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diff --git a/old/54776-8.txt b/old/54776-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d31f728..0000000 --- a/old/54776-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14830 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Ordeal by Battle, by Frederick Scott Oliver - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Ordeal by Battle - -Author: Frederick Scott Oliver - -Release Date: May 24, 2017 [EBook #54776] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ORDEAL BY BATTLE *** - - - - -Produced by Al Haines - - - - - - - - - ORDEAL BY BATTLE - - - BY - - FREDERICK SCOTT OLIVER - - - -With that they looked upon him, and began to reply in this sort: SIMPLE -said, _I see no danger_; SLOTH said, _Yet a little more sleep_; and -PRESUMPTION said, _Every Vat must stand upon his own bottom_. And so -they lay down to sleep again, and CHRISTIAN went on his way. - -_The Pilgrim's Progress_. - - - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON - 1915 - - - - -COPYRIGHT - - - - - TO - THE MEMORY OF - - HUGH DAWNAY - - COMMANDING THE 2ND LIFE GUARDS - WHO WAS KILLED AT ZWARTELEEN ON THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER 1914 - AND OF - - JOHN GOUGH, V.C. - - CHIEF OF THE STAFF OF THE FIRST ARMY - WHO FELL NEAR ESTAIRES ON THE 20TH OF FEBRUARY 1915 - - THEY WERE BROTHER-OFFICERS OF THE RIFLE BRIGADE - AND THOSE WHO KNEW THEM BOTH - WILL ALWAYS THINK OF THEM TOGETHER - - - - - _Works by the Same Author_ - - ALEXANDER HAMILTON (An Essay on American Union). - LIBRARY EDITION. Messrs. CONSTABLE & Co., London. - LIBRARY EDITION. Messrs. G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York. - POPULAR EDITION. Messrs. THOS. NELSON & SONS. - - FEDERALISM AND HOME RULE (Letters of Pacificus). - - THE ALTERNATIVES TO CIVIL WAR. - - WHAT FEDERALISM IS NOT. - - - MR. JOHN MURRAY, LONDON. - - - - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - LONDON * BOMBAY * CALCUTTA - MELBOURNE - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - NEW YORK * BOSTON * CHICAGO - DALLAS * SAN FRANCISCO - - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - TORONTO - - - - -{ix} - -PREFACE - -It is hardly necessary to plead, in extenuation of those many faults -which any impartial reader will discover in the following pages, the -impossibility of discussing events which are unfolding themselves -around us, in the same detached spirit as if we were dealing with past -history. The greater part of this volume has been written in haste, -and no one is more alive to its shortcomings than the author himself. - -Faults of style are a small matter, and will be easily forgiven. It -has not been the aim to produce a work of literary merit, but solely to -present a certain view of public affairs. It is to be hoped that -actual errors of fact are rare. Inconsistencies however--or apparent -inconsistencies--cannot be altogether avoided, even by careful -revision. But the greatest difficulty of all is to keep a true sense -of proportion. - -In Part I.--_The Causes of War_--an attempt has been made to state, -very briefly, why it has hitherto proved impossible to eliminate the -appeal to arms from human affairs; to set out the main incidents which -occurred at the opening of the present European struggle; to explain -the immediate occasions, as {x} well as the more permanent and -deep-seated causes, of this conflict; to consider some of the most -glaring miscalculations which have arisen out of misunderstanding -between nations. - -In Part II.--_The Spirit of German Policy_--an attempt has been made to -understand the ambitions of our chief antagonist, and to trace the -manner in which these ambitions have been fostered, forced, and -corrupted by a priesthood of learned men. The relations which exist -between this Pedantocracy and the Bureaucracy, the Army, the Rulers, -and the People of Germany have been examined. It would appear that -under an academic stimulus, healthy national ambitions have become -morbid, have resulted in the discovery of imaginary grievances, and -have led the Governing Classes of Germany to adopt a new code of morals -which, if universally adhered to, would make an end of human society. -On the other hand, it would also appear that the German People have -accepted the policy of their rulers, without in any way accepting, or -even understanding, the morality upon which this policy is founded. It -is also important for us to realise the nature of the judgment--not -altogether unjustified--which our enemies have passed upon the British -character, and upon our policy and institutions. - -In Part III.--_The Spirit of British Policy_--our own political course -since the beginning of the century has been considered--the -difficulties arising out of the competition for priority between aims -which are {xi} not in themselves antagonistic: between Social Reform, -Constitutional Reform, and Imperial Defence--the confusion which has -resulted from the inadequacy of one small parliament, elected upon a -large variety of cross issues, for dealing with these diverse -needs--the lowering of the tone of public life, the depreciation in the -character of public men, which have come about owing to these two -causes, and also to a third--the steadily increasing tyranny and -corruption of the party machines. - -The aim of British Foreign Policy has been simply--Security. Yet we -have failed to achieve Security, owing to our blindness, indolence, and -lack of leadership. We have refused to realise that we were not living -in the Golden Age; that Policy at the last resort depends on Armaments; -that Armaments, to be effective for their purpose, must correspond with -Policy. Political leaders of all parties up to the outbreak of the -present war ignored these essentials; or if they were aware of them, in -the recesses of their own consciousness, they failed to trust the -People with a full knowledge of the dangers which threatened their -Security, and of the means by which alone these dangers could be -withstood. - -The titles of Parts II. and III. are similar--_The Spirit of German -Policy_ and _The Spirit of British Policy_; but although the titles are -similar the treatment is not the same. Confession of a certain failure -in proportion must be made frankly. The two pieces do not balance. -German Policy is viewed {xii} from without, at a remote distance, and -by an enemy. It is easier in this case to present a picture which is -clear, than one which is true. British Policy, on the of other hand, -is viewed from within. If likewise it is tinged with prejudice, the -prejudice is of a different character. Both Parts, I fear, diverge to -a greater or less extent from the main purpose of the book. Mere -excision is easy; but compression is a difficult and lengthy process, -and I have not been able to carry it so far as I could have wished. - -In Part IV.--_Democracy and National Service_--an attempt has been made -to deal with a problem which faces us at the moment. Democracy is not -unlike other human institutions: it will not stand merely by its own -virtue. If it lacks the loyalty, courage, and strength to defend -itself when attacked, it must perish as certainly as if it possessed no -virtue whatsoever. Manhood suffrage implies manhood service. Without -the acceptance of this principle Democracy is merely an imposture. - -I prefer 'National Service' to 'Conscription,' not because I shrink -from the word 'Conscription,' but because 'National Service' has a -wider sweep. The greater includes the less. It is not only military -duties which the State is entitled to command its citizens to perform -unquestioningly in times of danger; but also civil duties. It is not -only men between the ages of twenty and thirty-eight to whom the State -should have the right to give orders; but men and women of all ages. -Under conditions of {xiii} modern warfare it is not only armies which -need to be disciplined; but whole nations. The undisciplined nation, -engaged in anything like an equal contest with a disciplined nation, -will be defeated. - - - -The Coalition Government - -This volume was in type before the Coalition Government was formed; but -there is nothing in it which I wish to change in view of that event. -This book was not undertaken with the object of helping the Unionists -back into power, or of getting the Liberals out of power. - -The new Cabinet contains those members of the late one in whom the -country has most confidence. Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. -Lloyd George, and Mr. Churchill have all made mistakes. In a great -crisis it is the bigger characters who are most liable to make -mistakes. Their superiority impels them to take risks which the -smaller men, playing always for safety, are concerned to avoid. - -The present Ministry also contains representatives of that class of -politicians which, according to the view set forth in the following -pages, is primarily responsible for our present troubles. -Lawyer-statesmanship, which failed to foresee the war, to prepare -against it, and to conduct it with energy and thoroughness when it -occurred, still occupies a large share of authority. Possibly -ministers of this school {xiv} will now walk in new ways. In any case, -they are no longer in a position of dangerous predominance. - -The Coalition Government, having wisely refused to part with any of -those men who rose to the emergency, and having received an infusion of -new blood (which may be expected to bring an accession of vigour) -starts upon its career with the goodwill and confidence of the People. - -What has happened, however, is a revolution upon an unprecedented -scale--one which is likely to have vast consequences in the future. -The country realises this fact, and accepts it as a matter of -course--accepts it indeed with a sigh of relief. But in other -quarters, what has just happened is hardly realised at all--still less -what it is likely to lead to in the future. - -During the 'Cabinet Crisis' one read a good deal of stuff in the -newspapers, and heard still more by word of mouth, which showed how -far, during the past nine months, public opinion has moved away from -the professionals of politics; how little account it takes of them; -also how much these gentlemen themselves mistake the meaning of the -present situation. - -In political circles one has heard, and read, very frequently of late, -expressions of regret--on the one hand that Unionists should have come -to the assistance of a discredited and bankrupt administration--on the -other hand that a government, secure in the confidence of the country, -should, through a mistaken {xv} sense of generosity, have admitted its -opponents to a share in the glory and prestige of office. One has -read, and heard, cavillings at the idea of appointing this, or that, -public character to this, or that, office, as a thing beyond what this, -or that, party 'could fairly be expected to stand.' Reports have -appeared of meetings of 'a hundred' perturbed Liberals; and very -possibly meetings, though unreported, of equally perturbed Unionists -have also been held. An idea seems still to be prevalent in certain -quarters, that what has just occurred is nothing more important than an -awkward and temporary disarrangement of the party game; and that this -game will be resumed, with all the old patriotism and good feeling, so -soon as war is ended. But this appears to be a mistaken view. You -cannot make a great mix-up of this sort without calling new parties -into existence. When men are thrown into the crucible of a war such as -this, the true ore will tend to run together, the dross to cake upon -the surface. No matter to what parties they may have originally owed -allegiance, the men who are in earnest, and who see realities, cannot -help but come together. May be for several generations the annual -festivals of the National Liberal Federation and the Union of -Conservative Associations will continue to be held, like other -picturesque survivals of ancient customs. When Henry VII. was crowned -at Westminster, the Wars of the Roses ended; the old factions of York -and Lancaster were dissolved, and {xvi} made way for new associations. -Something of the same sort has surely happened during the past -month--Liberal and Conservative, Radical and Tory have ceased for the -present to be real divisions. They had recently become highly -artificial and confusing; now they are gone--it is to be hoped for ever. - -Will the generation which is fighting this war--such of them as may -survive--be content to go back to the old barren wrangle when it is -done? Will those others who have lost husbands, sons, brothers, -friends--all that was dearest to them except the honour and safety of -their country--will they be found willing to tolerate the idea of -trusting their destinies ever again to the same machines, to be driven -once more to disaster by the same automatons? To all except the -automatons themselves--who share with the German Supermen the credit of -having made this war--any such resumption of business on -old-established lines appears incredible. There is something pathetic -in the sight of these huckstering sentimentalists still crying their -stale wares and ancient make-believes at the street corners, while -their country is fighting for its life. They remind one, not a little, -of those Pardoners of the fourteenth century who, as we read in history -books, continued to hawk their _Indulgences_ with unabated industry -during the days of the _Black Death_. - -{xvii} - -It is necessary to offer a few words of explanation as to how this book -came to be written. During the months of November and December 1912 -and January 1913, various meetings and discussions took place under -Lord Roberts's roof and elsewhere, between a small number of persons, -who held widely different views, and whose previous experience and -training had been as different as were their opinions. - -Our efforts were concerned with endeavouring to find answers to several -questions which had never been dealt with candidly, clearly, and -comprehensively in the public statements of political leaders. It was -clear that there was no 'national' policy, which the British people had -grasped, accepted, and countersigned, as was the case in France. But -some kind of British policy there must surely be, notwithstanding the -fact it had never been disclosed. What were the aims of this policy? -With what nation or nations were these aims likely to bring us into -collision? What armaments were necessary in order to enable us to -uphold this policy and achieve these aims? How, and when, and where -would our armaments be required in the event of war? Assuming (as we -did in our discussions) that our naval forces were adequate, was the -same statement true of our military forces? And if it were not true, -by what means could the necessary increases be obtained? - -The final conclusion at which we arrived was that National Service was -essential to security. {xviii} Under whatever aspect we regarded the -problem we always returned--even those of us who were most unwilling to -travel in that direction--to the same result. So long as Britain -relied solely upon the voluntary principle, we should never possess -either the Expeditionary Force or the Army for Home Defence which were -requisite for safety. - -It fell to me during the winter 1912-1913 to draft the summary of our -conclusions. It was afterwards decided--in the spring of 1913--that -this private Memorandum should be recast in a popular form suitable for -publication. I was asked to undertake this, and agreed to do so. But -I underestimated both the difficulties of the task and the time which -would be necessary for overcoming them. - -When we met again, in the autumn of that year, the work was still far -from complete, and by that time, not only public attention, but our -own, had become engrossed in other matters. The Irish controversy had -entered upon a most acute and dangerous stage. Lord Roberts put off -the meetings which he had arranged to address during the ensuing months -upon National Service, and threw his whole energies into the endeavour -to avert the schism which threatened the nation, and to find a way to a -peaceful settlement. Next to the security and integrity of the British -Empire I verily believe that the thing which lay nearest his heart was -the happiness and unity of Ireland. - -It is needless to recall how, during the ensuing {xix} months, affairs -in Ireland continued to march from bad to worse--up to the very day -when the menace of the present war suddenly arose before the eyes of -Europe. - -During August 1914 I went through the old drafts and memoranda which -had now been laid aside for nearly a year. Although that very thing -had happened which it had been the object of our efforts to avert, it -seemed to me that there might be advantages in publishing some portion -of our conclusions. The form, of course, would have to be entirely -different; for the recital of prophecies which had come true, though it -might have possessed a certain interest for the prophets themselves, -could have but little for the public. - -Early in September I consulted Lord Roberts, and also such of my -friends, who had originally worked with me, as were still within reach. -Finding that their opinion agreed with my own upon the desirability of -publication, I laid out a fresh scheme, and set to for a third time at -the old task. But as the work grew, it became clear that it would -contain but little of the former Memorandum, and much which the former -Memorandum had never contemplated. So many of our original -conclusions, laboriously hammered out to convince the public in the -spring of the year 1913, had become by the autumn of 1914, the most -trite of commonplaces. And as for the practical scheme which we had -evolved--endeavouring to keep our demands at the most modest {xx} -minimum--it was interesting chiefly by reason of its triviality when -contrasted with the scale of warlike preparations upon which the -Government was now engaged. Practically, therefore, the whole of the -present volume is new--not merely redrafted, but for the most part new -in substance. - - - -The author's acknowledgements. - -I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the friends with whom I have -studied the problems of policy and defence for some years past. The -responsibility for the contents and publication of the present volume -is mine alone; but I have used their ideas without hesitation, and have -drawn largely upon the notes and memoranda which they drafted for my -assistance. I wish also to thank several others--one in chief--for the -kindness with which, upon the present occasion, they have given me help -and criticism as these pages were passing through the press. - -There is also another source to which I wish here gratefully to confess -my obligations. During the past five years there have appeared in _The -Round Table_ certain articles upon the relations of England with -Germany[1] which have been characterised by {xxi} a remarkable degree -of prescience and sanity. At a certain point, however, there is a -difference between the views expressed in _The Round Table_ and those -expressed in the following pages--a difference of stress and emphasis -perhaps, rather than of fundamental opinion, but still a difference of -some importance. I have dealt with this in the concluding chapter. - -I should like to make one other acknowledgment of a different kind. I -have known the editor of _The National Review_ from a date long before -he assumed his onerous office--from days when we were freshmen together -by the banks of the Cam. During a period of upwards of thirty years, I -cannot remember that I have ever had the good fortune to see absolutely -eye to eye with Mr. Maxse upon any public question. Even now I do not -see eye to eye with him. In all probability I never shall. At times -his views have been in sharp opposition to my own. But for these very -reasons--if he will not resent it as an impertinence--I should like to -say here how greatly I respect him for three qualities, which have been -none too common among public men in recent times--first, for the -clearness with which he grasps and states his beliefs; secondly, for -the courageous constancy with which he holds to them through good and -evil report; thirdly, for the undeviating integrity of his public -career. Next to Lord Roberts, he did more perhaps than any -other--though unavailingly--to arouse public opinion to the dangers -{xxii} which menaced it from German aggression, to call attention to -the national unpreparedness, and to denounce the blindness and -indolence which treated warnings with derision. - - - -Lord Roberts. - -Lord Roberts's responsibility for the contents of this volume, as for -its publication at the present time, is nil. And yet it would never -have been undertaken in the first instance except at his wish, nor -re-undertaken in September last without his encouragement. There are -probably a good many besides myself who owe it to his inspiration, that -they first made a serious attempt to study policy and defence as two -aspects of a single problem. I also owe to him many things besides -this. - -The circumstances of Lord Roberts's death were befitting his character -and career. The first great battle of Ypres was ended. The British -line had held its own against tremendous odds of men and guns. He had -no doubt of the ultimate result of the war, and during his visit to -France and Flanders inspired all who saw him by the quiet confidence of -his words and manner. After the funeral service at Headquarters a -friend of his and mine wrote to me describing the scene. The religious -ceremony had taken place in the entrance hall of the Maine at St. Omer. -It was a day of storms; but as the coffin was borne out "the sun -{xxiii} appeared, and made a magnificent rainbow on a great black block -of cloud across the square; and an airman flew across from the rainbow -into the sunlight." - -If I were asked to name Lord Roberts's highest intellectual quality I -should say unhesitatingly that it was his instinct. And if I were -asked to name his highest moral quality I should say, also -unhesitatingly, that it was the unshakeable confidence with which he -trusted his instinct. But the firmness of his trust was not due in the -least to self-conceit, or arrogance, or obstinacy. He obeyed his -instinct as he obeyed his conscience--humbly and devoutly. The -dictates of both proceeded from the same source. It was not his own -cleverness which led him to his conclusions, but the hand of Providence -which drew aside a veil, and enabled him to see the truth. What gave -him his great strength in counsel, as in the field, was the simple -modesty of his confidence. - -He was a poor arguer; I think argument was painful to him; also that he -regarded it as a sad waste of the short span of human life. It was not -difficult to out-argue him. Plausible and perspicacious persons often -left him, after an interview, under the firm impression that they had -convinced him. But as a rule, he returned on the morrow to his old -opinion, unless his would-be converters had brought to his notice new -facts as well as new arguments. - -{xxiv} - -He arrived at an opinion neither hastily nor slowly, but at a moderate -pace. He had the gift of stating his conclusion with admirable -lucidity; and if he thought it desirable, he gave the reasons for his -view of the matter with an equal clearness. But his reasons, like his -conclusion, were in the nature of statements; they were not stages in -an argument. There are as many unanswerable reasons to be given for as -against most human decisions. Ingenuity and eloquence are a curse at -councils of war, and state, and business. Indeed, wherever action of -any kind has to be determined upon they are a curse. It was Lord -Roberts's special gift that, out of the medley of unanswerable reasons, -he had an instinct for selecting those which really mattered, and -keeping his mind close shut against the rest. - -It is superfluous to speak of his courtesy of manner and kindness of -heart, or of his unflagging devotion--up till the very day of his -death--to what he regarded as his duty. There is a passage in -Urquhart's translation of _Rabelais_ which always recalls him to my -mind:--_He was the best little great good man that ever girded a sword -on his side; he took all things in good part, and interpreted every -action in the best sense_. In a leading German newspaper there -appeared, a few days after his death, the following reference to that -event:--"It was not given to Lord Roberts to see the realisation of his -dreams of National Service; but the blows struck on the Aisne were -hammer-strokes which might after a long {xxv} time and bitter need -produce it. Lord Roberts was an honourable and, through his renown, a -dangerous enemy ... personally an extraordinarily brave enemy. Before -such a man we lower our swords, to raise them again for new blows dealt -with the joy of conflict." - -Nor was this the only allusion of the kind which figured in German -newspapers 'to the journey of an old warrior to Walhalla,' with his -final mission yet unaccomplished, but destined to be sooner or later -accomplished, if his country was to survive. In none of these -references, so far as I have been able to discover, was there the least -trace of malice against the man who had warned his fellow-countrymen, -more clearly than any other, against the premeditated aggression of -Germany. This seems very strange when we recollect how, for nearly two -years previously, a large section of the British nation had been -engaged in denouncing Lord Roberts for the outrageous provocations -which he was alleged to have offered to Germany--in apologising to -Germany for his utterances--in suggesting the propriety of depriving -him of his pension in the interests of Anglo-German amity. What this -section has itself earned in the matter of German gratitude we know -from many hymns and other effusions of hate. - -{xxvi} - -Hugh Dawnay and John Gough. - -I have dedicated this volume to the memory of John Gough and Hugh -Dawnay, not solely on grounds of friendship, but also because from both -I received, at different times, much help, advice, and criticism--from -the latter when the original Memorandum was in course of being -drafted--from both when it was being reconsidered with a view to -publication. Whether either of them would agree with the statement in -its present form is more than I can venture to say, and I have no -intention of claiming their authority for conclusions which were never -seen by them in final shape. - -In the first instance (November 1912-March 1913) Dawnay[2] and I worked -together. His original notes and memoranda are to a large extent -incorporated in Parts III. and IV.--so closely, however, that I cannot -now disentangle his from my own. The calculations as to numbers and -probable distribution of the opposing forces, were almost entirely his. -I have merely endeavoured here--not so successfully as I could wish--to -bring them up to the date of the outbreak of war. - -Dawnay took out his squadron of the 2nd Life Guards to France early in -August. Already, however, he had been appointed to the Headquarters -General Staff, on which he served with distinction, until early in -October, when he succeeded to the command {xxvii} of his regiment. He -fell at Zwarteleen near Ypres on the 6th of November 1914--one of the -most anxious days during the four weeks' battle. - -His friends have mourned his death, but none of them have grudged it; -for he died, not merely as a brave man should--in the performance of -his duty--but after having achieved, with consummate skill and daring, -his part in an action of great importance. On the afternoon of this -day General Kavanagh's Brigade of Household Cavalry[3]--summoned in -haste--dismounted, and threw back a German attack which had partially -succeeded in piercing the allied line at the point of junction between -the French and English forces. This successful counter-attack saved -the right flank of Lord Cavan's Guards' Brigade from a position of -extreme danger, which must otherwise, almost certainly, have resulted -in a perilous retreat. The whole of this Homeric story is well worth -telling, and some day it may be told; but this is not the place. - -Dawnay was fortunate inasmuch as he lost his life, not as so many brave -men have done in this war--and in all others--by a random bullet, or as -the result of somebody's blunder, or in an attempt which failed. On -the contrary he played a distinguished, and possibly a determining -part, in an action which succeeded, and the results of which were -fruitful. - -He was not merely a brave and skilful soldier {xxviii} when it came to -push of pike, but a devoted student of his profession in times of -peace. The mixture of eagerness and patience with which he went about -his work reminded one, not a little, of that same combination of -qualities as it is met with sometimes among men of science. - -Hunting accidents, the privations of Ladysmith followed by enteric, -divers fevers contracted in hot climates, and the severity of a -campaign in Somaliland, had severely tried his constitution--which -although vigorous and athletic was never robust--and had increased a -tendency to headaches and neuralgia to which he had been subject ever -since boyhood. Yet he treated pain always as a despicable enemy, and -went about his daily business as indefatigably when he was in -suffering, as when he was entirely free from it, which in later years -was but rarely. - -Dawnay had a very quick brain, and held his views most positively. It -was sometimes said of him that he did not suffer fools gladly, and this -was true up to a point. He was singularly intolerant of presumptuous -fools, who laid down the law about matters of which they were wholly -ignorant, or who--having acquired a smattering of second-hand -knowledge--proceeded to put their ingenious and sophistical theories -into practice. But for people of much slower wits than himself--if -they were trying honestly to arrive at the truth--he was usually full -of sympathy. His tact and patience upon great occasions were two of -his noblest qualities. - -{xxix} - -In some ways he used to remind me, not a little, of Colonel Henry -Esmond of Castlewood, Virginia. In both there was the same hard core -of resistance against anything, which appeared to challenge certain -adamantine principles concerning conduct befitting a gentleman. On -such matters he was exceedingly stiff and unyielding. And he resembled -the friend of Lord Bolingbroke, and General Webb, and Dick Steele also -in this, that he was addicted to the figure of irony when crossed in -discussion. One imagines, however, that Colonel Esmond must have kept -his countenance better, and remained imperturbably grave until his -shafts had all gone home. In Dawnay's case the sight of his opponent's -lengthening face was, as a rule, too much for his sense of humour, and -the attack was apt to lose some of its force--certainly all its -fierceness--in a smile which reminded one of Carlyle's -description--'sunlight on the sea.' - -The following extract from a letter written by one of his friends who -had attended the War Service at St. Paul's gives a true picture: "A -sudden vision arose in my imagination of Hugh Dawnay striding down the -choir, in full armour, like St. Michael--with his head thrown back, and -that extraordinary expression of resolution which he always seemed to -me to possess more than any one I have ever seen. His wide-apart eyes -had more of the spirit of truth in them than almost any--also an -intolerance of falsehood--or rather perhaps a disbelief in its -existence...." This is true. He was one of {xxx} that race of men -whose recumbent figures are seen in our old churches and cathedrals, -with hands clasping crusaders' swords against their breasts, their -hounds couching at their feet. - - -In physique and temperament Hugh Dawnay and John Gough[4] were in most -respects as unlike a pair of friends as ever walked this earth; but we -might have searched far before we could have found two minds which, on -most matters connected with their profession, were in more perfect -accord. Dawnay, younger by four years, had served under Gough in -trying times, and regarded him (an opinion which is very widely shared -by seniors as well as juniors) as one of the finest soldiers of his -age. Though Dawnay was slender and of great height, while Gough was -rather below the middle stature, broad and firmly knit, there was one -striking point of physical resemblance between them, in the way their -heads were set upon their shoulders. There was something in the -carriage of both which seemed to take it for granted that they would be -followed wherever they might chose to lead. In Lord Roberts, and also -in a strikingly different character--Mr. Chamberlain--there was the -same poise, the same stable equilibrium, without a trace in it of -self-consciousness or constraint. It may be that the {xxxi} habit of -command induces this bearing in a man; or it may be that there is -something in the nature of the man who bears himself thus which forces -him to become a leader. - -Gough took no part in the preparation of the original Memorandum; but -in March 1913 he discussed it with me[5] and made various criticisms -and suggestions, most of which have been incorporated here. His chief -concern with regard to all proposals for a National Army was, that the -period of training should be sufficient to allow time for turning the -average man into a soldier who had full confidence in himself. "When -war breaks out"--I can hear his words--"it's not recruits we want: it's -soldiers we want: that is, if our object is to win the war as speedily -as possible, and to lose as few lives as possible." Under normal peace -conditions he put this period at a minimum of two years for infantry; -but of course he would have admitted--and did, in fact, admit when I -saw him last December--that under the stress and excitement of war the -term might be considerably shortened. - -His chief concern in 1913 was with regard to shortage of officers. He -criticised with great severity the various recent attempts at reforming -our military {xxxii} system, not only on the ground that we had chosen -to rely upon training our national forces after war had actually broken -out (in his view a most disastrous decision); but also because we had -not taken care to provide ourselves against the very emergency which -was contemplated, by having a reserve of officers competent to -undertake the training of the new army in case of need. - -I went to see him at Aldershot on the Friday before war was declared, -and found, as I expected, that he regarded it as inevitable. He had -undergone a very severe operation in the early summer, and was still -quite unfit to stand the strain of hard exercise. It had been arranged -that we were to go together, a few days later, to Sweden, for six -weeks' shooting and fishing in the mountains. He was very anxious to -return to England for the September manoeuvres. His surgeon,[6] -however, forbade this, on the ground that even by that time he would -not be fit to sit for a whole day in the saddle. - -He was in two moods on this occasion. He was as light-hearted as a boy -who is unexpectedly released from school; the reason being that the -Army Medical Officer had that morning passed him as physically fit to -go abroad with Sir Douglas Haig, to whom he had acted as Senior Staff -Officer since the previous autumn. - -{xxxiii} - -His other mood was very different. The war which he had foreseen and -dreaded, the war which in his view might have been avoided upon one -condition, and one only--if England had been prepared--had come at -last. I don't think I have ever known any one--certainly never any -anti-militarist--whose hatred and horror of war gave the same -impression of intensity and reality as his. Not metaphorically, but as -a bare fact, his feelings with regard to it were too deep for words; he -would suddenly break off speaking about things which had occurred in -his own experience; in particular, about loss of friends and comrades. -He was an Irishman, and had not the impassive coldness of some of the -great soldiers. But most of all he hated war when it was not -inevitable--when with foresight and courage it might have been -averted--as in his opinion this war might have been. - -In radium there is said to be a virtue which enables it to affect -adjacent objects with its own properties, and to turn them, for a time, -and for certain purposes, into things of the same nature as itself. -Certain rare human characters possess a similar virtue; but although I -have met with several of these in my life, there is none of them all -who seemed to me to possess this quality in quite so high a degree as -Gough. He was an alchemist who made fine soldiers out of all sorts and -conditions of men, and whose spirit turned despondency out of doors. - -The clearness of his instinct and the power of his {xxxiv} mind were -not more remarkable than his swiftness of decision and indomitable -will. There are scores--probably hundreds--of young officers who -fought by his side, or under him, at Ypres and elsewhere, who years -hence, when they are themselves distinguished--perhaps great and -famous--and come, in the evening of their days, to reckon up and -consider the influences which have shaped their careers, will place his -influence first. And there are boys looking forward to the day when -they shall be old enough to serve in the King's Army, chiefly from the -love and honour in which they held this hero, with his winning smile -and superb self-confidence. - -He has left behind him a tradition, if ever man did. You will find it -everywhere, among young and old--among all with whom he ever came into -touch. Nor is the tradition which he has left merely among soldiers -and with regard to the art of war, but also in other spheres of private -conduct and public life. He had strong prejudices as well as -affections, which made him sometimes judge men unfairly, also on the -other hand too favourably; but he banished all meanness from his -neighbourhood, all thoughts of self-interest and personal advancement. -Duty, discipline, self-discipline, and the joy of life--these were the -rules he walked by; and if you found yourself in his company you had -perforce to walk with him, keeping up with his stride as best you could. - -We value our friends for different qualities, and would have their -tradition fulfil itself in different {xxxv} ways. Those of us who -counted these two--'Johnnie' Gough and Hugh Dawnay--among our friends -will wish that our sons may be like them, and follow in their footsteps. - -F.S.O. - -CHECKENDON COURT, OXFORDSHIRE, 1st June 1915. - - -[1] _The Round Table_ (quarterly Review). Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Of -the articles referred to the chief are: 'Anglo-German Rivalry' -(November 1910); 'Britain, France, and Germany' (December 1911); 'The -Balkan War and the Balance of Power' (June 1913); 'Germany and the -Prussian Spirit' (September 1914); 'The Schism of Europe' (March 1915). -It is to be hoped that these and some others may be republished before -long in more permanent form. - -[2] Major the Hon. Hugh Dawnay, D.S.O., _b._ 1875; educated Eton and -Sandhurst; Rifle Brigade, 1895; Nile Campaign and Omdurman, 1898; South -Africa, 1899-1900; Somaliland, 1908-1910; 2nd Life Guards, 1912; -France, August-November 1914. - -[3] This Brigade was known during the battle of Ypres as 'the Fire -Brigade,' for the reason that it was constantly being called up on a -sudden to extinguish unforeseen conflagrations. - -[4] Brigadier-General John Edmund Gough, V.C., C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C. to -the King; _b._ 1871; educated Eton and Sandhurst; Rifle Brigade, 1892; -British Central Africa, 1896-1897; Nile Campaign and Omdurman, 1898; -South Africa, 1899-1902; Somaliland, 1902-1903 and 1908-1909; France, -August 1914-February 1915. - -[5] At St. Jean de Luz, when he was endeavouring, though not very -successfully, to shake off the after-effects of his last Somaliland -campaign. He was then engaged in correcting the proofs of the volume -of his Staff College lectures which was subsequently published under -the title _Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville_ (Rees)--a most vivid -and convincing narrative. In the intervals of work and golf he spent -much of his time in visiting Wellington's adjacent battlefields and -studying his passage of the Bidassoa and forcing of the Pyrenees. - -[6] Gough's many friends will ever feel a double debt of gratitude to -that distinguished surgeon, Sir Berkeley Moynihan, who by this -operation restored him, after several years of ill-health and -suffering, almost to complete health; and who once again--when by a -strange coincidence of war he found his former patient lying in the -hospital at Estaires the day after he was brought in wounded--came to -his aid, and all but achieved the miracle of saving his life. - - - - - ORDEAL BY BATTLE - - - PART I - - THE CAUSES OF WAR - - - PART II - - THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY - - - PART III - - THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY - - - PART IV - - DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE - - - - - TABLE OF CONTENTS - - - - PART I - - THE CAUSES OF WAR - - - CHAPTER I - - PEACE AND WAR - - PAGE - - Peace is the greatest of British interests 3 - Peaceful intentions will not ensure peace 4 - Futility of Pacifism 6 - Causes of wars in general 8 - Causes of the American Civil War 10 - Influence of ideas of duty and self-sacrifice 11 - - - CHAPTER II - - THE OUTBREAK OF WAR - - July-August 1914 13 - Reality or illusion 15 - The Serajevo murders 16 - Austria and Servia 17 - English efforts to preserve peace 18 - Mobilisation in Germany and Russia 19 - Questions of neutrality 19 - German Army enters Luxemburg, Belgium, and France 20 - General conflagration 20 - - - CHAPTER III - - WHO WANTED WAR? - - Why did war occur? 22 - Servia did not want war 22 - Neither did Russia or France 23 - Nor Belgium or England 25 - Austria wanted war with Servia alone 26 - Germany encouraged Austria to bring on war 29 - Germany desired war believing that England would remain neutral 29 - Austrian eleventh-hour efforts for peace frustrated by Germany 30 - Sir Edward Grey's miscalculation 31 - M. Sazonof thought war could have been avoided by plain speaking 32 - Sir Edward Grey's reasons against plain speaking 33 - Which was right? 34 - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE PENALTY OF NEGLIGENCE - - Was war inevitable? 36 - Not if England had been prepared morally and materially 37 - Previous apprehensions of war 38 - Peculiar characteristics of German animosity 39 - British public opinion refused to treat it seriously 40 - - - CHAPTER V - - PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY - - Who actually caused the conflagration? 42 - Influence of the Professors, Press, and People of Germany 43 - Influence of the Court, Army, and Bureaucracy 44 - Various political characters 46 - The Kaiser 48 - There was no master-spirit 51 - - - CHAPTER VI - - GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS - - Hero-worship and sham super-men 53 - The Blunders of Bureaucracy 55 - As to the time-table of the war 55 - As to the quality of the French Army 55 - As to the opinion of the world 56 - As to the treatment of Belgium 57 - As to British neutrality 58 - As to the prevalence of Pacifism in England 59 - As to Civil War in Ireland 62 - As to rebellion in South Africa 64 - As to Indian sedition 65 - As to the spirit of the self-governing Dominions 67 - Lack of instinct and its consequences 67 - - - CHAPTER VII - - INTERNATIONAL ILL-WILL - - Great events do not proceed from small causes 69 - German hatred of England 70 - This is the German people's war 71 - Their illusion that England brought it about 73 - Difficulties in the way of international understandings 73 - British and German diplomacy compared 74 - German distrust and British indifference 78 - British policy as it appears to German eyes 79 - Vacillation mistaken for duplicity 80 - German policy as it appears to British eyes 81 - - - - PART II - - THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY - - - CHAPTER I - - THE BISMARCKIAN EPOCH - - National dreams 87 - 1789 and after 87 - The first German dream--Union 88 - How it was realised 89 - What the world thought of it 90 - Material development in Germany 91 - The peace policy of Bismarck 92 - - - CHAPTER II - - AFTER BISMARCK - - Nightmares and illusions 94 - Grievances against England, France, and Russia 96 - The second German dream--Mastery of the World 97 - Absorption of Belgium, Holland, and Denmark 98 - The Austro-Hungarian inheritance 98 - The Balkan peninsula 99 - Turkey in Asia 100 - German diplomacy at Constantinople 101 - The Baghdad Railway 102 - The hoped-for fruits of 'inevitable' wars 103 - The possession of Africa 103 - The Chinese Empire 104 - - - CHAPTER III - - THE GERMAN PROJECT OF EMPIRE - - Qualities of the German vision 106 - Symmetry and vastness are dangerous ideals 107 - Frederick the Great and Bismarck 108 - German predisposition to follow dreamers 108 - Grotesque proportions of the Second German dream 109 - The two Americas 110 - Pacifism and Militarism meet at infinity 111 - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE NEW MORALISTS - - Germany goes in search of an ethical basis 113 - Special grievances against France and England 114 - German thinkers recast Christian morals 115 - Heinrich von Treitschke 116 - _The principle of the state is power_ 117 - Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 118 - His contempt for British and Prussian ideals 119 - General von Bernhardi 122 - New morality never accepted by the German people 123 - Thrown over even by 'the brethren' when war occurred 124 - Causes of this apostasy 126 - - - CHAPTER V - - THE STATECRAFT OF A PRIESTHOOD - - German education a drill system 127 - Intellectuals are ranged on the government side 129 - Eighteenth-century France and modern Germany 129 - Contrast between their bureaucracies 130 - Between the attitude of their intellectuals 131 - Between their fashions of fancy dress 131 - Dangers to civilisation from within and without 132 - Political thinkers are usually destructive 133 - Unfitness of priesthoods for practical affairs 135 - Contrast between priests and lawyers 137 - Natural affinity between soldiers and priests 139 - Unforeseen consequences of German thoroughness 140 - May lead ultimately to ostracism of Germany 140 - Types of German agents 141 - Treacherous activities in time of peace 142 - The German political creed 144 - The true aim of this war 146 - - - CHAPTER VI - - THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE - - Intelligence and enterprise of the Germans 149 - They are nevertheless devoted to their own institutions 150 - German system is not reactionary but the reverse 151 - Experts are honoured and trusted 151 - German esteem for men of learning 152 - And for the military caste 153 - And for their Kaiser 155 - German contempt for party government 156 - And for the character of British official news 157 - And for the failure of the British Government to trust - the people 160 - And for its fear of asking the people to make sacrifices 161 - And for the voluntary system 162 - Their pride in the successes of German arms 163 - And in the number and spirit of their new levies 163 - Which they contrast with British recruiting 164 - The methods of which they despise 165 - What is meant by 'a popular basis' of government? 166 - - - CHAPTER VII - - THE CONFLICTS OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS - - Two issues between England and Germany 167 - Democracy cannot endure unless capable of self-defence 168 - Democracy good and bad 169 - Self-criticism may be carried too far 171 - The two dangers of democracy--German _Arms_ and German _Ideas_ 173 - Fundamental opposition between the spirit of German policy - and our own 173 - German people have not accepted the moral ideas of their - priesthood 174 - Recantation among 'the brethren' themselves on outbreak of war 175 - The cult of war 176 - - - - PART III - - THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY - - - CHAPTER I - - A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (JANUARY 1901-JULY 1914) - - In this war Democracy is fighting for its existence 181 - Against highly organised materialism 183 - The opening of the twentieth century 186 - Spirit of constitutional change 188 - Disappearance of great figures from the scene 189 - Change in character of the House of Commons 192 - Dearth of leadership 194 - Consequent demoralisation of parties 195 - And widespread anxiety 196 - Pre-eminence of Mr. Asquith 197 - His Parliamentary supremacy 198 - His maxim--_wait-and-see_ 199 - Character of his oratory 199 - Increasing prominence of lawyers in politics 200 - Their influence on Parliamentary institutions and national - policy 201 - Mr. Asquith's limitations 203 - - - CHAPTER II - - THREE GOVERNING IDEAS - - Situation at the death of Queen Victoria 207 - Comfort and security are not synonymous 208 - Two problems absorbed public attention 209 - Social and Constitutional Reform 209 - A third problem, security, was overlooked 210 - Social Reform intrinsically the most important 211 - The urgent need of peace 212 - Earnestness of public opinion 212 - How it was baulked by circumstances 213 - Limitations of popular judgment 214 - Want of leadership 216 - Strangulation of sincerity by party system 218 - The artificial opposition of three great ideas 221 - - - CHAPTER III - - POLICY AND ARMAMENTS - - The aim of British policy 223 - Organised and unorganised defences 223 - Policy depends on armaments, armaments on policy 225 - Difficulty of keeping these principles in mind 226 - Diplomacy to-day depends more than ever on armaments 228 - The sad example of China 229 - Policy should conform to national needs 230 - Dangers threatening British security (1901-1914) 231 - The Committee of Imperial Defence 232 - Reasons of its comparative failure 234 - Parliament and the people were left uneducated 235 - Naval preparations were adequate 236 - Military preparations were absurdly inadequate 237 - Our Foreign policy rested on an entirely false assumption as - regards the adequacy of our Army 238 - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE BALANCE OF POWER - - Security required that we should take account of Europe 241 - German aim--the suzerainty of Western Europe 243 - Maintenance of the _Balance of Power_ 244 - This is the unalterable condition of British security 245 - This need produced the Triple Entente 247 - Splendid isolation no longer compatible with security 249 - Meaning of a defensive war 249 - Defence of north-eastern frontier of France essential to - British security 250 - - - CHAPTER V - - THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1911) - - The British 'Expeditionary Force' 252 - Numbers as a test of adequacy 253 - Relations of Italy with Germany and Austria in event of war 254 - Troops for defence of coasts and neutral frontiers 256 - Germany must hold Russia in check with superior numbers 256 - Germany would then endeavour to crush France 257 - Having a superiority of 500,000 men available for this purpose 257 - Why neutrality of Holland was a German interest 258 - Why neutrality of Belgium was an obstacle to Germany 259 - Inadequacy of our own Army to turn the scales 260 - Our armaments did not correspond with our policy 261 - Ministerial confidence in the 'voluntary system' 261 - Three periods of war--the _onset_, the _grip_, and the _drag_ 263 - In 1870 the _onset_ decided the issue 264 - By 1914 the power of swift attack had increased 265 - Forecasts confirmed by experience (Aug.-Sept. 1914) 266 - Immense value of British sea-power 266 - No naval success, however, can win a European war 267 - Naval supremacy not the only essential to British security 268 - - - CHAPTER VI - - THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1914) - - Changes between August 1911 and August 1914 269 - Sensational German increases in 1913 took full effect within - a year 270 - Inability of France to counter this effort unaided 270 - French increase could not take effect till 1916 271 - Russian and Austrian increases 272 - No attempt to increase British Army though it is below strength 273 - Balkan wars (1912-1913) 273 - Their effect on _Balance of Power_ 274 - Reasons why they did not lead to general conflagration 275 - Germany's two dates: June 1914-June 1916 275 - - - CHAPTER VII - - A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS - - Why should we suspect Germany of evil intentions? 277 - The German Fleet was a challenge to British security 278 - Candour of German publicists 278 - British Government finds comfort in official assurances - of Berlin 279 - Disregarded warnings 279 - _First Warning_ 279 - (1905-1906) Morocco incident 279 - After which British naval programme was reduced 280 - _Second Warning_ 281 - (1908-1909) Secret acceleration and increase of German - naval programme 281 - Imperial Defence Conference 281 - _Third Warning_ 282 - (1910) German sincerity under suspicion 282 - The Constitutional Conference 283 - Secret de Polichinelle 283 - Failure of British Government to trust the people 284 - _Fourth Warning_ 285 - (1911) The Agadir incident 285 - Mr. Lloyd George's speech 285 - Consequences of various kinds 286 - _Fifth Warning_ 287 - (1912) Lord Haldane's rebuff 287 - Menacing nature of German proposals 288 - Dangers of amateur diplomacy 289 - German love of irregular missions 290 - _Sixth Warning_ 294 - (1913) German Army Bill and War Loan 294 - British Government ignore the danger 295 - Neglect military preparations 297 - Shrink from speaking plainly to the people 298 - Difficulties of Sir Edward Grey 298 - Enemies in his own household 299 - Radical attacks on Foreign Secretary and First Lord of - Admiralty fomented by Germany 299 - Attitude of a leaderless Cabinet 300 - Parallelogram of fears determines drift of policy 301 - Evil effects of failure to educate public opinion 302 - Danger of breaking the Liberal party 303 - Occasional efficacy of self-sacrifice 303 - War not inevitable had England been prepared 304 - - - - PART IV - - DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE - - - CHAPTER I - - THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE - - Public opinion puzzled by military problems 309 - The nation's growing anxiety and distrust (1909-1914) 310 - Army affairs a shuttlecock in the political game 312 - 'The blood taxes' 313 - The nation realised it had not been treated with candour 313 - Powerful British Army the best guarantee for European peace 314 - Alone among European nations Britain had not an army - commensurate to her population, policy, and resources 316 - - - CHAPTER II - - THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY - - The _Regular Army_ 317 - Three classes of reserves 318 - The _Army Reserve_ 318 - The _Special Reserve_ 319 - The _Territorial Army_ 320 - The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war 321 - These were inadequate to redress the balance against the - Triple Entente 322 - In the _onset_ period untrained and half-trained troops - were of no use 322 - Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops 323 - Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles 324 - Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis 326 - Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914 326 - Size of British striking force necessary as complete - were of against a coolly calculated war 327 - Reserves required behind this striking force 328 - South African War no precedent for a European war 330 - - - CHAPTER III - - LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS - - The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912) 332 - Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness 332 - Attack concentrated on three passages 333 - Two of these have been proved true by events 334 - The other was misinterpreted by its critics 335 - Liberal criticism 336 - Unionist criticism 341 - Ministerial rebukes 343 - No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of - these attacks 347 - - - CHAPTER IV - - LORD KITCHENER'S TASK - - All Lord Roberts's warnings were proved true 350 - Many people nevertheless still believed that the voluntary - system was a success 351 - Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War 353 - His previous record of success 354 - His hold on public confidence 354 - His grasp of the simple essentials 355 - His determination to support France and make a New Army 355 - His remarkable achievements 356 - His want of knowledge of British political and industrial - conditions 356 - His colleagues, however, understood these thoroughly 357 - - - CHAPTER V - - MATERIAL OF WAR - - Industrial congestion at the outbreak of war 358 - Need for looking far ahead and organising production of war - material 359 - The danger of labour troubles 360 - Outcry about shortage of supplies 360 - Official denials were disbelieved 361 - - - CHAPTER VI - - METHODS OF RECRUITING - - The first need was men 364 - A call for volunteers the only way of meeting it 364 - The second need was a system to provide men as required - over the period of the war 365 - No system was devised 365 - The Government shrank from exercising its authority 366 - Trusted to indirect pressure 366 - And sensational appeals 367 - They secured a new army of the highest quality 368 - But they demoralised public opinion by their methods 369 - Public opinion at the outbreak of war was admirable 372 - It was ready to obey orders 373 - No orders came 374 - The triumph of the voluntary system 376 - From the point of view of a Belgian or a Frenchman the - triumph is not so clear 377 - The voluntary system is inadequate to our present situation 379 - Folly of waiting for disaster to demonstrate the necessity - of National Service 380 - - - CHAPTER VII - - PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT - - British methods of recruiting in normal times 382 - _The Conscription of Hunger_ 382 - The cant of the voluntary principle 384 - The 'economic' fallacy 385 - The fallacy of underrating the moral of conscript armies 387 - The army which we call 'voluntary' our enemies call 'mercenary' 389 - 'Mercenary' describes not the British Army but the British - People 389 - The true description of the British Army is 'Professional' 390 - The theory of the British Army 391 - That officers should pay for the privilege of serving 391 - That the rank and file should contract for a term of years 392 - Under pressure of want 392 - At pay which is below the market rate 392 - This contract is drastically enforced 393 - With the full approval of anti-militarist opinion 393 - Inconsistencies of the anti-militarists 394 - Their crowning inconsistency 395 - Other industries put pressure on society 396 - Why should not a professional army? 396 - The example of Rome 397 - A professional army when it first interferes in politics - usually does so as a liberator 397 - Then military despotism follows speedily 399 - A fool's paradise 399 - - - CHAPTER VIII - - SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS - - Bugbears 401 - Conflict of 'opinion' with 'the facts' 402 - An army is no defence unless it is available for service - abroad 402 - The Industrial Epoch (1832-1886) 403 - Its grudging attitude towards the Army 403 - Honour paid by conscript nations to their armies 406 - Democracy cannot subsist without personal service 406 - During the Industrial Epoch exemption from Personal Service - was regarded as the essence of Freedom 408 - War was regarded as an anachronism 409 - Since 1890 there has been a slow but steady reaction from - these ideas 410 - Volunteer movement and Territorial Army compared 411 - Effect of the Soudan campaign and South African War 411 - Effect of more recent events 412 - Have we passed out of a normal condition into an abnormal - one, or the reverse? 412 - Germany's great grievance against Britain: we thought to - hold our Empire without sacrifices 413 - The Freiherr von Hexenküchen's views-- - (1) On our present case of conscience 416 - (2) On our voluntary system 416 - The American Civil War 417 - Lincoln insisted on conscription (1863) 418 - His difficulties 418 - Results of his firmness 419 - Difference in our own case 419 - Our need for conscription is much greater 419 - It is also far easier for our Government to enforce it 420 - - - CHAPTER IX - - THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR - - The objects of this book 421 - Criticism of naval and military strategy is no part of its - purpose 422 - Nor the ultimate political settlement of Europe 424 - Nor an inquisition into 'German atrocities' 424 - But the basis of Germany's policy must be understood 425 - And what we are fighting for and against 425 - The causes of German strength 427 - The causes of British weakness 427 - Illusions as to the progress of the war 428 - The real cause of our going to war 430 - Democracy is not by its nature invincible 431 - Leadership is our chief need 433 - The folly of telling half-truths to the People 435 - - - - -PART I - -THE CAUSES OF WAR - - - -Then _Apollyon_ strodled quite over the whole breadth of the way, and -said, I am void of fear in this matter, prepare thyself to die; for I -swear by my infernal Den, that thou shalt go no further; here will I -spill thy soul. - -And with that he threw a flaming Dart at his breast, but _Christian_ -had a shield in his hand, with which he caught it, and so prevented the -danger of that. - -Then did _Christian_ draw, for he saw 'twas time to bestir him: and -_Apollyon_ as fast made at him, throwing Darts as thick as Hail; by the -which, notwithstanding all that _Christian_ could do to avoid it, -_Apollyon_ wounded him in his _head_, his _hand_, and _foot_: this made -_Christian_ give a little back; _Apollyon_ therefore followed his work -amain, and _Christian_ again took courage, and resisted as manfully as -he could. This sore Combat lasted for above half a day, even till -_Christian_ was almost quite spent; for you must know that _Christian_, -by reason of his wounds, must needs grow weaker and weaker. - -Then _Apollyon_ espying his opportunity, began to gather up close to -_Christian_, and wrestling with him, gave him a dreadful fall; and with -that _Christian's_ sword flew out of his hand. Then said _Apollyon, I -am sure of thee now_: and with that he had almost pressed him to death, -so that _Christian_ began to despair of life. But as God would have -it, while Apollyon was fetching of his last blow, thereby to make a -full end of this good man, _Christian_ nimbly reached out his hand for -his Sword, and caught it, saying, _Rejoice not against me, O mine -enemy! when I fall I shall arise_; and with that gave him a deadly -thrust, which made him give back, as one that had received his mortal -wound: _Christian_ perceiving that, made at him again, saying, _Nay, in -all these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved -us_. And with that _Apollyon_ spread forth his dragon's wings, and -sped him away, that _Christian_ for a season saw him no more. - -In this Combat no man can imagine, unless he had seen and heard as I -did, what yelling and hideous roaring, _Apollyon_ made all the time of -the fight; he spake like a Dragon.... - -_The Pilgrim's Progress._ - - - - -{3} - -CHAPTER I - -PEACE AND WAR - -It is a considerable number of years since the most distinguished Tory -statesman of his time impressed upon his fellow-countrymen as a maxim -of policy, that _Peace is the greatest of British interests_. There -was an unexpectedness about Lord Salisbury's words, coming as they did -from the leader of a party which had hitherto lain under suspicion of -jingoism, which gave the phrase almost the colour of an epigram. The -truth of the saying, however, gradually became manifest to all men; and -thereupon a new danger arose out of this very fact. - -As a nation we are in some ways a great deal too modest; or it may be, -looking at the matter from a critical standpoint, too self-centred. We -have always been inclined to assume in our calculations that we -ourselves are the only possible disturbers of the peace, and that if we -do not seek war, or provoke it, no other Power will dream of forcing -war upon us. This unfortunately has rarely been the case; and those -persons who, in recent times, have refused most scornfully to consider -the lessons of past history, have now at last learned from a sterner -schoolmaster the falseness of their favourite doctrine. - -The United Kingdom needed and desired peace, so {4} that it might -proceed undistracted, and with firm purpose, to set its house in order. -The Dominions needed peace, so that they might have time to people -their fertile but empty lands, to strike deep roots and become secure. -To the Indian Empire and the Dependencies peace was essential, if a -system of government, which aimed, not unsuccessfully, at giving -justice and fostering well-being, was to maintain its power and -prestige unshaken. The whole British race had nothing material to gain -by war, but much to lose, much at any rate which would be put in -jeopardy by war. In spite of all these weighty considerations which no -man of sense and knowledge will venture to dispute, we should have been -wiser had we taken into account the fact, that they did not apply to -other nations, that in the main they affected ourselves alone, and that -our case was no less singular than, in one sense at all events, it was -fortunate. - -We did not covet territory or new subjects. Still less were we likely -to engage in campaigns out of a thirst for glory. In the latter -particular at least we were on a par with the rest of the world. The -cloud of anxiety which for ten or more years has brooded over the great -conscript nations, growing steadily darker, contained many dangers, but -among these we cannot reckon such antiquated motives as trivial -bravado, light-hearted knight-errantry, or the vain pursuit of military -renown. - -What is called in history books 'an insult' seemed also to have lost -much of its ancient power for plunging nations into war. The -Chancelleries of Europe had grown cautious, and were on the watch -against being misled by the emotions of the moment. A sensational but -unintended injury was not allowed to drive us {5} into war with Russia -in 1904, and this precedent seemed of good augury. Moreover, when -every statesman in Europe was fully alive to the electric condition of -the atmosphere, a deliberate insult was not very likely to be offered -from mere ill-manners or in a fit of temper, but only if there were -some serious purpose behind it, in which case it would fall under a -different category. - -Fear was a great danger, and everybody knew it to be so--fear lest this -nation, or that, might be secretly engaged in strengthening its -position in order to crush one of its neighbours at some future date, -unless that neighbour took time by the forelock and struck out -forthwith. Among the causes which might bring about a surprise -outbreak of war this was the most serious and probable. It was -difficult to insure against it. But though perilous in the extreme -while it lasts, panic is of the nature of an epidemic: it rages for a -while and passes away. It had been raging now with great severity ever -since 1909,[1] and by midsummer 1914 optimists were inclined to seek -consolation in the thought that the crisis must surely be over. - -[Sidenote: DANGERS TO PEACE] - -More dangerous to peace in the long run even than fear, were certain -aims and aspirations, which from one standpoint were concrete and -practical, but regarded from another were among the cloudiest of -abstractions--'political interests,' need of new markets, hunger for -fresh territory to absorb the outflow of emigrants, and the like; on -the other hand, those hopes and anxieties which haunt the {6} -imaginations of eager men as they look into the future, and dream -dreams and see visions of a grand national fulfilment. - -If the British race ever beheld a vision of this sort, it had been -realised already. We should have been wise had we remembered that this -accomplished fact, these staked-out claims of the British Empire, -appeared to fall like a shadow across visions seen by other eyes, -blotting out some of the fairest hopes, and spoiling the noble -proportions of the patriot's dream. - -There is a region where words stumble after truth, like children -chasing a rainbow across a meadow to find the pot of fairy gold. -Multitudinous volumes stuffed with the cant of pacifism and militarism -will never explain to us the nature of peace and war. But a few bars -of music may sometimes make clear things which all the moralists, and -divines, and philosophers--even the poets themselves for the most part, -though they come nearer to it at times than the rest--have struggled -vainly to show us in their true proportions. The songs of a nation, -its national anthems--if they be truly national and not merely some -commissioned exercise--are better interpreters than state papers. A -man will learn more of the causes of wars, perhaps even of the rights -and wrongs of them, by listening to the burst and fall of the French -hymn, the ebb and surge of the Russian, in Tschaikovsky's famous -overture, than he ever will from books or speeches, argument or oratory. - -[Sidenote: IMPOTENCE OF LOGIC] - -Yet there are people who think it not impossible to prove to mankind by -logical processes, that the loss which any great nation must inevitably -sustain through war, will far outweigh any advantages which {7} can -ensue from it, even if the arms of the conqueror were crowned with -victories greater than those of Caesar or Napoleon. They draw us -pictures of the exhaustion which must inevitably follow upon such a -struggle conducted upon the modern scale, of the stupendous loss of -capital, destruction of credit, paralysis of industry, arrest of -progress in things spiritual as well as temporal, the shock to -civilisation, and the crippling for a generation, probably for several -generations, possibly for ever, of the victorious country in its race -with rivals who have wisely stood aside from the fray. These arguments -may conceivably be true, may in no particular be over-coloured, or an -under-valuation, either of the good which has been attained by battle, -or of the evils which have been escaped. But they would be difficult -to establish even before an unbiassed court, and they are infinitely -more difficult to stamp upon popular belief. - -It is not sufficient either with statesmen or peoples to set before -them a chain of reasoning which is logically unanswerable. Somehow or -other the new faith which it is desired to implant, must be rendered -independent of logic and unassailable by logic. It must rise into a -higher order of convictions than the intellectual before it can begin -to operate upon human affairs. For it is matched against opinions -which have been held and acted upon so long, that they have become -unquestionable save in purely academic discussions. At those decisive -moments, when action follows upon thought like a flash, conclusions -which depend upon a train of reasoning are of no account: instinct will -always get the better of any syllogism. - -{8} - -So when nations are hovering on the brink of war, it is impulse, -tradition, or some stuff of the imagination--misused deliberately, as -sometimes happens, by crafty manipulators--which determines action much -more often than the business calculations of shopkeepers and -economists. Some cherished institution seems to be threatened. Some -nationality supposed--very likely erroneously--to be of the same flesh -and blood as ourselves, appears--very likely on faulty information--to -be unjustly oppressed. Two rival systems of civilisation, of morals, -of religion, approach one another like thunder-clouds and come together -in a clash. Where is the good at such times of casting up sums, and -exhibiting profit-and-loss accounts to the public gaze? People will -not listen, for in their view considerations of prosperity and the -reverse are beside the question. Wealth, comfort, even life itself, -are not regarded; nor are the possible sufferings of posterity allowed -to count any more than the tribulations of to-day. In the eyes of the -people the matter is one of duty not of interest. When men fight in -this spirit the most lucid exposition of material drawbacks is worse -than useless; for the national mood, at such moments, is one of -self-sacrifice. The philosopher, or the philanthropist, is more likely -to feed the flames than to put them out when he proves the certainty of -loss and privation, and dwells upon the imminent peril of ruin and -destruction. - -The strength of the fighter is the strength of his faith. Each new -Gideon who goes out against the Midianites fancies that the sword of -the Lord is in his hand. He risks all that he holds dear, in order -that he may pull down the foul images of Baal and build up an altar to -Jehovah, in order that his race {9} may not be shorn of its -inheritance, in order that it may hold fast its own laws and -institutions, and not pass under the yoke of the Gentiles. This habit -of mind is unchanging throughout the ages. What moved men to give -their lives at Marathon moved them equally, more than a thousand years -later, to offer the same sacrifice under the walls of Tours. It is -still moving them, after yet another thousand years and more have -passed away, in the plains of Flanders and the Polish Marshes. - -[Sidenote: THE MOTIVES OF NATIONS] - -When the Persian sought to force the dominion of his ideals upon the -Greek, the states of Hellas made head against him from the love and -honour in which they held their own. When the successors of the -Prophet, zealous for their faith, confident in the protection of the -One God, drove the soldiers of the Cross before them from the passes of -the Pyrenees to the vineyards of Touraine, neither side would have -listened with any patience to a dissertation upon the inconveniences -resulting from a state of war and upon the economic advantages of -peace. It was there one faith against another, one attitude towards -life against another, one system of manners, customs, and laws against -another. When a collision occurs in this region of human affairs there -is seldom room for compromise or adjustment. Things unmerchantable -cannot be purchased with the finest of fine gold. - -In these instances, seen by us from far off, the truth of this is -easily recognised. But what some of our recent moralists have -overlooked, is the fact that forces of precisely the same order exist -in the world of to-day, and are at work, not only among the fierce -Balkan peoples, in the resurgent empire of Japan, and in the great -military nations--the French, the {10} Germans, and the Russians--but -also in America and England. The last two pride themselves upon a -higher civilisation, and in return are despised by the prophets of -militarism as worshippers of material gain. The unfavourable and the -flattering estimate agree, however, upon a single point--in assuming -that our own people and those of the United States are unlikely to -yield themselves to unsophisticated impulse. This assumption is wholly -false. - -[Sidenote: VIRTUES OF THE WAR SPIRIT] - -If we search carefully, we shall find every where underlying the great -struggles recorded in past history, no less than those which have -occurred, and are now occurring, in our own time, an antagonism of one -kind or another between two systems, visions, or ideals, which in some -particular were fundamentally opposed and could not be reconciled. -State papers and the memoranda of diplomatists, when in due course they -come to light, are not a little apt to confuse the real issues, by -setting forth a diary of minor incidents and piquant details, not in -their true proportions, but as they appeared at the moment of their -occurrence to the eyes of harassed and suspicious officials. But even -so, all the emptying of desks and pigeon-holes since the great American -Civil War, has not been able to cover up the essential fact, that in -this case a million lives were sacrificed by one of the most -intelligent, humane, and practical nations upon earth, and for no other -cause than that there was an irreconcilable difference amongst them, -with regard to what St. Paul has called 'the substance of things hoped -for.' On the one side there was an ideal of Union and a determination -to make it prevail: on the other side there was an ideal of -Independence and an equal determination to defend it whatsoever {11} -might be the cost. If war on such grounds be possible within the -confines of a single nation, nurtured in the same traditions, and born -to a large extent of the same stock, how futile is the assurance that -economic and material considerations will suffice to make war -impossible between nations, who have not even the tie of a common -mother-tongue! - -A collision may occur, as we know only too well, even although one of -two vessels be at anchor, if it happens to lie athwart the course of -the other. It was therefore no security against war that British -policy did not aim at any aggrandisement or seek for any territorial -expansion. The essential questions were--had we possessions which -appeared to obstruct the national aspirations and ideals of others; and -did these others believe that alone, or in alliance, they had the power -to redress the balance? - -The real difficulty which besets the philanthropist in his endeavour to -exorcise the spirit of war is caused, not by the vices of this spirit, -but by its virtues. In so far as it springs from vainglory or -cupidity, it is comparatively easy to deal with. In so far as it is -base, there is room for a bargain. It can be compounded with and -bought off, as we have seen before now, with some kind of material -currency. It will not stand out for very long against promises of -prosperity and threats of dearth. But where, as at most crises, this -spirit is not base, where its impulse is not less noble, but more noble -than those which influence men day by day in the conduct of their -worldly affairs, where the contrast which presents itself to their -imagination is between duty on the one hand and gain on the other, -between self-sacrifice and self-interest, between their country's need -and {12} their own ease, it is not possible to quench the fires by -appeals proceeding from a lower plane. The philanthropist, if he is to -succeed, must take still higher ground, and higher ground than this it -is not a very simple matter to discover. - - - -[1] The increase and acceleration of German shipbuilding was discovered -by the British Government in the autumn of 1908, and led to the -Imperial Defence Conference in the summer of the following year. - - - - -{13} - -CHAPTER II - -THE OUTBREAK OF WAR - -When war came, it came suddenly. A man who had happened to fall sick -of a fever on St. Swithin's day 1914, but was so far on the way to -convalescence four weeks later as to desire news of the outside world, -must have been altogether incredulous of the tidings which first -greeted his ears. - -When he fell ill the nations were at peace. The townspeople of Europe -were in a holiday humour, packing their trunks and portmanteaus for -'land travel or sea-faring.' The country people were getting in their -harvest or looking forward hopefully to the vintage. Business was -prosperous. Credit was good. Money, in banking phraseology, was -'cheap.' The horror of the Serajevo assassinations had already faded -almost into oblivion. At the worst this sensational event was only an -affair of police. Such real anxiety as existed in the United Kingdom -had reference to Ireland. - -We can imagine the invalid's first feeble question on public -affairs:--'What has happened in Ulster?'--The answer, 'Nothing has -happened in Ulster.'--The sigh of relief with which he sinks back on -his pillows. - -When, however, they proceed to tell him what has happened, elsewhere -than in Ulster, during the {14} four weeks while they have been -watching by his bedside, will he not fancy that his supposed recovery -is only an illusion, and that he is still struggling with the phantoms -of his delirium? - -For what will they have to report? That the greater part of the world -which professes Christianity has called out its armies; that more than -half Europe has already joined battle; that England, France, Russia, -Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro on the one side are ranged against -Germany and Austria on the other. Japan, they will tell him, is upon -the point of declaring war. The Turk is wondering if, and when, he may -venture to come in; while the Italian, the Roumanian, the Bulgar, the -Greek, the Dutchman, the Dane, and the Swede are reckoning no less -anxiously for how short or long a period it may still be safe for them -to stand out. Three millions of men, or thereabouts--a British Army -included--are advancing against one another along the mountain barriers -of Luxemburg, Lorraine, and Alsace. Another three millions are engaged -in similar evolutions among the lakes of East Prussia, along the -river-banks of Poland, and under the shadow of the Carpathians. A -large part of Belgium is already devastated, her villages are in ashes -or flames, her eastern fortresses invested, her capital threatened by -the invader. - -Nine-tenths or more of the navies of the world are cleared for action, -and are either scouring the seas in pursuit, or are withdrawn under the -shelter of land-batteries watching their opportunity for a stroke. -Air-craft circle by day and night over the cities, dropping bombs, with -a careless and impartial aim, upon buildings both private and public, -both sacred and profane, upon churches, palaces, hospitals, {15} and -arsenals. The North Sea and the Baltic are sown with mines. The trade -of the greater part of industrial Europe is at a standstill; the rest -is disorganised; while the credit and finances, not merely of Europe, -but of every continent, are temporarily in a state either of chaos or -paralysis. - -[Sidenote: A NIGHTMARE] - -To the bewildered convalescent all this may well have seemed -incredible. It is hardly to be wondered at if he concluded that the -fumes of his fever were not yet dispersed, and that this frightful -phantasmagoria had been produced, not by external realities, but by the -disorders of his own brain. - -How long it might have taken to convince him of the truth and substance -of these events we may judge from our own recent experience. How long -was it after war broke out, before even we, who had watched the trouble -brewing through all its stages, ceased to be haunted, even in broad -daylight, by the feeling that we were asleep, and that the whole thing -was a nightmare which must vanish when we awoke? We were faced (so at -least it seemed at frequent moments) not by facts, but by a spectre, -and one by no means unfamiliar--the spectre of Europe at war, so long -dreaded by some, so scornfully derided by others, so often driven away, -of late years so persistently reappearing. But this time the thing -refused to be driven away. It sat, hunched up, with its head resting -on its hands, as pitiless and inhuman as one of the gargoyles on a -Gothic cathedral, staring through us, as if we were merely vapour, at -something beyond. - - -So late as Wednesday, July 29--the day on which Austria declared war on -Servia--there was {16} probably not one Englishman in a hundred who -believed it possible that, within a week, his own country would be at -war; still less, that a few days later the British Army would be -crossing the Channel to assist France and Belgium in repelling a German -invasion. To the ordinary man--and not merely to the ordinary man, but -equally to the press, and the great majority of politicians--such -things were unthinkable until they occurred. Unfortunately, the -inability to think a thing is no more a protection against its -occurrence than the inability to see a thing gives security to the -ostrich. - -The sequence of events which led up to the final disaster is of great -importance, although very far from being in itself a full explanation -of the causes. - -On June 28, 1914, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, together -with his consort, was murdered by a young Bosnian at Serajevo, not far -distant from the southern frontier. The Imperial authorities -instituted a secret enquiry into the circumstances of the plot, as a -result of which they professed to have discovered that it had been -hatched at Belgrade, that Government officials were implicated in it, -and that so far from being reprobated, it was approved by Servian -public opinion.[1] - -On Thursday, July 23--a month after the tragedy--Austria suddenly -delivered an ultimatum to Servia, and demanded an acceptance of its -terms within forty-eight hours. The demands put forward were {17} -harsh, humiliating, and unconscionable. They were such as could not -have been accepted, as they stood, by any nation which desired to -preserve a shred of its independence. They had been framed with the -deliberate intention, either of provoking a refusal which might afford -a pretext for war, or of procuring an acceptance which would at once -reduce the Servian Kingdom to the position of a vassal. Even in Berlin -it was admitted[2] that this ultimatum asked more than it was -reasonable to expect Servia to yield. But none the less, there can be -but little doubt that the German ambassador at Vienna saw and approved -the document before it was despatched, and it seems more than likely -that he had a hand in drafting it. It also rests on good authority -that the German Kaiser was informed beforehand of the contents, and -that he did not demur to its presentation.[3] - -[Sidenote: THE SERVIAN REPLY] - -On the evening of Saturday, July 25, the Servian Government, as -required, handed in its answer. The purport of this, when it became -known to the world, excited surprise by the humility of its tone and -the substance of its submission. Almost everything that {18} Austria -had demanded was agreed to. What remained outstanding was clearly not -worth quarrelling about, unless a quarrel were the object of the -ultimatum. The refusal, such as it was, did not close the door, but, -on the contrary, contained an offer to submit the subjects of -difference to the Hague Convention.[4] - -The document was a lengthy one. The Austrian minister at Belgrade -nevertheless found time to read it through, to weigh it carefully, to -find it wanting, to ask for his passports, and to catch his train, all -within a period not exceeding three-quarters of an hour from the time -at which it was put into his hands.[5] - -When these occurrences became known, the English Foreign Minister -immediately made proposals for a conference between representatives of -Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, with the object of -discovering some means of peaceful settlement.[6] France and Italy -promptly accepted his invitation.[7] Germany, while professing to -desire mediation, did not accept it.[8] Consequently Sir Edward Grey's -effort failed; and before he was able to renew it in any more -acceptable form, Austria, acting with a promptitude almost unique in -her annals, declared war upon Servia, and hostilities began. - -It is unnecessary to enter here into an examination of the feverish and -fruitless attempts to preserve peace, which were made in various -quarters during the next four and twenty hours. They present a {19} -most pathetic appearance, like the efforts of a crew, sitting with oars -unshipped, arguing, exhorting, and imploring, while their boat drifts -on to the smooth lip of the cataract. - - -[Sidenote: MOBILIZATION] - -Russia ordered the mobilisation of her Southern armies, alleging that -she could not stand by while a Slav nation was being crushed out of -existence, despite the fact that it had made an abject submission for -an unproved offence.[9] - -Subsequently, on Friday, July 31, Russia--having, as she considered, -reasons for believing that Germany was secretly mobilising her whole -forces--proceeded to do likewise.[10] - -Germany simultaneously declared 'a state of war' within her own -territories, and a veil instantly fell upon all her internal -proceedings. She demanded that Russia should cease her mobilisation, -and as no answer which satisfied her was forthcoming, but only an -interchange of telegrams between the two sovereigns--disingenuous on -the one side and not unreasonably suspicious on the other--Germany -declared war on Russia on Saturday, August 1. - -On Saturday and Sunday, war on a grand scale being by this time -certain, the chief interest centred in questions of neutrality. -Germany enquired of France whether she would undertake to stand -aside--knowing full well beforehand that the terms of the Dual Alliance -compelled the Republic to lend assistance if Russia were attacked by -more than one power. {20} Sir Edward Grey enquired of France and -Germany if they would undertake to respect the integrity of Belgium. -France replied in the affirmative. Germany declined to commit herself, -and this was rightly construed as a refusal.[11] - -While this matter was still the subject of diplomatic discussion the -German Army advanced into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and was -correctly reported as having entered Belgian territory near Liège and -French territory near Cirey. - -On the evening of Sunday, August 2, the German Government presented an -ultimatum to Belgium[12] demanding free passage for its troops, thereby -putting its intentions beyond all doubt. - -On the same day Italy issued a declaration of neutrality, making it -clear that, although a member of the Triple Alliance, she did not -consider herself bound to support her allies in a war of aggression.[13] - -Meanwhile Germany had been making enquiries as to the attitude of -England, and, startled to discover that this country might not be -willing tamely to submit to the violation of Belgium and invasion of -France, proceeded to state, under cross-examination, the price she was -prepared to pay, or at any rate to promise, for the sake of securing -British neutrality.[14] - -[Sidenote: ENGLAND DECLARES WAR] - -On Tuesday, August 4, the British Ambassador at Berlin presented an -ultimatum which demanded an assurance, before midnight, that the -integrity of Belgium would not be violated. The answer was given -informally at a much earlier hour by the {21} bombardment of Liège; and -shortly before midnight England declared war on Germany.[15] - -Two days later Austria declared herself to be at war with Russia, and -within a week from that date Great Britain and France issued a similar -declaration against Austria. - - - -[1] There is perhaps as much reason, certainly no more, for believing -that an official clique at Belgrade plotted the Serajevo murders, as -that an official clique at Vienna connived at them, by deliberately -withdrawing police protection from the unfortunate and unpopular -Archduke on the occasion of his visit to a notorious hotbed of sedition. - -[2] Herr von Jagow "also admitted that the Servian Government could not -swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.... He repeated very -earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all the contents -of that note, he had in fact no such knowledge."--Sir H. Rumbold at -Berlin to Sir Edward Grey (White Paper, No. 18). - -[3] "Although I am unable to verify it, I have private information that -the German Ambassador (_i.e._ at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian -ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the -German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he -endorses every line of it."--British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward -Grey (White Paper, No. 95). (Cf. also White Book, Nos. 95 and 141; -French Yellow Book, No. 87; Russian Orange Book, No. 41.) - -"The German Ambassador (_i.e._ in London) read me a telegram from the -German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known -beforehand, and had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff -terms of the Austrian note to Servia."--Sir Edward Grey to the British -Ambassador in Berlin (White Paper, No. 25). (Cf. also French Yellow -Book, Nos. 17, 30, 36, 41, 57, and 94.) - -[4] Last paragraph of Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian -note. - -[5] White Paper, Nos. 20 and 23. - -[6] White Paper, No. 36. - -[7] White Paper, Nos. 35, 42, and 52. - -[8] White Paper, Nos. 43 and 71. Cf. also German White Book, Nos. 12 -and 15. - -[9] White Paper, No. 113; Russian Orange Book, No. 77; French Yellow -Book, No. 95. - -[10] These suspicions were well founded. German mobilisation began at -least two days earlier (White Paper, No. 113; French Yellow Book, Nos. -60, 88, 89, and 106). - -[11] White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, and 125. - -[12] Belgian Grey Book, No. 20; French Yellow Book, No. 141. - -[13] White Paper, No. 152; French Yellow Book, No. 124. - -[14] White Paper, Nos. 85 and 123. - -[15] "I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once -began a harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that -the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree: -just for a word--'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often -been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to -make war on a kindred nation, who desired nothing better than to be -friends with her."--British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey -(White Paper, No. 160). - - - - -{22} - -CHAPTER III - -WHO WANTED WAR? - -Such is the chronological order of events; but on the face of it, it -explains little of the underlying causes of this conflagration. Why -with the single exception of Italy had all the great naval and military -powers of Europe, together with several smaller nations, suddenly -plunged into war? Which of the combatants wanted war? ... To the -latter question the answer can be given at once and with -certainty--save Germany and Austria no nation wanted war, and even -Germany and Austria did not want _this_ war. - -[Sidenote: DESIRE FOR PEACE] - -Whatever opinion we may entertain of the Servian character or of her -policy in recent times, it is at all events certain that she did not -desire war with Austria. That she submitted to the very depths of -humiliation in order to avoid war cannot be doubted by any one who has -read her reply to the demands put forward by Vienna. Only a few months -since, she had emerged from two sanguinary wars--the first against -Turkey and the second against Bulgaria--and although victory had -crowned her arms in both of these contests, her losses in men and -material had been very severe. - -That Russia did not desire war was equally plain. {23} She was still -engaged in repairing the gigantic losses which she had sustained in her -struggle with Japan. At least two years must elapse before her new -fleet would be in a condition to take the sea, and it was generally -understood that at least as long a period would be necessary, in order -to carry through the scheme of reorganisation by which she hoped to -place her army in a state of efficiency. Whatever might be the -ultimate designs of Russia, it was altogether incredible that she would -have sought to bring about a war, either at this time or in the near -future. - -Russia, like England, had nothing to gain by war. Her development was -proceeding rapidly. For years to come her highest interest must be -peace. A supreme provocation was necessary in order to make her draw -the sword. Such a provocation had been given in 1909 when, ignoring -the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, Austria had formally annexed the -provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But at that time Russia's -resources were not merely unprepared; they were utterly exhausted. -Menaced simultaneously by Vienna and Berlin, she had been forced on -that occasion to stand by, while her prestige in the Balkan peninsula -suffered a blow which she was powerless to ward off. Now a further -encroachment was threatened from the same quarters. A Serb power which -looked to St. Petersburg[1] for protection was to be put under the heel -of Austria. - -Nor can any one believe that France wanted war. It is true that for a -year, or rather more, after the Agadir episode[2] the spirit of France -was perturbed. But no Foreign Office in the world--least of all that -{24} of Germany--was so ill-informed as to believe that the sporadic -demonstrations, which occurred in the press and elsewhere, were caused -by any eagerness for adventure or any ambition of conquest. They were -due, as every calm observer was aware, to one thing and one thing -only--the knowledge that the Republic had come to the very end of her -human resources; that all her sons who were capable of bearing arms had -already been enrolled in her army; that she could do nothing further to -strengthen her defences against Germany, who up to that time, had taken -for military training barely one half of her available male population, -and who was now engaged in increasing her striking power both by land -and sea. The cause of this restlessness in France was the fear that -Germany was preparing an invincible superiority and would strike so -soon as her weapon was forged. If so, would it not be better for -France to strike at once, while she had still a fighting chance, and -before she was hopelessly outnumbered? But this mood, the product of -anxiety and suspense, which had been somewhat prevalent in -irresponsible quarters during the autumn of 1912 and the early part of -the following year, had passed away. Partly it wore itself out; partly -popular interest was diverted to other objects of excitement. - -France, during the twelve months preceding Midsummer 1914, had been -singularly quiescent as regards foreign affairs. Her internal -conditions absorbed attention. Various events had conspired to disturb -public confidence in the fidelity of her rulers, and in the adequacy of -their military preparations. The popular mood had been sobered, -disquieted, and scandalised to such a point that war, {25} so far from -being sought after, was the thing of all others which France most -wished to avoid. - -[Sidenote: THE CASE OF BELGIUM] - -It is unnecessary to waste words in establishing the aversion of -Belgium from war. There was nothing which she could hope to gain by it -in any event. Suffering and loss--how great suffering and loss even -Belgium herself can hardly have foreseen--were inevitable to her civil -population, as well as to her soldiers, whether the war went well or -ill. Her territory lay in the direct way of the invaders, and was -likely, as in times past, to become the 'cockpit of Europe.' She was -asked to allow the free passage of the Germanic forces. She was -promised restoration of her independence and integrity at the end of -the war. But to grant this arrogant demand would have been to destroy -her dynasty and wreck her institutions; for what King or Constitution -could have withstood the popular contempt for a government which -acquiesced in national degradation? And to believe the promise, was a -thing only possible for simpletons; for what was such an assurance -worth, seeing that, at the very moment of the offer, Germany was -engaged in breaking her former undertaking, solemnly guaranteed and -recorded, that the neutrality of Belgium should be respected? That the -sympathies of Belgium would have been with France in any event cannot -of course be doubted; for a French victory threatened no danger, -whereas the success of German arms was a menace to her independence, -and a prelude to vassalage or absorption in the Empire. - -Neither the British people nor their Government wanted war. In the end -they accepted it reluctantly, and only after most strenuous efforts had -been made {26} to prevent its occurrence. To the intelligent foreign -observer, however unfriendly, who has a thorough understanding of -British interests, ideas, and habits of mind this is self-evident. He -does not need a White Paper to prove it to him. - -It is clear that Austria wanted war--not this war certainly, but a snug -little war with a troublesome little neighbour, as to the outcome of -which, with the ring kept, there could be no possibility of doubt. She -obviously hoped that indirectly, and as a sort of by-product of this -convenient little war, she would secure a great victory of the -diplomatic sort over her most powerful neighbour--a matter of -infinitely more consequence to her than the ostensible object of her -efforts. - -The crushing of Servia would mean the humiliation of Russia, and would -shake, for a second time within five years, the confidence of the -Balkan peoples in the power of the Slav Empire to protect its kindred -and co-religionists against the aggression of the Teutons and Magyars. -Anything which would lower the credit of Russia in the Balkan peninsula -would be a gain to Austria. To her more ambitious statesmen such an -achievement might well seem to open the way for coveted expansions -towards the Aegean Sea, which had been closed against her, to her great -chagrin, by the Treaty of Bucharest.