why -did they never say so? Why, when Lord Roberts -said so, did they treat him with contumely, and -make every effort to discredit him? Why was -nothing done by them during their whole period of -office to increase the Army and thereby diminish the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P298"></a>298}</span> -numerical superiority of their adversaries. On the -contrary, they actually reduced the Army, assuring -the country that they had no use for so many trained -soldiers. Moreover, the timidity or secretiveness of -the Government prevented England from having, -what is worth several army corps, and what proved -the salvation of France—a National Policy, fully -agreed and appealing to the hearts and consciences of -the whole people. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The answers to these questions must be sought -in another sphere. The political situation was one -of great perplexity at home as well as abroad, and -its inherent difficulties were immeasurably increased -by the character and temperament of Mr. Asquith, -by the nature no less of his talents than of his -defects. The policy of wait-and-see is not necessarily -despicable. There are periods in which it has -been the surest wisdom and the truest courage; but -this was not one of those periods, nor was there -safety in dealing either with Ireland or with Germany -upon this principle. When a country is fully prepared -it can afford to wait and see if there will be a -war; but not otherwise. -</p> - -<p> -Sir Edward Grey is a statesman whose integrity -and disinterestedness have never been impugned by -friend or foe; but from the very beginning of his -tenure of office he has appeared to lack that supreme -quality of belief in himself which stamps the greatest -foreign ministers. He has seemed at times to hesitate, -as if in doubt whether the dangers which he foresaw -with his mind's eye were realities, or only nightmares -produced by his own over-anxiety. We have a -feeling also that in the conduct of his office he had -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P299"></a>299}</span> -played too lonely a part, and that such advice and -sympathy as he had received were for the most part -of the wrong sort. What he needed in the way of -counsel and companionship was simplicity and resolution. -What he had to rely on was the very reverse -of this. -</p> - -<p> -Lord Haldane, as we have learned recently, shared -largely in the work of the Foreign Office; a man -of prodigious industry, but over-ingenious, and of -a self-complacency which too readily beguiled him -into the belief that there was no opponent who could -not be satisfied, no obstacle which could not be made -to vanish—by argument. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -SIR EDWARD GREY'S DIFFICULTIES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Moreover, Sir Edward Grey had to contend -against enemies within his own household. In the -Liberal party there was a tradition, which has never -been entirely shaken off, that all increase of -armaments is provocative, and that all foreign -engagements are contrary to the public interest. After the -Agadir crisis he was made the object of a special -attack by a large and influential section of his own -party and press, and was roundly declared to be no -longer possible as Foreign Minister.[<a id="chap0307fn10text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn10">10</a>] There can be -no doubt that the attempt to force Sir Edward Grey's -resignation in the winter 1911-1912 was fomented -by German misrepresentation and intrigue, skilfully -acting upon the peculiar susceptibilities of radical -fanaticism. Nor is there any doubt that the attacks -which were made upon the policy of Mr. Churchill, -from the autumn of 1912 onwards, were fostered by -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P300"></a>300}</span> -the same agency, using the same tools, and aiming -at the same objects. -</p> - -<p> -The orthodoxy of Mr. Churchill was suspect on -account of his Tory ancestry and recent conversion; -that of Sir Edward Grey on the ground that he was -a country gentleman, bred in aristocratic traditions, -trained in Foreign Affairs under the dangerous -influences of Lord Rosebery, and therefore incapable -of understanding the democratic dogma that loving-kindness -will conquer everything, including Prussian -ambitions. -</p> - -<p> -Surely no very vivid imagination is needed to -penetrate the mystery of Cabinet discussions on -defence for several years before war broke out. -Behind the Cabinet, as the Cabinet well knew, was a -party, one half of which was honestly oblivious of all -danger, while the other half feared the danger much -less than it hated the only remedy. Clearly the bulk of -the Cabinet was in cordial sympathy either with one or -other of these two sections of their party. Sir Edward -Grey accordingly had to defend his policy against -an immense preponderance of settled convictions, -political prejudices, and personal interests. And -at the same time he seems to have been haunted -by the doubt lest, after all, his fears were only -nightmares. Mr. Churchill, there is no difficulty in seeing, -must have fought very gallantly; but always, for -the reason already given, with one hand tied behind -his back. He had all his work cut out to maintain -the Navy, which was under his charge, in a state of -efficiency; and this upon the whole he succeeded in -doing pretty efficiently.[<a id="chap0307fn11text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn11">11</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P301"></a>301}</span> -</p> - -<p> -If we may argue back from public utterances to -Cabinet discussions, it would appear that the only -assistance—if indeed it deserved such a name—which -was forthcoming to these two, proceeded from -Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane. The former was by -temperament opposed to clear decisions and vigorous -action. The latter—to whom the mind of Germany -was as an open book—bemused himself, and seems -to have succeeded in bemusing his colleagues to -almost as great an extent. -</p> - -<p> -In fancy, we can conjure up a scene which -must have been enacted, and re-enacted, very often -at Number 10 Downing Street in recent years. We -can hear the warnings of the Foreign Minister, the -urgent pleas of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the -scepticism, indifference, or hostility expressed by the -preponderant, though leaderless, majority in the -Cabinet. <i>Simple</i> said, <i>I see no danger</i>; <i>Sloth</i> said, -<i>Yet a little more sleep</i>; and <i>Presumption</i> said, <i>Every -Vat must stand upon his own bottom</i>.... We can -almost distinguish the tones of their Right Honourable -voices. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -EXCESSIVE TIMIDITY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The situation was governed by an excessive -timidity—by fear of colleagues, of the caucus, of the -party, and of public opinion—by fear also of Germany. -Mr. Asquith, and the Cabinet of which he was -the head, refused to look their policy between the -eyes, and realise what it was, and what were its -inevitable consequences. They would not admit that -the <i>Balance of Power</i> was an English interest, or that -they were in any way concerned in maintaining it. -They would not admit that our Entente with France -and Russia was in fact an alliance. They thought -they could send British officers to arrange plans of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P302"></a>302}</span> -campaign with the French General Staff—could learn -from this source all the secret hopes and anxieties of -France—could also withdraw the greater part of their -fleet from the Mediterranean, under arrangement -for naval co-operation with our present ally[<a id="chap0307fn12text"></a><a href="#chap0307fn12">12</a>]—all -without committing this country to any -form of understanding! They boasted that they had -no engagements with France, which puzzled the -French and the Russians, and convinced nobody; -save possibly themselves, and a section of their own -followers. They had in fact bound the country to a -course of action—in certain events which were not at -all improbable—just as surely by drifting into a -committal, as if they had signed and sealed a parchment. -Yet they would not face the imperative condition. -They would not place their armaments on a footing -to correspond with their policy. -</p> - -<p> -Much of this is now admitted more or less frankly, -but justification is pleaded, in that it was essential to -lead the country cautiously, and that the Government -could do nothing unless it had the people behind it. -In these sayings there is a measure of truth. But as a -matter of fact the country was not led at all. It was -trapped. Never was there the slightest effort made -by any member of the Government to educate -the people with regard to the national dangers, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P303"></a>303}</span> -responsibilities, and duties. When the crisis occurred -the hand of the whole British Empire was forced. -There was no other way; but it was a bad -way. And what was infinitely worse, was the fact -that, when war was declared—that war which had -been discussed at so many Cabinet meetings since -1906—military preparations were found to be utterly -inadequate in numbers; and in many things other -than numbers. The politician is right in thinking -that, as a rule, it is to his advantage if the people are -behind him; but there are times when we can imagine -him praying that they may not be too close. -</p> - -<p> -We have been given to understand that it was -impossible for the Government to acknowledge their -policy frankly, to face the consequences, and to -insist upon the necessary preparations in men and -material being granted. It was impossible, because -to have done so would have broken the Liberal -party—that great instrument for good—in twain. -The Cabinet would have fallen in ruin. The careers -of its most distinguished members would have been -cut short. Consider what sacrifices would have been -contained in this catalogue of disasters. -</p> - -<p> -That is really what we are now beginning to consider, -and are likely to consider more and more as -time goes on. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -VALUE OF SELF-SACRIFICE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -A great act of self-sacrifice—a man's, or a -party's—may sometimes make heedless people realise the -presence of danger when nothing else will. Suppose -Mr. Asquith had said, "I will only continue to hold -office on one condition," and had named the -condition—'that armaments should correspond to -policy'—the only means of safety. He might thereupon have -disappeared into the chasm; but like Curtius he -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P304"></a>304}</span> -might have saved the City. It would have made -a great impression, Mr. Asquith falling from office -for his principles. Those passages of Periclean -spoken after war broke out, about the -crime of Germany against humanity—about sacrificing -our own ease—about duty, honour, freedom, -and the like—were wonderfully moving. Would -there, however, have been occasion for them, if in -the orator's own case, the sacrifice had been made -before the event instead of after it, or if he had -faithfully performed the simplest and chief of all -the duties attaching to his great position? -</p> - -<p> -The present war, as many of us thought, and still -think, was not inevitable. None have maintained -this opinion in the past with greater vehemence -than the Liberal party. But the conditions on -which it could have been avoided were, that England -should have been prepared, which she was not; and -that she should have spoken her intentions clearly, -which she did not. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE PRICE PAID -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When the war is ended, or when the tide of it has -turned and begun to sweep eastward, there will be -much coming and going of the older people, and of -women, both young and old, between England and -France. They have waited, and what is it that they -will then be setting forth to see? ... From Mons -to the Marne, and back again to Ypres, heaps of -earth, big and little, shapeless, nameless, numberless—the -graves of men who did not hesitate to sacrifice -either their careers or their lives when duty called -them. Desolation is the heaviest sacrifice of all; -and those who will, by and by, go on this pilgrimage -have suffered it, ungrudgingly and with pride, -because their country needed it. If this war was -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P305"></a>305}</span> -indeed inevitable there is no more to be said. But -what if it was not inevitable? What if there would -have been no war at all—or a less lingering and -murderous war—supposing that those, who from the -trust reposed in them by their fellow-countrymen -should have been the first to sacrifice their careers -to duty, had not chosen instead to sacrifice duty to -their careers? It was no doubt a service to humanity -to save the careers of politicians from extinction, -to keep ministers in office from year to year, to -preserve the Liberal party—that great instrument -for good—unfractured. These benefits were worth -a great price; but were they worth quite so great a -price as has been paid? -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn1text">1</a>] The Editor of the <i>Westminster Gazette</i> -should be an unimpeachable -witness: "The (German) Emperor's visit -to Tangier (March 1905) was -followed by a highly perilous passage -of diplomacy, in which the German -Government appeared to be taking risks -out of all proportion to any -interest they could have had in Morocco. -The French sacrificed their -Foreign Minister (M. Delcasse) -in order to keep the peace, but the Germans -were not appeased, and the pressure continued. -It was the general belief -at this time, that nothing but the support -which the British government -gave to the French averted a catastrophe -in the early part of 1906, or -induced the Germans to accept the Algeciras -conference as the way out -of a dangerous situation."—<i>The Foundations -of British Policy</i> (p. 15), by J. A. Spender. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn2text">2</a>] The Cawdor Programme. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn3text">3</a>] Mr. Haldane reduced the Army -by nine battalions (<i>i.e.</i> 9000 men) in -1906. He stated that he had no use for them. -This meant a great deal -more, when the reserve-making power -is taken into consideration.... -"The Regular Army ... has been reduced -by over 30,000 men; not only -a present, but a serious prospective loss."—Lord -Roberts in the House of -Lords, April 3, 1913. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn4text">4</a>] Even four years later we find Sir Wilfrid -Laurier wedded to the belief -that the German Emperor was one -of the great men of the present age; -wonderfully endowed by intellect, character, -and moral fibre; his potent -influence was always directed towards -peace.—Canadian <i>House of -Commons Debates</i>, February 27, 1913, 4364. -The whole of this speech -(4357-4364) in opposition to Mr. Borden's -Naval Forces Bill is interesting -reading, as is also a later speech, -April 7, 1913, on the same theme (7398-7411). -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn5text">5</a>] <i>How Britain Strove for Peace</i>, -by Sir Edward Cook: especially pp. 18-35; -also <i>Why Britain is at War</i>, by the same author. -These two pamphlets are -understood to be a semi-official statement -authorised by the British Government. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn6text">6</a>] Lord Haldane has explained German conduct -in the present war by -a sudden change of spirit, -such as once befell a collie dog which owned him -as master, and which after a blameless -early career, was possessed by a fit -of depravity in middle life and took to worrying sheep. -Thus in a single -metaphor he extenuates the German offence -and excuses his own blindness! -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn7text">7</a>] "Lord Haldane: What he did to thwart Germany." Pamphlet -published by the <i>Daily Chronicle</i>. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn8text">8</a>] At Cardiff, October 2, 1914. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn9"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn9text">9</a>] If this were really so, it is remarkable -that Germany has not published -these opiate documents, -which lulled her vigilance and were the cause of her -undoing. In the <i>New York Evening Post</i> -(February 15, 1915) there is a -letter signed 'Historicus' in which -the German version of the facts is not -seriously questioned, although a wholly -different inference is drawn: -"This extremely conciliatory attitude -of England is another proof of the -pacific character of her foreign policy. -But, unfortunately, German -political thought regards force -as the sole controlling factor in international -relations, and cannot conceive of concessions -voluntarily made in answer -to claims of a more or less equitable nature. -To the German mind such -actions are infallible indications -of weakness and decadence. Apparently -Grey's attitude towards German claims -in Turkey and Africa was so -interpreted, and the conclusion was -rashly reached that England could -be ignored in the impending world-war." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn10"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn10text">10</a>] "The time has now come to state -with a clearness which cannot be -mistaken that Sir Edward Grey as Foreign -Secretary is impossible."—<i>Daily -News</i>, January 10, 1912. The <i>Daily News</i> -was not a lonely voice -speaking in the wilderness. -Similar threats have been levelled against Mr. Churchill. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn11"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn11text">11</a>] It has been stated on good authority, -that Mr. McKenna upheld the -national interests with equal firmness, -and against equal, if not greater -opposition, while he was at the Admiralty. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0307fn12"></a> -[<a href="#chap0307fn12text">12</a>] A large section of the Liberal party -watched with jealous anxiety our -growing intimacy with France. -In 1913, however, they discovered in it -certain consolations in the withdrawal -of our ships of war from the Mediterranean; -and they founded upon this a demand for the curtailing of our -own naval estimates. France according -to this arrangement was to look -after British interests in the Mediterranean, -Britain presumably was to -defend French interests in the -Bay of Biscay and the Channel. When, -however, the war-cloud was banking -up in July 1914, these very people -who had been most pleased with our -withdrawal from the Mediterranean, -were those who urged most strongly -that we should now repudiate our -liabilities under the arrangement. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0400"></a></p> - -<h2> -PART IV -<br /> -DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE -</h2> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="intro"> -Now I saw still in my Dream, that they went on until they were -come to the place that <i>Simple</i> and <i>Sloth</i> and <i>Presumption</i> lay and -slept in, when <i>Christian</i> went by on Pilgrimage. And behold they -were hanged up in irons, a little way off on the other side. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -Then said <i>Mercy</i> to him that was their Guide and Conductor, -What are those three men? And for what are they hanged there? -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -GREAT-HEART: These three men were men of very bad qualities, -they had no mind to be Pilgrims themselves, and whosoever they -could they hindered. They were for sloth and folly themselves, -and whoever they could persuade with, they made so too, and -withal taught them to presume that they should do well at last. -They were asleep when <i>Christian</i> went by, and now you go by they -are hanged. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -MERCY: But could they persuade any to be of their opinion? -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -GREAT-HEART: Yes, they turned several our of the way. -There was <i>Slow-pace</i>, that they persuaded to do as they. They -also prevailed with one <i>Short-wind</i>, with one <i>No-heart</i>, with one -<i>Linger-after-lust</i>, and with one <i>Sleepy-head</i>, and with a young -woman her name was <i>Dull</i>, to turn out of the way and become as -they. Besides they brought up an ill report of your Lord, -persuading others that he was a Task-master. They also brought up -an evil report of the good Land saying 'twas not half so good as -some pretend it was. They also began to vilify his Servants, and -to count the very best of them meddlesome troublesome busy-bodies. -</p> - -<p class="intro"> -<i>The Pilgrim's Progress</i>. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0401"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P309"></a>309}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER I -<br /> -THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE -</h3> - -<p> -Many people who were not in the habit of concerning -themselves with party politics endeavoured, during -the autumn of 1911, and from that time forward, -to straighten out their ideas on the twin problems -of Foreign Policy and Defence. They were moved -thereto mainly by the Agadir incident. Moreover, -a year later, the Balkan war provided an object lesson -in the success of sudden onset against an unprepared -enemy. Gradually also, more and more attention -was focussed upon the large annual increases in -preparation of the warlike sort, which successive -budgets, presented to the Reichstag, had been unable -to hide away. In addition to these, came, early in -1913, the sensational expansion of the German military -establishment and the French reply to it, which have -already been considered. -</p> - -<p> -Private enquirers of course knew nothing of Lord -Haldane's rebuff at Berlin in 1912, for that was a -Government secret. Nor had they any means of -understanding more than a portion of what was -actually afoot on the Continent of Europe in the -matter of armaments and military preparations. -Their sole sources of information were official papers -and public discussions. Many additional facts beyond -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P310"></a>310}</span> -these are brought to the notice of governments through -their secret intelligence departments. All continental -powers are more or less uncandid, both as regards -the direction and the amount of their expenditure -on armaments. In the case of Germany concealment -is practised on a greater scale and more methodically -than with any other. Ministers obviously knew a -great deal more than the British public; but what -was known to the man-in-the-street was sufficiently -disquieting, when he set himself to puzzle out its -meanings. -</p> - -<p> -At this time (during 1912, and in the first half -of 1913, until anxiety with regard to Ireland -began to absorb public attention) there was a very -widely-spread and rapidly-growing concern as to -the security of the country. For nearly seven -years Lord Roberts, with quiet constancy, had been -addressing thin and, for the most part, inanimate -gatherings on the subject of National Service. -Suddenly he found himself being listened to with -attention and respect by crowded audiences. -</p> - -<p> -Lord Roberts had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief -in 1904. After his retirement, and in the -same year, he revisited the South African battlefields. -During this trip, very reluctantly—for he -was no lover of change—he came to the conclusion -that in existing circumstances 'national service' -was a necessity. On his return to England he -endeavoured to persuade Mr. Balfour's Government -to accept his views and give effect to them. Failing -in this, he resigned his seat upon the Committee of -Imperial Defence in 1905, in order that he might be -able to advocate his opinion freely. He was then -in his seventy-fourth year. It was not, however, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P311"></a>311}</span> -until seven years later[<a id="chap0401fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0401fn1">1</a>] that his words can be said -to have arrested general attention. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NATIONAL ANXIETY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The truth was that the nation was beginning to -be dissatisfied with what it had been told by the -party speakers and newspapers, on the one side -and the other, regarding the state of the national -defences. It had not even the consolation of feeling -that what the one said might be set against the -other, and truth arrived at by striking a balance -between them. This method of the party system, -which was supposed to have served fairly well in -other matters, failed to reassure the nation with -regard to its military preparations. The whole of -this subject was highly complicated, lent itself readily -to political mystery, and produced in existing -circumstances the same apprehensions among ordinary men -as those of a nervous pedestrian, lost in a fog by the -wharf side, who finds himself beset by officious and -quarrelsome touts, each claiming permission to set -him on his way. -</p> - -<p> -The nation was disquieted because it knew that -it had not been told the whole truth by either set of -politicians. It suspected the reason of this to be -that neither set had ever taken pains to understand -where the truth lay. It had a notion, moreover, -that the few who really knew, were afraid—for party -reasons—to speak out, to state their conclusions, and -to propose the proper remedies, lest such a course -might drive them from office, or prevent them from -ever holding it. Beyond any doubt it was true that -at this time many people were seriously disturbed -by the unsatisfactory character of recent Parliamentary -discussions, and earnestly desired to know -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P312"></a>312}</span> -the real nature of the dangers to be apprehended, -and the adequacy of our preparations for meeting -them. -</p> - -<p> -There had always been a difficulty in keeping -the Army question from being used as a weapon in -party warfare. As to this—looking back over a long -period of years—there was not much to choose between -the Radicals, Liberals, or Whigs upon the one hand, -and the Unionists, Conservatives, or Tories on the -other. Military affairs are complicated and -technical; and the very fact that the line of country is -so puzzling to the ordinary man had preserved it as -the happy hunting-ground of the politician. When -an opportunity presented itself of attacking the -Government on its army policy, the opposition—whether -in the reign of Queen Victoria or in that of -Queen Anne—rarely flinched out of any regard for -the national interest. And when Parliamentary -considerations and ingrained prejudices made it seem a -risky matter to undertake reforms which were -important, or even essential, the Government of the -day just as rarely showed any disposition to discharge -this unpopular duty. -</p> - -<p> -While at times naval policy, and even foreign -policy, had for years together been removed out of -the region of purely party criticism, army policy had -ever remained embarrassed by an evil tradition. -From the time of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, -to the time of Field-Marshal Sir John French—from -a date, that is, only a few years after our modern -Parliamentary system was inaugurated by the 'Glorious -Revolution,' down to the present day—the -characteristic of almost every opposition with regard -to this matter, had been factiousness, and that of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P313"></a>313}</span> -almost every Government evasion. Neither the one -side nor the other had ever seemed able to approach -this ill-fated topic with courage or sincerity, or to -view it with steady constancy from the standpoint -of the national interest. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE BLOOD TAXES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -For several years past the country had been -watching a conspicuous example of this ingrained -habit of manoeuvring round the Army in order to -obtain party advantage. From 1912 onwards, until -more interesting perplexities provided a distraction, -a great part of the Liberal press and party had been -actively engaged in the attempt to fix the Unionist -party with responsibility for the proposals of the -National Service League. The Opposition, it is -hardly necessary to record, were innocent of this -charge—criminally innocent; but it was nevertheless -regarded as good party business to load them -with the odium of 'conscription.' The 'blood-taxes,' -as it was pointed out by one particularly -zealous journal, would be no less useful than the -'food-taxes' as an 'election cry,' which at this -time—more than ever before—appeared to have become -the be-all and end-all of party activities. -</p> - -<p> -It was obvious to the meanest capacity that -these industrious politicians were not nearly so much -concerned with the demerits, real or supposed, of -National Service, as with making their opponents -as unpopular as possible. In such an atmosphere -of prejudice it would have required great courage -and determination in a statesman to seek out and -proclaim the true way to security, were it national -service or anything else which entailed a sacrifice. -</p> - -<p> -Was it wonderful that when people examined -the signs of the times in the early part of 1913, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P314"></a>314}</span> -they should have found themselves oppressed by -feelings of doubt and insecurity? A huge German -military increase; a desperate French effort in -reply; war loans (for they were nothing else) on a -vast scale in both countries—what was the meaning -of it all? To what extent was British safety -jeopardised thereby? -</p> - -<p> -To these questions there was no answer which -carried authority; the official oracles were dumb. -We are a democratic country, and yet none of our -rulers had ever yet spoken plainly to us. None of -the Secretaries for War, none of the Prime Ministers -since the beginning of the century, had ever stated -the issue with uncompromising simplicity, as the -case required. None of them had ever taken the -country into his confidence, either as to the extent -of the danger or as to the nature of the remedy. It -is necessary to assume—in the light of subsequent -events—that these statesmen had in fact realised -the danger, and were not ignorant of the preparations -which were required to forestall it. Certainly it -is hard to believe otherwise; but at times, remembering -their speeches and their acts, one is inclined to -give them the benefit, if it be a benefit, of the doubt. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The question at issue was in reality a graver matter -than the security of the United Kingdom or the -British Empire. The outlook was wider even than -this. The best guarantee for the preservation of -the peace of Europe, and of the World, would have -been a British army proportionate to our population -and resources. There could be no doubt of this. -For half a century or more we had, half unconsciously, -bluffed Europe into the belief that we did in fact -possess such an army; but gradually it had become -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P315"></a>315}</span> -plain that this was not the case. Since the Agadir -incident the real situation was apparent even to the -man in the street—in Paris, Berlin, Brussels, the -Hague, Vienna, Rome, and Petrograd—in every -capital, indeed, save perhaps in London alone. -</p> - -<p> -If England had possessed such an army as would -have enabled her to intervene with effect in European -affairs, she would almost certainly never have been -called upon to intervene.[<a id="chap0401fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0401fn2">2</a>] Peace in that case would -have preserved itself. For Europe knew—not from -our professions, but from the obvious facts, which -are a much better assurance—that our army would -never be used except for one purpose only, <i>to maintain -the balance of Power</i>. She knew this to be our only -serious concern; and, except for the single nation -which, at any given time, might be aiming at -predominance, it was also the most serious concern of -the whole of Europe. She knew us to be disinterested, -in the diplomatic sense, with regard to all other -European matters. She knew that there was nothing -in Europe which we wished to acquire, and nothing—save -in the extreme south-west, a rock called -Gibraltar, and in the Mediterranean an island called -Malta—which we held and were determined to maintain. -In the chancelleries of Europe all this was -clearly recognised. And more and more it was -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P316"></a>316}</span> -coming to be recognised also by the organs of public -opinion on the Continent. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The population of France is roughly forty millions; -that of Germany} sixty-five millions; that of the -United Kingdom, forty-five millions. As regards -numbers of men trained to bear arms, France by -1911 had already come to the end of her resources; -Germany had still considerable means of expansion; -Britain alone had not yet seriously attempted to -put forth her strength. Had we done so in time -the effect must have been final and decisive; there -would then have been full security against disturbance -of the peace of Europe by a deliberately calculated -war. -</p> - -<p> -Europe's greatest need therefore was that Britain -should possess an army formidable not only in valour, -but also in numbers: her greatest peril lay in the -fact that, as to the second of these requirements, -Britain was deficient. No power from the Atlantic -seaboard to the Ural Mountains, save that one -alone which contemplated the conquest and spoliation -of its neighbours, would have been disquieted—or -indeed anything else but reassured—had the British -people decided to create such an army. For by -reason of England's peculiar interests—or rather -perhaps from her lack of all direct personal interests -in European affairs, other than in peace and the -balance of power—she was marked out as the natural -mediator in Continental disputes. In these high -perplexities, however, it is not the justice of the -mediator which restrains aggression, so much as -the fear inspired by his fleets and the strength of -his battalions. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0401fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0401fn1text">1</a>] October 1913. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0401fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0401fn2text">2</a>] This view was held by no one more -strongly than by Lord Roberts. -During the last five-and-twenty years -the writer has probably seen as much -of soldiers as falls to the lot of most civilians, -but nowhere, during that -period, from the late senior Field-Marshal downwards, -has he ever encountered that figment -of the pacifist imagination of which we read so -much during 1912-1914—"a military -clique which desires to create a -conscript army on the European model -for purposes of aggression on the -continent of Europe." The one thought -of all soldiers was adequate -defence. Their one concern was <i>how -to prevent war</i>.... M. Clemenceau -once urged that Lord Roberts should -receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his -advocacy of 'conscription' in England. -This proposal was made quite -seriously. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0402"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P317"></a>317}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER II -<br /> -THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY -</h3> - -<p> -The doubt and anxiety of public opinion in 1912 -were not allayed when the strength and composition -of the British Army came to be considered. -</p> - -<p> -Leaving out of account those troops which were -recruited and maintained in India, the Dominions, -and the Dependencies, the actual number of British -regulars employed in garrison duty abroad was in -round figures 125,000 men. The number in the -United Kingdom was approximately the same; but -by no means the whole of these were fit to take the -field. The total strength of the <i>Regular Army</i> in -1912-1913 might therefore be taken at somewhere -between 250,000 and 254,000 men,[<a id="chap0402fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn1">1</a>] of whom half -were permanently out of this country, while from -25,000 to 50,000 could not be reckoned on as -available in case of war, for the reason that they were -either recent recruits or 'immatures.'[<a id="chap0402fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn2">2</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P318"></a>318}</span> -</p> - -<p> -The reserves and additional troops which would -be called out in the event of a serious war were so -different in character that it was impossible simply -to throw them into a single total, and draw conclusions -therefrom according to the rules of arithmetic. For -when people spoke of the <i>Army Reserve</i>, the <i>Special -Reserve</i>, and the <i>Territorial Army</i>, they were talking -of three things, the values of which were not at all -comparable. The first were fully trained fighting -soldiers; the second were lads with a mere smattering -of their trade; while the third were little more -than an organised schedule of human material—mainly -excellent—which would become available for -training only at the outbreak of war, and whose -liability for service was limited to home defence. -The sum-total of these reserves and additional troops -was roughly 450,000 men; but this row of figures -was entirely meaningless, or else misleading, until -the significance of its various factors was grasped.[<a id="chap0402fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn3">3</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE THREE RESERVES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The first of these categories, the <i>Army Reserve</i>, -was the only one which could justly claim to rank -as a true reserve—that is, as a fighting force, from -the outbreak of war equal in calibre to the Continental -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P319"></a>319}</span> -troops against which, it would be called upon to -take the field. -</p> - -<p> -The <i>Army Reserve</i> consisted of men who had -served their full time in the <i>Regular Army</i>. They -were therefore thoroughly trained and disciplined, -needing only a few days—or at most weeks—to rub -the rust off them.[<a id="chap0402fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn4">4</a>] Nominally their numbers were -137,000[<a id="chap0402fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn5">5</a>] men; but as over 8000 of these were living -out of the United Kingdom the net remainder had -to be taken at something under 130,000. Moreover, -as the <i>Army Reserve</i> depended automatically upon -the strength of the <i>Regular Army</i>, and as the strength -of this had recently been reduced, it seemed -necessarily to follow that ultimately there would be a -considerable diminution. -</p> - -<p> -The second category to which the name of a -reserve was given was the <i>Special Reserve</i>. This, -however, was no true reserve like the first, for it was -wholly unfit to take the field upon the outbreak of -hostilities. It was the modern substitute for the -Militia, and was under obligation to serve abroad in -time of war. The term of enlistment was six years, -and the training nominally consisted of six months -in the first year, and one month in camp in each of -the succeeding years. But in practice these -conditions had been greatly relaxed. It was believed -that, upon the average, the term of training amounted -to even less than the proposals of the National Service -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P320"></a>320}</span> -League,[<a id="chap0402fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn6">6</a>] which had been criticised from the official -standpoint—severely and not altogether unjustly—on -the ground that they would not provide soldiers -fit to be drafted immediately into the fighting line. -</p> - -<p> -Notwithstanding the inadequacy of its military -education, this <i>Special Reserve</i> was relied upon in -some measure for making up the numbers of our -Expeditionary Force[<a id="chap0402fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn7">7</a>] at the commencement of war, -and individuals from it, and even in some cases units, -would therefore have been sent out to meet the -conscript armies of the Continent, to which they were -inferior, not only in length and thoroughness of -training, but also in age. It was important also to -bear in mind that they would be led by comparatively -inexperienced and untrained officers. The strength -of the <i>Special Reserve</i> was approximately 58,000[<a id="chap0402fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn8">8</a>] -men, or lads. Under the most favourable view it -was a corps of apprentices whose previous service -had been of a very meagre and desultory character. -</p> - -<p> -The third category was the <i>Territorial Army</i>, -whose term of service was four years and whose -military training, even nominally, only consisted of -fifteen days in camp each year, twenty drills the first -year, and ten drills each year after that. In reality -this training had, on the average, consisted of very -much less. This force was not liable for service -abroad, but only for home defence. -</p> - -<p> -The minimum strength of the <i>Territorial Army</i> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P321"></a>321}</span> -was estimated beforehand by Lord Haldane at -316,000 men; but these numbers had never been -reached. The approximate strength was only -260,000 men, of whom only about half had qualified, -both by doing fifteen days in camp, and by passing -an elementary test in musketry.[<a id="chap0402fn9text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn9">9</a>] These numbers had -recently shown a tendency to shrink rather than swell.[<a id="chap0402fn10text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn10">10</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THEIR VALUES AND TRAINING -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The value of the <i>Territorial Army</i>, therefore, was -that of excellent, though in certain cases immature, -material, available for training upon the outbreak -of war. But in spite of its high and patriotic spirit -it was wholly unfit to take the field against trained -troops until it had undergone the necessary training. -</p> - -<p> -In the event of war we could not safely reckon -upon being able to withdraw our garrisons from -abroad.[<a id="chap0402fn11text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn11">11</a>] Consequently, in the first instance, and -until the <i>Special Reserve</i> and the <i>Territorial Army</i> -had been made efficient, all we could reasonably -depend upon for serious military operations, either at -home or abroad, were that part of the <i>Regular Army</i> -which was in the United Kingdom, and the <i>Army -Reserve</i>. -</p> - -<p> -In round figures therefore our soldiers immediately -available for a European war (<i>i.e.</i> that portion of -the <i>Regular Army</i> which was stationed at home and -the <i>Army Reserve</i>) amounted on mobilisation to -something much under 250,000 men. Our apprentice -troops (the <i>Special Reserve</i>), who were really -considerably less than <i>half</i>-made, numbered something -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P322"></a>322}</span> -under 60,000 men. Our <i>un</i>made raw material (the -<i>Territorial Army</i>), excellent in quality and -immediately available for training, might be taken at -260,000 men. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The main consideration arising out of this analysis -was of course the inadequacy of the British Army to -make good the numerical deficiency of the Triple -Entente in the Western theatre during the <i>onset</i> and -the <i>grip</i> of war. Supposing England to be involved -in a European war, which ran its course and was -brought to a conclusion with the same swiftness -which had characterised every other European -war within the last half century, how were our -<i>half</i>-made and our <i>un</i>made troops to be rendered -efficient in time to effect the result in any way -whatsoever? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -SCARCITY OF OFFICERS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -There was yet another consideration of great -gravity. If our full Expeditionary Force were sent -abroad we should have to strain our resources to the -utmost to bring it up to its full nominal strength and -keep it there. The wastage of war would necessarily -be very severe in the case of so small a force; -especially heavy in the matter of officers. Consequently, -from the moment when this force set sail, there would -be a dearth of officers in the United Kingdom -competent to train the <i>Special Reserve</i>, the <i>Territorial -Army</i>, and the raw recruits. Every regular and -reserve officer in the country would be required in -order to mobilise the Expeditionary Force, and keep -it up to its full strength during the first six months. -As things then stood there was a certainty—in case -of war—of a very serious shortage of officers of suitable -experience and age to undertake the duties, which -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P323"></a>323}</span> -were required under our recently devised military -system.[<a id="chap0402fn12text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn12">12</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Half-made soldiers and raw material alike would -therefore be left to the instruction of amateur or -hastily improvised officers—zealous and intelligent -men without a doubt; but unqualified, owing to their -own lack of experience, for training raw troops, so as -to place them rapidly on an equality with the armies -to which they would find themselves opposed. What -the British system contemplated, was as if you were -to send away the headmaster, and the assistant-masters, -and the under-masters, leaving the school -in charge of pupil-teachers. -</p> - -<p> -In no profession is the direct personal influence -of teaching and command more essential than in -the soldier's. In none are good teachers and leaders -more able to shorten and make smooth the road to -confidence and efficiency. Seeing that we had chosen -to depend so largely upon training our army after -war began, it might have been supposed, that at least -we should have taken care to provide ourselves with -a sufficient number of officers and non-commissioned -officers, under whose guidance the course of education -would be made as thorough and as short as possible. -This was not the case. Indeed the reverse was the -case. Instead of possessing a large number of officers -and non-commissioned officers, beyond those actually -required at the outbreak of war for the purpose of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P324"></a>324}</span> -starting with, and repairing the wastage in the -Expeditionary Force, we were actually faced, as -things then stood, with a serious initial shortage of -the officers required for this one purpose alone. -</p> - -<p> -Lord Haldane in framing the army system which -is associated with his name chose to place his trust -in a small, highly-trained expeditionary force for -immediate purposes, to be supplemented at a later -date—if war were obliging enough to continue for so -long—by a new army of which the <i>Territorials</i> formed -the nucleus, and which would not begin its real -training until after the outbreak of hostilities. Under -the most favourable view this plan was a great gamble; -for it assumed that in the war which was contemplated, -the <i>onset</i> and the <i>grip</i> periods would be passed -through without crushing disaster, and that England -would, in due course, have an opportunity of making -her great strength felt in the <i>drag</i>. It will be said -that Lord Haldane's assumption has been justified -by recent events, and in a sense this is true; but by -what merest hair-breadth escape, by what sacrifices -on the part of our Allies, at what cost in British lives, -with what reproach to our national good name, we -have not yet had time fully to realise. -</p> - -<p> -But crediting Lord Haldane's system, if we may, -with an assumption which has been proved correct, -we have reason to complain that he did not act boldly -on this assumption and make his scheme, such as it -was, complete and effective. For remember, it was -contemplated that the great new army, which was -to defend the existence of the British Empire in the -final round of war, should be raised and trained upon -the voluntary principle—upon a wave of patriotic -enthusiasm—after war broke out. This new army -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P325"></a>325}</span> -would have to be organised, clothed, equipped, armed, -and supplied with ammunition. The 'voluntary -principle' did not apply to matters of this kind. It -might therefore have been expected that stores -would be accumulated, and plans worked out upon -the strictest business principles, with philosophic -thoroughness, and in readiness for an emergency -which might occur at any moment. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -WANT OF STORES AND PLANS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Moral considerations which precluded 'conscription' -did not, and could not, apply to inanimate -material of war, or to plans and schedules of army -corps and camps, or to a body of officers enlisted of -their own free will. It may have been true that to -impose compulsory training would have offended -the consciences of free-born Britons; but it was -manifestly absurd to pretend that the accumulation -of adequate stores of artillery and small arms, of -shells and cartridges, of clothing and equipment, -could offend the most tender conscience—could -offend anything indeed except the desire of the -tax-payer to pay as few taxes as possible. -</p> - -<p> -If the British nation chose to bank on the -assumption, that it would have the opportunity given -it of 'making good' during the <i>drag</i> of war, it should -have been made to understand what this entailed -in the matter of supplies; and most of all in reserve -of officers. All existing forces should at least have -been armed with the most modern weapons. There -should have been arms and equipment ready for the -recruits who would be required, and who were relied -upon to respond to a national emergency. There -should have been ample stores of every kind, -including artillery, and artillery ammunition, for that -Expeditionary Force upon which, during the first -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P326"></a>326}</span> -six months we had decided to risk our national -safety. -</p> - -<p> -But, in fact, we were provided fully in none of -these respects. And least of all were we provided in -the matter of officers. There was no case of conscience -at stake; but only the question of a vote in the -House of Commons. We could have increased our -establishment of officers by a vote; we could have -laid in stores of ammunition, of clothing, of equipment -by a vote. But the vote was not asked for—it might -have been unpopular—and therefore Lord Haldane's -scheme—in its inception a gamble of the most -hazardous character—was reduced to a mere -make-believe, for the reason that its originator lacked -confidence to back his own 'fancy.' -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -Looking back at the Agadir incident, it seemed -plain enough, from a soldier's point of view, that the -British Expeditionary Force was inadequate, in a -purely military sense, to redress the adverse balance -against the French, and beat back a German invasion. -The moral effect, however, of our assistance would -undoubtedly have been very great, in encouraging -France and Belgium by our comradeship in arms, -and in discouraging Germany, by making clear to -her the firmness of the Triple Entente. -</p> - -<p> -But by the summer of 1914—three years later—this -position had undergone a serious change. In -a purely military sense, the value of such aid as it had -been in our power to send three years earlier, was -greatly diminished. The increase in the German -striking force over that of France, which had taken -effect since 1911, was considerably greater than the -total numbers of the army which we held prepared -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P327"></a>327}</span> -for foreign service. This was fully understood -abroad; and the knowledge of it would obviously -diminish the moral as well as the material effect of -our co-operation. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -COST OF FULL INSURANCE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -In order that the combined forces of France and -England might have a reasonable chance of holding -their own[<a id="chap0402fn13text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn13">13</a>] against Germany, until Russian pressure -began to tell, the smallest army which we ought to -have been able to put in the field, and maintain there -for six months, was not less than twice that of the -existing Expeditionary Force. From a soldier's point -of view 320,000 men instead of 160,000 was the very -minimum with which there might be a hope of -withstanding the German onset; and for the purpose of -bringing victory within sight it would have been -necessary to double the larger of these figures. In -order to reach the end in view, Britain ought to have -possessed a striking force at least half as large as that -of France, in round figures between 600,000 and -750,000 men. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -This was how the matter appeared in 1912, viewed -from the standpoint of a soldier who found himself -asked to provide a force sufficient, not for -conquest—not for the purpose of changing the map of Europe to -the advantage of the Triple Entente—but merely in -order to safeguard the independence of Belgium and -Holland, to prevent France from being crushed by -Germany,[<a id="chap0402fn14text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn14">14</a>] and to preserve the security of the British -Empire. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P328"></a>328}</span> -</p> - -<p> -The political question which presented itself to -the minds of enquirers was this—If the British nation -were told frankly the whole truth about the -Army, would it not conceivably decide that -complete insurance was a better bargain than half -measures? What force ought we to be prepared to -send to France during the first fortnight of war in -order to make it a moral certainty that Germany -would under no circumstances venture to attack -France? -</p> - -<p> -To questions of this sort it is obviously impossible -to give certain and dogmatic answers. There are -occasions when national feeling runs away with -policy and overbears considerations of military -prudence. The effects of sudden panic, of a sense of -bitter injustice, of blind pride or overweening -confidence, are incalculable upon any mathematical basis. -But regarding the matter from the point of view of -the Kaiser's general staff, whose opinion is usually -assumed to be a determining factor in German -enterprises, a British Expeditionary Force, -amounting to something over 600,000 men, would have -been sufficient to prevent the occurrence of a -coolly calculated war. And in the event of war -arising out of some uncontrollable popular impulse, a -British Army of this size would have been enough, -used with promptitude and under good leadership, to -secure the defeat of the aggressor. -</p> - -<p> -An Expeditionary Force of 320,000 men would -mean fully trained reserves of something over 210,000 -in order to make good the wastage of war during a -campaign of six months. Similarly an Expeditionary -Force of 600,000 would mean reserves of 400,000. In -the former case a total of 530,000 trained soldiers, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P329"></a>329}</span> -and in the latter a total of 1,000,000, would therefore -have been required.[<a id="chap0402fn15text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn15">15</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Even the smaller of these proposed increases -in the Expeditionary Force would have meant -doubling the number of trained soldiers in the British -Army; the larger would have meant multiplying it -by four. Under what system would it be possible -to achieve these results if public opinion should -decide that either of them was necessary to national -security? The answer was as easy to give as the -thing itself seemed hard to carry out. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -LIMITS OF VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It had become clear a good deal earlier than the -year 1914 that the limit of voluntary enlistment, -under existing conditions, had already been reached -for the Regular as well as the <i>Territorial</i> Army. If, -therefore, greater numbers were required they could -only be provided by some form of compulsory service. -There was no getting away from this hard fact which -lay at the very basis of the situation. -</p> - -<p> -If security were the object of British policy, the -Expeditionary Force must be fully trained before -war broke out. It would not serve the purpose for -which it was intended, if any part of it, or of its -reserves, needed to be taught their trade after war -began. Thoroughness of training—which must under -ordinary circumstances[<a id="chap0402fn16text"></a><a href="#chap0402fn16">16</a>] be measured by length of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P330"></a>330}</span> -training—appeared to be a factor of vital importance. -Given anything like equality in equipment, generalship, -and position, men who had undergone a full two -years' course—like the conscript armies of the -Continent—ought to have no difficulty in defeating a -much larger force which had less discipline and -experience. -</p> - -<p> -The lessons of the South African War were in -many ways very useful; but the praise lavishly, and -justly, given to volunteer battalions by Lord Roberts -and other distinguished commanders, needed to be -studied in the light of the circumstances, and these -were of a peculiar character. For one thing our -antagonists, the Boers, were not trained troops, -and moreover, their policy to a large extent was to -weary us out, by declining decisive action and -engaging us in tedious pursuits. Our volunteers, -for the most part, were picked men. Although only -half-trained—perhaps in the majority of cases wholly -untrained—circumstances in this case permitted of -their being given the time necessary for gaining -experience in the field before being required to fight. -This was an entirely different state of affairs from -what might be looked for in a European war, in a -densely peopled country, covered with a close -network of roads and railways—a war in which great -masses of highly disciplined soldiers would be hurled -against one another systematically, upon a settled -plan, until at last superiority at one point or another -should succeed in breaking down resistance. The -South African war and a European war were two -things not in the least comparable. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE PEOPLE HAD A RIGHT TO KNOW -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Before the nation could be expected to come to a -final decision with regard to the insurance premium -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P331"></a>331}</span> -which it was prepared to pay, it would require to be -fully informed upon a variety of subordinate points -of much importance. Cost was a matter which could -not be put lightly on one side; our peculiar obligations -in regard to foreign garrisons was another; the -nature of our industrial system was a third; and -there were many besides. But the main and -governing consideration, if we wished to retain our -independence as a nation, was—what provisions were -adequate to security? The people wanted to know, -and had a right to know, the facts. And in the end, -with all due regard for our governors, and for the -self-importance of political parties, it was not either -for ministers or partisans to decide this question on -behalf of the people; it was for the people, on full -and honest information, to decide it for themselves. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn1text">1</a>] These rough totals were approximately -the same in the autumn of -1912, and at the outbreak of war in July 1914. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn2text">2</a>] The exact number of men who could remain -in the units when mobilised -was difficult to assess, for the reason that -it varied considerably according -to the trooping season, -which begins in August and ends in February. -February was therefore the most -unfavourable month for comparison, -and it is probably not far from the truth -to say that at that date 50,000 men -out of our nominal home army were -unavailable in case of war. Under -the extreme stress of circumstances, -it had recently been decided that boys -of nineteen might serve in Europe in the event of war, -so that a good many -'immatures' were now nominally -'mature.' Only nominally, however, -for even a war minister could not alter -the course of nature by a stroke -of the pen. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn3text">3</a>] Without wearying the reader -too much with figures the German -strength may be briefly indicated. -That country has a population roughly -half as large again as our own (65 millions against 45). -The total of fully -trained men whom the German Government could mobilise at the -declaration of war was something over 4,500,000. -Of these some 2,400,000 composed the 'striking force'; -the remaining 2,100,000 or thereabouts, the -reserve for making good wastage of war. -But in addition, Germany had -scheduled and inscribed in her Ersatz, -or recruiting reserve, and in the -Landsturm, fully 5,000,000 untrained -and partially trained men, with -ample equipment and military instructors -for them all. A large proportion -of these would be enrolled on mobilisation, -and would undertake garrison -and other duties, for which they would be -fitted after a short period of -service, thus freeing all fully trained men -for service in the field. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn4text">4</a>] For purposes of immediate mobilisation, -however, Continental reservists are superior to our own, -because in the British Army they lose -touch with their regiments, -and in case of war will in many cases be serving -with officers and comrades whom -they know nothing about; whereas in -Germany (for example) they come up -for periods of training with the -regiments to which they belong. -Also, at the outset, the proportion of -reservists to serving soldiers will be much greater in our case. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn5text">5</a>] This was in 1912. -Their numbers appear to have increased somewhat. -In July 1914 they were something over 146,000. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn6text">6</a>] Viz. four months for infantry and six for cavalry. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn7text">7</a>] Twenty-seven battalions of the -Special Reserve were scheduled to go -out as complete units for duty on lines -of communication, etc. The report -on recruiting for 1912 says that the great -majority of recruits for the Special -Reserve join between the ages of seventeen -and nineteen. It is hardly necessary -to point out the folly of putting boys -of this age in a situation where -they will be peculiarly liable to disease. -Continental nations employ their -oldest classes of reserves for these duties. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn8text">8</a>] In July 1914 about 61,000. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn9"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn9text">9</a>] <i>I.e.</i> in the autumn of 1912. -They were, therefore, 56,000 short of -Lord Haldane's estimate. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn10"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn10text">10</a>] Latterly there was a slight improvement -in recruiting. In July 1914 -the numbers (including permanent staff) -were a little over 268,000—48,000 -short of Lord Haldane's estimate. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn11"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn11text">11</a>] The fact that in certain cases we -did so withdraw our garrisons in -1914-1915 without disaster does not -invalidate this calculation. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn12"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn12text">12</a>] The experience of the past few months -makes this criticism appear -absurd—in its <i>under</i>statement. -But of course what was contemplated -in 1912-13 was not anything upon the -gigantic scale of our present -'New Army'; but only (a) the <i>Special Reserve</i>, -(b) the <i>Territorial Army</i>, -possibly doubled in numbers during -the first six months, and (c) fresh -recruits for the <i>Regular Army</i> upon -a very considerably enhanced scale. -But even for these purposes which were foreseen, -the provision of officers was -quite inadequate; so inadequate indeed -as to appear from the soldier's -point of view in the light of a parliamentary farce. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn13"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn13text">13</a>] <i>I.e.</i> of holding the Germans -at the French frontier and keeping them -out of Belgium should they attempt to invade that country. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn14"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn14text">14</a>] At the time these totals were -worked out the results appeared very -startling to the lay mind. -Recent experience, however, has proved that -the soldiers who worked them out were -right when they described them -as 'modest estimates.' -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn15"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn15text">15</a>] In this calculation the wastage of war -during the first six months has -been taken at two-thirds. -With the smaller force of 160,000 men, practically -the whole army would be in the fighting line -all the time, and the wastage -consequently would be heavier. -It could not wisely be assumed at less -than three-fourths for the same period. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0402fn16"></a> -[<a href="#chap0402fn16text">16</a>] Obviously the better and more -experienced the officers, the higher the -quality of the recruits, -and the keener their spirit, the more quickly the -desired result will be achieved. -The last two have been very potent factors -in the rapid education of our present -'New Army.' In a time of abnormal -patriotic impulse, the length of time -required will be much shortened. Since -August 1914 the lack of experienced officers -has been the great difficulty. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0403"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P332"></a>332}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER III -<br /> -LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS -</h3> - -<p> -Lord Roberts addressed many meetings in favour -of National Service during the years which followed -his return from South Africa in 1905; but the first -of his speeches to arrest widespread popular -attention was delivered in the Free Trade Hall at -Manchester, on October 22, 1912. A popular audience -filled the building to overflowing, listened with -respect, and appeared to accept his conclusions with -enthusiasm. His words carried far beyond the walls -of the meeting-place, and caused something approaching -a sensation, or, as some thought, a scandal, in -political circles. -</p> - -<p> -Of the commentators upon this speech the greater -part were Liberals, and these condemned his -utterances with unanimity in somewhat violent language. -Official Unionism was dubious, uncomfortable, and -disapproving: it remained for the most part dumb. -A few voices were raised from this quarter in open -reprobation; a few others proclaimed their independence -of party discipline and hastened to approve -his sentiments. -</p> - -<p> -There was no doubt of one thing—Lord Roberts's -speech had at last aroused public interest. For -the first time during the National Service agitation -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P333"></a>333}</span> -blood had been drawn. This was mainly due to the -object-lesson in the consequences of military -unpreparedness, which the first Balkan War was just -then unfolding before the astonished eyes of Europe. -In addition, those people, who for a year past had -been puzzling their heads over the true meaning -of the Agadir crisis, had become impressed with -the urgent need for arriving at a clear decision -with regard to the adequacy of our national -defences. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The speech was a lucid and forcible statement -of the need for compulsory military training. It -was interesting reading at the time it was delivered, -and in some respects it is even more interesting to-day. -It was compactly put together, not a thing of patches. -A man who read any part of it would read it all. -Yet in accordance with custom, controversy raged -around three isolated passages. -</p> - -<p> -The <i>first</i> of these runs as follows: "In the year -1912, our German friends, I am well aware, do -not—at least in sensible circles—assert dogmatically -that a war with Great Britain will take place this -year or next; but in their heart of hearts they -know, every man of them, that—just as in 1866 -and just as in 1870—war will take place the instant -the German forces by land and sea are, by their -superiority at every point, as certain of victory as -anything in human calculation can be made certain. -Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck. -That is the time-honoured policy of her Foreign -Office. That was the policy relentlessly pursued -by Bismarck and Moltke in 1866 and 1870. It -has been her policy decade by decade since that -date. It is her policy at the present hour." -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P334"></a>334}</span> -</p> - -<p> -The <i>second</i> passage followed upon the first: -"It is an excellent policy. It is or should be the -policy of every nation prepared to play a great -part in history. Under that policy Germany has, -within the last ten years, sprung, as at a bound, -from one of the weakest of naval powers to the -greatest naval power, save one, upon this globe." -</p> - -<p> -The <i>third</i> passage came later: "Such, gentlemen, -is the origin, and such the considerations which -have fostered in me the growth of this conviction—the -conviction that in some form of National Service -is the only salvation of this Nation and this Empire. -The Territorial Force is now an acknowledged -failure—a failure in discipline, a failure in numbers, -a failure in equipment, a failure in energy."[<a id="chap0403fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn1">1</a>] -</p> - -<p> -The accuracy of the <i>first</i> and <i>third</i> of these -statements now stands beyond need of proof. It was -not truer that Germany would strike so soon as her -rulers were of opinion that the propitious hour had -struck, than it was that, when the British Government -came to take stock of their resources at the -outbreak of war, they would find the Territorial Army -to be lacking in the numbers, equipment, training, -and discipline, which alone could have fitted it for -its appointed task—the defence of our shores against -invasion. Slowly, and under great difficulties, and -amid the gravest anxieties these defects had -subsequently to be made good, hampering the while our -military operations in the critical sphere. -</p> - -<p> -The <i>second</i> statement was of a different character, -and taken by itself, without reference to the context, -lent itself readily to misconception as well as -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P335"></a>335}</span> -misconstruction. A certain number of critics, no doubt, -actually believed, a still larger number affected to -believe, that Lord Roberts was here advocating the -creation of a British army, for the purpose of attacking -Germany, without a shred of justification, and at -the first favourable moment. -</p> - -<p> -The whole tenor of this speech, however, from -the first line to the last, made it abundantly clear -that in Lord Roberts's opinion Britain could have -neither motive nor object for attacking Germany; -that the sole concern of England and of the British -Empire with regard to Germany was, how we might -defend our possessions and secure ourselves against -her schemes of aggression. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -POINTS OF CRITICISM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Lord Roberts, however, had in fact pronounced -the intentions which he attributed to Germany to -be 'an excellent policy,' and had thereby seemed -to approve, and recommend for imitation, a system -which was revolting to the conscience of a Christian -community. -</p> - -<p> -The idea that Lord Roberts could have had any -such thoughts in his mind seemed merely absurd to -any one who knew him; nay, it must also have -seemed inconceivable to any one who had taken -the trouble to read the speech itself in an -unprejudiced mood. To an ordinary man of sense it -did not need Lord Roberts's subsequent letter of -explanation[<a id="chap0403fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn2">2</a>] to set his opinions in their true light. -It was clear that his object, in this 'peccant -passage,' had merely been to avoid a pharisaical -condemnation of German methods and ambitions, -and to treat that country as a worthy, as well as a -formidable, antagonist. Being a soldier, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P336"></a>336}</span> -however,—not a practised platform orator alive to the dangers -of too-generous concession—he went too far. The -words were unfortunately chosen, seeing that so -many critics were on the watch, not to discover the -true meaning of the speech, but to pounce on any -slip which might be turned to the disadvantage of -the speaker. -</p> - -<p> -At first there was an attempt on the part of certain -London[<a id="chap0403fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn3">3</a>] Liberal journals to boycott this speech. -Very speedily, however, it seemed to dawn upon -them that they had greater advantages to gain by -denouncing it. A few days later, accordingly, the -torrent of condemnation was running free. The -ablest attack appeared in the <i>Nation</i>,[<a id="chap0403fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn4">4</a>] and as this -pronouncement by the leading Radical weekly was -quoted with approval by the greater part of the -ministerial press throughout the country, it may -fairly be taken as representing the general view -of the party. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -A RADICAL ATTACK -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The article was headed <i>A Diabolical Speech</i>, -and its contents fulfilled the promise of the title. -"There ought," said the writer, "to be some means -of bringing to book a soldier, in the receipt of -money from the State, who speaks of a friendly -Power as Lord Roberts spoke of Germany." He -was accused roundly of predicting and encouraging -a vast and 'hideous conflict' between the -two countries. Lord Roberts was a 'successful'[<a id="chap0403fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn5">5</a>] -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P337"></a>337}</span> -soldier; but 'without training in statesmanship.' He -'had never shown any gift for it.' His was -'an average Tory intellect.' He was a 'complete -contrast to Wellington, who possessed two great -qualities; for "he set a high value on peace, and -he knew how to estimate and bow to the governing -forces of national policy.... Lord Roberts -possesses neither of these attributes. He is a mere -jingo in opinion and character, and he interprets -the life and interests of this nation and this Empire -by the crude lusts and fears which haunt the -unimaginative soldier's brain." -</p> - -<p> -We may pause at this breathing-place to take -note of the healing influences of time. Radical -journalists of 1832, and thereabouts, were wont to -say very much the same hard things of the Duke -of Wellington, as those of 1912 saw fit to apply to -Earl Roberts.... We may also remark in passing, -upon the errors to which even the most brilliant -of contemporary judgments are liable. There has -never been a man in our time who set a higher value -on peace than Lord Roberts did. He realised, -however, not only the intrinsic value of peace, but -its market cost. His real crime, in the eyes of pacifists, -was that he stated publicly, as often as he had the -chance, what price we must be prepared to pay, if -we wanted peace and not war. It was in this sense, -no doubt, that he did not know 'how to estimate and -bow to the governing forces of national policy.' His -blunt warnings broke in rudely and crudely upon the -comfortable discourse of the three counsellors—<i>Simple</i>, -<i>Sloth</i>, and <i>Presumption</i>, who, better than any others, -were skilled in estimating the 'governing forces,' and -the advantages to be gained by bowing to them. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P338"></a>338}</span> -</p> - -<p> -The writer in the <i>Nation</i> then proceeded to riddle -Lord Roberts's theories of defence. "He desires -us to remain a 'free nation' in the same breath -that he invites us to come under the yoke of -conscription"—intolerable, indeed, that the citizens -of a free nation should be ordered to fit themselves -for defending their common freedom—"conscription, -if you please, for the unheard-of purpose of overseas -service in India and elsewhere...." This invitation -does not seem to be contained in this, or any -other of Lord Roberts's speeches; but supposing it to -have been given, it was not altogether 'unheard-of,' -seeing that, under the law of conscription prevalent -(for example) in Germany, conscript soldiers can be -sent to Palestine, or tropical Africa as lawfully as into -Luxemburg, Poland, or France. According to the -<i>Nation</i>, the true theory of defence was Sea Power; -but this, it appeared, could not be relied on for all -time.... "While our naval monopoly—like our -commercial monopoly—cannot exist for ever, our -sea power and our national security depend on our -ability to crush an enemy's fleet.... We were never -so amply insured—so over-insured—against naval -disaster as we are to-day." -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -A LIBERAL ATTACK -</span> -</p> - -<p> -"Lord Roberts's proposition, therefore," the writer -continued, "is merely foolish; it is his way of -commending it, which is merely wicked. He speaks -of war as certain to take place 'the instant' the -German forces are assured of 'superiority at every -point,' and he discovers that the motto of German -foreign policy is that <i>Germany strikes when Germany's -hour has struck</i>. Germany does not happen to -have struck anybody since 1870, and she struck -then to secure national unity, and to put an end to -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P339"></a>339}</span> -the standing menace of French imperialism. Since -then she has remained the most peaceful and the -most self-contained, though doubtless not the most -sympathetic, member of the European family.... -Germany, the target of every cheap dealer in historic -slapdash, is in substance the Germany of 1870" -(<i>i.e.</i> in extent of territory), "with a great industrial -dominion superadded by the force of science and -commercial enterprise. That is the story across -which Lord Roberts scrawls his ignorant libel.... -By direct implication he invites us to do to Germany -what he falsely asserts she is preparing to do to -us. These are the morals, fitter for a wolf-pack -than for a society of Christian men, commended -as 'excellent policy' to the British nation in the -presence of a Bishop of the Anglican Church." -</p> - -<p> -This was very vigorous writing; nor was there -the slightest reason to suspect its sincerity. In the -nature of man there is a craving to believe; and if -a man happens to have his dwelling-place in a world -of illusion and unreality, it is not wonderful that he -should believe in phantoms. The credulity of the -<i>Nation</i> might appear to many people to amount -to fanaticism; but its views were fully shared, though -less tersely stated, by the whole Liberal party, -by the greater proportion of the British people, -and not inconceivably by the bulk of the Unionist -opposition as well. The Government alone, who had -learned the true facts from Lord Haldane eight -months earlier, knew how near Lord Roberts's -warnings came to the mark. -</p> - -<p> -This article set the tone of criticism. The -<i>Manchester Guardian</i> protested against the "insinuation -that the German Government's views of international -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P340"></a>340}</span> -policy are less scrupulous and more cynical than -those of other Governments." Germany has never -been accused with justice "of breaking her word, -of disloyalty to her engagements, or of insincerity. -Prussia's character among nations is, in fact, not -very different from the character which Lancashire -men give to themselves as compared with other -Englishmen. It is blunt, straightforward, and -unsentimental...." How foolish, moreover, are -our fears of Germany when we come to analyse them. -"We have no territory that she could take, except, -in tropical Africa, which no sane man would go to -war about. Our self-governing colonies could not -in any case be held by force; and Canada is -protected in addition by the Monroe doctrine. Egypt -is not ours to cede. Malta could not be had -without war with Italy nor India without war with -Russia."[<a id="chap0403fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn6">6</a>] -</p> - -<p> -This was a proud statement of the basis of British -security, and one which must have warmed the -hearts, and made the blood of Cromwell and Chatham -tingle in the shades. Egypt, which we had rescued -from a chaos of civil war, bankruptcy, and corruption, -which during more than thirty years we had administered -as just stewards for the benefit of her people, -which we had saved from conquest and absorption -by savage hordes—Egypt was not ours to cede. -For the rest our dependencies were not worth taking -from us, while our 'colonies' could defend themselves. -By the grace of Italy's protection we should be -secured in the possession of Malta. India would -be preserved to us by the goodwill of Russia, and -Canada by the strong arm of the United States.... -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P341"></a>341}</span> -Such at that time were the views of the Liberal -journal foremost in character and ability. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -A UNIONIST ATTACK -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Somewhat later the <i>Daily News</i> took the field, -making up for lost time by an exuberance of -misconstruction.... "The whole movement as -represented by the National Service League is definitely -unmasked as an attempt to get up, not defence, but -an invasion of German territory. This discovery, -which for years has been suspected, is most valuable -as showing up the real object of the League, with its -glib talk about military calisthenics. Lord Roberts -may have been indiscreet, but at least he has -made it clear that what the League wants is war."[<a id="chap0403fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn7">7</a>] -</p> - -<p> -On the same day, in order that the Liberals -might not have a monopoly of reprobation, the -<i>Evening Standard</i>, in an article entitled <i>A Word -with Lord Roberts</i>, rated him soundly for having -"made an attack upon Germany and an attack -upon the Territorial Force...." "It is mere -wanton mischief-making for a man with Lord -Roberts's unequalled prestige to use words which -must drive every German who reads them to -exasperation." And yet no signs whatsoever were -forthcoming that so much as a single Teuton had -been rendered desperate, or had taken the words -as in the least degree uncomplimentary. Up to the -day of his death—and indeed after his death[<a id="chap0403fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn8">8</a>]—Lord -Roberts was almost the only Englishman of -his time of whom Germans spoke with consistent -respect.... "Do not," continues this lofty and -sapient mentor, "Do not let us talk as if the Kaiser -could play the part of a Genghis Khan or an Attila, -ravening round the world at the head of armed -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P342"></a>342}</span> -hordes to devour empires and kingdoms."[<a id="chap0403fn9text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn9">9</a>] And -yet how otherwise has the whole British Press been -talking ever since the middle of August 1914? If -during this period of nine months, the <i>Evening -Standard</i> has kept all reference to Attila and his -Huns out of its columns, its continence is unique. -</p> - -<p> -It would serve no useful purpose to set out further -items of criticism and abuse from the leader and -correspondence columns of newspapers, or from the -speeches of shocked politicians. The <i>Nation</i>, the -<i>Manchester Guardian</i>, and the <i>Daily News</i> are entitled, -between them, to speak for the Liberal party; and -if it cannot be said that the <i>Evening Standard</i> is -quite similarly qualified in respect of the Unionists, -there is still no doubt that the views which it expressed -with so much vigour, prescience, and felicity were -held by many orthodox members of its party. -</p> - -<p> -Colonel Bromley-Davenport, for example, who -had been Financial Secretary to the War Office in the -late Unionist Government, spoke out strongly against -Lord Roberts's comments upon the efficiency of the -Territorial Force. 'Compulsory service,' in his -opinion, 'was not necessary....' And then, with -a burst of illuminating candour—"Which of the -great parties in the state would take up compulsory -service and fight a general election upon it? The -answer was that neither of the parties would; -and to ask for compulsory military service was -like crying for the moon."[<a id="chap0403fn10text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn10">10</a>] The power of any -proposal for winning elections was to be the touchstone -of its truth. It would be impossible to state more -concisely the attitude of the orthodox politician. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P343"></a>343}</span> -Which party, indeed, we may well ask, would have -fought a general election on anything, however -needful, unless it hoped to win on it? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MINISTERIAL ATTACKS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The attitude of Ministers, however, with regard -to Lord Roberts's speech is much more worthy of -remark than that of independent journalists and -members of Parliament. For the Government knew -several very important things which, at that time, -were still hidden from the eyes of ordinary men. -</p> - -<p> -It was eight months since Lord Haldane had -returned from Germany, concealing, under a smiling -countenance and insouciant manner, a great burden of -care at his heart. If on his return he spoke cheerily -on public platforms about the kindness of his -entertainment at Berlin, and of the greatness and goodness -of those with whom he had there walked and talked, -this was merely in order that his fellow-countrymen -might not be plunged in panic or despondency. He -had learned the mind of Germany, and it was no -light lesson. He had imparted his dreadful secret -to his colleagues, and we have learned lately from -Mr. Asquith himself what that secret was.... The -rulers of Germany, 'to put it quite plainly,' had -asked us for a free hand to overbear and dominate -the European world, whenever they deemed the -opportunity favourable. They had demanded this -of the astounded British emissary, "at a time when -Germany was enormously increasing both her -aggressive and defensive resources, and especially -upon the sea." To such a demand but one answer -was possible, and that answer the British Government -had promptly given—so we are led to infer—in clear -and ringing tones of scorn.[<a id="chap0403fn11text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn11">11</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P344"></a>344}</span> -</p> - -<p> -The Government knew for certain what nobody -else did. They knew what the aims of Germany -were, and consequently they knew that Lord Roberts -had spoken nothing but the truth. -</p> - -<p> -And yet, strange to relate, within a few days we -find Mr. Runciman, a member of the Cabinet, -administering a severe castigation to Lord Roberts. The -Manchester speech was "not only deplorable and -pernicious,' but likewise 'dangerous.' If it was -resented in Germany, Mr. Runciman 'would like -Germany to know that it is resented no less in -England...." Lord Roberts had been a great -organiser of the National Service League, the object -of which was 'practically conscription'; but "he -knows little of England, and certainly little of the -North of England, if he imagines we are ever likely -to submit to conscription"—not even apparently -(for there are no reservations) as an alternative to -conquest; or as a security against murder, arson, -and rape.... "War is only inevitable when statesmen -cannot find a way round, or through, difficulties -that may arise; or are so wicked that they prefer -the hellish method of war to any other method of -solution; or are so weak as to allow soldiers, -armament makers, or scaremongers to direct their -policy."[<a id="chap0403fn12text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn12">12</a>] Lord Roberts was not, of course, an -armament maker, but he was a scaremonger and a -soldier, and as such had no right to state his views -as to how peace might be kept. -</p> - -<p> -When Sir Edward Grey was asked if any -representation had been addressed by Germany to the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P345"></a>345}</span> -Foreign Office with reference to Lord Roberts's -utterances, he deprecated, with frigid discretion, the -idea that either Government should make official -representation to the other about 'unwise or -provocative speeches.'[<a id="chap0403fn13text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn13">13</a>] When Sir William Byles -plied the Secretary of State for War, Colonel Seely, -with questions as to the revocability of Lord Roberts's -pension, the answer was solemn and oracular, but -no rebuke was administered to the interrogator.[<a id="chap0403fn14text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn14">14</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MR. ACLAND'S PERSISTENCY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -But perhaps the most puzzling thing of all, is the -persistency with which Mr. Acland (Sir Edward Grey's -Under-Secretary) pursued Lord Roberts for some -three weeks after the rest were finished with him. -It might have been expected that Mr. Acland's chief, -who knew 'the dreadful secret,' would have curbed -his subordinate's excess of zeal. -</p> - -<p> -Mr. Acland distorted the Manchester speech into -an appeal to the British people to put themselves -"in a position to strike at the Germans, and to -smash them in a time of profound peace, and without -cause." And this fanciful gloss he rightly denounces, -in accents which remind us not a little of the Reverend -Robert Spalding, as 'nothing less than a wicked -proposal.'[<a id="chap0403fn15text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn15">15</a>] ... For England to adopt compulsory -military service would be "an utterly criminal and -provocative proceeding against other countries of the -world...." Here, indeed, is much food for wonder. -What single country of the world would have regarded -the adoption of national service by England as -'provocative'? What single country, except -Germany, would even have objected to it? And -what more right would Germany have had to object -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P346"></a>346}</span> -to our possessing a formidable army, than we had -right to object to her possessing a formidable -navy? -</p> - -<p> -When some days later Mr. Acland is reproached -with having misrepresented Lord Roberts's original -statement, he replies loftily that he "was justified -at the time in supposing that this was his real -meaning."[<a id="chap0403fn16text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn16">16</a>] One wonders why. Lord Roberts had -said nothing which any careful reader of his whole -speech—an Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, for -example, quoting and speaking with a due sense -of his great responsibilities—could conceivably have -understood to bear this interpretation. -</p> - -<p> -A fortnight later Mr. Acland returns to the charge -once more. "Lord Roberts," he says courteously, -"has since explained that he did not mean what -his words seemed so plainly to mean"—that is, -the smashing of Germany in time of profound peace -and without any cause.... Danger to peace, the -representative of the Foreign Office assures his -audience, "does not come from any action of His -Majesty's Government. It arises, if at all, from -irresponsible utterances such as those which we -heard from Lord Roberts. I very much regret -that harm must have been done between the two -countries by Lord Roberts's speech."[<a id="chap0403fn17text"></a><a href="#chap0403fn17">17</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Although an under-secretary does not always -enjoy the full confidence of his official superior, -he would presumably obey orders—even an order to -hold his tongue—if any were given. Consequently, -although Lord Haldane's dreadful secret may have -been kept from Mr. Acland, as unfit for his innocent -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P347"></a>347}</span> -and youthful ears, it is surprising that he was never -warned of the dangers of the path in which he was -so boldly treading. The discourtesies of youth to -age are not easily forgiven, especially where they are -founded upon misrepresentation, and when, as in -this case, the older man was right and the younger -wrong as to the facts. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -LORD ROBERTS WAS RIGHT -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It will be said—it has indeed been already said—by -way of excuse for the reticence of the Government -with regard to the intentions, which German statesmen -revealed to Lord Haldane, at Berlin, in February -1912—that by keeping back from the country the -knowledge which members of the Cabinet possessed, -they thereby prevented an outbreak of passion and -panic which might have precipitated war. This -may be true or untrue; it can neither be proved -nor controverted; but at any rate it was not in -accordance with the principle of trusting the people; -nor would it have prevented the Government and -their supporters—when war broke out—from making -amends to Lord Roberts and others whom, on grounds -of high policy, they had felt themselves obliged, in -the past to rebuke unjustly and to discredit without -warrant in the facts. This course was not impossible. -Peel, a very proud man, made amends to Cobden, -and his memory does not stand any the lower for it. -</p> - -<p> -With regard to those journalists and private -politicians whose mistakes were not altogether their -own fault—being due in part at least, to the -concealment of the true facts which the Government had -practised—it would not have been in the least wounding -to their honour to express regret, that they had -been unwittingly the means of misleading the people, -and traducing those who were endeavouring to lead -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P348"></a>348}</span> -it right. In their patriotic indignation some of -these same journalists and politicians had -overstepped the limits of what is justifiable in party -polemics. They had attacked the teaching at the -Military Colleges, because it sought to face the -European situation frankly, and to work out in the -lecture-room the strategical and tactical consequences -which, in case of war, might be forced upon us by our -relations with France and Russia. It would have -done these high-minded journalists no harm in the -eyes of their fellow-countrymen, had they -acknowledged frankly that when in former days they had -denounced the words of Lord Roberts as 'wicked' -and his interpretation of the situation as inspired -by "the crude lusts and fears which haunt the -unimaginative soldier's brain"—when they had -publicly denounced as 'a Staff College Cabal' teachers -who were only doing their duty—they had unwittingly -been guilty of a cruel misjudgment. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -FAILURE TO MAKE AMENDS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is not a little remarkable that in 1912—indeed -from 1905 to 1914—Lord Roberts, who, according -to the Nation, possessed but 'an average Tory -intellect,' should have trusted the people, while a -democratic Government could not bring itself to -do so. The Cabinet, which knew the full measure -of the danger, concealed it out of a mistaken notion -of policy. Their henchmen on the platform and in -the press did not know the full measure of the danger. -They acted either from natural prejudice, or official -inspiration—possibly from a mixture of both—when -they made light of the danger and held up to scorn -any one who called attention to it. The whole body -of respectable, word-worshipping, well-to-do Liberals -and Conservatives, whom nothing could stir out of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P349"></a>349}</span> -their indifference and scepticism, disapproved most -strongly of having the word 'danger' so much as -mentioned in their presence. The country would -to-day forgive all of these their past errors more -easily if, when the crisis came, they had acted a -manly part and had expressed regret. But never a -word of the sort from any of these great public -characters! -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn1text">1</a>] Manchester, October 22, 1912. -Quoted from <i>Lord Roberts's Message -to the Nation</i> (Murray), pp. 4-6 and p. 12. -The date, however, is there given -wrongly as October 25. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn2text">2</a>] <i>Manchester Guardian</i>, November 5, 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn3text">3</a>] This was not so, however, -with the Liberal newspaper of greatest -influence in the United Kingdom—the -<i>Manchester Guardian</i>—which gave a -full and prominent report of -Lord Roberts's meeting. This journal is -honourably free from any suspicion of -using the suppression of news as a -political weapon. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn4text">4</a>] October 26, 1912. Like the -<i>Manchester Guardian</i>, the <i>Nation</i> made -no attempt to boycott the speech. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn5text">5</a>] 'Successful,' not 'distinguished' or -'able' is the word. The amiable -stress would appear to be on luck rather than merit. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn6text">6</a>] <i>Manchester Guardian</i>, October 28, 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn7text">7</a>] <i>Daily News</i>, October 30, 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn8text">8</a>] See Preface. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn9"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn9text">9</a>] <i>Evening Standard</i>, October 30, 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn10"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn10text">10</a>] <i>Morning Post</i>, October 30, 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn11"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn11text">11</a>] Mr. Asquith at Cardiff, October 2, 1914. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn12"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn12text">12</a>] Mr. Runciman at Elland, <i>Manchester Guardian</i>, -October 26, 1912. -Sir Walter Runciman, the father of this speaker, -appears to be made of sterner -stuff. After the Scarborough raid -he denounced the Germans as "heinous -polecats." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn13"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn13text">13</a>] <i>Times</i>, Parliamentary Report, October 30, 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn14"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn14text">14</a>] <i>Ibid</i>. November 1, 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn15"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn15text">15</a>] Mr. Acland at Taunton, the <i>Times</i>, November 5, 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn16"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn16text">16</a>] Letter in the <i>Times</i>, November 11, 1912. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0403fn17"></a> -[<a href="#chap0403fn17text">17</a>] Mr. Acland at Rochdale, the <i>Times</i>, November 25, 1912. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0404"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P350"></a>350}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER IV -<br /> -LORD KITCHENER'S TASK -</h3> - -<p> -Lord Roberts had been seeking for seven years to -persuade the nation to realise that it was threatened -by a great danger; that it was unprepared to encounter -the danger; that by reason of this unpreparedness, -the danger was brought much nearer. Until October -1912, however, he had failed signally in capturing -the public ear. The people would not give him -their attention either from favour or indignation. -The cause of which he was the advocate appeared -to have been caught in an academic backwater. -</p> - -<p> -But from that time forward, Lord Roberts had -no reason to complain of popular neglect. Overcoming -his natural disinclination to platform oratory -and political agitation, sacrificing his leisure, putting -a dangerous strain upon his physical strength, he -continued his propaganda at a series of great meetings -in the industrial centres. Everywhere he was listened -to with respect, and apparently with a great measure -of agreement. Only on one occasion was he treated -with discourtesy, and that was by a civic dignitary -and not by the audience. But he had now become -an important figure in the political conflict, and he -had to take the consequences, in a stream of abuse -and misrepresentation from the party which -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P351"></a>351}</span> -disapproved of his principles; while he received but -little comfort from the other party, which lived in -constant terror lest it might be thought to approve -of them. Lord Roberts's advocacy of national -service continued up to the autumn of 1913, when -the gravity of the situation in Ireland made it -impossible to focus public interest on any other subject. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -TRIUMPH OF VOLUNTARY SYSTEM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -After the present war had run its course for a -month or two, the minds of many people reverted -to what Lord Roberts had been urging upon his -fellow-countrymen for nine years past. His warnings -had come true; that at any rate was beyond doubt. -The intentions which he had attributed to Germany -were clearly demonstrated, and likewise the vastness -and efficiency of her military organisation. The -inadequacy of British preparations was made plain. -They were inadequate in the sense that they had -failed to deter the aggressor from a breach of the -peace, and they had been equally inadequate for -withstanding his <i>onset</i>. The deficiencies of the -Territorial Army in numbers, discipline, training, -and equipment had made it impossible to entrust -it with the responsibility of Home Defence -immediately upon the outbreak of war. As a consequence -of this, the whole of the Regular Army could -not be released for foreign service, although Sir John -French's need of reinforcements was desperate. -Notwithstanding, however, that Lord Roberts's -warnings had come true, many people professed to -discover in what had happened a full justification—some -even went so far as to call it a 'triumph'—for -the voluntary system. -</p> - -<p> -Even after the first battle of Ypres, those who -held such views had no difficulty in finding evidences -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P352"></a>352}</span> -of their truth on all hands. They found them in -the conduct of our army in France, and in the courage -and devotion with which it had upheld the honour -of England against overwhelming odds. They found -it in the response to Lord Kitchener's call for -volunteers, and in the eagerness and spirit of the New -Army. They found it in our command of the sea, -in the spirit of the nation, and in what they read in -their newspapers about the approval and admiration -of the world. -</p> - -<p> -In the short dark days of December and January -we were cheered by many bold bills and headlines -announcing what purported to be victories; and -we were comforted through a sad Christmastide by -panegyrics on British instinct, pluck, good-temper, -energy, and genius for muddling through. Philosophic -commentators pointed out that, just as -Germany was becoming tired out and short of ammunition, -just as she was bringing up troops of worse and -worse quality, we should be at our very best, wallowing -in our resources of men and material of war. Six -months, a year, eighteen months hence—for the -estimates varied—Britain would be invincible. -Economic commentators on the other hand impressed -upon us how much better it was to pay through the -nose now, than to have been bleeding ourselves -white as the Germans, the French, and the Russians -were supposed (though without much justification) -to have been doing for a century. -</p> - -<p> -To clinch the triumph of the voluntary system—when -the Hour came the Man came with it. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -LORD KITCHENER'S APPOINTMENT -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Many of these things were truly alleged. Lord -Kitchener at any rate was no mirage. The gallantry -of our Army was no illusion; indeed, its heroism -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P353"></a>353}</span> -was actually underrated, for the reason that the -extent of its peril had never been fully grasped. -Although British commerce had suffered severely -from the efforts of a few bold raiders, the achievements -of our Navy were such that they could quite -fairly be described, as having secured command of -the sea.[<a id="chap0404fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0404fn1">1</a>] The German fleet was held pretty closely -within its harbours. We had been able to move -our troops and munitions of war wherever we pleased, -and so far, without the loss of a ship, or even of a -man. Submarine piracy—a policy of desperation—had -not then begun. The quality of the New Army, -the rapidity with which its recruits were being -turned into soldiers, not only impressed the public, -but took by complete surprise the severest of military -critics. -</p> - -<p> -This is not the place for discussing how Lord -Kitchener came to be appointed Secretary of State -for War, or to attempt an estimate of his character -and career.[<a id="chap0404fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0404fn2">2</a>] He was no politician, but a soldier -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P354"></a>354}</span> -and an administrator. He was in his sixty-fifth -year, and since he had left the Royal Military Academy -in 1871, by far the greater part of his work had been -done abroad—in the Levant, Egypt, South Africa, -and India.[<a id="chap0404fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0404fn3">3</a>] In no case had he ever failed at anything -he had undertaken. The greater part of his work -had been completely successful; much of it had been -brilliantly successful. He believed in himself; the -country believed in him; foreign nations believed -in him. No appointment could have produced a -better effect upon the hearts of the British people -and upon those of their Allies. The nation felt—if -we may use so homely an image in this connection—that -Lord Kitchener was holding its hand confidently -and reassuringly in one of his, while with the other -he had the whole race of politicians firmly by the -scruff, and would see to it that there was no nonsense -or trouble in that quarter. -</p> - -<p> -It is no exaggeration to say that from that time -to this,[<a id="chap0404fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0404fn4">4</a>] Lord Kitchener's presence in the Cabinet -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P355"></a>355}</span> -has counted for more with the country, than that -of any other minister, or indeed than all other -ministers put together. That in itself proves his -possession of very remarkable qualities; for nine -such months of public anxiety and private sorrow, -as England has lately known, will disturb any reputation -which is not firmly founded upon merit. During -this time we have seen other reputations come and -go; popularities made, and unmade, and remade. -We have seen great figures all but vanish into the -mist of neglect. But confidence in Lord Kitchener -has remained constant through it all. Things may -have gone wrong; the Government may have made -mistakes; even the War Office itself may have -made mistakes; yet the faith of the British people -in the man of their choice has never been shaken -for an instant. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -HIS GRASP OF ESSENTIALS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The highest of all Lord Kitchener's merits is, that -being suddenly pitchforked into office by an emergency, -he nevertheless grasped at once the two or three -main features of the situation, and turned the whole -force of his character to dealing with them, letting -the smaller matters meanwhile fall into line as best -they might. He grasped the dominating factor—that -it was essential to subordinate every military -and political consideration to supporting France, -whose fight for her own existence was equally a -fight for the existence of the British Empire. He -grasped the urgent need for the enrolment of many -hundreds of thousands of men fit for making into -soldiers, if we were to win this fight and not lose it. -He grasped the need for turning these recruits into -soldiers at a pace which hardly a single military -expert believed to be possible. He may, or may -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P356"></a>356}</span> -not, have fully grasped at the beginning, the difficulties—mainly -owing to dearth of officers—with which he -was faced: but when he did grasp them, by some -means or another, he succeeded in overcoming them. -</p> - -<p> -It is dangerous to speak of current events in -confident superlatives; but one is tempted to do -so with regard to the training of the New Army. -Even the most friendly among expert critics believed -that what Lord Kitchener had undertaken was a thing -quite impossible to do in the prescribed time. Yet he -has done it. And not only the friendly, but also the -severest critics, have admitted that the New Army -is already fit to face any continental army, and that, -moreover, to all appearance, it is one of the finest -armies in history. The sternest proof is yet to -come; but it is clear that something not far short -of a miracle has been accomplished. -</p> - -<p> -If we search for an explanation of the miracle, -we find it quite as much in Lord Kitchener's character -as in his methods. Fortunately what was so painfully -lacking in the political sphere was present in -the military—Leadership. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -HIS DISADVANTAGES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Despite the support which Lord Kitchener derived -from the public confidence he laboured under several -very serious disadvantages. A man cannot spend -almost the whole of his working life out of England, -and then return to it at the age of sixty-four, -understanding all the conditions as clearly as if he had -never left it. Lord Kitchener was ignorant not -only of English political conditions, but also of English -industrial conditions, which in a struggle like the -present are certainly quite as important as the -other. He may well have consoled himself, however, -with the reflection that, although he himself was -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P357"></a>357}</span> -lacking in knowledge, his colleagues were experts -in both of these spheres. -</p> - -<p> -It was inevitable that Lord Kitchener must -submit to the guidance of Ministers in the political -sphere, providing they agreed with his main objects—the -unflinching support of France, and the creation -of the New Army. -</p> - -<p> -In the industrial sphere, on the other hand, it -was the business of Ministers, not merely to keep -themselves in touch with Lord Kitchener's present -and future needs, and to offer their advice and help -for satisfying them, but also to insist upon his listening -to reason, if in his urgent need and unfamiliarity -with the business world, he was seen to be running -upon danger in any direction. -</p> - -<p> -It is impossible to resist the impression that, -while his colleagues held Lord Kitchener very close -by the head as to politics, and explained to him -very clearly what they conceived the people would -stand and would not stand, they did not show -anything like the same vigilance or determination in -keeping him well advised as to the means of procuring -the material of war. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0404fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0404fn1text">1</a>] Partly by good fortune, but mainly owing -to the admirable promptitude -and skill with which our naval resources -were handled, the bulk of the -German fleet was imprisoned from the outset. -We did not experience -anything like the full effect -of our unpreparedness. If Mr. Churchill had -not taken his decision on the day -following the delivery of the Austrian -ultimatum to Servia (July 24) -by postponing the demobilisation of the -Fleet—to the great scandal of his own party, -when the facts first became -known—there would have been a very different -tale to tell as regards the -fate of the British merchant service on the high seas. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0404fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0404fn2text">2</a>] Critics of the present Government, -such as the editor of the <i>National -Review</i>, have maintained that Lord Kitchener -was forced upon an unwilling -Cabinet by the pressure of public opinion; -that although he was in England -throughout the crisis he was allowed -to make all his preparations for returning to Egypt, -and was only fetched back as he was -on the point of stepping -aboard the packet; that the well-known form -of Lord Haldane had been -seen at the War Office, and that -if the Lord Chancellor had, as was intended, -relinquished his legal position in order -to become Secretary of State for War, -we should probably not have sent abroad -our Expeditionary Force. It is -undeniable that during Sunday, Monday, -and Tuesday (August 2, 3, and 4) -London was buzzing with a strange rumour -(which was fathered altogether -falsely upon the French Ambassador) -that France did not ask for or require -our assistance on land; but only at sea. -If this were so the absurdity of -sending our Expeditionary Force -would have been obvious. It is noteworthy that a usually -well-inspired section of the Ministerial Press—even -after they had reluctantly accepted war -as inevitable—were still maintaining -stoutly, even so late as Tuesday and -Wednesday (4th and 5th), that the -Expeditionary Force should not be allowed -to cross the channel. Lord -Kitchener was appointed on the Thursday, -and the Expeditionary Force -began to go abroad the following week. -The chapter of English political -history which begins with the presentation -of the Austrian ultimatum to -Servia on the 23rd of July, and ends -with the appointment of Lord Kitchener -on the 6th of August, will no doubt prove -to be one of the most interesting -in our annals. Whether it will prove -to be one of the most glorious or one -of the most humiliating exhibitions -of British statesmanship we cannot -say until we possess fuller knowledge -than we do at present of the attitude -of ministers at the Cabinets of Friday, -Saturday, and Sunday (July 31, -August 1 and 2). -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0404fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0404fn3text">3</a>] Palestine, 1874-1878; -Cyprus, 1878-1882; Egypt, 1882-1899; -South Africa, 1899-1902; -India, 1902-1909; Egypt, 1911-1914. Only -during the years 1871-1874 -and 1909-1911 does Lord Kitchener appear to -have been freed from foreign service, -and during a part of the latter interval -he was travelling in China and Japan. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0404fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0404fn4text">4</a>] End of May 1915. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0405"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P358"></a>358}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER V -<br /> -MATERIAL OF WAR -</h3> - -<p> -As regards the business world the position at this -time[<a id="chap0405fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0405fn1">1</a>] was a singularly difficult one. Within a few -days of the outbreak of war, orders from all parts -of the globe were forthcoming, on so vast a scale -that the ordinary means of coping with them were -wholly inadequate. It was not possible to walk out -of the War Office and buy what was wanted in the -shops. In a very brief period the whole industrial -system of the United Kingdom was congested with -orders. -</p> - -<p> -In Lord Kitchener's former experience of military -and civil administration the difficulty had usually -been to get the money he needed, in order to carry -out his reforms and undertakings. But here was a -case where he could have all the money he chose to -ask for; it was the commodities themselves which -could not be had either for money or love. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ORGANISATION OF RESOURCES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When war broke out the industries of France and -Belgium were paralysed—the former temporarily, -the latter permanently. We could buy nothing in -France; France, on the other hand, was buying eagerly -in England. And so was Russia, not herself as yet -a great industrial producer. And so were Belgium, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P359"></a>359}</span> -Servia, Italy, Roumania, Greece, Japan—indeed the -whole world, more or less—belligerents and neutrals -alike—except the two Powers with which we were at -war. All these competitors were in the field against -the War Office, running up prices, and making the -fortunes of enterprising middlemen, who flocked to -the feast, like vultures from all corners of the sky. -The industrial situation, therefore, needed the sternest -regulation, and needed it at once. For it was essential -to secure our own requirements, and to make certain -that our Allies secured theirs, at a fair price and in -advance of all other purchasers. -</p> - -<p> -Moreover, it was obviously necessary to look an -immense way ahead, especially as regards munitions -of war; to aid with loans, and encourage with orders, -firms able and willing to make what was required. -It was essential that makers of arms and supplies -should be stimulated to undertake vast increases of -their staff and plant. Before the battle of the Marne -was ended it was known, only too well, that every -nation in Europe—with the single exception of -Germany—had grossly underestimated the expenditure -of artillery ammunition under conditions of -modern warfare. It was of the most immediate -urgency to concert with our Allies, and with our -manufacturers, in order to set this trouble right. It -was as necessary for the Allies to organise their -resources as it was for them to organise their armies. -The second, indeed, was impossible without the first, -as Germany well knew, and in her own case had -already practised. -</p> - -<p> -Finally, there was the problem—half industrial, -half political—of labour; its hours, conditions, and -remuneration. Without the utmost vigilance and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P360"></a>360}</span> -sympathy, without a constant inspiration of duty, -without political leadership which appealed to the -imagination and heart of the people, there were bound -to be endless troubles and confusion; there were -bound to be disputes, quarrels, stoppages, and -strikes. -</p> - -<p> -The prices of certain munitions and materials -were almost anything the makers liked to name. -Money was flying about, and everybody was aware -of it. Human nature was sorely tempted. The -future was anxious and uncertain. People dependent -for a living on their own exertions, were beset with a -dangerous inclination to hold out their pitchers, in the -hopes of catching some portion of the golden shower -while it lasted. The idea that workmen were, on -the average, any greedier than their masters is only -held by persons who have little knowledge of the -facts. Cost of living had risen rapidly; this might -have been foreseen from the beginning, as well as -the dangers which it contained. -</p> - -<p> -In such circumstances as these the baser appetites -of mankind are always apt to break loose and gain -the upper hand, unless there is a firm leadership of -the nation. That is where the statesman should -come in, exercising a sagacious control upon the -whole organisation of industry; impressing on masters -the need for patience and sympathy; on their -men the need for moderation; on all the need for -sacrifices. -</p> - -<p> -During the months of February, March, and -April 1915 there was a loud outcry, led by a member -of the Government, deploring the lack of munitions -of war, and attributing the deficiency to -a want of industry and energy on the part of a -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P361"></a>361}</span> -section of the working classes. Their frequent -abstentions were condemned, and drunkenness was -alleged to have been, in many cases, a contributory -cause. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MINISTERIAL INCONSISTENCIES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Then Mr. Asquith came forward and astonished -the world by denying stoutly that there was, or ever -had been, any deficiency in munitions of war.[<a id="chap0405fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0405fn2">2</a>] He -assured the country that so long ago as September -he had "appointed a committee ... to survey the -situation."[<a id="chap0405fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0405fn3">3</a>] He said nothing about irregularity of -work, or about drunkenness as a cause of it. On -the contrary, he produced the impression that the -Army was as well provided as it could be, and that -the behaviour of the whole world of industry had -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P362"></a>362}</span> -been as impeccable as the foresight and energy of -the Government. -</p> - -<p> -The country found it difficult to reconcile these -various statements one with another. It found it -still more difficult to reconcile Mr. Asquith's -assurances with what it had heard, not only from other -Ministers, but from generals in their published -communications. Private letters from the front for -months past had told a very different story from -that which was told, in soothing tones, to the -Newcastle audience. These had laid stress upon the -heavy price paid in casualties, and the heavy handicap -imposed on military operations, owing to shortage -of artillery ammunition. The appointment of the -Committee alone was wholly credited; the rest of -these assurances were disbelieved. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -COMPLAINTS ABOUT MUNITIONS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Indeed it was impossible to doubt that there had -been miscalculation and want of foresight in various -directions; and it would have been better to admit -it frankly. The blame, however, did not rest upon -Lord Kitchener's shoulders, but upon those of his -colleagues. They understood the industrial -conditions of the United Kingdom; he did not and -could not; and they must have been well aware of -this fact. It was not Lord Kitchener's business, nor -had he the time, to make himself familiar with those -matters which are so well understood by the Board -of Trade, the Local Government Board, and the -Treasury. His business was to help France, to get -recruits as best he could, to train them as soon as -he could, and to send them out to beat the Germans. -It was the business of the Government—expert in -British political and industrial conditions—to put him -in the way of getting his recruits, and the equipment, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P363"></a>363}</span> -supplies, and munitions of war which were necessary -for making them effective.[<a id="chap0405fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0405fn4">4</a>] -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0405fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0405fn1text">1</a>] I am specially referring to August-December 1914. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0405fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0405fn2text">2</a>] "I saw a statement the other day -<i>that the operations not only of our -Army but of our Allies were being crippled, -or at any rate hampered, by our -failure to provide the necessary ammunition</i>. -There is not a word of truth -in that statement. I say there is not a word -of truth in that statement -which is the more mischievous because -if it were believed, it is calculated -to dishearten our troops, -to discourage our Allies, and to stimulate the -hopes and activities of our enemies. -Nor is there any more truth in the -suggestion that the Government, -of which I am the head, have only recently -become alive to the importance -and the urgency of these matters. On the -contrary, in the earliest days of the war, -when some of our would-be -instructors were thinking of quite other things, -they were already receiving -our anxious attention, and as far back, -I think, as the month of September -I appointed a Committee of the Cabinet, -presided over by Lord Kitchener, -to survey the situation from this point -of view—a Committee whose -labours and inquiries resulted -in a very substantial enlargement both on -the field and of machinery of supply.... -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"No, the urgency of the situation—and, -as I shall show, the urgency -is great—can be explained without any -resort to recrimination or to blame. -It is due, in the main, to two very obvious -causes. It is due, first of all, -to the unprecedented scale upon which -ammunition on both sides has been, -and is being, expended. -<i>It not only goes far beyond all previous experience, -but it is greatly in advance -of the forecasts of the best experts</i>."—Mr. Asquith -at Newcastle, April 20, 1915. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0405fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0405fn3text">3</a>] There has certainly been no lack -of appointments either of committees -or individuals. So lately as the 7th -of April the newspapers announced a -War Office Committee "to secure that -the supply of munitions of war shall -be sufficient to meet all requirements." About -a week later came the -announcement of a still more august -committee—'The Output Committee'—with Mr. Lloyd-George -as Chairman and Mr. Balfour as a member of it. -If war could be won by appointing committees -and creating posts, victory -ought long ago to have been secured. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0405fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0405fn4text">4</a>] Since this chapter was printed (May 1915) -public opinion has been -somewhat distracted by a sensational wrangle -as to whether or not the -right kind of ammunition had been supplied. -These are technical matters -upon which the ordinary man is no judge. -The main point is that—certainly until quite -recently—enough ammunition was not supplied; nor -anything like enough; and this was due -to the failure to look far enough -ahead in the early days of the war; -and to organise our industrial system -to meet the inevitable requirements. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0406"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P364"></a>364}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VI -<br /> -METHODS OF RECRUITING -</h3> - -<p> -If Lord Kitchener is not to be held primarily -responsible for the delay in providing war material, -just as little is he to be blamed for the methods of -recruiting. For he had to take what the politicians -told him. He had to accept their sagacious views -of what the people would stand; of 'what they would -never stand'; of what 'from the House of Commons' -standpoint' was practicable or impracticable. -</p> - -<p> -Lord Kitchener wanted men. During August -and September he wanted them at once—without a -moment's delay. Obviously the right plan was to -ask in a loud voice who would volunteer; to take as -many of these as it was possible to house, clothe, -feed, and train; then to sit down quietly and consider -how many more were likely to be wanted, at what -dates, and how best they could be got. But as -regards the first quarter of a million or so, which -there were means for training at once, there was -only one way—to call loudly for volunteers. The -case was one of desperate urgency, and as things -then stood, it would have been the merest pedantry -to delay matters until a system, for which not even -a scheme or skeleton existed before the emergency -arose, had been devised. The rough and ready -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P365"></a>365}</span> -method of calling out loudly was open to many -objections on the score both of justice and efficiency, -but the all-important thing was to save time. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NEED FOR A SYSTEM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Presumably, by and by, when the first rush was -over, the Cabinet did sit down round a table to talk -things over. We may surmise the character of the -conversation which was then poured into Lord -Kitchener's ears—how England would never stand -this or that; how no freeborn Englishman—especially -north of the Humber and the Trent,[<a id="chap0406fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0406fn1">1</a>] whence the -Liberal party drew its chief support—would tolerate -being tapped on the shoulder and told to his face -by Government what his duty was; how much less -would he stand being coerced by Government into -doing it; how he must be tapped on the shoulder -and told by other people; how he must be coerced -by other people; how pressure must be put on by -private persons—employers by threats of dismissal—young -females of good, bad, and indifferent character -by blandishments and disdain. The fear of starvation -for the freeborn Englishman and his family—at -that time a real and present danger with many minds—or -the shame of receiving a white feather, were the -forces by which England and the Empire were to be -saved at this time of trial. Moreover, would it not -lead to every kind of evil if, at this juncture, the -country were to become annoyed with the Government? -Better surely that it should become annoyed -with any one rather than the Government, whose -patriotic duty, therefore, was to avoid unpopularity -with more devoted vigilance than heretofore, if such -a thing were possible. -</p> - -<p> -One can imagine Lord Kitchener—somewhat weary -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P366"></a>366}</span> -of discussions in this airy region, and sorely perplexed -by all these cobwebs of the party system—insisting -doggedly that his business was to make a New Army, -and to come to the assistance of France, without a -day's unnecessary delay. He must have the men; -how was he to get the men? -</p> - -<p> -And one can imagine the response. "Put your -trust in us, and we will get you the men. We -will go on shouting. We will shout louder and -louder. We will paste up larger and larger pictures -on the hoardings. We will fill whole pages of -the newspapers with advertisements drawn up -by the 'livest publicity artists' of the day. We -will enlist the sympathies and support of the -press—for this is not an Oriental despotism, but -a free country, where the power of the press is -absolute. And if the sympathies of the press are -cool, or their support hangs back, we will threaten -them with the Press Bureau. We will tell the -country-gentlemen, and the men-of-business, that -it is their duty to put on the screw; and most of -these, being easily hypnotised by the word 'duty,' -will never dream of refusing. If their action is -resented, and they become disliked it will be -very regrettable; but taking a broad view, this -will not be injurious to the Liberal party in the -long run. -</p> - -<p> -"Leave this little matter, Lord Kitchener, to -experts. Lend your great name. Allow us to -show your effigies to the people. Consider what a -personal triumph for yourself if, at the end of this -great war, we can say on platforms that you and we -together have won it on the Voluntary System. -Trust in us and our methods. We will boom your -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P367"></a>367}</span> -New Army, and we will see to it at the same time -that the Government does not become unpopular, -and also, if possible, that the Empire is saved." -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE ADVERTISEMENT CAMPAIGN -</span> -</p> - -<p> -So they boomed the Voluntary System and the -New Army in Periclean passages; touched with awe -the solemn chords; shouted as if it had been Jericho. -</p> - -<p> -Two specimens, out of a large number of a -similar sort—the joint handiwork apparently of the -'publicity artists,' bettering the moving appeals of -the late Mr. Barnum, and of the party managers, -inspired by the traditions of that incomparable ex-whip, -Lord Murray of Elibank—are given below.[<a id="chap0406fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0406fn2">2</a>] It is of -course impossible to do justice here to the splendour -of headlines and leaded capitals; but the nature of -the appeal will be gathered clearly enough. Briefly, -the motive of it was to avoid direct compulsion by -Government—which would have fallen equally and -fairly upon all—and to substitute for this, indirect -compulsion and pressure by private individuals—which -must of necessity operate unequally, unfairly, -and invidiously. To say that this sort of thing is -not compulsion, is to say what is untrue. If, as -appears to be the case, the voluntary system has -broken down, and we are to have compulsion, most -honest men and women will prefer that the compulsion -should be fair rather than unfair, direct rather than -indirect, and that it should be exercised by those -responsible for the government of the country, rather -than by private persons who cannot compel, but can -only penalise. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P368"></a>368}</span> -</p> - -<p> -By these means, during the past six months, a -great army has been got together—an army great in -numbers,[<a id="chap0406fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0406fn3">3</a>] still greater in spirit; probably one of the -noblest armies ever recruited in an cause. And -Lord Kitchener has done his part by training this -army with incomparable energy, and by infusing into -officers and men alike his own indomitable resolution. -</p> - -<p> -The high quality of the New Army is due to the -fact that the bulk of it consists of two kinds of men, -who of all others are the best material for soldiers. -It consists of men who love fighting for its own -sake—a small class. It also consists of men who hate -fighting, but whose sense of duty is their guiding -principle—fortunately a very large class. It consists -of many others as well, driven on by divers motives. -But the spirit of the New Army—according to the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P369"></a>369}</span> -accounts of those who are in the best position to -judge—is the spirit of the first two classes—of the -fighters and the sense-of-duty men. It is these who -have leavened it throughout. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ITS EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -This magnificent result—for it is magnificent, -whatever may be thought of the methods which -achieved it—has been claimed in many quarters—Liberal, -Unionist, and non-party—as a triumph for -the voluntary system. But if we proceed to question -it, how voluntary was it really? Also how just? -Did the New Army include all, or anything like all, -those whose clear duty it was to join? And did it -not include many people who ought never to have -been asked to join, or even allowed to join, until -others—whose ages, occupations, and responsibilities -marked them out for the first levies—had all been -called up? -</p> - -<p> -There is also a further question—did the country, -reading these various advertisements and placards—heroic, -melodramatic, pathetic, and facetious—did -the country form a true conception of the gravity of -the position? Was it not in many cases confused -and perplexed by the nature of the appeal? Did -not many people conclude, that things could not -really be so very serious, if those in authority resorted -to such flamboyant and sensational methods—methods -so conspicuously lacking in dignity, so -inconsistent with all previous ideas of the majesty -of Government in times of national peril? -</p> - -<p> -The method itself, no doubt, was only unfamiliar -in so far as it used the King's name. It was familiar -and common enough in other connections. But a -method which might have been unexceptionable for -calling attention to the virtues of a shop, a soap, a -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P370"></a>370}</span> -circus, or a pill, seemed inappropriate in the case of -a great nation struggling at the crisis of its fate.[<a id="chap0406fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0406fn4">4</a>] -</p> - -<p> -Each of us must judge from his own experience -of the effect produced. The writer has heard harsher -things said of these appeals by the poor, than by the -well-to-do. The simplest and least sophisticated -minds are often the severest critics in matters of -taste as well as morals. And this was a matter of -both. Among townspeople as well as countryfolk -there were many who—whether they believed or -disbelieved in the urgent need, whether they responded -to the appeal or did not respond to it—regarded the -whole of this 'publicity' campaign with distrust -and dislike, as a thing which demoralised the country, -which was revolting to its honour and conscience, -and in which the King's name ought never to have -been used.[<a id="chap0406fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0406fn5">5</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P371"></a>371}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ON THE WORKING CLASSES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -On the part of the working-classes there were -other objections to the methods employed. They -resented the hints and instructions which were so -obligingly given by the 'publicity artists' and the -'party managers' to the well-to-do classes—to -employers of all sorts—as to how they should bring -pressure to bear upon their dependents. And they -resented—especially the older men and those with -family responsibilities—the manner in which they -were invited by means of circulars to signify their -willingness to serve—as they imagined in the last dire -necessity—and when they had agreed patriotically to -do so, found themselves shortly afterwards called -upon to fulfil their contract. For they knew that in -the neighbouring village—or in the very next -house—there were men much more eligible for military -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P372"></a>372}</span> -service in point of age and freedom from family -responsibilities, who, not having either volunteered, -or filled up the circular, were accordingly left -undisturbed to go about their daily business.[<a id="chap0406fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0406fn6">6</a>] -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The attitude of the country generally at the -outbreak of war was admirable. It was what it -should have been—as on a ship after a collision, where -crew and passengers, all under self-command, and -without panic, await orders patiently. So the country -waited—waited for clear orders—waited to be told, -in tones free from all ambiguity and hesitation, what -they were to do as classes and as individuals. There -was very little fuss or confusion. People were -somewhat dazed for a short while by the financial crisis; -but the worst of that was soon over. They then -said to themselves, "Let us get on with our ordinary -work as hard as usual (or even harder), until we -receive orders from those responsible for the ship's -safety, telling us what we are to do." -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -BUSINESS AS USUAL -</span> -</p> - -<p> -There was a certain amount of sparring, then and -subsequently, between high-minded journalists, who -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P373"></a>373}</span> -were engaged in carrying on their own <i>business as -usual</i>, and hard-headed traders and manufacturers -who desired to do likewise. The former were perhaps -a trifle too self-righteous, while the latter took more -credit than they deserved for patriotism, seeing that -their chief merit was common sense. To have stopped -the business of the country would have done nobody -but the Germans any good, and would have added -greatly to our national embarrassment. -</p> - -<p> -At times of national crisis, there will always -be a tendency, among most men and women, to -misgivings, lest they may not be doing the full measure -of their duty. Their consciences become morbidly -active; it is inevitable that they should; indeed it -would be regrettable if they did not. People are -uncomfortable, unless they are doing something they -have never done before, which they dislike doing, -and which they do less well than their ordinary work. -In many cases what they are inspired to do is less -useful than would have been their ordinary work, -well and thoughtfully done. At such times as these -the <i>Society for Setting Everybody Right</i> always -increases its activities, and enrols a large number of -new members. But very soon, if there is leadership -of the nation, things fall into their proper places and -proportions. Neither business nor pleasure can be -carried on as usual, and everybody knows it. There -must be great changes; but not merely for the sake -of change. There must be great sacrifices in many -cases; and those who are doing well must give a -helping hand to those others who are doing ill. But -all—whether they are doing well or ill from the standpoint -of their own private interests—must be prepared to -do what the leader of the nation orders them to do. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P374"></a>374}</span> -This was fully recognised in August, September, -October, and November last. The country expected -orders—clear and unmistakable orders—and it was -prepared to obey whatever orders it received. -</p> - -<p> -But no orders came. Instead of orders there were -appeals, warnings, suggestions, assurances. The -panic-monger was let loose with his paint-box of -horrors. The diffident parliamentarian fell to his -usual methods of soothing, and coaxing, and shaming -people into doing a very vague and much-qualified -thing, which he termed their duty. But there was no -clearness, no firmness. An ordinary man will realise -his duty so soon as he receives a definite command, -and not before. He received no such command; he -was lauded, lectured, and exhorted; and then was left -to decide upon his course of action by the light of his -own reason and conscience.[<a id="chap0406fn7text"></a><a href="#chap0406fn7">7</a>] -</p> - -<p> -He was not even given a plain statement of the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P375"></a>375}</span> -true facts of the situation, and then left at peace to -determine what he would do. He was disturbed in -his meditations by shouting—more shouting—ever -louder and louder shouting—through some thousands -of megaphones. The nature of the appeal was -emotional, confusing, frenzied, and at times degrading. -Naturally the results were in many directions most -unsatisfactory, unbusinesslike, and disorderly. The -drain of recruiting affected industries and individuals -not only unequally and unfairly, but in a way -contrary to the public interest. If Government will -not exercise guidance and control in unprecedented -circumstances, it is inevitable that the country must -suffer. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -AN ORGIE OF SENSATIONALISM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -To judge from the placards and the posters, the -pictures and the language, a casual stranger would -not have judged that the British Empire stood at -the crisis of its fate; but rather that some World's -Fair was arriving shortly, and that these were the -preliminary flourishes. Lord Kitchener cannot have -enjoyed the pre-eminence which was allotted to him -in our mural decorations, and which suggested that -he was some kind of co-equal with the famous Barnum -or Lord George Sanger. Probably no one alive hated -the whole of this orgie of vulgar sensationalism, -which the timidity of the politicians had forced upon -the country, more than he did.[<a id="chap0406fn8text"></a><a href="#chap0406fn8">8</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P376"></a>376}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Having stirred up good and true men to join the -New Army, whether it was rightly their turn or not; -having got at others in whom the voluntary spirit -burned less brightly, by urging their employers to -dismiss them and their sweethearts to throw them -over if they refused the call of duty, the 'publicity -artists' and the 'party managers' between them -undoubtedly collected for Lord Kitchener a very -fine army, possibly the finest raw material for an -army which has ever been got together. And Lord -Kitchener, thereupon, set to work, and trained -this army as no one but Lord Kitchener could have -trained it. -</p> - -<p> -These results were a source of great pride and -self-congratulation among the politicians. The -voluntary principle—you see how it works! What -a triumph! What other nation could have done -the same? -</p> - -<p> -Other nations certainly could not have done the -same, for the reason that there are some things which -one cannot do twice over, some things which one -cannot give a second time—one's life for example, -or the flower of the manhood of a nation to be made -into soldiers. -</p> - -<p> -Other nations could not have done what we were -doing, because they had done it already. They had -their men prepared when the need arose—which we -had not. Other nations were engaged in holding the -common enemy at enormous sacrifices until we made -ourselves ready; until we—triumphing in our -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P377"></a>377}</span> -voluntary system, covering ourselves in self-praise, -and declaring to the world, through the mouths of -Sir John Simon and other statesmen, that each of -our men was worth at least three of their 'pressed -men' or conscripts—until we came up leisurely with -reinforcements—six, nine, or twelve months -hence—supposing that by such time, there was anything -still left to come up for. If the Germans were then -in Paris, Bordeaux, Brest, and Marseilles, there -would be—temporarily at least—a great saving of -mortality among the British race. If, on the other -hand, the Allies had already arrived at Berlin without -us, what greater triumph for the voluntary principle -could possibly be imagined? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -A FRENCH VIEW -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Putting these views and considerations—which -have so much impressed us all in our own recent -discussions—before a French officer, I found him -obstinate in viewing the matter at a different angle. -He was inclined to lay stress on the case of Northern -France, and even more on that of Belgium, whose -resistance to the German invasion we had wished for -and encouraged, and who was engaged in fighting -our battles quite as much as her own. The voluntary -principle, in spite of its triumphs at home—which he -was not concerned to dispute—had not, he thought, -as yet been remarkably triumphant abroad; and -nine months had gone by since war began. -</p> - -<p> -He insisted, moreover, that for years before war -was declared, our great British statesmen could not -have been ignorant of the European situation, either -in its political or its military aspects. Such ignorance -was inconceivable. They must have suspected the -intentions of Germany, and they must have known -the numbers of her army. England had common -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P378"></a>378}</span> -interests with France. Common interests, if there -be a loyal understanding, involve equal sacrifices—equality -of sacrifice not merely when the push comes, -but in advance of the crisis, in preparation for it—a -much more difficult matter. Why then had not our -Government told the British people long ago what -sacrifice its safety, no less than its honour, required -of it to give? -</p> - -<p> -I felt, after talking to my friend for some time, -that although he rated our nation in some ways very -highly indeed, although he was grateful for our -assistance, hopeful of the future, confident that in -Lord Kitchener we had found our man, -nothing—nothing—not even selections from Mr. Spender's -articles in the <i>Westminster Gazette</i>, or from Sir John -Simon's speeches, or Sir John Brunner's assurances -about the protection afforded by international -law—could induce him to share our own enthusiasm for -the voluntary system.... <i>The triumph of the -voluntary system</i>, he cried bitterly, <i>is a German -triumph: it is the ruin of Belgium and the devastation -of France</i>. -</p> - -<p> -And looking at the matter from a Frenchman's -point of view, there is something to be said for his -contention. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -Apart from any objections which may exist to -British methods of recruiting since war broke out—to -their injustice, want of dignity, and generally to -their demoralising effect on public opinion—there -are several still more urgent questions to be -considered. Have those methods been adequate? And -if so, are they going to continue adequate to the end? -Is there, in short, any practical need for conscription? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P379"></a>379}</span> -</p> - -<p> -We do not answer these questions by insisting -that, if there had been conscription in the past, we -should have been in a much stronger position when -war broke out; or by proving to our own satisfaction, -that if we had possessed a national army, war would -never have occurred. Such considerations as these -are by no means done with; they are indeed still -very important; but they lie rather aside from the -immediate question with which we are now faced, -and which, for lack of any clear guidance from those -in authority, many of us have been endeavouring of -late to solve by the light of our own judgment. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The answer which the facts supply does not seem -to be in any doubt. We need conscription to bring -this war to a victorious conclusion. We need -conscription no less in order that we may impose terms -of lasting peace. Conscription is essential to the -proper organisation not only of our manhood, but -also of our national resources.[<a id="chap0406fn9text"></a><a href="#chap0406fn9">9</a>] Judging by the -increasing size, frequency, and shrillness of recent -recruiting advertisements, conscription would seem -to be equally essential in order to secure the number -of recruits necessary for making good the wastage of -war, even in the present preliminary stage of the war. -And morally, conscription is essential in order that -the whole nation may realise, before it is too late, the -life-or-death nature of the present struggle; in order -also that other nations—our Allies as well as our -enemies—may understand—what they certainly do -not understand at present—that our spirit is as firm -and self-sacrificing as their own. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The voluntary system has broken down long ago. -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P380"></a>380}</span> -It broke down on the day when the King of England -declared war upon the Emperor of Germany. From -that moment it was obvious that, in a prolonged war, -the voluntary system could not be relied upon to -give us, in an orderly and businesslike way, the -numbers which we should certainly require. It was -also obvious that it was just as inadequate for the -purpose of introducing speed, order, and efficiency -into the industrial world, as strength into our military -affairs. -</p> - -<p> -So far, however, most of the accredited oracles of -Government have either denounced national military -service as un-English, and a sin against freedom; or -else they have evaded the issue, consoling their -various audiences with the reflection, that it will be -time enough to talk of compulsion, when it is clearly -demonstrated that the voluntary system can no longer -give us what we need. It seems improvident to -wait until the need has been proved by the painful -process of failure. The curses of many dead nations -lie upon the procrastination of statesmen, who waited -for breakdown to prove the necessity of sacrifice. -Compulsion, like other great changes, cannot be -systematised and put through in a day. It needs -preparation. If the shoe begins to pinch severely -in August, and we only then determine to adopt -conscription, what relief can we hope to experience -before the following midsummer? And in what -condition of lameness may the British Empire be by -then? -</p> - -<p> -"But what," it may be asked, "of all the official -and semi-official statements which have been uttered -in a contrary sense? Surely the nation is bound -to trust its own Government, even although no -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P381"></a>381}</span> -facts and figures are offered in support of their -assurances." -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -VALUE OF OFFICIAL ASSURANCES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Unfortunately it is impossible to place an implicit -faith in official and semi-official statements, unless -we have certain knowledge that they are confirmed -by the facts. There has been an abundance of such -statements in recent years—with regard to the -innocence of Germany's intentions—with regard to -the adequacy of our own preparations—while only -a few weeks ago Mr. Asquith himself was assuring us -that neither the operations of our own army, nor -those of our Allies' armies, had ever been crippled, -or even hampered, by any want of munitions. -</p> - -<p> -When, therefore, assurances flow from the same -source—assurances that there is no need for -compulsory military service—that the voluntary system -has given, is giving, and will continue to give us all -we require—we may be forgiven for expressing our -incredulity. Such official and semi-official -statements are not supported by any clear proofs. They -are contradicted by much that we have heard from -persons who are both honest, and in a position to know. -They are discredited by our own eyes when we read the -recruiting advertisements and posters. It seems safer, -therefore, to dismiss these official and semi-official -assurances, and trust for once to our instinct and -the evidence of our own senses. It seems safer also -not to wait for complete breakdown in war, or -mortifying failure in negotiations for peace, in order -to have the need for national service established -beyond a doubt. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0406fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0406fn1text">1</a>] Cf. Mr. Runciman, <i>ante</i>, p. 344. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0406fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0406fn2text">2</a>] (A) Four questions to the women of England. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -1. You have read what the Germans -have done in Belgium. Have you -thought what they would do if they invaded England? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -2. Do you realise that the safety -of your Home and Children depends -on our getting more men now? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -3. Do you realise that the one word "Go" -from <i>you</i> may send another -man to fight for our King and Country? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -4. When the War is over and your husband -or your son is asked 'What -did you do in the great War?'—is -he to hang his head because you would -not let him go? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -Women of England do your duty! -Send your men <i>to-day</i> to join our -glorious Army. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -GOD SAVE THE KING. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -(B) Five questions to those who employ male servants. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -1. Have you a butler, groom, chauffeur, -gardener, or gamekeeper serving -<i>you</i> who, at this moment should -be serving your King and Country? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -2. Have you a man serving at your table -who should be serving a gun? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -3. Have you a man digging your garden -who should be digging trenches? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -4. Have you a man driving your car -who should be driving a transport -wagon? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -5. Have you a man preserving your game -who should be helping to -preserve your Country? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -A great responsibility rests on you. -Will you sacrifice your personal -convenience for your Country's need? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -Ask your men to enlist <i>to-day</i>. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -The address of the nearest Recruiting Office -can be obtained at any -Post Office. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -GOD SAVE THE KING. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0406fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0406fn3text">3</a>] How many we have not been told; -but that the numbers whatever -they may be do not yet reach nearly -what is still required we know from the -frantic character of the most recent advertisements. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0406fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0406fn4text">4</a>] With apologies for the dialect, -in which I am not an expert, I venture -to set out the gist of a reply given -to a friend who set himself to find out why -recruiting was going badly in a Devonshire -village.... "We do-ant -think nought, Zur, o' them advertaizements -and noospaper talk about -going soldgering. When Guv'ment needs -soldgers really sore, Guv'ment'll -say so clear enough, like it does when -it wants taxes—'<i>Come 'long, -Frank Halls, you're wanted.</i>' ... And when -Guv'ment taps Frank Halls -on showlder, and sez this, I'll go right enough; -but I'll not stir foot till -Guv'ment does; nor'll any man of sense this zide Exeter." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0406fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0406fn5text">5</a>] The following letter which appeared -in the <i>Westminster Gazette</i> (January -20, 1915), states the case so admirably -that I have taken the liberty -of quoting it in full: -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"DEAR SIR—Every day you tell your -readers that we are collecting -troops by means of voluntary enlistment, -yet it is self-evident that our -recruiting campaign from the first -has been a very noisy and a very vulgar -compulsion, which in a time of immense -crisis has lowered the dignity of -our country and provoked much anxiety -among our Allies. Our national -habit of doing the right thing in the -wrong way has never been exercised -in a more slovenly and unjust manner. -It is a crime against morals not -to use the equitable principles -of national service when our country is -fighting for her life; and this obvious -truth should be recognised as a -matter of course by every true democrat. -A genuinely democratic people, -proud of their past history, -and determined to hold their own against -Germany's blood-lust, would have divided -her male population into classes, -and would have summoned each class -to the colours at a given date. -Those who were essential to the leading trades -of the country would have -been exempted from war service in the field, -as they are in Germany; -the younger classes would have been called up first, -and no class would -have been withdrawn from its civil work -until the military authorities -were ready to train it. -Instead of this quiet and dignified justice, this -admirable and quiet unity of a -free people inspired by a fine patriotism, -we have dazed ourselves with shrieking -posters and a journalistic clamour -against 'shirkers,' and loud abuse -of professional footballers; and now -an advertisement in the newspapers assures -the women of England that -<i>they</i> must do what the State declines to achieve, -that they must send their -men and boys into the field since their country -is fighting for her life. What -cowardice! Why impose this voluntary duty -on women when the State -is too ignoble to look upon her own duty -in this matter as a moral obligation? -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"The one virtue of voluntary enlistment -is that it should be voluntary—a -free choice between a soldier's life -and a civilian's life. To use moral -pressure, with the outcries of public -indignation, in order to drive civilians -from their work into the army—what -is this but a most undignified -compulsion? And it is also a compulsion -that presses unequally upon the -people, for its methods are without system. -Many families send their -all into the fighting line; many decline -to be patriotic. A woman said -to me yesterday: 'My husband has gone, -and I am left with his business. -Why should he go? Other women in my -neighbourhood have their -husbands still, and it's rubbish -to say that the country is in danger when -the Government allows and encourages -this injustice in recruiting. If -the country is in danger all the men -should fight—if their trade work is -unnecessary to the armies." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"This point of view is right; the wrong one -is advocated by you and by -other Radicals who dislike the justice -of democratic equality.—Yours -truly, WALTER SHAW SPARROW." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0406fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0406fn6text">6</a>] There have been bitter complaints -of this artful way of getting recruits, -as a boy 'sniggles' trout. -The following letter to the Times (April 21, -1915) voices a very widely spread sense of injustice: -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"SIR—Will you give me the opportunity -to ask a question, which I -think you will agree is important? -When the Circular to Householders -was issued, many heads of families gave -in their names on the assumption -that they would be called up on the -last resort, and under circumstances -in which no patriotic man could refuse his help. -Married men with large -families are now being called up apparently -without the slightest regard -to their home circumstances. -Many of the best of them are surprised and -uneasy at leaving their families, -but feel bound in honour to keep their -word, some even thinking they have no choice. -The separation allowances -for these families will be an immense burden -on the State, and, if the -breadwinner falls, a permanent burden. -Is the need for men still so -serious and urgent as to justify this? -If it is, then I for one, who have -up to now hoped that the war might -be put through without compulsion, -feel that the time has come to 'fetch' -the unmarried shirkers, and I -believe there is a wide-spread and -growing feeling to that effect.—I am, -Sir, etc., CHARLES G. E. WELBY." -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0406fn7"></a> -[<a href="#chap0406fn7text">7</a>] An example of the apparent inability -of the Government to do anything thoroughly or -courageously is found in a circular letter to shopkeepers -and wholesale firms, which was lately -sent out by the Home Secretary and -the President of the Board of Trade. -The object of this enquiry—undertaken -at leisure, nine months after -the outbreak of war—is to obtain information -as to the number of men of military age, -who are still employed in these -particular trades, and as to the -willingness of their employers to spare them -if required, and to reinstate them -at the end of the war, etc., etc. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -The timid futility of this attempt -at organising the resources of the -country is shown <i>first</i> by the fact -that it left to the option of each employer -whether he will reply or not. -Businesses which do not wish to have their -employees taken away need not give an answer. -It is compulsory for -individuals to disclose all particulars -of their income; why, therefore, need -Government shrink from making it compulsory -upon firms to disclose all -particulars of their staffs? ... The <i>second</i> -vice of this application is that -the information asked for is quite inadequate -for the object. Even if the -enquiry were answered faithfully by every -employer and householder in -the country, it would not give the Government -what they require for the -purposes of organising industry or recruiting -the army.... In the <i>third</i> -place, a certain group of trades is singled -out at haphazard. If it is desired -to organise the resources of the country -what is needed is a general census -of all males between 16 and 60. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -One does not know whether to marvel -most at the belated timorousness -of this enquiry, or at the slatternly -way in which it has been framed. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0406fn8"></a> -[<a href="#chap0406fn8text">8</a>] One who is no longer alive—Queen -Victoria—would possibly have -hated it even more. Imagine her -late Majesty's feelings on seeing the -walls of Windsor plastered with the -legend—'<i>Be a sport: Join to-day</i>'—and -with other appeals of the same elevating -character! ... But perhaps -the poster which is more remarkable -than any other—considering the source -from which it springs—is one showing -a garish but recognisable portrait -of Lord Roberts, with the motto, -'<i>He did his duty. Will you do yours?</i>' If -the timidity of politicians is apparent -in certain directions, their courage -is no less noteworthy in others. -The courage of a Government (containing -as it does Mr. Asquith, Lord Haldane, -Mr. Runciman, Sir John Simon, -Mr. Harcourt, and Mr. Acland—not to -mention others) which can issue -such a poster must be of a very high order indeed. -One wonders, however, -if this placard would not -be more convincing, and its effect even greater, -were the motto amplified, -so as to tell the whole story: "<i>He did his duty; -we denounced him for doing it. -We failed to do ours; will you, however, -do yours?</i>" -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0406fn9"></a> -[<a href="#chap0406fn9text">9</a>] This aspect is very cogently stated -in Mr. Shaw Sparrow's letter to -the <i>Westminster Gazette</i> quoted on pp. 370-371. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0407"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P382"></a>382}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VII -<br /> -PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT -</h3> - -<p> -If 'National Service,' or 'Conscription,' has -actually become necessary already, or may -conceivably become so before long, it seems worth -while to glance at some of the considerations which -have been urged in favour of this system in the -past, and also to examine some of the causes and -conditions which have hitherto led public opinion in -the United Kingdom, as well as in several of the -Dominions, to regard the principle of compulsion -with hostility and distrust. The true nature of -what we call the 'Voluntary System,' and the reasons -which have induced a large section of our -fellow-countrymen to regard it as one of our most sacred -institutions, are worth looking into, now that -circumstances may force us to abandon it in the near -future. -</p> - -<p> -Beyond the question, whether the system of -recruiting, which has been employed during the -present war, can correctly be described as 'voluntary,' -there is the further question, whether the system, -which is in use at ordinary times, and which produces -some 35,000 men per annum, can be so described. -Lord Roberts always maintained that it could not, and -that its true title was 'the Conscription of Hunger.' -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P383"></a>383}</span> -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NORMAL RECRUITING METHODS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Any one who has watched the recruiting-sergeant -at work, on a raw cold day of winter or early spring, -will be inclined to agree with Lord Roberts. A fine, -good-humoured, well-fed, well-set-up fellow, in a -handsome uniform, with rows of medals which light -up the mean and dingy street, lays himself alongside -some half-starved poor devil, down in his luck, with -not a rag to his back that the north wind doesn't -blow through. The appetites and vanities of the -latter are all of them morbidly alert—hunger, thirst, -the desire for warmth, and to cut a smart figure in -the world. The astute sergeant, though no professor -of psychology, understands the case thoroughly, as he -marks down his man. He greets him heartily with -a 'good day' that sends a glow through him, even -before the drink at the Goat and Compasses, or Green -Dragon has been tossed off, and the King's shilling -accepted. -</p> - -<p> -Not that there is any need for pity or regret. -These young men with empty bellies, and no very -obvious way of filling them, except by violence—these -lads with gloom at their hearts, in many cases -with a burden of shame weighing on them at having -come into such a forlorn pass—in nine cases out of -ten enlistment saves them; perhaps in more even -than that. -</p> - -<p> -But talk about compulsion and the voluntary -principle! What strikes the observer most about -such a scene as this is certainly not anything which -can be truly termed 'voluntary.' If one chooses to -put things into ugly words—which is sometimes -useful, in order to give a shock to good people who -are tending towards self-righteousness in their worship -of phrases—this is the compulsion of hunger and -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P384"></a>384}</span> -misery. It might even be contended that it was not -only compulsion, but a mean, sniggling kind of -compulsion, taking advantage of a starving man. -</p> - -<p> -The law is very chary of enforcing promises made -under duress. If a man dying of thirst signs his -birthright away, or binds himself in service for a term -of years, in exchange for a glass of water, the ink -and paper have no validity. But the recruit is -firmly bound. He has made a contract to give his -labour, and to risk his life for a long period of years, -at a wage which is certainly below the market rate; -and he is held to it. Things much more 'voluntary' -than this have been dubbed 'slavery,' and denounced -as 'tainted with servile conditions.' And the loudest -denunciators have been precisely those anti-militarists, -who uphold our 'voluntary' system with the hottest -fervour, while reprobating 'compulsion' with the -utmost horror. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MORAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -We have heard much caustic abuse of the National -Service League. It has been accused of talking 'the -cant of compulsion'; by which has been meant that -certain of its members have put in the forefront of -their argument the moral and physical advantages -which they imagine universal military training would -confer upon the nation. Some may possibly have -gone too far, and lost sight of the need of the nation, -in their enthusiasm for the improvement of the -individual. But if occasionally their arguments -assume the form of cant, can their lapse be compared -with the cant which tells the world smugly that -the British Army is recruited on the voluntary -principle? -</p> - -<p> -The 'economic argument,' as it is called, is -another example. The country would be faced with -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P385"></a>385}</span> -ruin, we are told, if every able-bodied man had to -give 'two of the best years of his life,'[<a id="chap0407fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0407fn1">1</a>] and a week -or two out of each of the ensuing seven, to -'unproductive' labour. Sums have been worked out the -to hundreds of millions sterling, with the object of -showing that the national loss, during a single generation, -would make the national debt appear insignificant. -How could Britain maintain her industrial -pre-eminence weighted with such a handicap? -</p> - -<p> -One answer is that Britain, buoyed up though -she has been by her voluntary system, has not lately -been outstripping those of her competitors who -carried this very handicap which it is now proposed -that she should carry; that she has not even been -maintaining her relative position in the industrial -world in comparison, for example, with Germany. -</p> - -<p> -But there is also another answer. If you take -a youth at the plastic age when he has reached -manhood, feed him on wholesome food, subject him -to vigorous and varied exercise, mainly in the open -air, discipline him, train him to co-operation with -his fellows, make him smart and swift in falling-to -at whatever work comes under his hand, you are -thereby giving him precisely what, for his own sake -and that of the country, is most needed at the present -time. You are giving him the chance of developing -his bodily strength under healthy conditions, and -you are giving him a general education and moral -training which, in the great majority of cases, will -be of great value to him in all his after life. -</p> - -<p> -It is the regret of every one, who has studied our -industrial system from within, that men wear out too -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P386"></a>386}</span> -soon. By the time a man reaches his fortieth -year—often earlier—he is too apt, in many vocations, to -be an old man; and for that reason he is in danger -of being shoved out of his place by a younger -generation. -</p> - -<p> -This premature and, for the most part, unnecessary -ageing is the real economic loss. If by taking two -years out of a man's life as he enters manhood, if by -improving his physique and helping him to form -healthy habits, you can thereby add on ten or fifteen -years to his industrial efficiency, you are not only -contributing to his own happiness, but are also adding -enormously to the wealth and prosperity of the -country. Any one indeed, who chooses to work out -sums upon this hypothesis, will hardly regard the -national debt as a large enough unit for comparison. -The kernel of this matter is, that men wear out in -the working classes earlier than in others, mainly -because they have no break, no rest, no change, -from the day they leave school to take up a trade, -till the day when they have to hand in their checks -for good and all. It is not effort, but drudgery, which -most quickly ages a man. It is the rut—straight, -dark, narrow, with no horizons, and no general view -of the outside world—which is the greatest of social -dangers. More than anything else it tends to -narrowness of sympathy and bitterness of heart. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -UNDER-RATING OF CONSCRIPT ARMIES -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It would be cant to claim that universal military -training will get rid of this secular evil; but to say -that it will help to diminish it is merely the truth. -The real 'cant' is to talk about the economic loss -under conscription; for there would undoubtedly be -an immense economic gain. -</p> - -<p> -But indeed the advocacy of the voluntary system -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P387"></a>387}</span> -is stuffed full of cant.... We are all proud of -our army; and rightly so. But the opponents of -universal military service go much further in this -direction than the soldiers themselves. They -contrast our army, to its enormous advantage, with the -conscript armies of the continent, which they regard -as consisting of vastly inferior fighting men—of men, -in a sense despicable, inasmuch as their meek spirits -have submitted tamely to conscription. -</p> - -<p> -Colonel Seely, who, when he touches arithmetic -soars at once into the region of poetry, has pronounced -confidently that one of our voluntary soldiers is -worth ten men whom the law compels to serve. -Sir John Simon was still of opinion—even after several -months of war—that one of our volunteers was worth -at least three conscripts; and he was convinced that -the Kaiser himself already knew it. What a splendid -thing if Colonel Seely were right, or even if Sir John -Simon were right! -</p> - -<p> -But is either of them right? So far as our -voluntary army is superior—and it was undoubtedly -superior in certain respects at the beginning of the -war—it was surely not because it was a 'voluntary' -army; but because, on the average, it had undergone -a longer and more thorough course of training than -the troops against which it was called upon to fight. -Fine as its spirit was, and high as were both its -courage and its intelligence, who has ever heard -a single soldier maintain that—measured through -and through—it was in those respects superior -to the troops alongside which, or against which it -fought? -</p> - -<p> -As the war has continued month after month, -and men with only a few months' training have been -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P388"></a>388}</span> -drafted across the Channel to supply the British -wastage of war, even this initial superiority which -came of longer and more thorough training has -gradually been worn away. A time will come, no -doubt—possibly it has already come—when Germany, -having used up her trained soldiers of sound physique, -has to fall back upon an inferior quality. But that -is merely exhaustion. It does not prove the -superiority of the voluntary system. It does not -affect the comparison between men of equal stamina -and spirit—one set of whom has been trained beforehand -in arms—the other not put into training until -war began. -</p> - -<p> -Possibly Colonel Seely spoke somewhat lightly -and thoughtlessly in those serene days before the -war-cloud burst; but Sir John Simon spoke deliberately—his -was the voice of the Cabinet, after months of -grim warfare. To describe his utterances as cant -does not seem unjust, though possibly it is inadequate. -We are proud of our army, not merely because of -its fine qualities, but for the very fact that it is -what we choose to call a 'voluntary' army. But -what do they say of it in foreign countries? What -did the whole of Europe say of it during the South -African War? What are the Germans saying of it now? -</p> - -<p> -Naturally prejudice has led them to view the facts -at a different angle. They have seldom referred to -the 'voluntary' character of our army. That was -not the aspect which attracted their attention, so -much as the other aspect, that our soldiers received -pay, and therefore, according to German notions, -'fought for hire.' At the time of the South African -War all continental nations said of our army what -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P389"></a>389}</span> -the Germans still say—not that it was a 'voluntary' -army, but that it was a 'mercenary' army; and this -is a much less pleasant-sounding term.[<a id="chap0407fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0407fn2">2</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE CANT OF MILITARISM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -In this accusation we find the other kind of cant—the -cant of militarism. For if ours is a mercenary -army, so is their own, in so far as the officers and -non-commissioned officers are concerned. But as a -matter of fact no part, either of our army or the -existing German army, can with any truth be described -as 'mercenaries'; for this is a term applicable only -to armies—much more common in the past in -Germany than anywhere else—who were hired out -to fight abroad in quarrels which were not their own. -</p> - -<p> -But although this German accusation against the -character of our troops is pure cant, it would not -be wholly so were it levelled against the British -people. Not our army, but we ourselves, are the -true mercenaries; because we pay others to do for -us what other nations do for themselves. In German -eyes—and perhaps in other eyes as well, which are -less willing to see our faults—this charge against the -British people appears maintainable. It is -incomprehensible to other nations, why we should refuse to -recognise that it is any part of our duty, <i>as a people</i>, -to defend our country; why we will not admit the -obligation either to train ourselves to arms in time -of peace, or to risk our lives in time of war; why we -hold obstinately to it that such things are no part of -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P390"></a>390}</span> -our duty as a people, but are only the duty of private -individuals who love fighting, or who are endowed -with more than the average sense of duty. -</p> - -<p> -"As for you, the great British People," writes -Hexenküchen contemptuously, "you merely fold your -hands, and say self-righteously, that your duty begins -and ends with paying certain individuals to fight -for you—individuals whose personal interest can be -tempted with rewards; whose weakness of character -can be influenced by taunts, and jeers, and threats -of dismissal; or who happen to see their duty in a -different light from the great majority which calls -itself (and is <i>par excellence</i>) the British People...." This -may be a very prejudiced view of the matter, -but it is the German view. What they really mean -when they say that England is to be despised because -she relies upon a mercenary army, is that England -is to be despised because, being mercenary, she relies -upon a professional army. The taunt, when we -come to analyse it, is found to be levelled, not against -the hired, but against the hirers; and although we -may be very indignant, it is not easy to disprove its -justice. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -The British nation, if not actually the richest, -is at any rate one of the richest in the world. It has -elected to depend for its safety upon an army which -cannot with justice be called either 'voluntary' or -'mercenary,' but which it is fairly near the truth -to describe as 'professional.' The theory of our -arrangement is that we must somehow, and at the -cheapest rate, contrive to tempt enough men to -become professional soldiers to ensure national safety. -Accordingly we offer such inducements to take up -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P391"></a>391}</span> -the career of arms—instead of the trades of farm -labourer, miner, carpenter, dock hand, shopkeeper, -lawyer, physician, or stockbroker—as custom and -the circumstances of the moment appear to require. -</p> - -<p> -In an emergency we offer high pay and generous -separation allowances to the private soldier. In -normal times we give him less than the market rate -of wages. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -PAY OF THE BRITISH ARMY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The pay of junior or subaltern officers is so meagre -that it cannot, by any possibility, cover the expenses -which Government insists upon their incurring. -Captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels are paid -much less than the wages of foremen or sub-managers -in any important industrial undertaking. Even for -those who attain the most brilliant success in their -careers, there are no prizes which will stand -comparison for a moment with a very moderate degree -of prosperity in the world of trade or finance. They -cannot even be compared with the prizes open to the -bar or the medical profession. -</p> - -<p> -Hitherto we have obtained our officers largely -owing to a firmly rooted tradition among the country -gentlemen and the military families—neither as a -rule rich men, or even very easy in their circumstances -as things go nowadays—many of them very poor—a -tradition so strong that it is not cant, but plain truth, -to call it sense of duty. There are other motives, of -course, which may lead a boy to choose this profession—love -of adventure, comparative freedom from indoor -life, pleasant comradeship, and in the case of the -middle classes, recently risen to affluence, social -aspirations. But even in the last there is far more -good than harm; though in anti-militarist circles it -is the unworthy aim which is usually dwelt upon with -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P392"></a>392}</span> -a sneering emphasis. For very often, when a man -has risen from humble circumstances to a fortune, he -rejoices that his sons should serve the state, since it -is in his power to make provision. The example of -his neighbours, whose ancestors have been living on -their acres since the days of the Plantagenets or -the Tudors, is a noble example; and he is wise to -follow it. -</p> - -<p> -In the case of the rank and file of our army, a -contract for a term of years (with obligations -continuing for a further term of years) is entered into, -and signed, under the circumstances which have -already been considered. We are faced here with -a phenomenon which seems strange in an Age which -has conceded the right to 'down tools,' even though -by so doing a solemn engagement is broken—in an -Age which has become very fastidious about hiring -agreements of most kinds, very suspicious of anything -suggestive of 'servile conditions' or 'forced labour,' -and which deprecates the idea of penalising breach of -contract, on the part of a workman, even by process -in the civil courts. -</p> - -<p> -As regards a private soldier in the British army, -however, the Age apparently has no such -compunctions. His contract has been made under -duress. Its obligations last for a long period of -years. The pay is below the ordinary market rates. -Everything in fact which, in equity, would favour -a revision, pleads in favour of the soldier who -demands to be released. But let him plead and -threaten as he please, he is not released. It is not a -case of suing him for damages in the civil courts, but -of dealing with him under discipline and mutiny -acts, the terms of which are simple and drastic—in -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P393"></a>393}</span> -peace time imprisonment, in war time death. -Without these means of enforcing the 'voluntary' -system the British people would not feel themselves -safe. -</p> - -<p> -This phenomenon seems even stranger, when we -remember that a large and influential part of the -British people is not only very fastidious as to the -terms of all other sorts of hiring agreements, as to -rates of pay, and as to the conditions under which such -contracts have been entered into—that it is not only -most tender in dealing with the breach of such -agreements—but that it also regards the object of the -agreement for military service with particular -suspicion. This section of the British people is -anti-militarist on conscientious grounds. One would have -thought, therefore, that it might have been more -than usually careful to allow the man, who hires -himself out for lethal purposes, to have the benefit of -second thoughts; or even of third, fourth, and fifth -thoughts. For he, too, may develop a conscience -when his belly is no longer empty. But no: to do -this would endanger the 'voluntary' system. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE ANTI-MILITARIST CONSCIENCE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -This anti-militarist section of the British people is -composed of citizens who, if we are to believe their own -professions, love peace more than other men love it, -and hate violence as a deadly sin. They are -determined not to commit this deadly sin themselves; -but being unable to continue in pursuit of their -material and spiritual affairs, unless others will sin -in their behalf, they reluctantly agree to hire—at as -low a price as possible—a number of wild fellows from -the upper classes and wastrels from the lower classes—both -of whom they regard as approximating to the -reprobate type—to defend their property, to keep -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P394"></a>394}</span> -their lives safe, to enforce their Will as it is declared -by ballot papers and House of Commons divisions, -and to allow them to continue their careers of -beneficent self-interest undisturbed. -</p> - -<p> -But for all that, we are puzzled by the rigour -with which the contract for military service is enforced, -even to the last ounce of the pound of flesh. Not a -murmur of protest comes from this section of the -British people, although it has professed to take the -rights of the poorer classes as its special province. The -explanation probably is that, like King Charles I., -they have made a mental reservation, and are thus -enabled to distinguish the case of the soldier from -that of his brother who engages in a civil occupation. -</p> - -<p> -Roughly speaking, they choose to regard the -civilian as virtuous, while the soldier, on the other -hand, cannot safely be presumed to be anything of -the sort. Sometimes indeed—perhaps more often -than not—he appears to them to be distinctly -unvirtuous. The presumption is against him; for if he -were really virtuous, how could he ever have agreed -to become a soldier, even under pressure of want? -For regulating the service of such men as these force -is a regrettable, but necessary, instrument. The -unvirtuous man has agreed to sin, and the virtuous -man acts justly in holding him to his bargain. If a -soldier develops a conscience, and insists on 'downing -tools' it is right to imprison him; even in certain -circumstances to put him against a wall and shoot him. -</p> - -<p> -These ideas wear an odd appearance when we -come to examine them closely, and yet not only did -they exist, but they were actually very prevalent -down to the outbreak of the present war. They -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P395"></a>395}</span> -seem to be somewhat prevalent, even now, in various -quarters. But surely it is strange that virtuous -citizens should need the protection of unvirtuous -ones; that they should underpay; that they should -adopt the methods of 'forced labour' as a necessary -part of the 'voluntary system'; that they should -imprison and shoot men for breach of hiring -agreements—hiring agreements for long periods of years, -entered into under pressure of circumstances. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ANTI-MILITARIST CONFIDENCE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -But there is a thing even stranger than any of -these. Considering how jealous the great -anti-militarist section of our fellow-countrymen is of -anything which places the army in a position to -encroach upon, or overawe, the civil power, it seems -very remarkable that they should nevertheless have -taken a large number of men—whose morals, in their -view, were below rather than above the average—should -have armed them with rifles and bayonets, and -spent large sums of money in making them as efficient -as possible for lethal purposes, while refusing firmly to -arm <i>themselves</i> with anything but ballot-boxes, or -to make themselves fit for any form of self-defence. -</p> - -<p> -It seems never to have crossed the minds of the -anti-militarist section that those whom they thus -regard—if not actually with moral reprehension, -at any rate somewhat askance—might perhaps some -day discover that there were advantages in being -armed, and in having become lethally efficient; that -having studied the phenomena of strikes, and having -there seen force of various kinds at work—hiring -agreements broken, combinations to bring pressure -on society successful, rather black things occasionally -hushed up and forgiven—soldiers might draw their -own conclusions. Having grown tired of pay lower -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P396"></a>396}</span> -than the market rate, still more tired of moral lectures -about the wickedness of their particular trade, and -of tiresome old-fashioned phrases about the -subordination of the military to the civil power—what if -they, like other trades and classes, should begin to -consider the propriety of putting pressure on society, -since such pressure appears nowadays to be one of the -recognised instruments for redress of wrongs? ... Have -not professional soldiers the power to put -pressure on society in the twentieth century, just as -they have done, again and again, in past times in -other kingdoms and democracies, where personal -freedom was so highly esteemed, that even the freedom -to abstain from defending your country was respected -by public opinion and the laws of the land? -</p> - -<p> -But nonsense! In Germany, France, Russia, -Austria, Italy, and other conscript countries armies -are hundreds of times stronger than our own, while -the soldiers in these cases are hardly paid enough to -keep a smoker in pipe-tobacco. And yet they do -not think of putting pressure on society, or of -anything so horrible. This of course is true; but then, -in these instances, the Army is only Society itself -passing, as it were, like a may-fly, through a certain -stage in its life-history. Army and Society in the -conscript countries are one and the same. A man -does not think of putting undue pressure upon -himself. But in our case the Army and Society are -not one and the same. Their relations are those of -employer and employed, as they were in Rome long -ago; and as between employer and employed, there -are always apt to be questions of pay and position. -</p> - -<p> -It is useful in this connection to think a little -of Rome with its 'voluntary' or 'mercenary' or -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P397"></a>397}</span> -'professional' army—an army underpaid at first, -afterwards perhaps somewhat overpaid, when it -occurred to its mind to put pressure on society. -</p> - -<p> -But Rome in the first century was a very different -place from England in the twentieth. Very different -indeed! The art and rules of war were considerably -less of an expert's business than they are to-day. -Two thousand years ago—weapons being still -somewhat elementary—gunpowder not yet discovered—no -railway trains and tubes, and outer and inner -circles, which now are as necessary for feeding great -cities as arteries and veins for keeping the human -heart going—private citizens, moreover, being not -altogether unused to acting with violence in -self-defence—it might have taken, perhaps, 100,000 -disciplined and well-led reprobates a week or more to -hold the six millions of Greater London by the throat. -To-day 10,000 could do this with ease between -breakfast and dinner-time. Certainly a considerable -difference—but somehow not a difference which -seems altogether reassuring. -</p> - -<p> -Since the days of Oliver Cromwell the confidence -of the anti-militarists in the docility of the British -Army has never experienced any serious shock. But -yet, according to the theories of this particular school, -why should our army alone, of all trades and professions, -be expected not to place its own class interests -before those of the country? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ARMIES AS LIBERATORS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -When professional armies make their first entry -into practical politics it is almost always in the role -of liberators and defenders of justice. An instance -might easily occur if one or other set of politicians, -in a fit of madness or presumption, were to ask, or -order, the British Army to undertake certain -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P398"></a>398}</span> -operations against a section of their fellow-countrymen, -which the soldiers themselves judged to be contrary -to justice and their own honour. -</p> - -<p> -Something of this kind very nearly came to pass -in March 1914. The Curragh incident, as it was -called, showed in a flash what a perilous gulf opens, -when a professional army is mishandled. Politicians, -who have come by degrees to regard the army—not -as a national force, or microcosm of the people, but -as an instrument which electoral success has placed -temporarily in their hands, and which may therefore -be used legitimately for forwarding their own party -ends—have ever been liable to blunder in this -direction. -</p> - -<p> -Whatever may have been the merits of the Curragh -case, the part which the British Army was asked and -expected to play on that occasion, was one which -no democratic Government would have dared to -order a conscript army to undertake, until it had been -ascertained, beyond any possibility of doubt, that -the country as a whole believed extreme measures -to be necessary for the national safety. -</p> - -<p> -If professional soldiers, however high and patriotic -their spirit, be treated as mercenaries—as if, in their -dealings with their fellow-countrymen, they had -neither souls nor consciences—it can be no matter for -surprise if they should come by insensible degrees to -think and act as mercenaries.... One set or other of -party politicians—the occurrence is quite as conceivable -in the case of a Unionist Government as in that -of a Liberal—issues certain orders, which it would -never dare to issue to a conscript army, and these -orders, to its immense surprise, are not obeyed. -Thereupon a Government, which only the day before -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P399"></a>399}</span> -seemed to be established securely on a House of -Commons majority and the rock of tradition, is seen -to be powerless. The army in its own eyes—possibly -in that of public opinion also—has stood between the -people and injustice. It has refused to be made the -instrument for performing an act of tyranny and -oppression. Possibly in sorrow and disgust it -dissolves itself and ceases to exist. Possibly, on the -other hand, it glows with the approbation of its own -conscience; begins to admire its own strength, and -not improbably to wonder, if it might not be good for -the country were soldiers to put forth their strong -arm rather more often, in order to restrain the -politicians from following evil courses. This of course is -the end of democracy and the beginning of militarism. -</p> - -<p> -An army which starts by playing the popular -role of benefactor, or liberator, will end very speedily -by becoming the instrument of a military despotism. -We need look no farther back than Cromwell and -his major-generals for an example. We have been -in the habit of regarding such contingencies as remote -and mediaeval; none the less we had all but started -on this fatal course in the spring and summer of last -year. We were then saved, not by the wisdom of -statesmen—for these only increased the danger by -the spectacle which they afforded of timidity, temper, -and equivocation—but solely by the present war -which, though it has brought us many horrors, has -averted, for a time at least, what is infinitely the -worst of all. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -SERVICE AND SUFFRAGE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The conclusion is plain. A democracy which -asserts the right of manhood suffrage, while denying -the duty of manhood service, is living in a fool's -paradise. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P400"></a>400}</span> -</p> - -<p> -A democracy which does not fully identify itself -with its army, which does not treat its army with -honour and as an equal, but which treats it, on the -contrary, as ill-bred and ill-tempered people treat -their servants—with a mixture, that is, of fault-finding -and condescension—is following a very perilous -path. -</p> - -<p> -An army which does not receive the treatment it -deserves, and which at the same time is ordered by -the politicians to perform services which, upon -occasions, it may hold to be inconsistent with its -honour, is a danger to the state. -</p> - -<p> -A democracy which, having refused to train itself -for its own defence, thinks nevertheless that it can -safely raise the issue of 'the Army versus the People,' -is mad. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0407fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0407fn1text">1</a>] This was the German period -of training for infantry. The National -Service League proposal was four months. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0407fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0407fn2text">2</a>] The pay of the French private soldier is, -I understand, about a sou—a halfpenny—a day. -In his eyes the British soldier in the next trench, -who receives from a shilling to eighteenpence -a day—and in the case of -married men a separation allowance as -well—must appear as a kind of -millionaire. During the South African War -the pay of certain volunteer -regiments reached the preposterous figure -of five shillings a day for privates. -Men serving with our army as motor -drivers—in comparative safety—receive -something like six shillings or seven and sixpence a day. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0408"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P401"></a>401}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER VIII -<br /> -SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS -</h3> - -<p> -Prior to the present war the chief bugbears -encountered by Lord Roberts, and indeed by all -others whose aim it was to provide this country with -an army numerically fit to support its policy, were -the objections, real or imaginary, of the British race -to compulsory service, and more particularly to -compulsory service in foreign lands. These prejudices -were true types of the bugbear; for they were born -out of opinion and not out of the facts. -</p> - -<p> -The smaller fry of politicians, whose fears—like -those of the monkeys—are more easily excited by -the front-row of things which are visible, than by -the real dangers which lurk behind in the shadow, -are always much more terrified of opinion than of -the facts. This is precisely why most politicians -remain all their lives more unfit than any other class -of man for governing a country. Give one of these -his choice—ask him whether he will prefer to support -a cause where the facts are with him, but opinion is -likely for many years to be running hard against him, -or another cause where these conditions are reversed—of -course he will never hesitate a moment about -choosing the latter. And very probably his manner -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P402"></a>402}</span> -of answering will indicate, that he thinks you insult -his intelligence by asking such a question. -</p> - -<p> -It is only the very rare type of big, patient politician, -who realises that the facts cannot be changed -by opinion, and that in the end opinion must be -changed by the facts, if the two happen to be opposed. -Such a one chooses accordingly, to follow the facts in -spite of unpopularity. -</p> - -<p> -The little fellows, on the contrary, with their -large ears glued anxiously to the ground, keep ever -muttering to themselves, and chaunting in a sort of -rhythmical chorus, the most despicable incantation -in the whole political vocabulary:—"We who aspire -to be leaders of the People must see to it that we are -never in advance of the People.... The People -will never stand this: the People will never stand -that.... Away with it therefore; and if possible -attach it like a mill-stone round the necks of our -enemies." -</p> - -<p> -Of course they are quite wrong. The People will -stand anything which is necessary for the national -welfare, if the matter is explained to them by a big -enough man in accents of sincerity. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -A defensive force which will on no account cross -the frontier is no defensive force at all. It is only -a laughing-stock. -</p> - -<p> -A frontier is sometimes an arbitrary line drawn -across meadow and plough; sometimes a river; -sometimes a mountain range; sometimes, as with -ourselves, it is a narrow strip of sea—a 'great ditch,' -as Cromwell called it contemptuously. -</p> - -<p> -The awful significance, however, of the word -'frontier' seems to deepen and darken as we pass -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P403"></a>403}</span> -from the first example to the fourth. And there is -apparently something more in this feeling than the -terrors of the channel crossing or of a foreign language. -Territorials may be taken to Ireland, which is a -longer sea-journey than from Dover to Calais; but -to be 'butchered abroad'—horrible! -</p> - -<p> -It is horrible enough to be butchered anywhere, -but why more horrible in the valley of the Rhine -than in that of the Thames? If national safety -demands butchery, as it has often done in the past, -surely the butchery of 50,000 brave men on the -borders of Luxemburg is a less evil than the butchery -of twice that number in the vicinity of Norwich? -And if we are to consider national comfort as well as -safety, it is surely wise to follow the German example -and fight in any man's country rather than in -our own. The only question of real importance -is this:—At what place will the sacrifice of life -be most effective for the defence of the country? -If we can answer that we shall know also where -it will be lightest.[<a id="chap0408fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0408fn1">1</a>] -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE HONOUR OF THE ARMY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The school of political thought which remained -predominant throughout the great industrial epoch -(1832-1886) bitterly resented the assumption, made by -certain classes, that the profession of arms was more -honourable in its nature, than commerce and other -peaceful pursuits. The destruction of this supposed -fallacy produced a great literature, and even a -considerable amount of poetry. It was a frequent theme -at the opening of literary institutes and technical -colleges, and also at festivals of chambers of commerce -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P404"></a>404}</span> -and municipalities. Professors of Political Economy -expounded the true doctrine with great vehemence, -and sermons were preached without number upon -the well-worn text about the victories of peace. -</p> - -<p> -This reaction was salutary up to a point. It -swept away a vast quantity of superannuated rubbish. -International relations were at this time just as much -cumbered with old meaningless phrases of a certain -sort, in which vainglory was the chief ingredient, as -they have recently been cumbered with others of a -different sort in which indolence was the chief ingredient. -Inefficiency, indifference, idleness, trifling, and -extravagance were a standing charge against soldiers as -a class; and though they were never true charges -against the class, they were true, for two generations -following after Waterloo, against a large number of -individuals. But this reaction, like most other -reactions, swept away too much. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE PROFESSION OF ARMS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -A mercenary soldiery which looks to enrich itself -by pay and plunder is an ignoble institution. It -has no right to give itself airs of honour, and must be -judged like company promotion, trusts, or any of -the many other predatory professions of modern -times. It is also a national danger, inasmuch as its -personal interest is to foment wars. The British -Army has never been open to this charge in any -period of its history. -</p> - -<p> -A profession in which it is only possible, by the most -severe self-denial and economy, for an officer—even -after he has arrived at success—to live on his pay, to -marry, and to bring up a family, can hardly be ranked -as a money-making career. Pecuniary motives, -indeed, were never the charge against 'the military' -except among the stump-orator class. But -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P405"></a>405}</span> -professional indifference and inefficiency were, at that -particular time, not only seriously alleged, but were -also not infrequently true. It was a good thing that -slackness should be swept away. That it has been -swept away pretty thoroughly, every one who has -known anything about the Army for a generation -past, is well aware. -</p> - -<p> -But the much-resented claim to a superiority in -the matter of honour is well founded, and no amount -of philosophising or political-economising will ever -shake it. Clearly it is more honourable for a man -to risk his life, and what is infinitely more -important—his reputation and his whole future career—in -defence of his country, than it is merely to build up -a competency or a fortune. The soldier's profession -is beset by other and greater dangers than the physical. -Money-making pursuits are not only safer for the skin, -but in them a blunder, or even a series of blunders, -does not banish the hope of ultimate success. The -man of business has chances of retrieving his position. -Many bankrupts have died in affluence. In politics, -a man with a plausible tongue and a certain quality -of courage, will usually succeed in eluding the -consequences of his mistakes, by laying the blame on -other people's shoulders. But the soldier is rarely -given a second chance; and he may easily come down -at the first chance, through sheer ill-luck, and not -through any fault of his own. Such a profession -confers honour upon its members. -</p> - -<p> -Law, trade, and finance are not in themselves, as -was at one time thought, dishonourable pursuits; -but neither are they in themselves honourable. They -are neither the one nor the other. It casts no slur -upon a man to be a lawyer, a tradesman, or a banker; -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P406"></a>406}</span> -but neither does it confer upon him any honour. -But military service does confer an honour. The -devotion, hardship, and danger of the soldier's life are -not rewarded upon a commercial basis, or reckoned -in that currency. -</p> - -<p> -Some people are inclined to mock at the respect—exaggerated -as they think—which is paid by conscript -countries to their armies. For all its excesses and -absurdities, this respect is founded upon a true -principle—a truer principle of conduct than our own. -In countries where most of the able-bodied men -have given some years of their lives gratuitously to -the service of their country, the fact is brought home -to them, that such service is of a different character -from the benefits which they subsequently confer -upon the State by their industry and thrift, or by -growing rich. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -A THEORY OF BRITISH FREEDOM -</span> -</p> - -<p> -From the national point of view, it is ennobling -that at some period of their lives the great majority -of citizens should have served the commonwealth -disinterestedly. This after all is the only principle -which will support a commonwealth. For a commonwealth -will not stand against the shocks, which -history teaches us to beware of, merely by dropping -papers, marked with a cross, into a ballot-box once -every five years, or even oftener. It will not stand -merely by taking an intelligent interest in events, -by attending meetings and reading the newspapers, -and by indulging in outbursts of indignation or -enthusiasm. It will only stand by virtue of personal -service, and by the readiness of the whole people, -generation by generation, to give their lives -and—what is much harder to face—the time and irksome -preparation which are necessary for making the -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P407"></a>407}</span> -sacrifice of their lives—should it be called -for—effective for its purpose. -</p> - -<p> -If the mass of the people, even when they have -realised the need, will not accept the obligation of -national service they must be prepared to see their -institutions perish, to lose control of their own -destinies, and to welcome another master than -Democracy, who it may well be, will not put them -to the trouble of dropping papers, marked with a -cross, into ballot-boxes once in five years, or indeed -at all. For a State may continue to exist even if -deprived of ballot-boxes; but it is doomed if its -citizens will not in time prepare themselves to defend -it with their lives. -</p> - -<p> -The memories of the press-gang and the militia -ballot are dim. Both belong to a past which it is -the custom to refer to with reprobation. Both were -inconsistent with equal comradeship between classes; -with justice, dignity, honour, and the unity of the -nation; and on these grounds they are rightly -condemned. -</p> - -<p> -But the press-gang and the militia ballot have -been condemned, and are still condemned, upon other -grounds which do not seem so firm. Both have -been condemned as contravening that great and -laudable principle of British freedom which lays it -down that those who like fighting, or prefer it to -other evils—like starvation and imprisonment—or -who can be bribed, or in some other way persuaded -to fight, should enjoy the monopoly of being -'butchered,' both abroad and at home. And it has -been further maintained by those who held these -views, that people who do not like fighting, but choose -rather to stay at home talking, criticising, enjoying -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P408"></a>408}</span> -fine thrills of patriotism, making money, and sleeping -under cover, have some kind of divine right to go on -enjoying that form of existence undisturbed. Since -the Wars of the Roses the latter class has usually -been in a great majority in England. Even during -the Cromwellian Civil War the numbers of men, -capable of bearing arms, who actually bore them, -was only a smallish fraction of the entire population. -</p> - -<p> -The moral ideals of any community, like other -things, are apt to be settled by numbers. With the -extension of popular government, and the increase -of the electorate, this tendency will assert itself more -and more. But providing the people are dealt with -plainly and frankly, without flattery or deceit—like -men and not as if they were greedy children—the -moral sense of a democracy will probably be sounder -and stronger than that of any other form of State. -</p> - -<p> -Even in England, however, there have been -lapses, during which the people have not been so -treated, and the popular spirit has sunk, owing to -mean leadership, into degradation. During the whole -of the industrial epoch the idea steadily gained in -strength, that those whose battles were fought for -them by others, approached more nearly to the type -of the perfect citizen than those others who actually -fought the battles; that the protected were worthier -than the protectors. -</p> - -<p> -According to this view the true meaning of -'freedom' was exemption from personal service. -The whole duty of the virtuous citizen with regard -to the defence of his country began and ended with -paying a policeman. With the disappearance of -imminent and visible danger, the reprobate qualities -of the soldier became speedily a pain and a scandal -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P409"></a>409}</span> -to godly men. In time of peace he was apt to be -sneered at and decried as an idler and a spendthrift, -who would not stand well in a moral comparison with -those steady fellows, who had remained at home, -working hard at their vocations and investing their -savings. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NINETEENTH CENTURY NOTIONS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The soldier, moreover, according to Political -Economy, was occupied in a non-productive trade, -and therefore it was contrary to the principles of that -science to waste more money upon him than could -be avoided. Also it was prudent not to show too -much gratitude to those who had done the fighting, -lest they should become presumptuous and formidable. -</p> - -<p> -This conception of the relations between the army -and the civilian population has been specially marked -at several periods in our history—after the -Cromwellian wars; after the Marlborough wars; after -1757; but during the half century which followed -Waterloo it seemed to have established itself -permanently as an article of our political creed. -</p> - -<p> -After 1815 there was an utter weariness of fighting, -following upon nearly a quarter of a century of war. -The heroism of Wellington's armies was still tainted -in the popular memory by the fact that the prisons -had been opened to find him recruits. The industrial -expansion and prodigious growth of material wealth -absorbed men's minds. Middle-class ideals, middle-class -prosperity, middle-class irritation against a -military caste which, in spite of its comparative -poverty, continued with some success to assert its -social superiority, combined against the army in -popular discussions. The honest belief that wars -were an anachronism, and that the world was now -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P410"></a>410}</span> -launched upon an interminable era of peace, clothed -the nakedness of class prejudice with some kind of -philosophic raiment. Soldiers were no longer needed; -why then should they continue to claim the lion's -share of honourable recognition? -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -Up to August 1914 the chief difficulties in the -way of army reformers were how to overcome the -firmly-rooted ideas that preparations for war upon a -great scale were not really necessary to security, and -that, on those rare occasions when fighting might be -necessary, it should not be undertaken by the most -virtuous class of citizens, but by others whose lives -had a lower value. If the citizen paid it was enough; -and he claimed the right to grumble even at paying. -This was the old Liberal faith of the eighteen-fifties, -and it remained the faith of the straitest Radical sect, -until German guns began to batter down the forts of -Liège. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -A CHANGE OF TONE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -But any one who remembers the state of public -opinion between 1870 and 1890, or who has read the -political memoirs of that time, will realise that a change -has been, very slowly and gradually, stealing over public -opinion ever since the end of that epoch. In those -earlier times the only danger which disturbed our -national equanimity, and that only very slightly, -was the approach of Russia towards the north-western -frontier of India. The volunteer movement came -to be regarded more and more by ordinary people -in the light of a healthy and manly recreation, rather -than as a duty. A lad would make his choice, very -much as if volunteering were on a par with rowing, -sailing, hunting, or polo. It is probably no exaggeration -to say that nine volunteers out of every ten, who -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P411"></a>411}</span> -enrolled themselves between 1870 and 1890, never -believed for a single moment that there was a chance -of the country having need of their services. -Consequently, except in the case of a few extreme -enthusiasts, it never appeared that there was -anything unpatriotic in not joining the volunteers. -</p> - -<p> -One has only to compare this with the attitude -which has prevailed since the Territorial Army came -into existence, to realise that there has been a stirring -of the waters, and that in certain quarters a change -had taken place in the national mood. With regard -to the Territorials the attitude of those who joined, -of those who did not join, of the politicians, of the -press, of public opinion generally was markedly -different from the old attitude. It was significant -that a man who did not join was often disposed to -excuse and to justify his abstention. The -conditions of his calling, or competing duties made it -impossible for him; or the lowness of his health, or -the highness of his principles in some way interfered. -There was a tendency now to explain what previously -would never have called for any explanation. -</p> - -<p> -The causes of this change are not less obvious -than its symptoms. It is an interesting coincidence -that Lord Kitchener had a good deal to do with it. -The destruction of the bloodthirsty tyranny of the -Khalifa (1898), and the rescue of a fertile province -from waste, misery, and massacre, caused many -people to look with less disapproving eyes than -formerly upon the profession of the soldier. The -long anxieties of the South African War, and the -levies of volunteers from all parts of the Empire, who -went out to take a share in it, forced men to think -not only more kindly of soldiers, but also to think -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P412"></a>412}</span> -of war itself no longer as an illusion but as a -reality.[<a id="chap0408fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0408fn2">2</a>] -</p> - -<p> -The events which happened during the last -decade—the creation of the German Navy—the attempt -and failure of the British Government to abate the -rivalry in armaments—the naval panic and the -hastily summoned Defence Conference in 1909—the -Russo-Japanese war—the Agadir crisis—the two -Balkan wars—the military competition between -Germany and France—all these combined to sharpen -the consciousness of danger and to draw attention -to the need for being prepared against it. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -These events, which crowded the beginning of the -twentieth century, stirred and troubled public opinion -in a manner which not only Mr. Cobden, who died in -1865, but almost equally Mr. Gladstone, who survived -him by more than thirty years, would have utterly -refused to credit. Both these statesmen had been -convinced that the world was moving steadily -towards a settled peace, and that before another -century had passed away—possibly even in a single -generation—their dreams of general disarmament -would be approaching fulfilment. -</p> - -<p> -And to a certain extent our own generation -remains still affected by the same notions. Amid -the thunders of more than a thousand miles of battle -we still find ourselves clinging tenaciously to the -belief, that the world has entered suddenly, and -unexpectedly, upon an abnormal period which, from -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P413"></a>413}</span> -its very nature, can only be of very brief duration. -This comforting conviction does not appear to rest -upon solid grounds. In the light of history it would -not seem so certain that we have not passed out of -an abnormal period into the normal—if lamentable—condition -when a nation, in order to maintain its -independence, must be prepared at any moment to -fight for its life. -</p> - -<p> -It would be profitless to pursue these speculations. -It is enough for our own generation that we now -find ourselves in a situation of the gravest danger; -and that it depends upon the efforts which we as a -nation put forth, more than upon anything else, -whether the danger will pass away or settle down -and become chronic. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NATURE OF GERMAN ENMITY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Although we failed to perceive or acknowledge -the danger until some nine months ago, it had been -there for at least fifteen years, probably for twice -that number. -</p> - -<p> -German antagonism to England has been compounded -of envy of our possessions, contempt for -our character, and hatred of our good fortune. What -galled our rival more than anything else, was the -fact that we enjoyed our prosperity, and held our -vast Empire, upon too easy terms. The German -people had made, and were continuing to make, -sacrifices to maintain their position in the world, -while the British people in their view were making -none. And if we measure national sacrifices by -personal service, and not merely in money payments, -it is difficult to see what answer is to be given to this -charge. -</p> - -<p> -It is clear that unless the result of this war be to -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P414"></a>414}</span> -crush Germany as completely as she herself hoped -at the beginning of it, to crush France, our own -danger will remain, unless Germany's chief grievance -against us is meanwhile removed. It is not a -paradox, but merely a statement of plain fact, to say -that Germany's chief grievance against ourselves -was, that we were not prepared to withstand her -attack. Her hatred, which has caused, and still -causes us so much amazement, was founded upon -the surest of foundations—a want of respect. The -Germans despised a nation which refused to recognise -that any obligation rested on its citizens, to fit -themselves, by serious training, for defence of their -inheritance. And they will continue to despise us -when this war is over if we should still fail to recognise -this obligation. Despising us, they will continue -also to hate us; the peace of the world will still be -endangered; and we shall not, after all our sacrifices, -have reached the security at which we aimed. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -HEART-SEARCHINGS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -We may end this war without winning it, and at -the same time without being defeated. And although -it appears to be still believed by some persons that -we can win, in some sort of fashion, without accepting -the principle of national service, even those who -entertain this dangerous confidence will hardly dare -to deny that, after a war which ends without a -crowning victory, we shall have to accept conscription -at once upon the signature of peace. -</p> - -<p> -For it should be remembered that we have -other things to take into account besides the mood -of Germany. If we stave off defeat, only with the -assistance of allies—all of whom have long ago -adopted universal military service in its most rigorous -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P415"></a>415}</span> -form—we shall have to reckon with their appraisement -of the value of our assistance. If we are -to judge by Germany's indomitable enterprise -during the past two generations, she is likely to recover -from the effects of this war at least as rapidly as -ourselves. And when she has recovered, will she -not hunger again for our possessions, as eagerly as -before, if she sees them still inadequately guarded? -And maybe, when that time comes, there may be -some difficulty in finding allies. For a Power which -declines to recognise the obligation of equal sacrifices, -which refuses to make preparations in time of peace, -and which accordingly, when war occurs, is ever found -unready, is not the most eligible of comrades in arms. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -In a recent letter the Freiherr von Hexenküchen -refers, in his sour way, to some of the matters which -have been discussed in this chapter.... "The -British People," he writes, "appear to be mightily -exercised just now about their own and their -neighbours' consciences; about what they may or may -not do with decency; about whether or no football -matches are right; or race-meetings; or plays, -music-hall entertainments, concerts, the purchase -of new clothes, and the drinking of alcohol; whether -indeed any form of enjoyment or cheerfulness ought -to be tolerated in present circumstances. -</p> - -<p> -"But although you vex yourselves over these -and other problems of a similar kind, you never -seem to vex yourselves about the abscess at the -root of the tooth. -</p> - -<p> -"The Holy Roman Empire, which was not holy, -nor Roman, nor yet an empire, reminds me not a -little of your so-called voluntary military system, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P416"></a>416}</span> -which is not voluntary, nor military, nor yet a -system. It is only a chaos, a paradox, and a -laughing-stock to us Germans. -</p> - -<p> -"It is our army, and not yours, which really rests -on a voluntary basis. Our whole people for a -century past have voluntarily accepted the obligation -of universal military service. Those amongst -us who have raised objections to this system are -but an inconsiderable fraction; negligible at any -time, but in this or any other great crisis, not merely -negligible, but altogether invisible and inaudible. -</p> - -<p> -"Our people desire their army to be as it is, -otherwise it would not be as it is. No Kaiser, or -Bureaucracy, or General Staff could impose such -a system against the public will and conscience. -Your people, on the other hand, have refused <i>as -a people</i> to accept the military obligation. By -various devices they endeavour to fix the burden -on the shoulders of individuals. Is this the true -meaning of the word 'voluntary'—<i>to refuse?</i> ... Sir, -I desire to be civil; but was there ever a more -conspicuous instance of cant in the whole history -of the world, than your self-righteous boastings about -your 'voluntary' military system? -</p> - -<p> -"You may wonder why I bracket these two things -together—your soul-searchings about amusements -of all kinds, and your nonsensical panegyrics on the -voluntary' principle.... To my eyes they are -very closely connected. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE DUTY OF CHEERFULNESS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -"Cheerfulness is a duty in time of war. Every -man or woman who smiles, and keeps a good heart, -and goes about his or her day's work gaily, helps -by so much to sustain the national spirit. Not -good, but harm, is done to the conduct of the war, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P417"></a>417}</span> -by moping and brooding over casualty lists, and -by speculations as to disasters which have occurred, -or are thought to be imminent. But there is one -essential preliminary to national cheerfulness—before -a nation can be cheerful it must have a good -conscience; and it cannot have a good conscience -unless it has done its duty. -</p> - -<p> -"Your nation has a bad conscience. The reason -is that, <i>as a nation</i>, it has not done its duty. This -may be the fault of the leaders who have not dared -to speak the word of command. But the fact -remains, that you well know—or at any rate suspect -in your hearts—that you have not done your whole -duty. And consequently you cannot be really -cheerful about anything. As you go about your -daily work or recreations, you are all the while -looking back over your shoulders with misgiving. -<i>As a nation</i> you have not—even yet—dedicated -yourselves to this war. When you have done so—if -ever you do—your burden of gloom and mistrust -will fall from your back, like that of <i>Christian</i> as he -passed along the highway, which is fenced on either -side with the Wall that is called <i>Salvation</i>." -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -In the great American Civil War, the Southern -States, which aimed at breaking away from the Union, -adopted conscription within a year from the -beginning. They were brave fighters; but they were -poor, and they were in a small minority. The -Northern States—confident in their numbers and -wealth—relied at first upon the voluntary system. -It gave them great and gallant armies; but these -was not enough; and as months went by President -Lincoln realised that they were not enough. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P418"></a>418}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Disregarding the entreaties of his friends, to -beware of asking of the people 'what the people -would never stand,' disregarding the clamours of -his enemies about personal freedom, he insisted upon -conscription, believing that by these means alone -the Union could be saved. And what was the result? -A section of the press foamed with indignation. -Mobs yelled, demonstrated, and in their illogical -fury, lynched negroes, seeing in these unfortunates -the cause of all their troubles. But the mobs were -not the American people. They were only a noisy -and contemptible minority of the American people, -whose importance as well as courage had been vastly -over-rated. The quiet people were in deadly earnest, -and they supported their President.[<a id="chap0408fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0408fn3">3</a>] -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -LINCOLN AND CONSCRIPTION -</span> -</p> - -<p> -But the task which Lincoln set himself was one -of the hardest that a democratic statesman ever -undertook. The demand which he determined to -make, and did make, may well have tried his heart -as he sat alone in the night watches. For compulsion -was a violation of the habits and prejudices of the -old American stock, while it was even more distasteful -to new immigrants. It was contrary to the traditions -and theories of the Republic, and, as many thought, -to its fundamental principles. It was open to scornful -attack on grounds of sentiment. Against a foe who -were so weak, both in numbers and wealth, how -humiliating to be driven to such desperate measures! -But most of all—outweighing all other -considerations—this war of North and South was not only -war, but civil war. Families and lifelong friendships -were divided. What compulsion meant, therefore, -in this case was, that brothers were to be forced to -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P419"></a>419}</span> -kill brothers, husbands were to be sent out to slay -the kinsmen of their wives, or—as they marched with -Sherman through Georgia—to set a light with their -own hands to the old homesteads where they had -been born. Between the warring States there were -no differences of blood, tradition, or religion; or of -ideas of right and wrong; no hatred against a foreign -race; only an acute opposition of political ideals. -Compulsion, therefore, was a great thing to ask of -the American people. But the American people -are a great people, and they understood. And -Lincoln was a great man,—one of the greatest, noblest, -and most human in the whole of history,—and he -did not hesitate to ask, to insist, and to use force. -What the end was does not need to be stated here; -except merely this, that a lingering and bloody war -was thereby greatly shortened, and that the Union -was saved. -</p> - -<p> -The British Government and people are faced -to-day with some, but not all—and not the greatest—of -Lincoln's difficulties. Our traditions and theories -are the same, to a large extent, as those which prevailed -in America in 1863. But unlike the North we have -had recent experience of war, and also of the sacrifices -which war calls for from the civilian population. -By so much the shock of compulsion would find us -better prepared. -</p> - -<p> -But the other and much greater difficulties which -beset Lincoln do not exist in the case of the British -Government. We are not fighting against a foe -inferior in numbers, but against one who up till now -has been greatly superior in numbers—who has also -been greatly superior in equipment, and preparation, -and in deeply-laid plans. We are fighting against -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P420"></a>420}</span> -a foe who has invaded and encroached; not against -one who is standing on the defensive, demanding -merely to be let go free. The family affections and -friendships which would be outraged by conscription -in this war against Germany are inconsiderable; mere -dust in the balance. The present war is waged against -a foreign nation; it is not civil war. It is waged -against an enemy who plainly seeks, not his own -freedom, but our destruction, and that of our Allies. -It is waged against an enemy who by the treacherous -thoroughness of his peace-time preparations, appears -to our eyes to have violated good faith as between -nations, as in the conduct of the campaign he has -disregarded the obligations of our common humanity, -We may be wrong; we may take exaggerated views -owing to the bitterness of the struggle; but such is -our mind upon the matter. -</p> - -<p> -Lincoln's task would have been light had such -been the mind of the Northern States half a century -ago, and had he been faced with nothing more -formidable than the conditions which prevail in -England to-day. It does not need the courage of a -Lincoln to demand from our people a sacrifice, upon -which the safety of the British Empire depends, -even more certainly, than in 1863 did that of the -American Union. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0408fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0408fn1text">1</a>] Once more it is desirable to correct -the erroneous impression that the -conscript armies of continental powers -are under no liability to serve outside -their own territories or overseas. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0408fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0408fn2text">2</a>] Influences of another kind altogether -had much to do with the cleansing -of public opinion—the writings of Henley, -of Mahan, and of Mr. Rudyard -Kipling. Though not so well known -as the works of these, Henderson's <i>Life -of Stonewall Jackson</i> has nevertheless -changed many courses of thought, -and its indirect effect in removing -false standards has been very great. I -can never sufficiently acknowledge my -personal debt to these four. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0408fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0408fn3text">3</a>] Cf. <i>Round Table</i>, March 1915, 'The Politics of War.' -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /></p> - -<p><a id="chap0409"></a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum">{<a id="P421"></a>421}</span></p> - -<h3> -CHAPTER IX -<br /> -THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR -</h3> - -<p> -If in the foregoing pages the Liberal party has -come in for the larger share of criticism, the reason -is, that during the ten critical years, while dangers -were drawing to a head, a Liberal Government -chanced to be in power. That things would have -been managed better and more courageously had -the Unionists been in power may be doubted; and -certainly it is no part of my present task to champion -any such theory. -</p> - -<p> -The special type of politician whose influence -has wrought so much evil of late is no peculiar product -of the Liberal party. He is the product of the party -system in its corrupt decadence. You find him in -the ranks of the Opposition as well as in those of -the Ministerialists, just as you find good and true -men in both. In this last lies our hope. In our -present trouble good and true men have a chance -of taking things into their own hands, which has been -denied to them for many generations. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -This book has been written to establish the <i>Need</i> -for National Service, in order that the British Empire -may maintain itself securely in the present -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P422"></a>422}</span> -circumstances of the world. If this contention be true it -is obvious that a corresponding <i>Duty</i> lies upon -the whole nation to accept the burden of military -service. -</p> - -<p> -Neither need nor duty has ever been made clear -to the British people by their leaders. Owing to the -abuses of the party system, increasing steadily over -a considerable period of years, a certain type of -politician has been evolved, and has risen into great -prominence—a type which does not trust the people, -but only fears them. In order to maintain themselves -and their parties in power, politicians of this -type have darkened the eyes and drugged the spirit -of the nation. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -It is no part of the plan of this volume to offer -criticisms upon the naval and military aspects of -the present war, or upon the wisdom or unwisdom -of the operations which have been undertaken by -land and sea. All that need be said in this connection -may be put into a very few words. -</p> - -<p> -As we read and re-read British history we cannot -but be impressed with the fact that our leading -statesmen, misled by the very brilliancy of their -intellectual endowments, have always been prone to -two errors of policy, which the simpler mind of the -soldier instinctively avoids. They have ever been -too ready to conclude prematurely that a certain line -of obstacles is so formidable that it cannot be forced; -and they have also ever been too ready to accept -the notion, that there must surely be some ingenious -far way round, by which they may succeed in -circumventing the infinite. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -MAIN PRINCIPLE OF STRATEGY -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The defect of brilliant brains is not necessarily a -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P423"></a>423}</span> -want of courage—daring there has usually been in -plenty—but they are apt to lack fortitude. They -are apt to abandon the assault upon positions which -are not really invulnerable, and to go off, chasing -after attractive butterflies, until they fall into -quagmires. Dispersion of effort has always been the -besetting sin of British statesmen and the curse of -British policy. There is no clearer example of this -than the case of William Pitt the Younger, who -went on picking up sugar islands all over the world, -when he ought to have been giving his whole -strength to beating Napoleon. -</p> - -<p> -Very few obstacles are really insurmountable, -and it is usually the shortest and the safest course -to stick to what has been already begun. Especially -is this the case when your resources in trained soldiers -and munitions of war are painfully restricted. At -the one point, where you have decided to attack, -the motto is <i>push hard</i>; and at all others, where -you may be compelled to defend yourselves, the -motto is <i>hold fast</i>. -</p> - -<p> -The peril of British war councils in the past has -always been (and maybe still is) the tendency of -ingenious argument to get the better of sound -judgment. In the very opposite of this lies safety. -We find the true type of high policy, as well as -of successful campaigning, in the cool and patient -inflexibility of Wellington, holding fast by one -main idea, forcing his way over one obstacle after -another which had been pronounced invincible—through -walled cities; into the deep valleys of the -Pyrenees; across the Bidassoa—till from the crests -of the Great Rhune and the Little his soldiers looked -down at last upon the plains of France. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P424"></a>424}</span> -</p> - -<p> -Our most urgent problem with regard to the -present war, is how we may win it most thoroughly; -but, in addition to this, there are two questions -which have recently engaged a good deal of public -attention. There is a <i>Political</i> question—what sort -of European settlement is to take place after the -war? And there is also a <i>Criminal</i> question—what -sort of punishment shall be meted out, if crimes, -contrary to the practice of war among civilised -and humane states, have been committed by our -antagonists? -</p> - -<p> -I have not attempted to deal with either of these. -They do not seem to be of extreme urgency; for -unless, and until, we win the war it is somewhat idle -to discuss the ultimate fate of Europe or the penalty -of evil deeds. You cannot restore stolen property -until you have recovered it, and you cannot punish -a malefactor, nor is it very convenient even to try -him, while he is still at large. If that be true, which -was said of old by a great king—<i>I do not make peace -with barbarians but dictate the terms of their -surrender</i>—we are still a long way from that. -</p> - -<p> -I have not occupied myself therefore with what -are termed 'German atrocities.' So far as this -matter is concerned, I am satisfied to let it rest for -the present upon the German statement of intentions -before war began,[<a id="chap0409fn1text"></a><a href="#chap0409fn1">1</a>] and upon the proclamations which -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P425"></a>425}</span> -have been issued subsequently, with the object of -justifying their mode of operations by sea and land. -The case against Germany on her own admission, is -quite strong enough without opening a further -inquisition under this heading.[<a id="chap0409fn2text"></a><a href="#chap0409fn2">2</a>] -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING ABOUT -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is essential, however, to realise the falsities -and perversities upon which the great fabric of -German policy is founded; for otherwise we shall -never understand either the nature of the enemy -with whom we are at present engaged, or the full -extent of the danger by which, not only we, but -civilisation itself is now threatened. It is essential -that the whole British race should understand the -nature of the evils <i>against</i> which they are fighting—the -ambitions of Germany—the ruthless despotism -of the Prussian system—the new theories of right -and wrong which have been evolved by thinkers -who have been paid, promoted, and inspired by the -State, in order to sanctify the imperial policy of -spoliation. -</p> - -<p> -It is also essential for us to realise the nature of -those things <i>for</i> which we are fighting—what we -shall save and secure for our posterity in case of -victory; what we stand to lose in event of defeat. -The preservation or ruin of our inheritance, spiritual -and material—the maintenance or overthrow of our -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P426"></a>426}</span> -institutions, traditions, and ideas—the triumph, of -these, or the supplanting of them by a wholly -different order, which to our eyes wears the appearance -of a vast machine under the control of savages—are -the main issues of the present war. And when -now at last, we face them squarely, we begin to -wonder, why of late years, we have been wont to -treat problems of national defence and imperial -security with so much levity and indifference. -</p> - -<p> -It is profitable to turn our eyes from the -contemplation of German shortcomings inwards upon -our own. If we have been guilty as a people -during recent times of weakness, blindness, indolence, -or cowardice, we should face these facts squarely, -otherwise there is but a poor chance of arriving at -better conditions. If we have refused to listen to -unpleasant truths, and to exchange a drowsy and -dangerous comfort against sacrifices which were -necessary for security, it is foolish to lay the whole -blame upon this or that public man, this or that -government. For, after all, both public men and -governments were our own creation; we chose them -because we liked them; because it gave us pleasure -and consolation to listen to their sayings; because -their doings and their non-doings, their un-doings -and their mis-doings were regarded with approval -or indifference by the great bulk of our people. -</p> - -<p> -It would be wise also to take to heart the lesson, -plainly written across the record of the last nine -months, that the present confusion of our political -system is responsible, as much as anything—perhaps -more than anything—for the depreciated currency -of public character. The need is obvious for a -Parliament and a Government chosen by the Empire, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P427"></a>427}</span> -responsible to the Empire, and charged with the -security of the Empire, and with no other task. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -CAUSES OF WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Why we are fighting at all is one of our problems; -why we are finding it so hard to win is another. In -what does the main strength of our enemies consist? -And in what does our own chief weakness consist? -</p> - -<p> -To say that our weakness is to be sought in our -own vices, and the strength of our enemies in their -virtues, is of course a commonplace. But one has -only to open the average newspaper to realise the -need for restating the obvious. For there the -contrary doctrine is set forth daily and weekly with -a lachrymose insistency—that our hands are weakened -because we are so good; that the Germans fight at -an enormous advantage because they are so wicked -and unscrupulous. -</p> - -<p> -But the things which we are finding hardest to -overcome in our foes are not the immoral gibberings of -professors, or the blundering cynicism of the German -Foreign Office, or the methodical savagery of the -General Staff, whether in Belgium or on the High -Seas. These are sources of weakness and not of -strength; and even at the present stage it is clear -that, although they have inflicted immeasurable -suffering, they have done the German cause much -more harm than good. -</p> - -<p> -Our real obstacles are the loyalty, the self-sacrifice, -and the endurance of the German people. -</p> - -<p> -The causes of British weakness are equally plain. -Our indolence and factiousness; our foolish -confidence in cleverness, manoeuvres, and debate for -overcoming obstacles which lie altogether outside -that region of human endeavour; our absorption as -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P428"></a>428}</span> -thrilled spectators in the technical game of British -politics[<a id="chap0409fn3text"></a><a href="#chap0409fn3">3</a>]—these vices and others of a similar -character, which, since the beginning of the war we have -been struggling—like a man awakening from a nightmare—to -shake off, are still our chief difficulties. It -is a hard job to get rid of them, and we are not yet -anything like halfway through with it. -</p> - -<p> -It must be clear to every detached observer, -that the moral strength of England in the present -struggle—like that of France—does not lie in -Government or Opposition, but in the spirit of the people; -that this spirit has drawn but little support, in the -case of either country, from the leadership and -example of the politicians; and that there is little -cause in either case to bless or praise them for the -fidelity of their previous stewardship. In the case of -France this national spirit was assured at the -beginning; in our own case the process of awakening has -proceeded much more slowly. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -ILLUSIONS OF SUCCESS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is essential to put certain notions out of our -heads and certain other notions into them. From -the beginning of the war, a large part of the -press—acting, we are entitled to suppose, in patriotic -obedience to the directions of the Press Bureau—has -fostered ideas which do not correspond with the -facts. Information has been doled out and presented -in such a way as to destroy all sense of proportion -in the public mind. -</p> - -<p> -It is not an uncommon belief,[<a id="chap0409fn4text"></a><a href="#chap0409fn4">4</a>] for example, that -we with our Allies—ever since the first onset, when, -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P429"></a>429}</span> -being virtuously unprepared, we were pushed back -some little distance—have been doing much better -than the Germans; that for months past our -adversaries have been in a desperate plight—lacking -ammunition, on the verge of bankruptcy and -starvation, and thoroughly discouraged. -</p> - -<p> -There is also a tendency to assume—despite Lord -Kitchener's grave and repeated warnings to the -contrary—that the war is drawing rapidly to a -conclusion, and that, even if we may have to submit -to some interruption of our usual summer holidays, -at any rate we shall eat our Christmas dinners in an -atmosphere of peace and goodwill. -</p> - -<p> -The magnitude of the German victories, both in the -East and West, during the earlier stages of the war, -is not realised even now by the great majority of -our fellow-countrymen; while the ruinous consequences -of these victories to our Allies—the occupation -of Belgium, of a large part of northern France, -and of Western Poland—is dwelt on far too lightly. -Nor is it understood by one man in a hundred, that -up to the end of last year, British troops were never -holding more than thirty miles, out of that line of -nearly five hundred which winds, like a great snake, -from Nieuport to the Swiss frontier. On the -contrary, it is quite commonly believed that we have -been doing our fair share of the fighting—or even -more—by land as well as sea. -</p> - -<p> -A misleading emphasis of type and comment, -together with a dangerous selection of items of news, -are responsible for these illusions; while the -prevalence of these illusions is largely responsible for -many of our labour difficulties. -</p> - -<p> -Such dreams of inevitable and speedy victory -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P430"></a>430}</span> -are no doubt very soothing to indolent and timid -minds, but they do not make for a vigorous and -resolute spirit in the nation, upon which, more -than upon anything else, the winning of this war -depends. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -In some quarters there appears still to linger a -ridiculous idea that we went into this war, out of -pure chivalry, to defend Belgium.[<a id="chap0409fn5text"></a><a href="#chap0409fn5">5</a>] We went into -it to defend our own existence, and for no other -reason. We made common cause with Allies who -were menaced by the same danger as ourselves; but -these, most fortunately, had made their preparations -with greater foresight than we had done. The actual -fighting has taken place, so far, in their territories -and not in ours; but the issue of this war is not one -whit less a matter of life-or-death for us, than it is -for them. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -DEMOCRACY NOT INVINCIBLE -</span> -</p> - -<p> -Quite recently I have seen our present situation -described glowingly and self-complacently as the -'triumph of the voluntary system.' I must be -blind of both eyes, for I can perceive no 'triumph' -and no 'voluntary' system. I have seen the -territories of our Allies seized, wasted, and held fast -by an undefeated enemy. I have seen our small -army driven back; fighting with as much skill -and bravery as ever in its history; suffering losses -unparalleled in its history; holding its own in -the end, but against what overwhelming numbers -and by what sacrifices! The human triumph is -apparent enough; but not that of any system, -voluntary or otherwise. Neither in this record of -nine months' 'hard and hot fighting' on land, nor in -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P431"></a>431}</span> -the state of things which now exists at the end of it -all, is there a triumph for anything, or any one, save -for a few thousands of brave men, who were left to -hold fast as best they could against intolerable odds. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -Certain contemporary writers appear to claim -more for that form of representative government, -which we are in the habit of calling 'democracy,' -than it is either safe to count on, or true to assert. In -their eyes democracy seems to possess a superiority -in all the higher virtuous qualities—'freedom,' in -particular—and also an inherent strength -which—whatever may be the result of the present -war—makes the final predominance of British institutions -only a matter of time.[<a id="chap0409fn6text"></a><a href="#chap0409fn6">6</a>] -</p> - -<p> -I do not hold with either of these doctrines. -Universal superiority in virtue and strength is too -wide a claim to put forward for any system of government. -And 'freedom' is a very hard thing to define. -</p> - -<p> -It is not merely that the form of constitution, -which we call 'democracy,' is obviously not the best -fitted for governing an uncivilised or half-civilised -people. There are considerations which go much -deeper than that—considerations of race, religion, -temperament, and tradition. As it has been in the -past, so conceivably it may be again in the future, -that a people, which is in the highest degree civilised -and humane, will seek to realise its ideals of freedom -in some other sphere than the control of policy and -legislation according to the electoral verdicts of its -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P432"></a>432}</span> -citizens. It is even possible that its national -aspirations may regard some other end as a higher good -even than freedom. We cannot speak with certainty -as to the whole human race, but only with regard to -ourselves and certain others, who have been bred -in the same traditions. -</p> - -<p> -If a personal and autocratic government—the -German for example—is able to arouse and maintain -among its people a more ardent loyalty, a firmer -confidence, a more constant spirit of self-sacrifice -(in time of peace as well as war), I can see no good -reason for the hope, that democracy, merely because, -in our eyes, it approaches more nearly to the ideal -of the Christian Commonwealth, will be able to -maintain itself against the other. A highly centralised -system of government has great natural advantages -both for attack and defence; and if in addition it be -supported by a more enduring fortitude, and a more -self-denying devotion, on the part of the people, it -seems almost incredible that, in the end, it will not -prevail over other forms of government which have -failed to enlist the same support. -</p> - -<p> -The strength of all forms of government alike, -whether against foreign attack or internal disintegration, -must depend in the long last upon the spirit -of the people; upon their determination to maintain -their own institutions; upon their willingness to -undertake beforehand, as well as during the excitement -of war, those labours and sacrifices which are -necessary for security. The spirit is everything. -And in the end that spirit which is strongest is likely -to become predominant, and to impose its own forms, -systems, and ideas upon civilised and uncivilised -nations alike. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P433"></a>433}</span> -</p> - -<p> -A considerable part of the world—though it may -have adopted patterns of government which are either -avowedly democratic or else are monarchies of the -constitutional sort (in essence the same)—is by no -means wedded to popular institutions; has no deep-rooted -traditions to give them support; could easily, -therefore, and without much loss of self-respect, -abandon them and submit to follow new fashions. -But with the United Kingdom, the self-governing -Dominions, and the United States it is altogether -different. -</p> - -<p> -To exchange voluntarily, merely because circumstances -rendered it expedient to do so, a system -which is the only one consistent with our notions of -freedom would be an apostasy. It would mean our -immediate spiritual ruin, and for that reason also -our ultimate material ruin. On the other hand, to -continue to exist on sufferance, without a voice in -the destinies of the world, would be an even deeper -degradation. To be conquered outright, and absorbed, -would be an infinitely preferable fate to either of these. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NEED OF LEADERSHIP -</span> -</p> - -<p> -The nations of the world have one need in -common—Leadership. The spirit of the people can do much, -but it cannot do everything. In the end that form -of government is likely to prevail which produces the -best and most constant supply of leaders. On its -own theories, democracy of the modern type ought -to out-distance all competitors; under this system -capacity, probity, and vigour should rise most easily -to the top. -</p> - -<p> -In practice, however, democracy has come under -the thumb of the Party System, and the Party System -has reached a very high point of efficiency. It has -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P434"></a>434}</span> -bettered the example of the hugest mammoth store -in existence. It has elaborated machinery for -crushing out independent opinion and for cramping the -characters of public men. In commending its wares -it has become as regardless of truth as a vendor of -quack medicines. It pursues corruption as an end, -and it freely uses corruption—both direct and -indirect—as the means by which it may attain its end. If -the Party System continues to develop along its -present lines, it may ultimately prove as fatal to the -principle of democracy as the ivy which covers and -strangles the elm-trees in our hedgerows. -</p> - -<p> -Leadership is our greatest present need, and it -is there that the Party System has played us false. -To manipulate its vast and intricate machinery there -arose a great demand for expert mechanicians, and -these have been evolved in a rich profusion. But -in a crisis like the present, mechanicians will not -serve our purpose. The real need is a Man, who by -the example of his own courage, vigour, certainty, -and steadfastness will draw out the highest qualities -of the people; whose resolute sense of duty will brush -opportunism aside; whose sympathy and truthfulness -will stir the heart and hold fast the conscience of the -nation. Leadership of this sort we have lacked. -</p> - -<p> -The Newcastle speech with its soft words and -soothing optimism was not leadership. It does not -give confidence to a horse to know that he has a -rider on his back who is afraid of him. -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -NEED FOR FRANKNESS -</span> -</p> - -<p> -It is idle at this stage to forecast the issue of the -present war. Nevertheless we seem at last to have -begun to understand that there is but a poor chance -of winning it under rulers who are content to wait -and see if by some miracle the war will win itself; -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P435"></a>435}</span> -or if by another miracle our resources of men and -material will organise themselves. Since the battle -of the Marne many sanguine expectations of a speedy -and victorious peace have fallen to the ground. -The constant burden of letters from soldiers at the -front is that the war—so far as England is concerned—is -only just beginning. And yet, in spite of all these -disappointments and warnings, the predominant -opinion in official circles is still, apparently, as -determined as ever to wait and see <i>what the people -will stand</i>, although it is transparently clear what they -ought to stand, and must stand, if they are to remain -a people. -</p> - -<p> -We cannot forecast with certainty the issue of the -present war, but hope nevertheless refuses to be bound. -There is a false hope and a true one. There may be -consolation for certain minds, but there is no safety -for the nation, in the simple faith that democracy -is in its nature invincible. Democracy is by no -means invincible. On the contrary, it fights at a -disadvantage, both by reason of its inferiority in -central control, and because it shrinks from -ruthlessness. Nevertheless we may believe as firmly as -those who hold this other opinion that in the end it -will conquer. Before this can happen it must find -a leader who is worthy of its trust. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p> -Since August 1914 we have learned many things -from experience which we previously refused to -credit upon any human authority. We are not -altogether done with the past; for it contains lessons -and warnings—about men as well as things—which it -would be wasteful to forget. But our main concern -is with the present. And we are also treading very -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P436"></a>436}</span> -close on the heels of the future, when—as we -trust—the resistance of our enemies will be beginning to -flag; when the war will be drawing to an end; -afterwards through anxious years (how many we -cannot guess) when the war has ended, and when the -object of our policy will be to keep the peace which -has been so dearly bought. -</p> - -<p> -Lord Roberts was right in his forecast of the -danger; nor was he less right in his perception of -England's military weakness and general -unpreparedness for war. But was he also right as to the -principle of the remedy which he proposed? And -even if he were right as things stood when he uttered -his warnings, is his former counsel still right in our -present circumstances, and as we look forward into -the future? Is it now necessary for us to accept -in practice what has always been admitted in the -vague region of theory—that an obligation lies upon -every citizen, during the vigour of his age, to place -his services, and if need be his life, at the disposal -of that state under whose shelter he and all those -who are most dear to him have lived? -</p> - -<p> -<span class="sidenote"> -THE PEOPLE WILL NOT FLINCH -</span> -</p> - -<p> -There is always danger in treating a free people -like children; in humouring them, and coaxing them, -and wheedling them with half-truths; in asking -for something less than is really needed, from fear -that to ask for the whole would alarm them too -much; with the foolish hope that when the first -demand has been granted it will then be easy enough -to make them understand how much more is still -necessary to complete the fabric of security; that -having deceived them once, it will be all the easier -to deceive them again. -</p> - -<p> -As we look back over our country's history we -<span class="pagenum">{<a id="P437"></a>437}</span> -find that it was those men who told the people the -whole truth—or what, at least, they themselves -honestly believed to be the whole truth—who most -often succeeded in carrying their proposals through. -In these matters, which touch the very life and soul -of the nation, all artifice is out of place. The power -of persuasion lies in the truthfulness of the advocate, -no less than in the truth of his plea. If the would-be -reformer is only half sincere, if from timidity or -regard for popular opinion he chooses to tell but half -his tale—selecting this, suppressing that, postponing -the other to a more propitious season—he loses by -his misplaced caution far more than half his strength. -When there is a case to be laid before the British -People it is folly to do it piecemeal, by astute stages -of pleading, and with subtle reservations. If the -whole case can be put unflinchingly it is not the -People who will flinch. The issue may be left with -safety to a tribunal which has never yet failed in -its duty, when rulers have had the courage to say -where its duty lay. -</p> - -<p><br /></p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0409fn1"></a> -[<a href="#chap0409fn1text">1</a>] "A war conducted with energy cannot -be directed merely against the -combatants of the enemy State and the -positions they occupy, but it will -and must in like manner seek to destroy -the total intellectual and material -resources of the latter. -Humanitarian claims, such as the protection of -men and their goods, can only be taken -into consideration in so far as the -nature and object of the war permit. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -"International Law is in no way opposed -to the exploitation of the -crimes of third parties (assassination, -incendiarism, robbery, and the like) -to the prejudice of the enemy.... -The necessary aim of war gives the -belligerent the right and imposes -on him the duty, according to -circumstances, the duty not to let slip -the important, it may be the decisive -advantages to be gained by such -means."—<i>The German War Book</i>, issued -by the Great General Staff. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0409fn2"></a> -[<a href="#chap0409fn2text">2</a>] Clearly, however, when it comes -to the discussion of terms of peace, -not only the political question, -but also the criminal question, will have to -be remembered. Oddly enough the 'pacifist' -section, which has already -been clamorous for putting forward peace -proposals, seems very anxious -that we should forget, or at any rate ignore, -the criminal question—odd, -because 'humanity' is the stuff they have -set up their bills to trade in. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0409fn3"></a> -[<a href="#chap0409fn3text">3</a>] In reality, as regards party politics, -we have been for years past very -like those shouting, cigarette-smoking, -Saturday crowds at football matches -whom we have lately been engaged in -reproving so virtuously. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0409fn4"></a> -[<a href="#chap0409fn4text">4</a>] Certainly up to April 1915 it was -not an uncommon belief. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0409fn5"></a> -[<a href="#chap0409fn5text">5</a>] Mr. Lloyd George, <i>Pearson's Magazine</i>, March 1915. -</p> - -<p class="footnote"> -<a id="chap0409fn6"></a> -[<a href="#chap0409fn6text">6</a>] These views are very prevalent -among Liberal writers, and they are -clearly implied, if not quite so openly expressed, -by Conservatives. They -seem to be assumed in one of the ablest articles -which has yet been written -upon the causes of the present -war—'The Schism of Europe' (<i>Round Table</i>, March 1915). -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t3"> -THE END -</p> - -<p><br /><br /></p> - -<p class="t4"> -<i>Printed by</i> R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, <i>Edinburgh</i>. -</p> - -<p><br /><br /><br /><br /></p> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Ordeal by Battle, by Frederick Scott Oliver - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ORDEAL BY BATTLE *** - -***** This file should be named 54776-h.htm or 54776-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/7/7/54776/ - -Produced by Al Haines -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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