[3] To others, whose chief anxiety -was to preserve peace in their own time, and to prevent the -Austro-Hungarian State from splitting asunder, the repression of Servia -seemed to promise security against the growing unrest and discontent of -the vast Slav population which was included in the Empire. - -{27} - -[Sidenote: AUSTRIAN ILL-FORTUNE] - -For something nearer two centuries than one the Austro-Hungarian Empire -has been miscalculating and suffering for its miscalculations, until -its blunders and ill-fortune have become a byword. Scheming ever for -safety, Austria has never found it. The very modesty of her aim has -helped to secure its own defeat. Her unvarying method has been a timid -and unimaginative repression. In politics, as in most other human -affairs, equilibrium is more easily attained by moving forward than by -standing still. Austria has sought security for powers, and systems, -and balances which were worn out, unsuited to our modern world, and -therefore incapable of being secured at all. The more she has schemed -for safety the more precarious her integrity has become. There are -things which scheming will never accomplish--things which for their -achievement need a change of spirit, some new birth of faith or -freedom. But in Vienna change in any direction is ill-regarded, and -new births are ever more likely to be strangled in their cradles than -to arrive at maturity. - -Distracted by the problem of her divers, discordant, and unwelded[4] -races, Austria has always inclined to put her trust in schemers who -were able to produce some plausible system, some ingenious device, some -promising ladder of calculation, or miscalculation, for reaching the -moon without going through the clouds. In the present case there can -be no doubt that she allowed herself to be persuaded by her German -neighbours that Russia was not in a position to make {28} an effective -fight, and would therefore probably stand by, growling and showing her -teeth. Consequently it was safe to take a bold line; to present Servia -with an ultimatum which had been made completely watertight against -acceptance of the unconditional and immediate kind; to reject any -acceptance which was not unconditional and immediate; to allow the -Government of King Peter no time for second thoughts, the European -Powers no time for mediation, her own Minister at Belgrade time only to -give one hasty glance at the reply, call for his passports, and catch -his train. So far as poor humanity can make certain of anything, -Austria, with German approval and under German guidance, made certain -of war with Servia. - -But the impression produced, when this matter first began to excite -public attention, was somewhat different. Foreign newspaper -correspondents at Vienna and Berlin were specially well cared for after -the Serajevo murders, and when the ultimatum was delivered, they -immediately sent to England and elsewhere accounts of the position -which made it appear, that the Austrian Government and people, provoked -beyond endurance by the intrigues of Servia, had acted impetuously, -possibly unwisely, but not altogether inexcusably. - -At this stage the idea was also sedulously put about that the Kaiser -was behaving like a gentleman. It was suggested that Germany had been -left very much in the dark until the explosion actually occurred, and -that she was now paying the penalty of loyalty to an indiscreet friend, -by suffering herself to be dragged into a quarrel in which she had -neither interest nor concern. In these early days, when {29} Sir -Edward Grey was striving hopefully, if somewhat innocently, after -peace, it was assumed by the world in general, that Germany, for her -own reasons, must desire, at least as ardently as the British Foreign -Minister, to find a means of escape from an exceedingly awkward -position, and that she would accordingly use her great influence with -her ally to this end. If there had been a grain of truth in this -assumption, peace would have been assured, for France and Italy had -already promised their support. But this theory broke down very -speedily; and as soon as the official papers were published, it was -seen never to have rested on the smallest basis of fact. - -[Sidenote: GERMANY USES AUSTRIA] - -So far from Germany having been dragged in against her will, it was -clear that from the beginning she had been using Austria as an agent, -who was not unwilling to stir up strife, but was only half-conscious of -the nature and dimensions of the contest which was bound to follow. It -is not credible that Germany was blind to the all-but-inevitable -results of letting Austria loose to range around, of hallooing her on, -and of comforting her with assurances of loyal support. But it may -well be believed that Austria herself did not see the situation in the -same clear light, and remained almost up to the last, under the -delusion, which had been so industriously fostered by the German -ambassador at Vienna, that Russia could not fight effectively and -therefore would probably choose not to fight at all. - -But although Austria may have had no adequate conception of the -consequences which her action would bring about, it is certain that -Germany foresaw them, with the single exception of British {30} -intervention; that what she foresaw she also desired; and further, that -at the right moment she did her part, boldly but clumsily, to guard -against any miscarriage of her schemes. - -Germany continued to make light of all apprehensions of serious danger -from St. Petersburg; but at the eleventh hour Austria appears suddenly -to have realised for herself the appalling nature of the catastrophe -which impended. Something happened; what it was we do not know, and -the present generation will probably never know. We may conjecture, -however--but it is only conjecture--that by some means or other the -intrigues of the war cabal at Vienna--the instrument of German policy, -owing more fealty to the Kaiser than to their own Emperor--had been -unmasked. In hot haste they were disavowed, and Austria opened -discussions with Russia 'in a perfectly friendly manner,'[5] and with -good hopes of success, as to how the catastrophe might still be averted. - -On Thursday, July 30, we are informed, the tension between Vienna and -St. Petersburg had greatly relaxed. An arrangement compatible with the -honour and interests of both empires seemed almost in sight when, on -the following day, Germany suddenly intervened with ultimatums to -France and Russia, of a kind to which only one answer was possible. -The spirit of the Ems telegram[6] had inebriated a duller generation. -"A few days' delay," our Ambassador at Vienna concludes, "might in all -{31} probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities -in history."[7] - -[Sidenote: SIR EDWARD GREY] - -As we turn over the official pages in which the British Government has -set out its case, we are inclined to marvel--knowing what we now -know--that our Foreign Minister should have shown so much zeal and -innocence in pleading the cause of peace on high grounds of humanity, -and with a faith, apparently unshaken to the last, that in principle at -least, the German Government were in full agreement with his aims. The -practical disadvantages of being a gentleman are that they are apt to -make a man too credulous and not sufficiently inquisitive. Sir Edward -Grey acted according to his nature. His miscalculation was one which -his fellow-countrymen have not hesitated to forgive. But clearly he -misjudged the forces which were opposed to him. He was deceived by -hollow assurances. He beat hopefully, but vainly and pathetically, -against a door which was already barred and bolted, and behind which -(could he but have seen) the Kaiser, with his Ministers and Staff, was -wholly absorbed in the study of war maps and tables of mobilisation. - -Sir Edward Grey failed to prevent war, and in the circumstances it is -hardly to be wondered at. But if he failed in one direction he -succeeded in another. His whole procedure from first to last was so -transparently disinterested and above board that, when war did actually -come upon us, it found us, not merely as a nation, but also as an -Empire, more united than we have ever been at any crisis, since the -Great Armada was sighted off Plymouth Sound. English people felt that -whatever else there {32} might be to reproach themselves with, they at -any rate went into the fight with clean hands. What is even more -remarkable, the people of all neutral countries, with the possible -exception of the rigid moralists of Constantinople, appeared for once -to share the same opinion. - -This was a great achievement; nearly, but not quite, the greatest of -all. To have prevented war would have been a greater achievement -still.... But was war inevitable? Or was M. Sazonof right, when he -said to our Ambassador, on the morning of the day when Servia replied -to the Austrian ultimatum,[8] that if Britain then took her stand -firmly with France and Russia there would be no war; but that if we -failed them then, rivers of blood would flow, and in the end we should -be dragged into war?[9] - -Sir Edward Grey refused to take this course. He judged that a -pronouncement of such a character would appear in the light of a menace -to the governments of Germany and Austria, and also to public opinion -in those countries; that it would only stiffen their backs; that a more -hopeful way of proceeding was for England to deal with Germany as a -friend, letting it be understood that if our counsels of moderation -were disregarded, we might be driven most reluctantly into the camp of -her enemies. To this, when it was urged by our Ambassador at St. -Petersburg, the Russian Minister only replied--and the words seem to -have in them a note of tragedy and weariness, as if the speaker well -knew that he was talking to deaf ears--that unfortunately Germany was -convinced that she could count upon the neutrality of Britain.[10] - -{33} - -The alternative was to speak out as Mr. Lloyd George spoke at the time -of the Agadir crisis, 'to rattle the sabre,' and to take our stand 'in -shining armour' beside the other two members of the Entente. - -Sir Edward Grey believed that this procedure would not have the effect -desired, but the reverse. Further, it would have committed this -country to a policy which had never been submitted to it, and which it -had never considered, far less approved, even in principle. The Agadir -precedent could be distinguished. There the danger which threatened -France arose directly out of treaty engagements with ourselves. Here -there was no such particular justification, but a wide general question -of the safety of Europe and the British Empire. - -With regard to this wider question, notwithstanding its imminence for a -good many years, the British Empire had not made up its mind, nor -indeed had it ever been asked to do so by those in authority. Sir -Edward Grey appears to have thought that, on democratic principles, he -had not the right to make such a pronouncement as M. Sazonof desired; -and that even if this pathway might have led to peace, it was one which -he could not tread. - -The one alternative was tried, and failed. We proffered our good -offices, we urged our counsels of moderation, all in vain. That, at -any rate, is among the certainties. And it is also among the -certainties that, although this alternative failed, it brought us two -signal benefits, in the unity of our own people and the goodwill of the -world. - -About the other alternative, which was not tried, we cannot of course -speak with the same sureness. If Sir Edward Grey had taken the step -which {34} M. Sazonof desired him to take, he would at once have been -vehemently opposed and denounced by a very large body of his own -fellow-countrymen, who, never having been taken frankly into the -confidence of the Government with regard to the foundations of British -policy, were at this early stage of the proceedings almost wholly -ignorant of the motives and issues involved. This being so, if war had -ensued, we should then have gone into it a divided instead of a united -nation. On the other hand, if peace had ensued, it must have been a -patched-up ill-natured peace; and it is not improbable that Sir Edward -Grey would have been driven from office by enemies in his own -household, playing the game of Germany unconsciously, as on previous -occasions, and would have brought the Cabinet down with him in his -fall. For at this time, owing to domestic difficulties, the Government -stood in a very perilous position, and it needed only such a mutiny, as -a bold departure in foreign affairs would almost certainly have -provoked among the Liberal party, to bring Mr. Asquith's government to -an end. - -As one reads and re-reads the official documents in our present -twilight, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that on the main -point Sir Edward Grey was wrong and M. Sazonof right. Germany, with -her eyes wide open, had determined on war with Russia and France, -unless by Russia's surrender of her prestige in the Balkans--a -surrender in its way almost as abject as that which had already been -demanded of Servia--the results of victory could be secured without -recourse to arms. Germany, nevertheless, was not prepared for war with -Britain. She was reckoning with confidence on our standing aside, {35} -on our unwillingness and inability to intervene.[11] If it had been -made clear to her, that in case she insisted on pressing things to -extremity, we should on no account stand aside, she might then have -eagerly forwarded, instead of deliberately frustrating, Austria's -eleventh-hour negotiations for an accommodation with St. Petersburg. - -No one, except Germans, whose judgments, naturally enough, are -disordered by the miscarriage of their plans, has dreamed of bringing -the charge against Sir Edward Grey that he wished for war, or fomented -it, or even that through levity or want of vigilance, he allowed it to -occur. The criticism is, that although his intentions were of the -best, and his industry unflagging, he failed to realise the situation, -and to adopt the only means which might have secured peace. - -The charge which is not only alleged, but established against Austria -is of a wholly different order. It is that she provoked war--blindly -perhaps, and not foreseeing what the war would be, but at any rate -recklessly and obstinately. - -The crime of which Germany stands accused is that she deliberately -aimed at war, and that when there seemed a chance of her plan -miscarrying, she promptly took steps to render peace impossible. Among -neutral countries is there one, the public opinion of which has -acquitted her? And has not Italy, her own ally, condemned her by -refusing assistance on the ground that this war is a war of German -aggression? - - - -[1] The name of the Russian capital was not changed until after the -declaration of war, and therefore St. Petersburg is used in this -chapter instead of Petrograd. - -[2] July-September 1911. - -[3] August 1913. - -[4] The total population of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, including -Bosnia-Herzegovina, is roughly 50 millions. Of these 11 millions are -Germans and 10 millions Magyars. About 24 millions are composed of a -strange variety of Slav races. The remaining 5 millions consist of -Italians, Roumanians, and Jews. - -[5] White Paper, No. 161. - -[6] A harmless and unprovocative telegram from the King of Prussia to -Bismarck in July 1870 was, by the latter, so altered in tone that when -published it achieved the intention of its editor and served as 'a red -rag to the Gallic bull' and brought about the declaration of war by -Napoleon III.--Bismarck's _Reflections and Reminiscences_, vol. ii. p. -100. - -[7] White Paper, No. 161. - -[8] Saturday, July 25. - -[9] White Paper, No. 17. - -[10] Ibid. Nos. 17 and 44. - -[11] A proof of this is the outburst of hatred in Germany against -England so soon as we ranged ourselves with France and Russia. - - - - -{36} - -CHAPTER IV - -THE PENALTY OF NEGLIGENCE - -The East has been drawn into the circle of this war as well as the -West, the New World as well as the Old; nor can any man feel certain, -or even hopeful, that the conflagration will be content to burn itself -out where it is now raging, and will not spread across further -boundaries.... It is therefore no matter of surprise that people -should be asking themselves--"Of what nature is this war? Is it one of -those calamities, like earthquake or tempest, drought or flood, which -lawyers describe as 'the act of God'? Or is it a thing which, having -been conceived and deliberately projected by the wit of man, could have -been averted by human courage and judgment? Was this war, or was it -not, inevitable?" ... To which it may be answered, that no war is -inevitable until it occurs; and then every war is apt to make -pretensions to that character. - -In old times it was the Fates, superior even to Zeus, who decreed wars. -In later days wars were regarded as the will of God. And to-day -professional interpreters of events are as ready as ever with -explanations why this war was, in the nature of things, unavoidable. -Whether the prevailing priesthood wears white robes and fillets, or -rich vestments, or {37} cassocks and Geneva bands, or the severer -modern garb of the professor or politician, it appears to be equally -prone to dogmatic blasphemy. There is no proof that this war was -pre-ordained either by a Christian God or by the laws of Pagan Nature. - -[Sidenote: WAS WAR INEVITABLE?] - -One may doubt if any war is inevitable. If statesmen can gain time the -chances are that they will gain peace. This was the view of public -opinion throughout the British Empire down to July 1914. It was in a -special sense the view of the Liberal party; and their view was -endorsed, if not by the whole body of Unionists, at any rate by their -leader, in terms which admitted of no misunderstanding.[1] It is also -the point of view from which this book is written.... This war was not -inevitable; it could have been avoided, but on one condition--_if -England had been prepared_. - -England was not prepared either morally or materially. Her rulers had -left her in the dark as to the dangers which surrounded her. They had -neglected to make clear to her--probably even to themselves--the -essential principles of British policy, and the sacrifices which it -entailed. They had failed to provide armaments to correspond with this -policy. When the crisis arose their hands were tied. They had to sit -down hurriedly, and decipher their policy, and find out what it meant. -Still more hurriedly they had to get it approved, not merely by their -fellow-countrymen, but by their own colleagues--a work, if rumour[2] -speaks truly, of {38} considerable difficulty. Then they found that -one of the main supports was wanting; and they had to set to work -frantically to make an army adequate to their needs. - -But it was too late. By this time their policy had fallen about their -ears in ruins. For their policy was the neutrality of Belgium, and -that was already violated. Their policy was the defence of France, and -invasion had begun. Their policy was peace, and peace was broken. The -nation which would enjoy peace must be strong enough to enforce peace. - - -The moods of nations pass like clouds, only more slowly. They bank up -filled with menace; we look again and are surprised to find that they -have melted away as silently and swiftly as they came. One does not -need to be very old to recall various wars, deemed at one time or -another to be inevitable, which never occurred. In the 'sixties' war -with the second Empire was judged to be inevitable; and along our -coasts dismantled forts remain to this day as monuments of our fathers' -firm belief in the imminence of an invasion. In the 'seventies,' and -indeed until we had entered the present century, war with Russia was -regarded as inevitable by a large number of well-informed people; and -for a part of this period war with the French Republic was judged to be -no less so. Fortune on the whole was favourable. Circumstances -changed. The sense of a common danger healed old antagonisms. Causes -of chronic irritation disappeared of themselves, or were removed by -diplomatic surgery. And with the disappearance of these inflammatory -centres, misunderstandings, prejudices, and suspicions began to vanish -also. {39} Gradually it became clear, that what had been mistaken on -both sides for destiny was nothing more inexorable than a fit of -temper, or a conflict of business interests not incapable of -adjustment. And in a sense the German menace was less formidable than -any of these others, for the reason that it was a fit of temper on one -side only--a fit of temper, or megalomania. We became fully conscious -of the German mood only after the end of the South African War, when -its persistence showed clearly that it arose, not from any sympathy -with the Dutch, but from some internal cause. When this cause was -explained to us it seemed so inadequate, so absurd, so unreal, so -contrary to the facts, that only a small fraction of our nation ever -succeeded in believing that it actually existed. We had been taught by -Carlyle, that while the verities draw immortal life from the facts to -which they correspond, the falsities have but a phenomenal existence, -and a brief influence over the minds of men. Consequently the greater -part of the British people troubled their heads very little about this -matter, never thought things would come to a crisis, or lead to serious -mischief; but trusted always that, in due time, the ridiculous -illusions of our neighbours would vanish and die of their own inanity. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN JEALOUSY] - -We listened with an equal wonder and weariness to German complaints -that we were jealous of her trade and bent on strangling it; that we -grudged her colonial expansion, and were intriguing all the world over -to prevent it; that we had isolated her and ringed her round with -hostile alliances. We knew that these notions were all entirely false. -We knew that, so far from hampering German commerce, {40} our Free -Trade system in the United Kingdom, in the Dependencies, and in the -Indian Empire had fostered it and helped its rapid and brilliant -success more than any other external factor. - -For fully thirty years from 1870--during which period what remained of -the uncivilised portions of the world was divided up, during which -period also Germany was the most powerful nation in Europe, and could -have had anything she wanted of these new territories almost for the -asking--Bismarck and the statesmen of his school, engrossed mainly in -the European situation, set little store by colonies, thought of them -rather as expensive and dangerous vanities, and abstained deliberately -from taking an energetic part in the scramble. We knew, that in Africa -and the East, Germany had nevertheless obtained considerable -possessions, and that it was, primarily her own fault that she had not -obtained more. We assumed, no doubt very foolishly, that she must -ultimately become aware of her absurdity in blaming us for her own -neglect. We forgot human nature, and the apologue of the drunkard who -cursed the lamp-post for its clumsiness in getting in his way. - -The British people knew that Germany was talking nonsense; but -unfortunately they never fully realised that she was sincere, and meant -all the things she said. They thought she only half believed in her -complaints, as a man is apt to do when ill-temper upsets his -equanimity. They were confident that in the end the falsities would -perish and the verities remain, and that in the fulness of time the two -nations would become friends. - -As to this last the British people probably judged correctly; but they -entirely overlooked the fact, {41} that if truth was to be given a -chance of prevailing in the end, it was important to provide against -mischief which might very easily occur in the meantime. Nor did their -rulers, whose duty it was, ever warn them seriously of this necessity. - -[Sidenote: DANGERS OF ILL-TEMPER] - -When a man works himself up into a rage and proceeds to flourish a -loaded revolver, something more is necessary for the security of the -bystanders than the knowledge that his ill-temper does not rest upon a -reasonable basis. War was not inevitable, certainly; but until the -mood of Germany changed, it was exceedingly likely to occur unless the -odds against the aggressor were made too formidable for him to face. -None of the governments, however, which have controlled our national -destinies since 1900, ever developed sufficient energy to realise the -position of affairs, or ever mustered up courage to tell the people -clearly what the risks were, to state the amount of the premium which -was required to cover the risks, and to insist upon the immediate duty -of the sacrifice which imperial security inexorably demanded. - - - -[1] "I hear it also constantly said--there is no use shutting our eyes -or ears to obvious facts--that owing to divergent interests, war some -day or other between this country and Germany is inevitable. I never -believe in these inevitable wars."--Mr. Bonar Law in _England and -Germany_. - -[2] Rumour finds confirmation in the White Paper; also in an interview -with Mr. Lloyd George, reported in _Pearson's Magazine_, March 1915, p. -265, col. ii. - - - - -{42} - -CHAPTER V - -PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY - -Although in a technical sense the present war was brought on by -Austrian diplomacy, no one, in England at least, is inclined to rate -the moral responsibility of that empire at the highest figure. It is -in Germany that we find, or imagine ourselves to have found, not only -the true and deep-seated causes of the war, but the immediate occasions -of it. - -Not the least of our difficulties, however, is to decide the point--Who -is Germany? Who was her man of business? Who acted for her in the -matter of this war? Who pulled the wires, or touched the button that -set the conflagration blazing? Was this the work of an individual or a -camarilla? Was it the result of one strong will prevailing, or of -several wills getting to loggerheads--wills not particularly strong, -but obstinate, and flustered by internal controversy and external -events? What actually happened--was it meant by the 'super-men' to -happen, or did it come as a shock--not upon 'supermen' at all--but upon -several groups of surprised blunderers? These questions are not likely -to be answered for a generation or more--until, if ever, the archives -of Vienna and Berlin give up their {43} secrets--and it would therefore -be idle to waste too much time in analysis of the probabilities. - -The immediate occasion of the catastrophe has been variously attributed -to the German court, army, bureaucracy, professors, press, and people. -If we are looking only for a single thing--the hand which lit the -conflagration--and not for the profounder and more permanent causes and -origins of the trouble, we can at once dismiss several of these -suspects from the dock. - -[Sidenote: MEN OF LETTERS] - -Men of learning and letters, professors of every variety--a class which -has been christened 'the Pedantocracy' by unfriendly critics--may be -all struck off the charge-sheet as unconcerned in the actual -delinquency of arson. - -In fact, if not in name, these are a kind of priesthood, and a large -part of their lives' work has been to spread among German youth the -worship of the State under Hohenzollern kingship. It is impossible of -course to make 'a silk purse out of a sow's ear,' a religion out of a -self-advertising dynasty, or a god out of a machine. Consequently, -except for mischief, their efforts have been mainly wasted. Over a -long period of years, however, they have been engaged in heaping up -combustibles. They have filled men's minds to overflowing with notions -which are very liable to lead to war, and which indeed were designed -for no other purpose than to prepare public opinion for just such a war -as this. Their responsibility therefore is no light one, and it will -be dealt with later. But they are innocent at all events of complicity -in this particular exploit of fire-raising; and if, after the event, -they have sought to excuse, vindicate, and uphold the action of their -rulers it would be hard measure to condemn them for that. - -{44} - -Nor did the press bring about the war. In other countries, where the -press is free and irresponsible, it has frequently been the prime mover -in such mischief; but never in Germany. For in Germany the press is -incapable of bringing about anything of the political kind, being -merely an instrument and not a principal. - -Just as little can the charge of having produced the war be brought -against the people. In other countries, where the people are used to -give marching orders to their rulers, popular clamour has led to -catastrophe of this kind more frequently than any other cause. But -this, again, has never been so in Germany. The German people are -sober, steadfast, and humble in matters of high policy. They have -confidence in their rulers, believe what they are told, obey orders -readily, but do not think of giving them. When war was declared, all -Germans responded to the call of duty with loyalty and devotion. Nay, -having been prepared for at least a generation, they welcomed war with -enthusiasm. According to the lights which were given them to judge by, -they judged every whit as rightly as our own people. The lights were -false lights, hung out deliberately to mislead them and to justify -imperial policy. But this was no fault of theirs. Moreover, the -judgment which they came to with regard to the war was made after the -event, and cannot therefore in any case be held responsible for its -occurrence. This is a people's war surely enough, but just as surely, -the people had no hand in bringing it about. - -The circle of the accused is therefore narrowed down to the Court, the -Army, and the Bureaucracy. And there we must leave it for the -present--a joint indictment against all three. But whether these {45} -parties were guilty, all three in equal measure, we cannot conjecture -with the least approach to certainty. Nor can we even say precisely of -what they were guilty--of misunderstanding--of a quarrel among -themselves--of a series of blunders--or of a crime so black and -deliberate, that no apologist will be able ever to delete it from the -pages of history. On all this posterity must be left to pronounce. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN MILITARY OPINION] - -It is only human nevertheless to be curious about personalities. -Unfortunately for the satisfaction of this appetite, all is darkness as -to the German Army. We may suspect that the Prussian junker, or -country gentleman, controls and dominates it. But even as to this we -may conceivably be wrong. The military genius of some Hanoverian, -Saxon, or Bavarian may possess the mastery in council. As to the real -heads of the army, as to their individual characters, and their potency -in directing policy we know nothing at all. After nine months of war, -we have arrived at no clear notion, even with regard to their relative -values as soldiers in the field. We have even less knowledge as to -their influence beforehand in shaping and deciding the issues of war -and peace. - -This much, however, we may reasonably deduce from Bernhardi and other -writers--that military opinion had been anxious for some considerable -number of years past, and more particularly since the Agadir -incident,[1] lest war, which it regarded as ultimately inevitable, -should be delayed until the forces ranged against Germany, especially -upon her Eastern frontier, were too strong for her to cope with. - -In the pages of various official publications, and in newspaper reports -immediately before and after {46} war began, we caught glimpses of -certain characters at work; but these were not professional soldiers; -they were members of the Court and the Bureaucracy. - -Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, comes upon the -scene--a harassed and indignant official--sorely flustered--not by any -means master of his temper--not altogether certain of his facts--in -considerable doubt apparently as to whether things have not passed -behind his back which he ought to have been told of by higher powers, -but was not. He appears to us as a diligent and faithful servant,--one -who does not seek to impose his own decisions, but to excuse, justify, -and carry out, if he can, decisions which have been made by others, -more highly placed and greedier of responsibility than himself. - -Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Minister, is much affected. He drops -tears--or comes somewhere near dropping them--over the lost hopes of a -peaceful understanding between England and Germany. We can credit the -sincerity of his sorrow all the more easily, for the reason that Herr -von Jagow behaves throughout the crisis as the courteous gentleman; -while others, who by position were even greater gentlemen, forget -momentarily, in their excitement, the qualities which are usually -associated with that title. - -Then there is the German Ambassador at Vienna--obviously a -firebrand--enjoying, one imagines, the confidence of the war parties in -both capitals: also apparently a busy intriguer. The documents show -him acting behind the back of the Berlin Foreign Office, and -communicating direct with the Kaiser. - -We gather very clearly that he egged on the {47} statesmen of Vienna, -with great diligence and success, to press Servia to extremes, and to -shear time so short that peace-makers had nothing left to catch hold -of. Russia, he assured them, would never carry her opposition to the -point of war. Even if she did so, he argued with much plausibility, -she would be negligible. For she stood midway in a great military and -naval reformation, than which no situation is more deplorable for the -purposes of carrying on a campaign. - -[Sidenote: PRINCE LICHNOWSKY] - -When Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, took his -departure at the outbreak of war, he probably left no single enemy -behind him. A simple, friendly, sanguine figure, with a pardonable -vanity which led him to believe the incredible. He produced what is -called in the cant of the day 'an atmosphere,' mainly in drawing-rooms -and newspaper offices, but occasionally, one conjectures, even in -Downing Street itself. His artistry was purely in air and touched -nothing solid. He was useful to his employers, mainly because he put -England off her guard. He would not have been in the least useful if -he had not been mainly sincere. - -But though he was useful to German policy, he was not trusted by the -powers in Berlin to attend to their business at the Court of St. -James's except under strict supervision. What precisely were the -duties of Baron von Kuhlmann, Councillor to the Embassy? He was always -very cheerful, and obliging, and ready to smooth any little difficulty -out of the way. On the other hand, he was also very deft at inserting -an obstacle with an air of perfect innocence, which imposed on nearly -every one--even occasionally on the editors of newspapers. For {48} -some reason, however, very few people were willing to accept this -plausible diplomatist's assurances without a grain or two of salt. -Indeed quite a large number were so misled by their prejudices against -him, that they were convinced his prime vocation was that of a spy--a -spy on the country to which he was accredited and on the Ambassador -under whom he served.[2] - -[Illustration: THE KAISER] - -We know more of the Kaiser than of any of these others, and we have -known him over a much longer period. And yet our knowledge of him has -never enabled us to forecast his actions with any certainty. British -ministers and diplomatists, whose business it is to gauge, not only the -muzzle-velocity of eminent characters, but also the forces of their -recoil, never seem to have arrived at any definite conclusions with -regard to this baffling personality. Whatever he did or did not do, -they were always surprised by it, which gives us some measure of their -capacity if not of his. - -The Kaiser is pre-eminently a man of moods. At one time he is Henry -the Fifth, at another Richard the Second. Upon occasions he appears as -Hamlet, cursing fate which impels him to make a decision. Within the -same hour he is Autolycus crying up his wares with an unfeigned -cheerfulness. He is possessed by the demon of quick-change and -restlessness. We learn on good authority that he possesses an almost -{49} incredible number of uniforms which he actually wears, and of -royal residences which he occasionally inhabits. He clothes himself -suitably for each brief occasion, and sleeps rarely, if reports can be -believed, for more than two nights together under the same roof. He is -like an American millionaire in his fondness for rapid and sudden -journeys, and like a democratic politician in his passion for -speech-making. - -The phenomena of the moment--those which flicker upon the surface of -things--engage his eager and vivacious interest. Upon such matters his -commentaries are often apt and entertaining. But when he attempts to -deal with deeper issues, and with the underlying principles and causes -of human action, his utterances immediately lose the mind's attention -and keep hold only of the ear's, by virtue of a certain resonance and -blatancy. When the Kaiser discourses to us, as he often does, upon the -profundities of politics, philosophy, and religion, he falls instantly -into set forms, which express nothing that is living and real. He -would have the world believe, and doubtless himself sincerely believes, -that he has plunged, like a pearl-diver, into the deeps, and has -returned thence laden with rich treasures of thought and experience. -But in truth he has never visited this region at all, being of a nature -far too buoyant for such enterprises. He has not found truth, but only -remembered phrases. - -The Kaiser is frequently upbraided for his charm of manner by people -who have come under its influence and been misled. One of the -commonest accusations against him is that of duplicity; but indeed it -seems hardly more just to condemn him for duplicity than it would be to -praise him for sincerity. He is a man dangerous to have dealings with, -but this {50} is owing to the irresponsible effervescence of his ideas. -At any given moment he probably means the greater part of what he says; -but the image of one moment is swiftly expelled and obliterated by that -of the next. The Kaiser's untrustworthiness arises not from duplicity, -so much as from the quickness of his fancy, the shallowness of his -judgment, and the shortness of his memory. That his communications -frequently produce the same effects as duplicity, is due to the fact -that he recognises no obligation either to stand by his word, or to -correct the impression which his hasty assurances may have produced in -the mind of his interlocutor. The statesman who is won over to-day by -his advocacy of an English alliance, is astounded on the morrow to find -him encouraging an English pogrom.[3] - -{51} - -[Sidenote: THE IDEA OF ANTICHRIST] - -When a violent convulsion shakes the world people immediately begin to -look about them for some mighty and malevolent character who can be -held responsible for it. To the generations which knew them, Cromwell, -Napoleon, and Bismarck all figured as Antichrist. But in regard to the -policy which produced the present war, of what man can it be said -truly, either that he controlled that policy, or that he brought about -the results which he aimed at? Which of the great personages concerned -possesses the sublime qualities of the spirit of evil?[4] - -It is conceivable, though very unlikely, that behind the scenes there -was some strong silent man who worked the others like puppets on a -string; but among those who have made themselves known to us in the -pages of White Papers and the like, there is none whose features bear -the least resemblance to our conception of Antichrist; none who had -firm {52} control of events, or even of himself. There is none of whom -it is possible to say truly that he achieved the results at which he -aimed. - -It is clear that the war which the joint efforts of these great -personages brought into existence was a monstrous birth, and that it -filled those who were responsible for it with dismay, only a degree -less than it shocked other people. For proof of this, it is -unnecessary to look further than the miscalculations of the political -kind which became recognised for such within a few weeks after war was -declared. - - - -[1] July 1911. - -[2] Prussian policy appears to be modelled upon the human body. Just -as man is endowed with a duality of certain organs--eyes, nostrils, -lungs, kidneys, etc.--so Prussian policy appears to proceed upon the -principle of a double diplomatic representation, two separate Foreign -Office departments, etc., etc. It is no doubt an excellent plan to -have a second string to your bow; but it is not yet clear how far this -can be carried with advantage in delicate negotiations without -destroying confidence in your sincerity. - -[3] A labour leader, highly impressed by the spectacle, gave a vivid -description of an equestrian parade through the streets of Berlin after -the declaration of war--the Kaiser in helmet of gold, seated on his -white charger, frowning terribly, in a kind of immobility, as if his -features had been frozen into this dramatically appropriate -expression--following behind him in a carriage the Crown Prince and -Princess, all vivacity and smiles, and bows to this side and the -other--a remarkable contrast! - -It is interesting to contrast the ornate and flamboyant being whom we -know as Kaiser Wilhelm the Second with Carlyle's famous description of -the great Frederick:-- - -"A highly interesting lean little old man, of alert though slightly -stooping figure; whose name among strangers was King Friedrich the -Second, or Frederick the Great of Prussia, and at home among the common -people, who much loved and esteemed him, was _Vater Fritz_,--Father -Fred,--a name of familiarity which had not bred contempt in that -instance. He is a King every inch of him, though without the trappings -of a King. Presents himself in a Spartan simplicity of vesture; no -crown but an old military cocked-hat,--generally old, or trampled and -kneaded into absolute _softness_, if new;--no sceptre but one like -Agamemnon's, a walking-stick cut from the woods, which serves also as a -riding-stick (with which he hits the horse 'between the ears' say -authors);--and for royal robes, a mere soldier's blue coat with red -facings, coat likely to be old, and sure to have a good deal of Spanish -snuff on the breast of it; rest of the apparel dim, unobtrusive in -colour or cut, ending in high over-knee military boots, which may be -brushed (and, I hope, kept soft with an underhand suspicion of oil), -but are not permitted to be blackened or varnished; Day and Martin with -their soot-pots forbidden to approach. - -"The man is not of godlike physiognomy, any more than of imposing -stature or costume; close-shut mouth with thin lips, prominent jaws and -nose, receding brow, by no means of Olympian height; head, however, is -of long form, and has superlative gray eyes in it. Not what is called -a beautiful man; nor yet, by all appearance, what is called a happy. -On the contrary, the face bears evidence of many sorrows, as they are -termed, of much hard labour done in this world; and seems to anticipate -nothing but more still coming. Quiet stoicism, capable enough of what -joy there were, but not expecting any worth mention; great unconscious -and some conscious pride, well tempered with a cheery mockery of -humour,--are written on that old face; which carries its chin well -forward, in spite of the slight stoop about the neck; snuffy nose -rather flung into the air under its old cocked hat,--like an old snuffy -lion on the watch; and such a pair of eyes as no man or lion or lynx of -that century bore elsewhere, according to all the testimony we -have."--Carlyle, _History of Frederick the Great_, Bk. I. chap. i. - -[4] A friend who has been kind enough to read the proofs of this volume -takes exception to the rating of Antichrist. The Devil, he maintains, -is not at all a clever or profound spirit, though he is exceedingly -industrious. The conception of him in the old Mystery Plays, where he -figures as a kind of butt, whose elaborate and painfully constructed -schemes are continually being upset owing to some ridiculous oversight, -or by some trivial accident, is the true Satan; the Miltonic idea is a -poetical myth, not in the least borne out by human experience. - - - - -{53} - -CHAPTER VI - -GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS - -In the world's play-house there are a number of prominent and -well-placed seats, which the instinct of veneration among mankind -insists on reserving for Super-men; and as mankind is never content -unless the seats of the super-men are well filled, 'the Management'--in -other words, the press, the publicists, and other manipulators of -opinion--have to do the best they can to find super-men to sit in them. -When that is impossible, it is customary to burnish up, fig out, and -pass off various colourable substitutes whom it is thought, may be -trusted to comport themselves with propriety until the curtain falls. -But those resplendent creatures whom we know so well by sight and fame, -and upon whom all eyes and opera-glasses are directed during the -_entr'-actes_, are for the most part not super-men at all, but merely -what, in the slang of the box-office, is known as 'paper.' Indeed -there have been long periods, even generations, during which the -supposed super-men have been wholly 'paper.' - -Of course so long as the super-men substitutes have only to walk to -their places, to bow, smile, frown, overawe, and be admired, everything -goes safely enough. The audience is satisfied and the {54} -'management' rubs its hands. But if anything has to be done beyond -this parade business, if the unexpected happens, if, for instance, -there is an alarm of fire--in which case the example set by the -super-creatures might be of inestimable assistance--the 'paper' element -is certain to crumple up, according to the laws of its nature, being -after all but dried pulp. Something of this kind appears to have -happened in various great countries during the weeks which immediately -preceded and followed the outbreak of war, and in none was the -crumpling up of the supermen substitutes more noticeable than in -Germany. - -The thoroughness of the German race is no empty boast. All the world -knows as much by experience in peace as well as war. Consequently, -people had said to themselves: "However it may be with other nations, -in Germany at all events the strings of foreign policy are firmly held -in giant fingers." But as day succeeded day, unmasking one -miscalculation after another, it became clear that there must have been -at least as much 'paper' in the political high places of Germany as -elsewhere. - -Clearly, although this war was made in Germany, it did not at all -follow the course which had been charted for it in the official -forecasts. For the German bureaucracy and general staff had laid their -plans to crush France at the first onset--to crush her till the bones -stuck out through her skin. And they had reckoned to out-general -Russia and roll back her multitudes, as yet unorganised--so at least it -was conceived--in wave upon wave of encroaching defeat. - -Having achieved these aims before the fall of the leaf, Germany would -have gained thereby another {55} decade for the undisturbed development -of wealth and world-power. Under Prussian direction the power of -Austria would then be consolidated within her own dominions and -throughout the Balkan Peninsula. At the end of this interval of -vigorous recuperation, or possibly earlier, Germany would attack -England, and England would fall an easy prey. For having stood aside -from the former struggle she would be without allies. Her name would -stink in the nostrils of Russia and France; and indeed to the whole -world she would be recognised for what she was--a decadent and coward -nation. Even her own children would blush for her dishonour. - -That these were the main lines of the German forecast no man can doubt, -who has watched and studied the development of events; and although it -is as yet too early days to make sure that nothing of all this vast -conception will ever be realised, much of it--the time-table at all -events--has certainly miscarried for good and all. - - -[Sidenote: THE TIME-TABLE MISCARRIES] - -According to German calculations England would stand aside; but England -took part. Italy would help her allies; but Italy refused. Servia was -a thing of naught; but Servia destroyed several army corps. Belgium -would not count; and yet Belgium by her exertions counted, if for -nothing more, for the loss of eight precious days, while by her -sufferings she mobilised against the aggressor the condemnation of the -whole world. - -The Germans reckoned that the army of France was terrible only upon -paper. Forty-five years of corrupt government and political peculation -must, according to their calculations, have paralysed the {56} general -staff and betrayed the national spirit. The sums voted for equipment, -arms, and ammunition must assuredly have been spirited away, as under -The Third Empire, into the pockets of ministers, senators, deputies, -and contractors. The results of this régime would become apparent, as -they had done in 1870, only in the present case sooner. - -War was declared by the Third Napoleon at mid-July, by William the -Second not until August 1; but Sedan or its equivalent would occur, -nevertheless, in the first days of September, in 1914 as in 1870. In -the former contest Paris fell at the end of six months; in this one, -with the aid of howitzers, it would fall at the end of six weeks. - -Unfortunately for this confident prediction, whatever may have been the -deficiency in the French supplies, however dangerous the consequent -hitches in mobilisation, things fell out quite differently. The spirit -of the people of France, and the devotion of her soldiers, survived the -misfeasances of the politicians, supposing indeed that such crimes had -actually been committed. - - -It was a feature of Bismarck's diplomacy that he put a high value upon -the good opinion of the world, and took the greatest pains to avoid its -condemnation. In 1870, as we now know, he schemed successfully, to -lure the government of Napoleon the Third into a declaration of war, -thereby saddling the French government with the odium which attaches to -peace-breakers.[1] But in the case of the present war, {57} which, as -it out-Bismarcked Bismarck in deliberate aggressiveness, stood all the -more in need of a tactful introduction to the outside world, the -precautions of that astute statesman were neglected or despised. From -the beginning all neutral nations were resentful of German procedure, -and after the devastation of Belgium and the destruction of Louvain, -the spacious morality of the Young Turks alone was equal to the -profession of friendship and admiration. - -[Sidenote: CRUELTIES IN BELGIUM] - -The objects which Germany sought to gain by the cruelties perpetrated, -under orders, by her soldiers in Belgium and Northern France are clear -enough. These objects were certainly of considerable value in a -military as well as in a political sense. One wonders, however, if -even Germany herself now considers them to have been worth the -abhorrence and disgust which they have earned for her throughout the -civilised world. - -In nothing is the sham super-man more easily detected than in the -confidence and self-complacency with which he pounces upon the -immediate small advantage, regardless of the penalty he will have to -pay in the future. By spreading death and devastation broadcast in -Belgium the Germans hoped to attain three things, and it is not -impossible that they have succeeded in attaining them all. They sought -to secure their communications by putting the fear of death, and worse -than death, into the hearts of the civil population. They sought to -send the countryside fleeing terror-stricken before their advance, -choking and cumbering the highways; than which nothing is ever more -hampering to the operations of an army in retreat, or more depressing -to its spirits. But chiefly they desired to set a ruthless -object-lesson before the {58} eyes of Holland, in order to show her the -consequences of resistance; so that when it came to her turn to answer -a summons to surrender she might have the good sense not to make a -fuss. They desired in their dully-calculating, official minds that -Holland might never forget the clouds of smoke, from burning villages -and homesteads, which the August breezes carried far across her -frontiers; the sights of horror, the tales of suffering and ruin which -tens of thousands of starved, forlorn, and hurrying fugitives brought -with them when they came seeking sanctuary in her territories. But if -the Germans gained all this, and even if they gained in addition the -loving admiration of the Young Turks, was it worth while to purchase -these advantages at such a price? It seems a poor bargain to save your -communications, if thereby you lose the good opinion of the whole world. - - -What is of most interest to ourselves, however, in the long list of -miscalculations, is the confidence of Germany that Britain would remain -neutral. For a variety of reasons which satisfied the able bureaucrats -at Berlin, it was apparently taken for granted by them that we were -determined to stand out; and indeed that we were in no position to come -in even if we would. We conjecture that the reports of German -ambassadors, councillors, consuls, and secret service agents must have -been very certain and unanimous in this prediction. - -[Illustration: GERMAN VIEW OF ENGLAND] - -According to the German theory, the British race, at home and abroad, -was wholly immersed in gain, and in a kind of pseudo-philanthropy--in -making money, and in paying blackmail to the working-classes in order -to be allowed to go on making money. {59} Our social legislation and -our 'People's Budgets' were regarded in Germany with contempt, as sops -and shams, wanting in thoroughness and tainted with hypocrisy. - -English politicians, acting upon the advice of obliging financiers, had -been engaged during recent years (so grossly was the situation -misjudged by our neighbours) in imposing taxation which hit the trader, -manufacturer, and country-gentleman as hard as possible; which also hit -the working-class hard, though indirectly; but which left holes through -which the financiers themselves--by virtue of their international -connections and affiliations--could glide easily into comparative -immunity. - -From these faulty premisses, Germans concluded that Britain was held in -leading-strings by certain sentimentalists who wanted vaguely to do -good; and that these sentimentalists, again, were helped and guided by -certain money-lenders and exploiters, who were all very much in favour -of paying ransom out of other people's pockets. A nation which had -come to this pass would be ready enough to sacrifice future -interests--being blind to them--for the comforts of a present peace. - -The Governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions were largely -influenced--so it was believed at Berlin--by crooks and cranks of -various sorts, by speculators and 'speculatists,'[2] many of them of -foreign origin or descent--who preached day in and day out the doctrine -that war was an anachronism, _vieux jeu_, even an impossibility in the -present situation of the world. - - -[2] 'Speculatists' was a term used by contemporary American writers to -describe the eloquent theorists who played so large a part in the -French Revolution. - - -{60} - -The British Government appeared to treat these materially-minded -visionaries with the highest favour. Their advice was constantly -sought; they were recipients of the confidences of Ministers; they -played the part of Lords Bountiful to the party organisations; they -were loaded with titles, if not with honour. Their abhorrence of -militarism knew no bounds, and to a large extent it seemed to German, -and even to English eyes, as if they carried the Cabinet, the -party-machine, and the press along with them. - -'Militarism,' as used by these enthusiasts, was a comprehensive term. -It covered with ridicule and disrepute even such things as preparation -for the defence of the national existence. International law was -solemnly recommended as a safer defence than battleships. - -Better certainly, they allowed, if militarism could be rooted out in -all countries; but at any rate England, the land of their birth or -adoption, must be saved from the contamination of this brutalising -idea. In their anxiety to discredit Continental exemplars they even -went so far as to evolve an ingenious theory, that foreign nations -which followed in the paths of militarism, did so at serious loss to -themselves, but with wholly innocent intentions. More especially, they -insisted, was this true in the case of Germany. - -The Liberal party appeared to listen to these opinions with respect; -Radicals hailed them with enthusiasm; while the Labour party was at one -time so much impressed, as to propose through some of its more -progressive spirits that, in the exceedingly unlikely event of a German -landing, working-men {61} should continue steadily at their usual -labours and pay no heed to the military operations of the invaders. - -In Berlin, apparently, all this respect and enthusiasm for pacifism, -together with the concrete proposals for putting its principles into -practice, were taken at their face value. There at any rate it was -confidently believed that the speculators and the 'speculatists' had -succeeded in changing or erasing the spots of the English leopard. - -[Sidenote: ERRORS OF INFERENCE] - -But in order to arrive at such a conclusion as this the able German -bureaucrats must have understood very little, one would think, of human -nature in general, and of British human nature in particular. Clearly -they built more hopes on our supposed conversion to pacifism than the -foundations would stand. They were right, of course, in counting it a -benefit to themselves that we were unprepared and unsuspicious of -attack; that we had pared down our exiguous army and stinted our navy -somewhat beyond the limits of prudence. They were foolish, however, -not to perceive that if the British people found themselves confronted -with the choice, between a war which they believed to be righteous, and -a peace which they saw clearly would not only be wounding to their own -honour but ruinous to their security, all their fine abstract -convictions would go by the board; that party distinctions would then -for the time being disappear, and the speculators and the -'speculatists' would be interned in the nethermost pit of national -distrust.... In so far, therefore, as the Germans reckoned on our -unpreparedness they were wise; but in counting upon British neutrality -they were singularly wide of the mark. - -{62} - -One imagines that among the idealists of Berlin there must surely have -been a few sceptics who did not altogether credit this wholesale -conversion and quakerisation of the British race. But for these -doubters, if indeed they existed, there were other considerations of a -more practical kind which seemed to indicate that Britain must -certainly stand aside. - -The first and most important of these was the imminence of civil war in -Ireland. If Prince Lichnowsky and Baron von Kuhlmann reported that -this had become inevitable, small blame to their perspicacity! For in -this their judgment only tallied with that of most people in the United -Kingdom who had any knowledge of the true facts. - -In March an incident occurred among the troops stationed in Ireland -which must have given comfort at Berlin, even in greater measure than -it caused disquiet at home. For it showed in a vivid flash the -intrinsic dangers of the Irish situation, and the tension, almost to -breaking-point, which existed between the civil authorities and the -fighting services. - -It also showed, what in the circumstances must have been peculiarly -reassuring to the German Government, that our Navy and Army were under -the charge of Ministers whose judgments were apt to be led captive by -their tempers. Although the Secretary of State for War did not remain -in office for many days to encourage the hearts of the general staff at -Berlin, his important post was never filled. It was only occupied and -kept warm by the Prime Minister, whose labours and -responsibilities--according to the notions of the Germans, who are a -painstaking and thorough people--were already enough for one man to -undertake. Moreover, the First {63} Lord of the Admiralty had not -resigned; and it was perhaps natural, looking at what had just -happened, to conclude that he would be wholly incapable of the sound -and swift decision by which a few months later he was destined to atone -for his recent blunder. - -[Sidenote: THE DUBLIN RIOT] - -Moreover, although the Curragh incident, as it was called, had been -patched over in a sort of way, the danger of civil war in Ireland had -not diminished in the least by Midsummer. Indeed it had sensibly -increased. During the interval large quantities of arms and ammunition -had been imported by Ulstermen in defiance of the Government, and -Nationalists were eagerly engaged in emulating their example. The -emergency conference of the leaders of parties which the King, acting -upon the desperate advice of his Ministers, had called together at -Buckingham Palace ended in complete failure. - -On Monday the 27th of July readers of the morning newspapers, looking -anxiously for news of the Servian reply to the Austrian ultimatum, -found their eyes distracted by even blacker headlines, which announced -that a Scots regiment had fired on a Dublin mob. - -How the bureaucrats of Berlin must have rubbed their hands and admired -their own prescience! Civil war in Ireland had actually begun, and in -the very nick of time! And this occurrence, no less dramatic than -opportune, was a triumph not merely for German foresight but for German -contrivance--like a good many other things, indeed, which have taken -place of late. When the voyage of the good ship _Fanny_, which in -April carried arms to the coast of Antrim, comes to be written, and -that of the anonymous yacht which sailed from German waters, -transhipped its {64} cargo in the channel, whence it was safely -conveyed by another craft to Dublin Bay to kindle this blaze in -July--when these narratives are set out by some future historian, as -they deserve to be, but not until then, it will be known how zealously, -benevolently, and impartially our loyal and kindly Teuton cousins -forwarded and fomented the quarrel between Covenanter and Nationalist. -What the German bureaucrats, however, with all their foresight, -apparently did not in the least foresee, was that the wound which they -had intentionally done so much to keep open, they would speedily be -helping unintentionally to heal. - - -With regard to South Africa, German miscalculation and intrigue pursued -a somewhat similar course, though with little better results. It was -assumed that South Africa, having been fully incorporated in the Empire -as a self-governing unit only twelve years earlier, and as the result -of a prolonged and sanguinary war, must necessarily be bent on severing -the British connection at the earliest opportunity. The Dutch, like -the frogs in the fable, were imagined to be only awaiting a favourable -moment to exchange the tyranny of King Log for the benevolent rule of -King Stork. - -In these forecasts, however, various considerations were overlooked. -In the first place, the methods of incorporation pursued by the British -in South Africa were as nearly as possible the opposite of those -adopted by Prussia in Poland, in Schleswig-Holstein, and in -Alsace-Lorraine. In many quarters there were doubtless bitter memories -among the Dutch, and in some others disappointed ambition still ached; -{65} but these forces were not enough to plunge into serious civil war -two races which, after nearly a century of strife and division, had but -a few years before entered into a solemn and voluntary covenant to make -a firm union, and dwell henceforth in peace one with another. What -object could there be for Dutchmen to rise in rebellion against a -government, which consisted almost exclusively of Dutch statesmen, and -which had been put in office and was kept there by the popular vote? - -[Sidenote: MISTAKES AS TO DUTCH] - -What German intrigue and bribery could do it did. But Dutchmen whose -recollections went back so far as twenty years were little likely to -place excessive confidence in the incitements and professions of -Berlin. They remembered with what busy intrigues Germany had in former -times encouraged their ambitions, with what a rich bribery of promises -she had urged them on to war, with what cold indifference, when war -arose, she had left them to their fate. They also remembered how, when -their aged President, an exiled and broken-hearted man, sought an -interview with the great sovereign whose consideration for him in his -more prosperous days had never lacked for warmth, he received for an -answer, that Berlin was no place for people who had been beaten to come -whining, and was turned from the door. - - -In India, as in South Africa, Germany entertained confident hopes of a -successful rising. Had not the Crown Prince, a shrewd judge, visited -there a few years earlier and formed his own estimate of the situation? -Was there not a widely spread network of sedition covering the whole of -our Eastern Empire, an incendiary press, and orators who openly -counselled {66} violence and preached rebellion? Had not riots been -increasing rapidly in gravity and number? Had not assassins been -actively pursuing their trade? Had not a ship-load of Indians just -been refused admission to Canada, thereby causing a not unnatural -outburst of indignation? - -How far German statesmen had merely foreseen these things, how far they -had actually contrived them, we are as yet in ignorance; but judging by -what has happened in other places--in Ireland, South Africa, Belgium, -and France--it would surprise no one to learn that the bombs which were -thrown at the Viceroy and his wife with tragic consequences owed -something to German teaching. It is unlikely that German emissaries -had been less active in fomenting unrest in India than elsewhere among -the subjects of nations with which they were ostensibly at peace; while -the fact that the Crown Prince had but recently enjoyed the hospitality -of the Viceregal Court was only a sentimental consideration unworthy of -the attention of super-men. - -Moreover, it had for long been abundantly clear, on _a priori_ grounds, -to thinkers like Treitschke and Bernhardi that India was already ripe -for rebellion on a grand scale. There are but two things which affect -the Indian mind with awe and submission--a sublime philosophy and a -genius for war. The English had never been philosophers, and they had -ceased to be warriors. How, then, could a race which worshipped only -soldiers and sages be expected to reverence and obey a garrison of -clerks and shopkeepers? A war between England and Germany would -provide an opportunity for making an end for ever of the British Raj. - -{67} - -[Sidenote: MISTAKES AS TO DOMINIONS] - -The self-governing Dominions were believed to be affected with the same -decadent spirit and fantastic illusions as their Mother Country; only -with them these cankers had spread more widely, were more logically -followed out in practice, and less tempered and restrained by -aristocratic tradition. Their eloquent outpourings of devotion and -cohesion were in reality quite valueless; merely what in their own -slang is known as 'hot air.' They hated militarism in theory and -practice, and they loved making money with at least an equal fervour. -Consequently, it was absurd to suppose that their professions of -loyalty would stand the strain of a war, by which not only their -national exchequers, but the whole mass of the people must inevitably -be impoverished, in which the manhood of the Dominions would be called -on for military service, and their defenceless territories placed in -danger of invasion. - -It was incredible to the wise men at Berlin that the timid but clear -minds of English Statesmen had not appreciated these obvious facts. -War, therefore, would be avoided as long as possible. And when at a -later date, war was forced by Germany upon the pusillanimous islanders, -the Dominions would immediately discern various highly moral pleas for -standing aloof. Germany, honouring these pleas for the time being with -a mock respect, would defer devouring the Dominions until she had -digested the more serious meal. - - -It will be seen from all this how good the grounds were on which the -best-informed and most efficient bureaucracy in the world decided that -the British Empire would remain neutral in the present war. {68} -Looked at from the strictly intellectual standpoint, the reasons which -satisfied German Statesmen with regard to Britain's neutrality were -overwhelming, and might well have convinced others, of a similar -outlook and training, who had no personal interest whatsoever in coming -to one conclusion rather than another. - -None the less the judgment of the Kaiser and his Ministers was not only -bad, but inexcusably bad. We expect more from statesmen than that they -should arrive at logical conclusions. Logic in such cases is nothing; -all that matters is to be right; but unless instinct rules and reason -serves, right judgment will rarely be arrived at in such matters as -these. If a man cannot feel as well as reason, if he cannot gauge the -forces which are at work among the nations by some kind of -second-sight, he has no title to set up his bills as a statesman. It -is incredible that Lincoln, Cavour, or Bismarck would ever have -blundered into such a war as this, under the delusion that Britain -could remain neutral even if she would. Nor would any of these three -have been so far out in his reckoning as to believe, that the immediate -effect of such a war, if Britain joined in it, would be the disruption -of her empire. They might have calculated that in the event of the war -being prolonged and disastrous to England, disintegration would in the -end come about; but without stopping to reason the matter out, they -would have known by instinct, that the first effect produced by such a -war would be a consolidation and knitting together of the loose -Imperial fabric, and a suspension, or at least a diminution, of -internal differences. - - - -[1] British public opinion in regard to that war was divided roughly -according to party lines, the Conservatives favouring France on -sentimental grounds, the Liberals favouring Germany as a -highly-educated, peace-loving people who had been wantonly attacked. - - - - -{69} - -CHAPTER VII - -INTERNATIONAL ILL-WILL - -In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to consider the series -of events which immediately preceded the recent outbreak of war. But -the most complete account of moves and counter-moves, and of all the -pretexts, arguments, demands, and appeals which were put forward by the -various governments concerned, with the object of forcing on, -justifying, circumscribing, or preventing the present struggle, can -never give us the true explanation of why it occurred. For this we -must look much further back than Midsummer last, and at other things -besides the correspondence between Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors. - -Nobody in his senses believes that Europe is at present in a convulsion -because the heir-presumptive to the throne of Austria was murdered at -Serajevo on the 28th of June. This event was tragic and deplorable, -but it was merely a spark--one of that cloud of sparks which is always -issuing from the chimney-stack of the European furnace. This one by -ill-luck happened to fall upon a heap of combustibles, and set it in a -blaze. - -Great events, as the Greeks discovered several thousand years ago, do -not spring from small causes, {70} though more often than not they have -some trivial beginning. How came it that so much inflammable material -was lying ready to catch fire? - -To answer this question truthfully we need more knowledge of men and -things than is given in those books, of varying hue, which the -Chancelleries of Europe have published to explain their causes of -action. The official sources provide much valuable information; but -they will never explain to us why public opinion in Germany, ever since -the beginning of the present century, has been inflamed with hatred -against this country. Nor will they ever give us any clear idea as to -what extent, and where, the practical aims and policies of that nation -and our own were in conflict. - -According to the state papers, it would appear that Russia was drawn -into this war because of Servia, and France because of Russia, and -Belgium because of France, and we ourselves because of Belgium; but it -may well be doubted if even the first of this row of ninepins would -have been allowed to fall, had it not been for the feelings which the -German people and their rulers entertained towards Britain. - -It is always hard for a man to believe in the sincerity, friendliness, -and peaceful intentions of one against whom he is himself engaged in -plotting an injury. German distrust of England was based upon the -surest of all foundations--upon her own fixed and envious determination -to overthrow our empire and rob us of our property. Her own mind being -filled with this ambition, how could she be otherwise than incredulous -of our expressions of goodwill? How could she conceive that we were so -blind as not to have penetrated her thoughts, so deaf as not to have -heard the threats which her public characters {71} were proclaiming so -openly? Consequently when British Statesmen uttered amiable assurances -they were judged guilty of a treacherous dissimulation.... One can -only shrug one's shoulders, marvelling at the nightmares and suspicions -which a bad conscience is capable of producing even among intelligent -people. - - -[Sidenote: THE DANGER POINT] - -It has been the fashion for half a century or more to talk of the -Balkans as the danger-point of European peace. In a sense this is -true. The crust is very thin in that region, and violent eruptions are -of common occurrence. But the real danger of upheaval comes, not so -much from the thinness of the crust, as from the violence of the -subterranean forces. Of these, by far the most formidable in recent -times have been the attitude of public opinion in Germany towards -England--the hatred of England which has been sedulously and -systematically inculcated among the people of all ranks--the suspicions -of our policy which have been sown broadcast--the envy of our position -in the world which has been instilled, without remission, by all and -sundry the agencies and individuals subject to the orders and -inspiration of government. An obsession has been created, by these -means, which has distorted the whole field of German vision. National -ill-will accordingly has refused to yield to any persuasion. Like its -contrary, the passion of love, it has burned all the more fiercely, -being unrequited. - -The fact which it is necessary to face, fairly and squarely, is that we -are fighting the whole German people. We may blame, and blame justly, -the Prussian junkers, the German bureaucracy, the Kaiser himself, for -having desired this war, schemed {72} for it, set the match to it by -intention or through a blunder; but to regard it as a Kaiser's war, or -a junkers' war, or a bureaucrats' war is merely to deceive ourselves. -It is a people's war if ever there was one. It could not have been -more a people's war than it is, even if Germany had been a democracy -like France or England. - -The Kaiser, as regards this matter, is the mirror of his people. The -Army and the Navy are his trusted servants against whom not a word will -be believed. The wisdom of the bureaucracy is unquestioned. In -matters of faith the zealous eloquence of the learned men is wholly -approved. All classes are as one in devotion, and are moved by the -same spirit of self-sacrifice. Hardly a murmur of criticism has been -heard, even from the multitudes who at other times march under the red -flag of Socialism. - -Although a German panic with regard to Russia may have been the -proximate occasion of this war, the force which most sustains it in its -course is German hatred of England. We must recognise this fact with -candour, however painful it may be. And we must also note that, during -the past nine months, the feelings against England have undergone a -change by no means for the better. - -At the beginning the German people, if we may judge from published -utterances, were convinced that the war had been engineered by Russia, -and that England had meanly joined in it, because she saw her chance of -crushing a dangerous and envied rival. - -Two months later, however, it was equally clear that the German people -were persuaded--Heaven {73} knows how or why!--that the war had been -engineered by England, who was using France and Russia as her tools. -Behind Russia, France, Belgium, Servia, and Japan--according to this -view--stood Britain--perfidious throughout the ages--guiding her -puppets with indefatigable skill to the destruction of German trade, -colonies, navy, and world-power. - -[Sidenote: FANTASTIC ERRORS] - -Confiding Germany, in spite of all her unremitting abuse of Britain, -had apparently, for some reason, really believed her to be a friend and -a fellow Teuton! Could any treachery have been blacker than our own in -outraging these family affections? And for Britain to support the Slav -and the Celt against the Teuton, was judged to be the worst treachery -of all--race treachery--especially by the Prussians, who, having -forgotten that they themselves are half Slavs, seemed also to have -forgotten that the British are largely Celts. - -Every Englishman, whether he be an admirer of Sir Edward Grey's -administration of Foreign Affairs or not, knows these dark suspicions -to be merely nonsense. He knows this as one of the common certainties -of existence--just as he knows that ginger is hot i' the mouth. Every -Englishman knows that Sir Edward Grey, his colleagues, his advisers, -his supporters in Parliament and out of it, and the whole British race -throughout the world, hated the idea of war, and would have done--and -in fact did, so far as in them lay--everything they could think of to -avert it. Yet the German people do not at present believe a single -word of this; and there must be some reason for their disbelief as for -other things. - -Unfortunately the nations of the world never {74} see one another face -to face. They carry on their intercourse, friendly and otherwise, by -high-angle fire, from hidden batteries of journalistic howitzers. -Sometimes the projectiles which they exchange are charged with ideal -hate which explodes and kills; at others with ideal love and admiration -which dissolve in golden showers, delightful and amazing to behold. -But always the gunners are invisible to each other, and the ideal love -and admiration are often as far removed from the real merits of their -objective as the ideal hate. - -That there was no excuse, beyond mere fancy on Germany's part, for her -distrust of British policy, no one, unless he were wholly ignorant of -the facts, would dream of maintaining. During the years which have -passed since 1870, our intentions have very rarely been unfriendly. -Still more rarely, however, have we ever shown any real comprehension -of the German point of view. Never have we made our policy clear. The -last is hardly to be wondered at, seeing that we had not ourselves -taken the pains to understand it. - -On occasions, it is true, we have been effusive, and have somewhat -overstepped the limits of dignity, plunging into a gushing -sentimentality, or else wheedling and coaxing, with some material -object--the abatement of naval expenditure, for example--showing very -plainly through our blandishments. And as our methods at these times -have been lacking in self-respect, it is not wonderful if they have -earned little or no respect from others. Our protestations that we -were friends, our babble about blood-relationship, were suspected to -have their origin in timidity; our appeals for restriction of -armaments, {75} to our aversion from personal sacrifice and our senile -penuriousness. - -[Sidenote: FAULTS OF ENGLISH METHODS] - -Until lately these lapses into excessive amiability, it must be -allowed, were not very frequent. The main excuse for German suspicion -is to be found elsewhere--in the dilatoriness of our foreign policy--in -its inability to make up its mind--in its changeability after its mind -might have been supposed made up--in its vagueness with regard to the -nature of our obligations towards other powers--whom we would support, -and to what extent, and upon what pleas. - -Irritation on the part of Germany would have been natural in these -circumstances, even if she had not been in the mood to suspect dark -motives in the background. From the days of Lord Granville to those of -Sir Edward Grey, we had been dealing with a neighbour who, whatever her -failings might be, was essentially businesslike in her methods. We, on -the other hand, continued to exhibit many of those faults which are -most ill-regarded by business men. We would not say clearly what -regions came within our sphere of influence. We would not say clearly -where Germany might go and where we should object to her going; but -wherever she went, we were apt after the event to grumble and make -trouble. - -The delay and indecision which marked Lord Granville's dealings with -Bismarck over the partition of Africa were both bad manners in the -international sense, and bad policy. The neglect of Sir Edward Grey, -after Agadir, to make clear to his fellow-countrymen, and to the world -at large, the nature and extent of our obligations to France, was bad -business. Next {76} to the British people and our present allies, -Germany had the best reason to complain of this procedure, or rather of -this failure to proceed. - -The blame for this unfortunate record rests mainly upon our political -system, rather than on individuals. We cannot enjoy the benefits of -the most highly developed party system in the world, without losing by -it in various directions. A change of Government, actual or impending, -has more often been the cause of procrastination and uncertainty than -change in the mind of the Foreign Minister. There are people who -assure us that this must always be so, that it is one of the inherent -weaknesses of party government, and even of democracy itself. This is -not altogether true. It is true, however, that whereas statesmen may -be reticent and keep their own counsel under an autocracy, they are -bound to be frank, and simple, and outspoken as to their aims, where -their power is drawn directly from popular support. - -[Sidenote: BAD DIPLOMACY] - -The criticism against British foreign policy for upwards of a century, -is that it has aimed at managing our international relations on a -system of hoodwinking the people, which is altogether incompatible with -the nature of our institutions. The evils which have resulted from -this mistake are not confined to ourselves, but have reacted abroad. -"With whom," we can imagine some perplexed foreign Chancellor asking -himself--"with whom does power really rest in England? With the -Government or with the people? With which of these am I to deal? To -which must I address myself? As regards France there is little -difficulty, for her policy is national, and agreed on all hands. But -in England, so far as we can judge, the people have no idea of {77} -being dragged under any circumstances into a European war; while on the -other hand, the Government is obviously drifting, consciously or -unconsciously, into continental relations which, in certain events, can -lead to no other result...." Nor is it surprising that under these -conditions German diplomacy should have directed itself of late, with -much industry, to the cultivation of public opinion in this country, -and should at times have treated our Government with scant respect. - -The fact is that the two nations, which had most to gain by -clear-sighted and tactful foreign policy, were perhaps of all nations -in the world the least well served in that particular. English -relations with Germany have for many years past been more mismanaged -than anything except German relations with England. In their mutual -diplomacy the fingers of both nations have been all thumbs. - -It is not to be wondered at that two characters so antagonistic in -their natures and methods as English and German foreign policy should -have come to regard one another as impossible. The aggressive -personage who does know his own mind, and the vague, supercilious -personage who does not, have only one point in common--that they -understand and care very little about the feelings of other people. -But although this is a point in common, it is anything but a point of -agreement.[1] - -{78} The causes of what has happened will never be clear to us unless -we can arrive at some understanding of the ideas, aspirations, and -dreams which have filled the minds of the German people and our own -during recent years. On logical grounds we must consider the case of -Germany first, for the reason that all the warmth of enmity has -proceeded from her side, and, until recent events suddenly aroused the -Old Adam in us, the uncharitable sentiments of our neighbours were not -at all cordially reciprocated over here. - -As in romantic drama, according to the cynics, there is usually one who -loves and another who allows itself to be loved, so in this case there -was one who hated and another who allowed itself to be hated. The -British nation could not understand why the Germans were so angry and -suspicious. Nor would it trouble to understand. It was bored with the -whole subject; and even the irritation which it felt at having to find -huge sums annually for the Navy did not succeed in shaking it out of -its boredom. - -[Sidenote: INTERNATIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS] - -The most careful analysis of our thoughts about Germany would do little -to explain matters, because, as it happened, by far the greater part of -our thoughts was occupied with other things. Indeed we thought about -Germany as little as we could help thinking; and although we regretted -her annoyance, {79} our consciences absolved us from any responsibility -for it. - -It was entirely different with Germany. For many years past she had -been more occupied with her grievances against Britain, and with the -complications and dangers which would beset any attempt at redress, -than with any other single subject; or indeed, so it would appear, with -all other subjects put together. - -It is important to understand the German point of view, but it is -difficult. For at once we are faced with the eternal obstacle of the -foreigner, who sets out in search of a simple explanation. The mind of -the ordinary man, like that of the philosopher, is hypnotised by a -basic assumption of the One-ness of Things. He wants to trace all -trouble to a single root, as if it were a corn and could be extracted. -But in an enquiry like the present we are confronted at every turn with -the Two-ness of Things, or indeed with the Multiplicity of Things. - -We have only to read a few pages of any German book on England to see -that the other party to the dispute is confronted with exactly the same -difficulty. We are amazed, and perhaps not altogether chagrined, to -discover that, to German eyes, British policy appears to be a thing of -the most rigorous consistency. It is deliberate, far-sighted, and -ruthless. It is pursued with constancy from decade to decade--nay from -century to century--never faltering, never retreating, but always going -forward under Whig and Tory, Liberal and Conservative alike, to the -same goal. And we of course know, if we know anything, that this -picture, though very flattering to our political instinct, is untrue. - -{80} - -If Englishmen know anything at all, they know that the foreign policy -of this country during the last fifty years--under Lord Beaconsfield, -and Mr. Gladstone, Lord Salisbury, and Mr. Asquith--has been at times a -series of the most eccentric wobbles and plunges, like a kite which is -drawn at the wrong angle to the wind. Nay, even as regards our -participation in this very War--which in the German White Book is -asserted to have been preconceived and undertaken by us with a craft -and coolness worthy of Machiavelli himself--we can see from our own -White Paper that the final decision wavered this way and the other, -from day to day during the critical week, neither the Cabinet nor -public opinion being clear and unanimous as to the course which ought -to be pursued. - -Vacillation in national policy usually appears to hostile observers in -the light of perfidy. And it must be admitted that there is good -excuse for the mistake, seeing that weakness in such high matters is -quite as likely to injure everybody concerned as wickedness itself. - -Assuredly no sensible person who was required to make a defence of -British foreign policy, either during the century which has passed -since the battle of Waterloo, or in the much shorter period since the -death of Queen Victoria, would ever dream of doing so on the ground -that its guiding principles have been consistency and singleness of -purpose. These, indeed, are almost the last virtues he would think of -claiming for it. And yet these are the very qualities which foreign -nations are inclined to attribute to British statesmen, by way of -praise or blame. Our failures are apt to be overlooked by outside {81} -observers; our successes on the other hand are plain and memorable. -Other nations assume that because we have happened to achieve some -particular result, we must therefore have deliberately and patiently -set out to achieve it. Much more often this result has been due either -to pure good luck or else to some happy inspiration of the moment. - -A wise apologist for our foreign policy would at once concede that it -has frequently been characterised by feebleness and indecision, and -almost always by a want of clear perception of the end in view; but he -could contend with justice that upon the whole, for upwards of a -century, it has meant well by other nations, and that accusations of -far-sighted duplicity are purely ridiculous. - -Our own temptation on the other hand is to visualise a single, gross, -overbearing, and opinionated type of the Teuton species. We tend to -ignore important differences; and because German public opinion appears -to be unanimous in regard to the present War, we are apt to overlook -the fact that the love and admiration of the Bavarian and the Saxon for -the Prussian are probably some degrees less cordial than those which -the men of Kerry and Connemara entertain for the Belfast Covenanters. -And we incline also to forget, that though opinion in Germany in favour -of war became solid so soon as war was apprehended, and certainly -before it was declared, it is exceedingly unlikely, that even in -governing circles, there was an equal unanimity as to the procedure -which led up to the climax. - -[Sidenote: THE TRIANGLE OF FORCES] - -If it were really so, the case is unique in history, which shows us at -every other crisis of this sort always the same triangle of forces--a -War party, a Peace {82} party, and a Wait-and-See party; each of them -pulling vigorously in its own direction; each intriguing against, and -caballing with, the other two by turns; until at last the group, still -struggling, falls back on the side of safety or, as in the recent -instance, pitches over the edge of the precipice. - -It would be very hard to persuade any student of history that something -of this sort was not occurring both in Vienna and Berlin during the -months of June and July 1914. While he would admit to more than a -suspicion that intelligences had been passing for a considerably longer -period--for a year at least[2]--between the War parties in these two -capitals, he would be inclined to take the view, that in the last stage -of all, the Berlin group went staggering to perdition, dragging after -it the Vienna group, which by that time was struggling feebly in the -opposite direction. - -[Sidenote: LIMITS OF ENQUIRY] - -When we come to consider the German case it is wise to bear in mind the -erroneous judgments which foreigners have passed upon ourselves. It is -probable that the One-ness of things which we discover in their actions -is to some extent an illusion, like that which they have discovered in -our own. Indeed it is a fruitless task to hunt for logic and -consistency in things which, in their nature, are neither logical nor -consistent. For most of us, who have but a limited range of German -books, state papers, journalism, and acquaintances to judge from, it -would be vain and foolish to pretend that in a chapter, or a volume, we -can lay bare the German attitude of {83} mind. The most we can hope to -do is to illuminate this complex subject at certain points; and these -for the most part are where the edges rub, and where German policy and -temperament have happened to come into conflict with our own. - - - -[1] If we may offer a very homely simile--German policy may be compared -to a rude heavy fellow, who comes shoving his way into a crowded bus, -snorting aggressively, treading on everybody's corns, poking his -umbrella into people's eyes, and finally plumping himself down without -a word of regret or apology, between the two meekest and most -helpless-looking of the passengers. - -British diplomacy, on the other hand, bears a close resemblance to a -nuisance, equally well known to the bus public, and no less dreaded. -It reminds us constantly of that dawdling, disobliging female who never -can make up her mind, till the bus has actually started, whether she -wants to go to Shepherd's Bush or the Mansion House. If she has taken -a seat she insists on stopping the conveyance in order to get out. If -she has remained gaping on the pavement she hails it in order to get -in. She cares nothing about the inconvenience caused thereby to other -passengers, who do know whither they want to be conveyed, and desire to -arrive at their destination as quickly as possible. - -[2] We have recently learned from Signor Giolitti, ex-Premier of Italy, -that in August 1913 the Foreign Minister, the late Marquis di San -Giuliano, was sounded by Austria-Hungary as to whether he would join in -an attack upon Servia. - - - - -PART II - -THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY - - - -CHRISTIAN: Met you with nothing else in that Valley? - -FAITHFUL: Yes, I met with _Shame_. But of all the Men I met with in my -Pilgrimage, he I think bears the wrong name: ... this boldfaced -_Shame_, would never have done. - -CHRISTIAN: Why, what did he say to you? - -FAITHFUL: What! Why he objected against Religion itself; he said it -was a pitiful low sneaking business for a Man to mind Religion; he said -that a tender conscience was an unmanly thing, and that for a Man to -watch over his words and ways, so as to tye up himself from that -hectoring liberty that the brave spirits of the times accustom -themselves unto, would make me the Ridicule of the times. - -He objected also, that but few of the Mighty, Rich, or Wise, were ever -of my opinion; nor any of them, neither, before they were perswaded to -be Fools, and to be of a voluntary fondness to venture the loss of all, -_for no body else knows what_. - -Yea, he did hold me to it at that rate also about a great many more -things than here I relate; as, that it was a _shame_ ... to ask my -neighbour forgiveness for petty faults, or to make restitution where I -had taken from any. He said also that Religion made a man grow strange -to the great because of a few vices (which he called by finer names).... - -_The Pilgrim's Progress_. - - - - -{87} - -CHAPTER I - -THE BISMARCKIAN EPOCH - -All nations dream--some more than others; while some are more ready -than others to follow their dreams into action. Nor does the -prevalence, or even the intensity, of these national dreams seem to -bear any fixed relation to the strength of will which seeks to turn -them into achievement. - -After 1789 there was a great deal of dreaming among the nations of -Europe. At the beginning of it all was revolutionary France, who -dreamed of offering freedom to all mankind. A few years later, an -altogether different France was dreaming furiously of glory for her own -arms. In the end it was still France who dreamed; and this time she -sought to impose the blessings of peace, order, and uniformity upon the -whole world. Her first dream was realised in part, the second wholly; -but the third ended in ruin. - -Following upon this momentous failure came a short period when the -exhausted nations slept much too soundly to dream dreams. During this -epoch Europe was parcelled out artificially, like a patch-work quilt, -by practical and unimaginative diplomatists, anxious certainly to take -securities for a lasting {88} peace, but still more anxious to bolster -up the ancient dynasties. - -Against their arbitrary expedients there was soon a strong reaction, -and dreaming began once more among the nations, as they turned in their -sleep, and tried to stretch their hampered limbs. At the beginning -their dreaming was of a mild and somewhat futile type. It called -itself 'liberalism'--a name coined upon the continent of Europe. It -aimed by methods of peaceful persuasion, at reaching the double goal of -nationality as the ideal unit of the state, and popular representation -as the ideal system of government. Then the seams of the patchwork, -which had been put together with so much labour at Vienna[1] and -Aix-la-Chapelle,[2] began to gape. Greece struggled with some success -to free herself from the Turk,[3] and Belgium broke away from -Holland,[4] as at a much later date Norway severed her union with -Sweden.[5] In 1848 there were revolutions all over Europe, the objects -of which were the setting up of parliamentary systems. In all -directions it seemed as if the dynastic stitches were coming undone. -Italy dreamed of union and finally achieved it,[6] expelling the -Austrian encroachers--though not by peaceful persuasion--and -disordering still further the neatly sewn handiwork of Talleyrand, -Metternich, and Castlereagh. Finally, the Balkans began to dream of -Slav destinies, unrealisable either under the auspices of the Sublime -Porte or in tutelage to the Habsburgs.[7] - -[Sidenote: MAKING OF THE GERMAN UNION] - -But of all the nations which have dreamed since days long before -Napoleon, none has dreamed more {89} nobly or more persistently than -Germany. For the first half of the nineteenth century it seemed as if -the Germans were satisfied to behold a vision without attempting to -turn it into a reality. Their aspirations issued in no effective -action. They dreamed of union between their many kingdoms, -principalities, and duchies, and of building up a firm empire against -which all enemies would beat in vain; but until 1864 they had gone but -a few steps towards the achievement of this end. - -Then within a period of seven years, Prussia, the most powerful of the -German states, planned, provoked, and carried to a successful issue -three wars of aggression. By a series of swift strokes, the genius of -Bismarck snatched Schleswig-Holstein from the Danes, beat down the -pretensions of Austria to the leadership of the Teutonic races, and -wrested the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from France. When Denmark -was invaded by Germanic armies in February 1864, the vision of unity -seemed as remote as ever; by January 1871 it was fully achieved. When -at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, in the stately palace of the -Bourbons, King William accepted from the hands of his peers--the -sovereign rulers of Germany--an imperial crown, the dream of centuries -was fulfilled. - -Austria, indeed, stood aloof; but both by reason of her geographical -situation and the heterogeneous ancestry of her people that was a -matter only of small account. Union was, for all practical purposes -complete. And what made the achievement all the more marvellous was -the fact, that the vision had been realised by methods which had no -place in the gentle speculations of those, who had cherished the {90} -hope of unity with the most fervent loyalty. It had been accomplished -by the Prussians, who of all races between the Alps and the Baltic, -between the mountain barriers of Burgundy and the Polish Marshes, are -the least German in blood,[8] and who of all Germans dream the least. -It had been carried through, not by peaceful persuasion, nor on any -principles of Liberalism, nor in any of the ways foreseen by the -philosophers and poets who had beheld visions of the millennium. Union -was the triumph of craft and calculation, courage and resolve, 'blood -and iron.' - -The world in general, whose thoughts at this time were much more -congenially occupied with International Exhibitions, and Peace -Societies, and the ideals of Manchester statesmanship, was inclined to -regard the whole of this series of events as an anachronism--as the -belated offspring of 'militarism' and 'feudalism.' These were well -known to be both in their dotage; they could not possibly survive for -many years. What had happened, therefore, did not startle mankind -simply because the nature of it was not understood. The spirit of the -age, wholly possessed, as it was, by an opposite set of ideas, was -unable to comprehend, to believe in, or even to consider with patience, -phenomena which, according to prevailing theories, had no reasonable -basis of existence. - -In some quarters, indeed, efforts were made to gloss over the -proceedings of Prince Bismarck, and to fit them into the fashionable -theory of a universe, flowing with the milk of human kindness and the -{91} honey of material prosperity. It was urged that the Germans were -a people, pure in their morals, industrious in their habits, the -pioneers of higher education and domestic economy. For the most part, -British and American public opinion was inclined to regard these -various occurrences and conquests as a mediaeval masquerade, in rather -doubtful taste, but of no particular significance and involving no -serious consequences. Even in that enlightened age, however, there -were still a few superstitious persons who saw ghosts. To their eyes -the shade of Richard Cobden seemed in some danger of being eclipsed in -the near future by that of Niccolo Machiavelli; though the former had -died in great honour and prestige only a few years earlier, while the -latter had been dead, discredited, and disavowed for almost as many -centuries. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN PROSPERITY AFTER UNION] - -After 1870 Germany entered upon a period of peaceful prosperity. -Forges clanged, workshops throbbed, looms hummed, and within twenty -years, the ebb of emigration had entirely ceased. Indeed, not only was -there work in the Fatherland for all its sons, but for others besides; -so that long before another twenty years had passed away, the tide had -turned and immigrants were pouring in. - -At first the larger part of German exports was cheap and nasty, with a -piratical habit of sailing under false colours, and simulating -well-known British and other national trade-marks. But this was a -brief interlude. The sagacity, thoroughness, and enterprise of -manufacturers and merchants soon guided their steps past this dangerous -quicksand, and the label _made in Germany_ ceased to be a reproach. - -{92} - -Students and lovers of truth laboured at discovery; and hard upon their -heels followed a crowd of practical inventors--the gleaners, -scavengers, and rag-pickers of science. Never had the trade of any -country thriven with a more wonderful rapidity. Though still of -necessity a borrower by very reason of her marvellous expansion, -Germany nevertheless began to make her influence felt in the financial -sphere. Her own ships carried her products to the ends of the earth, -and fetched home raw materials in exchange. And not only this, her -merchant fleets began to enter into successful competition for the -carrying trade of the world, even with the Mistress of the Seas herself. - -[Sidenote: LIFE'S WORK OF BISMARCK] - -For a score of years after the fall of Paris, Germany found but little -time for dreaming. Meanwhile, by an astute if somewhat tortuous -policy, and under the impenetrable shield of the finest army in Europe, -Bismarck kept safe the empire which he had founded. He declined to be -drawn into adventures either at home or abroad, either in the new world -or the old. He opposed the colonial aspirations of a few visionaries, -who began to make some noise towards the end of his long reign, and -silenced them with some spacious but easy acquisitions in Africa and -the East. He consolidated the Prussian autocracy, and brought its -servant, the bureaucracy, to the highest pitch of efficiency. He -played with the political parties in the Reichstag as if they had been -a box of dominoes, combining them into what patterns he pleased. At -the same time he fostered the national well-being with ceaseless -vigilance, and kept down popular discontent by the boldness and -thoroughness of his social legislation. But for Bismarck himself {93} -the age of adventure was past. It was enough that by the labours of an -arduous lifetime, he had made of Germany a puissant state, in which all -her children, even the most restless, could find full scope for their -soaring ambitions. - - - -[1] 1814. - -[2] 1818. - -[3] 1821-1829. - -[4] 1830. - -[5] 1905. - -[6] 1859-1861. - -[7] 1875-1878. - -[8] The admixture of Slavonic and Wendish blood in the Prussian stock -is usually calculated by ethnologists at about half and half. - - - - -{94} - -CHAPTER II - -AFTER BISMARCK - -With the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, Germany entered upon a new -phase. Then once again her people began to dream, and this time -furiously. They had conquered in war. They had won great victories in -peace. According to their own estimate they were the foremost thinkers -of the world. They found themselves impelled by a limitless ambition -and a superb self-confidence. But the vision which now presented -itself to their eyes was disordered and tumultuous. Indeed it was less -dream than nightmare; and in some degree, no doubt, it owed its origin, -like other nightmares, to a sudden surfeit--to a glut of material -prosperity.[1] - -Why did Germany with her larger population still lag behind Britain in -commerce and shipping? Surely the reason could only be that Britain, -at every turn, sought to cripple the enterprise of her young rival. -Why had Britain a great and thriving colonial empire, while Germany had -only a few tracts of tropical jungle and light soil, not particularly -prosperous or promising? The reason could only be that, out of -jealousy, Britain had obstructed Teutonic acquisition. Why was Germany -tending {95} to become more and more isolated and unpopular in Europe? -The reason could only be that the crafty and unscrupulous policy of -Britain had intrigued, with some success, for her political ostracism. - -[Illustration: GERMAN NIGHTMARES] - -It is useless to argue with a man in a nightmare. He brushes reason -aside and cares not for facts. But to seekers after truth it was -obvious, that so far from making any attack upon German commerce, -Britain, by adhering to her system of free trade at home and in her -dependencies, had conferred a boon immeasurable on this new and eager -competitor. So far from hindering Germany's acquisition of colonies, -Britain had been careless and indifferent in the matter; perhaps too -much so for the security of some of her own possessions. It was -Bismarck, much more than Britain, who had put obstacles in the way of -German colonial expansion. With a sigh of relief (as we may imagine) -this great statesman saw the partition of the vacant territories of the -world completed, and his fellow-countrymen thereby estopped from -wasting their substance, and dissipating their energies, in costly and -embarrassing adventures. So far from holding aloof from Germany or -attempting to isolate her among European nations, we had persisted in -treating her with friendliness, long after she had ceased to be -friendly. One of our leading statesmen had even gone the length of -suggesting an alliance, and had been denounced immediately by the whole -German press, although it was understood at the time that he had spoken -with the august encouragement of the Kaiser and his Chancellor.[2] It -was Germany herself, deprived of the guidance of Bismarck, who by -blustering at {96} her various neighbours, and threatening them in -turn, had aroused their suspicions and achieved her own isolation. - -The grievances against Britain which figured in the phantasmagoria of -the German nightmare were obviously tinged with envy. There were other -grievances against France, and these were tinged with annoyance. For -France, although she had been beaten on to her knees, had nevertheless -had the impudence to make a successful recovery. There were also -grievances against Russia, and these were tinged with fear. Her vast -adjacent territories and teeming population, her social and industrial -progress, the reformation of her government, and the rapid recuperation -of her military and naval power, constituted in German eyes the gravest -menace of all. - -Self-confidence and ambition were the original stuff--the warp and the -weft--of which the German dream was made; but these admirable and -healthy qualities rapidly underwent a morbid deterioration. Ambition -degenerated into groundless suspicion, and self-confidence into -arrogance. It was a considerable time, however, before Germany was -realised to have become a public danger by reason of her mental -affliction. Until her prophets and high priests began preaching from -the housetops as a divine ordinance, that Germany was now so great, -prosperous, and prolific as to need the lands of her neighbours for her -expansion, her symptoms were not generally recognised. It was not -really pressure of population, but only the oppression of a nightmare -which had brought her to this restless and excited condition. In terms -of psychology, the disease from which Germany has been suffering of -late years is {97} known as megalomania, in the slang of the -street-corner as madness of the swollen head. - -The dreams of a nation may be guided well or ill by statesmen, or they -may be left altogether unguided. The dreams of Italy under Cavour, and -those of Germany under Bismarck, were skilfully fostered and directed -with great shrewdness to certain practical ends. But in considering -the case of Germany under William the Second, our feeling is that -although popular imaginings have been controlled from above with even -greater solicitude than before, the persons who inspired and regulated -them have been lacking in the sense of proportion. The governing power -would seem to have been the victim of changing moods, conflicting -policies, and disordered purposes. - - -[Sidenote: TWO FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS] - -When we piece together the various schemes for the aggrandisement of -the Fatherland, which German writers have set forth with increasing -boldness and perfect gravity during the past ten years, we are -confronted with an immense mosaic--a conception of the most grandiose -character. On examination each of these projects is found to be based -upon two fundamental assumptions:--The first, that the present -boundaries of Germany and her possessions overseas are too narrow to -contain the legitimate aspirations of the German race:--The second that -it is the immediate interest of Germany, as well as a duty which she -owes to posterity, to remedy this deficiency, by taking from her -neighbours by force what she requires for her own expansion. There is -a third assumption, not however of a political so much as an ethical -character, which is stated with {98} equal frankness and -conviction--that war on an extensive scale is necessary, from time to -time, in order to preserve the vigour of the German people and their -noble spirit. - -One school of dreamers, with its gaze fixed upon the Atlantic -trade-routes, insists upon the absurdity of resting content with a -western sea-board of some two hundred miles. The estuaries of the Elbe -and the Weser alone are exclusively German; that of the Ems is shared -with the Dutch; while the far more valuable harbour-mouths of the Rhine -and the Scheldt are in the possession of Holland and Belgium. Put into -plain language what this means is, that both Holland and Belgium must -be incorporated in the German Empire; if by treaty, so much the better -for all parties concerned; but if diplomacy should fail to accomplish -the desired absorption, then it must be brought about by war. Nor has -it been overlooked, that in order to complete the rectification, and to -secure the keys of the Baltic, it would be necessary to 'admit' Denmark -also into the privileges of the Germanic Empire. - -Another school looks to the south-east and broods upon the day, not far -distant, when the Germans of Austria-Hungary--a small but dominating -minority of the whole population--will be driven, by reasons of -self-defence, to seek a federal inclusion in the Empire of the -Hohenzollerns. And it is surmised that for somewhat similar reasons -the Magyars of Hungary will at the same time elect to throw in their -lot with Teutons rather than with Slavs. - -When that day arrives, however, it is not merely the German and Magyar -territories of the Habsburg Emperor-King which will need to be -incorporated {99} in the Hohenzollern Empire, but the whole congeries -of nations which at present submits, more or less reluctantly, to the -rule of Vienna and Buda-Pest. There must be no break-up of the empire -of Francis Joseph, no sentimental sacrifice to the mumbo-jumbos of -nationality. The Italians of Trieste and Fiume, the Bohemians, the -Croats, the Serbs, the Roumanians of Transylvania, and the Poles of -Galicia must all be kept together in one state, even more firmly than -they are to-day. The Germans of Austria will not be cordially -welcomed, unless they bring this dowry with them to the altar of -imperial union. - -[Sidenote: THE AUSTRIAN DOWRY] - -But to clear eyes, looking into the future, more even than this appears -to be necessary. Austria will be required to bring with her, not -merely all her present possessions, but also her reversionary -prospects, contingent remainders, and all and sundry her rights of -action throughout the whole Balkan peninsula, which sooner or later -must either accept the hegemony of the German Empire or submit to -annexation at the sword's point. Advantageous as it would be for the -Fatherland to obtain great harbours for her commerce at the head of the -Adriatic, these acquisitions might easily become valueless in practice -if some rival barred the right of entry through the Straits of Otranto. -Salonica again, in her snug and sheltered corner of the Aegean, is -essential as the natural entrepôt for the trade of Asia Minor and the -East; while there can be no hope, until the mouths of the Danube, as -well as the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, are firmly held, of turning -the Black Sea into a Germanic lake. - -The absorption of the Balkan peninsula, involving {100} as it must the -occupation of Constantinople and European Turkey, would carry with it, -as a natural consequence, the custody of the Sultan and the control of -his Asiatic dominions. These vast territories which extend from Smyrna -to the Caucasus, from Syria to the Persian Gulf, from the Black Sea to -the Gulf of Aden, contain some of the richest and most fertile tracts -upon the surface of the globe. Massacre, misrule, and oppression have -indeed converted the greater part of these regions into a state hardly -to be distinguished from the barest deserts of Arabia. But a culture -which has lapsed through long neglect may be reclaimed by new -enterprise. All that is required to this end is such shelter and -encouragement as a stable government would afford. - -What more suitable instrument for this beneficent recovery than the -peculiar genius of the Teuton race? Would not the whole world gain by -the substitution of settled order for a murderous anarchy, of tilth and -industry for a barren desolation? The waters of Tigris and Euphrates -are still sweet. It needs but the energy and art of man to lead them -in channelled courses, quenching the longings of a thirsty land, and -filling the Mesopotamian waste with the music of a myriad streams. The -doom of Babylon is no curse eternal. It awaits but the sword of -Siegfried to end the slumbers of two thousand years. Where great -cities and an ancient civilisation lie buried under drifted sand, great -cities may be raised once more, the habitations of a hardier race, the -seminaries of a nobler civilisation. - -This vision, more fanciful and poetically inspired than the rest, has -already advanced some considerable {101} way beyond the frontiers of -dreamland. When the Turko-Russian War came to an end[3] the influence -of Germany at Constantinople was as nearly as possible nil; and so long -as Bismarck remained in power, no very serious efforts were made to -increase it. But from the date of Bismarck's dismissal[4] down to the -present day, it has been the steady aim of German policy to control the -destinies of the Turkish Empire. These attempts have been persistent, -and in the main successful. - -[Sidenote: THE WOOING OF TURKEY] - -It mattered not what dubious personage or party might happen to be in -the ascendant at Stamboul, the friendship of Germany was always -forthcoming. It was extended with an equal cordiality to Abdul Hamid; -to the Young Turks when they overthrew Abdul Hamid; to the -Reactionaries when they overthrew the Young Turks; to the Young Turks -again when they compounded matters with the Reactionaries. The -largesse of Berlin bankers refreshed the empty treasuries of each -despot and camarilla in turn, so soon as proofs could be produced of -positive, or even of presumptive predominance. At the same time the -makers of armaments, at Essen and elsewhere, looked to it, that a -sufficient portion of these generous loans was paid in kind, and that -the national gain was not confined to high policy and high finance. -The reform of the Turkish army was taken in hand zealously by Prussian -soldiers. Imperial courtesies cemented the bricks which usury, -commerce, and diplomacy had laid so well. At a time when the late -Sultan was ill-regarded by the whole of Europe, on account of his -supposed complicity in Armenian massacres, the {102} magnanimity of the -Kaiser took pity on the pariah, and a visit of honour to the Bosphorus -formed an incident in the Hohenzollern pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre. - -The harvest of these endeavours was reaped at a later date in the form -of vast concessions for lines of railway running through Asia Minor to -the Persian Gulf. It is needless to enter here into a discussion of -the famous and still unsettled controversy regarding the Baghdad route, -except to say that this project for the benefit, not merely of Turkey, -but of the whole human race, was to be realised under German direction -and according to German plans and specifications; it was to be -administered under German control; but it was to be paid for in the -main out of the savings of England and France. - -The scheme was no less bold than ingenious. Obligations were imposed -upon Turkey which it was clearly impossible for Turkey to discharge. -In the event of her failure it was likely to go hard with the original -shareholders, and somewhat hard with the Sublime Porte itself; but on -the other hand it was not likely to go hard with Germany, or to involve -her in anything more irksome than a labour of love--a protectorate over -Asia Minor and Arabia.[5] - -These are the main dreams which German writers, with a genuine -enthusiasm and an engaging frankness, have set out in the pages of -books and periodicals--the North Sea dream, the Austrian dream, the -Balkan dream, and the Levantine dream. But these dreams by no means -exhaust the Teuton fancy. - -Wars are contemplated calmly as inevitable {103} incidents in the -acquisition of world-power--war with France, war with England, war -either of army corps or diplomacy with Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. -And as victory is also contemplated, just as confidently, various -bye-products of considerable value are likely to be secured during the -process, and as a result. - -[Sidenote: ACQUISITION OF AFRICA] - -The greater part of north-western Africa, which lies along the -seaboards of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, is under the French -flag. The greater part of eastern Africa from Alexandria to Capetown -is in the hands of the British. The central region of Africa is -Belgian. In the north there is Tripoli which is now Italian; and in -various quarters patches and scattered islands which are Portuguese. -The former might be tolerated as a harmless enclave; the latter might -readily be acquired by compulsory purchase. What would then remain of -the Dark Continent is already German. So that, as the results of the -wars and victories which are considered by German thinkers to be -inevitable, the whole of Africa would shortly pass into German hands. - -With the destinies of Africa in the keeping of a virile race, -accustomed to face great problems in no piecemeal fashion, but as a -whole, vast transformations must ensue. Before their indomitable will -and scientific thoroughness, the dusky savage will lay aside his -ferocity, and toil joyously at the arts of peace. Under an -indefatigable and intelligent administration, desert, jungle, forest, -and swamp will yield their appropriate harvests. Timber, oil, cotton, -rubber, tea, coffee, and every variety of raw material will gradually -become available in limitless supplies. Jewels and precious metals -will {104} be dug out of the bowels of the earth. Flocks and herds -will roam in safety over the rich uplands--no robber bands to drive -them off; no wild beasts to tear them limb from limb; no murrain or -envenomed fly to strike them down by tens of thousands. For as the -armies of the Kaiser are invincible against all human foes, so also are -his men of science invincible, in their ceaseless war against disease -of man and beast. In the end they also will conquer in their own -sphere, no less certainly than the soldier in his; for their courage is -as high and their devotion faces death, or worse than death, with -equanimity. - -The Dark Continent, which in all its history has never known either -peace or order, will then at last know both. Even the stiff-necked -Africander, jealous of his antique shibboleths of freedom, will not -refuse incorporation in an Empire to which the land of his forefathers -will already have become bound in federal ties. And the dowry which -Holland is expected to bring with her, will be not only the good will -of the South African Dutch, but the rich islands of the East, where -merchant-adventurers planted her flag, in days when the fleets of -Rotterdam disputed, not unsuccessfully, with London herself the primacy -of the seas. - -[Sidenote: THE EASTERN DREAM] - -Finally, there is the dream of the farthest East. This is of such -simple grandeur that it may be stated in a few sentences. When the war -between China and Japan came to an end in 1895 Germany, acting in -concert with France and Russia, forced the victorious troops of the -Mikado to forgo all the fruits of their conquest. When three years -later Germany herself seized upon the reversion of Kiao-Chau, she {105} -saw a vision of an empire, greater than that which had been secured to -her envied rival by the daring of Clive and the forethought of Warren -Hastings. If England could hold and rule India, a mightier than -England could surely hold and rule China, containing though it does a -full quarter of the human race. - - - -[1] "L'Allemand est né bête; la civilisation l'a, rendu -méchant."--HEINE. - -[2] Mr. Chamberlain at Leicester on November 30, 1899. - -[3] March 1878. Treaty of Berlin, July 1878. - -[4] 1890. - -[5] Cf. _The Anglo-German Problem_, by C. Sarolea, p. 247, and -following. - - - - -{106} - -CHAPTER III - -THE GERMAN PROJECT OF EMPIRE - -The German project of empire is a gorgeous fabric. The weft of it is -thread of gold, but the warp of it has been dipped in the centaur's -blood. It is the pride of its possessor; but it is likely to be his -undoing. It ravishes his fancy with the symmetry and vastness of the -pattern; yet these very two qualities, which so much excite his -admiration, have shown themselves in the past singularly unpropitious -to high imperial adventures. - -No man of action worthy of the name will ever take history for his -guide. He would rightly refuse to do so, even were it possible, which -it is not, to write history truthfully. But with all their -deficiencies, history books have certain sibylline qualities which make -them worth consulting upon occasions; and as to symmetry and vastness -this oracle, if consulted, would speak clearly enough. Of all false -enticements which have lured great princes to their ruin, these two -have the biggest tale of victims to their score. - -[Sidenote: SYMMETRY AND VASTNESS] - -The British Empire, like the Roman, built itself slowly. It was the -way of both nations to deal with needs as needs occurred, and not -before. Neither of them charted out their projects in advance, {107} -thereafter working to them, like Lenôtre, when he laid out the gardens -of Versailles. On the contrary, a strip was added here, a kingdom -there, as time went on, but not in accordance with any plan or system. -In certain cases, no doubt, the reason for annexation was a simple -desire for possession. But much more often the motive was apprehension -of one kind or another. Empire-builders have usually achieved empire -as an accident attending their search after security--security against -the ambition of a neighbour, against lawless hordes which threaten the -frontier, against the fires of revolution and disorder spreading from -adjacent territories. Britain, like Rome before her, built up her -empire piecemeal; for the most part reluctantly; always reckoning up -and dreading the cost, labour, and burden of it; hating the -responsibility of expansion, and shouldering it only when there seemed -to be no other course open to her in honour or safety. Symmetry did -not appeal to either of these nations any more than vastness. Their -realms spread out and extended, as chance and circumstances willed they -should, like pools of water in the fields when floods are out. - -We cannot but distrust the soundness of recent German policy, with its -grandiose visions of universal empire, if we consider it in the light -of other things which happened when the world was somewhat younger, -though possibly no less wise. The great imaginative conquerors, though -the fame of their deeds still rings down the ages, do not make so brave -a show, when we begin to examine into the permanency of their -achievements. The imperial projects of Alexander, of the Habsburgs, -the Grand Monarque, and Napoleon--each of whom drew out {108} a vast -pattern and worked to it--are not among those things which can be said -with any justice to have endured. None of them were ever fully -achieved; while some were broken in pieces, even during the lifetimes -of their architects. - -To treat the whole world as if it were a huge garden, for which one -small race of men, who have worked busily in a single corner of it, can -aspire to make and carry out an all-comprehending plan, is in reality a -proof of littleness and not largeness of mind. Such vaulting ambitions -are the symptoms of a dangerous disease, to be noted and distrusted. -And none ever noted these tendencies more carefully or distrusted them -more heartily than the two greatest statesmen whom Prussia has -produced. Frederick the Great rode his own Pegasus-vision on curb and -martingale. The Great Bismarck reined back the Pegasus-vision of his -fellow-countrymen on to its haunches with an even sterner hand. "One -cannot," so he wrote in later years--"one cannot see the cards of -Providence so closely as to anticipate historical development according -to one's own calculation." - -[Sidenote: MASTERY OF THE WORLD] - -Those very qualities of vastness and symmetry which appear to have such -fatal attraction for the pedantocracy repel the practical statesman; -and woe to the nation which follows after the former class rather than -the latter, when the ways of the two part company! To the foreign -observer it seems as if Germany, for a good many years past, has been -making this mistake. Perhaps it is her destiny so to do. Possibly the -reigns of Frederick and Bismarck were only interludes. For Germany -followed the pedantocracy during a century or more, {109} while it -preached political inaction and contentment with a shorn and parcelled -Fatherland. She was following it still, when Bismarck turned -constitutionalism out of doors and went his own stern way to union. -And now once again she seems to be marching in a fatal procession after -the same Pied Pipers, who this time are engaged, with a surpassing -eloquence and fervour, in preaching discontent with the narrow limits -of a united empire, and in exhorting their fellow-countrymen to proceed -to the Mastery of the World. - -Among an imaginative race like the Germans, those who wield the weapons -of rhetoric and fancy are only too likely to get the better of those -surer guides, who know from hard experience that the world is a diverse -and incalculable place, where no man, and no acre of land, are -precisely the same as their next-door neighbours, where history never -repeats itself, and refuses always--out of malice or disdain--to travel -along the way which ingenious Titans have charted for it. But it is -not every generation which succeeds in producing a Frederick the Great -or a Bismarck, to tame the dreamers and use them as beasts of draught -and burden. - -The complete mosaic of the German vision is an empire incomparably -greater in extent, in riches, and in population, than any which has yet -existed since the world first began to keep its records. Visionaries -are always in a hurry. This stupendous rearrangement of the Earth's -surface is confidently anticipated to occur within the first half of -the present century. It is to be accomplished by a race distinguished -for its courage, industry, and devotion,--let us admit so much without -grudging. {110} But in numbers--even if we count the Teutons of the -Habsburg Empire along with those of the Hohenzollern--it amounts upon -the highest computation to less than eighty millions. This is the -grain of mustard-seed which is confidently believed to have in it 'the -property to get up and spread,' until within little more than a -generation, it will dominate and control more than seven hundred -millions of human souls. - -Nor to German eyes, which dwell lovingly, and apparently without -misgiving, upon this appalling prospect of symmetry and vastness, are -these the sum total of its attractions. The achievement of their -vision would bring peace to mankind. For there would then be but two -empires remaining, which need give the overlords of the world the -smallest concern. Of these Russia, in their opinion, needs a century -at least in which to emerge out of primitive barbarism and become a -serious danger; while in less than a century, the United States must -inevitably crumble to nonentity, through the worship of false gods and -the corruption of a decadent democracy. Neither of these two empires -could ever hope to challenge the German Mastery of the World. - -In South America as in North, there is already a German garrison, -possessing great wealth and influence. And in the South, at any rate, -it may well become, very speedily, an imperative obligation on the -Fatherland to secure, for its exiled children, more settled conditions -under which to extend the advantages of German commerce and Kultur. -President Monroe has already been dead a hundred years or more. -According to the calculations of the pedantocracy, his famous doctrine -will need some stronger {111} backing than the moral disapprobation of -a hundred millions of materially-minded and unwarlike people, in order -to withstand the pressure of German diplomacy, if it should summon -war-ships and transports to its aid. - -[Sidenote: UNIVERSAL PEACE] - -So in the end we arrive at an exceedingly strange conclusion. For that -very thing, which the philanthropists have all these years been vainly -endeavouring to bring about by means of congresses of good men, and -resolutions which breathe a unanimity of noble aspirations, may be -achieved in a single lifetime by a series of bold strokes with the -German sword. Then at last Universal Peace will have been secured. - -At this point the Prussian professor and the pacifist apostle, who -turned their backs upon one another so angrily at the beginning, and -started off, as it seemed, in opposite directions, are confronting one -another unexpectedly at the other side of the circle of human -endeavour. They ought surely to shake hands; for each, if he be -honest, will have to own himself the convert of the other. "You admit -then after all," cries the triumphant Pacifist, "that Peace is the real -end of human endeavour!" "Whether or no," grunts the other in reply, -"this at any rate was the only road to it." - -One wonders--will the Pacifist be content? He has reached his goal -sure enough; though by means which he has been accustomed to denounce -as the end of all true morality? Will the Professor, on the other -hand, be well pleased when he discovers that by the very triumph of his -doctrines he has made war for ever impossible,--manliness, therefore, -and all true virtue likewise impossible,--thereby damning {112} the -souls of posterity to the end of time? "To put questions in this -quarter with a hammer, and to hear perchance that well-known hollow -sound which tells of blown-out frogs"[1]--this is a joy, no doubt; and -it is all we are ever likely to arrive at by the cross-examination of -dreamers. - - - -[1] Nietzsche, _The Twilight of Idols_. - - - - -{113} - -CHAPTER IV - -THE NEW MORALISTS - -The dream of German expansion, as year by year it took firmer hold upon -the popular imagination, produced, as might have been expected, a -desire that it might be realised. From the stage of vague and ardent -longing it was but a short way to the next, where a determined will -began to put forth efforts towards achievement. But as mankind in the -mass, whether in Germany or England, is still to some extent hampered -by human nature, by a number of habits, traditions, and instincts, and -by various notions of good and evil, justice and injustice--which the -subtlest philosophers and most eloquent rhetoricians have not yet -succeeded in eradicating--a need was felt for what the text-books in -their solemn nomenclature call _an ethical basis_. In plain words, the -German people wanted to have right on their side--if possible, -old-fashioned, Sunday-school, copy-book Right. Failing that, even such -a plea as the wolf maintained against the lamb would be a great deal -better than nothing. - -This tendency in a nation to look about for justification and a -righteous plea, when it is preparing to possess itself of property -belonging to its neighbours, is for the most part a subconscious -process, not only {114} among the common people, but also among the -leaders themselves. It resembles the instinct among hens which -produces in them an appetite for lime when the season has come to begin -laying. It was through some natural impulse of this sort, and not -through mere cynicism, hypocrisy, or cool calculation, that German -publicists discovered all the grievances which have been already -touched upon. For even if the possession of these grievances did not -altogether give the would-be aggressors right up to the point of -righteousness, it certainly put their neighbours in the wrong, and -branded the French dove and the British lamb with turpitude in the eyes -of the German people. The grievances against France were, that -although she had been vanquished in 1870, although her population had -actually decreased since that date, and although therefore she had -neither the right to nor any need for expansion, she had nevertheless -expanded in Africa as well as in the East, to a far greater extent than -Germany herself, the victorious power, whose own population had -meanwhile been increasing by leaps and bounds. - -[Sidenote: GRIEVANCES AGAINST ENGLAND] - -The grievances against Britain were that she was supposed to have made -war upon German trade, to have prevented her young rival from acquiring -colonies, and to have intrigued to surround the Teuton peoples with a -ring of foes. Britain had helped France to occupy and hold her new -territories. Britain had been mainly responsible for the diplomatic -defeat of Germany at Algeciras in 1905 and again over Agadir in 1911. -Moreover when Germany, during the South African war, had attempted, in -the interests of international morality, to combine the nations against -us, we had foiled her high-minded {115} and unselfish endeavours. When -at an earlier date she had sought, by the seizure of Kiao-Chau and by a -vigorous concentration, to oust British influence and trade from their -position of predominance in China, we had countered her efforts by the -occupation of Wei-hai-wei and the Japanese alliance. - -As regards command of the sea we had likewise frustrated German -ambitions. After a certain amount of vacillation, and a somewhat -piteous plea for a general diminution of armaments--backed up by an -arrest of our own, which Germany interpreted, perhaps not unnaturally, -as a throwing up of the sponge and beginning of the end of our naval -supremacy--we had actually had the treachery (for it was nothing less) -to upset all her calculations, and turn all her efforts and -acceleration to foolishness, by resuming the race for sea-power with -redoubled energy. And although to our own eyes, and even possibly to -the eyes of impartial observers, none of these doings of ours--in so -far as they were truly alleged--could be rightly held to constitute any -real grievance, that consideration was irrelevant. For when a man is -in search of a grievance he will find it, if he be earnest enough, in -the mere fact that his intended adversary stammers, or has a wart upon -his nose. - -German statesmen were happy in having established these grievances to -their own satisfaction; but something more was necessary in order that -their morality might rest upon a sure foundation. German policy must -be absolutely right, and not merely relatively right by contrast with -those neighbours whose power she sought to overthrow, and whose -territories she wished to annex. And although this {116} effort to -establish German policy on the principle of Right involved a recasting -of Christian morality, it was not shirked on that account. On the -contrary it was undertaken in a most energetic spirit. - -The first great influence in this readjustment of popular conceptions -of right and wrong was the historian Heinrich von Treitschke.[1] He -boldly differentiated the moral obligations of the private individual -from those of a government charged with the destinies of a nation.[2] -The duties of a man to his family, neighbours, and society Treitschke -left undisturbed. In this sphere of human life the teaching of the -Sermon on the Mount not only remained unchallenged, but was upheld and -reinforced. Statecraft, however, fell under a different category. - -[Sidenote: THE STATE IS POWER] - -The true principle of private conduct was Love for one's Neighbour, but -the true principle of the state was Power. The duty of a virtuous -ruler was to seek power, more power, and always more power, on behalf -of the nation he was called upon to govern. The internal power of the -state over the action of its own subjects was absolute, and it was a -duty owed by each generation of rulers to posterity, to see to it that -in their own time, the external power of the {117} state was increased -at the expense of its neighbours.[3] To secure this end wars were -inevitable; and despite the sufferings which wars entailed, they were -far from regrettable, for the reason that they preserved the vigour, -unity, and devotion of the race, while stimulating the virtues of -courage and self-sacrifice among private citizens.[4] - -Nations, he maintained, cannot safely stand still. They must either -increase their power or lose it, expand their territories or be -prepared to see them shorn away. No growth of spiritual force or -material well-being within the state will preserve it, if it fails to -extend its authority and power among its neighbours. Feelings of -friendliness, chivalry, and pity are absurd as between nations. To -speak even of justice in such a connection is absurd. Need and Might -together constitute Right. Nor ought the world to regret the eating-up -of weak nations by the strong, of small nations by the great, -because--a somewhat bold conclusion--great and powerful nations alone -are capable of producing what the world requires in thought, art, -action, and virtue. For how can these things flourish nobly in a -timid, cowering state, which finds itself driven by force of -circumstances to make-believes and fictions, to {118} the meanest -supplications and to devices of low cunning, in order to preserve an -independence which, as it can only exist on sufferance, is nothing -better than a sham?[5] - -As the Hohenzollerns, the noblest and most capable of modern dynasties, -had never been content merely to reign, but had always maintained their -'divine right' of ruling and dominating the Prussian Kingdom--as -Prussia itself, the most manly and energetic of modern nations, had not -been content merely to serve as the figurehead of a loose -confederation, but had insisted upon becoming supreme master and -imposing its own system, policy, and ideals upon all Germany--so was it -the duty and destiny of united Germany, under these happy auspices, -having been taught and seasoned by long centuries of stern and painful -apprenticeship, to issue forth in the meridian vigour of her age and -seize upon the Mastery of the World. - -[Sidenote: FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE] - -If Treitschke, the eloquent historian, succeeded to his own -satisfaction and that of a very large proportion of German statesmen, -soldiers, intellectuals, and publicists in taking high policy -altogether out of the jurisdiction of Christian morals, Friedrich -Wilhelm Nietzsche,[6] the even more eloquent and infinitely more subtle -poet-philosopher, made a cleaner and {119} bolder cut, and got rid of -Christian morality even in the sphere of private conduct. - -Nietzsche was but little interested or concerned in the practical -problems of statecraft which engrossed the patriotic mind of -Treitschke. The destinies of the German nation were for him a small -matter in comparison with those of the human race. But nevertheless -his vigorously expressed contempt for the English, their ways of life -and thought, the meanness of their practical aims, and the degradation -of their philosophic ideals,[7] was comforting to his -fellow-countrymen, who were relieved to find that the nation whom they -desired to despoil was so despicable and corrupt. This train of -argument was deceptive and somewhat dangerous; for it led his German -readers to overlook the fact, that the broad front of his attack aimed -at enveloping and crushing the cherished traditions of the Teuton race -no less than those of the Anglo-Saxon.[8] - -{120} - -Nietzsche's derision and dislike of the Prussian spirit, of militarism, -and of what he conceived to be the spurious principle of nationality, -his vague, disinterested cosmopolitanism or Europeanism, are as the -poles apart from the aims and ideas of Treitschke and the German -patriots.[9] Nietzsche is not concerned to evolve a sovereign and -omnipotent state, but a high overmastering type of man, who shall -inherit the earth and dominate--not for their good, but for his -own--the millions who inhabit it. His ideal is a glorious aristocracy -of intellect, beauty, courage, self-control, felicity, and power, -scornfully smiling, exuberantly vital. The evolution, ever higher and -higher, of this fine oligarchy of super-men is the one absolute end of -human endeavour. The super-men will use and direct the force and -instincts of 'the herd'--even the capacities of kings, soldiers, -law-givers, {121} and administrators--to make the world a fit place for -their own development. The millions of slaves are to be considered -merely as a means to this end. Concern about them for their own sakes, -above all pity for their sufferings, or regard on the part of the -super-men for their resentment--except to guard against it--is a -mistake. The serenity of the superman must not allow itself to be -disturbed and distracted by any such considerations. It is for him to -take what he needs or desires, to impose order on the world, so that it -may be a fit environment for the evolution of his own caste, and, so -far as he can compass it, to live like the gods.[10] - -[Sidenote: THE BLONDE BRUTE] - -It is clear that although Nietzsche chaunts a pæan in admiration of -"the magnificent blonde brute, avidly rampant for spoil and -victory,"[11] and although he is constantly found, as it were, humming -this refrain, he had no intention of taking the Prussian as his ideal -type--still less of personifying Prussia itself as a super-state -engaged in a contest for supremacy with a herd of inferior nations. He -does not trouble himself in the least about nations, but only about -individual men. Yet, like others who have had the gift of memorable -speech, he might {122} well marvel, were he still alive, at the -purposes to which his words have been turned by orators and -journalists, desirous to grind an edge on their own blunt axes. - -General von Bernhardi[12] may be taken as a type of the sincere but -unoriginal writer who turns all texts to the support of his own sermon. -He is an honest, literal fellow. In spite of all his ecstatic flights -of rhetoric he is never at all in the clouds--never any farther from -the earth's surface than hopping distance. Notwithstanding, he quietly -appropriates any Nietzschean aphorisms the sound and shape of which -appear to suit his purpose, and uses them to drive home his very simple -and concrete proposition that it is the duty of Germany to conquer the -world. - -One imagines from his writings that Bernhardi has no quarrel with -Christianity, no wish whatsoever to overturn our accepted notions of -morality. He is merely a soldier with a fixed idea, and he is very -much in earnest. His literary methods remind one somewhat of the -starlings in spring-time, perched on the backs of sheep and cattle, -picking off the loose hairs to line their nests. This is the highly -practical and soldierly use to which he puts philosophers, poets, and -men of letters generally--laying them under contribution to garnish his -discourse. - -[Sidenote: INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY] - -It is probably true that the average soldier who fought on the German -side at Ypres and elsewhere {123} was hardly more conversant with the -writings of Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi than the average -British soldier opposed to him was with those of Herbert Spencer, Mr. -Bernard Shaw, and Mr. Norman Angell. It is very unlikely, however, -that the battle of Ypres would ever have been fought had it not been -for the ideas which sprang from these and similar sources. The -influence of the written and spoken word upon German policy and action -is glaringly manifest.[13] It inspired and supported the high -bureaucrats at Berlin, and had equally to do, if indirectly, with the -marching of the humblest raw recruits shoulder to shoulder to be shot -down on the Menin Road. For by a process of percolation through the -press and popular literature, the doctrines of these teachers--diluted -somewhat, it is true, and a good deal disguised and perverted--had -reached a very wide audience. Though the names of these authors were -for the most part unknown, though their opinions had never been either -understood or accepted by the common people, the effects of their -teaching had made themselves felt in every home in Germany. - -The German private soldier would not have been shot down unless these -eloquent sermons had been preached. None the less, he had never -grasped or understood, far less had he adhered to and professed, the -cardinal doctrines which they contained. He still believed in the -old-fashioned morality, and thought that states as well as individual -men were bound to act justly. It was this faith which gave {124} him -his strength, and made him die gladly. For he believed that Germany -had acted justly, the Allies unjustly, that it was his task, along with -other good men and true, to win victory for his Emperor and safety for -his Fatherland, and to crush the treacherous and malignant aggressors. - -In spite of all this preliminary discoursing which had been going on -for many years past, like artillery preparation before an infantry -attack--about world-power, will-to-power, and all the rest of -it--nothing is more remarkable than the contrast presented, immediately -after war broke out, between the blatancy of those writers who had -caused the war and the bleating of those (in many cases the same) who -sought to justify Germany's part in it to their countrymen and the -world. - -On the enlightened principles of Treitschke and Bernhardi, Britain -would have acted not only wisely, but in the strictest accordance with -her duty to her own state, had she indeed contrived and compassed this -war, believing circumstances to be favourable for herself and -unfavourable for Germany. Not another shred of right or reason was -required.[14] But when war actually burst out, all these new-fangled -doctrines went by the board. Though the ink was hardly dry upon -Bernhardi's latest exhortation--of which several hundred thousand -copies had been sold, and in which he urged his fellow-countrymen to -watch their time and make war when it suited them, without remorse and -no matter on what {125} plea--in spite of this fact, there was a -singular lack of Stoicism among 'the brethren' when war was declared -against Russia and France. When Britain joined in, and when things -began to go less well than had been expected, Stoicism entirely -disappeared. Indeed there is something highly ludicrous, at the same -time painful--like all spectacles of human abasement--in the chorus of -whines and shrill execration, which at once went up to heaven from that -very pedantocracy whose leaders, so short a time before, had been -preaching that, as between the nations of the earth, Might is Right, -and Craft is the trusty servant of Might.[15] - -[Sidenote: APOSTASY WHEN WAR CAME] - -These scolding fakirs were of an infinite credulity, inasmuch as they -believed that Sir Edward Grey was the reincarnation of Machiavelli. -Yet on their own principles, what was there in this discovery to be in -the least shocked at? British statesmen (it is hardly necessary to -repeat it) had not walked in the footsteps of the Florentine; had not -provoked the war; had not wished for it; had tried with all their might -to prevent it; but if they had done the very reverse, would they not -merely have been {126} taking a leaf out of the sacred book of the -pedantocracy--out of Bernhardi's book, out of Nietzsche's book, out of -Treitschke's book? Why, then, all these unpleasant howlings and -ravings? - -The answers are not hard to find. The careful plans and theories of -the German bureaucrats had been turned topsy-turvy because England had -joined in the war when, according to the calculations of the augurs, -she should have remained neutral. That mistake must have been -sufficiently annoying in itself to disturb the equanimity even of -professional philosophers. And further, in spite of all the ingenious, -eloquent, and sophistical exhortations of the prophets, the old -morality still kept its hold upon the hearts of men. When trouble -arose they turned to it instinctively--priesthood as well as -people--and the later gospel fell flat like a house of cards. -Immediately war came there was an appeal to old-fashioned justice, and -the altars of the little, new-fangled, will-to-power gods were deserted -by their worshippers. - -When statesmen are laying out policies, and moralists are setting up -systems, it is worth their while to make certain that they are not, in -fact, engaged upon an attempt to make water flow uphill; above all, -that their ingenious new aqueducts will actually hold water, which in -this instance they certainly did not. - - - -[1] Heinrich von Treitschke, son of a Saxon general of -Bohemian-Slavonic origin; born at Dresden 1834. Deafness following -upon a fever in childhood prevented him from adopting the profession of -arms; 1858-1863 lectured on history at Leipzig; 1863-1866 professor at -Freiburg; 1866-1874 professor at Heidelberg; 1874 until his death in -1896 professor of history and politics at Berlin. - -[2] "Thus it follows from this, that we must distinguish between public -and private morality. The order of rank of the various duties must -necessarily be for the State, as it is power, quite other than for -individual men. A whole series of these duties, which are obligatory -on the individual, are not to be thought of in any case for the State. -To maintain itself counts for it always as the highest commandment; -that is absolutely moral for it. And on that account we must declare -that of all political sins that of weakness is the most reprehensible -and the most contemptible; it is in politics the sin against the Holy -Ghost...."--_Selections_, p. 32. - -[3] "That must not hinder us from declaring joyfully that the gifted -Florentine, with all the vast consequence of his thinking, was the -first to set in the centre of all politics the great thought: _The -State is power_. For that is the truth; and he who is not man enough -to look this truth in the face ought to keep his hands off -politics."--_Ibid._ p. 28. - -[4] "... to the historian who lives in the world of will it is -immediately clear that the demand for a perpetual peace is thoroughly -reactionary; he sees that with war all movement, all growth, must be -struck out of history. It has always been the tired, unintelligent, -and enervated periods that have played with the dream of perpetual -peace...."--_Selections_, p. 25. - -"It is precisely political idealism that demands wars, while -materialism condemns them. What a perversion of morality to wish to -eliminate heroism from humanity!"--_Ibid._ p. 24. - -[5] "... if we survey history in the mass, it is clear that all real -masterpieces of poetry and art arose upon the soil of great -nationalities;" and "The poet and artist must be able to react upon a -great nation. When did a masterpiece ever arise among a petty little -nation?"--_Ibid._ p. 19. - -[6] Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, son of a village pastor of Polish -ancestry; born at Röcken in Saxony 1844; served in the German army for -a few months in 1867; injured in mounting his horse; 1869-1879 -professor of classical philology at Bale which entailed naturalisation -as a Swiss subject; served in ambulance in war of 1870-1871; 1879-1889 -in bad health, wrote and travelled; 1889 became insane and remained so -till his death in 1900. - -[7] "What is lacking in England, and has always been lacking, that -half-actor and rhetorician knew well enough, the absurd muddlehead, -Carlyle, who sought to conceal under passionate grimaces what he knew -about himself: namely, what was lacking in Carlyle, real _power_ of -intellect, real _depth_ of intellectual perception, in short, -philosophy."--_Beyond Good and Evil_, p. 210. - -"The Englishman, more gloomy, sensual, headstrong, and brutal than the -German--is for that very reason, as the baser of the two, also the most -pious."--_Ibid._ p. 211. - -"The English coarseness and rustic demureness is still more -satisfactorily disguised by Christian pantomime, and by praying and -psalm-singing (or, more correctly, it is thereby explained and -differently expressed); and for the herd of drunkards and rakes who -formerly learned moral grunting under the influence of Methodism (and -more recently as the 'Salvation Army'), a penitential fit may really be -the relatively highest manifestation of 'humanity' to which they can be -elevated."--_Ibid._ p. 211. - -"The European ignobleness, the plebeianism of modern ideas, is -England's work and invention."--_Ibid._ p. 213. - -[8] "I believe only in French culture, and regard everything else in -Europe which calls itself 'culture' as a misunderstanding. I do not -even take the German kind into consideration.... The few instances of -higher culture with which I have met in Germany were all French in -their origin."--_Ecce Homo_, p. 27. - -"Wherever Germany extends her sway, she _ruins_ culture."--_Ibid._ p. -38. - -"Culture and the state are antagonists: a 'culture-state' is merely a -modern idea. The one lives upon the other, the one flourishes at the -expense of the other. All great periods of culture have been periods -of political decline; that which was great from the standpoint of -culture was always unpolitical--even anti-political.... In the history -of European culture the rise of the (German) Empire signifies, above -all, a displacement of the centre of gravity. Everywhere people are -already aware of this: in things that really matter--and these after -all constitute culture--the Germans are no longer worth considering.... -The fact that there is no longer a single German philosopher worth -mentioning is an increasing wonder."--_The Twilight of the Idols_, p. -54. - -"Every great crime against culture for the last four centuries lies on -their [the German] conscience.... It was the Germans who caused Europe -to lose the fruits, the whole meaning of her last period of -greatness--the period of the Renaissance...."--_Ecce Homo_, p. 124. - -"The future of German culture rests with the sons of Prussian -officers."--_The Genealogy of Morals_, p. 222. - -"If any one wishes to see the 'German soul' demonstrated _ad oculos_, -let him only look at German taste, at German arts and manners: what -boorish indifference to 'taste'!"--_The Antichrist_. - -[9] "What quagmires and mendacity there must be about if it is -possible, in the modern European hotchpotch, to raise questions of -race." - -A Nation--"Men who speak one language and read the same -newspapers."--_The Genealogy of Morals_, p. 226. - -[10] "A boldly daring, splendidly overbearing, high-flying, and -aloft-up-dragging class of higher men, who had first to teach their -century--and it is the century of the _masses_--the conception 'higher -man.'"--_Beyond Good and Evil_, p. 219. - -"This man of the future, this tocsin of noon and of the great verdict, -which renders the will again free, who gives back to the world its goal -and to man his hope, this Antichrist and Antinihilist, this conqueror -of God and of Nothingness--_he must one day come_."--_The Genealogy of -Morals_, p. 117. - -[11] "The blonde beast that lies at the core of all aristocratic -races."--_The Genealogy of Morals_, p. 42. - -"The profound, icy mistrust which the German provokes, as soon as he -arrives at power,--even at the present time,--is always still an -aftermath of that inextinguishable horror with which for whole -centuries Europe has regarded the wrath of the blonde Teuton -beast."--_Ibid._ - -[12] Friedrich von Bernhardi: born 1849 at St. Petersburg, where his -father Theodor von Bernhardi was a Councillor of the Prussian Legation; -entered a Hussar regiment in 1869; military attaché at Berne in 1881; -in 1897 he was chief of the General Staff of the 16th Army Corps; in -1908 he was appointed commander of the 7th Army Corps; retired in the -following year. He was a distinguished cavalry general, and is -probably the most influential German writer on current -politico-military problems. - -[13] Probably not less so upon British policy and inaction. As water -is the result of blending oxygen and hydrogen in certain proportions, -so is the present war the resultant of German militarism and British -anti-militarism in combination. - -[14] "Every State has as sovereign the undoubted right to declare war -when it chooses, consequently every State is in the position of being -able to cancel any treaties which have been concluded."--Treitschke, -_Selections_, p. 15. - -"It is not only the right, but the moral and political duty of the -statesman to bring about a war."--Bernhardi, _Germany and the Next -War_, p. 41 - -[15] Towards the end of March 1915 General von Bernhardi published in -the _New York Sun_ an article the object of which was to explain to the -American people how much his previous writings had been misunderstood -and perverted by the malice of the enemy. Long before this date, -however, there was strong presumptive evidence that the distinguished -military author was unfavourably regarded by the Super-men at Berlin. -He had been useful before the war for preparing the Teutonic youth for -Armageddon; but after hostilities began it was discovered that, so far -as neutral opinion was concerned, it would have been better had he been -wholly interdicted from authorship under the national -motto--_verboten_. As to the tenour of imperial communications to the -popular fire-eating publicist during the winter 1914-1915, might we -venture to paraphrase them into the vulgar vernacular as -follows?--"We've got to thank you and your damned books, more than -anything else, for the present mess with America. Get busy, and -explain them all away if you can."--Any one of the labours of Hercules -was easier. - - - - -{127} - -CHAPTER V - -THE STATECRAFT OF A PRIESTHOOD - -The thoroughness and efficiency of the Germans are admitted even by -hostile critics. In the practical sphere they have excelled in -military preparations, in the encouragement of industry, and in the -organisation of finance. But they have achieved an even more -remarkable success than any of these; for they have so arranged their -educational system that it is drilled hardly less admirably than their -army.[1] From the primary schools to the universities everything is -ordered, so that the plastic mind of youth is forced into a political -mould which suits the purposes of government. Patriotism of the -pattern approved by the authorities is inculcated directly or -indirectly in every class-room. While thought is left ostentatiously -free in regard to private morals and religious foundations, the duties -of the citizen to the state, the duties of the state to posterity, the -relations of Germany to the outside world, are subjects upon which -independent speculation is not tolerated. - -{128} - -Even schoolmasters and professors have their ambitions; but unless they -contribute their quota to the support of imperial ideals, their careers -are unlikely to prosper. It is not enough that a lecturer should not -run counter to state policy; he must actively promote its ends before -he can hope to be transferred to a sphere of greater dignity and -influence. Pedagogy is a branch of the Civil Service just as much as -the Treasury or the Public Health Department. Teachers from the lowest -to the highest grades are the stipendiaries of the bureaucracy. If -they render useful services they are promoted. If they fail to render -useful services they are passed over. If they indulge in dangerous -speculations they are sent adrift. Not merely the army, but the whole -German nation, is disciplined, during the period of its impressionable -youth, with the object of inclining its mind to support state policy -through thick and thin. - -The schools feed the universities; the universities feed the press, the -learned professions, and the higher grades in industry and finance. -Private conversation, as well as what is published in newspapers, -magazines, and books, bears the impress of the official mint to a -degree unthinkable in England or America, Russia or France. Theories -of politics are devised by ingenious sophists, exactly as the machinery -at Essen is contrived by engineers--for the express purpose of -forwarding Prussian policy. History is twisted and distorted in order -to prepare the way for imperial ambitions by justifying them in advance. - -It is a signal triumph for the thoroughness of German methods that all -the thinkers, dreamers, {129} poets, and prophets, with but a few -exceptions, should have been commandeered and set to work thinking, -dreaming, poetising, and prophesying to the glory of the Kaiser, and -his army, and his navy, and his counsellors, and his world policy, and -the conquests and expansion which are entailed therein. - -[Sidenote: MOBILISATION OF INTELLECTUALS] - -It is somewhat startling, however, to find the intellectuals thus -mobilised, and all but unanimous, on the official side; for hitherto in -history they have rarely agreed among themselves, and the greater part -have usually favoured the Opposition rather than the Government. Nor -does this close alliance between learning and the bureaucracy seem -altogether satisfactory. For thought loses its fine edge when it is -set to cut millstones of state. It loses its fine temper in the red -heat of political controversy. By turning utilitarian it ceases to be -universal; and what is perhaps even worse, it ceases to be free. It -tends more and more to become the mere inventor of things which will -sell at a profit; less and less the discoverer of high principles which -the gods have hidden out of sight. It would hardly be possible to -imagine a more complete reversal of attitude than that which has -occurred in Germany between the beginning of the nineteenth century and -the present time; and though this change may serve admirably the -immediate purposes of the state, it does not augur well for the future -of German thought. - -The similarities and contrasts of history are interesting to -contemplate. In the ferment of thought and action which occurred in -France during the generation preceding the battle of Valmy, and that -other which has been going on in Germany in the {130} generation -preceding the battle of the Marne, there are various likenesses and -unlikenesses. In France before the Revolution, as in Germany to-day, a -bureaucracy, responsible solely to the monarch, directed policy and -controlled administration. But in France this bureaucracy was -incompetent, unpractical, and corrupt. Its machinery was clogged with -dead matter of every kind, with prejudices, traditions, and statutes, -many of which had outlived their original purposes. The _Struldbrugs_, -discovered by Gulliver during his voyages, were a race of men whose -mortal souls were incased in immortal bodies. The French monarchy was -of this nature, and the soul of it was long since dead. Inefficiency -was everywhere apparent; and, as a natural consequence, the whole -system had become a butt, at which each brilliant writer in turn -levelled his darts of derision and contempt. - -In Germany, although the political mechanism is the same, the -conditions are diametrically the opposite. The bureaucracy and the -monarchy which it supports, have proved themselves highly efficient and -adaptive. The arrangement has worked with a marvellous success. It -has cherished the material, if not the spiritual, well-being of the -people. The wealth-producing and belly-filling activities of the race -have been stimulated to an extent never yet attained by any form of -government, either popular or despotic. Administration has been -honest, thrifty, and singularly free from the usual dull negatives of -officialdom and the pedantries of red tape. In all directions -industrial prosperity has increased, under the fostering care of the -state, by leaps and bounds. Anything more remote from the bankrupt -empire of {131} Louis XVI. it would be impossible to conceive. And as -a natural consequence, brilliant German writers have for the most -part[2] spent their forces of rhetoric and fancy in idealising the -grandeur and nobility of an order of things, under which resources, -comfort, and luxury have expanded with such amazing strides. - -[Sidenote: IDEAS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION] - -In the case of France the aim of the intellectuals was to pull down -existing institutions, in that of Germany it has been to bolster them -up, to extend and develop them to their logical conclusions. But the -second were no less agents of destruction than the first. Each alike, -as a condition of success, required that a new order of moral and -political ideas should be set up; each attained a certain measure of -success; and the results which followed were those which usually -follow, when new wine is poured into old bottles. - -The ideas of the French Revolution cast themselves into the mould of -republicanism. A picture wholly imaginary and fictitious was drawn of -the institutions of Greece and Rome in ancient days. _Liberty_, -_Equality_, and _Fraternity_ were believed to have been the foundations -of these famous states. Patriots on the banks of the Seine conceived -themselves to be re-incarnations of Aristides and the Gracchi, of -Pericles, of one Brutus or the other--it mattered little which. -Political idealism passed rapidly into a kind of religious fervour. - -The German masquerade is very different from this, but it is no less a -masquerade. What covers the new faith, indeed, is not plumage borrowed -from the Greeks and Romans, but habiliments which are supposed to have -clad the heroic forms of ancestral Teutons. The student on his way to -doctor's degree--the {132} intelligent clerk scanning the high-road to -fortune from the eminence of office-stool--dream in their pensive -leisure to emulate the heroes of Asgard, to merit and enjoy the glories -of Valhalla. But the noble shapes and gorgeous colourings in which the -modern young German of honest, sober, and industrious character has -chosen to see his destiny prefigured, are no less imaginary and -fictitious than those others, with which eloquent notaries'-clerks, and -emancipated, unfrocked priests, decked themselves out for the -admiration of the Paris mob. In Germany as in France political -idealism passed into a kind of religious fervour, which inspired men to -a mimicry of old-Wardour-Street shams, and led them to neglect the -development of their own true natures. - - -During quiet times that stream of events, which we are wont to call -human progress, is occupied incessantly in throwing up dams, of one -sort or another, throughout the world. Tree-trunks and logs, which -have been swept down by former floods of conquest and invasion, jam at -some convenient rocky angle, as the river falls to its normal level. -Against these obstacles the drift and silt of habit, custom, law, -convention, prejudice, and tradition slowly collect, settle, and -consolidate. An embankment is gradually formed, and the waters are -held up behind it ever higher and higher. The tribal pool becomes a -pond or nation; and this again, if conditions remain favourable--for so -long, that is to say, as there are no more raging and destructive -floods,--extends into a lake or inland sea of empire.... "See," cry -the optimists, "see what a fine, smooth, silvery sheet of civilisation, -culture, wealth, happiness, comfort, and {133} what not besides, where -formerly there was but an insignificant torrent brawling in the gorge!" -... But the pessimists, as is their nature, shake their heads, talk -anxiously of the weight of waters which are banking up behind, and of -the unreliable character of the materials out of which the dam has -grown. "Some day," they warn us, "the embankment will burst under the -heavy pressure; or, more likely still, some ignorant, heedless, or -malicious person will begin to fiddle and tamper with the casual -structure; and then what may we expect?" - -[Sidenote: RECENT ANXIETIES] - -There has been considerable nervousness of late among rulers of nations -as to the soundness of their existing barrages. For the most part, -however, they have concerned themselves with internal dangers--with -watching propagandists of the socialist persuasion--with keeping these -under a kind of benevolent police supervision, and in removing -ostentatiously from time to time the more glaring of their alleged -grievances. This procedure has been quite as noticeable in the case of -autocracies, as in countries which enjoy popular institutions. - -Treitschke and Bernhardi--even Nietzsche himself--valued themselves far -more highly as builders-up than as pullers-down. It is always so with -your inspired inaugurators of change. It was so with Rousseau and -those other writers, whose thoughts, fermenting for a generation in the -minds of Frenchmen, brought about the Revolution. The intellectuals of -the eighteenth century, like those of the nineteenth, aimed at getting -rid of a great accumulation of insanitary rubbish. But this was only a -troublesome preliminary, to be hurried through with as quickly as -possible, in order that the much greater {134} work of construction -might proceed upon the cleared site. - -Treitschke made a hole in the German dam when he cut an ancient -commonplace in two, and tore out the one half of it. Nietzsche turned -the hole into a much vaster cavity by pulling out the other half. -Bernhardi and the pedantocracy worked lustily at the business, with the -result that a great part of the sticks, stones, and mud of tradition -are now dancing, rumbling, and boiling famously in the flood. Whether -they have injured our dam as well as their own, we are hardly as yet in -a position to judge. - -The profounder spirit of Nietzsche realised clearly enough the -absurdity of supposing that the conflicting beliefs and aspirations of -mankind could all be settled and squared in a few bustling -decades--that the contradictions, paradoxes, and antinomies of national -existence could be written off with a few bold strokes of the sword, -and the world started off on the road to perfection, like a brisk -debtor who has purged his insolvency in the Bankruptcy Court. But the -enthusiasm of Treitschke and Bernhardi made them blind to these -considerations. Had not the formula been discovered, which would -overcome every obstacle--that stroke of genius, the famous bisection of -the commonplace? For private conduct, the Sermon on the Mount; for -high statecraft, Machiavelli's _Prince_! Was ever anything simpler, -except perhaps the way of Columbus with the egg? - - -When we push our examination further, into the means which Germany has -been urged by her great thinkers to employ in preparing for this -premeditated war, for provoking it when the season should be ripe, -{135} and for securing victory and spoils, we are struck more than ever -by the gulf which separates the ideas of the German pedantocracy from -those of the rest of the world. Nor can we fail to be impressed by the -matter-of-fact and businesslike way in which the military and civil -powers have set to work to translate those notions into practice. - -[Sidenote: A POLITICAL PRIESTHOOD] - -No kind of priesthood has ever yet exercised a great and direct -influence upon national policy without producing calamity. And by an -ill fate, it has always been the nature of these spiritual guides to -clutch at political power whenever it has come within their reach. - -Of all classes in the community who are intellectually capable of -having ideas upon public affairs, a priesthood--or what is the same -thing, a pedantocracy--is undoubtedly the most mischievous, if it -succeeds in obtaining power. It matters not a whit whether they -thunder forth their edicts and incitements from church pulpits or -university chairs, whether they carry their sophistical projects up the -back stairs of Catholic King or Lutheran Kaiser, whether, having shaved -their heads and assumed vows of celibacy, they dwell in ancient -cloisters, or, having taken unto themselves wives and begotten -children, they keep house in commonplace villa residences. None of -these differences is essential, or much worth considering. The one -class is as much a priesthood as the other, and the evils which proceed -from the predominance of the one, and the other, are hardly -distinguishable. - -They stand ostentatiously aloof from the sordid competitions of worldly -business. They have forsworn, or at any rate forgone, the ordinary -prizes of {136} wealth and position. And for these very reasons they -are ill equipped for guiding practical affairs. Their abstinences are -fatal impediments, and render them apt to leave human nature out of -their reckoning. They are wanting in experience of the difficulties -which beset ordinary men, and of the motives which influence them. -Knowing less of such matters (for all their book learning) than any -other class of articulately-speaking men, they find it by so much the -easier to lay down rules and regulations for the government of the -world. - -To a priesthood, whether ecclesiastical or academic, problems of -politics and war present themselves for consideration in an engaging -simplicity. They evolve theories of how people live, of how they ought -to live; and both sets of theories are mainly cobwebs. There is no -place in their philosophy for anything which is illogical or untidy. -Ideas of compromise and give-and-take, are abominations in priestly -eyes--at any rate when they are engaged in contemplation of worldly -affairs. And seeing that the priesthood aspires, nevertheless, to -govern and direct a world which is illogical and needs humouring, there -is nothing wonderful, if when it has achieved power, it should blunder -on disaster in the name of principle, and incite men to cruelties in -the name of humanity. 'Clericalism,' said a French statesman, and -English statesmen have echoed his words--'Clericalism is the enemy.' -And this is right, whether the priesthood be that of Rome or John -Calvin, of economic professors expounding Adam Smith in the interests -of Manchester, or history professors improving upon Treitschke in the -interests of the Hohenzollern dynasty. - -{137} - -[Sidenote: PRIESTS AND LAWYERS] - -Priests and professors when they meddle in politics are always the -same. They sit in their studies or cells, inventing fundamental -principles; building thereon great edifices of reasoned or sentimental -brickwork which splits in the sun and crumbles in the storm. -Throughout the ages, as often as they have left their proper sphere, -they have been subject to the same angry enthusiasms and savage -obstinacies. Their errors of judgment have been comparable only to -their arrogance. Acts of cruelty and treachery, meanness and -dishonour,[3] which would revolt the ordinary German or Englishman, -commend themselves readily, on grounds of sophistry or logic, to these -morbid ascetics, so soon as they begin busying themselves with the -direction of public affairs. - -It would be unfair to judge any country by its political professors. -At the same time, if any country is so foolish as to follow such -guides, there is a probability of mischief in national--still more in -international--affairs. For they are as innocent as the lawyers -themselves, of any knowledge of the real insides of things. They -differ of course from the lawyers in many ways. They are ever for -making changes for the sake of symmetry; while the man of law is for -keeping as he is until the last moment; or at any rate until it is -clearly his interest to budge. A priesthood has a burning faith in its -own hand-wrought idols; the lawyer on the contrary, does not go readily -to the stake, does not catch fire easily, being rather of the nature of -asbestos. When lawyers monopolise political power--even when they -merely {138} preponderate, as of late years they have seemed to do more -and more in all democratic countries, whether of the monarchical or -republican type--they invariably destroy by insensible gradations that -which is most worth preserving in man or state, the soul. But they do -not bring on sudden catastrophe as a priesthood does; their method is -to strangle slowly like ivy. - -In England, nowadays--indeed ever since the 'eighties, when professors -of Political Economy became discredited as political guides--there are -not many evidences of priestly influence. Certainly there is nothing -of an organised kind. What exists is erratic and incalculable. There -is much clamour; but it is contradictory, spasmodic, and inconstant, -without any serious pretence, either of learning or science, to support -it. Each of our prophets is in business for himself. There is no -tinge of Erastianism about any of them. For the most part they are the -grotesques and _lions comiques_ of the world of letters, who prophesy -standing on their heads, or grinning through horse-collars, and -mistaking always "the twinkling of their own sophisticated minds for -wisdom." - -Alliance between a priesthood and a bureaucracy tends gradually to -produce, as in the case of China, an oppressive uniformity--not unlike -that aimed at by the more advanced socialists--where every fresh -innovation is a restriction hampering the natural bent. On the other -hand an alliance between a priesthood and a military caste--especially -when the bureaucracy is ready to act in sympathy--is one of the -commonest causes of international convulsions. - -{139} - -[Sidenote: PRIESTS AND SOLDIERS] - -Oddly enough, the soldier, who affects to despise men of words and -make-believes, and who on this account has an instinctive dislike and -distrust of the lawyer--so violent indeed that it often puts him in the -wrong, and leaves him at the mercy of the object of his contempt--is -dangerously apt to become the tool of anything which bears a likeness -to Peter the Hermit. It is not really the lawyer's confidence in the -efficacy of words which revolts the soldier, nearly so much as the kind -of words used, the temperament of him who uses them, and the character -of the make-believes which it is sought to establish. The -unworldliness, simplicity, idealism, and fervour of the priesthood make -strong appeals to a military caste, which on the contrary is repelled -by what it conceives to be the cynicism, opportunism, and self-seeking -of lawyer statecraft. - -More especially is it difficult for the military caste to resist the -influence of the priesthood when, as in Germany of recent years, they -have insisted upon giving the warrior the most important niche in their -temple, and on burning incense before him day and night. Working -industriously in their studies and laboratories they have found moral -justification for every course, however repugnant to established ideas, -which may conceivably make it easier to attain victory and conquest. -The soldier might have scruples about doing this or that; but when he -is assured by inspired intellectuals, that what would best serve his -military ends is also the most moral course of action, how can -he--being a man of simple mind--presume to doubt it; though he may -occasionally shudder as he proceeds to put it into execution? - -{140} - -German thoroughness is an admirable quality, but even thoroughness may -be carried to extremes which are absurd, or something worse. - -No nation has a right to complain if another chooses to drill armies, -build fleets, accumulate stores of treasure, weapons, and material; nor -is it incumbent upon any nation to wear its heart upon its sleeve, or -to let the whole world into its secrets, military or political. In so -far as Germany has acted upon these principles she was well within her -rights. As a result we have suffered heavily; but we must blame -ourselves for being ill-prepared; we have no justification for -complaining because Germany was well-prepared. - -There are some kinds of preparation, however, which it does not seem -possible to justify, if the world is to consist as heretofore of a -large number of independent states, between whose citizens it is -desirable to maintain a certain friendliness and freedom of -intercourse. German activities in various directions, for many years -before war broke out, make one wonder what state of things was -contemplated by German statesmen, as likely to prevail when war should -be over. What, for instance, is to be the status of Germans visiting -or residing in other countries--seeking to trade with them--to borrow -money from them--to interchange with them the civilities of ordinary -life, or those more solemn courtesies which are practised by societies -of learning and letters? Will the announcement _civis Germanicus sum_ -be enough henceforth to secure the stranger a warm welcome and respect? -Or will such revelation of his origin be more likely to lead to his -speedy re-embarkation for the land of his nativity? - -{141} - -[Sidenote: GERMAN AGENCIES] - -Spying has always been practised since the beginning of time; but it -has rarely been conducted in such a manner as to produce general -uneasiness, or any sensible restraint upon private relations. -Logically, it would be unfair to condemn recent German enterprises in -this direction, seeing that she has only extended an accepted nuisance -on to a much vaster scale. But here again logic is a misleading guide. -There is something in the very scale of German espionage which has -changed the nature of this institution. It has grown into a huge -organised industry for the debauching of vain, weak, and greedy -natures; for turning such men--for the most part without their being -aware of it--into German agents. The result of Teutonic thoroughness -in this instance is a domestic intrusion which is odious, as well as a -national menace which cannot be disregarded. Many of these hostile -agencies may surely be termed treacherous, seeing that they have aimed, -under the guise of friendly intercourse, at forwarding schemes of -invasion and conquest. - -We are familiar enough with the vain purse-proud fellow, who on the -strength of a few civil speeches from the Kaiser--breathing friendship -and the love of peace--has thenceforward flattered himself that his -mission in life was to eradicate suspicion of German intentions from -the minds of his British fellow-countrymen. This is the unconscious -type of agent, useful especially in sophisticated circles, and among -our more advanced politicians of anti-militarist sympathies. - -Then we have the naturalised, or unnaturalised, magnate of finance or -industry, to whom business prosperity is the great reality of life, -politics and {142} patriotism being by comparison merely things of the -illusory sort. It would cause him no very bitter anguish of heart to -see England humiliated and her Empire dissolved, providing his own -cosmopolitan undertakings continued to thrive undisturbed by horrid -war. He, also, has very likely been the recipient of imperial -suavities. In addition to this, however, he has been encouraged to -imagine that he enjoys in a peculiar degree the confidence of the -German Foreign Office. The difficulties which so shrewd a fellow must -have in believing in the innocence of German intentions must be -considerable at the outset; but they are worn away by the constant -erosion of his private interests. Britain must not cross -Germany:--that is his creed in a nutshell. This is the semi-conscious -type of agent; and he carries great weight in business circles, and -even sometimes in circles much higher than those frequented by the -money-changers. - -We may resent such influences as these, now that we have become more or -less sensible of the effect which they have had during recent years in -hindering our preparations for defence; but here we cannot fairly -charge Germany with any breach of custom and tradition. We must blame -ourselves for having given heed to their counsellors. But it is -different when we come to such things as the wholesale corruption of -the subjects of friendly nations--a network of careful intrigue for the -promotion of rebellion--lavish subsidies and incitements for the -purpose of fostering Indian unrest, Egyptian discontent, and South -African treason--the supply of weapons and munitions of war on the -shortest notice, and most favourable terms, to any one and every one -who {143} seems inclined to engage in civil war in Ireland or elsewhere. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN METHODS AT WORK] - -The whole of this procedure has been justified in advance and advocated -in detail by Bernhardi and the priesthood. Belgium, France, Russia, -and Britain are doubtless peculiarly alive to the iniquity of these -practices, for the reason that their moral judgment has been sharpened -by personal suffering. But they do not denounce the system solely -because they themselves have been injured by it, but also because it -seems to them to be totally at variance with all recent notions -regarding the comity of nations. If we may use such an old-fashioned -term, it appears to us to be wrong. - -If methods such as these are henceforth to be practised by the world in -general, must not all international communion become impossible, as -much in time of peace as during a war? Indeed must not human existence -itself become almost intolerable? Friendliness, hospitality, -courtesies of every sort, between men and women of one country and -those of another, must cease absolutely, if the world should become a -convert to these German doctrines. Travel must cease; for no one likes -to be stripped naked and searched at every frontier. Trade and -financial operations must also be restricted, one would imagine, to -such an extent that ultimately they will wither and die. - -And if the world in general after the war is ended does not become a -convert to these German doctrines of treacherous preparation, made in -friendly territories during time of peace, what then will be its -attitude towards Germany and the Germans; for they presumably have no -intention of abandoning these {144} practices? It is an unpleasant -problem, but it will have to be faced sooner or later. - -For obviously, although every sensible man believes, and many of us -know by actual experience, that the instincts of Germans, in all -private relations, are as loyal and honourable as those of most other -races which inhabit the earth, no nation can afford any longer to have -dealings with them on equal terms, if they have decided to allow their -instincts to be used and abused, over-ridden and perverted, by a -bureaucracy whose ideal is thoroughness, and by a priesthood which has -invented a new system of morals to serve a particular set of ends. Not -only the allied nations which are at present at war with Germany, but -any country whose interests may conceivably, at any future time, come -into conflict with those of that far-sighted empire, will be forced in -self-defence to take due precautions. It is clear enough that more -efficacious means than mere scraps of naturalisation paper will be -needed to secure mankind against the abuse of its hospitality by -Teutonic theorists. - -[Sidenote: THE GERMAN CREED] - -The whole of this strange system, those methods which, even after -somewhat painful experience of their effects, we are still inclined in -our less reflective moments to regard as utterly incredible--is it -possible to summarise them in a few sentences? What are the accepted -maxims, the orthodox formulas of Prussian statecraft? - -Power, more power, world-power; these according to German theory, as -well as practice, should be the dominant principles of the state. - -When a nation desires territories belonging to its neighbours, let it -take them, if it is strong enough. {145} No further justification is -needed than mere appetite for possession, and the strength to satisfy -it. - -War is in itself a good thing and not a bad. Like a purge, or a course -of the waters of Aix, it should be taken, every half-century or so, by -all nations which aim at preserving the vigour of their constitutions. - -During the intervening periods the chief duty of the state is to -prepare for war, so that when it comes, victory, and with it benefits -of the material, as well as of the spiritual sort, may be secured. - -No means which will help to secure victory are immoral, whether in the -years preceding the outbreak of hostilities, or afterwards, when the -war is in full course. If the state, aided by its men of science, -could find any safe and secret means of sending a plague, as an advance -guard, to ravage the enemy, where is the objection? The soul of a -Prussian soldier might revolt against this form of warfare, but at what -point would it conflict with the teachings of the priesthood? Nor can -we imagine, were the thing possible, that the bureaucracy would allow -itself to be hampered by any scruples. - -As to the declaration of war, let it be made when the state is in a -strong position and its prey in a weak one. This is the all-important -consideration. The actual pretext is only a secondary matter, though -worthy of attention for the effect it may have on the action of -neutrals. And as war is a game of chance, it is wise and right to -'correct fortune,' so far as this can be accomplished during years of -peace and under the cloak of amity, by the aid of spies, secret agents, -accomplices, traitors, rebels, and what not besides. - -The state which has evolved this system and laid {146} down these -rules, without the least attempt at secrecy or concealment, is the most -efficient machine of the fighting and administrative kind at present -existing in the world--perhaps which has ever existed in the world. -But as you increase the size, power, and complexity of a machine there -are obvious dangers unless you can also increase the calibre of the men -who have to drive and direct it. This is a much more difficult problem -than the other; and there is no evidence to show that it has been -solved in the case of Germany. The more powerful the machine, the -greater is apt to be the disaster if it is mishandled. - -In history the blunders of bureaucracy are a by-word. They have been -great and many, even when, as in Germany to-day, the bureaucracy is in -the full vigour of its age, and in the first flower of uprightness; for -a bureaucracy, in order to retain its efficiency, must remain -incorruptible, and that is one of the hardest things to secure. - -As for the priesthoods, if they are to be of any use, their faith must -burn brightly. And the faith of a priesthood is very apt to burn -itself out--very apt also to set fire to other things during the -process; even to the edifice of popular virtue and the imperial purple -itself, which things--unlike the Phoenix, the Salamander, and the -Saint--are none the better or stronger for being burned. - - -We are constantly being told by high authorities that the moral -objective of the present war is 'to put down militarism,' and 'abolish -it' off the face of the earth. There are few of us who do not wish -that this aim may be crowned with success; but militarism is a tough -weed to kill, and something {147} more than the mere mowing of it down -by some outside scythesman will be necessary, one imagines, in order to -get rid of it. - -[Sidenote: MAIN OBJECT OF THE WAR] - -The true moral objective of the war is something much more important -than this. A blacker evil than militarism is that violation of private -trust and public honour which is known as the Prussian System, and -which has recently been 'marching through rapine, to the -disintegration,' not of a single nation, or group of nations, but of -the whole fabric of human society, including its own. It is an -elaborate contrivance of extreme artificiality, a strange perversion of -the nature of man. These are its inherent weaknesses; and fortunately, -by reason of them, it is more vulnerable to hard blows than militarism -which, with all its vices, and extravagancies, is rooted in instincts -which are neither depraved nor ignoble. - -Militarism might continue to thrive under adversity, and after the -heaviest defeat, as it has done in times past; but the life of the -Prussian System--that joint invention of the most efficient bureaucracy -in the world, and of a priesthood whose industry can only be matched by -its sycophancy and conceit--hangs upon the thread of success. Like the -South Sea Bubble, or any of those other impostures of the financial -sort, which have temporarily beguiled the confidence of mankind, it -must collapse utterly under the shock of failure. It depends entirely -on credit, and its powers of recuperation are nil. When its assets are -disclosed, the characters of its promoters will be understood. The -need, therefore, is to bring it at all costs to a complete -demonstration of failure. - -{148} - -We have been urged by our own anti-militarists not to inflict suffering -and humiliation on Germany. But this is not a matter of the slightest -importance one way or the other. It has but little to do with the -issue which it is our business to settle, if we have the good fortune -to come out victorious from the present struggle. To set up the -suffering and humiliation of Germany as the object of high policy would -cover the Allies with contempt; but to shrink from such things, if they -should happen to stand between the Allies and the utter moral -bankruptcy of the Prussian System, would overwhelm them with a burden -far heavier and more shameful than contempt. - - - -[1] "We may declare that the problem of training in arms and turning to -real account the energies of the nation was first undertaken in -thorough earnestness by Germany. _We possess in our army a -characteristic, necessary continuation of the school-system_. For many -men there is no better means of training; for them drilling, compulsory -cleanliness, and severe discipline are physically and morally -indispensable in a time like ours, which unchains all -spirits."--Treitschke, _Selections_, pp. 106-107. - -[2] Nietzsche is one of the rare exceptions. - -[3] Cf. Professor Kuno Meyer, _Times_, December 24, 1914, and March 8, -1915. - - - - -{149} - -CHAPTER VI - -THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE - -A German might fairly contend that British criticism of his moral ideas -and political system is tainted throughout by ignorance and prejudice, -and that all our talk of autocracy, bureaucracy, pedantocracy, military -caste, and sham constitutionalism is merely an attempt to avoid the -real issue by calling things, which we happen to dislike, by bad names. -Political institutions, he might insist, must be judged by their -fruits. If this test were applied, Germany in his opinion would have -nothing to fear in any comparison. - -"We Germans," writes a correspondent, the Freiherr von Hexenküchen,[1] -"are not inferior in intelligence or education to any other race. Had -this been so, we could never have reached, in so short a period as four -decades, the proud position which we now occupy in science, invention, -manufacture, commerce, finance, and administration.[2] {150} -Consequently, if we are well content to live under the institutions we -possess, this cannot be put down either to our want of enterprise or to -the dulness of our understandings. - -"Our people have already shown that they are willing to fight and die -for these very institutions which you Englishmen affect to regard with -so much contempt. Possibly your people are equally willing to fight -and die for theirs. I do not deny this; but it is not yet proved; it -remains to be proved. - -"I do not assert that your people are inferior to mine in their -readiness to fight and die when they are actually faced with a great -national danger. But I do claim that mine are superior to yours in the -constancy of their devotion to duty. For a hundred years past--not -only in periods of stress and danger, which stirred the national -imagination, but equally in times of peace and prosperity, which always -tend to encourage the growth of comfort and the love of ease--each -succeeding generation has been found willing to train itself in the use -of arms, so as to be prepared, if occasion should arise, to defend the -Fatherland. - -"When the present war broke out was there a firmer loyalty or a more -patriotic response to the call to arms among your people or among mine? -Will your people fight and suffer more gladly for their 'democratic' -ideals than mine will for their Kaiser and Fatherland? ... Surely, upon -your own principles no comparison should be possible between the warmth -of your devotion and the tepidity of ours. - -"Is our system really so reactionary and mechanical as you imagine? In -an age which has learned {151} as its special lesson the advantages, in -ordinary business affairs of life, of organisation, thoroughness, long -views, reticence, and combined effort, guided by a strong central -control, is it reaction, or is it progress, to aim at applying the same -principles to the greatest, most complex, and infinitely most important -of all businesses--that of government itself? Can a nation hope to -survive which refuses, in the name of freedom, to submit to control in -these respects, if it should be faced by competition with another, -which has been wise enough to employ quiet experts instead of -loquacious amateurs--any more than a cotton mill could escape -bankruptcy were it managed on a system of party government? - -"Our civil service, which you are pleased to describe as a Bureaucracy, -is distinguished among all others existing at the present time, by the -calibre of its members, by its efficiency and honesty, by its poverty, -and not less by the honour in which it is held notwithstanding its -poverty. You laugh at our love for calling men, and also their wives, -by the titles of their various offices--Herr this and Frau that, from -the humblest inspector of drains to the Imperial Chancellor himself! -And no doubt there is a ludicrous side to this practice. But it marks -at least one important thing--that membership of our civil service is -regarded as conferring honour. So far, we have succeeded in -maintaining public officials of all grades in higher popular respect -than men who devote their lives to building up private fortunes, and -also to those others who delight and excel in interminable debate. - -"You are used to boast, and I daresay rightly {152} of the personal -honesty and pecuniary disinterestedness of your politicians; and you -assume as a matter of course that your civil servants, with such high -standards and examples ever before their eyes, are likewise -incorruptible. We invert this order. With us the honour of our civil -servants is the chief thing; we assume that our politicians must follow -suit. They are probably as upright as your own, thanks partly to -tradition, but also to the vigilance of their superiors, the -professionals, who carry on the actual business of government. With -you the fame of the showy amateur fills the mouths of the public. We, -on the contrary, exalt the expert, the man who has been trained to the -job he undertakes. In so doing we may be reactionaries and you may be -progressives; but the progress of Germany since 1870--a progress in -which we are everywhere either already in front of you, or else -treading closely on your heels--does not seem to furnish you with a -conclusive argument. - -"As for what you call our Pedantocracy, meaning thereby our professors -and men of letters, it is true that these exercise a great influence -upon public opinion. We have always respected learning and thought. -It is in the German nature so to do. I admit that our learned ones are -rather too much inclined to imagine, that because they are students of -theory, they are therefore qualified to engage in practice. They are -apt to offer their advice and service officiously, and occasionally in -a ridiculous manner. But, if my recollection of the English newspapers -be correct, this is no more so with us than with you. There is -apparently something in the professorial nature which impels men of -this {153} calling to the drafting of manifestoes and the signing of -round-robins in times of excitement. They may be officious and absurd, -but they are not wholly despicable, since they act thus quite as much -from earnestness as from vanity. If our academicians on such occasions -mislead more people than your own it is due to their virtues, to the -greater zeal and success with which they have won the confidence of -their former pupils.[3] - -[Sidenote: THE MILITARY CASTE] - -"You are fond of sneering at our Military Caste and attribute to it the -most malign influence upon public affairs. But there again, believe -me, you exaggerate. Our officers are undoubtedly held in great -respect, even in some awe. And the reason is that they are known to be -brave, and like those you call the bureaucracy, to have preferred -comparative poverty in the public service to the pursuit of riches. To -say that they have no influence upon policy would of course be absurd. -It is inevitable that in the present state of the world, soldiers will -always have great influence in certain departments of public affairs. -This must be so in any country {154} which is not plunged in dreams. -For it is their business to guarantee national security, and to keep -watch over the growth of military strength among the neighbours and -rivals of Germany. If the general staff foresees dangers, and can give -reasonable grounds for its anticipations, it is clear that the military -view must carry weight with the Kaiser and his ministers. And surely -there can be no question that this is right. - -"The officers of the German Army are a caste, if you like to put it -that way. But in every form of government under the sun, unless -conceivably in some tiny oriental despotism, the predominance of a -certain caste, or the competition between different castes, is -absolutely essential to the working of the machinery. - -"It is not regrettable in our opinion if a caste, which has -considerable weight in public affairs, is a manly one, contemptuous of -wealth and sophistry, ready always to risk its own life for the faith -which is in it. The influence of a military caste may have its -drawbacks; but at any rate it has kept the peace in Germany for not far -short of half a century--kept it successfully until, as some people -have thought, the professors acquired too large a share of power. - -"Is it so certain, moreover, that the lawyer caste, the -self-advertising caste, and the financial caste are not all of them a -great deal worse, even a great deal more dangerous to peace? Is a -country any more likely to be safe, happy, and prosperous under the -régime of a talking caste--of windbags resourcefully keeping their -bellows full of air, and wheedling the most numerous with transparent -{155} falsehoods--than where civil servants of tried wisdom and -experience are responsible for carrying on affairs of state, aided at -their high task by sober military opinion?[4] - -"As for our Kaiser, whom you regard as a crafty and ambitious tyrant, -he appears in our view as the incarnation of patriotic duty, burdened -though not overwhelmed by care--a lover of peace, so long as peace may -be had with honour and safety; but if this may not be, then a stern, -though reluctant, drawer of the sword. It is true that the Kaiser's -government is in many important respects a purely personal government. -His is the ultimate responsibility for high policy. He fulfils the -function in our system of that strong central power, without which the -most ingeniously constructed organisation is but impotence. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN SELF-KNOWLEDGE] - -"The German people are ahead of the English and the Americans in -self-knowledge; for they realise that there are many things -appertaining to government, which cannot be discussed in the -newspapers, or on the platform, any more than the policy and conduct of -a great business can be made known in advance to the staff, and to -trade competitors all over the world. And so, believing the Kaiser's -government to be honest, capable, and devoted to the public weal, the -German people trust it without reservation to decide when action shall -be taken in a variety of spheres. - -"This system of ours which is founded in reason, and in experience of -modern conditions, and which {156} is upheld by the unfaltering -confidence of a great people, you are wont to condemn as tyrannical and -reactionary. But can democracy stand against it?--Democracy infirm of -purpose, jealous, grudging, timid, changeable, unthorough, unready, -without foresight, obscure in its aims, blundering along in an age of -lucidity guided only by a faltering and confused instinct! Given -anything like an equal contest, is it conceivable that such an -undisciplined chaos can prevail against the Hohenzollern Empire? - -"Of late your newspapers have been busily complaining of what they call -'German lies,' 'boastfulness,' and 'vulgar abuse.' They have taunted -our government with not daring to trust the people. Our Headquarters -bulletins have been vigorously taken to task by the Allies on these and -other grounds. - -"But all nations will acclaim their victories louder than they will -trumpet their defeats. This is in human nature. No official -communiqué will ever be a perfect mirror of truth. It will never give -the whole picture, but only a part; and by giving only a part it will -often mislead. Were we to believe literally what the various -governments have hitherto given out as regards their respective -advances, the Germans by this time might perhaps have been at Moscow in -the East and somewhere about the Azores in the West. But by the same -token the Russians should have been on the Rhine and the French and -English Allies at Berlin. - -"I read your newspapers, and I read our own. I do not think our -journalists, though they do their best, can fairly claim to excel yours -in the contest {157} of boastfulness and vulgar abuse. And as regards -the utterances of responsible public men in our two countries, can you -really contend that we Germans are more open to the reproach of -vainglorious and undignified speech than the British? Our Kaiser -denies having used the words, so often attributed to him in your press, -about 'General French's contemptible little army,' and in Germany we -believe his denial. But even if he did in fact utter this expression, -is it not quite as seemly and restrained as references to 'digging rats -out of a hole'--as applied to our gallant navy--or to that later -announcement from the same quarter which was recently addressed to the -Mayor of Scarborough about 'baby-killers'? Such expressions are -regrettable, no doubt, but not of the first importance. They are a -matter of temperament. An ill-balanced, or even a very highly-strung -nature, will be betrayed into blunders of this sort more readily than -the phlegmatic person, or one whose upbringing has been in circles -where self-control is the rule of manners. - -[Sidenote: TRUST IN THE PEOPLE] - -"But what puzzles us Germans perhaps more than any of your other -charges against us is, when you say that our rulers do not trust the -people as the British Government does. - -"You accuse our War Office of publishing accounts of imaginary -victories to revive our drooping confidence, and of concealing actual -disasters lest our country should fall into a panic of despondency. -There was surely nothing imaginary about the fall of Liège, Namur, -Maubeuge, Laon, or La Fere. The engagements before Metz, at Mons, -Charleroi, and Amiens, the battles of Lodz and Lyck, were {158} not -inconsiderable successes for German arms, or at the very least for -German generalship. The victory of Tannenberg was among the greatest -in history, reckoning in numbers alone. Our government made no secret -of the German retirement--retreat if you prefer the term--from the -Marne to the Aisne, or of that other falling back after the first -attempt on Warsaw. Naturally they laid less emphasis on reverses than -on conquests, but what government has ever acted otherwise? Certainly -not the French, or the Russian, or your own. And what actual disasters -have we concealed? In what respect, as regards the conduct of this -war, have we, the German people, been trusted less than yours? - -"I am especially interested, I confess, as a student of British -politics, in this matter of 'trusting the people.' All your great -writers have led me to believe that here lies the essential difference -between your system and ours, and that the great superiority of yours -to ours is demonstrated in the confidence which your statesmen never -hesitate to place in the wisdom, fortitude, and patriotism of the -people. Frankly, I do not understand it. Trust must surely have some -esoteric meaning when applied to your populace which foreigners are -unable to apprehend. I can discover no other sense in your phrase -about 'trusting the people,' than that they are trusted not to find out -their politicians. It certainly cannot be believed that you trust your -people to hear the truth; for if so why has your government practised -so rigorous an economy of this virtue, doling it out very much as we -have lately been doing with our wheat and potatoes? - -{159} - -[Sidenote: THE BRITISH PRESS BUREAU] - -"Has your government not concealed actual disaster--concealed it from -their own people, though from no one else; for all the world was on the -broad grin? Everybody knew of your misfortune save a certain large -portion of the British public. The motive of your government could not -have been to hide it away from the Germans, or the Austrians, or from -neutrals, for the illustrated papers all over the globe, even in your -own colonies, contained pictures reproduced from photographs of the -occurrence. It was only possible to muzzle the press and blindfold the -people of the United Kingdom, and these things your government did; -acting no doubt very wisely. - -"Again after the great German victory over the Russians at Tannenberg -in September last, an official bulletin of simple and conspicuous -candour was published at Petrograd which confirmed in most of the . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - -"Why did your Press Bureau during the heavy fighting from the middle of -October to the middle of November persist in maintaining that 'the -British are still gaining ground.' The British resistance from the -beginning to the end of the four weeks' battle round Ypres is not -likely to be forgotten by our German soldiers, still less to be -belittled by them. {160} It was surely a great enough feat of arms to -bear the light of truth. But. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . - -"But is the same true of the British people? Can they be trusted to -bear the light of truth? - -"You cannot wonder if we Germans, and for that matter the whole world, -have drawn certain conclusions from these and other incidents. We do -not doubt that your ministers have acted wisely in suppressing bad -tidings; but why should they have taken all those pains and endured the -derision, while incurring the distrust, of foreign countries--a -material injury, mind you, and not merely a sentimental one--unless -they had known, only too well, that publication of this or that piece -of news would have too painfully affected the nerves of your people? -Concealment of checks, reverses, and disasters which had not already -become known to the Austrians and ourselves might have served a useful -military purpose; but what purpose except that of a sedative for -British public opinion could be served by the concealment of such -matters when we, your enemies, knew them already? Have you ever -thought of asking your American friends in what order they would place -the candour of the official communications which emanate from Berlin, -Petrograd, Paris, and London? - -"Shortly before Christmas one of your legal ministers, who, I -understand, is specially responsible for looking after the Press -Bureau, explained to the House of Commons the principles by which he -had been guided in the suppression of news and comment. He should -refuse, he said, to publish any criticism {161} which might tend to -disturb popular confidence in the Government, or which might cause the -people of England to think that their affairs were in a really serious -state. On practical grounds there is no doubt something to be said for -such a policy; but (will you tell me?) has any autocratic government -ever laid down a more drastic rule for blindfolding the people in order -to preserve its own existence?[5] - -[Sidenote: BRITISH PATRIOTISM] - -"Pondering upon these things, I scratch my head and marvel what you can -possibly have had in yours, when you used to assure us that the -surpassing merit of the English political system was that it trusted -the people, the inherent weakness of ours, the Austrian, and the -Russian that they did not. - -"Your Prime Minister, speaking in the early autumn, thus adjured the -men of Wales:--'Be worthy of those who went before you, and leave to -your children the richest of all inheritances, the memory of fathers -who, in a great cause, put self-sacrifice before ease, and honour above -life itself.' These are noble words, of Periclean grandeur. But have -they met with a general response? Are these sentiments prevalent -outside government circles, among those--the bulk of your people--who -do not come under the direct influence of ministerial inspiration and -example? If so, why then {162} have your rulers not screwed up their -courage to call for national service? Why do they still continue to -depend for their recruits upon sensational advertisements, newspaper -puffs, oratorical entreaties, and private influence of a singularly -irregular sort? - -"Is not this the reason?--Your government is afraid--even in this great -struggle, where (as they put it) your future existence as a nation is -at stake--that the English people--or at any rate so large a proportion -of them, as if rendered uncomfortable could create a political -disturbance--is not even yet prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. -And so, to the amazement of us Germans, you let the older men, with -families dependent on them, go forth to the war, urged on by a high -sense of duty, while hundreds of thousands of young unmarried men are -still allowed to stay at home. - -[Sidenote: COMPARISON OF RECRUITING] - -"You are still, it would appear, enamoured of your voluntary system. -You have not yet abandoned your belief that it is the duty of the man, -who possesses a sense of duty, to protect the skin, family, and -property of the man who does not. To us this seems a topsy-turvy -creed, and not more topsy-turvy than contemptible. In Germany and -France--where for generations past the doctrine of private sacrifice -for the public weal is ingrained, and has been approved in principle -and applied in practice with unfaltering devotion--a 'voluntary' system -might conceivably have some chance of providing such an army as you are -in search of. But to the United Kingdom surely it is singularly -inapplicable? Let me illustrate my meaning by a comparison. - -{163} - -"Our Kaiser in his New Year's message--which in Germany we all read -with enthusiasm, and considered very noble and appropriate--summed up -the military situation by saying that after five months' hard and hot -fighting the war was still being waged almost everywhere off German -soil, and on the enemies' territories. And he summed up the domestic -situation by saying (and this, believe me, is true) that our nation -stands in unexampled harmony, prepared to sacrifice its heart's blood -for the defence of the Fatherland. Another three months have passed -away, and these statements still hold good. - -"The point to which I chiefly wish to call your attention is one of -numbers, and I will take my estimates of numbers from your own most -famous newspaper experts. - -"Your claim, as I understand it, is that on New Year's Day 1915 you -had--exclusive of Indian troops and Dominion contingents--between -2,000,000 and 2,500,000 men training and in the field. - -"Germany alone (here again I quote your English experts), without -reckoning Austria, has actually put into the field during the past five -months 5,000,000 men. Of these it is stated by your newspapers that -she has lost in round figures 1,500,000, who have either been killed, -or taken prisoners, or are too severely wounded to return as yet to the -fighting line. But in spite of this depletion, your military -statisticians tell us that Germany and her ally, at New Year's Day, -still outnumbered the Allies on both the Eastern and the Western -frontier. - -"The same high authorities tell us further, that {164} during this -period of five months, the German Government has called upon the civil -population, has appealed to able-bodied men who had previously been -exempt from military service, and that by this means it has obtained, -and has been engaged in training, arming, and equipping another -4,000,000 or 4,500,000 who, it is anticipated, will become available -for war purposes in new formations, during the spring and summer of the -present year. - -"Our Government, therefore, according to your own account, has not been -afraid to ask the civil population to serve, and this is the response. -Does it look as if the national spirit had been quenched under our -autocratic system? - -"Out of our whole population of sixty-five millions we have apparently -raised for military service on land and naval service at sea, between -9,000,000 and 11,000,000 men since this war began. Out of your whole -population of forty-five millions you have succeeded in raising for -these same purposes only something between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000 men. -And in your case, be it observed, in order to attract recruits, you -have offered good wages and munificent separation allowances; while in -our case men serve without pay. - -"This numerical comparison is worth carrying a stage further. Germany -and her ally have between them a total population of 115,000,000. The -United Kingdom (including the people of European stock who inhabit the -various Dominions), France, Russia, Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro -number in round figures about 280,000,000. Roughly speaking, these are -odds of seven to three against us. And I am leaving out of account all -the non-European races--the {165} Turks on the one side, the Japanese -and the Indians on the other. If these were included the odds would be -much heavier. - -"And yet our Kaiser spoke but the simple truth, when he told us on New -Year's Day that, after five months of war, the German armies were -almost everywhere on the territories of their enemies. We are not only -keeping you back and defying all your efforts to invade us; but like -the infant Hercules, we have gripped you by your throats, and were -holding you out at arm's length! - -[Sidenote: METHODS OF RECRUITING] - -"I do not of course pretend to look at this matter except from the -German standpoint; but is there any flaw in my reasoning, is there -anything at all unfair, if I thus sum up my conclusions?--By Midsummer -next--after stupendous efforts of the oratorical and journalistic -kind--after an enormous amount of shouting, music-hall singing, cinema -films, and showy advertising of every description--after making great -play with the name and features of a popular field-marshal, in a manner -which must have shocked both his natural modesty and soldierly -pride--after all this you expect, or say you expect, that you will -possess between two and two-and-a-half millions of men trained, armed, -equipped, and ready to take the field. - -"As against this, during the same period, and out of the less military -half of our male population, without any shouting or advertising to -speak of, we shall have provided approximately double that number. We -have raised these new forces quietly, without any fuss, and without a -word of protest from any of our people. We are training them without -any serious difficulty. We are arming {166} them, equipping them, -clothing them, and housing them without any difficulty at all. - -"To conclude this interesting contrast, may I ask you--is it true, as -the French newspapers allege, that you are about to invite, or have -already invited, your Japanese Allies to send some portion of their -Army to European battlefields? With what face can you make this appeal -when you have not yet called upon your own people to do, what every -other people engaged in the present struggle, has already done? - -"After you have pondered upon this strange and startling contrast, will -you still hold to the opinion that the German system--which you have -affected to despise, on the ground that it does not rest upon what you -are pleased to term 'a popular basis'--is at any point inferior to your -own in its hold upon the hearts of the people? - -"What is meant by the phrase--'a popular basis'? Is it something -different from the support of the people, the will of the people, the -devotion of the people? And if it is different, is it better--judging, -that is, by its results in times of trouble--or is it worse?" - -So the cultured Freiherr, watching democracy at work in Britain, its -ancient home, concludes with this question--"Is this timid, jealous, -and distracted thing possessed of any real faith in itself; and if so, -will it fight for its faith to the bitter end? Is the British system -one which even the utmost faith in it can succeed in propping up? Does -it possess any inherent strength; or is it merely a thing of -paste-board and make-believe, fore-ordained to perish?" - - - -[1] This letter, which is dated April 1, 1915, arrived at its -destination (via Christiania and Bergen) about ten days later. It had -not the good fortune, however, to escape the attentions of the Censor, -the ravages of whose blacking-brush will be noted in the abrupt -termination of sundry paragraphs. - -[2] "The empires which during the past forty years have made the -greatest relative material progress are undoubtedly Germany and -Japan--neither of them a democracy, but both military states." - -[3] It is not quite clear to what incidents the Freiherr is referring. -He may be thinking of a certain round-robin which appeared a few days -before the war, giving a most handsome academic testimonial of humanity -and probity to the German system; or he may have in mind a later -manifestation in February last, when there suddenly flighted into the -correspondence columns of the _Nation_ a 'gaggle' of university geese, -headed appropriately enough by a Professor of Political Economy, by -name Pigou, who may be taken as the type of that peculiarly British -product, the unemotional sentimentalist. To this 'gaggle' of the -heavier fowls there succeeded in due course a 'glory' of poetical and -literary finches, twittering the same tune--the obligation on the -Allies not to inflict suffering and humiliation on Germany--on Germany, -be it remembered, as yet unbeaten, though this was rather slurred over -in their spring-song of lovingkindness. The Freiherr, plunged in his -heathen darkness, no doubt still believed Germany to be not only -unbeaten but victorious, and likely to continue on the same course. He -must therefore have been somewhat puzzled by so much tender concern on -the part of our professors, etc. for sparing his feelings at the end of -the war. - -[4] Comment has already been made on the difficulty each nation has in -understanding the spirit of the institutions of its neighbours. If -this is borne in mind these depreciatory references of the Freiherr may -be forgiven. - -[5] I have had considerable difficulty in discovering the basis of this -extraordinary charge. It seems to consist of the following passage -from a speech by Sir Stanley Buckmaster, the Solicitor-General and -Chairman of the Press Bureau on November 12, 1914. It is distressing -to see how far national prejudice is apt to mislead a hostile critic -like the Freiherr von Hexenküchen: "Criticism of the Government, or of -members of the Government, is not that which I have ever stopped, -except when such criticism is of such a character that it might destroy -public confidence in the Government, which at this moment is charged -with the conduct of the war, or might in any way weaken the confidence -of the people in the administration of affairs, or otherwise cause -distress or disturbance amongst people in thinking their affairs were -in a really serious state." - - - - -{167} - -CHAPTER VII - -THE CONFLICT OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS - -The Freiherr's discourse raises a large number of questions, some of -them unarguable. Others again are too much so; for if once started -upon, argument with regard to them need never end. Some of his -contentions have already been dealt with in previous chapters; some on -the other hand, such as the British methods of recruiting, will be -considered later on. It must, however, be admitted that his taunts and -criticisms do not all rebound with blunted points from our shield of -self-complacency; some, if only a few, get home and rankle. - -We are challenged to contrast our faith in our own political -institutions with that of the Germans in theirs; also to measure the -intrinsic strength of that form of political organisation called -'democracy' against that other form which is known as 'autocracy.' - -The German state is the most highly developed and efficient type of -personal monarchy at present known to the world. Its triumphs in -certain directions have been apparent from the beginning. It would be -sheer waste of time to dispute the fact that Germany was incomparably -better prepared, organised, and educated for this war--the purpose of -which was the spoliation of her {168} neighbours--than any of her -neighbours were for offering resistance. - -But what the Freiherr does not touch upon at all is the conflict -between certain underlying ideas of right and wrong--old ideas, which -are held by Russia, France, and ourselves, and which now find -themselves confronted by new and strange ideas which have been -exceedingly prevalent among the governing classes in Germany for many -years past. He does not raise _this_ issue, any more than his -fellow-countrymen now raise it either in America or at home. It is -true that there was a flamboyant outburst from a few faithful -Treitschkians and Nietzschians, both in prose and poetry, during those -weeks of August and September which teemed with German successes; but -their voices soon sank below audibility--possibly by order -_verboten_--in a swiftly dying fall. We, however, cannot agree to let -this aspect of the matter drop, merely because patriotic Germans happen -to have concluded that the present time is inopportune for the -discussion of it. - -There are two clear and separate issues. From the point of view of -posterity the more important of these, perhaps, may prove to be this -conflict in the region of moral ideas. From the point of view of the -present generation, however, the chief matter of practical interest is -the result of a struggle for the preservation of our own institutions, -against the aggression of a race which has not yet learned the last and -hardest lesson of civilisation--how to live and let live. - -[Sidenote: DEMOCRACY] - -The present war may result in the bankruptcy of the Habsburg and -Hohenzollern dynasties. It is very desirable, however, to make clear -the fact {169} that the alternative is the bankruptcy of 'democracy.' -Our institutions are now being subjected to a severer strain than they -have ever yet experienced. Popular government is standing its trial. -It will be judged by the result; and no one can say that this is an -unfair test to apply to human institutions. - -No nation, unless it be utterly mad, will retain a form of government -which from some inherent defect is unable to protect itself against -external attack. Is democratic government capable of looking ahead, -making adequate and timely preparation, calling for and obtaining from -its people the sacrifices which are necessary in order to preserve -their own existence? Can it recover ground which has been lost, and -maintain a long, costly, and arduous struggle, until, by victory, it -has placed national security beyond the reach of danger? - -Defeat in the present war would shake popular institutions to their -foundations in England as well as France; possibly also in regions -which are more remote than either of these. But something far short of -defeat--anything indeed in the nature of a drawn game or -stalemate--would assuredly bring the credit of democracy so low that it -would be driven to make some composition with its creditors. - - -Words, like other currencies, have a way of changing their values as -the world grows older. Until comparatively recent times 'democracy' -was a term of contempt, as 'demagogue' still is to-day. - -The founders of American Union abhorred 'Democracy,'[1] and took every -precaution which occurred to them in order to ward it off. Their aim -was {170} 'Popular,' or 'Representative Government'--a thing which they -conceived to lie almost at the opposite pole. Their ideal was a state, -the citizens of which chose their leaders at stated intervals, and -trusted them. Democracy, as it appeared in their eyes, was a political -chaos where the people chose its servants, and expected from them only -servility. There was an ever-present danger, calling for stringent -safeguards, that the first, which they esteemed the best of all -constitutional arrangements, would degenerate into the second, which -they judged to be the worst. - -Until times not so very remote it was only the enemies of -Representative Government, or its most cringing flatterers, who spoke -of it by the title of Democracy. Gradually, however, in the looseness -of popular discussions, the sharpness of the original distinction wore -off, so that the ideal system and its opposite--the good and the -evil--are now confounded together under one name. There is no use -fighting against current terminology; but it is well to bear in mind -that terminology has no power to alter facts, and that the difference -between the two principles still remains as wide as it was at the -beginning. - -When a people becomes so self-complacent that it mistakes its own -ignorance for omniscience--so jealous of authority and impatient of -contradiction that it refuses to invest with more than a mere shadow of -power those whose business it is to govern--when the stock of -leadership gives out, or remains hidden and undiscovered under a litter -of showy refuse--when those who succeed in pushing themselves to the -front are chiefly concerned not to lead, but merely to act the parts of -leaders 'in silver slippers and amid applause'--when the chiefs of -parties are {171} so fearful of unpopularity that they will not assert -their own opinions, or utter timely warnings, or proclaim what they -know to be the truth--when such things as these come to pass the nation -has reached that state which was dreaded by the framers of the American -Constitution, and which--intending to warn mankind against it--they -branded as 'Democracy.' - - -[Sidenote: DANGERS OF SELF-CRITICISM] - -Self-criticism makes for health in a people; but it may be overdone. -If it purges the national spirit it is good; but if it should lead to -pessimism, or to some impatient breach with tradition, it is one of the -worst evils. One is conscious of a somewhat dangerous tendency in -certain quarters at the present time to assume the worst with regard to -the working of our own institutions. - -Critics of this school have pointed out (what is undoubtedly true) that -Germany has been far ahead of us in her preparations. Every month -since war began has furnished fresh evidence of the far-sightedness, -resourcefulness, thoroughness, and efficiency of all her military -arrangements. Her commercial and financial resources have also been -husbanded, and organised in a manner which excites our unwilling -admiration. And what perhaps has been the rudest shock of all, is the -apparent unity and devotion of the whole German people, in support of a -war which, without exaggeration, may be said to have cast the shadow of -death on every German home. - -These critics further insist that our own nation has not shown itself -more loyal, and that it did not rouse itself to the emergency with -anything approaching the same swiftness. Timidity and a wilful {172} -self-deception, they say, have marked our policy for years before this -war broke out. They marked it again when the crisis came upon us. -Have they not marked it ever since war began? And who can have -confidence that they will not continue to mark it until the end, -whatever the end may be? - -The conclusion therefore at which our more despondent spirits have -arrived, is that the representative system has already failed us--that -it has suffered that very degradation which liberal minds of the -eighteenth century feared so much. How can democracy in the bad -sense--democracy which has become decadent--which is concerned mainly -with its rights instead of with its duties--with its comforts more than -with the sacrifices which are essential to its own preservation--how -can such a system make head against an efficient monarchy sustained by -the enthusiastic devotion of a vigorous and intelligent people? - -It does not seem altogether wise to despair of one's own institutions -at the first check. Even democracy, in the best sense, is not a -flawless thing. Of all forms of government it is the most delicate, -more dependent than any other upon the supply of leaders. There are -times of dearth when the crop of leadership is a short one. Nor are -popular institutions, any more than our own vile bodies, exempt from -disease. Disease, however, is not necessarily fatal. The patient may -recover, and in the bracing air of a national crisis, such as the -present, conditions are favourable for a cure. - -And, after all, we may remind these critics that in 1792 democracy did -in fact make head pretty successfully against monarchy. Though it was -miserably unprovided, untrained, inferior to its enemies in everything -{173} save spirit and leadership, the states of Europe -nevertheless--all but England--went down before it, in the years which -followed, like a row of ninepins. Then as now, England, guarded by -seas and sea-power, had a breathing-space allowed her, in which to -adjust the spirit of her people to the new conditions. That Germany -will not conquer us with her arms we may well feel confident. But -unless we conquer her with _our arms_--and this is a much longer -step--there is a considerable danger that she may yet conquer us with -_her ideas_. In that case the world will be thrown back several -hundred years; and the blame for this disaster, should it occur, will -be laid--and laid rightly--at the door of Democracy, because it vaunted -a system which it had neither the fortitude nor the strength to uphold. - - -[Sidenote: IRRECONCILABLE OPPOSITIONS] - -When we pass from the conflict between systems of government, and come -to the other conflict of ideas as to right and wrong, we find ourselves -faced with an antagonism which is wholly incapable of accommodation. -In this war the stakes are something more than any of the material -interests involved. It is a conflict where one faith is pitted against -another. No casuistry will reconcile the ideal which inspires English -policy with the ideal which inspires German policy. There is no -sense--nothing indeed but danger--in arguing round the circle to prove -that the rulers of these two nations are victims of some frightful -misunderstanding, and that really at the bottom of their hearts they -believe the same things. This is entirely untrue: they believe quite -different things; things indeed which are as nearly as possible -opposites. - -{174} - -Our own belief is old, ingrained, and universal. It is accepted -equally by the people and their rulers. We have held it so long that -the articles of our creed have become somewhat blurred in -outline--overgrown, like a memorial tablet, by moss and lichen. - -In the case of our enemy the tablet is new and the inscription sharp. -He who runs may read it in bold clear-cut lettering. But the belief of -the German people in the doctrine which has been carved upon the stone -is not yet universal, or anything like universal. It is not even -general. It is fully understood and accepted only in certain strata of -society; but it is responsible, without a doubt, for the making in cold -blood of the policy which has led to this war. When the hour struck -which the German rulers deemed favourable for conquest, war, according -to their creed, became the duty as well as the interest of the -Fatherland. - -But so soon as war had been declared, the German people were allowed -and even encouraged to believe that the making of war from motives of -self-interest was a crime against humanity--the Sin against the Holy -Ghost. They were allowed and encouraged to believe that the Allies -were guilty of this crime and sin. And not only this, but war itself, -which had been hymned in so many professorial rhapsodies, as a noble -and splendid restorer of vigour and virtue, was now execrated with -wailing and gnashing of teeth, as the most hideous of all human -calamities. - -It is clear from all this that the greater part of the German people -regarded war in exactly the same light as the whole of the English -people did. In itself it was a curse; and the man who deliberately -contrived it for his own ends, or even for those of his {175} country, -was a criminal. The German people applied the same tests as we did, -and it is not possible to doubt that in so doing they were perfectly -sincere. They acted upon instinct. They had not learned the later -doctrines of the pedantocracy, or how to steer by a new magnetic pole. -They still held by the old Christian rules as to duties which exist -between neighbours. To their simple old-fashioned loyalty what their -Kaiser said must be the truth. And what their Kaiser said was that the -Fatherland was attacked by treacherous foes. That was enough to banish -all doubts. For the common people that was the reality and the only -reality. Phrases about world-power and will-to-power--supposing they -had ever heard or noticed them--were only mouthfuls of strange words, -such as preachers of all kinds love to chew in the intervals of their -discourses. - -[Sidenote: APOSTASY OF THE PRIESTHOOD] - -When the priests and prophets found themselves at last confronted by -those very horrors which they had so often invoked, did their new-found -faith desert them, or was it only that their tongues, for some reason, -refused to speak the old jargon? Judging by their high-flown -indignation against the Allies it would rather seem as if, in the day -of wrath, they had hastily abandoned sophistication for the pious -memories of their unlettered childhood. Their apostasy was too well -done to have been hypocrisy. - -With the rulers it was different. They knew clearly enough what they -had done, what they were doing, and what they meant to do. When they -remained sympathetically silent, amid the popular babble about the -horrors of war and iniquity of peace-breakers, their tongues were not -paralysed by remorse--they were merely in their cheeks. Their {176} -sole concern was to humour public opinion, the results of whose -disapproval they feared, quite as much as they despised its judgment. - -That war draws out and gives scope to some of the noblest human -qualities, which in peace-time are apt to be hidden out of sight, no -one will deny. That it is a great getter-rid of words and phrases, -which have no real meaning behind them--that it is a great winnower of -true men from shams, of staunch men from boasters and blowers of their -own trumpets--that it is a great binder-together of classes, a great -purifier of the hearts of nations, there is no need to dispute. -Occasionally, though very rarely, it has proved itself to be a great -destroyer of misunderstanding between the combatants themselves. - -But although the whole of this is true, it does not lighten the guilt -of the deliberate peace-breaker. Many of the same benefits, though in -a lesser degree, arise out of a pestilence, a famine, or any other -great national calamity; and it is the acknowledged duty of man to -strive to the uttermost against these and to ward them off with all his -strength. It is the same with war. To argue, as German intellectuals -have done of late, that in order to expand their territories they were -justified in scattering infection and deliberately inviting this -plague, that the plague itself was a thing greatly for the advantage of -the moral sanitation of the world--all this is merely the casuistry of -a priesthood whom the vanity of rubbing elbows with men of action has -beguiled of their salvation. - -[Sidenote: THE ARROGANCE OF PEDANTS] - -Somewhere in one of his essays Emerson introduces an interlocutor whom -he salutes as 'little Sir.' One feels tempted to personify the whole -corporation of German pedants under the same title. When they {177} -talk so vehemently and pompously about the duty of deliberate -war-making for the expansion of the Fatherland, for the fulfilment of -the theory of evolution, even for the glory of God on high, our minds -are filled with wonder and a kind of pity. - -Have they ever seen war except in their dreams, or a countryside in -devastation? Have they ever looked with their own eyes on shattered -limbs, or faces defaced, of which cases, and the like, there are -already some hundreds of thousands in the hospitals of Europe, and may -be some millions before this war is ended? Have they ever -reckoned--except in columns of numerals without human meaning--how many -more hundreds of thousands, in the flower of their age, have died and -will die, or--more to be pitied--will linger on maimed and impotent -when the war is ended? Have they realised any of these things, except -in diagrams, and curves, and statistical tables, dealing with the -matter--as they would say themselves, in their own dull and dry -fashion--'under its broader aspects'--in terms, that is, of population, -food-supply, and economic output? - -Death, and suffering of many sorts occur in all wars--even in the most -humane war. And this is not a humane war which the pedants have let -loose upon us. Indeed, they have taught with some emphasis that -humanity, under such conditions, is altogether a mistake. - -"Sentimentality!" cries the 'little Sir' impatiently, "sickly -sentimentality! In a world of men such things must be. God has -ordained war." - -Possibly. But what one feels is that the making of war is the Lord's -own business and not the 'little Sir's.' It is the Lord's, as -vengeance is, and {178} earthquakes, floods, and droughts; not an -office to be undertaken by mortals. - -The 'little Sir,' however, has devised a new order for the world, and -apparently he will never rest satisfied until Heaven itself conforms to -his initiative. He is audacious, for like the Titans he has challenged -Zeus. But at times we are inclined to wonder--is he not perhaps trying -too much? Is he not in fact engaged in an attempt to outflank -Providence, whose pivot is infinity? And for this he is relying solely -upon the resources of his own active little finite mind. He presses -his attack most gallantly against human nature--back and forwards, up -and down--but opposing all his efforts is there not a screen of -adamantine crystal which cannot be pierced, of interminable superficies -which cannot be circumvented? Is he not in some ways like a wasp, -which beats itself angrily against a pane of glass? - - - -[1] Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Jay. - - - - -PART III - -THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY - - - -I saw then in my dream that he went on _thus_, even until he came at a -bottom, where he saw, a little out of the way, three Men fast asleep -with Fetters upon their heels. - -The name of the one was _Simple_, another _Sloth_, and the third -_Presumption_. - -_Christian_ then seeing them lie in this case, went to them, if -Peradventure he might awake them. And cried, you are like them that -sleep on the top of a Mast, for the dead Sea is under you, a Gulf that -hath no bottom. Awake therefore and come away; be willing also, and I -will help you off with your Irons. He also told them, If he that goeth -about like a _roaring Lion_ comes by, you will certainly become a prey -to his teeth. - -With that they lookt upon him, and began to reply in this sort: -_Simple_ said, _I see no danger_; _Sloth_ said, _Yet a little more -sleep_; and _Presumption_ said, _Every Vat must stand upon his own -bottom_. And so they lay down to sleep again, and _Christian_ went on -his way. - -_The Pilgrim's Progress_. - - - - -{181} - -CHAPTER I - -A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD - -(_January_ 1901-_July_ 1914) - -It is not true to say that this is a war between the rival principles -of democracy and autocracy. A too great absorption in our own -particular sector of the situation has led certain writers to put -forward, as a general explanation, this formula which is not only -inadequate, but misleading. The real issue is something wider and -deeper than a struggle between forms of government. It is concerned -with the groundwork of human beliefs. - -And yet it is unquestionably true to say, that by reason of Germany's -procedure, this war is being waged against democracy--not perhaps by -intention, but certainly in effect. For if the Allies should be -defeated, or even if they should fail to conquer their present enemies, -the result must necessarily be wounding to the credit of popular -institutions all the world over, fatal to their existence in Europe at -any rate, fatal conceivably at no long distance of time to their -existence elsewhere than in Europe. For mankind, we may be sure, is -not going to put up with any kind of government merely because it is -ideally beautiful. No system will be tolerated {182} indefinitely -which does not enable the people who live under it to protect -themselves from their enemies. The instinct of self-preservation will -drive them to seek for some other political arrangement which is -competent, in the present imperfect condition of the world, to provide -the first essential of a state, which is Security. - -But although the whole fabric of democracy is threatened by this war, -the principle of autocracy is not challenged by it either directly or -indirectly. France and England are not fighting against personal -monarchy any more than Russia is fighting against popular government. -So far as the forms of constitutions are concerned each of the Allies -would be well content to live and let live. They are none of them -spurred on by propagandist illusions like the armies of the First -Republic. Among Russians, devotion to their own institutions, and -attachment to the person of their Emperor are inspired not merely by -dictates of political expediency and patriotism, but also by their -sense of religious duty.[1] It is inconceivable that the national -spirit of Russia could ever have been roused to universal enthusiasm -merely in order to fight the battles of democracy. And yet Russia is -now ranged side by side with the French Republic and the British -Commonwealth in perfect unison. What has induced her to submit to -sacrifices--less indeed than those of Belgium, but equal to those of -France, and much greater so far than our own--unless some issue was at -stake wider and deeper even than the future of popular government? - -The instincts of a people are vague and obscure. The reasons which are -put forward, the motives {183} which appear upon the surface, the -provocations which lead to action, the immediate ends which are sought -after and pursued, rarely explain the true causes or proportions of any -great national struggle. But for all that, the main issue, as a rule, -is realised by the masses who are engaged, although it is not realised -through the medium of coherent argument or articulate speech. - -The present war is a fight, not between democracy and autocracy, but -between the modern spirit of Germany and the unchanging spirit of -civilisation. And it is well to bear in mind that the second of these -is not invincible. It has suffered defeat before now, at various -epochs in the world's history, when attacked by the same forces which -assail it to-day. Barbarism is not any the less barbarism because it -employs weapons of precision, because it avails itself of the -discoveries of science and the mechanism of finance, or because it -thinks it worth while to hire bands of learned men to shriek pæans in -its praise and invectives against its victims. Barbarism is not any -the less barbarism because its methods are up to date. It is known for -what it is by the ends which it pursues and the spirit in which it -pursues them. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN MATERIALISM] - -The modern spirit of Germany is materialism in its crudest form--the -undistracted pursuit of wealth, and of power as a means to wealth. It -is materialism, rampant and self-confident, fostered by the -state--subsidised, regulated, and, where thought advisable, controlled -by the state--supported everywhere by the diplomatic resources of the -state--backed in the last resort by the fleets and armies of the state. -It is the most highly organised machine, {184} the most deliberate and -thorough-going system, for arriving at material ends which has ever yet -been devised by man. It is far more efficient, but not a whit less -material, than 'Manchesterism' of the Victorian era, which placed its -hopes in 'free' competition, and also than that later development of -trusts and syndicates--hailing from America--which aims at levying -tribute on society by means of 'voluntary' co-operation. And just as -the English professors, who fell prostrate in adoration before the -prosperity of cotton-spinners, found no difficulty in placing -self-interest upon the loftiest pedestal of morality, so German -professors have succeeded in erecting for the joint worship of the -Golden Calf and the War-god Wotun, high twin altars which look down -with pity and contempt upon the humbler shrines of the Christian faith. - -The morality made in Manchester has long ago lost its reputation. That -which has been made in Germany more recently must in the end follow -suit; for, like its predecessor, it is founded upon a false conception -of human nature and cannot endure. But in the interval, if it be -allowed to triumph, it may work evil, in comparison with which that -done by our own devil-take-the-hindmost philosophers sinks into -insignificance. - -[Sidenote: WANT OF A NATIONAL POLICY] - -Looking at the present war from the standpoint of the Allies, the -object of it is to repel the encroachments of materialism, working its -way through the ruin of ideas, which have been cherished always, save -in the dark ages when civilisation was overwhelmed by barbarism. -Looking at the matter from our own particular standpoint, it is also -incidentally a struggle for the existence of democracy. The chief -question {185} we have to ask ourselves is whether our people will -fight for their faith and traditions with the same skill and courage as -the Germans for their material ends? Will they endure sacrifices with -the same fortitude as France and Russia? Will they face the inevitable -eagerly and promptly, or will they play the laggard and by delay ruin -all--themselves most of all? ... This war is not going to be won for us -by other people, or by some miraculous intervention of Providence, or -by the Germans running short of copper, or by revolutions in Berlin, -nor even by the break-up of the Austrian Empire. In order to win it we -shall have to put out our full strength, to organise our resources in -men and material as we have never done before during the whole of our -history. We have not accomplished these things as yet, although we -have expressed our determination, and are indeed willing to attempt -them. We were taken by surprise, and the immediate result has been a -great confusion, very hard to disentangle. - -Considering how little, before war began, our people had been taken -into the confidence of successive governments, as to the relations of -the British Empire with the outside world; how little education of -opinion there had been, as to risks, and dangers, and means of defence; -how little leading and clear guidance, both before and since, as to -duties--considering all these omissions one can only marvel that the -popular response has been what it is, and that the confusion was not -many times worse. - -What was the mood of the British race when this war broke upon them so -unexpectedly? To what extent were they provided against it in a -material sense? And still more important, how far were {186} their -minds and hearts prepared to encounter it? It is important to -understand those things, but in order to do this it is necessary to -look back over a few years. - - -By a coincidence which may prove convenient to historians, the end of -the nineteenth century marked the beginning of a new epoch[2]--an -interlude, of brief duration as it proved--upon which the curtain was -rung down shortly before midnight on the 4th of August 1914. - -Between these two dates, in a space of something over thirteen years, -events had happened in a quick succession, both within the empire and -abroad, which disturbed or dissolved many ancient understandings. The -spirit of change had been busy with mankind, and needs unknown to a -former generation had grown clamorous. Objects of hope had presented -themselves, driving old ideas to the wall, and unforeseen dangers had -produced fresh groupings, compacts, and associations between states, -and parties, and individual men. - -In Europe during this period the manifest determination of Germany to -challenge the naval supremacy of Britain, by the creation of a fleet -designed and projected as the counterpart of her overwhelming army, had -threatened the security of the whole continent, and had put France, -Russia, and England upon terms not far removed from those of an -alliance. The gravity of this emergency had induced our politicians to -exclude, for the time being, this department of public affairs from the -bitterness of their party struggles; and it had also drawn {187} the -governments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions into relations -closer than ever before, for the purpose of mutual defence.[3] - -[Sidenote: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EAST] - -In the meanwhile there had been developments even more startling in the -hitherto unchanging East. Japan, as the result of a great war,[4] had -become a first-class power, redoubtable both by sea and land. China, -the most populous, the most ancient, and the most conservative of -despotisms, had suddenly sought her salvation under the milder -institutions of a republic.[5] - -The South African war, ended by the Peace of Pretoria, had paved the -way for South African Union.[6] The achievement of this endeavour had -been applauded by men of all parties; some finding in it a welcome -confirmation of their theories with regard to liberty and -self-government; others again drawing from it encouragement to a still -bolder undertaking. For if South Africa had made a precedent, the -existing state of the world had supplied a motive, for the closer union -of the empire. - -Within the narrower limits of the United Kingdom changes had also -occurred within this period which, from another point of view, were -equally momentous. In 1903 Mr. Chamberlain had poured new wine into -old bottles, and in so doing had hastened the inevitable end of -Unionist predominance by changing on a sudden the direction of party -policy. In the unparalleled defeat which ensued two and a half years -later the Labour party appeared for the first time, formidable both in -numbers and ideas. - -A revolution had likewise been proceeding in {188} our institutions as -well as in the minds of our people. The balance of the state had been -shifted by a curtailment of the powers of the House of Lords[7]--the -first change which had been made by statute in the fundamental -principle of the Constitution since the passing of the Act of -Settlement.[8] In July 1914 further changes of a similar character, -hardly less important under a practical aspect, were upon the point of -receiving the Royal Assent.[9] - -Both these sets of changes--that which had been already accomplished -and the other which was about to pass into law--had this in common, -that even upon the admissions of their own authors they were -incomplete. Neither in the Parliament Act nor in the Home Rule Act was -there finality. The composition of the Second Chamber had been set -down for early consideration, whilst a revision of the constitutional -relations between England, Scotland, and Wales was promised so soon as -the case of Ireland had been dealt with. - -It seemed as if the modern spirit had at last, in earnest, opened an -inquisition upon the adequacy of our ancient unwritten compact, which -upon the whole, had served its purpose well for upwards of two hundred -years. It seemed as if that compact were in the near future to be -tested thoroughly, and examined in respect of its fitness for dealing -with the needs of the time--with the complexities and the vastness of -the British Empire--with the evils which prey upon us from within, and -with the dangers which threaten us from without. - -Questioners were not drawn from one party alone. {189} They were -pressing forwards from all sides. It was not merely the case of -Ireland, or the powers of the Second Chamber, or its composition, or -the general congestion of business, or the efficiency of the House of -Commons: it was the whole machinery of government which seemed to need -overhauling and reconsideration in the light of new conditions. Most -important of all these constitutional issues was that which concerned -the closer union of the Empire. - -[Sidenote: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES] - -It was little more than eighty years since the Iron Duke had described -the British Constitution as an incomparably devised perfection which -none but a madman would seek to change. That was not now the creed of -any political party or indeed of any thinking man. No one was -satisfied with things as they were. Many of the most respectable old -phrases had become known for empty husks, out of which long since had -dropped whatever seed they may originally have contained. Many of the -old traditions were dead or sickly, and their former adherents were now -wandering at large, like soldiers in the middle ages, when armies were -disbanded in foreign parts, seeking a new allegiance, and constituting -in the meanwhile a danger to security and the public peace. - -And also, within this brief period, the highest offices had become -vacant, and many great figures had passed from the scene. Two -sovereigns had died full of honour. Two Prime Ministers had also died, -having first put off the burden of office, each at the zenith of his -popularity. Of the two famous men upon the Unionist side who remained -when Lord Salisbury tendered his resignation, the one since 1906 had -been wholly withdrawn from public life, {190} while the other, four -years later, had passed the leadership into younger hands.[10] - -There is room for an almost infinite variety of estimate as to the -influence which is exercised by pre-eminent characters upon public -affairs and national ideals. The verdict of the day after is always -different from that of a year after. The verdict of the next -generation, while differing from both, is apt to be markedly different -from that of the generation which follows it. The admiration or -censure of the moment is followed by a reaction no less surely than the -reaction itself is followed by a counter-reaction. Gradually the -oscillations become shorter, as matters pass out of the hands of -journalists and politicians into those of the historian. Possibly -later judgments are more true. We have more knowledge, of a kind. -Seals are broken one by one, and we learn how this man really thought -and how the other acted, in both cases differently from what had been -supposed. We have new facts submitted to us, and possibly come nearer -the truth. But while we gain so much, we also lose in other -directions. We lose the sharp savour of the air. The keen glance and -alert curiosity of contemporary vigilance are lacking. Conditions and -circumstances are no longer clear, and as generation after generation -passes away they become more dim. The narratives of the great -historians and novelists are to a large extent either faded or false. -We do not trust the most vivid presentments written by the man of -genius in his study a century after the event, while we know well that -even the shrewdest of contemporaneous observers is certain to omit many -{191} of the essentials. If Macaulay is inadequate in one direction, -Pepys is equally inadequate in another. And if the chronicler at the -moment, and the historian in the future are not to be wholly believed, -the writer who comments after a decade or less upon things which are -fresh in his memory is liable to another form of error; for either he -is swept away by the full current of the reaction, or else his -judgments are embittered by a sense of the hopelessness of swimming -against it. - -[Sidenote: DEATH OF QUEEN VICTORIA] - -This much, however, may be said safely--that the withdrawal of any -pre-eminent character from the scene, whether it be Queen Victoria or -King Edward, Lord Salisbury or Mr. Chamberlain, produces in a greater -or less degree that same loosening of allegiance and disturbance of -ideas, which are so much dreaded by the conservative temperament from -the removal of an ancient institution. For a pre-eminent character is -of the same nature as an institution. The beliefs, loyalties, and -ideals of millions were attached to the personality of the Queen. The -whole of that prestige which Queen Victoria drew from the awe, -reverence, affection, and prayers of her people could not be passed -along with the crown to King Edward. The office of sovereign was for -the moment stripped and impoverished of some part of its strength, and -was only gradually replenished as the new monarch created a new, and to -some extent a different, loyalty of his own. So much is a truism. -But, when there is already a ferment in men's minds, the disappearance -in rapid succession of the pre-eminent characters of the age helps on -revolution by putting an end to a multitude of customary attachments, -and by setting sentiments adrift to wander in search of new heroes. - -{192} - -A change of some importance had also come over the character of the -House of Commons. The old idea that it was a kind of grand jury of -plain men, capable in times of crisis of breaking with their parties, -had at last finally disappeared. In politics there was no longer any -place for plain men. The need was for professionals, and professionals -of this sort, like experts in other walks of life, were worthy of their -hire. - -The decision to pay members of Parliament came as no surprise. The -marvel was rather that it had not been taken at an earlier date, seeing -that for considerably more than a century this item had figured in the -programmes of all advanced reformers. The change, nevertheless, when -it came, was no trivial occurrence, but one which was bound -fundamentally to affect the character of the popular assembly; whether -for better or worse was a matter of dispute. - -Immense, however, as were the possibilities contained in the conversion -of unpaid amateurs into professional and stipendiary politicians, what -excited even more notice at the time than the thing itself, were the -means by which it was accomplished. No attempt was made to place this -great constitutional reform definitely and securely upon the statute -book. To have followed this course would have meant submitting a bill, -and a bill would have invited discussion at all its various stages. -Moreover, the measure might have been challenged by the House of Lords, -in which case delay would have ensued; and a subject, peculiarly -susceptible to malicious misrepresentation, would have been -kept--possibly for so long as three years--under the critical eyes of -public opinion. {193} Apparently this beneficent proposal was one of -those instances, so rare in modern political life, where neither -publicity nor advertisement was sought. On the contrary, the object -seemed to be to do good by stealth; and for this purpose a simple -financial resolution was all that the law required. The Lords had -recently been warned off and forbidden to interfere with money matters, -their judgment being under suspicion, owing to its supposed liability -to be affected by motives of self-interest. The House of Commons was -therefore sole custodian of the public purse; and in this capacity its -members were invited to vote themselves four hundred pounds a year all -round, as the shortest and least ostentatious way of raising the -character and improving the quality of the people's representatives. - -[Sidenote: CHANGE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS] - -Even by July 1914 the effect of this constitutional amendment upon our -old political traditions had become noticeable in various directions. -But the means by which it was accomplished are no less worthy of note -than the reform itself, when we are endeavouring to estimate the -changes which have come over Parliament during this short but -revolutionary epoch. The method adopted seemed to indicate a novel -attitude on the part of members of the House of Commons towards the -Imperial Exchequer, on the part of the Government towards members of -the House of Commons, and on the part of both towards the people whom -they trusted. It was adroit, expeditious, and businesslike; and to -this extent seemed to promise well for years to come, when the -professionals should have finally got rid of the amateurs, and taken -things wholly into their own hands. Hostile critics, it is true, -denounced the {194} reform bluntly as corruption, and the method of its -achievement as furtive and cynical; but for this class of persons no -slander is ever too gross--_They have said. Quhat say they? Let them -be saying_. - - -The party leaders were probably neither worse men nor better than they -had been in the past; but they were certainly smaller; while on the -other hand the issues with which they found themselves confronted were -bigger. - -Great characters are like tent-pegs. One of their uses is to prevent -the political camp from being blown to ribbons. Where they are too -short or too frail, we may look for such disorders as have repeated -themselves at intervals during the past few years. A blast of anger or -ill-temper has blown, or a gust of sentiment, or even a gentle zephyr -of sentimentality, and the whole scene has at once become a confusion -of flapping canvas, tangled cordage, and shouting, struggling humanity. -Such unstable conditions are fatal to equanimity; they disturb the -fortitude of the most stalwart follower, and cause doubt and distrust -on every hand. - -Since the Liberal Government came into power in the autumn of 1905, -neither of the great parties had succeeded in earning the respect of -the other; and as the nature of man is not subject to violent -fluctuations, it may safely be concluded that this misfortune had been -due either to some defect or inadequacy of leadership, or else to -conditions of an altogether extraordinary character. - -During these ten sessions the bulk of the statute book had greatly -increased, and much of this increase was no doubt healthy tissue. This -period, notwithstanding, {195} will ever dwell in the memory as a -squalid episode. Especially is this the case when we contrast the high -hopes and promises, not of one party alone, with the results which were -actually achieved. - -[Sidenote: DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIP] - -Democracy, if the best, is also the most delicate form of human -government. None suffers so swiftly or so sorely from any shortage in -the crop of character. None is so dependent upon men, and so little -capable of being supported by the machine alone. When the leading of -parties is in the hands of those who lack vision and firmness, the -first effect which manifests itself is that parties begin to slip their -principles. Some secondary object calls for and obtains the sacrifice -of an ideal. So the Unionists in 1909 threw over the order and -tradition of the state, the very ark of their political covenant, when -they procured the rejection of the Budget by the House of Lords. So -the Liberal Government in 1910, having solemnly undertaken to reform -the constitution--a work not unworthy of the most earnest -endeavour--went back upon their word, and abandoned their original -purpose. For one thing they grew afraid of the clamour of their -partisans. For another they were tempted by the opportunity of -advantages which--as they fondly imagined--could be easily and safely -secured during the interval while all legislative powers were -temporarily vested in the Commons. Nor were these the only instances -where traditional policy had been diverted, and where ideals had been -bargained away, in the hope that thereby objects of a more material -sort might be had at once in exchange. - -The business of leadership is to prevent the abandonment of the long -aim for the sake of the short. The rank and file of every army is at -all times most {196} dangerously inclined to this fatal temptation, not -necessarily dishonestly, but from a lack of foresight and sense of -proportion. - -Some dim perception of cause and effect had begun to dawn during the -years 1912 and 1913 upon the country, and even upon the more sober -section of the politicians. An apprehension had been growing rapidly, -and defied concealment, that the country was faced by a very formidable -something, to which men hesitated to give a name, but which was clearly -not to be got rid of by the customary methods of holding high debates -about it, and thereafter marching into division lobbies. While in -public, each party was concerned to attribute the appearance of this -unwelcome monster solely to the misdeeds of their opponents, each party -knew well enough in their hearts that the danger was due at least in -some measure to their own abandonment of pledges, principles, and -traditions. - -At Midsummer 1914 most people would probably have said that the -immediate peril was Ireland and civil war. A few months earlier many -imagined that trouble of a more general character was brewing between -the civil and military powers, and that an issue which they described -as that of 'the Army versus the People' would have to be faced. A few -years earlier there was a widespread fear that the country might be -confronted by some organised stoppage of industry, and that this would -lead to revolution. Throughout the whole of this period of fourteen -years the menace of war with Germany had been appearing, and -disappearing, and reappearing, very much as a whale shows his back, -dives, rises at some different spot, and dives again. For the moment, -{197} however, this particular anxiety did not weigh heavily on the -public mind. The man in the street had been assured of late by the -greater part of the press and politicians--even by ministers -themselves--that our relations with this formidable neighbour were -friendlier and more satisfactory than they had been for some -considerable time. - - -[Sidenote: MR. ASQUITH'S PRE-EMINENCE] - -At Midsummer 1914, that is to say about six weeks before war broke out, -the pre-eminent character in British politics was the Prime Minister. -No other on either side of the House approached him in prestige, and so -much was freely admitted by foes as well as friends. - -When we are able to arrive at a fair estimate of the man who is -regarded as the chief figure of his age, we have an important clue to -the aspirations and modes of thought of the period in which he lived. -A people may be known to some extent by the leaders whom it has chosen -to follow. - -Mr. Asquith entered Parliament in 1886, and before many months had -passed his reputation was secure. Mr. Gladstone, ever watchful for -youthful talent, promoted him at a bound to be Home Secretary, when the -Cabinet of 1892 came into precarious existence. No member of this -government justified his selection more admirably. But the period of -office was brief. Three years later, the Liberal party found itself -once again in the wilderness, where it continued to wander, rent by -dissensions both as to persons and principles, for rather more than a -decade. - -When Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman returned to office in the autumn of -1905, Mr. Asquith became {198} Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was -speedily accepted as the minister next in succession to his chief. He -was then just turned fifty, so that, despite the delays which had -occurred, it could not be said that fortune had behaved altogether -unkindly. Two and a half years later, in April 1908, he succeeded to -the premiership without a rival, and without a dissentient voice. - -The ambition, however, which brought him so successfully to the highest -post appeared to have exhausted a great part of its force in -attainment, and to have left its possessor without sufficient energy -for exercising those functions which the post itself required. The -career of Mr. Asquith in the highest office reminds one a little of the -fable of the Hare and the Tortoise. In the race which we all run with -slow-footed fate, he had a signal advantage in the speed of his -intellect, in his capacity for overtaking arrears of work which would -have appalled any other minister, and for finding, on the spur of the -moment, means for extricating his administration from the most -threatening positions. But of late, like the Hare, he had come to -believe himself invincible, and had yielded more and more to a drowsy -inclination. He had seemed to fall asleep for long periods, apparently -in serene confidence that, before the Tortoise could pass the -winning-post, somebody or something--in all probability the Unionist -party with the clamour of a premature jubilation--would awaken him in -time to save the race. - -So far as Parliament was concerned, his confidence in his own qualities -was not misplaced. Again and again, the unleadered energies or -ungoaded indolence of his colleagues landed the Government {199} in a -mess. But as often as this happened Mr. Asquith always advanced upon -the scene and rescued his party, by putting the worst blunder in the -best light. He obligingly picked his stumbling lieutenants out of the -bogs into which--largely, it must be admitted, for want of proper -guidance from their chief--they had had the misfortune to fall. Having -done this in the most chivalrous manner imaginable, he earned their -gratitude and devotion. In this way he maintained a firm hold upon the -leadership; if indeed it can properly be termed leadership to be the -best acrobat of the troupe, and to step forward and do the feats after -your companions have failed, and the audience has begun to 'boo.' - -[Sidenote: WAIT AND SEE] - -Some years ago Mr. Asquith propounded a maxim--_wait-and-see_--which -greatly scandalised and annoyed the other side. This formula was the -perfectly natural expression of his character and policy. In the -peculiar circumstances of the case it proved itself to be a successful -parliamentary expedient. Again and again it wrought confusion among -his simple-minded opponents, who--not being held together by any firm -authority--followed their own noses, now in one direction, now in -another, upon the impulse of the moment. It is probable that against a -powerful leader, who had his party well in hand, this policy of -makeshift and delay would have brought its author to grief. But -Unionists were neither disciplined nor united, and they had lacked -leadership ever since they entered upon opposition. - -For all its excellency, Mr. Asquith's oratory never touched the heart. -And very rarely indeed did it succeed in convincing the cool judgment -of people who had experience at first hand of the matters {200} under -discussion. There was lacking anything in the nature of a personal -note, which might have related the ego of the speaker to the sentiments -which he announced so admirably. Also there was something which -suggested that his knowledge had not been gained by looking at the -facts face to face; but rather by the rapid digestion of minutes and -memoranda, which had been prepared for him by clerks and secretaries, -and which purported to provide, in convenient tabloids, all that it was -necessary for a parliamentarian to know. - -The style of speaking which is popular nowadays, and of which Mr. -Asquith is by far the greatest master, would not have been listened to -with an equal favour in the days of our grandfathers. In the -Parliaments which assembled at Westminster in the period between the -passing of the Reform Bill and the founding of the Eighty Club,[11] the -country-gentlemen and the men-of-business--two classes of humanity who -are constantly in touch with, and drawing strength from, our mother -earth of hard fact[12]--met and fought out their differences during two -generations. In that golden age it was all but unthinkable that a -practising barrister should ever have become Prime Minister. The legal -profession at this time had but little influence in counsel; still less -in Parliament and on the platform. The middle classes were every whit -as jealous and distrustful {201} of the intervention of the -lawyer-advocate in public affairs as the landed gentry themselves. But -in the stage of democratic evolution, which we entered on the morrow of -the Mid-Lothian campaigns, and in which we still remain, the popular, -and even the parliamentary, audience has gradually ceased to consist -mainly of country-gentlemen interested in the land, and of the -middle-classes who are engaged in trade. It has grown to be at once -less discriminating as to the substance of speeches, and more exacting -as to their form. - -[Sidenote: POLITICAL LAWYERS] - -A representative assembly which entirely lacked lawyers would be -impoverished; but one in which they are the predominant, or even a very -important element, is usually in its decline. It is strange that an -order of men, who in their private and professional capacities are so -admirable, should nevertheless produce baleful effects when they come -to play too great a part in public affairs. Trusty friends, delightful -companions, stricter perhaps than any other civil profession in all -rules of honour, they are none the less, without seeking to be so, the -worst enemies of representative institutions. The peculiar danger of -personal monarchy is that it so easily submits to draw its inspiration -from an adulatory priesthood, and the peculiar danger of that modern -form of constitutional government which we call democracy, is that -lawyers, with the most patriotic intentions, are so apt to undo it. - -Lawyers see too much of life in one way, too little in another, to make -them safe guides in practical matters. Their experience of human -affairs is made up of an infinite number of scraps cut out of other -people's lives. They learn and do hardly anything {202} except through -intermediaries. Their clients are introduced, not in person, but in -the first instance, on paper--through the medium of solicitors' -'instructions.' Litigants appear at consultations in their counsel's -chambers under the chaperonage of their attorneys; their case is -considered; they receive advice. Then perhaps, if the issue comes into -court, they appear once again, in the witness-box, and are there -examined, cross-examined, and re-examined under that admirable system -for the discovery of truth which is ordained in Anglo-Saxon countries, -and which consists in turning, for the time being, nine people in every -ten out of their true natures into hypnotised rabbits. Then the whole -thing is ended, and the client disappears into the void from whence he -came. What happens to him afterwards seldom reaches the ears of his -former counsel. Whether the advice given to him in consultation has -proved right or wrong in practice, rarely becomes known to the great -man who gave it. - -Plausibility, an alert eye for the technical trip or fall--the great -qualities of an advocate--do not necessarily imply judgment of the most -valuable sort outside courts of law. The farmer who manures, ploughs, -harrows, sows, and rolls in his crop is punished in his income, if he -has done any one of these things wrongly, or at the wrong season. The -shopkeeper who blunders in his buying or his selling, or the -manufacturer who makes things as they should not be made, suffers -painful consequences to a certainty. His error pounds him relentlessly -on the head. Not so the lawyer. His errors for the most part are -visited on others. His own success or non-success is largely a matter -of words and pose. If he is confident and {203} adroit, the dulness of -the jury or the senility of the bench can be made to appear, in the -eyes of the worsted client, as the true causes of his defeat. And the -misfortune is that in politics, which under its modern aspect is a -trade very much akin to advocacy, there is a temptation, with all but -the most patriotic lawyers, to turn to account at Westminster the skill -which they have so laboriously acquired in the Temple. - -Of course there have been, and will ever be, exceptions. Alexander -Hamilton was a lawyer, though he was a soldier in the first instance. -Abraham Lincoln was a lawyer. But we should have to go back to the -'glorious revolution' of 1688 before we could find a parallel to either -of these two in our own history. Until the last two decades England -has never looked favourably on lawyer leaders. This was regarded by -some as a national peculiarity; by others as a safeguard of our -institutions. But by the beginning of the twentieth century it was -clear that lawyers had succeeded in establishing their predominance in -the higher walks of English politics, as thoroughly as they had already -done wherever parliamentary government exists throughout the world. - -[Sidenote: MR. ASQUITH'S ORATORY] - -During this epoch, when everything was sacrificed to perspicuity and -the avoidance of boredom, Mr. Asquith's utterances led the fashion. -His ministry was composed to a large extent of politicians bred in the -same profession and proficient in the same arts as himself; but he -towered above them all, the supreme type of the lawyer-statesman. - -His method was supremely skilful. In its own way it had the charm of -perfect artistry, even though {204} the product of the art was hardly -more permanent than that of the _cordon bleu_ who confections ices in -fancy patterns. And not only was the method well suited to the taste -of popular audiences, but equally so to the modern House of Commons. -That body, also, was now much better educated in matters which can be -learned out of newspapers and books; far more capable of expressing its -meanings in well-chosen phrases arranged in a logical sequence; far -more critical of words--if somewhat less observant of things--than it -was during the greater part of the reign of Queen Victoria. - -To a large extent the House of Commons consisted of persons with whom -public utterance was a trade. There were lawyers in vast numbers, -journalists, political organisers, and professional lecturers on a -large variety of subjects. And even among the labour party, where we -might have expected to find a corrective, the same tendency was at -work, perhaps as strongly as in any other quarter. For although few -types of mankind have a shrewder judgment between reality and dialectic -than a thoroughly competent 'workman,' labour leaders were not chosen -because they were first-class workmen, but because they happened to be -effective speakers on the platform or at the committee table. - -To a critic, looking on at the play from outside, Mr. Asquith's oratory -appeared to lack heart and the instinct for reality; his leadership, -the qualities of vigilance, steadfastness, and authority. He did not -prevail by personal force, but by adroit confutation. His debating, as -distinguished from his political, courage would have been admitted with -few reservations even by an opponent. {205} Few were so ready to meet -their enemies in the gate of discussion. Few, if any, were so capable -of retrieving the fortunes of their party--even when things looked -blackest--if it were at all possible to accomplish this by the weapons -of debate. But the medium must be debate--not action or counsel--if -Mr. Asquith's pre-eminence was to assert itself. In debate he had all -the confidence and valour of the _maître d'armes_, who knows himself to -be the superior in skill of any fencer in his own school. - -[Sidenote: HIS CHARACTER] - -Next to Lord Rosebery he was the figure of most authority among the -Liberal Imperialists, and yet this did not sustain his resolution when -the Cabinet of 1905 proceeded to pare down the naval estimates. He was -the champion of equal justice, as regards the status of Trades Unions, -repelling the idea of exceptional and favouring legislation with an -eloquent scorn. Yet he continued to hold his place when his principles -were thrown overboard by his colleagues in 1906. Again when he met -Parliament in February 1910 he announced his programme with an air of -heroic firmness.[13] It is unnecessary to recall the particulars of -this episode, and how he was upheld in his command only upon condition -that he would alter his course to suit the wishes of mutineers. And in -regard to the question of Home Rule, his treatment of it from first to -last had been characterised by the virtues of patience and humility, -rather than by those of prescience or courage. - -A 'stellar and undiminishable' something, around which the qualities -and capacities of a man revolve obediently, and under harmonious -restraint--like {206} the planetary bodies--is perhaps as near as we -can get to a definition of human greatness. But in the case of Mr. -Asquith, for some years prior to July 1914, the central force of his -nature had seemed inadequate for imposing the law of its will upon -those brilliant satellites his talents. As a result, the solar system -of his character had fallen into confusion, and especially since the -opening of that year had appeared to be swinging lop-sided across the -political firmament hastening to inevitable disaster. - - - -[1] Cf. 'Russia and her Ideals,' _Round Table_, December 1914. - -[2] Queen Victoria died on January 22, 1901. - -[3] Imperial Conference on Defence, summer of 1909. - -[4] 1904-1905. - -[5] 1911. - -[6] May 1902. - -[7] Parliament Act became law August 1911. - -[8] 1689. - -[9] Home Rule Bill became law August 1914. - -[10] Mr. Chamberlain died July 2, 1914; Mr. Balfour resigned the -leadership of the Unionist party on November 8, 1911. - -[11] 1832-1880. - -[12] They had an excellent sense of reality as regards their own -affairs, and there between them covered a fairly wide area; but they -were singularly lacking either in sympathy or imagination with regard -to the affairs of other nations and classes. Their interest in the -poor was confined for the most part to criticism of _one another_ with -regard to conditions of labour. The millowners thought that the -oppression of the peasantry was a scandal; while the landowners -considered that the state of things prevailing in factories was much -worse than slavery. Cf. Disraeli's _Sybil_. - -[13] _I.e._ curtailment of the powers of the House of Lords and its -reform. Only the first was proceeded with. - - - - -{207} - -CHAPTER II - -THREE GOVERNING IDEAS - -At the death of Queen Victoria the development of the British -Commonwealth entered upon a new phase. The epoch which followed has no -precedent in our own previous experience as a nation, nor can we -discover in the records of other empires anything which offers more -than a superficial and misleading resemblance to it. The issues of -this period presented themselves to different minds in a variety of -different lights; but to all it was clear that we had reached one of -the great turning-points in our history. - -The passengers on a great ocean liner are apt to imagine, because their -stomachs are now so little troubled by the perturbation of the waves, -that it no longer profits them to offer up the familiar prayer 'for -those in peril on the sea.' It is difficult for them to believe in -danger where everything appears so steady and well-ordered, and where -they can enjoy most of the distractions of urban life, from a -cinematograph theatre to a skittle-alley, merely by descending a gilded -staircase or crossing a brightly panelled corridor. But this agreeable -sense of safety is perhaps due in a greater degree to fancy, than to -the changes which have taken place in the essential facts. As dangers -have been diminished in one direction {208} risks have been incurred in -another. A blunder to-day is more irreparable than formerly, and the -havoc which ensues upon a blunder is vastly more appalling. An error -of observation or of judgment--the wrong lever pulled or the wrong -button pressed--an order which miscarries or is overlooked--and twenty -thousand tons travelling at twenty knots an hour goes to the bottom, -with its freight of humanity, merchandise, and treasure, more easily, -and with greater speed and certainty, than in the days of the old -galleons--than in the days when Drake, in the _Golden Hind_ of a -hundred tons burden, beat up against head winds in the Straits of -Magellan, and ran before the following gale off the Cape of Storms. - -Comfort, whether in ships of travel or of state, is not the same thing -as security. It never has been, and it never will be. - -The position after Queen Victoria's death also differed from all -previous times in another way. After more than three centuries of -turmoil and expansion, the British race had entered into possession of -an estate so vast, so rich in all natural resources, that a sane mind -could not hope for, or even dream of, any further aggrandisement. -Whatever may be the diseases from which the British race suffered -during the short epoch between January 1901 and July 1914, megalomania -was certainly not one of them. - -The period of acquisition being now acknowledged at an end, popular -imagination became much occupied with other things. It assumed, too -lightly and readily perhaps, that nothing was likely to interfere with -our continuing to hold what we had got. If there was not precisely a -law of nature, which precluded the possessions of the British Empire -from ever being {209} taken away, at any rate there was the law of -nations. The public opinion of the world would surely revolt against -so heinous a form of sacrilege. Having assumed so much, placidly and -contentedly, and without even a tremor either as to the good-will or -the potency of the famous Concert of Europe, the larger part of public -opinion tended to become more and more engrossed in other problems. It -began to concern itself earnestly with _the improvement of the -condition of the people_, and with _the reform and consolidation of -institutions_. Incidentally, and as a part of each of these -endeavours, the development of an estate which had come, mainly by -inheritance, into the trusteeship of the British people, began -seriously to occupy their thoughts. - -[Sidenote: SOCIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM] - -These were problems of great worth and dignity, but nevertheless there -was one condition of their successful solution, which ought to have -been kept in mind, but which possibly was somewhat overlooked. If we -allowed ourselves to be so much absorbed by these two problems that we -gave insufficient heed to our defences, it was as certain as any human -forecast could be, that the solution of a great deal, which was -perplexing us in the management of our internal affairs, would be -summarily taken out of the hands of Britain and her Dominions and -solved according to the ideas of strangers. - -If we were to bring our policy of social and constitutional improvement -and the development of our estate to a successful issue, we must be -safe from interruption from outside. We must secure ourselves against -foreign aggression; for we needed time. Our various problems could not -be solved in a day or even in a generation. The most urgent {210} of -all matters was _security_, for it was the prime condition of all the -rest. - -We desired, not merely to hold what we had got, but to enjoy it, and -make it fructify and prosper, in our own way, and under our own -institutions. For this we needed peace within our own sphere; and -therefore it was necessary that we should be strong enough to enforce -peace. - - -During the post-Victorian period--this short epoch of transition--there -were therefore three separate sets of problems which between them -absorbed the energies of public men and occupied the thoughts of all -private persons, at home and in the Dominions, to whom the present and -future well-being of their country was a matter of concern. - -The first of these problems was _Defence_: How might the British -Commonwealth, which held so vast a portion of the habitable globe, and -which was responsible for the government of a full quarter of all the -people who dwelt thereon--how might it best secure itself against the -dangers which threatened it from without? - -The second was the problem of _the Constitution_: How could we best -develop, to what extent must we remake or remould, our ancient -institutions, so as to fit them for those duties and responsibilities -which new conditions required that they should be able to perform? -Under this head we were faced with projects, not merely of local -self-government, of 'Home Rule,' and of 'Federalism'; not merely with -the working of the Parliament Act, with the composition, functions, and -powers of the Second Chamber, with the Referendum, the Franchise, and -{211} such like; but also with that vast and even more perplexing -question--what were to be the future relations between the Mother -Country and the self-governing Dominions on the one hand, and between -these five democratic nations and the Indian Empire and the -Dependencies upon the other? - -For the third set of problems no concise title has yet been found. -_Social Reform_ does not cover it, though perhaps it comes nearer doing -so than any other. The matters involved here were so multifarious and, -apparently at least, so detached one from another--they presented -themselves to different minds at so many different angles and under -such different aspects--that no single word or phrase was altogether -satisfactory. But briefly, what all men were engaged in searching -after--the Labour party, no more and no less than the Radicals and the -Tories--was how we could raise the character and material conditions of -our people; how by better organisation we could root out needless -misery of mind and body; how we could improve the health and the -intelligence, stimulate the sense of duty and fellowship, the -efficiency and the patriotism of the whole community. - -Of these three sets of problems with which the British race has -recently been occupying itself, this, the third, is intrinsically by -far the most important. - -[Sidenote: IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL REFORM] - -It is the most important because it is an end in itself whereas the -other two are only the means for achieving this end. Security against -foreign attack is a desirable and worthy object only in order to enable -us to approach this goal. A strong and flexible constitution is an -advantage only because we believe it will enable us to achieve our -objects, better and more quickly, than if we are compelled to go on -working {212} under a system which has become at once rigid and -rickety. But while we were bound to realise the superior nature of the -third set of problems, we should have been careful at the same time to -distinguish between two things which are very apt to be confused in -political discussions--_ultimate importance_ and _immediate urgency_. - -We ought to have taken into our reckoning both the present state of the -world and the permanent nature of man--all the stuff that dreams and -wars are made on. We desired peace. We needed peace. Peace was a -matter of life and death to all our hopes. If defeat should once break -into the ring of our commonwealth--scattered as it is all over the -world, kept together only by the finest and most delicate -attachments--it must be broken irreparably. Our most immediate -interest was therefore to keep defeat, and if possible, war, from -bursting into our sphere--as Dutchmen by centuries of laborious -vigilance have kept back the sea with dikes. - -The numbers of our people in themselves were no security; nor our -riches; nor even the fact that we entertained no aggressive designs. -For as it was said long ago, 'it never troubles a wolf how many the -sheep be.' They find no salvation in their heavy fleeces and their fat -haunches; nor even in the meekness of their hearts, and in their -innocence of all evil intentions. - - -The characteristic of this period may be summed up in one short -sentence; the vast majority of the British people were bent and -determined--as they had never been bent and determined before--upon -leaving their country better than they had found it. - -{213} - -To some this statement will seem a paradox. "Was there ever a time," -they may ask, "when there had been so many evidences of popular unrest, -discontent, bitterness and anger; or when there had ever appeared to be -so great an inclination, on the one hand to apathy and cynicism, on the -other hand to despair?" - -[Sidenote: THE RESULTS OF CONFUSION] - -Were all this true, it would still be no paradox; but only a natural -consequence. Things are very liable to slip into this state, when men -who are in earnest--knowing the facts as they exist in their respective -spheres; knowing the evils at first hand; believing (very often with -reason) that they understand the true remedies--find themselves -baulked, and foiled, and headed off at every turn, their objects -misconceived and their motives misconstrued, and the current of their -wasted efforts burying itself hopelessly in the sand. Under such -conditions as these, public bodies and political parties -alike--confused by the multitude and congestion of issues--are apt to -bestow their dangerous attentions, now on one matter which happens to -dart into the limelight, now upon another; but in the general hubbub -and perplexity they lose all sense, both of true proportion and natural -priority. Everything is talked about; much is attempted in a -piecemeal, slap-dash, impulsive fashion; inconsiderably little is -brought to any conclusion whatsoever; while nothing, or next to -nothing, is considered on its merits, and carried through thoughtfully -to a clean and abiding settlement.... The word 'thorough' seemed to -have dropped out of the political vocabulary. In an age of specialism -politics alone was abandoned to the Jack-of-all-trades. - -{214} - -This phenomenon--the depreciated currency of public character--was not -peculiar to one party more than another. It was not even peculiar to -this particular time. It has shown itself at various epochs--much in -the same way as the small-pox and the plague--when favoured by -insanitary conditions. The sedate Scots philosopher, Adam Smith, -writing during the gloomy period which fell upon England after the -glory of the great Chatham had departed, could not repress his -bitterness against "that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a -statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary -fluctuations of affairs." It would seem as if the body politic is not -unlike the human, and becomes more readily a prey to vermin, when it -has sunk into a morbid condition. - - -Popular judgment may be trusted as a rule, and in the long run, to -decide a clear issue between truth and falsehood, and to decide it in -favour of the former. But it becomes perplexed, when it is called upon -to discriminate between the assurances of two rival sets of showmen, -whose eagerness to outbid each other in the public favour leaves -truthfulness out of account. In the absence of gold, one brazen -counterfeit rings very much like another. People may be suspicious of -both coins; but on the whole their fancy is more readily caught by the -optimist effigy than the pessimist. They may not place entire trust in -the 'ever-cheerful man of sin,' with his flattery, his abounding -sympathy, his flowery promises, and his undefeated hopefulness; but -they prefer him at any rate to 'the melancholy Jaques,' booming -maledictions with a mournful {215} constancy, like some bittern in the -desolation of the marshes. - -So far as principles were concerned most of the trouble was -unnecessary. Among the would-be reformers--among those who sincerely -desired to bring about efficiency within their own spheres--there was -surprisingly little that can truly be called antagonism. But -competition of an important kind--competition for public attention and -priority of treatment--had produced many of the unfortunate results of -antagonism. It was inevitable that this lamentable state of things -must continue, until it had been realised that one small body of men, -elected upon a variety of cross issues, could not safely be left in -charge of the defence of the Empire, the domestic welfare of the United -Kingdom, and the local government of its several units. - -[Sidenote: ARTIFICIAL ANTAGONISMS] - -It was not merely that the various aims were not opposed to one -another; they were actually helpful to one another. Often, indeed, -they were essential to the permanent success of one another. The man -who desired to improve the conditions of the poor was not, therefore, -the natural enemy of him who wanted to place the national defences on a -secure footing. And neither of these was the natural enemy of others -who wished to bring about a settlement of the Irish question, or of the -Constitutional question, or of the Imperial question. But owing partly -to the inadequacy of the machinery for giving a free course to these -various aspirations--partly to the fact that the machinery itself was -antiquated, in bad repair, and had become clogged with a variety of -obstructions--there was an unfortunate tendency on the part of every -one who had any particular object very much {216} at heart, to regard -every one else who was equally concerned about any other object as an -impediment in his path. - - -The need of the time, of course, was leadership--a great man--or better -still two great men, one on each side--like the blades of a pair of -scissors--to cut a way out of the confusion by bringing their keen -edges into contact. But obviously, the greater the confusion the -harder it is for leadership to assert itself. We may be sure enough -that there were men of character and capacity equal to the task if only -they could have been discovered. But they were not discovered. - -There were other things besides the confusion of aims and ideas which -made it hard for leaders to emerge. The loose coherency of parties -which prevailed during the greater part of the nineteenth century had -given place to a set of highly organised machines, which employed -without remorse the oriental method of strangulation, against -everything in the nature of independent effort and judgment. The -politician class had increased greatly in numbers and influence. The -eminent and ornamental people who were returned to Westminster filled -the public eye, but they were only a small proportion of the whole; nor -is it certain that they exercised the largest share of authority. When -in the autumn of 1913 Sir John Brunner determined to prevent Mr. -Churchill from obtaining the provisions for the Navy which were judged -necessary for the safety of the Empire, the method adopted was to raise -the National Liberal Federation against the First Lord of the -Admiralty, and through the agency of that powerful organisation to -bring pressure to bear {217} upon the country, members of Parliament, -and the Cabinet itself. - -[Sidenote: BAD MONEY DRIVES OUT GOOD] - -It is unpopular to say that the House of Commons has deteriorated in -character, but it is true. An assembly, the members of which cannot -call their souls their own, will never tend in an upward direction. -The machines which are managed with so much energy and skill by the -external parasites of politics, have long ago taken over full -responsibility for the souls of their nominees. According to -'Gresham's law,' bad money, if admitted into currency, will always end -by driving out good. A similar principle has been at work for some -time past in British public life, by virtue of which the baser kind of -politicians, having got a footing, are driving out their betters at a -rapid pace. Few members of Parliament will admit this fact; but they -are not impartial judges, for every one is naturally averse from -disparaging an institution to which he belongs. - -During the nineteenth century, except at the very beginning, and again -at the very end of it, very few people ever thought of going into -Parliament, or even into politics, in order that they might thrive -thereby, or find a field for improving their private fortunes. This -cannot be said with truth of the epoch which has just ended. There has -been a change both in tone and outlook during the last thirty years. -Things have been done and approved by the House of Commons, elected in -December 1910, which it is quite inconceivable that the House of -Commons, returned in 1880, would ever have entertained. The -Gladstonian era had its faults, but among them laxity in matters of -finance did not figure. Indeed private members, as well as statesmen, -not infrequently {218} crossed the border-line which separates purism -from pedantry; occasionally they carried strictness to the verge of -absurdity; but this was a fault in the right direction--a great -safeguard to the public interest, a peculiarly valuable tendency from -the standpoint of democracy. - -A twelvemonth ago a number of very foolish persons were anxious to -persuade us that the predominant issue was the Army _versus_ the -People. But even the crispness of the phrase was powerless to convince -public opinion of so staggering an untruth. The predominant issue at -that particular moment was only what it had been for a good many years -before--the People _versus_ the Party System. - -[Sidenote: NEED OF RICH MEN] - -What is apt to be ignored is, that with the increase of wealth on the -one hand, and the extension of the franchise on the other, the Party -System has gradually become a vested interest upon an enormous -scale,--like the liquor trade of which we hear so much, or the _haute -finance_ of which perhaps we hear too little. Rich men are required in -politics, for the reason that it is necessary to feed and clothe the -steadily increasing swarms of mechanics who drive, and keep in repair, -and add to, that elaborate machinery by means of which the Sovereign -People is cajoled into the belief that its Will prevails. From the -point of view of the orthodox political economist these workers are as -unproductive as actors, bookmakers, or golf professionals; but they -have to be paid, otherwise they would starve, and the machines would -stop. So long as there are plenty of rich men who desire to become -even richer, or to decorate their names with titles, or to move in -shining circles, this is not at all likely to occur, unless the Party -System {219} suddenly collapsed, in which case there would be acute -distress. - -There are various grades of these artisans or mechanicians of politics, -from the professional organiser or agent who, upon the whole, is no -more open to criticism than any other class of mankind which works -honestly for its living--down to the committee-man who has no use for a -candidate unless he keeps a table from which large crumbs fall in -profusion. The man who supplements his income by means of politics is -a greater danger than the other who openly makes politics his vocation. -The jobbing printer, enthusiastically pacifist or protectionist, well -paid for his hand-bills, and aspiring to more substantial contracts; -the smart, ingratiating organiser, or hustling, bustling journalist, -who receives a complimentary cheque, or a bundle of scrip, or a seat on -a board of directors from the patron whom he has helped to win an -election--very much as at ill-regulated shooting parties the -head-keeper receives exorbitant tips from wealthy sportsmen whom he has -placed to their satisfaction--all these are deeply interested in the -preservation of the Party System. Innocent folk are often heard -wondering why candidates with such strange names--even stranger -appearance--accents and manner of speech which are strangest of -all--are brought forward so frequently to woo the suffrages of urban -constituencies. Clearly they are not chosen on account of their -political knowledge; for they have none. There are other aspirants to -political honours who, in comeliness and charm of manner, greatly excel -them; whose speech is more eloquent, or at any rate less -unintelligible. Yet London caucuses in particular have {220} a great -tenderness for these bejewelled patriots, and presumably there must be -reasons for the preference which they receive. One imagines that in -some inscrutable way they are essential props of the Party System in -its modern phase. - -The drawing together of the world by steam and electricity has brought -conspicuous benefits to the British Empire. The five self-governing -nations of which it is composed come closer together year by year. -Statesmen and politicians broaden the horizons of their minds by swift -and easy travel. But there are drawbacks as well as the reverse under -these new conditions. To some extent the personnel of democracy has -tended to become interchangeable, like the parts of a bicycle; and -public characters are able to transfer their activities from one state -to another, and even from one hemisphere to another, without a great -deal of difficulty. This has certain advantages, but possibly more -from the point of view of the individual than from that of the -Commonwealth. After failure in one sphere there is still hope in -another. Mr. Micawber, or even Jeremy Diddler, may go the round, using -up public confidence at one resting-place after another. For the Party -System is a ready employer, and providing a man has a glib tongue, a -forehead of brass, or an open purse, a position will be found for him -without too much enquiry made into his previous references. - -[Sidenote: LAWYERISM AND LEADERSHIP] - -In a world filled with confusion and illusion the Party System has -fought at great advantage. Indeed it is generally believed to be so -firmly entrenched that nothing can ever dislodge it. There are -dangers, however, in arguing too confidently from use and wont. -Conspicuous failure or disaster might bring {221} ruin on this revered -institution, as it has often done in history upon others no less -venerable. The Party System has its weak side. Its wares are mainly -make-believes, and if a hurricane happens to burst suddenly, the caucus -may be left in no better plight than Alnaschar with his overturned -basket. The Party System is not invulnerable against a great man or a -great idea. But of recent years it has been left at peace to go its -own way, for the reason that no such man or idea has emerged, around -which the English people have felt that they could cluster confidently. -There has been no core on which human crystals could precipitate and -attach themselves, following the bent of their nature towards a firm -and clear belief--or towards the prowess of a man--or towards a Man -possessed by a Belief. The typical party leader during this epoch has -neither been a man in the heroic sense, nor has he had any belief that -could be called firm or clear. For the most part he has been merely a -Whig or Tory tradesman, dealing in opportunism; and for the -predominance of the Party System this set of conditions was almost -ideal. It was inconceivable that a policy of wait-and-see could ever -resolve a situation of this sort. To fall back on lawyerism was -perhaps inevitable in the circumstances; but to think that it was -possible to substitute lawyerism for leadership was absurd. - -And yet amid this confusion we were aware--even at the time--and can -see much more clearly now the interlude is ended--that there were three -great ideas running through it all, struggling to emerge, to make -themselves understood, and to get themselves realised. But -unfortunately what were realities to ordinary men were only counters -according {222} to the reckoning of the party mechanicians. The -_first_ aim and the _second_--the improvement of the organisation of -society and the conditions of the poor--the freeing of local -aspirations and the knitting together of the empire--were held in -common by the great mass of the British people, although they were -viewed by one section and another from different angles of vision. The -_third_ aim, however--the adequate defence of the empire--was not -regarded warmly, or even with much active interest, by any organised -section. The people who considered it most earnestly were not engaged -in party politics. The manipulators of the machines looked upon the -_first_ and the _second_ as means whereby power might be gained or -retained, but they looked askance upon the _third_ as a perilous -problem which it was wiser and safer to leave alone. The great -principles with which the names--among others--of Mr. Chamberlain, Lord -Roberts, and Mr. Lloyd George are associated, were at no point opposed -one to another. Each indeed was dependent upon the other two for its -full realisation. And yet, under the artificial entanglements of the -Party System, the vigorous pursuit of any one of the three seemed to -imperil the success of both its competitors. - - - - -{223} - -CHAPTER III - -POLICY AND ARMAMENTS - -In the post-Victorian epoch, which we have been engaged in considering, -the aim of British foreign policy may be summed up in one -word--Security. It was not aggression; it was not revenge; it was not -conquest, or even expansion of territories; it was simply Security. - -It would be absurd, of course, to imagine that security is wholly, or -even mainly, a question of military preparations. "All this is but a -sheep in a lion's skin, where the people are of weak courage;" or where -for any reason, the people are divided among themselves or disaffected -towards their government. - -The defences of every nation are of two kinds, the organised and the -unorganised; the disciplined strength of the Navy and the Army on the -one hand, the vigour and spirit of the people upon the other. - -The vigour of the people will depend largely upon the conditions under -which they live, upon sufficiency of food, the healthiness or otherwise -of their employments and homes, the proper nourishment and upbringing -of their children. It is not enough that rates of wages should be -good, if those who earn them {224} have not the knowledge how to use -them to the best advantage. It is not always where incomes are lowest -that the conditions of life are worst. Measured by infant mortality, -and by the health and general happiness of the community, the crofters -of Scotland, who are very poor, seem to have learned the lesson _how to -live_ better than the highly paid workers in many of our great -manufacturing towns. - -Education--by which is meant not merely board-school instruction, but -the influence of the home and the surrounding society--is not a less -necessary condition of vigour than wages, sanitary regulations, and -such like. The spiritual as well as the physical training of children, -the nature of their amusements, the bent of their interests, the -character of their aims and ideals, at that critical period when the -boy or girl is growing into manhood or womanhood--all these are things -which conduce directly, as well as indirectly, to the vigour of the -race. They are every bit as much a part of our system of national -defence as the manoeuvring of army corps and the gun-practice of -dreadnoughts. - -The _spirit_ of the people, on the other hand, will depend for its -strength upon their attachment to their own country; upon their -affection for its customs, laws, and institutions; upon a belief in the -general fairness and justice of its social arrangements; upon the good -relations of the various classes of which society is composed. The -spirit of national unity is indispensable even in the case of the most -powerful autocracy. It is the very foundation of democracy. Lacking -it, popular government is but a house of cards, which the first serious -challenge from without, or the first strong outburst of {225} -discontent from within will bring tumbling to the ground. Such a -feeling of unity can only spring from the prevalence of an opinion -among every class of the community, that their own system, with all its -faults, is better suited to their needs, habits, and traditions than -any other, and that it is worth preserving, even at the cost of the -greatest sacrifices, from foreign conquest and interference. - -[Sidenote: A TWO-HEADED PRINCIPLE] - -While a people sapped by starvation and disease will be wanting in the -_vigour_ necessary for offering a prolonged and strenuous resistance, -so will a people, seething with class hatred and a sense of tyranny and -injustice, be wanting in the _spirit_. The problem, however, of these -unorganised defences, fundamental though it is, stands outside the -scope of the present chapter, which is concerned solely with those -defences which are organised. - - -The beginning of wisdom with respect to all problems of defence is the -recognition of the two-headed principle that _Policy depends on -Armaments just as certainly as Armaments depend on Policy_. - -The duty of the Admiralty and the War Office is to keep their armaments -abreast of the national endeavour. It is folly to do more: it is -madness to do less. The duty of the Foreign Minister is to restrain -and hold back his policy, and to prevent it from ambitiously outrunning -the capacity of the armaments which are at his disposal. If he does -otherwise the end is likely to be humiliation and disaster. - -When any nation is unable or unwilling to provide the armaments -necessary for supporting the policy which it has been accustomed to -pursue and would {226} like to maintain, it should have the sense to -abandon that policy for something of a humbler sort before the bluff is -discovered by the world.[1] - -It may possibly appear absurd to dwell with so much insistence upon a -pair of propositions which, when they are set down in black and white, -will at once be accepted as self-evident by ninety-nine men out of a -hundred. But plain and obvious as they are, none in the whole region -of politics have been more frequently ignored. These two principles -have been constantly presenting themselves to the eyes of statesmen in -a variety of different shapes ever since history began. - -It may very easily happen that the particular policy which the desire -for security requires, is one which the strength of the national -armaments at a given moment will not warrant the country in pursuing. -Faced with this unpleasant quandary, what is Government to do, if it be -convinced of the futility of trying to persuade the people to incur the -sacrifices necessary for realising the national aspirations? Is it to -give up the traditional policy, and face the various consequences which -it is reasonable to anticipate? Or is it to persevere in the policy, -and continue acting as if the forces at its disposal were sufficient -for its purpose, when in fact they are nothing of the kind? To follow -the former course {227} calls for a surrender which the spirit of the -people will not easily endure, and which may even be fatal to the -independent existence of the state. But to enter upon the latter is -conduct worthy of a fraudulent bankrupt, since it trades upon an -imposture, which, when it is found out by rival nations, will probably -be visited by still severer penalties. - -But surely Government has only to make it clear to the people that, -unless they are willing to bring their armaments abreast of their -policy, national aspirations must be baulked and even national safety -itself may be endangered. When men are made to understand these -things, will they not certainly agree to do what is necessary, though -they may give their consent with reluctance?[2] - -[Sidenote: POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES] - -It is very certain, however, that this outside view of the case -enormously underrates the difficulties which stare the politician out -of countenance. In matters of this sort it is not so easy a thing to -arrive at the truth; much less to state it with such force and -clearness that mankind will at once recognise it for truth, and what is -said to the contrary for falsehood. The intentions of foreign -governments, and the dangers arising out of that quarter, are subjects -which it is singularly difficult to discuss frankly, without incurring -the very evils which every government seeks to avoid. And if these -things are not easy to discuss, it is exceedingly easy for faction or -fanatics to misrepresent them.[3] Moreover, the lamentations of the -Hebrew prophets bear witness to the {228} deafness and blindness of -generations into whom actual experience of the evils foretold had not -already burnt the lesson which it was desired to teach. Evils which -have never been suffered are hard things to clothe with reality until -it is too late, and words, even the most eloquent and persuasive, are -but a poor implement for the task. - -The policy of a nation is determined upon, so as to accord with what it -conceives to be its honour, safety, and material interests. In the -natural course of events this policy may check, or be checked by, the -policy of some other nation. The efforts of diplomacy may be -successful in clearing away these obstructions. If so, well and good; -but if not, there is nothing left to decide the issue between the two -nations but the stern arbitrament of war. - -Moreover, diplomacy itself is dependent upon armaments in somewhat the -same sense as the prosperity of a merchant is dependent upon his credit -with his bankers. The news system of the world has undergone a -revolution since the days before steam and telegraphs. It is not -merely more rapid, but much ampler. The various governments are kept -far more fully informed of one another's affairs, and as a consequence -the great issues between nations have become clear and sharp. The most -crafty and smooth-tongued ambassador can rarely wheedle his opponents -into concessions which are contrary to their interests, unless he has -something more to rely upon than his own guile and plausibility. Army -corps and battle fleets looming in the distance are better persuaders -than the subtlest arguments and the deftest flattery. - -What, then, is the position of a statesman who {229} finds himself -confronted by a clash of policies, if, when the diplomatic deadlock -occurs, he realises that his armaments are insufficient to support his -aim? In such an event he is faced with the alternative of letting -judgment go by default, or of adding almost certain military disaster -to the loss of those political stakes for which his nation is -contending with its rival. Such a position must be ignominious in the -extreme; it might even be ruinous; and yet it would be the inevitable -fate of any country whose ministers had neglected the maxim that policy -in the last resort is dependent upon armaments. - -[Sidenote: EXAMPLE OF CHINA] - -If we are in search of an example we shall find it ready to our hand. -The Empire of China is comparable to our own at least in numbers; for -each of them contains, as nearly as may be, one quarter of the whole -human race. And as China has hitherto failed utterly to make her -armaments sufficient, under the stress of modern conditions, to support -even that meek and passive policy of possession which she has -endeavoured to pursue, so she has been compelled to watch in -helplessness while her policy has been disregarded by every adventurer. -She has been pressed by all the nations of the world and obliged to -yield to their demands. Humiliating concessions have been wrung from -her; favours even more onerous, in the shape of loans, have been forced -upon her. The resources with which nature has endowed her have been -exploited by foreigners against her will. Her lands have been shorn -from her and parcelled out among those who were strong, and who -hungered after them. This conquest and robbery has proceeded both by -wholesale and retail. {230} Because she yielded this to one claimant, -another, to keep the balance even, has insisted upon that. Safe and -convenient harbours, fortified places, islands, vast stretches of -territory, have been demanded and taken from her almost without a -struggle; and all this time she has abstained with a timid caution from -anything which can justly be termed provocation. For more than half a -century, none the less, China has not been mistress in her own house. - -The reason of this is plain enough--China had possessions which other -nations coveted, and she failed to provide herself with the armaments -which were necessary to maintain them. - -The British people likewise had possessions which other nations -coveted--lands to take their settlers, markets to buy their goods, -plantations to yield them raw materials. If it were our set -determination to hold what our forefathers won, two things were -necessary: the first, that our policy should conform to this aim; the -second, that our armaments should be sufficient to support our policy. - -A nation which desired to extend its possessions, to round off its -territories, to obtain access to the sea, would probably regard -conquest, or at all events absorption, as its highest immediate -interest. This would be the constant aim of its policy, and if its -armaments did not conform to this policy, the aim would not be -realised. Examples both of failure and success are to be found in the -history of Russia from the time of Peter the Great, and in that of -Prussia from the days of the Great Elector. - -A nation--like England or Holland in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and -eighteenth centuries--which {231} was seeking to secure against its -commercial rivals, if necessary by force of arms, new markets among -civilised but unmilitary races, would require a policy and armaments to -correspond. - -[Sidenote: BRITISH CONTENTMENT] - -The British Empire in the stage of development which it had reached at -the end of the Victorian era did not aim at acquisition of fresh -territories or new markets, save such as might be won peacefully by the -skill and enterprise of its merchants. It sought only to hold what it -already possessed, to develop its internal resources, and to retain -equal rights with its commercial rivals in neutral spheres. But in -order that those unaggressive objects might be realised, there was need -of a policy, different indeed from that of Elizabeth, of Cromwell, or -of Chatham, but none the less clear and definite with regard to its own -ends. And to support this policy there was need of armaments, suitable -in scale and character. - -It was frequently pointed out between the years 1901 and 1914 (and it -lay at the very root of the matter), that while we were perfectly -satisfied with things as they stood, and should have been more than -content--regarding the subject from the standpoint of our own -interests--to have left the map of the world for ever, as it then was -drawn, another nation was by no means so well pleased with existing -arrangements. To this envious rival it appeared that we had taken more -than our fair share--as people are apt to do who come early. We had -wider territories than we could yet fill with our own people; while our -neighbour foresaw an early date at which his race would be overflowing -its boundaries. We had limitless resources in the Dominions and -Dependencies {232} overseas, which when developed would provide a -united empire with markets of inestimable value. In these respects -Germany was in a less favourable position. Indeed, with the exceptions -of Russia and the United States, no other great Power was so -fortunately placed as ourselves; and even these two nations, although -they had an advantage over the British Empire by reason of their huge -compact and coterminous territories, still did not equal it in the -vastness and variety of their undeveloped resources. - -Clearly, therefore, the policy which the needs of our Commonwealth -required at this great turning-point in its history, was not only -something different from that of any other great Power, but also -something different from that which had served our own purposes in -times gone by. Like China, our aim was peaceful possession. Unlike -China, we ought to have kept in mind the conditions under which alone -this aim was likely to be achieved. It might be irksome and contrary -to our peaceful inclinations to maintain great armaments when we no -longer dreamed of making conquests; but in the existing state of the -world, armaments were unfortunately quite as necessary for the purpose -of enabling us to hold what we possessed, as they ever were when our -forefathers set out to win the Empire. - -[Sidenote: COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE] - -In 1904, with the object of promoting harmony between the policy and -armaments of the British Empire, Mr. Balfour created the Committee of -Imperial Defence. This was undoubtedly a step of great importance. -His purpose was to introduce a system, by means of which ministers and -high officials responsible for the Navy and Army would {233} be kept in -close touch with the trend of national policy, in so far as it might -affect the relations of the Commonwealth with foreign Powers. In like -manner those other ministers and high officials, whose business it was -to conduct our diplomacy, maintain an understanding with the Dominions, -administer our Dependencies, and govern India, would be made thoroughly -conversant with the limitations to our naval and military strength. -Having this knowledge, they would not severally embark on -irreconcilable or impracticable projects or drift unknowingly into -dangerous complications. The conception of the Committee of Imperial -Defence, therefore, was due to a somewhat tardy recognition of the -two-headed principle, that armaments are mere waste of money unless -they conform to policy, and that policy in the last resort must depend -on armaments. - -The Committee was maintained by Mr. Balfour's successors, and was not -allowed (as too often happens when there is a change of government) to -fall into discredit and disuse.[4] But in order that this body of -statesmen and experts might achieve the ends in view, it was essential -for them to have realised clearly, not only the general object of -British policy--which indeed was contained in the single word -'Security'--but also the special dangers which loomed in the near -future. They had then to consider what reciprocal obligations had -already been contracted with other nations, whose interests were to -some extent the same as our own, and what further undertakings of a -similar character it might be desirable to enter {234} into. Finally, -there were the consequences which these obligations and undertakings -would entail in certain contingencies. It was not enough merely to -mumble the word 'Security' and leave it at that. What security implied -in the then existing state of the world was a matter which required to -be investigated in a concrete, practical, and business-like way. - -Unfortunately, the greater part of these essential preliminaries was -omitted, and as a consequence, the original idea of the Committee of -Imperial Defence was never realised. Harmonious, flexible, and of -considerable utility in certain directions, it did not work -satisfactorily as a whole. The trend of policy was, no doubt, grasped -in a general way; but, as subsequent events have proved, the conditions -on which alone that line could be maintained, and the consequences -which it involved, were not at any time clearly understood and boldly -faced by this august body in its corporate capacity. - -The general direction may have been settled; but certainly the course -was not marked out; the rocks and shoals remained for the most part -uncharted. The committee, no doubt, had agreed upon a certain number -of vague propositions, as, for example, that France must not be crushed -by Germany, or the neutrality of Belgium violated by any one. They -knew that we were committed to certain obligations--or, as some people -called them, 'entanglements'--and that these again, in certain -circumstances, might commit us to others. But what the whole amounted -to was not realised in barest outline, by the country, or by -Parliament, or by the Government, or even, we may safely conjecture, by -the Committee itself. {235} We have the right to say this, because, if -British policy had been realised as a whole by the Committee of -Imperial Defence, it would obviously have been communicated to the -Cabinet, and in its broader aspects to the people; and this was never -done. It is inconceivable that any Prime Minister, who believed, as -Mr. Asquith does, in democratic principles, would have left the country -uneducated, and his own colleagues unenlightened, on a matter of so -great importance, had his own mind been clearly made up. - -[Sidenote: CONFUSION WHEN WAR OCCURRED] - -When the crisis occurred in July 1914, when Germany proceeded to -action, when events took place which for years past had been foretold -and discussed very fully on both sides of the North Sea, it was as if a -bolt had fallen from the blue. Uncertainty was apparent in all -quarters. The very thing which had been so often talked of had -happened. Germany was collecting her armies and preparing to crush -France. The neutrality of Belgium was threatened. Yet up to, and on, -Sunday, August 2, there was doubt and hesitation in the Cabinet, and -until some days later, also in Parliament and the country.[5] - -When, finally, it was decided to declare war, the course of action -which that step required still appears to have remained obscure to our -rulers. Until the Thursday following it was not decided to send the -Expeditionary Force abroad. Then, out of timidity, only two-thirds of -it were sent.[6] Transport arrangements which were all ready for -moving the whole force had to be hastily readjusted. The delay was -{236} not less injurious than the parsimony; and the combination of the -two nearly proved fatal. - -If the minds of the people and their leaders were not prepared for what -happened, if in the moral sense there was unreadiness; still more -inadequate were all preparations of the material kind--not only the -actual numbers of our Army, but also the whole system for providing -expansion, training, equipment, and munitions. It is asking too much -of us to believe that events could have happened as they did in England -during the fortnight which followed the presentation of the Austrian -Ultimatum to Servia, had the Committee of Imperial Defence and its -distinguished president taken pains beforehand to envisage clearly the -conditions and consequences involved in their policy of 'Security.' - -As regards naval preparations, things were better indeed than might -have been expected, considering the vagueness of ideas in the matter of -policy. We were safeguarded here by tradition, and the general idea of -direction had been nearly sufficient. There was always trouble, but -not as a rule serious trouble, in establishing the case for increases -necessary to keep ahead of German efforts. There had been pinchings -and parings--especially in the matter of fast cruisers, for lack of -which, when war broke out, we suffered heavy losses--but except in one -instance--the abandonment of the Cawdor programme--these had not -touched our security at any vital point. - -Thanks largely to Mr. Stead, but also to statesmen of both parties, and -to a succession of Naval Lords who did not hesitate, when occasion -required it, to risk their careers (as faithful servants ever will) -rather than certify safety where they saw danger--thanks, {237} -perhaps, most of all to a popular instinct, deeply implanted in the -British mind, which had grasped the need for supremacy at sea--our -naval preparations, upon the whole, had kept abreast of our policy for -nearly thirty years. - -As regards the Army, however, it was entirely different. There had -been no intelligent effort to keep our military strength abreast of our -policy; and as, in many instances, it would have been too bitter a -humiliation to keep our policy within the limits of our military -strength, the course actually pursued can only be described fitly as a -game of bluff. - -There had never been anything approaching agreement with regard to the -functions which the Army was expected to perform. Not only did -political parties differ one from another upon this primary and -fundamental question, but hardly two succeeding War Ministers had -viewed it in the same light. There had been schemes of a bewildering -variety; but as the final purpose for which soldiers existed had never -yet been frankly laid down and accepted, each of these plans in turn -had been discredited by attacks, which called in question the very -basis of the proposed reformation. - -[Sidenote: THE NAVAL POSITION] - -While naval policy had been framed and carried out in accordance with -certain acknowledged necessities of national existence, military policy -had been alternately expanded and deflated in order to assuage the -anxieties, while conforming to the prejudices--real or supposed--of the -British public. In the case of the fleet, we had very fortunately -arrived, more than a generation ago, at the point where it was a -question of what the country needed; as regards the {238} Army, it was -still a question of what the country would stand. But how could even a -politician know what the country would stand until the full case had -been laid before the country? How was it that while Ministers of both -parties had the courage to put the issue more or less nakedly in the -matter of ships, they grew timid as soon as the discussion turned on -army corps? If the needs of the Commonwealth were to be the touchstone -in the one case, why not also in the other? The country will stand a -great deal more than the politicians think; and it will stand almost -anything better than vacillation, evasion, and untruth. In army -matters, unfortunately, it has had experience of little else since the -battle of Waterloo. - -Mathematicians, metaphysicians, and economists have a fondness for what -is termed 'an assumption.' They take for granted something which it -would be inconvenient or impossible to prove, and thereupon proceed to -build upon it a fabric which compels admiration in a less or greater -degree, by reason of its logical consistency. There is no great harm -in this method so long as the conclusions, which are drawn from the -airy calculations of the study, are confined to the peaceful region of -their birth; but so soon as they begin to sally forth into the harsh -world of men and affairs, they are apt to break at once into shivers. -When the statesman makes an assumption he does so at his peril; or, -perhaps, to speak more correctly, at the peril of his country. For if -it be a false assumption the facts will speedily find it out, and -disasters will inevitably ensue. - -[Sidenote: TWO INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS] - -Our Governments, Tory and Radical alike, have {239} acted in recent -times as if the British Army were what their policy required it to -be--something, that is, entirely different from what it really was. -Judging by its procedure, the Foreign Office would appear to have made -the singularly bold assumption that, in a military comparison with -other nations, Britain was still in much the same relative position as -in the days of Napoleon. Sustained by this tenacious but fantastic -tradition, Ministers have not infrequently engaged in policies which -wiser men would have avoided. They have uttered protests, warnings, -threats which have gone unheeded. They have presumed to say what would -and would not be tolerated in certain spheres; but having nothing -better behind their despatches than a mere assumption which did not -correspond with the facts, they have been compelled to endure rebuffs -and humiliations. As they had not the prudence to cut their coat -according to their cloth, it was only natural that occasionally they -should have had to appear before the world in a somewhat ridiculous -guise. - -British statesmen for nearly half a century had persisted in acting -upon two most dangerous assumptions. They had assumed that one branch -of the national armaments conformed to their policy, when in fact it -did not. And they had assumed also, which is equally fatal, that -policy, if only it be virtuous and unaggressive, is in some mysterious -way self-supporting, and does not need to depend on armaments at all. - -The military preparations of Britain were inadequate to maintain the -policy of Security, which British Governments had nevertheless been -engaged in pursuing for many years prior to the outbreak of {240} the -present war.[7] On the other hand, the abandonment of this policy was -incompatible with the continuance of the Empire. We could not hope to -hold our scattered Dependencies and to keep our Dominions safe against -encroachments unless we were prepared to incur the necessary sacrifices. - - - -[1] American writers have urged criticism of this sort against the -armaments of the U.S.A., which they allege are inadequate to uphold the -policy of the 'Monroe Doctrine.' The German view of the matter has -been stated by the Chancellor (April 7, 1913) when introducing the Army -Bill:--"History knows of no people which came to disaster because it -had exhausted itself in the making of its defences; but history knows -of many peoples which have perished, because, living in prosperity and -luxury, they neglected their defences. A people which thinks that it -is not rich enough to maintain its armaments shows merely that it has -played its part." - -[2] So the argument runs, and the course of our naval policy since Mr. -Stead's famous press campaign in 1884 will be cited as an encouragement. - -[3] _E.g._ in the winter of 1908 and spring of 1909, when an -influential section of the supporters of the present Cabinet chose to -believe the false assurances of the German Admiralty, and freely -accused their own Government of mendacity. - -[4] Innovations of this particular sort have possibly a better chance -of preserving their existence than some others. 'Boards are screens,' -wrote John Stuart Mill, or some other profound thinker; and in politics -screens are always useful. - -[5] This is obvious from the White Paper without seeking further -evidence in the ministerial press or elsewhere. - -[6] Of the six infantry divisions included in the Expeditionary Force -only four were sent in the first instance; a fifth arrived about August -24; a sixth about mid-September. - -[7] "Our Army, as a belligerent factor in European politics, is almost -a negligible quantity. This Empire is at all times practically -defenceless beyond its first line. Such an Empire invites war. Its -assumed security amid the armaments of Europe, and now of Asia, is -insolent and provocative" (Lord Roberts, October 22, 1912). Nothing -indeed is more insolent and provocative, or more likely to lead to a -breach of the peace, than undefended riches among armed men. - - - - -{241} - -CHAPTER IV - -THE BALANCE OF POWER - -During the whole period of rather more than thirteen years--which has -been referred to in previous pages as the post-Victorian epoch, and -which extended roughly from January 1901, when Queen Victoria died, to -July 1914, when war was declared--the British Army remained inadequate -for the purpose of upholding that policy which British statesmen of -both parties, and the British people, both at home and in the -Dominions, were engaged in pursuing--whether they knew it or not--and -were bound to pursue, unless they were prepared to sacrifice their -independence. - -The aim of that policy was the security of the whole empire. This much -at any rate was readily conceded on all hands. It was not enough, -however, that we approved the general aim of British policy. A broad -but clear conception of the means by which our Government hoped to -maintain this policy, and the sacrifices which the country would have -to make in order to support this policy, was no less necessary. So -soon, however, as we began to ask for further particulars, we found -ourselves in the region of acute controversy. 'Security' was a -convenient political formula, which could be accepted as readily by the -{242} man who placed his trust in international law, as by his -neighbour who believed in battle fleets and army corps. - -In considering this question of security we could not disregard Europe, -for Europe was still the storm-centre of the world. We could not -afford to turn a blind eye towards the ambitions and anxieties of the -great continental Powers. We were bound to take into account not only -their visions but their nightmares. We could not remain indifferent to -their groupings and alliances, or to the strength and dispositions of -their armaments. - -That the United Kingdom was a pair of islands lying on the western edge -of Europe, and that the rest of the British Empire was remote, and -unwilling to be interested in the rivalries of the Teuton, Slav, and -Latin races, did not affect the matter in the least. Nowadays no -habitable corner of the earth is really remote; and as for willingness -or unwillingness to be interested, that had nothing at all to do with -the question. For it was clear that any Power, which succeeded in -possessing itself of the suzerainty of Europe, could redraw the map of -the world at its pleasure, and blow the Monroe Doctrine, no less than -the British Empire, sky-high. - -Looking across thousands of leagues of ocean, it was difficult for the -Dominions and the United States to understand how their fortunes, and -the ultimate fate of their cherished institutions, could possibly be -affected by the turmoil and jealousies of--what appeared in their eyes -to be--a number of reactionary despotisms and chauvinistic democracies. -Even the hundred and twenty leagues which separate Hull from Emden, or -the seven which divide Dover from Calais, were enough to convince many -people {243} in the United Kingdom that we could safely allow Europe to -'stew in her own juice.' But unfortunately for this theory, unless a -great continental struggle ended like the battle of the Kilkenny cats, -the outside world was likely to find itself in an awkward predicament, -when the conqueror chose to speak with it in the gates, at a time of -his own choosing. - -British policy since 1901 had tended, with ever increasing -self-consciousness, towards the definite aim of preventing Germany from -acquiring the suzerainty of Western Europe. It was obvious that German -predominance, if secured, must ultimately force the other continental -nations, either into a German alliance, or into a neutrality favourable -to German interests. German policy would then inevitably be directed -towards encroachments upon British possessions. Germany had already -boldly proclaimed her ambitions overseas. Moreover, she would find it -pleasanter to compensate, and soothe the susceptibilities of those -nations whom she had overcome in diplomacy or war, and to reward their -subsequent services as allies and friendly neutrals, by paying them out -of our property rather than out of her own. For this reason, if for no -other, we were deeply concerned that Germany should not dominate Europe -if we could help it. - -[Sidenote: GERMAN AIMS] - -During this period, on the other hand, Germany appeared to be setting -herself more and more seriously to acquire this domination. Each -succeeding year her writers expressed themselves in terms of greater -candour and confidence. Her armaments were following her policy. The -rapid creation of a fleet--the counterpart of the greatest army in -Europe--and the recent additions to the striking power of her {244} -already enormous army could have no other object. Certainly from 1909 -onwards, it was impossible to regard German preparations as anything -else than a challenge, direct or indirect, to the security of the -British Empire. - -Consequently the direction of British policy returned, gradually, -unavowedly, but with certainty, to its old lines, and became once more -concerned with the maintenance of the _Balance of Power_ as the prime -necessity. The means adopted were the Triple Entente between Britain, -France, and Russia. The object of this understanding was to resist the -anticipated aggressions of the Triple Alliance, wherein Germany was the -predominant partner. - -[Sidenote: DERELICT MAXIMS] - -The tendency of phrases, as they grow old, is to turn into totems, for -and against which political parties, and even great nations, fight -unreasoningly. But before we either yield our allegiance to any of -these venerable formulas, or decide to throw it out on the scrap-heap, -there are advantages in looking to see whether or not there is some -underlying meaning which may be worth attending to. It occasionally -happens that circumstances have changed so much since the original idea -was first crystallised in words, that the old saying contains no value -or reality whatsoever for the present generation. More often, however, -there is something of permanent importance behind, if only we can -succeed in tearing off the husk of prejudice in which it has become -encased. So, according to Disraeli, "the _divine right_ of Kings may -have been a plea for feeble tyrants, but the divine right of government -is the keystone of human progress." For many years the phrase _British -interests_, which used to figure so largely in speeches {245} and -leading articles, has dropped out of use, because it had come to be -associated unfavourably with bond-holders' dividends. The fact that it -also implied national honour and prestige, the performance of duties -and the burden of responsibilities was forgotten. Even the doctrine of -_laissez faire_, which politicians of all parties have lately agreed to -abjure and contemn, has, as regards industrial affairs, a large kernel -of practical wisdom and sound policy hidden away in it. But of all -these derelict maxims, that which until quite recently, appeared to be -suffering from the greatest neglect, was the need for maintaining the -_Balance of Power_ in Europe. For close on two generations it had -played no overt part in public controversy, except when some Tory -matador produced it defiantly as a red rag to infuriate the Radical -bull. - -If this policy of the maintenance of the _Balance of Power_ has been -little heard of since Waterloo, the reason is that since then, until -quite recently, the _Balance of Power_ has never appeared to be -seriously threatened.[1] And because the policy of maintaining this -balance was in abeyance, many people have come to believe that it was -discredited. Because it was not visibly and actively in use it was -supposed to have become entirely useless. - -This policy can never become useless. It must inevitably come into -play, so soon as any Power appears to be aiming at the mastery of the -continent. It will ever remain a matter of life or death, to the -United Kingdom and to the British Empire, that no continental state -shall be allowed to obtain {246} command, directly or indirectly, of -the resources, diplomacy, and armaments of Europe. - -In the sixteenth century we fought Philip of of Spain to prevent him -from acquiring European predominance. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, -and nineteenth centuries we fought Louis XIV., Louis XV., and Napoleon -for the same reason. In order to preserve the balance of power, and -with it our own security, it was our interest under Elizabeth to -prevent the Netherlands from being crushed by Spain. Under later -monarchs it was our interest to prevent the Netherlands, the lesser -German States, Prussia, Austria, and finally the whole of Europe from -being crushed by France. And we can as ill afford to-day to allow -France to be crushed by Germany, or Holland and Belgium to fall into -her power. The wheel has come round full circle, but the essential -British interest remains constant. - -The wheel is always turning, sometimes slowly, sometimes with startling -swiftness. Years hence the present alliances will probably be -discarded. It may be that some day the danger of a European -predominance will appear from a different quarter--from one of our -present allies, or from some upstart state which may rise to power with -an even greater rapidity than the Electorate of Brandenburg. Or it may -be that before long the New World, in fact as well as phrase, may have -come in to redress the balance of the Old. We cannot say, because we -cannot foresee what the future holds in store. But from the opening of -the present century, the immediate danger came from Germany, who hardly -troubled to conceal the fact that she was aiming at predominance by -mastery of the Low Countries and by crushing France. - -{247} - -[Sidenote: CONDITIONS OF BRITISH FREEDOM] - -That this danger was from time to time regarded seriously by a section -of the British Cabinet, we know from their own statements both before -war broke out and subsequently. It was no chimera confined to the -imaginations of irresponsible and panic-stricken writers. In sober -truth the balance of power in Europe was in as much danger, and the -maintenance of it had become as supreme a British interest, under a -Liberal government at the beginning of the twentieth century, as it -ever was under a Whig government at the close of the seventeenth and -opening of the eighteenth. - -The stealthy return of this doctrine into the region of practical -politics was not due to the prejudices of the party which happened to -be in power. Quite the contrary. Most Liberals distrusted the phrase. -The whole mass of the Radicals abhorred it. The idea which lay under -and behind the phrase was nevertheless irresistible, because it arose -out of the facts. Had a Socialist Government held office, this policy -must equally have imposed itself and been accepted with a good or ill -grace, for the simple reason that, unless the balance of power is -maintained in Europe, there can be no security for British freedom, -under which we mean, with God's help, to work out our own problems in -our own way. - -English statesmen had adopted this policy in fact, if -unavowedly--perhaps even to some extent unconsciously--when they first -entered into, and afterwards confirmed, the Triple Entente. And having -once entered into the Triple Entente it was obvious that, without -risking still graver consequences, we could never resume the detached -position which we occupied before we took that step. It is difficult -to {248} believe--seeing how the danger of German predominance -threatened France and Russia as well as ourselves--that we should not -have excited the ill-will of those two countries had we refused to make -common cause by joining the Triple Entente. It was obvious, however, -to every one that we could not afterwards retire from this association -without incurring their hostility. If we had withdrawn we should have -been left, not merely without a friend in Europe, but with all the -chief Powers in Europe our enemies--ready upon the first favourable -occasion to combine against us. - -There is only one precedent in our history for so perilous a -situation--when Napoleon forced Europe into a combination against us in -1806. And this precedent, though it then threatened our Empire with -grave dangers, did not threaten it with dangers comparable in gravity -with those which menaced us a century later. - -The consequences of breaking away from the Triple Entente were -sufficiently plain. "We may build ships against one nation, or even -against a combination of nations. But we cannot build ships against -half Europe. If Western Europe, with all its ports, its harbours, its -arsenals, and its resources, was to fall under the domination of a -single will, no effort of ours would be sufficient to retain the -command of the sea. It is a balance of power on the continent, which -alone makes it possible for us to retain it. Thus the maintenance of -the balance of power is vital to our superiority at sea, which again is -vital to the security of the British Empire."[2] - -{249} - -Security in the widest sense was the ultimate end of our -policy--security of mind, security from periodic panic, as well as -actual military security. Looked at more closely, the immediate end -was defence--the defence of the British Empire and of the United -Kingdom. - -[Sidenote: DEFENCE AND INVASION] - -In the existing condition of the world a policy of 'splendid isolation' -was no longer possible. Conditions with which we are familiar in -commercial affairs, had presented themselves in the political sphere, -and co-operation on a large scale had become necessary in order to -avoid bankruptcy. England had entered into the Triple Entente because -her statesmen realised, clearly or vaguely, that by doing so we should -be better able to defend our existence, and for no other reason. - -After 1911 it must have been obvious to most people who considered the -matter carefully that in certain events the Triple Entente would become -an alliance. It is the interest as well as the duty of allies to stand -by one another from first to last, and act together in the manner most -likely to result in victory for the alliance. What then was the manner -of co-operation most likely to result in victory for that alliance -which lay dormant under the Triple Entente? - -But first of all, to clear away one obscurity--_Invasion_ was not our -problem; _Defence_ was our problem; for the greater included the less. - -The word 'defence' is apt to carry different meanings to different -minds. The best defence of England and British interests, at any given -time, may or may not consist in keeping our main army in the United -Kingdom and waiting to be attacked here. It all depends upon the -special circumstances {250} of each case. The final decision must be -governed by one consideration, and one only--how to strike the -speediest, heaviest, and most disabling blow at the aggressor. If by -keeping our army in England and endeavouring to lure the enemy into our -toils, that end is most likely to be accomplished, then it is obviously -best to keep our army here. If by sending it into the north of France -to combine with the French the supreme military object has a superior -chance of being achieved, then it is best to send it into the north of -France. - -A defensive war cannot be defined and circumscribed as a war to drive -out invaders, or even to prevent the landing of invaders. The best way -to defend your castle may be to man the walls, to fall upon the enemy -at the ford, to harry his lands, or even to attack him in his castle. -There is no fixed rule. The circumstances in each case make the rule. - -[Sidenote: CO-OPERATION WITH FRANCE] - -A war is not less a defensive war if you strike at your enemy in his -own territory, or if you come to the aid of your ally, whose territory -has been invaded or is threatened. In the circumstances which -prevailed for a considerable number of years prior to the outbreak of -the present war, it gradually became more and more obvious, that our -soundest defence would be joint action with France upon her -north-eastern frontier. For there, beyond any doubt, would Germany's -supreme effort be made against the Triple Entente. If the attack -failed at that point, it would be the heaviest and most disabling blow -which our enemy could suffer. If, on the other hand, it succeeded, -France and England would have to continue the struggle on terms -immensely less favourable. - -{251} - -This opinion was not by any means unanimously or clearly held; but -during the summer of 1911 and subsequently, it was undoubtedly the -hypothesis upon which those members of our Government relied, who were -chiefly responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. Unfortunately -Parliament and the country had never accepted either the policy or its -consequences; they had never been asked to accept either the one or the -other; nor had they been educated with a view to their acceptance. - -At that time the error was exceedingly prevalent, that it is a more -comfortable business fighting in your own country than in somebody -else's. From this it followed that it would be folly to engage in what -were termed disapprovingly 'foreign adventures,' and that we should be -wise to await attack behind our own shores. Recent events have wrought -such a complete and rapid conversion from this heresy, that it is no -longer worth while wasting words in exposing it. It is necessary, -however, to recall how influential this view of the matter was, not -only up to the declaration of war, but even for some time afterwards. - -As to the precise form of co-operation between the members of the -Triple Entente in case of war, there could be no great mystery. It was -obvious to any one who paid attention to what happened during the -summer and autumn of 1911, that in the event of Germany attacking -France over the Agadir dispute, we had let it be understood and -expected, that we should send our Expeditionary Force across the -Channel to co-operate with the French army on the north-eastern -frontier. - - - -[1] It can hardly be overlooked, however, that this principle, rightly -or wrongly interpreted, had something to do with the Crimean War -(1854-56) and with the British attitude at the Congress of Berlin -(1878). - -[2] Viscount Milner in the _United Service Magazine_, January 1912. - - - - -{252} - -CHAPTER V - -THE MILITARY SITUATION - -(August 1911) - -The full gravity of the Agadir incident, though apparent to other -nations, was never realised by the people of this country. The crisis -arose suddenly in July 1911. Six weeks later it had subsided; but it -was not until well on in the autumn that its meanings were grasped, -even by that comparatively small section of the public who interest -themselves in problems of defence and foreign affairs. From October -onwards, however, an increasing number began to awake to the fact, that -war had only been avoided by inches, and to consider seriously--many of -them for the first time in their lives--what would have happened if -England had become involved in a European conflict. - -[Sidenote: THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE] - -From various official statements, and from discussions which from time -to time had taken place in Parliament, it was understood that our -'Expeditionary Force' consisted of six infantry divisions, a cavalry -division, and army troops;[1] also that the national resources -permitted of this force being kept up to full strength for a period of -at least six months, after making all reasonable deductions for the -wastage of {253} war. Was this enough? Enough for what? ... To uphold -British policy; to preserve Imperial security; to enable the Triple -Entente to maintain the balance of power in Europe. These were vague -phrases; what did they actually amount to? ... The adequacy or -inadequacy of such an army as this for doing what was required of -it--for securing speedy victory in event of war--or still better for -preserving peace by the menace which it opposed to German schemes of -aggression--can only be tested by considering the broad facts with -regard to numbers, efficiency, and readiness of all the armies which -would be engaged directly, or indirectly, in a European struggle. - -War, however, had been avoided in 1911, and not a few people were -therefore convinced that the menace of the available British army, -together with the other consequences to be apprehended from the -participation of this country, had been sufficient to deter Germany -from pursuing her schemes of aggression, if indeed she had actually -harboured any notions of the kind. But others, not altogether -satisfied with this explanation and conclusion, were inclined to press -their enquiries somewhat further. Supposing war had actually been -declared, would the British force have been sufficient--acting in -conjunction with the French army--to repel a German invasion of France -and Belgium, to hurl back the aggressors and overwhelm them in defeat? -Would it have been sufficient to accomplish the more modest aim of -holding the enemy at his own frontiers, or even--supposing that by a -swift surprise he had been able to overrun Belgium--at any rate to keep -him out of France? - -{254} - -When people proceeded to seek for answers to these questions, as many -did during the year 1912, they speedily discovered that, in -considerations of this sort, the governing factor is numbers--the -numbers of the opposing forces available at the outbreak of war and in -the period immediately following. The tremendous power of national -spirit must needs be left out of such calculations as a thing -immeasurable, imponderable, and uncertain. It was also unsafe to -assume that the courage, intelligence, efficiency, armament, transport, -equipment, supplies, and leadership of the German and Austrian armies -would be in any degree inferior to those of the Triple Entente. -Certain things had to be allowed for in a rough and ready way;[2] but -the main enquiry was forced to concern itself with numerical strength. - -There was not room for much disagreement upon the broad facts of the -military situation, among soldiers and civilians who, from 1911 -onwards, gave themselves to the study of this subject at the available -sources of information; and their estimates have been confirmed, in the -main, by what has happened since war began. The Intelligence -departments of London, Paris, and Petrograd--with much ampler means of -knowledge at their disposal--can have arrived at no other conclusions. -What the English War Office knew, the Committee of Imperial Defence -likewise knew; and the leading members of the Cabinet, if not the whole -Government, must be presumed to have been equally well informed. - -It was assumed in these calculations, that in case of tension between -the Triple Entente and the Triple {255} Alliance, the latter would not -be able--in the first instance at all events--to bring its full -strength into the struggle. For unless Germany and Austria managed -their diplomacy before the outbreak of hostilities with incomparable -skill, it seemed improbable that the Italian people would consent to -engage in a costly, and perhaps ruinous, war--a war against France, -with whom they had no quarrel; against England, towards whom they had -long cherished feelings of friendship; on behalf of the Habsburg -Empire, which they still regarded--and not altogether -unreasonably--with suspicion and enmity. - -[Sidenote: NEUTRALITY OF ITALY] - -But although the neutrality of Italy might be regarded as a likelihood -at the opening of the war, it could not be reckoned on with any -certainty as a permanent condition. For as no one can forecast the -course of a campaign, so no one can feel secure that the unexpected may -not happen at any moment. The consequences of a defeat in this quarter -or in that, may offer too great temptations to the cupidity of -onlookers; while diplomacy, though it may have bungled in the -beginning, is sure to have many opportunities of recovering its -influence as the situation develops. Consequently, unless and until -Italy actually joined in the struggle on the side of the Triple -Entente, a considerable section of the French army would, in common -prudence, have to be left on guard upon the Savoy frontier. - -In a war brought on by the aggressive designs of Germany, the only -nations whose participation could be reckoned on with certainty--and -this only supposing that Britain stood firmly by the policy upon which -her Government had embarked--were Russia, {256} France, and ourselves -on the one side, Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. - -It would certainly be necessary for Germany, as well as Austria, to -provide troops for coast defences, and also for the frontiers of -neutral countries, which might have the temptation, in certain -circumstances, to deneutralise themselves at an inconvenient moment, if -they were left unwatched. On the north and west were Denmark, Holland, -and Belgium, each of which had a small field army, besides garrison and -fortress troops which might be turned to more active account upon an -emergency. On the south and east were Montenegro, Servia, and -Roumania, whose military resources were on a considerable scale, and -whose neutrality was not a thing altogether to be counted on, even -before the Balkan war[3] had lowered the prestige of Turkey. In -addition there was Italy, who although a pledged ally in a defensive -war was not likely, for that reason, to consider herself bound to -neutrality, benevolent or otherwise, if in her judgment, the particular -contingencies which called for her support had not arisen at the outset. - -[Sidenote: SUPERIORITY OF GERMAN NUMBERS] - -After taking such precautions as seemed prudent under these heads, -Germany would then be obliged to detach for service, in co-operation -with the Austrians in Poland, and along the whole eastern border, a -sufficient number of army corps to secure substantial superiority over -the maximum forces which Russia, hampered by an inadequate railway -system and various military considerations,[4] could {257} be expected -to bring into the field and maintain there during the first few months -of the war. - - -It was reckoned[5] after taking all these things into account, that -Germany would have available, for the invasion of France, an army -consisting of some ninety divisions--roughly, rather more than a -million and three-quarters of men--and that she could maintain this -force at its full strength--repairing the wastage of war out of her -ample reserves--for a period of at least six months. It was assumed -that the Kaiser, relying upon the much slower mobilisation of Russia, -would undoubtedly decide to use the whole of this huge force in the -west, in the hope that before pressure could begin to make itself felt -in the east, France would either have been crushed, as she was in 1870, -or so much mangled that it would be possible to send reinforcements of -an overwhelming character to make victory secure in Poland. - -Against this German force of 1,800,000, France, according to the best -information available, could put into the field and maintain at full -strength for a similar period of six months about 1,300,000 men. But -this was the utmost that could be expected of the French, and the -initial discrepancy of 500,000 men was very serious. It precluded all -reasonable hope on their part of being able to take the offensive, to -which form of warfare the genius of the people was most adapted. It -would compel them to remain on the defensive, for which it was believed -at that {258} time--though wrongly, as events have proved--that they -were ill suited by temperament as well as tradition. - -If England joined in the war by land as well as sea the numerical -deficiency would be reduced to 340,000 on the arrival of our -Expeditionary Force. In this connection, as well as for other reasons, -the attitude of Holland and Belgium, and that of Germany with respect -to these two countries, were clearly matters of high importance. - -Holland had a field army of four divisions, and her interests could be -summed up in the words, 'preservation of independence.' She would -naturally wish to avoid being actively embroiled in the war on one side -or the other; and, fortunately for her, she had every reason to believe -that her neutrality would not be disturbed or questioned. Her -territories lay to one side of the probable campaign area, and -moreover, whatever might be the ulterior designs of Germany with regard -to western expansion, it was obvious that her immediate interests must -necessarily lie in Dutch neutrality, which would be infinitely more -useful to her than a Dutch alliance. For Holland holds the mouths of -the Scheldt and Rhine, and so long as she remained neutral, it was -anticipated that imports and exports would readily find their way into -and out of Germany. This advantage would cease were Britain to -establish a blockade of these inlets, as she would certainly do if they -belonged to a hostile Power. - -[Sidenote: POSITION OF BELGIUM] - -In certain respects Belgium was in the same case as Holland. She -likewise had a field army of four divisions, and her interests could be -summed up in the words, 'preservation of independence.' But {259} here -all resemblance between the two countries ended. - -Belgium was not merely the southern portion (Holland being the -northern) of that Naboth's vineyard, the possession of which German -visionaries had proclaimed to be essential to Teutonic world-power. -Belgium was more even than this. If the permanent possession of -Belgian territory was a political object in the future, temporary -occupation was no less a military necessity of the present. For in -order that Germany might benefit in full measure by her numerical -superiority, Belgian roads and railways were required, along which to -transport her troops, and Belgian hills and plains on which to deploy -them. If Germany were confined to the use of her own frontiers she -would not only lose in swiftness of attack, but her legions would be -piled up, one behind another, like a crowd coming out of a theatre. -She needed space on which to spread out her superior numbers in order -that her superior numbers might make certain of victory. - -There was an idea at this time (1911-12) that Germany would be -satisfied to keep to the south-east of the fortified line of the -Meuse--moving through Luxemburg and the mountains of the Ardennes--and -that if Belgium saw fit to yield, under protest, to _force majeure_, -the northern region, containing the great plain of Flanders and all -cities of importance, would be left inviolate. This theory was -probably erroneous, for the reason that--as the event has -shown--Germany required a greater space and more favourable ground, -than would have been provided under this arrangement, in order to bring -her great superiority to bear. - -{260} - -With the French on the other hand there was no similar advantage to be -gained by the violation of Belgian neutrality. From their point of -view the shorter the battle front could be kept the better. If Belgium -chose to range herself by the side of France as a willing ally it would -undoubtedly be a great gain; but if she chose to remain neutral the -French could have no object in invading or occupying her territories. - -It was assumed, and no doubt rightly, that, like Holland, Belgium would -prefer to remain neutral--leaving the question of future absorption to -take care of itself--provided she could do this without enduring the -humiliation of allowing foreign armies to violate her soil. For she -knew that, in the event of a French victory, her independence would -remain assured; whereas, if the Germans were successful, she would have -avoided awakening their hostility and giving them an excuse for -annexation. But even if Belgium, under gross provocation, were forced -to take sides against Germany, the deficit in numbers on the side of -the Triple Entente would only be reduced by some eighty or a hundred -thousand men. The deficit would still stand, roughly, at a quarter of -a million men. - - -[Sidenote: INADEQUACY OF BRITISH ARMY] - -In view of the foregoing considerations it was clearly absurd to think -that our own small force was at all adequate, in a military sense, to -deter Germany from engaging in a war of aggression. Had we been able, -during the years 1912 to 1914, to see into the minds of the German -General Staff we should probably have realised that this inadequacy was -even greater than it appeared. We should then have {261} known that -the numbers of the Kaiser's striking force had been carefully -understated; and that the amount of preparations in the way of material -had been hidden away with an equal industry. We should also have -learned, that the sending of our army abroad was viewed with scepticism -in German military circles, as an event hardly likely to occur. But -even if our Expeditionary Force did go, it was altogether inadequate to -redress the adverse balance; still more inadequate to bring an -immediate victory within the range of practical possibility. It was -inadequate to hold back the premeditated invasion, either at the German -frontier, or even at the French frontier. It was inadequate to make -Belgian resistance effective, even if that nation should determine to -throw in its lot with the Triple Entente. - -As a matter of the very simplest arithmetic our land forces were -inadequate for any of these purposes. They were unequal to the task of -maintaining the balance of power by giving a numerical superiority to -the armies of the Triple Entente. Our armaments therefore did not -correspond with our policy. It was clear that they would not be able -to uphold that policy if it were put to the supreme test of war. It -was impossible to abandon our policy. It was not impossible, and it -was not even in 1912 too late, to have set about strengthening our -armaments. Nothing of the kind, however, was undertaken by the -Government, whose spokesmen, official and unofficial, employed -themselves more congenially in deriding and rebuking Lord Roberts for -calling attention to the danger. - -Of course if it had been possible to place reliance upon the statement -of the English War Minister, {262} made little more than a year before -war broke out,[6] that every soldier under the voluntary system is -worth ten conscripts, we and our Allies would have been in a position -of complete security. In that case our force of 160,000 would have -been the equivalent of 1,600,000 Germans, and we should from the first -have been in a superiority of more than a million over our enemies. - -Even if we could have credited the more modest assumption of the -Attorney-General--made nearly four months after war broke out--that one -volunteer was worth three 'pressed' men, the opposing forces would have -been somewhere about an equality.[7] - -Unfortunately both these methods of ready-reckoning were at fault, -except for their immediate purpose of soothing, or deluding the -particular audiences to which they were addressed. The words were -meaningless and absurd in a military sense; though conceivably they -possessed some occult political virtue, and might help, for a time at -least, to avert the retribution which is due to unfaithful stewards. - -Both these distinguished statesmen, as well as {263} many of their -colleagues and followers, were beset by the error of false opposites. -A soldier who has enlisted voluntarily, and another who is a conscript -or 'pressed' man, have equally to fight their country's enemies when -they are ordered to do so. In both cases the particular war may be -against their consciences and judgments; and their participation in it -may therefore be involuntary. - -Of two men--equal in age, strength, training, and courage--one of whom -believes his cause to be just, while the other does not, there can be -no doubt that the former will fight better than the latter--even though -the latter was enlisted under the voluntary system while the former was -a conscript or 'pressed' man. In this sense the superiority of the -'voluntary' principle is incontestable. But is there any evidence to -show, that either the original soldiers, or the new levies, of the -German army are risking their lives in this war any less willingly than -our own countrymen, who went out with the Expeditionary Force, or those -others who have since responded to Lord Kitchener's appeal? Is there -any reason to suppose that they are fighting any less bravely and -intelligently?[8] - - -Another matter of importance in these calculations with regard to the -military strength of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance was the -time limit. - -[Sidenote: THE THREE PERIODS OF WAR] - -There are three periods in war. There is the _onset_ of war, where -swiftness of action is what tells most; there is the _grip_ of war, -where numbers of {264} trained men are what tell most; and there is the -_drag_ of war, when what tells most is the purse. - -Speaking by the book, it is of course numbers which tell all the way -through. At the beginning--in the _onset_--the aim is to hurl superior -numbers at a vital point--taking the enemy by surprise, and thereby -disordering his whole plan of campaign--very much as you knock a limpet -off a rock, with a sharp unexpected blow. - -If this effort fails to settle matters, then we are in the _grip_. -Here it is a case of sheer heavy slogging of all the available trained -troops. The weaker side is driven to the defensive. It is found -making use of every artificial and natural advantage to counteract the -superiority which threatens it, and which must speedily prevail, if -only it be superior enough. - -Finally, after a longer or shorter period of indecisive deadlock, the -time comes when trained troops and material of war accumulated in -advance begin to run short--when new levies, raised since the war broke -out, begin to take the field, well or ill equipped, well or ill armed, -as the case may be. When this stage is reached we are in the _drag_ of -war; and the side which can best afford to feed, clothe, and arm its -fresh reinforcements stands at an enormous advantage. - -In 1870 war was announced on July 15th, and formally declared on the -19th. Three weeks later, on August 6th, the important battles of -Woerth and Spicheren were won by the Germans. On September 2nd, the -issue of the war was decided, when the Emperor of the French, with his -main army, surrendered at Sedan. Metz fell in the last days of -October, and Paris on the first day of March in the {265} following -year. In that war the _onset_ settled everything. There was no real -_grip_ of the opposing forces. The German attack had been so swift, -vigorous, and successful that France was knocked out in the first round. - -[Sidenote: RESULTS OF SUCCESS IN ONSET] - -The speed with which great armies can be mobilised and hurled against -one another has not diminished in the forty odd years which have -elapsed since the _débâcle_. On the contrary, the art of war has been -largely concerned in the interval with the vital question, how to get -in the first deadly blow. - -The military view was, that probably not earlier than the fifteenth -day--certainly not later than the twenty-first--a battle would take -place which must be of the highest importance, and which might quite -well be decisive. It might make ultimate German victory only a matter -of time; or it might only determine whether the ensuing campaign was to -be waged on French or German soil--whether there was to be a German -invasion of France or a Franco-British invasion of Germany. -Consequently, if our Expeditionary Force was to render assistance at -the critical time, it must reach its position on the frontier within a -fortnight of the outbreak of war. - -As to the _drag_ of war, the Triple Entente had the advantage, if that -stage were ever reached. For the purses of England, France, and Russia -were much longer than those of Germany and Austria. It was important, -however, to remember that there would be no hope for us in the _drag_ -of war, if Germany could deliver a heavy enough blow at the beginning, -as she did in 1870. - -These were the considerations as to time, which presented themselves to -students of the military {266} situation during the breathing space -which followed upon the Agadir crisis. The substantial accuracy of -this forecast was confirmed by what happened during August and -September of last year. In 1914 war was declared by Germany on August -1st. For several days before she had been engaged actively in -mobilisation. Three weeks later three important battles--on the road -to Metz, at Charleroi, and at Mons[9]--were won by the Germans. If it -had not been for the unexpected obstacle of Liège the last two -engagements would in all probability have been fought at an even -earlier date, and in circumstances much more unfavourable to the -Franco-British forces. But in the early days of September, instead of -the crushing defeat of Sedan, there was the victory of the Marne, and -the Germans were forced to retreat to entrenched positions north of the -Aisne.[10] - -The _onset_ period was ended; but the issue had not been settled as in -1870. France and England had not been knocked out in the first round. -To this extent the supreme German endeavour had miscarried. -Nevertheless a great advantage had been secured by our enemies, -inasmuch as it was now apparent that the ensuing campaign--the _grip_ -of war--would be contested, not on German soil, but in France and -Belgium. - - -[Sidenote: LIMITATIONS OF SEA POWER] - -The value of the assistance which the British Navy would be able to -render to the cause of the Triple Entente was a consideration of the -highest importance. But while the fleet, if the national confidence in -it were justified, would render invaluable assistance to military -operations, it was necessary {267} to bear in mind--what Englishmen in -recent times have been very apt to forget--that no success at sea, -whether it consisted in the wholesale destruction of hostile ships, or -in an absolute blockade of the enemy's coast, could by itself determine -the main issue of a European contest of this character. Disaster in a -land battle could not be compensated for, nor could the balance of -power be maintained, by any naval victory. War would not be brought to -an end favourable to the Triple Entente, even by a victory as complete -as that of Trafalgar. It is also well to remember that peace came, not -after Trafalgar, but after Waterloo, nearly ten years later. - -The strange idea that the security of the British Empire can be -maintained by the Navy alone, seems to be derived by a false process of -reasoning, from the undeniable truth, that the supremacy of our Navy is -essential to our security. But though it is essential--and the first -essential--it is not the only essential of security. - -An insular Power, largely dependent on sea-borne food supplies and raw -materials for its industries--a Power which governs an empire in the -East, which has dependencies scattered in every sea, which is -politically united with immense but sparsely peopled dominions in the -four quarters of the globe--must keep command of the sea. If that -supremacy were once lost the British Empire, as an empire, would come -to an end. Its early dissolution would be inevitable. Therefore it is -true enough to say that if the German Alliance--or any other -alliance--were to win a decisive naval victory against Britain, it -would end the war completely and effectively so far as we were -concerned. - -{268} - -But the converse is not the case, and for obvious reasons. In a -contest with a continental enemy who conquers on land, while we win -victory after victory at sea, the result will not be a settlement in -our favour, but a drawn issue. And the draw will be to his advantage, -not our own. For having overthrown the balance of power by reason of -his successful campaign and invasions, he will then be free to -concentrate his whole energies upon wresting away naval supremacy from -the British Empire. In time the Sea Power which is only a Sea Power -will be overborne with numbers, and finally worsted by the victorious -Land Power. For how is it possible to fight with one hand against an -enemy with two hands? The fleets of Europe which at last must be -combined against us, if we allow any rival to obtain a European -predominance, are too heavy odds. German preparations alone were -already causing us grave anxiety nearly three years before the Agadir -crisis occurred. How then could we hope to build against the whole of -Europe? Or even against half of Europe, if the other half remained -coldly neutral? - - - -[1] In all about 160,000 men, of whom some 25,000 were non-combatants. - -[2] Such, for instance, as the fact that the time-table of German -mobilisation appeared to be somewhat more rapid than that of the -French, and much more so than that of the Russians. - -[3] The first Balkan war broke out in the autumn of 1912. - -[4] Russia had anxieties of her own with regard to the intentions of -Roumania, of Turkey in Persia and the Caucasus, and of China and Japan -in the Far East. - -[5] These calculations were worked out in various ways, but the net -results arrived at were always substantially the same. In view of the -fact that the main conclusions have been amply proved by the results of -the present war, it does not seem worth while to weary the reader with -more sums in arithmetic than are absolutely necessary. - -[6] Colonel Seely at Heanor, April 26, 1913. - -[7] Sir John Simon (Attorney-General and a Cabinet Minister), at -Ashton-under-Lyne, November 21, 1914.... This speech is instructive -reading. It is also comforting for the assurance it contains, that if -the speaker approved of our taking part in this war (as he vowed he -did) his audience might rest satisfied that it was indeed a righteous -war; seeing that war was a thing which, on principle, he (Sir John -Simon) very much reprehended. And yet we are not wholly convinced and -reassured. There is a touch of over-emphasis--as if perhaps, after -all, the orator needed the support of his own vehemence to keep him -reminded of the righteousness. The pacifist in war-paint is apt to -overact the unfamiliar part. One wonders from what sort of British -officer at the front the Attorney-General had derived the impression -that 'one' of our own voluntary soldiers--gallant fellows though they -are--is the equal of 'three' of the Germans who face him, or of the -Frenchmen who fight by his side.... This speech puts us not a little -in mind of _Evangelist's_ warning to _Christian_, with regard to _Mr. -Legality's_ fluent promises to relieve him of his burden--"There is -nothing in all this noise save a design to beguile thee of thy -salvation." - -[8] Sir John Simon clinched his arithmetical calculation of 'three' to -'one,' by stating that 'the Kaiser already knew it'; and this -reassuring statement was received with 'laughter and cheers.' The -laughter we can understand. - -[9] The battle in Northern Alsace was fought on August 21 and 22. A -French army was driven back at Charleroi on the 22nd, and the British -at Mons on the 23rd. - -[10] September 6-12. - - - - -{269} - -CHAPTER VI - -THE MILITARY SITUATION - -(August 1914) - -Such was the position of affairs at July 1911, as it appeared to the -eyes of people who--during the ensuing period--endeavoured to arrive at -an understanding of the problem without regard to the exigencies of -party politics. Between that date and July 1914, when war broke out, -various changes took place in the situation. The general effect of -these changes was adverse to Britain and her allies. - -In 1911 the German estimates provided for considerable increases, -especially in artillery and machine-guns. The peace strength of the -Army was raised. - -In the following year, 1912, further additions were made to the peace -strength, and two new army corps were formed out of existing units--one -for the Polish, the other for the French frontier. Artillery and -machine-guns were very greatly increased in the ordinary estimates of -that year, and again in those of 1913. In addition, Germany at the -same time added a squadron to her fleet in the North Sea, by arranging -to keep more ships permanently in commission. - -{270} - -[Sidenote: MILITARY INCREASES] - -But early in 1913 it became known, that the German Government was about -to introduce an Army Bill, providing for immense and sensational -additions. The sum of £50,000,000 was to be raised by loan for initial -expenditure. The increased cost of upkeep on the proposed new -establishment would amount to £9,500,000 per annum. Sixty-three -thousand more recruits were to be taken each year. The total peace -strength of the Army was to be raised by approximately 200,000 men. -Nearly four millions sterling was to be spent on aircraft, and ten and -a half on fortifications; while the war-chest was to be raised from six -to eighteen millions. Twenty-seven thousand additional horses were to -be purchased. - -These proposals were timed to take effect the same autumn; so that by -the following Midsummer (1914), the military strength of Germany would -have reaped the main benefit which was anticipated from the enormous -additions. - -It was not in the power of France to increase the actual total of her -numbers, because for many years past she had already taken every man -who was physically fit for military service. About eighty per cent of -the young Frenchmen who came each year before the revision boards had -been enlisted; whereas in Germany--up to the passing of the new Army -Law--considerably less than fifty per cent had been required to serve. -The German Army as a consequence was composed of picked men, while the -French Army contained a considerable proportion who were inferior both -in character and physique. - -But in the face of the new German menace France had to do the best she -could. She had to do it alone, for the reason that the British -Government {271} entertained conscientious and insuperable objections -to bearing its due share of the burden. - -Already, prior to the sensational expansion of Germany in 1913, France -had endeavoured to counteract the current yearly increases in the -military estimates of her neighbour, by various reorganisations and -regroupings of active units, and by improvements calculated to improve -the efficiency of the reserves. But when information was -forthcoming[1] as to the nature and extent of the developments proposed -under the German Army Bill of 1913, it was at once realised that more -drastic measures were essential to national safety. - -Before the German projects were officially announced, the French -Government took the bold step of asking the legislature to sanction a -lengthening of the period of active military service from two years to -three, and an extension of the age limit of the reserves from -forty-seven to forty-nine. Power was also taken to summon, in case of -emergency, the annual contingent of recruits a year before their due -time. Increases in artillery, engineers, railways, barrack -accommodation, and subsidiary services were asked for and obtained. -The cost of these, when the whole sum came to be calculated, was found -to amount to £32,000,000. - -Apart, therefore, from material preparations of one kind and another, -Germany was taking steps to add 200,000 men to her striking force, and -the intentions of France were approximately the same. In the {272} -case of Germany, however, the increases of strength would be operative -by Midsummer 1914, while with France they would not take effect until -two years later.[2] - -Germany, moreover, was arranging to take 63,000 more recruits annually. -France was unable to obtain any more recruits, as she already took all -that were fit to bear arms. The increase in her striking force was -made mainly at the expense of her reserves. Year by year, therefore, -the numerical inferiority of France must become more marked. - -Russia meanwhile was proceeding with her programme of military -extension and reorganisation which had been decided on after the -Japanese war. A great part of her expenditure was being devoted to the -improvement of her exceedingly defective system of railways and -communications, and to the fortification of the Gulf of Finland. - -Austria did not remain stationary in military preparations any more -than her neighbours. Her intake of recruits was 181,000 in 1912. It -was decided to raise it to 206,000 in 1913, and again to 216,000 in -1914. - -In the British Army, during this critical period, there had of course -been no increases, but the reverse. - -{273} - -The Regular Forces, which had been, reduced in 1906 by nine -battalions,[3] were in 1914 some eight thousand men under their nominal -strength. The Territorials, which had never yet reached the figure -postulated by their originator, were at this date about 47,000 short. -The Army Reserve was doomed in the near future to an automatic -shrinkage on a considerable scale, owing to the reductions which had -been effected in the Regular Forces, from which the reservists were -drawn at the expiry of their terms of service. - -Actually, therefore, the weakness of our own military position had -become more marked since 1911. Relatively it had undergone an even -greater change for the worse, owing to the stupendous German programme, -to the fact that we had lagged behind in the matter of aircraft, and -that our naval preponderance was not so great as it had been three -years earlier. - - -[Sidenote: EFFECT OF BALKAN WARS] - -The events which occurred in the Turkish peninsula between October -1912, when the first Balkan war broke out, and August 1913, when the -second was ended by the Treaty of Bucharest, were not without their -bearing upon the general balance of power in Europe. Turkey had -collapsed before the onset of {274} the allied states of Montenegro, -Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece, and this was a serious injury to German -interests. The Ottoman Empire had been warmly suitored, over a long -period of years, by the diplomacy of Berlin, with a view to -co-operation in certain contingencies. On the other hand, the result -of the second war--fomented by the intrigues of Vienna--in which -Bulgaria was finally overpowered by the other three states, destroyed -for the time being Slav solidarity, and thereby considerably relieved -the apprehensions of Austria with regard to her southern frontier and -recently annexed provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.... -Profit-and-loss accounts of this sort are impossible to work out upon -an arithmetical basis, and perhaps the chief importance of such -occurrences as these lies in the effect which they produce upon the -nerves of the onlookers. On the whole--judging by the tone of -diplomacy at the time--the Balkan series of events appeared to have -raised greater anxieties in the Chancelleries of Germany and Austria -than in any other quarter; though why this should have been so, it is -difficult to understand. - -Looking back at the Balkan struggle in the light of subsequent events, -it appears to us now a great deal less remarkable for what it actually -produced than for what it failed to produce. It failed to set Europe -in a blaze, and yet it afforded far better opportunities for doing this -than the Serajevo murders in June 1914. - -The full inner history of the negotiations between the Great Powers, -for six months prior to the Treaty of Bucharest, will be interesting -reading, if it ever sees the light. If even one of them had chosen to -work for war during this period, nothing could have {275} kept the -peace. If one or two of them had been apathetic, war must inevitably -have come of itself. But even France--who at that time was showing -signs of superficial excitement, and on that account was credited, not -only in the German press, but in a section of our own, with -chauvinistic designs--worked hard for peace. It is certain that -Germany desired peace; many well-informed people indeed believed that -at this time she desired peace more ardently than any other state. It -is true that a few days before the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, -Italy had been secretly sounded by Austria as to whether she would join -with her two allies in making an attack on Servia; but the Italian -reply being of a kind that took away all hope of securing the military -assistance of that country in the proposed adventure, the Concert of -Europe continued to perform the pacific symphony apparently in perfect -accord. - -[Sidenote: GERMANY'S TWO DATES] - -The policy of Germany, in 1912 and 1913, to preserve peace, and her -efforts--equally successful--in the following year to provoke war, were -probably due to one and the same cause. Two dates from Germany's point -of view were of supreme importance--_the summer of 1914_, when her new -military preparations would be complete, and when the Kiel -Canal--having been widened and deepened[4]--would {276} be available -for the passage of Dreadnoughts; _the summer of 1916_, by which date -the French Army increases were due to take effect, and the Russian -scheme of military reorganisation would have been carried through. -From the point of view of Berlin and Vienna war could be waged to -greatest advantage so soon as the first of these two dates had been -reached. If, however, Italy, always a doubtful participator, could -have been tempted by self-interest to make common cause with her allies -in the summer of 1913, the certainty of her adherence would have turned -the scales in favour of the earlier date. For Italy could put an army -of 700,000 men into the field; and this no doubt would have more than -compensated for the benefits which might have been lost by anticipating -the ideal moment by a year. - - - -[1] Germany took time by the forelock, and began to carry through the -contemplated programme before disclosing the terms of the Army Bill to -the legislature. Consequently her intentions were known in a general -way to every Intelligence department in Europe, long before they were -actually announced. - -[2] In going through the memoranda upon which this chapter is based, I -came across a paper written at the end of July 1913 by a retired -soldier friend, in answer to a request on my part for certain technical -information as to French and German preparations. On the margin of the -document, which gives a very full and able analysis, he had added the -following postscript as an expression of his personal opinion. -"_N.B.--Most Important_: The German Bill takes immediate effect. The -French only takes effect in 1916 because (1) the French are not going -to retain the class which finishes its service this year with the -colours; (2) comparatively few are fit for enrolment at twenty; (3) -there has been great delay in Parliament ... _A year from now will be -the critical time_. Germany will have had the full benefit from her -Bill, whereas France will have a mass of young recruits still under -instruction. The strain on officers will be tremendous in order to -knock this mass of raw men into shape." It is rarely that a prophecy -is fulfilled practically to a day. - -[3] Mr. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, in justifying this -reduction explained that 'his infantry was in excess, the artillery was -deficient.' He would rather not have cut off these nine battalions, -"but he could not use them. He had four more than he could mobilise" -(Auchterarder, December 29, 1906). In his view "the first step to -doing anything for developing the national basis of the Army was to cut -something off the Regular Forces" (Newcastle, September 15, 1906). "He -did not think Compulsory Training would be adopted in this country -until after England had been invaded once or twice" (London, December -1, 1911). The British, however, had the best reasons for feeling -secure: they "were always a nation of splendid fighters. They were -never ready, but they fought the better the less ready they were..." -(Glasgow, January 6, 1912). - -[4] On June 23, 1914, the Emperor William opened the new lock at the -North Sea end of the Kiel Canal. On the following day he performed the -same function at the Baltic end. The _Times_ correspondent remarks -that the Emperor's passage through the Canal on this occasion was of -symbolical rather than practical significance, as on the one hand -German Dreadnoughts had already used the widened passage -experimentally, while on the other hand it would be a long time before -the whole work was finished. He continues: "The extension works, which -were begun in 1907, are, however, of vast importance, especially to the -Navy. The Canal has been made two metres deeper, and has been doubled -in breadth. The places at which large ships can pass one another have -been increased in number, and at four of them Dreadnoughts can be -turned. There are now four, instead of two, at each end, which means a -great saving of time in getting a fleet through. Above all, the -distance between Kiel and Wilhelmshaven for battleship purposes is -reduced from more than 500 to only 80 nautical miles. The new locks at -Brunsbüttel and Holtenau are the largest in the world."--The _Times_, -June 25, 1914. - - - - -{277} - -CHAPTER VII - -A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS - -It may be said--up to the very outbreak of war it was said very -frequently--that the mere power and opportunity to make an outrageous -attack are nothing without the will to do so. And this is true enough. -Every barber who holds his client by the nose could cut his throat as -easily as shave his chin. Every horse could kick the groom, who rubs -him down, into the next world if he chose to do so. What sense, then, -could there be in allowing our minds to be disturbed by base suspicions -of our enterprising and cultured neighbour? What iota of proof was -there that Germany nourished evil thoughts, or was brooding on visions -of conquest and rapine? - -So ran the argument of almost the whole Liberal press; and a -considerable portion of the Unionist press echoed it. Warnings were -not heeded. They came only from unofficial quarters, and therefore -lacked authority. Only the Government could have spoken with -authority; and the main concern of members of the Government, when -addressing parliamentary or popular audiences, appeared to be to prove -that there was no need for anxiety. They went further in many -instances, and denounced {278} those persons who ventured to express a -different opinion from this, as either madmen or malefactors. -Nevertheless a good deal of proof had already been published to the -world--a good deal more was known privately to the British -Government--all of which went to show that Germany had both the will -and intention to provoke war, if a favourable opportunity for doing so -should present itself. - -For many years past--in a multitude of books, pamphlets, leading -articles, speeches, and university lectures--the Germans had been -scolding us, and threatening us with attack at their own chosen moment. -When Mr. Churchill stated bluntly, in 1912, that the German fleet was -intended as a challenge to the British Empire, he was only repeating, -in shorter form and more sober language, the boasts which had been -uttered with yearly increasing emphasis and fury, by hundreds of German -patriots and professors. - -With an engaging candour and in every fount of type, unofficial Germany -had made it abundantly clear how she intended to carry her designs into -execution--how, first of all, France was to be crushed by a swift and -overwhelming attack--how Russia was then to be punished at leisure--how -after that, some of the nations of Europe were to be forced into an -alliance against the British Empire, and the rest into a neutrality -favourable to Germany--how finally the great war, which aimed at making -an end of our existence, was to begin. And though, from time to time, -there were bland official utterances which disavowed or ignored these -outpourings, the outpourings continued all the same. And each year -they became more copious, and achieved a readier sale. - -{279} - -Those, however, who were responsible for British policy appear to have -given more credit to the assurances of German diplomacy than to this -mass of popular incitement. The British nation has always chosen to -plume itself upon the fact that the hearts of British statesmen are -stronger than their heads; and possibly their amiable credulity, in the -present instance, might have been forgiven, had their means of -ascertaining truth been confined to the statements of incontinent -publicists and responsible statesmen. But there were other proofs -available besides words of either sort. - - -[Sidenote: THE FIRST WARNING] - -The Liberal Government came into office in the autumn of 1905. -Ministers can hardly have had time to master the contents of their -various portfolios, before German aggression burst rudely in upon them. -Conceivably the too carefully calculating diplomatists of Berlin had -concluded, that the principles of the new Cabinet would tend to keep -England neutral under any provocation, and that a heaven-sent -opportunity had therefore arrived for proceeding with the first item in -their programme by crushing France. It is a highly significant fact -that early in 1906, only a few months after Sir Henry -Campbell-Bannerman's advent to power, he found himself faced with the -prospect of a European war, which was only averted when our Foreign -Minister made it clear to Germany, that in such an event this country -would range herself upon the side of France.[1] - -{280} - -This was the _first_ warning. - - -[Sidenote: THE SECOND WARNING] - -The British answer to it was to utter renewed protestations Of friendly -confidence. As an earnest of our good intentions, the shipbuilding -programme[2] of the previous Government was immediately reduced. The -burden of armaments became the burden of innumerable speeches. In -well-chosen words Germany was coaxed and cajoled to acquiesce in our -continued command of the sea; but finding in our action or inaction an -opportunity for challenging it, she turned a polite ear--but a deaf -one--and pushed forward her preparations with redoubled speed. In vain -did we on our part slow down work at our new naval base in the Firth of -Forth. In vain did we reduce our slender army to even smaller -dimensions.[3] In vain did we plead disinterestedly with Germany, for -a reduction in the pace of competition in naval armaments, on the terms -that we should be allowed to possess a fleet nearly twice as strong as -her own. For the most part, during this period, official Germany -remained discreetly silent, for the reason that silence served her -purpose best; but when the persistency of our entreaties made some sort -of {281} answer necessary, we were given to understand by unofficial -Germany--rather roughly and gruffly--that a certain class of requests -was inadmissible as between gentlemen. - -Then suddenly, having up to that time lulled ourselves into the belief -that our fine words had actually succeeded in buttering parsnips, we -awoke--in the late autumn of 1908--to the truth, and fell immediately -into a fit of panic. Panic increased during the winter and following -spring, and culminated during the summer, in an Imperial Defence -Conference with the Dominions. - -We had curtailed our shipbuilding programme and slowed down our -preparations. Thereby we had hoped to induce Germany to follow suit. -But the effect had been precisely the opposite: she had increased her -programme and speeded up her preparations. At last our Government -became alive to what was going on, and in tones of reverberant anxiety -informed an astonished nation that the naval estimates called for large -additions. - -Ministers, indeed, were between the devil and the deep sea. The -supremacy of the British Fleet was menaced; the conscience of the -Radical party was shocked--shocked not so much at the existence of the -menace as at official recognition of it, and at the cost of insuring -against it. It was so much shocked, indeed, that it took refuge in -incredulity; and--upon the strength of assurances which were of course -abundantly forthcoming from the German Admiralty, who averred upon -their honour that there had been neither addition nor -acceleration--roundly accused its own anointed ministers of bearing -false witness against an innocent neighbour. - -{282} - -None the less, large sums were voted, and the Dominions came forward -with generous contributions. - -Sir Wilfrid Laurier, indeed, who had been nourished and brought up on a -diet of dried phrases, was sceptical. To this far-sighted statesman -there appeared to be no German menace either then or subsequently. The -whole thing was a mere nightmare, disturbing the innocent sleep of -Liberalism and democracy.[4] - -This was the _second_ warning. - - -[Sidenote THE THIRD WARNING] - -The _third_ warning came in the form of subterranean rumblings, -inaudible to the general public, but clearly heard by ministerial ears. - -In July 1909, while the Imperial Conference on Defence was in session, -Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded Prince Bülow as German Chancellor. -Up to that time there had been the menace of the mailed fist, the -rattling sabre, and the shining armour. Henceforward there was the -additional menace of a diplomacy playing for time, with a careless and -unconcealed contempt for the intelligence, the courage, and the honour -of the British people and their statesmen.[5] The German Government -had clearly formed the opinion that our ministers were growing more and -more afraid of {283} asking their party to support increased naval -estimates, and that it was only necessary to go on, alternately -dangling and withdrawing illusory proposals for a naval understanding -and a general agreement, in order to steal ahead of us in the race. -Here, as in many other instances, the Germans had observed not -altogether incorrectly; but they had drawn the wrong inference from the -facts. - -During the summer and autumn of 1910 was held the famous but futile -Constitutional Conference, the primary object of which was to settle -the quarrel between the two Houses of Parliament. With steadily -increasing clumsiness, German diplomacy, through all this anxious time, -was engaged in holding out its hand and withdrawing it again; until -even men whose minds were worried with more immediate cares, could no -longer ignore the gravity of the situation. - -The Conference adjourned for the holiday season, but resumed its -sessions in October. The public assurances of those who took part in -it on both sides agree in this, that nothing except the special subject -for which it had been called into existence was ever discussed at its -meetings. But many other things were certainly discussed outside its -meetings--on the doorstep and the staircase, and in the anterooms. -Among these topics the dangers of the international situation, and the -peril of imperial security were the chief. - -In October and November 1910 there was a great secret of Polichinelle. -Conceivably we may learn from some future historian even more about it -than we knew at the time. All that need be said here with reference to -the matter is, that many persons on {284} both sides found themselves -faced with a position of affairs, where the security of the country -plainly required measures for its defence, of a character and upon a -scale, which neither political party could hope to carry through -Parliament and commend to the country, unless it were supported by the -more responsible section of its opponents. - -Neither party, however, was willing to pay the price necessary for the -support of the other, and as a consequence imperial interests suffered. -It is not necessary, however, to conclude from this lamentable failure -that a sordid spirit of faction was the explanation. In the -constitutional sphere certain principles were in conflict, which the -parties concerned had the honesty to hold by, but lacked the sympathy, -and possibly the intelligence, to adjust. The acrimony of an immediate -controversy distorted the vision of those engaged in it; so that the -proportions of domestic and foreign dangers were misjudged. - -The failure of this constitutional conference was welcomed at the time -by exultant shoutings among many, perhaps the majority, of the rank and -file of politicians upon both sides. It was not so regarded, however, -by the country, which in a remarkable degree refused to respond to the -incitements of violence and hatred with which it was plied during the -ensuing election. There was at this time, for no very definite reason, -a widespread popular uneasiness, and something approaching a general -disgust with politicians. - -Among more considerate men on both sides, the breakdown was frankly -spoken of as one of the great calamities in our political history. It -was more {285} than that. It was in reality one of the greatest which -have ever befallen Europe. - - -[Sidenote: THE FOURTH WARNING] - -During the following July (1911), while in this country we were deeply -engaged in the bitter climax of the constitutional struggle, there -sounded a _fourth_ strident warning from the gong of the German -Chancellery. - -The Agadir incident is one of the strangest which have occurred in -British history during recent years. Its full gravity was not realised -outside a very narrow circle at the time of its occurrence; and when -subsequently it became more widely understood there was a curious -conspiracy to hush it up--or, perhaps, not so much a conspiracy, as a -general instinct of concealment--a spontaneous gesture of modesty--as -if the British nation had been surprised bathing. - -At the beginning of July the German cruiser _Panther_ appeared at -Agadir in Morocco. This visit was intended and understood as a direct -challenge to France. Diplomacy was immediately in a stir. - -Three weeks later Mr. Lloyd George spoke at the Mansion House, making -it clear that England would not tolerate this encroachment. Even amid -the anger and excitement which attended the last stages of the -Parliament Bill, this statement created a deep impression throughout -the country, and a still deeper impression in other countries. - -Then the crisis appeared to fade away. Germany was supposed to have -become amenable. We returned to our internecine avocations. The -holiday season claimed its votaries, and a great railway strike upset -many of their best-laid plans. The inhabitants of the United Kingdom -are accustomed to think {286} only on certain topics during August and -September, and it is hard to break them of their habits. To reconsider -a crisis which had arisen and passed away some two and a half months -earlier, was more than could be expected of us when we returned to work -in the autumn. - -But Mr. Lloyd George's speech was capable of only one -interpretation,--if Germany had persisted in her encroachment, this -country would have gone to war in August or September 1911 in support -of France. His words had no other meaning, and every highly placed -soldier and sailor was fully aware of this fact, and made such -preparations in his own sphere as the case required. But from what has -transpired subsequently, it does not seem at all clear that more than -two or three of the Cabinet in the least realised what was happening. -Parliament did not understand the situation any more than the country -did. - -Later on, when people had time to concentrate their minds on such -matters, there was a thrill of post-dated anxiety--a perturbation and -disapproval; criticism upon various points; a transference of Mr. -McKenna from the Admiralty to the Home Office, and of Mr. Churchill -from the Home Office to the Admiralty. Indignant anti-militarists, -supporters for the most part of the Government, allowed themselves to -be mysteriously reduced to silence. Business men, who had been shocked -when they learned the truth, suffered themselves to be persuaded that -even the truth must be taken with a pinch of salt. There was, in fact, -a sort of general agreement that it was better to leave the summer -embers undisturbed, lest a greater conflagration {287} might ensue. -The attitude of the orthodox politician was that of a nervous person -who, hearing, as he imagines, a burglar in his bedroom, feels happier -and safer when he shuts his eyes and pulls the blankets over his head. - - -[Sidenote: THE FIFTH WARNING] - -A few months later, at the beginning of the following year (1912), the -_fifth_ warning of the series was delivered. - -It differed from its predecessors inasmuch as it was addressed to the -ears of the British Government alone. Neither the Opposition nor the -country heard anything of it until more than two years later--until the -battles of Alsace, of Charleroi, and of Mons had been lost--until the -battle of the Marne had been won--until the British Army was moving -north to take up a position in Flanders. Then we learned that, when -Lord Haldane had visited Berlin in the month of February 1912, he had -done so at the special request of the Kaiser, in order to consider how -Anglo-German misunderstandings might be removed. - -Lord Haldane would have acted more wisely had he stopped his journey -_en route_, and never entered Berlin at all. For, two days before the -date appointed for his visit, proposals for large increases of the -German Army and Navy were laid before the Reichstag. His mission was -to abate competition in armaments, and here was an encouraging -beginning! Was it contempt, or insolence, or a design to overawe the -supposed timidity of the emissary; or was it merely a blundering effort -to steal a march in the negotiations by facing the ambassador on his -arrival with a _fait accompli_? Possibly it was a combination of all -these; but at any rate it was {288} exceedingly clumsy, and no less -significant than clumsy. - -As to the mission--Germany was willing in a vague way to -'retard'--whatever that may mean--though not to abandon, or reduce, her -naval programme, providing the British Government would agree to remain -neutral in any war which Germany might choose to wage. France might be -crushed and Belgium annexed; but in either event England must stand -aside and wait her turn. On no other terms would the Kaiser consent to -a _rapprochement_ with this country, or allow the blessed words -'retardation of the naval programme' to be uttered by official lips. - -An undertaking of this tenor went beyond those assurances of -non-aggressive intent which Lord Haldane, on behalf of his own -Government, was fully prepared to give. We would not be a party to any -unprovoked attack on Germany--was not that sufficient? It was plainly -insufficient. It was made clear that Germany desired a free hand to -establish herself in a position of supremacy astride of Europe. So -Lord Haldane returned profitless from his wayfaring, and the British -Government was at its wits' end how to placate the implacable. - -The way they chose was well-doing, in which they wearied themselves -perhaps overmuch, especially during the Balkan negotiations. For -Germany did not want war at that time, for the reasons which have been -given already. And so, rather surlily, and with the air of one who was -humouring a crank--a pusillanimous people whose fixed idea was -pacifism--she consented that we should put ourselves to vast trouble to -keep the peace for her benefit. If {289} war had to come in the end, -it had much better have come then--so far as we were concerned--seeing -that the combined balance of naval and military power was less -unfavourable to the Triple Entente at the beginning of 1913 than it was -some fifteen months later.... This was all the notice we took of the -fifth warning. We earned no gratitude by our activities, nor added in -any way thereby to our own safety. - -[Sidenote: THE HALDANE MISSION] - -The Haldane mission is a puzzle from first to last. The Kaiser had -asked that he should be sent.... For what purpose? ... Apparently in -order to discuss the foreign policy of England and Germany. But surely -the Kaiser should have been told that we kept an Ambassador at Berlin -for this very purpose; an able man, habituated to stand in the strong -sunlight of the imperial presence without losing his head; but, above -all, qualified to converse on such matters (seeing that they lay within -his own province) far better than the most profound jurist in -Christendom. Or if our Ambassador at Berlin could not say what was -required, the German Ambassador in London might easily have paid a -visit to Downing Street; or the Foreign Ministers of the two countries -might have arranged a meeting; or even the British Premier and the -German Chancellor might have contrived to come together. Any of these -ways would have been more natural, more proper, more likely (one would -think) to lead to business, than the way which was followed. - -One guesses that the desire of the Kaiser that Lord Haldane should be -sent, was met half-way by the desire of Lord Haldane to go forth; that -there was some temperamental affinity between these {290} two -pre-eminent characters--some attraction of opposites, like that of the -python and the rabbit. - -Whatever the reasons may have been for this visit, the results of it -were bad, and indeed disastrous. To have accepted the invitation was -to fall into a German trap; a trap which had been so often set that one -might have supposed it was familiar to every Foreign Office in Europe! -Berlin has long delighted in these extra-official enterprises, -undertaken behind the backs of accredited representatives. Confidences -are exchanged; explanations are offered 'in the frankest spirit'; -sometimes understandings of a kind are arrived at. But so far as -Germany is concerned, nothing of all this is binding, unless her -subsequent interests make it desirable that it should be. The names of -the irregular emissaries, German, British, and cosmopolitan, whom the -Kaiser has sent to London and received at Berlin--unbeknown to his own -Foreign Office--since the beginning of his reign, would fill a large -and very interesting visitors' book. One would have imagined that even -so early as February 1912 this favourite device had been found out and -discredited even in Downing Street. - -Lord Haldane was perhaps even less well fitted for such an embassy by -temperament and habit of mind, than he was by position and experience. -Lawyer-statesmanship, of the modern democratic sort, is of all forms of -human agency the one least likely to achieve anything at Potsdam. The -British emissary was tireless, industrious, and equable. His -colleagues, on the other hand, were overworked, indolent, or flustered. -Ready on the shortest notice to mind everybody else's business, he was -allowed to mind far too much of it; and he appears to have {291} minded -most of it rather ill than well. He was no more suited to act for the -Foreign Office than King Alfred was to watch the housewife's cakes. - -[Sidenote: THE HALDANE MISSION] - -The man whose heart swells with pride in his own ingenuity usually -walks all his life in blinkers. It is not surprising that Lord -Haldane's visit to the Kaiser was a failure, that it awoke distrust at -the time, or that it opened the way to endless misrepresentation in the -future. What surprises is his stoicism; that he should subsequently -have shown so few signs of disappointment, distress, or mortification; -that he should have continued up to the present moment to hold himself -out as an expert on German psychology;[6] that he should be still -upheld by his journalistic admirers, to such an extent that they even -write pamphlets setting out to his credit 'what he did to thwart -Germany.'[7] - -We have been told by Mr. Asquith,[8] what was thought by the British -Government of the outcome of Lord Haldane's embassy. We have also been -informed by Germany, what was thought of it by high officials at -Berlin; what inferences they drew from these conversations; what hopes -they founded upon them. We do not know, however, what was thought of -the incident by the other two members of the Entente; how it impressed -the statesmen of Paris and Petrograd; for they must have known of the -occurrence--the English representative not being one whose comings and -goings would easily {292} escape notice. The British people were told -nothing; they knew nothing; and therefore, naturally enough, they -thought nothing about the matter. - -The British Cabinet--if Mr. Asquith's memory is to be relied on--saw -through the devilish designs of Germany so soon as Lord Haldane, upon -his return, unbosomed himself to the conclave in quaking whispers. We -know from the Prime Minister, that when he heard how the Kaiser -demanded a free hand for European conquests, as the price of a friendly -understanding with England, the scales dropped from his eyes, and he -realised at once that this merely meant the eating of us up later. But -one cannot help wondering, since Mr. Asquith was apparently so -clear-sighted about the whole matter, that he made no preparations -whatsoever--military, financial, industrial, or even naval (beyond the -ordinary routine)--against an explosion which--the mood and intentions -of Germany being what they were now recognised to be--might occur at -any moment. - -[Sidenote: COST OF AMATEUR DIPLOMACY] - -As to what Germany thought of the incident we know of course only what -the high personages at Berlin have been pleased to tell the world about -their 'sincere impressions.' They have been very busy doing this--hand -upon heart as their wont is--in America and elsewhere. According to -their own account they gathered from Lord Haldane's mission that the -British Government and people were very much averse from being drawn -into European conflicts; that we now regretted having gone quite so far -as we had done in the past, in the way of entanglements and -understandings; that while we could not stand by, if any other country -was being threatened directly on account of arrangements it {293} had -come to with England, England certainly was by no means disposed to -seek officiously for opportunities of knight-errantry. In simple words -the cases of Tangier and Agadir were coloured by a special obligation, -and were to be distinguished clearly from anything in the nature of a -general obligation or alliance with France and Russia. - -It is quite incredible that Lord Haldane ever said anything of this -kind; for he would have been four times over a traitor if he had--to -France; to Belgium; to his own country; also to Germany whom he would -thus have misled. It is also all but incredible that a single high -official at Berlin ever understood him to have spoken in this sense. -But this is what the high officials have assured their own countrymen -and the whole of the neutral world that they did understand; and they -have called piteously on mankind to witness, how false the British -Government was to an honourable understanding, so soon as trouble arose -in July last with regard to Servia. Such are some of the penalties we -have paid for the luxury of indulging in amateur diplomacy. - -The German bureaucracy, however, always presses things too far. It is -not a little like Fag in _The Rivals_--"whenever it draws on its -invention for a good current lie, it always forges the endorsements as -well as the bill." As a proof that the relations of the two countries -from this time forward were of the best, inferences have been drawn -industriously by the high officials at Berlin as to the meaning and -extent of Anglo-German co-operation during the Balkan wars; as to -agreements with regard to Africa already signed, but not published, in -which Downing {294} Street had shown itself 'surprisingly -accommodating'; as to other agreements with regard to the Baghdad -Railway, the Mesopotamian oil-fields, the navigation of the Tigris, and -access through Basra to the Persian Gulf. These agreements, the -earnest of a new _entente_ between the Teuton nations--the United -States subsequently to be welcomed in--are alleged to have been already -concluded, signed and awaiting publication when war broke out.[9] Then -trouble arises in Servia; a mere police business--nothing more--which -might have been settled in a few days or at any rate weeks, if -perfidious Albion had not seized the opportunity to work upon Muscovite -suspicions, in order to provoke a world-war for which she had been -scheming all the time! - - -[Sidenote: THE SIXTH WARNING] - -The _sixth_ warning was the enormous German Army Bill and the -accompanying war loan of 1913. By comparison, the five previous -warnings were but ambiguous whispers. And yet this last reverberation -had apparently no more effect upon the British Government than any of -the rest. - -With all these numerous premonitions the puzzle is, how any government -could have remained in doubt as to the will of Germany to wage war -whenever {295} her power seemed adequate and the opportunity favourable -for winning it. The favourite plea that the hearts of Mr. Asquith and -his colleagues were stronger than their heads does not earn much -respect. Knowing what we do of them in domestic politics, this excuse -would seem to put the quality of their heads unduly low. The true -explanation of their omissions must be sought elsewhere than in their -intellects and affections. - - -It is important to remember that none of the considerations which have -been set out in this chapter can possibly have been hidden from the -Foreign Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, the Prime Minister, the -Committee of Imperial Defence, or the inner or outer circles of the -Cabinet. Important papers upon matters of this kind go the round of -the chief ministers. Unless British public offices have lately fallen -into a state of more than Turkish indolence, of more than German -miscalculation, it is inconceivable that the true features of the -situation were not laid before ministers, dinned into ministers, proved -and expounded to ministers, by faithful officials, alive to the dangers -which were growing steadily but rapidly with each succeeding year. And -although we may only surmise the vigilant activity of these -subordinates, we do actually know, that Mr. Asquith's Government was -warned of them, time and again, by other persons unconcerned in party -politics and well qualified to speak. - -But supposing that no one had told them, they had their own wits and -senses, and these were surely enough. A body of men whose first duty -is the {296} preservation of national security--who are trusted to -attend to that task, paid for performing it, honoured under the belief -that they do attend to it and perform it--cannot plead, in excuse for -their failure, that no one had jogged their elbows, roused them from -their slumbers or their diversions, and reminded them of their duty. - -[Sidenote: INACTION OF THE GOVERNMENT] - -Mr. Asquith and his chief colleagues must have realised the -interdependence of policy and armaments; and they must have known, from -the year 1906 onwards, that on the military side our armaments were -utterly inadequate to maintain our policy. They must have known that -each year, force of circumstances was tending more and more to -consolidate the Triple Entente into an alliance, as the only means of -maintaining the balance of power, which was a condition both of the -freedom of Europe and of British security. They knew--there can be no -doubt on this point--what an immense numerical superiority of armed -forces Germany and Austria together could bring, first against France -at the _onset_ of war, and subsequently, at their leisure, against -Russia during the _grip_ of war. They knew that a British -Expeditionary Army of 160,000 men would not make good the -difference--would come nowhere near making good the difference. They -must have known that from the point of view of France and Belgium, the -special danger of modern warfare was the crushing rapidity of its -opening phase. They must have been kept fully informed of all the -changes which were taking place in the military situation upon the -continent to the detriment of the Triple Entente. They had watched the -Balkan war and measured its effects. They knew {297} the meanings of -the critical dates--1914-1916--better, we may be sure, than any section -of their fellow-countrymen. And even although they might choose to -disregard, as mere jingoism, all the boasts and denunciations of German -journalists and professors, they must surely have remembered the events -which preceded the conference at Algeciras, and those others which led -up to the Defence Conference of 1909. They can hardly have forgotten -the anxieties which had burdened their hearts during the autumn of -1910. Agadir cannot have been forgotten; the memory of Lord Haldane's -rebuff was still green; and the spectre of the latest German Army Bill -must have haunted them in their dreams. - -There is here no question of being wise after the event. The meaning -of each of these things in turn was brought home to the Prime Minister -and his chief colleagues as it occurred--firstly, we may be sure, by -their own intelligence--secondly, we may be equally sure, by the -reports of their responsible subordinates--thirdly, by persons of -knowledge and experience, who had no axe to grind or interest to serve. - -It is therefore absurd to suppose that ministers could have failed to -realise the extent of the danger, or of our unpreparedness to meet it, -unless they had purposely buried their heads in the sand. They knew -that they had not a big enough army, and that this fact might ruin -their whole policy. Why did they never say so? Why, when Lord Roberts -said so, did they treat him with contumely, and make every effort to -discredit him? Why was nothing done by them during their whole period -of office to increase the Army and thereby diminish the {298} numerical -superiority of their adversaries. On the contrary, they actually -reduced the Army, assuring the country that they had no use for so many -trained soldiers. Moreover, the timidity or secretiveness of the -Government prevented England from having, what is worth several army -corps, and what proved the salvation of France--a National Policy, -fully agreed and appealing to the hearts and consciences of the whole -people. - - -The answers to these questions must be sought in another sphere. The -political situation was one of great perplexity at home as well as -abroad, and its inherent difficulties were immeasurably increased by -the character and temperament of Mr. Asquith, by the nature no less of -his talents than of his defects. The policy of wait-and-see is not -necessarily despicable. There are periods in which it has been the -surest wisdom and the truest courage; but this was not one of those -periods, nor was there safety in dealing either with Ireland or with -Germany upon this principle. When a country is fully prepared it can -afford to wait and see if there will be a war; but not otherwise. - -Sir Edward Grey is a statesman whose integrity and disinterestedness -have never been impugned by friend or foe; but from the very beginning -of his tenure of office he has appeared to lack that supreme quality of -belief in himself which stamps the greatest foreign ministers. He has -seemed at times to hesitate, as if in doubt whether the dangers which -he foresaw with his mind's eye were realities, or only nightmares -produced by his own over-anxiety. We have a feeling also that in the -conduct of his office he had {299} played too lonely a part, and that -such advice and sympathy as he had received were for the most part of -the wrong sort. What he needed in the way of counsel and companionship -was simplicity and resolution. What he had to rely on was the very -reverse of this. - -Lord Haldane, as we have learned recently, shared largely in the work -of the Foreign Office; a man of prodigious industry, but -over-ingenious, and of a self-complacency which too readily beguiled -him into the belief that there was no opponent who could not be -satisfied, no obstacle which could not be made to vanish--by argument. - -[Sidenote: SIR EDWARD GREY'S DIFFICULTIES] - -Moreover, Sir Edward Grey had to contend against enemies within his own -household. In the Liberal party there was a tradition, which has never -been entirely shaken off, that all increase of armaments is -provocative, and that all foreign engagements are contrary to the -public interest. After the Agadir crisis he was made the object of a -special attack by a large and influential section of his own party and -press, and was roundly declared to be no longer possible as Foreign -Minister.[10] There can be no doubt that the attempt to force Sir -Edward Grey's resignation in the winter 1911-1912 was fomented by -German misrepresentation and intrigue, skilfully acting upon the -peculiar susceptibilities of radical fanaticism. Nor is there any -doubt that the attacks which were made upon the policy of Mr. -Churchill, from the autumn of 1912 onwards, were fostered by {300} the -same agency, using the same tools, and aiming at the same objects. - -The orthodoxy of Mr. Churchill was suspect on account of his Tory -ancestry and recent conversion; that of Sir Edward Grey on the ground -that he was a country gentleman, bred in aristocratic traditions, -trained in Foreign Affairs under the dangerous influences of Lord -Rosebery, and therefore incapable of understanding the democratic dogma -that loving-kindness will conquer everything, including Prussian -ambitions. - -Surely no very vivid imagination is needed to penetrate the mystery of -Cabinet discussions on defence for several years before war broke out. -Behind the Cabinet, as the Cabinet well knew, was a party, one half of -which was honestly oblivious of all danger, while the other half feared -the danger much less than it hated the only remedy. Clearly the bulk -of the Cabinet was in cordial sympathy either with one or other of -these two sections of their party. Sir Edward Grey accordingly had to -defend his policy against an immense preponderance of settled -convictions, political prejudices, and personal interests. And at the -same time he seems to have been haunted by the doubt lest, after all, -his fears were only nightmares. Mr. Churchill, there is no difficulty -in seeing, must have fought very gallantly; but always, for the reason -already given, with one hand tied behind his back. He had all his work -cut out to maintain the Navy, which was under his charge, in a state of -efficiency; and this upon the whole he succeeded in doing pretty -efficiently.[11] - -{301} - -If we may argue back from public utterances to Cabinet discussions, it -would appear that the only assistance--if indeed it deserved such a -name--which was forthcoming to these two, proceeded from Mr. Asquith -and Lord Haldane. The former was by temperament opposed to clear -decisions and vigorous action. The latter--to whom the mind of Germany -was as an open book--bemused himself, and seems to have succeeded in -bemusing his colleagues to almost as great an extent. - -In fancy, we can conjure up a scene which must have been enacted, and -re-enacted, very often at Number 10 Downing Street in recent years. We -can hear the warnings of the Foreign Minister, the urgent pleas of the -First Lord of the Admiralty, the scepticism, indifference, or hostility -expressed by the preponderant, though leaderless, majority in the -Cabinet. _Simple_ said, _I see no danger_; _Sloth_ said, _Yet a little -more sleep_; and _Presumption_ said, _Every Vat must stand upon his own -bottom_.... We can almost distinguish the tones of their Right -Honourable voices. - -[Sidenote: EXCESSIVE TIMIDITY] - -The situation was governed by an excessive timidity--by fear of -colleagues, of the caucus, of the party, and of public opinion--by fear -also of Germany. Mr. Asquith, and the Cabinet of which he was the -head, refused to look their policy between the eyes, and realise what -it was, and what were its inevitable consequences. They would not -admit that the _Balance of Power_ was an English interest, or that they -were in any way concerned in maintaining it. They would not admit that -our Entente with France and Russia was in fact an alliance. They -thought they could send British officers to arrange plans of {302} -campaign with the French General Staff--could learn from this source -all the secret hopes and anxieties of France--could also withdraw the -greater part of their fleet from the Mediterranean, under arrangement -for naval co-operation with our present ally[12]--all without -committing this country to any form of understanding! They boasted -that they had no engagements with France, which puzzled the French and -the Russians, and convinced nobody; save possibly themselves, and a -section of their own followers. They had in fact bound the country to -a course of action--in certain events which were not at all -improbable--just as surely by drifting into a committal, as if they had -signed and sealed a parchment. Yet they would not face the imperative -condition. They would not place their armaments on a footing to -correspond with their policy. - -Much of this is now admitted more or less frankly, but justification is -pleaded, in that it was essential to lead the country cautiously, and -that the Government could do nothing unless it had the people behind -it. In these sayings there is a measure of truth. But as a matter of -fact the country was not led at all. It was trapped. Never was there -the slightest effort made by any member of the Government to educate -the people with regard to the national dangers, {303} responsibilities, -and duties. When the crisis occurred the hand of the whole British -Empire was forced. There was no other way; but it was a bad way. And -what was infinitely worse, was the fact that, when war was -declared--that war which had been discussed at so many Cabinet meetings -since 1906--military preparations were found to be utterly inadequate -in numbers; and in many things other than numbers. The politician is -right in thinking that, as a rule, it is to his advantage if the people -are behind him; but there are times when we can imagine him praying -that they may not be too close. - -We have been given to understand that it was impossible for the -Government to acknowledge their policy frankly, to face the -consequences, and to insist upon the necessary preparations in men and -material being granted. It was impossible, because to have done so -would have broken the Liberal party--that great instrument for good--in -twain. The Cabinet would have fallen in ruin. The careers of its most -distinguished members would have been cut short. Consider what -sacrifices would have been contained in this catalogue of disasters. - -That is really what we are now beginning to consider, and are likely to -consider more and more as time goes on. - -[Sidenote: VALUE OF SELF-SACRIFICE] - -A great act of self-sacrifice--a man's, or a party's--may sometimes -make heedless people realise the presence of danger when nothing else -will. Suppose Mr. Asquith had said, "I will only continue to hold -office on one condition," and had named the condition--'that armaments -should correspond to policy'--the only means of safety. He might -thereupon have disappeared into the chasm; but like Curtius he {304} -might have saved the City. It would have made a great impression, Mr. -Asquith falling from office for his principles. Those passages of -Periclean spoken after war broke out, about the crime of Germany -against humanity--about sacrificing our own ease--about duty, honour, -freedom, and the like--were wonderfully moving. Would there, however, -have been occasion for them, if in the orator's own case, the sacrifice -had been made before the event instead of after it, or if he had -faithfully performed the simplest and chief of all the duties attaching -to his great position? - -The present war, as many of us thought, and still think, was not -inevitable. None have maintained this opinion in the past with greater -vehemence than the Liberal party. But the conditions on which it could -have been avoided were, that England should have been prepared, which -she was not; and that she should have spoken her intentions clearly, -which she did not. - -[Sidenote: THE PRICE PAID] - -When the war is ended, or when the tide of it has turned and begun to -sweep eastward, there will be much coming and going of the older -people, and of women, both young and old, between England and France. -They have waited, and what is it that they will then be setting forth -to see? ... From Mons to the Marne, and back again to Ypres, heaps of -earth, big and little, shapeless, nameless, numberless--the graves of -men who did not hesitate to sacrifice either their careers or their -lives when duty called them. Desolation is the heaviest sacrifice of -all; and those who will, by and by, go on this pilgrimage have suffered -it, ungrudgingly and with pride, because their country needed it. If -this war was {305} indeed inevitable there is no more to be said. But -what if it was not inevitable? What if there would have been no war at -all--or a less lingering and murderous war--supposing that those, who -from the trust reposed in them by their fellow-countrymen should have -been the first to sacrifice their careers to duty, had not chosen -instead to sacrifice duty to their careers? It was no doubt a service -to humanity to save the careers of politicians from extinction, to keep -ministers in office from year to year, to preserve the Liberal -party--that great instrument for good--unfractured. These benefits -were worth a great price; but were they worth quite so great a price as -has been paid? - - - -[1] The Editor of the _Westminster Gazette_ should be an unimpeachable -witness: "The (German) Emperor's visit to Tangier (March 1905) was -followed by a highly perilous passage of diplomacy, in which the German -Government appeared to be taking risks out of all proportion to any -interest they could have had in Morocco. The French sacrificed their -Foreign Minister (M. Delcasse) in order to keep the peace, but the -Germans were not appeased, and the pressure continued. It was the -general belief at this time, that nothing but the support which the -British government gave to the French averted a catastrophe in the -early part of 1906, or induced the Germans to accept the Algeciras -conference as the way out of a dangerous situation."--_The Foundations -of British Policy_ (p. 15), by J. A. Spender. - -[2] The Cawdor Programme. - -[3] Mr. Haldane reduced the Army by nine battalions (_i.e._ 9000 men) -in 1906. He stated that he had no use for them. This meant a great -deal more, when the reserve-making power is taken into -consideration.... "The Regular Army ... has been reduced by over -30,000 men; not only a present, but a serious prospective loss."--Lord -Roberts in the House of Lords, April 3, 1913. - -[4] Even four years later we find Sir Wilfrid Laurier wedded to the -belief that the German Emperor was one of the great men of the present -age; wonderfully endowed by intellect, character, and moral fibre; his -potent influence was always directed towards peace.--Canadian _House of -Commons Debates_, February 27, 1913, 4364. The whole of this speech -(4357-4364) in opposition to Mr. Borden's Naval Forces Bill is -interesting reading, as is also a later speech, April 7, 1913, on the -same theme (7398-7411). - -[5] _How Britain Strove for Peace_, by Sir Edward Cook: especially pp. -18-35; also _Why Britain is at War_, by the same author. These two -pamphlets are understood to be a semi-official statement authorised by -the British Government. - -[6] Lord Haldane has explained German conduct in the present war by a -sudden change of spirit, such as once befell a collie dog which owned -him as master, and which after a blameless early career, was possessed -by a fit of depravity in middle life and took to worrying sheep. Thus -in a single metaphor he extenuates the German offence and excuses his -own blindness! - -[7] "Lord Haldane: What he did to thwart Germany." Pamphlet published -by the _Daily Chronicle_. - -[8] At Cardiff, October 2, 1914. - -[9] If this were really so, it is remarkable that Germany has not -published these opiate documents, which lulled her vigilance and were -the cause of her undoing. In the _New York Evening Post_ (February 15, -1915) there is a letter signed 'Historicus' in which the German version -of the facts is not seriously questioned, although a wholly different -inference is drawn: "This extremely conciliatory attitude of England is -another proof of the pacific character of her foreign policy. But, -unfortunately, German political thought regards force as the sole -controlling factor in international relations, and cannot conceive of -concessions voluntarily made in answer to claims of a more or less -equitable nature. To the German mind such actions are infallible -indications of weakness and decadence. Apparently Grey's attitude -towards German claims in Turkey and Africa was so interpreted, and the -conclusion was rashly reached that England could be ignored in the -impending world-war." - -[10] "The time has now come to state with a clearness which cannot be -mistaken that Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary is -impossible."--_Daily News_, January 10, 1912. The _Daily News_ was not -a lonely voice speaking in the wilderness. Similar threats have been -levelled against Mr. Churchill. - -[11] It has been stated on good authority, that Mr. McKenna upheld the -national interests with equal firmness, and against equal, if not -greater opposition, while he was at the Admiralty. - -[12] A large section of the Liberal party watched with jealous anxiety -our growing intimacy with France. In 1913, however, they discovered in -it certain consolations in the withdrawal of our ships of war from the -Mediterranean; and they founded upon this a demand for the curtailing -of our own naval estimates. France according to this arrangement was -to look after British interests in the Mediterranean, Britain -presumably was to defend French interests in the Bay of Biscay and the -Channel. When, however, the war-cloud was banking up in July 1914, -these very people who had been most pleased with our withdrawal from -the Mediterranean, were those who urged most strongly that we should -now repudiate our liabilities under the arrangement. - - - - -PART IV - -DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE - - - -Now I saw still in my Dream, that they went on until they were come to -the place that _Simple_ and _Sloth_ and _Presumption_ lay and slept in, -when _Christian_ went by on Pilgrimage. And behold they were hanged up -in irons, a little way off on the other side. - -Then said _Mercy_ to him that was their Guide and Conductor, What are -those three men? And for what are they hanged there? - -GREAT-HEART: These three men were men of very bad qualities, they had -no mind to be Pilgrims themselves, and whosoever they could they -hindered. They were for sloth and folly themselves, and whoever they -could persuade with, they made so too, and withal taught them to -presume that they should do well at last. They were asleep when -_Christian_ went by, and now you go by they are hanged. - -MERCY: But could they persuade any to be of their opinion? - -GREAT-HEART: Yes, they turned several our of the way. There was -_Slow-pace_, that they persuaded to do as they. They also prevailed -with one _Short-wind_, with one _No-heart_, with one -_Linger-after-lust_, and with one _Sleepy-head_, and with a young woman -her name was _Dull_, to turn out of the way and become as they. -Besides they brought up an ill report of your Lord, persuading others -that he was a Task-master. They also brought up an evil report of the -good Land saying 'twas not half so good as some pretend it was. They -also began to vilify his Servants, and to count the very best of them -meddlesome troublesome busy-bodies. - -_The Pilgrim's Progress_. - - - - -{309} - -CHAPTER I - -THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE - -Many people who were not in the habit of concerning themselves with -party politics endeavoured, during the autumn of 1911, and from that -time forward, to straighten out their ideas on the twin problems of -Foreign Policy and Defence. They were moved thereto mainly by the -Agadir incident. Moreover, a year later, the Balkan war provided an -object lesson in the success of sudden onset against an unprepared -enemy. Gradually also, more and more attention was focussed upon the -large annual increases in preparation of the warlike sort, which -successive budgets, presented to the Reichstag, had been unable to hide -away. In addition to these, came, early in 1913, the sensational -expansion of the German military establishment and the French reply to -it, which have already been considered. - -Private enquirers of course knew nothing of Lord Haldane's rebuff at -Berlin in 1912, for that was a Government secret. Nor had they any -means of understanding more than a portion of what was actually afoot -on the Continent of Europe in the matter of armaments and military -preparations. Their sole sources of information were official papers -and public discussions. Many additional facts beyond {310} these are -brought to the notice of governments through their secret intelligence -departments. All continental powers are more or less uncandid, both as -regards the direction and the amount of their expenditure on armaments. -In the case of Germany concealment is practised on a greater scale and -more methodically than with any other. Ministers obviously knew a -great deal more than the British public; but what was known to the -man-in-the-street was sufficiently disquieting, when he set himself to -puzzle out its meanings. - -At this time (during 1912, and in the first half of 1913, until anxiety -with regard to Ireland began to absorb public attention) there was a -very widely-spread and rapidly-growing concern as to the security of -the country. For nearly seven years Lord Roberts, with quiet -constancy, had been addressing thin and, for the most part, inanimate -gatherings on the subject of National Service. Suddenly he found -himself being listened to with attention and respect by crowded -audiences. - -Lord Roberts had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief in 1904. After his -retirement, and in the same year, he revisited the South African -battlefields. During this trip, very reluctantly--for he was no lover -of change--he came to the conclusion that in existing circumstances -'national service' was a necessity. On his return to England he -endeavoured to persuade Mr. Balfour's Government to accept his views -and give effect to them. Failing in this, he resigned his seat upon -the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1905, in order that he might be -able to advocate his opinion freely. He was then in his seventy-fourth -year. It was not, however, {311} until seven years later[1] that his -words can be said to have arrested general attention. - -[Sidenote: NATIONAL ANXIETY] - -The truth was that the nation was beginning to be dissatisfied with -what it had been told by the party speakers and newspapers, on the one -side and the other, regarding the state of the national defences. It -had not even the consolation of feeling that what the one said might be -set against the other, and truth arrived at by striking a balance -between them. This method of the party system, which was supposed to -have served fairly well in other matters, failed to reassure the nation -with regard to its military preparations. The whole of this subject -was highly complicated, lent itself readily to political mystery, and -produced in existing circumstances the same apprehensions among -ordinary men as those of a nervous pedestrian, lost in a fog by the -wharf side, who finds himself beset by officious and quarrelsome touts, -each claiming permission to set him on his way. - -The nation was disquieted because it knew that it had not been told the -whole truth by either set of politicians. It suspected the reason of -this to be that neither set had ever taken pains to understand where -the truth lay. It had a notion, moreover, that the few who really -knew, were afraid--for party reasons--to speak out, to state their -conclusions, and to propose the proper remedies, lest such a course -might drive them from office, or prevent them from ever holding it. -Beyond any doubt it was true that at this time many people were -seriously disturbed by the unsatisfactory character of recent -Parliamentary discussions, and earnestly desired to know {312} the real -nature of the dangers to be apprehended, and the adequacy of our -preparations for meeting them. - -There had always been a difficulty in keeping the Army question from -being used as a weapon in party warfare. As to this--looking back over -a long period of years--there was not much to choose between the -Radicals, Liberals, or Whigs upon the one hand, and the Unionists, -Conservatives, or Tories on the other. Military affairs are -complicated and technical; and the very fact that the line of country -is so puzzling to the ordinary man had preserved it as the happy -hunting-ground of the politician. When an opportunity presented itself -of attacking the Government on its army policy, the opposition--whether -in the reign of Queen Victoria or in that of Queen Anne--rarely -flinched out of any regard for the national interest. And when -Parliamentary considerations and ingrained prejudices made it seem a -risky matter to undertake reforms which were important, or even -essential, the Government of the day just as rarely showed any -disposition to discharge this unpopular duty. - -While at times naval policy, and even foreign policy, had for years -together been removed out of the region of purely party criticism, army -policy had ever remained embarrassed by an evil tradition. From the -time of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, to the time of -Field-Marshal Sir John French--from a date, that is, only a few years -after our modern Parliamentary system was inaugurated by the 'Glorious -Revolution,' down to the present day--the characteristic of almost -every opposition with regard to this matter, had been factiousness, and -that of {313} almost every Government evasion. Neither the one side -nor the other had ever seemed able to approach this ill-fated topic -with courage or sincerity, or to view it with steady constancy from the -standpoint of the national interest. - -[Sidenote: THE BLOOD TAXES] - -For several years past the country had been watching a conspicuous -example of this ingrained habit of manoeuvring round the Army in order -to obtain party advantage. From 1912 onwards, until more interesting -perplexities provided a distraction, a great part of the Liberal press -and party had been actively engaged in the attempt to fix the Unionist -party with responsibility for the proposals of the National Service -League. The Opposition, it is hardly necessary to record, were -innocent of this charge--criminally innocent; but it was nevertheless -regarded as good party business to load them with the odium of -'conscription.' The 'blood-taxes,' as it was pointed out by one -particularly zealous journal, would be no less useful than the -'food-taxes' as an 'election cry,' which at this time--more than ever -before--appeared to have become the be-all and end-all of party -activities. - -It was obvious to the meanest capacity that these industrious -politicians were not nearly so much concerned with the demerits, real -or supposed, of National Service, as with making their opponents as -unpopular as possible. In such an atmosphere of prejudice it would -have required great courage and determination in a statesman to seek -out and proclaim the true way to security, were it national service or -anything else which entailed a sacrifice. - -Was it wonderful that when people examined the signs of the times in -the early part of 1913, {314} they should have found themselves -oppressed by feelings of doubt and insecurity? A huge German military -increase; a desperate French effort in reply; war loans (for they were -nothing else) on a vast scale in both countries--what was the meaning -of it all? To what extent was British safety jeopardised thereby? - -To these questions there was no answer which carried authority; the -official oracles were dumb. We are a democratic country, and yet none -of our rulers had ever yet spoken plainly to us. None of the -Secretaries for War, none of the Prime Ministers since the beginning of -the century, had ever stated the issue with uncompromising simplicity, -as the case required. None of them had ever taken the country into his -confidence, either as to the extent of the danger or as to the nature -of the remedy. It is necessary to assume--in the light of subsequent -events--that these statesmen had in fact realised the danger, and were -not ignorant of the preparations which were required to forestall it. -Certainly it is hard to believe otherwise; but at times, remembering -their speeches and their acts, one is inclined to give them the -benefit, if it be a benefit, of the doubt. - -[Sidenote: BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS] - -The question at issue was in reality a graver matter than the security -of the United Kingdom or the British Empire. The outlook was wider -even than this. The best guarantee for the preservation of the peace -of Europe, and of the World, would have been a British army -proportionate to our population and resources. There could be no doubt -of this. For half a century or more we had, half unconsciously, -bluffed Europe into the belief that we did in fact possess such an -army; but gradually it had become {315} plain that this was not the -case. Since the Agadir incident the real situation was apparent even -to the man in the street--in Paris, Berlin, Brussels, the Hague, -Vienna, Rome, and Petrograd--in every capital, indeed, save perhaps in -London alone. - -If England had possessed such an army as would have enabled her to -intervene with effect in European affairs, she would almost certainly -never have been called upon to intervene.[2] Peace in that case would -have preserved itself. For Europe knew--not from our professions, but -from the obvious facts, which are a much better assurance--that our -army would never be used except for one purpose only, _to maintain the -balance of Power_. She knew this to be our only serious concern; and, -except for the single nation which, at any given time, might be aiming -at predominance, it was also the most serious concern of the whole of -Europe. She knew us to be disinterested, in the diplomatic sense, with -regard to all other European matters. She knew that there was nothing -in Europe which we wished to acquire, and nothing--save in the extreme -south-west, a rock called Gibraltar, and in the Mediterranean an island -called Malta--which we held and were determined to maintain. In the -chancelleries of Europe all this was clearly recognised. And more and -more it was {316} coming to be recognised also by the organs of public -opinion on the Continent. - - -The population of France is roughly forty millions; that of Germany} -sixty-five millions; that of the United Kingdom, forty-five millions. -As regards numbers of men trained to bear arms, France by 1911 had -already come to the end of her resources; Germany had still -considerable means of expansion; Britain alone had not yet seriously -attempted to put forth her strength. Had we done so in time the effect -must have been final and decisive; there would then have been full -security against disturbance of the peace of Europe by a deliberately -calculated war. - -Europe's greatest need therefore was that Britain should possess an -army formidable not only in valour, but also in numbers: her greatest -peril lay in the fact that, as to the second of these requirements, -Britain was deficient. No power from the Atlantic seaboard to the Ural -Mountains, save that one alone which contemplated the conquest and -spoliation of its neighbours, would have been disquieted--or indeed -anything else but reassured--had the British people decided to create -such an army. For by reason of England's peculiar interests--or rather -perhaps from her lack of all direct personal interests in European -affairs, other than in peace and the balance of power--she was marked -out as the natural mediator in Continental disputes. In these high -perplexities, however, it is not the justice of the mediator which -restrains aggression, so much as the fear inspired by his fleets and -the strength of his battalions. - - - -[1] October 1913. - -[2] This view was held by no one more strongly than by Lord Roberts. -During the last five-and-twenty years the writer has probably seen as -much of soldiers as falls to the lot of most civilians, but nowhere, -during that period, from the late senior Field-Marshal downwards, has -he ever encountered that figment of the pacifist imagination of which -we read so much during 1912-1914--"a military clique which desires to -create a conscript army on the European model for purposes of -aggression on the continent of Europe." The one thought of all -soldiers was adequate defence. Their one concern was _how to prevent -war_.... M. Clemenceau once urged that Lord Roberts should receive the -Nobel Peace Prize for his advocacy of 'conscription' in England. This -proposal was made quite seriously. - - - - -{317} - -CHAPTER II - -THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY - -The doubt and anxiety of public opinion in 1912 were not allayed when -the strength and composition of the British Army came to be considered. - -Leaving out of account those troops which were recruited and maintained -in India, the Dominions, and the Dependencies, the actual number of -British regulars employed in garrison duty abroad was in round figures -125,000 men. The number in the United Kingdom was approximately the -same; but by no means the whole of these were fit to take the field. -The total strength of the _Regular Army_ in 1912-1913 might therefore -be taken at somewhere between 250,000 and 254,000 men,[1] of whom half -were permanently out of this country, while from 25,000 to 50,000 could -not be reckoned on as available in case of war, for the reason that -they were either recent recruits or 'immatures.'[2] - -{318} - -The reserves and additional troops which would be called out in the -event of a serious war were so different in character that it was -impossible simply to throw them into a single total, and draw -conclusions therefrom according to the rules of arithmetic. For when -people spoke of the _Army Reserve_, the _Special Reserve_, and the -_Territorial Army_, they were talking of three things, the values of -which were not at all comparable. The first were fully trained -fighting soldiers; the second were lads with a mere smattering of their -trade; while the third were little more than an organised schedule of -human material--mainly excellent--which would become available for -training only at the outbreak of war, and whose liability for service -was limited to home defence. The sum-total of these reserves and -additional troops was roughly 450,000 men; but this row of figures was -entirely meaningless, or else misleading, until the significance of its -various factors was grasped.[3] - -[Sidenote: THE THREE RESERVES] - -The first of these categories, the _Army Reserve_, was the only one -which could justly claim to rank as a true reserve--that is, as a -fighting force, from the outbreak of war equal in calibre to the -Continental {319} troops against which, it would be called upon to take -the field. - -The _Army Reserve_ consisted of men who had served their full time in -the _Regular Army_. They were therefore thoroughly trained and -disciplined, needing only a few days--or at most weeks--to rub the rust -off them.[4] Nominally their numbers were 137,000[5] men; but as over -8000 of these were living out of the United Kingdom the net remainder -had to be taken at something under 130,000. Moreover, as the _Army -Reserve_ depended automatically upon the strength of the _Regular -Army_, and as the strength of this had recently been reduced, it seemed -necessarily to follow that ultimately there would be a considerable -diminution. - -The second category to which the name of a reserve was given was the -_Special Reserve_. This, however, was no true reserve like the first, -for it was wholly unfit to take the field upon the outbreak of -hostilities. It was the modern substitute for the Militia, and was -under obligation to serve abroad in time of war. The term of -enlistment was six years, and the training nominally consisted of six -months in the first year, and one month in camp in each of the -succeeding years. But in practice these conditions had been greatly -relaxed. It was believed that, upon the average, the term of training -amounted to even less than the proposals of the National Service {320} -League,[6] which had been criticised from the official -standpoint--severely and not altogether unjustly--on the ground that -they would not provide soldiers fit to be drafted immediately into the -fighting line. - -Notwithstanding the inadequacy of its military education, this _Special -Reserve_ was relied upon in some measure for making up the numbers of -our Expeditionary Force[7] at the commencement of war, and individuals -from it, and even in some cases units, would therefore have been sent -out to meet the conscript armies of the Continent, to which they were -inferior, not only in length and thoroughness of training, but also in -age. It was important also to bear in mind that they would be led by -comparatively inexperienced and untrained officers. The strength of -the _Special Reserve_ was approximately 58,000[8] men, or lads. Under -the most favourable view it was a corps of apprentices whose previous -service had been of a very meagre and desultory character. - -The third category was the _Territorial Army_, whose term of service -was four years and whose military training, even nominally, only -consisted of fifteen days in camp each year, twenty drills the first -year, and ten drills each year after that. In reality this training -had, on the average, consisted of very much less. This force was not -liable for service abroad, but only for home defence. - -The minimum strength of the _Territorial Army_ {321} was estimated -beforehand by Lord Haldane at 316,000 men; but these numbers had never -been reached. The approximate strength was only 260,000 men, of whom -only about half had qualified, both by doing fifteen days in camp, and -by passing an elementary test in musketry.[9] These numbers had -recently shown a tendency to shrink rather than swell.[10] - -[Sidenote: THEIR VALUES AND TRAINING] - -The value of the _Territorial Army_, therefore, was that of excellent, -though in certain cases immature, material, available for training upon -the outbreak of war. But in spite of its high and patriotic spirit it -was wholly unfit to take the field against trained troops until it had -undergone the necessary training. - -In the event of war we could not safely reckon upon being able to -withdraw our garrisons from abroad.[11] Consequently, in the first -instance, and until the _Special Reserve_ and the _Territorial Army_ -had been made efficient, all we could reasonably depend upon for -serious military operations, either at home or abroad, were that part -of the _Regular Army_ which was in the United Kingdom, and the _Army -Reserve_. - -In round figures therefore our soldiers immediately available for a -European war (_i.e._ that portion of the _Regular Army_ which was -stationed at home and the _Army Reserve_) amounted on mobilisation to -something much under 250,000 men. Our apprentice troops (the _Special -Reserve_), who were really considerably less than _half_-made, numbered -something {322} under 60,000 men. Our _un_made raw material (the -_Territorial Army_), excellent in quality and immediately available for -training, might be taken at 260,000 men. - - -The main consideration arising out of this analysis was of course the -inadequacy of the British Army to make good the numerical deficiency of -the Triple Entente in the Western theatre during the _onset_ and the -_grip_ of war. Supposing England to be involved in a European war, -which ran its course and was brought to a conclusion with the same -swiftness which had characterised every other European war within the -last half century, how were our _half_-made and our _un_made troops to -be rendered efficient in time to effect the result in any way -whatsoever? - -[Sidenote: SCARCITY OF OFFICERS] - -There was yet another consideration of great gravity. If our full -Expeditionary Force were sent abroad we should have to strain our -resources to the utmost to bring it up to its full nominal strength and -keep it there. The wastage of war would necessarily be very severe in -the case of so small a force; especially heavy in the matter of -officers. Consequently, from the moment when this force set sail, -there would be a dearth of officers in the United Kingdom competent to -train the _Special Reserve_, the _Territorial Army_, and the raw -recruits. Every regular and reserve officer in the country would be -required in order to mobilise the Expeditionary Force, and keep it up -to its full strength during the first six months. As things then stood -there was a certainty--in case of war--of a very serious shortage of -officers of suitable experience and age to undertake the duties, which -{323} were required under our recently devised military system.[12] - -Half-made soldiers and raw material alike would therefore be left to -the instruction of amateur or hastily improvised officers--zealous and -intelligent men without a doubt; but unqualified, owing to their own -lack of experience, for training raw troops, so as to place them -rapidly on an equality with the armies to which they would find -themselves opposed. What the British system contemplated, was as if -you were to send away the headmaster, and the assistant-masters, and -the under-masters, leaving the school in charge of pupil-teachers. - -In no profession is the direct personal influence of teaching and -command more essential than in the soldier's. In none are good -teachers and leaders more able to shorten and make smooth the road to -confidence and efficiency. Seeing that we had chosen to depend so -largely upon training our army after war began, it might have been -supposed, that at least we should have taken care to provide ourselves -with a sufficient number of officers and non-commissioned officers, -under whose guidance the course of education would be made as thorough -and as short as possible. This was not the case. Indeed the reverse -was the case. Instead of possessing a large number of officers and -non-commissioned officers, beyond those actually required at the -outbreak of war for the purpose of {324} starting with, and repairing -the wastage in the Expeditionary Force, we were actually faced, as -things then stood, with a serious initial shortage of the officers -required for this one purpose alone. - -Lord Haldane in framing the army system which is associated with his -name chose to place his trust in a small, highly-trained expeditionary -force for immediate purposes, to be supplemented at a later date--if -war were obliging enough to continue for so long--by a new army of -which the _Territorials_ formed the nucleus, and which would not begin -its real training until after the outbreak of hostilities. Under the -most favourable view this plan was a great gamble; for it assumed that -in the war which was contemplated, the _onset_ and the _grip_ periods -would be passed through without crushing disaster, and that England -would, in due course, have an opportunity of making her great strength -felt in the _drag_. It will be said that Lord Haldane's assumption has -been justified by recent events, and in a sense this is true; but by -what merest hair-breadth escape, by what sacrifices on the part of our -Allies, at what cost in British lives, with what reproach to our -national good name, we have not yet had time fully to realise. - -But crediting Lord Haldane's system, if we may, with an assumption -which has been proved correct, we have reason to complain that he did -not act boldly on this assumption and make his scheme, such as it was, -complete and effective. For remember, it was contemplated that the -great new army, which was to defend the existence of the British Empire -in the final round of war, should be raised and trained upon the -voluntary principle--upon a wave of patriotic enthusiasm--after war -broke out. This new army {325} would have to be organised, clothed, -equipped, armed, and supplied with ammunition. The 'voluntary -principle' did not apply to matters of this kind. It might therefore -have been expected that stores would be accumulated, and plans worked -out upon the strictest business principles, with philosophic -thoroughness, and in readiness for an emergency which might occur at -any moment. - -[Sidenote: WANT OF STORES AND PLANS] - -Moral considerations which precluded 'conscription' did not, and could -not, apply to inanimate material of war, or to plans and schedules of -army corps and camps, or to a body of officers enlisted of their own -free will. It may have been true that to impose compulsory training -would have offended the consciences of free-born Britons; but it was -manifestly absurd to pretend that the accumulation of adequate stores -of artillery and small arms, of shells and cartridges, of clothing and -equipment, could offend the most tender conscience--could offend -anything indeed except the desire of the tax-payer to pay as few taxes -as possible. - -If the British nation chose to bank on the assumption, that it would -have the opportunity given it of 'making good' during the _drag_ of -war, it should have been made to understand what this entailed in the -matter of supplies; and most of all in reserve of officers. All -existing forces should at least have been armed with the most modern -weapons. There should have been arms and equipment ready for the -recruits who would be required, and who were relied upon to respond to -a national emergency. There should have been ample stores of every -kind, including artillery, and artillery ammunition, for that -Expeditionary Force upon which, during the first {326} six months we -had decided to risk our national safety. - -But, in fact, we were provided fully in none of these respects. And -least of all were we provided in the matter of officers. There was no -case of conscience at stake; but only the question of a vote in the -House of Commons. We could have increased our establishment of -officers by a vote; we could have laid in stores of ammunition, of -clothing, of equipment by a vote. But the vote was not asked for--it -might have been unpopular--and therefore Lord Haldane's scheme--in its -inception a gamble of the most hazardous character--was reduced to a -mere make-believe, for the reason that its originator lacked confidence -to back his own 'fancy.' - - -Looking back at the Agadir incident, it seemed plain enough, from a -soldier's point of view, that the British Expeditionary Force was -inadequate, in a purely military sense, to redress the adverse balance -against the French, and beat back a German invasion. The moral effect, -however, of our assistance would undoubtedly have been very great, in -encouraging France and Belgium by our comradeship in arms, and in -discouraging Germany, by making clear to her the firmness of the Triple -Entente. - -But by the summer of 1914--three years later--this position had -undergone a serious change. In a purely military sense, the value of -such aid as it had been in our power to send three years earlier, was -greatly diminished. The increase in the German striking force over -that of France, which had taken effect since 1911, was considerably -greater than the total numbers of the army which we held prepared {327} -for foreign service. This was fully understood abroad; and the -knowledge of it would obviously diminish the moral as well as the -material effect of our co-operation. - -[Sidenote: COST OF FULL INSURANCE] - -In order that the combined forces of France and England might have a -reasonable chance of holding their own[13] against Germany, until -Russian pressure began to tell, the smallest army which we ought to -have been able to put in the field, and maintain there for six months, -was not less than twice that of the existing Expeditionary Force. From -a soldier's point of view 320,000 men instead of 160,000 was the very -minimum with which there might be a hope of withstanding the German -onset; and for the purpose of bringing victory within sight it would -have been necessary to double the larger of these figures. In order to -reach the end in view, Britain ought to have possessed a striking force -at least half as large as that of France, in round figures between -600,000 and 750,000 men. - - -This was how the matter appeared in 1912, viewed from the standpoint of -a soldier who found himself asked to provide a force sufficient, not -for conquest--not for the purpose of changing the map of Europe to the -advantage of the Triple Entente--but merely in order to safeguard the -independence of Belgium and Holland, to prevent France from being -crushed by Germany,[14] and to preserve the security of the British -Empire. - -{328} - -The political question which presented itself to the minds of enquirers -was this--If the British nation were told frankly the whole truth about -the Army, would it not conceivably decide that complete insurance was a -better bargain than half measures? What force ought we to be prepared -to send to France during the first fortnight of war in order to make it -a moral certainty that Germany would under no circumstances venture to -attack France? - -To questions of this sort it is obviously impossible to give certain -and dogmatic answers. There are occasions when national feeling runs -away with policy and overbears considerations of military prudence. -The effects of sudden panic, of a sense of bitter injustice, of blind -pride or overweening confidence, are incalculable upon any mathematical -basis. But regarding the matter from the point of view of the Kaiser's -general staff, whose opinion is usually assumed to be a determining -factor in German enterprises, a British Expeditionary Force, amounting -to something over 600,000 men, would have been sufficient to prevent -the occurrence of a coolly calculated war. And in the event of war -arising out of some uncontrollable popular impulse, a British Army of -this size would have been enough, used with promptitude and under good -leadership, to secure the defeat of the aggressor. - -An Expeditionary Force of 320,000 men would mean fully trained reserves -of something over 210,000 in order to make good the wastage of war -during a campaign of six months. Similarly an Expeditionary Force of -600,000 would mean reserves of 400,000. In the former case a total of -530,000 trained soldiers, {329} and in the latter a total of 1,000,000, -would therefore have been required.[15] - -Even the smaller of these proposed increases in the Expeditionary Force -would have meant doubling the number of trained soldiers in the British -Army; the larger would have meant multiplying it by four. Under what -system would it be possible to achieve these results if public opinion -should decide that either of them was necessary to national security? -The answer was as easy to give as the thing itself seemed hard to carry -out. - - -[Sidenote: LIMITS OF VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT] - -It had become clear a good deal earlier than the year 1914 that the -limit of voluntary enlistment, under existing conditions, had already -been reached for the Regular as well as the _Territorial_ Army. If, -therefore, greater numbers were required they could only be provided by -some form of compulsory service. There was no getting away from this -hard fact which lay at the very basis of the situation. - -If security were the object of British policy, the Expeditionary Force -must be fully trained before war broke out. It would not serve the -purpose for which it was intended, if any part of it, or of its -reserves, needed to be taught their trade after war began. -Thoroughness of training--which must under ordinary circumstances[16] -be measured by length of {330} training--appeared to be a factor of -vital importance. Given anything like equality in equipment, -generalship, and position, men who had undergone a full two years' -course--like the conscript armies of the Continent--ought to have no -difficulty in defeating a much larger force which had less discipline -and experience. - -The lessons of the South African War were in many ways very useful; but -the praise lavishly, and justly, given to volunteer battalions by Lord -Roberts and other distinguished commanders, needed to be studied in the -light of the circumstances, and these were of a peculiar character. -For one thing our antagonists, the Boers, were not trained troops, and -moreover, their policy to a large extent was to weary us out, by -declining decisive action and engaging us in tedious pursuits. Our -volunteers, for the most part, were picked men. Although only -half-trained--perhaps in the majority of cases wholly -untrained--circumstances in this case permitted of their being given -the time necessary for gaining experience in the field before being -required to fight. This was an entirely different state of affairs -from what might be looked for in a European war, in a densely peopled -country, covered with a close network of roads and railways--a war in -which great masses of highly disciplined soldiers would be hurled -against one another systematically, upon a settled plan, until at last -superiority at one point or another should succeed in breaking down -resistance. The South African war and a European war were two things -not in the least comparable. - -[Sidenote: THE PEOPLE HAD A RIGHT TO KNOW] - -Before the nation could be expected to come to a final decision with -regard to the insurance premium {331} which it was prepared to pay, it -would require to be fully informed upon a variety of subordinate points -of much importance. Cost was a matter which could not be put lightly -on one side; our peculiar obligations in regard to foreign garrisons -was another; the nature of our industrial system was a third; and there -were many besides. But the main and governing consideration, if we -wished to retain our independence as a nation, was--what provisions -were adequate to security? The people wanted to know, and had a right -to know, the facts. And in the end, with all due regard for our -governors, and for the self-importance of political parties, it was not -either for ministers or partisans to decide this question on behalf of -the people; it was for the people, on full and honest information, to -decide it for themselves. - - - -[1] These rough totals were approximately the same in the autumn of -1912, and at the outbreak of war in July 1914. - -[2] The exact number of men who could remain in the units when -mobilised was difficult to assess, for the reason that it varied -considerably according to the trooping season, which begins in August -and ends in February. February was therefore the most unfavourable -month for comparison, and it is probably not far from the truth to say -that at that date 50,000 men out of our nominal home army were -unavailable in case of war. Under the extreme stress of circumstances, -it had recently been decided that boys of nineteen might serve in -Europe in the event of war, so that a good many 'immatures' were now -nominally 'mature.' Only nominally, however, for even a war minister -could not alter the course of nature by a stroke of the pen. - -[3] Without wearying the reader too much with figures the German -strength may be briefly indicated. That country has a population -roughly half as large again as our own (65 millions against 45). The -total of fully trained men whom the German Government could mobilise at -the declaration of war was something over 4,500,000. Of these some -2,400,000 composed the 'striking force'; the remaining 2,100,000 or -thereabouts, the reserve for making good wastage of war. But in -addition, Germany had scheduled and inscribed in her Ersatz, or -recruiting reserve, and in the Landsturm, fully 5,000,000 untrained and -partially trained men, with ample equipment and military instructors -for them all. A large proportion of these would be enrolled on -mobilisation, and would undertake garrison and other duties, for which -they would be fitted after a short period of service, thus freeing all -fully trained men for service in the field. - -[4] For purposes of immediate mobilisation, however, Continental -reservists are superior to our own, because in the British Army they -lose touch with their regiments, and in case of war will in many cases -be serving with officers and comrades whom they know nothing about; -whereas in Germany (for example) they come up for periods of training -with the regiments to which they belong. Also, at the outset, the -proportion of reservists to serving soldiers will be much greater in -our case. - -[5] This was in 1912. Their numbers appear to have increased somewhat. -In July 1914 they were something over 146,000. - -[6] Viz. four months for infantry and six for cavalry. - -[7] Twenty-seven battalions of the Special Reserve were scheduled to go -out as complete units for duty on lines of communication, etc. The -report on recruiting for 1912 says that the great majority of recruits -for the Special Reserve join between the ages of seventeen and -nineteen. It is hardly necessary to point out the folly of putting -boys of this age in a situation where they will be peculiarly liable to -disease. Continental nations employ their oldest classes of reserves -for these duties. - -[8] In July 1914 about 61,000. - -[9] _I.e._ in the autumn of 1912. They were, therefore, 56,000 short -of Lord Haldane's estimate. - -[10] Latterly there was a slight improvement in recruiting. In July -1914 the numbers (including permanent staff) were a little over -268,000--48,000 short of Lord Haldane's estimate. - -[11] The fact that in certain cases we did so withdraw our garrisons in -1914-1915 without disaster does not invalidate this calculation. - -[12] The experience of the past few months makes this criticism appear -absurd--in its _under_statement. But of course what was contemplated -in 1912-13 was not anything upon the gigantic scale of our present 'New -Army'; but only (a) the _Special Reserve_, (b) the _Territorial Army_, -possibly doubled in numbers during the first six months, and (c) fresh -recruits for the _Regular Army_ upon a very considerably enhanced -scale. But even for these purposes which were foreseen, the provision -of officers was quite inadequate; so inadequate indeed as to appear -from the soldier's point of view in the light of a parliamentary farce. - -[13] _I.e._ of holding the Germans at the French frontier and keeping -them out of Belgium should they attempt to invade that country. - -[14] At the time these totals were worked out the results appeared very -startling to the lay mind. Recent experience, however, has proved that -the soldiers who worked them out were right when they described them as -'modest estimates.' - -[15] In this calculation the wastage of war during the first six months -has been taken at two-thirds. With the smaller force of 160,000 men, -practically the whole army would be in the fighting line all the time, -and the wastage consequently would be heavier. It could not wisely be -assumed at less than three-fourths for the same period. - -[16] Obviously the better and more experienced the officers, the higher -the quality of the recruits, and the keener their spirit, the more -quickly the desired result will be achieved. The last two have been -very potent factors in the rapid education of our present 'New Army.' -In a time of abnormal patriotic impulse, the length of time required -will be much shortened. Since August 1914 the lack of experienced -officers has been the great difficulty. - - - - -{332} - -CHAPTER III - -LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS - -Lord Roberts addressed many meetings in favour of National Service -during the years which followed his return from South Africa in 1905; -but the first of his speeches to arrest widespread popular attention -was delivered in the Free Trade Hall at Manchester, on October 22, -1912. A popular audience filled the building to overflowing, listened -with respect, and appeared to accept his conclusions with enthusiasm. -His words carried far beyond the walls of the meeting-place, and caused -something approaching a sensation, or, as some thought, a scandal, in -political circles. - -Of the commentators upon this speech the greater part were Liberals, -and these condemned his utterances with unanimity in somewhat violent -language. Official Unionism was dubious, uncomfortable, and -disapproving: it remained for the most part dumb. A few voices were -raised from this quarter in open reprobation; a few others proclaimed -their independence of party discipline and hastened to approve his -sentiments. - -There was no doubt of one thing--Lord Roberts's speech had at last -aroused public interest. For the first time during the National -Service agitation {333} blood had been drawn. This was mainly due to -the object-lesson in the consequences of military unpreparedness, which -the first Balkan War was just then unfolding before the astonished eyes -of Europe. In addition, those people, who for a year past had been -puzzling their heads over the true meaning of the Agadir crisis, had -become impressed with the urgent need for arriving at a clear decision -with regard to the adequacy of our national defences. - -[Sidenote: NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE] - -The speech was a lucid and forcible statement of the need for -compulsory military training. It was interesting reading at the time -it was delivered, and in some respects it is even more interesting -to-day. It was compactly put together, not a thing of patches. A man -who read any part of it would read it all. Yet in accordance with -custom, controversy raged around three isolated passages. - -The _first_ of these runs as follows: "In the year 1912, our German -friends, I am well aware, do not--at least in sensible circles--assert -dogmatically that a war with Great Britain will take place this year or -next; but in their heart of hearts they know, every man of them, -that--just as in 1866 and just as in 1870--war will take place the -instant the German forces by land and sea are, by their superiority at -every point, as certain of victory as anything in human calculation can -be made certain. Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck. That -is the time-honoured policy of her Foreign Office. That was the policy -relentlessly pursued by Bismarck and Moltke in 1866 and 1870. It has -been her policy decade by decade since that date. It is her policy at -the present hour." - -{334} - -The _second_ passage followed upon the first: "It is an excellent -policy. It is or should be the policy of every nation prepared to play -a great part in history. Under that policy Germany has, within the -last ten years, sprung, as at a bound, from one of the weakest of naval -powers to the greatest naval power, save one, upon this globe." - -The _third_ passage came later: "Such, gentlemen, is the origin, and -such the considerations which have fostered in me the growth of this -conviction--the conviction that in some form of National Service is the -only salvation of this Nation and this Empire. The Territorial Force -is now an acknowledged failure--a failure in discipline, a failure in -numbers, a failure in equipment, a failure in energy."[1] - -The accuracy of the _first_ and _third_ of these statements now stands -beyond need of proof. It was not truer that Germany would strike so -soon as her rulers were of opinion that the propitious hour had struck, -than it was that, when the British Government came to take stock of -their resources at the outbreak of war, they would find the Territorial -Army to be lacking in the numbers, equipment, training, and discipline, -which alone could have fitted it for its appointed task--the defence of -our shores against invasion. Slowly, and under great difficulties, and -amid the gravest anxieties these defects had subsequently to be made -good, hampering the while our military operations in the critical -sphere. - -The _second_ statement was of a different character, and taken by -itself, without reference to the context, lent itself readily to -misconception as well as {335} misconstruction. A certain number of -critics, no doubt, actually believed, a still larger number affected to -believe, that Lord Roberts was here advocating the creation of a -British army, for the purpose of attacking Germany, without a shred of -justification, and at the first favourable moment. - -The whole tenor of this speech, however, from the first line to the -last, made it abundantly clear that in Lord Roberts's opinion Britain -could have neither motive nor object for attacking Germany; that the -sole concern of England and of the British Empire with regard to -Germany was, how we might defend our possessions and secure ourselves -against her schemes of aggression. - -[Sidenote: POINTS OF CRITICISM] - -Lord Roberts, however, had in fact pronounced the intentions which he -attributed to Germany to be 'an excellent policy,' and had thereby -seemed to approve, and recommend for imitation, a system which was -revolting to the conscience of a Christian community. - -The idea that Lord Roberts could have had any such thoughts in his mind -seemed merely absurd to any one who knew him; nay, it must also have -seemed inconceivable to any one who had taken the trouble to read the -speech itself in an unprejudiced mood. To an ordinary man of sense it -did not need Lord Roberts's subsequent letter of explanation[2] to set -his opinions in their true light. It was clear that his object, in -this 'peccant passage,' had merely been to avoid a pharisaical -condemnation of German methods and ambitions, and to treat that country -as a worthy, as well as a formidable, antagonist. Being a soldier, -{336} however,--not a practised platform orator alive to the dangers of -too-generous concession--he went too far. The words were unfortunately -chosen, seeing that so many critics were on the watch, not to discover -the true meaning of the speech, but to pounce on any slip which might -be turned to the disadvantage of the speaker. - -At first there was an attempt on the part of certain London[3] Liberal -journals to boycott this speech. Very speedily, however, it seemed to -dawn upon them that they had greater advantages to gain by denouncing -it. A few days later, accordingly, the torrent of condemnation was -running free. The ablest attack appeared in the _Nation_,[4] and as -this pronouncement by the leading Radical weekly was quoted with -approval by the greater part of the ministerial press throughout the -country, it may fairly be taken as representing the general view of the -party. - -[Sidenote: A RADICAL ATTACK] - -The article was headed _A Diabolical Speech_, and its contents -fulfilled the promise of the title. "There ought," said the writer, -"to be some means of bringing to book a soldier, in the receipt of -money from the State, who speaks of a friendly Power as Lord Roberts -spoke of Germany." He was accused roundly of predicting and -encouraging a vast and 'hideous conflict' between the two countries. -Lord Roberts was a 'successful'[5] {337} soldier; but 'without training -in statesmanship.' He 'had never shown any gift for it.' His was 'an -average Tory intellect.' He was a 'complete contrast to Wellington, -who possessed two great qualities; for "he set a high value on peace, -and he knew how to estimate and bow to the governing forces of national -policy.... Lord Roberts possesses neither of these attributes. He is -a mere jingo in opinion and character, and he interprets the life and -interests of this nation and this Empire by the crude lusts and fears -which haunt the unimaginative soldier's brain." - -We may pause at this breathing-place to take note of the healing -influences of time. Radical journalists of 1832, and thereabouts, were -wont to say very much the same hard things of the Duke of Wellington, -as those of 1912 saw fit to apply to Earl Roberts.... We may also -remark in passing, upon the errors to which even the most brilliant of -contemporary judgments are liable. There has never been a man in our -time who set a higher value on peace than Lord Roberts did. He -realised, however, not only the intrinsic value of peace, but its -market cost. His real crime, in the eyes of pacifists, was that he -stated publicly, as often as he had the chance, what price we must be -prepared to pay, if we wanted peace and not war. It was in this sense, -no doubt, that he did not know 'how to estimate and bow to the -governing forces of national policy.' His blunt warnings broke in -rudely and crudely upon the comfortable discourse of the three -counsellors--_Simple_, _Sloth_, and _Presumption_, who, better than any -others, were skilled in estimating the 'governing forces,' and the -advantages to be gained by bowing to them. - -{338} - -The writer in the _Nation_ then proceeded to riddle Lord Roberts's -theories of defence. "He desires us to remain a 'free nation' in the -same breath that he invites us to come under the yoke of -conscription"--intolerable, indeed, that the citizens of a free nation -should be ordered to fit themselves for defending their common -freedom--"conscription, if you please, for the unheard-of purpose of -overseas service in India and elsewhere...." This invitation does not -seem to be contained in this, or any other of Lord Roberts's speeches; -but supposing it to have been given, it was not altogether -'unheard-of,' seeing that, under the law of conscription prevalent (for -example) in Germany, conscript soldiers can be sent to Palestine, or -tropical Africa as lawfully as into Luxemburg, Poland, or France. -According to the _Nation_, the true theory of defence was Sea Power; -but this, it appeared, could not be relied on for all time.... "While -our naval monopoly--like our commercial monopoly--cannot exist for -ever, our sea power and our national security depend on our ability to -crush an enemy's fleet.... We were never so amply insured--so -over-insured--against naval disaster as we are to-day." - -[Sidenote: A LIBERAL ATTACK] - -"Lord Roberts's proposition, therefore," the writer continued, "is -merely foolish; it is his way of commending it, which is merely wicked. -He speaks of war as certain to take place 'the instant' the German -forces are assured of 'superiority at every point,' and he discovers -that the motto of German foreign policy is that _Germany strikes when -Germany's hour has struck_. Germany does not happen to have struck -anybody since 1870, and she struck then to secure national unity, and -to put an end to {339} the standing menace of French imperialism. -Since then she has remained the most peaceful and the most -self-contained, though doubtless not the most sympathetic, member of -the European family.... Germany, the target of every cheap dealer in -historic slapdash, is in substance the Germany of 1870" (_i.e._ in -extent of territory), "with a great industrial dominion superadded by -the force of science and commercial enterprise. That is the story -across which Lord Roberts scrawls his ignorant libel.... By direct -implication he invites us to do to Germany what he falsely asserts she -is preparing to do to us. These are the morals, fitter for a wolf-pack -than for a society of Christian men, commended as 'excellent policy' to -the British nation in the presence of a Bishop of the Anglican Church." - -This was very vigorous writing; nor was there the slightest reason to -suspect its sincerity. In the nature of man there is a craving to -believe; and if a man happens to have his dwelling-place in a world of -illusion and unreality, it is not wonderful that he should believe in -phantoms. The credulity of the _Nation_ might appear to many people to -amount to fanaticism; but its views were fully shared, though less -tersely stated, by the whole Liberal party, by the greater proportion -of the British people, and not inconceivably by the bulk of the -Unionist opposition as well. The Government alone, who had learned the -true facts from Lord Haldane eight months earlier, knew how near Lord -Roberts's warnings came to the mark. - -This article set the tone of criticism. The _Manchester Guardian_ -protested against the "insinuation that the German Government's views -of international {340} policy are less scrupulous and more cynical than -those of other Governments." Germany has never been accused with -justice "of breaking her word, of disloyalty to her engagements, or of -insincerity. Prussia's character among nations is, in fact, not very -different from the character which Lancashire men give to themselves as -compared with other Englishmen. It is blunt, straightforward, and -unsentimental...." How foolish, moreover, are our fears of Germany -when we come to analyse them. "We have no territory that she could -take, except, in tropical Africa, which no sane man would go to war -about. Our self-governing colonies could not in any case be held by -force; and Canada is protected in addition by the Monroe doctrine. -Egypt is not ours to cede. Malta could not be had without war with -Italy nor India without war with Russia."[6] - -This was a proud statement of the basis of British security, and one -which must have warmed the hearts, and made the blood of Cromwell and -Chatham tingle in the shades. Egypt, which we had rescued from a chaos -of civil war, bankruptcy, and corruption, which during more than thirty -years we had administered as just stewards for the benefit of her -people, which we had saved from conquest and absorption by savage -hordes--Egypt was not ours to cede. For the rest our dependencies were -not worth taking from us, while our 'colonies' could defend themselves. -By the grace of Italy's protection we should be secured in the -possession of Malta. India would be preserved to us by the goodwill of -Russia, and Canada by the strong arm of the United States.... {341} -Such at that time were the views of the Liberal journal foremost in -character and ability. - -[Sidenote: A UNIONIST ATTACK] - -Somewhat later the _Daily News_ took the field, making up for lost time -by an exuberance of misconstruction.... "The whole movement as -represented by the National Service League is definitely unmasked as an -attempt to get up, not defence, but an invasion of German territory. -This discovery, which for years has been suspected, is most valuable as -showing up the real object of the League, with its glib talk about -military calisthenics. Lord Roberts may have been indiscreet, but at -least he has made it clear that what the League wants is war."[7] - -On the same day, in order that the Liberals might not have a monopoly -of reprobation, the _Evening Standard_, in an article entitled _A Word -with Lord Roberts_, rated him soundly for having "made an attack upon -Germany and an attack upon the Territorial Force...." "It is mere -wanton mischief-making for a man with Lord Roberts's unequalled -prestige to use words which must drive every German who reads them to -exasperation." And yet no signs whatsoever were forthcoming that so -much as a single Teuton had been rendered desperate, or had taken the -words as in the least degree uncomplimentary. Up to the day of his -death--and indeed after his death[8]--Lord Roberts was almost the only -Englishman of his time of whom Germans spoke with consistent -respect.... "Do not," continues this lofty and sapient mentor, "Do not -let us talk as if the Kaiser could play the part of a Genghis Khan or -an Attila, ravening round the world at the head of armed {342} hordes -to devour empires and kingdoms."[9] And yet how otherwise has the -whole British Press been talking ever since the middle of August 1914? -If during this period of nine months, the _Evening Standard_ has kept -all reference to Attila and his Huns out of its columns, its continence -is unique. - -It would serve no useful purpose to set out further items of criticism -and abuse from the leader and correspondence columns of newspapers, or -from the speeches of shocked politicians. The _Nation_, the -_Manchester Guardian_, and the _Daily News_ are entitled, between them, -to speak for the Liberal party; and if it cannot be said that the -_Evening Standard_ is quite similarly qualified in respect of the -Unionists, there is still no doubt that the views which it expressed -with so much vigour, prescience, and felicity were held by many -orthodox members of its party. - -Colonel Bromley-Davenport, for example, who had been Financial -Secretary to the War Office in the late Unionist Government, spoke out -strongly against Lord Roberts's comments upon the efficiency of the -Territorial Force. 'Compulsory service,' in his opinion, 'was not -necessary....' And then, with a burst of illuminating candour--"Which -of the great parties in the state would take up compulsory service and -fight a general election upon it? The answer was that neither of the -parties would; and to ask for compulsory military service was like -crying for the moon."[10] The power of any proposal for winning -elections was to be the touchstone of its truth. It would be -impossible to state more concisely the attitude of the orthodox -politician. {343} Which party, indeed, we may well ask, would have -fought a general election on anything, however needful, unless it hoped -to win on it? - -[Sidenote: MINISTERIAL ATTACKS] - -The attitude of Ministers, however, with regard to Lord Roberts's -speech is much more worthy of remark than that of independent -journalists and members of Parliament. For the Government knew several -very important things which, at that time, were still hidden from the -eyes of ordinary men. - -It was eight months since Lord Haldane had returned from Germany, -concealing, under a smiling countenance and insouciant manner, a great -burden of care at his heart. If on his return he spoke cheerily on -public platforms about the kindness of his entertainment at Berlin, and -of the greatness and goodness of those with whom he had there walked -and talked, this was merely in order that his fellow-countrymen might -not be plunged in panic or despondency. He had learned the mind of -Germany, and it was no light lesson. He had imparted his dreadful -secret to his colleagues, and we have learned lately from Mr. Asquith -himself what that secret was.... The rulers of Germany, 'to put it -quite plainly,' had asked us for a free hand to overbear and dominate -the European world, whenever they deemed the opportunity favourable. -They had demanded this of the astounded British emissary, "at a time -when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and -defensive resources, and especially upon the sea." To such a demand -but one answer was possible, and that answer the British Government had -promptly given--so we are led to infer--in clear and ringing tones of -scorn.[11] - -{344} - -The Government knew for certain what nobody else did. They knew what -the aims of Germany were, and consequently they knew that Lord Roberts -had spoken nothing but the truth. - -And yet, strange to relate, within a few days we find Mr. Runciman, a -member of the Cabinet, administering a severe castigation to Lord -Roberts. The Manchester speech was "not only deplorable and -pernicious,' but likewise 'dangerous.' If it was resented in Germany, -Mr. Runciman 'would like Germany to know that it is resented no less in -England...." Lord Roberts had been a great organiser of the National -Service League, the object of which was 'practically conscription'; but -"he knows little of England, and certainly little of the North of -England, if he imagines we are ever likely to submit to -conscription"--not even apparently (for there are no reservations) as -an alternative to conquest; or as a security against murder, arson, and -rape.... "War is only inevitable when statesmen cannot find a way -round, or through, difficulties that may arise; or are so wicked that -they prefer the hellish method of war to any other method of solution; -or are so weak as to allow soldiers, armament makers, or scaremongers -to direct their policy."[12] Lord Roberts was not, of course, an -armament maker, but he was a scaremonger and a soldier, and as such had -no right to state his views as to how peace might be kept. - -When Sir Edward Grey was asked if any representation had been addressed -by Germany to the {345} Foreign Office with reference to Lord Roberts's -utterances, he deprecated, with frigid discretion, the idea that either -Government should make official representation to the other about -'unwise or provocative speeches.'[13] When Sir William Byles plied the -Secretary of State for War, Colonel Seely, with questions as to the -revocability of Lord Roberts's pension, the answer was solemn and -oracular, but no rebuke was administered to the interrogator.[14] - -[Sidenote: MR. ACLAND'S PERSISTENCY] - -But perhaps the most puzzling thing of all, is the persistency with -which Mr. Acland (Sir Edward Grey's Under-Secretary) pursued Lord -Roberts for some three weeks after the rest were finished with him. It -might have been expected that Mr. Acland's chief, who knew 'the -dreadful secret,' would have curbed his subordinate's excess of zeal. - -Mr. Acland distorted the Manchester speech into an appeal to the -British people to put themselves "in a position to strike at the -Germans, and to smash them in a time of profound peace, and without -cause." And this fanciful gloss he rightly denounces, in accents which -remind us not a little of the Reverend Robert Spalding, as 'nothing -less than a wicked proposal.'[15] ... For England to adopt compulsory -military service would be "an utterly criminal and provocative -proceeding against other countries of the world...." Here, indeed, is -much food for wonder. What single country of the world would have -regarded the adoption of national service by England as 'provocative'? -What single country, except Germany, would even have objected to it? -And what more right would Germany have had to object {346} to our -possessing a formidable army, than we had right to object to her -possessing a formidable navy? - -When some days later Mr. Acland is reproached with having -misrepresented Lord Roberts's original statement, he replies loftily -that he "was justified at the time in supposing that this was his real -meaning."[16] One wonders why. Lord Roberts had said nothing which -any careful reader of his whole speech--an Under-Secretary for Foreign -Affairs, for example, quoting and speaking with a due sense of his -great responsibilities--could conceivably have understood to bear this -interpretation. - -A fortnight later Mr. Acland returns to the charge once more. "Lord -Roberts," he says courteously, "has since explained that he did not -mean what his words seemed so plainly to mean"--that is, the smashing -of Germany in time of profound peace and without any cause.... Danger -to peace, the representative of the Foreign Office assures his -audience, "does not come from any action of His Majesty's Government. -It arises, if at all, from irresponsible utterances such as those which -we heard from Lord Roberts. I very much regret that harm must have -been done between the two countries by Lord Roberts's speech."[17] - -Although an under-secretary does not always enjoy the full confidence -of his official superior, he would presumably obey orders--even an -order to hold his tongue--if any were given. Consequently, although -Lord Haldane's dreadful secret may have been kept from Mr. Acland, as -unfit for his innocent {347} and youthful ears, it is surprising that -he was never warned of the dangers of the path in which he was so -boldly treading. The discourtesies of youth to age are not easily -forgiven, especially where they are founded upon misrepresentation, and -when, as in this case, the older man was right and the younger wrong as -to the facts. - -[Sidenote: LORD ROBERTS WAS RIGHT] - -It will be said--it has indeed been already said--by way of excuse for -the reticence of the Government with regard to the intentions, which -German statesmen revealed to Lord Haldane, at Berlin, in February -1912--that by keeping back from the country the knowledge which members -of the Cabinet possessed, they thereby prevented an outbreak of passion -and panic which might have precipitated war. This may be true or -untrue; it can neither be proved nor controverted; but at any rate it -was not in accordance with the principle of trusting the people; nor -would it have prevented the Government and their supporters--when war -broke out--from making amends to Lord Roberts and others whom, on -grounds of high policy, they had felt themselves obliged, in the past -to rebuke unjustly and to discredit without warrant in the facts. This -course was not impossible. Peel, a very proud man, made amends to -Cobden, and his memory does not stand any the lower for it. - -With regard to those journalists and private politicians whose mistakes -were not altogether their own fault--being due in part at least, to the -concealment of the true facts which the Government had practised--it -would not have been in the least wounding to their honour to express -regret, that they had been unwittingly the means of misleading the -people, and traducing those who were endeavouring to lead {348} it -right. In their patriotic indignation some of these same journalists -and politicians had overstepped the limits of what is justifiable in -party polemics. They had attacked the teaching at the Military -Colleges, because it sought to face the European situation frankly, and -to work out in the lecture-room the strategical and tactical -consequences which, in case of war, might be forced upon us by our -relations with France and Russia. It would have done these high-minded -journalists no harm in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, had they -acknowledged frankly that when in former days they had denounced the -words of Lord Roberts as 'wicked' and his interpretation of the -situation as inspired by "the crude lusts and fears which haunt the -unimaginative soldier's brain"--when they had publicly denounced as 'a -Staff College Cabal' teachers who were only doing their duty--they had -unwittingly been guilty of a cruel misjudgment. - -[Sidenote: FAILURE TO MAKE AMENDS] - -It is not a little remarkable that in 1912--indeed from 1905 to -1914--Lord Roberts, who, according to the Nation, possessed but 'an -average Tory intellect,' should have trusted the people, while a -democratic Government could not bring itself to do so. The Cabinet, -which knew the full measure of the danger, concealed it out of a -mistaken notion of policy. Their henchmen on the platform and in the -press did not know the full measure of the danger. They acted either -from natural prejudice, or official inspiration--possibly from a -mixture of both--when they made light of the danger and held up to -scorn any one who called attention to it. The whole body of -respectable, word-worshipping, well-to-do Liberals and Conservatives, -whom nothing could stir out of {349} their indifference and scepticism, -disapproved most strongly of having the word 'danger' so much as -mentioned in their presence. The country would to-day forgive all of -these their past errors more easily if, when the crisis came, they had -acted a manly part and had expressed regret. But never a word of the -sort from any of these great public characters! - - - -[1] Manchester, October 22, 1912. Quoted from _Lord Roberts's Message -to the Nation_ (Murray), pp. 4-6 and p. 12. The date, however, is -there given wrongly as October 25. - -[2] _Manchester Guardian_, November 5, 1912. - -[3] This was not so, however, with the Liberal newspaper of greatest -influence in the United Kingdom--the _Manchester Guardian_--which gave -a full and prominent report of Lord Roberts's meeting. This journal is -honourably free from any suspicion of using the suppression of news as -a political weapon. - -[4] October 26, 1912. Like the _Manchester Guardian_, the _Nation_ -made no attempt to boycott the speech. - -[5] 'Successful,' not 'distinguished' or 'able' is the word. The -amiable stress would appear to be on luck rather than merit. - -[6] _Manchester Guardian_, October 28, 1912. - -[7] _Daily News_, October 30, 1912. - -[8] See Preface. - -[9] _Evening Standard_, October 30, 1912. - -[10] _Morning Post_, October 30, 1912. - -[11] Mr. Asquith at Cardiff, October 2, 1914. - -[12] Mr. Runciman at Elland, _Manchester Guardian_, October 26, 1912. -Sir Walter Runciman, the father of this speaker, appears to be made of -sterner stuff. After the Scarborough raid he denounced the Germans as -"heinous polecats." - -[13] _Times_, Parliamentary Report, October 30, 1912. - -[14] _Ibid_. November 1, 1912. - -[15] Mr. Acland at Taunton, the _Times_, November 5, 1912. - -[16] Letter in the _Times_, November 11, 1912. - -[17] Mr. Acland at Rochdale, the _Times_, November 25, 1912. - - - - -{350} - -CHAPTER IV - -LORD KITCHENER'S TASK - -Lord Roberts had been seeking for seven years to persuade the nation to -realise that it was threatened by a great danger; that it was -unprepared to encounter the danger; that by reason of this -unpreparedness, the danger was brought much nearer. Until October -1912, however, he had failed signally in capturing the public ear. The -people would not give him their attention either from favour or -indignation. The cause of which he was the advocate appeared to have -been caught in an academic backwater. - -But from that time forward, Lord Roberts had no reason to complain of -popular neglect. Overcoming his natural disinclination to platform -oratory and political agitation, sacrificing his leisure, putting a -dangerous strain upon his physical strength, he continued his -propaganda at a series of great meetings in the industrial centres. -Everywhere he was listened to with respect, and apparently with a great -measure of agreement. Only on one occasion was he treated with -discourtesy, and that was by a civic dignitary and not by the audience. -But he had now become an important figure in the political conflict, -and he had to take the consequences, in a stream of abuse and -misrepresentation from the party which {351} disapproved of his -principles; while he received but little comfort from the other party, -which lived in constant terror lest it might be thought to approve of -them. Lord Roberts's advocacy of national service continued up to the -autumn of 1913, when the gravity of the situation in Ireland made it -impossible to focus public interest on any other subject. - -[Sidenote: TRIUMPH OF VOLUNTARY SYSTEM] - -After the present war had run its course for a month or two, the minds -of many people reverted to what Lord Roberts had been urging upon his -fellow-countrymen for nine years past. His warnings had come true; -that at any rate was beyond doubt. The intentions which he had -attributed to Germany were clearly demonstrated, and likewise the -vastness and efficiency of her military organisation. The inadequacy -of British preparations was made plain. They were inadequate in the -sense that they had failed to deter the aggressor from a breach of the -peace, and they had been equally inadequate for withstanding his -_onset_. The deficiencies of the Territorial Army in numbers, -discipline, training, and equipment had made it impossible to entrust -it with the responsibility of Home Defence immediately upon the -outbreak of war. As a consequence of this, the whole of the Regular -Army could not be released for foreign service, although Sir John -French's need of reinforcements was desperate. Notwithstanding, -however, that Lord Roberts's warnings had come true, many people -professed to discover in what had happened a full justification--some -even went so far as to call it a 'triumph'--for the voluntary system. - -Even after the first battle of Ypres, those who held such views had no -difficulty in finding evidences {352} of their truth on all hands. -They found them in the conduct of our army in France, and in the -courage and devotion with which it had upheld the honour of England -against overwhelming odds. They found it in the response to Lord -Kitchener's call for volunteers, and in the eagerness and spirit of the -New Army. They found it in our command of the sea, in the spirit of -the nation, and in what they read in their newspapers about the -approval and admiration of the world. - -In the short dark days of December and January we were cheered by many -bold bills and headlines announcing what purported to be victories; and -we were comforted through a sad Christmastide by panegyrics on British -instinct, pluck, good-temper, energy, and genius for muddling through. -Philosophic commentators pointed out that, just as Germany was becoming -tired out and short of ammunition, just as she was bringing up troops -of worse and worse quality, we should be at our very best, wallowing in -our resources of men and material of war. Six months, a year, eighteen -months hence--for the estimates varied--Britain would be invincible. -Economic commentators on the other hand impressed upon us how much -better it was to pay through the nose now, than to have been bleeding -ourselves white as the Germans, the French, and the Russians were -supposed (though without much justification) to have been doing for a -century. - -To clinch the triumph of the voluntary system--when the Hour came the -Man came with it. - -[Sidenote: LORD KITCHENER'S APPOINTMENT] - -Many of these things were truly alleged. Lord Kitchener at any rate -was no mirage. The gallantry of our Army was no illusion; indeed, its -heroism {353} was actually underrated, for the reason that the extent -of its peril had never been fully grasped. Although British commerce -had suffered severely from the efforts of a few bold raiders, the -achievements of our Navy were such that they could quite fairly be -described, as having secured command of the sea.[1] The German fleet -was held pretty closely within its harbours. We had been able to move -our troops and munitions of war wherever we pleased, and so far, -without the loss of a ship, or even of a man. Submarine piracy--a -policy of desperation--had not then begun. The quality of the New -Army, the rapidity with which its recruits were being turned into -soldiers, not only impressed the public, but took by complete surprise -the severest of military critics. - -This is not the place for discussing how Lord Kitchener came to be -appointed Secretary of State for War, or to attempt an estimate of his -character and career.[2] He was no politician, but a soldier {354} and -an administrator. He was in his sixty-fifth year, and since he had -left the Royal Military Academy in 1871, by far the greater part of his -work had been done abroad--in the Levant, Egypt, South Africa, and -India.[3] In no case had he ever failed at anything he had undertaken. -The greater part of his work had been completely successful; much of it -had been brilliantly successful. He believed in himself; the country -believed in him; foreign nations believed in him. No appointment could -have produced a better effect upon the hearts of the British people and -upon those of their Allies. The nation felt--if we may use so homely -an image in this connection--that Lord Kitchener was holding its hand -confidently and reassuringly in one of his, while with the other he had -the whole race of politicians firmly by the scruff, and would see to it -that there was no nonsense or trouble in that quarter. - -It is no exaggeration to say that from that time to this,[4] Lord -Kitchener's presence in the Cabinet {355} has counted for more with the -country, than that of any other minister, or indeed than all other -ministers put together. That in itself proves his possession of very -remarkable qualities; for nine such months of public anxiety and -private sorrow, as England has lately known, will disturb any -reputation which is not firmly founded upon merit. During this time we -have seen other reputations come and go; popularities made, and unmade, -and remade. We have seen great figures all but vanish into the mist of -neglect. But confidence in Lord Kitchener has remained constant -through it all. Things may have gone wrong; the Government may have -made mistakes; even the War Office itself may have made mistakes; yet -the faith of the British people in the man of their choice has never -been shaken for an instant. - -[Sidenote: HIS GRASP OF ESSENTIALS] - -The highest of all Lord Kitchener's merits is, that being suddenly -pitchforked into office by an emergency, he nevertheless grasped at -once the two or three main features of the situation, and turned the -whole force of his character to dealing with them, letting the smaller -matters meanwhile fall into line as best they might. He grasped the -dominating factor--that it was essential to subordinate every military -and political consideration to supporting France, whose fight for her -own existence was equally a fight for the existence of the British -Empire. He grasped the urgent need for the enrolment of many hundreds -of thousands of men fit for making into soldiers, if we were to win -this fight and not lose it. He grasped the need for turning these -recruits into soldiers at a pace which hardly a single military expert -believed to be possible. He may, or may {356} not, have fully grasped -at the beginning, the difficulties--mainly owing to dearth of -officers--with which he was faced: but when he did grasp them, by some -means or another, he succeeded in overcoming them. - -It is dangerous to speak of current events in confident superlatives; -but one is tempted to do so with regard to the training of the New -Army. Even the most friendly among expert critics believed that what -Lord Kitchener had undertaken was a thing quite impossible to do in the -prescribed time. Yet he has done it. And not only the friendly, but -also the severest critics, have admitted that the New Army is already -fit to face any continental army, and that, moreover, to all -appearance, it is one of the finest armies in history. The sternest -proof is yet to come; but it is clear that something not far short of a -miracle has been accomplished. - -If we search for an explanation of the miracle, we find it quite as -much in Lord Kitchener's character as in his methods. Fortunately what -was so painfully lacking in the political sphere was present in the -military--Leadership. - -[Sidenote: HIS DISADVANTAGES] - -Despite the support which Lord Kitchener derived from the public -confidence he laboured under several very serious disadvantages. A man -cannot spend almost the whole of his working life out of England, and -then return to it at the age of sixty-four, understanding all the -conditions as clearly as if he had never left it. Lord Kitchener was -ignorant not only of English political conditions, but also of English -industrial conditions, which in a struggle like the present are -certainly quite as important as the other. He may well have consoled -himself, however, with the reflection that, although he himself was -{357} lacking in knowledge, his colleagues were experts in both of -these spheres. - -It was inevitable that Lord Kitchener must submit to the guidance of -Ministers in the political sphere, providing they agreed with his main -objects--the unflinching support of France, and the creation of the New -Army. - -In the industrial sphere, on the other hand, it was the business of -Ministers, not merely to keep themselves in touch with Lord Kitchener's -present and future needs, and to offer their advice and help for -satisfying them, but also to insist upon his listening to reason, if in -his urgent need and unfamiliarity with the business world, he was seen -to be running upon danger in any direction. - -It is impossible to resist the impression that, while his colleagues -held Lord Kitchener very close by the head as to politics, and -explained to him very clearly what they conceived the people would -stand and would not stand, they did not show anything like the same -vigilance or determination in keeping him well advised as to the means -of procuring the material of war. - - - -[1] Partly by good fortune, but mainly owing to the admirable -promptitude and skill with which our naval resources were handled, the -bulk of the German fleet was imprisoned from the outset. We did not -experience anything like the full effect of our unpreparedness. If Mr. -Churchill had not taken his decision on the day following the delivery -of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia (July 24) by postponing the -demobilisation of the Fleet--to the great scandal of his own party, -when the facts first became known--there would have been a very -different tale to tell as regards the fate of the British merchant -service on the high seas. - -[2] Critics of the present Government, such as the editor of the -_National Review_, have maintained that Lord Kitchener was forced upon -an unwilling Cabinet by the pressure of public opinion; that although -he was in England throughout the crisis he was allowed to make all his -preparations for returning to Egypt, and was only fetched back as he -was on the point of stepping aboard the packet; that the well-known -form of Lord Haldane had been seen at the War Office, and that if the -Lord Chancellor had, as was intended, relinquished his legal position -in order to become Secretary of State for War, we should probably not -have sent abroad our Expeditionary Force. It is undeniable that during -Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday (August 2, 3, and 4) London was buzzing -with a strange rumour (which was fathered altogether falsely upon the -French Ambassador) that France did not ask for or require our -assistance on land; but only at sea. If this were so the absurdity of -sending our Expeditionary Force would have been obvious. It is -noteworthy that a usually well-inspired section of the Ministerial -Press--even after they had reluctantly accepted war as inevitable--were -still maintaining stoutly, even so late as Tuesday and Wednesday (4th -and 5th), that the Expeditionary Force should not be allowed to cross -the channel. Lord Kitchener was appointed on the Thursday, and the -Expeditionary Force began to go abroad the following week. The chapter -of English political history which begins with the presentation of the -Austrian ultimatum to Servia on the 23rd of July, and ends with the -appointment of Lord Kitchener on the 6th of August, will no doubt prove -to be one of the most interesting in our annals. Whether it will prove -to be one of the most glorious or one of the most humiliating -exhibitions of British statesmanship we cannot say until we possess -fuller knowledge than we do at present of the attitude of ministers at -the Cabinets of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday (July 31, August 1 and 2). - -[3] Palestine, 1874-1878; Cyprus, 1878-1882; Egypt, 1882-1899; South -Africa, 1899-1902; India, 1902-1909; Egypt, 1911-1914. Only during the -years 1871-1874 and 1909-1911 does Lord Kitchener appear to have been -freed from foreign service, and during a part of the latter interval he -was travelling in China and Japan. - -[4] End of May 1915. - - - - -{358} - -CHAPTER V - -MATERIAL OF WAR - -As regards the business world the position at this time[1] was a -singularly difficult one. Within a few days of the outbreak of war, -orders from all parts of the globe were forthcoming, on so vast a scale -that the ordinary means of coping with them were wholly inadequate. It -was not possible to walk out of the War Office and buy what was wanted -in the shops. In a very brief period the whole industrial system of -the United Kingdom was congested with orders. - -In Lord Kitchener's former experience of military and civil -administration the difficulty had usually been to get the money he -needed, in order to carry out his reforms and undertakings. But here -was a case where he could have all the money he chose to ask for; it -was the commodities themselves which could not be had either for money -or love. - -[Sidenote: ORGANISATION OF RESOURCES] - -When war broke out the industries of France and Belgium were -paralysed--the former temporarily, the latter permanently. We could -buy nothing in France; France, on the other hand, was buying eagerly in -England. And so was Russia, not herself as yet a great industrial -producer. And so were Belgium, {359} Servia, Italy, Roumania, Greece, -Japan--indeed the whole world, more or less--belligerents and neutrals -alike--except the two Powers with which we were at war. All these -competitors were in the field against the War Office, running up -prices, and making the fortunes of enterprising middlemen, who flocked -to the feast, like vultures from all corners of the sky. The -industrial situation, therefore, needed the sternest regulation, and -needed it at once. For it was essential to secure our own -requirements, and to make certain that our Allies secured theirs, at a -fair price and in advance of all other purchasers. - -Moreover, it was obviously necessary to look an immense way ahead, -especially as regards munitions of war; to aid with loans, and -encourage with orders, firms able and willing to make what was -required. It was essential that makers of arms and supplies should be -stimulated to undertake vast increases of their staff and plant. -Before the battle of the Marne was ended it was known, only too well, -that every nation in Europe--with the single exception of Germany--had -grossly underestimated the expenditure of artillery ammunition under -conditions of modern warfare. It was of the most immediate urgency to -concert with our Allies, and with our manufacturers, in order to set -this trouble right. It was as necessary for the Allies to organise -their resources as it was for them to organise their armies. The -second, indeed, was impossible without the first, as Germany well knew, -and in her own case had already practised. - -Finally, there was the problem--half industrial, half political--of -labour; its hours, conditions, and remuneration. Without the utmost -vigilance and {360} sympathy, without a constant inspiration of duty, -without political leadership which appealed to the imagination and -heart of the people, there were bound to be endless troubles and -confusion; there were bound to be disputes, quarrels, stoppages, and -strikes. - -The prices of certain munitions and materials were almost anything the -makers liked to name. Money was flying about, and everybody was aware -of it. Human nature was sorely tempted. The future was anxious and -uncertain. People dependent for a living on their own exertions, were -beset with a dangerous inclination to hold out their pitchers, in the -hopes of catching some portion of the golden shower while it lasted. -The idea that workmen were, on the average, any greedier than their -masters is only held by persons who have little knowledge of the facts. -Cost of living had risen rapidly; this might have been foreseen from -the beginning, as well as the dangers which it contained. - -In such circumstances as these the baser appetites of mankind are -always apt to break loose and gain the upper hand, unless there is a -firm leadership of the nation. That is where the statesman should come -in, exercising a sagacious control upon the whole organisation of -industry; impressing on masters the need for patience and sympathy; on -their men the need for moderation; on all the need for sacrifices. - -During the months of February, March, and April 1915 there was a loud -outcry, led by a member of the Government, deploring the lack of -munitions of war, and attributing the deficiency to a want of industry -and energy on the part of a {361} section of the working classes. -Their frequent abstentions were condemned, and drunkenness was alleged -to have been, in many cases, a contributory cause. - -[Sidenote: MINISTERIAL INCONSISTENCIES] - -Then Mr. Asquith came forward and astonished the world by denying -stoutly that there was, or ever had been, any deficiency in munitions -of war.[2] He assured the country that so long ago as September he had -"appointed a committee ... to survey the situation."[3] He said -nothing about irregularity of work, or about drunkenness as a cause of -it. On the contrary, he produced the impression that the Army was as -well provided as it could be, and that the behaviour of the whole world -of industry had {362} been as impeccable as the foresight and energy of -the Government. - -The country found it difficult to reconcile these various statements -one with another. It found it still more difficult to reconcile Mr. -Asquith's assurances with what it had heard, not only from other -Ministers, but from generals in their published communications. -Private letters from the front for months past had told a very -different story from that which was told, in soothing tones, to the -Newcastle audience. These had laid stress upon the heavy price paid in -casualties, and the heavy handicap imposed on military operations, -owing to shortage of artillery ammunition. The appointment of the -Committee alone was wholly credited; the rest of these assurances were -disbelieved. - -[Sidenote: COMPLAINTS ABOUT MUNITIONS] - -Indeed it was impossible to doubt that there had been miscalculation -and want of foresight in various directions; and it would have been -better to admit it frankly. The blame, however, did not rest upon Lord -Kitchener's shoulders, but upon those of his colleagues. They -understood the industrial conditions of the United Kingdom; he did not -and could not; and they must have been well aware of this fact. It was -not Lord Kitchener's business, nor had he the time, to make himself -familiar with those matters which are so well understood by the Board -of Trade, the Local Government Board, and the Treasury. His business -was to help France, to get recruits as best he could, to train them as -soon as he could, and to send them out to beat the Germans. It was the -business of the Government--expert in British political and industrial -conditions--to put him in the way of getting his recruits, and the -equipment, {363} supplies, and munitions of war which were necessary -for making them effective.[4] - - - -[1] I am specially referring to August-December 1914. - -[2] "I saw a statement the other day _that the operations not only of -our Army but of our Allies were being crippled, or at any rate -hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition_. There -is not a word of truth in that statement. I say there is not a word of -truth in that statement which is the more mischievous because if it -were believed, it is calculated to dishearten our troops, to discourage -our Allies, and to stimulate the hopes and activities of our enemies. -Nor is there any more truth in the suggestion that the Government, of -which I am the head, have only recently become alive to the importance -and the urgency of these matters. On the contrary, in the earliest -days of the war, when some of our would-be instructors were thinking of -quite other things, they were already receiving our anxious attention, -and as far back, I think, as the month of September I appointed a -Committee of the Cabinet, presided over by Lord Kitchener, to survey -the situation from this point of view--a Committee whose labours and -inquiries resulted in a very substantial enlargement both on the field -and of machinery of supply.... - -"No, the urgency of the situation--and, as I shall show, the urgency is -great--can be explained without any resort to recrimination or to -blame. It is due, in the main, to two very obvious causes. It is due, -first of all, to the unprecedented scale upon which ammunition on both -sides has been, and is being, expended. _It not only goes far beyond -all previous experience, but it is greatly in advance of the forecasts -of the best experts_."--Mr. Asquith at Newcastle, April 20, 1915. - -[3] There has certainly been no lack of appointments either of -committees or individuals. So lately as the 7th of April the -newspapers announced a War Office Committee "to secure that the supply -of munitions of war shall be sufficient to meet all requirements." -About a week later came the announcement of a still more august -committee--'The Output Committee'--with Mr. Lloyd-George as Chairman -and Mr. Balfour as a member of it. If war could be won by appointing -committees and creating posts, victory ought long ago to have been -secured. - -[4] Since this chapter was printed (May 1915) public opinion has been -somewhat distracted by a sensational wrangle as to whether or not the -right kind of ammunition had been supplied. These are technical -matters upon which the ordinary man is no judge. The main point is -that--certainly until quite recently--enough ammunition was not -supplied; nor anything like enough; and this was due to the failure to -look far enough ahead in the early days of the war; and to organise our -industrial system to meet the inevitable requirements. - - - - -{364} - -CHAPTER VI - -METHODS OF RECRUITING - -If Lord Kitchener is not to be held primarily responsible for the delay -in providing war material, just as little is he to be blamed for the -methods of recruiting. For he had to take what the politicians told -him. He had to accept their sagacious views of what the people would -stand; of 'what they would never stand'; of what 'from the House of -Commons' standpoint' was practicable or impracticable. - -Lord Kitchener wanted men. During August and September he wanted them -at once--without a moment's delay. Obviously the right plan was to ask -in a loud voice who would volunteer; to take as many of these as it was -possible to house, clothe, feed, and train; then to sit down quietly -and consider how many more were likely to be wanted, at what dates, and -how best they could be got. But as regards the first quarter of a -million or so, which there were means for training at once, there was -only one way--to call loudly for volunteers. The case was one of -desperate urgency, and as things then stood, it would have been the -merest pedantry to delay matters until a system, for which not even a -scheme or skeleton existed before the emergency arose, had been -devised. The rough and ready {365} method of calling out loudly was -open to many objections on the score both of justice and efficiency, -but the all-important thing was to save time. - -[Sidenote: NEED FOR A SYSTEM] - -Presumably, by and by, when the first rush was over, the Cabinet did -sit down round a table to talk things over. We may surmise the -character of the conversation which was then poured into Lord -Kitchener's ears--how England would never stand this or that; how no -freeborn Englishman--especially north of the Humber and the Trent,[1] -whence the Liberal party drew its chief support--would tolerate being -tapped on the shoulder and told to his face by Government what his duty -was; how much less would he stand being coerced by Government into -doing it; how he must be tapped on the shoulder and told by other -people; how he must be coerced by other people; how pressure must be -put on by private persons--employers by threats of dismissal--young -females of good, bad, and indifferent character by blandishments and -disdain. The fear of starvation for the freeborn Englishman and his -family--at that time a real and present danger with many minds--or the -shame of receiving a white feather, were the forces by which England -and the Empire were to be saved at this time of trial. Moreover, would -it not lead to every kind of evil if, at this juncture, the country -were to become annoyed with the Government? Better surely that it -should become annoyed with any one rather than the Government, whose -patriotic duty, therefore, was to avoid unpopularity with more devoted -vigilance than heretofore, if such a thing were possible. - -One can imagine Lord Kitchener--somewhat weary {366} of discussions in -this airy region, and sorely perplexed by all these cobwebs of the -party system--insisting doggedly that his business was to make a New -Army, and to come to the assistance of France, without a day's -unnecessary delay. He must have the men; how was he to get the men? - -And one can imagine the response. "Put your trust in us, and we will -get you the men. We will go on shouting. We will shout louder and -louder. We will paste up larger and larger pictures on the hoardings. -We will fill whole pages of the newspapers with advertisements drawn up -by the 'livest publicity artists' of the day. We will enlist the -sympathies and support of the press--for this is not an Oriental -despotism, but a free country, where the power of the press is -absolute. And if the sympathies of the press are cool, or their -support hangs back, we will threaten them with the Press Bureau. We -will tell the country-gentlemen, and the men-of-business, that it is -their duty to put on the screw; and most of these, being easily -hypnotised by the word 'duty,' will never dream of refusing. If their -action is resented, and they become disliked it will be very -regrettable; but taking a broad view, this will not be injurious to the -Liberal party in the long run. - -"Leave this little matter, Lord Kitchener, to experts. Lend your great -name. Allow us to show your effigies to the people. Consider what a -personal triumph for yourself if, at the end of this great war, we can -say on platforms that you and we together have won it on the Voluntary -System. Trust in us and our methods. We will boom your {367} New -Army, and we will see to it at the same time that the Government does -not become unpopular, and also, if possible, that the Empire is saved." - -[Sidenote: THE ADVERTISEMENT CAMPAIGN] - -So they boomed the Voluntary System and the New Army in Periclean -passages; touched with awe the solemn chords; shouted as if it had been -Jericho. - -Two specimens, out of a large number of a similar sort--the joint -handiwork apparently of the 'publicity artists,' bettering the moving -appeals of the late Mr. Barnum, and of the party managers, inspired by -the traditions of that incomparable ex-whip, Lord Murray of -Elibank--are given below.[2] It is of course impossible to do justice -here to the splendour of headlines and leaded capitals; but the nature -of the appeal will be gathered clearly enough. Briefly, the motive of -it was to avoid direct compulsion by Government--which would have -fallen equally and fairly upon all--and to substitute for this, -indirect compulsion and pressure by private individuals--which must of -necessity operate unequally, unfairly, and invidiously. To say that -this sort of thing is not compulsion, is to say what is untrue. If, as -appears to be the case, the voluntary system has broken down, and we -are to have compulsion, most honest men and women will prefer that the -compulsion should be fair rather than unfair, direct rather than -indirect, and that it should be exercised by those responsible for the -government of the country, rather than by private persons who cannot -compel, but can only penalise. - -{368} - -By these means, during the past six months, a great army has been got -together--an army great in numbers,[3] still greater in spirit; -probably one of the noblest armies ever recruited in an cause. And -Lord Kitchener has done his part by training this army with -incomparable energy, and by infusing into officers and men alike his -own indomitable resolution. - -The high quality of the New Army is due to the fact that the bulk of it -consists of two kinds of men, who of all others are the best material -for soldiers. It consists of men who love fighting for its own sake--a -small class. It also consists of men who hate fighting, but whose -sense of duty is their guiding principle--fortunately a very large -class. It consists of many others as well, driven on by divers -motives. But the spirit of the New Army--according to the {369} -accounts of those who are in the best position to judge--is the spirit -of the first two classes--of the fighters and the sense-of-duty men. -It is these who have leavened it throughout. - -[Sidenote: ITS EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION] - -This magnificent result--for it is magnificent, whatever may be thought -of the methods which achieved it--has been claimed in many -quarters--Liberal, Unionist, and non-party--as a triumph for the -voluntary system. But if we proceed to question it, how voluntary was -it really? Also how just? Did the New Army include all, or anything -like all, those whose clear duty it was to join? And did it not -include many people who ought never to have been asked to join, or even -allowed to join, until others--whose ages, occupations, and -responsibilities marked them out for the first levies--had all been -called up? - -There is also a further question--did the country, reading these -various advertisements and placards--heroic, melodramatic, pathetic, -and facetious--did the country form a true conception of the gravity of -the position? Was it not in many cases confused and perplexed by the -nature of the appeal? Did not many people conclude, that things could -not really be so very serious, if those in authority resorted to such -flamboyant and sensational methods--methods so conspicuously lacking in -dignity, so inconsistent with all previous ideas of the majesty of -Government in times of national peril? - -The method itself, no doubt, was only unfamiliar in so far as it used -the King's name. It was familiar and common enough in other -connections. But a method which might have been unexceptionable for -calling attention to the virtues of a shop, a soap, a {370} circus, or -a pill, seemed inappropriate in the case of a great nation struggling -at the crisis of its fate.[4] - -Each of us must judge from his own experience of the effect produced. -The writer has heard harsher things said of these appeals by the poor, -than by the well-to-do. The simplest and least sophisticated minds are -often the severest critics in matters of taste as well as morals. And -this was a matter of both. Among townspeople as well as countryfolk -there were many who--whether they believed or disbelieved in the urgent -need, whether they responded to the appeal or did not respond to -it--regarded the whole of this 'publicity' campaign with distrust and -dislike, as a thing which demoralised the country, which was revolting -to its honour and conscience, and in which the King's name ought never -to have been used.[5] - -{371} - -[Sidenote: ON THE WORKING CLASSES] - -On the part of the working-classes there were other objections to the -methods employed. They resented the hints and instructions which were -so obligingly given by the 'publicity artists' and the 'party managers' -to the well-to-do classes--to employers of all sorts--as to how they -should bring pressure to bear upon their dependents. And they -resented--especially the older men and those with family -responsibilities--the manner in which they were invited by means of -circulars to signify their willingness to serve--as they imagined in -the last dire necessity--and when they had agreed patriotically to do -so, found themselves shortly afterwards called upon to fulfil their -contract. For they knew that in the neighbouring village--or in the -very next house--there were men much more eligible for military {372} -service in point of age and freedom from family responsibilities, who, -not having either volunteered, or filled up the circular, were -accordingly left undisturbed to go about their daily business.[6] - - -The attitude of the country generally at the outbreak of war was -admirable. It was what it should have been--as on a ship after a -collision, where crew and passengers, all under self-command, and -without panic, await orders patiently. So the country waited--waited -for clear orders--waited to be told, in tones free from all ambiguity -and hesitation, what they were to do as classes and as individuals. -There was very little fuss or confusion. People were somewhat dazed -for a short while by the financial crisis; but the worst of that was -soon over. They then said to themselves, "Let us get on with our -ordinary work as hard as usual (or even harder), until we receive -orders from those responsible for the ship's safety, telling us what we -are to do." - -[Sidenote: BUSINESS AS USUAL] - -There was a certain amount of sparring, then and subsequently, between -high-minded journalists, who {373} were engaged in carrying on their -own _business as usual_, and hard-headed traders and manufacturers who -desired to do likewise. The former were perhaps a trifle too -self-righteous, while the latter took more credit than they deserved -for patriotism, seeing that their chief merit was common sense. To -have stopped the business of the country would have done nobody but the -Germans any good, and would have added greatly to our national -embarrassment. - -At times of national crisis, there will always be a tendency, among -most men and women, to misgivings, lest they may not be doing the full -measure of their duty. Their consciences become morbidly active; it is -inevitable that they should; indeed it would be regrettable if they did -not. People are uncomfortable, unless they are doing something they -have never done before, which they dislike doing, and which they do -less well than their ordinary work. In many cases what they are -inspired to do is less useful than would have been their ordinary work, -well and thoughtfully done. At such times as these the _Society for -Setting Everybody Right_ always increases its activities, and enrols a -large number of new members. But very soon, if there is leadership of -the nation, things fall into their proper places and proportions. -Neither business nor pleasure can be carried on as usual, and everybody -knows it. There must be great changes; but not merely for the sake of -change. There must be great sacrifices in many cases; and those who -are doing well must give a helping hand to those others who are doing -ill. But all--whether they are doing well or ill from the standpoint -of their own private interests--must be prepared to do what the leader -of the nation orders them to do. {374} This was fully recognised in -August, September, October, and November last. The country expected -orders--clear and unmistakable orders--and it was prepared to obey -whatever orders it received. - -But no orders came. Instead of orders there were appeals, warnings, -suggestions, assurances. The panic-monger was let loose with his -paint-box of horrors. The diffident parliamentarian fell to his usual -methods of soothing, and coaxing, and shaming people into doing a very -vague and much-qualified thing, which he termed their duty. But there -was no clearness, no firmness. An ordinary man will realise his duty -so soon as he receives a definite command, and not before. He received -no such command; he was lauded, lectured, and exhorted; and then was -left to decide upon his course of action by the light of his own reason -and conscience.[7] - -He was not even given a plain statement of the {375} true facts of the -situation, and then left at peace to determine what he would do. He -was disturbed in his meditations by shouting--more shouting--ever -louder and louder shouting--through some thousands of megaphones. The -nature of the appeal was emotional, confusing, frenzied, and at times -degrading. Naturally the results were in many directions most -unsatisfactory, unbusinesslike, and disorderly. The drain of -recruiting affected industries and individuals not only unequally and -unfairly, but in a way contrary to the public interest. If Government -will not exercise guidance and control in unprecedented circumstances, -it is inevitable that the country must suffer. - -[Sidenote: AN ORGIE OF SENSATIONALISM] - -To judge from the placards and the posters, the pictures and the -language, a casual stranger would not have judged that the British -Empire stood at the crisis of its fate; but rather that some World's -Fair was arriving shortly, and that these were the preliminary -flourishes. Lord Kitchener cannot have enjoyed the pre-eminence which -was allotted to him in our mural decorations, and which suggested that -he was some kind of co-equal with the famous Barnum or Lord George -Sanger. Probably no one alive hated the whole of this orgie of vulgar -sensationalism, which the timidity of the politicians had forced upon -the country, more than he did.[8] - -{376} - -Having stirred up good and true men to join the New Army, whether it -was rightly their turn or not; having got at others in whom the -voluntary spirit burned less brightly, by urging their employers to -dismiss them and their sweethearts to throw them over if they refused -the call of duty, the 'publicity artists' and the 'party managers' -between them undoubtedly collected for Lord Kitchener a very fine army, -possibly the finest raw material for an army which has ever been got -together. And Lord Kitchener, thereupon, set to work, and trained this -army as no one but Lord Kitchener could have trained it. - -These results were a source of great pride and self-congratulation -among the politicians. The voluntary principle--you see how it works! -What a triumph! What other nation could have done the same? - -Other nations certainly could not have done the same, for the reason -that there are some things which one cannot do twice over, some things -which one cannot give a second time--one's life for example, or the -flower of the manhood of a nation to be made into soldiers. - -Other nations could not have done what we were doing, because they had -done it already. They had their men prepared when the need -arose--which we had not. Other nations were engaged in holding the -common enemy at enormous sacrifices until we made ourselves ready; -until we--triumphing in our {377} voluntary system, covering ourselves -in self-praise, and declaring to the world, through the mouths of Sir -John Simon and other statesmen, that each of our men was worth at least -three of their 'pressed men' or conscripts--until we came up leisurely -with reinforcements--six, nine, or twelve months hence--supposing that -by such time, there was anything still left to come up for. If the -Germans were then in Paris, Bordeaux, Brest, and Marseilles, there -would be--temporarily at least--a great saving of mortality among the -British race. If, on the other hand, the Allies had already arrived at -Berlin without us, what greater triumph for the voluntary principle -could possibly be imagined? - -[Sidenote: A FRENCH VIEW] - -Putting these views and considerations--which have so much impressed us -all in our own recent discussions--before a French officer, I found him -obstinate in viewing the matter at a different angle. He was inclined -to lay stress on the case of Northern France, and even more on that of -Belgium, whose resistance to the German invasion we had wished for and -encouraged, and who was engaged in fighting our battles quite as much -as her own. The voluntary principle, in spite of its triumphs at -home--which he was not concerned to dispute--had not, he thought, as -yet been remarkably triumphant abroad; and nine months had gone by -since war began. - -He insisted, moreover, that for years before war was declared, our -great British statesmen could not have been ignorant of the European -situation, either in its political or its military aspects. Such -ignorance was inconceivable. They must have suspected the intentions -of Germany, and they must have known the numbers of her army. England -had common {378} interests with France. Common interests, if there be -a loyal understanding, involve equal sacrifices--equality of sacrifice -not merely when the push comes, but in advance of the crisis, in -preparation for it--a much more difficult matter. Why then had not our -Government told the British people long ago what sacrifice its safety, -no less than its honour, required of it to give? - -I felt, after talking to my friend for some time, that although he -rated our nation in some ways very highly indeed, although he was -grateful for our assistance, hopeful of the future, confident that in -Lord Kitchener we had found our man, nothing--nothing--not even -selections from Mr. Spender's articles in the _Westminster Gazette_, or -from Sir John Simon's speeches, or Sir John Brunner's assurances about -the protection afforded by international law--could induce him to share -our own enthusiasm for the voluntary system.... _The triumph of the -voluntary system_, he cried bitterly, _is a German triumph: it is the -ruin of Belgium and the devastation of France_. - -And looking at the matter from a Frenchman's point of view, there is -something to be said for his contention. - - -Apart from any objections which may exist to British methods of -recruiting since war broke out--to their injustice, want of dignity, -and generally to their demoralising effect on public opinion--there are -several still more urgent questions to be considered. Have those -methods been adequate? And if so, are they going to continue adequate -to the end? Is there, in short, any practical need for conscription? - -{379} - -We do not answer these questions by insisting that, if there had been -conscription in the past, we should have been in a much stronger -position when war broke out; or by proving to our own satisfaction, -that if we had possessed a national army, war would never have -occurred. Such considerations as these are by no means done with; they -are indeed still very important; but they lie rather aside from the -immediate question with which we are now faced, and which, for lack of -any clear guidance from those in authority, many of us have been -endeavouring of late to solve by the light of our own judgment. - -[Sidenote: NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE] - -The answer which the facts supply does not seem to be in any doubt. We -need conscription to bring this war to a victorious conclusion. We -need conscription no less in order that we may impose terms of lasting -peace. Conscription is essential to the proper organisation not only -of our manhood, but also of our national resources.[9] Judging by the -increasing size, frequency, and shrillness of recent recruiting -advertisements, conscription would seem to be equally essential in -order to secure the number of recruits necessary for making good the -wastage of war, even in the present preliminary stage of the war. And -morally, conscription is essential in order that the whole nation may -realise, before it is too late, the life-or-death nature of the present -struggle; in order also that other nations--our Allies as well as our -enemies--may understand--what they certainly do not understand at -present--that our spirit is as firm and self-sacrificing as their own. - - -The voluntary system has broken down long ago. {380} It broke down on -the day when the King of England declared war upon the Emperor of -Germany. From that moment it was obvious that, in a prolonged war, the -voluntary system could not be relied upon to give us, in an orderly and -businesslike way, the numbers which we should certainly require. It -was also obvious that it was just as inadequate for the purpose of -introducing speed, order, and efficiency into the industrial world, as -strength into our military affairs. - -So far, however, most of the accredited oracles of Government have -either denounced national military service as un-English, and a sin -against freedom; or else they have evaded the issue, consoling their -various audiences with the reflection, that it will be time enough to -talk of compulsion, when it is clearly demonstrated that the voluntary -system can no longer give us what we need. It seems improvident to -wait until the need has been proved by the painful process of failure. -The curses of many dead nations lie upon the procrastination of -statesmen, who waited for breakdown to prove the necessity of -sacrifice. Compulsion, like other great changes, cannot be -systematised and put through in a day. It needs preparation. If the -shoe begins to pinch severely in August, and we only then determine to -adopt conscription, what relief can we hope to experience before the -following midsummer? And in what condition of lameness may the British -Empire be by then? - -"But what," it may be asked, "of all the official and semi-official -statements which have been uttered in a contrary sense? Surely the -nation is bound to trust its own Government, even although no {381} -facts and figures are offered in support of their assurances." - -[Sidenote: VALUE OF OFFICIAL ASSURANCES] - -Unfortunately it is impossible to place an implicit faith in official -and semi-official statements, unless we have certain knowledge that -they are confirmed by the facts. There has been an abundance of such -statements in recent years--with regard to the innocence of Germany's -intentions--with regard to the adequacy of our own preparations--while -only a few weeks ago Mr. Asquith himself was assuring us that neither -the operations of our own army, nor those of our Allies' armies, had -ever been crippled, or even hampered, by any want of munitions. - -When, therefore, assurances flow from the same source--assurances that -there is no need for compulsory military service--that the voluntary -system has given, is giving, and will continue to give us all we -require--we may be forgiven for expressing our incredulity. Such -official and semi-official statements are not supported by any clear -proofs. They are contradicted by much that we have heard from persons -who are both honest, and in a position to know. They are discredited -by our own eyes when we read the recruiting advertisements and posters. -It seems safer, therefore, to dismiss these official and semi-official -assurances, and trust for once to our instinct and the evidence of our -own senses. It seems safer also not to wait for complete breakdown in -war, or mortifying failure in negotiations for peace, in order to have -the need for national service established beyond a doubt. - - - -[1] Cf. Mr. Runciman, _ante_, p. 344. - -[2] (A) Four questions to the women of England. - -1. You have read what the Germans have done in Belgium. Have you -thought what they would do if they invaded England? - -2. Do you realise that the safety of your Home and Children depends on -our getting more men now? - -3. Do you realise that the one word "Go" from _you_ may send another -man to fight for our King and Country? - -4. When the War is over and your husband or your son is asked 'What did -you do in the great War?'--is he to hang his head because you would not -let him go? - -Women of England do your duty! Send your men _to-day_ to join our -glorious Army. - -GOD SAVE THE KING. - -(B) Five questions to those who employ male servants. - -1. Have you a butler, groom, chauffeur, gardener, or gamekeeper serving -_you_ who, at this moment should be serving your King and Country? - -2. Have you a man serving at your table who should be serving a gun? - -3. Have you a man digging your garden who should be digging trenches? - -4. Have you a man driving your car who should be driving a transport -wagon? - -5. Have you a man preserving your game who should be helping to -preserve your Country? - -A great responsibility rests on you. Will you sacrifice your personal -convenience for your Country's need? - -Ask your men to enlist _to-day_. - -The address of the nearest Recruiting Office can be obtained at any -Post Office. - -GOD SAVE THE KING. - -[3] How many we have not been told; but that the numbers whatever they -may be do not yet reach nearly what is still required we know from the -frantic character of the most recent advertisements. - -[4] With apologies for the dialect, in which I am not an expert, I -venture to set out the gist of a reply given to a friend who set -himself to find out why recruiting was going badly in a Devonshire -village.... "We do-ant think nought, Zur, o' them advertaizements and -noospaper talk about going soldgering. When Guv'ment needs soldgers -really sore, Guv'ment'll say so clear enough, like it does when it -wants taxes--'_Come 'long, Frank Halls, you're wanted._' ... And when -Guv'ment taps Frank Halls on showlder, and sez this, I'll go right -enough; but I'll not stir foot till Guv'ment does; nor'll any man of -sense this zide Exeter." - -[5] The following letter which appeared in the _Westminster Gazette_ -(January 20, 1915), states the case so admirably that I have taken the -liberty of quoting it in full: - -"DEAR SIR--Every day you tell your readers that we are collecting -troops by means of voluntary enlistment, yet it is self-evident that -our recruiting campaign from the first has been a very noisy and a very -vulgar compulsion, which in a time of immense crisis has lowered the -dignity of our country and provoked much anxiety among our Allies. Our -national habit of doing the right thing in the wrong way has never been -exercised in a more slovenly and unjust manner. It is a crime against -morals not to use the equitable principles of national service when our -country is fighting for her life; and this obvious truth should be -recognised as a matter of course by every true democrat. A genuinely -democratic people, proud of their past history, and determined to hold -their own against Germany's blood-lust, would have divided her male -population into classes, and would have summoned each class to the -colours at a given date. Those who were essential to the leading -trades of the country would have been exempted from war service in the -field, as they are in Germany; the younger classes would have been -called up first, and no class would have been withdrawn from its civil -work until the military authorities were ready to train it. Instead of -this quiet and dignified justice, this admirable and quiet unity of a -free people inspired by a fine patriotism, we have dazed ourselves with -shrieking posters and a journalistic clamour against 'shirkers,' and -loud abuse of professional footballers; and now an advertisement in the -newspapers assures the women of England that _they_ must do what the -State declines to achieve, that they must send their men and boys into -the field since their country is fighting for her life. What -cowardice! Why impose this voluntary duty on women when the State is -too ignoble to look upon her own duty in this matter as a moral -obligation? - -"The one virtue of voluntary enlistment is that it should be -voluntary--a free choice between a soldier's life and a civilian's -life. To use moral pressure, with the outcries of public indignation, -in order to drive civilians from their work into the army--what is this -but a most undignified compulsion? And it is also a compulsion that -presses unequally upon the people, for its methods are without system. -Many families send their all into the fighting line; many decline to be -patriotic. A woman said to me yesterday: 'My husband has gone, and I -am left with his business. Why should he go? Other women in my -neighbourhood have their husbands still, and it's rubbish to say that -the country is in danger when the Government allows and encourages this -injustice in recruiting. If the country is in danger all the men -should fight--if their trade work is unnecessary to the armies." - -"This point of view is right; the wrong one is advocated by you and by -other Radicals who dislike the justice of democratic equality.--Yours -truly, WALTER SHAW SPARROW." - -[6] There have been bitter complaints of this artful way of getting -recruits, as a boy 'sniggles' trout. The following letter to the Times -(April 21, 1915) voices a very widely spread sense of injustice: - -"SIR--Will you give me the opportunity to ask a question, which I think -you will agree is important? When the Circular to Householders was -issued, many heads of families gave in their names on the assumption -that they would be called up on the last resort, and under -circumstances in which no patriotic man could refuse his help. Married -men with large families are now being called up apparently without the -slightest regard to their home circumstances. Many of the best of them -are surprised and uneasy at leaving their families, but feel bound in -honour to keep their word, some even thinking they have no choice. The -separation allowances for these families will be an immense burden on -the State, and, if the breadwinner falls, a permanent burden. Is the -need for men still so serious and urgent as to justify this? If it is, -then I for one, who have up to now hoped that the war might be put -through without compulsion, feel that the time has come to 'fetch' the -unmarried shirkers, and I believe there is a wide-spread and growing -feeling to that effect.--I am, Sir, etc., CHARLES G. E. WELBY." - -[7] An example of the apparent inability of the Government to do -anything thoroughly or courageously is found in a circular letter to -shopkeepers and wholesale firms, which was lately sent out by the Home -Secretary and the President of the Board of Trade. The object of this -enquiry--undertaken at leisure, nine months after the outbreak of -war--is to obtain information as to the number of men of military age, -who are still employed in these particular trades, and as to the -willingness of their employers to spare them if required, and to -reinstate them at the end of the war, etc., etc. - -The timid futility of this attempt at organising the resources of the -country is shown _first_ by the fact that it left to the option of each -employer whether he will reply or not. Businesses which do not wish to -have their employees taken away need not give an answer. It is -compulsory for individuals to disclose all particulars of their income; -why, therefore, need Government shrink from making it compulsory upon -firms to disclose all particulars of their staffs? ... The _second_ -vice of this application is that the information asked for is quite -inadequate for the object. Even if the enquiry were answered -faithfully by every employer and householder in the country, it would -not give the Government what they require for the purposes of -organising industry or recruiting the army.... In the _third_ place, a -certain group of trades is singled out at haphazard. If it is desired -to organise the resources of the country what is needed is a general -census of all males between 16 and 60. - -One does not know whether to marvel most at the belated timorousness of -this enquiry, or at the slatternly way in which it has been framed. - -[8] One who is no longer alive--Queen Victoria--would possibly have -hated it even more. Imagine her late Majesty's feelings on seeing the -walls of Windsor plastered with the legend--'_Be a sport: Join -to-day_'--and with other appeals of the same elevating character! ... -But perhaps the poster which is more remarkable than any -other--considering the source from which it springs--is one showing a -garish but recognisable portrait of Lord Roberts, with the motto, '_He -did his duty. Will you do yours?_' If the timidity of politicians is -apparent in certain directions, their courage is no less noteworthy in -others. The courage of a Government (containing as it does Mr. -Asquith, Lord Haldane, Mr. Runciman, Sir John Simon, Mr. Harcourt, and -Mr. Acland--not to mention others) which can issue such a poster must -be of a very high order indeed. One wonders, however, if this placard -would not be more convincing, and its effect even greater, were the -motto amplified, so as to tell the whole story: "_He did his duty; we -denounced him for doing it. We failed to do ours; will you, however, -do yours?_" - -[9] This aspect is very cogently stated in Mr. Shaw Sparrow's letter to -the _Westminster Gazette_ quoted on pp. 370-371. - - - - -{382} - -CHAPTER VII - -PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT - -If 'National Service,' or 'Conscription,' has actually become necessary -already, or may conceivably become so before long, it seems worth while -to glance at some of the considerations which have been urged in favour -of this system in the past, and also to examine some of the causes and -conditions which have hitherto led public opinion in the United -Kingdom, as well as in several of the Dominions, to regard the -principle of compulsion with hostility and distrust. The true nature -of what we call the 'Voluntary System,' and the reasons which have -induced a large section of our fellow-countrymen to regard it as one of -our most sacred institutions, are worth looking into, now that -circumstances may force us to abandon it in the near future. - -Beyond the question, whether the system of recruiting, which has been -employed during the present war, can correctly be described as -'voluntary,' there is the further question, whether the system, which -is in use at ordinary times, and which produces some 35,000 men per -annum, can be so described. Lord Roberts always maintained that it -could not, and that its true title was 'the Conscription of Hunger.' - -{383} - -[Sidenote: NORMAL RECRUITING METHODS] - -Any one who has watched the recruiting-sergeant at work, on a raw cold -day of winter or early spring, will be inclined to agree with Lord -Roberts. A fine, good-humoured, well-fed, well-set-up fellow, in a -handsome uniform, with rows of medals which light up the mean and dingy -street, lays himself alongside some half-starved poor devil, down in -his luck, with not a rag to his back that the north wind doesn't blow -through. The appetites and vanities of the latter are all of them -morbidly alert--hunger, thirst, the desire for warmth, and to cut a -smart figure in the world. The astute sergeant, though no professor of -psychology, understands the case thoroughly, as he marks down his man. -He greets him heartily with a 'good day' that sends a glow through him, -even before the drink at the Goat and Compasses, or Green Dragon has -been tossed off, and the King's shilling accepted. - -Not that there is any need for pity or regret. These young men with -empty bellies, and no very obvious way of filling them, except by -violence--these lads with gloom at their hearts, in many cases with a -burden of shame weighing on them at having come into such a forlorn -pass--in nine cases out of ten enlistment saves them; perhaps in more -even than that. - -But talk about compulsion and the voluntary principle! What strikes -the observer most about such a scene as this is certainly not anything -which can be truly termed 'voluntary.' If one chooses to put things -into ugly words--which is sometimes useful, in order to give a shock to -good people who are tending towards self-righteousness in their worship -of phrases--this is the compulsion of hunger and {384} misery. It -might even be contended that it was not only compulsion, but a mean, -sniggling kind of compulsion, taking advantage of a starving man. - -The law is very chary of enforcing promises made under duress. If a -man dying of thirst signs his birthright away, or binds himself in -service for a term of years, in exchange for a glass of water, the ink -and paper have no validity. But the recruit is firmly bound. He has -made a contract to give his labour, and to risk his life for a long -period of years, at a wage which is certainly below the market rate; -and he is held to it. Things much more 'voluntary' than this have been -dubbed 'slavery,' and denounced as 'tainted with servile conditions.' -And the loudest denunciators have been precisely those -anti-militarists, who uphold our 'voluntary' system with the hottest -fervour, while reprobating 'compulsion' with the utmost horror. - -[Sidenote: MORAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS] - -We have heard much caustic abuse of the National Service League. It -has been accused of talking 'the cant of compulsion'; by which has been -meant that certain of its members have put in the forefront of their -argument the moral and physical advantages which they imagine universal -military training would confer upon the nation. Some may possibly have -gone too far, and lost sight of the need of the nation, in their -enthusiasm for the improvement of the individual. But if occasionally -their arguments assume the form of cant, can their lapse be compared -with the cant which tells the world smugly that the British Army is -recruited on the voluntary principle? - -The 'economic argument,' as it is called, is another example. The -country would be faced with {385} ruin, we are told, if every -able-bodied man had to give 'two of the best years of his life,'[1] and -a week or two out of each of the ensuing seven, to 'unproductive' -labour. Sums have been worked out the to hundreds of millions -sterling, with the object of showing that the national loss, during a -single generation, would make the national debt appear insignificant. -How could Britain maintain her industrial pre-eminence weighted with -such a handicap? - -One answer is that Britain, buoyed up though she has been by her -voluntary system, has not lately been outstripping those of her -competitors who carried this very handicap which it is now proposed -that she should carry; that she has not even been maintaining her -relative position in the industrial world in comparison, for example, -with Germany. - -But there is also another answer. If you take a youth at the plastic -age when he has reached manhood, feed him on wholesome food, subject -him to vigorous and varied exercise, mainly in the open air, discipline -him, train him to co-operation with his fellows, make him smart and -swift in falling-to at whatever work comes under his hand, you are -thereby giving him precisely what, for his own sake and that of the -country, is most needed at the present time. You are giving him the -chance of developing his bodily strength under healthy conditions, and -you are giving him a general education and moral training which, in the -great majority of cases, will be of great value to him in all his after -life. - -It is the regret of every one, who has studied our industrial system -from within, that men wear out too {386} soon. By the time a man -reaches his fortieth year--often earlier--he is too apt, in many -vocations, to be an old man; and for that reason he is in danger of -being shoved out of his place by a younger generation. - -This premature and, for the most part, unnecessary ageing is the real -economic loss. If by taking two years out of a man's life as he enters -manhood, if by improving his physique and helping him to form healthy -habits, you can thereby add on ten or fifteen years to his industrial -efficiency, you are not only contributing to his own happiness, but are -also adding enormously to the wealth and prosperity of the country. -Any one indeed, who chooses to work out sums upon this hypothesis, will -hardly regard the national debt as a large enough unit for comparison. -The kernel of this matter is, that men wear out in the working classes -earlier than in others, mainly because they have no break, no rest, no -change, from the day they leave school to take up a trade, till the day -when they have to hand in their checks for good and all. It is not -effort, but drudgery, which most quickly ages a man. It is the -rut--straight, dark, narrow, with no horizons, and no general view of -the outside world--which is the greatest of social dangers. More than -anything else it tends to narrowness of sympathy and bitterness of -heart. - -[Sidenote: UNDER-RATING OF CONSCRIPT ARMIES] - -It would be cant to claim that universal military training will get rid -of this secular evil; but to say that it will help to diminish it is -merely the truth. The real 'cant' is to talk about the economic loss -under conscription; for there would undoubtedly be an immense economic -gain. - -But indeed the advocacy of the voluntary system {387} is stuffed full -of cant.... We are all proud of our army; and rightly so. But the -opponents of universal military service go much further in this -direction than the soldiers themselves. They contrast our army, to its -enormous advantage, with the conscript armies of the continent, which -they regard as consisting of vastly inferior fighting men--of men, in a -sense despicable, inasmuch as their meek spirits have submitted tamely -to conscription. - -Colonel Seely, who, when he touches arithmetic soars at once into the -region of poetry, has pronounced confidently that one of our voluntary -soldiers is worth ten men whom the law compels to serve. Sir John -Simon was still of opinion--even after several months of war--that one -of our volunteers was worth at least three conscripts; and he was -convinced that the Kaiser himself already knew it. What a splendid -thing if Colonel Seely were right, or even if Sir John Simon were right! - -But is either of them right? So far as our voluntary army is -superior--and it was undoubtedly superior in certain respects at the -beginning of the war--it was surely not because it was a 'voluntary' -army; but because, on the average, it had undergone a longer and more -thorough course of training than the troops against which it was called -upon to fight. Fine as its spirit was, and high as were both its -courage and its intelligence, who has ever heard a single soldier -maintain that--measured through and through--it was in those respects -superior to the troops alongside which, or against which it fought? - -As the war has continued month after month, and men with only a few -months' training have been {388} drafted across the Channel to supply -the British wastage of war, even this initial superiority which came of -longer and more thorough training has gradually been worn away. A time -will come, no doubt--possibly it has already come--when Germany, having -used up her trained soldiers of sound physique, has to fall back upon -an inferior quality. But that is merely exhaustion. It does not prove -the superiority of the voluntary system. It does not affect the -comparison between men of equal stamina and spirit--one set of whom has -been trained beforehand in arms--the other not put into training until -war began. - -Possibly Colonel Seely spoke somewhat lightly and thoughtlessly in -those serene days before the war-cloud burst; but Sir John Simon spoke -deliberately--his was the voice of the Cabinet, after months of grim -warfare. To describe his utterances as cant does not seem unjust, -though possibly it is inadequate. We are proud of our army, not merely -because of its fine qualities, but for the very fact that it is what we -choose to call a 'voluntary' army. But what do they say of it in -foreign countries? What did the whole of Europe say of it during the -South African War? What are the Germans saying of it now? - -Naturally prejudice has led them to view the facts at a different -angle. They have seldom referred to the 'voluntary' character of our -army. That was not the aspect which attracted their attention, so much -as the other aspect, that our soldiers received pay, and therefore, -according to German notions, 'fought for hire.' At the time of the -South African War all continental nations said of our army what {389} -the Germans still say--not that it was a 'voluntary' army, but that it -was a 'mercenary' army; and this is a much less pleasant-sounding -term.[2] - -[Sidenote: THE CANT OF MILITARISM] - -In this accusation we find the other kind of cant--the cant of -militarism. For if ours is a mercenary army, so is their own, in so -far as the officers and non-commissioned officers are concerned. But -as a matter of fact no part, either of our army or the existing German -army, can with any truth be described as 'mercenaries'; for this is a -term applicable only to armies--much more common in the past in Germany -than anywhere else--who were hired out to fight abroad in quarrels -which were not their own. - -But although this German accusation against the character of our troops -is pure cant, it would not be wholly so were it levelled against the -British people. Not our army, but we ourselves, are the true -mercenaries; because we pay others to do for us what other nations do -for themselves. In German eyes--and perhaps in other eyes as well, -which are less willing to see our faults--this charge against the -British people appears maintainable. It is incomprehensible to other -nations, why we should refuse to recognise that it is any part of our -duty, _as a people_, to defend our country; why we will not admit the -obligation either to train ourselves to arms in time of peace, or to -risk our lives in time of war; why we hold obstinately to it that such -things are no part of {390} our duty as a people, but are only the duty -of private individuals who love fighting, or who are endowed with more -than the average sense of duty. - -"As for you, the great British People," writes Hexenküchen -contemptuously, "you merely fold your hands, and say self-righteously, -that your duty begins and ends with paying certain individuals to fight -for you--individuals whose personal interest can be tempted with -rewards; whose weakness of character can be influenced by taunts, and -jeers, and threats of dismissal; or who happen to see their duty in a -different light from the great majority which calls itself (and is _par -excellence_) the British People...." This may be a very prejudiced -view of the matter, but it is the German view. What they really mean -when they say that England is to be despised because she relies upon a -mercenary army, is that England is to be despised because, being -mercenary, she relies upon a professional army. The taunt, when we -come to analyse it, is found to be levelled, not against the hired, but -against the hirers; and although we may be very indignant, it is not -easy to disprove its justice. - - -The British nation, if not actually the richest, is at any rate one of -the richest in the world. It has elected to depend for its safety upon -an army which cannot with justice be called either 'voluntary' or -'mercenary,' but which it is fairly near the truth to describe as -'professional.' The theory of our arrangement is that we must somehow, -and at the cheapest rate, contrive to tempt enough men to become -professional soldiers to ensure national safety. Accordingly we offer -such inducements to take up {391} the career of arms--instead of the -trades of farm labourer, miner, carpenter, dock hand, shopkeeper, -lawyer, physician, or stockbroker--as custom and the circumstances of -the moment appear to require. - -In an emergency we offer high pay and generous separation allowances to -the private soldier. In normal times we give him less than the market -rate of wages. - -[Sidenote: PAY OF THE BRITISH ARMY] - -The pay of junior or subaltern officers is so meagre that it cannot, by -any possibility, cover the expenses which Government insists upon their -incurring. Captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels are paid much -less than the wages of foremen or sub-managers in any important -industrial undertaking. Even for those who attain the most brilliant -success in their careers, there are no prizes which will stand -comparison for a moment with a very moderate degree of prosperity in -the world of trade or finance. They cannot even be compared with the -prizes open to the bar or the medical profession. - -Hitherto we have obtained our officers largely owing to a firmly rooted -tradition among the country gentlemen and the military -families--neither as a rule rich men, or even very easy in their -circumstances as things go nowadays--many of them very poor--a -tradition so strong that it is not cant, but plain truth, to call it -sense of duty. There are other motives, of course, which may lead a -boy to choose this profession--love of adventure, comparative freedom -from indoor life, pleasant comradeship, and in the case of the middle -classes, recently risen to affluence, social aspirations. But even in -the last there is far more good than harm; though in anti-militarist -circles it is the unworthy aim which is usually dwelt upon with {392} a -sneering emphasis. For very often, when a man has risen from humble -circumstances to a fortune, he rejoices that his sons should serve the -state, since it is in his power to make provision. The example of his -neighbours, whose ancestors have been living on their acres since the -days of the Plantagenets or the Tudors, is a noble example; and he is -wise to follow it. - -In the case of the rank and file of our army, a contract for a term of -years (with obligations continuing for a further term of years) is -entered into, and signed, under the circumstances which have already -been considered. We are faced here with a phenomenon which seems -strange in an Age which has conceded the right to 'down tools,' even -though by so doing a solemn engagement is broken--in an Age which has -become very fastidious about hiring agreements of most kinds, very -suspicious of anything suggestive of 'servile conditions' or 'forced -labour,' and which deprecates the idea of penalising breach of -contract, on the part of a workman, even by process in the civil courts. - -As regards a private soldier in the British army, however, the Age -apparently has no such compunctions. His contract has been made under -duress. Its obligations last for a long period of years. The pay is -below the ordinary market rates. Everything in fact which, in equity, -would favour a revision, pleads in favour of the soldier who demands to -be released. But let him plead and threaten as he please, he is not -released. It is not a case of suing him for damages in the civil -courts, but of dealing with him under discipline and mutiny acts, the -terms of which are simple and drastic--in {393} peace time -imprisonment, in war time death. Without these means of enforcing the -'voluntary' system the British people would not feel themselves safe. - -This phenomenon seems even stranger, when we remember that a large and -influential part of the British people is not only very fastidious as -to the terms of all other sorts of hiring agreements, as to rates of -pay, and as to the conditions under which such contracts have been -entered into--that it is not only most tender in dealing with the -breach of such agreements--but that it also regards the object of the -agreement for military service with particular suspicion. This section -of the British people is anti-militarist on conscientious grounds. One -would have thought, therefore, that it might have been more than -usually careful to allow the man, who hires himself out for lethal -purposes, to have the benefit of second thoughts; or even of third, -fourth, and fifth thoughts. For he, too, may develop a conscience when -his belly is no longer empty. But no: to do this would endanger the -'voluntary' system. - -[Sidenote: THE ANTI-MILITARIST CONSCIENCE] - -This anti-militarist section of the British people is composed of -citizens who, if we are to believe their own professions, love peace -more than other men love it, and hate violence as a deadly sin. They -are determined not to commit this deadly sin themselves; but being -unable to continue in pursuit of their material and spiritual affairs, -unless others will sin in their behalf, they reluctantly agree to -hire--at as low a price as possible--a number of wild fellows from the -upper classes and wastrels from the lower classes--both of whom they -regard as approximating to the reprobate type--to defend their -property, to keep {394} their lives safe, to enforce their Will as it -is declared by ballot papers and House of Commons divisions, and to -allow them to continue their careers of beneficent self-interest -undisturbed. - -But for all that, we are puzzled by the rigour with which the contract -for military service is enforced, even to the last ounce of the pound -of flesh. Not a murmur of protest comes from this section of the -British people, although it has professed to take the rights of the -poorer classes as its special province. The explanation probably is -that, like King Charles I., they have made a mental reservation, and -are thus enabled to distinguish the case of the soldier from that of -his brother who engages in a civil occupation. - -Roughly speaking, they choose to regard the civilian as virtuous, while -the soldier, on the other hand, cannot safely be presumed to be -anything of the sort. Sometimes indeed--perhaps more often than -not--he appears to them to be distinctly unvirtuous. The presumption -is against him; for if he were really virtuous, how could he ever have -agreed to become a soldier, even under pressure of want? For -regulating the service of such men as these force is a regrettable, but -necessary, instrument. The unvirtuous man has agreed to sin, and the -virtuous man acts justly in holding him to his bargain. If a soldier -develops a conscience, and insists on 'downing tools' it is right to -imprison him; even in certain circumstances to put him against a wall -and shoot him. - -These ideas wear an odd appearance when we come to examine them -closely, and yet not only did they exist, but they were actually very -prevalent down to the outbreak of the present war. They {395} seem to -be somewhat prevalent, even now, in various quarters. But surely it is -strange that virtuous citizens should need the protection of unvirtuous -ones; that they should underpay; that they should adopt the methods of -'forced labour' as a necessary part of the 'voluntary system'; that -they should imprison and shoot men for breach of hiring -agreements--hiring agreements for long periods of years, entered into -under pressure of circumstances. - -[Sidenote: ANTI-MILITARIST CONFIDENCE] - -But there is a thing even stranger than any of these. Considering how -jealous the great anti-militarist section of our fellow-countrymen is -of anything which places the army in a position to encroach upon, or -overawe, the civil power, it seems very remarkable that they should -nevertheless have taken a large number of men--whose morals, in their -view, were below rather than above the average--should have armed them -with rifles and bayonets, and spent large sums of money in making them -as efficient as possible for lethal purposes, while refusing firmly to -arm _themselves_ with anything but ballot-boxes, or to make themselves -fit for any form of self-defence. - -It seems never to have crossed the minds of the anti-militarist section -that those whom they thus regard--if not actually with moral -reprehension, at any rate somewhat askance--might perhaps some day -discover that there were advantages in being armed, and in having -become lethally efficient; that having studied the phenomena of -strikes, and having there seen force of various kinds at work--hiring -agreements broken, combinations to bring pressure on society -successful, rather black things occasionally hushed up and -forgiven--soldiers might draw their own conclusions. Having grown -tired of pay lower {396} than the market rate, still more tired of -moral lectures about the wickedness of their particular trade, and of -tiresome old-fashioned phrases about the subordination of the military -to the civil power--what if they, like other trades and classes, should -begin to consider the propriety of putting pressure on society, since -such pressure appears nowadays to be one of the recognised instruments -for redress of wrongs? ... Have not professional soldiers the power to -put pressure on society in the twentieth century, just as they have -done, again and again, in past times in other kingdoms and democracies, -where personal freedom was so highly esteemed, that even the freedom to -abstain from defending your country was respected by public opinion and -the laws of the land? - -But nonsense! In Germany, France, Russia, Austria, Italy, and other -conscript countries armies are hundreds of times stronger than our own, -while the soldiers in these cases are hardly paid enough to keep a -smoker in pipe-tobacco. And yet they do not think of putting pressure -on society, or of anything so horrible. This of course is true; but -then, in these instances, the Army is only Society itself passing, as -it were, like a may-fly, through a certain stage in its life-history. -Army and Society in the conscript countries are one and the same. A -man does not think of putting undue pressure upon himself. But in our -case the Army and Society are not one and the same. Their relations -are those of employer and employed, as they were in Rome long ago; and -as between employer and employed, there are always apt to be questions -of pay and position. - -It is useful in this connection to think a little of Rome with its -'voluntary' or 'mercenary' or {397} 'professional' army--an army -underpaid at first, afterwards perhaps somewhat overpaid, when it -occurred to its mind to put pressure on society. - -But Rome in the first century was a very different place from England -in the twentieth. Very different indeed! The art and rules of war -were considerably less of an expert's business than they are to-day. -Two thousand years ago--weapons being still somewhat -elementary--gunpowder not yet discovered--no railway trains and tubes, -and outer and inner circles, which now are as necessary for feeding -great cities as arteries and veins for keeping the human heart -going--private citizens, moreover, being not altogether unused to -acting with violence in self-defence--it might have taken, perhaps, -100,000 disciplined and well-led reprobates a week or more to hold the -six millions of Greater London by the throat. To-day 10,000 could do -this with ease between breakfast and dinner-time. Certainly a -considerable difference--but somehow not a difference which seems -altogether reassuring. - -Since the days of Oliver Cromwell the confidence of the -anti-militarists in the docility of the British Army has never -experienced any serious shock. But yet, according to the theories of -this particular school, why should our army alone, of all trades and -professions, be expected not to place its own class interests before -those of the country? - -[Sidenote: ARMIES AS LIBERATORS] - -When professional armies make their first entry into practical politics -it is almost always in the role of liberators and defenders of justice. -An instance might easily occur if one or other set of politicians, in a -fit of madness or presumption, were to ask, or order, the British Army -to undertake certain {398} operations against a section of their -fellow-countrymen, which the soldiers themselves judged to be contrary -to justice and their own honour. - -Something of this kind very nearly came to pass in March 1914. The -Curragh incident, as it was called, showed in a flash what a perilous -gulf opens, when a professional army is mishandled. Politicians, who -have come by degrees to regard the army--not as a national force, or -microcosm of the people, but as an instrument which electoral success -has placed temporarily in their hands, and which may therefore be used -legitimately for forwarding their own party ends--have ever been liable -to blunder in this direction. - -Whatever may have been the merits of the Curragh case, the part which -the British Army was asked and expected to play on that occasion, was -one which no democratic Government would have dared to order a -conscript army to undertake, until it had been ascertained, beyond any -possibility of doubt, that the country as a whole believed extreme -measures to be necessary for the national safety. - -If professional soldiers, however high and patriotic their spirit, be -treated as mercenaries--as if, in their dealings with their -fellow-countrymen, they had neither souls nor consciences--it can be no -matter for surprise if they should come by insensible degrees to think -and act as mercenaries.... One set or other of party politicians--the -occurrence is quite as conceivable in the case of a Unionist Government -as in that of a Liberal--issues certain orders, which it would never -dare to issue to a conscript army, and these orders, to its immense -surprise, are not obeyed. Thereupon a Government, which only the day -before {399} seemed to be established securely on a House of Commons -majority and the rock of tradition, is seen to be powerless. The army -in its own eyes--possibly in that of public opinion also--has stood -between the people and injustice. It has refused to be made the -instrument for performing an act of tyranny and oppression. Possibly -in sorrow and disgust it dissolves itself and ceases to exist. -Possibly, on the other hand, it glows with the approbation of its own -conscience; begins to admire its own strength, and not improbably to -wonder, if it might not be good for the country were soldiers to put -forth their strong arm rather more often, in order to restrain the -politicians from following evil courses. This of course is the end of -democracy and the beginning of militarism. - -An army which starts by playing the popular role of benefactor, or -liberator, will end very speedily by becoming the instrument of a -military despotism. We need look no farther back than Cromwell and his -major-generals for an example. We have been in the habit of regarding -such contingencies as remote and mediaeval; none the less we had all -but started on this fatal course in the spring and summer of last year. -We were then saved, not by the wisdom of statesmen--for these only -increased the danger by the spectacle which they afforded of timidity, -temper, and equivocation--but solely by the present war which, though -it has brought us many horrors, has averted, for a time at least, what -is infinitely the worst of all. - -[Sidenote: SERVICE AND SUFFRAGE] - -The conclusion is plain. A democracy which asserts the right of -manhood suffrage, while denying the duty of manhood service, is living -in a fool's paradise. - -{400} - -A democracy which does not fully identify itself with its army, which -does not treat its army with honour and as an equal, but which treats -it, on the contrary, as ill-bred and ill-tempered people treat their -servants--with a mixture, that is, of fault-finding and -condescension--is following a very perilous path. - -An army which does not receive the treatment it deserves, and which at -the same time is ordered by the politicians to perform services which, -upon occasions, it may hold to be inconsistent with its honour, is a -danger to the state. - -A democracy which, having refused to train itself for its own defence, -thinks nevertheless that it can safely raise the issue of 'the Army -versus the People,' is mad. - - - -[1] This was the German period of training for infantry. The National -Service League proposal was four months. - -[2] The pay of the French private soldier is, I understand, about a -sou--a halfpenny--a day. In his eyes the British soldier in the next -trench, who receives from a shilling to eighteenpence a day--and in the -case of married men a separation allowance as well--must appear as a -kind of millionaire. During the South African War the pay of certain -volunteer regiments reached the preposterous figure of five shillings a -day for privates. Men serving with our army as motor drivers--in -comparative safety--receive something like six shillings or seven and -sixpence a day. - - - - -{401} - -CHAPTER VIII - -SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS - -Prior to the present war the chief bugbears encountered by Lord -Roberts, and indeed by all others whose aim it was to provide this -country with an army numerically fit to support its policy, were the -objections, real or imaginary, of the British race to compulsory -service, and more particularly to compulsory service in foreign lands. -These prejudices were true types of the bugbear; for they were born out -of opinion and not out of the facts. - -The smaller fry of politicians, whose fears--like those of the -monkeys--are more easily excited by the front-row of things which are -visible, than by the real dangers which lurk behind in the shadow, are -always much more terrified of opinion than of the facts. This is -precisely why most politicians remain all their lives more unfit than -any other class of man for governing a country. Give one of these his -choice--ask him whether he will prefer to support a cause where the -facts are with him, but opinion is likely for many years to be running -hard against him, or another cause where these conditions are -reversed--of course he will never hesitate a moment about choosing the -latter. And very probably his manner {402} of answering will indicate, -that he thinks you insult his intelligence by asking such a question. - -It is only the very rare type of big, patient politician, who realises -that the facts cannot be changed by opinion, and that in the end -opinion must be changed by the facts, if the two happen to be opposed. -Such a one chooses accordingly, to follow the facts in spite of -unpopularity. - -The little fellows, on the contrary, with their large ears glued -anxiously to the ground, keep ever muttering to themselves, and -chaunting in a sort of rhythmical chorus, the most despicable -incantation in the whole political vocabulary:--"We who aspire to be -leaders of the People must see to it that we are never in advance of -the People.... The People will never stand this: the People will never -stand that.... Away with it therefore; and if possible attach it like -a mill-stone round the necks of our enemies." - -Of course they are quite wrong. The People will stand anything which -is necessary for the national welfare, if the matter is explained to -them by a big enough man in accents of sincerity. - - -A defensive force which will on no account cross the frontier is no -defensive force at all. It is only a laughing-stock. - -A frontier is sometimes an arbitrary line drawn across meadow and -plough; sometimes a river; sometimes a mountain range; sometimes, as -with ourselves, it is a narrow strip of sea--a 'great ditch,' as -Cromwell called it contemptuously. - -The awful significance, however, of the word 'frontier' seems to deepen -and darken as we pass {403} from the first example to the fourth. And -there is apparently something more in this feeling than the terrors of -the channel crossing or of a foreign language. Territorials may be -taken to Ireland, which is a longer sea-journey than from Dover to -Calais; but to be 'butchered abroad'--horrible! - -It is horrible enough to be butchered anywhere, but why more horrible -in the valley of the Rhine than in that of the Thames? If national -safety demands butchery, as it has often done in the past, surely the -butchery of 50,000 brave men on the borders of Luxemburg is a less evil -than the butchery of twice that number in the vicinity of Norwich? And -if we are to consider national comfort as well as safety, it is surely -wise to follow the German example and fight in any man's country rather -than in our own. The only question of real importance is this:--At -what place will the sacrifice of life be most effective for the defence -of the country? If we can answer that we shall know also where it will -be lightest.[1] - - -[Sidenote: THE HONOUR OF THE ARMY] - -The school of political thought which remained predominant throughout -the great industrial epoch (1832-1886) bitterly resented the -assumption, made by certain classes, that the profession of arms was -more honourable in its nature, than commerce and other peaceful -pursuits. The destruction of this supposed fallacy produced a great -literature, and even a considerable amount of poetry. It was a -frequent theme at the opening of literary institutes and technical -colleges, and also at festivals of chambers of commerce {404} and -municipalities. Professors of Political Economy expounded the true -doctrine with great vehemence, and sermons were preached without number -upon the well-worn text about the victories of peace. - -This reaction was salutary up to a point. It swept away a vast -quantity of superannuated rubbish. International relations were at -this time just as much cumbered with old meaningless phrases of a -certain sort, in which vainglory was the chief ingredient, as they have -recently been cumbered with others of a different sort in which -indolence was the chief ingredient. Inefficiency, indifference, -idleness, trifling, and extravagance were a standing charge against -soldiers as a class; and though they were never true charges against -the class, they were true, for two generations following after -Waterloo, against a large number of individuals. But this reaction, -like most other reactions, swept away too much. - -[Sidenote: THE PROFESSION OF ARMS] - -A mercenary soldiery which looks to enrich itself by pay and plunder is -an ignoble institution. It has no right to give itself airs of honour, -and must be judged like company promotion, trusts, or any of the many -other predatory professions of modern times. It is also a national -danger, inasmuch as its personal interest is to foment wars. The -British Army has never been open to this charge in any period of its -history. - -A profession in which it is only possible, by the most severe -self-denial and economy, for an officer--even after he has arrived at -success--to live on his pay, to marry, and to bring up a family, can -hardly be ranked as a money-making career. Pecuniary motives, indeed, -were never the charge against 'the military' except among the -stump-orator class. But {405} professional indifference and -inefficiency were, at that particular time, not only seriously alleged, -but were also not infrequently true. It was a good thing that -slackness should be swept away. That it has been swept away pretty -thoroughly, every one who has known anything about the Army for a -generation past, is well aware. - -But the much-resented claim to a superiority in the matter of honour is -well founded, and no amount of philosophising or political-economising -will ever shake it. Clearly it is more honourable for a man to risk -his life, and what is infinitely more important--his reputation and his -whole future career--in defence of his country, than it is merely to -build up a competency or a fortune. The soldier's profession is beset -by other and greater dangers than the physical. Money-making pursuits -are not only safer for the skin, but in them a blunder, or even a -series of blunders, does not banish the hope of ultimate success. The -man of business has chances of retrieving his position. Many bankrupts -have died in affluence. In politics, a man with a plausible tongue and -a certain quality of courage, will usually succeed in eluding the -consequences of his mistakes, by laying the blame on other people's -shoulders. But the soldier is rarely given a second chance; and he may -easily come down at the first chance, through sheer ill-luck, and not -through any fault of his own. Such a profession confers honour upon -its members. - -Law, trade, and finance are not in themselves, as was at one time -thought, dishonourable pursuits; but neither are they in themselves -honourable. They are neither the one nor the other. It casts no slur -upon a man to be a lawyer, a tradesman, or a banker; {406} but neither -does it confer upon him any honour. But military service does confer -an honour. The devotion, hardship, and danger of the soldier's life -are not rewarded upon a commercial basis, or reckoned in that currency. - -Some people are inclined to mock at the respect--exaggerated as they -think--which is paid by conscript countries to their armies. For all -its excesses and absurdities, this respect is founded upon a true -principle--a truer principle of conduct than our own. In countries -where most of the able-bodied men have given some years of their lives -gratuitously to the service of their country, the fact is brought home -to them, that such service is of a different character from the -benefits which they subsequently confer upon the State by their -industry and thrift, or by growing rich. - -[Sidenote: A THEORY OF BRITISH FREEDOM] - -From the national point of view, it is ennobling that at some period of -their lives the great majority of citizens should have served the -commonwealth disinterestedly. This after all is the only principle -which will support a commonwealth. For a commonwealth will not stand -against the shocks, which history teaches us to beware of, merely by -dropping papers, marked with a cross, into a ballot-box once every five -years, or even oftener. It will not stand merely by taking an -intelligent interest in events, by attending meetings and reading the -newspapers, and by indulging in outbursts of indignation or enthusiasm. -It will only stand by virtue of personal service, and by the readiness -of the whole people, generation by generation, to give their lives -and--what is much harder to face--the time and irksome preparation -which are necessary for making the {407} sacrifice of their -lives--should it be called for--effective for its purpose. - -If the mass of the people, even when they have realised the need, will -not accept the obligation of national service they must be prepared to -see their institutions perish, to lose control of their own destinies, -and to welcome another master than Democracy, who it may well be, will -not put them to the trouble of dropping papers, marked with a cross, -into ballot-boxes once in five years, or indeed at all. For a State -may continue to exist even if deprived of ballot-boxes; but it is -doomed if its citizens will not in time prepare themselves to defend it -with their lives. - -The memories of the press-gang and the militia ballot are dim. Both -belong to a past which it is the custom to refer to with reprobation. -Both were inconsistent with equal comradeship between classes; with -justice, dignity, honour, and the unity of the nation; and on these -grounds they are rightly condemned. - -But the press-gang and the militia ballot have been condemned, and are -still condemned, upon other grounds which do not seem so firm. Both -have been condemned as contravening that great and laudable principle -of British freedom which lays it down that those who like fighting, or -prefer it to other evils--like starvation and imprisonment--or who can -be bribed, or in some other way persuaded to fight, should enjoy the -monopoly of being 'butchered,' both abroad and at home. And it has -been further maintained by those who held these views, that people who -do not like fighting, but choose rather to stay at home talking, -criticising, enjoying {408} fine thrills of patriotism, making money, -and sleeping under cover, have some kind of divine right to go on -enjoying that form of existence undisturbed. Since the Wars of the -Roses the latter class has usually been in a great majority in England. -Even during the Cromwellian Civil War the numbers of men, capable of -bearing arms, who actually bore them, was only a smallish fraction of -the entire population. - -The moral ideals of any community, like other things, are apt to be -settled by numbers. With the extension of popular government, and the -increase of the electorate, this tendency will assert itself more and -more. But providing the people are dealt with plainly and frankly, -without flattery or deceit--like men and not as if they were greedy -children--the moral sense of a democracy will probably be sounder and -stronger than that of any other form of State. - -Even in England, however, there have been lapses, during which the -people have not been so treated, and the popular spirit has sunk, owing -to mean leadership, into degradation. During the whole of the -industrial epoch the idea steadily gained in strength, that those whose -battles were fought for them by others, approached more nearly to the -type of the perfect citizen than those others who actually fought the -battles; that the protected were worthier than the protectors. - -According to this view the true meaning of 'freedom' was exemption from -personal service. The whole duty of the virtuous citizen with regard -to the defence of his country began and ended with paying a policeman. -With the disappearance of imminent and visible danger, the reprobate -qualities of the soldier became speedily a pain and a scandal {409} to -godly men. In time of peace he was apt to be sneered at and decried as -an idler and a spendthrift, who would not stand well in a moral -comparison with those steady fellows, who had remained at home, working -hard at their vocations and investing their savings. - -[Sidenote: NINETEENTH CENTURY NOTIONS] - -The soldier, moreover, according to Political Economy, was occupied in -a non-productive trade, and therefore it was contrary to the principles -of that science to waste more money upon him than could be avoided. -Also it was prudent not to show too much gratitude to those who had -done the fighting, lest they should become presumptuous and formidable. - -This conception of the relations between the army and the civilian -population has been specially marked at several periods in our -history--after the Cromwellian wars; after the Marlborough wars; after -1757; but during the half century which followed Waterloo it seemed to -have established itself permanently as an article of our political -creed. - -After 1815 there was an utter weariness of fighting, following upon -nearly a quarter of a century of war. The heroism of Wellington's -armies was still tainted in the popular memory by the fact that the -prisons had been opened to find him recruits. The industrial expansion -and prodigious growth of material wealth absorbed men's minds. -Middle-class ideals, middle-class prosperity, middle-class irritation -against a military caste which, in spite of its comparative poverty, -continued with some success to assert its social superiority, combined -against the army in popular discussions. The honest belief that wars -were an anachronism, and that the world was now {410} launched upon an -interminable era of peace, clothed the nakedness of class prejudice -with some kind of philosophic raiment. Soldiers were no longer needed; -why then should they continue to claim the lion's share of honourable -recognition? - - -Up to August 1914 the chief difficulties in the way of army reformers -were how to overcome the firmly-rooted ideas that preparations for war -upon a great scale were not really necessary to security, and that, on -those rare occasions when fighting might be necessary, it should not be -undertaken by the most virtuous class of citizens, but by others whose -lives had a lower value. If the citizen paid it was enough; and he -claimed the right to grumble even at paying. This was the old Liberal -faith of the eighteen-fifties, and it remained the faith of the -straitest Radical sect, until German guns began to batter down the -forts of Liège. - -[Sidenote: A CHANGE OF TONE] - -But any one who remembers the state of public opinion between 1870 and -1890, or who has read the political memoirs of that time, will realise -that a change has been, very slowly and gradually, stealing over public -opinion ever since the end of that epoch. In those earlier times the -only danger which disturbed our national equanimity, and that only very -slightly, was the approach of Russia towards the north-western frontier -of India. The volunteer movement came to be regarded more and more by -ordinary people in the light of a healthy and manly recreation, rather -than as a duty. A lad would make his choice, very much as if -volunteering were on a par with rowing, sailing, hunting, or polo. It -is probably no exaggeration to say that nine volunteers out of every -ten, who {411} enrolled themselves between 1870 and 1890, never -believed for a single moment that there was a chance of the country -having need of their services. Consequently, except in the case of a -few extreme enthusiasts, it never appeared that there was anything -unpatriotic in not joining the volunteers. - -One has only to compare this with the attitude which has prevailed -since the Territorial Army came into existence, to realise that there -has been a stirring of the waters, and that in certain quarters a -change had taken place in the national mood. With regard to the -Territorials the attitude of those who joined, of those who did not -join, of the politicians, of the press, of public opinion generally was -markedly different from the old attitude. It was significant that a -man who did not join was often disposed to excuse and to justify his -abstention. The conditions of his calling, or competing duties made it -impossible for him; or the lowness of his health, or the highness of -his principles in some way interfered. There was a tendency now to -explain what previously would never have called for any explanation. - -The causes of this change are not less obvious than its symptoms. It -is an interesting coincidence that Lord Kitchener had a good deal to do -with it. The destruction of the bloodthirsty tyranny of the Khalifa -(1898), and the rescue of a fertile province from waste, misery, and -massacre, caused many people to look with less disapproving eyes than -formerly upon the profession of the soldier. The long anxieties of the -South African War, and the levies of volunteers from all parts of the -Empire, who went out to take a share in it, forced men to think not -only more kindly of soldiers, but also to think {412} of war itself no -longer as an illusion but as a reality.[2] - -The events which happened during the last decade--the creation of the -German Navy--the attempt and failure of the British Government to abate -the rivalry in armaments--the naval panic and the hastily summoned -Defence Conference in 1909--the Russo-Japanese war--the Agadir -crisis--the two Balkan wars--the military competition between Germany -and France--all these combined to sharpen the consciousness of danger -and to draw attention to the need for being prepared against it. - - -These events, which crowded the beginning of the twentieth century, -stirred and troubled public opinion in a manner which not only Mr. -Cobden, who died in 1865, but almost equally Mr. Gladstone, who -survived him by more than thirty years, would have utterly refused to -credit. Both these statesmen had been convinced that the world was -moving steadily towards a settled peace, and that before another -century had passed away--possibly even in a single generation--their -dreams of general disarmament would be approaching fulfilment. - -And to a certain extent our own generation remains still affected by -the same notions. Amid the thunders of more than a thousand miles of -battle we still find ourselves clinging tenaciously to the belief, that -the world has entered suddenly, and unexpectedly, upon an abnormal -period which, from {413} its very nature, can only be of very brief -duration. This comforting conviction does not appear to rest upon -solid grounds. In the light of history it would not seem so certain -that we have not passed out of an abnormal period into the normal--if -lamentable--condition when a nation, in order to maintain its -independence, must be prepared at any moment to fight for its life. - -It would be profitless to pursue these speculations. It is enough for -our own generation that we now find ourselves in a situation of the -gravest danger; and that it depends upon the efforts which we as a -nation put forth, more than upon anything else, whether the danger will -pass away or settle down and become chronic. - - -[Sidenote: NATURE OF GERMAN ENMITY] - -Although we failed to perceive or acknowledge the danger until some -nine months ago, it had been there for at least fifteen years, probably -for twice that number. - -German antagonism to England has been compounded of envy of our -possessions, contempt for our character, and hatred of our good -fortune. What galled our rival more than anything else, was the fact -that we enjoyed our prosperity, and held our vast Empire, upon too easy -terms. The German people had made, and were continuing to make, -sacrifices to maintain their position in the world, while the British -people in their view were making none. And if we measure national -sacrifices by personal service, and not merely in money payments, it is -difficult to see what answer is to be given to this charge. - -It is clear that unless the result of this war be to {414} crush -Germany as completely as she herself hoped at the beginning of it, to -crush France, our own danger will remain, unless Germany's chief -grievance against us is meanwhile removed. It is not a paradox, but -merely a statement of plain fact, to say that Germany's chief grievance -against ourselves was, that we were not prepared to withstand her -attack. Her hatred, which has caused, and still causes us so much -amazement, was founded upon the surest of foundations--a want of -respect. The Germans despised a nation which refused to recognise that -any obligation rested on its citizens, to fit themselves, by serious -training, for defence of their inheritance. And they will continue to -despise us when this war is over if we should still fail to recognise -this obligation. Despising us, they will continue also to hate us; the -peace of the world will still be endangered; and we shall not, after -all our sacrifices, have reached the security at which we aimed. - - -[Sidenote: HEART-SEARCHINGS] - -We may end this war without winning it, and at the same time without -being defeated. And although it appears to be still believed by some -persons that we can win, in some sort of fashion, without accepting the -principle of national service, even those who entertain this dangerous -confidence will hardly dare to deny that, after a war which ends -without a crowning victory, we shall have to accept conscription at -once upon the signature of peace. - -For it should be remembered that we have other things to take into -account besides the mood of Germany. If we stave off defeat, only with -the assistance of allies--all of whom have long ago adopted universal -military service in its most rigorous {415} form--we shall have to -reckon with their appraisement of the value of our assistance. If we -are to judge by Germany's indomitable enterprise during the past two -generations, she is likely to recover from the effects of this war at -least as rapidly as ourselves. And when she has recovered, will she -not hunger again for our possessions, as eagerly as before, if she sees -them still inadequately guarded? And maybe, when that time comes, -there may be some difficulty in finding allies. For a Power which -declines to recognise the obligation of equal sacrifices, which refuses -to make preparations in time of peace, and which accordingly, when war -occurs, is ever found unready, is not the most eligible of comrades in -arms. - - -In a recent letter the Freiherr von Hexenküchen refers, in his sour -way, to some of the matters which have been discussed in this -chapter.... "The British People," he writes, "appear to be mightily -exercised just now about their own and their neighbours' consciences; -about what they may or may not do with decency; about whether or no -football matches are right; or race-meetings; or plays, music-hall -entertainments, concerts, the purchase of new clothes, and the drinking -of alcohol; whether indeed any form of enjoyment or cheerfulness ought -to be tolerated in present circumstances. - -"But although you vex yourselves over these and other problems of a -similar kind, you never seem to vex yourselves about the abscess at the -root of the tooth. - -"The Holy Roman Empire, which was not holy, nor Roman, nor yet an -empire, reminds me not a little of your so-called voluntary military -system, {416} which is not voluntary, nor military, nor yet a system. -It is only a chaos, a paradox, and a laughing-stock to us Germans. - -"It is our army, and not yours, which really rests on a voluntary -basis. Our whole people for a century past have voluntarily accepted -the obligation of universal military service. Those amongst us who -have raised objections to this system are but an inconsiderable -fraction; negligible at any time, but in this or any other great -crisis, not merely negligible, but altogether invisible and inaudible. - -"Our people desire their army to be as it is, otherwise it would not be -as it is. No Kaiser, or Bureaucracy, or General Staff could impose -such a system against the public will and conscience. Your people, on -the other hand, have refused _as a people_ to accept the military -obligation. By various devices they endeavour to fix the burden on the -shoulders of individuals. Is this the true meaning of the word -'voluntary'--_to refuse?_ ... Sir, I desire to be civil; but was there -ever a more conspicuous instance of cant in the whole history of the -world, than your self-righteous boastings about your 'voluntary' -military system? - -"You may wonder why I bracket these two things together--your -soul-searchings about amusements of all kinds, and your nonsensical -panegyrics on the voluntary' principle.... To my eyes they are very -closely connected. - -[Sidenote: THE DUTY OF CHEERFULNESS] - -"Cheerfulness is a duty in time of war. Every man or woman who smiles, -and keeps a good heart, and goes about his or her day's work gaily, -helps by so much to sustain the national spirit. Not good, but harm, -is done to the conduct of the war, {417} by moping and brooding over -casualty lists, and by speculations as to disasters which have -occurred, or are thought to be imminent. But there is one essential -preliminary to national cheerfulness--before a nation can be cheerful -it must have a good conscience; and it cannot have a good conscience -unless it has done its duty. - -"Your nation has a bad conscience. The reason is that, _as a nation_, -it has not done its duty. This may be the fault of the leaders who -have not dared to speak the word of command. But the fact remains, -that you well know--or at any rate suspect in your hearts--that you -have not done your whole duty. And consequently you cannot be really -cheerful about anything. As you go about your daily work or -recreations, you are all the while looking back over your shoulders -with misgiving. _As a nation_ you have not--even yet--dedicated -yourselves to this war. When you have done so--if ever you do--your -burden of gloom and mistrust will fall from your back, like that of -_Christian_ as he passed along the highway, which is fenced on either -side with the Wall that is called _Salvation_." - - -In the great American Civil War, the Southern States, which aimed at -breaking away from the Union, adopted conscription within a year from -the beginning. They were brave fighters; but they were poor, and they -were in a small minority. The Northern States--confident in their -numbers and wealth--relied at first upon the voluntary system. It gave -them great and gallant armies; but these was not enough; and as months -went by President Lincoln realised that they were not enough. - -{418} - -Disregarding the entreaties of his friends, to beware of asking of the -people 'what the people would never stand,' disregarding the clamours -of his enemies about personal freedom, he insisted upon conscription, -believing that by these means alone the Union could be saved. And what -was the result? A section of the press foamed with indignation. Mobs -yelled, demonstrated, and in their illogical fury, lynched negroes, -seeing in these unfortunates the cause of all their troubles. But the -mobs were not the American people. They were only a noisy and -contemptible minority of the American people, whose importance as well -as courage had been vastly over-rated. The quiet people were in deadly -earnest, and they supported their President.[3] - -[Sidenote: LINCOLN AND CONSCRIPTION] - -But the task which Lincoln set himself was one of the hardest that a -democratic statesman ever undertook. The demand which he determined to -make, and did make, may well have tried his heart as he sat alone in -the night watches. For compulsion was a violation of the habits and -prejudices of the old American stock, while it was even more -distasteful to new immigrants. It was contrary to the traditions and -theories of the Republic, and, as many thought, to its fundamental -principles. It was open to scornful attack on grounds of sentiment. -Against a foe who were so weak, both in numbers and wealth, how -humiliating to be driven to such desperate measures! But most of -all--outweighing all other considerations--this war of North and South -was not only war, but civil war. Families and lifelong friendships -were divided. What compulsion meant, therefore, in this case was, that -brothers were to be forced to {419} kill brothers, husbands were to be -sent out to slay the kinsmen of their wives, or--as they marched with -Sherman through Georgia--to set a light with their own hands to the old -homesteads where they had been born. Between the warring States there -were no differences of blood, tradition, or religion; or of ideas of -right and wrong; no hatred against a foreign race; only an acute -opposition of political ideals. Compulsion, therefore, was a great -thing to ask of the American people. But the American people are a -great people, and they understood. And Lincoln was a great man,--one -of the greatest, noblest, and most human in the whole of history,--and -he did not hesitate to ask, to insist, and to use force. What the end -was does not need to be stated here; except merely this, that a -lingering and bloody war was thereby greatly shortened, and that the -Union was saved. - -The British Government and people are faced to-day with some, but not -all--and not the greatest--of Lincoln's difficulties. Our traditions -and theories are the same, to a large extent, as those which prevailed -in America in 1863. But unlike the North we have had recent experience -of war, and also of the sacrifices which war calls for from the -civilian population. By so much the shock of compulsion would find us -better prepared. - -But the other and much greater difficulties which beset Lincoln do not -exist in the case of the British Government. We are not fighting -against a foe inferior in numbers, but against one who up till now has -been greatly superior in numbers--who has also been greatly superior in -equipment, and preparation, and in deeply-laid plans. We are fighting -against {420} a foe who has invaded and encroached; not against one who -is standing on the defensive, demanding merely to be let go free. The -family affections and friendships which would be outraged by -conscription in this war against Germany are inconsiderable; mere dust -in the balance. The present war is waged against a foreign nation; it -is not civil war. It is waged against an enemy who plainly seeks, not -his own freedom, but our destruction, and that of our Allies. It is -waged against an enemy who by the treacherous thoroughness of his -peace-time preparations, appears to our eyes to have violated good -faith as between nations, as in the conduct of the campaign he has -disregarded the obligations of our common humanity, We may be wrong; we -may take exaggerated views owing to the bitterness of the struggle; but -such is our mind upon the matter. - -Lincoln's task would have been light had such been the mind of the -Northern States half a century ago, and had he been faced with nothing -more formidable than the conditions which prevail in England to-day. -It does not need the courage of a Lincoln to demand from our people a -sacrifice, upon which the safety of the British Empire depends, even -more certainly, than in 1863 did that of the American Union. - - - -[1] Once more it is desirable to correct the erroneous impression that -the conscript armies of continental powers are under no liability to -serve outside their own territories or overseas. - -[2] Influences of another kind altogether had much to do with the -cleansing of public opinion--the writings of Henley, of Mahan, and of -Mr. Rudyard Kipling. Though not so well known as the works of these, -Henderson's _Life of Stonewall Jackson_ has nevertheless changed many -courses of thought, and its indirect effect in removing false standards -has been very great. I can never sufficiently acknowledge my personal -debt to these four. - -[3] Cf. _Round Table_, March 1915, 'The Politics of War.' - - - - -{421} - -CHAPTER IX - -THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR - -If in the foregoing pages the Liberal party has come in for the larger -share of criticism, the reason is, that during the ten critical years, -while dangers were drawing to a head, a Liberal Government chanced to -be in power. That things would have been managed better and more -courageously had the Unionists been in power may be doubted; and -certainly it is no part of my present task to champion any such theory. - -The special type of politician whose influence has wrought so much evil -of late is no peculiar product of the Liberal party. He is the product -of the party system in its corrupt decadence. You find him in the -ranks of the Opposition as well as in those of the Ministerialists, -just as you find good and true men in both. In this last lies our -hope. In our present trouble good and true men have a chance of taking -things into their own hands, which has been denied to them for many -generations. - - -This book has been written to establish the _Need_ for National -Service, in order that the British Empire may maintain itself securely -in the present {422} circumstances of the world. If this contention be -true it is obvious that a corresponding _Duty_ lies upon the whole -nation to accept the burden of military service. - -Neither need nor duty has ever been made clear to the British people by -their leaders. Owing to the abuses of the party system, increasing -steadily over a considerable period of years, a certain type of -politician has been evolved, and has risen into great prominence--a -type which does not trust the people, but only fears them. In order to -maintain themselves and their parties in power, politicians of this -type have darkened the eyes and drugged the spirit of the nation. - - -It is no part of the plan of this volume to offer criticisms upon the -naval and military aspects of the present war, or upon the wisdom or -unwisdom of the operations which have been undertaken by land and sea. -All that need be said in this connection may be put into a very few -words. - -As we read and re-read British history we cannot but be impressed with -the fact that our leading statesmen, misled by the very brilliancy of -their intellectual endowments, have always been prone to two errors of -policy, which the simpler mind of the soldier instinctively avoids. -They have ever been too ready to conclude prematurely that a certain -line of obstacles is so formidable that it cannot be forced; and they -have also ever been too ready to accept the notion, that there must -surely be some ingenious far way round, by which they may succeed in -circumventing the infinite. - -[Sidenote: MAIN PRINCIPLE OF STRATEGY] - -The defect of brilliant brains is not necessarily a {423} want of -courage--daring there has usually been in plenty--but they are apt to -lack fortitude. They are apt to abandon the assault upon positions -which are not really invulnerable, and to go off, chasing after -attractive butterflies, until they fall into quagmires. Dispersion of -effort has always been the besetting sin of British statesmen and the -curse of British policy. There is no clearer example of this than the -case of William Pitt the Younger, who went on picking up sugar islands -all over the world, when he ought to have been giving his whole -strength to beating Napoleon. - -Very few obstacles are really insurmountable, and it is usually the -shortest and the safest course to stick to what has been already begun. -Especially is this the case when your resources in trained soldiers and -munitions of war are painfully restricted. At the one point, where you -have decided to attack, the motto is _push hard_; and at all others, -where you may be compelled to defend yourselves, the motto is _hold -fast_. - -The peril of British war councils in the past has always been (and -maybe still is) the tendency of ingenious argument to get the better of -sound judgment. In the very opposite of this lies safety. We find the -true type of high policy, as well as of successful campaigning, in the -cool and patient inflexibility of Wellington, holding fast by one main -idea, forcing his way over one obstacle after another which had been -pronounced invincible--through walled cities; into the deep valleys of -the Pyrenees; across the Bidassoa--till from the crests of the Great -Rhune and the Little his soldiers looked down at last upon the plains -of France. - -{424} - -Our most urgent problem with regard to the present war, is how we may -win it most thoroughly; but, in addition to this, there are two -questions which have recently engaged a good deal of public attention. -There is a _Political_ question--what sort of European settlement is to -take place after the war? And there is also a _Criminal_ -question--what sort of punishment shall be meted out, if crimes, -contrary to the practice of war among civilised and humane states, have -been committed by our antagonists? - -I have not attempted to deal with either of these. They do not seem to -be of extreme urgency; for unless, and until, we win the war it is -somewhat idle to discuss the ultimate fate of Europe or the penalty of -evil deeds. You cannot restore stolen property until you have -recovered it, and you cannot punish a malefactor, nor is it very -convenient even to try him, while he is still at large. If that be -true, which was said of old by a great king--_I do not make peace with -barbarians but dictate the terms of their surrender_--we are still a -long way from that. - -I have not occupied myself therefore with what are termed 'German -atrocities.' So far as this matter is concerned, I am satisfied to let -it rest for the present upon the German statement of intentions before -war began,[1] and upon the proclamations which {425} have been issued -subsequently, with the object of justifying their mode of operations by -sea and land. The case against Germany on her own admission, is quite -strong enough without opening a further inquisition under this -heading.[2] - - -[Sidenote: WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING ABOUT] - -It is essential, however, to realise the falsities and perversities -upon which the great fabric of German policy is founded; for otherwise -we shall never understand either the nature of the enemy with whom we -are at present engaged, or the full extent of the danger by which, not -only we, but civilisation itself is now threatened. It is essential -that the whole British race should understand the nature of the evils -_against_ which they are fighting--the ambitions of Germany--the -ruthless despotism of the Prussian system--the new theories of right -and wrong which have been evolved by thinkers who have been paid, -promoted, and inspired by the State, in order to sanctify the imperial -policy of spoliation. - -It is also essential for us to realise the nature of those things _for_ -which we are fighting--what we shall save and secure for our posterity -in case of victory; what we stand to lose in event of defeat. The -preservation or ruin of our inheritance, spiritual and material--the -maintenance or overthrow of our {426} institutions, traditions, and -ideas--the triumph, of these, or the supplanting of them by a wholly -different order, which to our eyes wears the appearance of a vast -machine under the control of savages--are the main issues of the -present war. And when now at last, we face them squarely, we begin to -wonder, why of late years, we have been wont to treat problems of -national defence and imperial security with so much levity and -indifference. - -It is profitable to turn our eyes from the contemplation of German -shortcomings inwards upon our own. If we have been guilty as a people -during recent times of weakness, blindness, indolence, or cowardice, we -should face these facts squarely, otherwise there is but a poor chance -of arriving at better conditions. If we have refused to listen to -unpleasant truths, and to exchange a drowsy and dangerous comfort -against sacrifices which were necessary for security, it is foolish to -lay the whole blame upon this or that public man, this or that -government. For, after all, both public men and governments were our -own creation; we chose them because we liked them; because it gave us -pleasure and consolation to listen to their sayings; because their -doings and their non-doings, their un-doings and their mis-doings were -regarded with approval or indifference by the great bulk of our people. - -It would be wise also to take to heart the lesson, plainly written -across the record of the last nine months, that the present confusion -of our political system is responsible, as much as anything--perhaps -more than anything--for the depreciated currency of public character. -The need is obvious for a Parliament and a Government chosen by the -Empire, {427} responsible to the Empire, and charged with the security -of the Empire, and with no other task. - - -[Sidenote: CAUSES OF WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH] - -Why we are fighting at all is one of our problems; why we are finding -it so hard to win is another. In what does the main strength of our -enemies consist? And in what does our own chief weakness consist? - -To say that our weakness is to be sought in our own vices, and the -strength of our enemies in their virtues, is of course a commonplace. -But one has only to open the average newspaper to realise the need for -restating the obvious. For there the contrary doctrine is set forth -daily and weekly with a lachrymose insistency--that our hands are -weakened because we are so good; that the Germans fight at an enormous -advantage because they are so wicked and unscrupulous. - -But the things which we are finding hardest to overcome in our foes are -not the immoral gibberings of professors, or the blundering cynicism of -the German Foreign Office, or the methodical savagery of the General -Staff, whether in Belgium or on the High Seas. These are sources of -weakness and not of strength; and even at the present stage it is clear -that, although they have inflicted immeasurable suffering, they have -done the German cause much more harm than good. - -Our real obstacles are the loyalty, the self-sacrifice, and the -endurance of the German people. - -The causes of British weakness are equally plain. Our indolence and -factiousness; our foolish confidence in cleverness, manoeuvres, and -debate for overcoming obstacles which lie altogether outside that -region of human endeavour; our absorption as {428} thrilled spectators -in the technical game of British politics[3]--these vices and others of -a similar character, which, since the beginning of the war we have been -struggling--like a man awakening from a nightmare--to shake off, are -still our chief difficulties. It is a hard job to get rid of them, and -we are not yet anything like halfway through with it. - -It must be clear to every detached observer, that the moral strength of -England in the present struggle--like that of France--does not lie in -Government or Opposition, but in the spirit of the people; that this -spirit has drawn but little support, in the case of either country, -from the leadership and example of the politicians; and that there is -little cause in either case to bless or praise them for the fidelity of -their previous stewardship. In the case of France this national spirit -was assured at the beginning; in our own case the process of awakening -has proceeded much more slowly. - - -[Sidenote: ILLUSIONS OF SUCCESS] - -It is essential to put certain notions out of our heads and certain -other notions into them. From the beginning of the war, a large part -of the press--acting, we are entitled to suppose, in patriotic -obedience to the directions of the Press Bureau--has fostered ideas -which do not correspond with the facts. Information has been doled out -and presented in such a way as to destroy all sense of proportion in -the public mind. - -It is not an uncommon belief,[4] for example, that we with our -Allies--ever since the first onset, when, {429} being virtuously -unprepared, we were pushed back some little distance--have been doing -much better than the Germans; that for months past our adversaries have -been in a desperate plight--lacking ammunition, on the verge of -bankruptcy and starvation, and thoroughly discouraged. - -There is also a tendency to assume--despite Lord Kitchener's grave and -repeated warnings to the contrary--that the war is drawing rapidly to a -conclusion, and that, even if we may have to submit to some -interruption of our usual summer holidays, at any rate we shall eat our -Christmas dinners in an atmosphere of peace and goodwill. - -The magnitude of the German victories, both in the East and West, -during the earlier stages of the war, is not realised even now by the -great majority of our fellow-countrymen; while the ruinous consequences -of these victories to our Allies--the occupation of Belgium, of a large -part of northern France, and of Western Poland--is dwelt on far too -lightly. Nor is it understood by one man in a hundred, that up to the -end of last year, British troops were never holding more than thirty -miles, out of that line of nearly five hundred which winds, like a -great snake, from Nieuport to the Swiss frontier. On the contrary, it -is quite commonly believed that we have been doing our fair share of -the fighting--or even more--by land as well as sea. - -A misleading emphasis of type and comment, together with a dangerous -selection of items of news, are responsible for these illusions; while -the prevalence of these illusions is largely responsible for many of -our labour difficulties. - -Such dreams of inevitable and speedy victory {430} are no doubt very -soothing to indolent and timid minds, but they do not make for a -vigorous and resolute spirit in the nation, upon which, more than upon -anything else, the winning of this war depends. - - -In some quarters there appears still to linger a ridiculous idea that -we went into this war, out of pure chivalry, to defend Belgium.[5] We -went into it to defend our own existence, and for no other reason. We -made common cause with Allies who were menaced by the same danger as -ourselves; but these, most fortunately, had made their preparations -with greater foresight than we had done. The actual fighting has taken -place, so far, in their territories and not in ours; but the issue of -this war is not one whit less a matter of life-or-death for us, than it -is for them. - -[Sidenote: DEMOCRACY NOT INVINCIBLE] - -Quite recently I have seen our present situation described glowingly -and self-complacently as the 'triumph of the voluntary system.' I must -be blind of both eyes, for I can perceive no 'triumph' and no -'voluntary' system. I have seen the territories of our Allies seized, -wasted, and held fast by an undefeated enemy. I have seen our small -army driven back; fighting with as much skill and bravery as ever in -its history; suffering losses unparalleled in its history; holding its -own in the end, but against what overwhelming numbers and by what -sacrifices! The human triumph is apparent enough; but not that of any -system, voluntary or otherwise. Neither in this record of nine months' -'hard and hot fighting' on land, nor in {431} the state of things which -now exists at the end of it all, is there a triumph for anything, or -any one, save for a few thousands of brave men, who were left to hold -fast as best they could against intolerable odds. - - -Certain contemporary writers appear to claim more for that form of -representative government, which we are in the habit of calling -'democracy,' than it is either safe to count on, or true to assert. In -their eyes democracy seems to possess a superiority in all the higher -virtuous qualities--'freedom,' in particular--and also an inherent -strength which--whatever may be the result of the present war--makes -the final predominance of British institutions only a matter of time.[6] - -I do not hold with either of these doctrines. Universal superiority in -virtue and strength is too wide a claim to put forward for any system -of government. And 'freedom' is a very hard thing to define. - -It is not merely that the form of constitution, which we call -'democracy,' is obviously not the best fitted for governing an -uncivilised or half-civilised people. There are considerations which -go much deeper than that--considerations of race, religion, -temperament, and tradition. As it has been in the past, so conceivably -it may be again in the future, that a people, which is in the highest -degree civilised and humane, will seek to realise its ideals of freedom -in some other sphere than the control of policy and legislation -according to the electoral verdicts of its {432} citizens. It is even -possible that its national aspirations may regard some other end as a -higher good even than freedom. We cannot speak with certainty as to -the whole human race, but only with regard to ourselves and certain -others, who have been bred in the same traditions. - -If a personal and autocratic government--the German for example--is -able to arouse and maintain among its people a more ardent loyalty, a -firmer confidence, a more constant spirit of self-sacrifice (in time of -peace as well as war), I can see no good reason for the hope, that -democracy, merely because, in our eyes, it approaches more nearly to -the ideal of the Christian Commonwealth, will be able to maintain -itself against the other. A highly centralised system of government -has great natural advantages both for attack and defence; and if in -addition it be supported by a more enduring fortitude, and a more -self-denying devotion, on the part of the people, it seems almost -incredible that, in the end, it will not prevail over other forms of -government which have failed to enlist the same support. - -The strength of all forms of government alike, whether against foreign -attack or internal disintegration, must depend in the long last upon -the spirit of the people; upon their determination to maintain their -own institutions; upon their willingness to undertake beforehand, as -well as during the excitement of war, those labours and sacrifices -which are necessary for security. The spirit is everything. And in -the end that spirit which is strongest is likely to become predominant, -and to impose its own forms, systems, and ideas upon civilised and -uncivilised nations alike. - -{433} - -A considerable part of the world--though it may have adopted patterns -of government which are either avowedly democratic or else are -monarchies of the constitutional sort (in essence the same)--is by no -means wedded to popular institutions; has no deep-rooted traditions to -give them support; could easily, therefore, and without much loss of -self-respect, abandon them and submit to follow new fashions. But with -the United Kingdom, the self-governing Dominions, and the United States -it is altogether different. - -To exchange voluntarily, merely because circumstances rendered it -expedient to do so, a system which is the only one consistent with our -notions of freedom would be an apostasy. It would mean our immediate -spiritual ruin, and for that reason also our ultimate material ruin. -On the other hand, to continue to exist on sufferance, without a voice -in the destinies of the world, would be an even deeper degradation. To -be conquered outright, and absorbed, would be an infinitely preferable -fate to either of these. - - -[Sidenote: NEED OF LEADERSHIP] - -The nations of the world have one need in common--Leadership. The -spirit of the people can do much, but it cannot do everything. In the -end that form of government is likely to prevail which produces the -best and most constant supply of leaders. On its own theories, -democracy of the modern type ought to out-distance all competitors; -under this system capacity, probity, and vigour should rise most easily -to the top. - -In practice, however, democracy has come under the thumb of the Party -System, and the Party System has reached a very high point of -efficiency. It has {434} bettered the example of the hugest mammoth -store in existence. It has elaborated machinery for crushing out -independent opinion and for cramping the characters of public men. In -commending its wares it has become as regardless of truth as a vendor -of quack medicines. It pursues corruption as an end, and it freely -uses corruption--both direct and indirect--as the means by which it may -attain its end. If the Party System continues to develop along its -present lines, it may ultimately prove as fatal to the principle of -democracy as the ivy which covers and strangles the elm-trees in our -hedgerows. - -Leadership is our greatest present need, and it is there that the Party -System has played us false. To manipulate its vast and intricate -machinery there arose a great demand for expert mechanicians, and these -have been evolved in a rich profusion. But in a crisis like the -present, mechanicians will not serve our purpose. The real need is a -Man, who by the example of his own courage, vigour, certainty, and -steadfastness will draw out the highest qualities of the people; whose -resolute sense of duty will brush opportunism aside; whose sympathy and -truthfulness will stir the heart and hold fast the conscience of the -nation. Leadership of this sort we have lacked. - -The Newcastle speech with its soft words and soothing optimism was not -leadership. It does not give confidence to a horse to know that he has -a rider on his back who is afraid of him. - -[Sidenote: NEED FOR FRANKNESS] - -It is idle at this stage to forecast the issue of the present war. -Nevertheless we seem at last to have begun to understand that there is -but a poor chance of winning it under rulers who are content to wait -and see if by some miracle the war will win itself; {435} or if by -another miracle our resources of men and material will organise -themselves. Since the battle of the Marne many sanguine expectations -of a speedy and victorious peace have fallen to the ground. The -constant burden of letters from soldiers at the front is that the -war--so far as England is concerned--is only just beginning. And yet, -in spite of all these disappointments and warnings, the predominant -opinion in official circles is still, apparently, as determined as ever -to wait and see _what the people will stand_, although it is -transparently clear what they ought to stand, and must stand, if they -are to remain a people. - -We cannot forecast with certainty the issue of the present war, but -hope nevertheless refuses to be bound. There is a false hope and a -true one. There may be consolation for certain minds, but there is no -safety for the nation, in the simple faith that democracy is in its -nature invincible. Democracy is by no means invincible. On the -contrary, it fights at a disadvantage, both by reason of its -inferiority in central control, and because it shrinks from -ruthlessness. Nevertheless we may believe as firmly as those who hold -this other opinion that in the end it will conquer. Before this can -happen it must find a leader who is worthy of its trust. - - -Since August 1914 we have learned many things from experience which we -previously refused to credit upon any human authority. We are not -altogether done with the past; for it contains lessons and -warnings--about men as well as things--which it would be wasteful to -forget. But our main concern is with the present. And we are also -treading very {436} close on the heels of the future, when--as we -trust--the resistance of our enemies will be beginning to flag; when -the war will be drawing to an end; afterwards through anxious years -(how many we cannot guess) when the war has ended, and when the object -of our policy will be to keep the peace which has been so dearly bought. - -Lord Roberts was right in his forecast of the danger; nor was he less -right in his perception of England's military weakness and general -unpreparedness for war. But was he also right as to the principle of -the remedy which he proposed? And even if he were right as things -stood when he uttered his warnings, is his former counsel still right -in our present circumstances, and as we look forward into the future? -Is it now necessary for us to accept in practice what has always been -admitted in the vague region of theory--that an obligation lies upon -every citizen, during the vigour of his age, to place his services, and -if need be his life, at the disposal of that state under whose shelter -he and all those who are most dear to him have lived? - -[Sidenote: THE PEOPLE WILL NOT FLINCH] - -There is always danger in treating a free people like children; in -humouring them, and coaxing them, and wheedling them with half-truths; -in asking for something less than is really needed, from fear that to -ask for the whole would alarm them too much; with the foolish hope that -when the first demand has been granted it will then be easy enough to -make them understand how much more is still necessary to complete the -fabric of security; that having deceived them once, it will be all the -easier to deceive them again. - -As we look back over our country's history we {437} find that it was -those men who told the people the whole truth--or what, at least, they -themselves honestly believed to be the whole truth--who most often -succeeded in carrying their proposals through. In these matters, which -touch the very life and soul of the nation, all artifice is out of -place. The power of persuasion lies in the truthfulness of the -advocate, no less than in the truth of his plea. If the would-be -reformer is only half sincere, if from timidity or regard for popular -opinion he chooses to tell but half his tale--selecting this, -suppressing that, postponing the other to a more propitious season--he -loses by his misplaced caution far more than half his strength. When -there is a case to be laid before the British People it is folly to do -it piecemeal, by astute stages of pleading, and with subtle -reservations. If the whole case can be put unflinchingly it is not the -People who will flinch. The issue may be left with safety to a -tribunal which has never yet failed in its duty, when rulers have had -the courage to say where its duty lay. - - - -[1] "A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the -combatants of the enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it -will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual and -material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims, such as the -protection of men and their goods, can only be taken into consideration -in so far as the nature and object of the war permit. - -"International Law is in no way opposed to the exploitation of the -crimes of third parties (assassination, incendiarism, robbery, and the -like) to the prejudice of the enemy.... The necessary aim of war gives -the belligerent the right and imposes on him the duty, according to -circumstances, the duty not to let slip the important, it may be the -decisive advantages to be gained by such means."--_The German War -Book_, issued by the Great General Staff. - -[2] Clearly, however, when it comes to the discussion of terms of -peace, not only the political question, but also the criminal question, -will have to be remembered. Oddly enough the 'pacifist' section, which -has already been clamorous for putting forward peace proposals, seems -very anxious that we should forget, or at any rate ignore, the criminal -question--odd, because 'humanity' is the stuff they have set up their -bills to trade in. - -[3] In reality, as regards party politics, we have been for years past -very like those shouting, cigarette-smoking, Saturday crowds at -football matches whom we have lately been engaged in reproving so -virtuously. - -[4] Certainly up to April 1915 it was not an uncommon belief. - -[5] Mr. Lloyd George, _Pearson's Magazine_, March 1915. - -[6] These views are very prevalent among Liberal writers, and they are -clearly implied, if not quite so openly expressed, by Conservatives. -They seem to be assumed in one of the ablest articles which has yet -been written upon the causes of the present war--'The Schism of Europe' -(_Round Table_, March 1915). - - - -THE END - - - -_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_. - - - - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Ordeal by Battle, by Frederick Scott Oliver - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ORDEAL BY BATTLE *** - -***** This file should be named 54776-8.txt or 54776-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/7/7/54776/ - -Produced by Al Haines -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. 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