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diff --git a/64943-0.txt b/64943-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc81a34 --- /dev/null +++ b/64943-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,32814 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the +International Military Tribunal, Vol. 10, by Various + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will +have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using +this eBook. + +Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military + Tribunal, Vol. 10 + Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 + +Author: Various + +Release Date: Mar 27, 2021 [eBook #64943] + +Language: English + +Produced by: John Routh, Cindy Beyer, and the online Distributed + Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net. + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS +BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 10 *** + + + [Cover Illustration] + + + + + TRIAL + OF + THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS + + BEFORE + + THE INTERNATIONAL + MILITARY TRIBUNAL + + N U R E M B E R G + 14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946 + + + [Illustration] + + + P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y + 1 9 4 7 + + + + + This volume is published in accordance with the + direction of the International Military Tribunal by + the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction + of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. + + + + + VOLUME X + + + + O F F I C I A L T E X T + + I N T H E + + ENGLISH LANGUAGE + + + + P R O C E E D I N G S + + 25 March 1946—6 April 1946 + + + + + CONTENTS + + + Ninetieth Day, Monday, 25 March 1946, + Morning Session 1 + Afternoon Session 34 + + Ninety-first Day, Tuesday, 26 March 1946, + Morning Session 75 + Afternoon Session 90 + + Ninety-second Day, Wednesday, 27 March 1946, + Morning Session 119 + Afternoon Session 156 + + Ninety-third Day, Thursday, 28 March 1946, + Morning Session 184 + Afternoon Session 196 + + Ninety-fourth Day, Friday, 29 March 1946, + Morning Session 230 + Afternoon Session 255 + + Ninety-fifth Day, Saturday, 30 March 1946, + Morning Session 279 + + Ninety-sixth Day, Monday, 1 April 1946, + Morning Session 311 + Afternoon Session 346 + + Ninety-seventh Day, Tuesday, 2 April 1946, + Morning Session 395 + Afternoon Session 433 + + Ninety-eighth Day, Wednesday, 3 April 1946, + Morning Session 466 + Afternoon Session 480 + + Ninety-ninth Day, Thursday, 4 April 1946, + Morning Session 508 + Afternoon Session 535 + + One Hundredth Day, Friday, 5 April 1946, + Morning Session 556 + Afternoon Session 583 + + One Hundred and First Day, Saturday, 6 April 1946, + Morning Session 617 + + + + + NINETIETH DAY + Monday, 25 March 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): May it please the Court: the +Defendants Streicher and Ribbentrop are absent from this session. + +THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Seidl. + +DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Mr. President, Your +Honors, on Friday last I stated that I would not read anything from the +first volume of the document book; that does not mean, however, that I +should not like to refer to one or another document in my final speech. +The question now arises whether, under these circumstances, documents to +which I may refer, but which I will not read now should be submitted as +evidence to the Court, or whether it is sufficient if these documents +are copied down in the book. I would be grateful if the Court would help +me regarding this question. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): +My Lord, I have a suggestion to make: That the Tribunal take these +documents _de bene esse_ at the moment, and that when Dr. Seidl comes to +make his final speech, then any point as to admissibility can be +discussed. With regard to the third book, for example, that consists of +a number of opinions of various politicians and economists in various +countries. The Prosecution will, in due course, submit that these have +no evidential value and in fact relate to a matter too remote to be +relevant. But I should have thought the convenient course would have +been to discuss that when we find what ultimate use Dr. Seidl makes of +the documents, at the moment letting them go in, as I suggest, _de bene +esse_. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal think that you should offer the +documents in evidence now, and that they should be numbered +consecutively. Probably the best way would be with the letter “H” in +front of them—H Number 1 and so on—and that then, as Sir David says, +as they are being offered all together, objection, if necessary, can be +taken to them at a later stage—objection on the ground of admissibility +or relevance. + +DR. SEIDL: Very well. I turn once more to Volume I of the document book. +The first document is a speech made by the Defendant Rudolf Hess on 8 +July 1934. This document will bear the Number H-1, Page 23 of the +document book. The second document can be found on Page 27 of the +document book... + +THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Dr. Seidl. To what issue has this speech got +relevance? + +DR. SEIDL: The speech of 8 July 1934? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, it is the one on Page 23. It is 8 July 1934. + +DR. SEIDL: Yes, Mr. President, this speech deals with the question of +war and peace. Since the Defendant Hess is accused of having +participated in the psychological preparation of aggressive war, and +thus also of being a participant in the conspiracy, it seems to me that +the attitude of the Defendant Hess toward the question of war is of +considerable importance as regards evidence. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will allow you to read it. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I do not intend to read the speech now. I only +want to bring up the speech as an exhibit so as to be able to refer to +it in my final speech, if necessary. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +DR. SEIDL: I shall read nothing at all from the first document book. I +shall only mention certain documents as exhibits. + +I turn to Page 28 of the document book. This is another speech by the +Defendant Hess, delivered on 27 November 1934. The number of this +exhibit will be H-2. + +THE PRESIDENT: The speech of 8 December 1934 begins on Page 27. + +DR. SEIDL: Page 27, that is right. It was marked here incorrectly. As +the third exhibit I submit a speech—that is to say, an excerpt from a +speech—of 17 November 1935, Page 31 of the document book, Exhibit +Number H-3. + +I turn to Page 32 of the document book, an excerpt from a speech of 11 +October 1936, Exhibit Number H-4. + +Then comes a speech of 14 March 1936, Page 33 of the document book, +Exhibit Number H-5. + +The next exhibit is on Page 35 of the document book, a speech of 21 +March 1936, Exhibit Number H-6. + +Exhibit Number H-7 is a speech on Page 36 of the document book. + +Exhibit Number H-8 is a speech of 6 June 1936, on Page 40 of the +document book. + +Then, I turn to Page 43 of the document book, a speech at the +Reichsparteitag in Nuremberg 1936, Exhibit Number H-9. + +There follow excerpts of a speech on Page 59 of the document book, +Exhibit Number H-10. + +A speech of 14 May 1938 at Stockholm is found on Page 70 of the document +book, Exhibit Number H-11. + +The next exhibit is on Page 78 of the document book, Exhibit Number +H-12. + +So much for the first volume of the document book. + +I pass on to the second volume, to the affidavit which I submitted last +Friday. It can be found on Page 164 of the document book. It is an +affidavit made by the former Secretary, Hildegard Fath, and it will bear +the Exhibit Number H-13. + +The next exhibit is on Page 86 of the document book, Volume 2, a decree +of 3 June 1936, Exhibit Number H-14. + +And now I come to the point where I shall read certain excerpts from the +minutes of the meeting between the Defendant Hess and Lord Simon, which +took place on 10 June 1941. These minutes begin on Page 93 of the +document book. The minutes will have the Exhibit Number H-15. + +Your Honors, the Defendant Hess, on 10 May 1941, flew to England. Nobody +except his then adjutant, Hitsch, knew of this flight. The Führer +himself was informed about the flight and the intentions connected +therewith in a letter which was delivered to the Führer after Hess had +already landed in England. After his arrival in England Hess was +frequently questioned by officials of the Foreign Office, and, as +already mentioned, a meeting took place between him and Lord Simon on 10 +June 1941. This meeting lasted two hours and a half. In the course of +this meeting the Defendant Hess told Lord Simon the reasons for his +extraordinary undertaking and he then submitted four proposals, or four +points, which he claimed would give the intentions of Adolf Hitler, and +which he considered to be the basis for an understanding and a +conclusion of peace. + +For the conference Lord Simon assumed a pseudonym; in the minutes which +were given to the Defendant Hess shortly after the meeting, he is +referred to as Dr. Guthrie. + +As far as I know, this measure was probably taken to prevent the +stenographers or the translators from knowing at once what it was all +about. In the minutes mention is also made of a Dr. Mackenzie, an +official of the Foreign Office, and of Mr. Kirkpatrick, who had +previously already spoken with the Defendant Hess. + +After a few introductory remarks by Lord Simon, the Defendant Hess began +to explain the reasons which led him to take his singular step, and I +quote liberally from Page 93 of the document book, about the middle of +the page. I must add that in the minutes, the Defendant Hess is referred +to by the name “J.” The Defendant Hess, after the introductory remarks, +said the following... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, there seems to be a typographical error, +probably in the date. The date is given as the 9th of August. You said +the 10th of June, did you not? + +DR. SEIDL: 10 June, yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Is this a mistake at the top of Page 93—9. 8. 41? + +DR. SEIDL: On the cover of the document there is the following remark: +“Minutes of the conversation which took place on 9 June 1941 somewhere +in England.” On the inside of the document, there is also the entry 9. +6. 41; so there must obviously be a typographical error here. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it must have been. They put “8” instead of “6.” + +DR. SEIDL: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + + DR. SEIDL: “I know that probably nobody has correctly understood + my coming; but in view of the extraordinary step that I have + taken, that can by no means be expected. Therefore I would like + to begin by explaining how I came to do this.” + +I continue on Page 94: + + “The idea came to me in June of last year, during the time of + the French campaign, while visiting the Führer....” + +I believe I may omit the following incidental remarks and continue +quoting further: + + “I must admit that I came to the Führer convinced, as we all + were, that sooner or later in the end we would surely conquer + England, and I expressed the opinion to the Führer that we must + naturally demand from England the restitution of property—such + as the equivalent of our merchant fleet, _et cetera_—which had + been taken from us by the Versailles Treaty.” + +I turn to Page 95: + + “The Führer then immediately contradicted me. He was of the + opinion that the war could possibly be an occasion for coming to + an agreement with England for which he had striven ever since he + had been politically active. To this I can testify, that ever + since I have known the Führer, since 1921, the Führer has always + said that an agreement between Germany and England had to be + achieved. He said he would bring this about as soon as he was in + power. He told me at that time in France that one should not + impose any severe conditions, even if victorious, on a country + with which one desired to come to an agreement. Then I conceived + the idea that if this were known in England, it might be + possible that England also might be ready for an agreement.” + +I turn now to Page 96 of the document book. + + “Then, at the conclusion of the French campaign came the + Führer’s offer to England. The offer, as is known, was refused. + This made me all the more firm in my belief that under these + circumstances I had to execute my plan. During the subsequent + period came the air war between Germany and England, which, on + the whole, meant heavier losses and damages for England than for + Germany. Consequently, I had the impression that England could + not give in at all without suffering considerable loss of + prestige. That is why I said to myself, ‘Now I must realize my + plan all the more, for if I were over in England, England could + be enabled to take up negotiations with Germany without loss of + prestige.’” + +I turn now to Page 97 of the document book. After a short incidental +remark by Dr. Mackenzie, Hess continued: + + “I was of the opinion that, apart from the question of the terms + for an agreement, there would be still in England a certain + general distrust to overcome. I must confess that I faced a very + grave decision, the gravest in my life, of course, and I believe + I was aided by continuously keeping before my inner vision the + picture of an endless row of children’s coffins with the mothers + weeping behind them on the German side as well as on the English + side...” + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you got the original document there +before you? + +DR. SEIDL: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Might it be handed up? + +DR. SEIDL: Yes. + +[_The document was handed to the President._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. + + DR. SEIDL: “...and vice versa, the coffins of mothers with the + children behind them. + + “I want to mention certain points which, I believe, have a + certain importance from the psychological point of view. I must + go back a bit. After Germany’s defeat in the World War, the + Versailles Treaty was imposed on her, and no serious historian + is today still of the opinion that Germany was responsible for + the World War. Lloyd George has said that the nations stumbled + into the war. I recently read an English historian, Farrar, who + wrote about Edward VII and his policy at that time. This + historian, Farrar, lays the main guilt for the war, on the + policies of Edward VII. After her collapse Germany had this + treaty imposed upon her, which was not only a frightful calamity + for Germany but also for the whole world. All attempts of + politicians, of statesmen in Germany, before the Führer came to + power—that is to say, when Germany was a pure democracy—to + obtain any sort of relief failed.” + +I forego the reading of the following part of the minutes literally. A +conversation followed on various points. Among other things the subject +of the conversation then was the air strength of Germany at that time +and the preparations with regard to the building of U-boats. I do not +believe that these questions are relevant in the present connection, and +so I shall turn at once to that part of the minutes where mention is +made of the proposals which Hess made to Lord Simon. This is on Page 152 +of the document book. From the minutes we can see that Hess had +previously written down the proposals which he wanted to submit. He gave +these notes to Dr. Mackenzie and Mr. Kirkpatrick, who then read and +translated them, and now I quote on Page 152, at the bottom of the page, +literally: + +“Basis for an understanding.” And here I have to ask the Tribunal to +turn from Page 152 of the document book to Page 159 of the document book +because the first point in the proposal obviously has been presented in +the wrong fashion. On Page 159, about the middle of the page, there is a +statement by Dr. Mackenzie which expresses the first point correctly, +and I quote: + + “In order to prevent future wars between the Axis and England, + the limits of the spheres of interest should be defined. The + sphere of interest of the Axis is Europe, and England’s sphere + of interest is the Empire.” + +I ask now that you turn back, namely to Page 153 of the document book. +Here we find on the last line the second point of the proposals which +Hess made. Dr. Mackenzie is reading: + + “2. Return of German Colonies.” + +I turn to Page 154 of the document book and begin to quote at the top of +the page—it is possible that the figure “2” is inadvertently repeated +here in the document book. It should be: + + “3. Indemnification of German citizens who before or during the + war had their residence within the British Empire, and who + suffered damage to life and property through measures of a + Government of the Empire or as a result of pillage, riot, _et + cetera_; indemnification of British subjects by Germany on the + same basis. + + “4. Armistice and peace to be concluded with Italy at the same + time.” + +Then there is a personal remark by Hess as follows: + + “The Führer in our conversation repeatedly presented these + points to me in general as the basis for an understanding with + England.” + +I shall not read any further excerpts from these minutes. + +I forego the reading of the other passages marked in red. The conference +was terminated by a statement made by Lord Simon to the effect that he +would bring the proposals made by Hess to the knowledge of the British +Government. That was Exhibit Number H-15. + +Your Honors, the Defendant Rudolf Hess is accused in the Indictment of +helping the Nazi conspirators to seize power and of furthering the +military, economic, and psychological preparations for the war as +mentioned under Count One of the Indictment; of participating in the +political planning and preparation of aggressive wars and of war in +violation of international treaties, agreements and promises, as +mentioned in Counts One and Two, and of participating in the preparation +and planning of foreign political plans of the Nazi conspirators as +listed under Count One. + +That accusation is the nucleus of the Indictment against Rudolf Hess. It +is therefore my duty to discuss also briefly in evidence the +circumstances which in 1939 led to the outbreak of war. In that respect +I have the following to say: + +On 23 August 1939, at Moscow a non-aggression pact was concluded between +Germany and the Soviet Union, which has already been submitted by the +Prosecution as Exhibit GB-145 (Document TC-25). On the same day, that is +to say but 1 week before the outbreak of the war and 3 days before the +planned attack on Poland, these two nations made another secret +agreement. This secret agreement essentially contained the definition of +the spheres of interest of both nations within the European territory +lying between Germany and the Soviet Union. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you are not forgetting, are you, the +Tribunal’s ruling that this is not the opportunity for making a speech, +but simply the occasion for introducing documents and calling witnesses. +You will have the opportunity of making your speech at a later stage. + +DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed. I do not intend to make a speech, but I intend +to say a few introductory words on a document which I shall submit to +the Tribunal. + +Germany, in the secret documents, declared herself disinterested in +Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, we have not yet seen the document. If you are +going to put in the document, put in the document. + +DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed. I can submit the document at once. It is an +affidavit of the former ambassador, Dr. Friedrich Gaus. In the year 1939 +he was the Chief of the Legal Department of the Foreign Office. He was +present at the negotiations as the assistant of the then German +plenipotentiary in Moscow, and it was he who drafted the non-aggression +pact which has already been submitted as an exhibit, as well as the +secret agreement, the contents of which I want to submit now to the +Tribunal as facts which are important as evidence. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, will you hand in the document? + +DR. SEIDL: Surely. However, I intend to read parts of this document +later. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal does not quite understand what +this document is, because it is not included in your document book and +it does not appear that you made any application for it or made any +reference to it, and it is in German; it is not translated. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, when I prepared the document book for the +Defendant Hess, I did not as yet have this affidavit in my possession. +It dates from 15 March 1946. At that time, when the relevancy of the +applications for Defendant Hess were discussed, I had as yet no definite +knowledge of the context which would have enabled me to make a proper +application. The excerpts which I intend to read from this document are +short, and it will be possible to have them translated immediately by +the interpreters present here in the courtroom. + +THE PRESIDENT: Have you a copy for the Prosecution? + +DR. SEIDL: Surely, a German copy. + +THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that would not be any use to me. I do not +know whether it is to all the members of the Prosecution. Have the +Prosecuting Counsel any objection to passages being read from this +document? + +GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr. +President, I did not know about the existence of this document, and I +therefore strenuously object to having it read into the record. I would +wish that the procedure established by the Tribunal be observed by the +Defense. The Prosecution, in the past, when presenting its evidence +invariably presented copies of these documents to the Defense Counsel. +Counsel for Hess is now presenting a completely unknown document, and +the Prosecution, with every reason, would like to familiarize itself +with this document beforehand. I do not know what secrets or what secret +agreements Counsel for the Defense is talking about and on what facts he +is basing his statements. I would therefore, to say the least, define +them as unfounded. I request that this document should not be read into +the record. + +DR. SEIDL: The Prosecutor for the Soviet Union states that he has no +knowledge of the existence of this secret document which shall be +established by this affidavit. Under these circumstances I am compelled +to move that Foreign Commissar Molotov of the Soviet Union be called as +a witness, so that it can be established, firstly whether this agreement +was actually concluded, secondly, what the contents of this agreement +are, and thirdly... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the first thing for you to do is to have a +translation of this document made, and until you have a translation of +this document made, the Tribunal is not prepared to hear you upon it. We +do not know what the document contains. + +DR. SEIDL: As to what the document contains, I already wanted to explain +that before. In the document there is... + +THE PRESIDENT: No, the Tribunal is not prepared to hear from you what +the document contains. We want to see the document itself and see it in +English and also in Russian. I do not mean, of course, you have to do it +yourself, Dr. Seidl. If you would furnish this copy to the Prosecution +they will have it translated into the various languages and then, after +that has been done, we can reconsider the matter. + +DR. SEIDL: Very well. I turn then to another document, the reading of +which can certainly raise no objections, because it is a document which +has already been submitted by the Prosecution. It is the address made by +the Führer to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on 22 August +1939. It was submitted by the Prosecution of the Soviet Union as 798-PS +and as Exhibit Number US-29. I quote from Page 6 of the German +photostat: “Thereupon Hitler declared...” + +THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your document book or not, I mean just +for convenience? + +DR. SEIDL: The document was already submitted by the Prosecution in +full. + +THE PRESIDENT: You mean it is not here. I have not got the document +before me. It is not in your document book? + +DR. SEIDL: No, it is not in the document book because the Court has +already ruled that each defendant’s counsel has the right to refer to +any document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution. I +quote: + + “...I have gradually brought about a change in our attitude + towards Russia. In connection with the trade agreement, we got + into a political conversation. Proposal of a non-aggression + pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I + took a special step which had as a result that Russia answered + yesterday she was ready for settlement. Personal contact with + Stalin has been established. Von Ribbentrop will conclude the + treaty the day after tomorrow. Now Poland is in the position in + which I wanted her to be.” + +End of the quotation. + +Mr. President, Gentlemen: I had now the intention to call the witness +Bohle who has already been approved by the Tribunal. The Defendant Hess, +however, has asked me to forego the personal appearance of that witness +and read an affidavit concerning the facts of evidence in reference to +which the witness was to be heard. + +I have prepared such an affidavit, and undoubtedly it would accelerate +the proceedings if the Tribunal would permit the reading of this +affidavit. If however, the Tribunal should have the opinion that... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not had the opportunity of seeing the +affidavit. As previously advised, if the witness covers the ground for +which he was asked, I should want him for cross-examination. + +THE PRESIDENT: Where is the witness? + +DR. SEIDL: He is here. With the permission of the Tribunal I would like +to call the witness Bohle now. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean to call him or to read his affidavit? + +DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed; since Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe apparently protests +against the reading of the affidavit, I would like to call the witness. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not seen the affidavit, of course, My +Lord, so at the moment, as I say, if the affidavit covers the ground +that the witness should speak upon, then I shall want to cross-examine +him. + +THE PRESIDENT: Unless the Prosecution are agreeable that the affidavit +should be put in, the witness must be called, but if the Prosecution are +agreeable to the affidavit being read and then the witness presented for +cross-examination, the Tribunal is quite willing that it should be done. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not mind that in the least, My Lord. Of +course, I am in slight difficulty not knowing what is in the affidavit. + +THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the best course would be for the Tribunal to have +a 10-minute adjournment now, and you could perhaps just see what is in +the affidavit. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a pleasure, My Lord. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal did not wish to hurry counsel, but we +thought we had better get on with other witnesses, and this document can +be translated and considered and possibly dealt with after the main +adjournment. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I have not had the +chance of reading the translation. A preliminary view of the affidavit +convinced my staff that it was not of very great importance, and I was +going to consider whether the quickest way might be to let the affidavit +be read, if the Tribunal would then permit me to read three documents +which I was going to put in cross-examination to the witness. That might +be more convenient than to take the course which Your Lordship suggests, +of waiting until we have seen the full affidavit and then consider what +would be the best way to deal with it. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have perhaps seen part of the document, and you +can perhaps judge better which would be the more convenient course. +Whichever you think more convenient. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am quite content if Dr. Seidl reads it, +but it would have to be on the terms that the documents which I was +going to put in cross-examination to the witness are read. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he had better be called. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes; Dr. Seidl? + +DR. SEIDL: If I understood the High Tribunal correctly, they do not wish +to have the affidavit read but to have the witness interrogated before +the Court. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the affidavit has been translated, and +the Prosecution have had an opportunity of considering it, they can let +us know whether they think it will be better to treat the affidavit as +the examination of the witness, and he must then be produced here for +the purpose of cross-examination unless you prefer to examine him orally +yourself. + +DR. SEIDL: I believe that under these circumstances it would be best to +call the witness immediately to the witness stand. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +[_The witness Bohle took the stand._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name? + +ERNST WILHELM BOHLE (Witness): Ernst Wilhelm Bohle. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the +Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will +withhold and add nothing. + +[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] + +DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were ultimately the leader of the +Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP? Is that correct? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +DR. SEIDL: You were also State Secretary of the Foreign Office? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd of the American Prosecution just made +the suggestion that, in order to save time, it might be possible to +follow the same procedure as in the case of witness Blaha, that is, +first of all, to read the affidavit in the presence of the witness and +then afterwards hear him in cross-examination. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. + +DR. SEIDL [_Turning to the witness._]: You made an affidavit which I +shall now read to you. Concerning the matter: + + “1. The Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP was founded on 1 May + 1931 at Hamburg upon suggestion of some Germans abroad. Gregor + Strasser, Reich Organization Chief at the time, appointed as its + leader the NSDAP Member of the Reichstag, Dr. Hans Nieland. + + “I myself became a volunteer assistant of the + Auslands-Organisation in December 1931 and was taken into the + Party on 1 March 1932. On 8 May 1933 Dr. Nieland resigned as + leader of the Auslands-Organisation, having become in the + meantime a member of the Hamburg Government and also, as a + German who had always stayed at home, being less interested in + questions concerning Germans abroad. On account of my + experience—and my connections abroad—I was born in England and + raised in South Africa—I was charged with the leadership of the + Auslands-Organisation. + + “2. The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was, upon the + assumption of power, to hold together in an organized way the + approximately 3,300 Party members living outside the boundaries + of Germany at the time of the seizure of power. Further, through + it Germans abroad, who could have only a vague idea of the + political happenings at home, were to be taught the philosophy + and the political program of the new state. + + “3. Only German nationals could become members of the Party. The + acceptance of foreigners or former Germans who had acquired + citizenship in another state was strictly prohibited. + + “4. The guiding principle of the Auslands-Organisation of the + Party concerning its attitude to foreign countries was found on + the Ausland pass of every German national who was a member of + the Party, in the following passage: ‘Observe the laws of the + country whose guest you are. Let the citizens of the country in + which you stay take care of their internal politics; do not + interfere in these matters, not even by way of conversation.’ + + “This principle was basic for the work and the attitude of the + Auslands-Organisation with respect to foreign countries from the + day of its founding up to its end. I myself referred to this in + many public speeches, and in so doing coined, among others, the + phrase: ‘The National Socialist honors foreign folkdom because + he loves his own.’ + + “My speeches in Porchester Hall in London on 2 October 1937 and + in Budapest at the end of January 1938 give a comprehensive + picture of the attitude of the Auslands-Organisation of the + NSDAP toward foreign countries. + + “Winston Churchill in the late summer of 1937 repeatedly + attacked the activity of the Auslands-Organisation in newspaper + articles, and in his well-known article, ‘Friendship with + Germany,’ in the London _Evening Standard_ of 17 September 1937, + designated it as an encumbrance on German-English relations. In + the same article he said that he was ready to converse with me + in the most cordial manner about this question. The German + Embassy in London informed the Foreign Office at that time that + a question by Churchill in the House of Commons regarding the + activity of the Auslands-Organisation would be extremely + undesirable. As a result a meeting between Churchill and myself + was advocated as urgent. This took place on the day of my speech + to the Reich Germans in London, in Winston Churchill’s London + home, and lasted more than an hour. I had ample opportunity in + this thoroughly cordial conversation to describe the activity of + the Auslands-Organisation and to dispel his misgivings. At the + end he accompanied me to my car and let himself be photographed + with me, in order, as he said, to show the world that we were + parting as friends. There was no inquiry in the House of + Commons. From that day Churchill never uttered a word of + objection again about the activity of the Auslands-Organisation. + My speech of the same date, which was published shortly + afterwards in English in pamphlet form by an English concern, + was very favorably received. _The Times_ published from it a + lengthy excerpt under the heading ‘Herr Bohle’s Plea for an + Understanding.’ After this conversation Churchill wrote me a + letter in which he voiced his satisfaction with the result of + our conversation. + + “6. In the trial of the murderer of the Landesgruppenleiter of + the Auslands-Organisation in Switzerland, Wilhelm Gustloff, + which was held in a Swiss court at Chur in 1936, the legality of + the activity of the Auslands-Organisation was the subject of + investigation by the court. The Defendant, David Frankfurter, + was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. From what I remember, I + can say that the Swiss authorities, who were in no way friendly + to Nazis, had to testify that Gustloff and the Landesgruppen of + the Auslands-Organisation had never in any way given reason for + complaint with regard to their activity. The testimony of + Federal Councillor Baumann, who, to my knowledge, was then + Minister of the Interior and of the Police in Switzerland, was + at that time decisive. + + “7. I should further like to point out in this connection that + also after the outbreak of the war the Landesgruppen of the + Auslands-Organisation in neutral countries continued to function + until the end of the war. That is especially true of + Switzerland, Sweden, and Portugal. + + “From 1943 on, at the latest, the Reich would hardly have been + able to take any steps against suppression, if the + Auslands-Organisation had come into conflict with the internal + laws of these countries; and suppression would have been the + inevitable result. + + “8. Aside from the indisputable legality of the + Auslands-Organisation, as its leader I have repeatedly expressed + the idea that the Auslandsdeutschen (Germans abroad) would + certainly be the last people who would let themselves be misused + as warmongers or as conspirators against the peace. From bitter + experience they knew that with the outbreak of the war they + would face at once internment, persecution, confiscation of + property, and destruction of their economic existence. + + “9. As a result of the knowledge of the situation abroad, no one + knew better than the Auslandsdeutschen that any activity in the + sense of a Fifth Column would be just as foolish as detrimental + to the interests of the Reich. To my knowledge, moreover, the + expression ‘Fifth Column’ can be traced back to the Spanish + Civil War. It is in any case a foreign invention. When Franco + attacked Madrid with four columns of troops, it was asserted + that a Fifth Column consisting of nationalist elements was doing + its seditious work underground within the besieged city. + + “10. There is no basis whatsoever for applying the term ‘Fifth + Column’ to the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. If this + assertion were true, it would mean that members of the + Auslands-Organisation working together with local oppositional + elements in one or more foreign countries had been delegated, or + had by themselves tried, to undermine this state from within. + Any such assertion would be pure invention. + + “11. Neither from the former Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf Hess, + nor from me, as the leader of the Auslands-Organisation, has + this organization or members of this organization in any way + received orders the execution of which might be considered as + Fifth Column activity. Even Hitler himself never gave me any + directive in that respect. In summary, I can say that the + Auslands-Organisation at no time, as long as I was its leader, + displayed any activity in the sense of a Fifth Column. Never did + the Deputy of the Führer give orders or directives to the + Auslands-Organisation which might have led to such activity. On + the contrary, Rudolf Hess most urgently desired that members of + the Auslands-Organisation should under no circumstances take + part in the internal affairs of the country in which they were + living as guests. + + “12. Of course, it is known that just as citizens of the then + enemy countries, so also Germans were employed in the espionage + and intelligence services abroad. This activity had however + nothing at all to do with membership in the + Auslands-Organisation. In order not to imperil the existence of + the Auslands-Organisation groups, which worked legally and + entirely in the open, I constantly demanded that members of the + Auslands-Organisation would not be used for such purposes or + that I should previously be given the opportunity to relieve + them of their functions within the Auslands-Organisation.” + +And that is the end of the statement of the witness Bohle. For the +moment I have no questions to ask the witness, Your Honor. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask the witness +any questions? + +DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): I would like to +put several questions to this witness, Your Honor. + +Witness, I represent the Defendant Von Schirach, the former leader of +the German Youth. Therefore the following would interest me: Did the +Hitler Youth (HJ) also exist in foreign countries or only in Germany? + +BOHLE: The Hitler Youth existed among German nationals in foreign +countries also. + +DR. SAUTER: Please tell me whether this HJ, the Hitler Youth abroad, was +subject to the political directives of the competent Landesleiter of the +Auslands-Organisation, or is that not right? + +BOHLE: Yes, the Hitler Youth abroad was politically under the control of +the Hoheitsträger of the Party. + +DR. SAUTER: Once in the course of the proceedings the assertion was made +that members of the Hitler Youth were trained for service as agents and +for espionage work abroad and also were used for these purposes. +Specific facts, that is, specific instances, were certainly not +mentioned, but only a general assertion was made, and it was also +asserted that Hitler Youth abroad were even used as paratroopers, that +is, that they had been trained at home as paratroopers in order to be +used abroad in this capacity. + +That is the assertion which I submit to you, and I now ask to have your +opinion on this, whether, on the basis of your knowledge as the +competent leader of the Auslands-Organisation, something like that did +occur or whether anything like that was at all possible? + +BOHLE: I would like to say the following in reply: I consider it +entirely out of the question that members of the Hitler Youth abroad +were misused in this way. I can assert that so much the more since I +know I would have heard anything to the contrary from the leaders of the +Party in the various foreign countries. I know also nothing at all about +the training of the Hitler Youth as paratroopers or anything similar. I +consider these assertions as absolutely pure invention. + +DR. SAUTER: Then I may assume, as the result of your testimony, that +things of that sort on the basis of the entire organization would +certainly have come to your knowledge, if something like that had +occurred or perhaps even only had been planned; is that correct? + +BOHLE: Yes, indeed. + +DR. SAUTER: And then, Witness, I have a last question: + +Here in the courtroom a further assertion was also made about the HJ, +that is, about the Hitler Youth. It has been asserted that at Lvov it +once happened that the Hitler Youth or members of the Hitler Youth had +used little children as targets. Also in this report no details of +course were given, but only the assertion was made. The following would +interest me: + +As you know the Hitler Youth had, I believe, a membership toward the end +of about 7 to 8 million. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, does that have anything to do with the +Auslands-Organisation? + +DR. SAUTER: Yes, it does insofar as my client, the Defendant Von +Schirach, is charged with the fact that the Hitler Youth abroad +committed such atrocities. + +THE PRESIDENT: It was not suggested that they did this abroad, was +it—that Hitler Youth ever used children as targets abroad? + +DR. SAUTER: Yes, indeed, it was said that at Lvov, in the Government +General, not in Germany, but in Lvov, which means abroad. + +THE PRESIDENT: You mean after the war began? + +DR. SAUTER: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: I thought this witness was speaking about the same +organization before the war. + +DR. SAUTER: I do not know whether he was also talking about the +Auslands-Organisation during the war. But in any case, Mr. President, +the witness knows these facts, for he was the head of the +Auslands-Organisation. Therefore this witness seems to me especially +qualified to give us information on these matters. + +THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that we are very far from the point, but +you can go on. + +DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President, for otherwise I would have to call +expressly this witness for my client again. + +Witness, do you at all recall the last question I put to you, whether +you had any knowledge that the Hitler Youth, or members of the Hitler +Youth abroad, which was under your jurisdiction, is supposed to have +committed atrocities of that nature? + +BOHLE: I regret to tell you, Mr. Attorney, that the Government General +did not belong to the Auslands-Organisation, that I was never there and +therefore am not in a position to state anything on that point. +Obviously the erroneous opinion seems to exist that the Government +General, from the point of view of the organization of the Party, was +connected with the Auslands-Organisation; however that was not the case. +I had no organizational powers there. + +DR. SAUTER: Otherwise, I have no further questions. + +DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Leadership Corps of the Nazi +Party): Witness, to what extent, in your capacity as Reichsleiter of the +Auslands-Organisation, were you informed about the foreign political +intentions of the Führer? + +BOHLE: I was not Reichsleiter, but Gauleiter, and was never informed of +the foreign political intentions of the Führer. + +DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know whether the Führer basically advocated to +your organization an understanding with England? + +BOHLE: I do not quite understand your question. + +DR. SERVATIUS: Did Hitler, before the war, in your presence and before +the other Gauleiter, frequently emphasize the fact that he wanted at all +costs an understanding with England, and that you also were to work for +its achievement? + +BOHLE: I received no orders in this respect from the Führer, but +certainly from the Deputy of the Führer. The Führer never discussed +foreign political matters with me during the 12 years I was in office. + +DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of the Defense Counsel want to ask any +other questions? + +LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the +United Kingdom): Your Auslands-Organisation was organized in the same +way as the Party in Germany was organized; is that not so? + +BOHLE: Not in all points, because there were various organizations +within the body of the Party in the Reich which were not intended for +foreign countries, for example, the Office for Municipal Policy. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps I can shorten my question: Did you have +Hoheitsträger abroad in the same way as you had them in Germany? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The organization in each country was under the +Landesgruppenleiter; is that correct? + +BOHLE: In almost all countries. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And under many there were lower-ranking +Hoheitsträger? + +BOHLE: Yes, the Ortsgruppenleiter. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was the result of that, that you had your +German population in foreign countries well organized and known to the +leaders in those countries? + +BOHLE: To a great extent that might be correct, but it was not so +thoroughly organized, nor could it actually be so, because the leader of +the Party did not know all the Reich Germans in the country concerned. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did it never occur to you that in the event of +your army’s invading a country where you had a well-organized +organization, that organization would be of extreme military value? + +BOHLE: No, that was not the sense and the purpose of the +Auslands-Organisation and no offices ever approached me in this +connection. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling this Tribunal now that when the +various countries of Europe were in fact invaded by the German Army your +local organizations did nothing to assist them in a military or +semimilitary capacity? + +BOHLE: Yes, indeed. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, let me ask you about something +else for a moment: You had, had you not, an efficient system of +reporting from your Landesgruppenleiter to your head office in Berlin? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I think you have said yourself, did you not, in +your interrogations, that you took an especial pride in the speed with +which your reports came back? + +BOHLE: I did not say that, I believe, with respect to speed but rather +with respect to the accuracy of their political survey. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In fact, your reports did come back with great +speed, did they not? + +BOHLE: I cannot say that in general. It depended on the possibility of +dispatching these reports quickly to Berlin, and how far that was the +case in individual instances, I naturally cannot say today. In any case, +I had no special speed or acceleration measures at my disposal. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In fact, you told your interrogator—and I can +refer you to it if necessary—that on occasion you got back information +before Himmler or the Foreign Office had got similar information. + +BOHLE: That must be a misunderstanding. It concerns the political +reports from the Landesgruppenleiter which I transmitted from Berlin to +the different offices. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, we will leave the speed out. I have +it from you that you had an efficient system of reporting, had you not? + +BOHLE: In order to answer that question I would have to know in respect +to what reports I am supposed to have had an efficient system of +reporting. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was going to be my next question. I was +going to ask you: What in fact did your Landesgruppenleiter report to +you? + +BOHLE: The Landesgruppenleiter reported of their own accord to me, +whenever they had anything of importance which they wanted to report to +the competent offices in the Reich. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did they ever report anything which might have +been of military or semimilitary value? + +BOHLE: That may have been the case in some instances, although at +present I cannot recall any specific cases. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They were never given any instructions, were +they, to report that kind of information? + +BOHLE: No, generally not. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: How did you get your reports back? Did you have +wireless sets with your organization in foreign countries? + +BOHLE: No, we did not have any such transmission or wireless stations. +Reports either came through courier in special cases or were brought by +individuals to Germany. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: After the war started, did your organizations +continue in neutral countries? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did they never have wireless sets reporting +back information? + +BOHLE: I do not know anything about that. I do not believe they had +them, for I would have had to know about it. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to ask you about only one or two +documents. Would you look at 3258-PS—My Lord, that is the exhibit +already in, GB-262; I have copies of the extract for the Tribunal and +members of Defense Counsel. I expect you read English—the book itself +is coming. + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There you have before you a copy of some +extracts from it. Would you look at the bottom of the first page, last +paragraph, commencing “In 1938...” Did you have a Landesgruppenleiter in +the Netherlands by the name of Butting? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just pay attention to me for perhaps one moment +before you look at that document. Do you know that Butting shared a +house at The Hague with the military intelligence office? Do you know +that? + +BOHLE: No, I do not. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to quote you quite shortly two +paragraphs of this document, which is a report, published as an official +United States publication, called “National Socialism, Basic Principles, +Their Application by the Nazi Party’s Foreign Organization, and The Use +of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims.” I just want you to tell the Tribunal +what you think first of all about this report, which is printed in that +book: + + “In 1938 the German Legation owned two houses in The Hague. Both + were of course the subject of diplomatic immunity and therefore + inviolable as concerned search and seizure by the Dutch police. + I shall call the house in which Dr. Butting had his office House + Number 2. What went on in House Number 2? It had been remodeled + and was divided like a two-family house—vertically, not + horizontally, but between the two halves there was a + communicating door. One side of the house was Dr. Butting’s. The + other half housed the Nazi military intelligence agent for + Holland....” + +You say that you do not know anything about that? + +BOHLE: Butting was Landesgruppenleiter of the Auslands-Organisation. I +am hearing about this house—or these two houses—for the first time, +that is quite new to me. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I will just go on. + + “S. B. (the military intelligence agent) may have had as many as + a dozen subordinates working in Holland, all subagents of the + Canaris bureau. These were professional spies who knew their + trade. But they could not possibly know Holland as intimately as + was required by the strategy of the German High Command, as it + was revealed following the invasion of May 1940. For this, not a + dozen but perhaps several hundred sources of information were + necessary. And it is at this point that Butting and the military + intelligence agent come together. Through his German Citizens’ + Association, Butting had a pair of Nazi eyes, a pair of Nazi + ears, in every town and hamlet of the Netherlands. They were the + eyes and ears of his minor Party officials. Whenever the + military intelligence agent needed information concerning a + corner of Holland which his people had not yet explored, or was + anxious to check information relayed to him by one of his own + people, he would go to Butting.” + +Do you know whether Butting assisted the military intelligence agent in +Holland in any way like that? + +BOHLE: I was told later that he aided in Holland. To what extent he +helped him I do not know, for he had had no such mission from me. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I understand, he had no instructions but he was +doing it. Just turn now to the last paragraph on that page, too: + + “‘I know every stone in Holland,’ S. B. once boasted. By ‘stone’ + he meant canal, lock, bridge, viaduct, culvert, highway, + by-road, airport, emergency landing field, and the name and + location of Dutch Nazi sympathizers who would help the invading + army when the time came. Had Dr. Butting’s Party organization + not existed under the innocent cover of his Citizens’ + Association, S.B.’s knowledge of Holland would have been as + nothing compared with what it was. Thus the Citizens’ + Association served a double purpose; it was invaluable for + espionage at the same time as it fulfilled its primary function + as a Fifth Column agency.” + +Do you know whether the members of your organization in Holland were +given instructions to learn about every canal, lock, bridge, viaduct, +railway, and so on? + +BOHLE: No, I had not the least idea of this. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I want you to be quite clear. I am +putting to you that your organization was in the first place an +espionage system reporting information of importance back to the Reich, +and, in the second place, it was an organization aimed to help, and +which did help, your invading German armies when they overran the +frontiers of their neighboring states. Do you understand those two +points? + +BOHLE: Yes, indeed. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your organization publish an annual book, +your _Year Book of the Foreign Organization_? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And did that book contain information as to the +activities of your organization during the year? + +BOHLE: Partially, yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I suppose that the Tribunal would be safe in +assuming that what was published in that book was accurate information? + +BOHLE: One may assume that. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at the _Year Book for 1942_? I +have copies of the extracts. Would you turn to Page 37 of that book? If +you look back one or two pages in the book, you will find that that is +an article entitled “The Work of the Norway Branch of the +Auslands-Organisation in the War.” Is that written by your +Landesgruppenleiter in Norway? + +BOHLE: I assume so, I cannot recall this. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 37, and you will see that +there are some passages in the book that you have in front of you that +have been lightly marked in pencil along the side. + +BOHLE: Yes, I have it. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you find the paragraph which starts, +“Therefore, soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939...” Have +you got that? + +BOHLE: Yes, I have it. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps you will be so kind as to follow me. + + “Therefore, soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939, + the enlargement and extension...” + +BOHLE: Yes, I am following you. + + LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “...the enlargement and extension of + the German Legation in Oslo and of the consulates at Bergen, + Trondheim, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Hamgesund, Narvik and + Kirkenes proved to be of primary importance. This enlargement of + the Reich agencies resulted in the local organization of the + NSDAP in Norway having to increase its field of activity too, in + the same proportion, in order to support the work of the Reich + agencies, particularly by Party members and other Germans who + had a thorough knowledge of the country and language.” + +Why, in September ’39, was it necessary for the Party to increase its +organization in Norway with people having higher knowledge of the +country and language? Answer me that before you read on. You need not +worry about the rest; we are going to deal with it. Why was it necessary +in 1939 to enlarge your organization? + +BOHLE: In Norway, as far as I recall, there were only 80 members of the +Party in all, and it goes without saying that after the outbreak of the +war the official agencies, not only of Germany but also, as you know, +those of other states, were enlarged and were assisted by national +elements, who knew the country concerned. That did not hold true for +Germany alone but for all the nations participating in the war. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. I still do not understand why your +perfectly harmless organization should have found it necessary to +increase its membership with people who had a profound knowledge of the +language and the country. Why should the Auslands-Organisation have +found it necessary? + +BOHLE: Because the Reich agencies needed Germans who knew the country +and the people, especially to furnish information on the German targets +of attack in Norway—exactly what every other nation did, too. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, your answer is, is it, that you required +them to tell you about targets in Norway? Is that your answer? + +BOHLE: No, I did not say that. I said that they were to be at the +disposal of the agencies in Norway in case they were needed for public +enlightenment, that is for German propaganda purposes among the +Norwegians. I would like to emphasize once again that that was done not +only by Germany but, of course, by all the warring countries. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, let us go on and see what happens +next: + + “The choice and assignment of these supplementary collaborators + was carried out by the local leader of the organization in close + collaboration with the representatives of the Reich. Therefore, + from the first moment of the outbreak of war a great number of + Party members were taken away from their jobs and employed in + the service of the nation and the fatherland. Without any + hesitation and without considering their personal interests, + their families, their careers or their property, they joined the + ranks and devoted themselves body and soul to the new and often + dangerous tasks.” + +Tell me, was finding out and reporting about the Norwegian people, was +that an “often dangerous task”? + +BOHLE: Certainly not. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What, then, were the often dangerous tasks +which your own Landesgruppenleiter is saying members of his organization +were undertaking from the very moment war broke out, in September ’39? + +BOHLE: I cannot tell you anything about that, for I have no knowledge +whatsoever about this and I cannot conceive any of these dangerous +tasks. I have the impression from this article, which, incidentally I +did not know about until now, that the Landesgruppenleiter had the +plausible desire to give more importance to his organization than it had +in reality. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you say you did not know about this. This +appeared in the official yearbook of your organization. Did you never +read what appeared in that book? + +BOHLE: Certainly not everything, for I am not familiar with this +article. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have told us that the members of your +organization took no part in this. What about the people who were +responsible for publishing that book? Did they not ever draw your +attention to an article of that kind? + +BOHLE: Obviously not. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just look at the next little paragraph: + + “The success of their work, which was done with all secrecy, was + revealed when, on 9 April 1940, German troops landed in Norway + and forestalled the planned flank attack of the Allies.” + +What work was revealed on the 9th of April? What work which had been +done with all secrecy was revealed on the 9th of April, work carried out +by members of your organization? + +BOHLE: I am sorry I cannot reply, for I have no knowledge whatsoever of +this. I do not know. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I see. Will you look down to the last paragraph +of that page? It is the second sentence—four, five lines down—at the +end of the fifth line. I beg your pardon. You have the book in front of +you. Will you look at Page 40 of the book? In the center of a paragraph +the last word of one of the lines starts with “According to the task +plan...” Have you got it? It is Page 40. To save time, let me read it: + + “According to the task plan which had been prepared since the + outbreak of the war, the Landeskreisleitung gave orders on 7 + April for Phase 1 of the state of employment...” + +It does not sound, does it, like plans being made for different phases +of an operation? It does not sound, does it, as if the work of your +organization had been simply finding out about Norwegian people? + +BOHLE: That might have been since this is entirely new to me, +exclusively an agreement within the country itself with military or +other authorities. I have had no knowledge of it up to this moment. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So I understand you to say. But you were the +head of this organization, were you not? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have come before this International +Tribunal and given them evidence, presumably saying you are in a +position to give them truthful and accurate evidence; is that so? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you understand that? + +BOHLE: Yes, I have understood that. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, then, do I understand you to say now that +you do not know what was happening in your organization, and therefore +you are not in a position to give evidence as to whether or not it was a +Fifth Column business? + +BOHLE: It is quite evident that in an organization of this size the +leader, who has his office at Berlin, cannot be closely acquainted with +everything which is going on abroad and, more so, what is done against +his instructions. I did not have the same disciplinary authority over my +Party members abroad as did, for instance, some Gauleiter within the +Reich. I need not elaborate on that, because it is self-evident. It is +also evident, and this I know, that some Germans abroad, who were called +on because of their patriotism in individual cases let themselves be +used for purposes without the knowledge of the Auslands-Organisation and +against its explicit instructions. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In the interest of time we will not pursue that +particular sphere of activity in Norway, just in case it may have been +an exception which you did not know about. + +Let me turn to something else. Will you look at Page 65 of that book? + +Is that an article by your Landesgruppenleiter in Greece? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Is it in the form of a day-to-day diary of the +activities of the Auslands-Organisation in Greece when German troops +invaded that country? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 65? + + “Sunday the 27th of April. Swastika on the Acropolis.” + +That is the heading. I beg your pardon. I do not know whether it comes +directly under that heading. This is the Landesgruppenleiter talking: + + “I set out immediately, quickly visiting the other + quarters,”—where the German colony had been interned—“the + Philadelphia and the Institute. I enjoined the inmates of the + house in Academy Street to give up returning home today, and to + hold themselves in readiness. After all, we did want to help the + German troops immediately with our knowledge of the language and + the district. Now the moment has come. We must start in + immediately.” + +Do you know... + +BOHLE: Yes, I even know all about this. It certainly must be evident +that the moment German troops occupied a foreign city and freed the +Germans living abroad who had been interned, the latter would put +themselves at the disposal of the German troops and help them in every +respect as guides, interpreters, or the like. That is certainly the most +logical thing in the world. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is in fact what they did do, and the +assistance that your organization appears to have given them is that it +managed to organize them and get them ready to do it; is that not so? +That is what your Landesgruppenleiter seems to be doing? + +BOHLE: I did not understand this question. Will you please repeat it? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you understand that it is your +Landesgruppenleiter who is organizing the members of your organization, +organizing them so that they can give their assistance most beneficially +to the invading armies? + +BOHLE: That is a completely wrong way to express it. The +Landesgruppenleiter in Greece, who filled that post from 1934, could not +possibly tell whether there was to be an invasion of Greece or not. That +had not the slightest thing to do with the nature of his organization. +The moment that German troops were in the country it stands to reason +that they would welcome their countrymen, act as their hosts, and help +them in every way. That was a patriotic duty taken for granted. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I see. + +Just turn to Page 66, the next page. Will you find the paragraph which +commences “Meanwhile I organized the employment of all Party members to +do auxiliary service for the Armed Forces.” + +Do you have that? + +BOHLE: I understand it... + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had better find the place. + +BOHLE: Where shall I find that place? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On Page 66. It is a new paragraph. + +BOHLE: Yes, I have it now. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Meanwhile I organized the employment of all +Party members to do auxiliary service for the Armed Forces.” + +It really looks now as though the Landesgruppenleiter is organizing +them, does it not? + +BOHLE: In this instance, yes. + + LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Soon our boys and girls could be seen + riding proud and radiant in their Hitler Youth uniforms, beside + the German soldiers on motorcycles and in Army cars....” + +Did you yourself know of the organization and work that your +Landesgruppenleiter had put in in Greece to assist your armies in +semimilitary capacities, or was that another case like Norway which you +did not know anything about? + +BOHLE: The Landesgruppenleiter in Greece did not create a semimilitary +organization, but set up of course in this instance an organization to +aid the troops entering the country in a sector which was entirely +civilian. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well; I just want to ask you about another +matter. Have you got a document there which is a telegram from somebody +called Stohrer, in Madrid? + +BOHLE: Stohrer, yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did Stohrer have something to do with the +German Embassy in Madrid? + +BOHLE: Stohrer was the German Ambassador himself; Doctor Von Stohrer. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This is dated 23 October 1939. Just let us see +what it says: + + “The Landesgruppenleiter can obtain a very suitable house for + accommodating the Landesgruppe, as well as the German Labor + Front, the Ortsgruppe, the Hitler Youth, and the German House + Madrid, also room available in case of embassy having to spread + out, and especially a very suitable isolated room for the + possible installation of second secret radio transmitter, which + can no longer be housed at the school because of reopening. + + “Landesgruppenleiter requests me to rent the house through the + embassy, in which way very considerable tax expense will be + avoided. Have no hesitation, in view of anticipated partial use + by embassy as mentioned above. If you do not agree I request + wire by return. + + “Please submit also to Gauleiter Bohle.” + +Were you telling the truth to this Tribunal when you told them some 30 +minutes ago that you had no knowledge of wireless sets being used by +your organization? + +BOHLE: Yes, because I have no knowledge of these transmitters, or their +use; I must assume that it concerns apparatus of the embassy. + +DR. SEIDL: The copy of the telegram, as I have it before me, does not +indicate to whom this wire was addressed. The last sentence of the +telegram leads one to assume that it was not in any case addressed to +the witness. According to my opinion, I think the witness should next be +asked whether he knew about this wire and to whom it was addressed. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps you will tell Dr. Seidl to whom the +Ambassador in Madrid was likely to send a telegram on such matters as +this? + +BOHLE: To the Foreign Office at Berlin. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And you, at that time, were State Secretary at +the Foreign Office of Berlin, were you not? + +BOHLE: Quite right, in October 1939. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Beneath his signature is set out the +distribution to—it mentions various persons in departments in the +Foreign Office in Berlin. Is that so? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And are you saying now that all of those +departments which were asked to submit this matter to you, that they all +failed to do so? + +BOHLE: No, I do not claim that. They surely would have done that. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember yourself seeing this telegram +before? + +BOHLE: I cannot recall it. I would have noticed it for I never heard +anything about two secret transmitters in Spain. It would also be quite +in order for me to admit it. But I cannot do so if I do not know it. The +distribution under Number 3 mentions "State Secretary,” but that does +not mean me, but the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, the +political one. My designation in the Foreign Office was: Chief A.O. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I can save you all that. I am not suggesting +that that “State Secretary” means you; otherwise it would not be asked +to be submitted to you. What I want to know is what you or your embassy +workers, or both of you working together, wanted with two secret +wireless transmitting sets in Spain in October 1939? + +Are you still saying that your organization was quite unconcerned in +reporting back information of military importance? + +BOHLE: Just how do you mean, “reporting back”? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling the Tribunal—I want you to be +quite clear—are you telling the Tribunal that your organization was not +being used for espionage purposes in Spain? + +BOHLE: Yes indeed, I am asserting that. A distinction must be made +between certain members of the Auslands-Organisation who naturally +without my knowledge—I protested against this often enough—were used +abroad for such purposes. I had no objection to Germans abroad being +utilized in time of war for such tasks, as was the case very frequently +with all other countries. However, I did not want members or officials +of the Auslands-Organisation to become involved. A distinction must... + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I do not want to stop you at all. I do not want +to stop you. Go on if you have anything to say. But, in the interest of +time, try and make it as short as possible. + +BOHLE: It seems to me there is some confusion between the +Auslands-Organisation as an organization and what certain Germans abroad +did during the war as their patriotic duty. This seems to me to be the +crucial point of the question. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, I will not argue about that. We see that +your organization took sufficient interest to reproduce accounts of what +they were doing in its official book. I just want to show you one thing +further. + +[_Turning to the President._] Well, I have one further document to put +to this witness. + +THE PRESIDENT: You may as well go on. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is a document which I have just had found. I +have not had them copied. The Tribunal will forgive me if I read +extracts from them? + +[_Turning to the witness._] It is an original document you hold in your +hand and it appears to be, does it not, a carbon copy of a letter +from... + +THE PRESIDENT: Has Dr. Seidl got one? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, he has one in German. + +[_Turning to the witness._] Is that a letter from your +Landesgruppenleiter Konradi? + +BOHLE: It seems to be a directive from Konradi, but not signed by him. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you will look at the end of the letter you +will see that it is actually signed “Konradi,” after the usual “Heil +Hitler”... + +BOHLE: The copy that I have is not signed. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you get that copy back? Perhaps these +documents... + +[_The document was taken from the witness to Lt. Col. Griffith-Jones._] + +It is in fact signed “Konradi.” Show it to him. + +[_The document was returned to the witness._] + +BOHLE: It is not signed by Konradi, but typed in. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged to you. It is my fault +for not making myself clear. I told you that we have here a carbon copy. +A copy of a letter which was signed and sent by Konradi. That appears to +be so, does it not? + +BOHLE: That I do not know, for of course I do not know about all the +letters written by Konradi. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You can take it, so far as you are concerned, +that that is a German document which has been captured, that it is this +bit of paper that you are holding in your hand which was found by Allied +troops and that bears a typewritten signature of Konradi, who was your +Landesgruppenleiter in Romania; is that correct? You remember that you +had a Landesgruppenleiter in Romania? + +BOHLE: His name was Konradi. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And is this a letter of instructions to the +Zellenleiter in Constantsa? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is dated the 25th of October 1939. Will you +read the first paragraph? + + “From 9 to 12 October conferences took place with the Supreme + Party functionaries, or their deputies, of the Southeastern and + Southern European groups at the head office of the + Auslands-Organisation.” + +Does that mean Berlin? + +BOHLE: Yes. Berlin. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That means your office, does it not? + +BOHLE: Yes, in my office, but not in my personal office. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, but is it in the office over which you had +complete control? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Agreed. I imagine, before we go on, that no +orders would be issued from your head office at a conference of that +kind which were contrary to your direction, would they? + +BOHLE: Not on important things, naturally not. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to you. + + “I subsequently received direct instructions from the competent + department of the head office of the Auslands-Organisation.” + +So it appears that the direction given at the conference was confirmed +in writing. + + “During the war, every National Socialist abroad must directly + serve the fatherland, either through propaganda for the German + cause or by counteracting enemy measures.” + +Now perhaps you will turn over, or rather, you will miss out—I am +reading from copy—the English, the next paragraph, and the next plus +one paragraph, and go on to the paragraph commencing: + + “As everywhere else it is extremely important to know where the + enemy is and what he is doing...” + +I want you to be quite clear about this and keep it in mind. These are +directions coming directly from your head office in Berlin. + + “It has been ascertained that the I.S. (Intelligence Service) + has attempted, sometimes most successfully, to gain admittance + for seemingly trustworthy persons into the activities of the + Party group and its associate organizations. It is therefore + necessary that you thoroughly investigate not only all those + persons coming into contact with you who are not very well known + to you, and above all you must scrutinize any new persons and + visitors appearing in your immediate vicinity. If possible, let + them be taken in hand by a comrade whose absolute Nazi + convictions are not generally known to the man in the + street....” + +I think we can leave the rest of that. + + “You are to report everything that comes to your notice, even + though it may at first appear very insignificant. Rumors + suddenly arising also come in this category, however false they + may be.” + +Do you remember your members in Romania being told to report everything? +Everything they saw? + +BOHLE: Yes, of course. + + LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “An important section of both your work + and that of your comrades’ work must be industrial concerns, + business enterprises, _et cetera_. Not only can you spread your + propaganda very well in this way, but it is precisely in such + concerns that you can easily pick up information concerning + strange visitors. It is known that the enemy espionage + organizations are especially active in industrial circles both + in gathering information and carrying out acts of sabotage. + Members with close connections with shipping and forwarding + companies are particularly suitable for this work. It goes + without saying that you must be meticulous and cautious when + selecting your assistants.” + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you have some more to read from this document? If so, +we will adjourn now until 2 o’clock. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is absent +from this session. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Witness, will you look again at the document we +were reading before the Court adjourned. Would you look at the paragraph +which commences “as everywhere else it is extremely important to know +where the enemy is and what he is doing.” My Lord, I am not absolutely +certain that I did not start reading. + +THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, you had read that and the next one and the one +at the top of Page 3 in the English text. At least I think you have. You +read the one beginning “An important section.” + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps I can start the paragraph commencing +“An important section.” Have you got that? + +BOHLE: Yes. + + LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “An important section of both your work + and that of your comrades must be industrial concerns, business + enterprises, _et cetera_. Not only can you spread your + propaganda very well in this way, but it is precisely in such + concerns that you can easily pick up information concerning + strange visitors. It is known that the enemy espionage + organizations are especially active in industrial circles, both + in gathering information and carrying out acts of sabotage. + Comrades with close connections with shipping and forwarding + companies are particularly suitable for this work. Naturally you + must be meticulous and cautious when selecting your assistants. + + “In this connection a reference to interstate organizations and + exchange organizations is relevant.”—I particularly want you to + note these next lines: + + “It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as + camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of the + Foreign Intelligence Department.” + +Witness, doesn’t that exactly describe the way in which the +Auslands-Organisation was carrying on its business? Read it again: + + “It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as + camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of the + Foreign Intelligence Department.” + +Doesn’t that fit in with the directions that this Landesgruppenleiter of +yours has been writing to his members in this document? + +BOHLE: On the contrary, I find that this is clear proof of the fact that +the organizations mentioned here were in a foreign espionage service and +not in the German espionage service. My interpretation is the exact +opposite of that of the British Prosecutor. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you not giving instructions here, or is not +your Landesgruppenleiter giving instructions, to carry out +counterespionage—the work that is carried on by the intelligence +service? Isn’t that what the writer is writing about so far? + +BOHLE: The letter, with which I am not personally familiar, apparently +instructs Germans abroad to turn in a report whenever they encounter the +intelligence service at work. I do not think that any objection can be +raised to that in time of war. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. We will not go on arguing about it. +I understand that you know nothing about the instructions which are +contained in that letter. This is the first you have ever seen or heard +of it; is that right? + +BOHLE: No, this letter is new to me, and I do not know whether it is +true, for there is no original here. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it then that, of the countries +around Germany in which your organization worked, you have no knowledge +of the activities that they were carrying out in Belgium? You have no +knowledge of the activities that they were carrying out in Norway, none +about what they were doing in Spain, and not very much about what they +were doing in Romania either; is that correct? + +BOHLE: No, that is not correct. Of course I knew of the activity of +these groups abroad; but the particular activity that the British +Prosecutor wishes to point out as the aim of the Auslands-Organisation +is not quite clear to me. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you had knowledge of any of their +activities—I understand from your evidence that you had none of the +activities about which your own Auslands-Organisation Yearbook publishes +a story. Both in Norway and Greece the activities were recounted in +those two stories. You knew nothing about them at all; is that right? + +BOHLE: I did not know about the activity in Norway. I have already +testified to that effect. I was very familiar with the activity in +Greece which was along perfectly normal lines. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I want to leave that, and I just +want to ask you two questions about another matter. Am I right in saying +that the information—and I am not going to argue with you now as to +what type of information it was—but the information that your +organization sent back, was that passed on to the Defendant Hess? + +BOHLE: Sometimes yes and sometimes no. It depended upon the nature of +the information. If it was information on foreign policy it was, of +course, sent to another office. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were in fact acting as a pool of +information, were you not? Let me explain myself: You were forwarding +information that you received, to the SS? + +BOHLE: Sometimes, yes; if not to the SS then probably... + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: To the Foreign Office? + +BOHLE: Sometimes also to the Foreign Office. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And to the Abwehr, were you not? + +BOHLE: Very seldom, but it happened occasionally. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say very seldom. Did you not have a liaison +officer attached to your organization from the Abwehr? + +BOHLE: No. I had only one assistant who maintained an unofficial +connection with the Abwehr, if the occasion arose. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps we are talking about the same +gentleman. Did you not have a Captain Schmauss attached to your head +office in Berlin? + +BOHLE: Mr. Schmauss has never been a captain but he was a political +leader and honorary SS-leader. In the Army, I believe he was a sergeant. +Moreover, he did not come from the Abwehr; he was chief of personnel of +the Auslands-Organisation and his function as liaison was purely +unofficial. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say he was not a liaison officer between +your organization and the Abwehr? + +BOHLE: No, he was not an officer at all. He was not a member of the +Wehrmacht. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I do not want to quibble with you about his +rank. Was he, in effect, whatever he was, acting in a capacity of +liaison between you and the Abwehr? + +BOHLE: Yes, that is correct. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, in addition to the information +that Hess obtained through your system of reporting, that is, the +Auslands-Organisation, did he also obtain information from those +organizations which were dealing with the Volksdeutsche, that is to say, +non-German citizens, racial Germans abroad who were not members of your +organization, because you allowed only German citizens to become members +of your organization. But others—Volksdeutsche, I think you call +them—did Hess receive information from other sources about their +activities? + +BOHLE: I could not say, because I did not discuss it with Hess, and the +affairs of the Volksdeutsche were entirely out of my field. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Dr. Karl Haushofer was for some time in 1938 +and 1939 president of the VDA, was he not? + +BOHLE: I believe so. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Which was an organization dealing with the +activities of the Volksdeutsche in foreign countries. Is that correct? + +BOHLE: Yes, I believe so. I am not familiar with this field. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And, as you know, Hess and Karl Haushofer were +great friends, were they not? + +BOHLE: Yes, that is correct. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Haushofer had been Hess’ pupil at Munich +University; did you know that? + +BOHLE: It was the other way around. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you not know that Hess received information +from Haushofer as to the activities of these other organizations? + +BOHLE: No, I know nothing about it. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, I do not want to catch you out. Is +that your answer? Are you being honest to this Tribunal? + +BOHLE: No. I wanted to add that the Deputy of the Führer very +painstakingly separated the “Auslandsdeutsche,” that is, citizens of the +Reich who worked abroad, and the “Volksdeutsche,” and with equal care he +made certain that I should have nothing to do with the question of +Volksdeutsche. Therefore I knew nothing of these matters. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Hess as Deputy to the Führer was in fact in +charge of all matters concerning Germanism abroad; was he not? + +BOHLE: Yes, that is so, because he was born abroad. However, to my +knowledge, he did not take charge of these matters in his capacity as +Deputy to the Führer. I do not believe that there was any connection. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling the Tribunal that just because +he was born in a foreign country he had charge of all matters concerning +Germanism abroad? + +BOHLE: I believe so, because any other Reichsleiter of the Party might +just as well have taken care of these matters. However, I assume that +Hess took over these functions simply because he was familiar with +foreign countries. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to be quite clear. Whatever the reason +was, he in fact did have charge of them. That is your evidence? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I just want to remind you of a passage in +your interrogation in this building on the 9th of November. Do you +remember that you were interrogated on the 9th... + +BOHLE: [_Interposing._]: September? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On 9 November last. + +BOHLE: November, yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were interrogated by a Lieutenant Martin, +the afternoon of that day. + +BOHLE: By Lieutenant Martin, yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me read a short extract from the transcript +of that interrogation and ask you whether, in fact, it is correct. You +were being asked about the information which came back through the +Auslands-Organisation. + + “Question: ‘He would have to rely on you for his information on + matters of that kind?’ + + “Answer: ‘Not entirely; I think Hess had a great many + connections in Hamburg through which he obtained information + which he did not relay to me.’ + + “Question: ‘What were his connections in Hamburg?’ + + “Answer: ‘The shipping companies.’ + + “Question: ‘Rather like your Landesgruppenleiter instructions in + Romania?’ + + “Answer: ‘I think he knew a number of people there. I have + always been convinced that he knew them.’ + + “Question: ‘Is that Helferich?’ + + “Answer: ‘Helferich was one, but then there were many people + from whom he received information. I believe from Professor + Haushofer, his old teacher, with whom he was very friendly. But + he always made it a point not to inform us of anything that + concerned the Volksdeutsche; he said, “It is not your affair at + all.”’” + +Is that correct? + +BOHLE: That is quite correct, yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And as you have said it there, is that a +correct description of the position that Hess was in with regard to +information from abroad, from agents abroad? Does that correctly state +the facts as they were? + +BOHLE: So far as I can see, it is probably correct. I myself can judge +only to the extent to which the reports concerned the +Auslands-Organisation. About the others I can make only a guess; I +cannot give definite information, because I was not acquainted with +them. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps I might +get the exhibits in order, the ones that I have referred to. + +The Yearbook of the Auslands-Organisation from which the stories about +Norway and Greece came, becomes Exhibit GB-284. The two translations +that you have are numbered Documents M-153 and M-156, both of which +become Exhibit GB-284. + +The secret wireless telegram, which was Document Number M-158, becomes +Exhibit GB-285; and the letter from Landesgruppenleiter Konradi, which +was Document Number 3796-PS, becomes Exhibit GB-286. + +BOHLE: May I add something to a point which was brought up by the +British cross-examination? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +BOHLE: May I begin? + +THE PRESIDENT: You may give a short explanation. You are not here to +make a speech. + +BOHLE: No, I do not want to make a speech. I merely wish to say the +following on the question of secret transmitters which was brought up +this morning: Although I am not familiar with the technique of these +secret transmitters, I assume that a secret transmitter would be of use +in a foreign country only if there were a receiving set in Berlin. + +I am quite certain that to my knowledge there was never such a receiving +set, either in my office in Berlin or in any other office of the +Auslands-Organisation, and therefore I may assume that such a receiving +set did not exist. + +COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United +States): Do you recall being interrogated on 11 September 1945, by +Colonel Brundage? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: I want to read you a few questions and answers from your +interrogation and ask you whether you recall being asked those questions +and having made those answers: + + “Question: ‘Now, when you started, your immediate superior was + who?’ + + “Answer: ‘Rudolf Hess, until 1941 when he left for England.’ + + “Question: ‘Who succeeded him?’ + + “Answer: ‘Martin Bormann. Martin Bormann automatically succeeded + Hess, but he did not really fill Hess’ position, because Hess + had been born abroad in Egypt, while Martin Bormann understood + nothing about foreign affairs. He paid no attention to them at + all, but of course, he was my superior.’ + + “Question: ‘But he was nominally your chief?’ + + “Answer: ‘He was technically my chief, but he gave me no orders, + directives or similar instructions, because he did not + understand anything about these things.’ + + “Question: ‘So that everything that was done in your office, you + would say you were responsible for?’ + + “Answer: ‘Absolutely.’ + + “Question: ‘And you are willing to accept the responsibility for + that?’ + + “Answers ‘Naturally.’” + +Do you remember being asked those questions and having made those +answers? + +BOHLE: That is absolutely correct. + +COL. AMEN: And were those answers true when you made them? + +BOHLE: Absolutely true. + +COL. AMEN: And are they still true today? + +BOHLE: They are still true. + +COL. AMEN: So that you accept responsibility for everything which your +office was conducting, is that true? + +BOHLE: Yes, that is correct. + +COL. AMEN: Who was Von Strempel? + +BOHLE: Von Strempel was, I believe, counsellor to a secretary of a +legation (Gesandtschaftsrat) in the foreign office, but I do not know +him very well. + +COL. AMEN: Was he not the first secretary of the German Embassy in the +United States from 1938 until Pearl Harbor? + +BOHLE: I cannot say definitely. I knew him only slightly and had +absolutely no contact with him. + +COL. AMEN: Well, he was interrogated with respect to the support of the +German-American Bund by the Auslands-Organisation prior to 1938, and I +want to read you just one or two questions and answers which he made and +ask you whether they conform to your understanding of the facts. Do you +understand? + +BOHLE: Yes. + + COL. AMEN: “Question: ‘Was the German-American Bund supported by + the Auslands-Organisation?’ + + “Answer: ‘I am positive that it was connected with the foreign + section of the Party. For example, the Bund received + instructions from the Party on how to build up their political + organization, how, where, and when to hold mass meetings and how + to handle their propaganda. Personally, I do not know whether it + received financial support.’” + +Does that conform with your understanding of the facts? + +BOHLE: No, that is a completely false representation. The +Auslands-Organisation gave no financial support whatever and had no +connection with the German-American Bund. I have stated that clearly in +many interrogations here in Nuremberg, and have signed an affidavit to +that effect. + +COL. AMEN: I know you have. So that if Von Strempel has sworn that that +is a fact, your testimony is that he was not telling the truth. Is that +correct? + +BOHLE: I am of the opinion that if Von Strempel was legation secretary, +or secretary of another office, he could not have known of the matter +and he therefore testified about something which was not quite clear to +him. In any event, what he said is not true. + +COL. AMEN: Are you familiar with the fact that in 1938 an order was +issued prohibiting members of the German embassies and consulates to +continue relations or connections with the Bund? + +BOHLE: It was a general order for German citizens abroad to resign from +the Bund if they were members. But as far as I know, that order was +issued some years previously about 1935 or 1936, by the Deputy of the +Führer upon my request. + +DR. SEIDL: I object to this question; it has no connection with the +evidence for which the witness Bohle was called. During his direct +examination he was not questioned on any subject which has the slightest +relation to the question of the activity of the German-American Bund. I +do not believe that this form of interrogation is designed to test the +witness, as it has not the slightest bearing on the subject. + +COL. AMEN: It seems to me to have a very direct bearing on whether or +not this organization was engaged in espionage work abroad and within +the United States. + +THE PRESIDENT: Certainly; in the opinion of the Tribunal the questions +are perfectly proper. + +COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that in spite of that order the foreign +section of the Nazi Party nevertheless continued to support the Bund? + +BOHLE: No, I was not aware of that and I consider it to be impossible. + +COL. AMEN: Now I would like to read you one or two further extracts from +the interrogation of Strempel and ask you whether these statements +conform with your knowledge of the facts: + + “Question: ‘Did the foreign section of the Party continue to + support the Bund after the order you mentioned before was + issued?’ + + “Answer: ‘I am sure that Mr. Draeger, consul in New York City + and representative of the foreign section of the Party, did + continue to have relations with Bund officials.’” + +Does that conform with your recollection of the facts? + +BOHLE: No. In my opinion, that does not correspond to the facts. +Naturally, I cannot say whether the consul, Dr. Draeger, maintained his +contacts against my order, but there was an imperative order to withdraw +completely from the Bund, because from the very beginning I objected +strenuously to the activities of the Bund and was supported in my +objections by the Deputy of the Führer. + +COL. AMEN: You were acquainted with Draeger, were you not? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: What was his position in the United States, insofar as your +organization was concerned? + +BOHLE: He was a liaison man (Vertrauensmann) of the +Auslands-Organisation for the individual Party members in the United +States. + +COL. AMEN: He was what was known as a confidential agent, was he not? + +BOHLE: No, he was not, naturally, but we had... + +COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, you called him a “confidential +agent” in your interrogation, did you not? + +BOHLE: No. I called him a “Vertrauensmann,” and this was translated into +“confidence man.” I did... + +COL. AMEN: Well, I will accept that correction. He was a confidence man +for your organization in the United States. Correct? + +BOHLE: Correct, yes, that is true. + +COL. AMEN: And in addition to him there were other confidence men of +your organization in the United States? Correct? + +BOHLE: Yes, correct. + +COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what their names were and where +they were located? + +BOHLE: One was Wiedemann, consul general in San Francisco. There was +also Consul Dr. Gissling in Los Angeles and Consul Von Spiegel in New +Orleans I believe, but I do not know; perhaps it was Boston. It was one +of the two. I believe these are all. + +COL. AMEN: And each of those individuals made reports from time to time +which were forwarded to you through Draeger. Is that not a fact? + +BOHLE: No, they made no reports to me. I cannot recall that I ever saw a +report from Wiedemann, Spiegel, or Gissling. That was not their job. + +COL. AMEN: Draeger made the reports to you, did he not? + +BOHLE: Draeger made the reports to the Auslands-Organisation in Berlin +or to me personally. Mostly to my office. + +COL. AMEN: And contained in those reports were various items of +information collected by other confidential agents? Isn’t that correct? + +BOHLE: I do not know, because I am not familiar with these reports and I +cannot say whether there was anything to report. We had no Party +organization in the United States, because it had been dissolved by +Rudolf Hess in April 1933. + +COL. AMEN: So you say; but you nevertheless had an individual in Germany +whose duty it was to read and pass upon these reports from Draeger as +they came in. Is that not a fact? + +BOHLE: So far as I know, and I believe my information is correct; the +reports that we received were of a purely technical nature. We merely +had few Party members in the United States whose card index and +membership fees had to be looked after in order to preserve their +privileges as Party members. Political activity in the United States was +forbidden and did not actually exist. + +COL. AMEN: But I am suggesting to you that in spite of the order the +activities of your organization nevertheless continued. Now, is it not a +fact that there was an individual in your organization in Germany who +received these reports from the United States regularly? + +BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe, who... + +COL. AMEN: I beg your pardon? + +BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe. + +COL. AMEN: Correct. Why didn’t you tell me that before when I asked you +about the individual who read these reports from the United States as +they came in? + +BOHLE: Please repeat the question. I did not fully understand it. + +COL. AMEN: Well, I will withdraw that question. After Grothe received +these reports from the United States regularly, to whom did he report +the substance of those reports? + +BOHLE: So far as I know, he usually kept them, because they contained +nothing of interest and he himself was not in a position to use them. +Mr. Grothe had an honorary position with us because of his advanced age +and took over this branch of the office because it was of no importance +at all in the Auslands-Organisation. + +COL. AMEN: So that you were in no position to know what was contained in +those reports? Is that correct? + +BOHLE: That is for the most part correct. + +COL. AMEN: So you do not know whether they were important or not and you +do not know whether they contained information relative to espionage +matters or not. Is that correct? + +BOHLE: I am sure that if they had contained such information, Grothe +would have submitted them to me. + +COL. AMEN: Well, outside of that, you have no knowledge of it +whatsoever. Is that correct? + +BOHLE: That is correct. + +COL. AMEN: Now, let me just read you one or two more excerpts from the +interrogation of Von Strempel: + + “Question: ‘These relationships seem to have violated the order + you mentioned before. Did you report these violations to the + Foreign Office?’ + + “Answer: ‘Yes, several times. In reports that I drafted for + Thomsen when I was in the Embassy, we called the attention of + Berlin to the fact that this relationship to the Bund was very + detrimental... and stated that the continued support of the Bund + by the foreign section of the Party was harming diplomatic + relations with the United States.’ + + “Question: ‘What action was taken in Berlin to halt the + activities of which you complained?’ + + “Answer: ‘I know of no action.’” + +Does that conform to your knowledge of the facts? + +BOHLE: I have not the slightest idea of this report by Herr Von Thomsen. +This is the first time that I have heard of protests from the Embassy in +Washington regarding prohibited connections between Dr. Draeger and the +Bund. + +COL. AMEN: You know who Thomsen was, do you not? + +BOHLE: Thomsen was Chargé d’Affaires in Washington. + +COL. AMEN: And you know that from time to time various officials of the +Bund came over here and had conferences with representatives of your +organization and of the Führer, do you not? + +BOHLE: I have heard that they visited the Führer but they did not visit +me and we had no conferences of any description. + +COL. AMEN: I did not say with you. I said with representatives of your +office; perhaps your friend, Mr. Grothe? + +BOHLE: That might be possible but I cannot say definitely because he did +not report to me on this matter. They could not have discussed any +official matters with Grothe, because he knew very well that I +completely repudiated the activities of the German Volksbund in America. + +COL. AMEN: In any event, however, you accept responsibility for +everything which was done in your organization. Correct? + +BOHLE: Naturally. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do either of the other Chief Prosecutors wish to +cross-examine? [_There was no response._] Then, Dr. Seidl, you can +re-examine if you wish. + +DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have already answered a question that I intended +to ask you, that is, that there was no secret transmitter in Germany +which would have been in a position to broadcast secret communications +to foreign countries. I ask you now, did you yourself have a transmitter +in Germany? + +BOHLE: I myself had no transmitter. + +DR. SEIDL: Did the Auslands-Organisation have such a transmitter? + +BOHLE: I consider that to be absolutely impossible; if there had been +one, I would have known of it. I never saw one. + +DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that in order to communicate with Germans +overseas by radio you yourself did not use code on the German network? + +BOHLE: That is correct. + +DR. SEIDL: You stated previously that the Deputy of the Führer, Hess, +was your immediate superior? + +BOHLE: Yes. + +DR. SEIDL: Were the directives given to you by the Deputy of the Führer +of a general nature, or did he go into the details of the work of the +Auslands-Organisation? + +BOHLE: The Deputy of the Führer gave only general directives and left +all the details to me because I had his complete confidence. In his +general directives he impressed upon me repeatedly in the sharpest terms +the fact that it was my duty to avoid any measures by the +Auslands-Organisation that might be detrimental to foreign relations. + +DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions. + +THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. + +[_The witness left the stand._] + +DR. SEIDL: Your Honors, before I go on to my next witness—that is the +witness Strölin—I should like to submit the suggestion or rather the +application to the Tribunal that the affidavit of the witness Gaus be +handled in the same way as the interrogation of the witness Bohle. Gaus +has already been admitted as a witness for another defendant. However, +the Defense Counsel for the other defendant waived his right to call +this witness. The situation is the same as it was in the case of Bohle; +therefore it would be preferable, in my opinion, to hear the witness +Gaus now and to read his sworn statement to him during his examination +as has been done in other cases, for instance in the case of Blaha. + +THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet and submitted in +the various languages to the Chief Prosecutors? + +DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the translation is complete. At any +rate, this noon I submitted six copies of the affidavit to the +Translation Division. + +THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell me, Sir David or Colonel Pokrovsky? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not seen this affidavit, and, My +Lord, with regard to the last one, we got it hurriedly translated into +English, but it was only by the kindness of my Soviet colleagues, who +allowed the matter to go on without a Russian translation and left it to +my delegation to deal with, that the matter went on. Otherwise, my +Soviet colleagues would have asked the Tribunal to have it put back. + +It is very difficult when these affidavits are sought to be put in at +the last minute without having given us a chance of seeing them. + +THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky could tell me whether he has +seen this affidavit or had it translated yet. + +COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): +Members of the Tribunal, I fully share the viewpoint of Sir David +Maxwell-Fyfe. It appears to me absolutely unacceptable to have this +document presented immediately to the Tribunal. + +If I understood Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe correctly, he did not receive +this affidavit. The Soviet delegation is in the same position. Besides, +I would like to remind you that the question of this witness has already +been discussed, that it has been definitely solved, and it seems to me +there are no grounds for a further revision of this question. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal considers that the course which +must be taken is that that affidavit must be translated and submitted to +the Tribunal for their consideration, for this witness was allowed to +the Defendant Ribbentrop, I think, and then he withdrew his application +for the witness. You have not applied for the witness Gaus, and I would +point out to you and to the other counsel for the defendants that it is +very inconvenient that documents of this sort—after all the question of +witnesses and documents has been thoroughly gone into by the +Tribunal—should be presented at the last moment and without any +translation whatever. But we will not go into it now, and it must be +translated and submitted to the Tribunal in the three languages. + +DR. SEIDL: Perhaps I might make one short remark in regard to the last +point. Up to now I was always under the impression that a formal +application to call a witness would not be necessary in the case of a +witness who has already been admitted by the Tribunal for another +defendant. That was undoubtedly so in the case of Gaus who was named as +a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. Consequently I had no reason +to make a formal application, since I would have the opportunity to +interrogate the witness in cross-examination anyhow. + +I have just been informed by counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop +that, as his representative said last Saturday, he will forego calling +the witness Gaus, and now I, in turn, apply to call Ambassador Dr. Gaus +as witness regarding the statements in his sworn affidavit. + +THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean by saying you call him. You +can apply to call him if you like, but you do not call him until you +apply. + +DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. + +THE PRESIDENT: When we have seen this document, we will determine the +question. + +DR. SEIDL: The next witness admitted by the Tribunal for the Defendant +Hess is the witness Karl Strölin. In order to save time I have also +prepared an affidavit for this witness, and I ask the Tribunal to inform +me whether we will follow the same procedure with this witness as with +the witness Bohle, or whether the Prosecution agree that only the +affidavit should be presented. + +THE PRESIDENT: Have they seen the affidavit? + +DR. SEIDL: I gave the affidavit to the Prosecution this morning. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have got an English translation of the +affidavit. There are one or two questions the Prosecution want to put to +the witness, so I suggest that the most convenient course would be if +Dr. Seidl did as he did with the last witness, to read the affidavit, +and then after the affidavit is read, the few questions that the +Prosecution desire to be put can be put to him. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. + +COL. POKROVSKY: I must report to you, Mr. President, that as far as this +document is concerned, the Defense Counsel has violated the procedure +you have established; the Soviet Prosecution received this affidavit +only a very short time ago—about 1 or 2 hours ago—and it was not +received by us in Russian but in English. Therefore, I had the +opportunity of familiarizing myself with it only very slightly, and I +ask to have the presentation of this document postponed until such time +when the order of the Tribunal is complied with, in other words, not +until we have received our document in Russian. + +THE PRESIDENT: But, Colonel Pokrovsky, in the interest of the time of +the Tribunal, wouldn’t it be better to get on with it now? Sir David has +apparently seen the affidavit and read it in English, and if he is +satisfied upon that, wouldn’t it be better to go on with it now rather +than to postpone it? + +You see, Dr. Seidl has actually been allowed this witness, so that it is +only a question of time, doing it by way of an affidavit when he can +call him, and he can then ask him questions. + +COL. POKROVSKY: I must repeat that I have familiarized myself with this +document very slightly. As far as I can understand, it is of no +particular interest to the Soviet Delegation; it is of greater interest +to the British Delegation... + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you see the witness was allowed to Dr. +Seidl. Therefore, Dr. Seidl could have put him on the witness box and +could have asked him questions, and the only reason for doing it by way +of an affidavit is to get the matter more clearly and more quickly. So +if we were to order that this affidavit was not to be used, we should +then have Dr. Seidl asking the witness questions, and probably, I am +afraid, taking up rather longer than it would to read the affidavit, and +you would not object to that. + +COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps the Tribunal would find it advisable to have Dr. +Seidl ask the witness those questions which have already been answered +in the affidavit? It seems to me that that would give us an opportunity +to reconcile this contradiction, especially since there are only a few +questions, and the first three, as far as I can understand, are mostly +of a historical nature and connected with the organization of the +Institute in Stuttgart in 1917. + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have not read the affidavit yet so I +am afraid I am not in a position to present the question which you wish +me to present. + +COL. POKROVSKY: All right, I withdraw my objection. + +THE PRESIDENT: Call your witness then now. + +[_The witness Strölin took the stand._] + +What is your name? + +KARL STRÖLIN (Witness): Karl Strölin. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the +Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will +withhold and add nothing.” + +[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] + +THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. + +DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were last Lord Mayor of the City of Stuttgart; +is that correct? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +DR. SEIDL: In this capacity were you also Honorary President of the +German Auslands-Institut? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +DR. SEIDL: You signed a sworn affidavit this morning which I shall now +read to you. + + “1. The German Auslands-Institut was founded in Stuttgart in the + year 1917. The fact that Stuttgart was chosen as the seat of + this institute is connected with the fact that the Swabian + district has always furnished a particularly high percentage of + emigrants. That is precisely why there arose in Stuttgart the + need to create an institution for the purpose of preserving the + national ties between the old and the new homeland. The German + Auslands-Institut was to serve this purpose. It had the + following aims: + + “(a) Scientific research on Germanism in the world. + + “(b) Maintaining cultural connections with the emigrants. + + “(c) Informing the people at home about Germanism abroad and + about foreign countries. + + “For scientific research the German Auslands-Institut had a + library of more than one hundred thousand volumes on folklore + and an archive for newspaper files concerning Germanism abroad. + For this purpose nearly all newspapers which were published + abroad in the German language and a large number of newspapers + in foreign languages were subscribed to and their contents + evaluated. An extensive collection of pictures was in one filing + room. As the Germans abroad became increasingly interested in + the homeland, genealogical research took on ever greater + proportions. + + “In addition to its activities of collecting and registering, + the German Auslands-Institut also had advisory and + representative functions. The question of emigration was also a + subject for consultation for a long time. This required that the + German Auslands-Institut be informed regarding the living + conditions and the possibility of finding employment in the + individual areas favored by emigrants. The records of the German + Auslands-Institut were placed at the disposal of the various + offices and organizations upon request. The representative + activities of the German Auslands-Institut consisted mainly in + organizing exhibitions. The center of this activity was the + Museum of Germandom Abroad, in Stuttgart. + + “The scientific work of the German Auslands-Institut found + expression particularly in the books, magazines, and calendars + about the homeland which it published. The connections with the + Germans abroad were maintained by sending out such publications. + The guiding thought of the German Auslands-Institut in its + relations with the Germans abroad was that these Germans abroad + were to be the connecting links between nations in order to + strengthen mutual understanding and the desire for co-operation. + They were to be the envoys of friendship between their old and + their new homeland. + + “As President of the German Auslands-Institut, I particularly + emphasized this thought in the speech which I made at Madison + Square Garden in New York City in October 1936 on the occasion + of German Day. Moreover the German Auslands-Institut had no + agencies or representatives abroad acting as liaison for these + corresponding members. Direct or individual care for Germans + abroad was not the task of the German Auslands-Institut. The + welfare of German nationals abroad was taken care of by the + Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. Relations with the + Volksdeutsche were maintained by the Volksbund für das + Deutschtum im Ausland (League For Germans Abroad). + + “2. The German Auslands-Institut never engaged in any activities + which could be termed Fifth Column activities. No one has ever + made a request of this nature to me or to the Institut. + + “3. Rudolf Hess, the Deputy of the Führer, did not exert any + influence on the activities of the Institute. He issued no + directives or instructions which could have induced the + Institute to undertake any activity along the lines of Fifth + Column work.” + +Witness, are these statements correct? + +STRÖLIN: These statements are correct. + +DR. SEIDL: I have at the moment no further questions to direct to the +witness. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any +questions of this witness? + +DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): +Witness, with the permission of the Tribunal I should like to ask you a +few questions. + +First, from when to when were you Lord Mayor of Stuttgart? + +STRÖLIN: From 1933 until the end of the war. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how long have you known the Defendant Von +Neurath? What was his position at that time and what was his reputation? + +STRÖLIN: I have known Herr Von Neurath since the first World War. At +that time, at the end of the first World War, he was Chief of the +Cabinet of the King of Württemberg, and his reputation was excellent. In +my capacity as Lord Mayor I met Herr Von Neurath frequently. In 1938 Von +Neurath became an honorary citizen of the city of Stuttgart. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you enter in still closer relations with him +later when he returned from Czechoslovakia? + +STRÖLIN: When he returned from Czechoslovakia Herr Von Neurath retired +to his estate of Leinfelden in the vicinity of Stuttgart, and here I had +closer and more active connection with him. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about his ancestry, his family, +his education, his personality, in general? + +STRÖLIN: Von Neurath comes from an old Swabian family. His father was +Lord Chamberlain of the King of Württemberg. His grandfather and his +great-grandfather were ministers. Von Neurath was very much respected as +a high-minded character, a distinguished personality, always ready to +help, extraordinarily humane, very conscientious, straightforward and +frank. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During his activity as Foreign Minister and +possibly later, did you have an opportunity to discuss politics with him +and particularly his views on foreign policy? + +STRÖLIN: Von Neurath repeatedly discussed these matters with me, but of +course, only in general terms. As Reich Foreign Minister he was +convinced that Germany would succeed in getting by peaceful means the +place in the world which she deserved. He rejected any other way. He +strove to build up and strengthen relations of mutual confidence with +other European powers, particularly with England. He was convinced that +it was precisely in this field that he had done everything possible. + +Later, I had occasion to examine with him Henderson’s book _Two Years +with Hitler_, which particularly emphasized how extremely popular Von +Neurath had been in London at that time. I recall that we also discussed +the sentence written by Henderson, that he acknowledged Von Neurath’s +honest devotion to peace and to peaceful and friendly relations with +England. Von Neurath was also greatly concerned with the cultivation of +better relations with the United States. I recall that he discussed the +subject with me after my trip to America and said that I had done well +to emphasize in my various speeches Germany’s desire for friendship with +the United States. I also remember how severely Von Neurath criticized +the tone of Hitler’s speech made in the beginning of 1939 in reply to +Roosevelt’s message. He said at that time that the international tension +had been increased by that speech. Then Von Neurath spoke of the Munich +Agreement, in which he had been an active participant. Later he very +frequently spoke of the tragedy that was implicit in the fact that, +despite all efforts, the relation between England and Germany had not +remained one of continuing confidence. He pointed out how tragic it was +for Europe and for the world. All my conversations with Von Neurath +convinced me that he desired an understanding and a peaceful settlement, +and that he would never have pursued a policy that might lead to war. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the reasons for his appointment as an +honorary citizen of Stuttgart? This happened after he resigned his +office as Reich Foreign Minister, did it not? + +STRÖLIN: He was appointed in 1938, on the occasion of his 65th birthday +on 2 February 1938. This appointment was to express to Von Neurath the +gratitude and appreciation not only of the people of Stuttgart but of +all Swabia for his manifest love of peace and the calm and prudence with +which he had conducted foreign affairs. It was also a token of respect +for his honest and incorruptible character. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, the British Prosecution assert that Herr +Von Neurath repeatedly assured foreign governments or their +representatives that Germany had no military or aggressive intentions +toward these states, but that these assurances were, in fact, given for +the sake of appearances, in order to lull these states into a false +sense of security, because even then Von Neurath knew and approved of +the fact that Hitler actually had aggressive intentions toward these +states. + +From your knowledge of his personality do you consider Von Neurath +capable of such infamy? + +STRÖLIN: No, I do not consider him capable of such action. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath inform you, at the time, of +his resignation from his position as Foreign Minister? + +STRÖLIN: By chance, I was with Von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry on 4 +February 1938 at the very moment when his resignation was accepted. He +described how this resignation came about. He said that until the end of +the year 1937 he had been convinced that Hitler was completely in +sympathy with the foreign policy which he was pursuing and that Hitler +as well as himself had not wanted to chance an armed conflict, but at +the end of 1937 Hitler had altogether unexpectedly changed his attitude; +he had suddenly struck a different note, and it was impossible to decide +whether it was to be taken seriously. Von Neurath went on to say that in +a personal conversation with Hitler he had attempted to persuade him to +give up this altered view, but that he had the impression that he had +lost his influence over Hitler, and this prompted him to submit his +resignation. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After, or rather simultaneously with his discharge +from the foreign ministry, Von Neurath was appointed President of the +Secret Cabinet Council. Do you know anything about this appointment—how +and why he received it and what he did in this capacity? + +STRÖLIN: He received this appointment as President of the Secret Cabinet +Council at the same time that his resignation was accepted, but this +Cabinet never convened; this was also true of the Reich Cabinet. The +Secret Cabinet was to be convened by Hitler personally, and Hitler had +simply not done this. Von Neurath believed later that he had been +appointed to this post as president only in order to conceal from +foreign countries that the former Foreign Minister no longer had any +influence on the policy of the Reich. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, I do not see how this witness can know +whether the Secret Cabinet Council was ever called. In any event we have +already heard it from Göring, and presumably we shall hear it again from +the Defendant Von Neurath, in which case it is grossly cumulative. I do +not think we should waste the time of the Tribunal with it. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you occasionally speak to Von Neurath +regarding his attitude and relations toward the Nazi Party? + +STRÖLIN: Von Neurath’s attitude toward the Party was critical and +disapproving; at first he disapproved and waited to see what would +develop. His relations with the Party were bad. The Party was of the +opinion that Von Neurath was not a National Socialist. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever discuss with him the policy of the +Nazis toward the Christian churches, that is, the Catholic and the +Protestant Church? + +STRÖLIN: Von Neurath was a faithful Christian and disapproved of the +policy of the Party toward the Christian churches. He particularly +supported Bishop Bohr’s efforts to maintain freedom of religion. He +repeatedly used his influence to see to it that seminaries which had +been requisitioned were released. Following a discussion with Von +Neurath I visited Minister for Churches Kerrl personally and discussed +with him the question of the policy toward the Church. I discovered that +Minister for Churches Kerrl was making every effort to represent and +carry out the ideas of positive Christianity. However, he did not +succeed because his work was continually sabotaged, particularly by +Himmler and Bormann. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Later, when Herr Von Neurath retired to his estate +of Leinfelden, did you discuss his activities as Reich Protector with +him? + +STRÖLIN: Von Neurath said that he took the post as Reich Protector in +Bohemia and Moravia most unwillingly, and that he had refused it twice, +but finally decided that he must make this sacrifice. He believed that +it was precisely there that he could act as an intermediary and bring +about reconciliation. He had personal difficulties with Himmler and +Frank; he told me of his efforts to gain better treatment for the +Czechs, and of the protests which he made to Hitler in vain. Once, when +I visited Von Neurath in Prague, I was invited to visit President Hacha, +who told me emphatically how pleased he was that Von Neurath had been +sent to Bohemia and Moravia, for he enjoyed fullest confidence and +performed in every respect a conciliatory function. Von Neurath told me +that he was recalled and replaced because in his treatment of the Czechs +he was too mild for the Führer, who preferred a particularly trustworthy +SS-leader in that position. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Who was to be appointed to that post? + +STRÖLIN: That was Heydrich. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was that Herr Von Neurath’s reason for resigning? + +STRÖLIN: Evidently. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, Von Neurath was also an Honorary +Gruppenführer of the SS. Did he tell you how he attained this—let us +say—honor? + +STRÖLIN: He told me that he was appointed honorary leader of the SS +without having been consulted. When he asked the reason, Hitler told him +that Mussolini was soon to pay a visit and that he, Hitler, wanted +everyone in his attendance to wear a uniform. Since Von Neurath had no +uniform he appointed him an honorary leader of the SS. Von Neurath said +he did not intend to become one of Himmler’s subordinates. Thereupon +Hitler told him that that was not necessary; it was merely a question of +wearing a uniform. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward war? + +STRÖLIN: On the first day of the war I saw Von Neurath to the railroad +station. He was depressed and rather dismayed. He called the war a +terrible disaster, a gamble with the existence of the nation. He said +that all his work from 1932 to 1938 had thereby been destroyed. I +understood that during the war he saw the Führer occasionally, and on +each such occasion he used the opportunity to ask Hitler to consider the +idea of peace. That he, Neurath... + +THE PRESIDENT: How can the witness say this? He was not present at these +meetings; how can the witness tell us what the Defendant Von Neurath +said to the Führer? + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As you will understand, that is what the defendant +told him. That was told the witness by the defendant directly. + +STRÖLIN: Von Neurath told me so repeatedly. He told me... + +THE PRESIDENT: It will be all extremely cumulative. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I do not believe so. The witness himself needs +only to corroborate this to the Prosecution. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal imagines that the +Defendant Von Neurath will give this evidence himself, and the Tribunal +does not wish to hear evidence from witnesses that was told to them. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, I shall dispense with any further +questions along those lines. I should like to ask only one more +question. + +[_Turning to the witness._] Did not Von Neurath, with you and other +people, make an effort to put an end to the war and to the Hitler +regime, or at least consider the possibility of doing so? + +Now these are facts that the witness knows from his own observation. + +STRÖLIN: Von Neurath discussed this question with me on several +occasions after his return from Prague. He tried particularly to bring +about a meeting of the Reich Cabinet, as did the other ministers, but he +did not succeed, since Hitler disapproved of this Reich Cabinet as a +“defeatists’ club.” As a preliminary step for ending the war Von Neurath +tried to bring about a change of ministers and the appointment of a +Reich Chancellor, which was also widely demanded. This also failed. +During the year 1943 Neurath became more and more convinced... + +THE PRESIDENT: This is the same thing over again—nothing about what Von +Neurath did but all about what Von Neurath said to this witness. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I beg your pardon; these are only preliminary +remarks to clarify what is to follow. + +THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had one last question? + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, we come to that now. The question shows the +attempts he made to carry out his intentions. + +STRÖLIN: When Von Neurath failed in his attempts at reform, that is, +when he saw that it had miscarried and that Hitler’s attitude was +negative and intransigent, Von Neurath came to the conviction, at the +beginning of 1944, that the saving of Germany from complete destruction +must not be wrecked because of Hitler. He considered the question of how +to speak to Hitler once more and persuade him to end the war. He thought +of Field Marshal Rommel and asked me to discuss the matters with him. +Rommel was at that time very popular in Germany and abroad, and Von +Neurath believed that due to the position he held, Rommel was the right +person to replace Hitler, if necessary. In the beginning of March 1944, +I went to Field Marshal Rommel and discussed the matter with him. Rommel +was just as critical of the situation. I knew him from the first World +War, so that I could speak to him frankly. He was also of the opinion +that if the war could not be won on a military basis, unnecessary +bloodshed and senseless destruction... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, we really do not want all this +conversation between this witness and Rommel. We do not want it. We will +not hear the conversation between this witness and Rommel. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Nor do I want the witness to discuss this matter. + +THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you stop him then? Why don’t you stop him? + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not want to hear it from the defendant +himself, but from the person who was employed by the defendant to take +these steps. That in my opinion has more weight than if the defendant +makes the statement himself. That is why I asked the witness about it. +But it is almost finished now. + +THE PRESIDENT: When we come to the defendant then we will not hear him +on these subjects. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, that is not intended—moreover, as far as I +know, the matter will be finished with just a few words. Please, +Witness. + +STRÖLIN: Upon Von Neurath’s instigation, Rommel wrote a letter to Hitler +saying that because of the military situation he believed that it would +not be possible to continue the war, and that he, Rommel, suggested to +Hitler that he start political negotiations. Consequently, as he told +me, after his accident Rommel fell from favor for this reason, and thus +Von Neurath’s attempt to end the war with Rommel’s aid also failed. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then came 20 July and soon afterwards the end. + +I have no more questions, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask +questions of this witness? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May the witness be handed GB-262 (Document +Number 3258-PS). My Lord, that is the same document of which an extract +has already been handed up to the Tribunal while I was cross-examining +the last witness. + +Witness, I want to be quite clear as to what you say about the Deutsches +Auslands-Institut. Do you say that that institute had no connection with +either Hess or the Auslands-Organisation? + +STRÖLIN: The Deutsches Auslands-Institut had no connection with Hess. +The connection with the Auslands-Organisation was due to the fact that +the Auslands-Organisation had its meetings at Stuttgart. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So that the fact that the Auslands-Organisation +and the Deutsches Auslands-Institut both had their meetings at +Stuttgart, that is the only connection between the two organizations; is +that so? + +STRÖLIN: The Auslands-Organisation, to my knowledge, did not consult the +German Auslands-Institut on practical matters, for it had its own +collection of material. The Auslands-Organisation was, as far as I know, +created in the year ’32, and... + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I do not want to stop you, but if you can +answer my question “yes” or “no” it will save us all a great deal of +time. I will repeat my question in case you are not quite clear about +it. Do you say that the fact that both those organizations held their +meeting in Stuttgart is the only connection between the two? Now you can +answer that “yes” or “no.” + +STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that with “yes” or “no.” I must say that the +connecting link was the fact that Stuttgart was the city of foreign +Germans and so to speak the representative of Germans abroad, because of +its past history. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you read English? + +STRÖLIN: A little. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 461 of the book that you +have? At the bottom of Page 461 you will see reproduced a copy of an +article from the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ of 21 September 1933. + +The Tribunal will find the extract on Page 4 of the translation. + +That article describes the annual meeting of your institution, after its +reorganization in 1933 when the Nazi Party came to power. I want to read +just four short extracts from that article 2 and ask you for your +comments. + + “The chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut, Lord Mayor, + Dr. Strölin, opened the celebration.” + +That is yourself presumably; is that so? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + + LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Among those present, he greeted in + particular, Minister President and Minister of Religion in + Württemberg, Mergenthaler, as the representative of the + supervisory authorities; General Haushofer of Munich as + representative of Rudolf Hess, who has been entrusted by the + Führer with the supreme direction of all matters concerning + Germans in foreign countries....” + +Did you say that? + +STRÖLIN: I cannot remember having said that. Haushofer was for me the +representative of the VDA, and I cannot conceive how he could have been +the deputy of Hess at this occasion. However, it is probably true. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think the Tribunal is safe in taking it +that the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ on the day after that celebration +would accurately report what you said in your opening address? + +You need not look at the rest of it for the moment. It is not likely +that that article is untrue or incorrect, is it? + +STRÖLIN: No, the article is probably correct, but I did not +remember—now looking back—that Haushofer was at that time the deputy +of Hess, for Rudolf Hess had no connection with the Deutsches +Auslands-Institut as such. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It appears that you are saying there, and you +are saying it in a speech, that Haushofer is representing Hess, and that +Hess has been charged by the Führer with the supreme command of all +matters concerning Germans in foreign countries. Do you understand what +you are saying there? + +STRÖLIN: Yes, it may have been put that way at that time, but in +practice, it never happened that I received a directive of any kind from +Rudolf Hess. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Your institution could correctly be said to +concern itself in matters concerning Germans in foreign countries, could +it not? + +STRÖLIN: I did not understand the question. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your institution, the Deutsches +Auslands-Institut, concern itself in matters concerning Germans in +foreign countries? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I shall leave that. Will you look +down the page and omit the next... + +STRÖLIN: I would like to add to this point. It was the first time that I +made a speech for the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the speech was, of +course drafted with the approval of the personalities who were to be +welcomed there. I cannot longer remember that Haushofer was present in +that capacity on that occasion and can merely repeat my statement that +as the honorary president of the Institute I know nothing of Rudolf Hess +having given directives to the Deutsches Auslands-Institut. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may have known nothing about it, but you +were the new chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut at that time, +were you not? + +STRÖLIN: No, I was not the chairman. The chairman of the Institute was a +special leader. In my capacity as Lord Mayor it was merely one of my +many extra duties to act as president of the Institute. It is quite +impossible for me to remember which personalities I greeted at the time, +and how I did it. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Please confine yourself to answering the +particular question I put to you: Were you or were you not the chairman +of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut on 20 September 1933? + +STRÖLIN: Yes, I was appointed to that position at that time. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had just been appointed because you were a +good Nazi and the Nazi Party had come to power and was reorganizing this +institution. + +STRÖLIN: I was appointed to this post because I was Lord Mayor of +Stuttgart and because later the city of Stuttgart was called the “City +of Germans Abroad” since, because of its history and tradition it had +always had very close connection with Germans abroad. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, now, we will go on. Will you miss +out the next short paragraph and look at the paragraph which starts off, +“Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing Dr. Goebbels, stated the local +Party leadership...” + +STRÖLIN: What page is that on? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is on the same page. + +STRÖLIN: Page 461? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, it is on Page 462. And it is +the third paragraph in the center of the page. + +STRÖLIN: Yes, I found the place. + + LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing + Dr. Goebbels, stated, ‘The local Party leadership (Gauleitung) + is prepared to co-operate through thick and thin with the new + officers of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.’” + +Hess, you know, was in charge of the Party leadership, wasn’t he—the +Gauleiter? We will go on: + + “National Socialism will demand the blood unity of all Germans + as its historic right.” + +Will you look now at Page 463—we will leave that—Will you look now... + +STRÖLIN: May I say something in connection with this? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you please, yes. + +STRÖLIN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Schmidt, was here purely in his capacity +as a deputy of the Gauleiter, but he was not the Deputy of Rudolf Hess. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No. But the point I am putting—I will make it +quite clear—is that the Gauleitung which came under Hess was going to +co-operate with your institution through thick and thin. You appreciate +that? + +STRÖLIN: That is obvious. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Page 463, and on the second +paragraph: + + “In his address the new director of the DAI, Dr. Csaki, stated: + ‘We followed with deep distress the inner disunity of the German + people. Now since all that has been overcome, since we see that + all the German Folk (Volksdeutsche) organizations are standing + in one line, we are filled with a feeling of pride for our + German mother-country, a feeling of happiness: Germany is + united.’ + + “‘The feeling of adherence to the German people gives us a happy + consciousness. In the course of centuries this or that position + has been lost. We must prevent any from being lost. It gives us + a feeling of pride and self-confidence that we are bridges for + the German Lebensraum.’” + +Was that in fact what the purpose of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut +was? + +STRÖLIN: Dr. Csaki said in this quotation that the Germans abroad were +bridges to the German Lebensraum. This German Lebensraum also applied, +for instance, to the Germans in Hungary and Romania and to that extent +it is true when he says the Germans are “bridges” to this Lebensraum, +that is, the space in which Germans live. This has also always been the +attitude of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut; to build bridges to the +Lebensraum in which these Germans live. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, have you ever read a book by +Dr. Emil Ehrlich, or seen it, entitled: _Die Auslands-Organisation der +NSDAP_? You need not look at that. Have you ever read that book? A title +of that kind? + +STRÖLIN: I do not think so. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that Dr. Emil Ehrlich was the +personal adviser to Bohle? + +STRÖLIN: I believe he was Bohle’s adjutant at one time. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 305 of the book that you +have in front of you—My Lord, this passage appears on Page 5 of the +document the Tribunal has—and that is a reproduction of Dr. Emil +Ehrlich’s book. Would you look at the second paragraph on Page 305, half +way down that paragraph, starting: + + “On 27 August 1936 the Führer designated Stuttgart as the ‘City + of Germans Abroad,’ and the Gauleiter of the + Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP assumed protection of this + beautiful city, which also houses within its walls the German + Auslands-Institut, which works in hearty co-operation with the + Auslands-Organisation.” + +Would I be right in saying that throughout the whole history, from 1933 +onwards, the Deutsches Auslands-Institut was working in the heartiest +co-operation with the Auslands-Organisation? + +STRÖLIN: This is not correct, inasmuch as there was no practical or +scientific co-operation between the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the +Auslands-Organisation. The hearty co-operation, as I have already +mentioned, referred to the fact that the Ausland Germans had their +meetings in Stuttgart. That was the hearty co-operation between them. +There was no co-operation in practical matters since it was not +necessary. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 127 of this book? I want +you to tell me, looking at the last paragraph, whether that is an +accurate report, “All persons who in the future...” this is, I beg your +pardon, a confidential report on the special schooling work conducted by +the DAI for the foreign organizations. You did in fact, did you not, +assist the foreign organizations in training their Landesgruppenleiter +and other leaders abroad? + +STRÖLIN: May I ask who signed this article or report? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I cannot tell you who signed that report. I +asked you a question. Did the Deutsches Auslands-Institut assist in +training leaders for the Auslands-Organisation abroad? + +STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just turn over to Page 128, second +paragraph, which I read to you quite shortly: + + “The Auslands-Institut plays a part in determining the + curriculum for the training camps (Schulungslager) as well as + serving as an intermediary between the party authorities who run + these camps and the Germans from abroad who attend them.” + +You still say that that report is... + +STRÖLIN: May I ask the date of this report? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I told you it is a report... + +STRÖLIN: I had no knowledge of this report. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I just want to ask you one or two +very short questions on the evidence that you have given about the +Defendant Von Neurath. You have told us that he was a man of peace, with +an excellent, kind character. Do you know that on the 5th of November +1937 he attended a meeting at which Hitler addressed the leaders of his +Armed Forces? Did you ever hear of that meeting, on the 5th of November +1937? + +STRÖLIN: No, I did not hear of this meeting, at least not until I was +imprisoned. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well then, perhaps I could tell you quite +shortly what took place. Hitler said at the meeting, among other things, +that the only way out of the German difficulties was to secure greater +living space, and he said that that problem could be solved only by +force. And, having said that, he then went on to say that he had decided +to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia. You never heard of that meeting? + +STRÖLIN: No, I have not heard anything of that meeting, and concluded +only later that... + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But... + +STRÖLIN: May I finish my sentence? + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know... + +STRÖLIN: I said just that Von Neurath indicated to me that he had +serious differences of opinion with Hitler. That was toward the end of +1937. It was only later that I realized that he must have meant the +conference with Hitler and the attitude which he took on 5 November; +however, it was only when I was in prison that I heard through the +newspapers that such a conference actually took place. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I shall come to all that in a moment. I just +want you to get a picture of what happened at this meeting, and I quote +four lines from the minutes of that meeting: + + “Hitler believed that very probably England and presumably + France had already secretly abandoned Czechoslovakia and were + satisfied that this question would one day be cleared up by + Germany.” + +And Hitler then went on to say that the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and +Austria would constitute a conquest of food for 5 or 6 million people, +and that he visualized the compulsory immigration of 2 million people +from Czechoslovakia. + +Now, that is what took place at that conference. Do you know that some 4 +months later—on 12 March 1938—Von Neurath was giving an assurance to +M. Masaryk, and among other things he assured him, on behalf of Herr +Hitler, that Germany still considered herself bound by the +German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of 1925? Do you know that he +said that? + +STRÖLIN: I do not recall it. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Can you understand, now that I have told you +that that is a fact, can you understand anybody who had been at that +conference and had heard what Hitler had said on 5 November giving an +assurance to Czechoslovakia 4 months later in terms of that kind? Can +you understand any honest man doing that? + +STRÖLIN: I cannot judge the situation prevailing at that time. I do not +know from whom Von Neurath might have received an order. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not asking you to judge at that time. I am +asking you now what your opinion is of a man who can do that sort of +thing. I want you to tell the Tribunal. + +STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that because I do not have a comprehensive +picture of that situation. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must under any circumstances +object to this type of suggestive question. It is not permissible to put +such a question to the witness without giving him the complete picture +of how this assurance was given. The fact is, and it is correct, that in +the speech of 5 November 1937, Hitler for the first time developed plans +which were no longer in accord with the peace policy of Herr Von +Neurath, and Von Neurath took the opportunity—I believe in December or +early in January—to discuss this thoroughly with Hitler and point out +to him the impossibility of the policy which he apparently wanted to +embark upon and to persuade him not to carry it out. When from Hitler’s +reply he was forced to the conclusion that Hitler would nevertheless +insist on this policy which would lead to aggression in the future he +submitted his resignation. On 4 February 1938 Herr Von Neurath was +permitted to resign. He no longer participated in active politics. + +On 11 or 12 March, when the invasion of Austria took place, an invasion +of which Herr Von Neurath had no inkling until that day, Hitler called +him... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly wait? The question was +put about the 5th of March 1938, whether a man who had heard the +conference of the 5th of November 1937 could have given the assurance of +the 5th of March. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I can also clarify that statement, if I may. +The question put by Minister Mastny was whether any military action +against Czechoslovakia was intended immediately or soon after the +invasion of Austria, and Herr Von Neurath believed that he could, +honestly and as a gentleman, answer this question in the negative. + +We have to take into consideration the circumstances under which this +statement was made. First, Hitler, in his speech of 5 November 1937, +spoke of the years to come. When he marched into Austria on 12 March, +that is at a time which from 5 March... + +THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment. We do not want to have all this +argument. The question was what was this witness’ opinion of a man who +had done that. That was all the question that was asked, and that +question is put to credit... + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I beg your pardon; no one can +answer that question unless he knows in what connection it was put. Mr. +Mastny asked whether the march into Austria would entail any aggressive +action against Czechoslovakia and Von Neurath answered that question. No +more and no less. He did not want to give an answer regarding the +future. The Minister wanted to know whether in connection with the march +of the German troops into Austria any military actions against +Czechoslovakia were intended. According to the information which my +client had, he could in the given situation answer this question in the +negative with a clear conscience. This question is admissible only if +the witness is informed about what I have just said. The point is not +that he declared once and for all Germany will never march into +Czechoslovakia, but that he merely answered the Czech Minister Mastny’s +question: Is there any danger that in connection with the march into +Austria, military measures will also be taken against Czechoslovakia? +This question he could answer the way he did. Therefore, the question in +the form in which it was put by the British Prosecution is in my opinion +not admissible. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question properly admissible. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we will not pursue the matter. I ask you +just this one further question, so that I make myself quite clear. You +said in your evidence, as I wrote it down, that the Defendant Von +Neurath was well thought of, dignified and of noble character. Having +heard what I have told you, are you still prepared to tell the Court +that you think he is well thought of, dignified, and of noble character? +Is that your opinion now? I just want to get the value of your evidence; +do you see? After what you have been told is that your opinion? + +STRÖLIN: It is still my opinion that Herr Von Neurath is a man of +distinguished and decent character. I cannot judge under what +circumstances he acted at the time and what considerations prompted him +to act this way. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say that he was in favor of peace and did +all he could to avoid a war. Do you call a deceit of that kind doing +everything possible to avoid war? Is that what your idea of a peaceful +policy is—giving assurance 4 months after you know perfectly well that +the German intention is to overrun their country? Is that what you call +doing everything to avoid war? + +STRÖLIN: I would like to state once more that I do not sufficiently +understand the essential points and ramifications of this question to +form a proper opinion on it. But obviously things cannot be as simple as +they have been pictured here. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me turn to another aspect of this matter. +We have been told at great length that he disapproved of Hitler’s +policy, and that he resigned. Do you know that, having resigned, he was +appointed Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939? Do you know +that? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was after the remainder of Czechoslovakia +had been overrun, occupied. + +STRÖLIN: I said previously that Von Neurath told me that he accepted +this post very reluctantly; that he had twice refused to accept it but +later he believed that he had to make a sacrifice in order to achieve +his ends; and, as the State President Hacha told me later, Von Neurath’s +personal influence was of great benefit because, as Hacha told me, Von +Neurath’s activity undoubtedly had a balancing and conciliatory effect. +As I said before, he was recalled because he was too mild. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you have already said it, and we have +heard it, and we have remembered it, so it is quite unnecessary for you +to say it again. Do try to answer my question shortly. Let me ask you +this question. Have you ever thought that the reason for that +appointment might have been as a reward for his assistance in the +occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia that had followed so shortly +before? + +STRÖLIN: No, I never thought of that. However, if I may mention it, I +have read quite a different version in the book by Henderson, that is, +that Von Neurath had been put into that post so that his international +prestige could be discredited. I wanted to bring in this version in +order to point out that there were other possibilities that might come +into question. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember that you described him as a +disciplined, humane, and conscientious man? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at that poster. + +[_The poster was submitted to the witness._] + +My Lord, I regret that I have not got a copy of this for the Tribunal. +It is a very short matter. It has been introduced in the Czechoslovak +report on the German occupation. I will give Your Lordship the number: +Document Number USSR-60. + +[_Turning to the witness._] Do you see that this is signed by the +Defendant Von Neurath, the humane and conscientious man? + +STRÖLIN: Yes, I see that the Czech universities were closed for a period +of 3 years, and that nine culprits were shot. This announcement, +however, does not say, as far as I can see, exactly why this was done. +Consequently I cannot pass judgment on the announcement, because I do +not know what Von Neurath proclaimed in it. The announcement does not +tell me anything, if I do not know the reason why the announcement was +issued. That universities were closed and nine culprits shot must have +been for convincing reasons. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I add the following? I would +like to say this in order to save time. This question of Czechoslovakia +and of this poster, with which I am also familiar, will, of course, be +dealt with, in connection with Von Neurath’s case, and at that stage of +the proceedings. I will then have the opportunity to bring the proof +that this poster did not originate with the Defendant Von Neurath. This +witness was not in Prague and can relate only things which he did not +know of his own experience, but which Herr Von Neurath told him. +Therefore, I believe that this question is not appropriate and is taking +up time unnecessarily, for I would have to raise objections and describe +the actual situation. We should not put questions to the witness which, +though put in good faith, are positively incorrect, that is, questions +which are based on inaccurately reported facts which actually occurred +in a different manner. I shall prove that at the time when this poster +was drafted and put up, Herr Von Neurath was not in Prague and was not +informed of what was going on during his absence. + +Therefore I believe that we should not deal with this question today, +since, as I have said, the witness cannot know anything about it from +his own observation. + +THE PRESIDENT: It will be open to you to show that this poster was put +up when Von Neurath was not at Prague, and that he gave no authority for +it. That would clear him with reference to this poster; but what is +being put to this witness is: Assuming that this poster was put up by +Von Neurath, is it right to describe him as a humane man? That is all +the cross-examination means. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But, the witness knows nothing of this poster. He +cannot answer the question correctly if he does not know the +ramifications, if he does not know that this poster actually did not +originate with Herr Von Neurath. + +THE PRESIDENT: The witness was examined at great length by you to show +he was a humane man and had a very good character. Under such +circumstances it is up to the Prosecution to put to the witness +circumstances which would indicate that he was not of that humane +character. That is all that is being done. + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that case the most this witness could say would +be “I do not know,” or “if it is true, one cannot call it humane.” Any +one of us can say that. The witness does not need to say it. + +THE PRESIDENT: The witness can say, “If this is correct it is +inconsistent with what I knew of Von Neurath.” + +DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He cannot and he will not say that either, for the +simple reason that he does not know the circumstances under which this +poster was published. Frankly I cannot see the purpose of this question, +for if the question is put in that way, every decent individual will say +that it is inhumane; but this would not alter the fact that the witness +would be judging facts which do not exist and which are not true. + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, don’t you think this is really +taking up unnecessary time, if this witness doesn’t know anything about +it? I quite see that it is the proper purpose of cross-examination to +discredit the witness. + +LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to the Tribunal. The point of +that cross-examination was, perhaps I might be allowed to say, this: +This defendant has produced a witness to give evidence on his oath +before this Tribunal. If that evidence is unchallenged, then it goes +down on the record, and there is nothing to stop this Tribunal from +regarding this witness as a man who is in a position to give reliable +evidence of that kind. This cross-examination is rather to show that +this witness, whether he is saying it truthfully or untruthfully, is +certainly inaccurate. The evidence he has given as to the good character +of this defendant does not bear investigation—that is quite clear—and +the Tribunal is not saying we are not entitled to cross-examine as to +character. However, I do not think I need occupy the time of the +Tribunal with that. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +COL. AMEN: Witness, when were you last in New York City? + +STRÖLIN: I was in New York in 1936. + +COL. AMEN: At that time you made a speech at Madison Square Garden; is +that correct? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: That was a rally in the Garden? + +STRÖLIN: It was for “German Day,” on 6 October 1936. + +COL. AMEN: A “German Day” rally, correct? + +STRÖLIN: It was the annual meeting of the Germans which took place on 6 +October. + +COL. AMEN: And a great percentage of the German-American Bund, is that +correct? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: In fact, that whole rally was held under the auspices of the +German-American Bund, was it not? + +STRÖLIN: The fact is, a festival committee had been commissioned by all +German clubs—I believe there are all in all two thousand of them in New +York—and these 2,000 German clubs had united in one festival committee +which organized the “German Day.” I did not know the composition of this +committee in detail. + +COL. AMEN: And it was at the solicitation of the German-American Bund +that you made your speech, was it not? + +STRÖLIN: No, it was at the solicitation of the festival committee of the +German clubs of New York. + +COL. AMEN: Yes, and on that committee were numerous members of the +German-American Bund; is that true? “Yes” or “no.” + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, there were many of the members of +your organization at that time who were active members of the +German-American Bund; is that correct? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: And you personally had had several conferences with them, +both here in Germany and in New York City, correct? + +STRÖLIN: No, that is not correct. + +COL. AMEN: Well, what is correct? + +STRÖLIN: It is correct that I was invited, but there were no further +conferences. + +COL. AMEN: But you do not dispute that many of the members of your +organization were at that time members of the German-American Bund? + +STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point. + +THE PRESIDENT [_To the witness_]: I have just taken down that you have +said that was so. + +COL. AMEN: Precisely. + +STRÖLIN: Please repeat the question. + +COL. AMEN: Did you not just tell me a few moments ago, in response to a +previous question, that many members of your organization were members +of the German-American Bund at the time of your speech at the rally in +Madison Square Garden? + +STRÖLIN: When you speak of an “organization,” do you mean members of the +German Auslands-Institut? + +COL. AMEN: “Your organization” is the way I put it. + +STRÖLIN: I had no organization; I had an institute. + +COL. AMEN: Exactly. And under whose auspices were you making this speech +in Madison Square Garden? + +STRÖLIN: I was asked to make this speech because I had shortly before +been appointed Lord Mayor of the City of Germans Abroad. I was Lord +Mayor of that city, and therefore I was asked to deliver the address. +Stuttgart was made the City of Germans Abroad, since the Swabians +furnished most of the emigrants, and for that reason Stuttgart was to be +the home city of foreign Germans. + +COL. AMEN: Well, is it not a fact that many members of the +Auslands-Organisation were at that time also members of the +German-American Bund? “Yes” or “no.” + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: Is it not also a fact that at that time many members of the +Institute were also members of the German-American Bund? Yes or no. + +STRÖLIN: Yes, some of these Germans had come from America; they were +students who had studied in America and returned to Germany. + +COL. AMEN: And is it not also a fact that many of these members of the +German-American Bund, who were likewise members of the +Auslands-Organisation and of the Institute, were indicted and tried and +convicted for various espionage offenses in the Federal courts of the +United States? Yes or no. + +STRÖLIN: No, I know nothing about that. + +COL. AMEN: You never heard that? + +STRÖLIN: No, I never heard about it. I know of the case of Kappe, but +that has no connection with the Deutsche Auslands-Institut. + +COL. AMEN: That is one case, as a matter of fact; now, you know some +others too, don’t you? + +STRÖLIN: I wonder if you could give me particulars. + +COL. AMEN: I could, but I am asking you the questions rather than trying +to tell you the answers. + +STRÖLIN: I cannot remember any other case. Please question me. + +COL. AMEN: No, I will go to another subject now, because it is getting +late. Are you acquainted with a Mr. Alfred Weninger—W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r? + +STRÖLIN: I did not understand the name. Alfred... + +COL. AMEN: Alfred Weninger, W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r, or however you pronounce +it. + +STRÖLIN: Weninger—yes I am familiar with that name. + +COL. AMEN: Who is he? + +STRÖLIN: Alfred Weninger is, to my knowledge, at present in France. I +believe he is a jurist. + +COL. AMEN: Well, don’t you know? Don’t you know whether he is a jurist +or not? + +STRÖLIN: Yes, he is employed as a jurist. + +COL. AMEN: What is his nationality? + +STRÖLIN: He is a Frenchman. + +COL. AMEN: Is he a friend of yours? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: Did you intervene on his behalf on at least one occasion? + +STRÖLIN: I provided for his release from prison. + +COL. AMEN: That was in March 1943? + +STRÖLIN: No, there must be some misunderstanding. I mean the Alfred +Weninger who is a Frenchman and whom I helped during the war so that he +was not sentenced to death, and was later released from prison. However, +that took place during the period from 1942 to 1944. I do not know +another Alfred Weninger. There may be two Alfred Weningers. + +COL. AMEN: No, that is correct. He was sentenced along with 12 other +comrades for espionage and intelligence with the enemy. + +STRÖLIN: Yes, and he is the one whom I helped. + +COL. AMEN: And you intervened with the Attorney General at the People’s +Court? + +STRÖLIN: Yes, I intervened with Freisler. + +COL. AMEN: And also, at the Ministries of the Interior and Justice in +Berlin? + +STRÖLIN: I submitted to the Ministry of the Interior a memorandum +regarding conditions in Alsace, at the time, in order to have the +Alsatians pardoned. + +COL. AMEN: And as a result of your efforts, these people received +temporary suspension of their sentences; is that correct? + +STRÖLIN: Yes. I would like to mention expressly that I asked Herr Von +Neurath to intervene and it is due to a letter which he wrote to Hitler +that these Alsatians were pardoned. + +COL. AMEN: So that this individual, to put it mildly, is under a +considerable obligation to you at the present time? Correct? + +STRÖLIN: Yes, I imagine so. + +COL. AMEN: Well, you saved his life in effect, did you not? + +STRÖLIN: I also saved the lives of many others; I do not know if the +people are grateful for it or not. + +COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, I take it you do not question the truth +of what he might report as a conversation with you, correct? + +STRÖLIN: I do not doubt that he would remember this. + +COL. AMEN: Do you recall having a conversation with him in June of 1940? + +STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot say unless you tell me what it was +about. + +COL. AMEN: Well, I will tell you what you are reported by him to have +said and I ask you whether you recall having said that to him, either in +the exact words which I put to you, or in substance. Do you understand? + +STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand. + + COL. AMEN: Here are the words: “I warn you against National + Socialism, which does not recoil before anything, and which + makes justice its servile agent. They are criminals and I have + but the one wish—to get out of it.” + +Did you say that to Weninger in words or in substance? “Yes” or “no”? + +STRÖLIN: I did not quite understand what you said. Will you please +repeat it? + +COL. AMEN: You understand English, don’t you, Witness? + +STRÖLIN: Some. I understand just a little. + +COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, you were interrogated in English by one +of our interrogators, were you not? + +STRÖLIN: I spoke a little English only on one occasion, but I believe +that he did not understand me correctly. + +COL. AMEN: And you understood perfectly well what I just read to you, +did you not? + +STRÖLIN: I did not fully understand the German translation of what you +said and the substance of your question is not clear to me. + +COL. AMEN: Well, I shall read it to you again. But I suggest that you +are merely taking this time in order to find out what answer you want to +make. I ask you again whether you said to Weninger in words or in +substance, in June of 1940, the following: + + “I warn you against National Socialism, which does not recoil + before anything, and which makes justice its servile agent. They + are criminals and I have but the one wish—to get out of it.” + +Do you understand? + +STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand but I do not recall having made that +statement. + +COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement when I tell you that +Weninger so states—Weninger, whom you have just told us has every +obligation to you? + +STRÖLIN: I do not remember it. It may be true that I made critical +statements, but I do not recall the wording. + +COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement? Answer yes or no. + +STRÖLIN: I deny the statement. I deny that I made it in this form. + +COL. AMEN: Did you make it in substance; did you make that statement? + +STRÖLIN: I cannot remember the conversation at all. + +COL. AMEN: Do you recall having made another statement to Weninger in +1936 in Strasbourg—were you in Strasbourg with Weninger in 1936? + +STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot recall. + +COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it? + +STRÖLIN: I cannot recall. + +COL. AMEN: It is quite possible? + +STRÖLIN: It is possible, but I cannot recall it. I cannot at a moment’s +notice recall the date I was there. + +COL. AMEN: And did you not say to Weninger in Strasbourg in 1936, in +words or in substance, the following: “When I am abroad I am ashamed to +be a German”? “Yes” or “no.” + +STRÖLIN: It was entirely out of the question at that time, since in the +year of 1936 I was very proud of the fact that I was a German. + +COL. AMEN: And then, do you deny having made that statement to Weninger? + +STRÖLIN: I am quite certain that I did not make that statement in the +year 1936. + +COL. AMEN: When did you make it? + +STRÖLIN: I do not recall having made such a statement to Weninger at +all, at least not in 1936. + +COL. AMEN: When did you make that statement to Weninger or anybody else? +In what year did you decide to make statements like that? + +STRÖLIN: I cannot recall having made such a statement at all. + +COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it? + +STRÖLIN: I frankly admit that there was a time when one was no longer +proud of Germany. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do the other Prosecutors wish to cross-examine? + +DR. SEIDL: I have no questions to put to the witness. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. [_The witness left the +stand._] + +Does that conclude your case, Dr. Seidl, or have you got any other +evidence to offer? + +DR. SEIDL: Yes. First, I have to read into the record the questionnaire +of the witness Alfred Hess which has arrived in the meantime. The +Tribunal has admitted his testimony in the form of a questionnaire. I +would then like to refer to various documents in Document Book Number 3, +but before going into that and to conclude today’s proceedings, I would +like to establish upon the request of the Defendant Hess—this refers to +Volume 2 of the document book—that Lord Simon came to the meeting as +the official representative of the British Government; I therefore read +a few sentences from Page 93 (Volume II, Page 93): + + “Lord Simon said: ‘Herr Reichsminister, I was informed that you + had come here feeling charged with a mission and that you wished + to speak of it to someone who would be able to receive it with + Government authority. You know I am Dr. Guthrie and therefore I + come with the authority of the Government and I shall be willing + to listen and to discuss with you as far as seems good anything + you would wish to state for the information of the Government.’” + +That was what I wished to state in completion of my reading of the Simon +minutes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Would you be able to finish tonight if we went on for a +few minutes or not? + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the answers on this questionnaire are rather +long. The witness was cross-examined and I assume that the Prosecution +also intend to read the particulars of the cross-examination and I do +not believe this would be possible today. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + NINETY-FIRST DAY + Tuesday, 26 March 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, Defendant Streicher will be absent +from this session of the Court. + +PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, I now turn to the reading of the +interrogation of the witness Alfred Hess. + +THE PRESIDENT: Where shall we find it? + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I received this transcript of the +interrogation of the witness only last Saturday, and it has thus not +been possible for me to incorporate it into the document book as yet. +This witness was interrogated at Bad Mergentheim on 19 March. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that we haven’t got copies of it? + +DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the General Secretary, from whom I +received this transcript, has supplied a copy for the Tribunal. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, you had better go on then. Go on. + +DR. SEIDL: Yes. Before answering the first question, the witness made a +few preliminary remarks which are as follows: + + “It should be noted that I had to terminate my activity in the + Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP after the flight to England + of my brother Rudolf Hess, Deputy of the Führer. Therefore, the + following statements are valid only for the period up to 12 May + 1941. + + “Question 1: ‘What were the tasks and the purpose of the + Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP?’ + + “Answer: ‘The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was the + cultural, social, and economic care of all German nationals in + foreign countries, regardless of whether they were Party members + or not. The Auslands-Organisation in this sense was to be a + bridge between Germans abroad and the home country. Its purpose + was to foster and maintain love for and ties with the distant + home country and to keep alive understanding for the fatherland, + as well as to awaken the understanding of Germans at home for + the hard battle for existence of their compatriots all over the + world. The German abroad, through his dignified, upright + bearing, was to make himself popular in the country of his + adoption, and thus act as the best representative of his + fatherland.’ + + “Question 2: ‘Who could become a member of the + Auslands-Organisation?’ + + “Answer: ‘The question is not understandable. There was no such + thing as a membership in the Auslands-Organisation; just as + little, for example, as there was a membership in the Foreign + Office of the Reich or in a Gau of the NSDAP in the Reich.’ + + “Question 3: ‘Is it correct that on the membership card of each + Reich German Party member the following principle was printed as + a ruling principle of the Auslands-Organisation: “Follow the + laws of the country whose guest you are, let its people make the + internal policy of that country, do not interfere in this, not + even in conversation”?’ + + “Answer: ‘It is correct that the above principle, among similar + ones, was printed on the membership card or on its cover. If I + am not mistaken, underneath this principle there was the warning + even of expulsion from the NSDAP if this principle was not + observed. This latter is to be ascertained without great + difficulty by procuring a cover, which was in the possession of + every Party member in a foreign country.’ + + “Question 4: ‘Did the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP develop + any activity which could appear as Fifth Column?’ + + “Answer: ‘“Fifth Column” is not a clear concept, uniformly used. + In general, it would probably mean secret espionage or sabotage + activity. According to its guiding principles, the + Auslands-Organisation could not have carried on any such + activity.’ + + “‘I remember that the slogan “Fifth Column” of the foreign press + was considered in the Auslands-Organisation as a clever bluff of + the antifascist propaganda, and it caused genuine amusement. + Seriously, no state could conceive that such a widely known, + rather suspect and vulnerable organization could be suited for + any service in the nature of the Fifth Column. I consider it + natural that some individual Germans abroad had secret missions, + services such as other nationals performed likewise for their + fatherland, but the Auslands-Organisation was certainly not the + giver of such assignments nor the intermediary for such agents.’ + + “Question 5: ‘What kind of instructions and directives did the + Deputy of the Führer give the Auslands-Organisation for its + activity?’ + + “Answer: ‘The instructions and directives of the Deputy of the + Führer for the activity of the Auslands-Organisation are such as + those mentioned in my answers to Questions 1 and 3. He pointed + out again and again, with special emphasis, his strict + instructions that the groups abroad were not to do anything + which could be detrimental to the countries affording them + hospitality, or which could be considered an interference in the + affairs of those countries. The basic principle must also be + that National Socialism was a purely German movement, not an + article for export which one wanted to force on other countries + as suitable for them.’ + + “Question 6: ‘Did the Deputy of the Führer give the + Auslands-Organisation any directions or orders which could have + caused them to carry on an activity similar to that of the Fifth + Column?’ + + “Answer: ‘The Deputy of the Führer not only never issued any + such directions or orders, but as stated above in Answer 5, laid + down principles which absolutely prohibited any activity of the + sort carried on by the so-called Fifth Column.’ + + “Question 7: ‘Is it correct that, on the contrary, the Deputy of + the Führer took meticulous care that in all circumstances + interference in the internal affairs of the country of adoption + was to be avoided?’ + + “Answer: ‘I can repeat only that it was a chief concern of the + Deputy of the Führer to direct the work of the + Auslands-Organisation abroad in such a way that no interference + of any kind should take place in the internal affairs of the + country of residence. The few insignificant offenses, which were + unavoidable with the then very large number of German nationals + abroad—already amounting to several million—were + correspondingly severely punished.’ + + “Question 8: ‘What were the tasks and the aims of the Volksbund + für das Deutschtum im Ausland (League for Germans Abroad)?’ + + “Answer: ‘The Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland had the + cultural care of the so-called Volksdeutsche. Volksdeutsche are + racial Germans who had lost their German citizenship either + voluntarily or through the laws of other countries, that is, had + acquired the citizenship of another country, for instance, + America, Hungary, Transylvania, _et cetera_.’ + + “Question 9: ‘Did the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland + ever, in particular however before 10 May 1941, develop any + activity which could have given it the appearance of a Fifth + Column?’ + + “Answer: ‘I must state in this connection that the activity of + the Auslands-Organisation did not have anything to do with the + Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, so I can have no + insight into its work. But I consider it entirely out of the + question that my brother could have given the Volksbund tasks of + a Fifth Column nature. It would neither have fallen within the + jurisdiction of the Deputy of the Führer, nor have corresponded + with his views as to the mission of the Volksbund für das + Deutschtum im Ausland.’ + + “Question 10, and last question: ‘What kind of directions and + instructions did the Deputy of the Führer give as to the + activity of this Bund?’ + + “Answer: ‘Directions, _et cetera_, which my brother gave as to + the activity of this Bund are unknown to me, for, as already + stated, my activity in the Auslands-Organisation was in no way + connected with the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im + Ausland.’”—Signed—“Alfred Hess. Sworn to and subscribed on 19 + March 1946.” + +The witness Alfred Hess was then cross-examined in connection with his +interrogation. I assume that the Prosecution want to submit this +cross-examination themselves to the Tribunal. But if this +cross-examination and the questions belonging to it have not yet been +translated, it might perhaps be practicable if it were done directly, in +this connection. + +MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If +it please the Tribunal, we have received the cross-interrogatories but I +suggest respectfully that, rather than take the time to read them, we +offer them and if the Court will permit us, have them translated into +the four languages. It will take another 10 minutes or so to read them +and we are not interested in doing it unless the Tribunal feels that we +should. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Mr. Dodd. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I do not know whether the +affidavit of Ambassador Gaus submitted by me yesterday has been +translated and whether the Tribunal has received these translations +already. Yesterday at midday I gave six copies to the information office +and have heard nothing further since. + +THE PRESIDENT: Can the Prosecution inform the Tribunal what the position +is? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution has not had a copy of +this affidavit yet so we do not know what is in it. We suggest that +perhaps Dr. Seidl could postpone the reading of that until we have had a +chance to consider it. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am afraid that must be postponed. + +DR. SEIDL: Yes. Now I turn to Volume 3 of the document book. + +If it please the Tribunal, this volume of the document book contains, in +substance, statements and quotations taken from books and speeches of +foreign statesmen, diplomats, and political economists, regarding the +history and origin of the Versailles Treaty, the contents of the +Versailles Treaty, the territorial changes made by this treaty, such as +the question of the Polish Corridor, and above all the disastrous +economic consequences which this treaty had for Germany and also for the +rest of the world. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have read the documents in this book +and I should like just to say one or two words about them. + +They are opinions expressed by a great variety of gentlemen, including +politicians, economists, and journalists. They are opinions that are +expressed polemically and some of them journalistically, and with most +of them one is familiar and knew them when they were expressed 15 to 25 +years ago. + +Now, while I submit, as I have submitted to the Tribunal, that the whole +subject is too remote, I have a suggestion which I hope the Tribunal +will consider reasonable, that the Prosecution should, as I suggested +yesterday, let this book go in at the moment _de bene esse_ and that +when Dr. Seidl comes to making his final speech he can adopt the +arguments that are put forward by the various gentlemen whom he quotes, +if he thinks they are right. He can use the points as illustrations, +always provided the thesis that he is developing is one which the +Tribunal thinks relevant to the issues before it. That will preserve for +Dr. Seidl the advantage of the right to use these documents subject, as +I say, to the relevancy of the issues, but I suggest that it would be +quite wrong to read them as evidence at the moment. They are merely +polemical and journalistic opinions and directed to an issue which the +Prosecution has submitted, and I do submit, is too remote. + +However, I am most anxious that Dr. Seidl should have every advantage +for his final speech. Therefore, I suggest it would be convenient if +they were put in without being read at the moment and were left subject +to the limitation of relevancy, which can be considered when all the +evidence is before the Tribunal, for him to make use of in his final +speech. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I shortly... + +THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, Dr. Seidl. We will hear you in a +moment—perhaps it would be better to hear what you have to say now. Do +you think the suggestion made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe would be one +which would be acceptable to you? + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, at first glance the suggestion of Sir David +Maxwell-Fyfe seems to be very reasonable. But I believe I must say that +if the matter is treated in that way great difficulties will arise for +the Defense. For example the arguments on relevancy, which in their +nature belong in the presentation of evidence and must be heard there, +will be postponed until the final speech of the Defense. This would mean +that the defense counsel in his final speech would be interrupted again +and again; that he would have to argue for the relevancy of his +quotations; that perhaps whole parts of his speech would fall by the +wayside in that manner; and that in that way the danger would arise that +the cohesion of the speech will be broken completely. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is a danger which every advocate +has to meet, that certain portions of his speech may not be deemed +relevant, but I thought that that might be a helpful way out. But if it +is not accepted, then the Prosecution must respectfully but very +strongly submit that the issues of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles +are not relevant to this Tribunal. + +I have already argued that and I do not want to develop it at great +length. I do want to make it clear that the questions which are raised +by the quotations here were, of course, the subject of political +controversy in practically every country in Europe, and different +opinions were expressed as to the rightness and the practicality of the +provisions, especially the economic provisions of the Treaty of +Versailles. I am not disputing that that is a matter of controversy, but +I am saying that it is not a controversy that should come before this +Tribunal. I myself have replied to practically all the quotations from +the English statesmen here as a politician over the past years, and I am +sure many people in this Court must have taken one view or the other, +but that is not a relevant issue to this Tribunal, and, of course, +especially is it wrong in my view to put forward as evidential matter +opinions expressed by one side in the controversy. Every one of these +speeches, as far as they were English, was either preceded by matters to +which it was a reply or was followed by a reply, and I should think the +same applies to those of Senator Borah in the United States. + +These matters—this is my second point—are not really evidential, and +this is a point for argument; and it will have to be decided what is a +convenient time for the Tribunal to decide on whether this is a relevant +issue. But that was why I put forward this suggestion that it was better +to decide it when the whole of the true evidence of fact had been put +before the Tribunal. But I do want, apart from my suggestion, to make +quite clear that as regards relevance, the Prosecution unitedly submit +that the rightness or practicality of the provisions of the Treaty of +Versailles is not a relevant matter. The other argument—I want to +distinguish between the two—the other argument has been adumbrated by +Dr. Stahmer as to the actual terms of the preamble to the military +clauses. That is quite a different point which we can discuss when, as I +understand, certain propositions of law are to be put forward by one of +the defense counsel on behalf of the Defense. But, as I say, the +rightness and practicality of the Treaty and especially the economic +clauses is a subject of enormous controversy on which there are +literally thousands of different opinions from one shade to the other, +and I submit it is not an issue before this Court, and, secondly, I +submit this is not evidence. It is not evidential matter, even if it +were an issue. + +DR. SEIDL: May I perhaps reply briefly? + +THE PRESIDENT: Then, Sir David, your proposition would be that Dr. Seidl +could not quote from any of these documents? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, certainly, yes, on my premise that it +is irrelevant matter, he could not. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. They are not admissible. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are not admissible. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My original suggestion was of course, leaving +over the discussion of whether they are admissible until all the +evidence had been filed, but if that is not accepted, I submit bluntly +if I may use the word with all respect—that they are not admissible. + +THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl. + +DR. SEIDL: May I reply briefly, Mr. President? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes. + +DR. SEIDL: It would indicate a complete misinterpretation of my +intentions if one were to assume that by the submission of this document +book I wanted to show whether or not the Treaty of Versailles is an +expression of statesmanly wisdom. I am not concerned with that here. + +With the submission of this document it is to be shown, or rather there +is to be brought under discussion: + +Firstly: Whether the opposite side at the conclusion of the Treaty, in +the preliminary negotiations—I call your attention to Wilson’s Fourteen +Points—was not guilty for its part, of violation of the general treaty +obligations, whether a _culpa in contrahendo_ is not to be assumed here. + +Secondly: The presentation of the documents should show whether the +opposite side complied with the obligations arising from the treaty, in +order to establish—that is, to give the Tribunal the opportunity of +establishing—in this way the legal inferences which Germany might draw +from this. + +Thirdly: The Treaty of Versailles and its violation by the defendants +forms the nucleus of Count One of the Indictment, namely, the Conspiracy +charged by the Prosecution. The Prosecution, in replying to a question +of the Tribunal as to when the conspiracy may be said to have started, +has said that the date might be set as far back as 1921. + +Fourthly: The Prosecution has extensive... + +THE PRESIDENT: I have not the least idea what you meant by the last +point. I do not understand what you said in the last point in the least. + +DR. SEIDL: I wanted to say that for the beginning of the Conspiracy +alleged by the Prosecution, the Treaty of Versailles played a decisive +part, and that there is at least some causal nexus between the origin of +this treaty and the alleged Conspiracy. Before there can be talk of +illegality and of guilt, the facts have to be established which were +causative for the Conspiracy charged by the Prosecution. + +Fourthly: The Prosecution has submitted extensive evidence on the +development of the NSDAP. Numerous document books were submitted to the +Court to show the growth in membership, to demonstrate the increase in +the Reichstag mandates. Now, if this evidence was relevant, it is my +assertion that also the circumstances and the facts that first enabled +this rise of the Party at all must be relevant, if only from the +viewpoint of causal nexus. + +THE PRESIDENT: Is it your contention that the opinion of a journalist +after the Treaty of Versailles was made, stating that, in his opinion, +the Treaty of Versailles was unjust to Germany, would be admissible +either for the interpretation of the Treaty or for any other purpose +with which this Tribunal is concerned? + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I admit that of course the isolated opinion of +a foreign journalist has not in itself to be a relevant document. But I +do maintain that the opinion of Secretary of State Lansing on the coming +about of the Treaty of Versailles and his connection with the history of +this treaty must be of some evidential relevance. What weight attaches +to his opinion is a question which cannot yet be established at this +point. This question can be decided by the Tribunal only when the +complete evidence has been submitted. I maintain further that the +opinion of the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the +Senate of the United States on the Treaty of Versailles, about its +formulation, about its effects within the Conspiracy alleged by the +Prosecution which purportedly is said to be directed chiefly against the +Treaty of Versailles can _prima facie_ have value as evidence. The same +applies to most of the other statements quoted in this document book. I +would like to call attention to Gustav Cassel, to John Maynard Keynes, +the official financial advisor of the British Government, and to a +number of others. + +THE PRESIDENT: It is your contention that because of the provisions of +the Versailles Treaty or because of an infraction of those provisions by +the signatory powers, Germany was justified in making an aggressive war? + +DR. SEIDL: I cannot answer that now definitely, so long as I have not +heard the evidence of the other defendants. I do assert, however, that +by violation of the Treaty of Versailles by the opposite side, under +certain circumstances Germany or the defendants could infer the right to +rearm, and that is an infraction of the Treaty of Versailles with which +the defendants are charged. As far as the right to an aggressive war is +concerned, I should not like to make any positive statements at least +until such time as the Tribunal has taken official notice of the +affidavit of Ambassador Gaus. + +THE PRESIDENT: One more question I should like to ask you: Are you +saying that the Fourteen Points which were laid down by President Wilson +are admissible evidence to construe the written document of the +Versailles Treaty? + +DR. SEIDL: I do not say that the Fourteen Points of Wilson, _per se_, +are admissible evidence. I do assert, on the other hand, that the +connection between these Fourteen Points of Wilson and the Treaty of +Versailles, and the contradiction resulting therefrom are of causal +significance for the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then you are really saying that the Versailles Treaty, +insofar as it departed from the Fourteen Points, was an unjust treaty? + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, whether the treaty was just or not is a point +which I do not wish to prove with this document at all. Whether the +treaty was unjust or not is in my opinion a fact which perhaps is beyond +the scope of these proceedings. I do assert, however, that the treaty, +at least in many of its terms, did not bring that which the victorious +states themselves expected of it. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more, Dr. Seidl? + +DR. SEIDL: Not at this point. + +DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Since it is a very +fundamental question which has been raised now for discussion by Sir +David, and since the Defense must always calculate on the possibility +that the Tribunal, even at this point, may make a decision on the +question of whether and how far such documentary material as that +discussed can be produced, I consider myself duty-bound to add to the +statements of my colleague, Dr. Seidl, with whom I agree fully, just a +few supplementary words. And I would like to reply to the very precise +question of Your Lordship which starts, “Do you consider it +relevant...?” I believe—and I will avoid any repetition—that a very +vital point as far as relevancy is concerned has not been brought out +yet, and that is the subjective aspect; that is the relevancy of the +investigation of evidence and of facts regarding the subjective state of +the individual defendant, that is, of the facts as seen from within. + +If, for example, one of the defendants committed an act which was, +considered purely objectively, a breach of the Treaty of Versailles, +then, as far as criminal law is concerned and looking at it from the +subjective view, it is of great significance whether in the opinion of +reasonable, just, and educated men of all nations, he acted with an +attitude and with a viewpoint which was not merely his special +viewpoint, but that of the most serious men of the various nations and +also of those nations which fought against Germany in the years 1914-18. +In order not to be too abstract, I should like to cite a concrete +example: + +A defendant holds the opinion that he is entitled to rearmament—not to +aggressive war; I will not touch this question. He considers rearmament +justified, either because the treaty has not been kept by the other side +or because owing to _expressis verbis_, or to some action, it is to be +considered obsolete. In my opinion it is of decisive relevancy whether +this defendant with this point of view, which explains his action, is +alone in all the world, or whether the opinion which guides his action +is held by men who are to be taken seriously, and who belonged to other +nations, even to those who in the years 1914-18 stood on the other side +and were his enemies. + +Rearmament according to the Prosecution, as I understand, is not a +crime, as such, but is merely used by the Prosecution as a charge for +the proving of the crime of having carried on an aggressive war. If, +now, a defendant can prove that he acted from clean and decent views, +views which, as stated, were held by such men of other nations as I have +described, and acted conscientiously and with a clear conscience both as +regards international law and international morals and also as regards +the needs of his country, then this material, which contains opinions, +literary statements, speeches, that coincide with the views of the +defendant in question, is not only of relevant, but of entirely decisive +significance. This viewpoint I ask the Tribunal to bear in mind, if it +desires to decide now the question of principle which Sir David has just +now raised for debate, and which he had to raise, as I fully recognize. +Moreover I am also now in the agreeable position of being able to agree +with Sir David in the practical handling of this matter. I too—and I am +speaking now for myself only—would prefer to have the decision on this +question postponed until the time suggested by Sir David. As far as I am +concerned I will accept the disadvantages, which Dr. Seidl is right in +seeing, because an advantage will result if the Tribunal decides this +question at that time, since it will then have a much larger view on all +questions and shades which are important for the decision. And at this +point I am not at all in a position to speak comprehensively about them, +for I do not want to make any summarizing speech, but just to treat one +aspect of this question of evidence. + +DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): I should like to +add a few remarks to those made by my colleague Dr. Dix. I request the +Tribunal... + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how many of the Defense +Counsel think that they are entitled to address them. If Dr. Horn wishes +to add a short argument, the Tribunal are prepared to hear it, but they +are not prepared to hear all the defendants’ counsel upon points such as +this, at this stage, and if any of the other defendants’ counsel desires +to address them, they will decide now whether they will hear any more or +not. + +It is understood, then, that Dr. Horn alone will address a short +argument to the Tribunal. If it is not, then the Tribunal will decide +whether they will hear any more argument upon the subject. + +DR. HORN: I cannot encroach on the rights of my colleagues in this +question, naturally, Mr. President. I should like personally to make +only a very brief statement on the legal points. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, you must consult your colleagues then. + +DR. HORN: If you wish a decision on this question now, Mr. President, I +must ask my colleagues beforehand, of course. + +THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. + +[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._] + +DR. HORN: May I make first a preliminary remark, Mr. President, to what +has just been said to me by my colleagues. Firstly, this decision has +for the Counsel for the organizations a very particular interest. + +For myself personally I would like to make the following remarks: The +Prosecution... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I asked you to consult the other defendants’ +counsel and ascertain whether they were willing that you should be +heard, and you alone. That is the only terms upon which I am prepared to +hear you. + +[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._] + +DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, my colleagues are agreed that I shall make +the last statements on this point. + +THE PRESIDENT: One moment—very well. Go on. + +DR. HORN: There is no doubt that the Prosecution, as far as vital +questions are concerned, base their case on infractions of the +Versailles Treaty. To these treaty infractions, it is absolutely +necessary, in my opinion, to submit the facts which allow the legality +of this treaty to be judged. There is no doubt that this treaty was +signed under duress. It is recognized in international law that such +treaties from the legal point of view have grave deficiencies and are +infamous. In my opinion we must be allowed to submit the facts that +serve to show the soundness of this assertion and legal viewpoint. A +further question—and if I have understood correctly, this is Sir +David’s point—is that of the polemic analysis of the legal, political, +and economic consequences of this treaty. + +I do not wish to make any further statements on this point, but I would +like to ask that my first request be granted, that the legal documentary +facts be allowed which would permit a judgment on the legal value of the +Versailles Treaty. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, if I might deal +first with the argument which Dr. Dix has put forward. As I understood +his first main proposition, it was this: That if a defendant has +committed an act which is an infraction of the treaty and can show that +in the opinion of reasonable and just and educated men in the states who +were the other parties to the treaty, the treaty was so bad that an +infraction was justifiable, that is a permissible argument. + +I submit that it is, with great respect to Dr. Dix, an unsound argument +and baseless, from any principle either of law or of materiality. Once +it is admitted that there is a treaty and that an infraction is made, +and it follows from the example that Dr. Dix was dealing with that, +these are the conceded facts. It is no answer to say that a number of +admirable people in the countries which were parties to the treaty +believed that its terms were wrong. The treaty is there and the person +who knowingly makes an infraction is breaking the treaty, however strong +is his support. + +In his second point Dr. Dix moved to quite different grounds. He said +that this evidence might be relevant in the special reference to the +question of rearmament because it might show that the treaty was +considered obsolete. Now, it is a rare but nonetheless existing doctrine +of international law that treaties, usually minor treaties, can be +abrogated by the conduct of the contracting parties. I would not contest +that you cannot get examples of that, although they are very rare and +generally deal with minor matters. But this evidence which is before the +Tribunal at the moment is not directed to that point at all. This is, in +the main, contemporary polemic evidence saying that certain aspects of +the treaty were bad, either as regards political standards or economic +standards. That is a totally different argument from the one which Dr. +Dix admirably adumbrated—which is one which if it came up would have to +be faced—that a treaty has become obsolete or that the breaches have +been condoned and that, therefore, the terms have really ceased to +exist. + +My answer to that is that this evidence is not directed to that point at +all. + +Now, if Dr. Dix will forgive me, and I am sure the fault was mine, I did +not quite appreciate what he termed his subjective argument. But insofar +as I did appreciate it, there seems to be a very good answer: that if he +seeks to suggest that a defendant’s guilt may be less because he, that +defendant, believed that the treaty was bad, that is essentially a +matter which can be judged by the Tribunal who will hear that defendant +and appreciate and evaluate his point of view. It really does not help +in deciding whether the Defendant Hess acted because he thought that the +Treaty of Versailles was a bad treaty, to know what the editor of the +_Observer_, which is a Sunday paper in England, expressed as his views +some twenty years ago, or the _Manchester Guardian_ or indeed, with all +respect to them, what distinguished statesmen have said in writing their +reminiscences years after a matter occurred. The subjective point +is—this is my submission—an important point in deciding on evidence. +The subjective point can be answered by the defendant himself, and the +view of the defendant which the Tribunal will receive. + +Now, Dr. Horn has opened up a much wider question, and one which I +submit is entirely irrelevant and beyond the scope of these proceedings. + +He wishes the Tribunal to try whether the Treaty of Versailles was +signed under duress. Well, that, of course, would involve the whole +consideration of the Government of the German Republic, the position of +the plenipotentiaries, and the legal position of the persons who +negotiated the treaty. + +The answer to that is that this Tribunal is concerned with certain quite +clearly stated offenses, fully particularized, which occurred at the +time that is stated in the Indictment; and all the evidence that is +given as to the actions of the pre-Nazi German Government, and indeed of +the Nazi Government, shows that for years Versailles was accepted as the +legal and actual basis on which they must work, and various different +methods were adopted in order to try to secure changes of the treaty, +and I need not go into, with the Tribunal, the whole frame work of the +Locarno Treaties, recognizing Versailles, which were signed in 1925, and +which were treated as existing and in operation by the Nazi Government +itself. + +With that, these actual facts, it would, in my submission, be completely +remote, irrelevant, and contrary to the terms of the Charter, for this +Tribunal to go into an inquiry as to whether the Treaty of Versailles +was signed under duress. + +As I gathered, Dr. Horn was not so much interested in the economic +clauses and their rightness or wrongness; but I should respectfully +remind the Tribunal that that is a matter which is before them at the +moment—that here we have, as I have pointed out before—and I do not +want to repeat myself—a number of opinions expressed by people of +varying eminence and with varying degrees of responsibility at the time +that they expressed them. And while strongly maintaining the position +which I have endeavored to express with regard to the treaty, I do +equally impress my second point: That to accept as matters of evidence +statements which in the main are made from a polemical standpoint, +either in answer to an attack or in an attack with background of the +politics of the state in which they were made, is simply a misuse of the +term “evidence”. That is not evidence of any kind, and I equally—not +equally because the first point is one of primary importance, which I +respectfully urge to the Tribunal—but I also suggest that to tender in +evidence matters of that kind is a misuse of the term “evidence,” that +they are matters of argument which an advocate may adopt if the argument +is a relevant one, but they should not be received in evidence by the +Tribunal for that reason. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Sir +David, is there anything in the Versailles Treaty that either calls for +disarmament by the signatories other than Germany or which looks to such +disarmament; and, if there is, could you give us the reference to it? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is the preamble to the Military Clauses. +That is the point which is usually relied on. It is about four lines at +the beginning of the Military Clauses, and, in quite general terms, it +looks to a general disarmament after Germany has disarmed. Of course, +the position was that—I think I have got the dates right—disarmament +was accepted. Whether, in view of the evidence in this case, it should +have been accepted does not matter; it was accepted in 1927. After that, +you may remember, there were a number of disarmament conferences which +examined that question, and eventually in 1933 Germany left the then +existing disarmament conference. + +Now, I am trying to be entirely objective. I do not want to put the +Prosecution view or the Defense view, but that is the position. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not quite clear. When you say +“accepted,” you mean that the extent of the disarmament called for had +been accepted by Germany? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the other way around: that Germany’s +response to the demand of Versailles was accepted by the Allies in 1927, +and the Disarmament Commission which had been in Germany then left +Germany under, I think, a French General Denoue. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then, what I understand you to argue is that +nothing contained in this folder has anything to do with that possible +issue. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is the point. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is not on that issue. I mean we will deal +with that issue when we come to it. I rather thought from some words +that Dr. Stahmer dropped that that would be one of the points which we +should meet in the general argument on law which will be presented, +which the Defense Counsel... + +DR. SEIDL: I believe that Sir David is under a slight misconception. In +Book 3 of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a +number of citations of foreign statesmen that refer to this military +clause in the Versailles Treaty and in which it is stated that Germany +fulfilled her obligations in the Versailles Treaty, but that the +reciprocal obligations in it for the opposite side were not fulfilled. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am sorry. I did not remember any. I have +read it through, and there may be some collateral matters dealing with +that, but—and I do not think that I am doing Dr. Seidl’s great industry +in collecting these matters an injustice in saying that if they do exist +they are collateral and the main point of this is an attack on the +political and economic clauses of the treaty. I hope that I have done +him justice. I certainly intended to do so. That is the impression made +on me. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, may I report that the Defendant +Streicher will be absent from this session of Court. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that evidence as to the injustice of +the Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is +inadmissible, and it therefore rejects Volume 3 of the documents on +behalf of the Defendant Hess. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors. Since Volume 3 of the document +book for the Defendant Rudolf Hess is not admissible as documentary +evidence, I am, so far as the submission of documents is concerned, at +the end of my submission of evidence. Now, we are further concerned only +with the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, which I have already submitted, +and I ask you not to decide on the admissibility of this document until +I have had opportunity to present arguments on the relevance of it and +of the secret treaty. But I should like to point out that with this +affidavit only the facts and the contents of this secret treaty are to +be proved; and therefore I shall read only excerpts from it, so that +other events and the history prior to the treaty are not to be +demonstrated by me. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, we understand that this affidavit of the +witness Gaus is now being translated and is going to be submitted to the +various prosecutors. They will then inform us of their position, and we +shall be able to see whether it is admissible or not, and the +Prosecution will likewise be able to tell us whether they want to have +the Ambassador here for the purpose of cross-examining him. + +DR. SEIDL: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: So we must postpone that until we get the translations. + +DR. SEIDL: I had then the further intention of calling the defendant +himself as a witness. In view of his attitude as to the question of the +competency of this Court, he has asked me, however, to dispense with +this procedure. I therefore forego the testimony of the defendant as a +witness and have no further evidence to put in at this point. + +THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. + +Then the Tribunal will now deal with the case against the Defendant +Ribbentrop. + +DR. HORN: Your Lordship, Your Honors, my client, Joachim von Ribbentrop, +had instructed me to make the following statement for him at the +beginning of the evidence: + + “As Foreign Minister for the Reich, I had to carry through the + directions and orders of Adolf Hitler concerning foreign policy. + For the measures of foreign policy undertaken by me I accept + full responsibility.” + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought defendants’ counsel knew that the +rule which we have laid down is that at this stage no speeches shall be +made, but that the evidence should be called, the oral evidence should +be called, and the documents should be briefly referred to and offered +in evidence. Did you not understand that? + +DR. HORN: I did not know, Mr. President, that one might not submit a +statement on behalf of his client. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has laid down on several occasions, I +think, verbally and certainly once in writing, that no speeches can be +made now, but that speeches can be made at the time laid down in the +Charter. The present opportunity is for all evidence to be given and for +documents to be offered in evidence, with such explanatory observations +upon the documents as may be necessary. + +DR. HORN: The former Foreign Minister for the Reich, Joachim von +Ribbentrop, is, according to the general Indictment and according to the +trial brief of the British Delegation and the verbally presented special +charges, held responsible for all crimes cited in Article 6 of the +Charter of the International Military Tribunal. + +Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in the session of the International Military +Tribunal of 8 January 1946, described the facts of the case against my +client as follows: + +Firstly, the using of his offices and of his personal influence and +intimate connection with Hitler to facilitate the seizure of power +through the NSDAP and the preparation of wars. + +Secondly, the participation in the political planning, and preparation +of the National Socialist Conspiracy for Wars of Aggression... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, are you again making a speech or what are you +doing? + +DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I am just enumerating on one page how I +plan to arrange my evidence, and I ask to be allowed to divide it in +this way. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +DR. HORN: Secondly, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe adduced the participation in +the political planning and preparation of the National Socialist +conspirators for aggressive war and the wars in violation of +international treaties. He accordingly bears the responsibility for the +execution of the foreign policy planned by the political conspirators. + +Thirdly, participation in and approval of Crimes against Peace, War +Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, especially crimes against persons +and property in the occupied territories. + +The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has declared himself not guilty of all +crimes charged against him. To refute the charges made against him, I +will begin now my presentation of evidence. + +The honorable prosecutor at the beginning of his statements quoted from +Exhibit Number USA-5, Document Number 2829-PS, and brought out that the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop was an SS Obergruppenführer. The honorable +prosecutor asserted that this rank was not an honorary one. In +opposition to this, the defendant asserts that the rank of an SS +Gruppenführer and later of Obergruppenführer, bestowed by Hitler, was +bestowed upon him only on an honorary basis, because Hitler wished that +the members of the Government should appear on official occasions in +uniform, and the rank of an SS Gruppenführer appeared in keeping with +the official position of the defendant. The defendant neither served in +the SS nor led an SS unit. Neither did he have any adequate military +training and preparation for this high military position. + +To demonstrate this I will submit evidence from the defendant himself as +a witness. + +The Prosecution has asserted that Von Ribbentrop, after the taking over +of power, for a short period of time was adviser of the Party on foreign +political matters. This assertion is refuted by Document 2829-PS which +is contained in the document book in the hands of the Tribunal. I will +read Paragraph 3, where it says: + + “Foreign Policy Collaborator to the Führer, 1933-1938.” + +This is the first document of the Ribbentrop document book. According to +it, in the years 1933 to 1938 Von Ribbentrop was only Hitler’s adviser +on foreign political questions. With reference to Document D-472, +Exhibit Number GB-130, the second document in the Document Book +Ribbentrop, which concerns an excerpt from the International +Biographical Archives, the honorable prosecutor claimed that the +defendant even before 1932 worked for the NSDAP, after he had entered +the Party service in 1930. The Prosecution cites Paragraph II, Lines +6-9, of this document, which says: + + “Following up his connection with foreign countries, he + established new relations with England and France; having been + in the service of the NSDAP since 1930, he knew how to extend + them to political circles.” + +The statement is not correct. The defendant was until 1932 not a member +of any political party in Germany, particularly not of the NSDAP. As far +as his political views were concerned, he leaned toward the Deutsche +Volkspartei—that is the party of Stresemann. + +In the year 1932 the defendant came to know Hitler personally. His views +on domestic and foreign political matters brought him... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I do not want to interrupt you unnecessarily, +but I do not understand what you are doing now. You seem to me to be +stating a part of the evidence which presumably the Defendant Von +Ribbentrop will give, and, if so, when he gives it it will be cumulative +to your statement. Also, you seem to be referring to documents which +have been produced by the Prosecution and answering them yourself. Well, +that is not what the Tribunal desires at this stage. It quite +understands that at the appropriate time you will make whatever argument +you think right with reference to the evidence which has been brought +forward, on behalf of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. But, as I have +already said—I thought quite clearly—what the Tribunal wants done now +is to hear all the evidence on behalf of Von Ribbentrop and to have +offered in evidence the documents upon which you will rely, with any +short explanatory statement as to the meaning of the documents. And if +there is any part of a document which has been produced by the +Prosecution but not cited by them which you think it necessary to refer +to, as explanatory of the part of the document which has been used by +them, then you are at liberty to put in, to offer in evidence that part +of the document with any short explanatory words that you wish. But I do +not understand what you are doing now except making a speech. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I was using the opposing fact which I wish to +present against the claims of the Prosecution, because according to my +information and according to my documents, they do not correspond to the +facts. As far as the establishment of Point 1 of what Mr. President has +just said, I would like to state the following: The health of the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop is quite poor at present. This morning the +doctor told me that Ribbentrop is suffering from so-called vasomotor +disturbances in his speech. I wanted to take a part of his evidence +statement from my client by making a statement of it here and thus +showing the position of the defendant to the Tribunal. I do not know +whether the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in view of his present state of +health, that is, his impediment of speech, could make these explanations +as briefly as I myself can. Then, when the defendant is in the box, he +needs only to confirm these statements under oath. + +THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is too ill to give +evidence today, then he must give evidence on some future occasion. If +you have any oral witnesses to call other than the Defendant Von +Ribbentrop, then they can give evidence today; and with reference to the +documentary evidence, it is perfectly simple for you to offer those +documents in evidence in the way that it was done by Dr. Stahmer, in the +way that it was done by Dr. Seidl, and the way in which the Tribunal +have explained over and over again. + +DR. HORN: I had intended to submit documents first and not to call my +witnesses until later. As far as Von Ribbentrop is concerned, I have +learned that his condition has become constantly worse. I do not know +therefore whether at the end of the presentation of evidence I will be +in a position to summon the Defendant Von Ribbentrop; but I must be +prepared for the possibility that I might not be able to call him. And +otherwise I am concerned with only a very few very general points for +rectification. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you cannot give evidence at any rate and if you +cannot call Von Ribbentrop, then you must, if it is possible to do so, +call some other witnesses who will give the evidence which he would have +given. If, unfortunately, it is not possible to do so, then his case may +suffer; but the Tribunal will give every possible facility for his being +called at any stage. If he is in fact so ill, as you suggest, that he +cannot give evidence, then his evidence may be put off until the end of +the defendants’ case, subject of course to a proper medical certificate +being produced. + +DR. HORN: If the Court wants then later to hear the defendant, I will +postpone the matter with the request that if I cannot hear him, that is, +cannot hear him fully—for I emphasize again, there is a speech +disturbance—then he can at least confirm the evidence as a witness. + +THE PRESIDENT: You may call any of the witnesses; the Tribunal has not +laid down that the defendant must be called first. You have applied for +eight witnesses, I think, in addition to the defendant and you can call +any of them or you can deal with your documents, but whichever you do, +you must do it in the way which the Tribunal has ordered. + +DR. HORN: Then, I will turn now to the occupation of the Rhineland. + +On 27 February 1936, there was ratified between the French Republic and +the Soviet Union a mutual-assistance pact, the content of which clearly +violated the Locarno Treaty and the covenant of the League of Nations, +and was solely directed against Germany. At the same time... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have just said that something or other is +against international law. Now, that is not a reference to any document +which you are offering in evidence, nor is it any comment upon the +production of oral evidence. If you have a document to offer, kindly +offer it and then make any necessary explanatory remarks. + +DR. HORN: Then, I wanted next to refer to Document Number 1 in the +Document Book Ribbentrop. We are concerned with a memorandum of the +German Government to the signatory powers of the Locarno Pact, of 7 +March 1936. + +THE PRESIDENT: Which page is that? + +DR. HORN: That is on Page 6 of the document book. In explanation I may +add that this memorandum was submitted to the signatory powers, because +between the French Government and the Republic of the Soviet Union a +treaty of mutual assistance had been ratified and at the same time, the +German Foreign Office received knowledge of a plan which the French +General Staff had worked out and which arranged that the French Army was +to advance along the line of the Main, so that North and South Germany +in this way would be separated, and even to join hands with the Russian +Army across Czechoslovakia. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, for the formality of the record, it is +necessary to offer each document in evidence and the document should be +given a number. You have not yet offered any of these documents in +evidence or given them any numbers, so far as I know. + +DR. HORN: I gave this document the number, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 1. +The number is in the upper right hand corner of the document. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +DR. HORN: And I ask—perhaps I may say this in order to save time—I ask +that all these documents quoted as Ribbentrop exhibit number be accepted +in evidence. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well, and in the order in which you quote them? + +DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: They will be numbered that way. Very well. + +DR. HORN: As to the particulars just submitted on the reason for this +memorandum being lodged, and as evidence of the fact just cited +regarding the arrangement of the French General Staff, I will call Von +Neurath as a witness. I will question him on this one point, when he is +called into the box. In order to justify the German view, which is +contained in the memorandum and which consists in the fact that the +Locarno Pact and the League of Nations covenant were considered +infringed upon, I would like to refer to Page 3 of the document and wish +to quote the following—this is on Page 8 of the document book: + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, was this document Exhibit Number Ribbentrop-1, +one of the documents for which you applied and which you were allowed in +the applications? + +DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President. This document is concerned with excerpts +from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_ (_Documents of German +Politics_), Volume 4. + +I want to stress that this collection of documents was granted to me at +the same time as the two evidence books. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to see the original document. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are not in a position to present original +documents, since the Foreign Office was confiscated by the victorious +powers and with it a great part of the documents. Then I would have to +make an application now that the signatory powers concerned produce +these original documents, for we simply are not able to. We can only +refer to document collections. + +THE PRESIDENT: Where does the copy come from? + +DR. HORN: This copy, Mr. President, is from the _Dokumente der Deutschen +Politik_, Volume 4, as is shown in the document book which the President +has before him. The document is found on Page 123 of this document +collection. + +I should like, Mr. President, to add an explanatory remark: If the Court +is interested in seeing the original, I should have to have the +collection, which is up in the document room now, brought down. It is in +German, and I do not believe that it would be of any value to the +Tribunal at this time. May I mention further... + +THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, as a matter of formality and +certainty, the Tribunal ought to have in its record every document which +forms part of the record, whether it is an original or whether it is a +copy; and whatever the document is that is offered in evidence, it ought +to be handed in to the Tribunal and kept by the Tribunal. It ought to be +put in evidence, offered in evidence, and handed to the General +Secretary or his representative, and then the Tribunal has a full record +of every document which is in evidence. + +But we cannot have documents such as this, which is a mere copy of the +original document which ought to be offered in evidence. If it is at the +Information Center, then it is quite capable of being produced here. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Court decided that we are justified in +copying documents and certifying to the authenticity in order that these +documents may be submitted as evidence to the Tribunal. Therefore, we +have compared every document with the original we had on hand, or with +the printed copy of the document and at the end of the document we +attested the authenticity of the copy. This document, certified with my +own signature, is in the hands of the Tribunal, I believe in five +copies. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn—Yes, Mr. Dodd. + +MR. DODD: We thought that we might be helpful. We say that we are +willing to accept this quotation from the volume referred to, and I do +think that we did put in some documents ourselves and asked the Court’s +indulgence at the time in something of the same fashion. + +I think the Court, if I may suggest respectfully, might take this +document on that same basis. + +I have conferred only with Sir David, but I feel quite sure that our +French and Russian colleagues will agree as well. + +THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Dodd, the point is—and, of course, it is +probably only a formal point—that the only document which is offered in +evidence or put in evidence is a copy which does not contain Dr. Horn’s +signature and therefore there is nothing to show that it is in fact a +true copy. Of course, if we had had Dr. Horn’s signature, we would be +prepared to accept that it was a true copy of the original. What we have +before us is a mere mimeograph, I suppose, of some document which has +not been produced to us. + +MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. I have not had an opportunity to +examine it carefully. We did not get these documents, by the way, until +pretty late last night. We have not had the usual period of time to +examine it, but in any event, I have suggested it might go in, and if +Dr. Horn would verify it, as suggested by the President, and later +furnish the original copy, it might be all right. + +THE PRESIDENT: That would be all right, certainly. + +Dr. Horn, you understand what I mean. If you will produce to us at some +future date the actual document which you signed yourself, to show that +it was a true copy, that will be quite satisfactory. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, in the entire document book there is no +document which I have not signed and given in five copies to be +translated. Of course, I cannot also sign all the translations. This +document which is contained in the document book submitted to the +President has my signature in the German text. + +THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you have handed your documents in to be +translated, in German, with your signature at the bottom, saying it is a +true extract, and you do not know where those documents are because they +have gone into the Translation Division? That is right, is it not? + +DR. HORN: Only partially, Mr. President. I know that I handed in these +documents, to the proper office, in German, and with my signature. Then +that office kept them and had them translated. From the moment I handed +them in I naturally have had no further control of what happened. + +I may also point out that the document books which we used were +available only in a single copy and must be used by all attorneys, even +now, for their future work. Because of that, I cannot produce the +original for the Tribunal since it is not my property. That can be done +in agreement only with the person in charge of the document section, +Lieutenant Commander Schrader. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, if, in the future, you and the other +defendants’ counsel could get your document books ready in sufficient +time, you could perhaps then make the arrangement that you hand in the +document book, when you are offering it in evidence, and then it would +be capable of being handed to the officer of the Court. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I do not believe that that possibility exists +at all, for these _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_—just to use this +example—are available only in one copy for the use of all Defense +Counsel attorneys; I cannot take these books away, if they wish to +continue work with them, in order to submit them to the Tribunal as +evidence. I would not receive them. I receive these books only to use +them, and make excerpts from them, and then I have to return them. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you are putting in evidence now a certain +extract from the book, and all the Tribunal wants is that that extract +be certified, either by you or by some other person who can be trusted, +as a correct extract from the book, and that that document, so signed, +can be produced. It may be difficult to produce it at the moment because +you have handed it in to some official or to somebody in the Translation +Division and therefore you cannot produce it, but it could be arranged +that it should be produced in the future. I do not mean this particular +one, but in the future other defendants’ counsel can produce their +documents certified by themselves or by some other person of authority. + +DR. HORN: That has already been done, Mr. President. Five document books +of the same type, signed by me, were handed to the Tribunal. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, the rule of the Tribunal happens to be that +they should be handed in, in this Court, at the time that they are being +used, as well as their being handed in to somebody for the purpose of +translation. That is the rule. + +But now perhaps we had better get on as we are taking up too much time +over this. + +DR. HORN: I have just heard that the German documents which I signed are +being procured from the Secretariat General, so I will be able to submit +them to the Tribunal with signature, in the German. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +DR. HORN: I should like to continue and explain the afore-mentioned +opinion of the legal consequences of the Pact made between France and +Russia in 1936, and I refer to Page 3, that is, Page 8 of the document +book. I quote: + + “Consequently, the only question is whether France, in accepting + these treaty obligations, has kept within those limits which, in + her relation to Germany have been laid on her by the Rhine Pact. + + “This, however, the German Government must deny. + + “The Rhine Pact was supposed to achieve the goal of securing + peace in Western Europe by having Germany on the one hand, and + France and Belgium on the other, renounce for all time employing + military force in their relations to each other. If, by the + conclusion of the pact, certain reservations to this + renunciation of war, going beyond the right of self-defense, + were permitted, the political reason for this was, as is + generally known, solely the fact that France had already taken + on certain alliance obligations towards Poland and + Czechoslovakia which she did not want to sacrifice to the idea + of absolute peace security in the West. Germany at that time + accepted in good faith these reservations to the renunciation of + war. She did not object to the treaties with Poland and + Czechoslovakia, placed on the table at Locarno by the + representative of France, only because of the self-understood + supposition that these treaties adapted themselves to the + structure of the Rhine Pact and did not contain any provisions + on the application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League + of Nations, such as are provided for in the new French-Soviet + agreements. This was true also of the contents of these special + agreements, which came to the knowledge of the German Government + at that time. The exceptions permitted in the Rhine Pact did, it + is true, not expressly refer to Poland and Czechoslovakia, but + were formulated generally. But it was the sense of all + negotiations about this matter to find a compromise between the + German-French renunciation of war and the desire of France to + maintain her already existent pact obligations. If, therefore, + France now takes advantage of the abstract formulation of war + possibilities allowed for in the Rhine Treaty in order to + conclude a new pact against Germany with a highly armed state, + if thus in such a decisive manner she limits the scope of the + renunciation of war mutually agreed upon with Germany, and if, + as set forth above, she does not even observe the stipulated + formal juridical limits, then she has created thereby a + completely new situation and has destroyed the political system + of the Rhine Pact both in theory and literally.” + +I will omit the next paragraph and will quote from Page 9 of the +document book as follows: + + “The German Government have always emphasized during the + negotiations of the last years that they would maintain and + carry out all obligations of the Rhine Pact as long as the other + partners to the Pact also were willing on their part to adhere + to this Pact. This natural supposition cannot any longer be + regarded as fulfilled by France. In violation of the Rhine Pact, + France has replied to the friendly offers and peaceful + assurances, made again and again by Germany, with a military + alliance with the Soviet Union, directed exclusively against + Germany. Therefore the Rhine Pact of Locarno has lost its inner + meaning and has ceased to exist in any practical sense. For that + reason Germany also on her side does not consider herself bound + any longer by this pact which has become void.” + +In consideration of the Franco-Russian pact and the intentions of the +French General Staff, Hitler had the Defendant Von Ribbentrop come to +him in order to question him about the presumable attitude of England to +a possible German reoccupation... + +THE PRESIDENT: You are reading from the document, are you not, Dr. Horn? +You begin to tell us something about Hitler. + +DR. HORN: Yes, I interrupted at the phrase “as bound by this pact which +has become void,” in order to bring in the role of Ribbentrop briefly. +On the basis of this pact and of the intentions of the French General +Staff, Hitler then had the Defendant Von Ribbentrop... + +THE PRESIDENT: We shall hear that from Von Ribbentrop, shall we not? + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are permitted to add a few connecting words +to the documents. I can now... + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Pokrovsky. + +COL. POKROVSKY: As far as I can understand, the Tribunal has already +explained to Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel, Dr. Horn, that the Defense is +now submitting a document. Although Dr. Horn does not consider it +necessary to state when he deviates from the document and when he quotes +from it, I have had the opportunity of noting that in the document he +has just quoted, numbered Ribbentrop-1, there is a complete absence of +any reference to the plans of the French General Staff. Among the +documents in the document book submitted by Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel +I could not find any copies of the plans of the French General Staff. It +is therefore quite incomprehensible to me how Dr. Horn happens to be +informed about the plans of the French General Staff, and on what +grounds he refers to these plans while presenting evidence, in +Ribbentrop’s case, since they appear to be completely absent among the +documents to which he refers. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what you appeared to the Tribunal to be doing +then was not anything explanatory of the document, but telling us what +Hitler did, and what the Defendant Ribbentrop did, in consequence of +what Hitler did. That is not in evidence. You cannot tell us what is not +in evidence. You can only give us explanatory remarks to make the +document itself intelligible. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is accused on +account of the conduct of the entire foreign policy. The Prosecution +have presented the foreign political activity as they see it, and we +have been permitted, not to give a speech, but, in connection with the +documents submitted, to present our opposing view, as the Defense see +it. In order to do that, I must refer to certain facts, documents and +quotations. I can never give a complete picture if I may just submit a +document without giving a large frame to this matter, a certain +development in the entire policy. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is not expecting you to give +a complete picture at this stage. All you are doing at the present +moment is introducing the evidence. You are going to give the complete +picture when you make your final speech. It is intelligible, this +document. It is a document which is well known; it is perfectly +intelligible without telling us what Hitler or what the Defendant +Ribbentrop did. + +DR. HORN: Regarding these questions raised by the Russian Prosecutor, I +have already asked for the Defendant Von Neurath as a witness. I can +interrogate him on this point only after the Defendant Von Neurath is in +the witness box. But I can still refer now to these facts that are +counterevidence. + +THE PRESIDENT: But, you see, that would be his function. If you are +going to tell us what you think the Defendant Von Neurath is going to +say in answer to questions which you put to him, that would be making an +opening statement. Well, that has not been provided for by the Charter. +We must wait until you call Von Neurath or until you question Von +Neurath. + +DR. HORN: Then I will read from this document just mentioned, Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 1, on Page 10 of the document book: + + “The German Government are now forced to face the new situation + created by this alliance, a situation which is made more + critical by the fact that the Franco-Soviet pact has found its + complement in a pact of alliance of exactly parallel nature + between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In the interest of + the elementary right of a nation to safeguard its borders and to + guarantee its defensive capacities, the German Government have + therefore re-established the full and unrestricted sovereignty + of the Reich in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, + effective today.” + +I ask the Tribunal to accept the entire document as evidence. Through +this step of the German Government certain articles of the Treaty of +Versailles which were concerned with the demilitarization of the +Rhineland zone had become obsolete. Since this morning, by decision of +the Court, the taking of a position on the Versailles Treaty is not +permitted, I will omit the corresponding material from the document book +of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, and turn now to the document Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 8, which is on Page 21 of the document book. + +May I put another question first, Mr. President? + +THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. + +DR. HORN: Is it permitted to submit the official documents on the Treaty +of Versailles that were exchanged between governments before the +conclusion of the treaty? These are purely government documents and not +any arguments on the treaty itself. May these documents be submitted +after the decision of the Tribunal today? + +THE PRESIDENT: Which are they, the one on Page 21? + +DR. HORN: This is in regard to the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 3. + +THE PRESIDENT: Where is that? + +DR. HORN: It is on Page 14 of the document book. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal would like to know what issue in +this Trial this document is relevant to. + +DR. HORN: I wanted to explain by it the German opinion of the Treaty of +Versailles. Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 2 is the note of Germany to the +United States that contains the offer for an armistice and conclusion of +peace. And I wanted further to show in the next note again that this +offer was one based on the Wilsonian Fourteen Points. Further, with +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 4, I wanted to submit evidence that the peace +and the armistice were to be concluded on the basis of the Fourteen +Points with two exceptions. I also wanted to show through Ribbentrop +Exhibit... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I tried not to interrupt, but really +this is the issue that the Tribunal ruled on a fortnight ago when the +Defendant Göring, I think, applied for documents on exactly this issue; +and that also, as I understand, the Tribunal ruled on again this +morning. The issue is perfectly clear; the only issue to which this can +be directed is whether the Treaty of Versailles was in accordance with +the Fourteen Points and if not, was therefore an unjust treaty which +comes directly within the Tribunal’s ruling of an hour ago. + +DR. HORN: May I add something more? + +As far as I and my colleagues have understood the ruling of the Tribunal +today, the only prohibition is against making before this Tribunal +statements on the injustice of the treaty and on the fact that it +purportedly was concluded under duress. We have not understood the +decision in any other way. + +THE PRESIDENT: That was why I asked you to what issue this was relevant, +and you said that it was relevant to showing what the German opinion on +the treaty was. Well, these are documents of the period before the +treaty was made, and they seem to be only relevant upon the question of +whether or not the treaty was a just treaty or not a just treaty. + +DR. HORN: I personally did not want to demonstrate through this document +either that it was a just or an unjust peace, but only that it was a +treaty which had many legal inadequacies, since the main treaty was not +in line with the agreements of the preliminary treaty. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, if the main treaty was not in accordance with the +preliminary treaty then the main treaty would, according to that +argument be an unfair treaty. That is the very point upon which the +Tribunal has ruled. + +DR. HORN: For that reason, Mr. President, I have just omitted these +documents also and said that I will not refer to them in view of this +ruling. I will now turn to Document Number 8. + +THE PRESIDENT: As you are going through a lot of documents we might +break off for 10 minutes. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +MR. DODD: I do not want to take much of the Tribunal’s time, but in view +of the statement of Dr. Horn concerning the condition of the Defendant +Von Ribbentrop, I think it is required that we inform the Tribunal of +the situation as we understand it, which is something quite different +from the understanding of Dr. Horn. + +I have talked with Colonel Andrus and with one of the Army doctors in +attendance. Colonel Andrus has talked with both of them, and our +understanding is that Ribbentrop is not ill and is able to take the +witness stand; that he is nervous, and appears to be frightened, but he +is not disabled in any sense and is capable of testifying. + +DR. HORN: I come now to Page 21 of the document book, and ask the Court +to take judicial notice of the document appearing under Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 8. It is a copy, again from the _Dokumente der Deutschen +Politik_, Volume 4, which I turned over, signed, to the Court. It is the +speech of Ambassador Von Ribbentrop at the 91st session of the League of +Nations Council in London, regarding the Soviet Pact, the Locarno Pact +and the German Peace Plan. The speech was delivered on 19 March 1936. I +refer to Page 3 of the speech and begin my quotation with Number 5. I +quote: + + “According to this alliance, France and Russia appoint + themselves judges on their own affairs by independently + determining the aggressor, if occasion arises without a + resolution or a recommendation of the League of Nations, and + thereby are able to go to war against Germany according to their + own judgment. + + “This strict obligation of the two countries is clearly and + unequivocally evident from Paragraph 1 of the signatory protocol + to the Treaty of Alliance. That means: In a given case France + can decide, on her own judgment, whether Germany or Soviet + Russia is the aggressor. She merely reserves the right not to be + exposed, on account of military action based on such an + individual decision, to sanctions on the part of the powers + guaranteeing the Rhine Pact, namely, England and Italy. + + “From the point of view of law and realistic politics, this + reservation is meaningless. + + “In terms of law: How will France be able to foresee, when + determining the aggressor herself, what attitude the guarantors + of the Locarno Pact will afterwards assume towards her one-sided + definition? The answer to the question of whether France would + have to fear sanctions in such a case depends in practice not + only on the faithful adherence to the pact by the + guarantors—about which the German Government do not wish to + raise doubts in any way—but also on the most various + prerequisites of a purely factual nature, the probability or + improbability of which is not to be perceived in advance. In + addition, however, the evaluation of the relationship between + the new Treaty of Alliance and the Rhine Pact cannot be made + dependent on the treaty relationship between France and Germany + on the one hand and the Guaranteeing Powers on the other, but + only on the direct treaty relationship between France and + Germany themselves. Otherwise one would have to expect Germany + to tolerate silently every possible violation of the Rhine Pact + by France, in confidence that the guarantors would have to + provide for her security. That certainly is not the intention of + the Rhine Pact. + + “In terms of realistic politics: When a country is attacked by + such a superior military coalition as a consequence of a + decision, incorrect because taken in advance in one of the + party’s own interests, it is an empty consolation to obtain its + right in subsequent sanctions against the aggressors condemned + by the League of Nations Council. For what sanctions could + actually hit such a gigantic coalition reaching from East Asia + to the Channel? These two countries are such powerful and + important members and especially militarily strong factors of + the League of Nations that according to all practical + considerations, sanctions would be unthinkable from the outset. + + “Therefore this second reservation dealing with the + consideration of probable sanctions is of no consequence at all + from a realistic political point of view. + + “I now ask the members of the Council to bear in mind not only + the legal and practical political scope of this obligation of + France’s to act independently, but to ask yourselves above all + whether the opinion can be advocated that the German Government + of that time, which signed the Locarno Pact, would ever have + taken upon themselves the obligations of this Pact, had it + contained such one-sided stipulations as have now later + developed.” + +I now go to Page 26 of the document book, and the same document, and to +clarify the German point of view, I add the following. I quote: + + “But the Franco-Soviet Russian alliance means, beyond that—in + the German Government’s view of history—a complete elimination + of the hitherto existing European balance and consequently of + the fundamental political and legal conditions under which the + Locarno Pact was concluded at that time.” + +With this, Germany had expressed the legal basis of her attitude toward +the Locarno Pact and the Versailles stipulations regarding the +demilitarization of the Rhineland. In order to prove her will to disarm, +there is in the same document on Page 7, that is, Page 27 of the +document book, an exhaustive and detailed disarmament proposal. + +I ask the Tribunal to accept in evidence the document just cited, so +that I may later refer to it. + +With this exposition I conclude my presentation on Germany’s reasons for +reoccupying the Rhineland. Regarding the role of the Defendant Von +Ribbentrop in the occupation of the Rhineland, I shall enter upon that +when I call the Defendant to the witness stand. + +After the occupation of the Rhineland, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop +returned to London, where he was then ambassador. On 4 February 1938 he +was appointed Foreign Minister, and from that time on, conducted the +foreign policy along the lines laid down by Hitler. In proof of this +statement I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10, to be found in the +document book. This is a very short document that I submit to the +Tribunal for judicial notice. It is an excerpt from the speech of the +Führer before the German Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin on +19 July 1940. I quote: + + “I cannot conclude this appraisal without finally thanking the + man who for years has carried out my foreign political + directions in loyal, tireless, self-sacrificing devotion. + + “The name of Party member Von Ribbentrop will be linked for all + time with the political rise of the German Nation as that of the + Reich Foreign Minister.” + +I submit this quotation to the Tribunal to show according to what +principles the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had to conduct the foreign +policy. + +I should like now to ask the Tribunal to hear the witness State +Secretary Von Steengracht. + +[_The witness Von Steengracht took the stand._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please? + +ADOLF FREIHERR STEENGRACHT VON MOYLAND (Witness): Adolf von Steengracht. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the +Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will +withhold and add nothing.” + +[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] + +THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. + +DR. HORN: What was your last position in the Foreign Office? + +VON STEENGRACHT: From May 1943 I was State Secretary of the Foreign +Office. + +DR. HORN: What were your activities? + +VON STEENGRACHT: In order to present my activities in a comprehensible +way, I must make the following prefatory remarks: + +From the beginning of the war, the Foreign Minister had his office in +the neighborhood of Hitler’s headquarters; that is to say in most +instances several hundred kilometers distant from Berlin. There he +carried on business with a restricted staff. The Foreign Office in +Berlin had duties of a routine and administrative nature. But above all, +its duty was also the execution of the regular intercourse with foreign +diplomats. + +Within the limits of this field of duties, I bore the responsibility, as +State Secretary, from May 1943. The molding of foreign political +opinion, the decisions and instructions in foreign policy, on the other +hand, originated from headquarters, mostly without any participation, +sometimes also without any subsequent information to the Foreign Office. + +DR. HORN: Who determined the basic lines of the foreign policy? + +VON STEENGRACHT: The foreign policy, not only on its basic lines, but +also usually down to the most minute details, was determined by Hitler +himself. Ribbentrop frequently stated that the Führer needed no Foreign +Minister, he simply wanted a foreign political secretary. Ribbentrop, in +my opinion, would have been satisfied with such a position because then +at least, backed by Hitler’s authority, he could have eliminated partly +the destructive and indirect foreign political influences and their sway +on Hitler. Perhaps he might then have had a chance of influencing +Hitler’s speeches, which the latter was accustomed to formulate without +Ribbentrop, even in the foreign political field. + +DR. HORN: Were there other offices or personalities, in addition to the +Foreign Office, that concerned themselves with foreign policy? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, there was practically no office in the Party or +its organizations that, after 1933, had no foreign political ambitions. +Every one of these offices had a sort of foreign bureau through which it +took up connections with foreign countries in the attempt to gain its +own foreign political channels. + +I should judge the number of these to be approximately thirty. For +example, the Hitler Jugend, the SA, the German Labor Front, the SS, the +Rosenberg office with its Foreign Political office, the Propaganda +Ministry, the office Waldeck, the Ribbentrop office, the Nordic Society; +further, the VDA, the German Academy, the Reich Railways (Reichsbahn) +and others. Besides these offices, the immediate entourage of Hitler and +personalities like Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann had an influence in +the shaping of foreign policy. Göring, too, as I see it, had perhaps a +certain influence, but only until 1938—at any rate, in matters of +foreign politics, scarcely later than that. + +DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop make efforts to prevent such influences or +to exclude them? + +VON STEENGRACHT: From my own observation, I can give only the following +judgment: Almost every one of those persons, who had never before lived +in foreign countries and who, as an occasional traveling salesman for +the Third Reich, in peacetime, or after the occupation of a foreign +country, had eaten well in the capital of this or that foreign country, +considered himself an unrivaled expert on this country. They all had a +predilection for bringing their enlightenment and discernment to Hitler. +Unfortunately the further they were removed from actual conditions, the +more they were in contradiction to the political requirements and +necessities, and especially, unfortunately, the more so-called strength +was shown and the more they stood in contradiction to the elementary +feelings of humanity, the more they pleased Hitler. For Hitler regarded +such statements and representations as sound judgment, and they had +sometimes an irreparable effect, and formed in Hitler’s mind, together +with his so-called intuition, the start of some fundamental idea. To the +possible objection that it should have been easy for an expert to +criticize such an opinion or view, I should like to point out the +following: As long as the future German Ambassador in Paris was still a +teacher of painting, Hitler read his reports with interest; but when he +became the official representative of the Reich, his reports were mostly +thrown unread into the wastepaper basket. Himmler’s reports, the slanted +opinions of Goebbels, and Bormann’s influence played, on the other hand, +a decisive role, as did reports from agents which could not be checked +and which carried more weight than the opinions of experts on the +countries. + +DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for relations with all +foreign countries? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to remark further here that I have not +yet answered the second part of your question, namely, regarding the +elimination of this influence. + +With Hitler’s methods of work, these so-called counterinfluences simply +could not be eliminated. Against this “organized disorganization” +Ribbentrop waged an unmitigating, bitter war, and that against almost +all German offices. I should like to state further that at least 60 +percent of his time was devoted to these things alone. + +DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for the relations with all +foreign countries? + +VON STEENGRACHT: In peacetime, yes. + +DR. HORN: Did the position of the Foreign Office change with the +outbreak of war? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. In point of fact, the Foreign Office lost its +competency toward the country concerned at the moment when the German +bayonet crossed the border. The exclusive right to maintain direct +relations with foreign governments was eliminated in all occupied +territories; in most instances even the right to have a representative +of the Foreign Office whose post was for observation only and without +competency. This is particularly true for the Eastern Territories and +for Norway. + +Where Ribbentrop made the effort to maintain, in spite of the +occupation, a certain degree of independence of a country, as, for +example, in Norway, this activity of our diplomats was termed weak, +traitorous, stupid, and those responsible had to stop their work at +once, on Hitler’s orders, and disappeared from the Foreign Office. + +In general the changed position of the Foreign Office during the war is +best characterized by Hitler’s statement: “The Foreign Office shall, as +far as possible, disappear from the picture until the end of the war.” +Hitler wanted to limit the Foreign Office to about 20 to 40 people, and +it was even partially forbidden to form or to maintain any connection +with the Foreign Office. + +The Foreign Office, as such, and its officials were detested by Hitler. +He considered them objective jurists, defeatists, and cosmopolitans, to +whom a matter can be given only if it is not to be carried out. + +DR. HORN: Was there any foreign policy, in a traditional sense, in +Germany? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No; at least, I never noticed anything of it, for +Hitler had in effect made the statement: “Diplomacy is defrauding the +people. Treaties are childish; they are respected only as long as they +seem useful to the respective partners.” That was Hitler’s opinion of +all diplomats in the world. + +DR. HORN: Did the Foreign Office have any influence in the Eastern +territories and the territories that were under civilian administration? + +VON STEENGRACHT: T have already touched on this question. I have already +said that in the territories in which there was a military government or +a civilian administration, a representative of the Foreign Office—if he +was tolerated at all—was tolerated only as an observation post, at any +rate had no functions; that was the rule. + +I think I would be going too far if I went through the condition in +every country. The situations varied. + +DR. HORN: Do you consider Von Ribbentrop a typical National Socialist or +not? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop was, in his whole attitude, no typical +exponent of National Socialism. He knew extraordinarily little of the +dogma and doctrines of National Socialism. He felt himself only +personally bound to Hitler, whom he followed with soldierly obedience, +and he stood under a certain hypnotic dependence on Hitler. However, I +cannot characterize him as a typical exponent of National Socialism. + +DR. HORN: Was Hitler a man who was accessible to suggestions and +objections? + +VON STEENGRACHT: In the first years after 1933 he is said still to have +been; but during the course of years he shut himself off more and more +from expert objections and suggestions. From the time that I became +State Secretary, I saw him only twice on official occasions. I can thus +speak only on the success or lack of success of our work. In the course +of my activities, covering almost 2 years, I can now recall almost no +case in which he agreed to one of our suggestions. On the contrary, it +was always to be feared that by some suggestion of a personal nature he +would be led to take violent action in an opposite direction. The basic +trait of his character was probably lack of confidence, and this bore +unprecedented fruit. Thus, experts and decent people who tried to +influence Hitler to their way of thinking were engaged, in my opinion, +in an altogether vain task. On the other hand, irresponsible creatures +who incited him to take violent measures, or who voiced their +suspicions, unfortunately found him extremely accessible. These men were +then termed strong, whereas the behavior of anyone who was even halfway +normal was condemned as weak or defeatist; through a reasonable opinion +voiced only once, the influence of that man could be forever destroyed. + +DR. HORN: What conclusions did Hitler draw from contradictory viewpoints +in respect to the contradicting persons? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question in general terms. I have +already shown it in my previous answers. First of all the reaction +depended very much, in my opinion, on the mood of the Dictator at the +time. It was also a matter of importance as to who contradicted and how +much strength or weakness he had already shown or seemed to have shown. +But what the atmosphere was can perhaps be demonstrated by the following +case, shortly after the death of President Roosevelt, as told by +Ribbentrop’s liaison agent with Hitler, a man named Hewel. He said: + + “Today I almost met my doom. Goebbels came from the Führer, and + reported on Germany’s prospects, as far as the Führer saw them + affected by Roosevelt’s death, and he drew up a very hopeful + picture of the future. I, Hewel, was of the opinion that such a + view was not justified and remarked as much cautiously to + Goebbels. Goebbels fell into a rage, called me a spirit who + demoralized everyone, who trampled on the happy moods and hopes + of every decent person. I was forced,” Hewel reports, “to make a + special trip to see Goebbels and to ask him to keep the matter + to himself. For if he had informed the Führer of my attitude, + Hitler would have merely pressed a button, and called + Rattenhuber, the Chief of his Security Service, and had me taken + away and shot.” + +DR. HORN: How do you explain the fact that so many people remained in +Hitler’s circle, although they could not agree with him on basic +matters? + +VON STEENGRACHT: It is true that many people remained in their positions +although at heart they disapproved of Hitler’s methods of government +and, indeed, were inimical to those methods. There are various reasons +for this. + +First, it must be said that the NSDAP had come into power according to +the rules of parliamentary procedure as being the strongest Party in the +Reichstag. The officials employed had no reason at all to retire from +service on account of the change of government. In consequence of the +change to dictatorial government and the completely different concept of +the State which the change of government involved, the individual +suddenly found that he was no longer allowed to take a position of his +own concerning this regime. The notorious reign of terror began. +Everywhere, in the ministries and chancelleries, in private dwellings, +and in restaurants there hovered spies who, out of fanaticism or for +pay, were willing to report everything they heard. + +Nevertheless, many would deliberately have risked the gravest +consequences, if their withdrawal could have in any way improved +anything. But it became obvious that such persons merely sacrificed +themselves and especially their families unavailingly, because cases of +the kind were painstakingly withheld from publicity and therefore had no +effect. Worst of all was the fact that the appointment vacated was +filled by an especially radical man. Many people realized this and +remained at their posts in order to prevent the development that I have +just described. The great number of atrocities committed or ordered by +Hitler or Himmler have led many foreigners to the conclusion that the +German people as a whole shared the guilt for these crimes, or at least +had knowledge of them. This is not the case. The majority of people even +in high government positions did not learn details of these matters—or +the extent to which they were carried on—until the war was over. +Perhaps the key to this is found in the speech which Himmler delivered +in Posen on 3 October 1943 to his Gruppenführer, and which I learned of +for the first time here. This speech directed that his special +assignments—that means the actions against the Jews and the +concentration camps—were to be kept just as secret as had been the +events of 30 June 1934, of which the German people have only now learned +the authentic story. + +Guilt for all these occurrences rests only on a relatively small group, +to be appraised at a few thousand people. It was these who carried out +this unparalleled terror against the German people. But those who +thought differently and who remained are chiefly to be thanked for the +fact that, for example, the Geneva Convention was not renounced, that +tens or even hundreds of thousands of English or American airmen and +prisoners were not shot, that the unfortunate prisoners, those seriously +wounded, were returned during the war to their families in their home +countries; Greece in her dire need received food; exchange was +stabilized as far as possible, as in Belgium and France, and militarily +pointless destruction ordered in foreign countries and in the home +country could be in part prevented or at least lessened; indeed that the +principles of human justice, in some places at least, remained alive. +These circles were discouraged in their attitude earlier by the fact +that no foreign power had used the conditions in Germany as a reason for +breaking off diplomatic relations, but that almost all, until the +outbreak of war negotiated with National Socialism, concluded treaties +and even had their diplomatic representatives at the National Socialist +Party Days at Nuremberg. It was particularly noted that National +Socialist Germany, outwardly at any rate, received much more +consideration, understanding, and respect from foreign countries than +ever had the Weimar Republic despite all its fidelity to treaties or its +integrity. + +Then the war came, and with it special duties for civil servants, +officers, and every individual German. Should, and if so when and how +could these people who still felt themselves to be the servants of the +nation, leave their posts under these circumstances? Would they, above +all, by taking such a step be useful to their country and to humanity? +Would they have frightened Hitler or even warned him? + +DR. HORN: Did you make peace suggestions of a foreign political nature +to Von Ribbentrop after the French campaign? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I had at that time, to be sure, no official +position. But I nevertheless felt the need, and I believe it was a +heartfelt wish of many, if not all, Germans, to see peaceful conditions +again in the world as soon as possible. On the day of the capitulation +of the King of the Belgians, I suggested: + +Firstly, the creation of a United States of Europe on a democratic +basis. This would have meant independence of Holland, Belgium, Poland, +and so on. + +Secondly, if this could not be brought about with Hitler, at any rate to +have as few encroachments on the autonomy of the countries as possible. + +DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop speak to Hitler on this matter? + +VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. But at that time Hitler +considered such plans as premature. + +DR. HORN: Did you speak to Von Ribbentrop again in the winter of 1942-43 +on the same subject? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Ribbentrop at that time also worked out very +concrete proposals. They provided for the sovereignty and independence +of all conquered countries, including Poland, and in addition, a +far-reaching economic collaboration. + +DR. HORN: How did Hitler react then to these proposals? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler turned down these proposals giving as reason the +fact that the time was not suitable, the military situation not +favorable enough, that this would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. + +DR. HORN: Now to another question. Before the outbreak of the Russian +campaign, did Von Ribbentrop mention to Hitler Bismarck’s statement +about the danger of preventive wars? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop told me several times that he was very +concerned about the pact with Russia. In regard to preventive war, he +had stated to Hitler: “The good God does not let anyone look at His +cards.” I know too that Ribbentrop made efforts to bring our experts on +Russia to Hitler in order to explain to him the situation there and to +advise him against a war. Hitler did not permit these people to see him, +so far as I know. Only Ambassador Count Schulenburg was granted a short +audience. He, who considered such a war ill-advised and emphatically +rejected the idea, could not, however, advance his views on Russia and +the reasons against a war; for Hitler, having delivered a speech of his +own on this subject, after about 20 minutes dismissed him abruptly +without letting him speak a word. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the order of the Tribunal was that witnesses +might refresh their memory by notes, but this witness appears to the +Tribunal to have read practically every word he has said. That is not +refreshing your memory with notes. That is making a speech which you +have written out beforehand, and if that sort of thing goes on the +Tribunal will have to consider whether it is necessary to alter its rule +and adhere to the ordinary rule, which is that no witness is allowed to +refer to any notes at all except those made at the time. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, to be sure, I discussed the questions with the +witness; but his notes, if they have been made, were made by the witness +independently and without my knowledge of the exact contents. I shall +now ask the witness to answer my questions without making use of any +means which I do not know. I do not—that I want to emphasize once +again—know these answers. + +Witness, is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop tried to use his +influence with Hitler to stop the damaging tendencies against the Church +and the Jews? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I know that Ribbentrop spoke frequently with +Hitler on this theme. I was absolutely in despair about the policy +toward the Church and the Jews, and for this reason had occasion to +speak to him about it often, as I have said. But he explained to me +again and again when he returned from Hitler: “Hitler cannot be spoken +to on this point. Hitler says that these problems have to be solved +before he dies.” + +DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office have any knowledge +of the military planning? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop frequently told me that he was completely in +the dark in military affairs. So far as the Foreign Office was +concerned, it had no ideas whatever of strategic planning. + +DR. HORN: What were the relations between Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels, +and Bormann? + +VON STEENGRACHT: The relations between Ribbentrop and the aforenamed +gentlemen were as bad as can be imagined. There was a perpetual fight +between them. In my opinion Ribbentrop would have been Himmler’s first +victim if anything had happened to Hitler. A constant struggle and feud, +I should like to state, went on between these men with an exceptionally +sharp exchange of letters. + +DR. HORN: What was the relationship in general between the highest Party +and Reich offices? + +VON STEENGRACHT: The relationship in the individual departments +naturally varied according to the character and the origin of the +department chiefs. But one can say that the relationship was bad +throughout, and, especially, that reciprocal information, so urgently +necessary for state business, practically never developed. It was almost +more difficult for one minister to discuss a question with another +minister by telephone than to have had the Angel Gabriel himself come +from heaven and speak with one of us. Even on the most important and +essential matters, a factual discussion could not take place. There was, +in other words, practically no connection between these departments. +Moreover, they were very different, both in their character and in their +ideas. + +DR. HORN: Is anything known to you about objections on the part of the +Vatican, above all regarding the Polish clergy? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I heard about that later, and there must have been two +protests concerning the Catholic Polish clergy. These two notes were +submitted by the Nuncio to the State Secretary of that time. The then +State Secretary turned these over to Ribbentrop according to regulation, +and Ribbentrop in his turn presented them to Hitler. Since the Vatican +had not recognized the Government General, and accordingly the Nuncio +was not competent for these regions, Hitler declared when these notes +were presented to him: + + “They are just one blunt lie. Give these notes back to the + Nuncio through the State Secretary in a sharp form, and tell him + that you will never again accept such a matter.” + +DR. HORN: Were these notes then dealt with by the Foreign Office? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Sharp and precise instructions were then issued that in +all cases in which representatives of countries brought up matters which +were not within their authority, whether in conversations, or notes, +_note verbale_, memoranda, or other documents, these were not to be +accepted, and verbal protests were to be turned down sharply. + +DR. HORN: Is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop prevented the shooting +of about 10,000 prisoners of war after the terrible air attack on +Dresden? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I know the following: Von Ribbentrop’s liaison man +with Hitler called me up one day in great excitement. He informed me +that on a suggestion by Goebbels, the Führer intended, as reprisal for +the holocaust of Dresden, to have English and American prisoners of +war—I believe mostly airmen—shot. I went immediately to Ribbentrop and +informed him of this. Ribbentrop became very excited; he turned pale as +death; he was in fact almost stunned and thought it was impossible; +picked up the phone and called up this liaison man in person in order to +verify this report. The liaison man corroborated it. Then Ribbentrop got +up immediately and went to Hitler, came back, I think after half an +hour, and told me that he had succeeded in having Hitler withdraw this +order. That is all I know about this matter. + +DR. HORN: Do you know anything about the convocation of an anti-Jewish +congress? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the convocation of an anti-Jewish congress I +know something; I believe our liaison man with Hitler informed us that, +on a suggestion of Bormann, Hitler had ordered the calling of an +anti-Jewish congress through the Rosenberg office. Ribbentrop did not +want to believe this; but nevertheless had to accept this too as true, +once he had spoken with our liaison man. Then, since on the basis of +this decision we could do nothing more officially to prevent the thing, +we nevertheless worked our way into it, and we made efforts by a policy +of hesitation, delay, and obstruction to render the convocation +impossible. And although the order was given in the spring of 1944 and +the war did not end until April 1945, this congress never actually took +place. + +DR. HORN: Could you observe whether Von Ribbentrop often adopted a stern +manner with his staff, for reasons of state, although he sometimes +thought entirely differently? + +VON STEENGRACHT: This would be passing a judgment. But I believe that I +must affirm this: Thinking that he was being loyal to Hitler, +Ribbentrop—it seems to me—in those cases when he went to Hitler with a +preconceived opinion and returned with a totally different view, tried +afterwards to explain to us Hitler’s view. This he always did with +special vehemence. I would assume then that this was contrary to his own +most personal original ideas. + +DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop during the course of the war ask that Rome +and Florence be spared? + +VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. He did speak with Hitler on +these subjects. + +DR. HORN: Are you acquainted with an article by Goebbels in the _Reich_, +or perhaps the _Völkischer Beobachter_, dealing with lynch justice? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Once by chance I came to Ribbentrop when he was +reading a paper and was again very excited. He asked me if I had read +the article yet, this shocking article by Goebbels. It was an article on +lynch justice. + +DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop lodge a protest with Goebbels about this +article? + +VON STEENGRACHT: As far as I know, he charged our press chief who had +the liaison with Goebbels to lodge a protest against this article. But +to his surprise he was forced to see that this protest was useless since +the article had not only been inspired but, I believe, ordered by +Hitler, and thus there was nothing more to be done. + +DR. HORN: What attitude did the Foreign Office take in view of the trend +of this article? + +VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office repudiated the article vehemently, +because it comprised an offense against international law and thus made +us depart from international law in another field. Moreover, it appealed +to the lower instincts of man, and both in internal and external policy +did great damage. + +Besides, such an article, that has been read by several hundred +thousands or by millions, does irreparable damage anyway. We therefore +insisted that under no circumstances should such things appear in the +press again. I must regretfully state, however, that we had a very +difficult stand in this matter, especially since low-flying enemy craft +often shot peasants in the fields and pedestrians in the streets, that +is to say, purely civilian people, with their murder weapons. And our +arguments that in our field we wanted to observe international law under +all circumstances, were not taken into account at all either by most +German officers, or above all by Hitler personally. On the contrary, in +this case too we were regarded again only as formal jurists. But later +we did try, as much as we could, with the help of military offices, to +prevent the carrying out of this order. + +DR. HORN: Do you know of a Battalion Günsberg? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know of a Battalion Günsberg. I know, of +course, of a former Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg in the Foreign +Office. This Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg received, as far as I +recall—I did not at that time do any work at all connected with these +matters—received from Ribbentrop the assignment of following, with a +few people from the Foreign Office and a few drivers, the fighting +troops, and seeing to it that, firstly, the foreign missions, for +instance in Brussels and Paris, and so forth, that stood under the +protection of the protective powers, should not be entered by our +troops. And at the same time Günsberg was charged with protecting the +files in the Foreign ministries that were of foreign political interest. + +After the conclusion of the French campaign, Günsberg, as far as I +recall, was no longer in the active service of the Foreign Office, but +was listed with the Secret Field Police, from which he had received a +uniform, because as a civilian he could not enter these countries. + +DR. HORN: How and when did Günsberg’s job end? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop lost interest after these events in Günsberg +and the original assignment. Then, after the beginning of the Russian +campaign, Günsberg, so far as I remember, reported again for duty and +said that he intended to do the same thing in the East, and Ribbentrop +told him: + + “Yes, that is very good. You may go with a few people to the + army groups and see whether anything of interest for us is + happening there and also see to it that when we approach Moscow + the foreign embassies _et cetera_ are not entered, and that the + documents are preserved.” + +But he did not consider himself any longer as belonging to the Foreign +Office and apparently received orders from other offices. Then, as I +later heard, he had a large number of men under him and had many +automobiles which he could not have received from the Foreign Office any +more than he could have received a military uniform from the Foreign +Office so he was apparently working for other offices. + +DR. HORN: He no longer belonged to the Foreign Office at any rate not in +a military capacity? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No. And, in addition, when Ribbentrop heard that he had +undertaken such a large job, he charged me personally to call +immediately on the SS and say that he, Ribbentrop, did not want to have +Günsberg any longer, and at that time I told Obergruppenführer Wolff +that I should like to point out that we wanted nothing more to do with +Günsberg. See to it that you keep him with the Waffen-SS along with all +his subordinates. That is all I know about the matter of Günsberg. + +DR. HORN: Would Your Lordship like to interrupt the examination or +should I continue to put further questions? + +THE PRESIDENT: Unless you are going to conclude almost immediately, we +had better adjourn. Will you be some time longer with this witness? + +DR. HORN: I have a number of further questions. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + NINETY-SECOND DAY + Wednesday, 27 March 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +DR. HORN: Witness, you knew Count Ciano. Where and when did you meet +him? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I knew Count Ciano but not in a political sense, only +personally. I cannot remember exactly when I met him; probably it was on +the occasion of a state visit. I was working at the time in the Protocol +Department in the Foreign Office. + +DR. HORN: What experiences did you have with Count Ciano? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Since I did not work with him politically, I had no +political experience with him. + +DR. HORN: Now, another matter. Is it correct that Herr Von Ribbentrop +gave orders that under all circumstances the French franc should be +sustained against inflation? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Such measures can apply only to a time when I was not +yet State Secretary. But I know that the basic attitude towards France +and all occupied territories was that under all circumstances their +currency was to be preserved as far as possible, or rather should be +preserved by all means. That is why we often sent gold to Greece in +order to attempt to maintain the value of the currency there to some +extent. + +DR. HORN: What was accomplished in Greece by sending this gold there? + +VON STEENGRACHT: By sending gold to Greece we lowered the rate of +exchange of foreign currencies. Thus the Greek merchants who had hoarded +food to a large extent, became frightened and threw the food on the +market, and in this way it was made available to the Greek population +again. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop gave strictest orders not to +undertake any confiscation in occupied territories but to deal directly +only with their governments? + +VON STEENGRACHT: If you put the question like that, it is basically +correct, but I say, as I said yesterday, that in principle we had no +functions at all in the occupied territories, therefore no power to +confiscate, nor was such power within the jurisdiction of other +agencies; but it is correct that we negotiated only with the foreign +governments and that Von Ribbentrop had most strictly forbidden us to +support any direct measures concerning an occupied country which were +carried out by other departments. + +DR. HORN: For the time being I have no further questions to put to this +witness. + +DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Witness, are you +well acquainted with Von Papen as a result of the period during which +you were working in the Foreign Office and particularly during the time +you were active as State Secretary in the Foreign Office? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I had known Herr Von Papen for several years before +1933, but privately. Then I lost track of him for some time and +re-established contact with him when I became State Secretary in the +German Foreign Office. Then I was continually associated with him in an +official and unofficial capacity. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, particularly in the last period of your +activities as State Secretary, continually receive the reports which Von +Papen, as Ambassador in Ankara, sent to Berlin? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Unless Herr Von Papen sent reports directly to Von +Ribbentrop—which may have been possible; I do not know—I received them +weekly through official channels. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you remember that after two previous refusals Von +Papen took over the post of Ambassador in Ankara, in April 1939, on the +day that Italy occupied Albania, whereby an acute danger of war arose in +the Southeast? + +VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I was not State Secretary and also had no +political position, so that I am not acquainted with the events of that +period. But today I have the impression that he took over that position +after the Italians had occupied Albania. And he himself told me later +that at that time there was danger that the Italians would advance +further into the Balkans, possibly causing a conflict with Turkey, as a +result of which world peace would have been endangered. For that reason +he had decided at the time to accept the post. Exactly on which day that +was, I cannot say. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: What can you say in general about Herr Von Papen’s +efforts toward peace? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I am under the impression that Herr Von Papen always +strove to preserve peace by every means. He certainly considered that it +would be a great disaster for Germany and the world if war were to break +out. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were the efforts which Von Papen made during the war +towards establishing peace aimed at foregoing any annexations regardless +of the military outcome and completely re-establishing the sovereignty +of occupied territories, in short, to achieve, by means of reasonable +renunciation, a bearable status for all European states? + +VON STEENGRACHT: In principle it was quite clear that Von Papen always +worked for the re-establishment of peace under conditions which would +have re-established full sovereignty for all countries, and so that no +encroachment nor damage, material or otherwise would be inflicted on any +foreign countries. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was that Von Papen’s attitude even at the time of the +greatest German military successes? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I believe that his basic attitude in this respect never +changed. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were his continuous personal efforts to establish peace +held against Von Papen by Hitler, and was he considered a disagreeable +outsider in that connection? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I did not have an opportunity to discuss it with +Hitler; I only know that he was quite generally criticized by Hitler and +other persons as a man who always followed a weak line. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen frankly acknowledge that peace would +be impossible as long as Hitler and the Party existed in Germany and the +necessary credit for negotiating abroad was lacking? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I think it must have been about April 1943 or May +1943, that I spoke to Von Papen in detail about the whole subject, +since, at that time, I had just become State Secretary. At that time he +very clearly voiced the opinion to me which you have just sketched. It +was quite plain to him that foreign countries would conclude no peace +with Hitler and the methods he employed. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Just one last question, Witness: The Indictment accuses +the Defendant Von Papen of being an unscrupulous opportunist. You, +Witness, know the defendant from the reports and from all the official +relations the defendant had with his superior office for a number of +years. Did you, on the strength of that knowledge, get the impression +that this characterization of Von Papen is correct, or can you say, on +the strength of these reports and these official relations, that Von +Papen appears to you to be a man who always tells the truth, even when +that truth is disagreeable to his quite unpleasant superiors, and even +when the voicing of that truth involves personal danger for him? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I can say that is absolutely so. I find the best +evidence of it is that Herr Von Papen was finally completely eliminated +from the position of Vice-Chancellor and resigned from the government, +then he became a private citizen and only in the greatest emergency was +he called upon. In my opinion, Von Papen made himself available only +because he said to himself, “I have still got a certain amount of +credit, I am a good Catholic, and accordingly I represent an attitude +which is opposed to all inhumanity, _et cetera_. Perhaps I can, through +my intervention, exercise some influence in that direction.” I myself +never attended a meeting or a conference which took place between Hitler +and Von Papen, but, particularly from my liaison officer with Hitler, I +often heard that Von Papen, in his smooth way, often told Hitler many +things which no one else could have told Hitler and I believe that +through his manner he prevented a number of things, at least for a time. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. + +DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, you have stated +that Hitler, because of the terrible bombing attack on Dresden, intended +to issue an order according to which thousands of prisoners of war were +to be killed in reprisal. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: Do I remember your testimony of yesterday correctly, that all +you have said about this matter is information from, or based on +information from Herr Von Ribbentrop? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No. + +DR. NELTE: What do you know from your own personal knowledge? + +VON STEENGRACHT: From my own personal knowledge I only know that our +liaison man with Hitler called me on the telephone and told me that +Goebbels had proposed to Hitler that 10,000 or more British and American +prisoners of war be shot in reprisal, and that Hitler would agree or had +agreed. I immediately reported this to Von Ribbentrop, and he went there +at once and told me after half an hour that the order had been +withdrawn. About Field Marshal Keitel I know nothing at all in that +connection. + +DR. NELTE: You do not know, therefore, who was the originator of that +order? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No. + +DR. NELTE: Who suggested it, I mean. + +VON STEENGRACHT: The suggestion for that order evidently came from +Goebbels according to the information which I received. + +DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop, do you mean? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Who? + +DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No, Von Ribbentrop had nothing to do with that. + +DR. NELTE: Then from Herr Hewel? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Herr Hewel told me that. He called me up and told me +that. + +DR. NELTE: And you know nothing about the participation of military men? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I know nothing at all about the participation of +military men. + +DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. + +DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the +German Armed Forces): Witness, I have only one question. Did you, as +State Secretary, or did the Foreign Office regularly inform military +offices, for instance, the Army High Command or the High Command of the +Navy, with reference to pertinent matters of German politics? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No, they were not informed. + +DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. + +THE PRESIDENT: Does the British Prosecutor wish to cross-examine? + +COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): +Witness, you told us yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop was against +the persecution of the churches, was against the persecution of Jews, +and did not know what was going on in the concentration camps. You have +told us that he was not a typical Nazi. What are the qualities of a +typical Nazi? + +VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical National Socialist, I mean a man who +fanatically acknowledges and represents all the doctrines of National +Socialism. + +Herr Von Ribbentrop, as I said, followed Hitler personally, but he +really knew uncommonly little of any of the other ideology and never +bothered about it. He never spoke at meetings, never participated in +large rallies, and therefore, he really knew extremely little about the +people and the mood of the people. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: By “a typical Nazi,” do you mean someone who was +persecuting the churches? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: I will repeat it. By “a typical Nazi,” do you mean a +man who was engaged in persecution of the churches? + +VON STEENGRACHT: At any rate, someone who, if Adolf Hitler considered it +right, did not state his personal opinion on the matter. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: And a man who would take his full share in persecution +and extermination of Jews? + +VON STEENGRACHT: That I would not like to say either. That was limited +to a certain circle of people. A large number even of fanatical Nazis +knew nothing about these atrocities and repudiated them and would have +repudiated them, had they been properly informed of them. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: I understand you to say that you knew nothing of them +yourself. Is that so? + +VON STEENGRACHT: That I knew nothing? + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. + +VON STEENGRACHT: In my position as State Secretary and because I read +foreign papers, and particularly since I had contact with the +opposition, I knew of many things connected with concentration camps. In +all these cases, as far as it was in my power, I intervened. But +regarding the things which I have heard here now, I knew nothing at all. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you about another matter. You have +told us that Ribbentrop had no responsibility in the occupied +territories. Your words were that “the Foreign Office lost +responsibility at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the +frontier.” Is that right? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I said that at that moment at which the German bayonet +crossed the frontier the Foreign Office lost the sole right to negotiate +with foreign governments everywhere. Beyond that, in most countries, the +Foreign Office did not have the right to have even a diplomatic observer +without authority, particularly in Norway and the Eastern Territories. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You have said the Foreign Office had no right to have +an observer there, and that direct relations with occupied territories +were withdrawn, is that right? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No, I said that in all occupied territories the Foreign +Office no longer had the sole right to negotiate with the government, +since there was then either a civil administration in those countries or +a military government with auxiliary command offices and a military +administrative head, and that these offices themselves then approached +the foreign governments and their executive organs in the countries +occupied at that time. Consequently one can no longer say that the +Foreign Office had the sole right to negotiate with the governments. But +in some countries, as in the North and the East, we no longer had any of +our people at all, and Hitler had issued the order that we withdraw our +observers from the other countries, such as Holland, Belgium and so on. +However, we did not do so. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You say that in France you had an ambassador reporting +direct to Ribbentrop, did you not? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: And his duties included advising the Secret Field +Police and the Secret State Police by the impounding of politically +important documents and securing and seizure of public property; +further, of private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the +basis of instructions especially given for the matter. Isn’t that right? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I already emphasized yesterday that only since 1943 had +I anything at all to do with political affairs. If I understood your +question correctly, Mr. Prosecutor, you are of the opinion that the +Secret State Police and the German executive organs in France were under +our jurisdiction. That is incorrect. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. I asked you if the +Minister Abetz had not got those duties. + +VON STEENGRACHT: He did not have the assignment of confiscating any +French property or carrying out any action against the Jews. No orders +of that kind went through my hands during my time, and he could... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: [_Handing the document to the witness._] Will you look +at Document 3614-PS. + +My Lord, that was put in as French Exhibit Number RF-1061 on the 4th of +February. It is a letter dated the 3rd of August 1940, signed by +Ribbentrop, to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces +(OKW). It reads: + + “The Führer has appointed the former Minister Abetz Ambassador + and after my report has decreed as follows: + + “I. Ambassador Abetz has the following tasks in France...” + +then it sets out a number of tasks and Number 6 is the one I put to the +witness: + + “6. Advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police + in connection with the impounding of politically important + documents. + + “7. Securing and seizure of public art property; further, of + private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the basis of + instructions specially given for this case.” + +Then the concluding paragraphs: + + “II. The Führer has hereby expressly ordered that Ambassador + Abetz is exclusively responsible for the handling of all + political questions in Occupied, and Unoccupied France. Insofar + as his functions touch military interests, Ambassador Abetz will + act only in agreement with the Military Commander in France. + + “III. Ambassador Abetz is attached to the Military Commander in + France as his Commissioner. His seat remains Paris as + heretofore. He receives instructions for carrying out his tasks + from me and is responsible exclusively to me on these + matters.”—Signed—“Ribbentrop.” + +I want to ask you one or two questions about the Jews. You have told us +that you and the Defendant Ribbentrop... + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal would like to know why +this witness told them that Ambassador Abetz did not have the task of +confiscating property. + +[_Turning to the witness._] Why did you say that? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz had no executive powers, and he was +expressly forbidden to intervene in French internal affairs. He could, +therefore, address himself exclusively to the French Government, and if +the French Government did anything by means of their executive power, +then that was a transaction on the part of the French Government but +never a confiscation carried out by Abetz. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: That is not an answer to the question. The question is +why, when you were asked whether Abetz had the task of advising the +Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police on the impounding of +politically important documents, did you not say so? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I said that no order went through my hands, since I did +not become State Secretary until May 1943. This is an order of 3 August +1940. But here we are concerned only with an official directive +addressed to Ambassador Abetz. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: At this time you were Ribbentrop’s personal adjutant, +weren’t you? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, but not political secretary. I was +only... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You were adjutant? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, that is to say I was concerned with +technical matters. At that time I never presented a political report to +him. But I should add, if I may, this concerns a directive to Ambassador +Abetz and this directive was completely outdated by actual conditions. +Because advising the Secret Field Police... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: How do you know that, if you were only personal +adjutant and not acting in political matters? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz was ambassador until May 1945. +Therefore from 1943 to 1945 I continuously corresponded with him, and +during that time Ambassador Abetz continually fought against the +measures which were carried out by the Secret State Police anyway. It +was a bitter struggle and he was personally threatened in all possible +matters. One can talk about advice, but whether people heeded him—he +had no power—that is quite another question. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Does it come to this, that your answer about occupied +territories applies only after 1943? + +VON STEENGRACHT: From my own experience I can speak only about the +period after 1943. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to turn to the question of Jews. You have +told us that you and Ribbentrop, by adopting a policy of delay, +prevented the holding of the Anti-Jewish Congress in 1944; is that +correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you were against the policy of persecution of +the Jews. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: And so was the Defendant Ribbentrop? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: I want you to look at Document 3319-PS. [_Handing the +document to the witness._] + +My Lord, that is a new document. It will be Exhibit GB-287. + +[_Turning to witness._] Now you have got a photostat there. Will you +look at Page 4 of the German—that’s the first page of the English. That +is a letter dated the 28th of April on the subject of anti-Jewish action +in foreign countries. It is marked at the bottom of Page 4. + +VON STEENGRACHT: I have not found it. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you look at Page 4, marked in a black square at +the bottom of the page. You see a letter dated the 28th of April 1944, +Subject: Anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, and it is addressed to +practically every German legation and mission abroad. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Turn to Page 10. You will see that it purports to be +signed by you; is that correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You remember the letter? I will read you the first +paragraph to refresh your memory. “The Reich Foreign Minister...” + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + + COL. PHILLIMORE: “...has ordered the creation of Information + Department XIV (Anti-Jewish Action Abroad) under the leadership + of Envoy I. K. Schleier, whose task it is to deepen and + strengthen the anti-Jewish information service abroad by the + incorporation of all experts of the departments and working + units of the Foreign Office who have an interest and take part + in the anti-Jewish information service abroad, in close + co-operation with all offices outside the Foreign Office which + are engaged in anti-Jewish work and with the German missions in + Europe.” + +Then you set out the co-workers, number of departments of the Foreign +Office, and then one permanent representative of the Reich Security Main +Office—that’s Himmler’s office, isn’t it? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: And one representative of the office of Reichsleiter +Rosenberg. That department just up above “Inland II,” that is the +Foreign Office which had liaison with the SS, isn’t it? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: At that time the chief was a man called Wagner and the +assistant chief, Von Thadden? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you still say that you were against the policy of +persecution of the Jews? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I maintain that now as before. I also say, as I +have already said during earlier interrogations, that even the holding +of an anti-Jewish congress in its effect would not have been directed +against the Jews because what was happening in Germany was all taking +place under the seal of secrecy and no one was informed in any way. The +Jews disappeared. But if there had been an international congress, one +would have been forced in the first place to bring up the question: +where are these Jews anyway? What is actually happening to these Jews? + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Is the point this, that you wanted to put off an +anti-Jewish congress because that would be known to the world, but you +were quite prepared to set up an organization in the Foreign Office? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Gentlemen, we must separate two completely different +problems here. The one problem is this: There were offices in Germany +which conducted and carried out anti-Jewish measures. These +organizations also reached abroad and there, without the knowledge and +without the participation of the Foreign Office, did away with the +people in foreign countries. Consequently, an improvement and a policy +guided to some extent into normal channels could exist only if some +German department had really assumed responsibility for these things at +that time. For we did not hear of these matters; we always heard the +complaints which we received from foreign mission heads about events +which took place. But we had no means of control. If I applied to the +inner German offices... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Was this set up to control the anti-Jewish policy, this +department? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Apparently we are discussing two different matters here +today. The anti-Jewish congress had been ordered. The fact that +Rosenberg’s office was holding an anti-Jewish congress... + +THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. The question was: Was +this organization, referred to in this letter, set up to control the +organization of anti-Jewish work abroad? That is the question. Can you +not answer that by “yes” or “no”? + +VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office could not exercise general control +since all anti-Jewish questions were principally dealt with in +Rosenberg’s office. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Well then, what was the purpose of this organization of +the Foreign Office? + +VON STEENGRACHT: By Hitler’s order we had to contact all German +departments and archives in order to collect all the material there, and +we attached importance... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: And this was ordered by Ribbentrop, wasn’t it? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: As set out in your letter? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. And we thought it important that we get an idea in +this way of what was actually happening to the Jews, _et cetera_, and +therefore we drew in people from all offices. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you in a minute what was actually happening +and out of your own files, but I just want to put this to you: + +The point of your putting off the anti-Jewish congress was simply +because you did not want the world to know. You had not the slightest +objection to setting up an anti-Jewish organization in Germany. + +Now, will you look at Page 32 of the German text. + +My Lord, that is on Page 23 of the English text. + +You will see there a letter from Rosenberg’s office to the Foreign +Office, signed by Bräutigam, Page 32 of the German text. It is marked at +the bottom of Page 32. + +Bräutigam was your liaison officer with Rosenberg, wasn’t he, Witness? +Was Bräutigam your liaison officer in Rosenberg’s office? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No. Bräutigam was, I think, in the Foreign Office in +1941. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: And in 1942. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but in 1941, since he had previously been working +on Eastern problems in the Foreign Office, he had been transferred and +was now in the Rosenberg office. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. And you will see there he is referring to a +conference with Obersturmbannführer Eichmann, that is, the chief of the +Jewish section of the Gestapo, and a Dr. Wetzel, and he sends you a copy +of an agreement made at Tighina in Romania on the 30th of August 1941 +with the request for acknowledgment. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, there could be an error here. This +letter is dated 11 March 1942. I became State Secretary in May 1943. I +therefore know nothing about this matter. I should like to remark... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You just listen and wait until you are asked a +question. We shall get on faster if you just listen to the letter: + + “I point out especially Number 7 of the agreements... I have + already taken a position in my letter of 5 March 1942.” + +Now, that enclosed an agreement made between the German and Romanian +General Staffs, and, if you will look at Paragraph 7, on Page 38 of the +German, Page 27 of the English, this was the agreement they made: + + “Deportation of Jews from Transnistria. Deportation of Jews + across the Bug is not possible at present. They must, therefore, + be collected in concentration camps and set to work until a + deportation to the east is possible after the end of + operations.” + +And then there’s a note on the file on the next page of the German, +still on Page 27 of the English: + + “According to information from Director General Lecca, today + 110,000 Jews are being evacuated from Bukovina and Bessarabia + into two forests in the Bug River Area. As far as he could + learn, this action is based upon an order issued by Marshal + Antonescu. Purpose of the action is the liquidation of these + Jews.” + +Now, do you doubt that that agreement, enclosed with that letter sent to +the Foreign Office, would have reached the Defendant Ribbentrop? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Well. I see this document and this agreement for the +first time today. Nothing of this entire affair... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Would you answer the question? Do you doubt that +that letter and that agreement enclosed with it would have been shown to +the Defendant Ribbentrop? + +VON STEENGRACHT: At that time there was an Under Secretary of State +Luther in the Foreign Office who acted quite independently; and I fought +a bitter battle against him although I was not called upon to do it, +because he wanted to introduce National Socialist methods. Whether he +submitted this matter to Ribbentrop or not I cannot decide. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. We come to a time when you were the State +Secretary. Would you look at Page 31 of the German text, Page 20 of the +English. + +THE PRESIDENT: What do the words that follow the passage you have just +read mean on Page 27: “Bucharest, 17 October 1941 (Signature +illegible)”—and below—“To be discussed with Vice Minister President +Antonescu. Confidential, Bucharest, 16 October 1943”? + +COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is badly typed. “Bucharest, 17 October +1943” and then follows the next letter. The previous part is a note on +the file. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a note on the German Legation file on Bucharest. + +THE PRESIDENT: Go on. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: I have not troubled the Tribunal with the following +letters. They deal with the earlier date on the expulsion of Jews from +firms owned by citizens of the German Reich. + +[_Turning to the witness._] Now would you look at Page 31 of the German, +Page 20 of the English. You will see there a document sent to... + +THE PRESIDENT: When you started that document you didn’t give the date +in full. The year there appears to be 1944, doesn’t it? + +COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not. In 1942, I think, My Lord. + +THE PRESIDENT: It should be April 29, 1942? Is the date at the head of +the document? + +COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the letter I read was dated March ’42 and +marked with a foreign office stamp “Received 13th of March 1942...” + +THE PRESIDENT: I am speaking of the whole document, Page 1 of the +document. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is a file, one of those rather inconvenient +documents, a file, and it starts with the earliest date at the bottom +and then works up to 1944. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then the part you read first... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: That was 1944. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. What page are you going to now? + +COL. PHILLIMORE: I was going to Page 20 now, My Lord. + +[_Turning to the witness._] Now, this is a communication from Von +Thadden who was, as you have told us, assistant in the Department Inland +II, to the German Legation in Bucharest. It is dated 12 October 1943, +and it is stamped as received on 18 October. And he encloses a letter +signed by Müller in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, to all German police +authorities abroad. You will see that it goes to the commander of the +Security Police in Prague, The Hague, Paris, Brussels, Metz, Strasbourg, +Luxembourg, Kraków, Kiev, Smolensk, and so on. October ’43. That is +after you had become Secretary of State, isn’t it? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You were appointed in April? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Turning to the substance of the letter, the subject is +the treatment of Jews with foreign citizenship in the sphere of German +power: + + “In agreement with the Foreign Office, all Jews who remain in + the sphere of German power after the end of the so-called + home-bringing action and who have the citizenship of the + following countries may now be included in the evacuation + measures: Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, + Finland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey. + + “Since the evacuation of these Jews to the East cannot yet take + place at the present time, for reasons of foreign policy, a + temporary stay is provided in Concentration Camp Buchenwald for + male Jews over 14 years of age and in the Concentration Camp + Ravensbrück for Jewesses and children. + + “The necessary measures are to be carried out on the following + dates: + + “a) for Jews with Italian citizenship, immediately; + + “b) for Jews with Turkish citizenship, on 20 October 1943; + + “c) for Jews with citizenship of other countries mentioned + above, on 10 October 1943. + + “A special application for protective custody is not required + for the transfer to the concentration camp, but the + concentration camp headquarters are to be notified that the + transfer to the concentration camp is taking place in keeping + with the evacuation measures.” + +And then there are arrangements about baggage. And if you look at 31-e, +you will see at the foot of Page 22, on the English, that that had been +signed by Müller and then was signed again by a clerk of Himmler’s +office. And then on the next page of the English, still on 31-e of the +German, Himmler’s office sends it to the Foreign Office, to Von Thadden, +on 2 October. + +Now, did you not see that document when it got to the Foreign Office? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No, I see this document today for the first time. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You were the State Secretary? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. This obviously concerns a measure which was +ordered by another office. Within the German Reich the Foreign Office +had no executive powers at all and no possibilities and consequently... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: No executive powers, but it was sent to you for +information. + +VON STEENGRACHT: That was sent to us, this affair, solely for our +information, and it was not given to me, this affair. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You had a departmental liaison with the SS, a Mr. Von +Thadden. Was he not a competent official? + +VON STEENGRACHT: The exact content of this affair I do not even know +now, because I have not read it through at leisure. I can imagine only +the following in reference to this whole matter: The question whether +the Jews who were in Germany could be returned to their home countries +was discussed for a long time. This, I think, is what we are concerned +with here? + +COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t think we are interested in your imagination. +Either you know or do not know. I asked you whether Von Thadden was a +competent official. + +VON STEENGRACHT: I have not seen this document. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. Was Von Thadden a +competent official? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Von Thadden was a man from the Foreign Office who knew +his job. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, knew his job. And do you not think that as State +Secretary he ought to have shown you this document? + +VON STEENGRACHT: He should have done that, certainly, if this matter was +not arranged in another office, and I was completely excluded from the +anti-Jewish action. Also instructions about anti-Jewish actions abroad +never went through my office. I pointed out yesterday, at the beginning +of my statement, that many matters were arranged directly in the highest +places, and that the Foreign Office also was not notified afterwards, +and orders in these matters... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a document you were informed about? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Müller sent it to the Foreign Office. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: And you sent it to your legation at Bucharest? + +VON STEENGRACHT: He ought certainly to have put that before me. But I +did not see it. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: And if you just look again at the letter, you notice +how Müller’s instructions start. He begins, “In agreement with the +Foreign Office...” + +VON STEENGRACHT: Where does it say so? Unfortunately I have not found +it. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: At the start of the letter: “Subject: Treatment of Jews +of foreign citizenship in the sphere of German power.” And then he +begins: “In agreement with the Foreign Office...” Does that just mean in +agreement with Mr. Von Thadden? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that this type of thing went to the competent +experts, and since this concerns a basic matter it was put directly +before Herr Von Ribbentrop. I request that Herr Von Ribbentrop should be +asked whether he knows of this matter or not. I have not seen this +matter. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a matter of such importance that it could not +have been agreed with the Foreign Office without Ribbentrop being +consulted; isn’t that the case? + +VON STEENGRACHT: In my opinion, I would never have decided alone on this +matter if it had been put before me. I am of the opinion that it was an +affair which would have to be put before Von Ribbentrop. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Good. And, of course, Von Ribbentrop was one of the +most ruthless persecutors of Jews, wasn’t he? + +VON STEENGRACHT: That is not correct. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: I am going to read you a short passage from a +conference between the Führer, Ribbentrop and the Hungarian Regent, +Horthy. This is Document D-736, which was put in as Exhibit GB-283 by +Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, to the Defendant Göring. This was a meeting at +Klessheim Castle on the morning of 17 of April 1943. And you see the +minutes are signed by Schmidt. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: The question of Jews was raised: + + “The Führer replied that it was the fault of the Jews who + considered hoarding and profiteering as their main sphere of + activity, even during the World War; in exactly the same way as + in England, sentences for rationing offenses, and the like, now + chiefly concern Jews. To Horthy’s counterquestion as to what he + should do with the Jews, now that he had deprived them of almost + all possibilities of livelihood—he could not kill them off—the + Reich Foreign Minister declared that the Jews must either be + exterminated or taken to concentration camps. There was no other + possibility.” + +And then, you see, the Führer goes on to describe them as tuberculosis +bacilli. Now, in the face of that document, do you still say that the +Defendant Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution and +extermination of the Jews? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday already that Herr Von Ribbentrop, when +he was with Hitler... + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Never mind what you said yesterday. I am putting it to +you now, today. You have now seen that document. Do you still say that +Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution and extermination of +the Jews? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Here, too, I should like to make a distinction between +the real instincts of Von Ribbentrop and what he said when he was under +Hitler’s influence. I said already yesterday that he was completely +hypnotized by Hitler and then became his tool. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, became his tool. And from then on, he was prepared +to do anything that Hitler wanted and was as violent a Nazi as anyone; +isn’t that right? + +VON STEENGRACHT: He followed blindly the orders given by Hitler. + +COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. And to the extent of conniving at any and every +atrocity, isn’t that right? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Since he had no executive powers he personally did not +commit these cruelties. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other chief prosecutors want to +cross-examine? + +COL. AMEN: You testified yesterday that you did not consider Ribbentrop +to be a typical Nazi; is that correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: Do you consider Göring to be a typical Nazi? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Göring made speeches at every type of meeting and +fought for the seizure of power, and accordingly he had a completely +different position in the party than Ribbentrop. + +COL. AMEN: I think you can answer my question “yes” or “no.” We are +trying to save time as much as possible. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly. + +COL. AMEN: Do you consider Göring to be a typical Nazi according to the +same standards that you were using with Ribbentrop, yes or no? + +VON STEENGRACHT: This question one cannot answer in that way with “yes” +or “no.” I am trying every... + +COL. AMEN: You answered it that way with respect to Ribbentrop, didn’t +you? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Göring was a peculiar type of person. I cannot class +him with the ordinary Nazis, as one usually expresses it. + +COL. AMEN: In other words, you don’t know whether you think he is a +typical Nazi or not, is that what you want the Tribunal to understand? + +VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical Nazi one understands the “average” Nazi. +Göring is a unique person and one cannot compare his manner of living +with the other National Socialists. + +COL. AMEN: Well, are you acquainted with all of the gentlemen in the box +there in front of you? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell me which of those individuals you consider +to be a typical Nazi, according to the standards which you applied +yesterday to Ribbentrop? + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I do not want to interrupt your +cross-examination, but want to say that there is too much laughter and +noise in Court, and I cannot have it. Go on, Colonel, with your +cross-examination. + +COL. AMEN: Do you understand my last question? Please name those of the +defendants in the box whom you consider to be typical Nazis, on the same +standard which you yesterday applied to Ribbentrop. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I am convinced that here the witness is making +a decision which in my opinion should be made by the Court at the end of +the proceedings. That is an evaluation which the witness cannot make. + +COL. AMEN: This is the subject that was brought up by this very Counsel +yesterday with respect to Ribbentrop. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it a perfectly proper question. They +understand that the phrase “a typical Nazi” was used by the witness +himself. + +COL. AMEN: And please just give us the names and not a long explanation, +if you can. + +VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday that by “typical Nazi” I meant people +who are familiar with the dogma and doctrine. I want to add today that +by “typical Nazis” I mean further those people who during the time of +struggle represented National Socialist ideology and were propagandists +of National Socialism. Rosenberg’s book is known, Herr Frank, as +President of the Academy for German Law is known, these are +really—Hess, of course, too—and these are people whom I want to put +into the foreground very particularly because by their writings and so +forth and by their speeches they became known. No one ever heard +Ribbentrop make an election speech. + +COL. AMEN: But you are not answering my question. Am I to assume from +that that in your opinion Rosenberg, Frank and Hess are the only persons +whom you could characterize as being typical Nazis, according to your +standards? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Well, shall I go through the ranks of the defendants to +give an opinion on each one? + +COL. AMEN: Precisely. Just give me the names. No, I do not want your +opinion. I want to know under your standards which of them you consider +to be typical Nazis. + +VON STEENGRACHT: I have already stated the standard before. It can be +proved by whether the people unreservedly represented the National +Socialist ideology in words or at meetings and in this respect I named +the prominent ones. + +COL. AMEN: And you consider all of the others not to be typical Nazis? +Correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. Then I would have to go through +them individually. + +COL. AMEN: I have asked you to do that three times. Will you please name +them individually? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I also see Herr Sauckel. Herr Sauckel was Gauleiter and +was active as a leader in the National Socialist movement. Then I see +the Reich Youth Leader, who educated the Hitler Youth. + +COL. AMEN: Who else? Just give me the names. Do not give these +explanations, please. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Well, I think that with that I have pointed out the +typical representatives of the Party. + +COL. AMEN: Well, how about Streicher? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I do not see him here, or I would have answered in the +affirmative. + +COL. AMEN: In other words, you consider him to be a typical Nazi under +your standards? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but please do not attribute his abuses to all +National Socialists. + +COL. AMEN: Now, while you were working with Ribbentrop, do I understand +that you knew nothing about the murders, tortures, starvations and +killings which were taking place in the concentration camps? + +VON STEENGRACHT: By the fact that foreign diplomats applied to me, and +by the fact that I was informed by opposition elements in Germany, and +from enemy propaganda, I knew of the existence and some of the methods. +But, I emphasize, only a part of the methods. I learned about the total +extent and degree only in internment here. + +COL. AMEN: Did you know that priests were being tortured and starved and +killed in concentration camps while you were working with Ribbentrop? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No, I heard nothing specific regarding individual +things that occurred there, and if that had happened or has happened to +priests, then I would consider the only authentic information to be that +which the Nuncio or the Vatican had given me; but that did not occur. +But in spite of the fact that, as I said yesterday, the Vatican had no +jurisdiction, I took care of all cases based on humanity, that is, all +humanitarian cases. I took care of them, and always strove to handle +them successfully. I handled 87 cases in which my activity threatened to +bring about my death. I intervened in hundreds of cases, and thus saved, +or at least improved, the lives of thousands and thousands of people. + +COL. AMEN: If you don’t confine your answers directly to my questions, +it is very difficult to get through and to save time. Now, will you +please try to answer my questions “yes” or “no,” if possible, and make +your explanations short. Do you understand? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I understand perfectly. As far as I can, I shall of +course do so. + +COL. AMEN: Did you know that nuns were being tortured and starved and +killed in concentrations camps, while you were working with Ribbentrop? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No. + +COL. AMEN: You did not know either about what was happening to priests +or the nuns or to other inmates of concentrations camps? Correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I have just said that I have intervened in hundreds of +cases, in which I was approached by the Nuncio even when it concerned +Jews, for whom the Nuncio was not authorized to act, and in cases in +which the Nuncio was acting on behalf of Polish clergymen, also a sphere +for which he was not authorized. In spite of the fact that I had +strictest orders not to receive such cases, I did receive the cases; +and, in spite of the “Nacht und Nebel” decree, I always gave information +when I could get any information. Details other than those which I +received officially I did not have. + +COL. AMEN: And who gave you the instructions not to do anything about +these complaints? + +VON STEENGRACHT: These orders came directly from Hitler and came to me +through Ribbentrop. + +COL. AMEN: How do you know? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I have already said yesterday that the two notes which +before my time were passed by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker to Hitler +through Ribbentrop were rejected with the remarks that they were blunt +lies and, apart from that, this was not within the jurisdiction of the +Nuncio; these notes were to be returned and in the future such documents +were not to be accepted. Furthermore, there were to be no discussions +and that applied, not only to the Nuncio, it applied to all unauthorized +actions particularly when foreign diplomats intervened in matters in +which they had no jurisdiction. + +COL. AMEN: But do you want the Tribunal to understand that you went +ahead and tried to do something about these complaints, whereas +Ribbentrop did nothing; is that correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I tried to settle within my own sphere of jurisdiction +all cases which, according to instructions, I was not permitted to +accept at all. But if a case here and there was of primary importance, +or where the lives of several people could have been saved, I always +applied to Ribbentrop. In most of these cases Ribbentrop took the matter +before Hitler, after we had invented a new competence, so that he could +not raise the objection that the Nuncio had no jurisdiction. Upon this, +Hitler either absolutely rejected them or at least said that the police +would have to investigate the case first. This presented the grotesque +picture that in a humanitarian matter or an affair which under all +circumstances had to be handled as foreign politics, the Foreign +Minister no longer made the decision, but the Criminal Inspector Meier +or Schulze who only needed to state “Undesirable in the interests of +state security.” + +COL. AMEN: Did Ribbentrop obey the instructions which you say were +received from the Führer not to do anything about these complaints or +did he not? “Yes” or “no”? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question since I do not know how +many orders he received from Hitler and whether he obeyed in each +individual case. + +COL. AMEN: Well, you have been testifying that you received instructions +not to do anything about these complaints from the Vatican; is that not +correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, and I did not obey them. + +COL. AMEN: Well, I am now asking you whether Ribbentrop obeyed those +instructions or whether he did not. + +VON STEENGRACHT: But he was in a higher position. What orders Hitler +gave to Ribbentrop privately I cannot say since I do not know. + +COL. AMEN: Where did you receive your instructions from? + +VON STEENGRACHT: From Ribbentrop. + +COL. AMEN: Ribbentrop has testified under interrogation that he knew +nothing of what went on in any of these concentration camps until the +Führer ordered Luther to be placed in a concentration camp. Do you know +who Luther was? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: Who was he, please? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Luther was an Under Secretary of State of the Foreign +Office who was the head of the “Deutschland” department. + +COL. AMEN: And when was he placed in a concentration camp? + +VON STEENGRACHT: That must have been about February 1943. + +COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact, is it not true that Ribbentrop had +a whole deskful of complaints from the Vatican about killings, +atrocities, the starving of priests and nuns, to which he never made any +reply at all, even an acknowledgment? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, what happened before May 1943, I do not +know. As long as I was State Secretary, I never failed to accept a note +or failed to answer it. On the contrary, I accepted all notes and +attempted, as I said before, to assist these people. Regarding +conditions before my term of service, I cannot give you any information +because I do not know them. + +COL. AMEN: Well, I am not talking about that time; I am talking about +the period immediately before and following your appearance there in +’43. Now I want to read you from... + +VON STEENGRACHT: I am sorry. I would gladly answer your question if I +knew anything about the matter. During my time—I cannot say anything +about it because I do not know. + +COL. AMEN: Well, I will read to you from the interrogation of Ribbentrop +and ask you whether what he says conforms with your recollection of the +facts. + +VON STEENGRACHT: I should only like to say that until May 1943 I was not +active politically, so that from my own knowledge I cannot make a +statement about it. + +COL. AMEN: Well, as I read the testimony to you, you will find that the +interrogation refers to communications which remained in his desk +unanswered for an indefinite period of time. Did you have access to +Ribbentrop’s desk? Did you know what was in it? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No. + + COL. AMEN: “Question: ‘Did you receive from the Vatican a + communication dated 2 March 1943 calling your attention to a + long list of persecutions of bishops and priests, such as + imprisonment, shooting, and other interferences with the + exercise of religious freedom?’ + + “Answer: ‘I do not recollect at the moment, but I know that we + had protests from the Vatican, that is, we had a whole deskful + of protests from the Vatican.’” + +Does that conform with your recollection? + +VON STEENGRACHT: That was, I must unfortunately say again, before my +time. I cannot know whether he had a whole drawer full of things. + +COL. AMEN: If they had remained in his desk from March until May, then +you would know about them; isn’t that correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I? No. I was not Herr Ribbentrop’s servant, who went +over his chairs or drawers. + +COL. AMEN: So that your testimony is that you knew nothing about any +protests from the Vatican other than those which you have already +referred to? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Apart from those I have mentioned, I know nothing about +protests. I emphasize again that during my time in office I accepted +them all and answered them all. + +COL. AMEN: I will read you further from the interrogation: + + “Question: ‘Did you reply to these Papal protests?’ + + “Answer: ‘I think there were very many we did not reply + to—quite a number.’” + +Does that conform with your recollection? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Certainly, that is correct. That was in accordance with +the instructions which were originally given. + +COL. AMEN: By whom? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler’s instructions. + +COL. AMEN: To whom? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Certainly to Ribbentrop. + +COL. AMEN: Those are the instructions which you say that you were +violating on the side, is that correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Which I did not obey, for otherwise I would not have +been allowed to accept the notes from the Vatican in all those cases +where the jurisdiction was questioned; nor would I have been allowed to +accept, for example, protests from the Swedish Ambassador regarding +mistreatment in Norway, which, however, I also accepted. + +COL. AMEN: I will continue to read from the interrogation: + + “Question: ‘Now, do you mean to say that you did not even read a + protest from the Vatican that came to your desk?’ + + “Answer: ‘It is really true. It is so that the Führer took such + a stand in these Vatican matters that from then on they did not + come to me any more.’” + +Does that conform with your recollection? + +VON STEENGRACHT: That Ribbentrop did not receive the protests any more? +Yes, that is correct, that tallies with what I said, that in all these +cases, where we could not accept them, I tried to settle them on my own +responsibility, since it was against orders. + +COL. AMEN: And in the course of reading these complaints from the +Vatican which went unanswered, both you and Ribbentrop learned full +details of exactly what was going on in the concentration camps, did you +not? + +VON STEENGRACHT: There was never anything about that in these notes—the +ones I saw—there was never anything about the treatment in them. +Instead they were concerned only with complaints asking why the death +sentence was ever imposed, or why the clergyman was ever arrested, or +similar cases, or the closing of churches or the like. + +COL. AMEN: I do not want to take the time of the Tribunal to read to you +the documents which are already in evidence. I am referring to Document +Numbers 3261-PS, 3262-PS, 3264-PS, 3267-PS, 3268-PS and 3269-PS, but in +those documents—I am sorry, sir, 3269 is not in evidence. But in those +documents, Witness, are set forth the details of numerous individual and +collective cases of just what went on in concentration camps. You say +you were not familiar with any of those matters? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, I do not think that I expressed myself +in that way. I gave you to understand that everything communicated to me +by foreign diplomats I do, of course, know. In other words, if detailed +reports were received during my term of office, then of course I know +it. I never denied it. + +THE PRESIDENT: What you said, Witness, was—at least what I took down +and understood you to say was—that nothing was ever mentioned in the +notes about the treatment in concentration camps. + +VON STEENGRACHT: But I remarked with reference to the previous question, +when the question was put generally as to whether I knew about +conditions in concentration camps and the ill-treatment, I said that I +knew everything that had been reported to me by foreign diplomats, by +people of the opposition, and what I could learn from the foreign press. +In other words, if these documents contained details during my time in +office, then I know that too. But may I ask the date of the documents? + +COL. AMEN: There are many documents with many dates, which can be +obtained, but we don’t want to take too much of the Tribunal’s time. +What I want to find out is whether or not you and Ribbentrop did not +know all about the murders, tortures, starvations, and killings that +were taking place in the concentration camps, and which were the subject +of constant and continuous protests from the Vatican, which Ribbentrop +has testified were not even read or acknowledged? Do you understand +that, Witness? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I understand that. I knew nothing at all of the +ill-treatment in concentration camps to the degree and in the bestial +way that I have heard about here. I must strongly protest against the +suggestion that I had heard things like that through the Vatican at that +time. Also, I am convinced that Herr Von Ribbentrop had no idea of the +details as we have heard them here and as they have been shown in the +films. + +COL. AMEN: Isn’t it a fact, Witness, that if you had followed up any of +these complaints from the Vatican which Ribbentrop has testified were +ignored, you would have found out everything which was going on in the +concentration camps to the last detail? “Yes” or “no.” + +VON STEENGRACHT: No, that is not correct. I said yesterday already that +perhaps the key to it can be found in the speech made by Himmler on 3 +October 1943, in which he said that the action against Jews and the +matter of concentration camps were to be kept just as secret as the +matter of 30 June 1934. And the great majority of the German people will +confirm the fact that until a short time ago they could not discover +anything at all about these events. If I went to Gruppenführer Müller or +other officials I was always told that everything in those concentration +camps was functioning beautifully and that there could be no question of +ill-treatment. Then I insisted that the foreigners, particularly the Red +Cross, inspect a concentration camp, and the Danish Red Cross was taken +to the Concentration Camp Theresienstadt. After that inspection took +place—this was a camp for Jews—the Danish Minister came to me and told +me that contrary to expectation everything had been favorable there. I +expressed my astonishment and he told me, “Yes, our people were there, +there was a theater there, and their own police force, their own +hospital, their own money; the thing is well-run.” I had no reason, +therefore, to doubt that it was true. But I myself could get no idea of +the true conditions from any German department, since they would +certainly have been afraid to tell a member of the Foreign Office +anything about it. But I want to emphasize again that we really had no +idea of the atrocities and such things. + +COL. AMEN: Why in the world should they be afraid to advise the Foreign +Office of these atrocities? Had the Foreign Office ever done anything to +discourage them? + +VON STEENGRACHT: In all matters which were violations of international +law we attempted to bring the case to the attention of the Red Cross in +one way or another. We did this particularly in all matters relating to +prisoners of war and if anything appeared to be wrong we drew the +attention of the Swiss Delegate to it, on our own initiative: “Go to +this place and see what is going on.” And in this case too, if I had +gone to the Swiss and told them in confidence that this and that has +occurred in the concentration camps, Switzerland and the Red Cross would +probably have interfered, which could ultimately have led to unpleasant +measures. + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I think we ought to have an adjournment for +10 minutes. + +COL. AMEN: I have only a few more questions. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +COL. AMEN: So far as you know, after Ribbentrop had received this +deskful of complaints from the Vatican, which he neither read nor +acknowledged, did Ribbentrop take any steps or do anything to find out +whether those complaints were justified and true, or did he not? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the complaints made before my time, I have no +idea. + +COL. AMEN: I am asking you about any complaints that were received from +the Vatican that ever came to your attention, with particular reference, +of course, to the deskful to which Ribbentrop himself has testified. Do +you know of any steps that were ever taken by Ribbentrop in connection +with complaints received from the Vatican about the atrocities taking +place in concentration camps? Please try to answer “yes” or “no.” + +VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I recall he submitted complaints of this sort +to Hitler, when he had the opportunity, and then waited for Hitler’s +order. + +COL. AMEN: All right. And when Hitler told him to pay no attention +whatsoever to these complaints, he, as usual, did exactly what the +Führer told him to do, namely, nothing. Is that correct, so far as you +know? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, he obeyed Hitler’s orders. + +COL. AMEN: And did nothing? + +VON STEENGRACHT: If that is how the order read, he did nothing, yes. + +COL. AMEN: Well, didn’t you tell the Tribunal that is what the directive +from the Führer was, to pay no attention to these complaints? “Yes” or +“no,” please. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: And so, I say, Ribbentrop, as usual, did nothing about any of +these complaints after the Führer instructed him to disregard them. Is +that right? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I could not quite understand that question. + +COL. AMEN: I say after Ribbentrop received instructions from the Führer +to disregard these complaints from the Vatican, Ribbentrop, as usual, +did what he was directed, namely, nothing. + +VON STEENGRACHT: I assume so, except for those cases where he +nevertheless tried again and then received the same answer. I also know +that he once appealed to Himmler and requested on principle that the +actions against the Jews should not be carried out; and he proposed that +Jewish children and women should, I believe, be turned over to England +and America. + +COL. AMEN: And you also know what reply he received to that suggestion, +don’t you? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know the answer. + +COL. AMEN: Well, you are certainly familiar with the fact that no such +thing was ever done, are you not? + +VON STEENGRACHT: That it was never carried out? I did not understand the +question. + +COL. AMEN: The suggestion which you claim that Ribbentrop made to +Himmler. That suggestion was never carried out, was it? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand; in what way not carried out? So +far as I know—Ribbentrop appealed directly to the foreign countries at +that time. I also do not know what answer he received at that time, at +least not in detail. + +COL. AMEN: Well, so far as you know, nothing ever came of that +suggestion, correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: No, nothing came of it. + +COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you know that Ribbentrop and +Himmler were not on good terms anyway, do you not? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: That was a matter of common knowledge to everybody, wasn’t +it? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, the enmity became greater in the course of time. + +COL. AMEN: So far as you know, did Ribbentrop take bromides every day? + +VON STEENGRACHT: That I do not know. He... + +COL. AMEN: You never saw him taking any? + +VON STEENGRACHT: It could be; I do not know. + +COL. AMEN: Well, did you ever see him taking any, or did he ever tell +that he was taking them? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I remember now that he took some sort of red +substance but I did not pay particular attention to it. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do we have anything to do with whether he took bromides? + +COL. AMEN: Yes, your Lordship, we will, because in his interrogations he +claims that his memory as to many of these events has been obscured or +removed by the over-use of such medicine. + +THE PRESIDENT: All right. + +COL. AMEN: Now, Witness, were you incarcerated at one time at a place +known as “Ash Can”? + +VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can? + +COL. AMEN: Outside of Luxembourg. + +VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can? I cannot remember it. + +COL. AMEN: Near Luxembourg. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Locked in a refuse can? No, I do not remember. + +COL. AMEN: After you were taken prisoner, where were you incarcerated? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Mondorf. + +COL. AMEN: For how long a period of time? + +VON STEENGRACHT: In Mondorf altogether 11 weeks. + +COL. AMEN: And at that time were numerous of the defendants in this case +also incarcerated there? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: And while you were there you were free to have conversations +with some of the inmates? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: And you did, from time to time, have such conversations? +Right? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I was not together with them all the time, because +I was transferred to another camp. + +COL. AMEN: Now, in the course of your conversations with one or another +of the inmates there, did you make the statement which I am about to +read to you, either in exact words or in substance? Do you understand +the question? “Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion of decency and truth. +The conception does not exist for him.” Please answer “yes” or “no.” Did +you say that, Witness, did you say that? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I should be grateful if I could hear that exactly again +what I am supposed to have said. + +COL. AMEN: Now remember, I am asking you whether you said it either in +the exact words or in substance. Do you understand that? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I did not precisely understand the German translation +of your question. + +COL. AMEN: Do you now understand it? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand. I did not exactly understand the +German translation. + +COL. AMEN: Yes, but do you understand my question, namely, that you are +to say, whether you used these exact words or some other similar words? +I will now read it to you again. Do you understand? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I would be grateful. + +COL. AMEN: “Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion of decency and truth. +The conception does not exist for him.” + +VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot recall that I ever made such a statement. I +would have to know to whom I am supposed to have said it. + +COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement, or is it simply that +you can’t remember whether you did or not? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot remember having said that. + +COL. AMEN: Is it possible that you did? + +VON STEENGRACHT: It could be that I made such a statement, in some +connection. + +COL. AMEN: Very good. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do the other prosecutors wish to ask any questions? + +MAJOR GENERAL N. D. ZORYA (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): To +save time, I shall restrict myself to a few questions only. Insofar as I +can understand the translation of your testimony, which you submitted +yesterday, you testified to the fact that besides the Ministry for +Foreign Affairs many individuals and organizations had influenced +Germany’s foreign policy. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +GEN. ZORYA: Tell me, which of the defendants in the present Trial whom +you see in the dock attempted to influence and did, to a certain extent, +influence Germany’s foreign policy. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy was, of course, after the beginning of +the war... + +GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you here and now not to make any declaration on +Germany’s foreign policy, but to indicate precisely, in the form of a +reply to my question, which of the defendants in the present Trial +attempted to influence and did influence Germany’s foreign policy? + +VON STEENGRACHT: The basic lines of foreign policy were determined +solely by Hitler. The fact that we had occupied many countries and in +these various countries had occupied the most varied positions... + +GEN. ZORYA: We know all about that. I ask you to indicate by name, which +of the defendants in the present Trial attempted to influence and did +influence Germany’s foreign policy. Is my question clear to you? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy, as I stated yesterday, was in its broad +outlines determined by Hitler alone; but those people who were assigned +to special fields naturally exercised some influence in one respect or +another. For example, some one who had a special assignment concerning +the police, carried out police measures; some one who had to take care +of labor problems conducted labor affairs. The same is true of other +sectors. + +GEN. ZORYA: You still do not answer my question. I ask you to indicate, +regardless of the form and extent of his influence, which of the +defendants in the current Trial attempted to influence, and did +influence, in one form or another, Germany’s foreign policy, and this +apart from representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. + +VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that you are asking this question in relation +to Russia; as the Foreign Office no longer had jurisdiction after the +entrance of German troops into Russia... + +GEN. ZORYA: I request you to understand my question thoroughly and to +answer which of the defendants, and in what form, regardless of concrete +facts of foreign policy, attempted to influence this foreign policy of +Germany and did, in effect, so influence it. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. As regards Russia, the Eastern ministry was +competent for these questions. + +GEN. ZORYA: No, not as regards Russia. + +VON STEENGRACHT: In Norway Terboven laid down the policy. Quite +naturally he influenced Hitler in his attitude toward Norway and +Norwegian problems. In the same way the individual chiefs of the +administrations in the individual countries exerted influence depending +on how close they could come to Hitler with their reports. + +THE PRESIDENT: We don’t want you to make speeches; we want you to answer +the question. You weren’t asked who influenced the foreign policy, but +which of the defendants influenced foreign policy. You may say none, or +you may say some. It is a question that you must be able to answer. + +VON STEENGRACHT: I would assume that Rosenberg had something to say +regarding Russia, Frank had something to say regarding Poland, +Seyss-Inquart had something to say regarding Holland. Other matters +touched only special sectors. Naturally the SS had something to say; the +Wehrmacht had something to say, also the various other offices and they +naturally all exerted a certain influence but only a certain influence. +However, the basic policy was conducted solely by Hitler. + +GEN. ZORYA: Do you not wish in this connection to name the Defendant +Göring? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Göring carried on the Four Year Plan and in this +capacity he naturally also exercised a certain influence on Russia. + +GEN. ZORYA: What did this influence consist of? + +VON STEENGRACHT: There again I must say that I and the Foreign Office +had nothing to do with Russia, and that we were strictly forbidden to +intervene in Russian affairs. In the sphere of propaganda and the press +we were in no way permitted to become active. For this reason I am +especially badly informed on Russian affairs. + +GEN. ZORYA: Did the Defendant Göring have any influence in other +questions besides the Russian question? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand the question in German. + +GEN. ZORYA: Besides the Russian question, did the Defendant Göring +exercise any influence on other questions in the sphere of foreign +policy? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I would say that until the year 1938 he certainly had +influence over Hitler in matters of foreign policy. + +GEN. ZORYA: You have stated in your testimony that in July ’44 the +Ministry for Foreign Affairs participated in preparations for the +anti-Jewish Congress which, it was assumed, would be held in Kraków. +Will you please answer this question briefly, “yes” or “no.” + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +GEN. ZORYA: Do you know who were the candidates for honorary membership +in this congress? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Probably there were many, Ribbentrop among others, as +far as I still remember today. + +GEN. ZORYA: Who else from among the defendants? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I really cannot say. As far as I remember, Rosenberg +and a large number of other leading personalities, but I cannot recall +their names any longer. Naturally there are documents on the subject, so +that it can be ascertained without trouble. + +GEN. ZORYA: Did Ribbentrop attempt in any form whatsoever to protest +against the inclusion of his name in the roster of honorary members of +this congress? + +VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can recall he very unwillingly took over +this post, but I do not believe that he really intended to take any +active part in this matter. + +GEN. ZORYA: If I have understood you correctly, you have recently +testified to the fact that relations between Ribbentrop and Himmler were +hostile. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, bad relations. + +GEN. ZORYA: But can you state whether any contact existed between +Ribbentrop and Himmler in their work, whether they maintained this +contact in any one particular sphere or branch of their work? + +VON STEENGRACHT: As a matter of fact, there was no working contact such +as would have been considered right in a well-organized state. Of +course, now and then there were matters somewhere that concerned both of +these men, and to that extent they did have contact, yes. + +GEN. ZORYA: What was the nature of this contact, and what, exactly, did +it represent? + +VON STEENGRACHT: It really only amounted to this: that Ribbentrop or +Himmler saw each other every few months. Besides that, we had a liaison +man in the Foreign Office for the Reichsführer SS Himmler. + +GEN. ZORYA: Then how does all this fit in with the hostility which, as +you have just mentioned, existed between Himmler and Ribbentrop? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I presume you are referring to the second question I +answered. In every normal state it was the case that the ministers saw +each other at least once a year and exchanged opinions. This, however, +did not take place, since, as we have already heard today at some +length, the fields of jurisdiction overlapped to a great extent and the +activity of one man touched very closely on the activity of the other. +Therefore some connection had to be established whether one wanted it or +not. + +GEN. ZORYA: Do I understand you to say that Himmler and Ribbentrop never +even met? + +VON STEENGRACHT: They met perhaps once every 3 months. It might have +been every 4 months and they usually met only if, by chance, both +Ribbentrop and Himmler were visiting Hitler at the same time. + +GEN. ZORYA: And there were no special meetings, no business contact +between them at all? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Actually not. + +GEN. ZORYA: I should like you to familiarize yourself with Document +Number USSR-120, which has already been submitted as evidence to the +Tribunal. You will see that this is an agreement between Himmler and +Ribbentrop regarding the organization of intelligence work. Are you +familiar with this agreement? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly. + +GEN. ZORYA: The contact between Himmler and Ribbentrop was evidently +closer than you wished to describe. + +VON STEENGRACHT: I do not believe, Mr. Prosecutor, that I wanted to give +you any impression other than the one that actually existed. This refers +to Hitler’s order of 12 February 1944. On the basis of this order +Himmler took charge of all activity abroad without the participation of +the Foreign Office, and after he had become the successor to Canaris, +through this order he secured a predominant position abroad. And if the +Foreign Office in one way or another had not tried to contact this +organization, then the Foreign Office would have had no influence at all +even in foreign countries. We had to fight vigorously over this +document, for on the basis of this document Himmler was obliged for the +first time to communicate to us also the information that he brought to +Germany. Otherwise he brought these reports in without telling us about +them. That was the reason why we reached this working agreement. But so +far as I recall, it was not put into practice at all, because Hitler’s +order was issued on 12 February 1944 and we had not come to an agreement +until February 1945. Then it gradually came about. That must be +approximately the date. At any rate it took quite a while. + +GEN. ZORYA: You say that this agreement never became valid? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. An agreement becomes effective at +the moment in which it is signed. But it was not put into practice or +hardly put into practice. + +GEN. ZORYA: I think we shall have to content ourselves with your reply +and pass over to some other questions. Did you ever come in contact with +Kaltenbrunner? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Did I come into contact with Kaltenbrunner? Yes. + +GEN. ZORYA: On what questions? + +VON STEENGRACHT: On precisely those questions which, for example, the +Nuncio addressed to me and also about people who because of the Nacht +und Nebel decree had been deported from abroad and about whom we were +not allowed to give information, I often went privately to Kaltenbrunner +and pointed out to him that this order was inhuman. As a favor +Kaltenbrunner then frequently gave me information; and I, contrary to +the orders, transmitted this information abroad because I considered it +justified for humanity’s sake. Those were the main points of contact +which I had with Kaltenbrunner. + +GEN. ZORYA: Did you, in particular, have any conversation with him on +the subject of the Danish policemen interned by the Gestapo in a +concentration camp without any concrete charges presented against them? +Please reply to this question by saying “yes” or “no.” + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +GEN. ZORYA: During one interrogation, an interrogation conducted by an +American interrogator, you stated that, although these policemen were +eventually sent back to Denmark, they were very badly treated. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +GEN. ZORYA: What did this ill-treatment consist of? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I learned at that time, I believe through the Danish +Minister, that 1600 Danish policemen... + +GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you to be brief. Of what did the ill-treatment +consist which was meted out to the Danish policemen who were interned in +a concentration camp without any concrete charges being presented +against them? + +VON STEENGRACHT: These policemen were transported from Denmark. When I +learned of it, I went to Kaltenbrunner on the same day and asked him +under all circumstances to treat these people as civilian internees or +as prisoners of war. + +GEN. ZORYA: I beg your pardon, but you are not answering my question. +What did the ill-treatment of the Danish policemen consist of? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that you want to know whether Kaltenbrunner is +personally responsible for it and to this I would have to tell you the +opposite. I am... + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question? It was repeated. You must +understand what the question is: What was the bad treatment? Either you +know or you do not know. If you know, you can say so. + +VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can remember, 10 percent of these prisoners +died. + +GEN. ZORYA: Is that all you can say in reply to the question? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding details of the ill-treatment I was informed +by Denmark that the men were not allowed to keep their uniforms and had +to wear concentration camp clothes, that this concentration camp +clothing was too thin and the men frequently died of inflammation of the +lungs, also that the food was insufficient. I did not learn any more at +the time. They were also flogged. + +GEN. ZORYA: Witness, please tell us: Did you ever come across the +activities of the Defendant Sauckel? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I came into touch with Sauckel’s activities only +insofar as we objected that so many people from abroad were brought into +Germany by force. + +GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember a conference at which both you and +Sauckel were present? You have already mentioned this fact in the course +of your interrogation prior to the opening of the current Trial. + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember you testified in the course of this +interrogation: “But the measures adopted for recruiting people in Russia +and similar countries are beyond description.” + +VON STEENGRACHT: In the session—I did not understand the question. + +GEN. ZORYA: You stated, during the interrogation of 28 September 1945—I +am quoting verbatim: “But the measures adopted for recruiting people in +Russia and similar countries are beyond description.” Do you remember +your testimony? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I confirm that statement. + +GEN. ZORYA: Then you confirm it? Will you kindly enumerate, if only in +brief, what precisely were the indescribable measures adopted by the +Defendant Sauckel in Russia and other countries? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I know of only one case that was reported to me at the +time. It concerned the fact that in a certain sector, people were +invited to a theatrical performance and the theatre was surrounded, and +the people who were inside were brought to Germany for forced labor. It +concerns these measures of which I have heard. + +GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask. + +COL. POKROVSKY: I request permission to ask one more question, or +rather, to have one more question elucidated. + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal has already indicated +that it wishes the cross-examination to be cut down as far as possible, +and it really cannot hear more than one counsel on behalf of each of the +four countries. It doesn’t wish to hear more than one on behalf of each +of the four countries. I am afraid we can’t hear any further +cross-examination from you. + +COL. POKROVSKY: The question is not a new one. The witness has not +answered a question which was repeated four times. + +THE PRESIDENT: It is a new counsel though. + +COL. POKROVSKY: No. The Soviet Prosecutor asked which of the defendants +influenced the foreign policy of Germany. The witness replied, “The +Armed Forces.” I wished to... + +THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry, Colonel Pokrovsky, but I have given you the +Tribunal’s ruling. We cannot hear more than one counsel. I hope, as I +say, that the prosecutors will make their examination as short as +possible. + +M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): This +witness having been already interrogated at considerable length, I wish +to ask only a very short question. + +Witness, I should like you to confirm precisely what you have already +declared, that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of +Ribbentrop and was responsible only to him; is that correct? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question in German. + +M. FAURE: Is it correct from your declaration, and from what you know, +that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of Ribbentrop +and that it was responsible only to him? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +M. FAURE: Does it mean that every important measure taken by the Embassy +would have to be known by the Defendant Ribbentrop? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +M. FAURE: I simply wanted to have this point elucidated in view of the +interrogatory of the witness, and I have no further questions to ask. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2 o’clock. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, +I request permission to ask one question which I could not ask before. +The Russian Prosecutor asked whether the witness had discussed the +question of the Danish policemen with Kaltenbrunner. In this connection +it remained entirely unanswered how Kaltenbrunner himself behaved. I +simply want to ask this one question. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann. + +DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, would you please tell the Tribunal how +Kaltenbrunner behaved when you discussed with him the question of the +Danish police who had been inhumanly treated—how Kaltenbrunner behaved +in this connection and what he did. + +VON STEENGRACHT: The question is perhaps not quite correct the way you +put it when you say “who had been inhumanly treated,” for they could not +have been dealt with. They had just been turned over to the +concentration camp. So the moment I heard about it I went to +Kaltenbrunner and told him that these people could not be put into a +concentration camp. They had to be treated either as prisoners of war or +as civilian internees. + +Kaltenbrunner listened to this and said he was also of that opinion, and +in my presence gave the order that these men should be transferred from +the concentration camp to a prisoner-of-war camp. I therefore assumed +that the matter was thereby settled and then found out a fortnight later +that they were still in the concentration camp. I appealed to +Kaltenbrunner earnestly. Kaltenbrunner said he could find no explanation +for it. I could not find any either, since the order to transfer these +people had been given in my presence. We subsequently carried on many +negotiations regarding this matter. I had the impression that other +influences were at work there and that Kaltenbrunner could not enforce +his opinion. + +DR. KAUFFMANN: Was he against this inhuman treatment? + +VON STEENGRACHT: He always told me that he was in favor of their being +put in a prisoner-of-war camp. That was naturally a substantial +improvement. + +DR. KAUFFMANN: No further questions. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you wish to re-examine this witness? + +DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the witness. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of violating the +Treaty of Versailles or was he opposed to that? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to say... + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you say “yes” or “no” and then explain +later? + +VON STEENGRACHT: He wanted a modification. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of the reoccupation +of the Rhineland? + +VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I did not know Ribbentrop and consequently +cannot answer this question. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop opposed to rearmament? + +VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer this question either, because I did not +know him at that time. I saw him for the first time in the year 1936. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Anschluss? + +VON STEENGRACHT: That I assume. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Tripartite Pact? + +VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. + +THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. + +[_The witness Von Steengracht left the stand._] + +DR. HORN: Yesterday I concluded the presentation of my documents with +the submission of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-10)—on page 35 of the document book. From this document I +proved that Von Ribbentrop conducted his foreign policy according to +lines laid down by Hitler. I should like to prove with the following +documents what the foreign political situation was that Ribbentrop found +when he took office in February of 1938. I ask the Court to take +judicial notice of the following documents, the numbers of which I shall +now communicate to the Tribunal, without my reading anything from them +in order that I may later be able to come back to them in my final +speech. + +The first of these documents is the document which bears the Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 14 (Document Number Ribbentrop-14). It is a question here +again of an extract from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume +1, and carries the heading “Proclamation of the Reich Government to the +German People of 1 February 1933.” This document describes briefly +Germany’s position at that time and the intentions of the Hitler +Government that came to power on 30 January 1933. + +The next document that I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of is +Ribbentrop Exhibit 15 (Document Number Ribbentrop-15). This document is +also taken from the first volume of the _Dokumente der Deutschen +Politik_. It carries the title “Adolf Hitler’s Address on the Occasion +of the Inauguration on 21 March 1933 in Potsdam”. In this document, too, +basic expositions are made regarding the internal and external policy +agreed upon by the new government. + +As the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 16 (Document Number Ribbentrop-16). Again it +is a document from the above-mentioned volume of documents. It is headed +“Adolf Hitler’s Speech on His Program at the Meeting of the Reichstag in +the Kroll Opera House on 23 March 1933.” + +I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the next document, Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 17 (Document Number Ribbentrop-17). It is again an +excerpt from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_. + +COL. POKROVSKY: I would not like to interrupt Dr. Horn, but not one +single document among those which he now mentions, beginning with Number +14, and as far as I understand, until Number 44, inclusive, was put at +the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution, and I cannot see any possibility +of aiding the Tribunal in the study of these documents until we have +received them. I suppose that the Tribunal will judge it necessary to +put off the studying of these documents until the Soviet Prosecution +have received them. + +DR. HORN: May I give a short explanation please. I have inquired as to +what extent the translations have progressed. Three weeks ago I turned +in my documents in the prescribed manner, the last of them about 10 days +ago. I was informed that the Translation Division unfortunately had too +few French and Russian translators available to have the translation of +the documents in these two languages as far advanced as is the case in +the English language up to now. These are, of course, things over which +I have no influence. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal appreciates that you have done +what fulfills the obligations which rested upon you and they, therefore, +think that the documents should go in, subject of course to any +objection being taken to them when the translations are available. + +DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, as a precaution I have already informed +Colonel Pokrovsky that this was the case, without knowing in detail what +documents had been translated into Russian. That was as far as I could +possibly go to reach an understanding, because the other thing was +beyond my control. + +MR. DODD: I wonder if it would be possible for Dr. Horn to indicate very +briefly the purpose for which he offers these documents as they come up. +We will have objection to some, I know, but some of that objection may +be clarified if we hear beforehand just what the purpose of the offer +is. + +THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, Dr. Horn is putting in a large number of +documents at the present moment and asking the Court to take judicial +notice of them and if the Prosecution finds that there is something +specific that they want to object to, wouldn’t it be best that they +should do that hereafter? + +MR. DODD: I thought it might be of assistance and save us from rising +very often if he gave us some idea of the purpose for which the offer is +made. + +THE PRESIDENT: I think it would take longer probably. + +DR. HORN: May I make a short explanation on this subject? Since 1933 my +client has occupied official positions that were closely tied up with +foreign policy. The direction of a foreign policy that had, as its aim, +the waging of aggressive war, has been charged against him. I now submit +with these documents the evidence which demonstrates how the policy +developed and that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop on his part made long +and continuous efforts to avoid a war of aggression, for example, +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 17, (Document Number Ribbentrop-17) of which I +ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. It is in the document book on +Page 40 and contains a speech of 17 May 1933 by Hitler before the German +Reichstag on the National Socialist Peace Policy. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on, Dr. Horn. + +DR. HORN: This document of 17 May 1933 I cite as proof of Germany’s +general will to disarm and as proof that the Reich Government made +efforts to bring about a general pacification of Europe. + +As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 18 (Document Number Ribbentrop-18). It is +again a document from the same collection and is headed “Treaty of +Agreement and Co-operation of 15 July 1933,” known in brief as the “Four +Power Pact.” It is on Page 42 of the document book. This Four Power Pact +between Germany, France, England, and Italy was inspired by Mussolini. +Its purpose was to bring about general disarmament and particularly, to +make effective the revision article—Number 19—in the Covenant of the +League of Nations. This pact did not come into being because France did +not ratify it. + +As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 20 (Document Number Ribbentrop-20). It +concerns a “Proclamation of the Reich Government to the German People in +Connection with the Withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October +1933.” This proclamation of the Reich Government affirms the failure of +the disarmament conference and gives a short account of Germany’s +reasons for withdrawing from the League of Nations. In connection with +this proclamation, Hitler on the same day made a speech over the radio +in order to state the reasons for Germany’s withdrawal from the League +of Nations. I submit this speech to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 21 (Document Number Ribbentrop-21), and ask the Tribunal to take +judicial notice of it. The speech is on Page 45 of the document book. + +In order to justify the then existing foreign policy to the people as +well as to obtain a confirmation of the policy at that time, Reich +President Von Hindenburg, on 11 November 1933, called the German people +to the ballot box. The proclamation in that connection is contained in +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 23 (Document Number Ribbentrop-23), which is +found on Page 48 of the document book. I present it to the Court again +with the request for judicial notice. + +I further ask the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit Number 24 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-24) in which the text of the question and +the results of the election are to be found. It is on Page 49 of the +document book which is before you. + +In the course of her disarmament policy, Germany, on 18 December 1933, +issued a German Memorandum on the disarmament question and Germany’s +attitude regarding the disarmament problem. I offer the Court this +document for judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 25 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-25). + +The next document is contained on Page 51 of the document book and +describes the course of the disarmament negotiations and Germany’s +attitude toward these negotiations. I submit it to the Court for +judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 26 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-26). The document is on Page 51 of the document book, and is +headed “The German Memorandum on Disarmament of 19 January 1934.” + +The German view on disarmament is again set forth in the following +document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 27 (Document Number Ribbentrop-27), +set forth on Page 53 of the document book, and is entitled “German +Memorandum of 13 March 1934.” I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice +of this document. + +The German Government answered an English disarmament memorandum on 16 +April 1934 with an _aide-mémoire_ to the English Government. I ask the +Court to take judicial notice of this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 28 (Document Number Ribbentrop-28). + +In the course of the disarmament negotiations, France, in 1934, +suggested a pact which became known under the name of the “Eastern +Pact.” Regarding this Eastern Pact, the German Government expressed +their view in a communiqué of the German Reich Government of 10 +September 1934, which is on Page 56 of the document book, and to which I +have given the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 30 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-30), again with the request that judicial notice be taken of +it. + +As the next document, which is on Page 57, I present to the Court for +judicial notice: Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 31 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-31). It concerns a copy of the _Dokumente der Deutschen +Politik_, Volume 3, and shows the reply of the Reich Government of 14 +February 1935 to the suggestion for an air pact. Germany’s comments on +this air pact include the following—I read Paragraph 2 from this +exhibit and begin the quotation: + + “The German Government welcomes the proposal to increase safety + from sudden attacks from the air by an agreement to be concluded + as soon as possible, which provides for the immediate use of the + air forces of the signatories on behalf of the victim of an + unprovoked air attack.” + +In the year 1935 compulsory military service was reintroduced in +Germany. On this occasion the German Government addressed a proclamation +to the German people. This proclamation is on Page 59 of the document +book and carries the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 33 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-33). I request that this excerpt from the proclamation be +given judicial notice. + +As Ribbentrop Exhibit 34 (Document Number Ribbentrop-34), I submit a +communiqué of the German Reich Government of 14 April 1935 on Germany’s +attitude toward the Eastern Pact. It is on Pages 61 and following of the +document book and I ask, without my reading anything from it, that the +Tribunal take judicial notice of it. + +The introduction of compulsory military service was regarded by the +signatory countries of the Versailles Treaty as an infraction of Part V +of this treaty. The states protested against the reintroduction of +compulsory military service in Germany. A protest was issued by the +Reich Government against this decision of the Council of the League of +Nations of 17 April 1935. This protest is on Page 63 of the document +book. I have this document the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 35 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-35), and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of +it. In this document the German Government dispute the right of the +governments represented in the Council of the League of Nations, who +approved the decision of 17 April, to set themselves up as judges over +Germany. In this protest it is stated that this attitude is interpreted +as a manifestation of renewed discrimination against Germany and +consequently is rejected. + +I turn now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 36 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-36) which is on Page 64 of the document book. This concerns +the German memorandum to the Locarno Powers of 25 May 1935, and deals +with the incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. The +Defendant Ribbentrop participated decisively in the negotiations that +led to the drawing up of this memorandum and to the presentation of the +German point of view before the League of Nations and the Locarno +Powers. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the document because +it contains Germany’s legal attitude toward this problem. + +A further memorandum to the Locarno Powers is to be found on Page 68 of +the document book (Document Number Ribbentrop-36) Exhibit Number +Ribbentrop 36, and it again exposes briefly and clearly the +incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. I ask that +also this German memorandum to the Locarno Powers—it is dated 25 May +1935—be given judicial notice. + +The legal point of view which formed the basis for this memorandum was +presented in a speech by Hitler, concerning the peace policy in the +German Reichstag on 21 May 1935, in order again to prove German +willingness for peace and disarmament. At the same time a peace and +disarmament proposal was submitted in London by Ribbentrop. I ask that +this document, this speech by Hitler, be given judicial notice as +Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 37 (Document Number Ribbentrop-37). It is on +Pages 69 and following of my document book. + +As the next document to prove that Germany made continuous efforts for +disarmament and attempts at agreement, I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 38 (Document Number Ribbentrop-38), for judicial notice, which is +on Page 77 of my document book. This concerns the Anglo-German Naval +Agreement of 18 June 1935, in which Ribbentrop played a decisive role, +and for the ratification of which Ribbentrop exerted himself +particularly. He induced the French Government in particular, by his own +efforts, to agree to this treaty. That was necessary because this naval +agreement made necessary a change in Part V of the Versailles Treaty, +already cited—it is the part that is concerned with disarmament +instructions and armament stipulations. At that time Ribbentrop +succeeded in persuading the French Government to give their approval to +this agreement. I submit this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 38, +with the request for judicial notice. + +I may, in addition, say in this connection that this treaty was at that +time considered, both by Ribbentrop and Hitler, as the cornerstone of a +far-reaching proposal for an understanding and an alliance with England. +During the succeeding years, as well as during the time he served as +ambassador in London and also as Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop made +constant efforts to bring about such a pact of agreement in some form or +other. + +As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 39 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-39), which is on Page 79 of the document book. + +Again, and in view of the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the German +Government found themselves compelled on 7 March 1936 to present their +attitude, through a memorandum, to the signatory powers of the Locarno +Pact. This point of view is found in the document just mentioned and I +ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. + +The occupation of the Rhineland had led to a protest by the powers +interested in it. Ribbentrop replied to this protest with a speech +before the Council of the League of Nations in London and then delivered +another protest before the Council of the League of Nations against the +protest of the signatory powers of Locarno. This protest of the then +Ambassador Von Ribbentrop, which I present as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number +40 (Document Number Ribbentrop-40), which is on Page 83 of my document +book, I also submit for judicial notice. + +As the next document I present to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 41 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-41), on Page 84 of the document book, with +the request for judicial notice. It contains the last peace proposals by +Germany in connection with the disarmament and peace proposals of that +time. It is headed “Peace Plan of the German Government of 31 March +1936.” + +In subsequent years Germany made repeated efforts to bring about the +withdrawal of the war guilt lie. In the year 1937 German and Italian +relations became constantly closer; and in connection with these +relations Hitler, on 30 January 1937, on the fourth anniversary of the +National Socialist revolution, made a proposal before the German +Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin, that agreements should be +reached with other European nations in Europe on the same basis as +between Germany and Italy, in order to attain harmonious relations. I +ask that this document be accepted as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the document +book. In this document the withdrawal of the war guilt lie was clearly +requested once more. I quote from the third paragraph of the above: + + “Above all, therefore, I solemnly withdraw Germany’s signature + from that statement, extorted against her better judgment from + the weak German government of the day, that Germany is to blame + for the war.” + +As the next document I bring... + +THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. Are you referring to 44? + +DR. HORN: I was just referring to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the document book. Please +pardon me if I left that out. + +THE PRESIDENT: There was some passage you read in it which does not +appear to be translated here. + +DR. HORN: Did I correctly understand you to say, Mr. President, that +there was no English translation in the document book? + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am not quite sure. I did not catch it myself. Did +you read anything which is not in the document book? + +DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I have cited only what is in the document +book. It is on Page 88, Paragraph 3 and it is specifically the paragraph +that begins, “And fourthly...” + +THE PRESIDENT: Thirdly, isn’t it? + +DR. HORN: Paragraph 3, and this paragraph is again divided into four +subparagraphs and I have read the fourth subparagraph. + +I come now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 44 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-44), which is on Page 90 in the document book. This document +contains the German note on Belgian inviolability, dated 13 October +1937. This document is of importance in view of the events of 1940; and, +in order to make clear the German view, I should like to read the last +paragraph, which in my document book is on Page 91 and which is preceded +by the Roman numeral II. I quote: + + “The German Government assert that the inviolability and + integrity of Belgium are of common interest to the western + powers. They confirm their determination not to impair that + inviolability and integrity under any circumstances and to + respect Belgian territory at all times, excepting of course, in + the case of Belgium collaborating in an armed conflict directed + against Germany in which Germany would be involved.” + +I ask that this document be given judicial notice. + +With this I conclude the series of documents which are to serve me, in +my final speech, as the basis for expounding the conditions of foreign +policy that Ribbentrop found upon his entry into office as Foreign +Minister. I shall refer to these documents when the occasion arises. + +THE PRESIDENT: Have you filed them in Court with the Secretary? + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, in connection with yesterday’s discussion I +again untied these documents and handed them, signed, to the General +Secretary. + +The next documents that I submit serve as substantiation of what I shall +say later regarding Ribbentrop’s participation in the policy that led to +the Anschluss with Austria. + +I should like to refer, first of all, to Document 386-PS, already +presented by the Prosecution, which is contained in my document book. I +am unfortunately not in the position to read off the page numbers to the +Tribunal because we ourselves have not yet received the files, that is, +the document book which now follows. This document follows Ribbentrop +Exhibit Number 44, which was on page 90 of the document book. + +THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit Number 44 is the last document in the second +document book. There are not any more, are there? There are not any +more? + +DR. HORN: I was informed today that the English Document Book was +finished and had been presented to the Tribunal. We unfortunately have +not yet received a copy, so I cannot compare the page numbers. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, we haven’t got it. We have only those two and the +last exhibit in the second book is Number 44, which you have just read. +But, Dr. Horn, as the document has already been put into evidence, it is +not necessary for you to produce it. You can say that you rely upon it; +that is all that is necessary. + +DR. HORN: Yes, but I believe that we must immediately decide the +question of the continuation of my presentation. I want to make clear +again that, after the Tribunal had ruled on the way in which documents +were to be presented, I at that time immediately submitted my documents +to the Tribunal for translation in the prescribed way, in that I +presented 6 document books bearing my signature. Unfortunately the +Translation Division was unable to keep up with the pace of the +presentation of evidence by the Defense and I am in the uncomfortable +position of being unable to provide the Tribunal with the assistance of +pointing out the pages in order to continue my delivery smoothly. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn, we think you had better go on, just +notifying us which the documents are and whether they are already in +evidence or whether you are offering them in evidence now. You have told +us Document 386-PS. We can make a note of that—that is already in +evidence. I do not know whether all your other documents are already in +evidence or whether there are any documents which are not and which you +are now going to offer in evidence. + +DR. HORN: The following documents are new. As to Document 386-PS, I +should only like to make clear that Von Ribbentrop was not one of those +present at that time. He has also learned here for the first time of +this document and its contents—it concerns the well-known Hossbach +Document. + +The next document to which I shall refer in my final speech is Document +Number 2461-PS, already submitted by the Prosecution. It is the official +German communication regarding the meeting between the Führer and Reich +Chancellor with the Austrian Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg in +Berchtesgaden on 12 and 15 February 1938. I refer to this document to +prove to what extent Ribbentrop participated in this discussion. + +The next document to which I shall refer, and which I present to the +Tribunal with the request for judicial notice, is Ribbentrop Exhibit +Number 11 (Document Number Ribbentrop-11), which is in my document book. +This document... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think it is really +necessary for you to refer to any documents which are completely in +evidence already unless you are going to read some passage in them and +rely upon some passage in them which has not already been read. I mean, +supposing that the Prosecution read a particular sentence out of a +particular document and you want to refer to some other sentence in it, +then it will probably be right for you to indicate that; but, if the +document has been read in full, any further reference is a mere matter +of argument and is not really a matter of evidence, and you will be at +liberty, you see, to argue it whenever you come to make your speech. So +that, I mean, as a matter of saving time, it would not be necessary to +refer us to 386-PS or 2461-PS unless there is some passage in them which +you rely upon and which has not been read by the Prosecution. + +DR. HORN: I may then go on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 11 and present +it to the Court for judicial notice. It concerns an agreement between +the German Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government on 11 +July 1936. When, on 12 February 1938, Ribbentrop drove with Hitler to +Berchtesgaden to have a conference with Dr. Schuschnigg, then Chancellor +of Austria, he was not informed about the deviation of Hitler’s plans +from the agreement of the year 1936 between Germany and Austria, and he +conducted his discussion with Schuschnigg also in the spirit of the +agreement of 1936. One month later the Anschluss with Austria came +about. + +As proof that this Anschluss corresponded to the wish of the Austrian +population, I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 12 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-12), which I present to the Tribunal for judicial notice. It +is the result of the national plebiscite and of the election to the +Greater German Reichstag of 10 April 1938. From this document it is to +be seen that at that time in Austria a total of 4,484,475 people had the +right to vote, 4,471,477 voted, 4,453,772 voted for the Anschluss, and +only 11,929 voted against it. + +THE PRESIDENT: Have we got this document? We do not have it in our +books. Does the clerk of the Court have it? + +DR. HORN: It is in the document book as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 12. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, it goes from 10 to 14 for some reason. Let me look +at it. There is some mistake, apparently. It has not been copied; that +is all. It is not in our books, but here it is, so it is all right. Go +on. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, it is to be seen from this document that the +Austrian people at that time expressed themselves in favor of the +Anschluss with 99.73 percent of the votes cast. + +As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 13 to the +Tribunal for judicial notice. I submit this document as proof that the +Anschluss would hardly have come about by international negotiations, +according to the opinion not only of the German Government, but also of +the English Government. I should like as proof of this assertion to read +the following from this document. It concerns a statement by Under +Secretary of State Butler before the House of Commons, which reads as +follows—it was made on 14 March 1938: + + “The English Government discussed the new situation with + ‘friends of the Geneva Entente’ and it was unanimously”—I + emphasize the word unanimously—“agreed that a discussion in + Geneva of the situation in Austria would not bring satisfactory + results but that the result would probably again be some kind of + humiliation. The Under Secretary of State stated that England + had never assumed any special guaranty for the ‘independence’ of + Austria which had been forced in the treaty of St. Germain.” + +I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. +Subsequently to this the reunion of Austria with the German Reich took +place as set down in the law of 13 March 1938, which also was signed by +Ribbentrop. + +Herewith I end the submission of those documents of mine that are +related to the question of Austria. I may now... + +THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute Dr. Horn, the only desire of the Tribunal +is to save time, and we observe from the index in your document book +that there are, I think, over three hundred separate documents upon +which you wish to rely, and most of them appear to come from the various +books, the _German White Books_ and these other books, which the +Tribunal provisionally allowed to you. Wouldn’t the most convenient +course be for you to put them in, in bulk, saying that you are putting +in Exhibits 44 to 314, or whatever it may be, rather than simply detail +each document by its number? If you have a particular passage which you +want to read at this moment, you can do so; but it seems to take up +unnecessary time, simply to give each exhibit number one after the +other. + +DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President, I shall mention those numbers in +this way which I should like only to bring to judicial notice, briefly +mention from such and such to such and such, when it is a matter of +several numbers; and I shall ask the Court to accept them then. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +DR. HORN: I will now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. The +American Prosecutor stated in his presentation on this question that +this marked the end of a series of events that struck him as one of the +saddest chapters in human history—the violation and destruction of the +weak and small Czechoslovak people. As proof that there was no +Czechoslovak people in the usual sense of the term either before or +after 1939, I would like to read a few extracts from Lord Rothermere’s +book _Warnings and Prophecies_, which has been expressly granted me +through a ruling by the Tribunal. This is Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 45 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-45). + +THE PRESIDENT: Did the Tribunal allow Lord Rothermere’s book? + +DR. HORN: The Tribunal has granted it to me and even put at my disposal +an English copy, which I herewith hand to the Court. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the question of admissibility was to be finally +determined when each book is offered in evidence, and I think you will +remember that the Tribunal stated in one of its orders that the opinions +of particular authors upon matters of ethics, history, and events would +not be admitted. + +Lord Rothermere is apparently an author and was not a member of the +British Government; and therefore, unless there is some very particular +reason, it would not appear that his books—or statements in his +books—are in any way evidence. + +DR. HORN: The paragraphs to be presented are concerned entirely with +matters of fact; and I therefore request that the Tribunal take judicial +notice of these facts. There is no question of any polemic discussions. + +THE PRESIDENT: The distinction which exists is this: The Tribunal under +Article 21 is directed to take judicial notice of official government +documents, reports, _et cetera_. This is not an official government +document. Therefore—you say it is factual evidence—it is not evidence, +for the purpose of this Tribunal, of any facts stated in it. So far as +it is facts, it is not evidence of the facts, and so far as it is +opinion, it is Lord Rothermere’s opinion. + +Well, Dr. Horn, can you tell me what you want to prove by it? + +DR. HORN: I should like to prove by it, first, a few historical facts; +secondly that the difficulties of a state composed of many +nationalities, of which Czechoslovakia is an example, led to this +conflict with the German minority and consequently with the German +Government. I want to provide you with the reasons and motives that led +to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany. + +MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, on behalf of the United States I wish +to object very strongly to this offer for the reason given by Dr. +Horn—the first reason—and for the reason given secondly. If I +understood the translation correctly, I understood him to say in the +first place it was offered to prove that there was no such thing as a +Czech people. I don’t think that is a matter that can properly be raised +certainly here before this Court. We object that it is out of place to +offer such proof. We object furthermore for the reason given in the +second explanation by Dr. Horn. + +DR. HORN: May I again point out that I wish to demonstrate by this +means, the motives that led to the separation of the Sudetenland in the +year 1938? + +If I wish to adopt an attitude toward some international offense with +which someone is charged and adjudge it, I must also be in a position to +judge the motives underlying it. Otherwise it is impossible for me to +conduct a legal investigation. + +I may also point out that I had first of all asked the Tribunal for +documents of the League of Nations as evidence and I would have referred +to these official documents if this evidence had come into my possession +in time; but as I am not yet in possession of them, I have resorted to +presenting facts to the Tribunal instead. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that, about the League of Nations? I did +not catch what you said. + +DR. HORN: I have asked the League of Nations’ Library for the +appropriate documents regarding minorities which are in the possession +of the League of Nations, in order to submit them as evidence. The +office of the General Secretary is obtaining this evidence for me, but +so far I have not received it. Consequently I had to refer to this +weaker source of evidence in connection with documents which are +comparable to the government reports of Article 21, or which are +themselves such reports. + +THE PRESIDENT: Have you specified the passages in the book to which you +wish to refer? I mean, have you marked them somewhere in some copy of +the book? + +DR. HORN: I have requested documents regarding minorities in +Czechoslovakia, as far as these questions have been decided by legal +proceedings conducted by the League of Nations and by the International +Court at The Hague. This is a collection published by the League of +Nations regarding minority matters and constantly brought up to date. It +is an official collection of documents. + +THE PRESIDENT: I was only asking you whether you had specified the +particular passages in Lord Rothermere’s book which you want to put in. + +DR. HORN: I am sorry. I did not understand your question. Could I +request you to repeat the question? + +THE PRESIDENT: The question I asked was whether you have specified the +particular passages in Lord Rothermere’s book which you want to use. + +DR. HORN: I have marked these passages, and they are on Pages 137, 150, +138, 151, 161... + +THE PRESIDENT: Not so fast, I want to get them down. 137, 138... + +DR. HORN: Pages 161, 162, 140, 144, 145, 157. They are in each case just +short paragraphs. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is an appropriate time for us to break off. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will rule upon the admissibility +of these passages from Lord Rothermere’s book when they have had the +translation submitted to them. In the meantime, will you go on +presenting your documents in the way that I suggested, and not stopping +to detail any of them except those that you particularly want to. + +DR. HORN: May I explain very briefly that the oppression of German +racial groups in the border territories of Czechoslovakia led to the +formation of the Sudeten German Party, and to the co-operation and +consultation of the latter with official German agencies. Therefore the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in his capacity of Reich Foreign Minister and +within the scope of the directives he received, held conferences with +leaders of the national groups. A number of documents have already been +submitted in evidence by the Prosecution and I shall refer to them +later. In this connection may I ask to make a correction in Document +2788-PS, where, on Page 2, approximately in the middle, it says “by the +extent and gradual”—there is an error in translation here. Our document +says “provocation,” whereas the original says “specification +(Präzisierung) of the demands in order to avoid entering the +government.” I request the correction of this error, as it distorts the +meaning. + +In the course of the Prosecution’s presentation Von Ribbentrop was said +to have supported the high-handed conduct of the Sudeten German leaders. +As evidence to the contrary I refer to a part of Document 3060-PS which +has not yet been read and from which the contrary can be gathered, that +is, that the then Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop took measures against +the high-handedness of the Sudeten German leaders with the help of his +Ministry in Prague. As evidence of this, may I quote the first and +second paragraphs of this document. I quote: + + “The rebuff to Frank”—that is, the leader of the Sudeten German + Party at that time—“has had a salutary effect. I have discussed + matters with Henlein, who had avoided me recently, and with + Frank, separately, and have received the following promises: + + “1. The policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party must + follow exclusively the lines of German foreign policy as + transmitted through the German Legation. My directives must be + obeyed implicitly.” + +These directives do not apply within the frame of the general policy +which had as its aim the avoidance of direct interference in Czech +affairs or in the policy of the Sudeten German Party. + +Regarding the details of the activity of the German Government and of +the Foreign Office in their relations with the Sudeten German Party, I +shall question Herr Von Ribbentrop when he is called as a witness. + +I now pass on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 46 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-46), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. This +document is a report from the Legation of the Czechoslovak Republic in +Paris. It is concerned with the meaning and purpose of Lord Runciman’s +mission to Prague. It shows that that mission was entrusted to him by +England for the purpose of gaining time for rearmament. I should like to +read the document. + + “Paris, 5 August 1938. Secret. Mr. Minister, + + “Massigli considers the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague a + good thing. Anthony Eden said, during a conversation with + Ambassador Corbin (the French Ambassador to London) that on + earnest reflection the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague was a + step in the right direction, as he is said to be going to engage + England more directly with Central Europe than has been the case + up to now. Massigli says that the English know that there will + be war, and that they are trying every means to delay it. He is + perfectly aware that Lord Runciman’s mission to Prague for the + purpose of settling that dispute is per se a danger to + Czechoslovakia; for Lord Runciman might, for the alleged purpose + of gaining time, propose something which could be tremendously + detrimental to Czechoslovakia. + + “To this view of Massigli’s I add further information which is + extremely instructive. During the recent grain conference held + in London; the British, the Dominions, the United States, and + France conducted separate discussions. The French Delegate had a + discussion with Minister Elliot (British Minister of Health) and + Morrison (British Minister for Agriculture) as well as with the + distinguished expert, Sir Arthur Street, who was in the Ministry + of Agriculture and who had been entrusted with a leading post in + the Air Ministry. From the speeches, conduct, and negotiations + of the British Delegation, the French Delegate gathered the + positive impression that the British were interested in + organizing grain supplies not so much to prevent the conflict as + to win the conflict. The ministers Elliot and Morrison are both + supposed to believe in the possibility of a conflict. + + “Sir Arthur Street said that in 6 months’ time he would have put + British aviation on its feet. Therefore much importance is + attached to the gaining of time in England. + + “I mention this information at this point in connection with + Lord Runciman’s mission to Prague; because, as I said already, + the question of gaining time plays an important if not decisive + role in the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague. + + “With best greetings, yours sincerely—Ususky.” + +On 29 September 1938, the Munich Pact was concluded, in which Von +Ribbentrop also participated. Just how far, is something I shall +demonstrate when the defendant is examined in the witness box regarding +his policy. + +On 30 September there was a mutual declaration, which I submit to the +Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 47 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-47). That declaration by the Führer and the British Prime +Minister Chamberlain, dated 30 September 1938, was planned to serve the +purpose of removing all differences still pending between Germany and +England. + +The reaction to this agreement differed in Germany and in England. As +evidence for the British reaction I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number +48 (Document Number Ribbentrop-48), which I am offering to the Tribunal +with the request for judicial notice. This is an extract from the speech +of the British Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons on 3 +October 1938. May I quote the following from its first paragraph: + + “If there is a lesson we can learn from the experiences of these + last weeks it is the fact that lasting peace cannot be attained + by sitting still and waiting for it. Active and positive efforts + are required to attain this peace. We, in this country have + already been busy for a long time with a rearmament program + whose speed and extent increase constantly. Nobody should + believe that, because of the signing of the Munich Agreement by + the four powers, we can at present afford to reduce our efforts + regarding this program....” + +As evidence of this rearmament program, which Chamberlain himself said +was constantly growing in speed and size, I should like to prove this +assertion by reference to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 49 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-49). This is a speech of the British Secretary of State for +War, Hore-Belisha, at the Mansion House in London, given on 10 October +1938, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this speech +also, from the extracts which I am submitting. May I quote a few words +from them? + + “More still, however, is to be done to give full force and + opportunity to the territorial army as a whole.” + +I am now skipping one paragraph and read the following paragraph, +Paragraph 5, which says: + + “As regards the organization of new formations, infantry + brigades will in future have three battalions, as in the Regular + Army, instead of four. Employing the material that we have, we + find that we can form nine complete divisions on the Regular + Army model... + + “We have provided also a considerable number of modern corps and + army units, such as Army Field and Survey regiments. R.A. and + Signal Corps will be ready to take their place in such + formations should war eventuate. This is also in accordance with + Regular Army organization.” + +So much for the quotation from the speech of the Secretary of State for +War. + +In Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 50 (Document Number Ribbentrop-50) further +stress is laid on armament. It concerns a speech of Winston Churchill’s +of 16 October 1938, and I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of +this speech in connection with extracts from it as a document. I am +quoting only a few sentences from it: + + “We must arm... We shall no doubt arm. + + “Britain, casting away habits of centuries, will decree national + service upon her citizens. The British people will stand erect + and will face whatever may be coming. But + arms—instrumentalities, as President Wilson called them—are + not sufficient by themselves. We must add to them the power of + ideas. People say we ought not to allow ourselves to be drawn + into a theoretical antagonism between Nazidom and democracy, but + the antagonism is here now.” + +I prove the fact that England was arming energetically in the air far +beyond the normal needs of defense, by Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 51 +(Document Number Ribbentrop-51), which I am offering to the Tribunal +with the request for judicial notice. This is a declaration of the +British Secretary of State for Air in the House of Commons, dated 16 +November 1938... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought you understood what the Tribunal +wanted you to do, which was to put in the documents all together. I +think I have said from 44—wasn’t it the document that you had got +to?—to 300 something, that you could put them in all together. But now +you have gone through 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and you seem to be +going through each one in detail, doing exactly what I asked you not to +do. Didn’t you understand what I said? + +DR. HORN: The way I understood you, Mr. President, was that I may read +important parts from them. That is what I did. It concerns only +important extracts. + +THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to find an important passage in each of the +300 documents? + +DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, certainly not; but if I cannot read these +documents, these extracts, then I would like to ask the Tribunal to +accept my whole document book as evidence so that I can refer to it +later. + +THE PRESIDENT: That is what we intended to do. What we want you to do is +to offer in evidence now, stating that you offer from Exhibit 44 up to +300 or whatever the number is, and we will allow you, of course, to +refer to them at a later stage when you make your speech; and if there +is any passage which the Prosecution object to, they can inform you +about it beforehand and the matter can then be argued. But what we do +not desire to do is to take up the time of the Tribunal by either +offering each of these documents by its number individually, 44, 45, and +so on, or that you should read anything except passages which are of +especial importance at this moment. After all, you are not putting +forward your whole case now; you are only introducing your evidence. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I had... + +THE PRESIDENT: I am reminded that of these last few exhibits to which +you have been referring, you have referred to about six, all of them +upon British rearmament. That is obviously cumulative, isn’t it? +Therefore, it cannot be that all those are all particularly important to +you. + +We only desire to get on, and we desire you, as I have said, to put in +these documents, if I may use the phrase, in bulk; and we do not desire +you to refer to any of them beyond that. + +DR. HORN: In that case I am offering Number 51... + +COL. POKROVSKY [_Interposing_]: If I understand rightly, Dr. Horn up to +now has not drawn any conclusions from those directions which were given +him, time and again, by the Tribunal. + +I had an opportunity, that is, as far as I could, actually to acquaint +myself with those translations that are gradually coming to me, and, by +the way, Dr. Horn turned over these documents, not 3 weeks ago, as he +said, but considerably later. As far as I can see up to now, I have a +whole series of objections. + +Most of the documents in general are altogether irrelevant to the +matter, and in particular, absolutely irrelevant to the case of +Ribbentrop. + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we have already indicated that we do +not want to deal with questions of admissibility at the moment, because +the documents are not before us. I do not understand the purpose of your +objections. We haven’t got the documents here. How can we tell whether +they are admissible or not? + +COL. POKROVSKY: I have an objection in principle. Part of the +documents—I will not quote their contents but merely for illustration +will name two or three numbers. Some of them are direct filthy and +slanderous attacks by private persons against such statesmen as Mr. +Roosevelt, the late President of the United States. I have in mind the +Documents Number Ribbentrop-290(4), 290(3), 290(1). Some of them are +just provocative forged documents. I have in mind Document Number +Ribbentrop-286. + +There is a whole series of documents which fall directly under the terms +of those directions that were given to Dr. Horn by the Tribunal, and it +seems to me that if Dr. Horn will continue reading those documents into +the record... + +THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: Colonel Pokrovsky, as I have said, we +haven’t got these documents before us. You say documents 290(1), 290(3), +290(4), and 286—I don’t know even what the documents are. I have never +seen them. + +I think the best way would be for the Chief Prosecutors to submit their +objections in writing, and then they will be considered by the Tribunal. +The documents aren’t here. We can’t do anything until we see what the +documents are. In order to try and get on with this case, we are +allowing Dr. Horn to put in the documents in bulk. But your objections +now are really simply taking up time and doing no good at all. If you +would put in your objections in writing, saying that you object on +certain grounds to these documents, that matter would be considered; but +we can’t consider it without that. + +COL. POKROVSKY: My objection was dictated by the wish to save time and +is of a very practical nature. + +From the moment when a certain document—well, at least the contents of +it—from the moment even a brief account of it is recorded in the +transcript this material becomes the property of the press; and it seems +to me that it is not in our interests to have a document which is a +known falsification, and the fate of which has not been determined by +the Tribunal, that such a document should be turned over to certain +circles and that it should be made public. + +Meanwhile, among the documents which have been presented by Dr. Horn, +there are such documents; and it is not quite clear to me why these +particular documents were delayed in translation, why these documents +were presented later than others. And on the basis of this consideration +I thought it my duty to address the Tribunal, and I think that the +Tribunal will consider the reason for my objections. + +THE PRESIDENT: I follow what you mean now with reference to documents +being communicated to the press, and steps ought to be taken on that. +The Tribunal will rule now that documents, upon the admissibility of +which the Tribunal has not ruled, are not to be given to the press. I +believe there have been some infractions of that in the past; but that +is the Tribunal’s ruling, that documents should not be given to the +press until they have been admitted in evidence before this Court. + +COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you. + +THE PRESIDENT: I ought perhaps to add that the Tribunal are not in +complete control of this matter. It is for the Prosecution to see—and +also possibly for the Defense—that documents should not be given to the +press until they have been admitted in evidence here. + +COL. POKROVSKY: Up to now the order was such if the documents mentioned +in Court are recorded in the transcript, then they become public +property. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor, I wonder if I could help on that +practical point, because it is one which has given us a little concern. + +As Your Lordship knows, the practice has been that the documents have +been given some 24 hours before they are produced in Court, on the +understanding which has been practically entirely, completely, complied +with, that the press would not publish until the document is put in +evidence. And, My Lord, I am sure that if the Tribunal expressed the +wish that where any objection is taken to a document and the Tribunal +reserves the question of admissibility, the press would, in the spirit +with which they have complied with the previous practice, comply at once +with the Tribunal’s desire and not publish it in these circumstances. I +think that in practice that would solve the difficulty which Your +Lordship has just mentioned. + +THE PRESIDENT: The only thing is, of course, that we are now dealing +with a very large number of documents which Dr. Horn wants to submit; +and, as you have heard, for purposes of trying to save time we have +asked him to submit those documents in bulk. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: And of course it is very difficult, if not impossible, +for members of the Prosecution to make their objections to documents +when they are offered in bulk in that way. Therefore, I think the most +convenient course would probably be if, as soon as the translation of +those documents has been made, the Prosecution could indicate any +objections they have to them and the Tribunal would consider them. And +after the order of the Tribunal has been made upon them, they should +then be made available to the press. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I respectfully and entirely agree. My +Lord, the Prosecutors did confer. Of course the only material that they, +had to confer upon was the short description of the document in Document +Book Number 1, and on that it appeared to all of us that there were a +number of documents which might be and probably were objectionable. But, +clearly, from our point of view it would be much more satisfactory if we +had the opportunity of seeing the actual document in translation, and +then we should gladly comply with what Your Lordship has suggested, +namely, that we will make the objections in writing to such of those as +we think are objectionable and let the Tribunal have them. + +THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them, I believe, are in +English, and you could let us have your objections as soon as possible. +Perhaps the press would act in accordance with our wishes and not make +public those documents to which objection is taken until we have ruled +upon them. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, yes. We will make our +objections as soon as we have had the opportunity of reading the +documents. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +DR. HORN: May I, Mr. President, state that none of my material has been +handed to the press by me up to now. I may further state that by an +order of the Tribunal only that part was to be translated which was +considered relevant by the Prosecution. On the basis of this ruling I +cannot rightly comprehend the one point of Colonel Pokrovsky’s objection +regarding the intrinsic value of the documents. I do not believe that +the Prosecution, on the strength of that ruling, would translate +anything which, as Colonel Pokrovsky emphasized, must be designated as +dirty in its contents. I think that would have been rejected already +before now by the Prosecution and therefore the danger does not exist at +all that any such translation or original will reach the press. + +THE PRESIDENT: I haven’t seen the documents, so I can’t say, but if you +would continue in accordance with the scheme that I have suggested to +you, I think that would be the best course for you to take. + +DR. HORN: May I now submit the documents referring to armament, military +as well as economic, which at the same time show the co-operation +between Britain and France? These are the Documents Number Ribbentrop-51 +to 62, in my document book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice +of these documents. + +I come to the question of Czechoslovakia. As evidence for the fact that +Slovakia requested to be taken under German protection I shall present +to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit Numbers 63, 64, and 65 (Documents +Ribbentrop-63, 64, and 65) with the request that they be given judicial +notice. Furthermore, I shall examine the Defendant Ribbentrop concerning +this subject when he takes the stand and, as far as is necessary, I +shall have him express an opinion regarding these particular documents. +Now I shall submit Documents Numbers 66 to 69 (Documents Ribbentrop-66 +to 69) to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They contain statements +regarding the reaction in Britain to the occupation of the rest of the +Czech country on 15 March 1939 by Germany. Regarding the details as to +how the creation of the protectorate came about I shall again question +the Defendant Von Ribbentrop concerning the individual documents. + +As the next group of exhibits, I present to the Tribunal the document +which refers to Article 99 of the dictate of Versailles and which +specifically refers to the international legal position of the Memel +territory. We are concerned here with Documents Ribbentrop-70 and 71 of +my document book. + +Regarding the fact that in accordance with the presentation of evidence +up to now, I had timed myself not to proceed any further today than to +this document, I should like to ask your Lordship’s permission to submit +the rest of the documents to the Tribunal tomorrow. For up to now, on +the strength of the existing practice of the Tribunal that the documents +be partly read with connecting text, I had expected not to go any +further than to this document. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, why don’t you put them all in now? You say you +have an index of them. All you have to say is that you offer in evidence +the documents from 71 to 300 and something and then they go in, and then +if the Prosecution should take an objection to them, of course you can +be heard upon the question of the objection. + +DR. HORN: May I have your permission to confer with my colleague for one +moment and see how much material he has here, so that I can then offer +evidence on the separate subjects to the Tribunal? May I again ask Your +Lordship?—I gather from this ruling of the Tribunal that submission of +evidence here is no longer to take place but merely presentation of +exhibits quite apart from the contents. + +THE PRESIDENT: Presumably when these documents are submitted for +translation which I understand you say you have done—but at any rate, +if you haven’t done it already you will be doing it—you will mark the +passages upon which you rely. Some may be in books, and there you will +indicate only certain parts; in documents you will indicate the parts +upon which you rely, which is what we desired you to do. You described +all these documents by numbers and gave them exhibit numbers in your +document book and all we want you to do now is to offer them in evidence +and then the Prosecution, when they have been translated, will have the +opportunity of objecting to them on the grounds of their being +cumulative or of their being inadmissible for some other reasons; and, +if necessary, you will be heard upon that. All we want you to do now is +to get on. What difficulty there can be in submitting these documents, +all of which you have indexed in your document book, the Tribunal is +quite unable to see. + +DR. HORN: Until now, however, the ruling of the Tribunal was to this +effect that we, in the Defense presentation, were not only allowed to +submit our documents but also to deliver them with a connecting text so +as to indicate the attitude of the Defense. Just recently, Mr. Justice +Jackson suggested that, on the contrary, the documents should be handed +over in their entirety and that objections could be raised subsequently +by the Prosecution against the individual documents without their being +presented. This suggestion was turned down on the strength of +representations made by Dr. Dix, and the Tribunal intended to continue +the established procedure, namely, that the documents could be read and +brought forward with a connecting text. Now, we come today to a complete +departure from this procedure, in which only the documents, and these in +bulk, are presented to the Tribunal for judicial notice. That is +naturally such a deviation that one first of all has to regroup all +these documents, in order to be able to submit them to the Tribunal in +their proper order, for up to now we had planned to deliver at least +some part of the contents. + +THE PRESIDENT: I am not aware of any order of the Tribunal which refers +to an interconnecting text. We did not rule that you should not be +allowed to read any passage from the documents, but what we did rule was +that we wished the documents to be presented and put in evidence and +that the passages upon which you relied should be marked and that the +Prosecution should, if they wished to object to them as being so +irrelevant that they needn’t be translated, that they should do so, and +that the Tribunal should rule, if there was a conflict upon that. Dr. +Horn, of course, you can put any document to your witnesses in the +course of their examination and ask them to explain it. It isn’t as +though you are confined to this presentation of the documents in bulk. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, may I add another word? This matter appears to +me to be again such a question of principle that I do not wish to +prejudice my colleagues and I should like to have an opportunity first +of all to confer with my colleagues about it. That is indeed a basic +departure from the established procedure which was allowed the Defense. +I would not like therefore to take it upon myself now simply to alter +these matters for myself and then in so doing, also commit my +colleagues. I hope that Your Lordship will understand that. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the only material order which the Tribunal has +made, as far as I am aware, is this: It is the order of the 4th of +February 1946, 2(a): + + “During the presentation of a defendant’s case, the defendant’s + counsel will read documents, will question witnesses, and will + make such brief comments on the evidence as are necessary to + insure a proper understanding of it.” + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, this ruling could naturally only be interpreted +by us to the effect that we were granted approximately the same +procedure as the Prosecution, for that certainly belongs to the +fundamental principles of any trial, that a certain equality of rights +exists between Prosecution and Defense. + +So as to save time, we are prepared to adapt ourselves to the Court to +the extent that we submit the documents to the Tribunal in bulk, insofar +as they refer to a definite problem; but still with the reservation to +make those statements upon their contents required in order to +understand the whole problem. This possibility, however, is taken away +from us, if we must now simply submit the entire documentary material +and can make no statements about it at all; for we certainly cannot make +any comments on a document if I now, for example, submit 10 pieces +altogether for a specific problem. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will adjourn now for a few minutes +to consider this question and will return in a short time and announce +their decision so that you can prepare yourself for tomorrow on the +lines which they wish. + +DR. DIX: Before the Tribunal confer, may I ask only one question. I have +understood the course of the discussion up to now in this way: That the +difficulty has arisen owing to the fact that as the Russian and French +translations are not available, some of the Prosecution are still unable +to form an opinion with reference to this material and consequently +cannot decide whether they wish to raise objections or not. On the other +hand the Tribunal wants to avoid quotations being read here concerning +matters on which it has not yet been decided whether the Prosecution +want to raise objections. This is the situation which appears to me to +be the cause of the difficulties arising at present. + +I have not understood the statements of the Tribunal, of His Lordship, +to mean—I beg to be corrected if I am wrong—that there is to be a +deviation from the already announced decision or from the procedure +followed up to now, that we may quote essential and important portions +of the documents submitted by us, when they have been admitted as +relevant by the Tribunal. + +I believe that I am right in my impression that no exception is to be +made to this principle and that no basic new decision is to be made here +now, but only an interim ruling is being sought: How can we surmount the +difficulties that Dr. Horn may not at the moment read individual +passages from his documents because the Tribunal is not yet in a +position to decide their relevancy and admit them, because the Tribunal +cannot yet hear the attitude of the Prosecution? + +Before we adjourn, therefore, so that we have a definite basis for our +discussion, I should like to ask the Court if my interpretation is +correct. Is it now merely a question of finding a way out while +basically maintaining the right of the Defense to speak connecting +words, words of explanation of the documents, that is, such words +without which the documents could not be understood, and to read +individual relevant parts, but that on principle only these technical +interim questions are to be decided? + +I should be grateful to Your Lordship if I could be told if this +conception of mine, regarding the nature of these difficulties which +have arisen, is correct. + +THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now and we will return to Court very +shortly and we will consider what you have said. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: On the 22 March 1946, the Tribunal made this ruling, +repeating a ruling of 8 March 1946: + + “To avoid unnecessary translations Defense Counsel shall + indicate to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents + which they propose to use in order that the Prosecution may have + an opportunity to object to irrelevant passages. + + “In the event of disagreement between the Prosecution and the + Defense as to the relevancy of any particular passage, the + Tribunal will decide what passages are sufficiently relevant to + be translated. Only the cited passages need be translated unless + the Prosecution require translation of the entire document.” + +That rule has not, for very likely sufficient reason, been able to be +carried out, and therefore certainly the Tribunal have not got the +translations, and they understand that the Prosecution have not got, at +any rate, all the translations. The difficulty which has arisen, the +Tribunal thinks, is in part, at any rate, due to that fact. + +The Tribunal, in citing that order of 8 March 1946, on 22 March 1946, +said this: + + “In considering the matters which have been raised this morning + the Tribunal has had in mind the necessity for a fair trial and + at the same time for an expeditious trial, and the Tribunal has + decided that for the present it will proceed under rules + heretofore announced, that is to say: + + “First, documents translated into the four languages may be + introduced without being read, but in introducing them counsel + may summarize them or otherwise call their relevance to the + attention of the Court and may read such brief passages as are + strictly relevant and are deemed important. + + “Second, when a document is offered the Tribunal will hear any + objections that may be offered to it.” + +In this connection the Tribunal then went on to read the order of 8 +March, which deals with translations. + +Now, in the present case, the translations not being in the hands of the +Tribunal or of all the prosecutors, it has been impossible for the +prosecutors to make their objections and impossible for the Tribunal to +rule upon the admissibility of the documents. Therefore, it is natural +that the Prosecution have objected to the Defense reading from documents +which they had not seen. + +The Tribunal understands that the translations of these documents of Dr. +Horn’s will be ready tomorrow. They hope, therefore, that the order +which I have just read will be able to be carried out tomorrow, and they +propose for the present, and if the order is reasonably and fairly +carried out by Defense Counsel, to adhere to it. They would draw the +attention of the defendants’ counsel again to the first paragraph of the +order and would remind them that they must adhere strictly to that +order: + + “The documents having been translated into the four languages + may be introduced without being read, but in introducing them + counsel may summarize them, or otherwise call their relevance to + the attention of the Court and may read such brief passages as + are strictly relevant and are deemed important.” + +In that connection I would add: “and are not cumulative”. + +The Tribunal cannot sit here and have three or four hundred documents +read to them and commented upon and argued, and therefore it is +absolutely essential in the opinion of the Tribunal that counsel must +summarize briefly and indicate the relevance of the documents briefly +and read only such passages as are really strictly relevant and are not +cumulative. + +The Tribunal are prepared to adhere to that rule, as I say, if counsel +will adhere strictly to it themselves, and they think if Dr. Horn will +state, after offering the documents either in one complete bulk or in a +group or in groups, the relevancy of each group and confine himself to +the reading of only passages which are really necessary to be read in +order to understand the documents, that will be satisfactory to them. +But they cannot sit here to hear either each of those documents offered +in evidence by its number or to hear a short speech or even a longer +speech about the relevancy of each of the documents or to hear passages +read from each of those documents. The number of documents is very great +and it is impossible for the Tribunal to carry on an expeditious trial +unless the rule which they have laid down is interpreted in the way in +which I have indicated. + +As I have already indicated in the emphasis which I threw upon the +words, this rule was expressly made for the present and unless it is +marked by the Defense Counsel in a reasonable way the rule will be +altered. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 28 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + NINETY-THIRD DAY + Thursday, 28 March 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +DR. HORN: In accordance with the request of the Tribunal, I am now +presenting in groups the documents not yet named, as follows: + +First of all, the group concerning the Polish question. In my document +book, you will find a document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 200 (Document +Number Ribbentrop-200) which I am submitting to the Tribunal for +judicial notice. In this document, Prime Minister Chamberlain, in a +letter to Hitler dated 22 August 1939, defines his attitude regarding +the basis for conflict between Germany and Poland. In this connection he +emphasizes the question of minorities as one of the main causes of the +conflict. As proof of the fact that this minority question already +played an important part when the Polish State came into being, I refer +to the document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 72 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-72), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. This +contains observations by the German Peace Delegation on the peace +conditions. + +In a further document—Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 74 (Document Number +Ribbentrop-74), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice—the +President of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, +Clemenceau, once again draws the attention of the Polish Prime Minister, +Paderewski, to this problem. May I offer as proof... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I want to explain the position of the +Prosecution. + +We have not yet received these documents, and therefore we are in the +position that we have been able to make only a tentative selection of +those to which we object. All this book of documents has been objected +to as far as we know. I want only to make it clear that we are +admitting, without protest, the course taken by Dr. Horn on the basis +which Your Lordship announced yesterday, that he is putting them in _en +bloc_, subject to our right to object formally when we have the +documents. + +Therefore it is only right that we must preserve our position, because I +have arranged, and all my colleagues agree, that there should be +objections to a number of these documents on our present state of +knowledge. + +DR. HORN: May I ask Your Lordship to hear me for a moment? + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to say something? Were you going to add +something to what Sir David had said? + +DR. HORN: In view of the objections raised by the Prosecution I request +that a general ruling be made now as to whether the Defense have to +submit to disadvantages arising out of technical deficiencies and for +which they are not responsible, and whether our already limited +presentation of evidence shall be made practically impossible by our +being unable to discuss even in a general way, documentary material with +the Prosecution and the Tribunal. + +May I ask, therefore, that the presentation of documents in their +shortened form, as requested by the Tribunal yesterday, be postponed +until the document books are available. + +THE PRESIDENT: The difficulty seems entirely to arise from the fact that +your document books are not ready. That is what causes the difficulty. +If the document books had been ready and had been submitted to the +Prosecution, the Prosecution would be in a position to object to them. +That is the reason why Sir David is objecting in this provisional form. +But if you have witnesses whom you are going to call, why do you not +call them while your books are being got ready? That seems to the +Tribunal to be the obvious course. + +Call your witnesses and then we can have the documents introduced at a +later stage, when we can see them. That is the only reasonable course +and why you do not adopt it I do not know. + +DR. HORN: An officer of the Translation Division informed me recently, +that he is not in a position, with the personnel at his disposal, to +catch up with translations. That is the cause of the trouble and it is +beyond my control. I submitted the documents in good time for +translation. + +THE PRESIDENT: That was not the point I was dealing with. Perhaps the +interpretation did not come through correctly. + +What I said was that if you have witnesses whom you propose to call, why +do you not call them now? + +DR. HORN: I had intended to call the witnesses in the course of my +presentation of documents and in accordance with the groups of questions +on which witnesses could make statements. + +THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you had, but as your documents are not here to +be presented to the Court, then you must get on, and the only way to get +on with your case is to call your witnesses. + +DR. HORN: In that case, may I ask for 5 minutes so that I can have a +short conversation with a woman witness and then I shall call her? + +THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. Wait one moment. + +Yes, Mr. Dodd? + +MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I would not begrudge any counsel 5 +minutes. This woman witness has been here for a long time. She stood +outside all day yesterday. I think Dr. Horn has talked to her before. He +has had ample opportunity to confer with her. He knew he was going to +call her; he asked this Court for permission to call her. I think we are +faced here with almost a one-man filibuster at this time. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the witness must be called at +once. + +DR. HORN: In that case I wish to have Fräulein Blank called as a +witness. + +[_The witness Blank took the stand._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name? + +MARGARETE BLANK (Witness): My name is Margarete Blank. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the +Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will +withhold and add nothing. + +[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] + +THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. + +DR. HORN: When did you first meet Herr Von Ribbentrop? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: I met him at the beginning of November 1934 in Berlin, +when he was delegate for disarmament questions. + +DR. HORN: When did you become secretary of the former Foreign Minister +Von Ribbentrop? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: On 1 November 1934 I was engaged as secretary in the +Ribbentrop office. His personal secretary gave notice and, as her +successor did not turn up, Von Ribbentrop asked me whether I was willing +to take the post. I said “yes” and became his personal secretary on 1 +February 1935. + +DR. HORN: What was Von Ribbentrop’s attitude towards Hitler? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge Herr Von Ribbentrop always showed +the greatest admiration and veneration for Adolf Hitler. To enjoy the +Führer’s confidence, to justify it by his conduct and work was his chief +aim, to which he devoted all his efforts. To achieve this aim no +sacrifice was too great. In carrying out the tasks set him by the Führer +he showed utter disregard for his own person. When speaking of Hitler to +his subordinates he did so with the greatest admiration. Appreciation of +his services by the Führer, as for instance the award of the Golden +Party Badge of Honor, the recognition of his accomplishments in a +Reichstag speech, a letter on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, +full of appreciation and praise, meant to him the highest recompense for +his unlimited devotion. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop adhered to Hitler’s views even if +he himself was of a different opinion? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: What I just said shows that in cases of differences of +opinion between himself and the Führer, Herr Von Ribbentrop subordinated +his own opinion to that of the Führer. Once a decision had been made by +Adolf Hitler there was no more criticism afterwards. Before his +subordinates Herr Von Ribbentrop presented the Führer’s views as if they +were his own. If the Führer expressed his will, it was always equivalent +to a military order. + +DR. HORN: To what do you attribute this attitude? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: I attribute it first of all to Ribbentrop’s view that +the Führer was the only person capable of making the right political +decisions. + +Secondly, I attribute it to the fact that Herr Von Ribbentrop, as the +son of an officer and as a former officer himself, having taken the oath +of allegiance to the Führer, felt himself bound in loyalty and +considered himself a soldier, so to say, who had to carry out orders +given him, and not to criticize or change them. + +DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Ribbentrop having tendered his +resignation several times? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, that happened several times. But about such +personal matters Ribbentrop would not speak to his subordinates. I +remember only the resignation handed in by him in 1941. I assume that +this resignation, as well as the later ones, was tendered by a +handwritten letter. The reason for this resignation lay in differences +with other departments as to competency; in view of their encroachments +upon the competence of the Foreign Office, Herr Von Ribbentrop felt he +could no longer take responsibility for the Reich’s foreign policy. + +DR. HORN: What was the result of these offers to resign? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: They were turned down. + +DR. HORN: Were you with Von Ribbentrop while he was Ambassador in +England? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop over a number of years worked for +close alliance between Germany and England? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. For this reason Von Ribbentrop, in the summer of +1936, asked the Führer to send him as ambassador to England. The Naval +Agreement of 1935 was only a first step. Subsequently an air pact was +contemplated, but, for reasons unknown to me, was not concluded. + +DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Von Ribbentrop’s views on the +British theory of balance of power on the continent? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: From numerous statements by Ribbentrop I know he was of +the opinion that England still adhered to her traditional balance of +power policy. In this his ideas were opposed to those of the Führer, who +was of the opinion that with the development of Russia a factor had +arisen in the East which necessitated a revision of the old balance of +power policy—in other words, that England had a vital interest in the +steadily increasing strength of Germany. From Ribbentrop’s attitude it +could be inferred that he expected that in the Polish crisis the English +guarantee for Poland would be honored. + +DR. HORN: What political aims did Von Ribbentrop want to achieve by the +conclusion of the Tripartite Pact? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Tripartite Pact was to be a pact for the limitation +of war. + +DR. HORN: Do you know whether Ribbentrop endeavored to keep America out +of the war? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, the Tripartite Pact was signed with this end in +view. + +DR. HORN: And now another set of questions. What was Herr Von +Ribbentrop’s attitude in church questions? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge, his attitude in church questions +was very tolerant. + +To my knowledge, he left the Church already in the twenties, but in this +respect he exercised no pressure or influence on his personnel or, +rather, he did not bother about it at all. His tolerance went even so +far that in 1935 he let his two eldest children have their wish and +rejoin the Church. His tolerance in personal questions of religion was +in line with his political attitude towards the Church. In this +connection I remember Von Ribbentrop’s sending the Führer a fundamental +memorandum in which he advocated a tolerant church policy. In the winter +of 1944 he received Bishop Heckel to discuss church matters with him. On +the occasion of a journey to Rome in 1941 or 1942, he paid a long visit +to the Pope. + +DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop of an introspective and secluded character, or +was he not? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, although I was his personal secretary for 10 years, +I hardly ever saw him in a communicative mood. His time and thoughts +were so completely occupied by his work, to which he devoted himself +wholeheartedly, that there was no room for anything private. Apart from +his wife and children there was nobody with whom Von Ribbentrop was on +terms of close friendship. This, however, did not prevent him from +having the welfare of his subordinates at heart and from showing them +generosity, particularly in time of need. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that you often felt that there were certain +differences of opinion between Ribbentrop and Hitler? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. True to his attitude, which I mentioned before, Von +Ribbentrop never discussed such differences with his subordinates, but I +do remember distinctly that there were times when such differences +surely did exist. At such times the Führer refused for weeks to receive +Herr Von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop suffered physically and mentally under +such a state of affairs. + +DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop independent in the attainment of the goals of +his foreign policy, or was he bound by orders and directives of the +Führer? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Ribbentrop often used the phrase that he was only the +minister responsible for carrying out the Führer’s foreign policy. By +this he meant that, in formulating his policy, he was not independent. +In addition, even in carrying out the directives given him by the +Führer, he was to a large extent bound by instructions from Hitler. +Thus, for instance, the daily reports of a purely informative nature +transmitted by the liaison officer, Ambassador Hewel, between the +Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Führer were often accompanied by +requests for the Führer’s decision on individual questions and by draft +telegrams containing instructions to the heads of missions abroad. + +DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop suffer by the fact that, although he was +responsible for foreign policy, he was not allowed to direct it? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: He never complained about it in my presence, but I had +the feeling that he did suffer. + +DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s attitude toward the Foreign Office? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Führer saw in the Foreign Office a body of ossified +red-tape civil servants, more or less untouched by National Socialism. I +gathered from men of his entourage, that he often made fun of the +Foreign Office. He considered it to be the home of reaction and +defeatism. + +DR. HORN: In what way did Ribbentrop try to bring the Foreign Office +closer to Hitler? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: When taking over the Foreign Office in February 1938, +Herr Von Ribbentrop intended to carry out a thorough reshuffle of the +entire German diplomatic service. He also intended to make basic changes +in the training of young diplomats. These plans did not go beyond the +initial stage because of the war. In the course of the war they were +taken up again when the question of new blood for the Foreign Office +became acute. Ribbentrop’s anxiety to counteract the Führer’s animosity +towards the Foreign Office led him to fill some of the posts of heads of +missions abroad, not with professional diplomats, but with tried SA and +SS leaders. + +DR. HORN: What were Ribbentrop’s views and intentions regarding Russia? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: His intentions regarding Russia were shown by the +Non-aggression Pact of August 1939, and the Trade Agreement of September +1939. + +DR. HORN: Do you know that, in addition to the Non-aggression Pact and +the Trade Agreement, a further agreement was concluded in Moscow? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, there was an additional secret agreement. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! It appears to me that the witness who has +been called to attend the present sitting of the Tribunal is, by the +very nature of her position as secretary to the former Minister of +Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, able to testify only to the personality of +the defendant, to his way of life, to the reticence or frankness of his +character, and so forth. But the witness is quite incompetent to pass an +opinion on matters pertaining to agreements, foreign policy, _et +cetera_. In this sense I consider the questions of the Defense +absolutely inadmissible and request that they be withdrawn. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, that is the same matter that is raised, is it +not, upon the affidavit of Dr. Gaus? I mean, you said that you were +going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gaus which dealt with a secret +agreement between—can’t you hear me? I beg your pardon. I ought to have +said that Dr. Seidl was going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gaus with +reference to this alleged agreement. That is right, is it not? + +DR. HORN: I assume so, yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Soviet Prosecutor objected to that agreement being +referred to until the affidavit should be admitted, until it had been +seen. Well, now, is the agreement in writing? + +DR. HORN: No. + +THE PRESIDENT: Is the alleged agreement between the Soviet Government +and Germany in writing? + +DR. HORN: Yes. It was put down in writing, but I am not in possession of +a copy of the agreement, and I should therefore like to ask the +Tribunal, in case the decision depends on the affidavit of Ambassador +Gaus, to allow me to obtain, at the appropriate time, an affidavit from +Fräulein Blank who saw the original. Would Your Lordship be agreeable to +that? + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you a copy of the agreement itself? + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, there are only two copies of this agreement. +One copy was left in Moscow on 23 August 1939. The other copy was taken +to Berlin by Von Ribbentrop. According to an announcement in the press +all the archives of the Foreign Office were confiscated by the Soviet +troops. May I, therefore, request that the Soviet Government or the +Soviet Delegation be asked to submit to the Tribunal the original of the +agreement? + +THE PRESIDENT: I asked you a question, Dr. Seidl. I did not ask you for +an argument. I asked you whether you have a copy of that agreement +available. + +DR. SEIDL: I, myself, am not in possession of a copy of the agreement. +The affidavit of Ambassador Gaus only states the contents of the secret +agreement. He was able to give the contents of the secret agreement +because he drafted it. The secret agreement, as drafted by Ambassador +Gaus, was signed by Foreign Commissar Molotov and Herr Von Ribbentrop. +That is all I have to say. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I wish to make the following statement: +With regard to what was mentioned here by Defense Counsel Seidl, about +the agreement allegedly seized by Soviet troops in connection with the +capture of the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—that is, +the agreement concluded in Moscow in August 1939—I would draw the +attention of the Defense Counsel, to the newspaper in which this +agreement, the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, was +published. That is a known fact. + +Insofar as other agreements are concerned, the Soviet Prosecution +considers that Dr. Seidl’s application for the incorporation into the +record of affidavits by Friedrich Gaus should be denied, and for the +following reasons: + +Gaus’ testimony on this pact and on the history immediately preceding +the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact is irrelevant. The presentation +of such affidavits, which, moreover, do not shed a true light on events, +can be looked upon only as an act of provocation. This is clearly borne +out by the fact that Ribbentrop himself repudiated this witness even +though his affidavits describe Ribbentrop’s activities, even though +Defense Counsel for Hess has accepted testimonies from this witness and +applied for their incorporation into the record, despite the fact that +they contain no reference to Hess. On the strength of these +considerations, of these circumstances, I request the Tribunal to reject +the request made by Defense Counsel Seidl and to consider the question +submitted by Defense Counsel Horn as being irrelevant to the matter +under our consideration. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl? Do you want to say something? + +DR. SEIDL: May I add something? The translation of what the Soviet +Prosecutor has just said has come through incompletely. I could not make +out whether General Rudenko wanted to deny altogether that such an +agreement was concluded or whether he wanted only to state that the +contents of this secret agreement are not relevant. + +In the first case, I repeat my application that the Soviet Foreign +Commissar Molotov be called and interrogated before this Tribunal; in +the latter case, I ask to be given the opportunity here and now to +submit to the Tribunal my points regarding the relevance of this secret +agreement. + +THE PRESIDENT: At the moment we are considering an objection to the +evidence of this witness, so we won’t trouble with that. + +The Tribunal will adjourn for a few moments. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal desires to point out to Counsel for the +Defense, that there was no mention of this alleged treaty in his +application for evidence to be given by the witness now in the witness +box, but as the matter has now been raised the Tribunal rules that the +witness may be questioned upon the matter. + +DR. HORN: [_To the witness._] You were speaking about the secret +agreement. How did you come to know about the conclusion of this +agreement? + +THE PRESIDENT: I am told that what I said was wrongly translated into +the Russian language. At any rate, I don’t know whether it was rightly +translated into the German language; but what I said was that the +witness may be questioned, not that the witness may not be questioned. +Is that clear to you? + +DR. HORN: Thank you. I understood the question correctly. + +[_Turning to the witness._] Taking up your previous statement about the +secret agreement I should like to ask you how you came to know about the +conclusion of this agreement? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Owing to illness, I could not accompany Von Ribbentrop +on his two trips to Russia. I was also absent when the preparatory work +for the agreements was being done. I learned of the existence of this +secret agreement through a special sealed envelope which, according to +instructions, was filed separately and bore an inscription something +like “German-Russian secret or additional agreement.” + +DR. HORN: You were also responsible for filing separately these secret +matters? Is this correct? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. + +DR. HORN: I should like to turn now to another group of questions. Did +Von Ribbentrop endeavor to keep the pact with Russia in any case? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Having signed the German-Russian pacts, Von Ribbentrop +was, of course, interested in their being kept. Moreover, he realized +fully the great danger a German-Russian war would mean for Germany; +accordingly he informed and warned the Führer. For this very purpose, as +far as I recall, Embassy Counsellor Hilger from Moscow and Ambassador +Schnurre were called to Berchtesgaden to report. Also, in the spring of +1941 Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg was again ordered to report, +to back up and to corroborate and reinforce Herr Von Ribbentrop’s +warnings to the Führer. + +DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop was informed beforehand of +Hitler’s intent to attach Austria to the Reich? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: At the time of the German march into Austria, Ambassador +Von Ribbentrop, who in February had been appointed Foreign Minister, was +in London on his farewell visit. There he heard to his surprise of the +Anschluss of Austria. He himself had had a different idea of a solution +of the Austria question, namely an economic union. + +DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop made repeated efforts to +end the war by diplomatic methods? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. One of his moves was to send Minister Professor +Berber to Switzerland in the winter of 1943-1944. Later on these moves +were intensified by sending Herr Von Schmieden to Bern and Dr. Hesse to +Stockholm. As the Führer had not given official authority to initiate +negotiations, it was possible only to try to find out on what conditions +discussions might be opened between Germany and the Allies. Similar +missions were entrusted to the German Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid, +Minister Von Bibra, Consul General Möllhausen in Lisbon, and the +Ambassador to the Vatican, Von Weizsäcker. A former member of the Office +Ribbentrop living in Madrid was instructed to make a similar attempt +with the British Government. + +On 20 April Von Ribbentrop dictated to me a detailed memorandum for the +Führer in which he asked for official authorization to initiate +negotiations. I do not know the outcome of this request because I left +Berlin. + +DR. HORN: In the course of your duties did you get to know what Hitler’s +basic attitude to this question was? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: From what I heard from men of his entourage I know that +the Führer did not expect much of it, or that he would have been in +favor of initiating negotiations only at a time of military successes. +If and when, however, there were military successes, he was likewise +against diplomatic initiative. As to the mission of Dr. Hesse—after its +failure, he, it was disclosed by an indiscretion, remarked that he had +not expected much of it anyway. + +DR. HORN: Just one more question: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop was +notified of the impending invasion of Norway and Denmark only a very +short time before this action? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, just a few days previously. + +DR. HORN: Have you heard anything to the effect that Von Ribbentrop was +of the opinion England would fight for Poland? + +FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. In line with his view that England would adhere to +the old balance of power policy, he was of the opinion that England +would honor her guarantee to Poland. + +DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any +questions of this witness? [_There was no response._] Do the +Prosecution? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have very carefully +considered this matter. They hope that the Tribunal will not hold it +against them that they accept everything that this witness says, but +they feel that all the matters could be more conveniently put to the +defendant himself, and therefore they do not intend to cross-examine. + +THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. + +[_The witness left the stand._] + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the Tribunal has permitted the question +concerning the secret agreement to be put to the witness. The witness +knew only of the existence of this agreement, not its contents. + +May I please be told whether the admission of this question to the +witness is to be considered as implying the decision by the Tribunal on +the admissibility of Ambassador Gaus’ affidavit, and whether I might now +be given the opportunity of reading an excerpt from this affidavit? + +THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been submitted to the Prosecution? + +DR. SEIDL: Last Monday—that is, 3 days ago—I submitted six copies of +the affidavit to the Translation Division or to Lieutenant Schrader of +the Defendants’ Information Center. I assume that in the meantime, since +3 days have elapsed, the Prosecution have received a copy. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have not received the +copies. I have not seen the affidavit yet. Neither has my friend Mr. +Dodd, nor have my other colleagues, General Rudenko, or M. Champetier de +Ribes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then I think we had better wait until the document is in +the hands of the Prosecution, then it can be considered. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything in my power to +furnish the Prosecution with the affidavit. I have no influence on the +General Secretary’s business, and I should be obliged if the Tribunal +would assist in this matter. + +THE PRESIDENT: Nobody has said that you have done anything wrong about +it, Dr. Seidl. + +Yes, Dr. Horn. + +DR. HORN: As my next witness I should like to call Minister Paul +Schmidt. + +[_The witness Schmidt took the stand._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name? + +DR. PAUL OTTO SCHMIDT (Witness): Schmidt is my name. + +THE PRESIDENT: Your full name? + +SCHMIDT: Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the +Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will +withhold and add nothing. + +[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] + +DR. HORN: Witness, you took part in some of the decisive discussions +between the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, and members of the +Reich Government before the outbreak of war. Is it correct that you were +present at the conference on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von +Ribbentrop and the British Ambassador? + +[_There was a pause in proceedings._] + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until a quarter to 2. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1345 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +DR. HORN: Witness, is it correct that you were present at the conference +on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the British +Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct. + +DR. HORN: Where did that conference take place? + +SCHMIDT: It took place in the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs +in the Foreign Office in Berlin. + +DR. HORN: In what capacity did you take part in that conference? + +SCHMIDT: I took part in that conference as interpreter and recorder. + +DR. HORN: Since when had you been employed in this capacity in the +Foreign Office and for whom did you work? + +SCHMIDT: I had been working in the Foreign Office as interpreter for +conferences since 1923, and in this capacity I interpreted for all +foreign ministers, from Stresemann to Von Ribbentrop, as well as for a +number of German Reich Chancellors such as Hermann Müller, Marx, +Brüning, Hitler, and for other cabinet members and delegates who +represented Germany at international conferences. In other words, I +participated as interpreter in all international conferences at which +Germany was represented since 1923. + +DR. HORN: Did you have the opportunity to act as interpreter during the +discussion between Ribbentrop and Sir Nevile Henderson? + +SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that opportunity as the discussion was +conducted in German. + +DR. HORN: Was Ambassador Henderson able to speak German fluently? + +SCHMIDT: Ambassador Henderson’s knowledge of German was rather good, but +not perfect. Hence it could happen that in moments of excitement he did +not quite understand certain points, as is proved by an incident which +occurred during the conference just mentioned; and it was not always +easy for him to express himself in German; but when speaking to Germans +he usually preferred to conduct these discussions in German. + +DR. HORN: In the course of the conference Herr Von Ribbentrop read out +to Henderson a memorandum containing the German proposals for a +settlement of the questions pending between Germany and Poland. And now +I am asking you, Witness, did Henderson ask you during that discussion +to translate to him the contents of the memorandum Ribbentrop had read +out? + +SCHMIDT: No, he did not do that. + +DR. HORN: Did you get the impression from his attitude that Sir Nevile +Henderson had fully understood the contents of the memorandum? + +SCHMIDT: That is, of course, very hard to say. You cannot tell what goes +on inside a person’s mind, but I doubt whether he understood the +document in all its details. + +DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop, when he read out the document to Sir Nevile +Henderson, give him any explanations? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, while reading out the document the Foreign Minister now +and then commented to Henderson about some points which might not have +been quite clear. + +DR. HORN: Did Sir Nevile Henderson himself ask for such explanations? + +SCHMIDT: No, Sir Nevile Henderson sat and listened to the document being +read out and the comments which were made. + +DR. HORN: What atmosphere prevailed during that conference? + +SCHMIDT: The atmosphere during that conference was, I think I can say, +somewhat charged with electricity. Both participants were extremely +nervous. Henderson was very uneasy; and never before, and perhaps only +once afterwards, have I seen the Foreign Minister so nervous as he was +during that conference. An incident which occurred during the first part +of the discussion can perhaps serve to illustrate the atmosphere. The +matter under discussion was the specifying of all the points Germany had +against Poland and her government, and the Foreign Minister had done +that in all details and concluded with the words: “So you see, Sir +Nevile Henderson, the situation is damned serious.” When Sir Nevile +Henderson heard those words, “damned serious” he started up, half raised +himself and pointing a warning finger at the Foreign Minister said: “You +have just said ‘damned.’ That is not the language of a statesman in so +serious a situation.” + +THE PRESIDENT: To what charge in the Indictment is this relevant? + +DR. HORN: To the point in the Indictment that on 30 August 1939, Von +Ribbentrop read out the memorandum, the decisive memorandum, so quickly +that Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson was not able to grasp its contents +and transmit it to his government and have it forwarded to the Polish +Government in order to continue negotiations between Germany and Poland. +England at that time had offered her good offices as intermediary +between both governments. Germany on the basis... + +THE PRESIDENT: Which passage of the Indictment are you referring to? You +may be right, I do not know. I only want to know which passage in the +Indictment you are referring to. + +DR. HORN: I am referring to the preparation of, that is, to the failure +to prevent aggressive war for which Ribbentrop is indicted as a +co-conspirator. + +THE PRESIDENT: That is on Page 9, is it not, from (F) 4? There is +nothing about the way in which this document was handed over to Sir +Nevile Henderson. Presumably you have got the Indictment. Where is it in +the Indictment? + +DR. HORN: It has been presented by the Prosecution and it has also been +presented in the House of Commons where Chamberlain insisted that +Ribbentrop had read it out so rapidly that it was impossible to grasp +the contents and transmit them through diplomatic channels, which +England had expressly offered to do. Thus the Defendant Von Ribbentrop +is directly indicted for having prevented this last chance of further +negotiations with Poland. The statement of the witness will prove that +the Defendant Von Ribbentrop cannot be charged with this. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, you made the point that it was read in +that way. There is no charge about it in the Indictment at all. It may +be that the Prosecution referred to it in the course of the history. You +have made the point, surely it is not necessary to go on at length about +it. + +DR. HORN: In that case may I proceed? + +[_Turning to the witness._] Then you had the impression that both these +statesmen were extremely agitated? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, I did have that impression. + +DR. HORN: To what causes do you attribute this agitation? + +SCHMIDT: To the tension which prevailed during the negotiations, to the +numerous conferences which had taken place almost without interruption +during the preceding days and which had made considerable demands upon +the nerves of all participants. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, as Sir Nevile Henderson +maintains in his book, said in the worst possible language that he would +never ask the Polish Ambassador to call on him? + +SCHMIDT: That I cannot remember. The Foreign Minister merely said that +he could receive the Polish Ambassador for negotiations or discussions +only if he came to him with the necessary authority to negotiate. + +DR. HORN: Ambassador Lipski did not have that authority? + +SCHMIDT: He answered a question respecting this, put to him by the +Foreign Minister when Ambassador Lipski was with him with an emphatic +“no.” He said he had no authority. + +DR. HORN: Thereupon, Ribbentrop declared to Sir Nevile Henderson that he +could not receive the ambassador, is that right? + +SCHMIDT: No. I was speaking about a conference which the Foreign +Minister had with the Polish Ambassador in the course of which the +latter was asked whether he had authority to negotiate. To this he +replied “no,” whereupon the Foreign Minister said that in this case +naturally no conversation could take place. + +DR. HORN: Then Von Ribbentrop did not hand the memorandum which we +mentioned previously to Sir Nevile Henderson. Did you have the +impression that Ribbentrop did not submit the text of the ultimatum to +Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson because he did not wish to or because he +was not allowed to do so? + +SCHMIDT: It is difficult for me to give a clear-cut answer to this +question as I was not present at the preliminary discussions which +Hitler doubtless had with the Foreign Minister regarding that point +before the conference with the British Ambassador. I, therefore, have to +rely on the impressions I got during the conference with the British +Ambassador; and from these I can draw my conclusions as to the +instructions Hitler may have given the Foreign Minister for this +conference. In this connection I can say the following: + +When Henderson requested that the document containing the German +proposals be submitted to him, the Foreign Minister said: “No, I cannot +give you the document.” These are the words he used. This of course was +a somewhat unusual procedure because normally Sir Nevile Henderson had +the right to expect that a document which had just been read out would +be handed to him. I myself was rather surprised at the Foreign +Minister’s answer and looked up because I thought I had misunderstood. I +looked at the Foreign Minister and heard him say for the second time: “I +cannot give you the document.” But I saw that this matter caused him +some discomfort and that he must have been aware of the rather difficult +position in which he found himself by this answer, because an uneasy +smile played on his lips when he said in a quiet voice to Sir Nevile +Henderson these words, “I cannot give you the document.” Then I looked +at Sir Nevile Henderson as I of course expected him to ask me to +translate the document, but this request was not forthcoming. I looked +at Henderson rather invitingly, since I wanted to translate the +document, knowing how extraordinarily important a quick and complete +transmission of its contents to the British Government was. If I had +been asked to translate I would have done so quite slowly, almost at +dictation speed, in order to enable the British Ambassador in this +roundabout way to take down not merely the general outline of the German +proposal, but all its details and transmit them to his Government. But +Sir Nevile Henderson did not react even to my glance so that the +discussion soon came to an end and events took their course. + +DR. HORN: Did you, on the morning of 3 September 1939, receive the +British ultimatum to the German Government? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct. + +DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this ultimatum? + +SCHMIDT: On the morning of the 3rd, at about 2 or 3 o’clock, the British +Embassy telephoned the Reich Chancellery, where I was still present with +the Foreign Minister in order to be available for possible conferences, +to give the information that the British Ambassador had received +instructions from his government, according to which, at exactly 9 +o’clock, he was to make an important announcement on behalf of the +British Government to the Foreign Minister. He therefore asked to be +received by Herr Von Ribbentrop at that time. He was given the reply +that Ribbentrop himself would not be available but that a member of the +Foreign Office, namely I, would be authorized to receive the British +Government’s announcement from the British Ambassador on his behalf. +Thus it happened that at 9 o’clock in the morning I received the British +Ambassador in Ribbentrop’s office. When I asked him to be seated +Henderson refused and while still standing he read to me the well-known +ultimatum of the British Government to the German Government, according +to which, unless certain conditions were fulfilled by Germany, the +British Government would consider themselves at war with Germany at 11 +o’clock that morning. + +After we had exchanged a few words of farewell, I took the document to +the Reich Chancellery. + +DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this document there? + +SCHMIDT: In the Reich Chancellery I gave it to Hitler, that is to say, I +found Hitler in his office in conference with the Foreign Minister and I +translated the document into German for him. When I had completed my +translation, there was at first silence. + +DR. HORN: Was Hitler alone in the room? + +SCHMIDT: No, as I said before, he was in his office with the Foreign +Minister. And when I had completed my translation, both gentlemen were +absolutely silent for about a minute. I could clearly see that this +development did not suit them at all. For a while Hitler sat in his +chair deep in thought and stared somewhat worriedly into space. Then he +broke the silence with a rather abrupt question to the Foreign Minister, +saying, “What shall we do now?” Thereupon they began to discuss the next +diplomatic steps to be taken, whether this or that ambassador should be +called, _et cetera_. I, of course, left the room since I had nothing +more to do. When I entered the anteroom, I found assembled there—or +rather I had already seen on my way in—some Cabinet members and higher +officials, to whose questioning looks—they knew I had seen the British +Ambassador—I had said only that there would be no second Munich. When I +came out again, I saw by their anxious faces that my remark had been +correctly interpreted. When I then told them that I had just handed a +British ultimatum to Hitler, a heavy silence fell on the room. The faces +suddenly grew rather serious. I still remember that Göring, for +instance, who was standing in front of me, turned round to me and said, +“If we lose this war, then God help us.” Goebbels was standing in a +corner by himself and had a very serious, not to say depressed, +expression. This depressing atmosphere prevailed over all those present, +and it naturally lives in my memory as something most remarkable for the +frame of mind prevailing in the anteroom of the Reich Chancellery on the +first day of the war. + +DR. HORN: So you did not have the impression, then, that these men +expected a declaration of war? + +SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that impression. + +DR. HORN: Witness, were you in a position to observe how Ribbentrop +reacted to the news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor? + +SCHMIDT: I had no direct opportunity, but in the Foreign Office it was +generally known that the news of Pearl Harbor took the Foreign Minister, +as indeed the whole Foreign Office, completely by surprise. This +impression was confirmed by what a member of the Press Department told +me. The Press Department had a listening station for radio news and the +official on duty had instructions to inform the Foreign Minister +personally of important news at once. When the first news of Pearl +Harbor was received by the listening station of the Press Department, +the official on duty considered it of sufficient importance to report it +to his chief, that is to say, the head of the Press Department, who in +turn was to pass it on to the Foreign Minister. He was, however—so I +was told—rather harshly rebuffed by the Foreign Minister who said it +must be an invention of the press or a canard, and he did not wish our +Press Department to disturb him with such stories. After that, a second +and third message about Pearl Harbor was received, I think a Reuters +report had also been received by the listening station; and the head of +the Press Department then again plucked up courage and, in spite of the +order not to disturb the Foreign Minister, he once more gave him this +news. + +THE PRESIDENT: This evidence seems to be utterly uninteresting and +irrelevant to the Tribunal. + +DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop is accused also of having prepared aggressive +war against the United States of America. + +THE PRESIDENT: What you were telling was the reactions of the press. +What have we got to do with the reactions of the press? + +DR. HORN: The witness described Von Ribbentrop’s reaction to the attack +on Pearl Harbor. Von Ribbentrop did not know that the Japanese were +about to attack Pearl Harbor or that they were about to attack America +at all. Neither was there such an agreement between Japan and Germany. +It is therefore not correct that Ribbentrop prepared an aggressive war +against the United States of America. That is... + +THE PRESIDENT: You were talking about the press. I am not saying that +you ought not to ask him whether the Foreign Minister knew nothing about +the attack upon Pearl Harbor. That was not what I said. What I said was +that the Tribunal was not interested and thought it was irrelevant for +you to go into the reactions of the press. + +DR. HORN: Witness, you were present at the negotiations regarding the +Naval Agreement with England. Can you tell us how those negotiations +proceeded, and whether Von Ribbentrop was sincere, and what aims he +pursued? + +SCHMIDT: These negotiations, at which I was also present as interpreter, +went perfectly smoothly after some difficulties had been overcome. The +aims which the Foreign Minister... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand it, this is the Naval +Agreement of 1935. In my recollection—I am just trying to check +it—that was one of the matters which we discussed on the application +for witnesses, and the Tribunal ruled against going into the +negotiations antecedent to the conclusion of that treaty. It came up on +application for witnesses. One or two witnesses who were going to give +the negotiations were asked for and, I think, to deal with this exact +point which Dr. Horn put in his last question, namely, the state of mind +of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I found one or two—there is Lord Monsell, +for example, who was on the list of witnesses—who were denied by the +Court, and a number of German ones were denied on the same point. My +Lord, it is in the Tribunal’s statement of the 26th of February; and +Your Lordship will see, on Page 2, I think, certainly the witness +Monsell, who happens to be the one most familiar to myself; but I am +sure there were other witnesses, too. I know that we discussed this +point quite fully on the application for witnesses. + +THE PRESIDENT: Who were the others, Sir David? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have a list of witnesses who were refused. +There is Admiral Schuster... + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he is one. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...who was relevant on this question as to who +initiated the treaty. And then there is Sir Robert Craigie, Number 24. +There is Lord Monsell... + +THE PRESIDENT: He was refused. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These are on the same points, Number 25. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I think these are the three. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what do you say to this? Those three +witnesses—Schuster, Craigie, and Monsell—who as alleged by you were to +give evidence on this 1935 treaty, were all refused. As to the witness +you are now examining, no such reference was contained regarding him in +the application. He was asked for only as an interpreter in the Foreign +Office. + +DR. HORN: I was under the impression that these other three witnesses +had been refused because they were cumulative and I was not going to +question the witness on the Naval Agreement but I merely want to ask him +about the attitude shown by Ribbentrop when the agreement was concluded +and afterwards in order to prove to the Tribunal that Von Ribbentrop was +not, in any case at that time, deliberately working towards an +aggressive war, nor was he participating in a conspiracy to initiate a +war of aggression, at least not at that time. And I wish to prove +further that this agreement was not “eyewash” as the afore-mentioned +British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, put it. + +THE PRESIDENT: Your application with reference to Ambassador Craigie was +this: The witness can give evidence that in 1935 Ribbentrop approached +England with a proposal that the Naval Treaty should be signed and +Ribbentrop’s initiative brought about an agreement by France to this +treaty which involved the Treaty of Versailles. Thus the treaty has come +into effect. + +Is it not in connection with that, that you were going to ask this +witness questions? + +DR. HORN: No. + +THE PRESIDENT: If you have nothing about the Naval treaty of 1935, then +you can go on. + +DR. HORN: Witness, in 1944, you were present at a conference between +Horthy and Hitler at Klessheim, in which Von Ribbentrop also took part +and during which the solution of the Jewish question in Hungary was +discussed. What did Von Ribbentrop say to you about this question? + +SCHMIDT: During this conference there had been a certain difficulty, +when Hitler insisted that Horthy should proceed more energetically in +the Jewish question, and Horthy answered with some heat, “But what am I +supposed to do? Shall I perhaps beat the Jews to death?”—Whereupon +there was rather a lull, and the Foreign Minister then turned to Horthy +and said, “Yes, there are only two possibilities—either that, or to +intern the Jews.” Afterwards he said to me—and this was rather +exceptional—that Hitler’s demands in this connection might have gone a +bit too far. + +DR. HORN: On 25 August 1939, you took part in a conference between +Hitler, Henderson, and Ribbentrop, at which Ribbentrop and Hitler once +more expressed their wish to come to an agreement with Poland, using +Britain as intermediary. Is it correct that Ribbentrop then sent you +with a draft note on this conference to Henderson at the Embassy to ask +him to back this proposal as far as possible and to try to put it +through? Is that correct? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, that is so. + +DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this telegram from Sir +Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax? (Document Number TC-72, Number 69.) + +[_Turning to the witness._] Is it correct, Witness, that on 28 August +1939, Herr Von Ribbentrop in a further discussion with Sir Nevile +Henderson again stressed that an agreement between Germany and Britain +after a settlement of the Polish question was Chamberlain’s greatest +wish, as the British Prime Minister had stated to Ribbentrop and that +Von Ribbentrop then repeated this to Henderson? Is that true? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, that is true. + +DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal the memorandum in question as an +exhibit? + +THE PRESIDENT: You offer a copy of that in evidence, do you? + +DR. HORN: I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the +document. + +THE PRESIDENT: What number? + +DR. HORN: The one number has already been submitted by the Prosecution. +It bears the Document Number TC-72 and another number, and the second +number has also been submitted by the Prosecution. I submit it again to +the Tribunal because I have referred to it just now. (Document Number +TC-72, Number 75). + +Witness, one last question: In your extensive experience as an +interpreter, you had much opportunity to observe Hitler in contact with +foreigners. What impression, according to your observations, did Hitler +make on foreign statesmen? + +SCHMIDT: Naturally, it is not quite so easy to answer this question, as +one cannot look into the hearts and minds of other people. But as an +observer one can naturally draw certain conclusions from the attitude... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think really that this is +a matter which is relevant, the effect that Hitler’s demeanor had on +foreign statesmen. It does not influence us in the least. + +DR. HORN: Then I withdraw my question. I have no further questions to +put to the witness. + +THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other defendants’ counsel who wish to ask +questions? + +DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Witness, were you +present at a conversation which, about one year before the outbreak of +war, took place between Lord Londonderry and Field Marshal Göring at +Karinhall? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present at this conversation. + +DR. STAHMER: Describe briefly to the Tribunal the substance of this +conversation. + +SCHMIDT: After so long a time I cannot, of course, remember the details, +but I recall merely that the subject of conversation was the +Anglo-German rapprochement, or rather the elimination of any points of +dispute between Germany and England, and that in addition, of course, +quite a number of technical questions regarding aviation and the air +force were dealt with. I have always remembered very clearly one +particular remark made by Göring in the course of this conversation, +when at the end of a discussion which was to prove how desirable it was +that Germany and England be friendly and avoid conflicts, he said the +following: + + “If our two countries should be involved in a war against each + other, then there will naturally be a victor and a vanquished, + but the victor in this bitter conflict will in the moment of + victory have just enough strength left to strike the last blow + at the defeated and will then fall to the ground himself gravely + wounded and for this reason alone our two countries should get + along with each other without conflict and without war.” + +DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in the negotiations in Munich in the +autumn of 1938? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, I did take part in these negotiations. + +DR. STAHMER: Was the then Field Marshal Göring also present? + +SCHMIDT: During the first part he was not present, but later when the +circle of those present became larger he likewise took part. + +DR. STAHMER: In what way did he participate in the negotiations? + +SCHMIDT: He intervened only in individual questions of lesser +importance. However, he did take part in a way which showed that through +his intervention he wanted to remove insofar as possible, any +difficulties arising from certain technical points which might hamper +the progress of the negotiations. In other words, he was anxious that +the Munich negotiations should not collapse over such technical points +of procedure, which played an important role in the second part of the +negotiations. + +DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conversation which took place in the +autumn of 1937 between Lord Halifax and the then Field Marshal Göring +and followed a conference between Lord Halifax and Hitler at the +Berghof? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present. + +DR. STAHMER: What course did this conversation take? Briefly, please. + +SCHMIDT: First I must say that at the Obersalzberg the conversation with +Lord Halifax had taken a very unsatisfactory turn. The two partners +could in no way come to an understanding, but in the conversation with +Göring the atmosphere improved. The same points were dealt with as at +Obersalzberg, the subjects which were in the foreground at the time, +namely, the Anschluss, the Sudeten question, and finally the questions +of the Polish Corridor and Danzig. At Obersalzberg Hitler had treated +these matters rather uncompromisingly, and he had demanded more or less +that a solution as he conceived it be accepted by England, whereas +Göring in his discussions always attached importance to the fact or +always stressed that his idea was a peaceful solution, that is to say, a +solution through negotiation, and that everything should be done in this +direction, and that he also believed that such a solution could be +reached for all three questions if the negotiations were properly +conducted. + +DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. + +DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were present at numerous political +conferences of Hitler’s. Did you notice on such occasions that high +military leaders tried to influence him to enlarge German territory in a +peaceful way or by war? + +SCHMIDT: No, no such efforts on the part of the military came to my +notice, because at political negotiations the military representatives +were for the most part not present at the beginning when the large +problems were dealt with and they were called in only when purely +military problems were discussed; and then, of course, they stated their +opinion only on purely military questions and did not speak on any +political matters. + +DR. LATERNSER: Then I have one more question: On the occasion of such +discussions, did you find that high military leaders were anxious to +exert political influence upon the Reich Government? + +SCHMIDT: No, I did not find that, and you could not have found it, since +they were hardly ever present. + +DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you first of all to tell the +Tribunal quite shortly the general background of your views. Do you +remember on 28 November making an affidavit at Oberursel; do you +remember? + +SCHMIDT: I cannot remember the date clearly, but I do remember that I +made an affidavit. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it. [_Handing the document to +the witness._] Paragraph 1 sets out your experience, the number of +conferences, _et cetera_. + +My Lord, I ought to have said that this document is Document Number +3308-PS and will be Exhibit GB-288. + +[_Turning to the witness._] Then, in Paragraph 2 you give the basis of +your experience. Would you follow it while I read: + + “Whatever success and position I have enjoyed in the Foreign + Office I owe to the fact that I made it my business at all times + to possess thorough familiarity with the subject matter under + discussion, and I endeavored to achieve intimate knowledge of + the mentality of Hitler and the other leaders. Throughout the + Hitler Regime I constantly endeavored to keep myself apprised as + to what was going on in the Foreign Office and in related + organizations, and I enjoyed such a position that it was + possible to have ready access to key officials and to key + personnel in their offices.” + +And then, if you will look at the third paragraph, which gives your +impression from that basis of the objectives of the foreign policy: + + “The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent + from the start, namely, the domination of the European + Continent, to be achieved, first, by the incorporation of all + German-speaking groups in the Reich, and secondly, by + territorial expansion under the slogan of ‘Lebensraum.’ The + execution of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be + characterized by improvisation. Each succeeding step apparently + was carried out as each new situation arose, but all consistent + with the ultimate objectives mentioned above.” + +Is that right, Herr Schmidt? Does that express your views? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I go on to deal with particular +matters, I want you to develop your impressions a little further. You +have told us that you acted under or with every foreign minister since +Herr Stresemann. Did you notice a considerable difference between the +style of living of the Nazi ministers and those who had preceded them? + +SCHMIDT: As far as the style of living is concerned, there were certain +differences, yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take the Defendant Ribbentrop. Before the +Defendant Ribbentrop went into politics, had he one house in +Berlin-Dahlem? I think Lenze-Allee 19. Was that his possession? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when he was Foreign Minister, had he six +houses? Let me remind you and take them one by one. You can tell me if I +am right. There was a house in Sonnenburg, somewhere near Berlin, with +an estate of 750 hectares, and a private golf course. That was one, was +it not? + +SCHMIDT: I knew that there was a house at Sonnenburg, but I did not know +how large it was. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then there was one at Tanneck bei Düren, near +Aachen, a house that he used for horse breeding? + +SCHMIDT: I did not know about that house. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then there was one near Kitzbühl that he +used for chamois hunting? + +SCHMIDT: That is not known to me in detail. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not in detail, but its existence was known? + +SCHMIDT: I consider that it is not at all improbable that the house +existed, but I have not heard any details about it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, of course, there was the Schloss Fuschl; +that is in Austria, is it not? + +SCHMIDT: Near Salzburg, yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Near Salzburg, yes. That was taken over as a +state residence. I will ask you about the circumstances a little later. + +Then there was a Slovakian hunting estate called “Pustepole,” was there +not? + +SCHMIDT: The name is familiar to me, and I know that Herr Von Ribbentrop +sometimes went hunting there, but I know nothing regarding the +proprietorship. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then he also used a hunting lodge, near +Podersan, that had been that of Count Czernin, near Podersan, in +Bohemia, in the Sudetenland? + +SCHMIDT: There was a hunting house or something similar, I do not know +the name, where receptions took place, as for instance, that given for +Count Ciano. But I think it had a different name. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the one—where Ciano visited. That is +the one I was indicating to you. I think I am right that it previously +belonged to Count Czernin. + +Tell me, was the salary fixed for Reich Ministers? + +SCHMIDT: I did not understand the question. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me put it quite clearly. Was a salary—that +is, a fixed annual remuneration—appointed for Reich Ministers? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, that is quite right. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How much was that? + +SCHMIDT: That I cannot say. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was kept secret? + +SCHMIDT: That is not the reason that I cannot give you any information. +I was not at all interested in how large a salary the Reich Foreign +Minister received. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know? + +SCHMIDT: No. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you say that you do not know, that is good +enough for me. I think, perhaps, you can answer this question. Had any +previous Reich Foreign Minister been able to run six country houses and +estates of various sizes on his salary, anyone that you had worked with? + +SCHMIDT: Whether he could have done it I cannot say, but he did not do +it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not. We will leave it there for a moment. + +Now, I want you to apply your mind to May 1939. That is about four +months before the war, when the Polish question was just coming up. I +mean, it was getting to be quite a serious question. Do you remember +what I think they call in the German Foreign Office a _conduite de +langage_ that was issued by Ribbentrop about that time and put out by +Baron Von Weizsäcker? + +SCHMIDT: No, I do not know that, or at any rate I should say that I +cannot remember it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me try to remind you, to see if this draws +it to your recollection: + + “The Polish problem will be solved by Hitler in 48 hours; the + Western Powers will be unable to give any assistance to Poland; + the British Empire is doomed within the next 10 years; France + will bleed to death if she tries to intervene.” + +Do you remember a _conduite de langage_ to that effect issued by the +Foreign Minister? + +SCHMIDT: I cannot remember a _conduite de langage_ of that kind. It +appears to me rather to resemble a _conduite de langage_ for propaganda +purposes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that Von Ribbentrop issued +instructions that no official of the Foreign Office was to issue any +different views? + +SCHMIDT: That is right, that one was to adhere to those _conduites de +langage_. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember what he told Baron Von +Weizsäcker to say would happen to anyone who expressed different views? + +SCHMIDT: No, I do not recollect that, but I can imagine that severe +penalties would have been threatened to such a person. But I do not +remember the actual case. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that he said they would be +shot by him personally? + +SCHMIDT: That such a statement may have been made by him on some +occasion when he was angry, I consider perfectly possible, but I do not +believe that it was meant seriously. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I thought you might remember—I just +suggest it to you—was the distress and difficulty that Baron Von +Weizsäcker had in deciding how he was to say it to the official +conference at the Foreign Office. Do you not remember that? + +SCHMIDT: At that time I had not yet been admitted to the morning +conferences. I was not present at that time so I cannot tell you +anything about it, but I can imagine that the State Secretary may have +had quite some trouble in translating that statement into official +language. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want to deal quite shortly with the +points that have been put to you about August 1939. I only want to get +the facts quite clear. + +Do you remember that you were with Hitler at the time that he was +expecting the reactions of the Western Powers to the Soviet treaty? + +SCHMIDT: No, I was attached to the delegation in Moscow and therefore +not with Hitler. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So did you come back with the Defendant +Ribbentrop on the 24th? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, but I remained in Berlin and did not go to Berchtesgaden. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now you remember that Hitler saw +Sir Nevile Henderson at 1:30 on the 25th and gave him what has been +called a _note verbale_? Do you remember that? + +SCHMIDT: I think that I was not present at that conference, because just +at that time I was in Moscow. It must be possible to establish the date. +I was not present at a conference between Hitler and the British +Ambassador which took place on the Obersalzberg during the time of our +Moscow journey. I think that is the conference to which you are +referring. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is the day after the defendant came back +from Moscow? + +SCHMIDT: No, I remained in Berlin. I was not up there. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to remind you of the day. If you +were not present, I will pass from it; but were you present when Signor +Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, produced a communication from +Mussolini? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the day I am asking you about. Do you +remember that a communication came from Signor Attolico that afternoon +that the Italian Army and Air Force were not in a condition to go to +war? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, indeed. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to try to help me because it is +rather important as to the time. Was that not about 3 o’clock in the +afternoon? + +SCHMIDT: That could be so; but with the many conferences which took +place at the time, the question of hours and dates is naturally a bit +confused. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember the news that the +Anglo-Polish Treaty would be signed that evening coming through about 4 +o’clock? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember about 4 o’clock M. +Coulondre, the French Ambassador, having an interview with Hitler? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, were you aware that on that day the orders +for an attack on Poland the next morning were countermanded? + +SCHMIDT: I remember that military orders had been withdrawn, but just +what orders these were I naturally never learned. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would not ask you about that, Herr Schmidt, +but you knew that orders had been countermanded. I wondered if you could +help me on this point: Was not the countermanding of the orders at +6:15—1815 hours—after the interview with the French Ambassador, M. +Coulondre, was not that the time when they were countermanded? + +SCHMIDT: I cannot recall whether that was the time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And equally could you help the Tribunal on this +point: Were they not issued about 2 o’clock—1400 hours—after the +interview with Sir Nevile Henderson? Do you know that? + +SCHMIDT: No. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You cannot help us on that point. + +Well, now. I am not going to take time about the interview on the night +of the 30-31 August between Sir Nevile Henderson and the Defendant +Ribbentrop, except to ask you this: You have told us that the Defendant +Ribbentrop was very excited; when he read these terms over, did he raise +his voice at times, shouting? + +SCHMIDT: No. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How did he show his nervousness, then? + +SCHMIDT: It manifested itself during some incidents which I mentioned +before, which had occurred during the conversation; previously during +those incidents the nervousness became apparent, but not during the +reading of the document. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, but you remember and were very much +astounded at the time at the refusal to hand over the vital document to +the British Ambassador? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to see if you can help us with one +or two other incidents. It has been suggested by a witness that we heard +yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop knew very little about +concentration camps. I want to make it clear that was suggested. I think +perhaps you can help us on one or two inhabitants of concentration camps +that he knew about. Do you remember a man called Martin Luther? Not the +religious gentleman but a contemporary? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that the Defendant Ribbentrop +brought him into his office, the Bureau Ribbentrop, in 1936? + +SCHMIDT: I am not sure about the year, but I do know that he got his job +through the Bureau. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I think it was not received with great joy +by the older members of the German Foreign Office. + +SCHMIDT: No, certainly not. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There had been some trouble about a small matter +of 4,000 Reichsmark that Mr. Luther had had to deal with in the past? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. We learned about that afterwards. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was taken into the Foreign Office and +received rapid promotion to counsellor, that is to say minister, and +Under Secretary of State, did he not? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, do you remember that in 1943 he had a +quarrel with the Defendant Ribbentrop? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he sent to Himmler—I think he did it +through Lieutenant Büttner—suggesting that Ribbentrop’s state of mind +was not such that he ought to continue as Foreign Secretary, and +suggesting that Werner Best, I believe it was, should be appointed. Do +you remember that? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that; but I did not know that he suggested +Werner Best as successor. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, he suggested that Ribbentrop should +go. I think he was quite blunt about it. I believe he suggested that his +mental powers were no longer up to it. + +SCHMIDT: I did not see the report. I only heard rumors about it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In consequence of that, of course, after an +interview with Ribbentrop, Ribbentrop had Luther put in a concentration +camp, did he not? + +SCHMIDT: I do not know whether that happened on Ribbentrop’s initiative, +or whether it came from some other source, but it was said among us in +the office that Luther had landed in a concentration camp. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, the sequence of events was that +Luther had this disagreement with Ribbentrop and shortly afterwards he +appeared in a concentration camp. And not only did he go into a +concentration camp, but is it not correct that even the SS asked that he +should come out of the concentration camp, and Ribbentrop would not +agree to it? + +SCHMIDT: That I cannot say, because the whole matter was, of course, +treated rather confidentially in the office by Herr Von Ribbentrop and +the members of the old Foreign Office, of whom I was one, did not have +his confidence to such an extent that they were informed of all such +details. In other words, I heard about the whole Luther affair only by +way of rumor, through special channels—actually through prohibited +channels—so that I cannot therefore give you any authentic information +but I can repeat only what I have heard unofficially. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure you desire to be absolutely frank with +the Tribunal, and the point I am putting to you is that everyone in the +Foreign Office knew that Luther had landed in a concentration camp and, +quite clearly, the Defendant Ribbentrop knew that he had landed in a +concentration camp. That is right, is it not? + +SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, let us just take one other incident +relating to this if I may comment as to his extraordinary innocence +about concentration camps. + +You remember two unfortunate people called Herr and Frau Von Remitz, to +whom the Schloss Fuschl used to belong? I think the name is either +Remitz or Raenitz. Do you remember? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Schloss Fuschl—would you tell me how +it is pronounced? + +SCHMIDT: Well, regarding these matters I am so little... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I want you to tell me how it is pronounced. + +SCHMIDT: Fuschl. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. + +The Schloss Fuschl used to belong to the people that I have just +mentioned. Frau Von Remitz was a sister of August Thyssen, was she not? + +SCHMIDT: I cannot say anything about that, since all these questions +refer to the private household of Herr Von Ribbentrop and I had nothing +to do with that. My connections with him were purely official and +limited at that to routine matters and the important political +interpretation affairs in the Foreign Office. I only heard about the +other matters, and naturally not in such a way that I could make any +authentic statements about them. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will ask you only one question. After +the Schloss had become the property, or at any rate had come to the use +of the Foreign Minister, did not Herr Von Remitz spend several years in +a concentration camp, where he ultimately died? You knew that, did you +not? + +SCHMIDT: I knew it as a rumor; I was told that it had happened in that +way. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did he not hear of other stories stronger +than these, that came out of concentration camps? + +SCHMIDT: I do not believe that any authentic reports were made there +regarding conditions because naturally, particularly in front of the +Foreign Office, it was treated as taboo by these people who were +responsible for concentration camps, since we were in any case regarded +as not quite reliable and as not belonging to them. Such matters were of +course diligently covered up and concealed from us. Therefore, any +concrete details never became known to us at all. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you knew, did you not, even in the Foreign +Office, that there were a large number of concentration camps in which a +vast number of people were shut up? + +SCHMIDT: We knew that, but our source of information was mostly the +foreign press, which we read, of course; and the foreign radio reports +which appeared on our table, translated, every morning. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that if you knew it from the foreign press +and the foreign radio, whoever else in that dock did not know about +concentration camps, the Defendant Ribbentrop, as foreign Minister, did +know. Is that not right? + +SCHMIDT: I would like to put it this way: Of course, he had access to +that foreign news material. Just how he evaluated it, whether he +considered it true or completely false, or exaggerated, naturally I +cannot say. Of course he also received the reports as such, but as +reports from abroad and, during the war, as reports from hostile +countries. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Doctor, I will not pursue that further at the +moment. I want you just to tell me this: You have given us your account +of the interview between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Horthy +when the question of the Jews was discussed, on the 17th of April 1943. +I just wanted on record that your account is based on the fact that you +actually made the minutes; the minutes are signed by you. + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to pass to another point. From 1943 to +1945 were you still going to Hitler’s headquarters for occasional +interpreting and attending of meetings and the like? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: For example—I do not know if you can remember +it, but I am sure you will try—on the 27th of February 1944, do you +remember a visit of Marshal Antonescu? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you present at that? + +SCHMIDT: I remember I was always present during all the visits of +Antonescu, since the discussion could not take place any other way. +Regarding the date I cannot tell you anything exact at the moment. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was actually the 27th of February. I wanted +to try and fix it by an incident which might remind you of it, that +Antonescu was there. Now, do you remember on that occasion that the +Defendant Dönitz was present? + +SCHMIDT: It is possible, but I have no exact recollection. It is quite +possible that he was present during the military discussions. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Exhibit, My Lord, is GB-207, and it is dealt +with on Page 2705 of the shorthand notes (Volume V, Page 249). The +document was originally Number D-648. + +[_Turning to the witness._] I want you to tell the Tribunal about the +general governmental setup. There has been considerable evidence given +before the Tribunal that the Reichsregierung, as such, did not meet +after the beginning of the war. Several people have told us that. +Instead of a cabinet meeting, was it not a fact that the Government of +Germany was carried on by these constant meetings at Hitler’s +headquarters? + +SCHMIDT: I consider it possible, but naturally I have no exact +knowledge, since I never took part in such internal conferences. I went +to headquarters only whenever I had to accompany a foreigner there. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You came only when there was a foreign visitor, +but you know that these meetings were continuously taking place and that +the Defendant Göring, the Defendant Speer, the Defendant Keitel, the +Defendant Jodl, the Defendant Dönitz were constantly attending these +meetings. + +SCHMIDT: I do not know, of course, whether you can describe that +conference as a meeting. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not mean to play with words with you at +all. I used the word only to describe what was happening. If you prefer +to call it a conference, I am willing to do that. + +SCHMIDT: I admit that on occasions conferences with Hitler took place or +could have taken place, while these people you have just named were +present at the headquarters. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you agree with me, do you not, that as +far as one can find any organism or organization through which the +government of the Reich was being carried on, it was this succession of +meetings or conferences at Hitler’s headquarters; is that not so? + +SCHMIDT: Well, I do not know whether you can regard that as governmental +activity, because if I drew a parallel with the conferences at which I +was present with these foreign gentlemen, then you will find that the +person who spoke and who pushed through decisions was Hitler alone. If +it was the same at those conferences, then you could call it a +government discussion; but it was only a one-man government. The others +were there only as an audience or to be questioned regarding individual +points. That is how I imagine it, but I was not present. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite appreciate your point, but these were +the occasions at which each service and each department and each +organization—like the SS through the Reichsführer SS, Himmler—put its +point of view and put the facts before Hitler on which decisions were +come to, were they not? And that is what happened for the last 2 years +of the war. + +SCHMIDT: One could have drawn that conclusion from the presence of those +people, yes, but as I say it could of course have been that there was +only a sort of taking of orders at headquarters. Both possibilities +exist, but which is applicable I cannot say. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, I think you will agree with this, +will you not, Herr Schmidt, that there was no other place at which the +government of Germany took place except that? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. That is right. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you be good enough to look at your +affidavit? I will just read the rest of it. It is quite short, but I +want it to be on the record. Paragraph 4: + + “The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on + 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the + Foreign Office, because these events discredited Germany in the + eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had + been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted + Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge + within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi + methods both in foreign and domestic policy. This concern over + the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by + a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence + in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December + 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning + by the Nazis. + + “5. The announcement in March of the establishment of a German + Air Force and of the reintroduction of conscription was followed + on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual-assistance pact + between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the + Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning + as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but + the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude towards the + Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be + intimidated. At this time, the career officials at least + expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I + do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these + expressions of concern to Hitler. + + “6. The re-entry of the German military forces into the + Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in + February. A German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed + that the French-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance was + incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the Covenant of the + League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no + real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. + Considered against the background statements in _Mein Kampf_, + offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest + that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I + do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was + decided upon. I personally knew about it and discussed it + approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear + had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning + the risks of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many + in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign + Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in government + circles, consulted by Hitler, who felt confident that the + Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from + Britain and France. Neurath’s position throughout this period + was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath + than in the general run of ‘old school’ diplomats whom Hitler + tended to hold in disrespect.” + +Then there is a paragraph about the sanctions in Italy which I do not +think is a relevant matter before the Tribunal; and then, in Paragraph +8, I will go on: + + “Plans for annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program + from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of + Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach to this + problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy by the + League, plus the rapid increase of German military strength, + made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. When Göring + visited Rome early in 1937 he declared that a union of Austria + and Germany was inevitable and could be expected sooner or + later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained + silent, and protested only mildly when I translated them into + French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a + Party matter, in which Von Papen’s role was to preserve smooth + diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more + devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move. The + speech delivered by Papen on 18 Feb. 1938, following the + Berchtesgaden meeting, interpreted the Berchtesgaden agreement + as the first step towards the establishment of a Central + European Commonwealth under the leadership of Germany. This was + generally recognized in the Foreign Office as a clear prophecy + of a Greater Germany which would embrace Austria.” + +The final paragraph says these matters are true and that you have made +this affidavit voluntarily and without compulsion. That is right, is it +not, Herr Schmidt? + +Now, just one more point and then I have finished with you. It is +correct, is it not, that in his period as Foreign Minister the Defendant +Ribbentrop brought a number of people who had rank in the SS, or, in the +old days in the SA into the Foreign Office and made them part of the +staff? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. Principally they were members of his so-called +Bureau—that is to say, his former organization. They were taken into +the Office, not all, but some of them. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. + +THE PRESIDENT: Does any other prosecutor want to cross-examine? Dr. +Horn, do you want to re-examine? + +DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness. + +THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. + +DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): Mr. President, I have just one +question to ask the witness. + +THE PRESIDENT: Keep the witness. + +DR. LÖFFLER: May I have your permission to put one question to the +witness? + +THE PRESIDENT: Would you say whom you are appearing for? + +DR. LÖFFLER: Dr. Löffler, Defense Counsel for the SA. + +[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you were, as a rule, personally +present during the visit of highly placed foreign statesmen. Were you +also present during the visit of statesmen during the Olympic Games of +1936? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. + +DR. LÖFFLER: Did any one of the foreign statesmen express the wish to +inspect the German institutions and the establishments set up by the +National Socialists—in particular in the social sphere—before or after +1936? + +SCHMIDT: Whether any such wishes were expressed during the Olympic Games +I cannot remember at the moment; but that such wishes were expressed and +that they were fulfilled becomes clear from a number of facts—for +instance, from Lloyd George’s visit to the Obersalzberg and, later on, +his inspection of social institutions in Germany; from the visit of a +number of interested foreign persons who, in my opinion, took a very +lively interest in the social institutions in Germany. + +DR. LÖFFLER: You were present personally during these inspections. Do +you remember an inspection during which you were present? + +SCHMIDT: Mostly I was not present at these inspections. I only recollect +that, for instance, the Labor Front had an organization which was called +“Joy and Work” and that was an international organization which held a +great annual congress at Hamburg, during which I often acted as +interpreter. + +DR. LÖFFLER: Do you know anything about the impressions made by these +institutions on foreign statesmen? + +SCHMIDT: The social institutions, as far as I know, always made quite a +favorable impression. + +DR. LÖFFLER: Do you remember the visit of the Prince of Wales to +Germany? + +SCHMIDT: Yes. I acted as interpreter there. + +THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the charges in the +Indictment? Dr. Löffler, your duty was to ask any question you have got +at the same time as the other defense counsels. I asked you whether you +had any questions to ask. You said “no,” or you indicated that you had +not. You now get up and say you have one question to ask and you have +asked about—I don’t know how many you are going to ask, but they are +all, in the opinion of the Tribunal, I think, irrelevant. + +DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I am putting are caused +by the cross-examination by Sir David. Sir David has mentioned the SA, +and I want to put a corresponding counterquestion to the witness, and +apart from that... + +THE PRESIDENT: Sir David had not asked any question as to the social +conditions of Germany, and he did not ask any questions about the +Olympic Games of 1936. In any event, you are not the right person to +re-examine. + +DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I have put are +important, because, through those visits which were made here and +through the statements made by the foreign statesmen afterwards, a +number of our members got the impression that the important statesmen +abroad were giving their recognition to the leaders of National +Socialism. And that is of quite decisive importance in the question of +the guilt or innocence of millions of Germans whom I represent here, +since these millions of Germans regarded the attitude of those foreign +statesmen as authoritative. It is therefore not irrelevant, but for us, +in fact, decisive, and he is the only witness who can really make an +authentic report about it. However, I am finished with my questions +about the Olympic Games and I have only two more questions to ask. I ask +you to permit me to put these because Sir David... + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the questions you are putting do +not arise out of the cross-examination and are entirely irrelevant, and +they will not hear any further questions from you. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, as you know perfectly well, this is not +the time to put questions on behalf of Von Papen. You have had your +opportunity, and you have not done it. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I merely propose to rectify some words +which were probably incorrectly repeated through translation, since I +did not receive copies of the affidavit. I heard that in that affidavit +a speech of Von Papen of 8 or 18 February 1938 was mentioned... + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if that is correct, you can correct anything +in the translation you want to. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: I would like to mention that the names “Hitler” and +“Papen” were mentioned here just now. I heard “Papen” in the +translation, but Papen never made such a speech, and any conclusions +drawn about Papen from that speech are incorrect. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you will receive the affidavit. You will +have an opportunity to look at the affidavit. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall look at the affidavit, and, if necessary, apply +in writing to have it rectified. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If there is any mistake in the affidavit it must be +corrected. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: It really says “Papen” in the text, but that is +completely wrong since he has never made such a speech. On Page 4 of the +text it says “The speech delivered by Papen.” + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is what the affidavit said. +Learned counsel says it is completely wrong; he did not make a speech. +But with the greatest respect to the learned counsel, I must suggest, if +he wants to refute the affidavit, he will have the opportunity of +recalling Von Papen and giving evidence then. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, in this case would it not be of value to +put the one short question to the witness as to whether he really meant +Papen? + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well; put the question to the witness. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you think that you said that Papen made a +speech on 18 February 1938? Where was this speech supposed to have been +made? + +SCHMIDT: That, in my opinion, is a mistake which may have crept in when +I made the affidavit; because if the speech was not made—at any rate, +at the moment I no longer remember such a speech as I described in that +affidavit. It is, therefore, perfectly possible that a mistake crept in. +And perhaps that mistake is excusable if you consider that this +affidavit was submitted to me at a time when I was rather seriously ill +in bed in a hospital. It can very well have happened that upon reading +through the affidavit I did not notice the mistake and I really consider +it to be a mistake. + +DR. KUBUSCHOK: That makes the actual fact established and the +conclusions drawn from it unnecessary? + +SCHMIDT: After what I have said, yes. I cannot remember the speech, and +I think it can be traced to a mistake on my part and I attribute it to +the circumstances under which I signed the document; I was seriously ill +at the time. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn. + +The witness can now retire. + +[_The witness left the stand._] + +DR. HORN: May I once more ask the Tribunal whether it can be ascertained +if the translations of the documents will be available by tomorrow +morning. I would like to base the further presentation of evidence on +them. If I have translations in the morning, then I would begin now to +examine the Defendant Von Ribbentrop as a witness. If translations +cannot be completed by tomorrow morning, then I would ask the Tribunal +to allow me to submit my documents now. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, this Trial has been going on for many months, +and it is taking a very much longer time than anybody anticipated, at +any rate longer than any member of the Tribunal anticipated, and they +cannot have it put off any longer. You must go on. Have you got any +further witnesses to call? + +DR. HORN: No, I have no further witnesses, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: Are you not going to call the Defendant Von Ribbentrop? + +DR. HORN: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Why can you not put him in the box now? + +DR. HORN: I can examine him, but I asked the President whether I can +have the assistance of the Tribunal, whether I can have the documents by +tomorrow morning. Then I would start now to examine the Defendant as a +witness and submit the documents when the Prosecution have their +documents too and can raise their objections here at the same time. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the documents are translated, you shall +have them, of course. We have sent out to find out whether they will be +available by tomorrow morning, but we have got 35 minutes now before 5 +o’clock. We want to occupy the time. + +DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. In that case I shall examine the +Defendant as witness now. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on please, Dr. Horn? + +DR. HORN: Yes. In that case I shall continue to present the documents. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you said you were going to call the Defendant +Von Ribbentrop. We have not got the documents here, and you must do as +you said. + +DR. HORN: Then I request to be given permission to examine the defendant +as a witness. + +[_The Defendant Von Ribbentrop took the stand._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you say your full name? + +JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP (Defendant): Joachim Von Ribbentrop. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the +Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will +withhold and add nothing.” + +[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._] + +THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. + +DR. HORN: Please give the Tribunal a brief explanatory report about the +most important points of your life. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I was born on 30 April 1893 at Wesel. I came from an old +family of soldiers. My mother came from the country. I went to school at +Kassel and Metz in Alsace-Lorraine. There, in Alsace-Lorraine, I had my +first contact with the domain of French culture; and at that time we +learned to love that country dearly. + +In 1908 my father resigned from active military service. The reason was +that there were differences at that time connected with the person of +the Kaiser. My father already had a strong interest in foreign politics +and also social interests, and I had a great veneration for him. + +At that time we moved to Switzerland and after living there for about +one year I went to London as a young man, and there, for about one year, +I studied, mainly languages. It was then that I had my first impression +of London and of the greatness of the British Empire. + +After about one year, in 1910, I went to Canada. Originally I wanted to +go to the German colonies, but then I went to America instead. I wanted +to see the world. I remained in Canada for several years, approximately +two years as a worker, a plate layer on the railroad, and later on I +turned to the bank and building trade. + +In 1914 the first World War caught me in Canada. Like all Germans at the +time we had only one thought—“Every man is needed at home and how can +we help the homeland?” Then I traveled to New York, and finally in +September 1914, after some difficulties, I arrived in Germany. After +serving at the front, for approximately 4 years, and after I had been +wounded, I was sent to Constantinople, to Turkey, where I witnessed the +collapse of Germany in the first World War. Then I had my first +impression of the dreadful consequences of a lost war. The Ambassador at +that time, Count Bernstorff, and the later Ambassador, Dr. Dieckhoff, +were the representatives of the Reich in Turkey. They were summoned to +Berlin in order to take advantage of Count Bernstorff’s connections with +President Wilson and to see—it was the hope of all of us—that on the +strength of these Points perhaps a peace could be achieved and with it +reconciliations. + +After some difficulties, in March 1919, I came to Berlin and I became +adjutant of the then General Von Seeckt for the peace delegation at +Versailles. Subsequently, when the Treaty of Versailles came, I read +that document in one night and it was my impression that no government +in the world could possibly sign such a document. That was my first +impression of foreign policy at home. + +In 1919 I resigned from the Armed Forces as a first lieutenant, and I +turned to the profession of a businessman. Through these business +contacts, I came to know particularly England and France rather +intimately during the following years. Several contacts with politicians +were already established at that time. I tried to help my own country by +voicing my views against Versailles. At first it was very difficult but +already in the years 1919, 1920, and 1921, I found a certain amount of +understanding in those countries, in my own modest way. + +Then, it was approximately since the years 1929 or 1930, I saw that +Germany after the seeming prosperity during the years 1926, 1927, and +1928, was exposed to a sudden economic upheaval and that matters went +downhill very fast. + +During the year 1931 and 1932, one noticed as a businessman, which I was +at the time, that in practice the consequences of Versailles were such +that German economic life was becoming more and more prostrate. Then I +looked around. At that time, I was closely attached to the German +People’s Party and I saw how the parties became always more and more +numerous in Germany. I remember that in the end we had something like 30 +parties or more in Germany, that unemployment was growing steadily, and +that the government was losing the confidence of the people more and +more. From these years I clearly recollect the efforts made by the then +Chancellor Brüning, which were doubtlessly meant sincerely and honestly +but which nevertheless had no success. + +Other governments came, that is well known. They, too, had no success. +The export trade in Germany no longer paid for itself. The gold reserves +of the Reichsbank dwindled, there was tax evasion, and no confidence at +all in the measures introduced by the government. That, roughly, was the +picture which I saw in Germany in the years 1930 and 1931. I saw then +how strikes increased, how discontented the people were, and how more +and more demonstrations took place on the streets and conditions became +more and more chaotic. + +I do not think that I am exaggerating if I say that the picture which +presented itself in the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, particularly 1932, +in Germany was not unlike the symptoms of civil war. For me as a +German—and I think I have always been a patriot like many other +Germans—it made a frightful impression. Actually I was not very close +to the political world, but during those years I realized that something +had to be done and that everyone, wherever he might be, would have to +help or assist to create a national front on a broad basis which would +once more have the confidence of men and particularly of the large +working masses of the people. At the same time, I was aware that most of +the men who were responsible for Versailles had not intended this—I am +sure of it—but it was a fact which I believe no one can deny today. I +have already mentioned the disappointment I experienced as a young +officer through personal contacts, in particular, with the German +Ambassador at that time, Dieckhoff, who is a distant relative of mine or +relative by marriage, the disappointment which in fact we all +experienced in the German Armed Forces, among the German people, and in +government circles naturally even more—that these Points of Wilson had +been so quickly abandoned. I do not propose to make a propaganda speech +here. I merely want to represent the facts soberly as I experienced them +at the time. There is no doubt that the defenselessness of the German +people at that time led to the fact that unfortunately a tendency was +maintained among our enemies not toward conciliation but toward hatred +or revenge. I am convinced that this was certainly not the intention of +Wilson, at that time President of the United States, and I myself +believe that in later years, he suffered because of it. At any rate that +was my first contact with German politics. + +This Versailles now became... + +But it is known that even the severe stipulations of Versailles as we +experienced them, from the closest personal observation, were not +adhered to as is well known. That, too, is perhaps a consequence, an +after-effect of a war, in which men drifted in a certain direction and +just could not or would not adhere to certain things. It is known that +the stipulations of Versailles were not observed then either +territorially speaking or in other very important points. May I mention +that one of the most important questions—territorial questions—at that +time was Upper Silesia and particularly Memel, that small territory. The +events which took place made a deep impression on me personally. Upper +Silesia particularly, because I had many personal ties there and because +none of us could understand that even those severe stipulations of +Versailles were not observed. It is a question of minorities which also +played a very important part. Later I shall have to refer to this point +more in detail, particularly in connection with the Polish crisis. But +right from the beginning, German minorities, as is known, suffered very +hard times. At that time it was again Upper Silesia particularly, and +those territories which were involved and suffering under that problem, +under that treatment. Further, the question of disarmament was naturally +one of the most important points of Versailles. And that, too, has +already been referred to in this courtroom. Therefore I do not want to +go into detail. + +At any rate, it was the denial of equality in all these spheres, the +denial of equal rights, which made me decide that year to take a greater +part in politics. I would like to say here quite openly that at that +time I often talked to French and British friends, and of course it was +already a well-known fact, even then—after 1930 the NSDAP received over +100 seats in the Reichstag—that here the natural will of the German +people broke through to resist this treatment, which after all meant +nothing more than that they wanted to live. At the time these friends of +mine spoke to me about Adolf Hitler, whom I did not know at the time, +they asked me, “What sort of a man is Adolf Hitler? What will come of +it? What is it?” I said to them frankly at that time, “Give Germany a +chance and you will not have Adolf Hitler. Do not give her a chance, and +Adolf Hitler will come into power.” + +That was approximately in 1930 or 1931. Germany was not given the +chance, so on 30 January 1933 he came—the National Socialists seized +power. + +DR. HORN: How and when did you come to know Adolf Hitler? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time on 13 August 1932 +at the Berghof. Since about 1930 or 1931 I had known Count Helldorf in +Berlin, whose name as a National Socialist is known. He was a regimental +comrade of mine in my squadron, and we went through 4 years of war +together. Through him I became acquainted with National Socialism in +Berlin for the first time. I had asked him at that time to arrange a +meeting with Hitler for me. He did so that time, as far as I remember, +through the mediation of Herr Röhm. I visited Adolf Hitler and had a +long discussion with him at that time, that is to say, Adolf Hitler +explained his ideas on the situation in the summer of 1932 to me. I then +saw him again in 1933—that has already been described here by Party +Member Göring—at my house at Dahlem which I placed at their disposal so +that I, on my part, should do everything possible to create a national +front. Adolf Hitler made a considerable impression on me even then. I +noticed particularly his blue eyes in his generally dark appearance, and +then, perhaps as outstanding, his detached, I should say reserved—not +unapproachable, but reserved—nature, and the manner in which he +expressed his thoughts. These thoughts and statements always had +something final and definite about them, and they appeared to come from +his innermost self. I had the impression that I was facing a man who +knew what he wanted and who had an unshakable will and who was a very +strong personality. I can summarize by saying that I left that meeting +with Hitler convinced that this man, if anyone, could save Germany from +these great difficulties and that distress which existed at the time. I +need not go further into detail about the events of that January. But I +would like to tell about one episode which happened in my house in +Dahlem when the question arose whether Hitler was to become Reich +Chancellor or not. I know that at that time, I believe, he was offered +the Vice Chancellorship and I heard with what enormous strength and +conviction—if you like, also brutality and hardness—he could state his +opinion when he believed that obstacles might appear which could lead to +the rehabilitation and rescue of his people. + +DR. HORN: Did you believe in the possibility of a revision of the +Versailles Treaty by means of mutual understanding? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I must say that the numerous business trips which in the +years of 1920 to 1932 took me abroad proved to me how endlessly +difficult it was or would have to be under the system which then existed +to bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty by means of +negotiations. In spite of that, I felt how from year to year the circles +grew in England and France which were convinced that somehow Germany +would have to be helped. During those years, I established many contacts +with men of the business world, of public life, of art and science, +particularly in universities in England and France. I learned thereby to +understand the attitude of the English and the French. I want to say now +that even shortly after Versailles it was my conviction that a change of +that treaty could be carried out only through an understanding with +France and Britain. I also believed that only in this way could the +international situation be improved and the very considerable causes of +conflict existing everywhere as consequences of the first World War be +removed. It was clear, therefore, that only by means of an understanding +with the Western Powers, with England and France, would a revision of +Versailles be possible. Even then, I had the distinct feeling that only +through such an understanding could a permanent peace in Europe really +be preserved. We young officers had experienced too much at that time. +And I am thinking of the Free Corps men in Silesia and all those things +in the Baltic, _et cetera_. I should like to add, and say it quite +openly, that right from the beginning, from the first day in which I saw +and read the Versailles Treaty, I, as a German, felt it to be my duty to +oppose it and to try to do everything so that a better treaty could take +its place. It was precisely Hitler’s opposition to Versailles that first +brought me together with him and the National Socialist Party. + +DR. HORN: Did you attempt to tell Hitler your views regarding this? + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is 5 o’clock and the Tribunal thinks they +had better adjourn now. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + NINETY-FOURTH DAY + Friday, 29 March 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +THE PRESIDENT: Before the examination of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop +goes on, the Tribunal desires me to draw the attention of Dr. Horn and +of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to what the Tribunal has said during the +last few days. + +In the first place, the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal has allowed the +Defendant Göring, who has given the evidence first of the defendants and +who has proclaimed himself to be responsible as the second leader of +Nazi Germany, to give his evidence without any interruption whatever, +and he has covered the whole history of the Nazi regime from its +inception to the defeat of Germany. The Tribunal does not propose to +allow any of the other defendants to go over the same ground in their +evidence except insofar as is necessary for their own defense. + +Secondly, the Tribunal ruled that evidence as to the injustice of the +Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is inadmissible. + +Thirdly, though this is not an order of the Tribunal, I must point out +that the Tribunal has been informed on many occasions of the view of the +defendants and some of their witnesses that the Treaty of Versailles was +unjust and therefore any evidence upon that point, apart from its being +inadmissible, is cumulative, and the Tribunal will not hear it for that +reason. + +And lastly, the Tribunal wishes me to point out to Dr. Horn that it is +the duty of counsel to examine their witnesses and not to leave them +simply to make speeches, and if they are giving evidence which counsel +knows is inadmissible according to the rulings of the Tribunal it is the +duty of counsel to stop the witness. That is all. + +Dr. Seidl, if you are going to refer to Gaus’ affidavit the Tribunal +will not deal with that matter now, it will be dealt with after the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop has given evidence. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I agreed with Dr. Horn, Counsel for the +Defendant Ribbentrop... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I do not care whether you spoke to Dr. Horn or +not or what arrangement you may have made with Dr. Horn; it is not +convenient for the Tribunal to hear Dr. Gaus’ evidence at the present +moment; they want to go on with Ribbentrop’s evidence. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] + +DR. HORN: Yesterday at the end you were speaking about your political +impressions in England and France. In connection with that I should like +to put the following question: Did you make efforts to tell Hitler of +your views on French and British politics at that time? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, after 30 January 1933 I saw Hitler repeatedly and +of course told him about the impressions which I gathered on my frequent +travels, particularly to England and France. + +DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s attitude toward France and England at that +time? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler’s attitude was as follows: He saw in France an +enemy of Germany because of the entire policy which France had pursued +with regard to Germany since the end of World War I, and especially +because of the position which she took on questions of equality of +rights. This attitude of Hitler’s found expression at the time in his +book _Mein Kampf_. + +I knew France well, since for a number of years I had had connections +there. At that time I told the Führer a great deal about France. It +interested him, and I noticed that he showed an increasing interest in +French matters in the year 1933. Then I brought him together with a +number of Frenchmen, and I believe some of these visits, and perhaps +also some of my descriptions of the attitude taken by many Frenchmen, +and all of French culture... + +DR. HORN: What Frenchmen were they? + +VON RIBBENTROP: There were a number of French economists, there were +journalists and also some politicians. These reports interested the +Führer, and gradually, he got the impression that there were, after all, +men in France who were not averse to the idea of an understanding with +Germany. + +Above all I acquainted the Führer with an argument which sprang from my +deepest conviction and my years of experience. It was a great wish of +the Führer, as is well known, to come to a definitive friendship and +agreement with England. At first the Führer treated this idea as +something apart from Franco-German politics. I believe that at that time +I succeeded in convincing the Führer that an understanding with England +would be possible only by way of an understanding with France as well. +That made, as I still remember very clearly from some of our +conversations, a strong impression on him. He told me then that I should +continue this purely personal course of mine for bringing about an +understanding between Germany and France and that I should continue to +report to him about these things. + +DR. HORN: Then you became Hitler’s foreign political advisor, not the +Party advisor? How was that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I reported to Hitler about my +travel experiences. These impressions which I brought from England and +France were of interest to him, and, without any special conferences or +discussions being arranged, I was often received by Hitler. I spoke with +him repeatedly and in that way it came about of itself that, apart from +the official channels, he acknowledged my co-operation and my advice as +to what I had seen and heard in foreign countries. + +Of course, he was particularly interested in all questions concerning +England. I told him about public opinion and personalities and +introduced to him, besides Frenchmen, a number of Englishmen with whom +he could exchange ideas outside the official channels, something which +he loved to do. + +DR. HORN: In what did your personal co-operation in the efforts made by +Hitler to come to an agreement with France in the years 1933 to 1935 +consist? + +VON RIBBENTROP: At that time the solution of the Saar question was one +of the first problems up for discussion. I tried through my own private +channels to make it clear to the French in Paris that a reasonable and +quiet solution of the Saar question in the spirit of the plebiscite, as +laid down in the Versailles Treaty, would be a good omen for the +relations between the two countries. I spoke with a number of people +during those years in Paris and also made the first contact with members +of the French Cabinet. I might mention that I had conversations with the +then French President Doumergue, with the Foreign Minister Barthou, who +was later assassinated, with M. Laval, and especially with M. Daladier. + +I remember that in connection with the Saar question in particular I met +with considerable understanding on the part of the latter. Then somewhat +later I noticed during the visits of Frenchmen to Hitler that it was +always mentioned, “Yes, but there is _Mein Kampf_ and your policy toward +France is contained in that book.” I tried to get the Führer to bring +out an official revision of this passage of _Mein Kampf_. The Führer +said, however—and I remember the exact words—that he was determined +through his policy, as put into practice, to prove to the world that he +had changed his view in this respect: Things once written down could not +be changed, they were a historical fact, and his former attitude toward +France had been caused by France’s attitude toward Germany at that time. +But one could now turn over a new leaf in the history of the two +countries. + +Then I asked Adolf Hitler to receive a French journalist, in order that +possibly by a public statement this revision of the view expressed in +his book _Mein Kampf_ could be made known to the world. + +He agreed to this and then received a French journalist and gave him an +interview in 1933. I do not recall the exact date. I believe this +article appeared in _Le Matin_ and created a great deal of excitement. I +was very glad, for thereby a large step toward an understanding with +France had been taken. Then I contemplated what could further be done +and how, from this simple public article, one could work up to a direct +contact between French and German statesmen. + +DR. HORN: At that time were you not contemplating the means for bringing +Hitler and Daladier together? What practical efforts did you make? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I was just going to come to that. At that time Daladier +was the French Premier. I had several conversations with him and +suggested to him that he meet Adolf Hitler so that quite frankly, man to +man, they could carry on a discussion and see whether Franco-German +relations could not be put on an entirely new basis. M. Daladier was +quite taken by this idea. I reported this to Hitler and Hitler was ready +to meet M. Daladier. + +The meeting place was to be in the German Odenwald and was already +agreed upon. I went to Paris to make the last arrangements with +Daladier. + +MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I am reluctant to interfere in any +respect with this examination of this defendant, but my colleagues and I +feel that this particular part of the examination is quite immaterial +and in any event much too detailed and that we will never get along +here. If counsel would abide by the instruction of the Court given this +morning, we could move along much more directly and much more quickly. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that the objection is +really well founded. The defendant is dealing with a period between 1933 +and 1935 and the efforts which he made for good relations with France. +Well now, that is very remote from any question which we have to decide +in this case, and therefore to deal with it in this detail seems to the +Tribunal a waste of time. + +DR. HORN: Then I will put other questions, which concern his direct +co-operation. + +What caused Hitler to appoint you Plenipotentiary for Disarmament? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe I was appointed Commissioner for Disarmament +in the year—in March or April. The reason was as follows: + +Hitler was of the opinion that there should be equality of armament. He +believed that this would be possible only through negotiations with +France and England. That was also my point of view. Because of my +efforts to establish good relations between Germany and England, since +this was the earnest wish of the Führer, I was at that time in London +and there was able to make contacts with men influential in English +politics. + +It was mainly the contact with Lord Baldwin. I spoke to Lord Baldwin and +the then Prime Minister, MacDonald, about the German desire for equality +and found that these ministers had an open ear. As the result of a long +conversation which I had with the Lord Chancellor of that time, the +present Lord Baldwin—the latter, I believe on 1 December 1933, made a +speech in the House of Commons, in which he pointed out that one should +meet Germany halfway. Armament equality had been promised and therefore +it would have to be reached somehow. For this purpose there were three +possibilities: One would be, that Germany arm up to the level of the +other powers, and that was not desired; the second possibility, that the +others would disarm to the level of Germany, and that could not be +carried out; and therefore one would have to meet halfway and permit +Germany a limited rearmament, and the other countries for their part +would have to disarm. Adolf Hitler was very happy then about this +attitude, for he considered it a practicable way of carrying through +equality for Germany. Unfortunately it was not at all possible in the +ensuing course of events to put into practice these good and reasonable +ideas and statements made by Baldwin. Adolf Hitler therefore took the +view that within the system now prevailing in the world it was +apparently impossible to attain, by means of negotiations, armament +equality—equality of rights—for Germany. + +THE PRESIDENT: Wait. The interpreter isn’t hearing you clearly. Could +you put the microphone a little bit more in front of you? And would you +repeat the last few sentences you said? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler saw that unfortunately, within the +international system prevailing at that time, the good ideas of Lord +Baldwin could not be carried out by means of negotiations. + +DR. HORN: What practicable steps in limitation of armament did you +obtain in London? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is known that Adolf Hitler, that means Germany, left +the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference because it was +impossible to carry through the German desires by way of negotiations. +Hitler therefore saw no other possibility, except to achieve this aim +through the efforts of the German people themselves. He knew and, of +course, realized that a risk was involved, but after the experiences of +the preceding few years no other means remained, so that then Germany +started to rearm independently. + +[_Dr. Horn attempted to interrupt._] + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to finish my answer to your question. + +As a practical result of this, the following happened: In the course of +the year 1934 there came about a closer contact between the German and +the British Governments. There followed visits by British statesmen to +Berlin, by Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden, and during these visits the +suggestion was brought up as to whether it would not be possible to come +to an agreement or an understanding at least as far as naval matters +were concerned. + +Hitler was very much interested in this idea and in the course of the +negotiations between the British and the German Governments it was +agreed that I should be sent to London to attempt to come to a naval +agreement with the British Government. + +It is not necessary for me to go into details of the pact which actually +materialized. Hitler himself had said from the beginning that, in order +to come to a final understanding with England, one would have to +acknowledge the absolute naval supremacy of Great Britain once and for +all. It was he who suggested the naval ratio of 100 to 35, which was an +entirely different ratio from that which was negotiated between Germany +and England before 1914. + +After relatively short negotiations this naval agreement was then +concluded in London. It was very important for future Anglo-German +relations, and at that time it represented the first practical result of +an actual armament limitation. + +DR. HORN: At that time did France agree to this rearmament and what were +your personal efforts in this step? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I might say in advance that Hitler and I were extremely +happy about this pact. I know, it was then styled once by certain +circles, to use an English expression, an “eyewash.” I can say here from +my own personal experience that I have never seen Adolf Hitler so happy +as at the moment when I was able to tell him personally, in Hamburg, of +the conclusion of this agreement. + +DR. HORN: And what was France’s attitude to this pact? + +VON RIBBENTROP: With France the situation was, of course, a little +difficult. I had already noticed this while the negotiations were taking +place, for one had deviated from the armament limitation of the +Versailles Treaty. Then I myself proposed to the gentlemen of the +Foreign Office—I can mention their names, they were Sir Robert Craigie +in particular and also Little, who was then a British Admiral—that I +would go to France so that I also could utilize my relations with French +statesmen and make clear to them the usefulness of this agreement for a +future German-Anglo-French understanding. + +I should like to point out something here. In this courtroom, sometime +ago, a film was shown in which a speech I made for the newsreels of that +time, at the conclusion of this naval agreement, was presented as proof +of the duplicity of German diplomacy. At that time I purposely made this +speech in London in order to record and to declare before the whole +world that this did not concern merely one-sided British-German matters, +but that it was the wish of Hitler—and also the spirit of the naval +agreement—to bring about a general limitation of armament, and that +this naval pact was also designed to improve finally the relations +between France and Germany. This wish was real and sincere. + +I then went to France, spoke with French statesmen and, I believe, did +help to some extent so that this first step in the limitation of +armaments was considered a reasonable measure by many Frenchmen in view +of the fact that in the long run equality of rights could not be +withheld from the German people. + +DR. HORN: Then you were appointed Ambassador to London. What led to this +appointment? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That came about as follows: In the time following the +naval agreement, which was hailed with joy by the widest circles in +England, I made great efforts to bring Lord Baldwin and the Führer +together, and I should like to mention here that the preliminary +arrangements for this meeting had already been made by a friend of Lord +Baldwin, a Mr. Jones. The Führer had agreed to fly to Chequers to meet +Lord Baldwin, but unfortunately Lord Baldwin declined at the last +minute. What led to his declining, I do not know, but there is no doubt +that certain forces in England at the time did not wish this +German-British understanding. + +Then in 1936, when the German Ambassador Von Hoesch died, I said to +myself, that on behalf of Germany one should make one last supreme +effort to come to a good understanding with England. I might mention in +this connection, that at that time I had already been appointed State +Secretary of the Foreign Office by Hitler and had asked him personally +that that appointment be cancelled and that I be sent to London as +Ambassador. + +The following may have led to this decision of Hitler’s. Hitler had a +very definite conception of England’s balance of power theory, but my +view perhaps deviated somewhat from his. My conviction was that England +would always continue to support her old balance of power theory, +whereas Hitler was of the opinion that this theory of balance of power +was obsolete, and that from now on, England should tolerate, that is, +should welcome a much stronger Germany in view of the changed situation +in Europe, and in view of Russia’s development of strength. In order to +give the Führer a definite and clear picture of how matters actually +stood in England—that was at any rate one of the reasons why the Führer +sent me to England. Another reason was that at that time we hoped, +through relations with the still very extensive circles in England which +were friendly to Germany and supported a German-English friendship, to +make the relations between the two countries friendly and perhaps even +to reach a permanent agreement. + +Hitler’s goal was finally and always the German-English pact. + +DR. HORN: In what way was your ambassadorial activity hampered in +England? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say first that I was repeatedly in +England in the 1930’s, mainly from 1935 to 1936, and, acting on +instructions from the Führer, I sounded out the opinions there on the +subject of a German-British pact. The basis of this pact is known. It +was to make the naval ratio of 100 to 35 permanent. Secondly the +integrity of the so-called Low Countries, Belgium and Holland, and also +France was to be guaranteed by the two countries forever and—this was +the Führer’s idea—Germany should recognize the British Empire and +should be ready to stand up, if necessary even with the help of her own +power, for the preservation and maintenance of the British Empire; and +England, in return, should recognize Germany as a strong power in +Europe. + +It has already been said, and I should like to repeat, that these +efforts in the 1930’s unfortunately did not lead to any results. It was +one of the Führer’s deepest disappointments—and I must mention that +here, for it is very important for the further course of events—that +this pact upon which he had placed such very great hopes and which he +had regarded as the cornerstone of his foreign policy did not +materialize in these years. What the forces were which prevented its +materializing I cannot say, because I do not know. In any case we got no +further. + +I came back to this question several times while I was Ambassador in +London and discussed it with circles friendly to Germany. And I must say +that there also were many Englishmen who had a very positive attitude +towards this idea. + +DR. HORN: Did you also meet with any attitude that was negative? + +VON RIBBENTROP: There was naturally a strong element in England which +did not look favorably upon this pact or this idea of close relations +with Germany, because of considerations of principle and perhaps because +of traditional considerations of British policy against definite +obligations of this kind. I should like to mention here briefly, even +though this goes back to the year 1936, that during the Olympic Games in +the year 1936 I tried to win the very influential British politician, +the present Lord Vansittart, to this idea. I had at that time a very +long discussion of several hours’ duration with him in Berlin. Adolf +Hitler also received him and likewise spoke with him about the same +subject. Lord Vansittart, even though our personal relations were good, +showed a certain reserve. + +In the year 1937, when I was in London, I saw that two clearly different +trends were gradually forming in England; the one trend was very much in +favor of promoting good relations with Germany; the second trend did not +wish such close relations. + +There were—I believe that I do not need to mention names, for they are +well known—those gentlemen who did not wish such close relations with +Germany, Mr. Winston Churchill, who was later Prime Minister, and +others. + +I then made strenuous efforts in London in order to promote this idea +but other events occurred which made my activity there most difficult. +There was first of all, the Spanish policy. It is well-known that civil +war raged in Spain at that time and that in London the so-called +Nonintervention Commission was meeting. + +I therefore, as Ambassador to the Court of St. James, had a difficult +task. On the one hand, with all means at my disposal, I wished to +further German-English friendship and to bring about the German-English +pact, but on the other hand, I had to carry out the instructions of my +government in regard to the Nonintervention Commission and Spain. These +instructions, however, were often in direct opposition to certain aims +of British policy. Therefore it came about that this sort of League of +Nations which the Nonintervention Commission represented at that time, +and of which I was the authorized German member, prejudiced the chief +aim with which Adolf Hitler had sent me to London. + +But I have to say here—if I may and am supposed to explain that period +openly in the interest of the case—that it was not only the policy +regarding Spain, but that in these years, 1937 until the beginning of +1938, that section which did not want a pact with Germany, doubtless +made itself constantly more evident in England; and that, today, is a +historical fact. Why? The answer is very simple, very clear. These +circles regarded a Germany strengthened by National Socialism as a +factor which might disturb the traditional British balance of power +theory and policy on the Continent. + +I am convinced that Adolf Hitler at that time had no intention at all of +undertaking on his part anything against England, but that he had sent +me to London with the most ardent wish for really reaching an +understanding with England. From London I reported to the Führer about +the situation. And before this Tribunal now I wish to clarify one point, +a point which has been brought up very frequently and which is relevant +to my own defense. It has often been asserted that I reported to the +Führer from England that England was degenerate and would perhaps not +fight. I may and must establish the fact here, that from the beginning I +reported exactly the opposite to the Führer. I informed the Führer that +in my opinion the English ruling class and the English people had a +definitely heroic attitude and that this nation was ready at any time to +fight to the utmost for the existence of its empire. Later, in the +course of the war and after a conference with the Führer, I once +discussed this subject in public, in a speech made in 1941. + +Summarizing the situation in London in the years 1937 and 1938, while I +was ambassador, I can at least say that I was fully cognizant of the +fact that it would be very difficult to conclude a pact with England. +But even so, and this I always reported, all efforts would have to be +made to come by means of a peaceful settlement to an understanding with +England as a decisive factor in German policy, that is, to create such a +relation between the development of German power and the British basic +tendencies and views on foreign policy that these two factors would not +conflict. + +DR. HORN: During the time you were ambassador you concluded the +so-called Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. How was it that just you, the +ambassador, concluded that pact? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to make the preliminary remark that in +1938 I was appointed Foreign Minister on 4 February. On 4 February I was +in Berlin. The Führer called me and informed me that he had appointed me +Foreign Minister. After that—I am not sure, are you talking of the +Three Power Pact? + +DR. HORN: No, you have misunderstood me. During your activity as +ambassador you concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, which in 1937 +was joined by Italy and later on by Spain, as well as other countries. +How was it that you, as ambassador, concluded this pact? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler at that time considered the ideological +difference between Germany, that is, National Socialism and communism +actually one of the decisive factors of his policy. Therefore, the +question arose as to how a way could be found at all to win over other +countries to counter communistic tendencies. The problem, therefore, was +an ideological one. In the year 1933, I believe, Hitler discussed with +me for the first time, the question of whether a closer contact with +Japan could be established in some form or other. I replied that I +personally had certain connections with Japanese persons and would +establish contact. When I did so it came to light that Japan had the +same anti-Comintern attitude as Germany. Out of these conversations of +the years 1933, 1934, 1935, I believe, the idea gradually crystallized +that one might make these common efforts the subject of a pact. I +believe it was one of my assistants who had the idea of concluding the +Anti-Comintern Pact. I presented this idea to the Führer and the Führer +approved of it. However, since it was, so to speak, an ideological +question, he did not wish at that time that it be done through the +official channels of German politics and therefore he instructed me to +prepare this pact which then was concluded in my office in Berlin, as I +believe, in the course of the year 1936. + +DR. HORN: If I understand you correctly, this pact was concluded by you +because you were the head of the Bureau Ribbentrop? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. The Bureau Ribbentrop consisted chiefly +of me and just a few aides. But it is correct to say that the Führer +wished that I conclude this pact because he did not wish to give it an +official air. + +DR. HORN: Did this pact have aims of practical policy or only +ideological aims? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain that this pact, on principle, I should +say, had an ideological aim. It was meant to oppose the work of the +Comintern in the various countries at that time. But naturally it also +contained a political element. This political element was anti-Russian +at the time, since Moscow was the representative of the Comintern idea. +Therefore, the Führer and I had a notion that through this pact, a +certain balance or counterbalance against the Russian efforts or against +Russia was being created in a political sense as well, because Russia +was at odds with Germany in respect to ideology and also, of course, to +politics. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you and the defendant really think it is +necessary to take as long as the defendant has taken to tell us why he, +as an ambassador in London, was called upon to sign the Anti-Comintern +Pact? + +DR. HORN: It is very difficult for me to hear Your Honor. + +THE PRESIDENT: What I asked you was whether you and the defendant think +it necessary for the defendant to make such a long speech in answer to +your question, why he, as ambassador in London, was employed to sign the +Anti-Comintern Pact. He has spoken for at least 5 minutes about it. + +DR. HORN: On 4 February 1938, you were made Foreign Minister. What were +the reasons for this appointment? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that on 4 February 1938 I was in +Berlin. The Führer called me and informed me that, because of a shift in +various higher positions, he was going to appoint a new Foreign +Minister, also that he had appointed the then Foreign Minister Von +Neurath, President of the Secret Cabinet Council. I replied to the +Führer that I, of course, would be glad to accept this appointment. + +DR. HORN: On this occasion you also received a high rank in the SS? The +Prosecution have asserted that this rank was not purely honorary. Is +that true? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I must correct this point, I believe. I had received a +rank in the SS prior to this time and I do not recall whether it was on +the occasion of this appointment or later on that I became SS +Gruppenführer. The Führer bestowed on me the rank and the uniform of an +SS Gruppenführer. That was a position, which formerly in the Army used +to be known as a rank _à la suite_. It happened that I agreed definitely +with the SS idea at that time. My relations with Himmler were also quite +good at the time. I considered the SS idea at that time the possible +basis for producing and creating an idealistic class of leaders, +somewhat like that existing in England, and such as emerged symbolically +through the heroism of our Waffen-SS during the war. Later on, it is +true, my attitude towards Himmler changed. But the Führer bestowed this +rank on me because he wished that within the Party and at the Party +meetings, I should wear the Party uniform and have a Party rank. + +May I at this time state briefly my attitude toward the Party. Yesterday +or the day before yesterday, I believe, the question was raised as to +whether I was a true National Socialist. I do not claim to be competent +to judge this question. It is a fact that it was only in later years +that I joined Adolf Hitler. I did not pay very much attention to the +National Socialist doctrines and program nor to the racial theories, +with which I was not very familiar. I was not anti-Semitic, nor did I +fully understand the church question, although I had left the church a +long time ago. I had my own inner reasons for doing so, reasons +connected with the early 20’s and the development of the church in +Germany in those years. However, I believe that I have always been a +good Christian. What drew me to the Party, as I recognized at the time, +was the fact that the Party wanted a strong, flourishing, and +socialistic Germany. That was what I wanted too. For that reason, in the +year 1932, I did, after thorough deliberation, become a member of the +NSDAP. + +DR. HORN: Had you put your services at the disposal of the Party before +that date, as the Prosecution assert, namely, from 1930 on? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It was in 1930 when in the large Reichstag election +National Socialism obtained more than 100 seats in the German Reichstag. +I set forth yesterday, and perhaps do not need to go into detail any +more, what conditions in Germany were at that time. However, during the +years 1930, 1931 and 1932 I gradually came nearer to the Party. Then +from 1932 on—I believe I entered the Party in August 1932—from that +moment on until the end of this war I devoted my entire strength to +National Socialist Germany and exhausted my strength in so doing. I wish +to profess frankly before this Tribunal and before the world that I have +always endeavored to be a good National Socialist and that I was proud +of the fact that I belonged to a little group of men, idealists, who did +not want anything else but to re-establish Germany’s prestige in the +world. + +DR. HORN: What foreign political problems did Hitler describe to you as +requiring solution, when you took office? What directives did he give +you for the conduct of foreign policy? + +VON RIBBENTROP: When I took office, the Führer said relatively little to +me. He said only that Germany had now assumed a new position, that +Germany had once more joined the circle of nations having equal rights +and that it was clear that in the future certain problems would also +still have to be solved. In particular, I recall that he pointed out +four problems which, sooner or later, would have to be solved. He +emphasized that such problems could be solved only with a strong +Wehrmacht, not by using it, but through its mere existence, because a +country which was not strongly armed could practice no foreign policy +whatsoever, but rather such a country operated, so to speak, in a vacuum +as we had experienced during the past years. He said we would have to +achieve clear-cut relations with our neighbors. The four problems he +enumerated were, first of all, Austria; then he mentioned a solution of +the Sudeten questions, of the question of the tiny Memel district and of +the Danzig and the Corridor question, all problems which would have to +be solved in one way or another. It would be my duty, he said, to assist +him diplomatically in this task. From this moment on I did my best to +assist the Führer in the preparation of some solution of these problems +in a way agreeable to Germany. + +DR. HORN: Shortly after your appointment you... + +THE PRESIDENT: I believe this would be a good time to break off. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +DR. HORN: Which course did German foreign policy take after you were +appointed Foreign Minister? + +VON RIBBENTROP: First I tried to get an overall picture of the pending +affairs of the Foreign Office and of the situation. German foreign +policy, as I said before, had reached a certain stage, that is, Germany +had regained prestige in the eyes of the world, and the future task +would be to solve in some way or other the important and vital problems +created in Europe by the Versailles Treaty. This was all the more +necessary since, by way of example, ethnic questions always were +material for conflict, that is, contained possibilities for conflict +dangerous to a peaceful development in Europe. + +During the period following I familiarized myself with the affairs of +the ministry. That was at first not easy, as I was dealing with +altogether new men. I should like to mention here that Hitler’s attitude +towards the Foreign Office was not always positive and, in continuing +the efforts of Minister Von Neurath, my predecessor, I considered it my +most important task to bring the Foreign Office closer to Hitler and to +bridge the two spheres of ideas. + +It was clear to me from the very beginning, after I took over the +ministry, that I would be working, so to speak, in the shadow of a titan +and that I would have to impose on myself certain limitations, that is +to say, that I would not be in a position, one might almost say, to +conduct the foreign policy as it is done by other foreign ministers, who +are responsible to a parliamentary system or a parliament. The +commanding personality of the Führer naturally dominated the foreign +policy as well. He occupied himself with all its details. It went like +this more or less: I reported to him and forwarded to him important +foreign policy reports through a liaison man, and Hitler in turn gave me +definite orders as to what views I should take in regard to problems of +foreign policy, _et cetera_. + +In the course of these conversations the problem of Austria crystallized +as the first and most important problem which had to be brought to some +solution or other. Austria had always been a matter very close to the +Führer’s heart, because he was himself a native of Austria and +naturally, with Germany’s power growing, the efforts already long in +existence for bringing Germany and Austria more closely together became +even more pronounced. At that time I did not yet know very much about +this problem, since Hitler himself handled this problem for the most +part. + +DR. HORN: When you took over your office, or later, did you get to know +the minutes of a conference of 5 November 1937 which has become known +here under the name of the Hossbach document? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know this document, which has been mentioned +here in various connections. I saw it here for the first time. + +DR. HORN: Did Hitler ever say anything to you which conforms to the +contents of this document? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall all the details of the contents of this +document, but it was the Führer’s practice to speak very little at all +about his aims and intentions and his attitude in matters of principle. +At any rate, this was his practice in dealing with me. He did say that +Germany had to solve certain problems in Europe, as I said before, and +that for this reason it was necessary to be strong. He also mentioned +the possibility that this might lead to disagreements, but he said to me +nothing more specific about this. On the contrary, he always emphasized +to me that it was his desire to solve by diplomatic means these problems +in Europe which had to be solved and that, once he had solved these +problems, he had the intention of creating an ideal social state of the +people and that the Germany he would then create would be a model modern +social state with all the new edifices to which he attached special +value. In other words, to me he did casually admit the possibility of an +armed conflict, but he always said it was his unalterable aim, and that +it had always been and was his intention, to achieve this solution of +the “impossibility of Versailles,” as he sometimes called it, in a +peaceful way. + +DR. HORN: Shortly after your appointment as Foreign Minister you were +called by Hitler to Berchtesgaden to the conference with Schuschnigg. +What was discussed there and what was your role in these conferences? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler informed me—I recall this was on 12 February +1938—that he was going to meet Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg at the +Obersalzberg. I do not remember the details. I see from my notes that +this was on 12 February. One thing I know is that he told me that the +solution to be achieved was that, in some form or other, the German +National Socialists in Austria must be given assistance. Difficulties of +all sorts had arisen there, the details of which I no longer recall. At +any rate, I believe, there were a great many National Socialists in +jail, and, as a consequence of the natural efforts of these Austrian +people to bring about a closer contact with the Reich, this Austrian +problem threatened to become a really serious problem between Germany +and Austria. + +Adolf Hitler told me at the time that I should be present in the +Berghof. Later it was said, and I have heard it said here, that Adolf +Hitler once declared that he intended to fight for the right for these 6 +million Germans to decide their own fate under all circumstances during +the year 1938. I do not recall that he said so but it is very well +possible that he did say so. On the occasion of Schuschnigg’s reception +I was at the Obersalzberg. Hitler received Schuschnigg alone and had a +long conversation with him. The details of this conversation are not +known to me because I was not present. I recall that Schuschnigg saw me +after this conversation and that I in turn had a long conversation with +him. + +DR. HORN: Did you at that time put Schuschnigg under political pressure, +as the Prosecution asserts? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not true. I remember very clearly my +conversation with Schuschnigg, whereas the other details of what was +going on at the Obersalzberg are not so clear in my memory, since I was +not present at either the first or the second meeting between +Schuschnigg and Hitler. My discussion with Schuschnigg proceeded in a +very amicable fashion. I felt that Schuschnigg obviously was very +greatly impressed by the Führer and the Führer’s personality. I wish to +say first that I do not know exactly the details of what Hitler wanted +to achieve or discuss with Schuschnigg, so that on this subject matter I +could say to him very little, or rather nothing. Our discussion +therefore was confined to more general subjects. I told Schuschnigg that +in my opinion these two countries must come into closer contact and that +perhaps it was his historical task to assist in this and to co-operate; +that the fact was undeniable that both nations were German, and two such +German nations could not forever be separated by artificial barriers. + +DR. HORN: Was it already at this conference that a recision of the +German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 was discussed? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not discuss this point with Schuschnigg and I +believe that the Führer did not do so either in any way because +according to what Schuschnigg told me, the Führer had told him that +certain measures would have to be carried out in Austria in order to +eliminate the reasons for conflict between the two countries. That is +what I understood him to say without remembering any details. As I said, +my discussion with him was very amicable, and I might mention that, when +I suggested to Schuschnigg that the two countries would have to get into +closer contact, Schuschnigg showed an altogether positive attitude +towards this idea so that, to a certain extent, I was even surprised by +his positive attitude at that time. There can be no talk of any pressure +exerted on Schuschnigg during our discussion. However, the Führer’s +discussion with him, I believe, was conducted in very clear language, +because the Führer wanted to reach some improvement in relations in +order to solve the problems between the two countries, and to achieve +this it was necessary for the two statesmen to reveal their thoughts +openly. I have heard here, and I think this is from an entry in General +Jodl’s diary, that heavy political and military pressure was exerted. I +believe I can testify here that I knew nothing of any military or strong +political pressure at this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. I may +reiterate that I am sure that the Führer used clear and frank language +with Schuschnigg, but I certainly did not notice any pressure of a +military or a political kind, or anything in the nature of an ultimatum. +Also I assume that General Jodl’s remark—I do not believe he was +present—is a diary entry based on hearsay. I should like to add that at +that time—and I have also stated this to several persons who were with +me and also to the Führer—I had an altogether positive and pleasant +impression of Schuschnigg’s personality. Schuschnigg even said that the +two countries, and I remember these words exactly, were bound together +by fate and that he would have to assist in some way in bringing these +two countries closer together. There was no mention in this discussion +of an Anschluss or any such thing. Whether the Führer mentioned that, I +do not know, but I do not believe so. + +DR. HORN: At that time, or shortly after, did Hitler mention to you that +he wished to deviate from the German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 and find +some other solution? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler did not discuss this matter with me. If at all, I +spoke very little with him about the Austrian problems. This may sound +surprising, but it can be understood from the fact that it was only on 4 +February that I took over the Foreign Office and that I first had to get +familiar with all the problems. The Austrian problem was anyway, as I +already said, a problem which was always dealt with by Hitler himself +and which consequently was, so to speak, merely taken note of in the +Foreign Ministry, whereas it was directed by him personally. I know and +I remember that the then Ambassador Von Papen also had the right to +report directly to Hitler and that the Foreign Office received copies of +these reports. These reports, I believe, were presented directly to +Hitler by the Reich Chancellery, so that the problem was anchored rather +in the Reich Chancellery than in the Foreign Office. + +DR. HORN: You then went back to London in order to give up your post as +ambassador. What did you hear in London regarding the development of the +Austrian question? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I may say the following in this connection: I myself had +always the idea that the Austrian problem should be solved by bringing +about a treaty, a customs and currency union, between the two countries, +since I personally believed that this was the most natural and the +easiest way to bring about a close connection between the two countries. +I might perhaps remind you at this point, that this idea of a currency +union, or at least a customs union, was nothing new and had already been +pursued by the governments before Hitler; it did not materialize at that +time, I believe, because of the veto of the Allied powers. But it was a +long-cherished wish of both countries. I might first answer your +question concerning London. According to my notes, I went to London on 8 +March. As I have already mentioned, I happened to be in Berlin for the +celebration of the seizure of power on 30 January, I believe, and then +was appointed Foreign Minister on 4 February. Because of this +appointment I did not have the opportunity to take official leave in +London. On 8 March 1938 I went to London. Before resigning my post I had +a short conversation with Hitler, primarily about English matters. I +remember that he remarked on this occasion that the Austrian problem +beyond a doubt was progressing very nicely in line with the arrangements +agreed upon with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. I wish to add that I did +not know all the details of the agreements but I still remember a small +detail about which we sent an inquiry to the Reich Chancellery only a +few weeks later for the information of our specialist on the Austrian +question. After I arrived in London, I believe it was in the afternoon, +I happened to hear over the radio in the embassy building a speech made +by the then Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg in Innsbruck or in Graz, I +believe. I must say this speech took me very much by surprise. To go +into details would take too long. Nor do I remember all the details. I +do know that the entire manner, and, as it seemed to me, also the tone +of this speech, was such that I immediately had the impression that the +Führer would not tolerate this, and that the entire speech, without any +doubt, contradicted at least the spirit of the agreements made with the +Führer at the Obersalzberg. As I said, I was convinced that Adolf Hitler +would do something about it; and I should like to say quite openly +before this Tribunal that it appeared quite in order to me that the +question be solved in some way or other, I mean, that one would have to +speak to Schuschnigg very frankly, to prevent matters leading to a +catastrophe, perhaps even a European catastrophe. Then, on the next +morning, I had a long discussion with Lord Halifax. Lord Halifax had +also received reports from Austria, and I tried, without knowing the +situation fully, to explain to him that it was better to solve this +problem now in one form or another, and that this would be precisely in +the interests of the German-English efforts toward friendly relations; +that in the long run the assumption would prove false that the +friendship between Germany and England, as striven for by both +countries, could be broken up by such a problem. Lord Halifax was not +alarmed by the situation and told me, as far as I remember, that I +should still have an opportunity to discuss these matters with the +British Prime Minister Chamberlain at the breakfast which was to follow. +After this I had breakfast with the then Prime Minister Chamberlain; +during or after this breakfast I had a long conversation with +Chamberlain. During this conversation Mr. Chamberlain again emphasized +his desire to reach an understanding with Germany. I was extremely happy +to hear this and told him that I was firmly convinced that this was also +the Führer’s attitude. He gave me a special message for the Führer that +this was his desire and that he would do everything he could in this +direction. Shortly after this conversation telegrams arrived from +Austria, from Vienna, I believe from the Minister or the British Consul. +Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax asked me to come to their office. I +believe the breakfast took place at 10 Downing Street and I went then to +their office in order to discuss these telegrams. I told them that of +course I had no precise reports; then the news of an ultimatum came, and +later of the entry of German troops. We arranged that I should try to +contact my government and that Lord Halifax would come to see me in the +German Embassy in the afternoon to discuss these things further. I wish +to emphasize that Mr. Chamberlain on this occasion also took a very +composed and, it seemed to me, very sensible attitude towards the +Austrian question. In the afternoon Lord Halifax visited me and we had a +long talk. In the meantime the entry of German troops had become known. +I should like to emphasize the fact that this talk with Lord Halifax was +very amicable and that at the end of it I invited the English Foreign +Minister to pay Germany another visit. He accepted with the remark that +he would be glad to come and perhaps another exhibition of hunting +trophies could be arranged. + +DR. HORN: On the next morning you had a telephone conversation with the +Defendant Göring. This telephone conversation has been put in evidence +by the Prosecution, with the assertion that it is a proof of your +double-crossing policy. What about that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is not true. Reich Marshal Göring has already +testified that this was a diplomatic conversation, and diplomatic +conversations are carried on all over the world in the same way. But I +may say that through this telephone conversation I learned for the first +time of the details of the events in Austria. Without going into details +I heard, first of all, that this vote without doubt was not in +accordance with the true will of the Austrian people, and a number of +other points which Göring asked me to mention in my conversations with +the British ministers. But I should like to say that actually such +conversations did not take place because I had already taken leave of +the official English circles. In fact, I did not have any further talks +after my conversation with Göring; just a few hours after this +conversation I left London and went to Berlin and later to Vienna. + +I might say that first I flew to Karinhall to visit Göring and talked to +him and found him just as happy about the Anschluss—that is, not about +the Anschluss but about the whole Austrian development as I myself was. +We all were happy. Then I flew, I believe, on the same day, to Vienna +and arrived there at about the same time as Adolf Hitler. In the +meantime I heard about the Anschluss and it was only in Vienna that I +learned that the idea of the Anschluss, had definitely not occurred to +Hitler until his drive through Austria. I believe it was prompted by a +demonstration in Linz and then he decided very quickly, I think, to +accomplish the Anschluss. + +DR. HORN: What problem did Hitler mention to you as the next one which +you should solve following the Anschluss? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The next problem which Hitler outlined to me on 4 +February was the problem of the Sudeten Germans. This problem, however, +was not a problem posed by Hitler or the Foreign Office or any office, +it was a _de facto_ problem that existed of itself. I believe it was the +American prosecutor who said here that with the dissolution of +Czechoslovakia a chapter ended which was one of the saddest in the +history of nations, namely, the oppression and destruction of the small +Czechoslovak nation. I should like to state the following from my own +knowledge of these matters. + +One may speak in this sense of a Czechoslovak State but not of a +Czechoslovak nation, because it was a state of different nationalities, +a state which comprised the most varied national groups. I mention, +besides Czechs, only Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians, +Carpatho-Ukrainians, Slovaks, _et cetera_. This shows that quite +heterogeneous elements had been welded together in 1919 to form the +state. It is certain, and probably a historical fact, that the efforts +of the different nationalities within the artificially welded state were +divergent to a certain extent and that the Czechs, following their own +tendencies, tried to surround these nationalities with a strong ring, I +should like to say, with an iron ring. This produced pressure as +pressure always created counterpressure, counterpressure from the +various nationalities of this state, and it is evident that a strong +Germany, a Germany of National Socialism at that time, exerted a strong +power of attraction on all the national segments in Europe; or, at any +rate, on those living close to the German border and partly, I might +say, on the others as well. So it came about that the German minorities +in the Sudetenland, who, since 1919, had been constantly exposed to a +considerable pressure on the part of Prague, now were subjected to still +greater pressure. I do not believe I have to go into details, but I can +say from my own knowledge, and even from my own discussions while I was +ambassador in London, that the question of the Sudetenland was very +clearly understood by the Foreign Office in London and that it was +precisely England that very often before 1938 had supported certain +interests of the Sudeten Germans in co-operation with Konrad Henlein. + +After the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler the suppression of these +German minorities undoubtedly increased. I should also like to point +out, and I know this from having read the files of the Foreign Office at +the time, that the League of Nations’ Committee for Minorities had a +tremendous amount of documents on the Sudeten Germans and the great +impediments encountered by the Germans in practicing and living their +own cultural life. + +I do not believe it is too much to say that the manner in which the +Sudetenland was treated by Prague was, even in the opinion of the +competent and unprejudiced authorities of the League of Nations, in no +way in accord with the provisions of the League of Nations regarding +minorities. I myself thought it was absolutely necessary to reach some +solution in order that this problem might not become a matter of +conflict, whereby again, as in the case of Austria, all Europe would be +stirred up. I should like to emphasize that the Foreign Office and I +always endeavored, from the very beginning, to solve the Sudeten German +problem by way of diplomatic negotiations with the main signatory powers +of Versailles. And I might add that it was my personal conviction, which +I also expressed to Hitler, that with sufficient time on hand and +appropriate action, the Germany that we had in 1938 could solve this +problem in a diplomatic, that is, peaceful way. + +The Prosecution have charged me with having stirred up unrest and +discord in Czechoslovakia by illegal means and thereby with having +consciously helped to bring about the outbreak of this crisis. I do not +deny in any way that between the Sudeten German Party and the NSDAP +there had been connections for a long time which aimed at taking care of +the Sudeten-German interests. Nor do I wish to deny, for example, what +was mentioned here, that the Sudeten German Party was supported with +certain funds from the Reich. I might even say, and I believe the +Czechoslovak Government will confirm this, that that was an open secret +which was well known in Prague. However, it is not correct to say that +anything was done on the part of the Foreign Office and by me to direct +these efforts in such a way that a really serious problem might arise. I +do not want to go into further detail, but I should like to mention one +more point. Documents have been mentioned about arrests of Czech +nationals in Germany as reprisals for Czech treatment of Sudeten +Germans. To that I can say merely that these were measures which can be +understood and explained only in view of the situation at that time, but +which were not brought about by us in the Foreign Office in order to +make the situation more critical. On the contrary, in the further course +of events, I attempted through the legation in Prague as well as through +efforts of the gentlemen of my office to restrain the activities of the +Sudeten German Party. I believe that this has to some extent been proved +clearly by the documents which have been made known here. I do not have +these documents before me, so I cannot deal with them in greater detail; +but I believe that perhaps the Defense have the opportunity to make +these matters clear in detail. + +DR. HORN: What brought about the critical situation in the summer? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is natural and has always been the case that such a +nationality has its own dynamics. This question of the split of German +groups bordering on Germany was often referred to by us in the Foreign +Office as “the sinister problem,” that is a problem which could not be +solved in a way compatible with the interests of foreign policy. We had +to deal here not with letters and paragraphs but with living people who +had laws and dynamics of their own. Therefore the Sudeten German Party +naturally strove for greater and greater independence; it cannot be +denied that a number of influential leaders, at least at that time, +demanded absolute autonomy, if not the possibility of joining the Reich. +This is perfectly clear, and that was also the goal of the Sudeten +German Party. For the Foreign Office and German foreign policy, as well +as for Hitler, of course, manifold difficulties arose because of this. +As I said before, I tried to get the foreign policy affairs under +control. At the time I received Konrad Henlein—I believe once or twice, +I do not remember exactly—and asked him not to do anything, as far as +Prague was concerned, in the pursuit of his political goals that might +put German foreign policy into a state of emergency. This was perhaps +not always so easy for Henlein either, and I know that the leaders of +the Sudeten German Party could naturally approach and be received by +other offices of the Reich; also Adolf Hitler himself, who was +interested in this problem, occasionally received these leaders. The +crisis, or rather the whole situation, developed more and more +critically, because on the one hand the Sudeten Germans insisted on +their demands in Prague more and more openly and stubbornly and because +the Czechs, the Government in Prague, opposed these demands, which +resulted in excesses, arrests and so on. Thus the situation became even +more critical. At that time I often spoke with the Czech Minister. I +asked him to meet the demands of the Sudeten Germans for autonomy and +all their demands to the furthest extent possible. However, matters +developed in such a way that the attitude displayed by Prague became +more stubborn, and so did the attitude of the Sudeten Germans. + +DR. HORN: What brought about Chamberlain’s visit? What were the reasons +for this visit and for the role played by you on that occasion? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to interpolate here that in the summer of +1938 the situation was driving more and more toward a crisis. Ambassador +Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin, with whom I had often discussed this +problem and who was making efforts on his part to bridge matters, +undoubtedly made continuous reports to his government. I do not know +exactly today, but I believe that it was through his initiative that +Lord Runciman went to Prague. Runciman undoubtedly went to Prague in +good faith and tried to get a clear picture of the situation. He also +rendered an opinion which, as far as I recall, was to the effect—I do +not remember the wording—that the right to exercise self-determination, +immediate self-determination, should not be denied the Sudetenland. +Thus, I believe, this opinion was favorable for the Sudeten Germans. +Nevertheless, the crisis was there. I do not remember exactly what the +date was, but I believe it happened that through Ambassador Henderson, +Chamberlain got in touch with the Reich Government. In this way +Chamberlain’s visit to the Führer at the Obersalzberg came about during +the first half of September. Regarding this visit, there is not very +much to be said. The Führer spoke alone with Chamberlain on that +occasion. I do know, however, and we all felt it, that the visit took +place in an altogether good and pleasant atmosphere. As far as I +remember the Führer told me that he had told Chamberlain frankly that +the demand of the Sudeten Germans for self-determination and freedom in +some form or other would have to be met now. Chamberlain, I believe—and +this was the substance of that conference—replied that he would inform +the British Cabinet of these wishes of the German Government and that he +would then make further statements. + +DR. HORN: How did the second visit of Chamberlain to Godesberg come +about afterwards? + +VON RIBBENTROP: As far as I recall, matters did not progress +satisfactorily. The situation in the Sudetenland became more difficult +and threatened to develop into a very serious crisis, not only within +Czechoslovakia but also between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and thereby +into a European crisis. The result was that Chamberlain once more took +the initiative and thus his visit to Godesberg came about; I believe +this was in the middle of September or during the second half of +September. + +DR. HORN: How, then, was the Sudeten German question solved, and what +was your part in this solution? + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I first report about Godesberg? In view of the +crisis which had developed, Hitler informed Mr. Chamberlain at Godesberg +that now he had to have a solution of this question under all +circumstances. I might emphasize that I knew nothing regarding details +of a military nature at that time, but I do know that the Führer +concerned himself with the possibility that this problem might have to +be solved by military power. He told Mr. Chamberlain at Godesberg that a +solution of the Sudeten German problem would have to be found as rapidly +as possible. Mr. Chamberlain was of the opinion that it would be +difficult to win Prague over so quickly to a solution, and finally +things broke down altogether at the conference. Adolf Hitler then +personally dictated a memorandum which he or I was to give to Mr. +Chamberlain. Then Sir Horace Wilson, a friend of Mr. Chamberlain, +visited me, a man who deserves much credit in bridging disagreements. I +succeeded in arranging for another meeting in the evening. During this +meeting, which started in a rather cool atmosphere, the Führer received +a report of Czechoslovakia’s mobilization. This was a most deplorable +circumstance since Hitler, just at this moment, resented that very +strongly, and both he and Mr. Chamberlain wanted to break off the +conference. This happened, I believe, exactly at the moment when the +interpreter was about to read the Führer’s memorandum containing a +proposal for the solution of the Sudeten German problem. By a remark and +a short conversation with Hitler and then with Chamberlain, I succeeded +in straightening matters out. Negotiations were resumed, and after a few +hours of negotiations the result was that Mr. Chamberlain told the +Führer he could see now that something had to be done and that he was +ready, on his part, to submit this memorandum to the British Cabinet. I +believe he also said that he would suggest to the British Cabinet, that +is to say, to his ministerial colleagues, that compliance with this +memorandum be recommended to Prague. The memorandum contained as a +solution, in general outlines, the annexation of the Sudetenland by the +Reich. I believe, the Führer expressed his desire in the memorandum +that, in view of the critical situation there, it would be advisable +that this be carried out, if possible, within a definite period of +time—I believe, by 1 October, that was within 10 days or two weeks. Mr. +Chamberlain then departed and a few days passed. The crisis did not +improve but rather became worse. I remember that very well. Then, during +the last part of September, I do not have the date here, the French +Ambassador came and said that he had good news about the Sudeten German +question. Later on the British Ambassador also called. At the same +time—Reich Marshal Göring has already testified to this—Italy wanted +to take part in the solution of the crisis acting on a wish made known +to Göring by Mussolini and offered to mediate. Then came Mussolini’s +proposal that a conference be held, which proposal was accepted by +England, France, and Germany. The French Ambassador, and later on the +British Ambassador, saw the Führer and outlined on a map the approximate +solution which apparently was being proposed by France, England, and +Italy as a solution of the Sudeten problem. I still remember that the +Führer in the first place stated to the French Ambassador that this +proposal was not satisfactory, whereupon the French Ambassador declared +that of course further discussions should be held regarding this +question and the question of where Germans really were living and how +far the Sudetenland extended; all these questions could still be +discussed in detail. + +Anyway, as far the French Government was concerned—and I believe, Sir +Nevile Henderson used similar words later at his reception by the +Führer—the Führer could be assured that the British as well as the +French intended to contribute to the solution of this problem in +conformity with the German view. + +Then came the Munich conference. I take it I need not go into the +details of this conference; I should like only to describe briefly the +results of it. The Führer explained to the statesmen, with the aid of a +map, the necessity, as he saw it, of annexing a particular part of the +Sudetenland to the German Reich to reach final satisfaction. A +discussion arose; Mussolini, the Italian Chief of Government, agreed in +general with Hitler’s ideas. The English Prime Minister made at first +certain reservations and also mentioned that perhaps the details might +be discussed with the Czechs, with Prague. Daladier, the French +Minister, said, as far as I recall, that he thought that since this +problem had already been broached, the four great powers should make a +decision here and now. In the end this opinion was shared by all the +four statesmen; as a result the Munich Agreement was drawn up providing +that the Sudetenland should be annexed to Germany as outlined on the +maps that were on hand. The Führer was very pleased and happy about this +solution, and, with regard to other versions of this matter which I have +heard during the Trial here, I should like to emphasize here once more +particularly that I also was happy. We all were extremely happy that in +this way in this form the matter had been solved. + +THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 minutes past 2. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow morning from 10 o’clock +until 1 in open session. And now before going on, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal +wish me to say that they think that entirely too much time is being +taken up by the defendant in detailed accounts of negotiations which led +up to an agreement which is a matter of history and which is perfectly +well known to everybody. That is not the case which the defendant has to +meet; what the defendant has to meet is not the making of agreements +which are perfectly well known, but the breach of those agreements by +Germany and any part which he may have played in the breach of those +agreements. It is very important that the time of this Tribunal should +not be taken up by unnecessary details of that sort. + +DR. HORN: What foreign political reaction did the Munich Agreement have? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The Munich Agreement is well known. Its contents were +the following: Germany and England should never again wage war; the +naval agreement on the ratio of 100 to 35 was to be permanent and, in +important matters, consultations were to be resorted to. Through this +agreement the atmosphere between Germany and England was undoubtedly +cleared up to a certain degree. It was to be expected that the success +of this pact would lead to a final understanding. The disappointment was +great when, a few days after Munich, rearmament at any cost was +announced in England. Then England started on a policy of alliance and +close relationship with France. In November 1938 trade policy measures +were taken against Germany, and in December 1938 the British Colonial +Secretary made a speech in which a “no” was put to any revision of the +colonial question. Contact with the United States of America was also +established. Our reports of that period, as I remember them, showed an +increased—I should like to say—stiffening of the English attitude +toward Germany; and the impression was created in Germany of a policy +which practically aimed at the encirclement of Germany. + +DR. HORN: You are accused by the Prosecution of having contributed to +the separation of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia in violation of +international law. What part did you take in the Slovakian declaration +of independence? + +VON RIBBENTROP: There is no doubt that there were relations between +Slovakians and quite a number of members of the National Socialist +German Workers Party. These tendencies naturally were known to the +Foreign Office, and it would be wrong to say that we in any way did not +welcome them. But it is not correct to say that the autonomy was +demanded or forced by us in any way. I remember that Dr. Tiso proclaimed +this autonomy; and the Prague Government, under the influence of Munich, +also recognized the autonomy. What the situation was like at the time +after Munich can be seen from the fact that all minorities of +Czechoslovakia wanted autonomy and independence. Shortly thereafter the +Carpatho-Ukrainians declared their independence and others as well had +similar aspirations. In the Munich Agreement, I should like to add, +there was a clause according to which Germany and Italy were to give +Czechoslovakia a guarantee; but a declaration to this effect was not +made. The reason for that was that Poland, after the Munich Agreement, +sent an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, and on her own initiative, severed +the Polish minorities and occupied these areas. The Hungarians also +wanted autonomy, or rather, incorporation of Hungarian areas; and +certain areas of Czechoslovakia were thereupon given to Hungary by the +Vienna decision. The situation in Czechoslovakia, however, was not yet +clear and also remained difficult during the following period. Then the +Slovak, Tuka, approached us. He wanted to win Germany’s approval for +Slovakia’s independence. The Führer received Tuka at that time and, +after a few interludes, the final result was the declaration of +independence of Slovakia made by Tiso on 13 March. The Prosecution have +submitted a document in which I am alleged to have said, during the +conversation which took place between the Führer and Tiso, that it was +only a matter of hours, not of days, that Slovakia would have to come to +a decision. However, this was to be understood to mean that at that time +preparations for an invasion had been made by Hungary in order to occupy +Carpatho-Ukrainia as well as some other regions of Slovakia. We wanted +to prevent a war between Slovakia and Hungary or between Czechoslovakia +and Hungary; Hitler was greatly concerned about it, and therefore he +gladly complied with Tiso’s desire. Later, after the declaration of +Slovakia’s independence by the Slovak parliament, he complied with +Tiso’s request and took over the protection of Slovakia. + +DR. HORN: What brought about Hacha’s visit to Berlin on 14 March 1939? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Events in Slovakia had their repercussions, of course, +and chiefly very strong excesses against racial Germans in the area of +Prague, Brünn, Iglau, _et cetera_, were reported to Hitler. Many +fugitives came into the old Reich. In the winter of 1938-39 I repeatedly +attempted to discuss these matters with the Prague Government. Hitler +was convinced that a development was being initiated in Prague which +could not be tolerated by the German Reich. It was the attitude of the +press and the influential government circles in Prague. The Führer also +wished that the Czech nation should reduce her military power, but this +was refused by Prague. + +During these months I tried repeatedly to maintain good German relations +with Prague. In particular I spoke frequently with Chvalkovsky, the +Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister. In the middle of March, Chvalkovsky, +the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, turned to our German +representative in Prague to find out whether Hitler would give Hacha the +opportunity of a personal interview. I reported this to the Führer and +the Führer agreed to receive Hacha; however, he told me that he wished +to deal with this matter personally. To that effect I had an exchange of +telegrams with Prague: A reserved attitude should be taken in Prague but +Hacha should be told that the Führer would receive him. + +At this point I should like to mention briefly that the Foreign Office +and I myself did not know anything at this date of impending military +events. We learned about these things only shortly before they happened. +Before the arrival of Hacha I asked the Führer whether a treaty was to +be prepared. The Führer answered, as I recall distinctly, that he had +the intention of going far beyond that. After the arrival of Hacha in +Berlin I visited him at once and he told me he wanted to place the fate +of the Czech State in the Führer’s hands. I reported this to the Führer +and the Führer instructed me to draft an agreement. The draft was +submitted to him and corrected later on, as I remember. Hacha was then +received by the Führer and the results of this conference, as far as I +know, are already known here and have been submitted in documentary form +so that I do not need to go into it. + +I know that Adolf Hitler at that time spoke pointedly to Hacha and told +him that he intended to occupy Czechoslovakia. It concerned old historic +territory which he intended to take under his protection. The Czechs +were to have complete autonomy and their own way of living, and he +believed that the decision which was being made on that day would result +in great benefit for the Czech people. While Hacha talked to the Führer, +or rather afterwards—I was present at the Führer’s conference with +Hacha—I had a long discussion with the Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky. He +adopted our point of view fairly readily and I asked him to influence +Hacha so that the Führer’s decision and the whole action might be +carried out without bloodshed. + +I believe it was the deep impression made on him first of all by the +Führer and then by what Adolf Hitler had told him which caused Hacha to +get in touch by telephone with his Government in Prague and also, I +believe, with the Chief of the General Staff. I do not know this +exactly. He obtained the approval of his Government to sign the +agreement which I mentioned at the beginning. This agreement was then +signed by Hitler, Hacha, and both the Foreign Ministers, that is by +myself also. Then Hacha, as I recall, gave instructions that the German +Army should be received cordially and, as far as I know; the march into +and the occupation of Czechoslovakia, that is Bohemia and Moravia, was +completed without serious incident of any kind. + +After the occupation I went to Prague with the Führer. After the +occupation, or maybe it was in Prague, the Führer gave me in the morning +a proclamation in which the countries of Bohemia and Moravia were +declared to be a protectorate of the Reich. I read out this proclamation +in Prague which, I may say, was somewhat a surprise to me. No protest of +any sort was made as far as I recall, and I believe I might mention that +the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, which the Führer considered +necessary in the ultimate interest of the Reich, took place for +historical and economic reasons and above all for reasons of security +for the German Reich. I believe that Göring has given the details. + +DR. HORN: What did the European situation look like to you at the time +of the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I might say that after the proclamation at Prague I had +a lengthy discussion with the Führer. I pointed out to the Führer that +this occupation, of course, would have considerable repercussions in +British-French circles. In this connection I should like to point out +that in England those circles which had turned against Germany had grown +larger and were led by important persons. In this connection I should +like to come back to or mention briefly one incident which took place +while I was still Ambassador in London, when Mr. Winston Churchill paid +me a visit at the Embassy. Mr. Winston Churchill was not in the +government at that time, and I believe he was not leader of the +opposition—it has already been discussed—but he was one of the most +outstanding personalities in England. I was especially interested in +arranging a meeting between him and Adolf Hitler and therefore had asked +him to come to see me at the Embassy. We had a conversation which lasted +several hours and the details of which I recall exactly. I believe it +would go too far to relate all the details of this conversation. But +whereas important men like Lord Vansittart in 1936... + +THE PRESIDENT: Documents with reference to Mr. Winston Churchill at this +time when he was not a member of the government have already been ruled +by the Tribunal to be irrelevant and what he said and such a +conversation as this appears to the Tribunal to be absolutely irrelevant +and the Tribunal will not hear it. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I called the Führer’s attention +to the British reaction. Adolf Hitler explained to me the necessity of +the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, especially on historic and +strategic grounds. I remember that in this connection he quoted +especially the former French Minister of Aviation, Pierre Cot, who had +called Bohemia and Moravia, that is Czechoslovakia, the “airplane +carrier” against Germany. I believe it was Reich Marshal Göring who +already mentioned that at that time we received intelligence reports of +Russian pilots or Russian missions being on Czech airdromes. + +Hitler said to me, and I remember these words distinctly, that he could +not tolerate an inimical Czech thorn in the German flesh. One could get +along well enough with the Czechs, but it was necessary for Germany to +have in her hands the protection of these countries. He mentioned Soviet +Russia, allied with Czechoslovakia, as a factor of inestimable power. +When I mentioned England and her reaction he said that England was in no +position to take over the protection of the Germans in Czechoslovakia. +Furthermore, the structure of the Czechoslovakian State had +disintegrated and Slovakia had become independent. Therefore he thought +it was necessary in the interest of future German-English relations that +the countries of Bohemia and Moravia should come into a close contact +with the Reich. A protectorate seemed to him to be the appropriate form. +Adolf Hitler said that while this question was utterly unimportant to +England it was absolutely vital for Germany. This becomes evident if one +glances at the map—this is what he literally said. Besides, he said, he +was unable to see how this solution could disturb the co-operation which +was being striven for between Germany and England. Hitler pointed out +that England—by chance I still remember the figure—had about 600 +dominions, protectorates, and colonies and therefore should understand +that such problems have to be solved. + +I told Adolf Hitler about the difficulties which might confront Mr. +Chamberlain personally because of this action on the part of Germany, +that England might consider this an increase of Germany’s power and so +on; but the Führer explained the whole question with the reasons I have +mentioned before. + +The English reaction at first, in the person of Mr. Chamberlain in the +House of Commons, was rather a positive one. He said it was not a +violation of the Munich Agreement and the British Government was not +bound by any obligation. The Czechoslovakian State had disintegrated and +the guarantee which England had said she would give had not come into +effect, or rather the obligations of the guarantee did not apply under +the circumstances. + +I might say that all of us were glad that this attitude was taken in +England. I believe it was 2 or 3 days later when Mr. Chamberlain in +Birmingham... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what have we got to do with the reactions in +England unless they took the form of a note? I do not see what it has to +do with it. What we want to know is the part that the Defendant +Ribbentrop played in the breach of the Munich Agreement. + +DR. HORN: The Defendant Von Ribbentrop is accused of having participated +in a conspiracy when he was Foreign Minister, and it is charged that his +foreign policy contributed to the bringing about of aggressive war. If +the Defendant Von Ribbentrop wishes and is allowed to defend himself +against these charges then he must be permitted to describe the +circumstances as he saw them and the motives behind his actions. I am +putting only such questions to the defendant in this case as have +reference to his forming certain opinions. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don’t think you asked him any question about it. +He was just... + +DR. HORN: It is not coming through quite audibly. + +THE PRESIDENT: What I said was, I did not think you asked him any +questions as to the reactions in England. + +THE INTERPRETER: The channels seem to be disturbed in some way. I think +they are getting more than one language. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had better adjourn, I think. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what I was attempting to say to you when the +system broke down was that it seems to the Tribunal that the defendant +ought to be able to keep his evidence within stricter limits and not to +go into so much detail, and that, with regard to the reactions, the +political reactions in England, they are not relevant in themselves, and +that the bearing which they may have upon the case is really remote. + +DR. HORN: What caused Hitler to commission you, in October 1938, to +enter into negotiations with Poland? + +VON RIBBENTROP: There had always been the minority problem in Poland, +which had caused great difficulties. Despite the agreement of 1934, this +situation had not changed. In the year 1938 the “de-Germanization” +measures against German minorities were continued by Poland. Hitler +wished to reach some clear settlement with Poland, as well as with other +countries. Therefore he charged me, I believe during October 1938, to +discuss with the Polish ambassador a final clarification of the problems +existing between Germany and Poland. + +DR. HORN: Besides the minority problem, what other problems were +involved? + +VON RIBBENTROP: There were two questions: One, the minority problem, was +the most burning one; the second problem was the question of Danzig and +the Corridor, that is to say, of a connection with East Prussia. + +DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s and your attitude toward the Danzig and +Corridor questions? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is clear that these two questions were the problems +that had caused the greatest difficulties since Versailles. Hitler had +to solve these problems sooner or later one way or another. I shared +this point of view. Danzig was exposed to continual pressure by the +Poles; they wanted to “Polandize” Danzig more and more and by October of +1938 from 800,000 to a million Germans, I believe, had been expelled +from the Corridor or had returned to Germany. + +DR. HORN: How did the Polish Ambassador take your suggestions in October +1938? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The Polish Ambassador was reticent at first. He did not +commit himself, nor could he do so. I naturally approached him with the +problem in such a way that he could discuss it at ease with his +government, and did not request, so to speak, a definitive answer from +him. He said that of course he saw certain difficulties with reference +to Danzig, and also a corridor to East Prussia was a question which +required much consideration. He was very reticent, and the discussion +ended with his promise to communicate my statements, made on behalf of +the German Government, to his government, and to give me an answer in +the near future. + +DR. HORN: How did your second discussion with Ambassador Lipski on 17 +November 1938 end? + +VON RIBBENTROP: On 17 November 1938 Lipski came to see me and declared +that the problem involved considerable difficulties and that the Danzig +question in particular was very difficult in view of Poland’s entire +attitude. + +DR. HORN: Did you then, on Hitler’s order, submit the request to Lipski +to take up direct negotiations with Foreign Minister Beck? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I invited Foreign Minister Beck to Berlin. + +DR. HORN: When did Foreign Minister Beck come to Berchtesgaden? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Unfortunately, Minister Beck did not come to Berlin; he +went to London. + +DR. HORN: You misunderstood my question. When did Foreign Minister Beck +come to Berchtesgaden? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler had said that he wanted to speak with Mr. Beck +personally about this problem. Thereupon Mr. Beck came; I do not know +the date exactly... + +DR. HORN: It was the beginning of January, on 5 January. + +VON RIBBENTROP: ...to Berchtesgaden and had a long talk with Adolf +Hitler. + +DR. HORN: What was the result of this talk? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I was present at that conversation. The result was that +Adolf Hitler informed Beck, once more in detail, of his desire for good +German-Polish relations. He said that a completely new solution would +have to be found in regard to Danzig, and that a corridor to East +Prussia should not give rise to insurmountable difficulties. During this +conversation Mr. Beck was rather receptive. He told the Führer that +naturally the question of Danzig was difficult because of the mouth of +the Vistula, but he would think the problem over in all its details. He +did not at all refuse to discuss this problem, but rather he pointed out +the difficulties which, due to the Polish attitude, confronted a +solution of the problem. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that Beck was, as a matter of principle, willing to +negotiate and therefore invited you, at the end of January, to make a +visit to Warsaw? + +VON RIBBENTROP: One cannot put it quite that way. After the meeting at +Berchtesgaden with the Führer, I had another lengthy conversation with +Beck in Munich. During this conversation Beck explained to me again that +the problem was very difficult, but that he would do everything he +could; he would speak to his governmental colleagues, and one would have +to find a solution of some kind. On this occasion we agreed that I would +pay him a return visit in Warsaw. During this visit we also spoke about +the minority question, about Danzig and the Corridor. During this +conversation the matter did not progress either; Mr. Beck rather +repeated the arguments why it was difficult. I told him that it was +simply impossible to leave this problem the way it was between Germany +and Poland. I pointed out the great difficulties encountered by the +German minorities and the undignified situation, as I should like to put +it, that is, the always undignified difficulties confronting Germans who +wanted to travel to East Prussia. Beck promised to help in the minority +question, and also to re-examine the other questions. Then, on the +following day, I spoke briefly with Marshal Smygly-Rydz, but this +conversation did not lead to anything. + +DR. HORN: At that time did you ask Beck to pay another visit to Berlin, +and did this visit take place, or did Beck decide on a different course? + +VON RIBBENTROP: What happened was that I invited Foreign Minister Beck +to Berlin, because his first visit was not an official one. +Unfortunately, however, Beck did not come to Berlin, but, as I have +already said, he went to London. + +DR. HORN: What was the effect of his visit to London on the subsequent +negotiations? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The effect of this London visit was a complete surprise +to us. Minister Lipski, I believe it was on 21 March, yes, it was, +suddenly handed us a memorandum. + +DR. HORN: Let me interrupt you. On 21 March you had previously another +conversation with Lipski regarding the partition of Czechoslovakia and +the problems arising from the establishment of the Protectorate? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That may be true, in that case I meant 26. + +DR. HORN: Yes. + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is right; on the 21st I had a talk with Lipski, +that is true, and in this talk Lipski expressed certain doubts +concerning Slovakia and the protection afforded by Germany. He expressed +the wish that between Hungary and Poland, two countries which had always +had close relations with each other, a direct, common boundary might be +established and asked whether or not this would be possible. He also +inquired indirectly whether the protection afforded to Slovakia was +directed in any way against Poland. I assured Mr. Beck that neither +Hitler nor anybody else had been motivated by the slightest intention of +acting against Poland when the protection was promised. It was merely a +measure to point out to Hungary that the territorial questions were now +settled. However, I believe I told Mr. Lipski to look forward to such a +link being established via the Carpatho-Ukraine. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that consultations were initiated between Poland +and the British Government, the French Government and the Russian +Government about 20 March? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. These consultations, as far as I +recall, go back to a suggestion made by Lord Simon. A common declaration +was to be made with regard to Poland. But Poland did not regard this as +satisfactory, and made it clear in London that this solution was out of +the question for Poland. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that Poland worked toward a concrete alliance with +England and France? + +VON RIBBENTROP: There can be no doubt, and it is a historical fact that +Poland strove for an alliance with England. + +DR. HORN: When did the German Government find out that Poland had been +promised support by England and France? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That became known, I cannot tell you the date precisely, +but it was, at any rate, during the latter part of March. Anyway, I +know, and we all were convinced of what, I believe, is an established +fact today, that these relations taken up during the latter part of +March between Warsaw and London determined the answer which was, to our +surprise, communicated to us by memorandum on 26 March, I believe. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that this memorandum stated that a further +pursuit of German aims regarding a change in the Danzig and Corridor +questions would mean war as far as Poland was concerned? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. That was a great surprise to us. I +know that I read the memorandum, and for a moment I simply could not +believe that such an answer had been given, when one considers that for +months we had tried to find a solution, which—and I wish to emphasize +this—only Adolf Hitler, at that time, with his great authority over the +German people could bring about and be responsible for. + +I do not want to get lost in details, but I do want to say that the +Danzig and Corridor problem, since 1919, had been considered by +statesmen of great authority the problem with which somehow the revision +of Versailles would have to start. I should like to remind you of the +statement by Marshal Foch and other statements by Winston Churchill, who +also elaborated on this subject, as well as by Clemenceau, _et cetera_. +All these statesmen were undoubtedly of the opinion that a territorial +revision of this Corridor would really have to be undertaken. But +Hitler, for his part, wanted to make it an overall settlement and reach +an understanding with Poland on the basis of his putting up with the +Corridor and taking only Danzig back into the Reich, whereby Poland was +to be afforded a very generous solution in the economic field. That, in +other words, was the basis of the proposals which I had been working on +for 4 to 5 months on Hitler’s order. All the greater was our surprise +when, suddenly, the other side declared that a further pursuit of these +plans and solutions, which we regarded as very generous, would mean war. +I informed Hitler of this, and I remember very well that Hitler received +it very calmly. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that on the following day you stated to the +Polish Ambassador that the memorandum of 26 March 1939 could not serve +as the basis for a solution? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. I just said that Hitler received this +harsh and serious message of the Polish Ambassador very calmly. He said, +however, that I should tell the Polish Ambassador that of course no +solution could be found on this basis. There should be no talk of war. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that thereupon, on 6 April 1939, the Polish Foreign +Minister Beck traveled to London and returned with a temporary agreement +of mutual assistance between Poland, England, and France? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. + +DR. HORN: What was the German reaction to this pact of mutual +assistance? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The German reaction—here I might refer to Hitler’s +Reichstag speech in which he stated his attitude toward this whole +problem. We felt this pact of mutual assistance between Poland and +England to be not in agreement with the German-Polish pact of 1934, for +in the 1934 pact any application of force was excluded between Germany +and Poland. By the new pact concluded between Poland and England without +previous consultation with Germany, Poland had bound herself for +example, to attack Germany in case of any conflict, between Germany and +England. I know that Adolf Hitler felt that it was also not in +conformity with the agreements between him and Mr. Chamberlain in +Munich, namely, the elimination of any resort to force between Germany +and England, regardless of what might happen. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that Germany then sent through you a memorandum to +Poland on 28 April by which the German-Polish declaration of 1934 was +rescinded? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. It was, I believe, on the same day as the +Reichstag speech of the Führer. This memorandum stated more or less what +I have just summarized here, that the pact was not in agreement with the +treaty of 1934 and that Germany regarded this treaty as no longer valid. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that as a consequence of this memorandum +German-Polish relations became more tense and that new difficulties +arose in the minority question? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. During the preceding period +negotiations had been pending in order to put the minority problem on a +new basis. I still remember that no progress was made. That was already +the case before 28 May, and after 28 May the situation of the German +minority became even more difficult. In particular the Polish +association for the Western Territories was very active at that time and +persecution of Germans and their expulsion from hearth and home was the +order of the day. I know that just during the months following 28 May, +that is to say, in the summer of 1939, the so-called refugee reception +camps for German refugees from Poland showed a tremendous influx. + +DR. HORN: How did you and Hitler react to the British-French +declarations of guarantee to Romania and Greece, and later on Turkey? + +VON RIBBENTROP: These declarations could be interpreted by the German +policy only as meaning that England was initiating a systematic policy +of alliances in Europe which was hostile to Germany. That was Hitler’s +opinion and also mine. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that these declarations of guarantee and +Roosevelt’s message of 14 April 1939 were then, on 22 May 1939, followed +by the German-Italian pact of alliance? And what were the reasons for +this pact? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is known that between Germany and Italy friendly +relations had naturally existed for a long time; and when the European +situation became more acute these relations were, at Mussolini’s +suggestion, intensified and a pact of alliance, which was discussed +first by Count Ciano and me in Milan, was drawn up and provisionally +signed on the order of the Government heads. This was an answer to the +efforts of English-French policy. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that the crisis with Poland became acute through +the fact that on 6 August in Danzig a dispute with the customs +inspectors took place by which Germany was forced to take a stand? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. A quarrel had arisen between the Polish +representative and the Senate of the City of Danzig. The Polish +representative had sent a note to the President of the Senate informing +him that certain customs officers of the Senate wanted to disobey Polish +regulations. This information proved later to be false, was answered by +the Senate, and led to a sharp exchange of notes between the Senate and +the Polish representative. On Hitler’s order I told the State Secretary +of the Foreign Office to lodge appropriate protests with the Polish +Government. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that Weizsäcker, the then State Secretary, on 15 +August called the English and French Ambassadors in order to inform both +these ambassadors in detail of the seriousness of the situation? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. He did that on my order. + +DR. HORN: On 18 August was Ambassador Henderson again asked to see your +State Secretary because the situation was becoming more acute in Poland +and Danzig? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. A conversation took place a few days later between +the English Ambassador and the State Secretary. The State Secretary +explained to him in very clear words the great seriousness of the +situation and told him that things were taking a very serious turn. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that in this phase of the crisis you made up your +mind, on the basis of a suggestion made to you, to initiate negotiations +with Russia, and what were your reasons for doing that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Negotiations with Russia had already started sometime +previously. Marshal Stalin, in March 1939, delivered a speech in which +he made certain hints of his desire to have better relations with +Germany. I had submitted this speech to Adolf Hitler and asked him +whether we should not try to find out whether this suggestion had +something real behind it. Hitler was at first reluctant, but later on he +became more receptive to this idea. Negotiations for a commercial treaty +were under way, and during these negotiations, with the Führer’s +permission, I took soundings in Moscow as to the possibility of a +definite bridge between National Socialism and Bolshevism and whether +the interests of the two countries could not at least be made to +harmonize. + +DR. HORN: How did the relations taken up by the Soviet Russian +commercial agency in Berlin with your Minister Schnurre develop? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The negotiations of Minister Schnurre gave me within a +relatively short period of time a picture from which I could gather that +Stalin had meant this speech in earnest. Then an exchange of telegrams +took place with Moscow which, in the middle of August, led to Hitler’s +sending a telegram to Stalin, whereupon Stalin in answer to this +telegram invited a plenipotentiary to Moscow. The aim in view, which had +been prepared diplomatically, was the conclusion of a non-aggression +pact between the two countries. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that you were sent to Moscow as plenipotentiary? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is known. + +DR. HORN: When did you fly to Moscow, and what negotiations did you +carry on there? + +VON RIBBENTROP: On the evening of 22 August I arrived in Moscow. The +reception given me by Stalin and Molotov was very friendly. We had at +first a 2-hour conversation. During this conversation the entire complex +of Russo-German relations was discussed. The result was, first, the +mutual will of both countries to put their relations on a completely new +basis. This was to be expressed in a pact of non-aggression. Secondly, +the spheres of interests of the two countries were to be defined; this +was done by a secret supplementary protocol. + +DR. HORN: Which cases were dealt with in this secret supplementary +protocol? What were its contents and what were the political bases? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say, first of all, that this secret +protocol has been spoken about several times here in this Court. I +talked very frankly during the negotiations with Stalin and Molotov, and +the Russian gentlemen also used plain language with me. I described +Hitler’s desire that the two countries should reach a definitive +agreement, and, of course, I also spoke of the critical situation in +Europe. I told the Russian gentlemen that Germany would do everything to +settle the situation in Poland and to settle the difficulties peacefully +in order to reach a friendly agreement despite everything. + +However, I left no doubt that the situation was serious and that it was +possible that an armed conflict might break out. That was clear anyway. +For both statesmen, Stalin as well as Hitler, it was a question of +territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. It +is, therefore, wrong to look at these things from any other point of +view. And just as Adolf Hitler was of the opinion which I expressed in +Moscow, that in some form or other this problem would have to be solved, +so also the Russian side saw clearly that this was the case. + +We then discussed what should be done on the part of the Germans and on +the part of the Russians in the case of an armed conflict. A line of +demarcation was agreed upon, as is known, in order that in the event of +intolerable Polish provocation, or in the event of war, there should be +a boundary, so that the German and Russian interests in the Polish +theater could and would not collide. The well-known line was agreed upon +along the line of the Rivers Vistula, San, and Bug in Polish territory. +And it was agreed that in the case of conflict the territories lying to +the west of these rivers would be the German sphere of interest, and +those to the east would be the Russian sphere of interest. + +It is known that later, after the outbreak of the war, these zones were +occupied on the one side by Germany and on the other side by Russian +troops. I may repeat that at that time I had the impression, both from +Hitler and Stalin, that the territories—that these Polish territories +and also the other territories which had been marked off in these +spheres of interest, about which I shall speak shortly—that these were +territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. And +both statesmen undoubtedly held the opinion that if these +territories—if, I should like to say, the last chance for a reasonable +solution of this problem was exhausted—there was certainly a +justification for Adolf Hitler to incorporate these territories into the +German Reich by some other procedure. + +Over and above that, it is also known that other spheres of interest +were defined with reference to Finland, the Baltic States, and +Bessarabia. This was a great settlement of the interest of two great +powers providing for a peaceful solution as well as for solution by war. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that these negotiations were drawn up +specifically only in the event that, on the basis of the non-aggression +pact and the political settlement between Russia and Germany, it might +not be possible to settle the Polish question diplomatically? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that it was clearly stated that this solution +was designed only to provide for the event that, despite the Pact of +Non-aggression with Russia, the Polish conflict might not be solved by +diplomatic means and that the treaty was to become effective only in +this case? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. I stated at that time that on the +German side everything would be attempted to solve the problem in a +diplomatic and peaceful way. + +DR. HORN: Did Russia promise you diplomatic assistance or benevolent +neutrality in connection with this solution? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It could be seen from the Pact of Non-aggression and +from all the conferences in Moscow that this was so. It was perfectly +clear, and we were convinced of it, that if, due to the Polish attitude, +a war broke out, Russia would assume a friendly attitude towards us. + +DR. HORN: When did you fly back from Moscow, and what sort of situation +did you find in Berlin? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The Pact of Non-aggression with the Soviet Union was +concluded on the 23rd. On the 24th I flew back to Germany. I had thought +at first that I would fly to the Führer, to the Berghof in +Berchtesgaden, but during the flight or prior to it—I do not know +exactly—I was asked to come to Berlin. + +We flew to Berlin, and there I informed Hitler of the Moscow agreements. +The situation which I found there was undoubtedly very tense. On the +next day I noticed this particularly. + +DR. HORN: To what circumstances was this aggravation of the +German-Polish situation to be attributed? + +VON RIBBENTROP: In the middle of August all sorts of things had happened +which, as I should like to put it, charged the atmosphere with +electricity: frontier incidents, difficulties between Danzig and Poland. +On the one hand, Germany was accused of sending arms to Danzig, and, on +the other hand, we accused the Poles of taking military measures in +Danzig, and so on. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that on your return from Moscow to Berlin, you were +informed of the signing of the British-Polish Pact of Guarantee and what +was your reaction and that of Hitler to this? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That was on 25 August. On 25 August I was informed about +the conversation which the Führer had had with Ambassador Henderson +during my absence from Germany, I believe at Berchtesgaden on 22 August. +This was a very serious conversation. Henderson had brought over a +letter from the British Prime Minister which stated clearly that a war +between Germany and Poland would draw England into the picture. + +Then, early on the 25th I—the Führer then answered this letter, I +believe on the same day—and the answer was couched so as to mean that +at the moment a solution by diplomatic means could not be expected. I +discussed with the Führer on the 25th this exchange of letters and asked +him to consider this question once more and suggested that one more +attempt might be made with reference to England. This was 25 August, a +very eventful day. In the morning a communication came from the Italian +Government, according to which Italy, in the case of a conflict over +Poland, would not stand at Germany’s side. The Führer decided then to +receive Ambassador Henderson once more in the course of that day. This +meeting took place at about noon of the 25th. I was present. The Führer +went into details and asked Henderson once more to bear in mind his +urgent desire to reach an understanding with England. He described to +him the very difficult situation with Poland and asked him, I believe, +to take a plane and fly back to England in order to discuss this whole +situation once more with the British Government. Ambassador Henderson +agreed to this and I sent him, I believe in the course of the afternoon, +a memo or a _note verbale_ in which the Führer put in writing his ideas +for such an understanding, or rather what he had said during the +meeting, so that the ambassador would be able to inform his government +correctly. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that after the British-Polish Pact of Guarantee +became known, you asked Hitler to stop the military measures which had +been started in Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. I was just about to relate that. During +the course of the afternoon—I heard in the course of the day that +certain military measures were being taken and then in the afternoon I +received, I believe, a Reuters dispatch, at any rate it was a press +dispatch—saying that the Polish-British Pact of Alliance had been +ratified in London. + +I believe there was even a note appended that the Polish Ambassador +Raczynski had been sick but had nevertheless suddenly given his +signature in the Foreign Office. + +DR. HORN: Was this treaty signed before or after it was known that Italy +refused to sign the Italian mobilization? + +VON RIBBENTROP: This treaty was undoubtedly concluded afterwards. Of +course, I do not know the hour and the day, but I believe it must have +been on the afternoon of 25 August, and Italy’s refusal had already +reached us by noon; I believe in other words, it had undoubtedly been +definitively decided in Rome in the morning or on the day before. At any +rate, I can deduce this from another fact. Perhaps I might, however, +answer your other question first, namely, what I did upon receipt of +this news. + +DR. HORN: Yes. + +VON RIBBENTROP: When I received this press dispatch, of which I was +informed once more when I came to the Chancellery, I went immediately to +Hitler and asked him to stop at once the military measures, whatever +they were—I was not familiar with military matters in detail—and I +told him that it was perfectly clear that this meant war with England +and that England could never disavow her signature. The Führer reflected +only a short while and then he said that was true and immediately called +his military adjutant, and I believe it was Field Marshal Keitel who +came, in order to call together the generals and stop the military +measures which had been started. On this occasion he made a remark that +we had received two pieces of bad news on one day. That was Italy and +this news, and I thought it was possible that the report about Italy’s +attitude had become known in London immediately, whereupon the final +ratification of this pact had taken place. I still remember this remark +of the Führer’s very distinctly. + +DR. HORN: Did you and Hitler, on this day, make efforts with Henderson +to settle the conflict, and what were your proposals? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have already stated that the Führer, I believe it was +in the early afternoon, saw Henderson on the 25th and told him that he +still had the intention of reaching some final understanding with +England. The question of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved +in some way and he wanted to approach England with a comprehensive offer +which was not contained in the _note verbale_, in order to settle these +things with England on a perfectly regular basis. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that Hitler then put an airplane at Henderson’s +disposal so that the latter could submit these proposals to his +government at once and request his government to make their promised +mediation effective in regard to Poland? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. I know that Henderson—I believe it +was on the next day, the 26th—flew to London in a German airplane. I do +not know the details, but I know that the Führer said during the +meeting, “Take an airplane immediately and fly to your government.” + +DR. HORN: What results did Ambassador Henderson bring back to Berlin on +28 August? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say in this connection, that in view of +the critical situation between Poland and Germany, which, of course, was +also known to the British Ambassador, Hitler expressed to me a certain +disappointment that the British Ambassador had not returned more quickly +with his answer, for the atmosphere was charged with electricity on that +day. On the 28th, Henderson then had another discussion with the Führer. +I was also present. The answer brought back by Sir Nevile Henderson from +London appeared at first not very satisfactory to the Führer. It +contained various points which seemed unclear to the Führer. But the +main point was that England announced her readiness for a wholesale +solution of the existing problems between Germany and England, on the +condition that the German-Polish question could be brought to a peaceful +solution. + +In the discussion Adolf Hitler told Sir Nevile Henderson that he would +examine the note and would then ask him to come back. Then he... + +DR. HORN: Is it true that in this memorandum England suggested that +Germany take up direct negotiations with Poland? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. One of the points in the note—I intended +to go into that—was that the English suggested that German-Polish +direct negotiations would be the most appropriate way to reach a +solution and, secondly, that such negotiations should take place as soon +as possible, because England had to admit that the situation was very +tense because of the frontier incidents and in every respect. +Furthermore the note stated that no matter what solution might be +found—I believe this was in the note—it should be guaranteed by the +great powers. + +DR. HORN: Did England offer a mediator to forward to Poland German +proposals for direct negotiations? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. + +DR. HORN: What were these German proposals like, which on 29 August +1939, were given by Hitler to Henderson in answer to Henderson’s +memorandum? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The situation was this: On the 29th Adolf Hitler again +received the British Ambassador and on this occasion told him that he +was ready to take up the English suggestion of the 28th, that is to say, +that despite the great tension and despite the Polish attitude, which he +resented so profoundly, he was prepared to offer his hand once more for +a peaceful solution of the German-Polish problems, as suggested in the +British note of the 28th. + +DR. HORN: What were the reasons for including in this German proposal a +request that a Polish plenipotentiary be sent by 30 August? + +VON RIBBENTROP: In Adolf Hitler’s communication to Ambassador Henderson +for the British Government it was stated that the German Government, in +view of the tense situation, would immediately set about working out +proposals for a solution of the Danzig and Corridor problems. The German +Government hoped to be in a position to have these proposals available +by the time a Polish negotiator arrived who was expected during the +course of 30 August. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that Hitler included this condition or this +request to send a plenipotentiary within 24 hours because he was afraid +that a conflict might arise due to the fact that the mobilized armies of +the two countries faced each other? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely true. I might say that during the +meeting on the 29th Ambassador Henderson, as I recall, asked the Führer +whether this was an ultimatum. The Führer answered “No,” that that was +not an ultimatum, but rather, I believe he said, a practical proposal or +a proposal arising from the situation, or something of that sort. I +should like to repeat that it was a fact that the situation near the +frontiers of Danzig and the Corridor during the last days of August +looked, one might say, as if the guns would go off on their own unless +something was done rather soon. That was the reason for the relatively +short respite which was made a condition by the Führer. He feared that +if more time were allowed, matters would drag out and danger of war not +decrease but rather increase. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that, despite this information given to Ambassador +Henderson, the answer of the British Government called this proposal +unreasonable? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I know of the British reaction from several documents +that I saw later. The first reaction came during my discussion with +Henderson on 30 August. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that on 30 August you received a confidential +communication regarding Poland’s total mobilization? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. On the 30th Hitler awaited word from the +Polish negotiator. This, however, did not come, but, I believe, on the +evening of the 30th the news arrived that Poland had ordered, although +not announced, general mobilization. I believe it was not announced +until the next morning. This, of course, further aggravated the +situation enormously. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that the British Government then practically +withdrew their offer to mediate by suggesting that Germany take +immediate and direct steps to prepare negotiations between Germany and +Poland? + +VON RIBBENTROP: You mean on the 30th? + +DR. HORN: Yes, on the 30th. + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is so. As I said before, we had been waiting on the +30th, but the Polish negotiator had not arrived. In the meantime, Hitler +had prepared the proposals which he wanted to hand to a Polish +negotiator who, as he had expressly promised Sir Nevile Henderson, would +be able to negotiate with Germany on the basis of complete equality. Not +until shortly before midnight, or at least in the late evening, a call +came through saying, that the British Ambassador wanted to transmit a +communication from his government. This meeting, I believe, was then +postponed once more; at any rate at midnight on 30 August the well-known +conversation between Henderson and me took place. + +DR. HORN: You heard yesterday Minister Schmidt’s description of this +meeting. Do you have anything to add to his description of it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to add the following about this +conversation. It is perfectly clear that at that moment all of us were +nervous, that is true. The British Ambassador was nervous and so was I. +I should like to and must mention here the fact that the British +Ambassador had had on the day before a minor scene with the Führer which +might have ended seriously. I succeeded in changing the subject. +Therefore, there was also a certain tension between the British +Ambassador and myself. However, I intentionally received the British +Ambassador composedly and calmly, and accepted his communication. I +hoped that this communication would, in the last moment, contain his +announcement of a Polish negotiator. + +However, this did not happen. Rather, Sir Nevile Henderson told me: + +1. That his government could not recommend this mode of procedure, +despite the tense situation, which had been aggravated still more by the +Polish total mobilization; rather the British Government recommended +that the German Government use diplomatic channels. + +2. That, if the German Government would submit the same proposals to the +British Government, the British Government would be ready to exert their +influence in Warsaw in order to find a solution, as far as these +suggestions appeared to be reasonable. In view of the whole situation +this was a very difficult answer because, as I said, the situation was +extremely tense and the Führer had been waiting since the day before for +a Polish emissary. I, in turn, feared also that the guns would go off by +themselves unless a solution or something else came quickly, as I have +said. I then read to Henderson the proposals given to me by the Führer. +I should like to state here once more under oath that the Führer had +expressly forbidden me to let these proposals out of my hands. He told +me that I might communicate to the British Ambassador only the substance +of them, if I thought it advisable. I did a little more than that; I +read all the proposals, from the beginning to the end, to the British +Ambassador. I did this because I still hoped that the British Government +wanted to exert their influence in Warsaw and assist in a solution. But +here too I must state frankly that from my talk with the British +Ambassador on 30 August, from his whole attitude, which Minister Schmidt +also described to a certain extent yesterday, as well as from the +substance of the communication of the British Government, I got the +impression that England at this moment was not quite prepared to live up +to the situation and, let us say, to do her utmost to bring about a +peaceful solution. + +DR. HORN: What did the German Government do after the contents of the +note were made known to Ambassador Henderson? + +VON RIBBENTROP: After my conversation with the British Ambassador I +reported to the Führer. I told him it had been a serious conversation. I +told him also that in pursuance of his instructions I had not handed the +memorandum to Sir Nevile Henderson despite the latter’s request. But I +had the impression that the situation was serious and I was convinced +that the British guarantee to Poland was in force. That had been my very +definite impression from this conversation. Then, in the course of the +31st the Führer waited the whole day to see whether or not some sort of +Polish negotiator would come or whether a new communication would come +from the British Government. We have heard here about Reich Marshal +Göring’s intervention, how he informed Mr. Dahlerus of the contents of +this note in every detail. There can thus be no doubt that during the +course of that night, at the latest in the morning of the 31st the +precise proposals of the Reich Government were in the hands of both the +London Government and the Warsaw Government. On the 31st the Führer +waited the whole day and I am convinced, and I want to state it very +clearly here, that he hoped that something would be done by England. +Then in the course of the 31st the Polish Ambassador came to see me. But +it is known that he had no authority to do anything, to enter into +negotiations or even to receive proposals of any sort. I do not know +whether the Führer would have authorized me on the 31st to hand +proposals of this sort to him, but I think it is possible. But the +Polish Ambassador was not authorized to receive them, as he expressly +told me. I might point out briefly that regarding the attitude in Warsaw +the witness Dahlerus has already given additional testimony. + +DR. HORN: It is correct that England did not forward the German +proposals to Warsaw until the evening of 31 August? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that the German proposals which had been +submitted by you on the preceding evening of the 30th to Ambassador Sir +Nevile Henderson were not forwarded to Warsaw until the evening of 31 +August? + +VON RIBBENTROP: You mean from London? + +DR. HORN: From London. + +VON RIBBENTROP: That I cannot tell you precisely, but that can +undoubtedly be verified from official documents. + +DR. HORN: What considerations then led to the final decision to take +military action against Poland? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you the details of this. I know only that +the Führer—that the proposals which I had read to the British +Ambassador in the night of the 30th were published by broadcast, as I +believe, on the evening of the 31st. The reaction of the Warsaw radio, I +remember this reaction exactly, was unfortunately such as to sound like +a veritable battlecry in answer to the German proposals which, as I +heard, had been characterized by Henderson as reasonable. I believe they +were characterized by the Polish radio as an insolence, and the Germans +were spoken of as Huns or the like. I still remember that. At any rate, +shortly after the announcement of these proposals a very sharp negative +answer came from Warsaw. I assume that it was the answer which persuaded +the Führer in the night of the 31st to issue the order to march. I, for +my part, can say only that I went to the Reich Chancellery, and the +Führer told me that he had given the order and that nothing else could +be done now, or something to this effect, and that things were now in +motion. Thereupon I said to the Führer merely, “I wish you good luck.” + +I might also mention that the outbreak of these hostilities was the end +of years of efforts on the part of Adolf Hitler to bring about +friendship with England. + +DR. HORN: Did Mussolini make another proposal of mediation and how did +this proposal turn out? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. On 3 September, in the morning, such +a proposal of mediation arrived in Berlin stating that Mussolini was +still in a position to bring the Polish question in some way before the +forum of a conference, and that he would do so if the German Government +agreed rapidly. It was said at the same time that the French Government +had already approved this proposal. Germany also immediately agreed. But +a few days later—I cannot now state the time precisely—it was reported +that, in a speech I believe, by the British Foreign Minister Halifax in +the House of Commons or in some other British declaration, this proposal +had been turned down by London. + +DR. HORN: Do you know whether France also turned down this proposal? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that we received along with the +proposal, I believe through the Italian Government, the information that +the French Government either was in favor of the suggestion or had +already accepted it. + +DR. HORN: Did you see any possibilities for peace after the conclusion +of the Polish campaign and were they pursued? + +VON RIBBENTROP: After the conclusion of the Polish campaign I had some +lengthy conversations with Adolf Hitler. The situation was then such +that beyond a doubt there was a certain lack of enthusiasm for this +whole war on the part of the French. During these weeks military people +occasionally used the expression “potato war in the West.” Hitler, as +far as I can judge from everything that he told me, was not interested +in bringing the war in the West to a decision, and I believe this was +true of all of us members of the Government. I should like to remind you +of the speech made by Reich Marshal Göring to this effect at that time. +Hitler then made a speech in Danzig, and I believe later somewhere else, +perhaps in the Reichstag, I believe in the Reichstag, in which he twice +told England and France in unmistakable language that he was still ready +to open negotiations at any time. We tried to find out also very +cautiously by listening to diplomatic circles what the mood was in the +enemy capitals. But the public replies to Adolf Hitler’s speeches +clearly demonstrated that there could be no thought of peace. + +DR. HORN: What did you do from then on to prevent the war from becoming +more extended? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It was, I should like to say, my most ardent endeavor +after the end of the Polish campaign to attempt to localize the war, +that is, to prevent the war from spreading in Europe. However, I soon +was to find out that once a war has broken out, politics are not always +the only or rather not at all, the decisive factor in such matters, and +that in such cases the so-called timetables of general staffs start to +function. Everybody wants to outdo everybody else. Our diplomatic +efforts were undoubtedly everywhere, in Scandinavia as well as in the +Balkans and elsewhere, against an extension of the war. Nevertheless, +the war did take that course. I should like to state that according to +my conversations with Adolf Hitler, and I am also convinced that the +German military men were of the same opinion, Hitler wished in no way to +extend the war anywhere. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that you received information which pointed to +the intention of the Western Powers to invade the Ruhr? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. We received numerous reports all the +time. Our intelligence service was such that we had a great many +channels doing intelligence work. All of these channels led to the +Führer. The Foreign Office had relatively little intelligence service, +but relied rather on official diplomatic channels. But we too received +reports and news at that time which undoubtedly allowed inferences to be +drawn. We in the Foreign Office also received reports implying that the +Western Powers had the intention of advancing into the Ruhr area at the +first appropriate opportunity. The situation in the West was such that +the West Wall was a very strong military barrier against France and this +naturally gave rise to the idea that such an attack might come through +neutral territory, such as Belgium and Holland. + +THE PRESIDENT: How much longer will you take, Dr. Horn? + +DR. HORN: I believe an hour to an hour and a half, Your Lordship. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has listened with great patience to a +very great deal of detail. All I can say is that this exaggerated going +into detail does not do the defendant’s case any good in my opinion. We +will adjourn now. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 March 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + NINETY-FIFTH DAY + Saturday, 30 March 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Dönitz is absent from +Court this morning. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn. + +DR. HORN: On 16 February 1923 a conference of ambassadors transferred to +Lithuania the sovereignty over the territory of Memel, which had already +been annexed in 1923 by a surprise attack by Lithuanian troops. What +caused Hitler to issue these directives for the reintegration of the +Memel territory in 1939? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The small territory of Memel, being the land mentioned +in our National anthem, was always very dear to the hearts of the entire +German people. The military facts are well known. It was placed under +the control of the Allied Powers after the World War I and was later +seized and occupied by Lithuanian soldiers by a _coup de main_. The +country itself is ancient German territory, and it was natural that it +should wish to become a part of Germany once more. As early as 1938, the +Führer referred to this problem in my presence as one which would have +to be solved sooner or later. In the spring of 1939 negotiations were +begun with the Lithuanian Government. These negotiations resulted in a +meeting between Urbisk, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, and myself, and +an agreement was signed, by means of which the Memel territory was once +more to become part of the Reich. That was in March 1939. I do not need +to describe the sufferings which this region has had to endure in the +past years. At any rate it was quite in accordance with the principle of +the self-determination of peoples, that the will of the people of Memel +was granted in 1939, and all that the agreement did, was to restore a +perfectly natural state of affairs and one which would have had in any +case to be established sooner or later. + +DR. HORN: It was followed half a year later by the war with Poland. +What, in your opinion, were the decisive causes which brought about this +war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I gave evidence in this matter yesterday. The decisive +factor was the English guarantee extended to Poland. I do not need to +elaborate this point. This guarantee, combined with the Polish +mentality, made it impossible for us to negotiate with the Poles or to +come to an understanding with them. As for the actual outbreak of war, +the following reasons for it can be given: + +1. There is no doubt... + +MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I generalized this morning and I repeat +my assertion of yesterday that I am most reluctant to interfere here +with this examination. But as the witness has said himself, we did go +all through this yesterday, we have heard this whole story already in +the occasion of yesterday afternoon’s session. My point is that the +witness himself, before going into his answer, stated that he had +already given the causes for the war, yesterday afternoon, and I quite +agree. I think it is entirely unnecessary for him to go over it again +today. I might add parenthetically that we had some great doubt about +the relevancy or the materiality of it even on yesterday’s occasion, but +surely we do not have to hear him again. + +THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Horn? + +DR. HORN: I would like to say that the former German Minister for +Foreign Affairs, who is accused of being co-responsible for a war of +aggression, might perhaps say a few words about the decisive causes, +which according to him led to this war. The defendant, of course, should +not repeat what he said yesterday. I want him to give only some details +on points to which he referred in only a general way yesterday, and it +will not take up very much of the Tribunal’s time. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Horn, provided, of course, that he does +not go over the identical ground that he went over yesterday. + +DR. HORN: Please tell us very briefly the facts that determined your +attitude. + +VON RIBBENTROP: There are just a few brief facts that I would like to +mention, and they concern only the events of these last 2 days: + +First of all, there is no doubt that on 30 and 31 August, England was +well aware of the extreme tension of the situation. This fact was +communicated to Hitler in a letter, and Hitler said that the decision +must be made and a way of solving the problem found, with all possible +speed. This was Chamberlain’s letter to Hitler. + +Secondly: England knew that the proposals made by Germany were +reasonable, for we know that England was in possession of these +proposals in the night of 30 to 31 August. Ambassador Henderson himself +declared that these proposals were reasonable. + +Thirdly: It would have been possible, therefore, on 30 or 31 August, to +give a hint to Warsaw and tell the Poles to begin some sort of +negotiations with us. This could have been done in three different ways: +Polish negotiator could have flown to Berlin, which would have been, as +the Führer said, a matter of an hour to an hour and a half; or, a +meeting could have been arranged between the foreign ministers or the +heads of the states to take place on the frontiers; or else, Ambassador +Lipski could simply have been instructed at least to receive the German +proposals. If these instructions had been given, the crisis would have +been averted and diplomatic negotiations could have been initiated. +England herself, had she wished to do so, could have sent her ambassador +to represent her at the negotiations, which action, after what had gone +before, would undoubtedly have been regarded very favorably by Germany. + +This, however, did not take place, and, as I gather from documents which +I saw for the first time here, nothing was done during this period to +alleviate this very tense situation. Chauvinism is natural to the Poles; +and we know from Ambassador Henderson’s own words and from the testimony +of Mr. Dahlerus that Ambassador Lipski used very strong language +illustrative of Polish mentality. Because Poland was very well aware +that she would, in all circumstances, have the assistance of England and +France, she assumed an attitude which made war inevitable to all intents +and purposes. I believe that these facts really are of some importance +for the historical view of that entire period. I would like to add that +I personally regretted this turn of events. All my work of 25 years was +destroyed by this war; and up to the last minute I made every possible +effort to avert this war. I believe that even Ambassador Henderson’s +documents prove that I did make these attempts. I told Adolf Hitler that +it was Chamberlain’s most ardent desire to have good relations with +Germany and to reach an agreement with her; and I even sent a special +messenger to the Embassy to see Henderson, to tell him how earnestly the +Führer desired this, and to do everything in his power to make this +desire of Adolf Hitler’s clear to his government. + +DR. HORN: Denmark and Norway were occupied in April 1940. You had +concluded a non-aggression pact with Denmark on 31 May 1939 and on the +basis of these facts you are accused by the Prosecution of perfidious +diplomacy. When and in what way did you receive knowledge of the +imminent occupation of Denmark and Norway? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It had always been the Führer’s wish and mine to keep +Scandinavia neutral. In accordance with Adolf Hitler’s policy, I did my +best to prevent the war from spreading. + +One day in April 1940 Hitler summoned me to the Chancellery. He told me +that he had received reports stating that the British were on the point +of occupying Norway, or of landing troops there. He had therefore +decided to occupy Norway and Denmark on the morning of the day after +next. That was the first I heard of it. I was amazed; and the Führer +then showed me the documentary evidence which he had received through +his intelligence service. He ordered me to prepare notes at once, +informing the Norwegian and the Danish governments that German troops +were about to march in. I reminded the Führer that we had a +non-aggression pact with Denmark and that Norway was a neutral country, +and told him that reports received from our Legation at Oslo did not +indicate any landing. When the documents were shown to me, however, I +realized how grave the situation was and that these reports had to be +taken seriously. + +The next day along with my assistants, I prepared diplomatic notes to be +sent by plane to Oslo and Copenhagen on 8 April. On that day we worked +day and night in order to finish these notes. The Führer had given +orders that these notes were to arrive shortly before the German +occupation. The order was executed. + +The occupation of Denmark was completed without trouble, as far as I +know. I believe that hardly a shot was fired. As soon as we had occupied +the country, we negotiated with the Danish Government, under Stauning, +and made agreements so that everything should go on without disturbances +and as far as possible in a friendly atmosphere. Denmark’s integrity was +fully guaranteed, and matters went on, even in the later stages, in a +comparatively quiet and orderly way. + +The situation was rather different in Norway. Resistance had developed. +We tried to keep the King of Norway in the country and to induce him to +stay there. We negotiated with him but we had no success. He went north, +I believe, to Narvik; and so there was no longer any possibility of +negotiating with Norway. Norway was occupied, as you know, and a civil +administration established. After this date, Norway was no longer any +concern of the Foreign Office; but one thing I should like to add: that +the Führer told me repeatedly that the measures he had taken were +extremely necessary, and that documents found after the landing of +British troops in Norway, and published at a later date, showed that the +occupation of these countries and the landing in Norway had doubtlessly +been planned for a long time by England. + +Frequent allusions have been made in the course of this Trial to the +great sufferings of the Norwegian and Danish peoples. I personally am of +the opinion that whatever one may think of the German occupation, for +all intents and purposes it prevented Scandinavia from becoming a +theater of war, and I believe, that in that way the Norwegian and Danish +peoples were spared untold suffering. If war had broken out between +Germany and the Scandinavian countries, these people would have been +exposed to much greater suffering and privation. + +DR. HORN: Did you have anything to do with Quisling before the +occupation of Norway? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I must explain that the name of Quisling became known +only at a much later date. Before the occupation of Norway his name +meant nothing to me. It is true that Herr Rosenberg contacted me with a +view to assisting pro-German Scandinavians within the frame of the +former Nordic Movement (Nordische Bewegung) and that was a perfectly +natural thing to do. At that period, we also provided funds for +newspapers, propaganda, and also for political activities in Norway. + +At these discussions, I remember this distinctly, no mention was ever +made of any seizing of political power through certain circles in +Norway, or of military operations. + +DR. HORN: What influence did the Foreign Office have in Denmark after +the occupation of the country? + +VON RIBBENTROP: After the occupation of Denmark the Foreign Office was +represented by a minister at the Danish Court. Later, because of certain +events—I believe it would take too long to enumerate them—the Danish +Government resigned and a Reich Plenipotentiary was appointed. There was +also a Military Commander in Denmark and later on a Higher SS and Police +Leader. + +The activities of the minister of the Danish Court were those of an +ordinary and very influential minister, who tried to straighten out all +the difficulties which might naturally arise during an occupation; and +later on the function of the Reich Plenipotentiary, according to my +instructions, was to treat Denmark, not as an enemy of Germany, but as a +friend. This was always a guiding principle in Denmark and even at a +much later period, when more serious difficulties arose as a result of +the intensified warfare, there was really complete quiet and calm in +Denmark throughout the long years of war and we were very well satisfied +with conditions there. + +Later, because of the activities of enemy agents against our measures, +_et cetera_, things took a more rigorous turn; the Reich Plenipotentiary +always had instructions from me not to aggravate things but to +straighten them out and to work on the continuation of good relations +between the Danes and the Germans. His task was not always an easy one; +but on the whole, I believe, he did his work satisfactorily. + +DR. HORN: Since when and how did you receive reports about the intention +of the Franco-British General Staff to include Belgium and Holland in +their theater of operations? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Great importance has obviously been attached to this +question during the proceedings here as well. The situation was as +follows: In 1937, Germany declared that she had made an agreement with +Belgium in which Germany undertook to respect Belgium’s strict +neutrality on condition that Belgium on her part would maintain her +neutrality. + +After the Polish campaign the Führer told me on several occasions that, +according to his intelligence reports, the enemy intended to cross Dutch +and Belgian territory to attack the Ruhr. We also sometimes received +reports of this kind; these were of a less concrete nature. + +In any event, Adolf Hitler believed that an attack on the Ruhr district, +which was Germany’s most vital area, was a possibility that had to be +reckoned with at all times. I had a good many discussions with the +Führer about that time, regarding the importance of Belgian neutrality +for the world in general; but I knew, too, that we were involved in a +struggle, a hard struggle of larger dimensions where completely +different standards would have to be applied. + +In the course of events, in the spring of 1940, our intelligence reports +about an attack of this kind became more and more concrete, and I may +mention that documents belonging to the French General Staff, _et +cetera_, which were found later and published by the German Foreign +Office, proved conclusively that the reports which Germany had received +were absolutely true and that an attack on the Ruhr area had actually +been repeatedly considered by the enemies of Germany, that is, by those +who were her enemies at the time. + +In this connection I would like to call attention to a document +concerning a meeting between Prime Minister Chamberlain and M. Daladier +in Paris, at which Mr. Chamberlain suggested an attack for the +destruction of the vitally important industrial areas of the Ruhr +through the so-called “chimneys” of Holland and Belgium. I believe this +document is here and has been granted to the Defense. + +The situation before the offensive in the West on which the Führer had +decided was therefore such that an attack by the enemy through these +great areas had to be expected at any time. For this reason he decided +to attack across this area, across these two neutral territories, and I +believe that after the attack—the military authorities will confirm +this—further documents were found and facts established, which as far +as I remember, showed that the closest co-operation had existed between +the Belgian and I believe also the Dutch General Staffs, and the British +and French General Staffs. + +Of course it is always a very grave matter in such a war to violate the +neutrality of a country, and you must not think that we dismissed it, so +to speak, with a wave of the hand. It cost me many a sleepless night and +I would like to remind you that the same questions arose on the other +side and other statesmen also discussed them at the time. I remind you +of a statement to the effect that “one got tired of thinking of the +rights of neutrals”; and this assertion was made by the eminent British +statesman, Winston Churchill. + +DR. HORN: What caused Germany to violate the integrity of Luxembourg? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Luxembourg was in much the same situation as Belgium and +Holland. It is a very small country, and obviously in a war on the scale +of this one the armies cannot suddenly bypass one particular country. +But I would like to point out just one thing in connection with +Luxembourg: The summer before, that is during the summer of 1939, we had +started negotiations with France and Luxembourg with a view to making +perfectly definite pacts of neutrality to be established by treaties. At +first, the negotiations seemed to be going very well; but they were +suddenly broken off by both France and Luxembourg. At the time we did +not understand the reason for this, but I know that when I reported it +to the Führer, it made him a little distrustful as to the motives that +may have been of importance on the other side. We never knew the exact +reason. + +DR. HORN: How far was the German Foreign Office able to exert its +influence in France after the partial occupation of the country? + +VON RIBBENTROP: After the occupation or partial occupation of France, +although we were not yet at peace with France and there was therefore +really no reason to resume diplomatic relations, as only an armistice +had been declared, the Führer, at my request, appointed an ambassador to +the Vichy Government. I was especially anxious for this to be done +because it had always been my aim to come to a closer co-operation with +France. I would like to emphasize the fact that I resumed my efforts in +this direction immediately after the victory and the armistice. I +have—the Führer readily agreed to this and also initiated the so-called +Montoire Policy at my request, by meeting Marshal Pétain at Montoire +after a meeting with General Franco. I was present at this meeting. + +I believe I may say in the interests of historical truth that Adolf +Hitler’s treatment of the head of the defeated French nation is probably +unexampled and must be described as chivalrous. There cannot be many +parallel cases in history. Adolf Hitler immediately made proposals to +Marshal Pétain for a closer collaboration between Germany and France, +but Marshal Pétain, even at the very first meeting, adopted an attitude +of marked reserve towards the victor, so that, to my great personal +regret this first meeting came to an end somewhat more quickly than I +had really hoped it would. In spite of this, we continued to try to +carry out a systematic policy of conciliation and even of close +collaboration with France. Our lack of success was probably due to the +natural attitude of France and the will of influential circles. Germany +did not fail to make every effort. + +DR. HORN: What influence did you yourself, and the German Foreign Office +have on conditions in Belgium after the occupation? + +VON RIBBENTROP: We had no influence whatsoever on conditions in Belgium +or in Holland. The Führer set up military and civilian administrations, +and the Foreign Office had no further connection with them, beyond being +represented by a liaison officer who, in practice, had nothing or almost +nothing to do. I would like to add that it was rather different in +France, inasmuch as we were naturally in a position to exercise a +certain amount of influence on the Vichy Government through our +ambassador. I did so, for instance, in matters of finance. + +We have heard here in court a good deal about the activities of Herr +Hemmen. I should just like to say that, no matter how his powers may +have been defined, I appointed him for the express purpose of preventing +inflation and the collapse of the French currency. That was the special +mission entrusted to Hemmen. Even if France was no longer willing to +co-operate politically with Germany, she was undoubtedly of economic +importance to us; and I wanted to keep her on a sound basis and to +preserve her system of finance. That was the real reason for Herr +Hemmen’s mission. + +DR. HORN: What plans did Hitler have with regard to his foreign policy +after the conclusion of the campaign in the West? + +VON RIBBENTROP: After the conclusion of the campaign in the West, I +discussed future developments with the Führer at his headquarters. I +asked him what his further intentions were with regard to England. The +Führer and I proposed at the time, whether we had not better make +another attempt with England. The Führer seemed to have had the same +idea and was delighted with my proposal for making a fresh peace offer +or attempting to make peace with England. I asked the Führer whether I +should draft such a treaty for this case. The Führer spontaneously +replied: “No, that will not be necessary, I will do that myself, that +is, there is no need to do it at all.” + +He said, word for word: “If England is ready for peace, there are only +four points to be settled. Above all, after Dunkirk, I do not want +England in any circumstances to suffer a loss of prestige, so under no +circumstances do I want a peace which would involve that.” + +With regard to the contents of such a treaty, he enumerated four points: + +1. Germany is ready to recognize in all respects the existence of the +British Empire. + +2. England must, therefore, acknowledge Germany to be the greatest +continental power, if only because of the size of her population. + +3. He said, “I want England to return the German colonies. I would be +satisfied with one or two of them, because of the raw materials.” + +4. He said that he wanted a permanent alliance with England for life and +death. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that at the end of 1939, you heard from Hitler +that conferences had taken place between the Greek and French General +Staffs and that French officers had been sent to Greece? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. It came within the scope of the +Führer’s policy for preventing the war from spreading, as entrusted to +me, that I should keep a sharp watch on these things and, of course, +especially on the Balkans; Adolf Hitler wished in all circumstances to +keep the Balkans out of the war. + +As for Greece the situation was as follows: Greece had accepted a +British guarantee. Also, there were close links between Yugoslavia and +England and, especially, France. Through the Führer’s intelligence +service and through military channels we repeatedly heard about staff +conferences between Athens, Belgrade, London and Paris, which were +supposed to be taking place. About that time I summoned the Greek +Minister on several occasions and drew his attention to these things. I +asked him to be very careful, and told him that Germany had no intention +of taking any steps against the Greek people, who had always been very +much liked in Germany. + +However, further intelligence reports came in to the effect that Britain +had been given permission to establish naval bases in Greece. I +believe—and all this led up to the intervention of Italy, which we did +not desire at all—I believe Reich Marshal Göring has already discussed +this topic. It was impossible to prevent this intervention, for when we +arrived in Florence—I was with Adolf Hitler at the time—for his +conference with Mussolini, it was too late and Mussolini said: “We are +on the march.” + +The Führer was very much upset and depressed when he heard this news. We +then had to do everything in our power so that the war between Greece +and Italy might at least be prevented from spreading. Yugoslav policy +was naturally the decisive factor here. I tried in every possible way to +establish closer links with Yugoslavia and to win her over to the +Tripartite Pact which had already been concluded then. It was difficult +at first, but with the help of the Regent Prince Paul and the +Zvetkovitch Government, we finally succeeded in inducing Yugoslavia to +join the Tripartite Pact. We knew very well, however, that there was +strong opposition in Belgrade to the adhesion of Yugoslavia to the +Tripartite Pact and to any kind of closer connection with Germany. In +Vienna at the time the Führer said that the signing of the Tripartite +Pact seemed like a funeral to him. + +All the same, we were very much surprised when—I think it was 2 or 3 +days after the conclusion of this pact—the government was overthrown by +General Simovic’s coup and a new government was set up which certainly +could not be described as friendly to Germany. + +Reports came from Belgrade concerning close collaboration with the +British General Staff. I believe American observers in this field are +informed on the point, and during the last few months I have heard from +English sources that British elements had played a part in this coup. +That was quite natural, for we were at war. + +All these events caused the Führer to intervene in the Balkans, first of +all, to help Italy, whom the courageous resistance of the Greeks had +forced into a very difficult position in Albania; and secondly, to +prevent a possible attack from the north on the part of Yugoslavia, +which might have made the Italian situation still more serious or even +brought about a crushing defeat for our Italian ally. + +Those were the military and strategic factors which induced the Führer +to intervene and to conduct the campaign against Greece and Yugoslavia. + +DR. HORN: If I understood you correctly, Greece put bases on her +territory at the disposal of the British Navy before the Italian attack +in October 1940, in spite of the fact that she had declared her +neutrality. Is that correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That was the substance of the military reports which I +received. + +DR. HORN: In September 1939, General Gamelin, then French +Commander-in-Chief, approved the project for an Allied landing at +Salonika. When did Germany receive knowledge of this intention? + +VON RIBBENTROP: We first learned the exact details from the files of the +French General Staff on the outbreak of war. But I know that from the +very beginning all the reports which the Führer received from the +various intelligence branches of the Reich caused him to fear the +possibility that a new front might be built up at any moment in Salonika +as had happened in the first World War, and that would mean a +considerable dispersal of the German forces. + +DR. HORN: In September 1939 you made a second trip to Moscow. What was +the reason for this visit and what was discussed there? + +VON RIBBENTROP: My second visit to Moscow was made necessary by the +ending of the Polish campaign. I flew to Moscow toward the end of +September, and this time I received an especially cordial reception. The +situation then was such that we had to create clear conditions in the +Polish territory. Soviet troops had occupied the eastern regions of +Poland, and we had occupied the western parts up to the line of +demarcation previously agreed upon. Now we had to fix a definite line of +demarcation. We were also anxious to strengthen our ties with the Soviet +Union and to establish cordial relations with them. + +An agreement was reached in Moscow, fixing a definite line in Poland, +and an economic treaty to put economic relations on an entirely new +basis was envisaged. A comprehensive treaty regulating the exchange of +raw materials was envisaged and later on concluded. At the same time +this pact was politically amplified into a treaty of friendship, as is +well known. One question remained, about the territory of Lithuania. For +the sake of establishing particularly trustful relations between Moscow +and Berlin, the Führer renounced influence over Lithuania and gave +Russia predominance in Lithuania by this second treaty, so that there +was now a clear understanding between Germany and Soviet Russia with +respect to territorial claims as well. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that on 15 June 1940, after the delivery of an +ultimatum, the Russians occupied the whole of Lithuania, including the +part which was still German, without notifying the Reich government? + +VON RIBBENTROP: There was no special agreement concerning this, but it +is well known that these areas were actually occupied. + +DR. HORN: What further Russian measures caused Hitler anxiety as to +Russia’s attitude and intentions? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Various things made the Führer a little sceptical about +the Russian attitude. One was the occupation of the Baltic States, which +I have just mentioned. Another was the occupation of Bessarabia and +North Bukovina after the French campaign and of which we were simply +informed without any previous consultation. The King of Romania asked us +for advice at that time. The Führer, out of loyalty to the Soviet pact, +advised the King of Romania to accept the Russian demands and to +evacuate Bessarabia. In addition, the war with Finland in 1940 caused a +certain uneasiness in Germany, among the German people who had strong +sympathies for the Finns. The Führer felt himself bound to take this +into account to some extent. There were two other points to consider. +One was that the Führer received a report on certain communist +propaganda in German factories which alleged that the Russian trade +delegation was the center of this propaganda. Above all, we heard of +military preparations being made by Russia. I know after the French +campaign he spoke to me about this matter on several occasions and said +that approximately 20 German divisions had been concentrated near the +East Prussian border; and that very large forces—I happen to remember +the number, I think about 30 army corps—were said to be concentrated in +Bessarabia. The Führer was perturbed by these reports and asked me to +watch the situation closely. He even said that in all probability the +1939 Pact had been concluded for the sole purpose of being able to +dictate economic and political conditions to us. In any case, he now +proposed to take countermeasures. I pointed out the danger of preventive +wars to the Führer, but the Führer said that German-Italian interests +must come first in all circumstances, if necessary. I said I hoped that +matters would not go so far and that, at all events, we should make +every effort through diplomatic channels to avoid this. + +DR. HORN: In November, from 12 to 14 November 1940 to be exact, the +Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov visited Berlin. On whose initiative +did this visit take place and what was the subject under discussion? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The conferences with Molotov at Berlin concerned the +following subjects: I might interpolate that when we were trying to +effect a settlement with Russia through diplomatic channels, I wrote a +letter to Marshal Stalin, with the Führer’s permission, in the late +autumn of 1940 and invited Mr. Molotov to come to Berlin. This +invitation was accepted, and Russo-German relations were discussed in +their entirety during a conversation between the Führer and Mr. Molotov. +I was present at this discussion. Mr. Molotov first discussed with the +Führer Russo-German relations in general and then went on to mention +Finland and the Balkans. He said that Russia had vital interests in +Finland. He said that when the delimitation of zones of influence had +been settled, it had been agreed that Finland should be included in the +Russian sphere of influence. The Führer replied that Germany also had +extensive interests in Finland, especially with regard to nickel, and +furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the entire German people +sympathized with the Finns. He would therefore ask Mr. Molotov to +compromise on this question. This topic was brought up on several +occasions. + +With regard to the Balkans, Mr. Molotov said that he wanted a +non-aggression pact with Bulgaria, and generally closer ties with +Bulgaria. He also thought of establishing bases there. The Führer +replied, or rather asked, whether Bulgaria had approached Molotov in the +matter, but that apparently was not the case. The Führer then said that +he could not express any opinion on this question until he had discussed +it with Mussolini, who was his ally and who was naturally interested in +the Balkans too. + +Various other points were also discussed, but no final settlement was +reached at this discussion. The discussion rather proceeded on lines +which seemed to me not those best calculated to lead to a bridging of +all contrasts. As soon as the meeting was over, I requested the Führer +to authorize me to take up again the discussions with Mr. Molotov and +asked him if he would consent to my discussing with Mr. Molotov the +possibility of Russia’s joining the Tripartite Pact. That was one of our +aims at the time. The Führer agreed to this and I had another long +discussion with the Russian Foreign Commissar. In this conversation the +same topics were discussed. Mr. Molotov alluded to Russia’s vital +interest in Finland; he also referred to Russia’s deep interest in +Bulgaria, the kinship between the Russian and the Bulgarian people, and +her interest in other Balkan countries. It was finally agreed that on +his return to Moscow he should speak to Stalin and try to arrive at some +solution of the question. I proposed that they join the Tripartite Pact +and further proposed that I should discuss with the Führer the various +points which had been raised. Perhaps we could still find a way out. The +general result of this conversation was that Molotov went back to Moscow +with the intention of clearing up through the embassies the differences +still existing between us. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, surely, as these negotiations did not eventuate +in any agreement, they are very remote from anything we are considering. +You are not suggesting that any agreements were come to, are you? + +DR. HORN: No. I wanted to prove only that Germany made efforts to +prevent the conflict with Russia. + +THE PRESIDENT: There was no question of a conflict with Russia in any of +these negotiations. + +DR. HORN: No. It is evident from all the efforts made by Germany, and +from Ribbentrop’s testimony, that they wanted to eliminate as far as +possible any differences which might lead to a conflict between Germany +and Russia. As regards a deliberate—the Prosecution assert that the +pact with Russia was made with the intention of violating it and +attacking Russia, that it was intended to attack Russia all along. I +want to prove with this evidence that this was not the case. + +THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me to be very remote, indeed. It only goes to +show that Ribbentrop entered into certain negotiations with Russia which +had no result. That is all. You may go on, Dr. Horn. + +DR. HORN: In one of your previous answers you spoke of troop +concentrations on the East Prussian border mentioning 20 German +divisions. I assume that that was just a _lapsus linguae_ on your part. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I meant to say Russian divisions. The Führer, I know, +mentioned this many times. He said, I believe, that we had only one +division in the whole of East Prussia. + +DR. HORN: Was not the occupation of Balkan territory by the Russians the +reason for your discussion with Molotov? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand the question. Please repeat +it. + +DR. HORN: Was not the Russian occupation of territory in the Balkans and +also in the Baltic States the reason for inviting Molotov to Berlin? + +VON RIBBENTROP: In the Balkans, no; for there were no Russian occupation +zones there. But it did apply to Bessarabia, which is not a Balkan +country in the strictest sense of the term. It was the occupation of +Bessarabia, which took place with surprising speed, and that of Northern +Bukovina, which had not been agreed to fall within the Russian sphere of +influence in the discussions at Moscow—and which was, as the Führer +said at the time, really an old Austrian crown land—and the occupation +of the Baltic territories. It is true that this caused the Führer a +certain amount of anxiety. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that in the summer of 1940 you and Hitler were +informed that a Franco-British military commission was in Moscow? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes—no. What was the date, please? + +DR. HORN: The summer of 1940; that is, after June 1940? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. Such reports came in continually, +but I cannot say now how far that was correct for the summer of 1940. +When I arrived in Moscow in 1939, I found French and English military +commissions there, with instructions from the British and French +governments to conclude a military alliance between Russia, England, and +France. This was part of the policy which the Führer described as +“British encirclement policy” in his speech to the Reichstag, I think on +28 May, and which Mr. Churchill in 1936 in the embassy had made quite +evident to me. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that at these conferences between... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am trying very hard to follow this. I +wonder if I could be helped? Did the witness refer to 1940? I wanted to +get it clear whether it was 1940 or 1939. It makes a big difference. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean about an English mission? 1940, I believe. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I was going to reply to that. I have already said that I +am not quite sure about 1940; I said only that these reports existed. I +know, however, that this mission was there in 1939. + +DR. HORN: During Molotov’s visit to Berlin in the year 1940, was any +allusion made to the fact that Russia was not satisfied with the last +Russo-Finnish peace treaty and that she intended to annex the whole of +Finland? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It was not as definite as that, but it was clear from +her attitude that Russia considered Finland as her sphere of influence. +What measures Russia intended to take there is not in my power to say. + +DR. HORN: On 5 April 1941 a Russian-Yugoslav Non-aggression and +Friendship Pact was concluded. What was the effect of this conclusion +upon Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: This seemed to the Führer to confirm the fact that +Russia had deviated from the 1939 policy. He considered it an affront, +to use his own words, for he said that he had concluded a pact with the +other government and Russia only a short time afterwards had concluded a +pact with the government which was definitely hostile to Germany. + +DR. HORN: Is it true that Hitler thereupon forbade you to take any +further diplomatic steps in connection with Russia? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. I told the Führer at the time that we +must now make even more determined efforts to come to an understanding +about Russia’s attitude. He said that would be useless and he did not +think it would change the Russian attitude. + +DR. HORN: What were the causes which led to the outbreak of the conflict +with Russia? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I must say this here: In the winter of 1940-41 the +Führer was confronted with the following situation. I think it is most +important to make this clear. + +England was not prepared to make peace. The attitude of the United +States of America and of Russia was therefore of decisive importance to +the Führer. He told me the following about this—I had a very lengthy +discussion with him on the subject and asked him to give me clearly +defined diplomatic directives. He said that Japan’s attitude was not +absolutely secure for Germany; although we had concluded the Tripartite +Pact, there were very strong oppositional elements at work in Japan and +we could not know what position Japan would take; Italy had proved to be +a very weak ally in the Greek campaign. Germany might, therefore, have +to stand entirely alone. + +After that, he spoke of the American attitude. He said that he had +always wanted to have good relations with the United States, but that in +spite of extreme reserve the United States had grown steadily more +hostile to Germany. The Tripartite Pact had been concluded with a view +to keeping the United States out of the war, as it was our wish and our +belief that in that way those circles in the United States which were +working for peace and for good relations with Germany could be +strengthened. We were not successful in this, however, as the attitude +of the United States was not favorable to Germany after the conclusion +of the Tripartite Pact. The Führer’s basic idea, and mine, namely, that +if the United States did enter the war in Europe, they would have to +reckon with a war on two fronts and therefore would prefer not to +intervene, was not realized. + +Now the further question of Russia’s attitude came up and in this +connection the Führer made the following statement: We have a friendship +pact with Russia. But Russia has assumed the attitude which we have just +been discussing and which causes me a certain amount of concern. We do +not know, therefore, what to expect from that side. More and more troop +movements were reported; he had himself taken military countermeasures, +the exact nature of which was, and still is, unknown to me. However, his +great anxiety was that Russia on the one hand and the United States and +Britain on the other, might proceed against Germany. On the one hand, +therefore, he had to reckon with an attack by Russia and on the other +hand with a joint attack by the United States and England, that is to +say with large-scale landings in the West. All these considerations +finally caused the Führer to take preventive measures, to start a +preventive war against Russia on his own initiative. + +DR. HORN: What actual political reasons were there for the Tripartite +Pact? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The Tripartite Pact was concluded, I believe, in +September 1940. The situation was as I have just described it, that is +to say, the Führer was alarmed that the United States might sooner or +later enter the war. For this reason I wanted to do all I could, in the +field of diplomacy, to strengthen Germany’s position. I thought we had +Italy as an ally, but Italy showed herself to be a weak ally. + +As we could not win France over to our side, the only friend apart from +the Balkan States was Japan. In the summer of 1940 we therefore tried to +achieve closer collaboration with Japan. Japan was trying to do the same +with us and that led to the signing of the pact. The aim, or substance, +of this pact was a political, military, and economic alliance. There is +no doubt, however, that it was intended as a defensive alliance; and we +considered it as such from the start. By that I mean that it was +intended in the first place to keep the United States out of the war; +and I hoped that a combination of this kind might enable us to make +peace with England after all. The pact itself was not based on any plan +for aggression or world domination, as has often been asserted. That is +not true; its purpose was, as I have just said, to arrive at a +combination which would enable Germany to introduce a new order in +Europe and would also allow Japan to reach a solution acceptable to her +in East Asia, especially in regard to the Chinese problem. + +That was what I had in mind when I negotiated and signed the pact. The +situation was not unfavorable; the pact might possibly keep the United +States neutral and isolate England so that we might all the same arrive +at a compromise peace, a possibility of which we never lost sight during +the whole course of the war, and for which we worked steadily. + +DR. HORN: What effect, according to the embassy reports which reached +you, did the Anschluss of Austria and the Munich Agreement have on the +United States? + +VON RIBBENTROP: There is no doubt that the occupation of Austria and the +Munich Agreement produced a much more unfavorable feeling towards +Germany in the United States. + +DR. HORN: In November 1938 the American Ambassador at Berlin was +recalled to Washington to report to his government, and the normal +diplomatic relations with Germany were thus broken off. According to +your observations, what were the reasons for this measure? + +VON RIBBENTROP: We never really found out the details, and we very much +regretted it, as it forced us to recall our own Ambassador in +Washington, at least to call him back to make a report. It is, however, +evident that this measure was determined by the whole attitude of the +United States. Many incidents took place about that time which gradually +convinced the Führer that sooner or later they would bring the United +States into the war against us. + +Permit me to mention a few examples. President Roosevelt’s attitude was +defined for the first time in the “quarantine speech” which he made in +1937. The press then started an energetic campaign. After the ambassador +was recalled the situation grew more critical and the effect began to +make itself felt in every sphere of German-American relations. + +I believe that many documents dealing with the subject have been +published in the meantime and that a number of these have been submitted +by the Defense, dealing, for instance, with the attitude adopted by +certain United States diplomats at the time of the Polish crisis; the +cash-and-carry clause was then introduced which could benefit only +Germany’s enemies; the ceding of destroyers to England; the so-called +Lend-Lease Bill later on; and in other fields the further advance of the +United States towards Europe: The occupation of Greenland, Iceland, on +the African Continent, _et cetera_; the aid given to Soviet Russia after +the outbreak of this war. All these measures strengthened the Führer’s +conviction that sooner or later he would certainly have to reckon with a +war against America. There is no doubt that the Führer did not, in the +first instance, want such a war; and I may say that I myself, as I think +you will see from many of the documents submitted by the Prosecution, +again and again did everything I could, in the diplomatic field, to keep +the United States out of this war. + +DR. HORN: In the summer of 1941 President Roosevelt gave his so-called +“firing order” to the American Fleet in order to protect transports +carrying armaments to England. How did Hitler and German diplomacy react +to this order? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It was a very regrettable event for us. I am not +competent to deal with technical details but I remember exactly that +Hitler was greatly excited about this order. I believe it was in a +speech at some meeting—probably at Munich, but I do not remember +exactly—that he replied to this speech and issued a warning in answer +to the announcement. I happen to remember the form which his reply took, +because at the time I thought it rather odd. He said that America had +given the order to fire on German ships. “I gave no order to fire but I +ordered that the fire be returned”; I believe that is the way he +expressed it. + +Documentary evidence of these events reached us in the diplomatic +service, but the Navy is better informed on the subject than I am. After +that, I believe, there were protests and publications about the measures +which made the German attitude plain; I cannot give you exact details of +these protests without referring to the documents themselves. + +DR. HORN: Did Japan notify Germany in advance of her attack on Pearl +Harbor? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, she did not. At the time I tried to induce Japan to +attack Singapore, because it was impossible to make peace with England +and I did not know what military measures we could take to achieve this +end. In any case, the Führer directed me to do everything I could in the +diplomatic field to weaken England’s position and thus achieve peace. We +believed that this could best be done through an attack by Japan on +England’s strong position in East Asia. For that reason I tried to +induce Japan, at that time, to attack Singapore. + +After the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I also tried to make Japan +attack Russia, for I thought that in this way the war could be ended +most speedily. Japan, however, did not do that. She did then—she did +neither of the things we wanted her to do, but instead, she did a third. +She attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. This attack came as a +complete surprise to us. We had considered the possibility of Japan’s +attacking Singapore, that is England, or perhaps Hong Kong, but we never +considered an attack on the United States as being to our advantage. We +knew that in the case of an attack on England, there was a possibility +that the United States might intervene; that was a question which, +naturally, we had often considered. We hoped very much, however, that +this would not happen and that America would not intervene. The first +news I received of the attack on Pearl Harbor was through the Berlin +press, and then from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima. I should like to +say under oath that all other reports, versions, or documentary evidence +are entirely false. I would like to go even further to state that the +attack came as a surprise even to the Japanese Ambassador—at least he +told me that. + +DR. HORN: Does Your Lordship wish for a recess now? + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, how much longer are you going to take? + +DR. HORN: Not much more, Your Honor. I should say 15 or 20 minutes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will recess for 10 minutes. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +DR. HORN: What considerations caused Hitler and you to enter the war +against the United States on the side of Japan? + +VON RIBBENTROP: When the news of Pearl Harbor came, the Führer had to +make a decision. The text of the Tripartite Pact bound us to assist +Japan only in case of an attack against Japan herself. I went to see the +Führer, explained the legal aspect of the situation and told him that, +although we welcomed a new ally against England, it meant we had a new +opponent to deal with as well, or would have one to deal with if we +declared war on the United States. + +The Führer then decided that the United States had already fired upon +our ships and thereby had practically created a state of war; that it +was therefore only a question of form, or, at least, that this official +state of war might supervene at any moment, as a result of an incident; +and that in the long run it was impossible that this state of affairs in +the Atlantic continue without a German-American war. + +He then instructed me to draft a note—which he subsequently +altered—and to hand the American Ambassador his papers. + +DR. HORN: How did the Foreign Office co-operate with Germany’s allies +during the war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: We naturally had close co-operation with Italy. By that +I mean that in the further course of war, we were forced to all intents +and purposes to take charge of all military operations there ourselves, +or, at least, to take joint charge of them. + +Co-operation with Japan was very difficult, for the simple reason that +we could communicate with the Japanese Government only by air. We had +contact with them from time to time through U-boats, but there was no +co-ordinated military or political plan of campaign. I believe that on +this point General Marshall’s view is correct, namely, that there was no +close strategic co-operation or planning of any kind; and, really, there +was not any. + +DR. HORN: How was co-operation with Italy? + +VON RIBBENTROP: As I have just said, we naturally had very close +co-operation with Italy, but difficulties arose through the many +heterogeneous influences at work; and Italy proved herself, right from +the start, to be a very weak ally in every respect. + +DR. HORN: Why, in the course of the Russian campaign, did you suggest to +Hitler the conclusion of separate peace agreements? + +VON RIBBENTROP: A certain atmosphere of confidence between the Soviet +Government and ourselves had been created at Moscow, between Stalin, +Molotov and myself, and also extending to the Führer. For instance, the +Führer told me that he had confidence in Stalin, whom he considered one +of the really great men of history, and whose creation of the Red Army +he thought a tremendous achievement; but that one could never tell what +might happen. The power of the Soviets had grown and developed +enormously. It was very difficult to know how to deal with Russia and +make an agreement with her again. I myself always tried, through +diplomatic and other channels, to maintain contact to a certain extent, +because I still believed and hoped that some sort of peace could be made +which would relieve Germany in the East and allow her to concentrate her +forces in the West and even lead, perhaps, to a general peace. With this +in view, I proposed to the Führer, for the first time, in the winter of +1942, it was before Stalingrad, that an agreement should be reached with +Russia. I did that after the Anglo-American landing in Africa which +caused me great misgivings. Adolf Hitler—I met him in the train at +Bamberg—most emphatically rejected the idea of any such peace or peace +feelers, because he thought that if it became known, it would be liable +to create a spirit of defeatism, _et cetera_. I had suggested to him at +the time that we should negotiate peace with Russia on a very moderate +basis. + +Secondly, in 1943, I again advised the Führer in a lengthy, written +exposition, to seek such a peace. I think it was after the collapse of +Italy. The Führer was at that time open to consider such a peace; and he +drafted a possible mutual line of demarcation which might be adopted, +and said that he would let me know definitely on the following day. Next +day, however, I did not receive any authorization or directive from him. +I think that the Führer probably felt that it was impossible to heal the +breach between National Socialism and communism and that such a peace +would be no more than an armistice. + +I made one or two further attempts but the Führer held the view that a +decisive military success must be achieved first, and only after that +could we start negotiations, otherwise the negotiations would be +useless. + +If I were asked to express an opinion as to whether such negotiations +would have been likely to succeed, I would say that I think it very +doubtful. I believe that, considering the strong stand taken by our +opponents, especially England, even since the beginning of the war, +there was never any real chance of Germany’s attaining peace; and that +holds good for both the East and the West. And I am convinced that with +the formulation at Casablanca of the demand for unconditional surrender, +the possibility ceased entirely to exist. I base my opinion not on +purely abstract considerations, but on continuous feelers, made through +indirect channels, often unidentifiable as such, by the other side, and +which expressed the opinion of important personalities with a guiding +influence on policy in those countries. They were determined to fight it +out to the bitter end. I think the Führer was right when he said that +such negotiations would serve no purpose. + +DR. HORN: To come to a different subject, the witness Lahousen has +testified here that in September 1939 a conversation took place in +Hitler’s private train at which you were also present, and which dealt +with the instigation of a rebellion in the Polish Ukraine. What led to +this conversation and what part did you play in the discussion? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I remember that in the course of the Polish campaign +Admiral Canaris, who was at the time Chief of the Wehrmacht +Counterintelligence Service, came to see me, as he sometimes did when he +was making a short personal visit. I was in my compartment on the +Führer’s train at the time. I do not remember that the witness Lahousen +was present; I had the impression when I saw Herr Lahousen here that I +had never seen him before. Canaris came to me from time to time to tell +me about his activities in the Intelligence and other fields. He did so +on this occasion; and I believe it was he who told me that he had set +all his agents to fomenting a revolt among the Ukrainian and other +minorities in the rear of the Polish Army. He certainly received no +instructions or directives from me, as was alleged here—and cannot have +received any, for these two reasons: + +1. The German Foreign Minister was never in a position to give any +directives to a military authority. + +2. At the beginning of the Polish campaign, the German Foreign Office +was not at all concerned with the question of the Ukraine, and similar +questions—or at any rate I myself was not. I was not even sufficiently +well acquainted with the details to be able to give directives. + +DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a circular issued by the +Foreign Office... + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something more about this? The witness +Lahousen has alleged that I said that houses were to be burned down or +villages were to be burned down and the Jews were to be killed. I would +like to state categorically that I never said such a thing. + +Canaris was with me in my car at that time, and it is possible, although +I do not remember it exactly, that I may have seen him going out later +on. Apparently he received instructions which originated with the Führer +as to the attitude he was to take in Poland with regard to the Ukrainian +and other questions. There is no sense in the statement ascribed to me, +because especially in the Ukraine—the Ukrainian villages—those were +Ukrainians living in them, and they were not our enemies but our +friends; it would have been completely senseless for me to say that +these villages should be burned down. Secondly, as regards killing the +Jews, I can only say that this would have been entirely contrary to my +inner conviction and that the killing of the Jews never entered the mind +of anybody at that time. I may say, in short, that all this is +absolutely untrue. I have never given instructions of this kind, nor +could I have done so, nor even a general indication on those lines. May +I add that I remember that Herr Lahousen himself was not quite convinced +that I had made this statement; at least, that was my impression. + +DR. HORN: Have you anything to say about the Foreign Office circular +submitted by the Prosecution and bearing the title: “The Jewish question +as a factor in foreign politics in the year 1938”? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I saw this circular here for the first time. Here are +the facts: There was a section in the Foreign Office which was concerned +with Party matters and questions of ideology. That department +undoubtedly co-operated with the competent departments of the Party. +That was not the Foreign Office itself. I saw the circular here. It +seems to me that it is on the same lines as most of the circulars issued +at the time for the information and training of officials, and so on. It +even might possibly have gone through my office, but I think that the +fact that it was signed by a section chief and not by myself or by the +state secretary, should prove that I did not consider the circular very +important even if I did see it. Even if it did go through my office or +pass me in some other way, I certainly did not read it because in +principle I did not read such long documents, but asked my assistants to +give me a short summary of the contents. I may add that I received +hundreds of letters in the course of the day’s work, some of which were +read to me, and also circulars and decrees which I signed, and many of +which I did not acquaint myself with. I wish to state, however, that if +one of my officials signed the circular it goes without saying that I +assume full responsibility for it. + +DR. HORN: The Prosecution have several times spoken of the Geneva +Convention. Your name was frequently mentioned in this connection also. +What was your attitude toward the Geneva Convention? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe, and many people will and could confirm it, +that from the beginning of the war the Foreign Office and I have always +supported the Geneva Convention in every way. I should like to add that +the military authorities always showed much understanding for these +things—at least, for the affairs I had to deal with. If, later on, this +no longer held good in every respect, it was due to the rigors of war, +and possibly to the harshness of the Führer. + +As to the terror-fliers I must state that in 1943 and 1944 the English +and American air raids gradually became a terrible threat to Germany. I +saw this for the first time in Hamburg, and I remember this event +because I was with the Führer at the time and I described to him the +terrifying impression I had received. I do not believe that anyone who +has not experienced such a raid and its results can imagine what it +means. It is evident that we Germans, and especially Adolf Hitler, +continually sought means to master this menace. + +I must also mention the terrible attack on Dresden, and I would like to +ask the Tribunal’s permission to name a witness, the former Danish +Minister Richard, who was there during the attack and described it to me +2 days later. It was, therefore, self-evident that the problem of +terror-fliers had to be solved somehow by the Führer. This was in +contrast to our view insofar as we wanted to find a solution which would +not infringe upon the Geneva Convention, or at least a solution which +could be publicly proclaimed to our enemies. My department was not +directly concerned with the question, for we had nothing to do with +defense problems which were taken care of by the military authorities, +the police and those responsible for home policy. But we were indirectly +concerned where the matter was affected by the Geneva Convention, and my +point of view, which I frequently expressed, was that if any steps were +taken an official proclamation should be published, giving a definition +of a terror-flier, and stating that these terror-fliers convicted or +airmen suspected of an attack upon the civilian population would be +tried by courts-martial. Geneva would then be officially notified of +this measure or preparatory measure and then the enemy would be informed +through the protecting powers. Fliers found guilty of deliberate +terrorist raids by the courts-martial would be sentenced; if not, they +would revert to the normal status of prisoners of war. But this was +never carried out in practice. It was not a suggestion by me but an idea +which I expressed to Hitler in the course of conversations on one or two +occasions and which was not put into practice because, in practice, it +was impossible to find a definition for these raids. I believe some +mention was also made of a conference supposed to have taken place in +Klessheim during which I was said to have proposed or supported +farther-reaching measures. I remember quite clearly that this conference +did not take place. I do not believe, or at least, I do not remember, +that I ever discussed this question at that time with Himmler, with whom +I was not at that time on good terms, or Göring, whom I did not see very +often. I believe that it is possible that the subject was brought up in +a conversation during an official visit to Klessheim, as often happened, +with the Führer, but that I do not know any more, I do know one thing +that if allusion is made to a more thorough-going proposal emanating +from me it can refer only to the following: At the time we were anxious +to arrive at a clear definition of these attacks by terror-fliers and in +the course of discussion various suggestions were made for the +definition of certain categories of attacks, such as machine-gunning +from the air, as terror attacks. It is possible that this note, or +whatever it was, came into being in this way: That the person in +question knew my views, that is, the person trying to find a practical +solution—if one was arrived at—to agree officially with the Geneva +Convention or could, at least, have been officially discussed with +Geneva. + +Another document has also been submitted in this connection. I believe +it was a suggestion for an expert opinion on this question by the +Foreign Office. I do not remember exactly how this expert opinion came +to be given, whether it was done on my orders or whether it was the +result of a discussion with the Wehrmacht authorities concerned, who +wanted to know the opinion of the Foreign Office. All I know is that the +Wehrmacht always attached great importance to an exact knowledge of our +opinion with regard to the Geneva Convention. I remember that expert +opinion, however, and that I have seen it. I am now said to have +approved it. It would take too long to go into details, but that is not +correct. I remember that I submitted that expert opinion to the Führer +as being a very important matter which I could not deal with alone. I +think that the Führer—or I remember rather exactly, that the Führer +dismissed it as nonsense at the time, so this expert opinion was not +well received by the Führer. In the further course of events all we +heard, because we were only concerned indirectly, was that no order of +any sort was issued by the Führer or any Wehrmacht authority, because +the Wehrmacht shared our very views on this subject. Admittedly, I do +not know that in detail; but I can say with absolute certainty that +since this question of defense against terror-fliers was under +consideration, and afterwards, not a single case of lynching came to my +ears. I did not hear that this had happened until I was here. + +DR. HORN: The other day witness Dahlerus was brought here. How long have +you known Dahlerus? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that I saw Dahlerus here for the first time. +Of course, it is possible that I may have seen him once from a distance +or possibly in the Reich Chancellery during one of his apparently +frequent visits to the Führer. But I do not remember him, and when I saw +him here I had the impression that I had never seen him before. + +DR. HORN: Were you in a position to exercise influence regarding planes +for visitors to the Reich Government? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I had no such influence. + +DR. HORN: One more question on a different subject. What real estate was +at your disposal in your official capacity as Foreign Minister? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The other day the British Prosecutor declared that, to +begin with, I had one house and later on I had six. I want to clear this +matter up for the Court. After losing my entire fortune in America, I +became quite wealthy again through my own work. As such, and in other +ways, too, I had certain possibilities and I also had funds through +relatives, through my wife. I built a house in Berlin-Dahlem in 1922-23 +and bought several lots there. We lived there for many years. +Furthermore, in 1934—I want to emphasize the fact that this had nothing +to do with my political activities, because at the time I had only just +started them—I bought a small house and estate called Sonnenburg, near +Berlin, with some funds which my wife inherited, I think, and from funds +of my own. + +The other—or I should say rather that since that time I have not +acquired a square yard of property in Germany or anywhere else. The +other houses mentioned by the British Prosecutor, that is, the so-called +Schloss Fuschl, this became known because various foreign statesmen were +received there during the war. That is not really a castle but a tower, +an old hunting tower of the Archbishops of Salzburg. The Führer had put +it at my disposal to have a roof over my head when I was at +Obersalzberg, because he did not want me to stay in the hotel, which was +always very crowded, and I had to bring my staff with me. Fuschl was +never my personal property, but was a so-called Foreign Office +establishment, which belonged exclusively to the state and was kept up +by the state. I knew the former owners of this castle or tower only by +name and, therefore, I cannot give any information about them. I only +heard that this building was confiscated by the Reich Government, along +with other property belonging to political opponents in Austria. + +The second house mentioned here was, I think, a house in Slovakia. There +was also a question of a third house in Sudetenland, which was alleged +to be the property of a Count Czernin. I believe I can explain this +also. Here are the facts: The Führer had given me permission to arrange +hunting parties to which I could invite foreign statesmen for the +purpose of more informal talks. I was also a hunter, so the Foreign +Office, that is to say the Reich Government, had leased ground from some +of the farmers in Sudetenland for hunting purposes, along with a +suitably impressive house. I believe they were rented for only a couple +of years; they were not even purchased. The same thing was done in the +case of a hunting ground in Slovakia. I do not think that this was our +property at all. The Slovak Government placed it at our disposal for a +few days every year, to shoot deer. It was a hunting lodge in which I +once or twice spent 2 or 3 days, but it has nothing to do with my own +property. + +Another place was mentioned, a house called Tanneck. I may mention that +I have never even seen this house, situated, I believe, in the +Rhineland. According to the description which I have received, it is a +small house occupied by a man responsible for looking after several +horses. I had formerly served in the cavalry and was interested in +horses which had been purchased in France by the State, from the +well-known racing stable owner, the Aga Khan in Normandy, as they would +otherwise have been ruined. I should like to emphasize the fact that +full compensation—I always paid particular attention to this—was paid +for the horses, as I think the Aga Khan will gladly confirm. They were +brought to Germany with the Führer’s full consent, although he was not +greatly interested in horses; but he understood my point of view. These +horses were later to be put in the stud farm Grabitz, which belonged to +the Reich Government. + +If the Tribunal permits, I would like to say that, as far as my personal +affairs are concerned, my Defense Counsel will present the necessary +testimony. I gave instructions at that time that I did not want to have +a single Reichsmark more at the end of my term of office than I had at +the beginning, with the exception of two gifts which I received from the +Führer, but most of which, or at least part of which, I believe, has +since been spent by the State for my official expenses. + +DR. HORN: One last question: During your activities, in regard to +foreign policy, did you see any possibility of realizing prospects of +revision which had been conceded to Germany but which had not +materialized? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That was precisely the great problem out of which, in +the final analysis, this war developed. As Adolf Hitler often told me, +he wanted to build up an ideal social state in Europe after the solution +of the problems which he had recognized as vital. He wanted to erect +buildings, _et cetera_; that was his aim. Now, the realization of these +aims defined as vital by the Führer was greatly hampered by the +petrified political system, which had been established in Europe and the +world in general. + +We, the Führer, and then I myself on his order—so I believe I can be +the chief witness—always tried to solve these problems through +diplomatic and peaceful channels. I brooded many nights over the League +of Nations—day and night over Paragraph 19 of the Covenant of the +League of Nations, but the difficulty was that the Führer was not in a +position, or was convinced that it was simply impossible to obtain +results through negotiation—at least, without having strong armed +forces to back him up. The mistake was, I believe, that, although +Paragraph 19 was a very good paragraph of the Covenant of the League of +Nations, and one which we all would have been very willing to sign and +follow or one which we did sign and would have followed, no means of +putting it into practice existed. That gradually created a situation in +which the powers, and that is quite natural, who wanted to retain this +state of petrifaction, as I might call it, or _status quo_, opposed any +steps taken by Germany, which of course, caused reaction on the part of +the Führer, until finally it reached the point, the very tragic point, +where this great war began over a question like Danzig and the Corridor, +which could have been solved comparatively easy. + +DR. HORN: I have no more questions. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I do not think it would be possible to go any +further with the examination of the witness today, but the Tribunal +would welcome your assistance and the assistance of the Prosecution with +reference to your documents, if you could tell us what the position is +with reference to your documents, and if the Prosecution could tell us +how far they have been able to see these documents since they have been +translated and how far they have been able to make up their minds as to +what documents they wish to object to and what documents they are +prepared to admit as being offered in evidence before us. Could you tell +us what the position is with reference to these documents; how many of +your documents have been translated? + +DR. HORN: A gentleman from the British Prosecution told me this morning +that the English Document Book will be ready on Monday and that I can +discuss with him the question of what documents will be admitted. He +also told me that the British Prosecution would arrange everything with +the other delegations of the Prosecution, so that on Tuesday I should be +in a position to submit the remaining documents and, I believe, this +could be done in 2 or 3 hours. I want to submit these documents in +groups and do not wish to read too much from them, but only explain to +the Tribunal my reason for asking them to take judicial notice of these +documents. + +THE PRESIDENT: You said, did you not, it would take you no longer than 2 +or 3 hours to explain the documents after you had come to the +arrangement with the Prosecution? + +DR. HORN: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: And have you any other witnesses to call besides the +defendant? + +DR. HORN: No. I would like only to submit an affidavit by a witness +requested by me, Counsellor of Legation Gottfriedsen, dealing with the +personal financial circumstances of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, former +Minister for Foreign Affairs. Gottfriedsen was the Foreign Office +official whose task was to look after the official income of the Foreign +Minister and who is also very well acquainted with his private financial +affairs. He can give information about the personal and official estates +belonging to the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry. I have +embodied this information in the form of a few questions in an +affidavit. If the Prosecution have no objection to this affidavit, I +could dispense with the calling of the witness, Gottfriedsen. However, +if the Prosecution want him to appear, then I would question him on the +contents of the affidavit. + +I have no other witnesses for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. When all my +documents will have been presented, the case for the Defense will be +concluded. + +THE PRESIDENT: Would the Prosecution tell us their view on this? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as far as the British Prosecution is +concerned, we have now had six document books, I think, taking us up to +Number 214, roughly two-thirds of the documents which Dr. Horn wishes to +tender, and we have been able to go through up to Number 191. I made out +a list—I could hand one to the Court and give Dr. Horn another one—of +those documents that we object to, which are very briefly set out. I +should think we object to something like 70 or 80, between the Numbers +45 and 191, maybe a little more. The Soviet Delegation are, I think, in +a position to tender their objections, which are practically entirely in +accord with ours, though they were prepared separately. M. Champetier de +Ribes has at least two batches of documents to which he wishes to make +objections. I think I may say that Mr. Dodd is more or less leaving this +point to me and will act in accordance with the British Delegation’s +view on the point. So that is the position. It probably would be +convenient if I handed in a very outlined list of objections which I +have up to date. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know, Sir David, what the +position of the Prosecution is about the translation of the documents. +You remember that the Tribunal did make an order that the Prosecution +should object to documents, if possible, before they were translated, so +as to avoid unnecessary translations, and in the event of any +disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense any matter should +be referred to the Tribunal. It was thought that there were a great +number of documents on which agreement could be achieved in that way, +and the labor and time taken up in translating would be obviated. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The difficulty we have been in over these +documents, is that we did our best to try to formulate our view on the +index, but it is a very difficult matter to form a view when you get a +short description of only a line and a half about a document. But it +might be that that would be the most practical way of doing it, despite +its difficulty. If the Prosecution were given an index with as good a +description as possible of the document, the Prosecution then formulated +their objections on the index, and the Tribunal heard any outstanding +differences before the documents were translated, I should think—I am +afraid I can put it only tentatively—it would be worth a trial. +Otherwise, you would get a terrible blockage in the Translation Division +of the Tribunal by a vast number of documents, such as we have had in +this case, to which ultimately we are going to make full and numerous +objections, but that holds up the translation of all the documents +belonging to the subsequent proceedings. So I should be prepared—and I +think my colleagues would support me—in making a trial, if the Tribunal +thought it could be done, to hand in an objection on a list of documents +and see if we could in that way arrive at the results which would +obviate the necessity of translating them all. + +THE PRESIDENT: Would it be of assistance to the Prosecution, supposing +the defendants’ counsel were to give them the entire documents in German +with also a full index in English, and then the Prosecution, or some +member of the Prosecution who is familiar with German, could go through +the documents in German and the Prosecution can then make up their minds +in that way? Would that be an assistance to the Prosecution? They would +have not only the index to inform them as to what was the nature of the +documents, but they would have the documents in German. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think that would be a great help, especially +if he underlined the more material passages. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then, with the co-operation of the defendants’ counsel, +some measure of agreement might be arrived at as to what were the +necessary documents to lay before the Tribunal. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I think that could be done, My Lord. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, Sir David, with reference to the immediate +future, on Monday, of course, some of the defendants’ counsel may wish +to ask questions of the Defendant Ribbentrop and then the Prosecution +may wish to cross-examine him, and that, I suppose, might possibly take +all Monday. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think that is highly probable, My Lord. + +THE PRESIDENT: Under those circumstances, if the scheme which Dr. Horn +has outlined is carried out, there would not necessarily be any delay at +all, because by Tuesday morning his documents would have been all +examined by the Prosecution and the objections to them would have been +put in, and he could then go through, as he says, in 2 or 3 hours, the +documents which remain for the consideration of the Tribunal. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I respectfully agree, My Lord. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal would like to know what the position is +with reference to the next defendant. It may be that on Tuesday after +the midday adjournment the case of Defendant Keitel would come on. Now, +are his documents in order? As far as I remember, most of his documents +are documents which have already been put in evidence. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A great many. + +THE PRESIDENT: Is that not so? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Dr. Nelte could help us. + +THE PRESIDENT: If he would, yes. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am ready to begin at any time. The documents +have been presented and affidavits were already presented to the +Prosecution last week. I am waiting only for the Prosecution to decide +as to the relevancy of those documents which the defendant has submitted +as his own statements and which are to be submitted in order to shorten +the examination. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not had the chance of going through them +myself but, as a matter of principle, we have always been quite prepared +that a statement should be read so long as the witness is there to be +cross-examined. If the Tribunal has no objection, there will be none +from the Prosecution on that procedure. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal has no objection at all to that method +of presenting written documents, provided the Prosecution does not +object to them, and, therefore, no cross-examination is necessary. Could +Dr. Nelte tell us whether the documents which he wishes to present, +insofar as they have not already been put in evidence, have been +translated yet? + +DR. NELTE: They all were sent to the translation office and the last two +documents were sent 3 days ago. I assume, therefore, that the +delegations of the Prosecution have, in the meantime, received the +translations. + +THE PRESIDENT: Have you received them, Sir David? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, we have not received them. + +DR. NELTE: Perhaps they have not been distributed yet. Several or about +two-thirds of the documents were translated into French and English +about two weeks ago and are ready. I subsequently also sent these +documents to the Russian Delegation so that they could be translated +into Russian. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am told, My Lord, from General Mitchell, that +the documents are translated. They have not yet been distributed. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then there ought to be no cause for delay in connection +with the Defendant Keitel’s case. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not think so. + +DR. NELTE: No. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then, does the same apply to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, +who is the next one? Dr. Kauffmann, are your documents yet translated? + +DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have only a very few affidavits and +there is no doubt that they will be in the hands of the Prosecution in +due time. + +THE PRESIDENT: One moment. So that you will be quite ready to go on +then? + +DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, after Keitel, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, after Keitel, very well. Sir David, then you will +present to us the objections which you are making to Dr. Horn’s +documents, and the Soviet Prosecutor will present his objections. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall hand them in as far as I have gone, +if I may, at once. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and M. Champetier de Ribes, so far as he has any. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If My Lordship pleases, yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + NINETY-SIXTH DAY + Monday, 1 April 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +[_The Defendant Von Ribbentrop resumed the stand._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Have any of the defendants’ counsel any questions they +want to put to the defendant? + +DR. SEIDL: Yes, Your Honor. Witness, the preamble to the secret pact +concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939 is +worded more or less as follows: + + “In view of the present tension between Germany and Poland, the + following is agreed upon in case of a conflict...” + +Do you recall whether the preamble had approximately that wording? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact wording, but it is +approximately correct. + +DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the chief of the legal department of the +Foreign Office, Ambassador Dr. Gaus, participated as legal adviser in +the negotiations in Moscow on 23 August 1939 and drafted the treaty? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Ambassador Gaus participated partly in the negotiations +and drafted the agreements with me. + +DR. SEIDL: I shall now read an extract from the statement by Ambassador +Gaus and ask you a few questions in connection with it. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, what document are you going to read? + +DR. SEIDL: I shall read from Paragraph 3 of the statement made by Dr. +Gaus and in connection with it ask a few questions of the witness, +because some points concerning this pact do not seem to have been +sufficiently clarified as yet. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko? + +GEN. RUDENKO: I do not know, Mr. President, what relation these +questions have with the Defendant Hess, who is defended by Dr. Seidl, or +with the Defendant Frank. I do not wish to discuss this affidavit, as I +attach no importance whatsoever to it. I wish only to draw the attention +of the Tribunal to the fact that we are not investigating the problems +connected with the policy of the Allied nations, but are investigating +the charges against the major German war criminals; and such questions +on the part of the Defense Counsel is an attempt to divert the attention +of the Tribunal from the issues we are investigating. I therefore think +it proper that questions of this kind should be rejected as not +relevant. + +[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the questions. + +DR. SEIDL: Gaus stated, under Paragraph 3 of his affidavit: + + “The plane of the Reich Foreign Minister whom I had to accompany + as legal adviser in the intended negotiations arrived in Moscow + at noon on 23 August 1939. On the afternoon of the same day the + first conversation between Herr Von Ribbentrop and Mr. Stalin + took place at which, on the German side, besides the Reich + Foreign Minister, only Embassy Counsellor Hilger, as + interpreter, and perhaps also Ambassador Count Schulenburg, but + not myself, were present. + + “The Reich Foreign Minister returned very satisfied from this + long conference and indicated that it was as good as certain + that it would result in the conclusion of the agreements desired + on the part of Germany. The continuation of the conference, at + which the documents to be signed were to be discussed and + completed, was scheduled for later in the evening. At this + second conference I participated personally and so did + Ambassador Count Schulenburg and Embassy Counsellor Hilger. On + the Russian side the negotiations were conducted by Messrs. + Stalin and Molotov, whose interpreter was Mr. Pavlov. An + agreement on the text of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact + was reached quickly and without difficulties. + + “Herr Von Ribbentrop himself had inserted in the preamble to the + agreement which I had drafted a rather far-reaching phrase + concerning the formation of friendly German-Soviet relations to + which Mr. Stalin objected with the remark that the Soviet + Government could not suddenly present to the public + German-Soviet assurances of friendship after they had been + covered with pails of manure by the Nazi Government for 6 years. + Thereupon this phrase in the preamble was deleted or rather + changed. + + “Besides the Non-aggression Pact there were negotiations for + quite some time on a separate secret document, which according + to my recollection was called a ‘secret agreement’ or ‘secret + additional agreement’ and the terms of which were aimed at a + demarcation of the mutual spheres of interest in the European + territories situated between the two countries. Whether the + expression ‘spheres of interest’ or other such expressions were + used therein, I do not recall. In the document, Germany declared + herself politically disinterested in Latvia, Estonia and Finland + but considered Lithuania to be part of her sphere of influence. + + “Regarding the political disinterest of Germany in the two + Baltic countries mentioned, controversy arose when the Reich + Foreign Minister, in accordance with his instructions, wanted to + have a certain part of the Baltic territory exempted from this + political disinterest; this, however, was rejected on the part + of the Soviets, especially on account of the ice-free ports in + this territory. + + “Because of this point, which apparently had already been + discussed in Ribbentrop’s first conversation, the Foreign + Minister had put in a call to Hitler which came through only + during the second discussion, and during which, in direct + conversation with Hitler, he was authorized to accept the Soviet + standpoint. A demarcation line was laid down for the Polish + territory. I cannot remember whether it was drafted on a map + which was to be attached to the document or only described in + the document. Moreover, an agreement was reached in regard to + Poland, stating approximately that the two powers would act in + mutual agreement in the final settlement of questions concerning + this country. It could, however, be possible that this last + agreement regarding Poland was reached only when the change of + the secret agreement mentioned later in Paragraph 5 was made. + + “Regarding the Balkan States, it was confirmed that Germany had + only economic interests there. The Non-aggression Pact and the + secret agreement were signed rather late that same evening.” + +Witness, in the affidavit of Gaus, a pact is mentioned whereby the two +powers agree to act in mutual agreement with regard to the final +settlement of the questions concerning Poland. Had such an agreement +already been reached on 23 August 1939? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. At that time the serious +German-Polish crisis was acute, and it goes without saying that this +question was thoroughly discussed. I should like to emphasize that there +was not the slightest doubt in either Stalin’s or Hitler’s mind that, if +the negotiations with Poland came to naught, the territories that had +been taken from the two great powers by force of arms could also be +retaken by force of arms. In keeping with this understanding, the +eastern territories were occupied by Soviet troops and the western +territories by German troops after victory. There is no doubt that +Stalin can never accuse Germany of an aggression or of an aggressive war +for her action in Poland. If it is considered an aggression, then both +sides are guilty of it. + +DR. SEIDL: Was the demarcation line in this secret agreement described +merely in writing or was it drawn on a map attached to the agreement? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The line of demarcation was roughly drawn on a map. It +ran along the Rivers Rysia, Bug, Narew, and San. These rivers I +remember. That was the line of demarcation that was to be adhered to in +case of an armed conflict with Poland. + +DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of that agreement, not +Germany but Soviet Russia received the greater part of Poland? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the exact proportions, but, at any rate, +the agreement was that the territories east of these rivers were to go +to Soviet Russia and the territories west of these rivers were to be +occupied by German troops, while the organization of this territory as +intended by Germany was still an open question and had not yet been +discussed by Hitler and myself. Then, later the Government General was +formed when the regions lost by Germany after World War I were +incorporated into Germany. + +DR. SEIDL: Now, something else. You stated last Friday that you wanted +Russia to join in the Tripartite Pact. Why did that fail? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That failed because of Russian demands. The Russian +demands concerned—I should perhaps say first that I had agreed with M. +Molotov in Berlin to conduct further negotiations through diplomatic +channels. I wanted to influence the Führer regarding the demands already +made by Molotov in Berlin in order that some sort of an agreement or +compromise might be arrived at. + +Then Schulenburg sent us a report from Moscow with the Russian demands. +In this report was, first of all, the renewed demand for Finland. To +this the Führer, as is well known, told Molotov that he did not wish +that after the winter campaign of 1940 another war should break out in +the North. Now the demand for Finland was raised again, and we assumed +that it would mean the occupation of Finland. It was difficult since it +was a demand which the Führer had already turned down. + +Another demand of the Russians was that of the Balkans and Bulgaria. +Russia, as is well known, wanted bases there and wished to enter into +close relations with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government, with whom we +got in touch, did not want this. Moreover, this Russian penetration of +the Balkans was for both the Führer and Mussolini a difficult question +because of our economic interests there: grain, oil, and so on. But +above all it was the will of the Bulgarian Government themselves, which +was against this penetration. + +Then, thirdly, there was the demand of the Russians for outlets to the +sea and military bases on the Dardanelles; and then the request which +Molotov had already expressed to me in Berlin, to secure somehow at +least an interest in the outlets of the Baltic Sea. M. Molotov himself +told me at that time that Russia naturally was also very much interested +in the Skagerrak and Kattegat. + +At that time I discussed these demands and requests fully with the +Führer. The Führer said we would have to get in touch with Mussolini, +who was very much interested in some of these demands. This took place, +but neither the demands for the Balkans nor the demands for the +Dardanelles met with the approval from Mussolini. As far as Bulgaria is +concerned I have already stated that she did not want it either; and +with regard to Finland, neither Finland nor the Führer wanted to accede +to the demands of the Soviet Union. + +Negotiations were then carried on for many months. I recall that upon +receipt of a telegram from Moscow in December 1940 I had another long +conversation with the Führer. I had an idea that, if we could bring +about a compromise between the Russian demands and the wishes of the +various parties concerned, a coalition could be formed which would be so +strong that it would eventually induce England to remain at peace. + +THE PRESIDENT: What is this all an answer to? What was your question +that this is supposed to be an answer to? + +DR. SEIDL: In essence he has already answered the question. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if he has answered the question you should +stop him. + +DR. SEIDL: Very well. I now come to another question: What was Adolf +Hitler’s opinion regarding the military strength of Russia? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler once said to me—he expressed himself +thus—and this was when he became worried about what was taking place in +Russia in the way of preparations against Germany: “We do not know of +course what is concealed behind this gate, if some day we should really +be forced to kick it open.” From this and other statements which the +Führer made at this time I concluded that, on the basis of reports about +Russia, he suffered great anxiety about the strength and the possible +display of might by the Soviet Union. + +DR. SEIDL: My next question: What circumstances induced Hitler to +anticipate the threatening danger of an offensive by the Soviet Union? + +VON RIBBENTROP: This was as follows... + +THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t this been dealt with extensively and exhaustively +by the Defendant Göring? You are here as counsel for Hess. + +DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal is of the opinion that this has been dealt +with exhaustively, I shall withdraw the question. + +THE PRESIDENT: Before you sit down, Dr. Seidl, you were putting Gaus’ +affidavit to the defendant, I suppose with the intention that he should +say that the affidavit was true; is that right? + +DR. SEIDL: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: You didn’t put to him Paragraph 4 of the affidavit at +all, did you? + +DR. SEIDL: I read only Paragraph 3 of the affidavit. I did not read +Paragraph 1, 2, 4, and 5 in order to save time. + +THE PRESIDENT: The answer to my question was, “yes,” that you did not +put it. Should you not put the end of Paragraph 4 to him, which reads in +this way: + + “The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner + that he let a warlike conflict of Germany with Poland appear not + as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent + possibility. No statements which could have included the + approval or encouragement for such a conflict were made by the + Soviet statesmen on this point. Rather the Soviet + representatives limited themselves in this respect simply to + taking cognizance of the explanations of the German + representatives.” + +Is that correct? + +DR. SEIDL: That is correct. + +THE PRESIDENT: I am asking the witness. Is that correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I may say the following to this. When I went to Moscow +no final decision had been reached by the Führer... + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, couldn’t you answer the question directly? I asked +you whether the statement in the affidavit was correct or not. You can +explain afterwards. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Not quite correct, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: Now you can explain. + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is not correct insofar as at that time the decision +to attack Poland had in no way been made by the Führer. There is, +however, no doubt that it became perfectly clear during the discussions +in Moscow that there was at any time the possibility of such a conflict, +if the last effort at negotiations failed. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the difference between that and what I have +just read to you? What I read to you was this: + + “The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner + that he let a warlike conflict of Germany with Poland appear not + as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent + possibility.” + +I should have thought your explanation was exactly the same as that. +That’s all. + +DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I mention something briefly in this +connection? This witness Gaus was present only at the second conference. +He was, however, not present at the long conference which took place +previously between the witness Ribbentrop on the one hand and Molotov +and Stalin on the other hand. At these conferences only Embassy +Counsellor Hilger was present and I ask the Tribunal to call witness +Hilger, who has, in view of the importance of this point, already been +granted me. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, as you know, you can make any application in +writing for calling any witness that you like; and also the Tribunal +wishes me to say that if the Prosecution wish to have the witness Gaus +here for a cross-examination they may do so. + +DR. SEIDL: Then I should like to put in as Hess Exhibit Number 16 +(Document Number Hess-16) the sworn affidavit of Ambassador Gaus. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. + +MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, as far as I understand, there is +some slight danger of the witness Gaus being removed from Nuremberg. I +would like to state at this time that we would like to have him retained +here for long enough time for possible cross-examination. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions? + +DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel states that in the autumn of 1940, when +the idea of a war with Russia was discussed by Hitler, he went to Fuschl +in order to talk to you about this question. He believed that you too +had misgivings about it. Do you recall that Keitel at the end of August +or at the beginning of September was in Fuschl? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. He did visit me at that time. + +DR. NELTE: Do you recall that Keitel at that time stated to you his +opinion about the probably imminent war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. He spoke of that at the time. I +believe he said that the Führer had discussed it with him. + +DR. NELTE: What I am driving at is this: Keitel states that he spoke +with you about a memorandum he intended to submit to Hitler which +referred to the considerations which were to be taken into account in +case of war with Soviet Russia. + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. Field Marshal Keitel told me at that +time that he intended to submit a memorandum to Hitler, and he expressed +his misgivings concerning a possible conflict between the Soviet Union +and Germany. + +DR. NELTE: Did you have the impression that Field Marshal Keitel was +opposed to the war at that time? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I had absolutely that impression. + +DR. NELTE: Is it true that he, as a result of this discussion, asked you +to support his point of view with Hitler? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct, and I told him at that time that I +would do so, that I would speak to Hitler, and he ought to do the same. + +DR. NELTE: Another question, regarding the escape of the French General +Giraud. Is it true that Keitel, when the French General Giraud escaped +from Königstein, asked you to take steps with the French Government to +bring about the voluntary return of General Giraud? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. At that time he asked me whether it +would not be possible, by way of negotiations with the French +Government, to induce Giraud to return to imprisonment in some way or +other. + +DR. NELTE: Did a meeting then take place with General Giraud in occupied +France through the intervention of Ambassador Abetz? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, such a meeting took place. I believe Ambassador +Abetz met Giraud, who, as I recall, appeared in the company of M. Laval. +The Ambassador did everything he could in order to induce the General to +return, but finally did not succeed. The General was promised safe +conduct for this meeting and upon its conclusion the General and Laval +left. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has submitted an order, the subject of which +was the branding of Soviet prisoners of war. The Defendant Keitel is +held responsible for this order. He states that he spoke with you about +this question at headquarters located at the time in Vinnitza; that he +had to do it because all questions pertaining to prisoners of war also +concerned the department for international law of the Foreign Office. Do +you recall that in this connection Keitel asked you whether there were +any objections from the point of view of international law to this +branding which Hitler wished. + +VON RIBBENTROP: The situation was this: I heard about the intention of +marking prisoners of war and went to headquarters to speak with Keitel +about this matter because it was my opinion that the marking of +prisoners in such a way was out of the question. Keitel shared my +opinion; and, so far as I recall, I believe he gave later orders that +this intended form of marking was not to be used. + +DR. NELTE: I have no further question. + +FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Witness, +when did you make the acquaintance of Admiral Dönitz? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I made his acquaintance after he was appointed +Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That was in 1943? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe so. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz before or after this time +exert or try to exert any influence on German foreign policy? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have never heard that Admiral Dönitz tried to exert +any influence on German foreign policy. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you recall Marshal Antonescu’s visit to +the Führer headquarters on 27 February 1944? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do recall the visit but not the date. Marshal +Antonescu used to visit the Führer frequently. I should say every six +months or so; I believe you said at the beginning of 1944? + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, on 27 February 1944. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I think it is correct that he visited the Führer at +the beginning of 1944. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you recall whether Antonescu, at that +time, attended the discussion of the military situation, as guest? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I am quite certain, because this was usually the case +when Antonescu came to see the Führer. The Führer always explained the +military situation to him, that is, he invited him to the so-called noon +discussion of the military situation. I do not recall exactly now, but +there can be no doubt that Marshal Antonescu attended the discussion of +the military situation in February. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Besides the military discussions were there +also political discussions with Antonescu? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, every visit with Marshal Antonescu began by the +Führer’s withdrawing either with the Marshal alone or sometimes also +with me, but mostly with the Marshal alone, because he was the chief of +state; a long detailed political discussion would ensue, to which I was +generally called in later. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz take part in these +political discussions? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Certainly not, because the Führer seldom invited +military leaders to these political discussions with Marshal Antonescu. +Later however, he did occasionally, but I do not recall that Admiral +Dönitz took part in a discussion with Antonescu. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions. + +DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Witness, the +Prosecution have submitted a document concerning a discussion between +you and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 March 1941. The +document carries the Document Number 1877-PS, and is Exhibit Number +USA-152. A part of this document was read into the record by the +Prosecution, and on Page 1007 of the German transcript (Volume III, Page +379) can be found among other things, the following passage which +concerns Grossadmiral Raeder: + + “Next, the RAM (Foreign Minister) turned again to the Singapore + question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of + possible attacks by submarines based in the Philippines, and of + the intervention of the English Mediterranean and Home Fleets, + he had again discussed the situation with Grossadmiral Raeder. + The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year + would have its hands so full in English home waters and in the + Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single + ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder had described the + United States submarines as so poor that Japan need not bother + about them at all.” + +Witness, as the Defendant Raeder clearly remembers, you, as Foreign +Minister, never spoke with him about strategic matters regarding Japan +or even about the worth or worthlessness of American submarines. I +should be obliged to you if you could clarify this point, whether there +might be some confusion as to the person involved in this discussion. + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is altogether possible. I do not recall that I ever +spoke with Admiral Raeder about German-Japanese strategy. The fact was +that we had only very loose connections with Japan on these questions. +If at that time I said to Matsuoka what is written there, it is quite +possible that I quoted the Führer that he had said it to me. Naturally I +could not have said it on my own initiative, because I did not know +about it. I know that the Führer spoke to me frequently about such +points particularly with regard to Japan. It is possible therefore that +this did not originate with Admiral Raeder but the Führer. I do not know +who made this note. Is it a... + +DR. SIEMERS: The document is entitled, “Notes on the conference between +the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, +Matsuoka...” + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that here. It is possible that the Führer +said that to me. In fact, I consider that probable. It is possible that +some mistake was made in the note; that I do not know. + +DR. SIEMERS: Witness, did you inform the Defendant Raeder of such +political discussions as you had with Matsuoka or Oshima? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not the case. + +DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever speak with Grossadmiral Raeder about other +political questions or have him present at political negotiations? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not our practice. Generally, the Führer +kept military and political matters strictly separate, so that I, as +Foreign Minister, never had an opportunity to discuss military or +strategic matters at my office; but when questions of foreign policy +were to be discussed, this took place at the Führer headquarters, but as +I have seen from documents which I read for the first time here, matters +were kept separate even there. In other words, if such discussions took +place at all, a fact which I cannot recall at the moment, it could have +been only at the Führer headquarters. + +DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. + +DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, +Steengracht, who was heard here as a witness, answered in the negative +my question as to whether the high military leaders were regularly +informed by him about current political matters. Now I ask whether you, +as Foreign Minister, informed high military leaders about political +matters? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must answer this question in the same way as I +answered the previous one. That was not our practice. All political and +military matters were dealt with exclusively by the Führer. The Führer +told me what I had to do in the diplomatic and political field, and he +told the military men what they had to do militarily. I was +occasionally, but very seldom, informed about military matters by the +Führer, and whatever the military men had to know about political +matters they never learned from me; but if they learned at all, it was +from the Führer. + +DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. + +HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, did you have an order or an +instruction according to which you were to inform the SA leaders of the +development and treatment of foreign political matters? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The SA? No. There was no such order, and I had no such +instructions. + +HERR BÖHM: Did the SA leadership have any influence on foreign policy at +all? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No. + +HERR BÖHM: And now I should like to ask a question for my colleague Dr. +Sauter who is ill: Were you in 1943 witness to a conversation between +Hitler and Himmler, in which the question was discussed as to whether +Von Schirach, who was then Reichsleiter, should be summoned before the +Volksgericht (People’s Court)? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. + +HERR BÖHM: What consequences would such a trial before the Volksgericht +have had for Schirach? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say exactly, of course. I do not know the +details of this matter. I only know that Himmler, in my presence, made +the suggestion to the Führer that Schirach should be brought and tried +before the Volksgericht for some reason or other. I do not know the +details. I was not interested in them. I said to the Führer that this, +in my opinion, would make a very bad impression from the point of view +of foreign policy and I know that Himmler received no answer from the +Führer; at any rate, he did not give the order. What consequences that +would have had I cannot say, but when such a suggestion came from +Himmler, the consequences were very serious. + +HERR BÖHM: How is it that you were witness to this conversation and how +did you react to it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It was purely accidental; I have just stated that I told +the Führer as well as Himmler that it would make a very bad impression. + +HERR BÖHM: I have no further questions. + +THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions on behalf of the +defendants’ counsel? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, when you began to advise Hitler on +matters of foreign policy in 1933, were you familiar with the League of +Nations declaration of 1927? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know which declaration you mean. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember the League of Nations +declaration of 1927? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The League of Nations has made many declarations. Please +tell me which one you mean? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It made a rather important one about aggressive +war in 1927, didn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know this declaration in detail, but it is +clear that the League of Nations, like everyone, was against an +aggressive war, and at that time Germany was a member of the League of +Nations. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was a member, and the preamble of the +declaration was: + + “Being convinced that a war of aggression would never serve as a + means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence + an international crime...” + +Were you familiar with that when you... + +VON RIBBENTROP: Not in detail, no. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was rather an important matter to be familiar +with if you were going to advise Hitler, who was then Chancellor, on +foreign policy, wasn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: This declaration was certainly important, and +corresponded exactly with my attitude at that time. But subsequent +events have proved that the League of Nations was not in a position to +save Germany from chaos. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold that as your own view? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold the expression of +opinion I have quoted to you from the preamble as your own view? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That was as such my fundamental attitude, but on the +other hand I was of the opinion that Germany should be given help in +some way. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I gathered. Now, apart from that, if you were +not familiar in detail with that resolution, were you familiar in detail +with the Kellogg-Briand Pact? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was familiar with it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with the view expressed in the +preamble and in the pact that there should be a renunciation of war as +an instrument of national policy? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell us how you carried that +out. Let’s take the first example. Are you telling this Tribunal that as +far as you know, no pressure or threats were made to Herr Von +Schuschnigg? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean in the discussions with Hitler at the +Obersalzberg? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, on the 12th of February. + +VON RIBBENTROP: At this discussion... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, answer the question first, and then you +can give your explanation. Are you saying that no pressure or threats +were put to Herr Von Schuschnigg on the 12th of February? Answer that +“yes” or “no”, and we will go into the explanation later. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Not exactly, no. I believe that the dominating +personality of the Führer and the arguments that he presented made such +an impression on Schuschnigg that he finally agreed to Hitler’s +proposals. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s just look into that. + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I continue? I personally had a conversation at that +time with Herr Schuschnigg after his first talk with Adolf Hitler, in +which his reaction to the first conference became very clear to me. This +reaction was one of being deeply impressed by Hitler’s personality and +by the arguments which Hitler submitted to him. Schuschnigg told me in +this conversation, which was extremely cordial, that he too—and I +believe these were his words—regarded it as a historical mission to +bring the two peoples closer together. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were present at the Berghof—I don’t say in +the room, but in the building or about? Were there present Hitler, +yourself, the Defendant Von Papen, the Defendant Keitel, General +Sperrle, and General Von Reichenau? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I think that is correct, yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the morning of the 12th, I think that +Hitler and Von Schuschnigg were together for about 2 hours before lunch +in the morning, isn’t that so? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the time exactly. Anyway, they had a +long conversation, that is correct. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, after lunch, Von Schuschnigg was +allowed to have a short conversation with his own Foreign Minister, +Guido Schmidt, isn’t that so? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know exactly, but it is possible. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, Von Schuschnigg and Guido +Schmidt were called before you and the Defendant Von Papen, isn’t that +right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. I do not think so. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember that? Just think again. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean—then I believe I did not understand the +question. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I will put it again. After a conversation +that Schuschnigg had with Guido Schmidt, he and Schmidt came before you +and the Defendant Von Papen and they had a conversation with you, which +I will put to you in a moment. Now, isn’t it right that you and Von +Papen saw Von Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not believe so. I do not believe that is true. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember exhibiting to Von Schuschnigg +a typewritten draft containing the demands made on Von Schuschnigg? Now, +just think. + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely possible. Hitler had dictated a +memorandum, and it is possible that I gave it to Schuschnigg. I am not +sure of the details now. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the subject of that memorandum? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know; and in order to explain my ignorance +about the entire conference I would like to state that at this time I +was not at all informed about the Austrian problem because Hitler had +handled these matters personally and I had become Foreign Minister only +a few days before. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you hand someone a memorandum, at an occasion +which you have described to him as a historic meeting, presumably you +can give the Tribunal at any rate an outline of what the memorandum +contained. What were the points in the memorandum? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Curiously enough, I really do not remember that in +detail. This meeting was one between the Führer and Schuschnigg, and +everything that was done and agreed upon there was either dictated by +the Führer himself or was suggested to the Führer by someone else. I did +not know the details. I only knew that it was primarily a question of +bringing about better relations between Germany and Austria. Since many +National Socialists had been arrested in Austria the relations between +the two countries had been greatly troubled. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if I remind you, perhaps, it will bring it +back. Were not they the three points for the reorganization of the +Austrian Cabinet, including: + +The appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the Ministry of +Security in the Interior; second, a general political amnesty of Nazis +convicted of crimes; and thirdly, a declaration of equal rights for +Austrian National Socialists and the taking of them into the Fatherland +Front? + +Are these the points that you were putting to Von Schuschnigg? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember exactly now but that may be about +correct. At that time that corresponded with the vague notion and +knowledge I had about Austrian affairs. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you tell Von Schuschnigg that Hitler had +informed you that these demands which you were offering were the final +demands of the Führer and that Hitler was not prepared to discuss them? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that, but it is possible that I told Von +Schuschnigg something to that effect but at the moment I do not +remember. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say, “You must accept the whole of these +demands?” + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so, I did not say that. I exerted no +pressure whatsoever on Schuschnigg, for I still remember that this +conversation which lasted about an hour to an hour and a half was +confined to generalities and to personal matters and that I gained from +this conversation a very favorable impression of Schuschnigg’s +personality, which fact I even mentioned to my staff later on. I put no +pressure on Schuschnigg. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us that before, and I am suggesting to +you that at this conversation you were trying to get Schuschnigg to sign +the document containing these terms which you agree that you may have +had. I want you to remember the answer and remind you of that. + +Don’t you remember Herr Von Schuschnigg turning to the Defendant Von +Papen and saying, “Now, you told me that I would not be confronted with +any demands if I came to Berchtesgaden,” and Herr Von Papen apologizing +and saying, “That is so. I did not know you were going to be confronted +with these demands.” + +Don’t you remember that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that. That cannot be quite right. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will just see. Do you remember Von +Schuschnigg being called back to speak to Hitler again and Guido Schmidt +remaining with you to make some alterations in the document which you +were putting? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that changes were made; it is +conceivable, I do not remember the details, though. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you hear that in this second +conversation with Hitler, Hitler telling Schuschnigg that he must comply +with these demands within 3 days? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am hearing that for the first time today. I did +not know that. I was not present at the second conversation. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just be a little careful before you say you have +heard that for the first time today, because in a moment I will show you +some documents. Are you sure you did not hear that Hitler told +Schuschnigg that he must comply within 3 days, or Hitler would order the +march into Austria? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that to be out of the question. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If he had said that, you will agree that that +would be the heaviest military and political pressure? There could be no +other heavier pressure than suggesting a march into Austria, could +there? + +VON RIBBENTROP: In view of the tense situation that existed between the +two countries at that time, that, of course, would have been a pressure. +But one thing must be taken for granted; and that is, that under no +circumstances would it have been possible in the long run to find any +solution between the two countries if there were no closer contact, and +from the beginning—I should like to state this here—it was always my +view that the two countries should form some sort of close alliance, and +I visualized a customs and currency union... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve given that view about three times. Let us +come back to this interview which I am putting back to you, that took +place on the 12th of February. Don’t you know that Schuschnigg said: “I +am only the Bundeskanzler. I have to refer to President Miklas, and I +can sign this protocol only subject to reference to President Miklas.” + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that any more in detail. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Hitler opening the door and +calling Keitel? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No; I only learned here that this is supposed to have +happened. I have no knowledge whatsoever about that. I heard about it +here for the first time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know it is true, don’t you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know. I heard about it here for the first time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Keitel’s going in to speak to +Hitler? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I did not hear about that. I do +not know, I cannot say. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Von Schuschnigg signed this +document on the condition that within 3 days these demands would be +fulfilled, otherwise Germany would march into Austria? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it would be convenient if the witness +had the German Document Book in front of him. I tried to get most of the +pages agreeing. + +THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps this would be a good time to break +off. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, will you look first at the Defendant +Jodl’s diary, the entry of the 13th of February, it is the Ribbentrop +Document Book, Page 9, Exhibit Number USA-72, Document Number 1780-PS. +The entry is as follows: + + “In the afternoon General K.”—that is Keitel—“asks Admiral + C.”—that is Admiral Canaris—“and myself to come to his + apartment. He tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect + that military pressure by shamming military action should be + kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers + are drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone for + approval.” + +You were suggesting on Friday that the Defendant Jodl had got hold of +some rumors or gossip that were going around the Berghof. That rumor or +gossip was a definite order from his superior officer, General Keitel, +wasn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I know absolutely nothing about any military measures, +therefore I cannot pass judgment on the value of this entry. The Führer +did not inform me about any military measures regarding Austria. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal you were there, +that you were taking part, handling the document, and that Hitler never +said a word to you about what he was arranging with the Defendant +Keitel, who was also there? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the next entry for the +14th of February: + + “At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer arrives. Canaris + went to Munich to the Counterintelligence Office (Abwehrstelle + VII) and initiated the different measures. The effect was quick + and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is + undertaking serious military preparation.” + +Are you telling this Tribunal that you know nothing about either these +military measures or the effect on Austria? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about the military measures, but +I consider it quite possible that the Führer, in order to put more +stress on his wishes, caused something to be done in this field... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, just a moment! + +VON RIBBENTROP: ...and that may have contributed in the end to the +solution of the problem. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I quite agree. That is just why I am +putting it to you that it did contribute. But surely you as Foreign +Minister of the Reich, with all the channels available to a foreign +minister, knew something about the effect in Austria, which General Jodl +was remarking, that “the effect was quick and strong.”—the impression +was “created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.” +Are you telling the Tribunal, on your oath, that you knew nothing about +the effect in Austria? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to point out again that I did not know +anything about military measures and, if I had known, I would not have +the slightest reason not to say here that it was not so. It is a fact, +however, that in the days before and after the conversations between the +Führer and Schuschnigg, I was so busy taking over the Foreign Office +that I treated the Austrian problem, at that time, merely as a secondary +matter in foreign policy. I did not play a leading role in the handling +of the Austrian problem... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We know you said that before, that you were +engaged in the Foreign Office, and my question was perfectly clear—my +question was: Are you telling this Tribunal that you did not know +anything about the effect in Austria—you, as Foreign Minister of the +Reich? Now answer the question. Did you or did you not know of the +effect in Austria? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about that effect, and I did not +observe it in detail either. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, that is your story and you want that to +be taken as a criterion, a touchstone of whether or not you are telling +the truth; that you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich, say that you knew +nothing about the effect in Austria of the measures taken by Keitel on +the Führer’s orders? Is that your final answer? + +VON RIBBENTROP: To that I can tell you again quite precisely, I learned +from the Führer when I went to London a little later, and that is +absolutely the first thing I remember about the entire Austrian affair, +that matters in Austria were working out more or less as agreed upon in +the conversations in Berchtesgaden. I did not make any particular +observations in detail at that time, so far as I remember. It is +possible that this or that detail slipped my memory in the meantime, for +many years have passed since then. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next two entries in Jodl’s +diary: + + “15 February. In the evening, an official announcement about the + positive results of the conference at Obersalzberg was issued.” + + “16 February. Changes in the Austrian Government and the general + political amnesty.” + +Do you remember my putting to you what Herr Von Schuschnigg signed, and +the condition was made that the matters would come into effect within 3 +days; within 3 days there was a conference about the effects and the +changes were announced in Austria in accordance with the note that you +had put to Schuschnigg. You can see that that is clear, isn’t it—3 +days—you still say... + +VON RIBBENTROP: Of these 3 days, as I have told you already, I know +nothing; but it was a matter of course that this meeting would have some +results in the way of appeasing. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You call it “appeasing”? Is that your considered +view to the Tribunal, that assuming that the Defendant Jodl is telling +the truth or assuming that the Defendant Keitel said that to him, as +General Jodl was saying, that these military preparations should be put +in hand, isn’t that the most severe political and military pressure that +could be put on the chancellor of another state? + +VON RIBBENTROP: If one considers the problem from a higher viewpoint, +no; I have a different opinion. Here was a problem which might possibly +have led to war, to a European war; and I believe, and I also said that +later to Lord Halifax in London, that it was better to solve this +problem than to allow it to become a permanent sore spot on the body of +Europe. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to put words in your mouth. Do you +mean by the last answer, that it was better that political and military +pressure should be put on Schuschnigg, so long as the problem was +solved? Is that your view? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not get that question. May I ask you to repeat it? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question was: Is it your view that it was +better that political and military pressure should be put on Herr Von +Schuschnigg if by that means the problem was solved? + +VON RIBBENTROP: If by that means, a worse complication, that is to say a +war was actually avoided, I consider that was the better way. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just tell me, why did you and your friends keep +Schuschnigg in prison for 7 years? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, at any rate, I believe Schuschnigg—I do +not know the details—must at that time have done something which was +against the State or the interests of the State. But if you say +“prison”, I know only from my own recollection that the Führer said and +emphasized several times that Schuschnigg should be treated particularly +well and decently and that he was not in a prison but lodged in a house +and also, I believe, that his wife was with him. I cannot, however, say +more on the subject from my own experience and from my own observation. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean “prison.” I will substitute for it +“Buchenwald” and “Dachau”. He was at both Buchenwald and Dachau. Do you +think he was enjoying himself there? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I only heard here that Herr Schuschnigg was in a +concentration camp; I did not know before. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just make a change, just try to answer my +question. Why did you and your friends keep Schuschnigg in prison for 7 +years? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything on that point. I can only say and +repeat, that, according to what I heard at that time, he was not in +prison but confined in a villa and had all the comforts possible. That +is what I heard to that time and I was glad about it because, as I have +said already, I liked him. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is one thing he did not have, Witness, he +did not have the opportunity of giving his account as to what had +happened at Berchtesgaden or of his side of the Anschluss to anyone for +these 7 years, did he? That is quite obvious with all you say, that he +was very comfortable at Buchenwald and Dachau, wherever he was, but +comfortable or not, he didn’t get the chance of putting his side of the +happenings to the world, did he? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That I could not judge. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You couldn’t judge? You know perfectly well, +don’t you, that Herr Von Schuschnigg was not allowed to publish his +account of anything while he was under restraint for these 7 years? +Don’t you know that quite well? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That may be assumed... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now... + +VON RIBBENTROP: It may have been in the interests of the State, however. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is your view of it. We will pass to +another subject. + +I am going to ask you a few questions now about your share in the +dealing with Czechoslovakia. Will you agree with me, that in March of +1938, the Foreign Office, that is, you, through your ambassador in +Prague, took over control of the activities of the Sudeten Deutsche +Party under Konrad Henlein? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I am sorry but that is not correct. May I explain... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Before you explain, I think you might save time +if you look at the document book on Page 20 in your book, it is Page 31 +in the English book, and listen while I refer you to a letter from your +ambassador. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Which number, please? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 20. It is a letter from your ambassador in +Prague to the Foreign Office. + +If I may explain to the Tribunal, it is not the defendant’s document +book, it is the Prosecution’s book. I will see, hereafter, that it is +correct. + +[_Turning to the defendant_]: Now, this letter from your ambassador to +the Foreign Office... + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know about that letter. May I... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me refer you to Paragraph 1. I refer +you also to Paragraph 3, so you need not be worried that I shall miss +it. + +Paragraph 1: + + “The line of German Foreign policy, as transmitted by the German + Legation, is exclusively decisive for the policy and tactics of + the Sudeten German Party. My”—that is, your + ambassador—“directives are to be complied with implicitly.” + +Paragraph 2: + + “Public speeches and the press will be co-ordinated uniformly + with my approval. The editorial staff of _Zeit_ is to be + improved.” + +Paragraph 3: + + “Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which, + in the end, might lead to political complications, and adopts + the line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. The + objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and + to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action.” (Document Number + 3060-PS) + +Having read that, don’t you agree with me—what I put to you a moment +ago—that the activities of the Sudeten German Party were to take place +according to the directives? + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I state an opinion on that now? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like the answer to that question first, +and I am sure the Tribunal will let you make an explanation. It is +perfectly easy to answer that question “yes” or “no”. Isn’t it right +that that letter shows that the Sudeten German Party was acting under +your directives; isn’t that right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to explain. This letter in itself is a +crowning proof of the fact that things were quite to the contrary. +Between the Sudeten German Party and many agencies in the Reich, +connections had been established; this was quite natural, because there +was a very strong movement among the Sudeten Germans which was striving +for closer connection with the Reich, especially after Adolf Hitler had +come to power. These tendencies were beginning to impair the relations +between Germany and Czechoslovakia and this very letter bears proof of +the fact that I attempted gradually to put these uncontrolled +connections, which existed between the Sudeten Germans and the Reich, in +some way under control. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I am asking you, Witness. What +I put to you, and I put it to you three times, I think, quite clearly: +Does this letter show that that Party, the Sudeten German Party, was +from that time acting under your directions? Are you still denying that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I deny that emphatically. The case is just the +opposite. This letter indicates an attempt to direct the German-Czech +relations, which had become very difficult due to the natural desire of +the Sudeten Germans to establish closer relations with the German +people, into right and sensible channels, which however, shortly after +this letter, unfortunately failed. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you deny what I have put to you, what is +meant when your ambassador writes to the Foreign Office and says that +the line of German policy, as transmitted by the German Legation, is +exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party? +What does that mean if it doesn’t mean what you have said—that the +Party was acting under your direction? What else can it mean if it +doesn’t mean that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It means exactly what I have said, that the legation +should try to induce the leadership of the Sudeten Germans to adopt a +sensible program, so that the illegal tendencies which were existent +should not lead to difficulties in German-Czech relations. That was at +that time the purport of the conversation with the legation in Prague +and that is quite clearly expressed by this letter. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us see what this sensible program which you +were suggesting was. The next day, on the 17th of March, Konrad Henlein +writes to you and suggests a personal talk; and if you will turn over to +Page 26 of the German document book—Page 33 of the English—you will +find the note of the personal talk which you had at the Foreign Office +on the 29th of March with Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, and two other +gentlemen whose names are not so well known. (Document Number 2788-PS, +Exhibit Number USA-95) I only want you to look at four sentences in +that, after the first one: “The Reichsminister started out by +emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference, which had been +scheduled, strictly a secret.” + +And then you refer to the meeting that the Führer had had with Konrad +Henlein the afternoon before. I just want you to have that in mind. + +Now, if you will look down the page, after the “1” and “2”, there is a +paragraph which begins “The Foreign Minister”, and the second sentence +is: + + “It is essential to propose a maximum program which as its final + aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It appears + dangerous to be satisfied prematurely with promises of the + Czechoslovakian Government, which, on the one hand, would give + the impression abroad that a solution has been found and, on the + other hand, would only partially satisfy the Sudeten Germans.” + +Then, if you will look one sentence further on, after some +uncomplimentary remarks about Beneš, it says: + + “The aim of the negotiations to be carried on by the Sudeten + German Party with the Czechoslovakian Government would finally + be to avoid entry into the government”—observe the next + words—“by the extension and gradual specification of the + demands to be made.” + +And then you make the position of the Reich Cabinet clear: + + “The Reich Cabinet”—the next sentence but one—“itself must + refuse to appear towards the government in Prague or towards + London and Paris as the advocate”—note the next words—“or + peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands.” + +The policy which I suggest to you was now to direct the activities of +the Sudeten Germans. They were to avoid agreement with the Czechoslovak +Government, avoid participation in the Czechoslovak Government, and the +Reich Cabinet in its turn would avoid acting as mediator in the matter; +in other words, Witness, that you, through your influence on the Sudeten +Germans, were taking every step and doing your utmost to see that no +agreement could be reached on the difficulties or the minority problem. +Isn’t that right? Isn’t that what you were telling them at that +interview? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Give your explanation. What would you say these +words meant? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I summoned Konrad Henlein at that time, and believe it +was the only time, or perhaps I saw him once more; unfortunately, only +once or twice, in order to enjoin him, too, to work for a peaceful +development of the Sudeten German problem. The demands of the Sudeten +Germans were already far-reaching at that time. They wanted to return to +the Reich. That was more or less tacit or was expressed. It seemed to me +a solution which was dangerous and which had to be stopped in some way +or another because otherwise it might lead to a war. Henlein finally +came to see me then, but I wish to point out in advance that it was the +only time, I believe, that I discussed the matter thoroughly with +Henlein, and soon afterwards I lost control of the matter. The entire +Sudeten German problem, that is, what is contained in this letter and +about which there can be no doubt, is: + +Firstly, that I wanted to bring the efforts of the Sudeten Germans to a +peaceful development so that we could support it diplomatically also, +which seemed to me absolutely justified. + +And secondly, that in this way we should avoid the sudden development of +a situation which, by acts of terror or other wild incidents, would lead +to a German-Czech and European crisis. + +Those were at that time the reasons why I summoned Henlein. + +Now, as to the various sentences which the Prosecutor has read, it is +clear that the Sudeten German Party had at that time very far-reaching +demands. Naturally, they wanted Adolf Hitler to send an ultimatum to +Prague saying “You must do that, and that is final,” and that is what +they would have preferred. + +We did not want that, of course. We wanted a quiet, peaceful development +and solution of these things. Therefore, I discussed with Henlein at +that time the way in which the Sudeten German Party was to proceed in +order to put through their demands gradually. The demands which I had in +mind at that time were demands for a far-reaching cultural autonomy, and +possibly autonomy in other fields too. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you were thinking of cultural and social +autonomy, why were you telling these gentlemen not to come to an +agreement with the Prague Government? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I could not specify that now. That may have been for +tactical considerations. I assume that Konrad Henlein made such a +suggestion and that I agreed with it. Naturally I did not know the +problem too well in detail and this note must be—I presume that what +happened was that Henlein himself merely explained his program—the +details are not contained here—and that I agreed to it more or less. +Therefore, I assume that at that time it seemed perhaps advisable to +Henlein for tactical reasons not to enter into the government and assume +responsibilities at that moment, but rather to try first to proceed with +the matter in a different way. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the 29th of March, and you have told +the Tribunal a moment ago about your anxiety for peace. You very soon +knew that there wasn’t going to be any question of relying on peaceful +measures, didn’t you? Can you remember? Just try and apply yourself to +it, because you have obviously been applying your mind to this. Can you +remember when Hitler disclosed to you that he was making the military +preparations for occupying Czechoslovakia that autumn? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler spoke very little to me about military +matters. I do not remember such a disclosure, but I know of course that +the Führer was determined to solve this problem at a fixed time; and +according to the experiences which Germany had had in past years, it was +for him a matter of course that to do this he was obliged, I might say, +to take some sort of military measures in order to put more pressure on +his demands. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me help you about that. Turn on to Page 31 +of your document book. It is Page 37 of the English Document Book. +(Document Number 2360-PS, Exhibit GB-134) + +VON RIBBENTROP: Page 31? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 31 of your document book, yes. It is a +quotation from Hitler’s speech in January 1939, but it happens to make +clear this point. You see he says—have you got it, Witness? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “On the basis of this unbearable provocation, +which was still further emphasized by truly infamous persecution and +terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve the +Sudeten German question in a final and radical manner. On 28 May I gave: + + “1. The order for the preparation of military steps against this + State”—that is Czechoslovakia—“to be completed by 2 October. + + “2. I ordered the intensive and speedy completion of our line of + fortifications in the West.” (Document Number 2360-PS) + +I want to remind you of that, because there was a meeting on the 28th of +May, and that is Hitler’s own account of it. Put in another way, he +said, “It is my absolute will that Czechoslovakia should disappear from +the map.” And then he made clear the other thing about the defensive +front in the West. + +Now, do you remember that meeting, the 28th of May? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have here, I believe, seen the document about it. I do +not recall the meeting. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if—I think Captain Fritz Wiedemann was +still adjutant of the Führer at that time; it was before he went +abroad—he says you were there, would you deny it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that, but I believe that is an error by Herr +Wiedemann. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you think you weren’t there? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I am inclined to believe that it is an error. At any +rate I do not remember that meeting. I could not say for sure. Generally +I was not drawn into military affairs, but in this case I cannot say for +sure. But I knew that it was common talk that the Führer, in the course +of the year 1938, became more and more determined to assure the rights, +as he put it, of the Sudeten Germans; I knew that he had made certain +military preparations for that purpose, but I did not know in what form +and to what extent. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just to put your point of view fairly—I don’t +want to put anything more into it—you knew that military preparations +were being made, but you did not know the details of what we know now as +“Fall Grün.” + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know any details; I never heard about +them, but I knew that during the last weeks and months of the crisis... + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I object to this question. I believe I may, in +order to save time, just point out that the entire Sudeten German policy +was sanctioned by the four great powers, England, France, Italy, and +Germany, and by the Munich Agreement which determined this policy. +Therefore, I do not see that in this respect there can be a violation of +International Law. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is perfectly proper. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, at the time you knew enough to discuss the +possible course of the possible war with the foreign personalities. +Would you look on to Page 34, that is Page 40 of the English book. These +are the notes of a discussion with the Italian Ambassador. I do not know +which of your officials it took place with, but I want you to look at +where it says in a handwritten note “only for the Reichsminister.” + + “Attolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed + unmistakably to the Italians our intentions against the Czechs. + Also, as to the date he had information so far that he might go + on leave for perhaps 2 months, but certainly not later than...” + (Document Number 2800-PS) + +If you look at the date you will see it is the 18th of July, and 2 +months from the 18th of July would be the 18th of September. Then if you +will look, a month later there is a note, I think signed by yourself, on +the 27th of August: + + “Attolico paid me a visit. He had received another written + instruction from Mussolini, asking that Germany communicate in + time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia. + Mussolini asked for such notification, as Attolico assured me, + in order: ‘to be able to take in due time the necessary measures + on the French frontier.’ + + “Note: I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former + _démarche_, that I could not give him any date, that, however, + in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of + any decision.” (Document Number 2792-PS) + +So that it is quite clear, isn’t it, that you knew that the general +German preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia were under way but +the date had not been fixed beyond the general directive of Hitler, that +it was to be ready by the beginning of October. That was the position in +July and August, wasn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: In August, 27 August, there was, of course, already a +sort of crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia about that problem; +and it is quite clear that during that time there was some alarm as to +the final outcome. And apparently, according to this document, I said to +the Italian Ambassador that in case crisis developed into a military +action, Mussolini would, of course, be notified in advance. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And Mussolini would be ready to make a +demonstration on the French frontier in order to help forward your +military plans; is that right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is in this document, but I do not know anything +about it. Perhaps Attolico said that; if it says so here he must have +said it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over to about the same time, +Pages 36 to 38, Pages 41 to 43 of the English book. I do not want to +take up time in reading it all, but that is the account of the meeting +which you had with the Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya. And I +should be very glad if, in the interest of time, you would try to answer +the general question. + +Weren’t you trying in your discussions with Imredy and Kanya to get the +Hungarians to be prepared to attack Czechoslovakia, should war +eventuate? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I am not very familiar with the contents of this +document. May I read it first, please? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just read to you... + +VON RIBBENTROP: I may perhaps be able to answer it from recollection. I +do not know exactly what the document says, but my recollection is, that +at that time a crisis was impending. It is quite natural, if an armed +conflict about the Sudeten German problem was within the realm of +possibility, that Germany should then establish some sort of contact +with neighboring states. That is a matter of course, but I believe... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you went a little beyond contacting them, +didn’t you? The document says at the end of the sixth paragraph, “Von +Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good +opportunity and participate.” (Document Number 2796-PS) + +That is a bit beyond contacting people. What you are saying to the +Hungarians is: “If you want the revision of your boundaries, you have to +come into the war with us.” It is quite clear, isn’t it, Witness, that +is what you were saying, that is what you were trying to do? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is exactly in line with what I just said. I do not +know if that expression was used, but, at any rate, it is clear that at +that time, I remember, I told these gentlemen that the possibility of a +conflict was present and that in such a case it would be advisable if we +reached an agreement regarding our interests. I would like to mention +that Hungary, during all the preceding years, considered it one of the +hardest conditions of the peace treaty that these territories in the +north had been separated from her and naturally she was very much +interested in the agreement. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were very much interested in offering them +revision. Just look at the last two paragraphs. It is headed “The 25th.” +It should be Page 38 of your document book. It begins—the very end of +this statement: + + “Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness for participation in + case of a German-Czech conflict, Von Kanya mentioned several + days ago that his country would need a period of one or two + years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of + Hungary. During today’s conversation, Von Kanya corrected this + remark and said that Hungary’s military situation was much + better; his country would be ready, as far as armaments were + concerned, to take part in the conflict by 1 October of this + year.” (Document Number 2797-PS) + +You see that? What I am putting to you, Witness, is this: That your +position was perfectly clear. First of all, you get the Sudeten Germans +under your control. Then you learned from Hitler that there were +military preparations. Then you get the Italians in line. Then you get +the Hungarians in line. You are getting everyone ready for aggression +against Czechoslovakia. That is what I am putting to you. I want you to +be quite clear about it, to be under no misapprehension. Now, look, +what... + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I answer to that? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, if you like. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I said once before that the Sudeten German Party was +unfortunately not under my control. Moreover, it is and was my view that +it was the fundamental right of the Sudeten Germans, according to the +law of the sovereign rights of peoples which had been proclaimed in +1919, to decide themselves where they wanted to belong. + +When Adolf Hitler came, this pressure to join the Reich became very +strong. Adolf Hitler was determined to solve this problem, either by +diplomatic means or, if it had to be, by other means. That was obvious, +and became more so to me. At any rate, I personally did everything to +try to solve the problem diplomatically. On the other hand, however, in +order to bring about a situation such as eventually led to Munich, I +naturally tried my utmost to surround Germany with friends in order to +make our position as strong as possible in the face of such a problem. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew perfectly well, did you not, that the +Fall Grün and Hitler’s military plans envisaged the conquest of the +whole of Czechoslovakia? You knew that, didn’t you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. As far as the Sudeten-German +problem is concerned, the British Government themselves concluded the +agreement at Munich by which the entire problem was solved in the way I +always strove to achieve it by German diplomacy. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I am not going to argue politics with +you on any point. I only remind you of this: That the Fall Grün and +Hitler’s plans on this matter had been known to His Majesty’s Government +only since the end of the war, when it came into our possession as a +captured document. What I asked you was—you say that as the Foreign +Minister of the Reich, you did not know of these military plans, that +the conquest of the whole Czechoslovakia was envisaged? You say that? +You want the Tribunal to believe that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I repeat again that I read about Fall Grün and the +conception of Fall Grün here for the first time in the documents. I did +not know that term before, nor was I interested. That the Führer +envisaged a more far-reaching solution became, of course, clear to me +later in the course of the subsequent developments and by the +establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment. We will get to that in a moment. +I just want you to look at the final act of preparation which you were +doing, and I am suggesting for this clear aggression; if you will look +at Page 45 in the book in front of you, you will see a note from the +Foreign Office to the Embassy in Prague. + + “Please inform Deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get + into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start + their demands for autonomy tomorrow.” (Document Number 2858-PS) + +That was your office’s further act, wasn’t it, in order to make things +difficult for the Government in Prague? You were getting your friends to +induce—to use your own word—the Slovaks to start an advance for +autonomy, is that right? Is that what your office was doing? + +VON RIBBENTROP: This is, beyond doubt, a telegram from the Foreign +Office. I do no longer recall the details, but according to the +contents, Henlein apparently approached us to send a telegram because +Henlein was apparently of the opinion, at that time, that he should put +the demands for autonomy to the Prague Government. How that came about, +I could not say in detail today. I would like to emphasize again that +Conrad Henlein’s activity—I say, unfortunately, and I said so +before—was far beyond my control. I saw Henlein only once or twice +during that entire time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take you through all the +details. You understand what I’m suggesting to you, that your office was +now taking one of its last steps, because this was in the middle of the +crisis, on the 19th of September, trying to weaken the Czech Government +by inducing demands of autonomy from the Slovaks. You said that you were +only passing on Henlein’s wishes. If you like to leave it at that, I +shall not trouble you further. Besides, you suggested—I come on to what +took place in the spring and ask you one or two questions about that. In +the spring Hitler was out and you acquiesced in his wishes, without—I +was going to say swallowing, but I want to choose my language +carefully—to obtain the adherence of Bohemia and Moravia to the Reich +and to make Slovakia separate from Bohemia and Moravia. Now, just look +on to Page 65 of the book in front of you. That is a telegram in secret +code from the Foreign Office, from yourself in fact; to the Embassy in +Prague. + + “With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today, + in case you should get any written communications from President + Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take + any other action but pass them on here by ciphered telegrams. + Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the legation + to make a point of not being available during the next few days + if the Czech Government wants to communicate with you.” + (Document Number 2815-PS) + +Why were you so anxious that your ambassador should not carry out these +ordinary functions and form a channel of communication with the Czech +Government? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That happened as follows. I remember very well. That had +the following reasons: The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, +Chvalkovsky, on one of these days, it must have been the same day, +approached the envoy in Prague, saying that President Hacha wished to +speak to the Führer. I had reported that to the Führer, and the Führer +had agreed to receive the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister or the +Czechoslovakian President. The Führer said, at the same time, that he +wished to conduct these negotiations himself and that he did not wish +anybody else, even the legation, to interfere in any way. That, +according to my recollection, was the reason for this telegram. No one +was to undertake anything in Prague; whatever was done would be done by +the Führer personally. + +I wish to point out that also at that time signs of an impending crisis +between Prague and ourselves became apparent. The visit of President +Hacha or his desire to see the Führer can be explained as being the +result of this situation in general. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like to remind you what you +and the Führer were doing on that day. You will find that if you look at +Page 66, which is 71 of the English book. You were having a conference, +you and the Führer, with Meissner and the Defendant Keitel and Dietrich +and Keppler; and you were having the conference with the Slovaks, with +M. Tiso. Do you remember that conference? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember that conference very well. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I will ask you a general question +and perhaps without putting the details to you. What Hitler and you were +doing at that conference was saying this to the Slovaks: “If you do not +declare your independence of Prague, we shall leave you to the tender +mercies of Hungary.” Isn’t that in a sentence a fair summary of what +Hitler and you were saying at that conference? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct to a certain degree. But I would like to +add a further statement to that. The situation at the time was as +follows, and one has to look at it from a political point of view: The +Hungarians were highly dissatisfied and they wanted to regain the +territories which they had lost by the peace treaty and today form a +part of Czechoslovakia, that is the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. There +were, therefore, constantly great differences between Pressburg +(Bratislava) and Budapest and, chiefly, also between Prague and +Budapest. The outbreak of an armed conflict could be expected at any +time; at least half a dozen times we were given to understand by the +Hungarian Government that this could not go on forever; that they must +have their revision in one way or the other. The situation was such that +for quite some time very strong movements for independence existed among +the Slovaks. We were approached on this matter quite frequently, at +first by Tuka and later by Tiso. In this conference described here, the +situation was that the Führer, who knew for weeks of the endeavors of +the Slovaks to become independent, finally received Tiso, later +President of the State, and told him that now, of course—I believe he +told him during this conversation—that he was not interested in the +question for its own sake. But if anything should happen at all, then +the Slovaks must proclaim their independence as quickly as possible. +There is no doubt that at the time we expected an action by Hungary. It +is, however, correct... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can see how very anxious the Slovaks seemed +to be for independence and what action Hitler and yourself were taking +to secure it; if you try to find it, it will probably be at Page 67; it +is at the end of a paragraph beginning, “Now he has permitted Minister +Tiso to come here...” + +And just below the middle of that paragraph, Hitler is reported as +saying that he would not tolerate that internal instability and he had +for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It +was not a question of days but of hours. He stated at that time that, if +Slovakia wished to make herself independent, he would support this +endeavor and even guarantee it; he would stand by his words so long as +Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she +hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he +would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of the events for which +he was no longer responsible. + +Then in the next paragraph he asks you if you had anything to say and +you are reported as saying (Document Number 2802-PS, Exhibit USA-117): + + “The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the + view that in this case a decision was a question of hours and + not of days. He showed Hitler a message he had just received + which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontier. + The Führer read this report and mentioned it to Tiso and + expressed his hope that Slovakia would soon come to a clear + decision.” + +Are you denying, Witness, that Hitler and you were putting the strongest +possible pressure you could on the Slovaks to dissolve connections with +Prague and so leave the Czechs standing alone to meet your pressure on +Hacha which was coming in a couple of days? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. Very strong pressure was not +used. There is no doubt that on the part of Hungary—and my remark +refers to the possibility of warlike developments with the +Hungarians—but wishes for independence had for a long time been +conveyed to us again and again by the Slovaks. It is possible that, at +the time, as the document shows, Tiso was hesitating, because after all +it was an important step. But in view of the wish of the Führer, which +must have been obvious by then, to solve the question of Bohemia and +Moravia in one way or another, it was in the interest of the Führer to +do his part to bring about the independence of Slovakia. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: One point. This is my last question before I +come to the interview with President Hacha. Don’t you remember that 2 +days before Herr Bürckel—that is in my recollection—Herr Bürckel and +another Austrian National Socialist, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart and a +number of German officers, at about 10 in the evening of Saturday, the +11th of March, went into a Cabinet meeting at Bratislava and told the +_soi-disant_ Slovak Government that they should proclaim the +independence of Slovakia? Don’t you know that? It was reported by our +consul. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall it in detail, but I believe that +something of the kind took place but I do not know exactly what it was. +I believe that it was directed by the Führer. I had, I believe, less to +do with that. I no longer recall that exactly. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal very shortly... + +THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it is a quarter to 1 now. We had better +adjourn until 2. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, you were present at the interview +between President Hacha and Hitler on 15 March 1939, were you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was present. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler’s saying at that +interview that he had given the order for German troops to march into +Czechoslovakia, and that at 6 o’clock in the morning the German Army +would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact words, but I know that Hitler +told Hacha that he would occupy the countries of Bohemia and Moravia. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember his saying what I put to you, +that he had given the order for German troops to march into +Czechoslovakia? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is what I just said. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the Defendant Göring, as he told +the Tribunal, telling President Hacha that he would order the German Air +Forces to bomb Prague? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that in detail, because at +that discussion I was not... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you for a detailed statement; I +am asking you if you remember what I should suppose was a rather +remarkable statement, that the Defendant Göring said to President Hacha +that he would order the German Air Force to bomb Prague if Czech +resistance was not called off. Do you remember that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that; I was not present. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there during the whole interview, were +you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not. If the British Prosecutor will give me a +chance I shall explain how it was. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question at the moment. +You say you do not remember that. At any rate, if the Defendant Göring +said that he said it, would you accept that it happened? + +VON RIBBENTROP: If Göring says so, then it must, of course, be true. I +have merely stated that I was not present during that conference between +President Hacha and the then Reich Marshal Göring. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that within 2 days +the Czech Army would not exist any more? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that in detail, no; it was a very long +conference. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that at 6 o’clock +the troops would march in? He was almost ashamed to say that there was +one German division to each Czech battalion. + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is possible that something like that was said. +However, I do not remember the details. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If these things were said, will you agree with +me that the most intolerable pressure was put on President Hacha? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly Hitler used very clear language. However, to +that I must add that President Hacha, on his part, had come to Berlin in +order to find a solution, together with Hitler. He was surprised that +troops were to march into Czechoslovakia. That I know, and I remember it +exactly. But he agreed to it eventually and then contacted his +government and his chief of staff, so that there would be no hostile +reception for the German troops. He then concluded with Hitler, with the +Czech Foreign Minister and me, the agreement which I had drafted. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree with me that that agreement was +obtained through a threat of aggressive action by the German Army and +Air Force? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain, since the Führer told President Hacha +that the German Army would march in, that naturally, this instrument was +written under that impression. That is correct. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think you could answer one of my +question directly? I will ask it again. Will you agree with me that that +document was obtained by the most intolerable pressure and threat of +aggression? That is a simple question. Do you agree? + +VON RIBBENTROP: In that way, no. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What further pressure could you put on the head +of a country except to threaten him that your army would march in, in +overwhelming strength, and your Air Force would bomb his capital? + +VON RIBBENTROP: War, for instance. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is that but war? Do you not consider it war +that the Army would march in with a proportion of a division over a +battalion, and that the Air Force would bomb Prague? + +VON RIBBENTROP: President Hacha had told the Führer that he would place +the fate of his country in the Führer’s hands, and the Führer had... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question. My question is +a perfectly simple one, and I want your answer to it. You have told us +that that agreement was obtained after these threats were made. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what you said a moment ago. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you that that agreement was obtained by +threat of war. Is that not so? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that this threat is incomparably lighter than +the threats under which Germany stood for years through the Versailles +Treaty and its sanctions. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, leaving whatever it is comparatively, will +you now answer my question? Do you agree that that agreement was +obtained by threat of war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It was obtained under a pressure, that is under the +pressure of the march into Prague; there is no doubt about that. +However, the decisive point of the whole matter was that the Führer +explained to President Hacha the reasons why he had to do this, and +eventually Hacha agreed fully, after he had consulted his government and +his general staff and heard their opinion. However, it is absolutely +correct that the Führer was resolved to solve this question under any +circumstances. The reason was, that the Führer was of the opinion that +in the remainder of Czechoslovakia there was a conspiracy against the +German Reich; Reich Marshal Göring had already stated that Russian +commissions were said to have been at Czech airdromes. Consequently the +Führer acted as he did because he believed that it was necessary in the +highest interest and for the protection of the German Reich. I might +draw a comparison: For instance, President Roosevelt declared an +interest in the Western Hemisphere; England has extended her interest +over the entire globe. I think, that the interest which the Führer +showed in the remainder of Czechoslovakia was, as such, not unreasonable +for a great power; about the methods one may think as one pleases. At +any rate one thing is certain, and that is that these countries were +occupied without a single drop of blood being shed. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were occupied without a single drop of +blood being shed because you had threatened to march in overwhelming +strength and to bomb Prague if they didn’t agree, isn’t that so? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, not because we had threatened with superiority, but +because we had agreed beforehand that the Germans could march in +unimpeded. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you again, that the agreement was +obtained, however, by your threatening to march in and threatening to +bomb Prague, was it not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have already told you once that it was not so, but +that the Führer had talked to President Hacha about it and told him that +he would march in. The conversation between President Hacha and Göring +is not known to me. President Hacha signed the agreement after he had +consulted his government and his general staff in Prague by telephone. +There is no doubt that the personality of the Führer, his reasoning, and +finally the announced entry of the German troops induced President Hacha +to sign the agreement. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember—would you mind standing up, +General, for a second? [_A Czechoslovakian Army officer arose._] Don’t +you remember that General Ecer asked you some questions once, this +general from Czechoslovakia? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, certainly. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say to him that you thought that this +action on the 15th of March was contrary to the declaration of Hitler +given to Chamberlain but, in fact, that Hitler saw in the occupation a +vital necessity for Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I was wrong in the first point; I +will admit that openly; I remembered it afterward. In the Munich +Agreement between Hitler and Chamberlain nothing like that is contained. +It was not intended as a violation of that agreement. In the second +place, I think I stated that Hitler believed he had to act that way in +the interest of his country. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to tell us one or two +general things about your views with regard to Great Britain. Is it +correct that when you went to London as Ambassador of the Reich you +thought there was very little chance of an agreement, in fact that it +was a hundred-to-one chance of getting an understanding with Great +Britain? + +VON RIBBENTROP: When I asked the Führer to send me to London +personally... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Here is a simple question I am asking you: Is it +right that when you went to London as Ambassador you thought there was +very little chance of an understanding with England, in fact, that the +chance was a hundred-to-one? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the chances were not good. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These, as you know, are your own words... + +VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to add something. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: First answer my question. These are your own +words, aren’t they, that the chance was a hundred-to-one? Do you +remember saying that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: A hundred-to-one? I do not remember that, but I want to +add something. I told Hitler that the chance was very small; and I also +told him that I would try everything to bring about an Anglo-German +understanding in spite of the odds. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England did you believe that +war was inevitable? When you left England, when you ceased being +ambassador, did you believe that war was unavoidable? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not of the opinion that it was inevitable, but +that, considering the developments which were taking place in England, a +possibility of war existed, of that I was convinced. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to be careful about this. Did you say +that you didn’t think war was unavoidable when you left England? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I can neither say that it was unavoidable nor that it +was avoidable; at any rate, it was clear to me that with the development +of the policy towards Germany which was taking place in England, an +armed conflict might lie in the realm of possibility. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at page 211-E of the document book; +English book, 170. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 211? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now will you look at the second paragraph? It +reads like this: + + “He, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister), had been more than + skeptical even on his arrival in London and had considered the + chances for an understanding as a hundred-to-one. The + warmongers’ clique in England had won the upper hand. When he + (the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable.” (Document Number + 1834-PS) + +Is that what you said to Ambassador Oshima? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I said exactly that; at any rate, +that is diplomatic language, Mr. Prosecutor, and it is quite possible +that we at that time, as a result of the situation, in consultation with +the Japanese ambassador, considered it opportune to express it that way. +At any rate, that is not the important point; the important thing is +that as I remember, when I left England a certainty and inevitability of +war did not exist. Whether in later years I said this or that has no +bearing on what I said when I left London. I do not think that there is +the least bit of evidence for that. Perhaps I tried to draw him into the +war against England and therefore used forceful language. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As you said “no,” just look at Document Number +TC-75, Exhibit GB-28, and at your conclusions that are to be drawn. You +will see it at the end under Number 5, “Therefore, conclusions to be +drawn by us...” It is about the end of the third page: + + “5) Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us: + + “1) Outwardly further understanding with England while + protecting the interest of our friends; + + “2) Formation, under great secrecy but with all persistence, of + a coalition against England, that is, in practice a tightening + of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the winning over of + all nations whose interests conform with ours, directly or + indirectly; close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats + of the three great powers towards this purpose.” + +And the last sentence: + + “Every day on which—no matter what tactical interludes of + rapprochement towards us are attempted—our political + considerations are not guided fundamentally by the thought of + England as our most dangerous adversary, would be a gain for our + enemies.” + +Why did you tell the Tribunal a minute ago that you had not advised the +Führer that there should be outward friendly relations and in actuality +a coalition against her? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what kind of a document that is at all. +May I see it? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by yourself on the 2d of January +1938. It is your own report to the Führer. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite correct as such; that is the +conclusive statement: Only thus can we, some day, come to an agreement +or to a conflict with England. The situation at that time was clearly +this, that England was resisting the German wishes for a revision which +the Führer had declared vital and that only through a strong diplomatic +coalition did it seem possible to induce England, by diplomatic and not +by bellicose means. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You probably told him what was untrue? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, and I also do not know whether the +details have been recorded accurately. It is a long record; I do not +know where it comes from. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your own record of the meeting, from +captured German documents. + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is quite possible, but many things are said in +diplomacy every word of which is not weighed carefully. At any rate, the +truth is that when I left London there was no certainty that the war was +inevitable, but there is no doubt that I was skeptical when I left +London and did not know in what direction things would be drifting, +particularly on account of the very strong pro-war party in England. + +THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, will you speak a little bit more slowly? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, Sir. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England, was it not your view +that the German policy should be pretended friendliness toward England +and actual formation of a coalition against her? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Put this way, that is not correct. It was clear to me, +when I became Foreign Minister, that the realization of the German +desires in Europe was difficult and that it was principally England who +opposed them. I had tried for years, by order of the Führer, to achieve +these things by means of a friendly understanding with England. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now to answer my question: Did you +advise the Führer that the proper policy was pretended friendliness with +England and in actuality the formation of a coalition against her? Did +you or did you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not the right way of putting it to agree to +these German aspirations. That without doubt, was the situation. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, Witness, why you told the +Tribunal 5 minutes ago that you had not advised Hitler in the sense in +which I put to you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Which advice do you mean? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Outwardly an understanding with England and +formation under great secrecy of a coalition against her. I put that to +you twice and you denied it, I want to know why you did deny it. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I said quite clearly that England was resisting the +German requests and that therefore, if Germany wanted to realize these +aspirations, she could do nothing but find friends and bring England +with the help of those friends to the conference table so that England +would yield to these aspirations by diplomatic means. That was my task +at that time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to direct your attention to the +relations with Poland. I will give you the opportunity of answering a +question generally, and I hope in that way we may save time. + +Will you agree that up to the Munich Agreement, the speeches of all +German statesmen were full of the most profound affection and respect +for Poland? Do you agree with that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the purpose of what is shown in the +Foreign Office memorandum of 26 August 1938? I will give you the page +number, Page 107 of your document book. I want you to look at it. I +think it is the fourth paragraph, beginning, “This method of approach +towards Czechoslovakia...”; and you may take it from me that the method +of approach was putting forward the idea that you and Hitler wanted the +return of all Germans to the Reich. I put it quite fairly and +objectively. That is what preceded it. I want you to look at that +paragraph. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Which paragraph do you mean? I did not hear. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The fourth, “This method of approach towards +Czechoslovakia...” it begins. The fourth on my copy. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet. Paragraph 5, yes, I have it. + + SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “This method of approach towards + Czechoslovakia is to be recommended also because of our + relationship with Poland. The turning away of Germany from the + boundary question of the southeast and her change-over to those + of the east and northeast must inevitably put the Poles on the + alert. After the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian question, it + will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn; + but the later this assumption becomes a factor in international + politics, the better.” (Document Number TC-76) + +Does that correctly set out the endeavors of German foreign policy at +that time? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly no, for, first of all, I do not know what +kind of a document it is. It has apparently been prepared by some +official in the Foreign Office where sometimes such theoretical +treatises were prepared and may have come to me through the State +Secretary. However, I do not remember having read it. Whether it reached +me, I cannot tell you at the moment; but it is possible that such +thoughts prevailed among some of our officials. That is quite possible. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now, if you do not agree, would you look +at Page 110, on which you will find extracts from Hitler’s Reichstag +speech on 26 September 1938. I am sorry. I said Reichstag; I meant +Sportpalast. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Sportpalast, yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the end of this extract the Führer is quoted +as saying with regard to Poland, after a tribute to Marshal Pilsudski: + + “We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting + pacification. We realize that here are two peoples who must live + together and neither of whom can do away with the other. A + people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the + sea. A way to understanding, then, had to be found. It has been + found, and it will be continually extended further. Certainly, + things were difficult for this area. The nationalities and small + groups frequently quarreled among themselves, but the decisive + fact is that the two Governments and all reasonable and + clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two + countries possess the firm will and determination to improve + their relations. This is a real work of peace, of more value + than all of the idle talk at the League of Nations Palace in + Geneva.” (Document Number TC-73, Number 42) + +Do you think that is an honest statement of opinion? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I believe that that was definitely the Führer’s +view at the time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so at that time all the questions of the +treatment of minorities in Poland were very unimportant; is that so? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, they were not unimportant. They were a latent and +even difficult point between Poland and ourselves, and the purpose of +that particular kind of statement by the Führer was to overcome it. I am +so familiar with the problem of the minorities in Poland because I +watched it for personal reasons for many years. From the time I took +over the Foreign Ministry, there were again and again the greatest +difficulties which, however, were always settled on our part in the most +generous way. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate you have agreed with me that the +speeches at that time—and you say quite honestly—were full of praise +and affection for the Poles; is that right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, we were hoping that thereby we could bring the +German minority problem, in particular, to a satisfactory and sensible +solution. That had been our policy since 1934. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, immediately after Munich you first +raised the question of Danzig with M. Lipski, I think, in October, +around 21 October. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Right, 28 October. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28 October. And the Poles had replied on the +31st; it may have reached you a day later through M. Lipski, suggesting +the making of a bilateral agreement between Germany and Poland, but +saying the return of Danzig to the Reich would lead to a conflict. I put +it quite generally. I just wanted to remind you of the tenor of the +reply. Do you remember? + +VON RIBBENTROP: According to my recollection it was not quite like that. +The Führer had charged me—it was on 28 October, to be exact—to request +Ambassador Lipski to come to Berchtesgaden. His order was given because +the Führer in particular, perhaps as a sequel to the speech in the +Sportpalast, but that I do not remember, wanted to bring about a +clarification of the relations with all his neighbors. He wanted that +now particularly with respect to Poland. He instructed me, therefore, to +discuss with Ambassador Lipski the question of Danzig and the question +of a connection between the Reich and East Prussia. + +I asked Ambassador Lipski to come and see me, and stated these wishes in +a very friendly atmosphere. Ambassador Lipski was very reserved; he +stated that after all Danzig was not a simple problem but that he would +discuss the question with his government. I asked him to do so soon and +inform me of the outcome. That was the beginning of the negotiations +with Poland. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you will turn—I do not want to +stop you, but I want to get on quickly over this matter—if you will +turn to Page 114, you will find the minutes of M. Beck’s conversation +with Hitler on 5 January. I just want to draw your attention to the last +paragraph, where, after M. Beck had said that the Danzig question was a +very difficult problem: + + “In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this + problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite + new, some new formula, for which he used the term + ‘Körperschaft,’ which on the one hand would safeguard the + interest of the German population and on the other hand the + Polish interest. In addition the Chancellor declared that the + Minister could be quite at ease; there would be no _fait + accompli_ in Danzig and nothing would be done to render + difficult the situation of the Polish Government.” (Document + TC-73, Number 48) + +Do you see that, before I ask you the question? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have read that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the summary of your own +conversation with M. Beck on the next day. It is Page 115, at the +beginning of the paragraph, the second paragraph. You will see that, +after M. Beck had mentioned the Danzig question, you said, “In answer, +Herr Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking +any violent solution.” (Document TC-73, Number 49). That was almost word +for word what Hitler had said the day before; do you see that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, turn back to Page 113. (Document Number +C-137, Exhibit GB-33) These are the Defendant Keitel’s orders to—or +rather, to put it exactly—the Defendant Keitel’s transmission of the +Führer’s order with regard to Danzig. It is dated 24 November. That was +some 6 weeks before, and it is supplementary to an order of 21 October, +and you see what it says: + + “Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the + instructions of 21 October, preparations are also to be made to + enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops + by surprise. (‘4. Occupation of Danzig’). + + “The preparations will be made on the following basis. The + condition is a _coup de main_ occupation of Danzig, exploiting a + politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland.” + (Document Number C-137) + +Did you know of these instructions? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. This is the first time that I +have seen that order or whatever it may be. May I add something? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not for the moment. Hitler must have known of +the order, mustn’t he? It is an order of the Führer? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, of course, and therefore I assume—that is what I +wanted to add—that the British Prosecution are aware that political +matters and military matters are in this case two completely different +conceptions. There is no doubt that the Führer, in view of the permanent +difficulties in Danzig and the Corridor, had given military orders of +some kind—just in case—and I can well imagine that it is one of these +orders. I see it today for the first time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Supposing that you had known of the orders, +Witness, would you still have said on the 5th of January that Germany +was not seeking a _fait accompli_ or a violent solution? If you had +known of that order would you still have said it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: If I had known this order and considering it an order of +the General Staff for possible cases, as I am compelled to do, then I +would still continue to have the same opinion. I think it is part of the +General Staff’s duty to take into consideration all possible +eventualities and prepare for them in principle. In the final analysis +that has nothing to do with politics. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Nothing to do with politics to have a +cut-and-dried plan how the Free State of Danzig is to be occupied by +German troops by surprise when you are telling the Poles that you won’t +have a _fait accompli_? That is your idea of how matters should be +carried on? If it is I will leave it. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must rather add that I know that the Führer was +alarmed for a long time, particularly during 1939, lest a sudden Polish +attack take place against Danzig; so that to me, I am not a military +man, it appears quite natural to make some preparations for all such +problems and possibilities. But, of course, I cannot judge the details +of these orders. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when did you learn that Hitler was +determined to attack Poland? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That Hitler contemplated a military action against +Poland, I learned for the first time, as I remember, in August 1939. +That, of course, he had made certain military preparations in advance to +meet any eventuality becomes clear from this order regarding Danzig. But +I definitely did not learn about this order, and I do not recollect now +in detail whether I received at that time any military communication. I +do remember that I knew virtually nothing about it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that you did not know +in May that Hitler’s real view was that Danzig was not the subject of +the dispute at all, but that his real object was the acquisition of +Lebensraum in the East? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know it in that sense. The Führer talked +sometimes about living space, that is right, but I did not know that he +had the intention to attack Poland. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at Page 117, or it may be +118, of your document. On Page 117 you will find the minutes of the +conference on the 23rd day of May 1939 at the new Reich Chancellery. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 117? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 117. I want you to look at it. It may be on Page +118, and it begins with the following words: + + “Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a + question of expanding our Lebensraum in the East and of securing + our food supplies and of the settlement of the Baltic problem. + Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. + Added to the natural fertility, the German, through cultivation, + will enormously increase the surplus. There is no other + possibility for Europe.” (Document Number L-79) + +Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never explained that view to +you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It may be strange to say so, but I should like to say +first that it looks as though I was not present during this conference. +That was a military conference, and the Führer used to hold these +military conferences quite separately from the political conferences. +The Führer did now and then mention that we had to have Lebensraum; but +I knew nothing, and he never told me anything at that time, that is in +May 1939, of an intention to attack Poland. Yes, I think this was kept +back deliberately, as had been done in other cases, because he always +wanted his diplomats to stand wholeheartedly for a diplomatic solution +and to bring it about. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean to say that Hitler was deliberately +keeping you in the dark as to his real aims; that Danzig was not the +subject of dispute and what he really wanted was Lebensraum; is that +your story? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I assume that he did that deliberately because... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the very short paragraph +a little further on where he says: + + “There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with no + alternative but to attack Poland at the first suitable + opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. + There will be fighting. The task is to isolate Poland.” + +Do you tell the Tribunal that he never said that to his Foreign +Minister? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand that question. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a perfectly simple one. Do you tell the +Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned what I have just read from his +speech, that there is to be no question of sparing Poland, that you had +to attack Poland at the first opportunity, and your task was to isolate +Poland? Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned that to +his Foreign Minister, who would have the practical conduct of foreign +policy? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not do that at that time; but, according to +my recollection, only much later, in the summer of 1939. At that time he +did say that he was resolved—and he said literally—to solve the +problem one way or another. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you say that you didn’t know in May that +Hitler wanted war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That he wanted what? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know in May that Hitler wanted war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not convinced of that at all. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear from the document that he did +want war, isn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: This document, no doubt, shows the intention of an +action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used strong language +to his military men, that is, he spoke as though he had the firm +intention of attacking a certain country in some way, but whether he +actually would have carried it out later politically is an entirely +different question. I know that he repeatedly told me that one had to +talk with military men as if war was about to break out here or there on +the next day. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about another point. You +said on Friday that you had never expressed the view that Great Britain +would stay out of war and would fail to honor her guarantee to Poland. +Do you remember saying that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you to look at one +or two other documents. Do you remember on the 29th of April 1939 +receiving the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister at 3:30 +in the afternoon? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we have the minutes of your meeting signed +by Von Erdmannsdorff, I think. Did you say this to the Hungarian Prime +Minister and Foreign Minister: + + “The Reich Foreign Minister added that it was his firm + conviction that, no matter what happened in Europe, no French or + English soldier would attack Germany. Our relations with Poland + were gloomy at the moment.” + +Did you say that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think I ever said that. I consider that +impossible. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you got a copy... + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I perhaps have a look at the document? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, with pleasure. This will become +Exhibit GB-289, Document D-737. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot, of course, tell you now in detail what I said +at that time, but it may be possible that there was an effort at that +time to reassure the Hungarians who were probably concerned about the +Polish problem; that is absolutely possible. But I hardly believe that I +said anything like this. However, it is certain that the Führer knew, +and I had told the Führer that England would march to the aid of Poland. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are a little doubtful would you look at +Document Number D-738, which will be Exhibit GB-290. Apparently you saw +these gentlemen again 2 days later. Just look at the last sentence of +that: + + “He (the Reich Foreign Minister) pointed out again that Poland + presented no military problem for us. In case of a military + clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.” + +That is quite straight speaking, isn’t it, “The British would coldly +leave the Poles in the lurch”? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know on just what page that is. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 7, and it is the report of the +1st of May, the last sentence of my quotation. It is signed by a +gentlemen called Von Erdmannsdorff; it appears above his signature. The +words I am asking you about are, “In case of a military clash the +British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.” + +VON RIBBENTROP: Is that on Page 8 or where? On what page, if I may ask? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My heading is Paragraph 7. It begins: + + “The Reich Foreign Minister then returned to our attitude + towards the Polish question and pointed out that the Polish + attitude had aroused great bitterness.” + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is perfectly conceivable that I said something like +that, and if it has been said it was done in order not to alarm the +Hungarians and to keep them on our side. It is quite clear that that is +nothing but diplomatic talk. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think there is any requirement to tell +the truth in a political conversation? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That was not the point; the point was to bring about a +situation which made it possible to solve this and the Polish question +in a diplomatic way. If I were to tell the Hungarians today, and this +applies to the Italians also, that England would assist Poland and that +a great war would result, then this would create a diplomatic situation +which would make it impossible to solve the problem at all. There is no +doubt that during the entire time I had to use very strong language, +just as the Führer had always ordered, for if his own Foreign Minister +had hinted at other possibilities, it would naturally have been very +difficult, and I venture to say, it would have meant that this would, in +any case, have led to war. But we wanted to create a strong German +position so that we could solve this problem peacefully. I may add that +the Hungarians were somewhat worried with regard to the German policy, +and that the Führer had told me from the start to use particularly clear +and strong language on these subjects. I used that kind of language also +quite frequently to my own diplomats for the same reasons. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You want us to assume that you were telling lies +to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That +is what it comes to shortly, isn’t it? That is what you want us to +understand—that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are +telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what you want us to +understand isn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether one can talk of lies in this case, +Mr. Prosecutor. This is a question of diplomacy; and if we wanted to +create a strong position, then of course we could not go beating about +the bush. Consider what the impression would have been if the German +Foreign Minister had spoken as if at the slightest German step the whole +world would attack Germany! The Führer used frequently such strong +language and expected me to do the same. I want to emphasize again that +often I had to use such language, even to my own Foreign Office, so that +there was no misunderstanding. If the Führer was determined on the +solution of a problem, no matter what the circumstances, even at the +risk of war if it had to be, our only chance to succeed was to adopt a +firm stand, for had we failed to do that, war would have been +inevitable. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you to have in mind what Count +Ciano says that you said to him on, I think the 11th or 12th of August, +just before your meeting at, I think it was at Salzburg, with you and +Hitler. You remember that according to Count Ciano’s diary he said that +he asked you, “What do you want, the Corridor or Danzig?” and that you +looked at him and said, “Not any more; we want war.” Do you remember +that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is absolutely untrue. I told Count Ciano at +that time, this is on the same line, “the Führer is determined to solve +the Polish problem one way or another.” This was what the Führer had +instructed me to say. That I am supposed to have said “we want war” is +absurd for the simple reason that, it is clear to every diplomat, those +things are just not said, not even to the very best and most trusted +ally, but most certainly not to Count Ciano. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should just like you to look at a report of +the subsequent conversation that you had with Mussolini and Count Ciano +not very long after, on the 10th of March 1940, that is, about 9 months +later. If you look at Document Number 2835-PS, which will become Exhibit +GB-291, and if you will turn to, I think it is Page 18 or 19... + +VON RIBBENTROP: You mean Page 18? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I remind you again, a conversation between you +and Mussolini and Ciano on the 10th of March 1940. It begins by saying: + + “The Reich Foreign Minister recalled that he actually had stated + in Salzburg to Count Ciano that he did not believe that England + and France would assist Poland without further questions, but + that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of + intervention by the Western Powers. He was glad now about the + course of events, because, first of all, it had always been + clear that the clash would have to come sooner or later and that + it was inevitable.” + +And then you go on to say that it would be a good thing to finish the +conflict in the lifetime of the Führer. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was after the outbreak of war; is that it? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. What I am putting to you are these words: + + “He was glad now about the course of events, because, first of + all, it had always been clear that the clash would have to come + sooner or later and that it was inevitable.” + +And if you will look at where it says “secondly”... + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to that? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; but what I am suggesting to you is that +that shows perfectly clearly that Count Ciano is right, and that you +were very glad that the war had come, because you thought this was an +appropriate time for it to happen. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree. On the contrary, it says here also +“that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of intervention +by the Western Powers.” It says so here quite clearly. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is the second part that I am putting to +you. I pass from that point about British intervention. I say, “he was +glad now about the course of events,” and if you will look down at the +paragraph where it says “secondly,” so that you will have it in mind, +the third line says: + + “Secondly, at the moment when England introduced general + conscription it was clear that the ratio of war strength would + not develop in the long run in favor of Germany and Italy.” + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask where it says that? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A few lines further down. The word “secondly” is +underlined, isn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not here. Yes, I have it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Secondly, at the moment when England introduced +general conscription...” It is about 10 lines further on. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, what does the British Prosecutor try to prove with +that; I do not quite understand? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at the next sentence before +you answer my question. + + “This, along with the other things, was decisive for the + Führer’s decision to solve the Polish question, even under the + danger of intervention by the Western Powers. The deciding fact + was, however, that a great power could not take certain things + lying down.” + +What I am saying... + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that appears correct to me. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was your view at the time and the view +that you declared afterwards as being your view, that you were +determined that you would solve the Polish question even if it meant +war? Count Ciano was perfectly right in saying that you wanted war. That +is what I am putting to you. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No; that is not correct. I told Count Ciano at the time +at Berchtesgaden that the Führer was determined to solve the problem one +way or another. It was necessary to put it in that way because the +Führer was convinced that whatever became known to Rome would go to +London and Paris at once. He wanted therefore to have clear language +used so that Italy would be on our side diplomatically. If the Führer or +myself had said that the Führer was not so determined to solve that +problem, then it would have been without doubt passed on immediately. +But since the Führer was determined to solve the problem, if necessary +by war if it could not be solved any other way, this would have meant +war, which explains the clear and firm diplomatic attitude which I had +to adopt at that time in Salzburg. But I do not know in what way this is +contradictory to what is being said here. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to pass on to the last week in August +and take that again very shortly, because there is a lot of ground to +cover. + +You agreed in your evidence that on the 25th of August the Führer called +off the attack which was designed for the morning of the 26th. You +remember that? I just want you to have the dates in mind. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I know that date very well. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were here in court the day Dahlerus gave his +evidence, were you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was here. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And let me remind you of the date, that on the +evening of the 24th the Defendant Göring asked Herr Dahlerus to go to +London the next morning to carry forward a preliminary outline of what +the Führer was going to say to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th. So you +remember that was his evidence? And on the 25th, at 1:30... + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the dates exactly, but I suppose they +are correct. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I know these dates pretty well, and the Tribunal +will correct me if I am wrong, but I am giving them as I have looked +them up. That was the night of the 24th; Dahlerus left on the morning of +the 25th, and then at 1:30 on the 25th—you said about noon, I am not +quarreling with you for a matter of minutes—midday on the 25th the +Führer saw Sir Nevile Henderson... + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And gave him what is called a _note verbale_, +that is, an inquiry in general terms. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was given to him in the evening. At noon he had +only talked to him and in the evening I had Minister Schmidt take the +_note verbale_ to him, I think that is the way it was, with a special +message in which I asked him again to impress upon his Government how +serious the Führer was about this message or offer. I think that is +contained in the _British Blue Book_. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Whenever you gave him the actual note, Herr +Hitler told him the general view in the oral conversation which he had +with Sir Nevile in the middle of the day? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the actual calling off of the attack on the +morning of the 26th, as you have said, was not done until you had had +the message from Signor Mussolini at about 3 o’clock, and the news that +the Anglo-Polish formal agreement was going to be signed that evening +about 4 o’clock. That is what you have said. + +Now, the first point that I am putting to you is this: That at the time +that Herr Dahlerus was sent, and the time of this note, when the words +were spoken by the Führer to Sir Nevile Henderson, it was the German +intention to attack on the morning of the 26th; and what I suggest is +that both the message to Herr Dahlerus and the words which were spoken +to Sir Nevile Henderson were simply designed in order to trouble the +British Government, in the hope that it might have some effect on them +withdrawing from their aid to Poland; isn’t that right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Do you want me to answer that? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly; I am asking you. + +VON RIBBENTROP: The situation is that I am not familiar with the message +of Dahlerus, I cannot say anything about it. Regarding the meeting +between Hitler and Sir Nevile Henderson, I can say that I read the +correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler in the morning, I +think it was dated the 22d, and somehow had arrived at a sort of +deadlock. I talked to the Führer afterwards, about whether or not +another attempt should be made in order to arrive at some kind of a +solution with England. Subsequently, towards noon, I think it was 1 or 2 +o’clock, the Führer met Sir Nevile Henderson in my presence and told him +he should take a plane and fly to London in order to talk to the British +Government as soon as possible. After the solution of the Polish problem +he intended to approach England again with a comprehensive offer. He +gave, I believe, a rough outline of the offer already in the _note +verbale_; but I do not recall that exactly. Then Sir Nevile Henderson +flew to London. While the Führer was having that conversation, military +measures were under way. I learned of that during the day, because +Mussolini’s refusal had arrived, I believe, not at 3 o’clock, but +earlier in the course of the morning or at noon. Then at 4 or 5 in the +afternoon I heard about the ratification of the Polish-British +agreement. I went to the Führer immediately and suggested to him to +withdraw the military measures; and he did so after short deliberation. +There is no doubt that in the meantime certain military measures had +been taken. Just how far they went I regret not to be able to say. But +when the Führer sent that offer, that _note verbale_ to England I was +convinced and under the impression that if England would respond to it +in some way, it would not come to an armed conflict, and that in this +case the military measures which, I believe, were automatically put in +effect, would somehow have been stopped later on. But I cannot say +anything about that in detail. I recollect only one thing, and that is +that when I received the _note verbale_ from the Führer, which I think +was in the afternoon or in the evening, these measures had already +either been stopped or were, at any rate, in the process of being +stopped. I cannot give it to you in chronological order at the moment. +For that I have to have the pertinent documents which, unfortunately, +are not at my disposal here. But one thing is certain, the offer of the +Führer to England was made in order to try once again to come to a +solution of the Polish problem. When I saw the _note verbale_ I even +asked him, “How about the Polish solution?” and I still recollect that +he said, “We will now send that note to the British, and if they respond +to it then we can still see what to do, there will still be time.” + +At any rate, I believe, the military measures had either been stopped +when the note was submitted, or they were stopped shortly after. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you were not present at the meeting of the +Führer and his generals on the 22d of August, but you must have heard +many times the account of it read out since this Trial started. You +remember the Führer is reported, according to minutes, to have said: + + “I shall use propagandistic reasons for starting the war; never + mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be + asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and + making the war, not the right is what matters but victory.” + (Document Number 1014-PS). + +That is what was said at Obersalzberg. Has Hitler ever said anything +like that to you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say the 27th? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the 22d. What I am asking you is, has Hitler +said anything similar to that to you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, at the meeting on the 22d, I was not present; I +think I was on my way to Moscow. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said you were not present. That is why I put +it in that way. Has he ever said anything similar to you? You say “no.” +Well, now, I want you to come to the 29th. + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something about that? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No; if you say that he has not said it to you, I +am not going to pursue it, because we must not waste too much time on +each of these details. I want you to come to the 29th of August when you +saw Sir Nevile Henderson, and while accepting, with some reservations, +the idea of direct negotiation with Poland, you said that it must be a +condition of that negotiation that the Poles should send a +plenipotentiary by the next day, by the 30th. You remember that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, well, it was like this... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I really do not want to stop you, but I do want +to keep it short on this point. + +VON RIBBENTROP: In that case I must say “no”. May I make a statement? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, because this is only preliminary. I +thought it was common ground that you saw Sir Nevile on the 29th, that +you put a number of terms. One of the terms was that a Polish +plenipotentiary should be present by the 30th. If you don’t agree with +that, please tell me if I am wrong, because it is my recollection of all +documents. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 30th you have told us that your +reason for not giving a copy of the terms to Sir Nevile was, first, +because Hitler had ordered you not to give a copy. And I think your +reason given at the time was that the Polish plenipotentiary had not +arrived, and therefore it was no good giving a copy of the terms. That’s +right, isn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, these terms that were given, that were read +out by you, were not ready on the 29th, because in your communication +demanding a plenipotentiary you said if he came on the 30th you would +have the terms ready by that time. So may I take it that these terms +were drawn up by Hitler with the help of the Foreign Office between the +29th and the 30th? + +VON RIBBENTROP: He dictated them personally. I think there were 16 +points, if I remember rightly. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you really expect after the treatment +of Von Schuschnigg, of Tiso, of Hacha, that the Poles would be willing +to send a fly into the spider’s parlor? + +VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly counted on it and hoped for it. I think +that a hint from the British Government would have sufficed to bring +that envoy to Berlin. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And what you hoped was to put the Poles in this +dilemma, that either these terms would stand as a propagandistic cause +for the war, to use Hitler’s phrase—or else you would be able, by +putting pressure on the Polish plenipotentiary, to do exactly what you +had done before with Schuschnigg and Tiso and Hacha, and get a surrender +from the Poles. Wasn’t that what was in your mind? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, the situation was different. I must say, that on the +29th the Führer told the British Ambassador that he would draft these +conditions or this agreement and by the time of the arrival of the +Polish Plenipotentiary, would make them also available to the British +Government—or he hoped that this would be possible, I think that is +what he said. Sir Nevile Henderson took note of that, and I must repeat +that the Führer, after the British reply had been received on the 28th, +once more, and in spite of the extremely tense situation between Poland +and Germany, agreed to that kind of negotiation. The decisive thing in +these crucial days of the 30th and 31st is, therefore, the following: +The Führer had drafted these conditions, England knew that the +possibility of arriving at a solution existed. All during the 30th of +August we heard nothing from England, at least nothing definite. Only at +midnight, I think, did the British Ambassador report for this +discussion. In the meantime, I must mention that at 7 o’clock in the +evening news of the general mobilization in Poland had been received, +which excited the Führer extremely. Through that, the situation had +become extraordinarily acute. I still remember exactly the situation at +the Chancellery where almost hourly reports were received about +incidents, streams of refugees, and so forth. It was an atmosphere +heavily charged with electricity. The Führer waited all through the +30th; no definite answer arrived. Then, at midnight of the 30th, that +conversation took place. The course of that conversation has already +been described here by me and also by a witness, the interpreter +Schmidt. I did more then than I was allowed to do, in that I had read +the entire contents to Sir Nevile Henderson. I was hoping that England +perhaps might do something yet. The Führer had told Sir Nevile Henderson +that a Polish plenipotentiary would be treated on equal terms. +Therefore, there was the possibility of meeting somewhere at an +appointed place, or, that someone would come to Berlin, or that the +Polish Ambassador Lipski would be given the necessary authority. Those +were the possibilities. I would even like to go further. It was merely +necessary, during the 30th or the 31st, until late that night, or the +next morning when the march began, for the Polish Ambassador Lipski to +have authority at least to receive in his hands the German proposals. +Had this been done, the diplomatic negotiations would in any case have +been under way and thus the crisis would have been averted, at least for +the time being. + +I also believe, and I have said so before, that there would have been no +objections. I believe the Führer would have welcomed, if the British +Ambassador had intervened. The basis for the negotiations, I have also +mentioned this here before, was called reasonable by Sir Nevile +Henderson personally. One hint from the British Government during the +30th or 31st, and negotiations would have been in course on the basis of +these reasonable proposals of the Führer, termed reasonable even by the +British themselves. It would have caused no embarrassment to the Poles, +and I believe that on the basis of these reasonable proposals, which +were absolutely in accord with the Covenant of the League of Nations, +which provided for a plebiscite in the Corridor area, a solution, +perfectly acceptable for Poland, would have been possible. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal desire me to say that they think +that your answers and your explanations are too long, too argumentative, +and too repetitive, and they are upon matters which have been gone over +and over again before the Tribunal, so they would therefore ask you to +try to keep your answers as short as possible. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did I understand you correctly, Witness, on +Friday, that you didn’t know about the connection between Quisling and +the Defendant Rosenberg in the spring and summer of 1939? It was well +before the war, in the spring and summer, before June of 1939? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I knew that Rosenberg had friends +in Norway and that the name of Quisling was mentioned, but this name +meant nothing to me at that time. On the request of the Führer, at that +time I gave Rosenberg certain amounts of money for his friends in +Norway, for newspapers, propaganda, and similar purposes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know, as I understand your testimony, +that some of Quisling’s men had been in a schooling camp in Germany in +August of 1939, before the war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No I do not remember that. I learned of it here through +a document. But I do not recall having known anything about it. At any +rate, if I knew anything about it, I did not know any of the details. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the Germans living in Norway +had been used to enlarge and extend the staff of the various German +official agencies, the legation and the consulates, soon after the +beginning of the war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that at the moment, at all. At +that time I probably never did learn correctly about that, if that was +the case. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the quotation from the _Yearbook of the +NSDAP_. All I want to know at the moment is whether or not you knew +about that. If you say you did not... + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know and cannot say a thing about it, I’m +afraid... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know at the time, in December 1939, that +Quisling had two interviews with Hitler on the 16th and 18th of +December? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either. What was the date, may I +ask? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 16th and 18th December 1939, through the +Defendant Raeder. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing of these interviews, according to my +recollection. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that practically the first matter that you +knew about in regard to Norway was, first, when you got the letter from +Raeder, dated the 3rd of April? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that was a letter from Keitel. I believe +this is a misunderstanding. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is a mistake of mine. I am +sorry. Do you remember a letter from Keitel, where he says: + + “The military occupation of Denmark and Norway had been, by + command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High Command + of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht had + therefore ample time to deal with all questions connected with + the carrying out of this operation.” + +So really, Witness—I may perhaps be able to shorten the matter—you are +really not a very good person to ask about the earlier preparations with +regard to Norway, because you weren’t in on these earlier discussions +with Quisling and with Raeder and Hitler. Is that right? If so, I will +leave the subject. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not in on these discussions. But I should like +to clarify one thing briefly: that I received this letter—why, I do not +know—only some days later. The first intimation of the intention to +occupy Norway, due to the anticipated landing of the British, I received +about 36 hours ahead of time from the Führer. The letter was probably +longer under way than it should have been. I saw it only afterwards. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall not occupy time, because there is a +good deal to cover, and I will take you straight to the question of the +Low Countries. You have heard me read, and probably other people read, +more than once, the statement of Hitler’s on the 22d of August 1939: + + “Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and + Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well + as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available + means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of + these countries.” (Document Number 798-PS) + +That is what Hitler said on the 22d of August. You weren’t there, and I +ask you again if he expressed the same opinion to you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that from a very early date, on the +7th of October 1939, an army group order was given that Army Group B is +to make all preparations, according to special orders, for immediate +invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so +demands. Did you know of that order on the 7th of October? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No; I believe I have seen it here; I did not know it +before. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that on the 9th of October +Hitler issued a directive: + + “A longer delay would not only result in the abandonment of + Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality in favor of the + Western Powers, but would also serve to strengthen the military + power of our enemies to an increasing degree, and would lessen + the confidence of neutral states in final German victory. + Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern + flank of the Western Front, crossing the area of Luxembourg, + Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon + and as forcibly as possible.” (Document Number C-62) + +Did you know that Hitler issued that directive on the 9th of October? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that as far as you were concerned you are +telling the Tribunal that Hitler gave his assurance, the many +assurances, in August and October, without telling his Foreign Minister +that on the 7th and 9th of October, he had given the directive for the +attack on the Low Countries, that he did not tell you about his order or +his directive for his attack on the Low Countries? Are you sure of that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I am pretty sure of that, otherwise I should recall it. +I know one thing, that such ideas, as to whether or not an offensive +should be assumed in the West, after the Polish Campaign, had +occasionally been discussed, but I never heard about any orders. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. If you say that is the state of your +knowledge, we will pass on to something about which you did know a +little bit more. Do you remember the meeting of Hitler and yourself with +Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August 1939? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I saw the document, the minutes, about it, here. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I want you just to look at that +document, and it is on Page 181. I want you to follow while I read one +passage, which should be about 182. It is on my second page and it is a +paragraph which begins, “As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude +that in case of conflict...” + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you look for that “As Poland makes it +clear by her whole attitude...” + +VON RIBBENTROP: On Page 2? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It should be on Page 2, on my Page 2. It may be +further on in yours. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Is that the beginning of the paragraph? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. “As Poland makes it clear...” It is two +paragraphs on from a single line that says at the point “Count Ciano +showed signs of...” + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have found it, yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at the next sentence: “Generally +speaking...” This is the next sentence but one: + + “Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the + pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This could be done fairly + easily if one Axis partner protected the rear of the other, who + was just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and _vice + versa_. For Italy, Yugoslavia was to be considered such an + uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul, he, (the + Führer) had suggested, particularly in consideration of Italy, + that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis + by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the + Axis, and Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of Nations. Prince + Paul had agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent had + been in London and sought reassurance of the Western Powers. The + same thing was repeated that had happened in the case of + Gafencu, who had also been very reasonable during his visit to + Germany, and had denied any interest in the aims of the Western + democracies.” (Document Number 1871-PS) + +Now, that was Hitler’s formulation of his policy, and may I take it that +that was the policy which you were assisting to carry out, to liquidate +the pseudo-neutrals one after the other, and include among these +pseudo-neutrals Yugoslavia? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not to be understood in that way. I must +state the following in this connection. The situation was this at that +time: Hitler wanted under all circumstances to keep Italy on our side. +Italy was always a very unreliable partner. For that reason the Führer +spoke at that time in a way designed to tell Italy, so to speak, that, +if it came to difficulties with Yugoslavia, he would support Italy. It +can be understood only from the situation which was this: Germany, with +Italy’s assistance, had already peacefully carried out some of her +revisions in Europe, except for Danzig and the Corridor, in which +Mussolini supported Hitler. I remember the situation. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite a long explanation. But it is not +an explanation of the words I put to you which is the important thing. +“It would be best to liquidate uncertain neutrals one after the other.” +Are you denying that that was your policy, to liquidate uncertain +neutrals? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not that. That cannot be taken so literally, +for in diplomatic discussions—and I do not think it is different in +other countries—many things are said sometimes... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to... + +VON RIBBENTROP: This was the question of Yugoslavia. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This had always been Mussolini’s view, hadn’t +it, that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible +opportunity? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, would you look at Document 2818-PS. My +Lord, this will be Exhibit GB-292. Remember this is the secret +additional protocol to the Friendship and Alliance Pact between Germany +and Italy made on the 22d of May 1939, and appended to it there are some +comments by Mussolini on the 30th of May 1939. Do you see? + +VON RIBBENTROP: What page? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just wanted you to look at two passages. +Do you see where the comments by Mussolini begin? Under the Pact itself, +do you see the comment by Mussolini? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, Number 1 says: + + “The war between the plutocratic and, therefore, selfishly + conservative nations and the densely populated and poor nations + is inevitable. One must prepare in the light of this situation.” + +Now, if you will turn to Paragraph 7, you will see Mussolini is hoping +that the war will be postponed, and he is saying what should happen if +the war comes; he says that: + + “The war which the great democracies are preparing is a war of + exhaustion. One must therefore start with the worst premise, + which contains 100 percent probability. The Axis will get + nothing more from the rest of the world. This assumption is + hard, but the strategic positions reached by the Axis diminish + considerably the vicissitude and the danger of a war of + exhaustion. For this purpose one must take the whole Danube and + Balkan area immediately after the very first hours of the war. + One will not be satisfied with declarations of neutrality but + must occupy the territories and use them for the procurement of + necessary food and industrial war supplies.” + +Do you see that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you agree that it was Mussolini’s view +that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible moment? + +VON RIBBENTROP: They are utterances of Mussolini which I see here for +the first time. I did not know them. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to the remarks of Hitler +which you have seen considerably more than once. You remember, after the +Simovic _coup d’état_ on the 26th of March, there was a meeting, a +conference with Hitler, where he announced his policy: + + “The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty + declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in + order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a state. With + regard to foreign policy neither will diplomatic inquiries be + made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav + Government, which cannot be trusted in any case in the future, + will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the + means and troops available for it are ready.” (Document Number + 1746-PS) + +Do you remember Hitler’s saying that on the 27th of March? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. Could I perhaps see the +document? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember it? It has been read many +times in this court, Hitler’s statement. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember it, not the individual words, but in +general. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that was the sense of it, and I +read his words. Now, that was the policy... + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what you mean by “the sense of it.” + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I’ll put it to you now. What I mean is +this, that it was your policy to attack Yugoslavia without asking them +for assurances, without any diplomatic action of any kind. You decided +to attack Yugoslavia and to bomb Belgrade. Isn’t that right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was entirely different; and I ask to be permitted +to explain the actual state of the case. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want your explanation of these points which I +have specifically read and mentioned to you. “No diplomatic inquiries +will be made.” Why did you decide, or why did Hitler decide, and you +help, to attack Yugoslavia without making any diplomatic inquiries, +without giving the new government any chance to give you assurances? Why +did you do it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Because the new government had been formed mainly by +England, as one of the British interrogation officers himself, in the +course of the preliminary hearings, admitted to me. Therefore it was +perfectly clear to the Führer, when the Simovic Putsch was carried out, +that the enemies of Germany at that time stood behind Simovic’s +government and that it mobilized the army—this information had been +received—in order to attack the Italian army from the rear. It was not +my policy, for I was called into the conference of which you are +speaking only later, I believe, and at that time Hitler categorically +announced his position without being contradicted by anyone. I ask you +to question the military men about that. I was present, and had a +serious encounter with the Führer. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think it right to attack this country +without any diplomatic measures being taken at all, to cause military +destruction, to use Hitler’s words, “with unmerciful harshness” and to +destroy the capital of Belgrade by waves of bomber attacks? Did you +think that was right? I ask you a simple question: Did you think it was +right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot answer this question either with “yes” or “no,” +as you want it, without giving an explanation. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you need not answer it. If you cannot +answer that question “yes” or “no,” you need not answer it at all. And +you come on to the next point, which is the question of Russia. Now, as +far as I could understand your statement, you said that Hitler had +decided to attack the Soviet Union after Mr. Molotov’s visit to Berlin +on, I think, the 12th of November of 1940. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not say that, because I did not know it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, as I understood it, one of the reasons +which you were giving as a justification for the attack on the Soviet +Union was what was said by Mr. Molotov during his visit of November +1940. Isn’t that what you said? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That was one of the reasons that caused the Führer +concern. I did not know anything about an attack at that time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that the Defendant Jodl says that even +during the Western campaign, that is, May and June 1940, Hitler had told +him that he had made a fundamental decision to take steps against this +danger, that is, the Soviet Union, “the moment our military position +made it at all possible.” Did you know that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I learned that first now here in Nuremberg. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is Document L-172, USA-34, Jodl’s lecture. +And did you know that on the 14th of August 1940 General Thoma was +informed during a conference with Göring that the Führer desired +punctual deliveries to the Russians only until the spring of 1941; that +“later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the +Russian demands.” Did you know that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that in November of 1940, +General Thoma and State Secretaries Körner, Neumann, Becker, and General +Von Hannecken were informed by Göring of the action planned in the East? +Did you know that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know now, don’t you, that a long time before +any of the matters raised in Molotov’s visit came up for discussion, +Hitler had determined to attack the Soviet Union? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that at all. I knew that Hitler had +apprehensions but I knew nothing about an attack. I was not informed +about military preparations, because these matters were always dealt +with separately. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Even on 18 December, when Hitler issued the +directive Number 21 on “Barbarossa,” he told you nothing about it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, because just in December, as I happen to remember +exactly, I had another long talk with the Führer in order to obtain his +consent to win the Soviet Union as a partner to the Three-Power Pact, +and to make it a four-power pact. Hitler was not altogether enthusiastic +about this idea, as I noticed; but he told me, “We have already made +this and that together; perhaps we will succeed with this too.” These +were his words. That was in December. I believe there is also an +affidavit about that from a witness, which the Defense is going to +present. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you understand what you are saying? This is +after the Defendant Göring had announced it to General Thoma and these +under-secretaries, after the directive had actually gone out for +Barbarossa, that Hitler let you suggest that you should try to get the +Soviet Union to join the Tripartite Pact, without ever telling you that +he had his orders out for the attack on the Soviet Union. Do you really +expect anyone to believe that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand the question. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question was, do you really expect anyone to +believe that after it had been announced time and again that the Reich +was going to attack the Soviet Union, and after the actual directive had +gone out for the attack, that Hitler let you tell him that you were +thinking of asking them to join the Tripartite Pact? Is that your +evidence? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is exactly the way it was. I suggested this to +Hitler again in December, and received his consent for further +negotiations. I knew nothing in December of an aggressive war against +the Soviet Union. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And it was quite clear that, as far as your +department was concerned, you were getting the most favorable reports +about the Soviet Union and about the unlikeliness of the Soviet Union +making any incursion into political affairs inimical to Germany? Is that +right, so far as your reports from your own ambassador and your own +people in Russia were concerned? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Reports of this sort came from the embassy in Moscow. I +submitted them repeatedly, or rather always, to the Führer but his +answer was that the diplomats and military attachés in Moscow were the +worst informed men in the world. That was his answer. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But that was your honest view, based on your own +information, that there was no danger from Russia, that Russia was +keeping honestly to the agreement that she had made with you. That was +your honest view, was it not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that. I said those were the reports +from the diplomats, which we received from Moscow. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t you believe them? Didn’t you believe your +own staff yourself? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I was very skeptical myself as to whether these reports +were reliable, because the Führer, who received reports, had reports of +an altogether different nature and the political attitude also pointed +in a different direction. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, in the spring of 1941, your office +joined in the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, did it +not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know precisely when, but in the spring things +came to a head and there must have been conferences between some offices +that dealt with the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union. +However, I do not recall details about that any more. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Again, I do not want to occupy too much +time over it, but it is right, is it not, that in April of 1941 you were +co-operating with Rosenberg’s office in preparing for the taking over of +Eastern territories, and, on the 18th of May, you issued a memorandum +with regard to the preparation of the naval campaign? + +VON RIBBENTROP: So far as the preparations with Rosenberg are concerned, +that is in error. I spoke, according to my recollection, about this +matter to Rosenberg only after the outbreak of war. So far as that Navy +memorandum is concerned, I saw that document here; I had not known of it +previously. I believe it is an expert opinion on international law about +matters which might arise in connection with a war in the Baltic Sea. +Such expert opinion was doubtless submitted. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It says, “The Foreign Office has prepared, for +use in Barbarossa, the attached draft of a declaration of operational +zones.” Don’t you remember anything about that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that did not reach me at all at that time. +That was acted upon by another office. Of course I am responsible for +everything that happens in my ministry. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn’t Ambassador Ritter the liaison officer +between your office and the Wehrmacht? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, again, I want you to help me about one or +two other matters. You have told us that you negotiated the +Anti-Comintern Pact back in 1936; and, of course, at that time the +Anti-Comintern Pact—and I think you said so yourself—was directed +against the Soviet Union. That is so, isn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it was more an ideological pact, which, of course, +had certain political implications. That is right. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was extended by the Tripartite Pact of +the 27th of September 1940? That was an extension of the first pact, was +it not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It had in itself nothing to do with the first pact, +because this one was a purely political, economic, and military pact. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the fact is—and I think I can take +this quite shortly—that you were urging Japan to enter the war quite +early in March of 1941, weren’t you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That could be; at that time for an attack on England. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I am taking it shortly, because you have +given your explanation. You say you were at war with England, and +therefore you were entitled to see an ally in the Japanese. That is your +point, is it not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not believe that I did anything other than what +other diplomats would do, for instance, what those of Great Britain have +done in America, and later in Russia. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to put any points to you on that +actual fact; but it did occur to you quite early, didn’t it, that if +Japan came into the war, then it was a possibility that the United +States might be brought in very shortly after? And you agreed, in April +of 1941, that if the coming in of Japan produced the fact that Japan +would be involved with the United States, you would be prepared to fight +the United States too. That is right isn’t it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. I believe I did everything I +could, until the day of Pearl Harbor, to keep America out of the war. I +believe also that that is proved by many documents that I have seen here +for the first time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, since you said that, I would like you +to look at the Document 352 of your book, at Page 204 of the English +document book. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know this document; I have read it here already. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was a week before Pearl Harbor, on +the 29th of November; and according to the Japanese Ambassador, you are +saying this to him—if you look at Paragraph 1: + + “Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in + East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been, + and probably never will be, a time when closer co-operation + under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at + this time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European + New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United + States will be concentrated against Japan. As the Führer Hitler + said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right + to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We + have received advice to the effect that there is practically no + hope of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded + successfully, because of the fact that the United States is + putting up a stiff front. + + “‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a + decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident + that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan + jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan + herself.’” (Document D-656) + +Do you still say, in view of that document and that statement that you +made to the Japanese Ambassador, that you were trying to prevent war +with the United States? I suggest to you that you were doing everything +to encourage Japan to go to war with the United States. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I must contradict you there, Mr. Prosecutor; that is not +true. I do not know this document, nor do I know where it comes from. At +any rate, under no circumstances did I express it that way; and I regret +that all the other documents which prove that I tried again and again to +keep the United States out of the war, have not yet been read here. I +have seen this document here and I have been pondering all the time as +to how this passage would have gotten into the document. All the other +documents, I believe a dozen or a dozen and a half, which have been +presented here prove clearly my wish to keep America out of the war. I +can prove that for years I had made efforts in all fields, despite the +intransigent attitude of the United States, not to undertake anything +against America. I can explain this only as follows: The Japanese +Ambassador earnestly desired that his country should take some action +and I know he sent many telegrams to Tokio in order to get Japan to +participate in the war, particularly against Singapore. I can only +presume that this is perhaps, if I may say so, an incorrect +interpretation of this conference. I ask you to give the Defense an +opportunity to submit all the other documents up to this date, which +will prove the exact opposite of what is laid down in this one +paragraph. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, this is the official report to the +Government of the Japanese Ambassador. You say that he is wrong when he +says that you told him—he gives your exact words—that you were +comforted that it would not only be in the interest of Germany and Japan +jointly but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself. + +Well, just look at the next document, if you deny that one, on Page 356. +This is another report of the Japanese Ambassador and he said, the day +after Pearl Harbor: + + “At 1 o’clock... I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and + told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal + declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that + Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general + headquarters, discussing how the formalities of declaring war + could be carried out, so as to make a good impression on the + German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at + once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out + properly.” + +Now, look at the last three lines: + + “At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th, + Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack + American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them.” + (Document Number D-657) + +That was 3 days before the declaration of war. You say that that report +of the Japanese Ambassador is also wrong? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that it is an error. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is wrong about it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe it is an error. That was after the attack on +Pearl Harbor? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Exactly, the day after Pearl Harbor. + +VON RIBBENTROP: That was an order of Adolf Hitler’s to attack America +who, as everyone knows, had been attacking our ships for months. This is +an altogether different affair. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When you say “attacking German ships,” do you +mean defending themselves against German submarines? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, so far as I know, some months earlier, I cannot tell +you the exact date; but it was a long time before Pearl Harbor, we had +delivered an official protest to the United States, in which we pointed +out, in the case of the two ships _Greer_ and _Kerne_, that these two +boats had pursued German submarines and had thrown depth charges at +them. I believe the Secretary of the Navy Knox admitted this openly in a +press conference. I mentioned yesterday that Hitler said in his speech +in Munich that he did not give the order to shoot or to attack American +vessels but he had given the order to fire back if they fired first. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know from you is this: Did you +approve of the policy of ordering the entire German Navy to attack +American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them 3 days before +war was declared? Did you approve of that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that now, because I do not +remember it and do not even know the document. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about another point. Do +you remember that the... + +VON RIBBENTROP: It would have been understandable, that I must add. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given your answer. Do you remember, in +June 1944, that there was a conference about which we have heard +evidence, regarding the shooting of what is known as “terror-fliers”? + +Now, just listen to this question and try to answer it directly, if you +would. Is it correct, as is stated in the report, that you wished to +include among terror-fliers every type of terror attack on the German +civilian population, that is, including bombing attacks on cities? Is it +right that you wished to include the airmen engaged in attacks on German +cities as terror-fliers? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not true like that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at Page 391. This is a report signed +by General Warlimont on the conference on the 6th of June, and in the +fourth line—well, let me read it. It says: + + “Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy chief of + the Operations Staff in Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th + that a conference on this question had been held shortly before, + between the Reich Marshal, the Reich Foreign Minister, and + Reichsführer SS. Contrary to the original suggestion made by + Ribbentrop, who wished to include every type of terror attack on + the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on + cities, it was agreed at the above conference that only attacks + carried out with aircraft armament should be considered as + criminal actions in that sense.” (Document Number 135-PS) + +Do you say that Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he said that you wished to +include every type of attack? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yesterday I answered this question at length. I do not +know whether I should refer to this point again. I dealt with this +point, I think, very exhaustively. If you wish, I can repeat it now. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I do not want you to repeat it. I want you +to answer my question. Do you say that Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he +said at this conference that you wished to include those who were +engaged in bombing of cities? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is not so. First of all, so far as I remember, this +conference never took place; and, secondly, I stated my attitude +perfectly clearly yesterday, how I wished to treat terror-fliers. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, answer my question. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not true as you have stated it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Then answer this question. Did you +approve that those you called “terror-fliers” were to be left to be +lynched by the population or handed over to the SS? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not my attitude. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look on Page 393, Page 214 +of the English? This, as you know, is a memorandum from the Foreign +Office; and it is stated on Page 396 that General Warlimont states that +Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone that the Minister for +Foreign Affairs has approved this draft (Document 740-PS). The draft +deals with the two actions in Paragraph 1, that of lynching, and the +draft says, “The German authorities are not directly responsible, since +death occurred before a German official intervened” (Document 728-PS). + +Do you agree with that view? Is that your view of the lynching of +fliers? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not my view. I explained that yesterday +quite exhaustively and stated what my attitude was toward this document. +This document is an expert opinion of the Foreign Office, which was +submitted to me. I do not know how it originated, upon my order or upon +a statement of the military authorities. I did not approve this expert +opinion as it is submitted to me here, but I did send it to the Führer +and asked him to decide about it. The Führer then called this document +“nonsense,” I believe, and therewith this expert opinion of the Foreign +Office was rejected and did not come into effect. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that, with regard to this, you say that when +Warlimont says that Ambassador Ritter advised the Wehrmacht by telephone +on 29 June that you approved the draft, that either Warlimont is not +speaking the truth or Ritter is not speaking the truth? + +VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, it is not true, because it can be seen from +another document which I have also seen here that this document was sent +to the Führer and that I said there that the Führer must approve it. I +did see also another document regarding it. That is also my recollection +of the matter. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, if you referred to the Führer’s +view, let us just have a look at what that was. Have a look at Document +3780-PS, which will be GB-293, which is an account of a meeting that you +and Hitler had with Oshima on the 27th of May 1944. It is on Page 11, +Lines 9 to 12. Do you remember in your presence Hitler advising Oshima +that the Japanese should hang, not shoot, every American terror pilot, +that the Americans will think it over before making such attacks? Did +you agree with that view? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree with that view. If that is in this +document, that is not my meaning, not my opinion. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now... + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not even know where what you said here is in the +document. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will find it on Page 11, Lines 9 to 12. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that, but I can only say that this +attitude of Hitler’s as it appears in this document was brought about by +the terrible results of the air attacks at that time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I heard all that before. I asked you whether you +agreed or not; you said “no.” I want you now to deal with another point. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I want to say something further, however, regarding this +point because it is of decisive importance. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will say that to learned Counsel after you +have answered my question on this. I want you now to direct your +attention to Stalag Luft III. You may have heard me asking a number of +witnesses a certain number of questions about it. These were the 50 +British airmen who were murdered by the SS after they escaped. Do you +know that? Do you know what I am talking about? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I do. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that my colleague, Mr. Eden, made a +strong statement in the House of Commons, saying that these men had been +murdered and that Great Britain would exact justice upon the murderers? +Do you remember that, in June of 1944? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I heard of this through the speech made by Mr. Eden in +the House of Commons, yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that the Reich Government +issued a statement saying that, in a communication by the Reich +Government conveyed to the British via Switzerland, this unqualifiable +charge of the British Foreign Minister had been sharply refuted, that +being issued in July 1944? Do you remember that being issued? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember it. I remember only the following: +That at that time we received evidence of what had happened and that it +was communicated to us in a note from the protecting powers. That is all +I know about it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to ask you: Did you know +at the time that this statement was issued—did you know that these +officers had been murdered in cold blood? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not. I heard that these men had been shot +while trying to escape. At that time, to be sure, we did have the +impression that everything was not in order, I know that. I remember +that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me take it in two stages. Who told you the +lie that these men had been shot trying to escape? Who informed you of +that lie? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember in detail. At that time we received +the documentation from the competent authorities and a memorandum was +forwarded to the Swiss Government. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From whom did you get your documentation which +contained that lie? Did you get it from Himmler or Göring? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you told us, I think, that you had a good +idea that things were not all right, hadn’t you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, I want you to tell us a word +about your connection with the SS. You are not suggesting, are you, at +this stage that you were merely an honorary member of the SS? It has +been suggested by your counsel, and I am sure it must have been on some +misunderstanding of information, that you were merely an honorary member +of the SS. That is not the case, is it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is no misunderstanding. This is exactly how it was: +I received the SS uniform from Adolf Hitler. I did not serve in the SS, +but as ambassador and later as Foreign Minister it was customary to have +a rank of some sort and I had received the rank of SS Führer. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you that that is entirely untrue, +that you joined the SS by application before you became +ambassador-at-large in May 1933, isn’t that right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I know that. At any rate I always belonged to the SS. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said just now it was honorary, because +Hitler wanted you to have a uniform. I am putting it to you; you applied +to join the SS in May 1933, in the ordinary way. Did you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Of course, one had to make an application; but the fact +was this, that I occasionally went around in a grey greatcoat and +thereupon Hitler said I must wear a uniform. I do not remember when that +was. It must have been 1933. As ambassador I received a higher rank, as +Foreign Minister I received a still higher one. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in May 1933, after you made application, you +joined the SS in the not too high rank of Standartenführer, didn’t you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that could be. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you became an Oberführer only on the 20th of +April 1935, a Brigadeführer on 18 June 1935, and Gruppenführer on the +13th of September 1936—that was after you became an ambassador—and +Obergruppenführer on the 20th of April 1940. Before you were made an +ambassador you had been in the SS for 3 years and you had received +promotion in the ordinary way, when you did your work with the SS, isn’t +that so? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Without ever taking any steps or doing anything myself +in the SS, yes, that is correct. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look. It is Document D-744(a), Exhibit +GB-294. The correspondence is 744(b). You may take it; you need not go +through it in detail. That is your application, with all the +particulars. I just want to ask you one or two things about it. You +asked to join, did you not, the “Totenkopf,” the Death’s-Head Division +of the SS? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that cannot be true. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember getting a special +Death’s-Head ring and dagger from Himmler for your services? Don’t you? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember. I never belonged to a +Death’s-Head Division. You were just talking about a Death’s-Head +Division, were you not? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A Death’s-Head Division. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. If it says so here, it is not true. +But I think that I at one time received a so-called dagger, like all SS +Führer. That is correct. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the ring, too. Here is a letter dated the +5th of November 1935, to the Personnel Office of the Reichsführer SS: +“In reply to your question I have to inform you that Brigadeführer Von +Ribbentrop’s ring size is 17. Heil Hitler,” (signed) (Adjutant) +“Thorner.” Do you remember getting that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that everyone received such a ring but I do +not remember precisely. No doubt it is true. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took, didn’t you, continuous interest in +the SS from 1933 up to well into the war? I think your correspondence +with Himmler goes on to well into 1941 or 1942. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, that is certainly correct. +Of course, we had a great deal to do with the SS in all fields. That is +quite clear. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had, and especially in the field of +concentration camps, hadn’t you? Are you saying that you did not know +that concentration camps were being carried on in an enormous scale? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing about that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look around for the moment. [_A +map behind the witness box was uncovered._] That is an enlargement of +the exhibits put in by the French Prosecution and these red spots are +concentration camps. Now, I would just like you to look at it. We will +see now one of the reasons for the location of your various residences. +There, one north of Berlin, Sonnenburg. Do you see roughly where that is +on that map? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Sonnenburg is 1 hour’s auto ride from Berlin. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: North of Berlin? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, east of Berlin. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another house. You are quite near it +yourself, your schloss or tower at Fuschl. That is quite near the +border; just over the border, and very near it, the group of camps which +existed around Mauthausen. Do you see them, just above your right hand? +Do you see the group of camps, the Mauthausen group? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to state on my oath that I heard the name +of “Mauthausen” for the first time in Nuremberg. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another of the places. You say you +did not go there very often, but you used to... + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe I can make this much more brief for you. I can +say that I heard of only two concentration camps until I came here—no +it was three: Dachau, Oranienburg, and Theresienstadt. All the other +names I heard here for the first time. The Theresienstadt camp was an +old people’s home for Jews, and I believe was visited a few times by the +International Red Cross. I never heard previously of all the other +camps. I wish to make that quite clear. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that near Mauthausen there were 33 +camps at various places, within a comparatively short distance, and 45 +camps as to which the commandant did not give the names because there +were so many of them, and in the 33 camps there were over 100,000 +internees? Are you telling the Tribunal that in all your journeys to +Fuschl you never heard of the camps at Mauthausen, where 100,000 people +were shut up? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me, and I can produce +dozens of witnesses who can testify to that. Dozens. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not care how many witnesses you produce. I +ask you to look at that map again. You were a responsible minister in +the Government of that country from the 4th of February 1938 till the +defeat of Germany in May 1945, a period of 7 and a quarter years. Are +you telling the Tribunal that anyone could be a responsible minister in +that country where these hundreds of concentration camps existed and not +know anything about them except two? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It may be amazing but it is 100 percent true. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that it is not only amazing, +but that it is so incredible that it must be false. How could you be +ignorant of these camps? Did you never see Himmler? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I never saw him about these things. Never. These +things were kept absolutely secret and we heard here, for the very first +time, what went on in them. Nobody knew anything about them. That may +sound astounding but I am positively convinced that the gentlemen in the +dock also knew nothing about all that was going on. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear from them in their turn. Did you +know that at Auschwitz alone... + +VON RIBBENTROP: I heard the name Auschwitz here for the first time. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the German official of Auschwitz has sworn +an affidavit that 4 million people were put to death in the camp. Are +you telling the Tribunal that that happened without your knowing +anything about it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me. I can state that here +on my oath. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, there is one other subject, which I +would like you to deal with; and here, fortunately, I am in the position +of assisting your memory with some documents. It is a question of the +partisans. I want you to look at a few documents, three documents, with +regard to that. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish tonight? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall, if Your Lordship will allow me 5 +minutes. That is what I have been trying to do. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you agree that you were in favor of the +harshest treatment of people in the occupied countries? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand. Could you repeat the question? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question is, would it be a fair way of +expressing your point of view to say that you were in favor of the +harshest treatment of—I will put it first of all—of partisans? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I ever expressed myself about the +treatment of partisans. I do not recall having done so. In any case, I +was against it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, look at Document D-735, which will be +Exhibit GB-295. That is a discussion between you and Count Ciano in the +presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Cavallero in the Führer’s +headquarters after breakfast on the 19th of December 1942. Now, if you +will look at Page 2, you will see that there is a passage where Field +Marshal Keitel told the Italian gentlemen that: + + “The Croatian area was to be cleaned up by German and Italian + troops working in co-operation; and this while it was still + winter, in view of the strong British influence in this area. + The Führer explained that the Serbian conspirators were to be + burned out, and that no soft methods were to be used in doing + this. Field Marshal Keitel here interjected that every village + in which partisans were found had to be burned down. Continuing, + the Reich Foreign Minister declared that Roatta must not leave + the third zone, but must on the contrary advance, and this in + the closest collaboration with the German troops. In this + connection Field Marshal Keitel requested the Italian gentlemen + not to regard the utilization of Croatian troops to help in this + cleaning-up operation as a favoring of the Croatians. The Reich + Foreign Minister stated in this connection that the Poglavnik to + whom he had spoken very clearly, was 100 percent ready to come + to an agreement with Italy.” + +Did that represent your view, that “the Serbian conspirators should be +burned out”? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Please? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did that represent your view, that “the Serbian +conspirators should be burned out”? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know that expression. At any rate it is certain +that they should have been locked up. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What it means is that their villages should be +razed to the ground by fire. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Where did I say that? I do not believe I said that. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the Führer’s point of view. Was it your +point of view? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The Führer took a very harsh attitude on these +questions, and I know that occasionally harsh orders had to be issued +also from other offices, including the military. It was a struggle for +life and death. One should not forget that it was war. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you denying... + +VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, I do not see where I said anything about +partisans, that is... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that is not your point of view? Is that +what you are saying? That is not your point of view? Are you saying that +it is not your point of view as to the way to treat them? Do not look at +the next document. Tell me, is that your point of view? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question that you want me to answer. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you say that you were not in favor of harsh +treatment of partisans? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I am of the opinion that the partisans who attack the +troops in the rear should be treated harshly. Yes, I am of that opinion, +I believe everyone in the Army is of that opinion, and every politician. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Including women and children? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, by no means. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at that, if you deny this attitude to +women and children. Look at the document, Number D-741. + +My Lord, that will be Document D-741; this will be GB-296. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at the end of that. That is +a conference between you and Ambassador Alfieri in Berlin on 21 February +1943. The last paragraph says: + + “Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that the + conditions which Roatta’s policy had helped to produce in + Croatia were causing the Führer great concern. It was + appreciated on the German side that Roatta wished to spare + Italian blood, but it was believed that he was, as it were, + trying to drive out Satan with Beelzebub by this policy. These + partisan gangs had to be exterminated, including men, women, and + children, as their further existence imperiled the lives of + German and Italian men, women, and children.” + +Do you still say that you did not want harsh treatment of women and +children? + +VON RIBBENTROP: What page is that on? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is on Pages 10 to 13. It is the last +paragraph of my translation. + + “These partisan gangs had to be exterminated, including men, + women and children, as their further existence imperiled the + lives of German and Italian men, women, and children.” + +VON RIBBENTROP: If I did say that at any time, it must have been under +great excitement. In any case, it does not correspond to my opinion +which I have proved by my other acts during the war. I cannot say +anything else at the moment. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just show you one of your other acts, +which will be the final one, if the Tribunal will bear with me. It is +Document D-740, which will be GB-297. This is a memorandum of the +conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Secretary of State +Bastianini in the presence of Ambassadors Von Mackensen and Alfieri at +Klessheim castle on the afternoon of the 8th of April 1943. If you will +look at the beginning, I think you were discussing some strike in Italy. +You say: + + “The Reich Foreign Minister’s supposition that this strike had + perhaps been instigated by British agents was energetically + contested by Bastianini. There were Italian communists who were + still in Italy and who received their orders from Moscow. The + Reich Foreign Minister replied that, in such a case, only + merciless action would remedy.” + +And then, after a statement with regard to the information, you say: + + “He (the Reich Foreign Minister) did not want to discuss Italy + but rather the occupied territories, where it had been shown + that one would not get anywhere with soft methods or in the + endeavor to reach an agreement. The Reich Foreign Minister then + explained his views by a comparison between Denmark and Norway. + In Norway brutal measures had been taken which had evoked lively + protests, particularly in Sweden.” + +And then you go on, and after a certain criticism of Dr. Best... + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot find it; what page is it on, please? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The paragraph begins: “The Reich Foreign +Minister’s supposition that this strike has perhaps been instigated by +British agents...” + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see what I have put to you. You say: + + “Only merciless action would be any good. In Norway brutal + measures had been taken.” + +And at the beginning of the next paragraph: + + “In Greece, too, brutal action would have to be taken if the + Greeks should sense a change for the better. He was of the + opinion that the demobilized Greek Army should be deported from + Greece with lightning speed, and that the Greeks should be shown + in an iron manner who was master in the country. Hard methods of + this kind were necessary if one was waging a war against Stalin, + which was not a gentleman’s war but a brutal war of + extermination.” + +And then, with regard to France, after some statement about the French +you say: + + “Coming back to Greece, the Reich Foreign Minister once again + stressed the necessity of taking severe measures.” + +And in the third line of the next paragraph: + + “The Führer would have to take radical measures in the occupied + territories to mobilize the local labor potential in order that + the American armament potential might be equaled.” + +Do you agree? Does that fairly express your view, that you wanted the +most severe measures taken in occupied territories in order to mobilize +labor to increase the Reich war potential? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I can say the following in regard to this document. I +know that at that time... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE; Well, you can say that, but you can answer my +question first. Do these views express your view that... + +VON RIBBENTROP: No. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...severe measures should be taken with foreign +labor and with people in occupied territories. Does that document +express your view? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it does not. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why did you say it? Why did you say these +things? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Because at that time, on the commission of the Führer, I +had to keep the Italians’ noses to the grindstone, since there was +complete chaos in some of the areas and the Italians always attempted to +cause complete confusion in the rear areas of the German Army by some of +the measures they took there. That is why I occasionally had to speak +very harshly with the Italians. I recall that very distinctly. At that +time the Italians were fighting together with the Chetniks partly +against German troops; it was complete chaos there and for this reason I +often used rather earnest and harsh language with the diplomats—perhaps +an exaggerated language. But things actually looked quite different +afterwards. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was not a bit exaggeration, was it, in both +Norway and Greece? You were taking the most brutal measures against the +occupied countries. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. We had absolutely nothing to say in +Norway; we always tried to do things differently. And in Denmark we did +everything to reduce these harsh measures, which were in part necessary, +because of the paratroopers and so forth, and tried not to have them +carried out. + +I think it can be proved, from a number of other documents, that I and +the Foreign Office always worked toward compromise in the various +occupied countries. I do not believe that it is quite fair and correct +to take only one or two such statements from the innumerable documents +where occasionally I did use harsh words. It is certain that in the +course of 6 years of war harsh language must be used from time to time. +I may remind you that foreign statesmen also used harsh language +regarding the treatment of Germany. But I am sure they did not mean it +that way. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me this: Every time today when you have +been confronted with a document which attributes to you some harsh +language or the opposite of what you have said here you say that on that +occasion you were telling a diplomatic lie. Is that what it comes to? +Thank you very much. + +THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, do you have all these documents in evidence? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + NINETY-SEVENTH DAY + Tuesday, 2 April 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +[_The Defendant Von Ribbentrop resumed the stand._] + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Your Lordship will have noticed that I +did not deal with the question of Jews. That will now be taken up by my +learned friend, M. Faure, of the French Delegation. + +DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I say a few words on an important +question? A map was discussed here yesterday, the map which is now +visible in court. From that map the Prosecution conclude that a large +number of concentration camps were distributed all over Germany. The +defendants are contradicting this statement as energetically as +possible. In the treatment of my case, the case of the Defendant +Kaltenbrunner, I hope to adduce evidence to the effect that only a very +few of the red spots on this map are accurate. I wish to make this +statement here and now, in order that the impression does not arise over +again, in the subsequent cases, that this map is a correct one. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, this is only a reproduction of what has +already been put in evidence. + +DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, but I am at liberty to adduce proof to the contrary. + +THE PRESIDENT: Of course you are, but it is not necessary for you to say +so now. The fact that the evidence was put in by the Prosecution at an +earlier date, of course, gives you every opportunity to answer it, but +not to answer it at this moment. + +M. FAURE: Defendant, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, you were the chief +of the diplomatic personnel, were you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +M. FAURE: The personnel followed your instructions, did they not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +M. FAURE: You declared yesterday that you were responsible for the acts +of your subordinates? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +M. FAURE: Would you tell me if Dr. Best, Plenipotentiary for Denmark, +was a member of your Ministry? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +M. FAURE: Dr. Best told you, did he not, that Hitler had given an order +to assassinate Danes when there were acts of sabotage? + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask you to repeat the question? + +M. FAURE: According to the documents that have been produced before the +Tribunal, Dr. Best saw you on 30 December 1943 and told you that Hitler +had given the order to assassinate Danes when there were acts of +sabotage in Denmark; is that so? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was to be done against saboteurs. Hitler had +ordered it. + +M. FAURE: The order, according to the terms employed by Dr. Best in the +document, was to “execute persons, terrorists or non-terrorists, without +trial.” Can that not be considered as assassination? + +VON RIBBENTROP: From the beginning I strongly opposed these measures, +and so did Dr. Best. We went so far as to... + +M. FAURE: Defendant, I am not trying to say that you were pleased with +this state of affairs. I am merely asking you if you were informed +thereof. Is that correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the Führer wanted that. I do not know the details. + +M. FAURE: But I am not asking for details. + +VON RIBBENTROP: And what was ordered afterwards I do not know because, +so far as I am aware, it did not go through us, but through another +department. + +M. FAURE: I note that you actually were informed of the Führer’s order +given that day to permit assassination. You therefore considered it +normal to belong to a government, the head of which was a murderer. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, the exact opposite is true here, the exact +opposite... + +M. FAURE: All right, all right, just answer, please. + +VON RIBBENTROP: ...for I told him that I had taken my stand and that I +held divergent views. The Führer was most dissatisfied with Dr. Best and +had the matter handled through other channels, since Dr. Best was +against it and so was I. + +M. FAURE: I am merely asking you to answer my question very briefly. You +can give details through your counsel later. + +With regard to Denmark, there was action against the Jews in that +country in order to deport them. Did you have anything to do with that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you anything about matters relating to the +Jews in Denmark, since I know nothing. + +M. FAURE: Did you never hear anything about it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I remember that I discussed the fact with Best, that +this question was of no significance in Denmark. He was therefore not +proposing to do anything in particular about the Jewish question there, +and I declared myself in complete agreement with him. + +M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown Document 2375-PS. This document has +not yet been submitted to the Tribunal. I would like to submit it under +French Exhibit Number RF-1503. I would like to read with you the second +paragraph of this document. It is an affidavit from Mildner, a colonel +of the police in Denmark. + + “As commander, I was subordinate to the Reich Plenipotentiary, + Dr. Best. Since I was opposed to the persecution of the Jews, on + principle and for practical reasons, I asked Dr. Best to give me + the reasons for the measures that were ordered. + + “Dr. Best declared to me that the Reich Foreign Minister, + Ribbentrop, obviously knew Hitler’s intention to exterminate the + Jews in Europe. He had furnished Hitler with a report about the + Jewish problem in Denmark and proposed to deport the Jews from + Denmark. + + “Dr. Best declared furthermore that Ribbentrop was afraid of + being held responsible in case the Jews remained in Denmark. + + “Dr. Best was now compelled to carry out the measures that were + proposed to Hitler by Ribbentrop. + + “From the discussion with Dr. Best I gathered that he must have + had a discussion or a telephone conversation with Ribbentrop.” + +You read that, did you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: What is written in this document is pure fantasy. It is +not true. + +M. FAURE: Very well; I ask then that you be shown Document 3688-PS, +which I wish to deposit under the French Exhibit Number RF-1502. It is a +note of 24 September 1942, signed by Luther, and addressed to his +collaborators. I should like to read with you the first two paragraphs +of that document. + + “The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me today by + telephone to expedite as much as possible the evacuation of the + Jews from different countries in Europe, since it is certain + that the Jews stir up feelings against us everywhere and must be + held responsible for acts of sabotage and outrages. + + “After a short report on the evacuation of Jews at present in + process in Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, and the occupied + territories, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has ordered us now + to approach the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Danish Governments + with the aim of getting the evacuation started in these + countries.” + +I suggest that this second document confirms the first as regards your +participation in the deportation of Jews in Denmark. Do you agree? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It was the Führer’s plan, at the time, to deport the +Jews from Europe to North Africa, and Madagascar was also mentioned in +this connection. He ordered me to approach various governments with a +view to encouraging the emigration of the Jews, if possible, and to +remove all Jews from important government posts. I issued instructions +to the Foreign Office accordingly, and, if I remember rightly, certain +governments were approached several times to that effect. It was the +question of the Jewish emigration to certain parts of North Africa; that +is true. May I return to this affidavit? This sworn affidavit is pure +fantasy of Colonel Mildner’s and is absolutely untrue. + +M. FAURE: But, in any case, you admit... + +VON RIBBENTROP: Dr. Best once discussed the Jewish question with me, and +he said that as far as Denmark was concerned, the question was of no +particular importance, since there were not many Jews left there. I +explained to him that he would have to let matters take their own course +there. That is the truth. + +M. FAURE: You admit, nevertheless, that this document signed by Luther +is correct, and that you did give the order to evacuate the Jews of +Denmark? It is in the letter. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, not in Denmark. I do not even know this document of +Luther’s. This is the first time I have seen it. + +M. FAURE: Please, simply answer my questions; otherwise we shall waste a +lot of time. In your opinion, both these documents are incorrect, you +said so; let us pass on. + +The German Embassy in Paris... + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say so. That is incorrect. I said that I +did not know Luther’s document. It is, however, true that the Führer +gave me instructions to tell the Foreign Office to approach certain +foreign governments with a view to solving the Jewish problem by +removing the Jews from government positions and, wherever possible, to +favor Jewish emigration. + +M. FAURE: The German Embassy in Paris was under your orders, was it not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The German Embassy in Paris, that is, the Ambassador to +the Vichy Government, naturally received orders from me. + +M. FAURE: French Document RF-1061 has already been read to the Tribunal +and in this document you defined the functions of Ambassador Abetz. It +is 3614-PS. + +In this document, which has already been read to you twice here, I would +remind you that you commissioned Abetz to put in a safe place the public +and private art treasures, particularly those belonging to Jews, on the +basis of special instructions mentioned here. Abetz executed this +mission by pillaging art collections in France. + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is not true. + +M. FAURE: I would ask that you be shown Document 3766-PS, which has not +yet been produced, and to which I should like to give the French Exhibit +Number RF-1505. I will go over merely a few lines of this document with +you. It is a report from the military administration, which was +distributed in 700 copies. It is entitled: “Report on the Removal of +French Works of Art by the German Embassy and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg +in France.” + +If you will look at Page 3, you will see that the title in the margin is +very significant: “German-Embassy: Attempt to remove paintings from the +Louvre.” + +Page 4, I will read the first sentence at the top of the page... + +VON RIBBENTROP: When may I refer to the individual points? Not at all, +or here and now? + +M. FAURE: When I ask you a question you will answer. I am reading a +passage to you: + + “Ambassador Abetz, disregarding the prohibition pronounced by + the military administration, undertook to send to Germany a + series of works of art from the Louvre which had been placed in + safety.” + +Were you informed of this? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I declare that this is absolutely untrue. Not a single +work of art was taken out of the Louvre by Ambassador Abetz. That would +have been contrary to the express orders of the Führer, who had strictly +forbidden it. The report is incorrect. + +May I mention that on one occasion the French Government wanted to +present me with a work of art from the Louvre, a painting by Boucher. I +returned this picture to the Louvre. I do not possess anything, and the +Foreign Office never even saw a single work of art, from the Louvre. + +M. FAURE: You state that this report is incorrect? + +THE PRESIDENT: What is this report you are putting to him? + +M. FAURE: It is Document 3766-PS. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but what is this document? + +M. FAURE: It is a report from the German military administration, which +is in the American documents in the PS series. The Tribunal received a +general affidavit referring thereto. + +THE PRESIDENT: Captured documents? + +M. FAURE: Yes, captured documents. I indicate to the Tribunal that this +captured report contains numerous other passages relating to the actions +of Abetz, but as the defendant declares that the report is inexact as +regards one of its passages, I shall not continue reading the document, +in order to save time. + +In addition... + +VON RIBBENTROP: But this is not a captured document, not a report. + +M. FAURE: Please answer my questions. We are not going to carry on this +controversy. Your counsel can interrogate you later on. + +DR. HORN: I must ask your permission to inquire into the nature of the +documents submitted to the defendant. If it is stated that it is a +captured report and then that it is not a captured report, the matters +should be put right, here and immediately. + +M. FAURE: I have already indicated that this document belongs to the PS +series of captured documents. The Tribunal has a large number of such +documents and I do not think that their authenticity will be disputed. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] I would now like to ask you the following +question:... + +THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to ask further questions upon this +document? + +M. FAURE: No, Mr. President. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Apart from the questions of art treasures, +Abetz also dealt with the question of the treatment of Jews in general, +did he not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Abetz had no order. As far as I know he also had nothing +to do with the Jewish question. This question was handled by other +departments. + +M. FAURE: Is it not true that in October 1940 Abetz communicated with +you with a view to settling the situation of Jews of German or Austrian +descent who were residing in France? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know; it did not interest me. + +M. FAURE: I would like to show you Document EC-265, which I wish to +submit as French Document RF-1504. It is a telegram from Abetz dated 1 +October 1940. I will read merely the first and last sentences: + + “The solution of the Jewish problem in the occupied territory of + France requires, besides other measures, a regulation as soon as + possible of the citizenship status of the Reich German Jews who + were living here at the beginning of the war...” + +And the last sentence: + + “The measures proposed above are to be considered as merely the + first step toward the solution of the entire problem. I reserve + the right to make other proposals.” + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I have time to read the telegram first? + +THE PRESIDENT: That is a little too fast. + +M. FAURE: Yes. + +VON RIBBENTROP: So far as I can see, this telegram apparently deals with +the fact that Austrian and German Jews are to be repatriated to Austria +and Germany from France. I do not know that. This is the first time I +have seen this telegram, and I can give no information about it. It +probably represents one of the routine measures dealt with by the +Foreign Office in the course of the day’s work, but which were not +submitted to me; and apart from that, these matters were individually +dealt with by other departments, not by us. + +M. FAURE: If you will look on the left-hand side of the telegram, you +will see the distribution list. There were 19, including you, were there +not? You were Number 2. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to inform the French prosecutor that every +day four, five, six, or eight hundred such documents and telegrams +reached my office, of which only 1 or 2 percent were submitted to me. + +M. FAURE: Apart from the question... + +VON RIBBENTROP: In any case I know nothing about this telegram. + +M. FAURE: Apart from the question of Jews of Austrian and German origin, +your colleagues and subordinates in the Embassy also dealt with the +question of the French Jews. Now, before asking you this question, I +should like to read out to you two sentences from a document which was +submitted to the Tribunal as French Document Number RF-1207. It is a +report from Dannecker, who was responsible for solving the Jewish +problem in France. Dannecker concluded his report as follows: + + “In this connection, I cannot speak of this matter without + mentioning the genuinely friendly support which our work + received from the German Ambassador Abetz, his representative, + the envoy Schleier, and SS Sturmbannführer and Counsellor of + Legation Dr. Zeitschel. I should like to add that the Embassy in + Paris has, on its own initiative, placed quite large sums at the + disposal of the branch in charge of the Jewish question, for the + financing of the Anti-Jewish Institute, and that it will + continue to do so in future.” + +Therefore, according to these documents, Abetz, Schleier, and Zeitschel +worked together. + +THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Faure, we do not know where you are reading from. + +M. FAURE: Mr. President, this document was not given to you in this +folder because it has already been submitted to the Tribunal. I merely +wished to read two sentences from it. + +THE PRESIDENT: All right. + +M. FAURE: It is evident therefore, from this document, that three +officials of the German Embassy, Abetz, Schleier, and Zeitschel, +collaborated with Dannecker in the settlement of Jewish affairs. That is +shown by the document, is it not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Am I supposed to answer that? Is it a question? + +M. FAURE: It is a question. + +VON RIBBENTROP: To that question I must answer “naturally.” They +certainly collaborated to some extent in the Jewish question in France; +that is perfectly clear. But I can also add that the French Prosecution +surely is informed that Ambassador Abetz was not only instructed by me, +but also acted on his own initiative in always attempting to reach some +kind of conciliatory settlement of this question. It goes without saying +that the Embassy was involved, one way or the other, in this sphere of +action. And it also goes without saying that I must assume +responsibility for anything done by the gentlemen in the Embassy, and I +should like to repeat that my instructions as well as the activities of +Ambassador Abetz were always in the opposite direction. It is quite +clear that the basic anti-Semitic tendency and policy of the German +Government spread over all the departments and naturally, in any +sphere—I mean, every Government office somehow or other came into +contact with these matters. Our task in the Foreign Office—which could +be proved in thousands of cases if the documents would be submitted—was +to act as an intermediary in this sphere. I might say, we often had to +do things in accordance with this anti-Semitic policy, but we always +endeavored to prevent these measures and to reach some kind of +conciliatory settlement. In fact, the German Embassy was not responsible +for any anti-Semitic measures of any description in France. + +M. FAURE: I would like to draw your attention to another document, +Number RF-1210, a French document which is a second report from +Dannecker of 22 February 1942, Page 3 of the document, Page 2 of the +German text. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say here and now that I do not even +know who Dannecker is. Perhaps you can give me some information on that +subject. + +M. FAURE: I informed you that Dannecker was the person responsible for +Jewish affairs in France. As a matter of fact, these documents were +submitted a long time ago to the Tribunal and communicated to the +Defense. + +At Page 3 of the document, which is Page 2 of the German, there is a +paragraph entitled, “Actions,” from which I read one sentence: “Up to +the present, three large-scale operations have been undertaken against +the Jews in Paris.” + +Now, if you will look at the last page of the document, the last +paragraph but one, we read as follows: + + “Since the middle of 1941 there has been a conference every + Tuesday in which the following services participate:... I, II, + and III, military commands, administrative, police, and economic + sections; IV, German Embassy, Paris; V, Einsatzstab Westen of + Reichsleiter Rosenberg. + + “The result of the conference is that—with very few exceptions + naturally called for by outsiders—the anti-Jewish policy is + being brought into one common line in the occupied territory.” + +This document clearly shows, does it not, that your collaborators were +in agreement with the anti-Jewish policy in the occupied territories and +that this policy included the arrest of Jews? + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to this statement? According to my +information, in this case, as so often happened in such cases, the +German ambassadors could have served as the branch offices. They might +have joined in with a view to guiding matters into peaceful channels. + +M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown French Document RF-1220, which is a +letter from the German Embassy of 27 June 1942, addressed to the head of +the Security Police and the SD in France. Before asking you a question I +would like to read with you the first two paragraphs of this letter: + + “Following my interview with Hauptsturmführer Dannecker on the + date of 27 June, during which he indicated that he required that + 50,000 Jews from the unoccupied zone be deported to the East as + soon as possible, and that on the basis of notes sent by the + Commissioner General for Jewish Questions, Darquier de + Pellepoix, under any circumstances something had to be done for + this, I reported the matter to Ambassador Abetz and Minister + Rahn immediately after the discussion. The latter is to confer + with President Laval this afternoon, and he has promised me that + he will speak to him at once about the handing over of these + 50,000 Jews; also he will insist that Darquier de Pellepoix be + given complete freedom of action according to the laws already + promulgated, and that the credits which have been promised to + him be handed to him immediately.” + +Now, I should like to ask you a question. I ask you to answer as briefly +as possible: Were you aware of this _démarche_ for the handing over of +these 50,000 Jews? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not; I heard about it here for the first time, +when this document was, I believe, read out once before. + +M. FAURE: If your collaborators Abetz, Rahn, and Zeitschel took such +action on this subject without informing you, was it not because they +thought they were acting in accordance with your general directives? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so; they worked very independently in +Paris, but I should like to repeat once again that I am assuming +responsibility for everything that these gentlemen have done. I make a +point of emphasizing this fact. I did not, however, know anything about +the proposed measure against the 50,000 Jews. And I do not even know +whether it was ever put into effect, and in what manner these gentlemen +had implicated themselves in the matter. The letter does not make it +clear. I know only one thing, and that is that my general instructions +were to tread cautiously in such matters and, if possible, to bridge +difficulties according to my own basic concepts and not to do anything +to force matters but, on the contrary, to smooth them over. I can say no +more on the subject. + +M. FAURE: During the interrogation of your witness Steengracht, the +British Prosecution produced a document, 3319-PS, under the British +Exhibit Number GB-287. I should like to refer to this document for one +question only. + +In this document there is an account of a meeting, or a congress, at +which were present all the reporters on Jewish questions from the +various diplomatic missions in Europe. This congress was held on 3 and 4 +April 1944 in Krummhübel. It was organized by Schleier. This was read +the other day. You knew about this congress, I suppose? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, this is the first time I have heard about it. What +congress was that? I have never heard that such a congress ever took +place. What kind of congress was it supposed to be? + +M. FAURE: This document has already been submitted; it was a congress +held... + +VON RIBBENTROP: I know only about one congress which I asked the Führer +not to hold. That I do know. But I know nothing at all about a congress +which did take place. Please give more detailed information on the +subject. + +M. FAURE: The document was handed over to the Tribunal, and I would like +to ask you one question. You testified that you were unaware of this +meeting at which 31 persons, most of whom belonged to the diplomatic +service, were present. I will inform you that during this meeting +Embassy Counsellor Von Thadden made a declaration which was reported in +the following terms: + + “The speaker explained the reasons why the Zionist solution of + Palestine and similar alternative solutions must be rejected and + why the Jews must be expatriated into the Eastern territories.” + +I suggest that this declaration made by an embassy counsellor in the +presence of 31 people belonging to your service voiced your own attitude +on these matters. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but I do not know in the very least what you mean. +May I, to begin with, please have some information on the matter with +which we are dealing? I do not understand it at all. I have told you +once before that I know nothing about any congress except the one which +I countermanded. That was an international congress which was to have +been held. I know nothing of a congress of diplomats. Would you kindly +place the document in question at my disposal in order that I may make +my reply? + +M. FAURE: I do not intend to show you this document. I read one sentence +contained in this document, and I am merely asking you if this phrase +represents your opinion or not. Answer “yes” or “no”. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Then I must request you to repeat the sentence. I wish +to confirm again, however, that no congress took place; it is not true. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I object to that question, if the opportunity +is not afforded the defendant to give a truthful answer. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question was proper. + +M. FAURE: I ask you whether this sentence which I have read out to you +corresponded to your opinion. + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask you to repeat the sentence. I did not +understand it correctly. + + M. FAURE: “The speaker explained the reasons why the Zionist + solution of Palestine and similar alternative solutions must be + rejected and why the Jews must be expatriated to the Eastern + territories.” + +Was that your thesis? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not. + +M. FAURE: Was your attention drawn to the fact that the Italian +authorities in France protected the Jews against persecution by Germans? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I recollect that there was something of the kind +but I no longer remember exactly. + +M. FAURE: Did you approach the Italian Government on this subject? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect that on one occasion I spoke either to +Mussolini or to Count Ciano about certain acts of sabotage, espionage, +or something of that kind which had occurred in France and against which +one would have to be on the alert, and in this connection, I believe, +the Jewish problem was also discussed. + +M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown Document D-734, which I would like to +submit as French Exhibit Number RF-1501. This note is headed: + + “Account of a conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and + the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia in the presence of Ambassadors + Von Mackensen and Alfieri and the State Secretary Bastianini on + the 25th of February 1943.” + +I would like to read with you the second paragraph on this page: + + “Further, the Reich Foreign Minister dealt with the Jewish + question. The Duce was aware that Germany had taken a radical + position with regard to the treatment of the Jews. As a result + of the development of the war in Russia she had come to an even + greater clarification of this question. All Jews had been + transported from Germany and from the territories occupied by + her to reservations in the East. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, + knew that this measure was described as cruel, particularly by + enemies, but it was necessary in order to be able to carry the + war through to a successful conclusion.” + +I shall not read the following paragraph, but the fourth: + + “France also had taken measures against the Jews which were + extremely useful. They were only temporary, because here, too, + final solution would be the deportation of the Jews to the East. + He, the Reich Foreign Minister, knew that in Italian military + circles, and occasionally among German military people too, the + Jewish problem was not sufficiently appreciated. It was only in + this way that he could understand an order of the _Comando + Supremo_ which, in the Italian occupation zone of France had + canceled measures taken against the Jews by the French + authorities acting under German influence. The Duce contested + the accuracy of this report and traced it back to the French + tactics of causing dissension between Germany and Italy.” + +Now I shall ask you a question: A short while ago you told us that you +wanted to make all the Jews emigrate to Madagascar. Is Madagascar in the +Eastern reservations mentioned in the document? + +VON RIBBENTROP: About what? I have not understood. + +M. FAURE: You were talking in this document of deporting Jews to the +reservations in the Eastern territories, and a short while ago you spoke +to us of settling the Jews in Madagascar. Is Madagascar meant here? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was the Führer’s plan. This document refers to +the fact that a large-scale espionage system had been discovered, I +believe, in France. The Führer sent me while I was on a journey to Italy +and told me to speak to Mussolini and see to it that in cases of Jews +involved in these acts of sabotage and espionage, the Italian Government +or the Italian Army did not intervene to prevent this measure. Also I +should like to state definitely that I knew, and it was also the +Führer’s plan, that the European Jews were to be resettled on a +large-scale either in Madagascar, North Africa, or in reservations in +the East. This was generally known in Germany. That is all that we are +concerned with here, and I also knew that some very unpleasant things +had occurred at that time and that the Führer was convinced that all of +them could be attributed to Jewish organizations in the south of France, +I believe. I now recollect very well that at the time I discussed the +matter with Mussolini and begged him to adopt suitable measures since +these Jews were furnishing all the information to the English and +American Intelligence Services. At least that was the information which +the Führer was constantly receiving. + +M. FAURE: You said, did you not, that all Jews were to be deported to +the Eastern reservations? Is that correct? Please reply “yes” or “no”. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Whether I was in favor of it? + +M. FAURE: Germany deported all the Jews from German territory and +territories occupied by her to Eastern reservations. That is true, is it +not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the contents of the document in detail. I +do not know what I myself said in detail. But at any rate I knew that +the Führer had ordered that the Jews of the occupied territories in +Europe were to be transported to reservations in the East and resettled +there. That I did know. The carrying out of these measures, however, was +not my task as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Foreign Office, but I +did know that it was the Führer’s wish. In this connection, I remember +that I received an order from him to discuss the matter with the Italian +Government so that they too would introduce corresponding measures +regarding the Jewish problem. That applied to other countries as well, +where we had to send telegrams quite frequently, so that these countries +should solve the Jewish question. + +THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, did you read to the witness the second +paragraph beginning: “Further, the Reich Foreign Minister dealt with the +Jewish question...”? + +M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President, the second paragraph. That is the +paragraph which I have just been reading. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, you read the third one, but I did not know you read +the second one too. You read the second one too, did you? Very well. + +M. FAURE: Yes, I read it as well, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: The document is a new document, is it not? + +M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President, it is a document which I would like to +submit under the Exhibit Number RF-1501. It belongs to the “D” series; +it is D-734 of the British document books. + +THE PRESIDENT: Has the defendant said whether he admits that it is a +substantially accurate account of the conversation? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I can no longer say for certain, Mr. President; what I +did say at the time, I know only, and gather, from this document, from +these words, that the Jews were spreading news from British and American +sources. I can remember that at that time a large espionage and sabotage +organization was in existence, and that this organization was causing a +great deal of trouble in France, and that the Führer ordered me to +discuss the matter with Mussolini since the Italians were opposing +certain measures we had introduced in France. I spoke to Mussolini and +told him that the Führer was of the opinion that, where this question +was concerned, we should have to come to a definite understanding. + +THE PRESIDENT: I think, Defendant, you have already told us that. The +question that I asked was whether you agreed that it was a substantially +accurate account of the conversation. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that in certain points the report is +incorrect, but fundamentally the position was as I have just explained +it. + +M. FAURE: Now, you also spoke about this question with Horthy, did you +not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I had to confer several times with the Hungarian +Government so as to persuade them to do something about the Jewish +problem. The Führer was extremely insistent on this point. I therefore +discussed the question repeatedly with the Hungarian Ambassador and the +question was primarily to centralize the Jews somehow or other in some +part of Budapest, I think it was slightly outside Budapest or in—as a +matter of fact, I do not know Budapest very well—in any case, it was +somewhere in Budapest itself. That was the first point. And the second +point dealt with the removal of the Jews from influential Government +posts, since it had been proved that Jewish influence in these +departments was sufficiently authoritative to bring Hungary to a +separate peace. + +M. FAURE: The document relating to your conversation or one of the +conversations which you had with Horthy has already been produced. It +was that of 17 April 1943. It is Document D-736, which was submitted as +GB-283. + +During the interrogation of your witness, Schmidt, the British +prosecutor asked this witness if he admitted having compiled this +account, and this was confirmed by Schmidt. This note bears the +following remark at the bottom of the first paragraph: “The Foreign +Minister declared that the Jews were either to be exterminated or sent +to concentration camps. There was no other solution.” + +You did say that, did you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I definitely did not say it in those words. But I would +like to reply as follows: + +It was apparently an account prepared by “Minister” Schmidt, as was his +habit, some days after a long discussion between the Führer and Horthy. +I have already said that the Führer had repeatedly charged me to talk to +Horthy, to the Hungarian Government, to the Ambassador, in order to +reach a solution of the Jewish question. At the time when Horthy visited +the Führer the Führer emphasized the question to him in a very irritable +manner, and I remember perfectly that subsequent to this discussion I +talked the matter over with “Minister” Schmidt, saying that I, strictly +speaking, had not quite understood the Führer. + +The remark mentioned was definitely not made in this way. M. Horthy had +apparently said that he could not, after all, beat the Jews to death. It +is possible, since there would have been no question of that in any +case, that in this connection I did endeavor to persuade Horthy to do +something or other at once about the Jewish question in Budapest, +namely, that he should undertake now the centralization which the Führer +had already wished to carry out for a long time. My objection or my +interpolation may have referred to this question. + +I must add that the situation, at that time, was as follows: We had been +receiving repeated indications from Himmler, to the effect that Himmler +wished to handle the Jewish situation in Hungary himself. I did not want +this, since, one way or another, it would probably have created +political difficulties abroad. + +Consequently, acting on the wish of the Führer, who was extremely +obstinate on this subject, I, as is known, repeatedly attempted to +smooth matters over and, at the same time, pin the Hungarians down to do +something about it in any case. Therefore, if, from a long conversation, +some remark has been extracted and summarized in brief, and contains +some such statement, it certainly does not mean that I wished the Jews +to be beaten to death. It was 100 percent contrary to my personal +convictions. + +M. FAURE: I do not understand whether you answered my question or not. I +will have to ask you again. Is the report correct, or is it not correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, in this form it cannot be correct. These are notes. +I personally have never seen these notes before; otherwise I should have +said at once that this is nonsense and liable to misconstruction. I did +not see these notes before; I saw them for the first time in Nuremberg. + +I can say only one thing which may possibly have occurred. I might have +said...well yes, “the Jews cannot be exterminated or beaten to death, +so, please do something in order that the Führer will be satisfied at +long last, and centralize the Jews.” + +That was our aim, at that time at any rate. We did not want to render +the situation more acute, but we were trying to do something in Hungary +so that no other department could take the matter in hand, thereby +creating political difficulties abroad for the Foreign Office. + +M. FAURE: You knew at that time that many Jews had been deported. That +may be gathered from your explanations. + +THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, please. Are you passing from this +document? + +M. FAURE: I was continuing to speak of it in more general terms. + +THE PRESIDENT: You are passing from it, did you say? + +M. FAURE: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, Defendant, the Tribunal would like to know whether +you did say to the Regent Horthy that Jews ought to be taken to +concentration camps. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I consider it possible that such may have been the case, +for we had, at that time, received an order that a concentration camp +was to be installed near Budapest or else that the Jews should be +centralized there, and the Führer had instructed me a long time before +to discuss with the Hungarians a possible solution of the Jewish +question. This solution should consist of two points. One was the +removal of the Jews from important government positions and two, since +there were so many Jews in Budapest, to centralize the Jews in certain +quarters of Budapest. + +THE PRESIDENT: I understand your suggestion to be that this document is +inaccurate. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it is not accurate. The way I should like to put +it, Mr. President, is that when reading the document, it would appear +from this document that I considered it possible or desirable to beat +the Jews to death. That is perfectly untrue but what I did say here and +what I emphasized later on could be understood to mean only that I +wished something to be done in Hungary to solve the Jewish problem, so +that other departments should not interfere in the matter. For the +Führer often spoke to me about it, very seriously indeed, saying that +the Jewish problem in Hungary must be solved now... + +THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that, I think, already. What I wanted to +ask you was this: Are you suggesting that Schmidt, who drew up this +memorandum, invented the last few sentences, beginning with the words: + + “If the Jews there did not want to work they would be shot. If + they could not work they would have to perish. They had to be + treated like tuberculosis bacilli with which a healthy body may + become infected. This was not cruel if one remembered that + innocent creatures of nature, such as hares or deer, have to be + killed so that no harm is caused by them. Why should the beasts + who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be shown more leniency? + Nations which did not rid themselves of Jews perished. One of + the most famous examples of this was the downfall of a people + who once were so proud, the Persians, who now lead a pitiful + existence as Armenians.” + +Are you suggesting that Schmidt invented those sentences or imagined +them? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Mr. President, I should like to add that I myself was +very grieved by these words of the Führer, and I did not quite +understand them. But perhaps this attitude can be understood only if we +remember that the Führer believed that the Jews had caused this war, and +that he had gradually developed a very fanatical hatred for them. + +I remember too that later on, after this conference, I discussed with +the interpreter Schmidt and the two gentlemen the fact that this was the +first time the Führer had used expressions in connection with the Jewish +problem which I could no longer understand. These words were certainly +not invented by Schmidt. The Führer did express himself in some such way +at that time. That is true. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure. + +M. FAURE: It appears from his document that you thought there were +concentration camps in Hungary and yet you said yesterday that you did +not know there were any in Germany. Is that not so? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know that there were any concentration camps +in Hungary, but I did say that the Führer had instructed me to ask +Horthy to ask the Hungarian Government to concentrate the Jews in +Budapest, in certain parts of the city of Budapest. As to concentration +camps in Germany, I already spoke yesterday about my knowledge of that +subject. + +M. FAURE: You admitted that you knew Hitler’s policy to deport all Jews +and you admitted that insofar as you were competent as Minister for +Foreign Affairs, you assisted this policy, did you not? That is right, +is it not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: As his faithful follower I adhered to the Führer’s +orders even in this field, but I always did my utmost to alleviate the +situation as far as possible. This can be stated and proved by many +witnesses. Even in 1943 I submitted a comprehensive memorandum to the +Führer in which I urged him to alter the Jewish policy completely. I +could also quote many other examples. + +M. FAURE: If I understand your testimony rightly, you were morally +opposed to this persecution of Jews, but you did help to carry them out, +is that not so? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I repeatedly said at the very beginning of my +examination, that in that sense I have never been anti-Semitic. But I +was a faithful follower of Adolf Hitler. + +M. FAURE: Apart from the Jewish question, you dealt with arrests of +French people, did you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The arrests of Frenchmen... + +M. FAURE: Yes. Did you or did you not give orders to arrest Frenchmen? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that this was so. Quite possible. + +M. FAURE: Can you be more precise on that subject? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I cannot, for the moment, remember any details. In +any case I know that Frenchmen were arrested. Just how far this depended +on us, at that time, I do not know. It was, I think, in 1944, shortly +before the invasion that the Führer issued an order to the effect that a +large number of important French members of the resistance movement were +to be arrested on the spot, and I believe that we were advised +accordingly. It is also possible that we co-operated in this action to a +certain extent, but I cannot remember any details. + +It was a question of arresting those elements who would kindle the flame +of the Resistance Movement in the event of an invasion, and would attack +the German armies in the rear. But I cannot give you any more +particulars now. + +M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown a document which will be submitted as +Exhibit Number RF-1506 (Document Number RF-1506). It is an affidavit by +Dr. H. Knochen. I shall read some passages from this document. + + “At the end of 1943—it must have been in December—there was a + conference at the Foreign Office on arrests to be made in + France. As I was in Berlin, I was also summoned to it. Present + at this conference were: The Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop; + the State Secretary Von Steengracht; Ambassador Abetz; another + member of the Foreign Office, whose name I do not know; the + Chief of the SIPO and the SD, Dr. Kaltenbrunner; the Higher SS + and Police Leader in France, Oberg; and representing the + Military Commander-in-Chief was his Chief of Staff Colonel + Kossmann, if my memory serves me right. + + “The Minister stated the following: The Führer expects in France + more attention to be paid in the future than hitherto. The enemy + force must not be allowed to increase. Therefore all German + services will have to carry out their duties more meticulously.” + +I omit the next paragraph. Then we read the following: + + “He sees arising danger, in the event of invasion, of those + prominent Frenchmen who do not wish to collaborate with Germany, + and who are secretly active against her. They might constitute a + danger to the troops. These dangerous elements should be sought + out in business circles, university centers, in certain military + and political circles, and all classes of society connected with + them. He believes that it will be necessary to strike an + immediate blow against these people. He suggests that they + number easily 2,000 people or more. At a moment when it is + necessary to defend Europe against her enemy, there is no reason + why we should shrink from taking preventive measures of this + kind in France. As to the practical means of putting this into + effect, the Minister stated, Ambassador Abetz will have to take + up this matter immediately and draw up a list in collaboration + with the German services in order to take account of all the + questions that arise out of this matter.” + +I end the quotation here. Do you admit the accuracy of this document? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I distinctly remember that discussion. This was a +Führer order to the effect that immediate action be taken—I have just +spoken about this—in view of the pending invasion, to arrest all +potentially dangerous elements who could fan the flame of resistance in +the rear of the German armies. I considered this a perfectly +comprehensible measure which any Government, with the welfare of the +troops at heart, would have made. + +I then held this conference. The Führer expected a far greater wave of +arrests, but only a comparatively small number, I believe, were arrested +then. + +Subsequently we had comparatively little to do with the actual arrests; +they were carried out by the police. + +But it is perfectly clear that this conference did take place at the +time indicated and that we did what had to be done at the moment, as +proposed, namely, the arrest of those elements which might have been +dangerous in case of an invasion. That is quite true. + +M. FAURE: I have no further questions. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: There are two things that I want to say. One of them +relates to the Prosecution and one of them relates to the Defense. It is +desired that the Prosecution should furnish documents to the +interpreters when they are going to use documents in the course of +examination or cross-examination. Documents need not necessarily be in +the language which the interpreter is going to use, but there must be +some document in some language, one of the languages, placed before the +interpreters in order to assist. + +The other point is that I am told that the defendants’ counsel are not +getting their documents ready for the Translation Division in anything +like the 2 weeks beforehand which was specified by the Tribunal. The +Tribunal, it is true, said that the documents must be furnished to the +Tribunal or the Translation Division 2 weeks ahead, if possible. Those +words “if possible” are being treated too lightly and the documents, I +am told, are sometimes coming in as late as 48 hours before the case of +the particular defendant is to be taken. That is not sufficient and it +will lead to delay. That is all. + +MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, in the course of the +cross-examination of this defendant by the French Prosecution, reference +was made to Document 3766-PS and I understood Dr. Horn to say that that +document was not a captured document. That was my understanding of his +statement. I am not altogether sure that that was what he said when he +approached the microphone. So that the record will be perfectly clear, I +now wish to inform the Tribunal that it is a captured document and I do +not know upon what basis Dr. Horn made that assertion. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have not, so far, had any opportunity—it has +been stated that we are dealing with a captured document, and I have had +no opportunity of checking the matter beforehand. It said on the top of +this document that it was a USA exhibit, Document Number 3766-PS, and I +had no opportunity of checking this on its arrival. I have therefore +requested that this fact be kindly established by the French +Prosecution. That was my sole objection. I did not deny that it was a +captured document; I was merely unable to prove it. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecutors wish to ask questions of +the defendant? Colonel Amen, the Tribunal hopes that you are not going +over ground which has already been gone over. + +COL. AMEN: Most certainly not, Sir. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] You speak English pretty well, Ribbentrop? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I spoke it well in the past and I think I speak it +passably well today. + +COL. AMEN: Almost as well as you speak German? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I would not say that, but in the past I spoke it +nearly as well as German, although I have naturally forgotten a great +deal in the course of the years and now it is more difficult for me. + +COL. AMEN: Do you know what is meant by a “yes man” in English? + +VON RIBBENTROP: A “yes man”—_per se_. A man who says “yes” even when he +himself—it is somewhat difficult to define. In any case, I do not know +what you mean by it in English. In German I should define him as a man +who obeys orders and is obedient and loyal. + +COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you were a “yes man” for Hitler, +isn’t that correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I was always loyal to Hitler, carried through his +orders, differed frequently in opinion from him, had serious disputes +with him, repeatedly tendered my resignation, but when Hitler gave an +order, I always carried out his instructions in accordance with the +principles of our authoritarian state. + +COL. AMEN: Now, you were interrogated frequently by me, were you not, +before this Trial? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, once or twice, I believe. + +COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read to you certain questions and answers +which were given in the course of these interrogations, and simply ask +you to tell the Tribunal whether or not you made the answers that I read +to you. That question can be answered “yes” or “no”; do you understand? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + + COL. AMEN: “I have been a loyal man to the Führer to his last + days. I have never gone back on him. I have been a loyal man to + his last days, last hours, and I did not always agree with + everything. On the contrary, I sometimes had very divergent + views, but I promised to him in 1941 that I would keep faith in + him. I gave him my word of honor that I would not get him into + any difficulties.” + +Is that correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that according to my recollection is correct. I did +not see the document and I did not sign anything, but as far as I can +remember, that is correct. + +COL. AMEN: Well, what did you mean by saying that you would not get him +into any difficulties? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I saw in Adolf Hitler the symbol of Germany and the only +man who could win this war for Germany, and therefore I did not want to +create any difficulties for him, and remained faithful to him until the +end. + +COL. AMEN: Well, what you really meant was that you were never going to +cross him, and you promised him that in 1941, isn’t that true? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I would never cause him any difficulties, yes, I did say +that. He often found me a rather difficult subordinate, and that is when +I told him that I would not cause him any difficulties. + +COL. AMEN: In 1941 you told him that no matter whether you differed with +his opinion in the future, you would never press the point, isn’t that +true? + +[_There was no response._] “Yes” or “no”? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite that, but... + +COL. AMEN: Well, approximately that, is that right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it cannot be put that way. I only meant, if I may +explain it this way, that I would never cause him any difficulties; if a +serious divergence of opinion should ever arise, I would just withhold +my own view. That was what I meant. + +COL. AMEN: Well, you gave him your word of honor to that effect, isn’t +that true? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct, yes. + +COL. AMEN: And at that time you had talked about resigning, isn’t that +correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is also true, yes. + +COL. AMEN: And that made the Führer lose his temper and become ill, +correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. “Ill” is not the correct expression, but he became +very excited at that time. I should prefer not to mention the details. + +COL. AMEN: Well, he said it was injuring his health, isn’t that correct, +and told you to stop arguing with him about any of these questions and +do what he told you to do? Right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not wish to say anything more about the personal +reasons, nor do I believe that these are matters which could be of any +interest here. Those would be personal matters between the Führer and +myself. + +COL. AMEN: Well, I am not interested in that. I am interested only in +ascertaining if it is not a fact, and if you did not swear under oath, +that on that occasion you swore to Hitler that you would never express +or press any divergent views to anything which he desired. Is that not +correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, no! That is absolutely untrue, the interpretation is +false. I told the Führer that I would never create any difficulties for +him. After 1941 I had many divergencies with him, and even at that time +I always voiced my own opinions. + +COL. AMEN: Well, Ribbentrop, whatever divergent views you had you were +never able to put any of them into effect after 1941, were you? “Yes” or +“no?” + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question. Please repeat it. + +COL. AMEN: I say, no matter how divergent your views were, or what views +you expressed to the Führer on any of these questions after 1941, your +suggestions being contrary to the Führer’s were never put into effect. +Isn’t that correct? You always eventually did what the Führer told you +to do and what he wished, regardless of your own views. + +VON RIBBENTROP: You are putting two questions to me. To the first I must +reply that it is not correct that Hitler never accepted suggestions from +me. Question Number 2, however, is correct. I can answer it by saying +that if Hitler at any time expressed an opinion to me and issued an +order, I carried the order through as was natural in our country. + +COL. AMEN: In other words, eventually you always said “yes”, isn’t that +correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I carried out his order, yes. + +COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you some more of your testimony: + + “He”—referring to the Führer—“considered me his closest + collaborator. We had a very serious conversation then, and when + I wanted to go away, I promised it to him and I have kept it to + the last moment. It was sometimes very difficult, I can assure + you, to keep this promise, and today I am sorry that I gave it. + Perhaps it would have been better if I had not given it. It put + me from then on in the position that I could not talk to Hitler, + in very serious and important moments of this war, in the way in + which I would have liked to, and in which, perhaps, I might have + been able to talk to him after this conversation in 1941. + + “I must explain all this to you. If you do not know the + background of these things you might think perhaps that as + Foreign Minister during these last years I would like to say + more about this. Perhaps I might say one could give some more + information about this, but I want to be and remain loyal to + this man, even after his death, as far as I can possibly do it. + But I reserve the right to prove to posterity that I kept my + promise and also the right to show the role which I have played + in the whole of this drama.” + +Did you or did you not make those statements under oath to me? + +VON RIBBENTROP: They are... + +COL. AMEN: “Yes” or “no”? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Here again we have two questions. To question Number 1, +I would say that I know nothing at all. To the second question, I answer +“no.” I certainly never testified under oath to that. I was put on oath +only twice, but that is not relevant here. The statement is not verbatim +and must have been wrongly translated. It is correct that I said that I +was loyal to the Führer and that I further said that I had many +arguments with him, that we were not always of the same opinion, and +that is the essence of my statement. That is correct. + +COL. AMEN: I asked you only one question, and I ask you again to answer +it “yes” or “no.” Did you or did you not make those statements in the +exact language that I just read them to you? + +THE PRESIDENT: I think, Colonel Amen, he really did answer that, because +he said it is not verbatim. + +COL. AMEN: But it is verbatim. + +THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of opinion. He says it is not verbatim. + +COL. AMEN: Well, very good, Your Lordship. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] In any event, you can see that you stated +the substance of what I just read to you; correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: As I have just said, yes. + +COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, Ribbentrop, you testified and gave this +particular testimony in English, did you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have often spoken English at interrogations, that is +quite true, but whether it was precisely this statement which was made +in English, I do not know. In any case, I repeat, these statements on +both points are to be understood that way; that is how they were meant. + +COL. AMEN: And when you gave your testimony in English, that was at your +own request, was it not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. + +COL. AMEN: At whose request? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know. I believe it just happened that way; +I cannot remember. I believe I spoke English mostly, and German a few +times. Most of the time, however, I spoke English. + +COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you a little more of your testimony +and ask you the same question, which I hope you will answer “yes” or +“no,” namely: Did you give this testimony in the course of the +interrogation: + + “Question: ‘Do you feel that you have an obligation to the + German people to set forth historically not only the good + things, but the bad things, for their education in the future?’ + + “Answer: ‘That is a terribly difficult question to answer.’ + + “Question: ‘Does that counterbalance the loyalty you feel + towards the Führer?’ + + “Answer: ‘I do not want to stand before the German people as + being disloyal to the Führer.’” + +Did you make those statements? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, though I can no longer +remember very exactly. But that is quite possible. So much has been said +in the course of the last few months, and then too, from a physical +point of view, I have, as you know, not been quite up to the mark, so +that I just cannot remember every single word. + +COL. AMEN: All right. Now see if you recall having made these +statements: + + “I always told the Führer openly my view if he wanted to hear + it, but I kept myself entirely back from all decisions, but if + the Führer once had decided, I, according to my attitude toward + the Führer, blindly carried out his orders and acted in the + sense of his decision. In a few decisive foreign political + points, I tried to give my opinion more forcefully. This was in + the Polish crisis and also in the Russian question, because I + considered this absolutely important and necessary, but from + 1941 I had but very little weight and it was difficult to bring + an opinion through with the Führer.” + +Do you recall having made those statements? “Yes,” or “no,” please. + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is more or less true. Yes, I practically remember +it. + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal has already heard a very long +cross-examination of the defendant, and they think that this is not +adding very much to what they have already heard. The defendant has +given very similar evidence already. + +COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. I will pass to another subject. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] You have testified that there was a sharp +line of demarcation between the political and the military situations. +Correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Between—I did not understand that. + +COL. AMEN: You have testified that there was always a sharp line of +demarcation between the political and the military elements. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. The Führer always differentiated rather strongly +between these two elements; that is correct. + +COL. AMEN: And that information belonging to the military was kept +exclusively for the military and not made available to your office, for +example? Is that correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I heard little of military matters and plans; yes, that +is correct. + +COL. AMEN: And that the contrary was also true, that the information +which you obtained was not made available to the military; is that +correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That I am in no position to judge, but I would assume +so, since I do not know what information the military received from the +Führer. + +COL. AMEN: Well, you told us that the Führer’s entire plan was to keep +those political and military channels separate each from the other. +Correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, in general he kept them very severely apart. I have +already said so several times. That is why I have only just now had +cognizance of many military documents for the first time. That was +perfectly in keeping with the Führer’s decrees on secrecy, that no one +department should know more than was absolutely essential. + +COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact that was not true at all; was it, +Ribbentrop? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have already given you my answer. + +COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact you had secret agents out who were +working jointly in foreign countries for your office, for the Army, and +for the Navy; isn’t that true? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is incorrect. + +COL. AMEN: You are quite sure of that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I am certain of that. + +COL. AMEN: And you are swearing to that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: You mean agents who did something, who... + +COL. AMEN: Who were out obtaining information for your office, for the +Army, and for the Navy at the same, jointly? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that highly improbable. It is, of course, +possible that somehow or other, some man may have worked for different +departments, but this was definitely not done on an organized scale. The +organization—we maintained a very small intelligence service +abroad—and the intelligence services of the other departments of the +Reich generally worked, as far as I was informed, completely apart from +ours. It is possible that here and there some person or other would work +for other, for different departments. That is quite conceivable. For +instance, some person or other in our legations, as was customary at the +English, American, Russian, and other legations, who had dug themselves +in as consular assistants or some other kind of assistants, and carried +out intelligence work for some organization or other. + +COL. AMEN: So you want to change the answer you made a moment ago; is +that right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not wish to change it at all. Fundamentally, as +an organized routine matter, I never introduced any of the secret agents +who worked for the different departments abroad. It is, however, +conceivable that the department of the Foreign Office dealing with such +matters may have appointed somebody. It was, however, a fairly +insignificant affair. Today I say “unfortunately.” It is quite possible +that other agents from this department, working for other departments, +for Counterintelligence or the SD, _et cetera_, were correlated. Later +on we even—I should like to add the following: I had pronounced +differences of opinion with Himmler, over the intelligence services +abroad, and it was only through the good offices of the Defendant +Kaltenbrunner that I obtained an agreement to the effect that certain +items of information would be placed at my disposal. But later this +agreement was not honored. I think it was practically ineffective, +because it was already too late. That, I believe, was in 1944. + +COL. AMEN: Will you look at Document Number 3817-PS, please? Will you +first tell the Tribunal who Albrecht Haushofer was, please? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Albrecht Haushofer was a former collaborator of mine and +was a man who, yes, who dealt with German minority questions. Could I +perhaps read the letter first? Is it a letter from Haushofer? It is not +signed. + +COL. AMEN: Yes, it is. Have you finished reading? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite, not yet. Shall I read the others too, or +only the first letter? + +COL. AMEN: We shall get to the other letters in a moment. I am trying to +make this as short as we possibly can. Does that letter refresh your +recollection that Haushofer was out in the Orient investigating various +matters and making reports to you as early as 1937? + +VON RIBBENTROP: At the moment I cannot recall that Haushofer was in +Tokio but it is conceivable, it is possible that such was the case. + +COL. AMEN: Well, the letter is addressed to you and it encloses a +report, does it not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Isn’t this a letter from Count Dürckheim? Isn’t there +some misunderstanding? But if you say this was written by Haushofer, +then it is conceivable that he was in Tokio; it is possible. I am not +acquainted with the details. I sent Count Dürckheim to Tokio at that +time but it is possible that Haushofer was there too. To be candid, I +have, at present, forgotten all about it. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have just seen that this letter is not fully +dated and is unsigned but I hear from Colonel Amen it was allegedly +written in 1937. In 1937 Ribbentrop was not yet Foreign Minister. He was +appointed Foreign Minister only on 4 February 1938. + +COL. AMEN: It has the date on it—3 October—and it was captured with +Haushofer’s documents. + +VON RIBBENTROP: But I consider it quite probable that this letter is +from Haushofer, although, to be quite candid, I no longer remember +exactly that he had been to Tokio in 1937. + +COL. AMEN: Well, now... + +VON RIBBENTROP: He was a collaborator who worked with us in the early +years but later dealt more with German minority questions, so that I +lost track of him in recent years. + +COL. AMEN: I will just pass along through this document. You will find +the next document is dated 15 April 1937, requesting reimbursement and +funds for this trip. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: And then passing to the next document, you will find a letter +to the Deputy of the Führer, Hess, saying: + + “I am using the courier to send you also personally a short + report which is going to Ribbentrop at the same time. It + contains as briefly as possible a summary of what I could + observe and hear over here in 4 weeks.” + +Do you see that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see the letter. Yes, yes! + +COL. AMEN: Then you will pass on to the next letter, dated 1 September +1937, addressed to yourself. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +COL. AMEN: Enclosing a report covering the first 4 weeks. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it before me. + +COL. AMEN: Now, we will pass the report over just for the moment and you +will come to a letter dated 17 December 1937. + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal thinks this is very far from +the matters which they have really got to consider. + +COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. If seems to me that this indicates very +clearly that copies of the same report which is included here were being +sent simultaneously to the Army, to the Navy—that went to Raeder—and +one to the Army and to Ribbentrop. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is true that the witness’ first answer was that +they did not have joint agents but he subsequently qualified that and +said they might sometimes have had joint agents. + +COL. AMEN: That is right, Sir. If you think he has conceded that +point... + +I should like to put this in as Exhibit USA-790. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but may I be allowed to say that we are not, in +this case, dealing with an agent. Herr Haushofer was a free collaborator +of ours, interested in politics in general, and in the question of the +German minorities in particular. If he was in Tokio at that time, and he +doubtless was there, although it has slipped my memory, then I must have +told him to speak to several persons over there and report to me. He +apparently, as I have only just gathered from this letter, either +because he liked to be busy or for some other reason unknown to me, or +because he knew the other gentlemen, placed these reports at the +disposal of these other gentlemen, on his own initiative. But he +certainly was no agent sent out by different departments. I think the +only person who knew him well was Rudolf Hess; otherwise, I believe, he +knew nobody at all. I fear I am not giving you quite the right ideas; he +was a private tourist, who submitted his impressions. + +COL. AMEN: Now, I believe you have told the Tribunal that you were not +very close to Himmler; is that right? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have always said that my relations with Himmler were +good during the first few years, but I regret to say that in the latter +years I was not on good terms with him. I naturally—it was not very +noticeable to the outside world—but I do not wish to discuss this +matter in detail. Many things have already been said about it and there +were serious and violent divergencies, due to many reasons... + +COL. AMEN: I do not care what the divergencies were. In what years did +you get along closely with him? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand your question. + +COL. AMEN: In what years were you close to him? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The first divergencies between Himmler and myself arose, +I believe, in 1941, over Romania and difficulties in Romania. These +divergencies were smoothed over, and naturally to all outward +appearances we had to work together as before, and we often exchanged +letters on our respective birthdays and on other occasions. But later on +relations were not very good. The final break came in 1941. Formerly I +had been on good terms with him and also shared his opinion for the +creation of a leadership class, at which he was aiming. + +COL. AMEN: And you had at least 50 social appointments with Himmler in +1940 and 1941? + +VON RIBBENTROP: How many? + +COL. AMEN: Fifty? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Fifty? No, that certainly could not have been the case. +Perhaps five or thereabouts, I cannot say for certain. But after 1941 +relations between us were more strained, and later they were not very +good. Others, I believe, have already testified to that effect. + +COL. AMEN: Well, I do not want to take any more time, except... + +THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing with social appointments between +Ribbentrop or something other? + +COL. AMEN: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Is that a matter which the Tribunal has to go into? + +COL. AMEN: Well, I expect, Sir, that any person that has as many +appointments as are indicated by these books certainly has discussed +with Himmler the matter of concentration camps and the entire matters +which Himmler was exclusively handling. He has told the Tribunal that he +had never heard anything about concentration camps from Himmler. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I wish to repeat my statement that at no time did +Himmler discuss this matter with me. As for our 50 meetings, I do not +know, we may have met frequently, despite everything, but I cannot +remember 50 meetings. Possibly five or ten, I do not know. I do not +believe it to be of vital importance since it is not a decisive factor. +Of course we had to work together in various fields and this +collaboration was mostly very difficult. + +COL. AMEN: Well, there were many business appointments which you had +with him also, were there not? Just take a look at this sheet of entries +from Himmler’s appointment book and tell me whether that conforms to +your... + +THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not want this matter gone +into any further. + +COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir, but these were business appointments as +distinguished from social. There are no further questions. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, during the last sessions of the +Tribunal you explained in great detail the bases of German foreign +policy. I should like to ask you a few comprehensive questions and +request you to answer these questions laconically in terms of “yes” or +“no.” Do you consider the Anschluss as an act of German aggression? +Please answer this. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Austria? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression. It was the accomplishment of a +purpose. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I must request you... + +VON RIBBENTROP: But I presume I can say a few sentences at least, after +saying “yes,” or must I never say anything else but “yes” and “no”? + +GEN. RUDENKO: I must beg you to answer my questions. You have replied +far too extensively. I would like you to summarize your replies, +precisely by saying “yes” or “no.” + +VON RIBBENTROP: That depends on my state of health. I must ask you to +forgive me. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I understand. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not consider the Anschluss as an act of aggression, +that is “no.” I consider it the realization of the mutual purpose of +both nations involved. They had always wished to be together and the +government before Adolf Hitler had already striven for it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more: Please answer “yes” or “no.” Do you +consider that the Anschluss was not an act of German aggression? Do you +consider... + +THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, he gave you a categorical answer to +that; that it was not an aggression. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: And we have already ruled that the witnesses are not to +be confined to answering “yes” or “no.” They must answer “yes” or “no” +first, and then make a short explanation if they want to. But, anyhow, +with reference to this question, he has answered it categorically. + +GEN. RUDENKO: The second question: Do you consider the seizure of +Czechoslovakia as an act of aggression by Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression in that sense, but a union in +accordance with the right of self-determination of nations, as laid down +in 1919 by the President of the United States, Wilson. The annexation of +the Sudetenland was sanctioned by an agreement of four great powers in +Munich. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You evidently have not understood my question. I asked you +whether you considered the seizure of Czechoslovakia, of the whole of +Czechoslovakia, as an act of aggression by Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not an act of aggression by Germany. I +consider, according to the words of the Führer, and I believe he was +right, that it was a necessity resulting from Germany’s geographical +position. This position meant that the remaining part of Czechoslovakia, +the part which still existed, could always be used as a kind of +aircraft-carrier for attacks against Germany. The Führer therefore +considered himself obliged to occupy the territory of Bohemia and +Moravia, in order to protect the German Reich against air attack—the +air journey from Prague to Berlin took only half an hour. The Führer +told me at the time that in view of the fact that United States had +declared the entire Western Hemisphere as its particular sphere of +interest, that Russia was a powerful country with gigantic territories, +and that England embraced the entire globe, Germany would be perfectly +justified in considering so small a space as her own sphere of interest. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Poland as an act of +aggression by Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No. I must again say “no.” The attack on Poland was +rendered inevitable by the attitude of the other powers. It might have +been possible to find a peaceful solution to the German demands, and I +think the Führer would have trodden this path of peace, had the other +powers taken this path with him. As matters stood, the situation had +become so tense that Germany could no longer accept it as it was, and as +a great power Germany could not tolerate Polish provocations any +further. That is how this war arose. I am convinced that primarily the +Führer was never interested in conquering Poland. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Denmark as an act of +aggression by Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, the “invasion” of Denmark, as it is called, was, +according to the Führer’s words and explanation, a purely preventive +measure adopted against imminent landings of British fighting forces. +How authentic our information was is proved by the fact that only a few +days later English and German troops were engaged in battle in Norway. +That means that it was proved that these English troops had been ready +for a long time for fighting in Norway, and it came out from the +documents discovered later on and published at the time, and from orders +issued, that the English landing in Scandinavia had been prepared down +to the smallest detail. The Führer therefore thought that by seizing +Scandinavia, he would prevent it from becoming another theater of war. I +do not therefore think that the invasion of Denmark can be considered as +an act of aggression. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And you do not consider this attack on Norway as an act of +aggression on the part of Germany either? + +VON RIBBENTROP: We have just been talking about Norway. I was talking +about Norway and Denmark, a combined action. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Together with Denmark. All right, it was a simultaneous +action. Do you consider the attack on Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg +as an act of aggression on the part of Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That is the same question. I must again say “no,” but I +would like to add an explanation. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Just a moment. I would like you to give shorter replies +because you explain the basic questions far too extensively. You deny +that this was an act of aggression on the part of Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The Russian Prosecutor will understand that we are +dealing with very important questions, which are not easily explained in +a sentence, especially since we did not have the opportunity to explain +the matter in detail. I shall be quite brief. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I quite appreciate that you have already been answering +questions of this nature for 3 days running. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I shall now be very brief. After the Polish campaign +military considerations proved to be the decisive factors. The Führer +did not wish the war to spread. As for Holland, Belgium, and France, it +was France who declared war on Germany and not we who declared war on +France. We therefore had to prepare for an attack from this direction as +well. The Führer told me at the time that such an attack on the Ruhr +area was to be expected, and documents discovered at a later date have +proved to the world at large beyond a shadow of doubt that this +information was perfectly authentic. The Führer therefore decided to +adopt preventive measures in this case as well and not to wait for an +attack on the heart of Germany, but to attack first. And so the +timetable of the German General Staff was put into practice. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Greece as an act of +aggression on the part of Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The attack on Greece and Yugoslavia by Germany has +already been discussed. I do not believe I need give any further details +on this point. That is here... + +GEN. RUDENKO: I also do not think it is necessary to give detailed +replies. I ask whether you consider the attack on Greece as an act of +aggression on the part of Germany? Answer “yes” or “no.” + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, and I consider that the measures adopted in +Yugoslavia and the measures taken by Greece in granting bases, _et +cetera_, to the enemies of Germany justified the intervention of Adolf +Hitler, so that here too one cannot speak of aggressive action in this +sense. It was quite clear that British troops were about to land in +Greece, since they had already landed in Crete and the Peloponnesos, and +that the uprising in Yugoslavia by the enemies of Germany, in agreement +with the enemies of Germany, as I mentioned yesterday, had been +encouraged with the intent of launching an attack against Germany from +that country. The documents of the French General Staff discovered later +in France showed only too clearly that a landing in Salonika had been +planned... + +GEN. RUDENKO: Witness Ribbentrop, you have already spoken about that in +much detail. You explained it yesterday at great length. Now will you +please answer “yes” or “no” to my last question: Do you, or do you not +consider the attack on the Soviet Union as an act of aggression on the +part of Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: It was no aggression in the literal sense of the word, +but... + +GEN. RUDENKO: You say that in the literal sense of the word it was not +an act of aggression. Then in what sense of the word was it an +aggression? + +THE PRESIDENT: You must let him answer. + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I offer a few words of explanation? I must be +allowed to say something. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You... + +VON RIBBENTROP: The concept of “aggression” is a very complicated +concept, which even today the world at large cannot readily define. That +is a point I should like to emphasize first. We are here dealing, +undeniably, with a preventive intervention, with a war of prevention. +That is quite certain, for attack we did. There is no denying it. I had +hoped that matters with the Soviet Union could have been settled +differently, diplomatically, and I did everything I could in this +direction. But the information received and all the political acts of +the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1941 until the outbreak of war, persuaded +the Führer, as he repeatedly told me, that sooner or later the so-called +East-West pincers would be applied to Germany, that is, that in the +East, Russia with her immense war potential, and in the West, England +and the United States, were pushing steadily towards Europe with the +purpose of making a large-scale landing. It was the Führer’s great worry +that this would happen. Moreover, the Führer informed me that close +collaboration existed between the General Staffs of London and Moscow. +This I do not know; I personally received no such news. But the reports +and information which I received from the Führer were of an extremely +concrete nature. At any rate, he feared that, one day, Germany, faced +with this political situation, would be threatened with catastrophe and +he wished to prevent the collapse of Germany and the destruction of the +balance of power in Europe. + +GEN. RUDENKO: In your testimony you have frequently stated that, in the +pursuit of peaceful objectives, you considered it essential to solve a +number of decisive questions through diplomatic channels. Now this +testimony is obviously arrant hypocrisy since you admitted just now that +all these acts of aggression on the part of Germany were justified. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not mean to say that; I said only that we were not +dealing with an act of aggression, Mr. Prosecutor, and explained how +this war came to pass and how it developed. I also explained how I had +always done everything in my power to prevent the war at its outbreak +during the Polish crisis. Beyond the precincts of this Tribunal, history +will prove the truth of my words and show how I always endeavored to +localize the war and prevent it from spreading. That, I believe, will +also be established. Therefore, in conclusion I should like to say once +more that the outbreak of war was caused by circumstances which, at long +last, were no longer in Hitler’s hands. He could act only in the way he +did, and when the war spread ever further all his decisions were +principally prompted by considerations of a military nature, and he +acted solely in the highest interests of his people. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now I beg you to answer the following +questions: + +I understand that you have submitted to the Tribunal a document, Number +311, written by yourself, which is an appreciation of Hitler entitled +the “Personality of the Führer.” You wrote that document not so very +long ago. I am not going to quote from it, since you doubtlessly +remember it, as you wrote it a very short time ago. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am not quite sure what document that is. May I +look at it? + +GEN. RUDENKO: This document was submitted by you to your own defense +counsel, as Exhibit Number 311, and submitted to the Tribunal by your +attorney. On Page 5 there... + +VON RIBBENTROP: Will you be kind enough to give a copy of this document? + +GEN. RUDENKO: It is Document Number 311. + +THE PRESIDENT: It cannot have been submitted to the Tribunal as 111, +without anything more. What is it, 111-PS or 111? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is a document of the Defense submitted +as Ribbentrop-311. We have only a Russian translation here, which came +to us together with a German document book. I presume that the document +book has been submitted to the Tribunal. + +THE PRESIDENT: It is R-111—it is Ribbentrop-111, you mean. It is not +111; it is Ribbentrop-111. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is Document 311. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I’ve got it now. It is in Document Book Number 9. + +GEN. RUDENKO: May I continue, Mr. President? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: On Page 5 of the document, your appreciation of Hitler, +you state, “After the victory over Poland and in the West, under an +influence which I mainly ascribe to Himmler, Hitler’s plans were +extended, that is, in the direction of establishing German hegemony in +Europe.” Do you remember the passage of the document you wrote yourself, +Defendant Ribbentrop? + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I see this document? I do not know it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to ask counsel for Defendant +Ribbentrop to submit this document to his client. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are dealing here with... + +THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. + +Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is inclined to think that this document is quite +irrelevant. It is apparently a document prepared by the Defendant +Ribbentrop, upon the personality of the Führer. I do not know when it +was prepared, but it seems to us to be irrelevant. + +DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I too am of the opinion that it is +irrelevant. I included this document only in case the defendant did not +have an opportunity to speak in greater detail of his relation to +Hitler. Since he has had that opportunity I should like to withdraw the +document. + +THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal consider the document quite +irrelevant. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this document was presented by the defense +counsel in the Document Book. It was written by the Defendant Ribbentrop +in the course of this Trial. All the prosecutors considered it +admissible since this document, this appreciation, presented by the +Defendant Ribbentrop would justify us in asking a large number of +questions. But if the Tribunal considers that it really is quite +irrelevant to the case, I shall, of course, refrain from quoting it. + +THE PRESIDENT: We have not yet had an opportunity of ruling on the +admissibility of these documents. It is the first time we have seen them +this morning. We all consider this document irrelevant. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] I should like to put a few questions with +regard to German aggression against Yugoslavia. I should like you to +acquaint yourself with Document 1195-PS. This document is entitled +“Preliminary Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.” I invite your +attention to Paragraph 4 of the first section of the document. It +states: “The Führer has, in connection with the partition of +Yugoslavia...” Have you found the place? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Can you tell me, please, on what page it is? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4: “In connection with the partition of +Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions...” + +VON RIBBENTROP: I must have the wrong document. + +GEN. RUDENKO; Document 1195-PS. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Ah, yes. The beginning. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I begin again: + +“In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued +the following instructions: + + “The transfer of territories occupied by the Italians is being + prepared for by a letter of the Führer to the Duce and will be + carried out by detailed directive of the Foreign Office.” + +Have you found the place? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not see the place. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4, beginning with the words: “The +Führer...” Do you have it? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I have already read this paragraph into the record. + +VON RIBBENTROP: It begins: “In connection with the partition of +Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions.” That is +how the document begins. May I ask—now what passage are you quoting? + +GEN. RUDENKO: It ends with the following words: “...will be carried out +according to a detailed directive of the Foreign Office.” And then +reference is made to a teletype from the Quartermaster General of the +OKH. + +VON RIBBENTROP: There must be some mistake. It is not mentioned here. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Probably you did not find it in the document. + +THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, it is 12:45 now. Perhaps this would be a +good time to adjourn. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, have you acquainted yourself with +the contents of the document? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with the entire document or +with Paragraph 4 only? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I have read Paragraph 1 of which you spoke previously. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Did you find the passage referring to the plenary powers +of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the partition of the +territory of Yugoslavia? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it says in my document that the surrender of the +territory occupied by the Italians is to be prepared by a letter from +the Führer to the Duce and put into effect on further instructions from +the Foreign Office. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct. That is precisely the passage which I had +in view, that is, Section 2 of this document, which is headed “The +Delimitation of the Frontiers.” It is stated there—Section 2, Page 2 of +the Document—it is stated: + + “As far as the delimitation of the frontiers was not in the + foregoing Section I, this is done in agreement with the Ministry + of Foreign Affairs....” + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I have only one question to ask in this connection. May I +assume that this document defines the part played by the Ministry for +Foreign Affairs in the partition of Yugoslav territory? Is this correct? + +VON RIBBENTROP: That appears from the fact that the Foreign Office was +to take part in fixing the other frontiers, in addition to those defined +here, the main lines of which were probably, already, fairly clear. That +is correct. + +GEN. RUDENKO: This is quite evident. I should like to put two more +questions to you concerning Yugoslavia. + +On 4 June 1941—this no longer refers to the previous document—a +conference was held in the German Legation, presided over by the German +Minister in Zagreb, Siegfried Kasche, at which it was decided forcibly +to evacuate the Slovenes to Croatia and Serbia and the Serbs from +Croatia into Serbia. This decision results from a telegram from the +Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Number 389, dated 31 May 1941. Do you know +about these measures? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I do not know them, but perhaps I +may read through them. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Please do. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect that resettlement was undertaken there but I +do not know the details. + +GEN. RUDENKO: It goes without saying that it must be very difficult for +you to remember all the details at the present time. But you do remember +that such deportations did actually take place and precisely in +accordance with the directives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. It states here that the Führer had approved a +resettlement program, but I do not know the details. At any rate, we +undoubtedly had something to do with it, for this meeting definitely +took place in the Foreign Office; that is certain. Unfortunately I +cannot add any details since I am not informed. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I understand you. There is one more question in this +connection. This was a compulsory resettlement of the population? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know; I cannot say. No. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know? All right. And now the last question in +connection with Yugoslavia: After Germany’s attack on Yugoslavia about +200 employees of the Yugoslav Foreign Office attempted to leave for +Switzerland. They were arrested; and then, in spite of protests +addressed to your Ministry, they were forcibly taken to Belgrade whence +many of them were sent to concentration camps and there died. Why did +you not take the measures which you were obliged to take after such a +glaring breach of diplomatic immunity? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I must say that at the moment I cannot recollect it at +all; but, as far as I know, instructions have always followed the +principle that diplomats must be treated as diplomats and sent back to +their own countries. If it did not happen in this case, I do not know +why it was not done. However you yourself say that they were sent to +Belgrade. That, at any rate, is certainly in accordance with my +instructions. Why or whether they were later interned in Belgrade, I +must say I do not know. I do not think we had anything to do with that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know that they were interned in concentration +camps? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Now for a further series of questions. Who, +beside Hitler, signed the decree regarding the Sudetenland of 21 +November 1938? Can you remember? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know to which order you are referring. May I +look through it? I see that I am one of those who signed it. This is the +law regarding the reincorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You remember that you actually signed this decree? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No doubt. If it says so here, then it must certainly +have been so. At the moment, of course, I do not remember it exactly. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is evident. Who, beside Hitler, signed the decree +regarding the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, of 16 March 1939, +which by its very nature destroyed any remaining vestige of the +sovereignty of the Czechoslovakian Republic? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that I was one of those who signed that one, +too. At least so I assume. Yes, I see that I signed it; here it is. + +THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, surely all these documents speak for +themselves. The defendant has not challenged his signature upon these +documents. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I only want to remind the +defendant. Since he appears to forget I simply present the documents to +him. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] You also signed the decree of 12 October +1939 regarding the occupation of the Polish territories. Do you remember +that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: 12 October ’39? No, I do not remember it. I signed a +great many things during those years but I cannot remember them in +detail. + +GEN. RUDENKO: This is the decree dated 12 October. + +THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if he does not dispute his signature, +why should you waste time in putting these documents to him? His +signature is on the document. He does not dispute it. This is a mere +waste of time. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Mr. President. Then I have only one more question in +this connection. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Your signature also appears on the decree +of 18 May 1940, regarding the annexation by Germany of the Belgian +territories, Eupen and Malmédy. + +I put these questions so that I may conclude with the following +question. Am I right in stating that each time the Hitler Government was +attempting to lend the appearance of legality to their territorial +annexation by a decree, this decree invariably bore the signature of the +Reich Minister Ribbentrop? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I believe not. If any territorial changes were +undertaken, it was the Führer who ordered them; and, as is probably +evident from these documents, the various ministers who were in any way +concerned then countersigned the Führer’s order or the laws decreed by +the Führer, and, of course, I probably countersigned most of these +orders myself. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now, I should like you to acquaint yourself +with the document already submitted in evidence to the Tribunal as +Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document Number USSR-120). It is your agreement +with Himmler for the organization of intelligence work. It is an +extensive document and I should like you to acquaint yourself with +Subparagraph 6 of this document. + +VON RIBBENTROP: I beg your pardon. This is a different document. This +concerns the intelligence service. You spoke of slave labor, but this +concerns the intelligence service. + +GEN. RUDENKO: This has been incorrectly translated to you. I was not +speaking about slave labor; I was speaking about intelligence work. +Please refer to Subparagraph 6 of this document. It is an extensive +document and the time of the Tribunal should not be taken up unduly. It +is stated here, and I quote: + + “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives every possible assistance + to the Secret intelligence service. The Minister of Foreign + Affairs, as far as this is compatible with the requirements of + foreign policy, will install certain members of the intelligence + service in the diplomatic missions.” + +I want to omit one long paragraph and will read the final paragraph: + + “The responsible member of the intelligence service must keep + the head of the mission informed on all important aspects of + secret intelligence service activities in the country in + question.” + +You did sign such an agreement? Is that true? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: We are therefore forced to the conclusion that the foreign +organization of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs was actually +engaged in espionage work? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, you cannot really say that, for the following +reasons: + +I mentioned once before this morning in the course of the examination +that there were differences of opinion between Himmler and myself in +regard to the intelligence service abroad. Thanks to the efforts of the +Defendant Kaltenbrunner, that agreement was eventually signed. We +planned to co-operate, and I do not deny that we intended to work +intelligence service personnel into the Foreign Office organization. +This, however, was not put into practice. The agreement could not become +effective because it was concluded so late that the end of the war +intervened. I think the date of the conclusion of this agreement, which +is lacking in this copy, must have been 1944 or even 1945. Thus, there +was no actual co-operation. Such co-operation was, however, planned; and +I was particularly interested in it. There had been all sorts of +differences and I wanted to end them and put matters on a more uniform +basis. That was the reason. In any case, I think that is part of the +procedure which all countries had to employ abroad. I do not think it is +anything unusual. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I am not asking you your opinion. I was only interested in +this document; it is true that you did sign such an agreement. You +replied in the affirmative. I am not asking you further questions about +this document. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I replied in the affirmative—yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I wanted to know this only. I have another document from +this series. Do you remember a letter of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner in +which he asked for one million Tomans for bribery in Iran? + +VON RIBBENTROP: One million...? What is that? I did not hear it; please +repeat it. I did not hear the word very well... + +GEN. RUDENKO: One million Tomans. Tomans are Iranian currency. I should +like you to acquaint yourself with this document; it is a short one. + +VON RIBBENTROP: May I see it, please? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Of course. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I recollect the matter, and I think certain funds +were placed at their disposal. + +GEN. RUDENKO: The money was placed at Kaltenbrunner’s disposal? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the details, but I believe I did give +instructions to the Foreign Office at the time that financial support +should be given in this matter. That is correct. + +GEN. RUDENKO: It was precisely that point which interested me. The +document speaks for itself. + +I now proceed to the following series of questions. + +You have testified that in August or September 1940 in the Schloss +Fuschl, you met the Defendant Keitel to discuss a memorandum on the +possibility of an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union. Consequently, +nearly one year prior to that attack on the Soviet Union, you were +already informed of the plans for this attack, were you not? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. The Defendant Keitel was with +me at the time at Fuschl, and on that occasion he told me that the +Führer had certain misgivings regarding Russia and could not leave the +possibility of an armed conflict out of his calculations. He said that, +for his part, he had prepared a memorandum which he proposed to discuss +with the Führer. He had doubts as to the wisdom of any conflict of that +kind in the East, and he asked me at the time if I would also use my +influence with the Führer in that direction. I agreed to do so. But an +attack or plans for an attack were not discussed; I might say that all +this was a discussion more from a General Staff point of view. He made +no mention to me of anything more concrete. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I do not want to detain the attention of the Tribunal on +this question, because it has already been sufficiently investigated. +But I want to ask you in this connection the following question: You +replied to Keitel during this conversation that you would express your +opinion regarding the war with the U.S.S.R. to Hitler. Did you have a +conversation with Hitler on that subject? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I discussed the subject several times with Hitler, and +on this occasion I spoke of the danger of preventive wars to him. Hitler +told me of his misgivings, which I have already mentioned here. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, you have testified in that sense. Tell me, did you +know that the so-called “Green File” of the Defendant Göring, containing +directives for the plunder and exploitation of the temporarily occupied +territories of the Soviet Union was prepared a long time prior to the +attack on the Soviet Union? Did you know this? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. I heard the term “Green File” +here for the first time. + +GEN. RUDENKO: All right—you did not know the name. And when did you +learn about the contents? The contents of this file? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Neither the file nor the name. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know. All right. You knew that already before +the war directives were drafted for the extermination of the peaceful +Soviet population? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And when did you know about that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I heard nothing at all about such plans. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And the directives? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding the preparation of such plans... + +GEN. RUDENKO: And regarding the directives concerning jurisdiction in +the Barbarossa region? You evidently did know about that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding what? I did not understand that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Regarding jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region. It is a +supplement to Plan Barbarossa. + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I have never occupied myself +personally with that subject. It might be possible that some department +in my office did have a hand in it somewhere; but as far as I remember +I, myself, was never concerned with the subject of jurisdiction; for +after the outbreak of the conflict with the Soviet Union the Foreign +Office had nothing more to do with these territories. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you to take cognizance of a telegram which +you addressed on 10 July 1941, at 1451 hours, to the German Ambassador +in Tokio. We are submitting this document, Number 2896-PS, to the +Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-446. You must remember this telegram. + +VON RIBBENTROP: To whom is it addressed? It does not say here. + +GEN. RUDENKO: To the German Ambassador in Tokio. Do you remember? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Oh, Tokio, yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You apparently remember it. I must ask you to pay +attention to the words on Page 4 at the end of this document. They are +underlined in pencil for the sake of convenience. Have you found the +passage? I shall read only that part into the record. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Which part are you referring to? The last page? + +GEN. RUDENKO: It is on Page 4. It is underlined. + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have found it now. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I am going to read this passage into the record. + + “I request you to use every means in your power to influence + Matsuoka, in the way I have indicated, so that Japan will + declare war on Russia as soon as possible; for the sooner this + happens, the better it will be. It must still be our natural aim + to shake hands with Japan on the Trans-Siberian railway before + the winter. With the collapse of Russia the position of the + countries participating in the Three Power Pact will be so + strong that the collapse of England or the complete annihilation + of the British Isles will be only a question of time.” + +Have you found this passage? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have the passage; yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: What is it? Is it one of your efforts to localize the war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand that last question? + +GEN. RUDENKO: I say, is this one of your efforts to localize the war? + +VON RIBBENTROP: The war against Russia had started, and I tried at the +time—the Führer held the same view—to get Japan into the war against +Russia in order to end the war with Russia as soon as possible. That was +the meaning of that telegram. + +GEN. RUDENKO: This was not only the policy of the Führer; it was also +your policy as the then Minister for Foreign Affairs? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask. You state that you +never heard a thing about the cruelties perpetrated in the concentration +camps? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. + +GEN. RUDENKO: During the war you, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, +studied the foreign press and the foreign newspapers. Did you know what +the foreign press was saying? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is true only up to a certain point. I had so +much to read and so much work to do every day that, on principle, I +received only the foreign political news selected for me from the +foreign press. Thus, during the whole of the war I never had any news +from abroad about the concentration camps, until one day your armies, +that is, the Soviet Russian armies, captured the camp at Maidanek in +Poland. + +On that occasion news came from our embassies and I asked for press +news, _et cetera_, to be submitted to me. How I took these news releases +to the Führer and what resulted from that has already been discussed +here. Before that I knew nothing about any atrocities or any measures +taken in the concentration camps. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know about the notes of the Minister for Foreign +Affairs of the Soviet Union, Molotov, concerning the atrocities +committed by the German fascists in the temporarily occupied territories +of the Soviet Union, the deportation into slavery of the people of the +Soviet, the pillaging? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I think that note reached me somehow through diplomatic +channels. I am not quite sure how; it may have come through news +agencies. However, I do remember that at the time—I believe there were +even several notes—at any rate I remember one of these notes which I +submitted to the Führer. But since the beginning of the Russo-German war +we could not carry out any action in these territories, and we had no +influence there. Therefore, I am not informed about details. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I was primarily interested in one fundamental fact, +namely, that you were aware of the notes from the Minister for Foreign +Affairs of the Soviet Union. Tell me, please, do you know that millions +of citizens were driven into slavery to Germany? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know! And that those citizens were used as +slaves in Germany—you were not aware of that? + +VON RIBBENTROP: No. According to what I heard, all these foreign workers +are supposed to have been well treated in Germany. I think it is +possible, of course, that other things might have happened, too; but on +the whole, I believe that a good deal was done to treat these workers +well. I know that on occasion departments of the Foreign Office +co-operated in these matters with a view to preventing those possible +things. Generally speaking, however, we had no influence in that sphere, +as we were excluded from Eastern questions. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Why were you informed that foreign laborers were treated +well and why were you not informed that they were being treated as +slaves? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think that this is correct. We in the Foreign +Office—in the case of the French, for instance, and quite a number of +other foreign workers—co-operated in getting musicians, _et cetera_, +from France for them. We advised on questions concerning their welfare. +And I know that the German Labor Front did everything in its power, at +least with regard to the sector which we could view to some extent, to +treat the workers well, to preserve their willingness to work, and to +make their leisure pleasant. I know, at least, that those of its efforts +in which we co-operated were on these lines. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I now present a penultimate group of questions in +connection with the activities of the “Ribbentrop Battalion.” I must now +request you to read the testimony of SS Obersturmbannführer Norman Paul +Förster. This document is submitted as Exhibit Number USSR-445 (Document +Number USSR-445). Please pay particular attention to Page 3 of Förster’s +testimony. This passage is underlined. It is stated there: + + “When in that same month, August 1941, I reported to the address + given to me in Berlin, I learned that I had been transferred to + Special Command SS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A member + of the Foreign Ministry, Baron von Kunsberg, was at the head of + the SS Special Command... In this command there were about 80 to + 100 men altogether and 300 or 400 men were added later. The + special command was later rechristened the Ministry of Foreign + Affairs Battalion ‘z.b.V.’ (for special employment). + + “I was received by Baron von Kunsberg in a building belonging to + the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the Sonderkommando was + quartered. He explained to me that the Sonderkommando was + created on instructions from the Reich Minister of Foreign + Affairs Von Ribbentrop. According to Von Ribbentrop’s + instructions, our Sonderkommando was to move forward with the + front-line troops in occupied territory in order to protect the + cultural treasures—museums, archives, scientific institutions, + art galleries, and so forth—from ruin and destruction by the + German soldiers, to confiscate them and transport them to + Germany.” + +Here I omit a few lines and then: + + “On the evening of 5 August 1941, in the presence of Nietsch, + Paulsen, Krallat, Remerssen, Lieben, and others, Von Kunsberg + informed us of Von Ribbentrop’s verbal order according to which + all scientific institutions, libraries, palaces, _et cetera_, in + Russia were to be thoroughly ‘combed out’ and everything of + definite value was to be carried off.” + +Did you find that passage in the document? + +VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. Shall I answer? + +GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you first of all to reply to my question, +reading as follows: You know that such a battalion of the Ministry of +Foreign Affairs existed, and that in accordance with your directives, it +was especially concerned—as is stated in this document—with the +preservation of cultural treasures? Please reply to this question. + +VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite incorrect as it appears in this document. I +cannot acknowledge it in any way and I must object to it. The following +is correct: + +This Herr Von Kunsberg is a man who was appointed, with a few +assistants, long before the Russian campaign with the idea even at that +time of confiscating in France documents, important documents, which +might be found there and which might be of importance or value to us. +Any order which—at the same time, I may say, he had orders to see to it +that there should be no unnecessary destruction of art treasures, _et +cetera_. In no circumstances did he receive from me orders to transport +these things to Germany or to steal any of them. I do not know how this +statement came to be made; but in this form it is certainly not correct. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You have protested against a great many of the documents +here. That does not mean that they are incorrect. I am not going to +quote from this testimony any further. I shall now refer to a document; +it is a letter from the Defendant Göring addressed to the Defendant +Rosenberg. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal under Document +Number 1985-PS. I shall here quote Paragraph 2 of the document. It has +already been submitted, so I shall read this letter addressed by Göring +to Rosenberg into the record. He writes: + + “After all the fuss and bother I very much welcomed the fact + that an office was finally set up to collect these things, + although I must point out that still other offices refer here to + authority received from the Führer, especially the Reich + Minister of Foreign Affairs, who sent a circular to all the + organizations several months ago, stating amongst other things, + that he had been given authority in the occupied territories for + the preservation of cultural treasures.” + +We can assume that the Defendant Göring is better acquainted with the +circumstances anent the preservation of art treasures. Don’t you +remember those things at all? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know how this letter from Reich Marshal Göring +came to be written. I do not know, but if there is any mention in it of +authorities or anything of that kind, that could only refer to the fact +that these art treasures were secured in these territories. I have +already stated here that during the war neither I myself nor the Foreign +Office confiscated or claimed any art treasures whatsoever, whether for +my personal use or for our use. It is possible that these art treasures +were temporarily placed in safekeeping. Certainly none of them passed +into our possession. Therefore it might be a misunderstanding in this +letter because I remember clearly that at that time we were dealing with +the safekeeping of art treasures. In France, for instance, at that time +robberies were beginning to be committed in private houses and art +galleries, _et cetera_; and I still remember asking the Wehrmacht to +provide guards to keep a watch on these art treasures, _et cetera_. At +any rate we in the Foreign Office never saw any of these works of art +ourselves. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I think we had better not go too deeply into details. I +should like to ask another question in this connection. Don’t you think +that the term “safekeeping of art treasures in the occupied territories” +actually concealed the looting of art treasures? + +VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly never intended that; and I have never given +any order to that effect. I should like to state that here, +emphatically. Perhaps I may add that when I heard that Kunsberg had +suddenly assembled such a large staff, I immediately ordered the +dissolution of his entire battalion—it was not a battalion; that is +badly expressed—at any rate, its immediate dissolution; and I think I +even remember dismissing him from the Foreign Office, because he did not +do what I wanted. I think he was removed from his office. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I am closing my interrogation. You were +Minister of Foreign Affairs of the fascist Germans from 4 February 1938. +Your appointment to this post coincided with the initial period, when +Hitler had launched on a series of acts involving a foreign policy which +in the end led to the World War. The question arises: Why did Hitler +appoint you his Minister of Foreign Affairs just before embarking on a +wide program of aggression? Don’t you consider that he thought you were +the most suitable man for the purpose, a man with whom he could never +have any differences of opinion? + +VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you anything about Adolf Hitler’s +thoughts. He did not tell me about them. He knew that I was his faithful +assistant, that I shared his view that we must have a strong Germany, +and that I had to get these things done through diplomatic and peaceful +channels. I cannot say more. What ideas he may have had, I do not know. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Here is my last question. How can you explain the fact +that even now, when the entire panorama of the bloody crimes of the +Hitler regime has been unfolded before your eyes, when you fully realize +the complete crash of that Hitlerite policy which has brought you to the +dock—how can we explain that you are still defending this regime; and, +furthermore, that you are still praising Hitler and that you are still +declaring that the leading criminal clique consisted of a group of +idealists? How can you explain that? + +THE PRESIDENT: That seems to be a number of questions in one, and I do +not think it is a proper question to put to the witness. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I thought that this was only one question which summarizes +everything. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you answer please, Defendant +Ribbentrop? + +THE PRESIDENT: I told you, General Rudenko, that the Tribunal does not +think it a proper question to put. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further questions. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you want to re-examine? + +DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the defendant, Mr. +President. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat. + +Now, Dr. Horn, I understand that you are going to deal with your +documents now, are you not? + +DR. HORN: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: I see the time; we might perhaps adjourn for 10 minutes +now. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to announce that the Tribunal will +not sit on Good Friday or the Saturday afterwards nor on Easter Monday. + +MAJOR J. HARCOURT BARRINGTON (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): +May it please the Tribunal, I am speaking for all the four prosecutors, +to put the Prosecution’s comments on the document books which the +Defendant Von Ribbentrop has put in. I am speaking for all the four +prosecutors, with one exception, that the French Chief Prosecutor wishes +to speak on two particular groups of documents which are of special +interest to the French Delegation. I think, if it is convenient to the +Tribunal, I might put the whole of the Prosecution’s position before Dr. +Horn puts his answer if that is agreeable to him. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree, Dr. Horn, that he might put his view first? +Is it agreeable to you that Mr. Barrington should put the position +first? + +DR. HORN: Yes. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: There are, in all, nine books in the English version; +and the last two have been received only today, so, as they contain +perhaps about 350 documents, I regret that I have not been able to agree +in the list with Dr. Horn, himself, although I have acquainted him with +the comments that the Prosecution proposes to make. + +The first two books, comprising Documents 1 to 44, have already been +read in open court on the 27th of March by Dr. Horn, and I take it that +Your Lordship does not want them gone into again. + +THE PRESIDENT: No. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: So that leaves simply Books 3 to 9, and I have made +out a working note of which I have copies. I do not know whether the +members of the Tribunal have them. + +THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Oh, yes; Your Lordship will see that on the left +column are the documents which the Prosecution would object to, and in +the middle column are those that they would allow, and there are remarks +on the right-hand side. + +Although this does not show it, I have, for convenience, divided these +documents up into nine groups; and so I think I need not go through all +the documents in detail unless there is any particular question on any +one of them. + +Before saying what the groups are, perhaps I might make two general +remarks, that the Prosecution takes the position that the _German White +Books_, which figure very largely in this list—_White Books_ issued by +the government of the Nazi conspirators,—cannot be regarded as evidence +of facts, stated therein; and secondly, that there are among these +documents a considerable number which are only discussions of subjects +in a very vague and tentative stage, and a great many of them, in the +Prosecution’s view, are cumulative. + +Now, of the first of the nine groups, I have broken them down to +Czechoslovakia; and if you will look at the note that I have handed up, +that consists of the first few documents down to 45. I beg your +Lordship’s pardon. That is wrong. From after 45, there are six PS +documents which are already exhibits and there are 46 and 47 and over +the page there are 7 more on Czechoslovakia, and the Prosecution’s +position on those is that six PS documents are allowed and 46 and 47; +but, over the page, 66, 67, and 69 are objected to purely on the ground +that they are cumulative—cumulative, I think of Number 68. + +THE PRESIDENT: Which volume are they in, 66 and 69? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: In Volume 3, My Lord. + +THE PRESIDENT: As they have already been translated does it make much +difference if there are objections that they are cumulative? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, there is not any difference, My Lord, at all, +except if they are going to be read into the record. + +THE PRESIDENT: They have all been translated? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: They have all been translated. + +THE PRESIDENT: And in the other languages, too? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: I understand so, My Lord, yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: So they need not be read into the record. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: If your Lordship pleases. + +THE PRESIDENT: That is the rule, isn’t it, that if they have been +translated into the four languages, they need not be read into the +record? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: That would apply to all the documents in all these +nine books now because they all have been translated. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it would; but there may be other objections to the +documents besides their being cumulative. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: There will be, according to the Prosecution’s +submission, a very large number that are cumulative _in toto_. + +THE PRESIDENT: There will be a very large number? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the point was that, being translated, they are +there already. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is the only point the Prosecution has against +those. The thing is, My Lord, the Prosecution say they are cumulative. +Of course, Dr. Horn might not say so and perhaps he would welcome a +ruling as to whether they should be used or not. + +THE PRESIDENT: No. What I was suggesting to you was that if the only +objection to them was that they were cumulative they may just as well go +in, be put in evidence, because they have already been translated—it +saves time—as to have them all argued. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord, unless Dr. Horn wishes to read any of +these documents and refer to them specifically. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, you mean that he might read them all and then... + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not know what Your Lordship is going to allow him +to do. I understood perhaps he would read some of them. + +THE PRESIDENT: Presumably, if he reads many that are cumulative, we +shall stop him. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: I will pass on to the second group, which are Numbers +48 to 62 inclusive, and those are on the subject of Allied rearmament +and alleged warlike intentions before the outbreak of war. Number 54 +appears to be missing from my book, and I do not know whether it was +intentionally left out. + +The Prosecution would object to all those on the ground that they are +irrelevant. They are in Book 3, My Lord. + +THE PRESIDENT: 59 is different, isn’t it? 59 is dealing with a speech by +Sir Malcolm MacDonald about the colonies. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. That is not exactly rearmament, but of course it +is on the same theme in a way, that it is a provocation to war. It is +certainly in rather a different category from the others. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: The third group deals with Poland, and that is a very +large group because it includes all the negotiations before the outbreak +of the war, and the numbers involved in that group are 74 to 214. + +I think it would perhaps be convenient to break that group down into two +phases. The first one would be the questions of the minorities and +Danzig and the Corridor and the incidents connected with them, and the +second phase—slightly overlapping in time, but roughly it follows after +the other one—would be the diplomatic events involving countries other +than Poland, that is to say, very approximately from the 15th of March +1939 onwards. The first phase of that group would be Numbers 74 to 181, +and the second phase 182 to 214. + +Now, in regard to the first phase, there are two points. The Prosecution +says that these are, with very few exceptions, irrelevant because they +treat of incidents and the problems arising out of these minority +questions, and the Prosecution says those are irrelevant for two +reasons. One of the documents among them consists of an exchange of +notes between the German and Polish governments on the 28th of April +1939. That is TC-72, Number 14, in Book 5. And that exchange of notes +consists of a confirmation that both parties unconditionally renounce +the use of force on the basis of the Kellogg Pact. That had been done +previously on the 26th of January 1934, as appears in another document +here. It is on Page 2 of my note, TC-21. + +THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of TC-72? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: TC-72, Number 14, was the 28th of April 1939. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: And on the footing that the two countries +unconditionally renounced, the use of force on the basis of the Kellogg +Pact, added to the fact that the Defendant Ribbentrop has himself said +that during 1938 Germany was on very good terms with Poland. And also +there was a declaration made by Germany and Poland on the 5th of +November 1937 about minorities—that is Number 123 in this list of +documents; it occurs at the top of Page 4 in the note. In view of these +things, the Prosecution says that the accounts of these and reports of +these incidents and minority problems are irrelevant and very old +history. + +I think perhaps I might... + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You have them all cumulative or irrelevant +starting with 76. You mean the cumulative? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, I am afraid to say, Your Honor, this was +originally got out purely as a working note, and that is rather an +error. It should be irrelevant on account of TC-21. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I was going to say that perhaps I might +anticipate an objection that Dr. Horn has been good enough to tell me +that he will make to this, that yesterday he contended that certain +incidents before Munich had been condoned by the Munich Agreement, and +that the argument I have just put up is on the same lines as that which +the Tribunal turned down yesterday. + +But, of course, there is this difference, that the Munich Agreement was +negotiated in ignorance of the Fall Grün and that, from the point of +view of condoning previous incidents, it is not on the same footing as +an agreement negotiated in full knowledge of the circumstances. + +So, My Lord, taking Group 3, Poland and the first phase of it, the +Prosecution would suggest—looking at the middle column on Page +2—allowing Number 75, which is the Polish Treaty of 1919, and TC-21, +which I have already mentioned, which reaffirmed the Kellogg Pact, and +Number 123 and TC-72, Number 14 and 16, which I have already mentioned. +The remainder, perhaps, might all be said to be irrelevant; but it would +be reasonable, perhaps, to allow Numbers 117, 149, 150, 153, 154, 159, +160, 163, and TC-72, Number 18. These were largely discussions between +ambassadors and heads of state, which may have rather more importance +than the other documents in this particular group. + +As a matter of fact, My Lord, I think they are all in anyhow, those that +I have just mentioned. + +That goes up to 182. Starting now at 182, and the first five, 182 to +186... + +THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to 155 which is the calling out of +Polish reserves, 155 to 158? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, My Lord, the objection to that was simply based +on the fact that... + +THE PRESIDENT: I think they are all mentioned in the conversation which +is 159, and that is probably the reason. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. I am obliged, Your Lordship. I think that it is +so, but I do not think the objection to them could be very strong. + +THE PRESIDENT: No. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 182 to 186, My Lord, they are reports by the +German chargés d’affaires in various capitals, and the Prosecution say +that those would not be proper evidence. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why not? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are just accounts of the German chargés +d’affaires’ observations and conclusions of fact, for the most part by +them, transmitted to their Foreign Office. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you mean they are irrelevant on the ground +of hearsay? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: I beg your pardon. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Because they are hearsay they should not be +admitted; is that what you mean? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, of course, partly hearsay. They are +also vague, and again, they are transmitted with an object in view. At +least that has been the submission of the Prosecution, that they are +transmitted to color the picture from the German point of view. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Would you admit these if they were made by +chargés d’affaires of other states? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: If they were made by chargés d’affaires of other +states? + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they would be admissible if they were put in as +government reports by Allied nations under the Charter; but they are not +really admissible if they are German documents. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry; I do not know what you mean. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Article 21 of the Charter... + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry. Perhaps I do not make myself +clear. I do not quite understand why these are different from any other +official reports made by chargés d’affaires of any country. Is it +because they are German reports? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Because they are German reports. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see. In other words, you think German +reports should be excluded. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think under the Charter they should be excluded, +except, of course, if they are used by the Prosecution as admissions +against the German Government itself. + +THE PRESIDENT: We are going to hear you in a moment, Dr. Horn. Anyhow, +Mr. Barrington, your objection to 182 to 214 is that it is self-serving +evidence and therefore not admissible; is that it? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is right, My Lord. + +THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other objection to them? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, as I said, conclusions of fact drawn +by an observer in a foreign country. They tend to get rather vague. + +THE PRESIDENT: That might apply to a great deal of the evidence. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 187 to 192 and TC-77 there is no objection to. + +Number 193 and 194 are German Foreign Office memoranda and they are mere +discussions, internal to the German Foreign Office. 193 is a memorandum +of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, and it deals with a visit +to him of the French Ambassador. And Number 194 is similar, a visit of +the British Ambassador. Number 195, that is Sir Nevile Henderson’s White +Paper, _Failure of a Mission_, and there are a number of extracts from +that; it is a book and there are a number of extracts from that in the +document book and it is contended that they are cumulative of evidence +which has already been given and that in particular most of them are +really provocative. That applies particularly to the first extract. + +THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by provocative? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Your Lordship will see that in the first extract +there are some rather strongly worded opinions. + +THE PRESIDENT: Which book are they in? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: They are in Book 6, My Lord. There are some rather +strongly worded opinions about the position of Soviet Russia. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Number 196 and 197 are German memoranda and reports +for Foreign Office use, and they cover the same category as 193 and 194. +One of them is internal to the Foreign Office and the other from the +German chargé d’affaires in Washington. + +Numbers 198 to 203 are all right. + +Number 204 is objected to as not being evidence; it is a memorandum of +the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office in +Berlin, and it merely talks of a report in the _Berliner Börsenzeitung_. +It is merely secondhand evidence. + +Number 205 and 206 are not objected to. + +The next one, TC-72, Number 74, is not objected to. + +Number 207 is the same document as the previous one. It is a mere +repetition. + +Now, Number 208, My Lord, consists of a collection of extracts from the +_British Blue Book_, and I am afraid I have not had time to check up +which of them are actually in evidence already. But it is clear that the +majority of them are obviously relevant, but it is suggested that those +in the left-hand column do include unnecessary detail in view of the +rest of them. + +Number 209, there is no objection. + +Number 210 is a conversation between the Defendant Ribbentrop and Sir +Nevile Henderson on the 30th of August 1939, and that of course has been +the subject of evidence already and is perhaps in any event cumulative +for that reason. + +Number 211(a) and 211(b) are just repetitions of documents quoted from +the _British Blue Book_. + +Number 212 is a Polish wireless broadcast, and Number 213 is a German +communiqué to the German public, and it is contended that those have no +evidential value. + +Number 214 is an extract from a book which the Tribunal has already +refused to the defendants. + +Now, the next page of the note, My Lord, deals with my next group, which +is Norway and Denmark. + +THE PRESIDENT: Group 4, is it? Group 4, is that right? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is Group 4, My Lord, yes. + +215(a) and 215(b) deal with the case of Iceland and Greenland. They are +not very long documents; they are just considered to be irrelevant. +Objection to them could not be very strong. + +There is no objection to 216(a) and 216(b), which are already in +evidence, I think; and D-629 is also already in evidence. + +Number 217 is simply an interview which the Defendant Ribbentrop gave to +the press, which the Prosecution says is not proper evidence. + +Number 004-PS is already in evidence. + +Number 218 and 219, I think, are also in evidence. + +Number 220 again is objected to as it is simply an interview with the +press. + +THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to those two Ribbentrop communications +to the press? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: It is self-created evidence, My Lord. He has +presumably given that evidence already. He had not given it at the same +time. + +THE PRESIDENT: What he said 6 years ago might be relevant. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, if Your Lordship thinks so; but the point I was +making is simply that it is self-created evidence and created at the +time with a view to create an impression. It is propaganda. + +THE PRESIDENT: You may say that, yes. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: Then, My Lord, the next group is the Low Countries. +That group really began at 218, of course, and it goes on to 240... + +THE PRESIDENT: Is this another group? Communiqué of the 5th group? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: This is the fifth group, My Lord, yes. That goes on +from 218 to 245, and I shall not deal in detail with that because the +French Chief Prosecutor is going to speak about that. And the same with +the next group, Number 6, which is the Balkans. The French Chief +Prosecutor will deal with that, Documents 246 to 278. + +The next group, Number 7, is Russia, that is, Documents 280 to 295, with +the exception, I think of 285(a), which seems to have got there by +mistake; it appears to refer to the United States. + +Number 279—I cannot identify from the English translation what it is at +all. Perhaps Your Lordship will be good enough to make an amendment +against Numbers 232 and 283; they should be put into the middle column, +there being no objection to them. But there is an objection to all the +other Russian documents. Your Lordship will see, beginning at the bottom +of the group, 291 to 295, they all concern the Anticomintern Pact. +Working up the page again from the bottom, 290, 1 to 5, are extracts +from the book which the Tribunal has already refused. And, of the +documents above that, 280 is Hitler’s speech about Russia in October +1939. And 281 is a repetition of a document we have already had, Number +274, which is the Three Power Pact. That will be dealt with. + +THE PRESIDENT: You mean that that is a textual reproduction? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think I am right in saying that it is actually a +textual reproduction. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But why is there an objection if it is simply +a textual reproduction? The Prosecution has been given textual +reproduction. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: There is no objection at all. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean it is not in the right column? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: I was putting in the Allied column only the ones which +could make up a complete set according to the Prosecution’s views. + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that true of 284 also, the Soviet-German +pact? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not know whether that has come before... + +THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why do you object to that then? + +THE PRESIDENT: By “Pact,” is it the German Pact of the 28th of September +1939? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: This is the 28th of September 1939. I am told that +there is no objection to that. + +Number 285 is again simply a German report which draws conclusions of +facts, and the Prosecution says that has no proper evidential value. It +is a very long report by the German Foreign Office concerning the +agitation in Europe against the German Reich by the Soviet Union, and it +is full of conclusions of fact and opinions. + +THE PRESIDENT: It is after the date of the beginning of war against +Russia? + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: It is after the beginning of that war, My Lord, yes. +Number 286 and 287, those are objected to as being without value as +evidence. They come from the _Völkischer Beobachter_. + +Number 288 is said to be a captured Soviet document; but it has +deteriorated generally in the English version, had no date and no +signature, and it seems of very doubtful value. + +Number 289 is a report from the Yugoslav military attaché in Moscow, +which is also thought to be irrelevant by the Prosecution. + +Then Group Number 8, My Lord, is the group concerning the United States +of America, Documents 299 to 310, and including 285(a). The first ten +documents, Your Lordship will see, are reports from, we would say they +come from a very indirect source, the process report by the Polish +Ambassador on the political situation in the United States in 1939. The +next one seems to come from Portugal, the next from the Polish +Ambassador again, the next two also from the Polish Ambassador. Then the +next one, Number 300, is President Roosevelt’s Quarantine Speech in +1937, which seems too far back to be of any proper relevance. Number 301 +is a German summary of events in the United States, which we say is +irrelevant for the reasons I have stated: That they are German +summaries, rather more unreliable than irrelevant. Number 302 again is +the Polish Ambassador’s report. Number 303 is a statement by President +Roosevelt in 1936, and Number 304 is President Roosevelt’s message to +Congress on the 4th of January 1939. I do not think there is anything +very objectionable about that. To numbers 305 to 308, there is no +objection; 309—in my copy there are two different versions of 309. The +first one is a German summary of the facts without any dates and with no +sources indicated. It seems to be of no proper value as evidence, and +the second one, 309 and 309(a), are declarations of the Pan-American +Conference and the German note in reply to it. I do not think the +Prosecution can take a very strong objection to that, but it does not +seem to be very closely in point. + +TC-72, Number 127, and TC-72, Number 124, are both appeals of President +Roosevelt to Hitler and are not objected to. 310 is another German +summary of facts without any sources indicated. + +The ninth group is simply a miscellaneous group; and, if My Lordship +will turn back to the first page of my note, it is the first 8 documents +on that page, down to Number 45. They are all allowed. There is no +objection to them, except Number 12, which is the announcement of the +Reichstag election results. It does not seem to matter one way or the +other whether that is in. + +Number 45 is Lord Rothermere’s book of predictions and prophecies, +_Warnings and Prophecies_. I think the Prosecution contends that it is +not relevant evidence in this case. + +The next lot of miscellaneous ones is on Page 2, Numbers 70 to 73. +Number 71 is the German-Lithuanian treaty about Memel, and there is no +objection. Number 70 is thought to be rather irrelevant. Numbers 72 and +73 are objected to because they deal with the Fourteen Points of +President Wilson. + +The next lot of miscellaneous ones is on the last page of one of my +notes right down at the bottom, Number 296, and that is a speech by +Hitler on the Rhineland. You have all the evidence that has been given. +It appears to be rather cumulative, if it is not in already. I have not +actually checked whether it is in. + +Number 298 on the top of the next page is, in fact, superfluous. It is +the same as Number 274. And down at the bottom of the last page, My +Lord, 311, is a paper written by the Defendant Ribbentrop on the +Führer’s personality. + +THE PRESIDENT: That has already been ruled out. + +MAJOR BARRINGTON: That, I think, has been ruled out this morning by Your +Lordship. Number 312 is an affidavit of Frau Von Ribbentrop. Number 313 +is an affidavit of Dr. Gottfriedsen. I understand from Dr. Horn that, +although he had been allowed Dr. Gottfriedsen as a witness, he thinks it +will save time if he reads the affidavit or a part of it. Perhaps, if +Your Lordship will allow the Prosecution to make what comments they +think fit when he comes to do that, it would be the best way of treating +it. + +That is all—all my points, My Lord. There are just the Low Countries +and the Balkans. + +MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, it is true that Mr. Barrington has +spoken for all of us; and I do not intend to go over any of these +documents, except this, because I fear there is some question in the +minds of the members of the Tribunal about our objection running from 76 +through 116, 118 to 122, and 114 to 148, the Polish documents. We also +say, of course, with Major Barrington that they are cumulative, but it +seems to me there is a much more basic objection. Perhaps they all have +to do with the alleged incidents inside Poland and they were published +in these _White Papers_. These incidents involved the mistreatment of +Polish citizens inside Poland, who were perhaps of German extraction. +Well, it is our view that such documents are irrelevant here because +that is no defense at all to the charges; and we cannot permit, we say, +a nation to defend itself or these defendants to defend themselves on +charges such as have been preferred here, by proving that citizens of +another state, although they may have been of German extraction or any +other extraction, were mistreated inside that state. Beginning with 76 +running through to 116, 118 through 122, 114 through 148, and 151 +through 152—it is 124 through 148 rather than 114 through 148, 124 +through 148. The last are 151 and 152. + +M. AUGUSTE CHAMPETIER DE RIBES (Chief Prosecutor for the French +Republic): I will ask the Tribunal’s permission to make two short +remarks about documents which are part of the fifth and sixth group, and +which concern entirely French documents taken from the _German White +Book_. It is, as a matter of fact only for this reason, that the French +Prosecution has any knowledge of them, for, contrary to what the +Tribunal believes, the French Prosecution has not yet received a +translation of the documents submitted by Dr. Horn. The first group, +Number 5, Documents 221 to 245; these are General Staff documents; and +it appears that from them Dr. Horn wishes to draw the conclusion that +England and France violated the neutrality of Belgium. If we ask the +Tribunal to reject the 25 documents, it is only because we see a grave +risk of the Tribunal’s losing time in useless discussions. Far from +having any reason to fear discussion, we feel that on the contrary +France and Britain would both be found to have respected scrupulously +the two pacts which they had signed: The first being to respect the +neutrality of Belgium, and the second being to respect the pact by which +they had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. + +What is the precise issue here, Gentlemen? Only to find out whether +Germany, France, or England violated the neutrality of Belgium. The +Defendant Ribbentrop has been asked this by his counsel, and has +answered it in the clearest possible manner, during Saturday’s session, +in a statement which the Tribunal is certain to remember. The Defendant +Ribbentrop said, “Of course it is always very hard in a war like this to +violate the neutrality of a country; and you must not think that we +enjoyed doing things like that.” + +That, Gentlemen, is a formal admission that Germany violated the +neutrality of Belgium. Why should we waste time in discussing the +relevance of these 25 documents now? + +I go on to the second group, Group Number 6. These are General Staff +documents, which Germany claims to have seized; and they concern events +in the Balkans in 1939 and 1940. The French Prosecution asks you to +reject the 22 documents submitted by Dr. Horn for the two reasons +following: They have absolutely no claim to be considered authentic, and +they are not relevant. They have absolutely no claim to be considered +authentic—they are all extracts from the _White Book_; and the Tribunal +knows the Prosecution’s views on this point. Moreover, the great +majority of these documents are extracts from documents originating with +the Allied general staffs. No originals have been produced; and the +supposed copies are not even submitted in their entirety. In the second +place, they are not relevant, for they all concern plans studied by the +general staffs in the last months of 1939 and the early part of 1940. +These plans for French or British intervention in Yugoslavia and Greece +naturally presupposed the consent of the governments concerned as an +indispensable condition. The plans were never carried through. They were +definitely abandoned after the Armistice of June 1940. The documents +date from 1939 and 1940; and the Tribunal will remember that the +aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece occurred on 6 April 1941 at a +time when the Hitler Government no longer had any reason to fear plans +made in 1939. + +These documents, which have no claim to be considered authentic, are +also in no way relevant to the present discussion; and for that reason +the French Prosecution asks the Tribunal to reject them. + +THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Horn. Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that you may +possibly, in view of the evidence which the Defendant Ribbentrop has +given, find it possible to withdraw some of these documents, in view of +the time that has been taken up. I mean the Defendant Ribbentrop has +dealt with the subject very fully; and it may be, therefore, that you +will be able to withdraw some of these documents in order to save time. + +DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I will withdraw all the documents which +are cumulative. I should like first... + +THE PRESIDENT: If you let us know now what it is you wish to withdraw... + +DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President. + +To begin with may I state my position on a few basic questions? That is +the probative value of the _White Books_ and the ambassadors’ reports. I +would like to point out that these documents had a decisive influence on +political opinion. That applies to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop as well +as Hitler. And in addition, I would like to point out that the +Prosecution have relied largely on reports of this kind. I should like, +therefore, to ask for equal rights for the Defense. + +Then I would like to say a few words about the documents of the French +General Staff which were found in the town of La Charité during the +French campaign. If the High Tribunal shares the doubts and misgivings +expressed by the representative of the French Prosecution, I ask +permission to question the Commander of Army Group 10, Field Marshal +Leeb, as to the fact that these General Staff documents were found in +the town of La Charité. + +The Polish documents to which I have referred were found in the Polish +Foreign Ministry at Warsaw. The Commander-in-Chief at that time, Field +Marshal or Generaloberst Blaskowitz, can testify to that effect. And in +this connection I would also name Generaloberst Blaskowitz as a witness, +if the Tribunal has any misgivings. + +Moreover, I can summarize the opinion of the Defense by saying that I +believe that objections can be raised against a document only if its +inaccuracy is obvious from the contents or if it can be shown to be a +forgery. I ask the Tribunal to admit all the other documents contained +in the _White Books_ or the ambassadors’ reports. + +As to the documents on Polish minority questions I would like to point +out that Prime Minister Chamberlain himself described the minority +question as being the decisive question between Germany and Poland. +Since these negotiations, of which the main subject, besides Danzig and +the Corridor, was the minority question, led to war, the minority +question is therefore one of the causes of the war. Therefore I ask that +the documents on this point, which prove continuous violation of the +minority pacts on the part of Poland be admitted in evidence. + +If the High Tribunal agree, I will now begin to submit the documents to +the Tribunal for judicial notice or to read certain essential passages; +and I would like to tell the Tribunal now which documents I will +dispense with. + +DR. DIX: I should be grateful to the Tribunal if I might just state my +position—not as regards the case of Ribbentrop, with whom I am not +concerned; my colleague, Dr. Horn, is dealing with him—but simply on +principle, not exclusively from the Defense point of view, but quite +objectively and basically in regard to the various problems which the +Tribunal must consider before making their decision as to the +admissibility of any piece of evidence—either in the form of a question +put to a witness or a document to be submitted. + +I am not asking for permission to talk for the sake of talking, but +because I believe that by doing so I can shorten the later stages of the +proceedings; because I hope that the Tribunal will be in agreement with +the main points of my statements and that therefore it will be +unnecessary for the Defense to make these statements at a later stage. + +I have naturally to leave it entirely to the Tribunal whether they +consider it now the appropriate time or whether I shall do it only after +my colleague Horn has finished with his documentary evidence. At any +case I should like to make the statements before the Tribunal have ruled +upon the applications of the Prosecution and of Dr. Horn. + +I should like to ask Your Lordship whether the Tribunal will allow me +now to make clear, as shortly as possible, the position I take up in +principle on the questions which I consider of vital importance for the +decision. May I do this? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +DR. DIX: I believe, without wishing to criticize the juridical value of +the statements which we have heard here, that there has been some +confusion of ideas. We must keep the distinction quite clear in our +minds: 1. Is an item of evidence—and that applies to witnesses as well +as documents—relevant? 2. Is an item of evidence useful as such? 3. Is +an item of evidence cumulative and therefore to be rejected? + +If the Tribunal rule that something offered in evidence is not relevant, +not useful, or cumulative, then it must refuse the application for it at +this stage of the proceedings. On the other hand, the question of the +credibility of something offered in evidence—that is, whether the +answer of a witness is to be believed or not, whether the contents of a +document may be considered credible, whether expositions set forth in a +_White Book_, for instance, are to be believed or not believed—that, in +my opinion, is a question which can be decided only when the evidence in +question has been brought into the proceedings and the Tribunal have +taken judicial notice of it and are able, when freely evaluating the +evidence—a course which is open to the Tribunal—to pass judgment on +its credibility or otherwise. For that reason I think that at the +present moment there seems to be no reason for saying, for instance that +this document cannot be used at all because it is part of a _White Book_ +published by the German Government. No one will deny that a _White +Book_, that is, a publication, an official publication, issued by any +government, can as such be useful and relevant evidence. Whether the +passage read and introduced into the proceedings is such that the +Tribunal can give it credence is a question that can be decided after +the evidence in connection with the _White Book_ has been introduced +into the proceedings, and the Tribunal have taken official notice of the +passage in question. + +Now, I turn to the question of relevancy and effectiveness. The +representative of the British Prosecution has stated here that the +reports sent by the German ambassadors to their Foreign Minister are, +_per se_, not useful. At least, that is the way I understood him. They +will be admitted only if the Prosecution wishes to use them. In other +words, they are to be admitted only if the Prosecution, wishes to use +them to the detriment of the defendants. I do not think that this point +of view can be maintained. The representative of the British Delegation +cited Article 21 of the Charter in this connection. Article 21 of the +Charter has nothing whatsoever to do with this question. Article 21 of +the Charter merely states, so far as I remember it—I do not have the +Charter on hand but I believe I know the contents of it very well—that +documents referring to the investigation by the governments of the +victorious powers of war crimes committed in their own countries do not +have to be read, but may merely be submitted to the Tribunal for +judicial notice. This question however has nothing whatsoever to do with +the question of the usefulness or relevancy of a report submitted at any +time by a German ambassador to his Foreign Office. Whether this report +has been admitted, or is to be admitted, can be decided according to +whether the Tribunal consider as relevant the subject which it concerns +and which it is to prove—if the fact which is to be proved by it is +considered relevant by the Tribunal and is adequately established by one +or both parties. Then, in my opinion, this ambassador’s report should be +admitted; and after its admission the Tribunal can, by freely weighing +the evidence, consider the value of the evidence, that is, its +credibility, and moreover its objective as well as its subjective +credibility. So much for the clear-cut differentiation of the concepts +of relevancy and usefulness and for the concept of the value of +evidence, that is, the objective and subjective credibility of evidence. + +Now, with regard to the question of whether evidence is cumulative. It +is certain that every jurist in this courtroom agrees that cumulative +evidence should not be admitted; but the question of whether evidence is +cumulative may in no circumstances be judged formally, so to speak, +mechanically. I can well imagine that a question with the same wording +as one that has already been put, need not necessarily be cumulative, +for reasons which I will enumerate in a moment and that a question which +in form does not resemble one already put, may nevertheless be +cumulative because it requires an answer from the witness regarding the +same evidence, but expressed in different words. The fact that a +question may be identical in wording with one which has already been put +does not necessarily mean that it is cumulative as shown by the old +proverb _Si duo faciunt idem non est idem_. If, for instance, I ask a +witness who bears the stamp of a fanatical adherent of the Nazi regime +for his subjective impression of something and then put the same +question on the same impression to a witness who is known to be a +fanatical opponent of the Nazi regime, then these two questions are +certainly not cumulative, for it is of paramount importance, if the +Tribunal is to be in a position to form an opinion and make a decision, +to find out whether an impression is registered in the same way by two +worlds, so to speak—by two diametrically opposed persons. Therefore one +has to take the witness into consideration in judging whether a question +is cumulative or not. A further example of the fact that a question +which is exactly similar to one previously put need not be cumulative +would be, for instance, if I put the question to the defendant and then +to a witness who is not interested. In saying this I wish in no way to +disparage the evidence given by the defendant under oath. That is far +from being my intention. In principle, the testimony of both the +witnesses is alike. There is, however, a great difference. In order not +to take too long I will cite only one example—whether when +investigating some phase of the defendant’s inner life about which he +himself is best informed, I question a witness who had an impression of +this incident concerning the defendant, or whether I question the +defendant himself for whom this inner impression is a part of the +psychological background of his deed. + +I should like to stop at this point, in order not to take up too much of +the Tribunal’s time with theoretical expositions. My intention in making +this statement was only to request the high Tribunal in making their +decision, I repeat in regard to relevancy and usefulness, to make a +clear distinction in the question of the value to be attached to +subjective evidence, which should be decided after its admission, and to +ask the Tribunal, when considering whether evidence is cumulative, not +to be guided solely by the outward form of the question or the document +but to investigate whether it would not be in the interest of truth and +give a deeper insight into the case to put the same question to +different people, or to have the same question confirmed, or not +confirmed, by written statements by different people. + +My conscience is uneasy about this academic exposition, but I hope that +the clarification which I have tried to make and in which I may perhaps +have succeeded to some extent, may help to shorten somewhat later stages +of the proceedings. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how long you think you +are going to be over these documents, because we are getting further and +further behind. And how long do you anticipate you will be? Have you +made up your mind yet what documents you are prepared to withdraw, if +any? + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I should need about two more hours—that is +without objections on the part of the Prosecution, and I believe that in +that time I can finish my entire presentation including the reading of +the most important passages, which are limited to a very few documents. +Therefore, without objections about two hours. + +THE PRESIDENT: You have heard the Prosecution’s objections. We have +heard them. We will consider them, and we will consider any answer that +you make to them; but we do not desire at this stage, when we have all +these other defendants’ cases to be heard, that you should go into these +documents in detail now and read them, and we hope that you will not +think it necessary to read from these documents after you have answered +the objections of the Prosecution to certain of the documents. + +DR. HORN: I have the intention... + +THE PRESIDENT: Have you the idea that you had finished your argument in +answer to the Prosecution’s objections or not? Did you intend to deal +further with the admissibility of any of these particular documents or +not? + +DR. HORN: In accordance with the wishes expressed by the Tribunal I +intend to submit these documents in groups, with a brief connecting text +and in each group where the Prosecution has made objections to add a few +remarks on the points raised. I do not intend to do any more. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you see, the position is this. The Prosecution +have objected to certain documents on certain grounds, and we want to +give you a full opportunity to answer those objections. When you have +your full answer to those objections, we think it will be appropriate we +should adjourn and decide upon those objections and upon your arguments. +Do you see? That we should rule that, after you have given your answer +to the objections, we should adjourn and decide which of the documents +we rule to be admissible in evidence. + +DR. HORN: If the Tribunal intends to give its ruling after I have taken +my position on the objections of the Prosecution, then I ask that I be +given an opportunity now, for, to begin with, I would like... + +THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Horn. Because you see, it is 5 +o’clock, and we shall not be able to conclude it tonight. + +Dr. Horn, if you could conclude your arguments in answer to the +questions of principle which have been raised by the Prosecution now, we +think it would be the most convenient course if you could do it in a +fairly short time. I mean, you have heard what the Prosecution say about +these various groups, and it would be more convenient, we think, if you +could answer that in the space of a quarter of an hour now. + +DR. HORN: First of all, I would like to refer to documents numbered 48 +to 61. In regard to these I can take only the following position. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +DR. HORN: Number 48 to 61. Perhaps I may again use these pages of the +Prosecution, with their objections, as a basis. Documents 48 to 61 were +rejected as irrelevant, but these documents deal with rearmament and +preparation for war by the opposite side. I can arrive at the basic +motives animating Hitler and Ribbentrop only by contrasting the German +evidence with the evidence given by the other side. I cannot judge of +the illegality of an action unless I know all the facts. To know all the +facts, I have to know the attitude taken by the other side. Therefore, I +consider these documents highly relevant. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +DR. HORN: The next group of decisive importance consists of the +documents dealing with the Polish minority problem. The representative +of the Prosecution has said that by the German-Polish agreement of 5 +November 1937, the minority problem was sanctioned by both countries. +That is, all violations of international law in regard to minority +questions would be considered a closed chapter if they had occurred +before that year. This view is certainly not correct, because one +agreement cannot sanction the violation of a prior agreement. Moreover, +during the negotiations for the 1934 pact between Germany and Poland it +was expressly agreed, as I can prove by means of these documents that, +after a general political agreement had been made, the minority question +as well as that of Danzig and of the Corridor should be settled. + +These questions were expressly held in abeyance pending a further +settlement by agreement, and as no such settlement of the two questions +was made, the documents dealing with the violations by the Poles of +international law with regard to minority pacts cannot be rejected on +account of this agreement. For this agreement, as I should like to +emphasize once more, particularly deals with a further agreement for the +settlement of this question. + +The second objection for this group is the fact that the minority +problem on the whole is called irrelevant. Previously I stated briefly +that the British Prime Minister Chamberlain himself realized the need +for regulating this problem. I will submit this document too; it is +Document Number 200 in my document book. All the political circles +concerned thought that the solution must be found for this question and +therefore considered it relevant. I ask the Tribunal therefore to admit +the documents referring to it. These documents cannot be rejected in +part as cumulative, as was done here, for on the strength of these +documents, I wish to prove that these minority pacts have been +repeatedly violated since 1919, and I submit documents from the +international tribunal of The Hague and the League of Nations at Geneva, +showing that these violations took place during a period of over 20 +years. + +I accept the objections made by the Soviet Delegation to Documents 286 +to 289, and I withdraw Documents 286 to 289. + +Since the Tribunal recently objected to the book _America in the Battle +of the Continents_, I also withdraw documents presented under Number +290, 1 to 5. I have also referred to that book under several other +numbers, and I withdraw also all those numbers which refer to the book, +_America in the Battle of the Continents_. As for the ambassadors’ +reports, I again refer to my statement and the basic statements made +here a moment ago by my colleague, Dr. Dix. I am convinced that, on +principle, and on the strength of the legal arguments adduced and also +in view of the fact that the Prosecution have used such reports +extensively, the Defense should also be granted the right of referring +to these reports, especially as they formed the foundation on which +German political opinion was based. + +I shall not be able to dispense with the files of the French General +Staff either, for the reasons I have stated. It has been said that +Documents 221 to 269 are irrelevant. They are not irrelevant, because we +had neutrality pacts with those countries, and in the neutrality pacts +it was agreed that Germany would respect their neutrality as long as the +other side also respected it. As it would now be possible here to prove +that the other side did not respect this neutrality, the proof of +whether a war of aggression against these countries by Germany... + +THE PRESIDENT: The point that M. Champetier de Ribes was making was that +France was out of the war by 1940. Therefore documents which were drawn +up by the French General Staff in 1940 had no relevance in 1941. Isn’t +that so? That is the point that he was making. + +DR. HORN: You mean the French Prosecutor? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the French Prosecutor. + +DR. HORN: Yes. However, the fact that breaches of neutrality were +committed by France and were known to the German Government at the time +alters the legal situation completely. You cannot say that Germany waged +an aggressive war against these countries when we knew through our +intelligence service that our opponents intended to occupy these +countries, and did in fact do so, by sending out General Staff officers. +Thus it was the other side which was guilty of violation, and the files +which have been found have only confirmed the intelligence reports +submitted to us at the time; I say, at the time. + +Therefore, you cannot accuse Germany of violating the neutrality pact in +these cases. I would like to ask the Tribunal, therefore, to admit those +files as relevant for the reasons stated. With reference to the other +documents, I ask to be permitted to make my statement when I submit the +documents to the Tribunal in the presentation of evidence. + +THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, we want to rule upon it when we have +heard your arguments; we do not want to have to rule again over every +document. We want you to take them in groups, in the way the Prosecution +has, so that we may make up our minds and rule. + +DR. HORN: These are the main objections which I have to make to the +arguments of the Prosecution. I ask the Tribunal once more to +differentiate between considerations of principle raised by Dr. Dix, and +between the factual considerations raised by myself with regard to the +individual groups. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + NINETY-EIGHTH DAY + Wednesday, 3 April 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has read and considered every one of the +documents produced by Dr. Horn on behalf of the Defendant Ribbentrop and +the Tribunal rules as follows: + +I will refer only to the documents to which no objection was taken, +where the Tribunal rejects them; that is to say, documents to which no +objection is taken are allowed with the particular exceptions which I +make. + +With reference to the documents to which objection was taken, the +Tribunal rejects Numbers 12, 45, 48 to 61 inclusive. It allows Document +62. It rejects Documents 66, 67 and 69. It allows Document 70. It +rejects Documents 72, 73, 74. It rejects Documents 76 to 81 inclusive. +It grants Document 82. It rejects Document 83. It grants Documents 84 to +87 inclusive. It rejects Documents 88 to 116 inclusive. It rejects +Documents 118 to 126 inclusive. It allows Document 127. It rejects +Documents 128 to 134 inclusive. It rejects Documents 135 to 148 +inclusive. It rejects Documents 151 and 152. It allows Documents 155 and +156. It rejects Documents 157 and 158. It rejects Document 161. It +allows Document 162. It allows Document 164. It allows Documents 165 to +183 inclusive. It rejects Document 184. It allows Documents 185 and 186. +It rejects Document 191. It allows Documents 193 and 194. It rejects +Document 195, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. It grants Document 195, +Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. It rejects Documents 196 and 197 and 198. It +rejects Document 204. It rejects Document 207. It grants the whole of +Document 208. It grants Document 210. It rejects Document 211 (a) and +(b) and Document 212. It grants Document 213. It rejects 214. It rejects +215 (a) and (b). It grants Documents 217 and 220. It grants Documents +221 to 245, except Document 238, and it also excludes all comments +contained in those documents. It rejects Documents 246 to 269. It +rejects 270 and 271. It rejects 275. It rejects 276. It grants 277 and +278. As to 279, the Tribunal would like Dr. Horn to inform them what +that document is because in the copy that they have got it is +unidentified. That is 279, Dr. Horn, in Book 8, I think. + +DR. HORN: The document contains the Non-aggression Treaty between +Germany and the Soviet Union, of 23 August 1939. It contains the text of +that treaty. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well, then that will be allowed. 280 and 281 are +granted. 282, 283, and 284 are granted. 285 is rejected. 286 to 289 were +withdrawn. 290 was withdrawn. 291 is granted. 292 is rejected, 293 is +rejected, 294 is rejected. 295 is rejected. 296 is granted. 298 to 305, +inclusive, are rejected. 306 is granted. 307 is rejected. 308 is +granted. 309 and 309 (a) are both rejected. 310 is rejected. 311 had +already been ruled out. 313 is granted. 314 is rejected. 317 is granted. +318 is rejected. Well, 312 is granted; it had not been objected to. I do +not have a note of 315 and 316; are they asked for? + +DR. HORN: 315, Mr. President, is the reproduction of a PS number, that +is 1834-PS, and has already been submitted and therefore need not be +submitted again. + +THE PRESIDENT: Does that apply also to 316, Dr. Horn? + +DR. HORN: 316 also has a PS number and therefore need not be +resubmitted. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, that deals with all the numbers, I think. + +DR. HORN: Mr. President, I will dispense with Number 312, and ask +instead for Number 317. This contains a notarized statement under +oath... + +THE PRESIDENT: 317 is granted. + +DR. HORN: Thank you, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Horn, will you deal with the ones which we have +left in, as far as you wish to deal with them. If you wish to comment +upon any of the ones that we have allowed, you may do so now. We do not +desire you to do so, but if you wish to do so, you may. + +DR. HORN: May I ask Your Lordship for permission to present my +arguments. I will present only very brief arguments at a time to be +determined by the High Tribunal, so that I can sort the documents and +need not take up your time unnecessarily? All the documents are fastened +together at present and it would take longer if I were to present my +case now than if I could present the sorted documents. I therefore ask +the Tribunal to set a time when I may present these documents. + +THE PRESIDENT: The application is granted. + +DR. HORN: Yes. I will then have concluded my case and will need only a +relatively short time to comment briefly on some but not all of the +documents. + +THE PRESIDENT: If Dr. Nelte is already to go on with the case of the +Defendant Keitel, the Tribunal suggests possibly you might be able to +deal shortly with your documents at 2 o’clock. + +DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: Would that be agreeable to Dr. Nelte? + +DR. HORN: I will consult my colleague. + +Dr. Nelte has just advised me that he will fetch his documents and then +he can proceed with the presentation of his case immediately. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +[_Dr. Nelte returned to the courtroom._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal is much obliged to you for +presenting your argument now. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I will begin the presentation of the case for +Keitel by asking you to summon the defendant to the witness stand, and I +shall question him. The documents which I will use in this interrogation +were submitted with a list yesterday. I hope that those documents are at +your disposal so that you will be able to follow my questions in a +manner which is desirable in the interest of a smoothly conducted +interrogation. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then you will call the Defendant Keitel? + +DR. NELTE: Yes. + +[_The Defendant Keitel took the stand._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? + +WILHELM KEITEL (Defendant): Wilhelm Keitel. + +THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: + +I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure +truth—and will withhold and add nothing. + +[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._] + +THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish. + +DR. NELTE: Please describe your military career briefly. + +KEITEL: In the year 1901, in the beginning of March, I became an officer +candidate in an artillery regiment of the Prussian Army. At the +beginning of the first World War, in 1914, I was the regimental adjutant +of my regiment. I was wounded in September 1914, and in the beginning of +November I became chief of a battery of my regiment. Since the spring of +1915 I served in various general staff capacities, first with higher +commands of the field army, later as a general staff officer of a +division. Towards the end I was the first general staff officer of the +Naval Corps in Flanders. Then I joined the Reichswehr as a volunteer. +Beginning with the year 1929 I was Division Head (Abteilungsleiter) of +the Army Organizational Division in the Reichswehrministerium. After an +interruption from 1933 to 1935 I became, on 1 October 1935, Chief of the +Wehrmacht Department (Wehrmachtsamt) of the Reichskriegsminister, that +is Chief of Staff with the Minister of War. While on active service I +became Generalmajor. At that time I was chief of an infantry brigade. On +4 February 1938 to my surprise I was appointed Chief of Staff of the +Führer, or Chief of the OKW—Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. On 1 October +1939, I became General of the Infantry and after the campaign in the +West in 1940 I became Field Marshal. + +DR. NELTE: Were you a member of the National Socialist German Labor +Party? + +KEITEL: No, I was not a member. According to military law I could not be +or become a member. + +DR. NELTE: But you received the Golden Party Badge. For what reason? + +KEITEL: That is correct. Hitler presented this Golden Badge of the Party +to me in April 1939, at the same time that the Commander-in-Chief of the +Army, General Von Brauchitsch, received it. The Führer said it was to be +in commemoration of the march into Czechoslovakia. The Golden Badge had +“16 and 17 March” engraved on it. + +DR. NELTE: In the year 1944 the Military Service Law was changed so that +active soldiers could also become members of the Party. What did you do +at that time? + +KEITEL: That is correct. In the late summer or autumn of 1944 the +Military Service Law was changed so that active soldiers could also be +Party members. At that time I was invited to submit personal data for +the Party in order to be listed as a member of the Party. At the same +time I was asked to send in a donation of money to the Party. I +submitted personal data to Party headquarters and also sent in a +donation, but as far as I know I never became a member. I never received +a membership card. + +DR. NELTE: To what extent did you participate at Party functions? + +KEITEL: Owing to my position and to the fact that I accompanied the +Führer constantly, I participated at public functions of the Party +several times, for example, at the Party rallies in Nuremberg, also each +year when the Winter Relief Work campaign was launched. Finally, +according to orders, each year on the 9th of November, I had to attend, +together with a representative of the Party a memorial service at the +graves of the victims of 9 November 1923. It took place symbolically in +memory of the fight on 9 November, between the Party and the Wehrmacht. +I never participated in internal conferences or meetings of the Party +directorate. The Führer had let me know that he did not want this. Thus, +for example, every year on 9 November I was in Munich, but never +participated in the gatherings of the so-called Hoheitsträger (bearers +of power) of the Party. + +DR. NELTE: What decorations did you receive during the war? + +KEITEL: During the war—it must have been in the winter of 1939-1940—I +received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross. I did not receive any +other German war decorations. + +DR. NELTE: Do you have any sons? + +KEITEL: I had three sons, all of whom served at the front as officers +during this war. The youngest one died in battle in Russia in 1941. The +second was a major in Russia and has been missing in action, and the +eldest son, who was a major, is a prisoner of war. + +DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Keitel, beginning with essential matters, I +would like to put the following basic questions to you: What basic +attitude did you, as a soldier, an officer, and a general, have toward +the problems with which you had to deal in your profession? + +KEITEL: I can say that I was a soldier by inclination and conviction. +For more than 44 years without interruption I served my country and my +people as a soldier, and I tried to do my best in the service of my +profession. I believed that I should do this as a matter of duty, +laboring unceasingly and giving myself completely to those tasks which +fell to me in my many and diverse positions. I did this with the same +devotion under the Kaiser, under President Ebert, under Field Marshal +Von Hindenburg, and under the Führer, Adolf Hitler. + +DR. NELTE: What is your attitude today? + +KEITEL: As a German officer, I naturally consider it my duty to answer +for what I have done, even if it should have been wrong. I am grateful +that I am being given the opportunity to give an account here and before +the German people of what I was and my participation in the events which +have taken place. It will not always be possible to separate clearly +guilt and entanglement in the threads of destiny. But I do consider one +thing impossible, that the men in the front lines and the leaders and +the subleaders at the front should be charged with the guilt, while the +highest leaders reject responsibility. That, in my opinion, is wrong, +and I consider it unworthy. I am convinced that the large mass of our +brave soldiers were really decent, and that wherever they overstepped +the bounds of acceptable behavior, our soldiers acted in good faith, +believing in military necessity, and the orders which they received. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution, in presenting evidence regarding violations +of the laws of war, Crimes against Humanity, repeatedly point to +letters, orders, _et cetera_, which bear your name. Many so-called +Keitel orders and Keitel decrees, have been submitted here. Now we have +to examine whether and to what degree you and your actions are guilty of +and responsible for the results of these orders. What do you wish to say +to this general accusation? + +KEITEL: It is correct that there are a large number of orders, +instructions, and directives with which my name is connected, and it +must also be admitted that such orders often contain deviations from +existing international law. On the other hand, there are a group of +directives and orders based not on military inspiration but on an +ideological foundation and point of view. In this connection I am +thinking of the group of directives which were issued before the +campaign against the Soviet Union and also which were issued +subsequently. + +DR. NELTE: What can you say in your defense in regard to those orders? + +KEITEL: I can say only that fundamentally I bear that responsibility +which arises from my position for all those things which resulted from +these orders and which are connected with my name and my signature. +Further, I bear the responsibility, insofar as it is based on legal and +moral principles, for those offices and divisions of the OKW which were +subordinate to me. + +DR. NELTE: From what may your official position and the scope of your +legal responsibility be inferred? + +KEITEL: That is contained in the Führer’s decree of 4 February 1938 +which has been frequently cited. + +DR. NELTE: I am submitting this decree to you so that you can have the +text before you. In this Führer decree, Paragraph 1, you will find: + +“From now on I will directly and personally take over the Supreme +Command of the entire Wehrmacht.” + +What did that mean compared with the conditions that had existed until +then? + +KEITEL: Until that time we had a Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, +Field Marshal Von Blomberg. In addition there was the Supreme Commander +of the Wehrmacht who, according to the constitution, was the head of the +State—in this case, Hitler. With the resignation of the +Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Von Blomberg, there was only one +Supreme Commander and that was Hitler himself. And from that time on he +himself exercised command of all three arms of the Wehrmacht: The Army, +Navy, and Air Force. It also says “from now on directly.” That should +establish unequivocally that any intermediary position with authority to +issue orders was no longer to exist, but that Hitler’s orders as Supreme +Commander were issued directly to the three arms of the Wehrmacht and +their Commanders. It also says here “directly” and “personally.” That, +too, had its meaning, for the word “personally” was to express the fact +that there was and would be no, I would say, “deputizing” of this +authority. + +DR. NELTE: I assume therefore that you never signed your orders “acting +for”? + +KEITEL: No, I do not remember a single instance in which I signed +“acting for.” According to our military principles, if the question had +arisen to appoint a deputy, it could have been only one person, the +Commander-in-Chief of the three arms of the Wehrmacht, namely the one +highest in rank. + +DR. NELTE: In Paragraph 2 of the decree of 4 February 1938 it says: + + “...the former Wehrmacht office in the Ministry of War, with its + functions is placed directly under my command as OKW and as my + military staff.” + +What does this signify in regard to the staff which was thereby formed? + +KEITEL: The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht had his military staff +in the Wehrmachtsamt, that is to say, the Wehrmachtsamt in the Ministry +of War. Hitler, as Supreme Commander, took over the Wehrmachtsamt as his +military staff. Thus, this staff was to be his personal working staff. +At the same time that the post of Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht was +eliminated, that of Reich Minister of War was also removed. There was no +War Ministry and no Minister of War as heretofore. Thus one could +clearly see what Hitler wanted, namely, that between him and the +Wehrmacht divisions there was to be no one holding office with any +authority either in command channels or in ministerial functions. + +DR. NELTE: When this decree was issued you were installed as holder of a +new office with the title of “Chief OKW.” Will you please clarify +whether this term “Chief OKW” is correct; that is, whether it really was +what the title seems to indicate. + +KEITEL: I must add that I realize only now that this term in its +abbreviated form is not quite apt. To be exact one should have said, +“Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht,” and not the +abbreviation, “Chief OKW.” From the case presented by the Prosecution I +gathered that the idea of “Chief” was interpreted as if that were a +commander, chief of an office, with authority to issue orders. And that, +of course, is an erroneous conclusion. It was neither a position of a +chief in the sense of a commander, nor, as might have been assumed or +has been assumed, was it a position as chief of a general staff. That +too, is incorrect. I was never Chief of the General Staff of the +Wehrmacht. It was Hitler’s unmistakable wish to concentrate in his own +person all the authority, all the power of command. That is not merely a +retrospective statement. He clearly expressed this desire to me on +several occasions, partly in connection with the fact that he told me +repeatedly, “I could never put this through with Blomberg.” + +DR. NELTE: I have here a statement made by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch +and submitted by the Prosecution. + +KEITEL: Perhaps I might add something further. I was discussing the fact +that it was not a position of Chief of the General Staff, since it was +Hitler’s basic view that commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches +each had his own general staff, or operations staff, and that he did not +want the High Command of the Wehrmacht, including the Wehrmacht +Operations Staff, to take over the functions of a general staff. +Therefore, in practice the work was done by the general staffs of the +Wehrmacht branches, while the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the OKW, +which was purposely kept small, was a working staff for Hitler, a staff +for strategic planning and for special missions. + +DR. NELTE: Then Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch’s statement in his +affidavit, of which I have already spoken, is correct? It says here: + + “When Hitler had decided to use military pressure or military + power in attaining his political aims, the Commander-in-Chief of + the Army, if he participated, received his instructions first + orally, as a rule, or by an appropriate order. Thereupon the OKW + worked out the operation and deployment plans. When they had + been submitted to Hitler and were approved by him, a written + order from the OKW to the branches of the Wehrmacht followed.” + +Is that correct? + +KEITEL: Yes, in principle it is correct insofar as the final formulation +of the order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army took the form of a +directive, as we called it, based on the general plans which had already +been submitted and approved. This work was done by the Wehrmacht +Operational Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab); thus the Wehrmacht +Operational Staff was not an office which became independently active +and did not handle matters concerning the issuing of orders +independently; rather the Wehrmacht Operational Staff and I took part in +the basic determination or approval of these proposals and formulated +them in the manner in which they were then carried out by Hitler as +Commander-in-Chief. To speak technically we then passed these orders on. + +DR. NELTE: Then I have an affidavit by Generaloberst Halder which deals +with the same subject. You know this affidavit Number 1. I believe I can +dispense with the reading of it and as evidence refer only to Halder’s +affidavit Number 1, which has been submitted by the Prosecution +(Document Number 3702-PS). + +In addition the Prosecution submitted another treatise without a special +number. The title of the treatise is “Basis for the Organization of the +German Wehrmacht.” + +THE PRESIDENT: Is this the document which you say the Prosecution +offered in evidence but did not give a number to? + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, this document was given to us by the +Prosecution, I believe by the American Prosecution, on 26 November 1945. +I do not know... + +THE PRESIDENT: You mean it never was deposited in evidence by the +Prosecution? + +DR. NELTE: I do not believe I can decide that. I assume that a document +which has been submitted to the Defense Counsel was submitted to the +High Tribunal at the same time, if not as evidence, then at least for +judicial notice. + +THE PRESIDENT: What is the document? Is it an affidavit or not? + +DR. NELTE: It is not an affidavit; it is really a study by the American +Prosecution. And, I assume, it is a basis for the indictment of the +organization OKW, and so forth. + +THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your document book or not? + +DR. NELTE: No, I do not have it in the document book, because I assumed +that was also at the disposal of the High Tribunal. Besides, Mr. +President, it is a short document. + +THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, Mr. Dodd can tell us what it is. + +MR. DODD: If I could see it I might be able to be helpful. I am not +familiar with it. It is probably one of the documents which we submitted +to the Defense but which we did not actually introduce in evidence, and +that happened more than once, I think, in the early days of the Trial. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: I refer to a single short paragraph of this study which I +would like to read. Perhaps we can thus obviate submitting the document. + +THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering in evidence the whole of the affidavit? +I do not mean at this moment, but are you proposing to offer it? + +DR. NELTE: I assume that the Prosecution have already submitted it. I am +only referring to it. + +THE PRESIDENT: The whole affidavit? What is the number of it, if it has +been submitted? + +DR. NELTE: This affidavit also does not have a number. The +Prosecution... + +THE PRESIDENT: It has not been submitted if it has not a number on it +then. + +It is suggested to me that possibly the Halder affidavit was offered and +then rejected. + +DR. NELTE: No. At that time a series of affidavits was submitted: By +Brauchitsch, Halder, Heusinger, and many other generals who are in +Nuremberg. None of these affidavits had an exhibit number. + +MR. DODD: This affidavit was put in by the United States as an exhibit. +I do not have the number handy, but I think it was submitted at the time +Colonel Telford Taylor submitted the case on behalf of the Prosecution +against the High Command and the OKW. This Halder “affidavit,” the first +document which Doctor Nelte referred to, is not an affidavit. It was a +paper submitted to the Tribunal and to the Defense by Colonel Taylor. It +set out some of the basic principles of the organization of the High +Command and the OKW wholly before he presented his part of the case. It +is really just the work of our own staff here in Nuremberg. + +THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Nelte, as the document you are referring to, not +the Halder affidavit, appears to be a mere compilation, the Tribunal +thinks it should not go in as an exhibit, but you can put a question to +the witness upon it. + +DR. NELTE: [_Turning to the defendant._] In the essay which you have +before you, the Prosecution asserted the following: After 1938 there +were four divisions: The OKW (High Command of the Wehrmacht); the OKH +(High Command of the Army); the OKL (High Command of the Air Force); the +OKM (High Command of the Navy); and each had its own general staff. What +can you tell us about that? + +KEITEL: I can say only that this is not correct, and also contradicts +the description which I have already given of the functions of the High +Commands of the Wehrmacht branches and of the OKW. There were not four +such departments. There were only three: The High Command of the Army, +the High Command of the Navy, and the High Command of the Air Force. + +As I have just stated, the High Command of the Wehrmacht as a personal, +direct working staff, was in no way an independent authority in that +sense. The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches were +commanders, had the authority to issue orders and exercised this power +over troops which were subordinate to them. The OKW had neither the +power to issue orders, nor subordinate troops to which orders could have +been issued. It is also not correct, if I recall the speeches of the +Prosecution, to use the expression “Keitel was Commander-in-Chief of the +Wehrmacht.” I am mentioning it only to emphasize this point. Further, I +would like, briefly, to call attention to the diagram on the last page +of the document which has been shown to me. + +DR. NELTE: This sketch is the diagram which is called “The Wehrmacht.” +It is an exposition, a diagrammatic exposition of the entire Wehrmacht +and its branches. + +KEITEL: I believe I should point briefly to the fact that it is this +diagram which was the basis for this erroneous conception, because in it +the High Command of the Wehrmacht is designated as a special office or +office of command, and that is incorrect. + +DR. NELTE: What tasks had you in this military sector as the Chief of +the OKW? + +KEITEL: First of all, it was an essential task to secure for the Führer +with and through the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, all the documents and +all the numerous informations and reports which he desired. I dare say +that the Wehrmacht Operational Staff had, in this connection, the +function to one might say arrange and establish direct and close +communication between Hitler and the general staffs of the branches of +the Wehrmacht. In addition to securing a countless number of such +documents which were demanded daily, there was a second function, namely +to be regularly present at all conferences in which the +commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches and the chiefs of their +staffs participated as well as the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational +Staff. On those occasions as soon as a series of oral orders was given, +these orders, in compliance with military principles, naturally had +later to be confirmed in writing. Only in this way could we prevent +mistakes or misunderstandings from arising, that is, by confirming these +orders to those who had already received them orally the orders were +made clear. That is the purpose and meaning of the order. + +DR. NELTE: How did you sign the orders and documents which you drew up? + +KEITEL: It is correct that this form of orders and directives were +almost exclusively signed by me. They were actually orders which had +already been given and which had already long since been transmitted +through military channels. As can be seen from the bulk of the documents +submitted here, this gave rise to the form which I made a habit of using +in which I always wrote at the beginning or after a few preliminary +words, “The Führer has therefore ordered...” + +In the large majority of cases this order was no longer a surprise to +the office which received it. It was nothing new but it was only a +confirmation. In a similar way I naturally had also a considerable +number of organizational and other directives and orders also in not +purely operational fields worked out under my supervision and passed on. +In this respect I should like to point out particularly that in no case +did I send out orders without having shown them again to my supreme +commander when making the daily reports, in order to be certain that I +had not misunderstood him in any form or manner or that I was not +issuing anything which—and this I would like to emphasize—did not have +his approval to the letter. + +DR. NELTE: There was another category of orders and directives... + +KEITEL: May I perhaps add a few words? + +DR. NELTE: Please do. + +KEITEL: In order to clarify this: Among the documents submitted here are +those which Hitler personally signed and released under the heading “The +Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.” There are some +exceptions in which such directives were signed by me “by order of,” I +would like to explain this matter also. In this case it is also true +that if these directives, which for the most part had been corrected +several times by Hitler personally, had to be issued urgently and the +Supreme Commander was prevented from signing himself, it was necessary +for me to let the signature go out in this form, never as “deputy” but +always as “by order of.” Otherwise, orders were issued as I have already +stated, in the form of directives which were signed by me. + +At the same time I should like to mention that even if we have a series +of documents here headed “Chief, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht” +or—some of them are different: “High Command of the Wehrmacht”—if they +are signed, “by order, Jodl,” I can say that it can be proved almost +automatically that I did not happen to be there at the time; otherwise I +would have signed it myself, knowing that I was Chief of Staff who, in +accordance with military regulations, had to sign such documents. + +DR. NELTE: The memorandum which you have before you contains the +following sentence: + + “The OKW united in itself the activity of a staff and of a + ministry; the matters involved, which had previously been taken + care of by the Reich War Ministry, have probably also been + turned over to the OKW.” + +Please clarify the ministerial function of the OKW. + +KEITEL: Yes, this formulation as set down in this document is not +exactly incorrect, but it is on important points at least, open to +misunderstanding, for it was not at all true that all functions which +had been previously carried out by the War Minister were turned over to +the OKW. There were many functions and rights which the War Minister, in +his capacity as minister, and thus the person responsible for them, +could and did decide even for the branches of the Wehrmacht and their +commanders, which were never transmitted to the Chief of the OKW, that +is, to me. + +The following things happened at that time: Everything in this +connection involving authority to issue orders or exercise supreme +command, and which the Führer did not wish to take over personally, was +transferred to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht +as far as supreme authority and authority to make decisions were +concerned. To touch on the subject briefly, I should like to mention a +few essential facts which I remember. For example, the officers’ +personnel records, decisions on complaints, documentary material on +budget questions, court jurisdiction and court authority, which formerly +belonged to the Minister of War, were transferred to the +commander-in-chief, as well as all questions concerning officials and +all questions of the rights of officials. I could mention still more, +but I merely wished to point out that even in cases where decisions had +to be made, as for example, removing an official or dismissing an +employee, the chief of the OKW did not decide. These powers were +delegated to the commanders-in-chief in addition to the powers they held +previously and which were transferred from the War Minister’s +jurisdiction. There were only certain reservations which the Führer made +for himself. Similarly some of the other fields of the OKW were limited +in their assignments in the course of the following years through the +dissolution of the Economic Armament Office. The position of Armament +Minister was created because of the dissolution of the Amt Ausland +Abwehr, that is, the Counterintelligence Service, of which only the +branch self-protection of the troops was left with the Wehrmacht; +everything else was transferred, and so forth. + +My authority included the following: It was my duty in all cases to get +Hitler’s decision on all basic questions with which this ministerial +section was concerned. I was free from the necessity of doing this only +in current matters or if there was complete agreement between the +persons involved in a ministerial or administrative question and the +branches of the Wehrmacht in my department. In such a case a decision by +Hitler was not necessary. I must emphasize again, in summary, that the +OKW had no authority of its own, and that one can say only that Hitler +actually functioned as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, just as the +functions of the War Minister were combined in his person so as to, to +repeat that, to eliminate an intermediary official at all costs. That +is, there was to be no intermediary between him and the +commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches. + +THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, although the Tribunal did say that they would +hear Dr. Horn at 2 o’clock, they would not wish to interrupt the +examination of the Defendant Keitel if you prefer to go on with that +now. It is a matter for you to consider whichever you like. + +DR. NELTE: Dr. Horn agrees that I continue the interrogation of Keitel +now. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, for the assistance of the Tribunal +I have ascertained that the first Halder affidavit, referred to this +morning by Dr. Nelte, was introduced as Exhibit USA-531 (Document Number +3702-PS) on 4 January, by Colonel Taylor; and the second Halder +affidavit referred to by Dr. Nelte was introduced as Exhibit USA-533 +(Document Number 3707-PS) on 5 January, by Colonel Taylor. + +THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd was kind enough to put at my disposal +a number of copies of the pamphlet, “Principles of Organization of the +German Armed Forces” so that I can submit them to the Tribunal. I do so +now. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] You last explained that on 4 February +1938, part of the authority of the War Ministry was transferred to +branches of the Armed Forces, and part to the High Command of the +Wehrmacht. In the decree which has been mentioned it says, concerning +this matter: + + “The OKW at the same time is taking care of the affairs of the + Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the OKW, on my orders will + exercise the authority which the Reich Minister of War had + heretofore.” + +Tell me briefly to which fields this applied. I myself will submit to +the Tribunal a diagram which has already been sent to the Translation +Division for translation. I do not know, however, if the Tribunal +already has the translation. + +KEITEL: The ministerial functions actually transferred to the OKW were +executed by a number of offices. I shall name the most important now, +indicating their functions: + +First of all, a few words about the Wehrmacht Operations Staff +(Wehrmachtführungsstab) which, being an office of the OKW, was +subordinated to it in the same way as the other offices of the OKW were, +but which was on a higher level than the other offices. As the name +implies, the Wehrmacht Operations Staff was an organ of the Führer’s +High Command with which he frequently—I might say, mostly—collaborated +personally. It had no ministerial powers. + +Then there was the General Armed Forces Office (Allgemeines +Wehrmachtsamt) which took care mainly of ministerial and administrative +questions. One could almost call it a war ministry on a small scale. + +Then the office of Counterintelligence Service (Amt Ausland Abwehr), +which was to a large extent ministerial but to some degree an aid in +operational questions. + +Then the Economic Armament Office, in regard to which I must point out +that in the year 1940 this office was dissolved and only a small Defense +Economy Office (Wehrwirtschaftsamt) remained, which was mainly concerned +with questions of supply of all consumer goods needed by the Armed +Forces, such as fuel, coal, gasoline, _et cetera_, and which I need not +mention further. + +Then an important field of activity: Replacements Administration for the +entire Armed Forces, or abbreviated, Recruiting, a central office which +was designed mostly to take care of personnel questions within the OKW. + +Then the Legal Administration, the Budget Department, and a number of +other offices which it is not necessary to enumerate. + +In these offices the ministerial functions of the OKW were carried out. +I would like... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think the Tribunal has followed the +distinction which the defendant has made between the General Staff for +the High Commands and the position of the OKW; but is it necessary for +the Tribunal to go into all these details? + +DR. NELTE: I had finished dealing with this section. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +DR. NELTE: I want to put just one more... + +THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document that you have just put +before the Tribunal, this diagram, are you desiring to make an exhibit +of that? + +DR. NELTE: I would like to submit it in evidence. You will also be given +a translation. + +THE PRESIDENT: If so, what number will you give it? You must number all +your exhibits. + +DR. NELTE: Please number it, Keitel-1(a). + +THE PRESIDENT: Who prepared it? + +DR. NELTE: We prepared it and the technical division of the Prosecution +has reproduced it. The Prosecution also are in possession of the +diagram. + +THE PRESIDENT: Have you asked the defendant to confirm that it is +correct? + +DR. NELTE: Field Marshal, would you please look at this diagram and +confirm whether it is correct? + +KEITEL: Yes, I recognize the diagram... + +GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, the Prosecution have not received this +diagram. Therefore, the Prosecution would like, before making +conclusions, to acquaint themselves with this diagram. + +THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any more copies of it, Dr. Nelte? + +DR. NELTE: They can be obtained and distributed right away. Then I would +like the Tribunal to reserve its decision until the diagrams have been +submitted in sufficient numbers. + +KEITEL: I recognize this diagram as correct. It does not contain the +minor changes which occurred from the time of the creation of the OKW up +to the time which I have mentioned, changes brought about by the +reorganization of the armament ministries, _et cetera_, but it shows the +manner in which it actually worked during the last years. + +THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte. + +DR. NELTE: In order to terminate this group of questions I would like to +say the following: Is it correct that according to this, all the Keitel +orders, Keitel decrees, which have been submitted by the Prosecution, +were in reality Führer orders, that is to say, orders which were the +expression of Hitler’s will, based on his instructions and commands? + +KEITEL: Yes, that is the correct definition of the summary of the +testimony I have given. I would like to state again in summarizing that, +as I have stated from the beginning, I assume and have assumed +responsibility for these orders insofar as they are connected with my +name, for the position was this: I, of course, knew the contents of +these orders which I executed. I recognize my signature, of course, in +the documents which have been submitted to me and therefore I accept the +documents as authentic. I may add that insofar as I had military or +other objections to the orders, I naturally expressed them very forcibly +and that I endeavored to prevent orders being given which I considered +controversial. But I must state in all truth that if the decision had +been finally made by Hitler, I then issued these orders and transmitted +them, I might almost say, without checking them in any way. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, before I enter upon the next phase of my +questions I should like to state the following: + +The Prosecution have deduced Keitel’s participation in the many crimes +which have been described here from various facts, facts which cannot +always be connected with each other and made to agree. The Prosecution +have stated that he was a powerful and important staff officer. That is +set out in the Indictment. Then the Prosecution stated that he was a +tool without a will of his own and that the relation between himself and +Hitler was an intimate one. + +You will understand that if the defendant wants to clarify or to protest +against these things he must explain the relation between himself and +Hitler. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, that is what the defendant has been doing. He +has been explaining his relationship to Hitler, and if you want to +elucidate it further you must ask him further questions. + +DR. NELTE: I only wanted to let him speak about the private relation to +Hitler. So far we have been concerned only with the official relation. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Would you please tell us something about +the co-operation between you and Hitler? I ask you to be as brief as +possible and tell us only the most necessary facts, but at the same time +give us a correct picture. + +KEITEL: The co-operation can be characterized only as one between a high +military superior and his subordinate. In other words, the same +relations as I have always had in my military career with the senior +officers of whose staff I was a member. The relation between Hitler and +myself never departed from this strictly military and soldierly +relationship. Of course, it was my right and my duty to express my +opinions. How difficult that was can be judged only by someone who knows +that Hitler, after a few words, was wont to take over the entire +discussion and to exhaust the subject entirely from his point of view. +It was then very difficult, of course, to come back to the subject +again. I may say that due to my various positions in high staff offices +I was quite used to dealing with the superior commanders, if I may use +that expression. However, I was quite unaccustomed to the conditions +which I encountered here. They surprised me, and not infrequently they +reduced me to a state of real uncertainty. That can be understood if one +knows that Hitler, in soldiering or military questions, if I were to +express myself very cautiously, was a man with far-reaching plans for +reform with which I, with my 37 years of service as a soldier of the old +school, was confronted. + +DR. NELTE: Was it the same during the war or do you refer to the time +before the war? + +KEITEL: During the war these controversies were moderated by the events, +so that actuality was strongly influenced by the urgency of the +situation. Therefore, these things did not appear in that form. On the +other hand, the position then was that Hitler in his discussions about +the situation had a comparatively large circle of about twenty people +assembled around him, and speaking in military terms, unsparingly made +his accusations—objections and criticism—directed, as a rule, at +people who were not present. I took the part of the absent person as a +matter of principle, because he could not defend himself. The result was +that the accusations and criticism were then aimed at me, and my +training as a soldier finally forced me to control myself, because it is +unseemly to answer back or to oppose or to attempt to contradict a +superior before very young subordinates, such as those who were present. +Opposition to a superior or to personalities, no matter what their rank, +was unbearable to the Führer. One could then attempt to speak to him +about these things only in private. + +DR. NELTE: Had you the feeling that you had Hitler’s confidence? + +KEITEL: I could not say yes. I must frankly admit that Hitler’s +confidence in me was not without reservations, and today I know only too +well that there were many things concerning which he had never spoken +frankly to me and about which he never took me into his confidence. It +was a fact that Hitler was very suspicious of the old or elderly +generals. For him they were products of an old and antiquated school and +in this sense he was to us old soldiers a man who brought new +revolutionary ideas into the Wehrmacht and wished to incorporate them +into Wehrmacht training. This frequently led to serious crises. I +believe I do not have to elaborate on that. The real evil, however, was +that this lack of confidence led him to believe that I was in conspiracy +with the Army generals behind his back and that I supported them against +him. Perhaps that was a result of my habit of defending them because +they could not defend themselves. At various instances that led to +extremely acute and serious crises. + +DR. NELTE: Much will depend upon stating how your co-operation with +Hitler has to be valued, particularly to what extent you could be +considered his collaborator or adviser. Will you tell me whether Hitler +discussed his plans with you in the manner which is customary in close +collaboration? + +KEITEL: In general I must deny that. It was not in any way in keeping +with Hitler’s peculiar disposition and personality to have advisers of +that kind, that is, if you call an adviser someone who gives advice in +the sense of presenting, let us say, a great number of military elements +from long experience as an officer, but not in the sense of an adviser +to help to formulate a decision, such far-reaching decisions which are +doubtlessly meant here. On principle, such a decision was preceded by +weeks or months of careful consideration. During that time one had to +assist by procuring documents, but concerning the main point, the +decision itself, he did not brook any influence. Therefore, strange as +it may sound, the final answer always was: “This is my decision and it +is unalterable.” That was the announcement of his decision. + +DR. NELTE: But if various departments were competent for these +decisions, were there no general conferences? + +KEITEL: No. I cannot recall that any one of the really important +decisions after the year 1938 had ever been formulated as the result of +joint counsel for instance between the politicians, the soldiers or +other ministers, because it was Adolf Hitler’s own way to speak, +privately as a rule, to each department and each department chief, to +learn from him what he wanted to know, and then to find out some element +that could be used in the elaboration of his plans. Things were not at +all as would appear from the documents here of minutes of conferences of +generals, of meetings and similar things with a list of those present. +Never did such a meeting have the character of a deliberation. There +could be no question of that. Rather, the Führer had a certain idea, and +if for various reasons he thought that we opposed that idea even +inwardly, he used that as a reason to clarify his thoughts before a +large circle without any discussion. In other words, in these +assemblies, which the documents here speak of as conferences, there was +never any deliberation. I must add that even the external form which +these things took was such that, following the military example, the +senior commander convened a certain number of generals, everyone was +seated, the Führer arrived, spoke and went out. No one in such a +situation could have found an opening to say anything. To use just one +word for it, and I certainly do not exaggerate, it was the issuing of an +order but not a conference. + +DR. NELTE: To come to a different subject, the Prosecution have asserted +that you had been a member of the Reich Government. What do you have to +say about that? + +KEITEL: I never belonged to the Reich Government and I was also never a +member of the Cabinet. I must also state that I never became a minister, +but as is stated in the decree of 1938, “he has the rank of a Reich +minister,” not “he is Reich minister.” The expression “minister” is, of +course, simply intended to indicate the rank of minister and there was a +good reason for that. I need point out only what I said this morning: It +was not intended that there should be anyone holding an office with the +authority of a minister between Hitler and the Wehrmacht, and the +branches of the Wehrmacht. I must clarify the question which has been +frequently raised by the Prosecution that “He had the rank of a +minister,” by saying that, before the decree was issued, I asked whether +I was to deal with the State secretaries or with the ministers, and +Hitler said, “If on my orders you deal with other ministers of the +Reich, then, of course, you can do so only with the rank of a minister, +not on the level of a state secretary.” + +That is the explanation of the expression in the decree “He has the rank +of a Reich minister.” + +DR. NELTE: Did you, in the headquarters have any conferences with other +important and competent personalities, such as Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, +Speer, Sauckel, _et cetera_? + +KEITEL: Ministers or special plenipotentiaries visited headquarters +according to a plan which very seldom led to the simultaneous presence +of several of them. Generally, it was carefully arranged so that a +special time was set aside for each one. As a rule, I was of course +informed that “the Foreign Minister is here” or “Minister Speer is here” +or the “Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor Sauckel is +here.” However, I was called in only in regard to purely military +questions which the Führer discussed with these gentlemen in private and +I could give instances of this. However, as has already been mentioned +recently, during the interrogation of State Secretary Steengracht, it +would be false to believe that these gentlemen who came to headquarters +formed a small or select cabinet. Hitler dealt with each of these +officials and functionaries separately, gave him his orders, and +dismissed him. It sometimes happened that on the way home, these +gentlemen visited me, mostly to ask me about small questions and small +favors which I could do for them or with instructions to inform me about +a decision or with the order to forward a decision to those military +offices which had to be notified. + +DR. NELTE: In concluding, I would like to know whether the expression +“intimate” which is contained in the Indictment, is correct in order to +describe the relations between you and Hitler, privately or officially? + +KEITEL: I found the word “intimate” in the Indictment and I asked myself +the question, “Where does this conception originate?” To be quite frank, +I have but one answer for it, that is that no one ever heard a single +word from me about the actual and constant difficulties that I had. I +deliberately kept quiet about them. Intimate relations are, according to +my definition of “intimate”—I do not know if in the English translation +“intimate” expresses the same thing which we call “intim”—relations +where there is confidence and frank discussion and these did not exist. +I have already characterized it. Intimacy was not Hitler’s attitude +towards the generals, to whose senior generation I also belonged. Apart +from the very formal intercourse which sometimes lasted for weeks and in +which even the external forms were hardly observed—I do not want to +discuss this in detail here—the relation never reached a point where it +could be classified as that of a close adviser or a close collaborator +as I conceived it in my Army staff positions. I must say that for my +part I have been faithful and loyal and I always fulfilled my duties in +that manner. However, I must also say that a sincere and personal +relation based upon mutual understanding and confidence never existed. +It has always been correct, but it was military and official, and never +went beyond that. + +DR. NELTE: By the decree of 4 February 1938 a Secret Cabinet Council was +established. According to the contents of that decree, you are supposed +to have been a member of the Cabinet Council. In order to save time, I +merely wish to ask you: Do you confirm from your own knowledge the +statement made by Reich Marshal Göring, that the Secret Cabinet Council +was established only for appearances and that a Secret Cabinet Council +was never constituted and that it never had a session? + +KEITEL: I can answer only, “Yes, never.” + +DR. NELTE: I come now to the question of the Reich Defense Council +(Reichsverteidigungsrat). In the session of 23 November, the prosecutor +submitted in evidence, as proof of the rearmament and the active +participation of the Wehrmacht in the planning of war of aggression, +among others: + +Document EC-177, which was designated as “Meeting of the Reich Defense +Council of 22 May 1933.” I must say that I have taken the translation +from the minutes and I am not sure whether the expression +“Reichsverteidigungsrat” was translated correctly. In the minutes it +states that it is a meeting of the working committee. For your +information may I say that the Reichsverteidigungsrat was supposed to be +a sort of ministerial body and that in addition, there was a working +committee. + +A second document, EC-405, was submitted concerning a meeting of the +same body on 7 March 1934; and a third document, 2261-PS, dealing with +the Reich Defense Law of 1935 and the simultaneous appointment of Dr. +Schacht as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy. + +Beyond doubt, you have been active in questions of national defense. +These documents are also submitted as evidence against you. I ask you, +therefore, to state whether these meetings in which you participated and +which you conducted, were concerned with preparations for war and +rearmament. + +KEITEL: From the very beginning, as long as we were working on these +things and by means of a committee of experts from which everything else +evolved, I personally participated in these matters, and I may call +myself the founder of that committee of ministerial experts which was +set up to co-operate with the War Ministry. As Chief of the +Organizational Department of the Army, in the winter of 1929 and 1930, +that is, 3 years before Hitler came to power, I formed and personally +assembled that committee after the Chancellor—I believe it was +Brüning—and the Prussian and Reich Minister of the Interior Severing +had consented to it. I would like to add that a representative of +Minister Severing was always present to make sure that nothing took +place which would have been in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. +This work was very difficult, because no Reich minister and no +department head was officially obliged to carry out the wishes of the +National Ministry of Defense, this was purely voluntary. Consequently, +the work went along haltingly and slowly. In this committee of experts +which met perhaps two or three times a year, we dealt with, if I may put +it briefly, what assistance the Civilian Department could render, in +order to set free the small army of 100,000 soldiers for purely military +tasks, naturally limiting ourselves to the defense of our frontiers, as +stated in the Treaty of Versailles: “The Defense of the Frontiers”; I +could perhaps still repeat our discussion from memory, since, with the +exception of the period from 1933 to 1935, I conducted every one of +these meetings myself, that is as leader of the discussion, not as +chairman. I can, however, refer you now to the _Mobilization Handbook +for Civil Authorities_, which was the outcome of this work and about +which I shall speak later. It may be possible to submit it here. We were +concerned only with questions of defense, such as the protection of our +frontiers, and, in order to make myself clear, I should like to mention +some of them. The Wehrmacht was to be free to protect railway property, +post office property, repeater stations, radio stations, and to man the +frontiers with security units for which the Customs Services were to be +responsible. Cable and sea communications with East Prussia were also to +be improved. + +I will not bore you with all this. They were all defensive measures with +a view to freeing the few soldiers for purely military functions, +because for purposes of actual military operations I need not tell you +what we could have done with an army of only 100,000 men. Any questions +which went beyond this were never dealt with in that committee. The +manner in which we worked was this: I asked the experts to submit their +wishes to the heads of departments or state secretaries and then to try +to persuade the heads of departments to take over the tasks from us, so +that we could say that was being done by others and we need not bother +about it. I can guarantee that operational questions, strategic +questions, armament questions, questions of supply of war equipment, +were never discussed in this committee. They were only organizational +questions of the taking over of functions which generally should be +performed by a soldier, but which we wanted to transfer to the civil +authorities. + +Now, as to the meeting of 22 May 1933, which has been discussed several +times, it was already stated in the heading of the minutes which we have +before us: “Competency—heretofore the Reichswehrminister, now the Reich +Defense Council”—I have just explained that. Hitherto +Reichswehrminister, over the committee, voluntary participation of the +ministers of other departments, now obligatory activity of the heads of +departments, that is, the group of ministers who received the title of +“Defense Council.” I will express that even more clearly, so that it +cannot be misunderstood. Every member of the committee represented a +ministry. The minister to whom the committee member was responsible, +along with his colleagues, formed the Reich Defense Council, as +envisaged by us then. They were the Council and we were the Committee. +Therefore, “heretofore the Reichswehrminister”—now, one could say, as I +have just expressed it, the other ministers were obliged to do that. + +In Paragraph 3 the working plans were particularly mentioned. These +working plans, in a word, are the forerunner of the _Mobilization Book_, +which is the final stage; whereas the working plans of about 1933 were +the intermediary stage. Then as regards the concluding words at the +meeting of 22 May 1933, which have been given special prominence here by +the Prosecution, and which deal with the need for secrecy—the passage +where I said, according to the minutes, that nothing which could lead to +objections at the Disarmament Conference should be left lying in the +desks of the ministries—that is correct. I did say that, and I have +said it because the experts told me that, with the exception of a small +wooden box or a drawer in a desk which could not be locked, they had no +place in which to keep anything, and because Von Blomberg, Reich War +Minister at that time, who had been in Geneva at the Disarmament +Conference for almost two years, gave me the definite order before this +meeting, to point out these things, because in Geneva one was surrounded +by an extremely large number of agents who were only waiting to be able +to present proof that, in spite of the disarmament negotiations, there +were things going on which could be interpreted as violations of the +Versailles Treaty. That is what I had to say about the document. + +DR. NELTE: I have given to you now the _Mobilization Book for the Civil +Administration_. It is Document 1639-PS. It has been submitted in order +to prove that aggressive wars were being planned. Would you explain to +us the purpose of this book? + +KEITEL: I have already stated that at an earlier stage, that is, during +the years 1932-33, the individual ministries had so-called working +plans, indicating what they were to do if something happened which +necessitated their participation in defending the country. In the course +of years, naturally, a number of new tasks were added and that finally +led to this _Mobilization Book_ for the civil authorities and civil +administration, the study of which would certainly show nothing which +might have anything to do with strategic, operational, or other +preparations for war. On the other hand, I am not in a position to prove +that everything contained in this book could never have been useful in +military operations which could develop from an aggressive war plan. +Many measures, one could almost say most measures, in the event of +mobilization would not indicate on the surface whether it is a measure +for defense or a measure which is necessary or indispensable for +aggressive action. That cannot be determined. But I believe I can say, +because I, myself, have been engaged so deeply in this work, perhaps +more than in any other, that there was no reason at all to burden the +civilian experts—they were high government counsellors—with strategic +or operational planning. I do not believe that it is necessary to prove +that such work is not within their scope. I have looked through and +studied this mobilization book here. I do not wish to bore you by citing +points which are of a purely defensive nature. I could name them: +barriers, reinforcement of the frontier defenses, demolitions, cutting +of railroads and similar things, all this is in the book. One of the +most important chapters, which, if I remember correctly, we discussed +during four or five of these sessions, was the question of evacuation, +that is, evacuating territories close to the border of valuable war +material and personnel, so that, in case of war with the neighbor, they +should not fall into the hands of the enemy. This problem of evacuation +was one of the most difficult, because the extent to which one can +evacuate, that is, what things can be evacuated, is perhaps one of the +most difficult decisions to make. + +I would like to say one more thing about the Reich Defense Committee, +supplementing the ideas which I expressed before. Until the year 1938, +no meeting or session of the Reich Defense Council was ever held, that +is, the ministers who were the superiors of the committee members never +met, not even once. I would have known about it, although at the cabinet +meeting, I believe as early as March 1933, we passed a resolution to +make these ministers responsible for a Reich Defense Council which +should deal with these tasks, and to oblige them to take over these +tasks as their necessary contribution to the defense of the Reich, and, +of course, to finance them. That was the main purpose, otherwise the +Reich Defense Council never met. + +DR. NELTE: Actually, the minutes which have been presented, for the +period of ’33 to ’38, are of the meetings of the working committee. But +you know that about eight days ago two documents were submitted which +appeared to be the minutes of the meetings of the Reich Defense Council. +One session or assembly is supposed to have taken place in November +1938, and the second one in March 1939. Unfortunately these documents +have not been submitted to me, but I have looked at them and you have +also seen them. Can you explain to us how these minutes, that is, these +meetings came about and what they mean? + +KEITEL: I merely wish to add a few supplementary words to the statement +which Reich Marshal Göring has already made. In December 1938, there was +passed the Reich Defense Law, which had been drawn up in 1935, a shelved +law, that is, a law which had not been made public and which required +modification, the reason being that the Reich Defense Law of ’35 was +devised by the Reich War Minister, Commander-in-Chief Von Blomberg, who +no longer held office. I was with Reich Marshal Göring at that time to +discuss this with him and to find a new basis for this law, which until +then had not been published. This law of the autumn of 1938 had a number +of supplementary clauses as compared to the old one, and perhaps I will +be able to give details later. Among other things, according to this law +also, Reich Marshal Göring was the delegate of the Führer, a function +formerly held by the Reich War Minister and which I could not exercise. + +This conference in November 1938, to recall it briefly, had been +convened by Reich Marshal Göring in order to present this law which had +not been published, and which was not to be published, to a large circle +of members of the ministries. There were about seventy or more persons +present to whom the Reich Marshal explained the purpose and the essence +of this law in the form of a speech. There was no discussion, apart from +that speech, and there was certainly no question of a meeting of the +Reich Defense Council at that time. + +You also recently showed me the second document of a meeting of the +Reich Defense Council as it is called and as also appears in the heading +of the minutes of the summer 1939. + +DR. NELTE: No, March 1939. + +KEITEL: That has been mentioned here, and I believe it was the second +meeting of the Reich Defense Council. I can explain that. This is how it +was: I called a meeting of the committee and, of course, furnished Reich +Marshal Göring with the agenda and the names of the people who were to +be present. Reich Marshal Göring informed me that he would come himself +and that since he wished to discuss other questions, he would +accordingly enlarge the attendance. This conference, therefore, had an +agenda which I had planned for the committee, and concrete questions +were also brought up for debate. It is, however, remarkable that +according to the list of those present, that is, according to the +numbers, the members of the Reich Defense Council were represented by +only a very small number, almost not at all, although there were about +forty or fifty people present. The Reich Defense Council itself was a +body of 12 people, and it needs no further explanation that, from the +form in which these two conferences took place, one could not say that +this was a plenary session of the Reich Defense Council based upon a +clearly defined agenda, but rather that there were two meetings, the +motive and extent of which I have described here. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal thinks that you might get on a +little more quickly with the defendant. The Tribunal recall that you +asked a few days ago that you might submit an affidavit of the +defendant’s evidence, and there is in your document book an affidavit. +You have been over all those matters in the affidavit at very much +greater length than you would have gone into them if you read the +affidavit, and we hope that you will be able to deal more shortly with +the evidence in future. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I made every effort to be as brief and concise +as possible in my questions, but testimony is, of course, always +subjective. The defendant is unfortunately the one who is mentioned most +frequently in this Trial and naturally he is interested in clarifying +those matters which he considers essential in order to present his case +clearly. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Nelte, I do not think it is necessary to +discuss the matter further; but the Tribunal have expressed their wish. + +DR. NELTE: As far as I am able, I shall comply with your request, Mr. +President. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] + +Field Marshal Keitel, you have just given us an explanation of the Reich +Defense Council and the Reich Defense Committee. You probably realize +that we are not and should not be so much concerned with whether +decisions are made by a Reich Defense Council or a Reich Defense +Committee. We are interested in what actually took place and whether or +not these things justify the imputations of the Prosecution. In this +respect I ask you to tell me if those things which you discussed and +planned on the Reich Defense Committee justify the suspicion that you +were considering aggressive war? + +KEITEL: I realize fully that we are not concerned with the formality of +whether it was the Council or the Committee, since the Council was a +board of ministers while the Committee was a board of minor experts. We +are concerned with what actually did take place and what was done. With +the exception that in the year 1934 and until the autumn of 1935 I was +not present at these discussions, and therefore cannot vouch for every +word which was spoken at that time, I must state that nothing about the +planning of wars, the preparing for wars, the operational, strategical, +or armed preparedness for war, was ever discussed. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has labeled you as a member of the Three Man +College, from which they have deduced that you had special powers to act +within the German Reich Government. I am submitting to you Document +2194-PS. In this document in the Reich Defense Law of 1938, Paragraph 5, +Subsection 4, you will find the source of this term which in itself is +not official. + +KEITEL: The Reich Defense Law of 1938 provided for a plenipotentiary +general for administration in order to restrict the size of the body. +The Reich Minister of the Interior was to have this office and further, +according to Paragraph 5, Subsection 4, the Supreme Command of the Army +was to have priority influence in regard to the State Railways and the +State Postal Services, for in the event of mobilization, transports must +run and the services for the transmission of news must be available, as +is the case in all countries. + +The Three Man College is a concept which I have never heard of until +just now. It probably refers to the Plenipotentiary General for +Administration, the Plenipotentiary General for Economy and the Chief of +the OKW. It referred to these three. There is no doubt about it, +because, in line with the Reich Defense Law, they were already supposed +to have a number of decrees ready in the drawers which were to be +published when this law was made public, and each one of the three had +to make the necessary preparations in his own sphere. From the right to +assume these functions by reason of these authorities the Three Man +College concept originated. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution then contended that according to Document +2852-PS you were a member of the Council of Ministers for Defense of the +Reich. Did you become a minister through this membership in the Reich +Defense Council? + +KEITEL: I might perhaps say a few words to begin with about the Council +of Ministers, insofar as the Reich Defense Law, the Reich Defense +Committee and the Reich Defense Council, disappeared as a result of the +law regarding the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, that +is, they were never made public and never put into effect. The Council +of Ministers for Defense of the Reich was newly created on 1 September +1939 and this made all these preparations on paper in the Reich Defense +Council, Reich Defense Committee and the law null and void and put in +its place a new thing, an institution. This institution, the Council of +Ministers for Defense of the Reich, was now the small war cabinet, +which, if I may say so, should previously have been the Reich Defense +Council with their limited number of members. Thus, a new basis was +established, and new decrees which were necessary were put into effect +by the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, after it had been +created and officially confirmed. + +I was called into this Council of Ministers or rather I received a chair +in this Council of Ministers. I prefer not to give the reasons, because +they were entirely private. It was a compensation for opposition against +these things—I never became active in this Council of Ministers for +Defense of the Reich, but I was a member; it was not necessary to be +active since in the purely military sphere, that is, things with which +the Wehrmacht immediately was concerned, the Führer personally, without +the Council of Ministers, issued the necessary decrees with his own +signature and the detour via the Council of Ministers in Berlin was not +necessary; and in my opinion I must deny that I became a minister by +this appointment. The authority to exercise the functions of a minister +was in no way given. I was only the representative of the Wehrmacht in +this Council of Ministers. + +DR. NELTE: However, your name is indisputably at the bottom of many laws +and decrees which were issued. How do you explain the signature on these +laws? + +KEITEL: Yes, I did sign a series of decrees issued by the Council of +Ministers because they were submitted to me by the Secretariat, that is, +the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Minister Lammers, with a request for +my signature. When I questioned the necessity for doing this, I received +a formal answer from Lammers to the effect that other Reich departments +might see that the Wehrmacht was not excluded from these decrees or +laws. That is why my signature is included. It means that the Wehrmacht +must also obey these decrees and laws. That is why I had no misgivings +in signing my name. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution further accuse you of having been a political +general. Undoubtedly you appeared at various special functions. Will you +please answer this accusation and tell us how it came about? + +KEITEL: I can readily understand the fact that functions of a +ministerial nature which necessarily brought me frequently into contact +with ministers of the Reich—in the course of a war everything is tied +up with the Wehrmacht in some way or other—would seem to indicate that +I had exercised a political function in these matters. The same +conclusion can be drawn from other events. That is, my presence at State +visits and similar functions as indicated by many documents might +suggest that I was exercising political functions or in some way had +been called to exercise such functions. Neither is true; neither in +regard to internal German ministerial functions nor in regard to matters +connected with foreign policy. There were naturally a great many things +to be settled with the ministries, the technical ministries. The +Wehrmacht had to participate and had a voice in almost all the decrees +which were issued by the civilian ministries. This work was naturally +done in Berlin. The fact that I had to remain with the Führer at his +headquarters kept me away; and this meant that my offices, the offices +of the OKW, had to settle these questions with the Reich departments and +their experts rather independently on the whole. Thus it happened, +naturally, that decrees of this kind were drawn up requiring my comments +and the Führer’s consent, which was obtained through me and that in this +connection I was the person who co-ordinated the various wishes and +views of the High Commanders of the Wehrmacht branches and reduced them +to a common Wehrmacht denominator, so to speak. Through these activities +I was naturally drawn into the general apparatus of this work, but I do +not believe that this would justify the application of the term +“political general” to the Führer’s Military Chief of Staff. + +DR. NELTE: What can you tell us with regard to foreign policy and the +meetings at which foreign policy was discussed? + +KEITEL: Concerning the sphere of foreign policy, I would merely like to +emphasize what the former Reich Foreign Minister has already said about +collaboration with the leaders of the Wehrmacht. If at all, two of the +leading partners marched their own roads, then it was the foreign policy +on one side and the Wehrmacht on the other, especially under the +influence of the Führer himself, who did not desire collaboration and +opposed the mutual exchange of ideas. He kept us in avowedly separate +camps, and wished to work with each one separately. I must emphasize +that most strongly. To conclude, this applied to all other departments +who came to headquarters, that is, everything was discussed with them +alone, and they also left the headquarters alone. + +There were contacts with the Foreign Office, as State Secretary Von +Steengracht has stated, with regard to all questions of international +law or, in connection therewith, with questions affecting the prisoners +of war, questions of communication with the protecting powers, and +questions which Von Steengracht may have had in mind when he said, “With +the Wehrmacht the whole field of an attaché’s work,” since all reports +sent by military attachés in neutral and friendly countries to the +Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht branches went through Foreign +Office channels. They all arrived there and we received them from there. +It was quite natural that during the war any news of special interest +might call for special contacts in that we often had to complain that +the reports did not reach us in time from the Foreign Office, and that +our Ministry wanted to have them sent direct and not by a roundabout +way. Otherwise, however, I must emphasize that there was no +collaboration in any other field nor, I might say, any community of work +in the field of strategics with the Foreign Office. + +DR. NELTE: About ten days ago Document D-665 was submitted by the +Prosecution. This document is headed “The Führer’s Ideas Regarding the +Waffen-SS” dated 6 August 1940. In this document there is a passage by +the OKW which states the following: + + “The Chief of the OKW has decided in this connection that it can + be only desirable for the ideas of the Führer to be given the + utmost publicity.” + +Do you know this document? + +KEITEL: Yes, I read this document at the time it was submitted, and I +remembered it. To explain the origin of this document I must say +briefly: After the war in France Hitler planned to give an independent +status to the SS units, the Waffen-SS units, or form them into complete +military bodies of troops. Until that time they had been parts of +infantry troops attached to different Army formations. Now these groups +were to be made into independent and fully-equipped units and would thus +become independent formations. This created extreme unrest in the Army, +and caused acute dissatisfaction among the generals. It was said to +denote competition to the Army and the breaking of the promise made to +the army that “there is only one bearer of arms in Germany, and that is +the Wehrmacht.” They asked: “Where would this lead to?” + +At that time the Commander-in-Chief of the Army asked Hitler’s chief +adjutant for information about this revolting affair and General +Schmundt, with Hitler’s approval, then wrote the passage mentioned in +this document. + +I went to the Führer personally about this question to tell him plainly +that the Army considered it an insult. He decided to handle the matter +through his chief adjutant, as it had nothing to do with the High +Command of the Wehrmacht. This announcement was then made by the Army +itself in order to calm the excited minds. My personal comment that +there was no objection to the widest publicity in this case either was +given to satisfy General Von Brauchitsch, who expressly requested to be +allowed to distribute it to every unit, in order to reassure the Army +that the troops in question were police troops who under all +circumstances had to have experience of active service, as otherwise +they would be denied any recognition at home as troops. That is how that +came about, and if I am asked today about my views on this matter I may +say briefly: I also thought at the time that there ought to be a limit +to these things; I believe 10 percent was the figure mentioned. With the +development of events in connection with the setting up of new +formations after 1942, these troops lost their original character of an +elite selected on physical and racial grounds. There was no mistaking +the fact that considerable pressure was exercised; and I myself was very +much afraid that some day this instrument of the Waffen-SS, which had +swelled to a force more than 20 divisions strong, would grow into a new +Army with a different ideology. We had very grave misgivings in this +respect, especially as what we now saw before us was no longer an elite +in any sense of the term, and since we even saw commissioned and +noncommissioned officers and men transferred from these troops to the +Wehrmacht. It was no longer the pick of volunteers. I do not think there +is anything further to add. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have submitted Document L-211 to me. It is +headed “War Operations as an Organizational Problem,” and contains the +comments of the OKW on the memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the +Army regarding the organization of the leadership of the Wehrmacht. This +document was submitted to prove that the OKW and you, as Chief of the +High Command of the Wehrmacht, held views which favored aggression and +had expressed them in this study. + +I assume that you remember this study. What have you to say about the +accusation which is based on this study? + +KEITEL: This study was submitted to me during my preliminary +interrogation and thus I was reminded of its existence. In this +connection I must also give a brief description of the background. It is +not an exaggeration to say that in the early twenties, that is, shortly +after the end of World War I, there was a great deal of literature +produced, I believe, in all countries which had taken part in the war, +on the most efficient organization and co-ordination at the highest +level in the Armed Forces (Kriegsspitzengliederung). I myself wrote on +the subject and I know the opinions held in the United States, England, +and France. At that time everybody was occupied with the question of +that organization, and Von Blomberg said he was in favor of the eighth +solution—seven had already been discarded. + +In this connection a struggle developed, led by the High Command of the +Army and the General Staff of the Army, who constantly opposed the idea +of a combined supreme operational command of the Wehrmacht, and demanded +that the supreme authority should be in the hands of the Army General +Staff, as it was before. + +When the High Command of the Wehrmacht was created and Blomberg had +gone, the Army thought the moment opportune to return with renewed vigor +to the attack. The result was a memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army, written by General Beck, and the answer to this is the +study mentioned here. As I collaborated in the drafting of this answer, +I can vouch for the two men responsible for it, namely, Generaloberst +Jodl and myself, who were the only two who worked on it. I can state +that at that time we were not motivated by any acute problem or by any +preliminary general staff work in preparation for war, but only by the +fact, as I might put it, that of all the many memoranda and +investigations into the most expedient method, the one drawn up by us +appeared to be the most practical. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, does not the document speak for itself? He +says he collaborated in it, but that it was not concerned with war, so +that is all that needs to be said. The document speaks for itself then. + +DR. NELTE: But surely he may clarify some of the ideas contained in this +document. Moreover, Mr. President, in regard to this question I took the +liberty of submitting the affidavit in Document Book Number 2: “High +Command of the Wehrmacht and General Staff” which is signed by the +Defendant Keitel as well as by Herr Jodl. It has been submitted to you +as Number 2 of Document Book 2. + +THE PRESIDENT: Is that the affidavit of 8 March? + +DR. NELTE: 29 March, Mr. President. + +THE PRESIDENT: The first one in the book, or where is it? + +DR. NELTE: No, in the second part. + +THE PRESIDENT: But what page? + +DR. NELTE: The pages have not been numbered consecutively, it has a +table of contents, and under that you will find it as Number 2. + +THE PRESIDENT: Are you quoting them from L-211 now? Are you finished +with that? + +DR. NELTE: This affidavit belongs to L-211. + +THE PRESIDENT: I thought the witness said he had collaborated in the +study, which is L-211, and that it was not concerned with war. You might +leave it at that. + +DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, in this Trial it matters to hear +what the defendants have to say about those documents which allegedly +accuse them. The explanation of Document L-211 which the Defendant +Keitel wishes to make is contained in the affidavit which I submitted in +Document Book Number 2. + +THE PRESIDENT: If what he wishes to say was put down in the affidavit +then he should not have been asked about it; the affidavit should have +been read. + +DR. NELTE: The difference between the length of his verbal statement and +the length of the affidavit is indicated by the relation of 1 to 10. He +gave only a brief summary of the answer he wished to make. The affidavit +is longer, and therefore I thought I could dispense with reading the +affidavit if he would give us a brief summary of the chief points with +which we are concerned. + +THE PRESIDENT: You and I have a different idea of the word summary. + +DR. NELTE: May I continue, Mr. President? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. + +DR. NELTE: I now come to the question of rearmament, and the various +cases of Austria, Czechoslovakia, _et cetera_. I would like to ask you +about the accusation of the Prosecution that you participated in the +planning and preparation of wars of aggression. So that we can +understand each other, and that you can give your answers correctly, we +must be quite clear as to what is meant by war of aggression. Will you +tell us your views on that subject? + +KEITEL: As a soldier, I must say that the term “War of Aggression” as +used here is meaningless as far as I am concerned; we learned how to +conduct actions of attack, actions of defense, and actions of retreat. +However, according to my own personal feelings as a military man, the +concept “war of aggression” is a purely political concept and not a +military one. I mean that if the Wehrmacht and the soldier are a tool of +the politicians, they are not qualified in my opinion to decide or to +judge whether these military operations did or did not constitute a war +of aggression. I think I can summarize my views by saying that military +offices should not have authority to decide this question and are not in +a position to do so; and that these decisions are not the task of the +soldier, but solely that of the statesman. + +DR. NELTE: Then you mean to say, and this applies also to all commanders +and offices involved, that the question of whether or not a war is a war +of aggression, or whether it has to be conducted for the defense of a +country, in other words, whether a war is a just war or not, was not in +the field of your professional deliberations and decisions? + +KEITEL: No; that is what I wish to express, since... + +DR. NELTE: What you are giving is an explanation. But you are not only a +soldier, you are also an individual with a life of your own. When facts +brought to your notice in your professional capacity seemed to reveal +that a projected operation was unjust, did you not give it +consideration? + +KEITEL: I believe I can truthfully say that throughout the whole of my +military career I was brought up, so to speak, in the old traditional +concept that one never discussed this question. Naturally, one has one’s +own opinion and a life of one’s own, but in the exercise of one’s +professional functions as a soldier and an officer, one has given this +life away, yielded it up. Therefore I could not say either at that time +or later that I had misgivings about questions of a purely political +discretion, for I took the stand that a soldier has a right to have +confidence in his state leadership, and accordingly he is obliged to do +his duty and to obey. + +DR. NELTE: Now let us take up the questions individually. Did you know +Hitler’s plans first in regard to rearmament, and later in regard to any +aggression, as the Prosecution calls it? I am thinking chiefly of the +period from February 1933 to 1938. + +KEITEL: It was clear to me that when Hitler became Chancellor, we +soldiers would undoubtedly have a different position in the Reich under +new leadership, and that the military factor would certainly be viewed +differently from what had been the case before. Therefore we quite +honestly and openly welcomed the fact that at the head of the Reich +Government there was a man who was determined to bring about an era +which would lead us out of the deplorable conditions then prevailing. +This much I must confess, that I welcomed the plan and intention to +rearm as far as was possible at that time, as well as the ideas which +tended in that direction. In any event, as early as 1933, in the late +summer, I resigned from my activities in the War Ministry. I spent two +years on active service and returned only at the time when the military +sovereignty had been won back and we were rearming openly. Therefore, +during my absence I did not follow these matters. At any rate, in the +period from 1935 to 1938, during which I was Chief under Blomberg, I +naturally saw and witnessed everything that took place in connection +with rearmament and everything that was done in this field by the War +Ministry to help the Wehrmacht branches. + +DR. NELTE: Did you know that the occupation of the Rhineland in the +demilitarized zone, the re-establishment of military sovereignty, the +introduction of conscription, the building up of the Air Force and the +increase in the number of Wehrmacht contingents violated the Versailles +Treaty? + +KEITEL: The wording of the Versailles Treaty, as long as it was +considered binding upon us, did not, of course, permit these things. The +Treaty of Versailles, may I say, was studied very closely by us in order +to find loopholes which allowed us, without violating the treaty, to +take measures which would not make us guilty of breaking the treaty. +That was the daily task of the Reich Defense Committee. From 1935 on, +conditions were entirely different, and after my return as Chief, under +Blomberg, I must state frankly that I no longer had any misgivings as to +whether the Treaty of Versailles was violated or not because what was +done, was done openly. We announced that we would raise 36 divisions. +Discussions were held quite openly, and I could see nothing in which we +soldiers could, in any way, see a violation of the treaty. It was clear +to all of us, and it was our will to do everything to free ourselves of +the territorial and military fetters of the Treaty of Versailles. I must +say honestly that any soldier or officer who did not feel similarly +about these things would in my estimation have been worthless. It was +taken as a matter of course if one was a soldier. + +DR. NELTE: During this Trial, an order, C-194, which bears your +signature, was submitted. It concerns aerial reconnaissance and +movements of U-boats at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland. +This order leads to the inference that you participated in the +occupation of the Rhineland. In what capacity did you sign this order? + +KEITEL: The order shows already the future introductory phrasing: “The +Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Minister Von Blomberg, upon report, +has ordered...” I transmitted in this form an instruction which General +Von Blomberg had given me, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force +and I recall that it concerned the introduction of control measures +during the days when the three battalions were marching into the +demilitarized zone. + +DR. NELTE: Did you, up to the time of your appointment as Chief of the +OKW, learn from Hitler himself or from other sources, that there were +plans in existence which, contrary to Hitler’s avowed peace assurances +could be put into effect only by force, that is, through a war? + +KEITEL: During this period of time until the first practical measures +were taken in the case of Austria, I cannot remember having had any +knowledge of a program, or the establishment of a program or +far-reaching plan, or one covering a period of years. I must say also +that we were so occupied with the reorganization of this small army of +seven divisions into an expanded force of twice or three times its +original size, apart from the creation of a large air force which had no +equipment at all, that in those years a visit to our office would have +shown that we were completely occupied with purely organizational +problems, and from the way Hitler worked, as described by me today, it +is quite obvious that we saw nothing of these things. + +DR. NELTE: Did you have any personal connection with Hitler before 4 +February 1938? + +KEITEL: In the years from 1935 to 1938, as chief under Blomberg, I saw +the Führer three times. He never spoke one word to me and so he did not +know me. If he knew anything at all about me it could have been only +through Herr Von Blomberg. I had absolutely no contact with the Führer +either personally or through other people who were prominent in the +Party or in politics. My first conversation with him was in the last +days of January before I was appointed to this office. + +DR. NELTE: Did you hear anything of the meeting or discussion with +Hitler in November 1937? I am referring to a conference in which Hitler, +as it is alleged, made public his last will. + +KEITEL: I already stated under oath at the preliminary interrogation +that I did not know about this, and that I saw a document or the minutes +or a record of this meeting at this Trial for the first time. I believe +it is the Hossbach document and I do not remember that Von Blomberg gave +me any directions to take preparatory steps after this conference. That +is not the case. + +DR. NELTE: Did you know of any of Hitler’s intentions regarding +territorial questions? + +KEITEL: Yes. I must answer that in the affirmative. I learned of them, +and I also knew from public political discussions that he proposed to +settle in some form, gradually, sooner or later, a series of territorial +problems which were the result of the Treaty of Versailles. That is +true. + +DR. NELTE: And what did you think about the realization of these +territorial aims, I mean the manner in which they were to be solved? + +KEITEL: At that time I saw these things and judged them only according +to what we were capable of in military terms. I can only say, when I +left the troops in 1935, none of these 24 divisions which were to be +established existed. I did not view all this from the standpoint of +political aims, but with the sober consideration: Can we accomplish +anything by attack and the conduct of war if we have no military means +at our disposal? Consequently for me everything in this connection +revolved around the programs of rearmament, which were to be completed +in 1943-1945, and for the Navy in 1945. Therefore, we had 10 years in +which to build up a concentrated Wehrmacht. Hence, I did not consider +these problems acute even when they came to my attention in a political +way, for I thought it impossible to realize these plans except by +negotiations. + +DR. NELTE: How do you explain the general directives of June 1937 for +preparation for mobilization? + +KEITEL: This document is actually an instruction for mobilization kept +in general terms and was in line with our traditional General Staff +policy before the war and before the World War, the World War I, that on +principle something of the kind must be prepared beforehand. In my +opinion, this had nothing to do with any of Hitler’s political plans, +for at that time I was already Chief of Staff under Blomberg, and +General Jodl was at that time the Chief of the National Defense +Division. Perhaps it sounds somewhat arrogant for me to say that we were +very much satisfied that we were at last beginning to tell the Wehrmacht +each year what it had to do intellectually and theoretically. In the +former General Staff training which I received before the World War, the +chief aim of these instructions was that the General Staff tours for the +purpose of study should afford an opportunity for the theoretical +elaboration of all problems. Such was the former training of the Great +General Staff. I no longer know whether in this connection Blomberg +himself originally thought out these salient ideas of possible +complications or possible military contingencies, or whether he was +perhaps influenced by the Führer. + +It is certain that Hitler never saw this. It was the inside work of the +General Staff of the Wehrmacht. + +DR. NELTE: But in it you find a reference to a “Case Otto,” and you know +that that was the affair with Austria. + +KEITEL: Of course I remember the Case Otto, which indicated by its name +that it concerns Otto von Hapsburg. There must have been—were of +course—certain reports about an attempted restoration, and in that case +an intervention, eventually an armed one, was to take place. The Führer, +Adolf Hitler, wished to prevent a restoration of the monarchy in +Austria. Later this came up again in connection with the Anschluss. I +believe that I can omit that now and perhaps explain later. In any +event, we believed that on the basis of the deliberations by the Army +some sort of preparations were being made which would bring into being +Case Otto, because the code word was “Case Otto comes into force.” + +DR. NELTE: You mean to say that no concrete orders were given in regard +to Case Otto on the basis of this general directive? + +KEITEL: You mean the Anschluss at the beginning of February? + +DR. NELTE: I beg your pardon? + +KEITEL: I can state here only what I experienced when Hitler sent me to +the Army. I went into General Beck’s office and said: “The Führer +demands that you report to him immediately and inform him about the +preparations which have already been made for a possible invasion of +Austria”, and General Beck then said, “We have prepared nothing; nothing +has been done, nothing at all.” + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution contends that you participated in planning +the action against Austria as it was put into effect in March of 1938. I +have here the directive regarding Case Otto, C-102. + +Can you still affirm that the whole matter was improvised? + +KEITEL: I remember that this order was not issued to the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army and to the other Commanders-in-Chief +until the whole project was under way. Nothing had been prepared. It was +all improvised and this was to be the documentary registration of facts +which were being put into practice. The commands were given verbally and +individually regarding what was to be done and what actually was done on +the morning of 12 March, when Austria was invaded. + +DR. NELTE: I must now return to the events preceding the case of +Austria. You know that in General Jodl’s diary it is stated: +“Schuschnigg signs under strongest political and military pressure.” In +what manner did you participate in this conference at the Obersalzberg +which took place with Schuschnigg? + +KEITEL: May I add to my previous answer that we can see from this that +the invasion took place on the morning of 12 March and the order was +issued late in the evening of 11 March. Therefore this document could +not have had any real influence on this affair. Such an order cannot be +worked out between 10 in the evening and 6 in the morning. + +I can say the following in regard to my participation at Obersalzberg on +10 or 11 February: + +It was the first official action in which I took part. In the evening of +4 February Hitler left Berlin. He summoned me to be at Obersalzberg on +10 February. There, on that day the meeting with the Austrian Federal +Chancellor, Schuschnigg, which has been frequently discussed here, took +place. Shortly after I arrived—I had no idea why I had been +summoned—General Von Reichenau arrived from Munich, and General of the +Air Force, Sperrle; so that we three Generals were present when at about +10:30 Herr Schuschnigg arrived with Herr Von Papen. Since I had never +attended a conference or a political action or any meeting of that +nature, I did not know what I was there for. I must tell you this +frankly, otherwise you will not understand it. In the course of the day +the reason for the presence of the three representatives of the +Wehrmacht naturally became clear to me. In certain respects they +represented a military, at least a military demonstration—I may safely +call it that. In the preliminary interrogation and also in later +discussions I was asked the significance of the fact that in the +afternoon my name was suddenly called through the house and I was to +visit the Führer. I went to him in his room. Perhaps it sounds strange +for me to say that when I entered the room I thought that he would give +me a directive but the words were “Nothing at all.” He used the words, +“Please sit down.” Then he said, “Yes, the Federal Chancellor wishes to +have a short conference with his Foreign Minister Schmidt; otherwise I +have nothing at all.” I can only assure you that not one word was said +to me about a political action apart from the fact that Herr Schuschnigg +did not leave until the evening and that further conferences took place. + +We Generals sat in the anteroom, and when in the evening, shortly before +my departure, I received the direction to launch reports that we were +taking certain measures for mobilization, of which you have been +informed here through a document, then it became quite clear to me that +this day had served to bring the discussions to a head by the +introduction of military representatives, and the directive to spread +reports was to keep up the pressure, as has been shown here. + +Upon my return to my apartment in Berlin, in the presence of Goebbels +and Canaris, we discussed the reports which were to be sent out and +which Canaris then broadcast in Munich. Finally, in order to conclude +this matter, it might be interesting to point out that the Chief of +Intelligence in the Austrian Federal Ministry, Lahousen, who has been +present here in court, told Jodl and me when later on he came into the +service of the Wehrmacht: “We were not taken in by this bluff.” And I +indubitably gave Jodl a basis for his entry in the diary, even though it +is somewhat drastically worded, for I was naturally impressed by this +first experience. + +DR. NELTE: What is your position on the measures against Austria? + +KEITEL: Nothing further need be said concerning the further developments +of the affair. It has already been presented here in detail. On the day +of the invasion by the troops I flew with Hitler to the front. We drove +along the highways through Braunau, Linz. We stayed overnight and +proceeded to Vienna. And to put it modestly, it is true that in every +village we were received most enthusiastically and the Austrian Federal +Army marched side by side with the German soldiers through the streets +over which we drove. Not a shot was fired. On the other side the only +formation which had a certain military significance was an armored unit +on the road from Passau to Vienna which arrived in Vienna with very few +vehicles. This division was on the spot for the parade the next day. +That is a very sober picture of what I saw. + +DR. NELTE: Now we come to the question of Czechoslovakia. When did +Hitler for the first time discuss with you the question of +Czechoslovakia and his intentions in that respect? + +KEITEL: I believe 6 to 8 weeks after the march into Austria, that is, +after the Anschluss toward the end of April. The Anschluss was about the +middle of March and also took the form of a sudden summons, one evening, +to the Reich Chancellery where the Führer then explained matters to me. +This resulted in the well-known directive in the Case Green. The history +of this case is well known by the Schmundt Files all of which I +identified in the preliminary interrogation. At that time he gave me +first directives in a rather hasty manner. It was not possible for me to +ask any questions, as he wished to leave Berlin immediately. These were +the bases for the questions regarding the conditions under which a +warlike action against Czechoslovakia could or would arise. + +DR. NELTE: Did you have the impression that Hitler wanted to attack +Czechoslovakia? + +KEITEL: In any event the instructions which he gave me that evening were +to the effect that preparations for a military action with all the +preliminary work, which was the responsibility of the General Staff, +were to be made. He expressed himself very precisely although he +explained explicitly that the date was quite open and said that for the +time being it was not his intention. These were the words: “...for the +time being it is not my intention.” + +DR. NELTE: In this connection was a difference made between the +Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia? + +KEITEL: I do not believe that we discussed it at all that evening during +that short conference. The Führer did not discuss with me the political +aspects; he merely assigned me to the consideration of the necessary +military measures. He did not say whether he would be content with the +Sudetenland or whether we were to break through the Czechoslovakian line +of fortification. That was not the problem at that time. But in any +event—if they had to be settled by going to war—then the war had to be +prepared; if it came to a conflict with the Czech Army, that is, a real +war it would have to be prepared. + +DR. NELTE: You know that the record of the Hitler-General Keitel +Conference on 21 April, of which there are two versions, speaks of a +lightning action being necessary in case of an incident. In the first +one after the word “incident” it reads: “for example, the assassination +of the German Minister” following a demonstration hostile to Germany. In +the second one, after the word “incident” it reads only “for example, +action in case of an incident.” Will you please explain to what this +note, which is not a record in the proper sense of the word, can be +attributed? + +KEITEL: I saw the Schmundt notes for the first time here. We did not +receive it at that time as a document to work with. It is not a record. +These are notes made subsequently by an adjutant. I do not want to doubt +their correctness or accuracy, for memory would not permit me to recall +today the exact words which were used. However this question, which is +considered significant here, the assassination of the German Minister in +Prague, is a situation which I have never heard of, if only for the +reason that no one ever said such a thing. It was said it might happen +that the Minister is assassinated whereupon I asked which minister, or +something similar. Then, as I recall it, Hitler said that the war of +1914 also started with an assassination at Sarajevo, and that such +incidents could happen. I did not in any way get the impression at that +time that a war was to be created through a provocation. + +DR. NELTE: You will have to tell me some more on that point. + +THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + NINETY-NINTH DAY + Wednesday, 4 April 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte. + +DR. NELTE: Yesterday we discussed last the meeting on 21 April of you, +Hitler, and Adjutant Schmundt. I am again having Document 388-PS brought +to you and ask you to answer when I ask you. Was this not a conference +of the kind which you said yesterday in principle did not take place? + +KEITEL: To a certain extent it is true that I was called in and to my +complete surprise was presented with ideas concerning preparation for +war against Czechoslovakia. This took place within a very short time, +before one of Hitler’s departures for Berchtesgaden. I do not recall +saying one word during these short instructions, but I asked only one +question, and then with these extremely surprising directives I went +home. + +DR. NELTE: What happened then, so far as you were concerned? + +KEITEL: My reflections during the first hour after that were that this +could not be carried out in view of the military strength which I knew +we then possessed. I then comforted myself with the thought that the +conversation premised that nothing had been planned within a measurable +lapse of time. The following day I discussed the matter with the Chief +of the Operations Staff, General Jodl. I never received any minutes of +this discussion, nor any record. The outcome of our deliberations was +“to leave things alone because there was plenty of time, and because any +such action was out of the question for military reasons.” I also +explained to Jodl that the introductory words had been: “It is not my +intention to undertake military action against Czechoslovakia within a +measurable lapse of time.” + +Then, in the next weeks, we started theoretical deliberations; this, +however, without taking into consultation the branches of the Wehrmacht +because I considered myself not authorized to do so. In the following +period it is to be noted, as can be seen from the Schmundt File, that +the adjutants, the military adjutants, continuously asked innumerable +detailed questions regarding the strength of divisions, and so on. These +questions were answered by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to the best of +their knowledge. + +DR. NELTE: I believe we can shorten this considerably, Herr Marshal, +however important your explanations are. The decisive point now is—if +you would take the document in front of you and compare the draft which +you finally made on pressure from Obersalzberg and tell me what happened +after that. + +KEITEL: Yes. About four weeks after I had been given this job, I sent to +Obersalzberg a draft of a directive for the preparatory measures. In +reply I was informed that Hitler himself would come to Berlin to speak +with the commander-in-chief. He came to Berlin at the end of May, and I +was present at the conference with Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. In +this conference the basic plan was changed altogether, namely, to the +effect that Hitler expressed the intention to take military action +against Czechoslovakia in the very near future. As reason why he changed +his mind he gave the fact that Czechoslovakia—I believe it was on the +20th or 21st of May—had ordered general mobilization, and Hitler at +that time declared this could have been directed only against us. +Military preparations had not been made by Germany. This was the reason +for the complete change of his intentions, which he communicated orally +to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and he ordered him to begin +preparations at once. This explains the changes in the basic +orders—that is to say, the directive which was now being issued had as +its basic idea: “It is my irrevocable decision to take military action +against Czechoslovakia in the near future.” + +DR. NELTE: War against Czechoslovakia was avoided as a result of the +Munich Agreement. What was your opinion and that of the generals about +this agreement? + +KEITEL: We were extraordinarily happy that it had not come to a military +operation, because throughout the time of preparation we had always been +of the opinion that our means of attack against the frontier +fortifications of Czechoslovakia were insufficient. From a purely +military point of view we lacked the means for an attack which involved +the piercing of the frontier fortifications. Consequently we were +extremely satisfied that a peaceful political solution had been reached. + +DR. NELTE: What effect did this agreement have on the generals regarding +Hitler’s prestige? + +KEITEL: I believe I may say that as a result this greatly increased +Hitler’s prestige among the generals. We recognized that on the one hand +military means and military preparations had not been neglected and on +the other hand a solution had been found which we had not expected and +for which we were extremely thankful. + +DR. NELTE: Is it not amazing that 3 weeks after the Munich Agreement +that had been so welcomed by everyone, including the generals, Hitler +gave instructions for the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia? + +KEITEL: I believe that recently Reich Marshal Göring enlarged on this +question in the course of his examination. It was my impression, as I +remember it, that Hitler told me at that time that he did not believe +that Czechoslovakia would overcome the loss of the Sudeten-German +territories with their strong fortifications; and, moreover, he was +concerned about the close relations then existing between Czechoslovakia +and the Soviet Union and thought that Czechoslovakia could and perhaps +would become a military and strategic menace. These were the military +reasons which were given to me. + +DR. NELTE: Was it not pointed out to Hitler by anyone that a solution by +force of the problem regarding the remainder of Czechoslovakia involved +a great danger, namely, that the other powers, that is England, France, +would be offended? + +KEITEL: I was not informed of the last conversation in Munich between +the British Prime Minister Chamberlain and the Führer. However, I +regarded this question as far as its further treatment was concerned as +a political one, and consequently I did not raise any objections, if I +may so express myself, especially as a considerable reduction in the +military preparations decided on before the Munich meeting was ordered. +Whenever the political question was raised, the Führer refused to +discuss it. + +DR. NELTE: In connection with this question of Czechoslovakia, I should +like to mention Lieutenant Colonel Köchling, who was characterized by +the Prosecution as the liaison man with Henlein. Was the Wehrmacht or +the OKW engaged in this matter? + +KEITEL: Köchling’s job remained unknown to me; it was I who named +Köchling. Hitler asked me if an officer was available for a special +mission, and if so he should report to me. After I dispatched Lieutenant +Colonel Köchling from Berlin I neither saw nor spoke to him again. I do +know, however, that, as I heard later, he was with Henlein as a sort of +military adviser. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has pointed out that you were present at the +visit of Minister President Tiso in March 1939, as well as at the visit +of President Hacha, and from this it was deduced that you participated +in the political discussions which then took place. What role did you +play on these occasions? + +KEITEL: It is true, I believe in every case, that on the occasion of +such state visits and visits of foreign statesmen I was present in the +Reich Chancellery or at the reception. I never took part in the actual +discussions of political questions. I was present at the reception and +felt that I should be present to be introduced as a high ranking +representative of the Wehrmacht. But in each individual case that I can +recall I was dismissed with thanks or waited in the antechamber in case +I should be needed. I can positively say that I did not say one single +word either to Tiso or to President Hacha on that night, nor did I take +part in Hitler’s direct discussions with these men. May I add that just +on the night of President Hacha’s visit I had to be present in the Reich +Chancellery, because during that night the High Command of the Army had +to be instructed as to how the entry which had been prepared was to take +place. + +DR. NELTE: In this connection I wish to establish only this, since I +assume that this question has been clarified by Reich Marshal Göring’s +testimony. You never spoke to President Hacha of a possible bombing of +Prague in the event that he should not be willing to sign? + +KEITEL: No. + +DR. NELTE: We come now to the case of Poland. Here too the Prosecution +accuses you of having participated in the planning and preparation for +military action against Poland and of having assisted in the execution +of this action. Would you state in brief your basic attitude towards +these Eastern problems? + +KEITEL: The question concerning the problem of Danzig and the Corridor +were known to me. I also knew that political discussions and +negotiations with regard to these questions were pending. The case of +the attack on Poland, which in the course of time had to be and was +prepared, was, of course, closely connected with these problems. + +Since I myself was not concerned with political matters, I personally +was of the opinion that, as in the case of Munich and before Munich, +military preparations, that is, military pressure if I may call it such, +would play the same kind of role as in my opinion it had played at +Munich. I did not believe that the matter would be brought to an end +without military preparations. + +DR. NELTE: Could not this question have been solved by direct preceding +negotiations? + +KEITEL: That is hard for me to say, although I know that several +discussions took place concerning the Danzig question as well as +concerning a solution of the Corridor problem. I recall a remark that +impressed me at the time, when Hitler once said he deplored Marshal +Pilsudski’s death, because he believed he had reached or could have +reached an agreement with this statesman. This statement was once made +to me. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has stated that already in the autumn of 1938 +Hitler was working on the question of a war against Poland. Did you +participate in this in 1938? + +KEITEL: No. This I cannot recall. I should like to believe that, to my +recollection, at that time there were even signs that this was not the +case. At that time I accompanied Hitler on an extensive tour of +inspection of the eastern fortifications. We covered the entire front +from Pomerania through the Oder-Warthe marshland as far as Breslau in +order to inspect the various frontier fortifications against Poland. The +question of fortifications in East Prussia was thoroughly discussed at +that time. When I consider this in this connection today, I can only +assume that for him these discussions were possibly connected with the +Danzig and Corridor problem and he simply wanted to find out whether +these eastern fortifications had sufficient defensive strength, should +the Danzig and Corridor question eventually lead to war with Poland. + +DR. NELTE: When were the preparations made for the occupation of Danzig? + +KEITEL: I believe that as early as the late autumn of 1938 orders were +issued that Danzig be occupied at a favorable moment by a _coup de main_ +from East Prussia. That is all I know about it. + +DR. NELTE: Was the possibility of war against Poland discussed in this +connection? + +KEITEL: Yes, that was apparently connected with the examination of the +possibilities to defend the border, but I do not recall any, nor was +there any kind of preparation, any military preparations, at that time, +apart from a surprise attack from East Prussia. + +DR. NELTE: If I remember rightly you once told me, when we discussed +this question, that Danzig was to be occupied only if this would not +result in a war with Poland. + +KEITEL: Yes, that is so. This statement was made time and again, that +this occupation of, or the surprise attack on Danzig was to be carried +out only if it was certain that it would not lead to war. + +DR. NELTE: When did this view change? + +KEITEL: I believe Poland’s refusal to discuss any kind of solution of +the Danzig question was apparently the reason for further deliberations +and steps. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution is in possession of the directive of 3 April +1939... + +KEITEL: I might perhaps add that generally after Munich the situation +also in regard to the Eastern problem was viewed differently, perhaps, +or as I believe, from this point of view: The problem of Czechoslovakia +has been solved satisfactorily without a shot. This will perhaps also be +possible with regard to the other German problems in the East. I also +believe I remember Hitler saying that he did not think the Western +Powers, particularly England, would be interested in Germany’s Eastern +problem and would sooner act as mediators than raise any objection. + +DR. NELTE: That is Document C-120, the “Fall Weiss”. According to this, +the directive was issued on 3 April 1939. + +KEITEL: Let us take the document first. In the first sentence it is +already stated that this document was to replace the regular annual +instructions of the Wehrmacht regarding possible preparations for +mobilization, a further elaboration of subjects known to us from the +instructions which had been issued in 1937-38 and which were issued +every year. But in fact, at that time or shortly before, Hitler had, in +my presence, directly instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to +make strategic and operative preparations for an attack on, for a war +with Poland. I then issued these first considerations, as can be seen +from this document, that is, the Führer had already ordered the +following: Everything should be worked out by the OKH of the Army by 1 +September 1939, and that after this a timetable should be drawn up. This +document was signed by me at that time. + +DR. NELTE: What was your attitude and that of the other generals towards +this war? + +KEITEL: I must say that at this time, as in the case of the preparations +against Czechoslovakia, both the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the +generals to whom I spoke, and also I, myself, were opposed to the idea +of waging a war against Poland. We did not want this war, but, of +course, we immediately began to carry out the given orders, at least as +far as the elaboration by the General Staff was concerned. Our reason +was that to our knowledge the military means which were at our disposal +at that time, that is to say, the divisions, their equipment, their +armament, let alone their absolutely inadequate supply of munition kept +reminding us as soldiers that we were not ready to wage a war. + +DR. NELTE: Do you mean to say that in your considerations only military +viewpoints defined your attitude? + +KEITEL: Yes. I must admit that. I did not concern myself with the +political problems but only with the question: Can we or can we not? + +DR. NELTE: I want to establish only this. Now, on 23 May 1939, there was +a conference at which Hitler addressed the generals. You know this +address? What was the reason for and the contents of this address? + +KEITEL: I saw the minutes of it for the first time in the course of my +interrogations here. It reminded me of the situation at that time. The +purpose of this address was to show the generals that their misgivings +were unfounded, to remove their misgivings, and finally to point out +that the conditions were not yet given and that political negotiations +about these matters still could and perhaps would change the situation. +It was however simply to give encouragement. + +DR. NELTE: Were you at that time of the opinion that war would actually +break out? + +KEITEL: No, at that time—and this was perhaps rather naïve—I believed +that war would not break out, that in view of the military preparations +ordered, negotiations would take place again and a solution would be +found. In our military considerations a strictly military point of view +was always dominant. We generals believed that France—to a lesser +extent England—in view of her mutual-assistance pact with Poland would +intervene and that we did not at all have the defensive means for this. +For this very reason I personally was always convinced that there would +be no war because we could not wage a war against Poland if France +attacked us in the West. + +DR. NELTE: Now then, what was your opinion of the situation after the +speech of 22 August 1939? + +KEITEL: This speech was made at the end of August and was addressed to +the generals assembled at Obersalzberg, the commanders-in-chief of the +troops preparing in the East. When Hitler, towards the end of this +speech, declared that a pact had been concluded with the Soviet Union, I +was firmly convinced that there would be no war because I believed that +these conditions constituted a basis for negotiation and that Poland +would not expose herself to it. I also believed that now a basis for +negotiations had been found although Hitler said in this speech, a copy +of which I read here for the first time from notes, that all +preparations had been made, and that it was intended to put them into +execution. + +DR. NELTE: Did you know that England actually attempted to act as +intermediary? + +KEITEL: No, I knew nothing of these matters. The first thing which was +very surprising to me was that on one of those days which have been +discussed here repeatedly, namely on the 24th or 25th, only a few days +after the conference at Obersalzberg, I was suddenly called to Hitler at +the Reich Chancellery and he said to me only, “Stop everything at once, +get Brauchitsch immediately. I need time for negotiations.” I believe +that after these few words I was dismissed. + +DR. NELTE: What followed thereupon? + +KEITEL: I at once rang up the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and passed +on the order, and Brauchitsch was called to the Führer. Everything was +stopped and all decisions on possible military action were suspended, +first without any time limit, on the following day for a certain limited +period, I believe it was 5 days according to the calculations we can +make today. + +DR. NELTE: Did you know of the so-called minimum demands on Poland? + +KEITEL: I believe that I saw them in the Reich Chancellery, that Hitler +himself showed them to me, so that I knew about them. + +DR. NELTE: As you saw them, I would like to ask whether you considered +these demands to be serious? + +KEITEL: At that time I was always only a few minutes in the Reich +Chancellery and as a soldier I naturally believed that these were meant +perfectly honestly. + +DR. NELTE: Was there any talk at that time of border incidents? + +KEITEL: No. This question of border incidents was also extensively +discussed with me here in my interrogations. In this situation and in +the few discussions we had at the Reich Chancellery in those days there +was no talk at all on this question. + +DR. NELTE: I am now having Document 795-PS brought to you, notes which +deal with the Polish uniforms for Heydrich. + +KEITEL: May I add... + +DR. NELTE: Please do. + +KEITEL: ...namely, that on 30 August, I believe, the day for the attack, +which took place on 1 September, was again postponed for 24 hours. For +this reason Brauchitsch and I were again called to the Reich Chancellery +and to my recollection the reason given was that a Polish Government +plenipotentiary was expected. Everything was to be postponed for 24 +hours. Then no further changes of the military instructions occurred. + +This document deals with Polish uniforms for border incidents or for +some sort of illegal actions. It has been shown to me, I know it; it is +a subsequent note made by Admiral Canaris of a conversation he had with +me. He told me at that time that he was to make available a few Polish +uniforms. This had been communicated to him by the Führer through the +adjutant. I asked: “For what purpose?” We both agreed that this was +intended for some illegal action. If I remember rightly I told him at +that time that I did not believe in such things at all and that he had +better keep his hands off. We then had a short discussion about Dirschau +which was also to be taken by a _coup de main_ by the Wehrmacht. That is +all I heard of it. I believe I told Canaris he could dodge the issue by +saying that he had no Polish uniforms. He could simply say he had none +and the matter would be settled. + +DR. NELTE: You know, of course, that this matter was connected with the +subsequent attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. Do you know anything +of this incident? + +KEITEL: This incident, this action came to my knowledge for the first +time here through the testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was +charged to carry out such things and I knew nothing of the raid on the +radio station at Gleiwitz until I heard the testimonies given here +before the Tribunal. Neither do I recall having heard at that time that +such an incident had occurred. + +DR. NELTE: Did you know of the efforts of America and Italy after 1 +September 1939 to end the war in one way or another? + +KEITEL: I knew nothing at all of the political discussions that took +place in those days from the 24th to the 30th, 31st of August or the +beginning of September 1939. I never knew anything about the visits of a +Herr Dahlerus. I knew nothing of London’s intervention. I remember only +that, while in the Reich Chancellery for a short time, I met Hitler, who +said to me: “Do not disturb me now, I am writing a letter to Daladier.” +This must have been in the first days of September. Neither I nor, to my +knowledge, any of the other generals ever knew anything about the +matters I have heard of here or about the steps that were still taken +after 1 September. Nothing at all. + +DR. NELTE: What did you say to Canaris and Lahousen in the Führer’s +train on 14 September, that is, shortly before the attack on Warsaw, +with regard to the so-called political “house cleaning”? + +KEITEL: I have been interrogated here about this point, but I did not +recall this visit at all. But from Lahousen’s testimony it appeared—he +said, as I remember—that I had repeated what Hitler had said and had +passed on these orders, as he put it. I know that the Commander-in-Chief +of the Army who then directed the military operations in Poland had at +the daily conferences already complained about interference by the +police in occupied Polish territory. I can only say that I apparently +repeated what had been said about these things in my presence between +Hitler and Brauchitsch. I can make no statements regarding details. + +I might add that to my recollection the Commander-in-Chief of the Army +at that time complained several times that as long as he had the +executive power in the occupied territories he would under no +circumstances tolerate other agencies in this area and that at his +request he was relieved of his responsibility for Poland in October. I +therefore believe that the statements the witness made from memory or on +the strength of notes are not quite correct. + +DR. NELTE: We come now to the question of Norway. Did you know that in +October 1939 Germany had given a declaration of neutrality to Denmark +and Norway? + +KEITEL: Yes, I knew that. + +DR. NELTE: Were you and the OKW taken into consultation about +declarations of neutrality in this or other cases? + +KEITEL: No. + +DR. NELTE: Were you informed of them? + +KEITEL: No, we were not informed either. These were discussions +referring to foreign policy, of which we soldiers were not informed. + +DR. NELTE: You mean you were not informed officially. But you as a +person who also reads newspapers knew of it? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: Good. Before our discussion about the problem of aggressive +war I asked you a question which, in order to save time, I would not +like to repeat. However, it seems to me that the question I put to you +in order to get your opinion on aggressive war must be asked again in +this connection because an attack on a neutral country, a country which +had been given a guarantee was bound to cause particular scruples on the +part of people who have to do with these things, with the waging of war. + +Therefore, I put this question to you again in this case and ask you to +describe what your attitude and the soldiers’ attitude was to it. + +KEITEL: In this connection, I must say we were already at war. There was +a state of war with England and France. It would not be right for me to +say that I interfered in the least with these matters, but I regarded +them rather as political matters, and, as a soldier, I held the opinion +that preparations for military actions against Norway and Denmark did +not yet mean their outbreak and that these preparations would very +obviously take months if such an action was executed at all and that in +the meantime the situation could change. It was this train of thought +which caused me not to take any steps in regard to the impossibility to +consider and to prepare strategically this intervention in Norway and +Denmark; therefore, I left these things, I must say, to those who were +concerned with political matters. I cannot put it any other way. + +DR. NELTE: When did the preparations for this action start? + +KEITEL: I think the first deliberations took place already in October +1939; on the other hand, the first directives were issued only in +January, that is to say, several months later. In connection with the +discussions before this Tribunal and with the information given by Reich +Marshal Göring in his statements, I also remember that one day I was +ordered to call Grand Admiral Raeder to the Führer. He wanted to discuss +with him questions regarding sea warfare in the Bay of Heligoland and in +the Atlantic Ocean and the dangers we would encounter in waging war in +this area. + +Then Hitler ordered me to call together a special staff which was to +study all these problems from the viewpoint of sea, air, and land +warfare. I remembered this also upon seeing the documents produced here. +This special staff dispensed with my personal assistance. Hitler said at +the time that he himself would furnish tasks for this staff. These were, +I believe, the military considerations in the months from 1939 to the +beginning of 1940. + +DR. NELTE: In this connection I should only like to know further whether +you had any conversation with Quisling at this stage of preliminary +measures? + +KEITEL: No, I saw Quisling neither before nor after the Norway campaign; +I saw him for the first time approximately one or two years later. We +had no contact, not even any kind of transmission of information. I +already stated in a preliminary interrogation that by order of Hitler I +sent an officer, I believe it was Colonel Pieckenbrock, to Copenhagen +for conferences with Norwegians. I did not know Quisling. + +DR. NELTE: As to the war in the West, there is once more in the +foreground the question of violation of neutrality in the case of +Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. Did you know that these three +countries had been given assurances regarding the inviolability of their +neutrality? + +KEITEL: Yes, I knew and also was told that at that time. + +DR. NELTE: I do not want to ask the same questions as in the case of +Norway and Denmark, but, in this connection, however, I should like to +ask: Did you consider these assurances by Hitler to be honest? + +KEITEL: When I remember the situation as it was then, I did at that time +believe, when I learned of these things, that there was no intention of +bringing any other state into the war. At any rate, I had no reason, no +justification, to assume the opposite, namely that this was intended as +a deception. + +DR. NELTE: After the conclusion of the Polish campaign did you still +believe that there was any possibility of terminating or localizing the +war? + +KEITEL: Yes, I did believe this. My view was strengthened by the +Reichstag speech after the Polish war, in which allusions were made +which convinced me that political discussions about this question were +going on, above all, with England, and because Hitler had told me time +and again, whenever these questions were brought up, “The West is +actually not interested in these Eastern problems of Germany.” This was +the phrase he always used to calm people, namely that the Western Powers +were not interested in these problems. + +Furthermore, seen from a purely military point of view, it must be added +that we soldiers had, of course, always expected an attack by the +Western Powers, that is to say, by France, during the Polish campaign, +and were very surprised that in the West, apart from some skirmishes +between the Maginot Line and the West Wall, nothing had actually +happened, though we had—this I know for certain—along the whole +Western Front from the Dutch border to Basel only five divisions, apart +from the small forces manning the fortifications of the West Wall. Thus, +from a purely military operative point of view, a French attack during +the Polish campaign would have encountered only a German military +screen, not a real defense. Since nothing of this sort happened, we +soldiers thought of course that the Western Powers had no serious +intentions, because they did not take advantage of the extremely +favorable situation for military operations and did not undertake +anything, at least not anything serious, against us during the 3 to 4 +weeks when all the German fighting formations were employed in the East. +This also strengthened our views as to what the attitude of the Western +Powers would probably be in the future. + +DR. NELTE: What plans did Hitler have for the West? + +KEITEL: During the last phase of the Polish campaign, he had already +transferred all unnecessary forces to the West, in consideration of the +fact that at any time something else might happen there. However, during +the last days of the Polish campaign, he had already told me that he +intended to throw his forces as swiftly as possible from the East to the +West and if possible, attack in the West in the winter of 1939-1940. + +DR. NELTE: Did these plans include attacks on and marching through +Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland? + +KEITEL: Not in the beginning, but first, if we can express it from the +military point of view, the deployment in the West was to be a +protective measure, that is, a thorough strengthening of the frontiers, +of course preferably to take place where there was nothing except border +posts. Accordingly, already at the end of September and the beginning of +October, a transportation of the army from the East to the West did take +place, as a security measure without, however, any fixed center of +gravity. + +DR. NELTE: What did the military leaders know about Belgium and +Holland’s attitude? + +KEITEL: This naturally changed several times in the course of the +winter. At that time, in the autumn of 1939—I can speak only for +myself, and there may be other opinions on this matter—I was convinced +that Belgium wanted to remain out of the war under any circumstances and +would do anything she could to preserve her neutrality. On the other +hand, we received, through the close connections between the Belgian and +Italian royal houses, a number of reports that sounded very threatening. +I had no way of finding out whether they were true, but we learned of +them, and they indicated that strong pressure was exerted on Belgium to +give up her neutrality. + +As for Holland, we knew at that time only that there were General Staff +relations between her and England. + +But then of course, in the months from October 1939 to May 1940 the +situation changed considerably and the tension varied greatly. From the +purely military point of view, we knew one thing: That all the French +swift units, that is motorized units, were concentrated on the +Belgian-French border, and from a military point of view, we interpreted +this measure as meaning that at least preparations were being made for +crossing through Belgium at any time with the swift units and advancing +up to the borders of the Ruhr district. + +I believe I should omit details, here, because they are not important +for the further developments, they are of a purely operative and +strategic nature. + +DR. NELTE: Were there differences of opinion between the generals and +Hitler with reference to the attack in the West which had to take place +through this neutral territory? + +KEITEL: I believe I must say that this at that time was one of the most +serious crises in the whole war, namely, the opinions held by a number +of generals, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch, +and his Chief of General Staff, and I also personally belong to that +group, which wanted at all costs to attempt to prevent an attack in the +West which Hitler intended for that winter. There were various reasons +for this: The difficulty of transporting the Eastern Army to the West; +then the point of view—and this I must state—the fact that we believed +at that time, perhaps more from the political point of view, that if we +did not attack, the possibility of a peaceful solution might still exist +and might still be realizable. Thus we considered it possible that +between then and the spring many political changes could take place. +Secondly, as soldiers, we were decidedly against the waging of a winter +war, in view of the short days and long nights, which are always a great +hindrance to all military operations. To Hitler’s objection that the +French swift forces might march through Belgium at any time and then +stand before the Ruhr district, we answered that we were superior in +such a situation in a war of movement, we were a match for it; that was +our view. I may add that this situation led to a very serious crisis +between Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and also me, +because I had this trend of thought which Hitler vigorously rejected +because it was, as he declared, strategically wrong. In our talks he +accused me in the sharpest manner of conspiring against him with the +generals of the Army and strengthening them in their opposition to his +views. I must state here that I then asked to be relieved immediately of +my post and given another, because I felt that under these circumstances +the confidence between Hitler and myself had been completely destroyed, +and I was greatly offended. I may add that relations with the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army also suffered greatly from this. But the +idea of my discharge or employment elsewhere was sharply rejected, I +would not be entitled to it. It has already been discussed here; I need +not go into it any further. But this breach of confidence was not to be +mended, not even in the future. In the case of Norway, there had already +been a similar conflict because I had left the house. General Jodl’s +diary refers to it as a “serious crisis.” I shall not go into this in +detail. + +DR. NELTE: What was the reason for Hitler’s speech to the +Commanders-in-Chief on 23 November 1939, in the Reich Chancellery? + +KEITEL: I can say that this was very closely connected with the crisis +between Hitler and the generals. He called a meeting of the generals at +that time to present and substantiate his views, and we knew it was his +intention to bring about a change of attitude on the part of the +generals. In the notes on this speech, we see that individual persons +were more than once directly and sharply rebuked. The reasons given by +those who had spoken against this attack in the West were repeated. +Moreover, he now wanted to make an irrevocable statement of his will to +carry out this attack in the West that very winter, because this, in his +view, was the only strategic solution, as every delay was to the enemy’s +advantage. In other words, at that time, he no longer counted on any +other solution than resort to force of arms. + +DR. NELTE: When, then, was the decision made to advance through Belgium +and Holland? + +KEITEL: The preparations for such a march through and attack on Belgium +and Holland had already been made, but Hitler withheld the decision as +to whether such a big attack or violation of the neutrality of these +countries was actually to be carried out, and kept it open until the +spring of 1940, obviously for all sorts of political reasons, and +perhaps also with the idea that the problem would automatically be +solved if the enemy invaded Belgium or if the mobile French troops +entered, or something like that. I can only state that the decision for +the carrying out of this plan was withheld until the very last moment +and the order was given only immediately before it was to be executed. I +believe that there was also one other factor in this, which I have +already mentioned, namely the relationship between the royal houses of +Italy and Belgium. Hitler always surrounded his decisions with secrecy +for he was obviously afraid that they might become known through this +relationship. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal will be glad if when you refer to +Czechoslovakia or any other state you will refer to it by its proper +name, you, and the defendants, and other witnesses. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, the Defendant Keitel wishes to make a slight +correction in the statement which he made earlier upon my question +regarding the occupation in the West during the Polish campaign. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +KEITEL: I said earlier that in the West during the war against Poland, +there were five divisions. I must rectify that statement. I had confused +that with the year 1938. In 1939 there were approximately 20 divisions, +including the reserves in the Rhineland and in the West district behind +the lines. Therefore, the statement I made was made inadvertently and +was a mistake. + +DR. NELTE: Now we come to the Balkan wars. The Prosecution, with +reference also to the war against Greece and Yugoslavia, have accused +you of having co-operated in the preparation, planning, and above all in +the carrying out of those wars. What is your attitude toward this? + +KEITEL: We were drawn into the war against Greece and against Yugoslavia +in the spring of 1941 to our complete surprise and without having made +any plans. Let me take Greece first: I accompanied Hitler during his +journey through France for the meetings with Marshal Pétain and with +Franco on the Spanish border, and during that journey we received our +first news regarding the intention of Italy to attack Greece. The +journey to Florence was immediately decided upon, and upon arrival in +Florence, we received Mussolini’s communication, which has already been +mentioned by Reich Marshal Göring, namely, that the attack against +Greece had already begun. + +I can only say from my own personal knowledge that Hitler was extremely +angry about this development and the dragging of the Balkans into the +war and that only the fact that Italy was an ally prevented a break with +Mussolini. I never knew of any intentions to wage war against Greece. + +DR. NELTE: Was there any necessity for Germany to enter into that war or +how did that come about? + +KEITEL: At first the necessity did not exist, but during the first +months, October-November, of that campaign of the Italians, it already +became clear that the Italian position in this war had become extremely +precarious. Therefore, as early as November or December, there were +calls on the part of Mussolini for help, calls to assist him in some +form or other. + +Moreover, seen from the military point of view, it was clear of course +that for the entire military position in the war, a defeat of Italy in +the Balkans would have had considerable and very serious consequences. +Therefore, by improvised means, assistance was rendered. I think a +mountain division was to be brought in, but it was technically +impossible, since there were no transportation facilities. Then another +solution was attempted by means of air transport and the like. + +DR. NELTE: At the time when improvisations ceased, we come, however, to +the plan presented by the Prosecution and called “Marita.” When was +that? + +KEITEL: The war in Greece and Albania had begun to reach a certain +standstill because of winter conditions. During that time, plans were +conceived in order to avoid a catastrophe for Italy, to bring in against +Greece certain forces from the North for an attack to relieve pressure, +for such I must call it. That would, and did of course, take several +months. + +May I just explain that at that time the idea of a march through +Yugoslavia, or even the suggestion that forces should be brought in +through Yugoslavia was definitely turned down by Hitler, although the +Army particularly had proposed that possibility as the most suitable way +of bringing in troops. + +Regarding the “Operation Marita,” perhaps not much more can be said than +to mention the march through Bulgaria, which had been prepared and +discussed diplomatically with Bulgaria. + +DR. NELTE: I would like to ask just one more question on that subject. +The Prosecution have stated that even before the overthrow of the +Yugoslav Government, that is to say, at the end of March 1941, +negotiations were conducted with Hungary for the eventuality of an +attack on Yugoslavia. Were you or the OKW informed of this, or were you +consulted? + +KEITEL: No. I have no recollection at all of any military discussion on +the part of the OKW with Hungary regarding the eventuality of a military +action in the case of Yugoslavia. That is completely unknown to me. On +the contrary, everything that happened later on—a few words about +Yugoslavia will have to be said later—was completely improvised. +Nothing had been prepared, at any rate not with the knowledge of the +OKW. + +DR. NELTE: But it is known to you, is it not, that military discussions +with Hungary had taken place during that period? I assume that you +merely want to say that they did not refer to Yugoslavia. + +KEITEL: Of course, it was known to me that several discussions had taken +place with the Hungarian General Staff. + +DR. NELTE: You said you wanted to say something else about the case of +Yugoslavia. Reich Marshal Göring has made statements upon that subject +here. Can you add anything new? Otherwise, I have no further questions +with regard to that subject. + +KEITEL: I should merely like to confirm once more that the decision to +proceed against Yugoslavia with military means meant completely +upsetting all military advances and arrangements made up to that time. +Marita had to be completely readjusted. Also new forces had to be +brought through Hungary from the North. All that was completely +improvised. + +DR. NELTE: We come now to Fall Barbarossa. The Soviet Prosecution, +particularly, have stressed that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces +and you as Chief of Staff, as early as the summer of 1940, had dealt +with the plan of an attack against the Soviet Union. When did Hitler for +the first time talk to you about the possibility of a conflict, of an +armed conflict with the Soviet Union? + +KEITEL: As far as I recollect, that was at the beginning of August 1940, +on the occasion of a discussion of the situation at Berchtesgaden, or +rather at his house, the Berghof. That was the first time that the +possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union was discussed. + +DR. NELTE: What were the reasons which Hitler gave at that time which +might possibly lead to a war? + +KEITEL: I think I can refer to what Reich Marshal Göring has said on +this subject. + +According to our notions, there were considerable troop concentrations +in Bessarabia and Bukovina. The Foreign Minister, too, had mentioned +figures which I cannot recall, and there was the anxiety which had been +repeatedly voiced by Hitler at that time that developments might result +in the Romanian theater which would endanger our source of petroleum, +the fuel supply for the conduct of the war, which for the most part came +from Romania. Apart from that, I think he talked about strong or +manifest troop concentrations in the Baltic provinces. + +DR. NELTE: Were any directives given by you at that time or by those +branches of the Wehrmacht which were affected? + +KEITEL: No. As far as I can recollect this was confined firstly to +increased activities of the intelligence or espionage service against +Russia and, secondly, to certain investigations regarding the +possibility of transferring troops from the West, from France, as +quickly as possible to the Southeast areas or to East Prussia. Certain +return transports of troops from the Eastern military districts had +already taken place at the end of July. Apart from that no instructions +were given at that time. + +DR. NELTE: How was the line of demarcation occupied? + +KEITEL: There were continual reports from that border or demarcation +line on frontier incidents, shootings, and particularly about frequent +crossings of that line by aircraft of the Soviet Union, which led to the +due exchange of notes. But at any rate there were continual small +frontier fights and shootings, particularly in the South, and we +received information through our frontier troops that continual or at +certain times new Russian troop units appeared opposite them. I think +that was all. + +DR. NELTE: Do you know how many divisions of the German Wehrmacht were +stationed there at the time? + +KEITEL: During the Western campaign there were—I do not think I am +wrong this time—seven divisions, seven divisions from East Prussia to +the Carpathians, two of which, during the Western campaign, had even +been transported to the West but later on were transported back again. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution submitted that at the end of July 1940 +Generaloberst Jodl had given general instructions at Reichenhall to +several officers of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to study the Russian +problem, and particularly to examine the railway transport problems. +Since you said a little earlier that not until August did you hear for +the first time from Hitler what the situation was, I am now asking you +whether you were informed about these conferences of Generaloberst Jodl. + +KEITEL: No. I did not hear until I came here, that such a conference +took place in Berchtesgaden at the end of July or beginning of August. +This was due to the fact that I was absent from Berchtesgaden. I did not +know of this conference, and I think General Jodl probably forgot to +tell me about it at the time. I did not know about it. + +DR. NELTE: What were your personal views at that time regarding the +problem which arose out of the conference with Hitler? + +KEITEL: When I became conscious of the fact that the matter had been +given really serious thought I was very surprised, and I considered it +most unfortunate. I seriously considered what could be done to influence +Hitler by using military considerations. At that time, as has been +briefly discussed here by the Foreign Minister, I wrote a personal +memorandum containing my thoughts on the subject, I should like to say, +independently of the experts working in the General Staff and the +Wehrmacht Operations Staff and wanted to present this memorandum to +Hitler. I decided on that method because, as a rule, one could never get +beyond the second sentence of a discussion with Hitler. He took the word +out of one’s mouth and afterwards one never was able to say what one +wanted to say. And in this connection I should like to say right now +that I had the idea—it was the first and only time—of visiting the +Foreign Minister personally, in order to ask him to support me from the +political angle regarding that question. That is the visit to Fuschl, +which has already been discussed here and which the Foreign Minister Von +Ribbentrop confirmed during his examination the other day. + +DR. NELTE: Then you confirm what Herr Von Ribbentrop has said, so that +there is no need for me to repeat it? + +KEITEL: I confirm that I went to Fuschl. I had the memorandum with me. +It had been written by hand, since I did not want anybody else to get +hold of it. And I left Fuschl conscious of the fact that he wanted to +try to exercise influence on Hitler to the same end. He promised me +that. + +DR. NELTE: Did you give that memorandum to Hitler? + +KEITEL: Yes. Some time later at the Berghof, after a report of the +situation had been given, I handed him that memorandum when we were +alone. I think he told me at the time that he was going to study it. He +took it, and did not give me a chance to make any explanations. + +DR. NELTE: Considering its importance did you later on find an +opportunity to refer to it again? + +KEITEL: Yes. At first nothing at all happened, so that after some time I +reminded him of it and asked him to discuss the problem with me. This he +did, and the matter was dealt with very briefly by his saying that the +military and strategic considerations put forward by me were in no way +convincing. He, Hitler, considered these ideas erroneous, and turned +them down. In that connection I can perhaps mention very briefly that I +was again very much upset and there was another crisis when I asked to +be relieved of my post, and that another man be put in my office and +that I be sent to the front. That once more led to a sharp controversy +as has already been described by the Reich Marshal when he said that +Hitler took the attitude that he would not tolerate that a general whose +views he did not agree with should ask to be relieved of his post +because of this disagreement. I think he said that he had every right to +turn down such suggestions and ideas if he considered them wrong. I had +not the right to take any action. + +DR. NELTE: Did he return that memorandum to you? + +KEITEL: No, I do not think I got it back. I have always assumed that it +was found among the captured Schmundt files, which apparently is not the +case. I did not get it back; he kept it. + +DR. NELTE: I do not wish to occupy the time of the Tribunal in this +connection any further. I will leave it to you as to whether you wish to +disclose the contents of that memorandum. I am not so much concerned +with the military presentation—one can imagine what it was—but the +question is: Did you refer to the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 in that +memorandum? + +KEITEL: Yes, but I must say that the main part of my memorandum was +devoted to military studies, military studies regarding the amount of +forces, the requirements of effectives, and the dispersal of forces in +France and Norway at the time, and the Luftwaffe in Italy, and our being +tied down in the West. In that memorandum I most certainly pointed to +the fact that this Non-Aggression Pact existed. But all the rest were +military considerations. + +DR. NELTE: Were any military orders given at that time? + +KEITEL: No. No orders were given at that time except, I think, for the +improvement of lines of communications from the West to the East to +permit speeding up troop transports, particularly to the Southeastern +sector, in other words, north of the Carpathians and in the East +Prussian sector. Apart from that no orders of any kind were given at +that time. + +DR. NELTE: Had the discussion with Foreign Minister Molotov already +taken place at that time? + +KEITEL: No. On the contrary, at that time, in October the idea of a +discussion with the Russians was still pending. Hitler also told me that +at the time, and he always emphasized in that connection that until such +a discussion had taken place he would not give any orders, since it had +been proved to him by General Jodl that in any case it was technically +impossible to transfer strong troop units into the threatened sectors in +the East which I have mentioned. Accordingly, nothing was done. The +visit or rather discussion with the Russian delegation was prepared, in +which connection I would like to say that I made the suggestion at that +time that Hitler should talk personally with M. Stalin. That was the +only thing I did in the matter. + +DR. NELTE: During that conference were military matters discussed? + +KEITEL: I did not take any part in the discussions with M. Molotov, +although in this instance too I was present at the reception and at +certain social meetings. I remember that on two occasions I sat next to +Molotov at the table. I did not hear any political discussion, nor did I +have any political discussions with my table companion. + +DR. NELTE: What did Hitler say after these discussions had come to an +end? + +KEITEL: After the departure of Molotov he really said very little. He +more or less said that he was disappointed in the discussion. I think he +mentioned briefly that problems regarding the Baltic Sea and the Black +Sea areas had been discussed in a general way and that he had not been +able to take any positive or desired stand. He said he did not go into +details. I asked him about military things which had a certain +significance at the time—the strong forces, for instance, in the +Bessarabian sector. I think Hitler evaded the answer and said that this +was obviously connected with all these matters and that he had not gone +into it too deeply, or something similar, I cannot remember exactly. At +any rate, there was nothing new in it for us and nothing final. + +DR. NELTE: After that conference were any military orders given? + +KEITEL: I think not even then, but Hitler told us at the time that he +wished to wait for the reaction to these discussions in the Eastern area +after the delegation had returned to Russia. Certain orders had been +given to the ambassador, too, in that respect, however not directly +after the Molotov visit. + +DR. NELTE: May I ask you to give the date when the first definite +instructions were given? + +KEITEL: I can only reconstruct it retrospectively, on the strength of +the instruction Barbarossa which has been shown to me here and which +came out in December. I believe it must have been during the first half +of December that the orders were issued, the well-known order +Barbarossa. To be precise, these orders were given at the beginning of +December, namely, the orders to work out the strategic plan. + +DR. NELTE: Did you know about the conference which took place at Zossen +in December and which has been mentioned by the Prosecution here? +Perhaps I may remind you that the Finnish General Heinrichs was present. + +KEITEL: No, I knew nothing about the conference in Zossen, and I think +General Buschenhagen was also there, according to the statements he has +made here. I did not know anything about the Finnish General Heinrichs’ +presence in Zossen and have heard about it for the first time here. The +only way I can explain this is that the General Staff of the Army wanted +to get information or other things and that for that purpose they +discussed that with the persons concerned. I did not meet General +Heinrichs until May 1941. At that time I had a conference with him and +General Jodl at Salzburg. Before that I had never seen him and I had +never talked to him. + +DR. NELTE: Is there any significance in the fact that Directive Number +21 says that Hitler would order the actual deployment of the troops 8 +weeks before the operational plan would become effective? + +KEITEL: Yes, there was considerable significance attached to that. I +have been interrogated about that by the Soviet Delegation here. The +reason was that according to the calculations of the Army, it would take +about eight weeks to get these troops, which were to be transported by +rail, into position; that is to say, if troops from Reich territory were +to be placed in position on an operative starting line. Hitler +emphasized when the repeated revisions of the plan were made that he +wanted to have complete control of such deployment. In other words, +troop movements without his approval were not to be made. That was the +purpose of this instruction. + +DR. NELTE: When did it become clear to you that Hitler was determined to +attack the Soviet Union? + +KEITEL: As far as I can recollect, it was at the beginning of March. The +idea was that the attack might be made approximately in the middle of +May. Therefore the decision regarding the transport of troops by rail +had to be made in the middle of March. For that reason, during the first +half of March a meeting of generals was called, that is to say, a +briefing of the generals at Hitler’s headquarters and the explanations +given by him at that time had clearly the purpose of telling the +generals that he was determined to carry out the deployment although an +order had not yet been given. He gave a whole series of ideas and issued +certain instructions on things which are contained in these directives +here for the special parts of Fall Barbarossa. This is Document 447-PS, +and these are the directives which were eventually also signed by me. He +then gave us the directive for these guiding principles and ideas, so +that the generals were already informed about the contents, which in +turn caused me to confirm it in writing in this form, for there was +nothing new in it for any one who had taken part in the discussions. + +DR. NELTE: It appears to me, however, that what Hitler told the generals +in his address was something new; and it also seems to me that you who +were concerned with these matters, that is to say, who had to work them +out, understood or had to understand that now a completely abnormal +method of warfare was about to begin, at least when seen from your +traditional point of view as a soldier. + +KEITEL: That is correct. Views were expressed there regarding the +administration and economic exploitation of the territories to be +conquered or occupied. There was the completely new idea of setting up +Reich commissioners and civilian administrations. There was the definite +decision to charge the Delegate for the Four Year Plan with the supreme +direction in the economic field; and what was for me the most important +point, and what affected me most was the fact that besides the right of +the military commander to exercise the executive power of the occupation +force, a policy was to be followed here in which it was clearly +expressed that Reichsführer SS Himmler was to be given extensive +plenipotentiary powers concerning all police actions in these +territories which later on became known. I firmly opposed that, since to +me it seemed impossible that there should be two authorities placed side +by side. In the directives here it says: “The authority of the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army is not affected by this.” + +That was a complete illusion and self-deception. Quite the opposite +happened. As long as it was compatible with my functions, I fought +against this. I think I ought to say that I have no witness to that +other than General Jodl, who shared these experiences with me. +Eventually, however, Hitler worked out those directives himself, more or +less, and gave them the meaning he wanted. That is how these directives +came about. + +That I had no power to order the things which are contained in these +directives is clear from the fact that it says that the Reich Marshal +receives this task...the Reichsführer SS receives that task, _et +cetera_. I had no authority whatever to give orders to them. + +DR. NELTE: Was it never actually discussed that if one wanted to launch +an attack on the Soviet Union, one would previously have to take +diplomatic steps or else send a declaration of war, or an ultimatum? + +KEITEL: Oh, yes, I discussed that. As early as the winter of 1940-1941, +whenever there were discussions regarding the strength of the Russian +forces on the demarcation line, that is, in December-January, I asked +Hitler to send a note to the Soviet Union so as to bring about a +cleaning-up of the situation, if I may express it so. I can add now that +the first time he said nothing at all, and the second time he refused, +maintaining that it was useless, since he would only receive the answer +that this was an internal affair and that it was none of our business, +or something like that. At any rate, he refused. I tried again, at a +later stage, that is to say I voiced the request that an ultimatum +should be presented before we entered upon an action, so that in some +form the basis would be created for a preventive war, as we called it, +for an attack. + +DR. NELTE: You say “preventive war.” When the final decisions were made, +what was the military situation? + +KEITEL: I am best reminded of how we, or rather the Army judged the +situation, by a study or memorandum. I believe it is Document 872-PS, +dated the end of January or the beginning of February, a report made by +the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to Hitler on the state of +operative and strategic preparations. And in this document I found the +information we then had on the strength of the Red Army and other +existing information known to us, which is dealt with fully in this +document. + +Apart from that, I have to say too that the intelligence service of the +OKW, Admiral Canaris, placed at my disposal or at the Army’s disposal +very little material because the Russian area was closely sealed against +German intelligence. In other words, there were gaps up to a certain +point. Only the things contained in Document 872-PS were known. + +DR. NELTE: Would you like to say briefly what it contained, so as to +justify your decision? + +KEITEL: Yes, there were—Halder reported that there were 150 divisions +of the Soviet Union deployed along the line of demarcation. Then there +were aerial photographs of a large number of airdromes. In short, there +was a degree of preparedness on the part of Soviet Russia, which could +at any time lead to military action. Only the actual fighting later made +it clear just how far the enemy had been prepared. I must say, that we +fully realized all these things only during the actual attack. + +DR. NELTE: You were present during Hitler’s last speech to the +commanders in the East, made on 14 June 1941, in the Reich Chancellery, +were you not? I ask you, without going over old ground, to state briefly +what Hitler said on that occasion, and what effect it had on the +generals. + +THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t there a document in connection with this? It must +all be in the document. Isn’t that so? + +DR. NELTE: I wanted to ask one question on that subject and then submit +the document; or, if the Tribunal so desires, I will not read the +document at all, but will merely quote the short summaries which are at +the end of the document. Will the Tribunal agree to that? + +THE PRESIDENT: But what you did was to ask the defendant what was in the +document. + +DR. NELTE: The document contains, if I may indicate it briefly, the +following: The developments, and the ever increasing influence of +organizations alien to the Wehrmacht on the course of the war. It is the +proof that the Wehrmacht, during this war, which must be called a +degenerate war, tried, as far as possible, to keep within the limits of +international law and that when the... + +THE PRESIDENT: I only want to know what your question is, that is all. + +DR. NELTE: My question to Field Marshal Keitel was to tell me about the +speech on the 14th of June 1941, and what Hitler ordered the generals to +do and what the effect on them was. With that, I intended to conclude +the preparations for the Russian campaign. + +THE PRESIDENT: He can tell what the effect was upon himself, but I don’t +see how he can tell what the effect was upon the other generals. + +DR. NELTE: He can only assume of course, but he can say whether the +others reacted in one way or another. One can talk and one can take an +opposing stand. I merely wanted to know whether this happened or not. + +THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better ask him what happened that day at +the conference; if you want to know what happened at the conference, why +don’t you ask him? + +DR. NELTE: Please, tell us about it. + +KEITEL: After short reports regarding the operational orders to the +individual commanders, there followed a recapitulation, which I must +describe as a purely political speech. The main theme was that this was +the decisive battle between two ideologies, and that this fact made it +impossible—that the leadership in this war, the practices which we knew +as soldiers, and which we considered to be the only correct ones under +international law, had to be measured by completely different standards. +The war could not be carried on by these means. This was an entirely new +kind of war, based on completely different arguments and principles. + +With these explanations, the various orders were then given to do away +with the legal system in territories which were not pacified, to combat +resistance with brutal means, to consider every local resistance +movement as the expression of the deep rift between the two ideologies. +These were decidedly quite new and very impressive ideas, but also +thoughts which affected us deeply. + +DR. NELTE: Did you, or did any other generals raise objections to or +oppose these explanations, directives, and orders? + +KEITEL: No, I personally made no remonstrances, apart from those which I +had already advanced and the objections I had already expressed before. +However, I have never known which generals, if any of the generals, +addressed the Führer. At any rate, they did not do so after that +discussion. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think that now the time has come to decide +whether you will accept the affidavits of the Defendant Keitel contained +in my Document Book Number 2 under the Numbers 3 and 5, as exhibits. +Perhaps the Prosecution can express an opinion on this. + +Up to now we have merely discussed the history before the actual Russian +war. Insofar as the Defendant Keitel and the OKW is concerned, I should +like to shorten the examination by submitting these two affidavits. The +affidavit Number 3 is an exposé of the conditions governing the +authority for issuing orders in the East. The extent of the territory +and the numerous organizations led to an extremely complicated procedure +for giving orders. To enable you to ascertain whether the Defendant +Keitel, or the OKW, or some other department might be responsible, the +conditions governing the authority to issue orders in the East have been +presented in detail. I believe it would save a great deal of time if you +would accept this document as an exhibit. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Mr. Dodd and I have no objection to +this procedure used by the Defense and we believe that it might probably +help the Tribunal to have in front of them the printed accounts. + +THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte intend to read or only summarize these +affidavits? + +DR. NELTE: I intend merely to submit it to you after I have asked the +defendant whether the contents of the affidavit have been written and +signed by him. + +THE PRESIDENT: And the Prosecution, of course, have had these affidavits +for some time? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: The same applies, if I understand Sir David correctly, to +affidavit Number 5. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it would be convenient, I think, if you gave +these affidavits numbers in the sequence of your exhibit numbers and +gave us also their dates so that we can identify them. Can you give us +the dates of the affidavits? + +DR. NELTE: May I be permitted to arrange the matter in the secretary’s +office during the recess? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The first is dated the 8th of March, isn’t it? The +other is the 18th, is it? Dr. Nelte, you can do it at the recess and +give them numbers. You can give them numbers at the recess. + +It is nearly 1 o’clock now, and we are just going to adjourn. You can +give them numbers then. Does that conclude your examination? + +DR. NELTE: We come now to the individual cases which I hope, however, to +conclude in the course of the afternoon. Mr. President, I am sorry but I +must discuss the prisoner-of-war affairs and several individual matters. +I think I still need this afternoon for myself. I believe that if I bear +in mind the interests of the Defendant Keitel, I am limiting myself a +good deal. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you desire to put your questions to him now or not? + +DR. NELTE: I think—I do not know how the President feels about it—it +would be convenient if we had a recess now so that in the meantime I can +put the affidavits in order. I have not yet finished the discussion of +this subject. + +THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, of the two documents mentioned this morning, +the first document, Number 3 of Document Book Number 2, entitled “The +Command Relationships in the East,” will be given the number 10 of the +Keitel Documents. + +THE PRESIDENT: That is dated the 14 March 1946? + +DR. NELTE: Yes, 14 March 1946. + +THE PRESIDENT: The document that I have got is headed the 23 February +1946, and at the end, the 14 March 1946. Is that the one? + +DR. NELTE: The document was first written down and later attested. There +is, therefore, a difference in the two dates. + +THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to identify which it is, that is all. + +DR. NELTE: It is the document of 14 March 1946. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +DR. NELTE: The affidavit is dated 14 March. + +THE PRESIDENT: And you are giving it what number? + +DR. NELTE: I give it Number Keitel-10. The second document, which is +fifth in the document book, is dated at the head 18 March 1946 and has +at the end the defendant’s attestation as of 29 March 1946. This +document has received the number Keitel-12. Permit me to read a summary +of a few points on Pages 11 and 12 of the German copy. This, as it +appears to me, is of very great importance for this Trial. + +THE PRESIDENT: Of which document? + +DR. NELTE: Document Number 12. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: The question in this document... + +THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. I do not think the interpreters have found +the document yet, have they? It comes just after a certificate, by +Catherine Bedford, and I think it is about halfway through the book, +and, although the pages are not numbered consecutively, it appears to +have the figure 51 on it. + +DR. NELTE: I shall begin where it says, “In summing up...” Those are the +last three pages of this document: + + “In summing up it must be established that: + + “1. In addition to the Wehrmacht as the legal protector of the + Reich internally and externally (as in every State)”—I + interpolate, ‘in the SS organizations’—“a particular, + completely independent power factor arose and was legalized, + which politically, biologically, in police and administration + matters actually drew the powers of the State to itself. + + “2. Even at the beginning of military complications and + conflicts the SS came to be the actual forerunner and standard + bearer of a policy of conquest and power. + + “3. After the commencement of the military actions the + Reichsführer SS devised methods which always appeared + appropriate, which were concealed at first, or were hardly + apparent, at least from the outside, and which enabled him in + reality to build up his power under the guise of protecting the + annexed or occupied territories from political opponents. + + “4. From the occupation of the Sudeten territory, beginning with + the organization of political unrest, that is, of so-called + liberation actions and ‘incidents,’ the road leads straight + through Poland and the Western areas in a steep curve into the + Russian territory. + + “5. With the directives for the Barbarossa Plan for the + administration and utilization of the conquered Eastern + territories, the Wehrmacht was, against its intention and + without knowledge of the conditions, drawn further and further + into the subsequent developments and activities. + + “6. I (Keitel) and my colleagues had no deeper insight into the + effects of Himmler’s full powers, and had no idea of the + possible effect of these powers. + + “I assume without further discussion that the same holds true + for the OKH, which according to the order of the Führer made the + agreements with Himmler’s officials and gave orders to the + subordinate army commanders. + + “7. In reality, it was not the Commander-in-Chief of the Army + who had the executive power assigned to him and the power to + decree and to maintain law in the occupied territories, but + Himmler and Heydrich decided on their own authority the fate of + the people and prisoners, including prisoners of war in whose + camps they exercised the executive power. + + “8. The traditional training and concept of duty of the German + officers, which taught unquestioning obedience to superiors who + bore responsibility, led to an attitude,—regrettable in + retrospect,—which caused them to shrink from rebelling against + these orders and these methods even when they recognized their + illegality and inwardly refuted them. + + “9. The Führer, Hitler, abused his authority and his fundamental + Order Number 1 in an irresponsible way with respect to us. This + Order Number 1 read, more or less: + + “‘1. No one shall know about secret matters which do not belong + to his own range of assignments. + + “‘2. No one shall learn more than he needs to fulfill the tasks + assigned to him. + + “‘3. No one shall receive information earlier than is necessary + for the performance of the duties assigned to him. + + “‘4. No one shall transmit to subordinate offices, to any + greater extent or any earlier than is unavoidable for the + achievement of the purpose, orders which are to be kept secret.’ + + “10. If the entire consequences which arose from granting + Himmler authority in the East had been foreseen, in this case + the leading generals would have been the first to raise an + unequivocal protest against it. That is my conviction. + + “As these atrocities developed, one from the other, step by + step, and without any foreknowledge of the consequences, destiny + took its tragic course, with its fateful consequences.” + +Witness, Defendant Keitel, did you yourself write this statement, that +is, dictate it as I have just read it? Are you perfectly familiar with +its contents and did you swear to it? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: I shall submit the document in the original. + +[_Turning to the defendant_]: We had stopped at Document C-50, which +deals with the abolition of military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa +area. I do not know whether you still want to express your opinion on +it, or whether that is now superfluous after what has just been read. + +KEITEL: I should like to say to this only that these documents, C-50 and +884-PS, beginning at Page 4, are the record of the directives that were +given in that General Staff meeting on 14 June. In line with military +regulations and customs they were given the form of written orders and +then sent to the subordinate offices. + +DR. NELTE: I have a few more short questions regarding the war against +America. The Prosecution assert that Japan was influenced by Germany to +wage war against America and have, in the course of their presentation, +accused you of participation and co-operation in this plan. Would you +like to make some statement regarding this? + +KEITEL: Document C-75 is a directive by the Supreme Command of the +Wehrmacht which deals with co-operation with Japan. Of course, I +participated in the drawing-up of this order and signed it by order. The +other document, Number 1881-PS, regarding a conference between the +Führer and Matsuoka, I do not know, and I did not know anything about +it. I can say only the following for us soldiers: + +In the course of all this time, until the Japanese entry into the war +against America, there were two points of view that were the general +directives or principles which Hitler emphasized to us. One was to +prevent America from entering the war under any circumstances; +consequently to renounce military operations in the seas, as far as the +Navy was concerned. The other, the thought that guided us soldiers, was +the hope that Japan would enter the war against Russia; and I recall +that around November and the beginning of December 1941, when the +advance of the German armies west of Moscow was halted and I visited the +front with Hitler, I was asked several times by the generals, “When is +Japan going to enter the war?” The reasons for their asking this were +that again and again Russian Far East divisions were being thrown into +the fight via Moscow, that is to say, fresh troops coming from the Far +East. That was about 18 to 20 divisions, but I could not say for +certain. + +I was present in Berlin during Matsuoka’s visit, and I saw him also at a +social gathering, but I did not have any conversation with him. All the +deductions that might be made from Directive 24, C-75, and which I have +learned about from the preliminary examination during my interrogation, +are without any foundation for us soldiers, and there is no +justification for anyone’s believing that we were guided by thoughts of +bringing about a war between Japan and America, or of undertaking +anything to that end. + +In conclusion, I can say only that this order was necessary because the +branches of the Wehrmacht offered resistance to giving Japan certain +things, military secrets in armament production, unless she were in the +war. + +DR. NELTE: There was also a letter submitted by the Prosecution, a +letter from Major Von Falkenstein to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff. +Reich Marshal Göring testified to this in his interrogation. I only +wanted to ask you if you knew of this letter, or if you have anything to +add to Reich Marshal Göring’s testimony? + +KEITEL: I have nothing to add, for I never saw this letter by Von +Falkenstein until I saw it here during my interrogation. + +DR. NELTE: We come now to the individual facts with which you and the +OKW are charged by the Prosecution. Because of the vast number of points +brought up by the Prosecution I can naturally choose only individual +groups and those with the most serious charges, in order to elucidate +whether and to what extent you were involved and what your attitude was +to the ensuing results. In most cases it is a question of orders from +Hitler, but in your statement on the actual happenings you have admitted +to a certain participation in these things and knowledge of them. +Therefore, we must discuss these points. One of the most important is +that of hostages. In this connection I want to show you Document C-128. +These are orders for operations in the West. Let me ask you, however, +first of all, what is the basis for the taking of hostages as it was +usually carried out by the Wehrmacht? + +KEITEL: These are the printed regulations “Secret G-2” (Army Service +Regulation G-2) and headed, according to the order: “Service +Instructions for Army Units.” + +DR. NELTE: I ask you, Mr. President, to turn to Document Book Number 1, +Number 7 on Page 65 of my document book. I ask you to establish that +this is a copy from the afore-mentioned Army Regulations, Section 9, +which deals with the question of hostages. This is Document K-7, and it +reads as follows: + + “Hostages may be taken only by order of a regimental commander, + an independent battalion commander or a commander of equal rank. + With regard to accommodation and feeding, it is to be noted + that, though they should be kept under strictest guard, they are + not convicts. Furthermore, only senior officers holding at least + the position of a division commander can decide on the fate of + hostages.” + +That is, if you want to call it so, the Hostage Law of the German +Wehrmacht. + +KEITEL: I might say in this connection that in Document C-128, which is +the preparatory operational order of the Army for the battle in the +West, this is mentioned specially under the heading: “3a. Security +measures against the population of occupied territory. A) Hostages.” + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you offering that as Keitel-7? + +DR. NELTE: I ask to have these printed Army Instructions put in evidence +as Exhibit Keitel-7 (Document Number Keitel-7). + +THE PRESIDENT: Would you kindly say what you are putting it in as each +time, because if you simply say “7” it will lead to confusion. + +DR. NELTE: Keitel-7. + +[_Turning to the defendant_]: Was Document C-128 the order of the High +Command of the Army on the occasion of the march into France? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: Now I have here another document, Document Number 1585-PS, +which contains an opinion expressed by the OKW. It is a letter to the +Reich Minister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; and in +this letter, I assume, are contained the convictions held by the office +of which you were head. + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: What do you say today in connection with this letter? + +KEITEL: I can say only that it is precisely the same standpoint that I +represent today, because there is here, with reference to the +above-mentioned order, the following paragraph, beginning with the +words, “For the protection against any misuse...” and so on. Then the +order is quoted. + +DR. NELTE: This is in reference to Regulation G-2, and further, that the +“decision regarding the fate of hostages...” + +KEITEL: It says, “According to which the decision on the fate of +hostages is reserved to senior officers holding at least the position of +a division commander.” + +DR. NELTE: Is it correct when I say that this letter was drawn up by the +Legal Department of the OKW after examination of the situation as +regards international law and its implications? + +KEITEL: Yes, it is to be seen from the document itself that this point +of view was taken into consideration. + +DR. NELTE: Did you issue any general orders on this question of hostages +in your capacity as chief of OKW, apart from those we have had up to +now? + +KEITEL: No, the OKW participated only in helping to draw up this order. +No other basic orders or directions were issued on this question. + +DR. NELTE: Did you nevertheless in individual cases have anything to do +with this question of hostages? You and the OKW are charged by the +Prosecution with having expressed yourselves in some way or having taken +some kind of attitude when inquiries were made by Stülpnagel and +Falkenhausen. + +I show you Document 1594-PS. + +KEITEL: This document, 1594-PS, is a communication from Von +Falkenhausen, the Military Commander of Belgium, and is directed to the +OKH, General Staff, Quartermaster General, and, further, to the +Commander-in-Chief and Military Commander in France and for the +information of the Wehrmacht Commander in the Netherlands and Luftgau +Belgium. + +I do not know this document nor could I know it, for it is directed to +the Army. The assumption expressed by the French Prosecutor that I +received a letter from Falkenhausen is not true. I do not know this +letter and it was not sent to me. Official communication between the +military commanders in France and Belgium took place only between the +OKH and these two military commanders subordinate to it. These +commanders were not subordinate either to the OKW or to me. + +DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution has submitted Document Number UK-25 +and has asserted that this document was the basis for the hostage +legislation in France, that there is, in other words, a basic connection +between the order you signed on 16 September 1941 and the treatment of +hostages in France. I will show you these documents, 1587-PS and +1588-PS, in addition to UK-25 and request you to comment on them. + +KEITEL: I must first answer the question as to whether I had any +discussion on individual matters with military commanders regarding the +question of hostages. Did you not ask me that? + +DR. NELTE: With regard to Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen? + +KEITEL: Yes, with regard to Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen. It is possible, +and I do recall one such case, Stülpnagel called me up from Paris on +such a matter because he had received an order from the Army to shoot a +certain number of hostages for an attack on members of the German +Wehrmacht. He wanted to have this order certified by me. That happened +and I believe it is confirmed by a telegram, which has been shown to me +here. It is also confirmed that at that time I had a meeting with +Stülpnagel in Berlin. Otherwise, the relations between myself and these +two military commanders were limited to quite exceptional matters, in +which they believed that with my help they might obtain certain support +with regard to things that were very unpleasant for them, for example, +in such questions as labor allocation, that is, workers from Belgium or +France destined for Germany, where also, in one case, conflicts arose +between the military commanders and their police authorities. In these +cases I was called up directly in order to mediate. + +Permit me, please, to look at the documents first. + +DR. NELTE: You must begin with UK-25, 16 September 1941. + +KEITEL: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: It is impossible for the Tribunal to carry all these +documents in their heads by reference to their numbers, and we do not +have the documents before us. We do not know what documents you are +dealing with here. It is quite impossible for us. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, for this reason, I took the liberty of +submitting to the Tribunal before the beginning of the sessions a list +of documents. I am sorry if that was not done. I could not submit the +documents themselves. You will always find a number to the left of this +list. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see that, but all that I see here is 1587-PS, +which is not the one that you are referring to, apparently, and it is +described as a report to the Supreme Command of the Army. That does not +give us much indication of what it is about. The next one is 1594-PS, a +letter to OKH. That again does not give us much indication of what it is +about, except that they have something to do with the hostage question. + +DR. NELTE: It is concerned with the question which the Defendant Keitel +is about to answer. Do you not also have the order bearing Document +Number C-128? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have that. That is directions for the operation in +the West. + +DR. NELTE: And UK-25? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: And 1588-PS? + +THE PRESIDENT: We have got them all. The only thing that I was pointing +out to you was that the description of them is inadequate to explain to +us what they mean and what they are. Perhaps by a word or two you can +indicate to us when you come to the document what it is about. + +DR. NELTE: Document UK-25, about which the Defendant Keitel is about to +testify, is an order of 16 September 1941, signed by him, regarding +“Communist Uprisings in the Occupied Territories.” It contains, among +other things, the sentence, “The Führer has now ordered that most severe +measures should be taken everywhere in order to crush this movement as +soon as possible.” The French Prosecution asserted that, on the basis of +this order, hostage legislation was promulgated in France, which is +contained in Document 1588-PS. If you have Document 1588-PS, you will +find on the third page a regular code regarding the taking and treatment +of hostages. + +The defendant is to state whether such a causal relation did exist, and +to what extent the OKW and he himself were at all competent in these +matters. + +KEITEL: Document UK-25, the Führer Order of the 16 September 1941, as +has just been stated, is concerned with communist uprisings in occupied +territories, and the fact that this is a Führer order has already been +mentioned. I must clarify the fact that this order, so far as its +contents are concerned, referred solely to the Eastern regions, +particularly to the Balkan countries. I believe that I can prove this by +the fact that there is attached to this document a distribution list, +that is, a list of addresses beginning, “Wehrmacht Commander Southeast +for Serbia, Southern Greece, and Crete.” This was, of course, +transmitted also to other Wehrmacht commanders and also to the OKH with +the possibility of its being passed on to subordinate officers. I +believe that this document, which, for the sake of saving time, I need +not read here, has several indications that the assumption on the part +of the French Prosecution that this is the basis for the hostage law to +be found in Document Number 1588-PS is false, and that there is no +causal nexus between the two. It is true that the date of this hostage +law is also September—the number is hard to read—but, as far as its +contents are concerned, these two matters are, in my opinion, not +connected. Moreover, the two military commanders in France and Belgium +never received this order from the OKW, but they may have received it +through the OKH, a matter which I cannot check because I do not know. + +Regarding this order of 16 September 1941, I should like to say that its +great severity can be traced back to the personal influence of the +Führer. The fact that it is concerned with the Eastern region is already +to be seen from the contents and from the introduction and does not need +to be substantiated any further. It is correct that this order of 16 +September 1941 is signed by me. + +DR. NELTE: We come now to the second individual fact, “Nacht und Nebel.” +The Prosecution charges you of having participated in the Nacht und +Nebel decree of 12 December 1941, Document Number L-90... + +KEITEL: May I say one more thing regarding the other question? + +DR. NELTE: Please, if it appears to be necessary. In the communication +of 2 February 1942 we find the words, “In the annex are transmitted: 1) +A decree of the Führer of 7 December 1941...” You wanted to say +something more; if it is important, please. Do you have Document Number +L-90? + +KEITEL: L-90, yes. + +DR. NELTE: What was the cause for this order, so terrible in its +consequences? + +KEITEL: I must state that it is perfectly clear to me that the +connection of my name with this so-called “Nacht und Nebel” order is a +serious charge against me, even though it can be seen from the documents +that it is a Führer order. Consequently I should like to state how this +order came about. Since the beginning of the Eastern campaign and in the +late autumn of 1941 until the spring of 1942, the resistance movements, +sabotage and everything connected with it increased enormously in all +the occupied territories. From the military angle it meant that the +security troops were tied down, having to be kept on the spot by the +unrest. That is how I saw it from the military point of view at that +time. And day by day, through the daily reports we could picture the +sequence of events in the individual occupation sectors. It was +impossible to handle this summarily; rather, Hitler demanded that he be +informed of each individual occurrence, and he was very displeased if +such matters were concealed from him in the reports by military +authorities. He got to know about them all the same. + +In this connection, he said to me that it was very displeasing to him +and very unfavorable to establishing peace that, owing to this, death +sentences by court-martial against saboteurs and their accomplices were +increasing; that he did not wish this to occur, since from his point of +view it made appeasement and relations with the population only more +difficult. He said at that time that a state of peace could be achieved +only if this were reduced and if, instead of death sentences—to shorten +it—in case a death sentence could not be expected and carried out in +the shortest time possible, as stated here in the decree, the suspect or +guilty persons concerned—if one may use the word “guilty”—should be +deported to Germany without the knowledge of their families and be +interned or imprisoned, instead of lengthy court-martial proceedings +with many witnesses. + +I expressed the greatest misgivings in this matter and know very well +that I said at that time that I feared results exactly opposite to those +apparently hoped for. I then had serious discussions with the legal +adviser of the Wehrmacht, who had similar scruples, because there was an +elimination of ordinary legal procedures. I tried again to prevent this +order from being issued or to have it modified. My efforts were in vain. +The threat was made to me that the Minister of Justice would be +commissioned to issue a corresponding decree, should the Wehrmacht not +be able to do so. Now may I refer to details only insofar as these ways +were provided in this order, L-90, of preventing arbitrary application, +and these were primarily as follows: + +The general principles of the order provided expressly that such +deportation or abduction into Reich territory should take place only +after regular court-martial proceedings, and that in every case the +officer in charge of jurisdiction, that is, the divisional commander +must deal with the matter together with his legal adviser, in the legal +way, on the basis of preliminary proceedings. + +I must say that I believed then that every arbitrary and excessive +application of these principles was avoided by this provision. You will +perhaps agree with me that the words in the order, “It is the will of +the Führer after long consideration...” put in for that purpose, were +not said without reason and not without the hope that the addressed +military commander would also recognize from this that this was a method +of which we did not approve and did not consider to be right. + +Finally we introduced a reviewing procedure into the order so that +through the higher channels of appeal, that is, the Military Commander +in France and the Supreme Command or Commander of the Army, it would be +possible to try the case legally by appeal proceedings if the verdict +seemed open to question, at least, within the meaning of the decree. I +learned here for the first time of the full and monstrous tragedy, +namely, that this order, which was intended only for the Wehrmacht and +for the sole purpose of determining whether an offender who faced a +sentence in jail could be made to disappear by means of this Nacht und +Nebel procedure, was obviously applied universally by the police, as +testified by witnesses whom I have heard here, and according to the +Indictment which I also heard, and so the horrible fact of the existence +of whole camps full of people deported through the Nacht und Nebel +procedure has been proved. + +In my opinion, the Wehrmacht, at least I and the military commanders of +the occupied territories who were connected with this order, did not +know of this. At any rate it was never reported to me. Therefore this +order, which in itself was undoubtedly very dangerous and disregarded +certain requirements of law such as we understood it, was able to +develop into that formidable affair of which the Prosecution have +spoken. + +The intention was to take those who were to be deported from their home +country to Germany, because Hitler was of the opinion that penal +servitude in wartime would not be considered by the persons concerned as +dishonorable in cases where it was a question of actions by so-called +patriots. It would be regarded as a short detention which would end when +the war was over. + +These reflections have already been made in part in the note. If you +have any further questions, please put them. + +DR. NELTE: The order for the carrying out of this Nacht und Nebel decree +states that the Gestapo was to effect the transportation to Germany. You +stated that the people who came to Germany were to be turned over to the +Minister of Justice, that is, to normal police custody. You will +understand that, by the connection with the Gestapo, certain suspicions +are raised that it was known from the start what happened to these +people. Can you say anything in elucidation of that matter? + +KEITEL: Yes. The order that was given at that time was that these people +should be turned over to the German authorities of justice. This letter +signed “by order” and then the signature, was issued 8 weeks later than +the decree itself by the Amt Ausland Abwehr as I can see from my +official correspondence. It indicates the conferences, that is, the +agreements, which had to be reached at that time, regarding the method +by which these people were to be taken from their native countries to +Germany. They were apparently conducted by this Amt Abwehr, which +evidently ordered police detachments as escorts. That can be seen from +it. + +I might mention in this connection—I must have seen it—that it did not +seem objectionable at that time, because I could have, and I had, no +reason to assume that these people were being turned over to the +Gestapo, frankly speaking, to be liquidated, but that the Gestapo was +simply being used as the medium in charge of the transportation to +Germany. I should like to emphasize that particularly, so that there can +be no doubt that it was not our idea to do away with the people as was +later done in that Nacht und Nebel camp. + +DR. NELTE: We come now to the question of parachutists, sabotage troops, +and Commando operations. The French Prosecution treat in detail the +origin and effect of the two Führer Orders of 18 October 1942 regarding +the treatment of Commandos. + +Does the Tribunal have a copy of this Führer Order? It is 498... + +THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t got a copy of the order. You mean 553-PS or +498? + +DR. NELTE: The second is Document Number 553-PS. + +THE PRESIDENT: We have not got that either, “Combating of Individual +Parachutists, Decree of 4. 8. 42.” + +DR. NELTE: Could you please repeat your statement? What you just said +did not come through. + +THE PRESIDENT: 553-PS, “Combating of Individual Parachutists, Decree of +4. 8. 42.” That is what we have, nothing else. You also have 498... + +DR. NELTE: Document Number 553-PS is a memorandum signed by Keitel. The +French Prosecution has assumed correctly that there is some connection +between the Document 553-PS and the Führer Order of 18 October 1942. The +defendant is to testify what were the reasons that lay behind this +Führer Order and this notice. + +KEITEL: First of all, Document 553-PS, the note: This memorandum was +issued by me in August 1942. As I have already described in connection +with the Nacht und Nebel Decree, sabotage acts, the dropping of agents +by parachute, the parachuting of arms, ammunition, explosives, radio +sets and small groups of saboteurs reached greater and greater +proportions. They were dropped at night from aircraft in thinly +populated regions. This activity covered the whole area governed by +Germany at that time. It extended from the west over to Czechoslovakia +and Poland, and from the East as far as the Berlin area. Of course, a +large number of the people involved in these actions were captured and +much of the material was taken. This memorandum was to rally all +offices, outside the Wehrmacht, as well, police and civilian +authorities, to the service against this new method of conducting the +war, which was, to our way of thinking, illegal, a sort of “war in the +dark behind the lines.” Even today, after reading this document through +again—it has already been given to me here—I consider this memorandum +unobjectionable. It expressly provides that members of enemy forces, +that is members of any enemy force, if captured by the police, should be +taken to the nearest Wehrmacht office after being identified. I know +that in the French sector the French police did their full share in +arresting these troops and putting them in safe charge. They +collaborated in preventing these acts of sabotage. It will perhaps make +clear how extensive these activities were if I mention that on certain +days there were as many as 100 railways blown up in this way. That is in +the memorandum. + +Now, as to the Führer orders of 18 October 1942, which have been +mentioned very often here and which I may describe as the further +development of the regulations mentioned in this memorandum: As to these +methods, this way of conducting illegal warfare kept on increasing, and +individual parachutists grew into small Commando units which landed from +heavy aircraft or by parachute and were systematically employed, not to +create disturbances or destruction in general, but to attack specific, +vital, and important military objectives. In Norway, for instance, I +recall that they had the task of blowing up the only aluminum works. It +may sound strange, but during this period half to three-quarters of an +hour of the daily discussion on the situation was devoted to the problem +of how to handle these incidents. These incidents in all sectors caused +the Führer to demand other methods, vigorous measures, to combat this +activity, which he characterized as “terrorism” and said that the only +method that could be used to combat it was severe countermeasures. I +recall that in reply to our objections as soldiers the following words +were spoken: “As long as the paratrooper or saboteur runs the danger +only of being taken captive, he incurs no risk; in normal circumstances +he risks nothing; we must take action against this.” These were the +reasons behind his thoughts. I was asked several times to express myself +on this subject and to present a draft. General Jodl will also recall +this. We did not know what we, as soldiers, were to do. We could make no +suggestion. + +If I may sum up briefly, we heard Hitler’s bursts of temper on this +subject almost every day, but we did nothing, not knowing what we could +do. Hitler declared that this was against the Hague Convention and +illegal, that it was a method of waging war not foreseen in the Hague +Convention and which could not be foreseen. He said that this was a new +war with which we had to contend, in which new methods were needed. +Then, to make it short, as I have already testified in the preliminary +investigation, these orders—this order itself and the well-known +instructions that those who did not carry out the first order should be +punished—were issued in a concise form and signed by Hitler. They were +then distributed, I believe, by the Chief of the Operations Staff, Jodl. +I might add that many times the commanders who received these orders +asked questions about how they were to be applied, particularly in +connection with the threat that they would be punished if they did not +carry them out. The only reply we could make was, “You know what is in +the orders,” for we were not in a position to change these signed +orders. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have accused you personally of having issued +the order to kill the English saboteurs captured in the Commando +operations at Stavanger. In this connection I submit to you Documents +498-PS, 508-PS, and 527-PS. [_The documents were submitted to the +defendant._] + +This, Mr. President, was a Commando mission in the vicinity of +Stavanger. The troops who fell into German hands had to be killed, +according to the Führer decree. There was a remote possibility of +interrogating these persons, if that was demanded by military necessity. +In this case the Commander-in-Chief in Norway, General Von Falkenhorst, +dealt with the matter. He turned to the OKW, as he has already testified +in the minutes of an interrogation. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Would you make any statement in this +connection? + +KEITEL: I was interrogated on this subject, and in the course of the +interrogation I was confronted with General Von Falkenhorst. As I +recall, I did not remember his having asked me questions regarding the +carrying out of this order. I did not know of it. Even the event itself +was no longer in my memory, and I remembered it again only after I had +seen the documents. During the interrogation, I told the interrogator +that I had no authority to change that order, that I could refer any one +concerned only to the order, as such. As regards my confrontation with +General Von Falkenhorst, I should like to say only what is stated here +in the minutes, “He obviously shelved the answers and altered his +earlier statements, but did not deny them. Keitel did not deny having +had this talk with me but denied that the subject of it was what I +said.” + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I can only say that this is a summary of the +interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst, a document which was submitted +by the Prosecution without having a document number. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you finished your statement? + +KEITEL: Yes. I believe that suffices. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Prosecution did not put in this document, +did they? They have not offered it in evidence? + +DR. NELTE: I believe they did. + +THE PRESIDENT: I think they must have put it to the Defendant Keitel in +one of his interrogations, did they not? Isn’t that right? That does not +mean that it is put in evidence, because the interrogation itself, you +see, need not be put in evidence. You must put it in now if you want it +to go in. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is some error here. This document was +put in by the Prosecution here as proof of the assertion that the +Defendant Keitel had given the order to kill these paratroopers. I +received the document here. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will tell me if that is so, but I cannot +think of any document having been put in here that has not had an +exhibit number. + +MR. DODD: We have no recollection of having put it in. Many of these +interrogations did not have document numbers; but, of course, if they +were put in, they would have USA or Great Britain exhibit numbers. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps the best way would be for Counsel for the +Prosecution to verify whether it was read in evidence. + +MR. DODD: That will take me a few minutes, Your Honor. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I mean at your leisure. Would that be a convenient +time to break off for 10 minutes? + +DR. NELTE: Yes. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at a quarter to +5. They will then sit again in this Court in closed session, and they +desire that both Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense +should be present then, as they wish to discuss with those counsels on +both sides the best way of avoiding translating unnecessary documents. + +There have, as you know, been a very great number of documents put in, +and a great burden has fallen upon the Translation Division. That is the +problem which the Tribunal wish to discuss in closed session with +Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense; They will, +therefore, as I say, sit here in closed session where there is room for +all the Defense Counsel. That is at 5 o’clock. + +DR. NELTE: Do you remember an inquiry of the Commander-in-Chief West, in +June 1944, regarding the treatment of sabotage troops behind the +invasion front? A new situation had been created by the invasion and, +therefore, by the problem of the Commandos. + +KEITEL: Yes, I remember, since these documents too have been submitted +to me here, and there were several documents. It is true that the +Commander-in-Chief West, after the landing of Anglo-American forces in +Northern France, considered that a new situation had arisen with +reference to this Führer Order of 18 October 1942 directed against the +parachute Commandos. + +The inquiry was, as usual, reported, and General Jodl and I represented +the view of the Commander-in-Chief West, namely, that this order was not +applicable here. Hitler refused to accept that point of view and gave +certain directives in reply, which, according to the document, had at +least two editions; after one had been cancelled as useless, the +Document 551-PS remained as the final version as approved by the Führer +during that report. + +I remember all this so accurately because, on the occasion of presenting +that reply during the discussion of the situation, this handwritten +appendix was added by General Jodl with reference to the application in +the Italian theatre, too. With that appendix, this version, which was +approved and demanded by Hitler, was then sent out to the +Commander-in-Chief West. + +DR. NELTE: In this connection, was the question discussed as to how the +active support of such acts of sabotage by the population could be +judged from the point of view of international law? + +KEITEL: Yes, that question arose repeatedly in connection with the order +of 18 October 1942, and the well-known memorandum previously discussed. +I am of the opinion that, giving any assistance to agents or other enemy +organs in such sabotage acts, is a violation of the Hague Rules for Land +Warfare. If the population takes part in, aids, or supports such action, +or covers the perpetrators—hides them or helps them in any way or in +any form—that, in my opinion, is clearly expressed in the Hague Rules +for Land Warfare, namely that the population must not commit such +actions. + +DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have submitted a letter of 30 July +1944, which is Document 537-PS. This document is concerned with the +treatment of members of foreign military missions caught together with +partisans. Do you know this order? + +KEITEL: Yes I do. Yes, I have already been interrogated on this Document +537-PS during the preliminary investigation, and I made the statement +which I will repeat here: It had been reported that, attached to the +staffs of these partisans, particularly those of the leaders of the +Serbian and Yugoslav partisans, there were military missions which, we +believed, were certainly individual agents or teams for maintaining +liaison with the states with which we were at war. It had been reported +to me, and I had been asked what should be done if such a mission, as it +was called, were captured. When this was reported to the Führer he +decided to reject the suggestions of the military authority concerned, +namely, to treat them as prisoners of war, since, according to the +directive of 18 October 1942, they were to be considered as saboteurs +and treated as such. This document is, therefore, the transmission of +this order which bears my signature. + +DR. NELTE: The problem of terror-fliers and lynch law has been mentioned +during the examination of Reich Marshal Göring. I shall confine myself +to a few questions which concern you personally in connection with that +problem. Do you know what we are concerned with in the conception of +terror-fliers and their treatment? What was your attitude toward this +question? + +KEITEL: The fact that, starting from a certain date in the summer of +1944, machine-gun attacks from aircraft against the population as has +already been mentioned here, increased considerably, with 30 to 40 dead +on certain days, caused Hitler to demand categorically an adequate +ruling on this question. We soldiers were of the opinion that existing +regulations were sufficient, and that new regulations were unnecessary. +The question of lynch law was dragged into the problem and the question +of what was meant by the term terror-flier. These two groups of +questions resulted in the very large quantity of documents which you all +know, and which contain the text of the discussion on these subjects. + +DR. NELTE: I think it will not be necessary to repeat the details which +have already been discussed. In connection with your responsibility, I +am interested in the words which you have written across this document. +Please, will you explain those? + +KEITEL: I merely wanted to state, first of all, that I had suggested, +following the lines of the warning issued when German prisoners of war +taken at Dieppe were shackled, that a warning should be issued here, +too, in the form of a similar official note, saying that we should make +reprisals unless the enemy commanders stopped the practice of their own +accord. That was turned down as not being a suitable course of action. + +And now let us turn to the documents, which are important to me. + +DR. NELTE: Document 735-PS. + +KEITEL: There are some notes in handwriting made by Jodl and myself. +That is the record of a report written by me in the margin which runs as +follows: “Courts-martial will not work”; at least that was the content. +That was written at the time because the question of sentence by +courts-martial came up for discussion since this very document laid down +in detail for the first time what a terror-flier was, and because it +stated that terror attacks were always attacks carried out from +low-flying aircraft with machine guns. I was led to think that crews +attacking in low-level flights could not, generally speaking, in 99 out +of 100 cases be captured alive, if they crashed; for there is no +possibility of saving oneself with a parachute from a low-level attack. +Therefore, I wrote that remark in the margin. Furthermore, I considered, +apart from the fact that one could not conduct proceedings against such +a flier, one would, secondly, not be able to conclude a satisfactory +trial or a satisfactory investigation if an attack had been carried out +from a considerable height, because no court, in my opinion, would be +able to prove that such a man had had the intention of attacking those +targets which possibly were hit. + +Finally, there was one last thought, which was that, in accordance with +the rules, court-martial sentences against prisoners of war had to be +communicated to the enemy state through the protecting power, and 3 +months’ grace had to be given during which the home state could object +to the sentence. It was, therefore, out of the question that, through +those channels the deterrent results desired could be achieved within a +brief period. That was really what I meant. I also wrote another note, +and this refers to lynch law. It states: “If you allow lynching at all, +then you can hardly lay down rules for it.” + +To that I cannot say very much, since my conviction is that there is no +possibility of saying under what circumstances such a method could be +regulated or considered justified by mob justice, and I am still of the +opinion that rules cannot be laid down, if such proceedings are +tolerated. + +DR. NELTE: But what was your attitude regarding the question of lynch +law? + +KEITEL: It was my point of view that it was a method completely +impossible for us soldiers. One case had been reported by the Reich +Marshal in which proceedings against a soldier who had stopped such +action were suppressed. I know of no case where soldiers, with reference +to their duty as soldiers, behaved towards a prisoner of war in any way +other than that laid down in the general regulations. That is unknown to +me. + +I should also like to state, and this has not been mentioned yet, that I +had a discussion with Reich Marshal Göring at the Berghof about the +whole question, and he, at that time, quite clearly agreed with me: We +soldiers must reject lynch law under any circumstances. I requested him +in this awkward position in which we found ourselves to approach Hitler +once more personally, to persuade him not to compel us to give an order +in these matters or to draft an order. That was the situation. + +DR. NELTE: We are now turning to questions relating to prisoners of war. + +KEITEL: May I just say finally that an order from the OKW was never +submitted and never issued. + +DR. NELTE: There is hardly any problem in the law of warfare in which +all nations and all people are so passionately interested as the +prisoner-of-war question. That is why, here too, the Prosecution have +stressed particularly those cases which were considered to be violations +of laws for prisoners of war, according to the Geneva Convention, or to +international law in general. + +Since the OKW, and you as its Chief, were responsible for +prisoner-of-war questions in Germany, I should like to put the following +questions to you: What had been done in Germany to make all departments +and offices of the Wehrmacht acquainted with international agreements +which referred to prisoners of war? + +KEITEL: There was a special military manual on that subject, which I +think is available, and which contained all the clauses in the existing +international agreements and the provisions for carrying them out. That +is, I think, Directive Number 38, which applied to the Army and the +Navy, and also to the Luftwaffe as a military manual. That was the +basis, the basic order. + +DR. NELTE: How was that put into practice? Were people who were +concerned with such questions in practice instructed, or was it +sufficient to draw their attention to the Army directives? + +KEITEL: Every department right down to the smallest unit had these +directives, and every soldier up to a certain point was instructed on +them. Apart from that, no further explanations and regulations were +issued at the beginning of the war. + +DR. NELTE: I am thinking of the courses of instruction instituted in +Vienna for that particular purpose. Do you know that they took place in +Vienna? + +KEITEL: It is known to me that such matters were the subject of courses +of instructions suitable for those people who were actually in contact +with prisoner-of-war matters. They took the form of training courses. + +DR. NELTE: Is it, furthermore, correct that every soldier had a leaflet +in his pay book? + +KEITEL: Yes. That has already been confirmed by General Milch the other +day, who had it with him. + +DR. NELTE: When were the first instructions regarding prisoners of war +given in our case? + +KEITEL: As far as I know, the first instructions appeared after the +beginning of the Polish campaign in the East, since every—I should like +to say—preparatory measure for reception of prisoners of war had been +rejected by Hitler. He had prohibited it. Afterwards things had to be +improvised at very short notice. + +DR. NELTE: What was ordered? + +KEITEL: It was ordered that the three branches of the Wehrmacht, the +Navy, Army and Luftwaffe—the latter had to do with it only to a limited +extent—but particularly the Army should make appropriate preparations +for camps, guards, and whatever was necessary for the establishment and +the organization of such things. + +DR. NELTE: Please tell us what the functions of the OKW were regarding +the treatment and care of prisoners of war? + +KEITEL: The principal instruction was treatment according to Directive +KGV-38 (Prisoner of War Regulation 38) based on international +agreements; in my opinion it contained absolutely everything which the +people concerned should know. Apart from that, no additional +instructions were issued at that time, but the above directive was +applied. + +DR. NELTE: I should like to know first of all how far the OKW had +jurisdiction regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. + +KEITEL: The OKW was, shall I say, the ministerial directing department +which had to issue and prepare all basic regulations and directives +concerning these questions. It was entitled to make sure, by means of +inspections and surprise visits, that the instructions were carried out. +In other words, it was the head office which issued directives and was +entitled to make inspections, but was not in command of the camps +themselves. + +DR. NELTE: Should one not add the contact with the Foreign Office? + +KEITEL: Of course, I forgot that. One of the main tasks of the entire +Wehrmacht, and therefore of the Navy and Luftwaffe too, was to +communicate with the protecting powers, through the Foreign Office and +also to communicate with the International Red Cross and all agencies +interested in the welfare of prisoners of war. I had forgotten that. + +DR. NELTE: Therefore the OKW was, generally speaking, the legislator and +the control organ. + +KEITEL: That is correct. + +DR. NELTE: What did the branches of the Wehrmacht have to do? + +KEITEL: The Navy and the Luftwaffe had camps under their command, which +were restricted to prisoners of war belonging to their own arms; and so +did the Army. But owing to the large numbers belonging to the Army, the +deputy commanding generals of the home front, that is, the commanders of +the Wehrkreise were the commanding authorities who in their area were in +charge of the camps. + +DR. NELTE: Now, let us take the prisoner-of-war camps. Who was at the +head of such a camp? + +KEITEL: In the Wehrkreis command, there was a commander or a general +responsible for questions relating to prisoners of war in the Wehrkreis +concerned, and the camp itself was under the charge of a camp commandant +who had a small staff of officers, among them an intelligence officer +and similar personnel who were necessary for such matters. + +DR. NELTE: Who was the superior officer of the general for +prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis? + +KEITEL: The commander of the Wehrkreis was the superior officer of the +commander for prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis. + +DR. NELTE: Who was the superior of the Wehrkreis commander? + +KEITEL: The Wehrkreis commanders were under the Commander-in-Chief of +the Home Army and the Reserve, and he in turn under the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + ONE HUNDREDTH DAY + Friday, 5 April 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +DR. NELTE: The last question I asked you yesterday concerned the channel +through which orders were transmitted in matters concerning prisoners of +war. You said that orders went from the camp commander to the army +district commander and then by the commander of the reserve army to the +OKH, the High Command of the Army. I should now like to have you tell me +who was responsible if something happened in a PW camp which violated +the Geneva Convention or was a breach of generally recognized +international law. Was that your business? Was the OKW responsible? + +KEITEL: The OKW was responsible in the case of incidents which violated +general orders, that is, basic instructions issued by the OKW, or in the +case of failure to exercise the right to inspect. In such circumstances +I would say that the OKW was responsible. + +DR. NELTE: How did the OKW exercise its right to inspect camps? + +KEITEL: At first, in the early days of the war, through an inspector of +the Prisoners of War Organization (the KGW), who was at the same time +the office or departmental chief of the department KGW in the General +Office of the Armed Forces. In a certain sense, he exercised a double +function. Later on, after 1942 I believe, it was done by appointing an +inspector general who had nothing to do with the correspondence or +official work on the ministerial side. + +DR. NELTE: What was the control by the protecting powers and the +International Red Cross? + +KEITEL: If a protecting power wished to send a delegation to inspect +camps, that was arranged by the department or the inspector for the +prisoner-of-war matters, and he accompanied the delegation. Perhaps I +ought to say that, as far as the French were concerned, Ambassador +Scapini carried out that function personally and that a protecting power +did not exist in this form. + +DR. NELTE: Could the representatives of the protecting powers and the +Red Cross talk freely to the prisoners of war or only in the presence of +officers of the German Armed Forces? + +KEITEL: I do not know whether the procedure adopted in camps was always +in accordance with the basic instructions, which were to render possible +a direct exchange of views between prisoners of war and visitors from +their own countries. As a general rule, it was allowed and made +possible. + +DR. NELTE: Did you as the chief of the OKW concern yourself personally +with the general instructions on prisoner-of-war matters? + +KEITEL: Yes. I did concern myself with the general instructions. Apart +from that, my being tied to the Führer and to headquarters naturally +made it impossible for me to be in continuous contact with my offices. +There were, however, the KGW branch office and the inspector, as well as +the Chief of the General Armed Forces Office who was, in any case, +responsible to me and dealt with these matters. These three departments +had to deal with the routine work; and I, myself, was called on when +decisions had to be made and when the Führer interfered in person, as he +frequently did, and gave orders of his own. + +DR. NELTE: According to the documents presented here in Court, Soviet +prisoners of war seem to have received different treatment from the +other prisoners. What can you say on that subject? + +KEITEL: It is true that in this connection there was a difference in +treatment due to the view, frequently stated by the Führer, that the +Soviet Union on their part had not observed or ratified the Geneva +Convention. It was also due to the part played by “ideological +conceptions regarding the conduct of the war.” The Führer emphasized +that we had a free hand in this field. + +DR. NELTE: I am now going to show you Document EC-388, Exhibit USSR-356. +It is dated 15 September 1941. + +Part 1 is the minutes of a report by the Foreign Intelligence Department +of the OKW. Part 2 is a directive from the OKW, dated 8 September 1941, +regarding the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war. Part 3 is a +memorandum on the guarding of Soviet prisoners of war, and the last +document is a copy of the decree by the Council of People’s Commissars +regarding the prisoners of war matters dated 1 July 1941. + +[_The document was submitted to the defendant._] + +KEITEL: Perhaps I can say by way of introduction that these directives +were not issued until September, which can be attributed to the fact +that at first an order by Hitler existed, saying that Russian prisoners +of war were not to be brought back to Reich territory. This order was +later on rescinded. + +Now, regarding the directive of 8 September 1941, the full text of which +I have before me, I should like to say that all these instructions have +their origin in the idea that this was a battle of nationalities, for +the initial phrase reads, “Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of National +Socialist Germany.” That, in my opinion, immediately shows the basis on +which these instructions were made and the motives and ideas from which +they sprang. It is a fact that Hitler, as I explained yesterday, did not +consider this a battle between two states to be waged in accordance with +the rules of international law but as a conflict between two ideologies. +There are also several statements in the document regarding selection +from two points of view: Selection of people who seem, if I may express +it in this way, not dangerous to us; and the selection of those who, on +account of their political activities and their fanaticism, had to be +isolated as representing a particularly dangerous threat to National +Socialism. + +Turning to the introductory letter, I may say that it has already been +presented here by the Prosecutor of the Soviet Union. It is a letter +from the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the OKW, Admiral Canaris, +reminding one of the general order which I have just mentioned and +adding a series of remarks in which he formulates and emphasizes his +doubts about the decree and his objections to it. About the memorandum +which is attached I need not say any more. It is an extract, and also +the orders which the Soviet Union issued in their turn I think on 1 +July, for the treatment of prisoners of war, that is, the directives for +the treatment of German prisoners of war. I received this on 15 +September, whereas the other order had been issued about a week earlier; +and after studying this report from Canaris, I must admit I shared his +objections. Therefore I took all the papers to Hitler and asked him to +cancel the provisions and to make a further statement on the subject. +The Führer said that we could not expect that German prisoners of war +would be treated according to the Geneva Convention or international law +on the other side. We had no way of investigating it and he saw no +reason to alter the directives he had issued on that account. He refused +point-blank, so I returned the file with my marginal notes to Admiral +Canaris. The order remained in force. + +DR. NELTE: What was the actual treatment accorded to Soviet prisoners of +war? Was it in compliance with the instructions issued or was it handled +differently in practice? + +KEITEL: According to my own personal observations and the reports which +have been put before me, the practice was, if I may say so, very much +better and more favorable than the very severe instructions first issued +when it had been agreed that the prisoners of war were to be transported +to Germany. At any rate, I have seen numerous reports stating that labor +conditions, particularly in agriculture, but also in war economy, and in +particular in the general institution of war economy such as railways, +the building of roads, and so on, were considerably better than might +have been expected, considering the severe terms of the instructions. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, may I refer on this occasion to Document +Number 6 in the document book? + +THE PRESIDENT: Which document book? + +DR. NELTE: Document Number 6, in Document Book Number 1—in my document +book, Number 6—“Conditions of employment for workers from the East, as +well as Soviet Russian prisoners of war.” In this document book I have +included from the book I am submitting only those passages which concern +the conditions of employment for Soviet Russian prisoners of war. I am +submitting this book in evidence as Exhibit K-6, and beg the Tribunal to +admit it in evidence without my having to read from it. These +instructions refer expressly to the points which indicate that at a +later period Soviet Russian prisoners of war were to be treated in +accordance with the Geneva Convention as laid down by the OKW, author of +the decree. + +May I continue? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. You do not wish to read from it? + +DR. NELTE: No, I do not want to. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, will you explain to me just what +relations existed between the police, or rather Himmler, on the one hand +and the Prisoners of War Organization, the KGW, on the other? + +KEITEL: May I say, first of all, that there was constant friction +between Himmler and the corresponding police services and the +departments of the Wehrmacht which worked in this sphere and that this +friction never stopped. It was apparent right from the first that +Himmler at least desired to have the lead in his own hands, and he never +ceased trying to obtain influence of one kind or another over +prisoner-of-war affairs. The natural circumstances of escapes, recapture +by police, searches and inquiries, the complaints about insufficient +guarding of prisoners, the insufficient security measures in the camps, +the lack of guards and their inefficiency—all these things suited him; +and he exploited them in talks with Hitler, when he continually accused +the Wehrmacht behind its back, if I may use the expression, of every +possible shortcoming and failure to carry out their duty. As a result of +this Hitler was continually intervening, and in most cases I did not +know the reason. He took up the charges and intervened constantly in +affairs so that the Wehrmacht departments were kept in what I might term +a state of perpetual unrest. In this connection, since I could not +investigate matters myself, I was forced to give instructions to my +departments in the OKW. + +DR. NELTE: What was the underlying cause and the real purpose which +Himmler attempted to achieve? + +KEITEL: He wanted not only to gain influence but also, as far as +possible, to have prisoner-of-war affairs under himself as Chief of +Police in Germany so that he would reign supreme in these matters, if I +may say so. + +DR. NELTE: Did not the question of procuring labor enter into it? + +KEITEL: Later on that did become apparent, yes. I think I shall have to +refer to that later but I can say now that one observation at least was +made which could not be misinterpreted: The searches and inquiries, made +at certain intervals in Germany for escaped persons, made it clear that +the majority of these prisoners of war did not go back to the camps from +which they had escaped so that obviously they had been retained by +police departments and probably used for labor under the jurisdiction of +Himmler. Naturally, the number of escapes increased every year and +became more and more extensive. For that, of course, there are quite +plausible reasons. + +DR. NELTE: The prisoner-of-war system, of course, is pretty closely +connected with the labor problem. Which departments were responsible for +the employment of prisoners of war? + +KEITEL: The departments which dealt with this were the State Labor +Offices in the so-called Reich Labor Allocation Service, which had +originally been in the hands of the Labor Minister and was later on +transferred to the Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor. In +practice it worked like this: The State Labor Offices applied for +workers to the Army district commands which had jurisdiction over the +camps. These workers were supplied as far as was possible under the +existing general directives. + +DR. NELTE: What did the OKW have to do with the allocation of labor? + +KEITEL: In general, of course, they had to supervise it, so that +allocation was regulated according to the general basic orders. It was +not possible, of course, and the inspector was not in a position to +check on how each individual was employed; after all, the army district +commanders and their generals for the KGW were responsible for that and +were the appropriate persons. The actual fight, as I might call it, for +prisoner-of-war labor did not really start until 1942. Until then, such +workers had been employed mainly in agriculture and the German railway +system and a number of general institutions, but not in industry. This +applies especially to Soviet prisoners of war who were, in the main, +agricultural workers. + +DR. NELTE: What was the actual cause for these labor requirements? + +KEITEL: During the winter of 1941-42 the problem of replacing soldiers +who had dropped out arose, particularly in the eastern theater of war. +Considerable numbers of soldiers fit for active service were needed for +the front and the armed services. I remember the figures. The army alone +needed replacements numbering from 2 to 2.5 million men every year. +Assuming that about 1 million of these would come from normal recruiting +and about half a million from rehabilitated men, that is, from sick and +wounded men who had recovered, that still left 1.5 million to be +replaced every year. These could be withdrawn from the war economy and +placed at the disposal of the services, the Armed Forces. From this fact +resulted the close correlation between the drawing off of these men from +the war economy and their replacement by new workers. This manpower had +to be taken from the prisoners of war on the one hand and +Plenipotentiary Sauckel, whose functions may be summarized as the task +of procuring labor, on the other hand. This connection kept bringing me +into these matters, too, since I was responsible for the replacements +for all the Wehrmacht—Army, Navy, and Air Force—in other words, for +the recruiting system. That is why I was present at discussions between +Sauckel and the Führer regarding replacements and how these replacements +were to be found. + +DR. NELTE: What can you tell me about the allocation of prisoners of war +in industry and in the armament industry? + +KEITEL: Up to 1942 or thereabouts we had not used prisoners of war in +any industry even indirectly connected with armaments. This was due to +an express prohibition issued by Hitler, which was made by him because +he feared attempts at sabotaging machines, production equipment, _et +cetera_. He regarded things of that kind as probable and dangerous. Not +until necessity compelled us to use every worker in some capacity in the +home factories did we abandon this principle. It was no longer +discussed; and naturally prisoners of war came to be used after that in +the general war production, while my view which I, that is the OKW, +expressed in my general orders, was that their use in armament factories +was forbidden; I thought that it was not permissible to employ prisoners +of war in factories which were exclusively making armaments, by which I +mean war equipment, weapons, and munitions. + +For the sake of completeness, perhaps I should add that an order issued +by the Führer at a later date decreed further relaxation of the +limitations of the existing orders. I think the Prosecution stated that +Minister Speer is supposed to have spoken of so many thousands of +prisoners of war employed in the war economy. I may say, however, that +many jobs had to be done in the armament industry which had nothing to +do with the actual production of arms and ammunition. + +DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have frequently stated that prisoners of war +were detained by the police and even placed in concentration camps. Can +you give an explanation about that? + +KEITEL: I think the explanation of that is that the selection process +already mentioned took place in the camps. Furthermore there are +documents to show that prisoners of war in whose case the disciplinary +powers of the commander were not sufficient were singled out and handed +over to the Secret State Police. Finally, I have already mentioned the +subject of prisoners who escaped and were recaptured, a considerable +number of whom, if not the majority, did not return to their camps. +Instructions on the part of the OKW or the Chief of Prisoners of War +Organization ordering the surrender of these prisoners to concentration +camps are not known to me and have never been issued. But the fact that, +when they were handed over to the police, they frequently did end up in +the concentration camps has been made known here in various ways, by +documents and witnesses. That is my explanation. + +DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have presented a document which bears +the Number 1650-PS. This is an order, or, rather, an alleged order, from +the OKW ordering that escaped prisoners of war who are not employed are +to be surrendered to the Security Service. After what you have just told +us, you will have to give an explanation of that. I am showing you, in +addition, Document 1514-PS, an order from the Wehrkreiskommando VI (Area +Command), from which you will be able to see the procedure adopted by +the OKW in connection with the surrender of prisoners of war to the +Secret State Police. + +KEITEL: First of all, I want to discuss Document 1650-PS. To begin with, +I have to state that I did not know of that order, that it was never in +my hands, and that so far I have not been able to find out how it came +to be issued. + +DR. NELTE: Wouldn’t you like to say, first of all, that the document as +such is not a document of the OKW? + +KEITEL: I am coming to that. + +DR. NELTE: I am afraid you must start with that in order to clear up the +matter. + +KEITEL: The document starts like a document which has been confiscated +in a police department. It starts with the words, “The OKW has ordered +as follows:”; after that come the Numbers 1, 2, 3 and then it goes on to +say, “In this connection I order...”, and that is the Supreme Police +Chief of the Reich Security Head Office; it is signed by Müller, not +Kaltenbrunner but Müller. I have certainly not signed this order OKW 1 +to 3, and I have not seen it; there is no doubt about that. The fact +that technical expressions, “Stage 3 b” _et cetera_, are used proves +that in itself. These are terms used by the police and they are unknown +to me. I must say, therefore, that I am not sure how this document was +drafted. I cannot explain it. There are assumptions and possibilities, +and I should like to mention them briefly because I have given a great +deal of thought to the matter. First, I do not believe that any +department of the OKW, that is, the Chief of Prisoners of War +Organization or the Chief of the General Wehrmacht Office, could have +issued this order independently without instructions to do so. I +consider that quite impossible, as it was completely contrary to the +general tendency. I have no recollection that I have ever received any +instructions of this kind from Hitler or that I have passed any such +instruction on to anybody else. I conclude that even if this may look +like an excuse, there were, of course, other channels which the Führer +used without regard to competency. And, if I must supply an explanation, +such orders could have been given through an adjutant without my +knowledge. I emphasize that this is a supposition and that it cannot +absolve me from blame. + +There is only one thing that I would like to say, and that is with +reference to the Document 1514-PS. This is a captured order from the +Wehrkreiskommando VI, at Münster, dated 27 July 1944, in other words, +the summer of 1944. It deals with escaped prisoners of war and how they +are to be dealt with. It says “Reference,” and then it quotes seven +different orders from the year 1942 up to the beginning of July 1944. +This order deals with the question of escaped prisoners of war and ought +to have been incorporated in this document, if the military office of +Wehrkreis VI had had such an OKW order. That fact is remarkable, and it +led me to the conclusion that there never was a written order and that +the military authorities in question never received such an order at +all. I cannot say more about it since I cannot prove it. + +DR. NELTE: You know that the Prosecution have submitted an order, +according to which Soviet Russian prisoners of war were to be marked by +means of tattooing, so that they could be identified. Would you please +make a statement on that? + +KEITEL: The facts are as follows: During the summer of 1942, the Führer +called the Quartermaster General of the Army to headquarters for a +report lasting several hours, at which the Führer asked him to report on +conditions in the Eastern rear army territory. I was suddenly called in +and told that the Quartermaster General was saying that thousands of +Russian prisoners of war were escaping every month, that they +disappeared among the population, immediately discarded their uniforms, +and procured civilian clothes, and could no longer be identified. I was +ordered to make investigations and to devise some means of +identification which would enable them to be identified even after they +had put on civilian clothing. Thereupon I sent instructions to Berlin, +saying that such an order should be prepared but that investigations +should first be made by the international law department of the Foreign +Office to find out whether such an order could be given at all; and, +secondly, whether it could be carried out technically. + +I should like to say that we were thinking of tattoo marks of the kind +found on many seamen and bricklayers in Germany. But I heard no more +about it. One day I met the Foreign Minister at headquarters and talked +to him about the question. Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop knew about +the inquiry submitted to the Foreign Office and considered the measure +extremely questionable. That was the first news I had about the subject. +I gave immediate instructions, whether personally or through the +adjutant I cannot remember, that the order was not to go out. I had +neither seen a draft nor had I signed anything. At any rate I gave an +unmistakable order: “The order is in no circumstances to be issued.” I +received no further detailed information at the time. I heard nothing +more about it and I was convinced that the order had not been issued. + +When I was interrogated, I made a statement on those lines. I have now +been told by my Defense Counsel that the woman secretary of the Chief of +the Prisoners of War Organization has volunteered to testify that the +order was rescinded and was not to be issued and, further, that she had +received those instructions personally. She said in her statement, +however, that this did not happen until several days after the order had +actually gone out and that that was the only possible explanation of how +that order came to be found in the police office as still valid. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I shall submit the affidavit of the witness +which has been received at the appropriate time. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] We now turn to the case of Sagan. The +Prosecution originally accused you of giving the order for the killing +of 50 Royal Air Force officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III at +Sagan. + +I am no longer clear as to whether the Prosecution still maintain this +grave accusation since Reich Marshal Göring and the witness Westhoff +have been interrogated, the latter outside these proceedings. I have the +report of Westhoff’s interrogation before me and I have also submitted +it to you. I should like to ask you now to amplify the statement which +the witness Westhoff made during the preliminary proceedings and which +he will make shortly in this court, and to say what you yourself know +about this extremely grave incident. + +KEITEL: The facts are that one morning it was reported to me that the +escape had taken place. At the same time I received the information that +about 15 of the escaped officers had been apprehended in the vicinity of +the camp. I did not intend to report the case at the noon conference on +the military situation held at Berchtesgaden, or rather, at the Berghof, +as it was highly unpleasant, being the third mass escape in a very short +period. As it had happened only 10 or 12 hours before, I hoped that in +the course of the day the majority of them would be caught and that in +this way the matter might be settled satisfactorily. + +While I was making my report Himmler appeared. I think that it was +towards the end of my report that he announced the incident in my +presence, as he had already started the usual general search for the +escaped prisoners. There was an extremely heated discussion, a serious +clash between Hitler and myself, since he immediately made the most +outrageous accusations against me on account of this incident. + +Things are sometimes incorrectly represented in Westhoff’s account, and +that is why I am making a detailed statement. During this clash the +Führer stated in great excitement, “These prisoners are not to be sent +back to the Armed Forces; they are to stay with the Police.” I +immediately objected sharply. I said that this procedure was impossible. +The general excitement led Hitler to declare again and with considerable +emphasis, “I am ordering you to retain them, Himmler; you are not to +give them up.” + +I put up a fight for the men who had already come back and who should, +according to the original order, be brought out again and handed over to +the police. I succeeded in doing it; but I could not do anything more. + +After that very grave clash... + +DR. NELTE: Will you tell me, please who was present during that scene? + +KEITEL: As far as I remember, Colonel General Jodl was certainly +present, at least for part of the time, and heard some of it, though +perhaps not every word, since he was in the adjoining room at first. At +any rate, Jodl and I returned to our quarters together. We discussed the +case and talked about the extremely unpleasant consequences which the +whole matter would have. On returning to my quarters I immediately +ordered General Von Graevenitz to report to me the following morning. + +In this connection I must explain that Reich Marshal Göring was not +present. If I was a little uncertain about that during my interrogation +it was because I was told that witnesses had already stated that Göring +was present. But right from the beginning I thought it improbable and +doubtful. It is also incorrect, therefore, that Göring raised any +accusations against me at the time. There had not been a conference in +Berlin either. These are mistakes which I think I can explain by saying +that Graevenitz, who came with Westhoff and saw me for the first time, +was present during the report and witnessed a scene of a kind unusual in +military life, because of the violence of my remarks in connection with +the incident. + +Do you want me to say anything more about the discussion with +Graevenitz? + +DR. NELTE: The only thing which interests me in this connection is, +whether you repeated to Graevenitz the order previously given by Hitler +in such a way that both Graevenitz and Westhoff who was also present, +might get the impression that you yourself had issued the order for the +shooting of the escaped officers. + +KEITEL: According to the record of Westhoff’s interrogation, which I +have seen, I can explain it, I think, as follows: first of all, I made +serious accusations. I myself was extraordinarily excited, for I must +say that even the order that the prisoners were to be retained by the +police caused me extreme anxiety regarding their fate. I frankly admit +that the possibility of their being shot while trying to escape remained +in my subconscious mind. I certainly spoke in extreme agitation at the +time and did not weigh my words carefully. And I certainly repeated +Hitler’s words, which were, “We must make an example,” since I was +afraid of some further serious encroachments upon the Prisoners of War +Organization in other ways, apart from this single case of the prisoners +not being returned to the Wehrmacht. On reading the interrogation report +I saw the statement by Graevenitz, or rather, Westhoff, to the effect +that I had said, “They will be shot, and most of them must be dead +already.” I probably said something like, “You will see what a disaster +this is; perhaps many of them have been shot already.” + +I did not know, however, that they had already been shot; and I must +confess that in my presence Hitler never said a word about anybody being +shot. He only said, “Himmler, you will keep them; you will not hand them +over.” I did not find out until several days later that they had been +shot. I saw among other papers also an official report from the British +Government stating that not until the 31st—the escape took place on the +25th—that not until the 31st were they actually shot. + +Therefore Westhoff is also wrong in thinking that orders had already +been issued saying that an announcement was to be made in the camp +stating that certain people had been shot or would not return and that +lists of names were to be posted. That order did not come until later, +and I remember it; I remember it because of the following incident: + +A few days afterwards, I think on or about the 31st, before the +situation report, one of the adjutants told me that a report had been +received that some had been shot. I requested a discussion alone with +Hitler and told him that I had heard that people had been shot by the +police. All he said was that he had received it too—naturally, since it +was his report. In extreme disgust I told him my opinion of it. At that +time he told me that it was to be published in the camp as a warning to +the others. Only upon this the announcement in the camp was ordered. In +any case, Westhoff’s recollection of some of the facts, which he has +sworn to, is not quite accurate, even if such expressions as those used +by him and explained by me here may have occurred. We shall hear his own +account of that. + +DR. NELTE: Did Hitler ever tell you that he had ordered those men to be +shot? + +KEITEL: No, he never told me that. I never heard it from him. I heard it +very much later, as far as I can remember, from Reich Marshal Göring, +with whom the whole incident was, of course, the subject of discussions +and conversations, especially as an Air Force camp was involved. + +DR. NELTE: I should like to say in conclusion: Are you stating under +oath, here, that you yourself neither ordered these Royal Air Force +officers to be shot, nor did you receive and pass on such an order, nor +did you yourself learn who gave the order? + +KEITEL: That is correct. I neither received that order nor did I know or +hear of it; nor did I pass on such an order. I can repeat this herewith +under oath. + +DR. NELTE: We now turn to deportations. What the Prosecution refer to as +deportation of workers is the removal of bodily fit citizens of the +occupied territories to Germany or other occupied territories for the +purpose of using them for “slave labor” on defense work or other tasks +connected with warfare. That is the accusation which I have read to you. + +The Prosecution have repeatedly coupled your name with these accusations +and have said that you, that is, the OKW, had co-operated in supplying +workers for the German war economy. You know that in fact the Defendant +Sauckel was the Plenipotentiary in that field. I should like to ask you +whether workers had been taken from the occupied territories and brought +to Germany before Plenipotentiary Sauckel was appointed. + +KEITEL: As far as I know, workers came from occupied territories, +especially those in the West: Belgium, Holland—I do not know about +Holland, but certainly France—to Germany. According to what I heard, I +understood at the time that it was done by recruiting volunteers. I +think I remember that General Von Stülpnagel, the military commander of +Paris, told me in Berlin once during a meeting that more than 200,000 +had volunteered, but I cannot remember exactly when that was. + +DR. NELTE: Was the OKW the competent authority on these matters? + +KEITEL: No, the OKW had nothing to do with it. These questions were +handled through the usual channels, the OKH, the Military Commanders in +France and in Belgium and Northern France with the competent central +authorities of the Reich at home, the OKW never had anything to do with +it. + +DR. NELTE: What about civilian administration in occupied territories? + +KEITEL: In occupied territories with civilian administration, the +Wehrmacht was excluded from any executive powers in the administration, +so that in these territories the Wehrmacht and its services had +certainly nothing to do with it. Only in those territories which were +still operational areas for the Army were executive powers given to +military troops, high commanders, army commanders, _et cetera_. The OKW +did not come into the official procedure here either. + +DR. NELTE: According to an interrogation report submitted here the +Defendant Sauckel said that you, that is, the OKW, were responsible for +giving instructions to the military commanders in the occupied +territories and that he, Sauckel, was to have their support in his +recruiting campaigns for getting the quotas. What can you say about +that? + +KEITEL: The view held by Plenipotentiary Sauckel can obviously be +explained by the fact that he knew neither the official service channels +nor the functions of the Wehrmacht, that he saw me at one or two +discussions on the furnishing of manpower, and, thirdly, that he +sometimes came to see me when he had made his report and received his +orders alone. He had probably been given orders to do so, in Hitler’s +usual way: Go and see the Chief of the OKW; he will do the rest. The OKW +had no occasion to do anything. The OKW had no right to give orders, but +in Sauckel’s case I did take over the job of informing the OKH or the +technical departments in the General Quartermaster’s office. I have +never issued orders or instructions of my own to the military commanders +or other services in occupied territories. It was not one of the +functions of the OKW. + +DR. NELTE: A document has been submitted here according to which +Generals Stapf and Nagel had agreed to ask you to exercise pressure or +coercion during the recruiting campaigns in the East. That, at any rate, +is the assertion by the Prosecution. Do you know of this happening? + +KEITEL: I remembered it when the document was presented. It was +obviously an attempt on the part of Stapf, who had worked with me in the +Army for many years, to get the Führer’s support or assistance through +my mediation. Stapf, who was the director of the Economic Staff East at +the time, and General Nagel, who was also mentioned in this connection +and who was in charge of the Economic Inspectorate Department in the +East, had obviously tried to involve me in the matter. According to the +document, some pressure had to be applied from higher quarters; but I +took no steps at all as I had nothing to do with these things. + +DR. NELTE: I am now going to deal with the question of the pillage of +art treasures. + +THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we might adjourn now. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have accused you, among other things, +of issuing directives regarding the safeguarding and confiscation of +objects of art, libraries, _et cetera_. Were any military orders, +directives, or instructions laid down before the campaign in the West or +in the East, with regard to objects of art, libraries, and their +treatment in occupied territories? + +KEITEL: No, as far as I know, there was nothing at all about these +matters, although thorough provision had been made for everything else +which might happen in the course of a war. I am not aware of any orders +which were given with that in mind. + +DR. NELTE: I am going to show you three documents submitted by the +French Prosecution, which mention you in connection with Rosenberg’s +special staff, which has already been mentioned here on various +occasions. These are Documents 137-PS, 138-PS, and 140-PS. These are +documents from the Chief of the OKW to the Commander-in-Chief of the +Army in France and in the Netherlands. + +KEITEL: The first two documents, 137-PS and 138-PS, came from +headquarters. They were dictated in part by myself and sent to offices +of the Army. One says “To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,” the other +one “To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Occupied France” and to +the “Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands.” They originated +partly in answers to queries from various military offices which +considered themselves responsible for the safekeeping or guarding of +whatever was in the occupied territories, and also from offices which +obviously were going to collect, inspect, to register, or otherwise +investigate these art treasures, libraries, _et cetera_, and to +confiscate them. In one case I was called up on the phone by the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army, I think, who protested against this, at +other times by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. The Führer directed me to +instruct military services to acquiesce in this and to state their +agreements, as they were directives which he had issued and approved +himself. The way in which the documents are drawn up shows, in itself, +that they did not emanate from an OKW office. My adjutant signed them; +but I myself dictated them on the Führer’s orders and sent them out. +These queries may have been made just because no provision had been made +and no orders given. I did not know what was to be done with these art +treasures, _et cetera_; but I naturally took the view that the object +was to safeguard them. No mention was made of transport, or +confiscation, or expropriation; and the question did not occur to me; I +merely gave these instructions in quite a brief form and did not bother +any further about the matter. I took them to be precautionary measures +and they did not seem to me to be unjustified. + +DR. NELTE: Then you mean the OKW had no jurisdiction over these affairs? + +KEITEL: No. + +DR. NELTE: It was a question of merely transmitting letters to the +military authorities to make known Hitler’s wishes to assist Rosenberg +in his task? + +KEITEL: That is correct. + +DR. NELTE: I should like to put a personal question to you in this +connection. Have you ever appropriated to yourself any of the art +treasures from public or private ownership in the occupied countries, or +did any office whatever assign any work of art to you? + +KEITEL: No, I never had anything to do with these things. + +DR. NELTE: We now come to the so-called economic exploitation of +occupied territories. You are accused of participating, in your official +position as Chief of the OKW, in the economic exploitation of the +occupied Eastern countries and the Western occupied countries. This +question has already been discussed in Reich Marshal Göring’s +examination, so I can treat it relatively briefly. It is, however, +necessary for you to clarify the extent to which the OKW, and yourself +in particular, were connected with these matters, for both the OKW and +yourself are mentioned in this connection, as well as the +Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt (Economic Armament Office), which was a branch of +the OKW. General Thomas of that office prepared a compilation which was +produced by the Prosecution. What can you say about this question, if I +have Document 1157-PS and USSR-80 shown to you? + +KEITEL: 1157-PS deals with “Plan Barbarossa Oldenburg.” I would like to +say this: + +The Wehrwirtschaftsamt (War Economy Office), which even then was no +longer known as the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt carried out under its chief, +General Thomas, certain organizational preparations, first for the +campaign in the West and later for campaign Barbarossa in the East. They +were made by the military economic organization at home, in the Reich, +which had teams attached to all Wehrkreiskommandos. As a result, +advisers and some personnel with experience in problems of war economy +supplies and a few small detachments called Feldwirtschaftskommandos +(Field Economic Detachments) were assigned to the Army Commands (the +A.O.K’s). + +The personnel attached to the Quartermaster Staffs at the A.O.K. were +responsible for securing, or causing to be secured, supplies, fuel, and +food stuffs found in occupied or conquered territories, as well as other +articles suitable for the immediate requirements of the troops. They +should then co-operate with the Senior Quartermaster, who looks after my +army supplies, and the intendant in charge of the transport of supplies, +in making them available for the fighting troops. Information obtained +regarding war economy in the important areas of France and Belgium, as +far as such information could be obtained, was kept for later use. The +East, as I believe Reich Marshal Göring has already explained at length, +was organized on quite a different basis with a view not only to +supplying the troops, but also to exploiting the conquered territories. +An organization serving this aim was built up, called +Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost-Oldenburg (Economic Organization +East-Oldenburg). Its connection with the OKW lay in the fact that the +necessary preparations for organizing and developing panels of experts +and technical branch offices had to be discussed with the Ministry of +Economics, the Four Year Plan, and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. +That was Wirtschaftsorganisation Oldenburg. The OKW and its Chief, that +is myself, had no power to give orders or instructions affecting its +activities. The organization was created and placed at the disposal of +those responsible for putting it in action, giving it instructions and +working with it. If General Thomas wrote in his book, which was produced +here as a document... + +DR. NELTE: 2353-PS (Exhibit Number USA-35), Page 386. Perhaps you will +just read that, so that you can give us a summary. + +KEITEL: Yes. This is an excerpt from the book of General Thomas, where +he describes in detail his own functions and those of the organization +which he directed in the OKW, from its origin until far into the war. He +says here: + + “The functions exercised by the Economic Armament Office + (Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt) while the Eastern campaign was going on + consisted mainly in the organizational management of the + economic machinery set in motion and in advising the Operational + Staff for War Economy East.” + +DR. NELTE: You need read only Paragraph 4 for your summary. + +KEITEL: The Operational Staff for Military Economy East, attached to the +Four Year Plan as Barbarossa-Oldenburg, was responsible for the entire +economic direction of the whole of the Eastern area. It was responsible, +for the technical instructions of the State Secretaries in the +Operational Staff for Military Economy, for the organization of Thomas’ +Economic Armament Office, and for applying all measures to be taken by +the Operational Staff for Military Economy East under the direction and +command of the Reich Marshal. + +DR. NELTE: How were conditions in the West? + +KEITEL: I described very briefly the small group of experts attached to +the High Command quartermaster departments in the West. Later on, as I +have already stated, at the beginning of June, the entire economic +direction was transferred to the Four Year Plan and the +plenipotentiaries for the Four Year Plan, as far as anything passed +beyond current supplies intended to cover daily requirements, fuel, _et +cetera_. This was done by a special decree, which has already been +mentioned by the Reich Marshal and which had been issued by the Führer. + +DR. NELTE: That was laid down by General Thomas on Page 304 in Document +2353-PS, which we have already mentioned. There is no need for me to +read this; and I request the Tribunal to allow me to present the +defendant’s affidavit in Document Book Number 2 for the Military +Economic Armament Office of the OKW, as Document Keitel-11 in evidence, +so that no further questions on the subject may be necessary. I assume +that the Prosecution will agree to this procedure. + +THE PRESIDENT: What number is it in Book 2? + +DR. NELTE: Number 4 in this Document Book Number 2. It is Page 27 and +following, in Document Book 2, submitted to the Court. The document is +dated 29 March 1946. + +THE PRESIDENT: What date did you say it is? + +DR. NELTE: The 29th of March 1946. I do not think there is any date in +the document book. I will present the original, which I have here. + +THE PRESIDENT: How is it described in the document itself? We have a +document dated 4 March 1946, “The Economic Armament Office of the +Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.” Is that right? + +DR. NELTE: The document was written on 4 March 1946, but the affidavit +was added on 29 March 1946. + +THE PRESIDENT: But that appears to have been 8 March? Is it that +document? + +DR. NELTE: The Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt in the OKW. It is possible. + +THE PRESIDENT: That’s here. + +DR. NELTE: In any case, there is no doubt about the identity of the +document. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Now I come to a topic which is presented +again and again before the high Tribunal and which is very difficult +because the reason for these questions is not properly understood. + +The charge has been made against you that in your capacity as a member +of the government, as the Prosecution contend, you knew, or must have +known of the happenings in the concentration camps. I am therefore +compelled to ask you what you know about the existence of the +concentration camps, how much you knew and what you had to do with them. +Did you know of their existence? Did you know that concentration camps +existed? + +KEITEL: Yes, I knew already before the war that concentration camps +existed; but at that time I knew only two of them by name; and I +supposed and assumed that there were other concentration camps besides +the two I knew. I had no further particulars about the existence of +concentration camps. As far as internees in such camps were concerned, I +knew that they included habitual criminals and political opponents. As +Reich Marshal Göring has said, that was the basis of the institution. + +DR. NELTE: Did you hear anything about the treatment of internees? + +KEITEL: No, I heard nothing precise about it. I assumed that it was a +severe form of detention, or one which brought severe measures in its +train, under certain specific circumstances. I knew nothing about the +conditions found there, especially ill-treatment of internees, tortures, +_et cetera_. + +I tried in two cases to free individuals who were in concentration +camps. One was Pastor Niemöller, by intervention of Grossadmiral Raeder. +With the help of Canaris and at the request of Grossadmiral Raeder, I +tried to get Pastor Niemöller out of the concentration camps. The +attempt was unsuccessful. I made a second attempt at the request of a +family in my home village, in a case where a peasant was in a +concentration camp for political reasons; and in this case I succeeded. +The individual involved was set free. That was in the autumn of 1940. I +had a talk with this man; and when I asked him what things were like +there, he gave me a non-committal reply to the effect that he had been +all right. He gave me no details. I know of no other cases. + +DR. NELTE: When you talked to this man did you have the impression that +anything had happened to him? + +KEITEL: Undoubtedly he did not give that impression. I did not see him +directly after his release. I saw him later when I was at home. The +reason that I talked to him was because he came to thank me. He said +nothing about being badly treated or anything like that at all. + +DR. NELTE: It has been stated here that now and again these +concentration camps were visited by members of the Wehrmacht, by +officers—and high ranking officers, too. How do you explain that? + +KEITEL: I am convinced that these visits took place on Himmler’s +invitation. I myself once received a personal invitation from him to pay +a visit to the Dachau Camp from Munich. He said he would like to show it +to me. I know also that large and small groups of officers and +commissions were shown through the camps. I think I need scarcely say +how these visits were handled as regards the things that were shown to +them. To supplement my statement I would like to say it was not uncommon +to hear such remarks as “You’ll end up in a concentration camp!” or “All +sorts of things go on there.” I do know, however, that whenever anyone +came to me with these rumors and stories and I asked what exactly they +knew and where the information came from, the reply was always: “I +really do not know; I just heard it.” So that whatever one might think, +one never got at the facts and never could get at them. + +DR. NELTE: You heard that medical experiments were made on these +internees, and that this was done by agreement with higher quarters. I +ask you whether you had knowledge of that, either personally or from the +Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. + +KEITEL: No, I never heard anything about the medical experiments on +internees, which have been described here in detail, either officially +or otherwise. Nothing. + +DR. NELTE: I turn now to a group of questions relating to the +Prosecution’s assertion that you intended to have General Weygand and +General Giraud assassinated or, at least, were participating in plans to +that end. You know that witness Lahousen, on 30 November 1945 stated +that Admiral Canaris had been pressed by you for some time, +November-December 1940, to do away with the Chief of the French General +Staff, General Weygand. + +Lahousen added that Canaris told his departmental heads that after a +talk with you. Did you discuss the case of General Weygand with Canaris? + +KEITEL: That is probably correct, for there were reports at the time +that General Weygand was traveling in North Africa, visiting the troops, +and inspecting the colonial troops. I consider it quite natural that I +told Canaris, who was the Chief of Counterintelligence, that it should +be possible to determine the object of General Weygand’s journey, the +places at which he stopped in North Africa, and whether any military +significance could be attached to this visit, as regards putting +colonial troops into action or the introduction of other measures +concerning them in North Africa. He is sure to have received +instructions to try to get information through his Intelligence +Department as to what was taking place. + +DR. NELTE: I assume, also to keep an eye on him? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: Could the Counterintelligence department send members of its +staff to North Africa? + +KEITEL: I believe that certain channels of information existed via +Spanish Morocco; and I know that Canaris maintained intelligence links +with Morocco by way of Spain. + +DR. NELTE: My question was meant to find out whether it was officially +possible to visit North Africa in agreement with France. + +KEITEL: Of course it was possible. After the Armistice, there were +Disarmament Commissions in North Africa, as well as in France. We had +several Army departments there in connection with checking up the +armaments of the North African troops. + +DR. NELTE: What was the point, or was there any point, in wishing +General Weygand ill? Was he a declared opponent of the policy Germany +wished to carry through? What was the reason? + +KEITEL: We had no reason to think that General Weygand might be, shall +we say, inconvenient. In view of the connection with Marshal Pétain, +which was started about the end of September and the beginning of +October of that year, and the well-known collaboration policy which +reached its height in the winter of 1940-41, it was absurd even to think +of doing away with the Marshal’s Chief of Staff. An action of this kind +would not have fitted into the general policy followed in dealing with +the situation in North Africa. We released a large number of officers in +the regular French Colonial Army from French prisoner-of-war camps in +the winter of 1940-1941 for service with the colonial forces. There were +generals among them; I remember General Juin in particular who, as we +knew at the time, had been Chief of the General Staff in North Africa +for many years. At my suggestion he was put at the disposal of the +Marshal by Hitler, obviously with the aim of utilizing him in the +colonial service. There had not been the slightest motive for wishing +General Weygand ill or to think of anything of the sort. + +DR. NELTE: Is it correct that conferences even took place with the +French General Staff and Laval about co-operating in operations in +Africa and the strengthening of West Africa? + +KEITEL: Yes. Among the documents of the French Armistice Delegation +there ought to be a large number of documents asking for all sorts of +concessions in connection with North Africa and more especially Central +and West Africa, owing to the fact that during the winter of 1940-41 +riots had taken place in French Central Africa against which the French +Government wanted to take measures. I believe that in the spring of 1941 +a conference lasting several days took place in Paris with the French +General Staff, in order to prepare measures in which the German +Wehrmacht, which already had troops stationed in Tripoli in the Italian +area, would participate. + +DR. NELTE: So there is no apparent motive? + +KEITEL: No. + +DR. NELTE: Something must have been said, however, in this conversation +with Canaris, which led to this misunderstanding. Can you suggest +anything which might have caused this misunderstanding? + +KEITEL: It can only be that, according to the very comprehensive details +given by Lahousen in his testimony, I said at a later meeting, “What +about Weygand?” That was the phrase Lahousen used; and he might have +drawn the conclusion that, perhaps, in that sense of the word, as he +represented it, he kept on saying “in that sense of the word,” and when +asked what that meant, he said, “To kill him.” It is due only to that, +it can be due only to that. I must say that Canaris was frequently alone +with me. Often he brought the chiefs of his departments along. When we +discussed matters by ourselves, I thought he was always perfectly frank +with me. If he had misunderstood me, there would certainly have been +discussions about it, but he never said anything like that. + +DR. NELTE: Is it clear to you that if there had been any idea of putting +Weygand out of the way, it would have constituted an act of high +political significance? + +KEITEL: Yes, of course. In the collaboration of the Führer Adolf Hitler +and Marshal Pétain an act of that kind would have had the greatest +imaginable political significance. + +DR. NELTE: Then you still believe that if it had happened, it would have +meant the breaking-off of the policy initiated by Hitler? + +KEITEL: Certainly one would have had to expect that. + +DR. NELTE: Only with regard to the great importance of General Weygand’s +personality? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: Can you give any other explanation, or any proof that the +designs attributed to you, but thanks be to God were never put into +practice, had no foundation in fact? + +KEITEL: Although it was at a much later date that General Weygand was +taken to Germany, on the occupation of the hitherto unoccupied zone of +Southern France, I was told by the Führer himself that he had given +orders only for the general to be interned in his own home, without +being inconvenienced by guards—an honorable arrest and not the +treatment accorded to an ordinary prisoner of war. Of course, that was +in 1942. + +DR. NELTE: Therefore, you finally and repeatedly deny under oath that +you gave any order or expressed yourself in any way which might lead +your hearers to conclude that you intended or wished General Weygand to +be put out of the way? + +KEITEL: Yes. I can expressly reaffirm that. + +DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen also spoke of Giraud and described the +case much in the same way as that of Weygand. In neither case was he in +a position to say from his own first-hand knowledge that you had given +such an order, but he reported what Canaris had told him and illustrated +his testimony by means of later inquiries. I ask you to tell us what you +know about the case of Giraud, which created a sensation at the time and +also here, and to say what part you took in discussions regarding +Giraud. + +KEITEL: Giraud’s successful escape from the Fortress of Königstein near +Dresden on 19 April 1942 created a sensation; and I was severely +reprimanded about the guard of this general’s camp, a military fortress. +The escape was successful despite all attempts to recapture the general, +by police or military action, on his way back to France. Canaris had +instructions from me to keep a particularly sharp watch on all the +places at which he might cross the frontier into France or +Alsace-Lorraine, so that we could recapture him. The police were also +put on to this job; 8 or 10 days after his escape it was made known that +the general had arrived safely back in France. If I issued any orders +during this search I probably used the words I gave in the preliminary +interrogations, namely, “We must get the general back, dead or alive.” I +possibly did say something like that. He had escaped and was in France. + +Second phase: Efforts, made through the Embassy by Abetz and Foreign +Minister Ribbentrop to induce the general to return to captivity of his +own accord, appeared not to be unsuccessful or impossible, as the +general had declared himself willing to go to the occupied zone to +discuss the matter. I was of the opinion that the general might possibly +do it on account of the concessions hitherto made to Marshal Pétain +regarding personal wishes in connection with the release of French +generals from captivity. The meeting with General Giraud took place in +occupied territory, at the staff quarters of a German Army Corps, where +the question of his return was discussed. The Military Commander +informed me by telephone of the general’s presence in occupied +territory, in the hotel where the German officers were billeted. + +The commanding general suggested that if the general would not return +voluntarily it would be a very simple matter to apprehend him if he were +authorized to do so. I at once refused this categorically for I +considered it a breach of faith. The general had come trusting to +receive proper treatment and be returned unmolested. + +Third phase: The attempt or desire to get the general back somehow into +military custody arose from the fact that Canaris told me that the +general’s family was residing in territory occupied by German troops; +and it was almost certain that the general would try to see his family, +even if only after a certain period of time and when the incident had +been allowed to drop. He suggested to me to make preparations for the +recapture of the general if he made a visit of this kind in occupied +territory. Canaris said that he himself would initiate these +preparations through his Counterintelligence office in Paris and through +his other offices. Nothing happened for some time; and it was surely +quite natural for me to ask on several occasions, no matter who was with +Canaris or if Lahousen was with him, “What has become of the Giraud +affair?” or, in the same way, “How is the Giraud case getting on?” The +words used by Mr. Lahousen were, “It is very difficult; but we shall do +everything we can.” That was his answer. Canaris made no reply. That +strikes me as significant only now; but at the time it did not occur to +me. + +Third phase: At a later stage—Shall I continue? + +DR. NELTE: Fourth phase. + +KEITEL: Fourth phase. This began with Hitler saying to me: “This is all +nonsense. We are not getting results. Counterintelligence is not capable +of this and cannot handle this matter. I will turn it over to Himmler +and Counterintelligence had better keep out of this, for they will never +get hold of the general again.” Admiral Canaris said at the time that he +was counting on having the necessary security measures taken by the +French secret state police in case General Giraud went to the occupied +zone; and a fight might result, as the general was notoriously a +spirited soldier, a man of 60 who lowers himself 45 meters over a cliff +by means of a rope—that is how he escaped from Königstein. + +Fifth phase: According to Lahousen’s explanation in Berlin, Canaris’ +desire to transfer the matter to the Secret State Police, which Lahousen +said was done as a result of representations from the departmental +heads, was because I asked again how matters stood with Giraud and he +wanted to get rid of this awkward mission. Canaris came to me and asked +if he could pass it on to the Reich Security Main Office or to the +police. I said yes, because the Führer had already told me repeatedly +that he wanted to hand it over to Himmler. + +Next phase: I wanted to warn Canaris some time later, when Himmler came +to see me and confirmed that he had received orders from Hitler to have +Giraud and his family watched unobtrusively and that I was to stop +Canaris from taking any action in the case. He had been told that +Canaris was working along parallel lines. I immediately agreed. + +Now we come to the phase which Lahousen has described at length. I had +asked about “Gustav” and similar questions. I wanted to direct Canaris +immediately to stop all his activities in the matter, as Hitler had +confirmed the order. What happened in Paris according to Lahousen’s +detailed reports, that excuses were sought, _et cetera_, that the matter +was thought to be very mysterious, that is, Gustav as an abbreviation +for the G in Giraud, all this is fancy rather than fact. I had Canaris +summoned to me at once, for he was in Paris and not in Berlin. He had +done nothing at all, right from the start. He was thus in a highly +uncomfortable position with regard to me for he had lied to me. When he +came I said only, “You will have nothing more to do in this matter; keep +clear of it.” + +Then came the next phase: The general’s escape without difficulty to +North Africa by plane, which was suddenly reported—if I remember +correctly—before the invasion of North Africa by the Anglo-American +troops. That ended the business. No action was ever taken by the +Counterintelligence whom I had charged to watch him, or by the police; +and I never even used the words to do away with the general. Never! + +The final phase of this entire affair may sound like a fairy tale, but +it is true nevertheless. The general sent a plane from North Africa to +Southern France near Lyons in February or March 1944, with a liaison +officer who reported to the Counterintelligence and asked if the general +could return to France and what would happen to him on landing in +France. The question was turned over to me. Generaloberst Jodl is my +witness that these things actually happened. The chief of the +Counterintelligence Office involved in this matter was with me. The +answer was: “Exactly the same treatment as General Weygand who is +already in Germany. There is no doubt that the Führer will agree.” + +Nothing actually did happen, and I heard no more about it. But these +things actually happened. + +DR. NELTE: To complete our information, I must ask you a few questions +for the French Prosecution have mentioned that later, in a later phase, +the family of General Giraud suffered inconveniences or losses of a +rather serious nature. When you were searching for Giraud did you cause +any trouble to his family, who were living in occupied France? Did you +give any directives which would confine or inconvenience the family in +any way? + +KEITEL: No. I had only an unobtrusive watch kept on the family’s +residence in order to receive information of any visit which he might +have planned. But no steps of any kind were ever taken against the +family. It would have been foolish in this case. + +DR. NELTE: Foolish of you? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. NELTE: To make matters quite clear: You had no knowledge of anything +having happened later on? + +KEITEL: No, none at all. + +DR. NELTE: Well, General Giraud is still alive and I will only ask you, +in conclusion, under your oath: Can you confirm that you did not, at any +time, give an order or a directive which might be interpreted to mean +that General Giraud was to be killed? + +KEITEL: No. I never gave such an order, unless the phrase “We must have +him back, dead or alive” may be considered of weight in this respect. I +never gave orders that the general was to be killed or done away with, +or anything of the kind. Never. + +DR. NELTE: I have concluded my direct examination of the Defendant +Keitel. May I ask you to permit me to submit in evidence the affidavit, +that last one, Number 6 in Document Book Number 2. I would like to +submit that affidavit in evidence. It is on Page 51 and following and is +Document K... + +THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you put that in as K-12 yesterday? + +DR. NELTE: Today I submit Keitel-13... + +THE PRESIDENT: This affidavit that you want to submit now, where is it +and what is the date of it? + +DR. NELTE: It is Page 51 and following, and it is dated 9 March 1946. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. + +DR. NELTE: This affidavit has also been attested to by Generaloberst +Jodl. I ask permission to question him about the affidavit or to show it +to him for confirmation when he is called to the witness stand. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +MR. DODD: If the Court please, we have looked into the matter of the +so-called interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst referred to yesterday +by Dr. Nelte. Insofar as we can determine, this paper was never offered +in evidence by any members of the Prosecution. It was referred to by M. +Dubost—I mean, it was not referred to by him, but it was included in +his brief. I did not refer to it, and I did not offer it in evidence. +That is how it came into the hands of Dr. Nelte, but not in evidence. + +THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte want to offer it in evidence now? + +DR. NELTE: I ask to submit it as Document Number Keitel-14. + +THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number or another number? + +DR. NELTE: No, Mr. President, it has no other number. + +THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. + +Now, do any of the other Defense Counsel want to ask questions? + +DR. STAHMER: Mr. Defendant, as you have corrected your former statement +by answering the question put by your counsel with a statement that +Reich Marshal Göring was not present at the conference in which Hitler +gave orders for the airmen who had escaped from the Sagan Camp should be +held by the police and since you further said that a conference with +Reich Marshal Göring in Berlin did not take place, I have only the +following questions on this subject: Some weeks after that escape, did +you receive a letter from the Quartermaster General of the General Staff +of the Luftwaffe informing you that the Luftwaffe wanted to hand over +their prison camps to the OKW? + +KEITEL: Yes, I received this letter and following an interview with +Hitler I declined the offer. + +DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions. + +DR. SEIDL: At the beginning of the war, the Defendant Dr. Frank was a +lieutenant of the 9th Infantry Regiment; is that correct? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. SEIDL: Do you remember receiving a letter from Dr. Frank, who was +then Governor General, in 1942, saying that he wanted to rejoin the +Wehrmacht? + +The purpose of that letter was, of course, that he be relieved of his +office as Governor General in this way. Is that correct? + +KEITEL: Yes, I received such a letter and handed it to the Führer who +merely made a movement with his hands and said “Out of the question.” I +informed Frank of that decision through the liaison officer who was +temporarily with him at the time. + +DR. SEIDL: That is all. + +DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is 3 minutes to one and it will not take me +very long, but it might take me beyond 1 o’clock, so it might be better +to adjourn now. I would then put my question to the witness after the +recess. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn until 2:00 o’clock. + + [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] + + + + + _Afternoon Session_ + +DR. DIX: May it please the Tribunal, this witness is competent and an +expert who can give the Tribunal definite figures about the armament +expenditures of the Reich. However, the witness is certainly not in a +position to remember these figures just at the moment. Professor Kraus, +my colleague, therefore, during my absence, was kind enough to mark +these figures down and to check them in co-operation with the witness. +The written deposition was signed by the witness at that time, in order +to avoid any misunderstanding. In order to help him recollect these +figures, I now ask your permission to have submitted to the witness this +deposition which he has signed. I have had translations made of this +deposition into the three languages in question and I now submit to the +Tribunal eight copies. I also have four copies for the four delegations +of the Prosecution, and German copies for the counsels of the Defendants +Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Dönitz, and the OKW. + +May I ask for just one moment so that the witness can read it? + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, would you please look at the +first column only, which bears the heading “Total Expenditures.” The +second and the third columns show which of those sums were raised +through the Reichsbank, on the one hand, and which were raised from +other sources, on the other hand. These figures I should like to have +certified during the interrogation of Schacht himself, because they were +the results of Schacht’s calculations and the witness here can therefore +give no information about them. May I ask you concerning these armament +expenditures of the Reich, beginning with the fiscal year of 1935, the +fiscal year running from 1 April to 31 March: The figures stated herein +are: 5,000 millions for 1935, 7,000 millions for 1936, 9,000 millions +for 1937, 11,000 millions for 1938, and 20,500 millions for 1939. Are +these figures correct? + +KEITEL: According to my conviction these figures are correct. May I add +that at the beginning of my captivity I also had an opportunity to speak +to the Reich Finance Minister about these figures and to co-ordinate our +opinions. + +DR. DIX: Now, a question about the armament strength of the Reich on 1 +April 1938. Is it correct to say that at that time there existed: 24 +infantry divisions, 1 armored division, no motorized division, 1 +mountain division, 1 cavalry division, and that in addition 10 infantry +divisions and 1 armored division were being formed? I wish to add, that +of the 3 reserve divisions none had been completed on 1 April 1938; and +only 7 to 8 were in the process of being formed and expected to be +complete by 1 October 1938. + +KEITEL: I consider these figures correct and I have therefore confirmed +them in this affidavit. + +DR. DIX: That is as far as the deposition goes. I would like to put two +more questions to the witness which have not been discussed with him so +that I do not know whether he remembers the figures in question. + +I consider it possible that the Tribunal would be interested in the +proportion of strength between the Reich, on the one hand, and +Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, at the time of Hitler’s march into +Czechoslovakia; that is the relation of strength (a) concerning the +armed might and (b) concerning the civilian population. + +KEITEL: I do not remember the accurate figures about that. In the +preliminary interrogation I have been questioned about it and I believe +the figures will be correct if I say that in the fall of 1938, going by +military units, that is, divisions... + +DR. DIX: I mean now the time when Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia, in +the spring of 1939. + +KEITEL: That was in the same year of mobilization, that is to say at +that time, as far as figures are concerned, there were fewer divisions +than Czechoslovakia had at her disposal. In the fall of 1938 the number +of formations, that is, divisions, was probably equal. In the spring of +1939, when we marched in, the strength which was used then was less than +that which stood ready in the fall of 1938. Accurate figures, if they +are important to this Tribunal, you could get rather from General Jodl. + +DR. DIX: As to the number of divisions which Czechoslovakia had at her +disposal in March 1939, could you not tell us anything about that? + +KEITEL: No, I do not know that exactly. + +DR. DIX: Then I shall possibly ask General Jodl about that later. + +THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you will actually offer this document in evidence +when the Defendant Schacht gives evidence. Is that what you intend to +do? + +DR. DIX: I am going to submit it in evidence and it will be included in +my document book. It is not necessary to keep it now, because I have to +take it up again when Schacht will be examined and you will find it then +in the document book. However, I would like to suggest that the copy +which I have given to the witness should become a part of the record, +because my questions have referred to this document. For this reason it +might be useful to make this copy a part of the record. + +THE PRESIDENT: If you want to make it a part of the record it had better +be given a number now. It had better be S-1 had it not? + +DR. DIX: Yes. Your Lordship, may I suggest Schacht-1? + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +DR. STAHMER (Representing Dr. Robert Servatius, Counsel for Defendant +Sauckel, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Witness, on 4 +January 1944, a conference allegedly took place between the Führer and +Sauckel about the procuring of manpower. Were you present at this +conference? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. STAHMER: Did Sauckel on this occasion state that he could not fill, +to the extent demanded, the manpower demands of those who asked for it? + +KEITEL: Yes, he discussed it thoroughly and also gave his reasons for +it. + +DR. STAHMER: What reasons did he give? + +KEITEL: He pointed out the great difficulties encountered in the areas +from which he was supposed to draft or recruit manpower; the strong +activity of guerillas and partisans in these areas, the great obstacles +in obtaining sufficient police forces for protecting the action, and +similar reasons. I do not remember any details. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Field Marshal, were you the leader of the +German delegation which signed the capitulation with which the war in +Europe was terminated? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When and where did that take place? + +KEITEL: In Berlin on 8 May, that is to say during the night from 8 to 9 +May 1945. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you asked for full powers which would +authorize you to negotiate about the capitulation? + +KEITEL: Yes. I took the full powers with me to Berlin. They had been +signed by Grossadmiral Dönitz in his capacity as Chief of State and +Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and stated in a few words that he +had authorized and ordered me to conduct the negotiations and to sign +the capitulation. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these full powers examined and +acknowledged by the Allies? + +KEITEL: In the course of the afternoon of 8 May I was asked to present +the full powers. Obviously they were examined and several hours later +they were returned to me by a high ranking officer of the Red Army who +said that I had to show them again when signing. + +FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you show them again? + +KEITEL: I did have my credentials at hand during the act of capitulation +and handed them over to become part of the record. + +PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness, +during your testimony you have explained the organization of the Supreme +Command of the Wehrmacht. This organization was based on a decree of the +Führer and Reich Chancellor of 4 February 1938. In that decree the OKW +was designated as the military staff of the Supreme Commander of the +Armed Forces. So, in that aspect you were the Chief of Staff. Now, the +Prosecution have repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is that +correct? + +KEITEL: No, General Jodl never was my Chief of Staff, he was the Chief +of the Armed Forces’ Operations Staff and one of the departmental chiefs +of the Armed Forces High Command as I have already stated, although the +first among equals. + +DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say, the Chief of several collateral +co-ordinated offices? + +KEITEL: Yes; I never had a Chief of Staff. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Mention was made here about the discussion between Hitler +and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938. Do you remember +that? A diary entry by Jodl referring to this conversation has been +submitted to the Tribunal. Was Jodl present at this conference? + +KEITEL: No, he was not present and his knowledge is derived from the +conference which I described before and which I held with him and +Canaris about the news to be disseminated as to certain military +preparations during the days following the Schuschnigg conference; it is +therefore an impression gained by General Jodl as a result of the +description made to him. + +DR. JAHRREISS: In the course of the preparations to make the +German-Czechoslovakian question acute, that is, the Sudeten question, +the plan to stage an incident played a great role. Did you ever give an +order to the department Abwehr II (Counterintelligence) under Canaris, +to stage such an incident in Czechoslovakia or on the border? + +KEITEL: No, such orders were never given to the Abwehr, anyway, not by +myself. + +DR. JAHRREISS: After Munich, that is in October 1938, Field Marshal, the +then Chief of National Defense, Defendant Jodl, left this position and +was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor? + +KEITEL: Jodl was transferred to active service. He became chief of an +artillery division in Vienna and his successor was Warlimont, at that +time Colonel Warlimont. + +DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say his successor... + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. JAHRREISS: If I understood you correctly, that is to say Jodl was +not only sent on leave but he definitely left his office? + +KEITEL: Jodl had definitely left the High Command of the Armed Forces +and was personnel officer of a division; Warlimont was not his +representative but successor in Jodl’s position. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Now, the Prosecution has said that, at the occasion of +that famous conference of 23 May 1938—no, 1939—Warlimont was present +as deputy designate for Jodl. What had Jodl to do with that conference? + +KEITEL: Nothing at all, he was at that time a front-line officer and +commander in Vienna. + +DR JAHRREISS: Why did you choose Jodl to be chief of the Armed Forces +Operations Staff? + +KEITEL: That was in consequence of our co-operation from 1935 to 1938. +My opinion was that I could not find a better man for that position. + +DR. JAHRREISS: How did Jodl picture his military career, once his +command as artillery commander in Vienna or Brünn had ended? + +KEITEL: I knew about his passion and his desire to become commander of a +mountain division. He has frequently told me about it. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Well, would there have been any chance to get such a +command? + +KEITEL: Yes, I tried to use my influence with the Commander-in-Chief of +the Army and I remember that during the summer of 1939, I wrote him that +his wish to become the commander of a mountain division in +Reichenhall—I do not remember the number—would come true. I was glad +to be able to give him that information. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Was it up to you to make the decision or was it up to the +OKH? + +KEITEL: I had made a request to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and +he had made the decision. + +DR. JAHRREISS: And if I understand correctly, you yourself notified +Jodl? + +KEITEL: I wrote him a letter because I knew that I would make him very +happy. + +DR. JAHRREISS: May I ask, Field Marshal, did you correspond regularly +with Jodl? + +KEITEL: No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to him +during that year. + +DR. JAHRREISS: I ask that for a definite reason: Jodl leaves the OKW. He +knows that if the necessity arises he will become chief of the future +so-called Armed Forces Operations Staff, that is to say, a rather +important position. He goes on active service, as you say. One should +think that then he would not only receive a private letter once from you +but would be kept informed by you regularly. + +KEITEL: That was certainly not done by me and, according to my personal +opinion, every general staff officer who goes on active service is very +happy if he is not bothered with such things any longer. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but fate does not grant us everything which would +make us happy. It could be that somebody received the official order for +instance, to keep this gentleman informed. + +KEITEL: I certainly did not do it. I do not believe that it happened, +but I do not know for sure whether or not somebody tried to do it. + +DR. JAHRREISS: During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and Brünn, that +is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly in Berlin in order to get +information? + +KEITEL: I did not see him and he did not come to see me. I believe it is +very unlikely because if such were the case he would have visited me. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have to understand from what you say, that when he +came to Berlin shortly before the beginning of the war, in response to a +telegram, he first had to be informed as to what was going on? + +KEITEL: Yes, and that was the first thing done between him and myself. + +DR. JAHRREISS: You informed him? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Another thing, Field Marshal. You remember, perhaps, the +somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellery after the Simovic +Putsch; that was 27 March 1941, was it not? + +KEITEL: Yes, Yugoslavia. + +DR. JAHRREISS: If one reflects on the politics and the history of the +wars of the last 200 years in Europe, one asks: Was there nobody at that +conference in the Reich Chancellery who might have suggested that +instead of attacking immediately, it would be better to march to the +borders of a state whose attitude was completely uncertain and then +clarify the situation by an ultimatum? + +KEITEL: Yes, during all these pros and cons under turbulent conditions +in that morning session, Jodl, himself, to my knowledge, brought that +point up in the debate. Proposal: To march and to send an ultimatum; +that is about the way it was. + +DR. JAHRREISS: If I am correctly informed, you were in the East in +October 1941 for the purpose of an inspection or a visit to Army Group +North; is that correct? + +KEITEL: Yes, in the autumn of 1941 I frequently went by plane to Army +Group North in order to get information for the Führer. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Was Field Marshal Von Leeb the commander of Army Group +North? + +KEITEL: Yes, he was. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Did Von Leeb tell you about particular worries which he +had at that time? + +KEITEL: I think it was my last or the next to the last visit to Von Leeb +where the questions of capitulation, that is to say, the question of the +population of Leningrad, played an important role, which worried him +very much at that time because there were certain indications that the +population was streaming out of the city and infiltrating into his area. +I remember that at that time he asked me to make the suggestion to the +Führer that, as he could not take over and feed 1 million civilians +within the area of his army group, a sluice, so to speak, should be made +towards the east, that is, the Russian zone, so that the population +could flow out in that direction. I reported that to the Führer at that +time. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did the population turn in any other direction? + +KEITEL: Yes, especially to the south into the Southern forests. +According to Von Leeb a certain pressure exerted by the population to +get through the German lines made itself felt at the time. + +DR. JAHRREISS: And that would have impeded your operations? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +DR. JAHRREISS: Field Marshal, you are aware, I suppose, since it has +been mentioned this morning, of the order issued by the Führer and +Supreme Commander about the Commandos, dated 18 October 1942, that is +Document Number 498-PS which has been submitted here. It had been +announced publicly beforehand that an order of that kind would be +issued. Do you know that? + +KEITEL: Yes; the item in question was included in one of the daily +communiqués of the Wehrmacht. + +DR. JAHRREISS: We are dealing with the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October +1942, which, below the usual report, states with reference to what has +happened, “The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore considers +itself obliged to issue the following orders.” The first item is of no +interest here, and then, at the second item appears the following +sentence: + + “In the future all terror and sabotage Commandos of the British + and their accomplices who do not behave like soldiers, but + rather like bandits, will be treated as such by the German + troops and will be killed in combat without mercy wherever they + appear.” + +Field Marshal, who drafted this wording? + +KEITEL: The Führer personally. I was present when he dictated and +corrected it. + +DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to continue at the point which was +last mentioned by Professor Jahrreiss. The order about Commandos, +Document Number 498-PS, was discussed. In this order on Commandos, under +Number VI, Hitler threatened that all commanders would be +court-martialed if they did not carry out this order. Do you know what +considerations prompted Hitler to include this particular passage in the +order? + +KEITEL: Yes, they are actually quite clear; I should think that the +purpose, was to put emphasis on the demand that this order should +actually be carried out, since it was definitely considered by the +generals and those who were to carry it out, as a very grave order; and +for that reason compliance was to be enforced by the threat of +punishment. + +DR. LATERNSER: Now, I should like to ask you several questions +concerning the nature of the so-called Groups of the General Staff and +the OKW. What do you understand to be the German General Staff? + +KEITEL: By the General Staff I understand those officers who are +especially trained to be assistants to the higher leadership. + +THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already spent a very long time in +explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff of the various +commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically and quite +clearly what the group is, which they are asking the Court to declare as +criminal; and therefore, I do not see what relevance any further +evidence on the subject can have. What are you trying to show by asking +him now about what he understands by the General Staff? + +DR. LATERNSER: This question was purely preparatory. I intended to +connect this question with another one; and, by the answer to the second +question, I wanted to prove that under the alleged group, a group has +been accused under a wrong name. + +THE PRESIDENT: I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong name if the +group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has already told us what +he understands by the General Staff. Will you put your second question. + +DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if the higher military leaders are considered +collectively to form one group which is designated as General Staff and +OKW, do you consider this designation to be correct or misleading? + +KEITEL: According to our German military concepts this designation is +misleading, because to us the General Staff always means a body of +assistants, whereas the commanders of armies and army groups and the +commanding generals represent the leadership corps. + +DR. LATERNSER: The military hierarchy has been discussed sufficiently in +this Trial. I want to know only the following from you: Was the relation +of these echelons to each other that of military superiors and +subordinates or did there exist an additional organization involving +these ranks which went beyond purely professional military duties? + +KEITEL: No, the General Staff, that is to say, the General Staff +officers as assistants to the leaders, could be recognized by their +uniforms as such. The leaders or so-called commanders themselves had no +relation to each other through any interoffice channels or through any +other organizations of any kind. + +DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday the affidavit made by Generaloberst Halder was +put to you. I would like to discuss now the last sentence of that +affidavit; I shall read it to you, “That was the actual General Staff +and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces.” Is the statement in +that sentence correct or incorrect? + +KEITEL: I understand it this way, that Halder wanted to say that those +few officers who had General Staff positions were the ones who did the +real work in the General Staff of the Army, while the rest of the far +more than 100 General Staff officers in the OKH had nothing to do with +these matters. That is what I think he wanted to say, a small group +which was concerned with these problems. + +DR. LATERNSER: Do you know of a single incident where Hitler ever +consulted a military leader on a political matter? + +KEITEL: No, that did not happen. + +DR. LATERNSER: I assume that you were present at most of the conferences +with Hitler when the situation was discussed. Could you tell me anything +about protests made, with or without success, by any commanders who had +come from the front and who happened to be present? + +KEITEL: As a rule front Commanders who were present were silent +listeners at the general discussion of the situation; and afterwards, +according to circumstances, such commanders used to make a special +report to Hitler about their respective areas. Then there was also an +opportunity, as I believe was already mentioned by Kesselring, to +discuss these things personally and to advance opinions. But otherwise +nobody had anything to say in these matters. + +DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you ever present when particularly emphatic +objections were raised, by any commander, to Hitler? + +KEITEL: During the discussion of the situation? + +DR. LATERNSER: No, I mean, whatever the occasion may have been. + +KEITEL: I was not, of course, present at every conference which Hitler +had with high ranking commanders in his quarters, but I do not know of +any such incidents. I have related in detail those cases which played a +role in this war, namely the opposition of the generals in the West, +before the beginning of the war, and I understood your question to mean +whether I knew of any cases beyond that. + +DR. LATERNSER: Yes. + +KEITEL: I have related all that and must emphasize once more that the +Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the limit of +anything which could be justified from the military viewpoint. + +DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of Hitler toward the General Staff +of the Army? + +KEITEL: It was not a good one. One may say that he held a prejudice +against the General Staff and thought the General Staff was arrogant. I +believe that is sufficient. + +THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this once, if not more than once. + +DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not believe that this witness has +been asked about that. As far as I remember, this particular witness has +not been asked about these points. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he has been asked about it. + +DR. LATERNSER: I would have paid special attention to this point and +would have crossed off this question already if one of my colleagues had +put it before. + +[_To the defendant._] Would Hitler, in case an application for +resignation was tendered by one or more front commanders have been +willing to take back an order which he had once given... + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, nearly every officer who has come and +given evidence to this Court has spoken about that subject, certainly +many of them. + +DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, does your objection refer to the question +I have put now? + +THE PRESIDENT: Nearly all the officers who have been examined in this +Court have told us it was impossible to resign. That is what you are +asking about, isn’t it? + +DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I will be glad to forego that question, if I can +assume that the Tribunal accepts those facts which I wanted to prove, as +true. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether they accept +its truth or not, is a different question. + +DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to say something also to +this question. I do not believe that it can be considered cumulative, +since as has already been pointed out by my colleague, Dr. Dix, the same +question when put to two different witnesses is in each case a different +question, because the subjective answer of the individual witness to +this particular point is desired. But I will forego that question. + +THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask? + +DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have a few more questions. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, to what extent was the +headquarters of the Führer protected against attacks during the war? + +KEITEL: There was a special guard detachment of the Army and also I +believe one company of the Waffen-SS. Very thorough security measures +had been taken with every kind of safety device such as fences, +obstacles, and similar things. It was very well secured against any +surprise attack. + +DR. LATERNSER: Were there several zones? + +KEITEL: Yes, there was an inner zone and an outer zone and several areas +which were fenced in separately. + +DR. LATERNSER: Yes. You have already stated that the commanders of the +army groups and armies in the East did not have any authority outside +their area of operation. Was there a tendency to keep that operational +area as small as possible, or as large as possible? + +KEITEL: Originally the tendency definitely was to have large areas of +operation in order to assure the greatest possible freedom of movement +in the rear of the armies and army groups. The Führer was the first who, +by drastic means, caused the limitation of these zones to make them as +small as possible. + +DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons? + +KEITEL: As he said, in order to free military officers from +administrative measures and get them out of the extended space they had +sought for their equipment and to concentrate them into narrowly limited +areas. + +DR. LATERNSER: You mentioned during your interrogation, units of the +Waffen-SS which were assigned to the Army for operational, that is, for +combat purposes. I am particularly interested in getting that point +clear because, as far as I see, there still prevails some confusion. Did +the forces of the SD have anything to do with the units of the Waffen-SS +which were subordinated to army units for the purpose of operational +assignments? + +KEITEL: No, the formations of the Waffen-SS within divisions were +incorporated as such into the armies and had nothing to do with anything +else. They were in that case purely Army Forces. + +DR. LATERNSER: Was it possible for a commander to punish an SS man for +any offense? + +KEITEL: If the man was caught in the act I believe no commander would +have hesitated; but apart from that, the last resort for disciplinary +measures and jurisdiction was the Reichsführer Himmler, and not the +commander of the army. + +DR. LATERNSER: Did the executives of the Einsatzgruppen of the SD have +to report to the commanders of the armies upon what they did on +Himmler’s orders? + +KEITEL: This question has been dealt with here in great detail by the +witness Ohlendorf, and I am not informed about the connections which +existed between the commanders and the Einsatzgruppen and commands. I +was not involved and took no part in it. + +DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to know from you whether the Einsatzgruppen of +the SD, according to your knowledge of the regulations, were obliged to +report to the military commanders in whose rear areas they operated. + +KEITEL: I do not believe so; I do not know the orders which were in +force in this respect; I have not seen them. + +DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military commanders at any +time were informed of the intention of Hitler or Himmler to kill the +Jews? + +KEITEL: According to my opinion, that was not the case, since I +personally was not informed either. + +DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have only one more question, on the subject of the +prisoners of war. It had already become known during the war that the +conditions relating to the food supply of Soviet Russian prisoners of +war during the first period of the eastern campaign were miserable. What +was the reason for these conditions which prevailed during that first +period? + +KEITEL: I can base my statement only on what the Commander-in-Chief of +the Army said during the situation report conferences. As I recall, he +repeatedly reported that it was clearly a problem of large masses which +required extraordinary efforts of organization to provide food supply, +housing, and security. + +DR. LATERNSER: Now, these conditions were without doubt actually chaotic +during a certain period of time. I am thinking of a particular reason +which existed, and in order to refresh your memory, Witness, I would +like to mention the following: + +The Army had already prepared camps in the homeland for the future +prisoners of war, because it was planned in the beginning that these +prisoners should be transferred to the homeland. In spite of these +preparations, however, as has been stated here, this was stopped by a +sudden order from Hitler which prohibited the transfer of these Russian +prisoners into the homeland. + +KEITEL: I explained that this morning; and I said that during a certain +period until September, the transfer of Soviet Russian prisoners of war +into the Reich was prohibited and only after that the transfer into the +home camps was made possible in order to utilize the manpower. + +DR. LATERNSER: And the deficiencies which appeared during this first +period could not be remedied by the means at the disposal of the troops? + +KEITEL: That I do not know. I am not informed about that. Only the OKH, +which had the exclusive responsibility, would know that. + +DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions about the position of +the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. When was that +position set up? + +KEITEL: I believe in 1942. + +DR. LATERNSER: 1942. What was the rank connected with that position? + +KEITEL: It could be a colonel or a general. + +DR. LATERNSER: What I mean is whether it was about the same as the +position of a commander of a division? + +KEITEL: Well, I would say it was equal to the position of the commander +of a brigade or a division, a section chief. + +DR. LATERNSER: How many section chiefs were there in the OKW? + +KEITEL: I could not say that at present from memory. By way of estimate +I had eight department chiefs, each of which had one, two, three or four +sections. Therefore there would have been about 30 or 35 section chiefs. + +DR. LATERNSER: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was +one of the eight or of the 30 section chiefs? + +KEITEL: No, I would not like to say that definitely. We had among the +department chiefs so-called department group chiefs, who combined +several small sections. That was about his position. + +DR. LATERNSER: What were the official duties connected with that +position? + +KEITEL: Naturally the supervision and direction of all the work of that +part of the Armed Forces Operations Staff which was attached to the +Führer’s headquarters. It was his task to direct that work in accordance +with the directives given by Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces +Operations Staff. + +DR. LATERNSER: Was the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff +responsible for the strategic planning to a particularly high degree, as +is maintained by the Prosecution? + +KEITEL: He was, of course, not responsible for that in this capacity, +but as a matter of fact he belonged to the small group of high ranking +and outstanding general staff officers who were concerned with these +things, as Halder has pointed out. + +DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question. Was, therefore, the +position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, not +equal in importance to the other positions which are included in this +group or alleged group of the General Staff and the OKW? + +KEITEL: I said chief of a group of departments in the Armed Forces +Operations Staff and co-worker in the small group of those who had to +deal with operational and strategical questions, but subordinate to +General Jodl and director of the work supervisor in the Arbeitsstab. + +DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, I believe that the question which I have +put to you was not completely answered. I have asked you whether the +importance of that position was equal to or even approached equality +with that of the other offices which are included in the group of the +general staff and the OKW. + +KEITEL: No, certainly not, because in the group of the General Staff and +the OKW there were the commanders-in-chief, the supreme commanders, and +the chiefs of the general staff. He certainly did not belong to those. + +DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. + +HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, you have said in your +Affidavit Keitel-12 that the SS, at the beginning of the war, became the +champions and standard bearers of a policy of conquest and force. In +order to exclude any misunderstandings, I should like to clarify the +following: What did you mean by SS in this case? + +KEITEL: I can say to that, that what has been read here by my counsel +was a short summary of a much longer affidavit. If you read the latter +you would find for yourself the answer to your question. To state it in +a more precise way: It concerned the Reich SS Leadership under Himmler +and under those functionaries within his sphere of command, police and +SS, who appeared and were active in the occupied territories. The +concept of the so-called general SS in the homeland had nothing to do +with that. I hope that makes it clear. + +HERR BABEL: Yes, thank you. + +DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): Witness, the +Prosecution in their trial brief have charged the Defendant Bormann also +with his activity in the so-called Volkssturm. In that connection, I +would like to put a few questions to you. + +Was an offensive or defensive activity planned for the Volkssturm as it +was formed by decree of the Führer of 18 October 1944? + +KEITEL: To that I can only say that Reichsleiter Bormann refused to give +the military authorities any advice, any co-operation, and any +information on the Volkssturm. + +DR. BERGOLD: You mean to say that you were not at all informed of the +purpose of the Volkssturm? + +KEITEL: Only that I saw it as the last levy of men to defend their own +homesteads. + +DR. BERGOLD: That means that, within the framework of the Wehrmacht, the +Volkssturm was not designed for any offensive purpose? + +KEITEL: No, but all services of the Wehrmacht which encountered the +Volkssturm units in their areas, either incorporated them or sent them +home. + +DR. BERGOLD: Did I understand you correctly that you wanted to say that +that institution, the Volkssturm, was a product of Bormann’s brain or +did it originate with Hitler? + +KEITEL: I do not know that, perhaps from both. + +DR. BERGOLD: Hitler did not tell you about it, either? + +KEITEL: No, he spoke only about the Volkssturm and similar things, but +military authorities had nothing to do with it. + +DR. BERGOLD: Did Bormann report any other military matters to the Führer +besides the odd things about the Volkssturm? + +KEITEL: He has often accused the Wehrmacht of all sorts of things; I can +conclude that only from what I was told, and assume that it originated +with Bormann. I do not know it. + +DR. BERGOLD: Thank you. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, after his +return from Moscow in August 1939, on account of the changed foreign +political situation—the guarantee pact between England and Poland had +been ratified—advised Hitler to stop the military measures which had +been set in motion? + +KEITEL: I had the impression at that time that the orders given to me by +Hitler were based upon a conversation between him and his foreign +minister. I was not present at that conversation. + +DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, just like the other +ministers with portfolio, was as a rule not informed about the strategic +plans? + +KEITEL: I can say only for myself and for the Chief of the Armed Forces +Operations Staff, that we were not authorized to do it and that we never +did it. If the Reich Foreign Minister was informed about such questions, +that information could have come only from Hitler himself. I doubt that +he made an exception here. + +DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a letter of 3 April 1940, +concerning the impending occupation of Denmark and Norway which you sent +to the then Reich Foreign Minister. In that letter you informed the +Reich Foreign Minister of the impending occupation and requested him to +take the necessary political steps. Had you already instructed Von +Ribbentrop before that date about the intended occupation of Norway and +Denmark? + +KEITEL: No, I would not have been allowed to do that, according to the +way in which the Führer worked with us. That letter was an unusual +method of giving information about this, by the Führer’s order, to the +Reich Foreign Minister, who knew nothing about these things. I was +ordered to write it to him. + +DR. HORN: In connection with the testimony by General Lahousen, I want +to ask you one question. At the time of the Polish campaign, was there a +directive or an order by Hitler to exterminate the Jews in the Polish +Ukraine? + +KEITEL: I cannot recall any such things. I know only that during the +occupation of Poland—that is after the occupation—the problem of the +Polish Jews played a part. In that connection I also put a question once +to Hitler to which, I believe, he answered that that area was well +suited for settling the Jews there. I do not know or remember anything +else. + +DR. HORN: At the time of the Polish campaign, was there any plan to +instigate a revolt in the Polish Ukraine in the rear of the Poles? + +KEITEL: I cannot answer that question, although I have heard such things +said here by Lahousen. I do not know or remember anything about it. + +DR. HORN: Thank you. + +HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): Field Marshal, you were Chief of +the OKW and thereby also the Chief of the KGF, that is, Prisoners of War +Organization. Did you ever issue orders or have orders issued on the +basis of which members of the SA or units of the SA were detailed to +guard prisoners of war or prisoner-of-war camps, or were to be used for +that purpose? + +KEITEL: I cannot remember that any such directive had been issued by the +OKW. I believe that certainly was not the case. + +HERR BÖHM: In that respect, was a report ever made to you that any such +guard duty was performed? + +KEITEL: I cannot remember but I do not mean to deny that some units of +the army in some particular place may have used SA men temporarily to +assist in guard duty, which I would not know. + +HERR BÖHM: Thank you. + +THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now for 10 minutes. + + [_A recess was taken._] + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in open session tomorrow morning at +10 o’clock. At 1230 it will take the supplementary applications for +witnesses and documents, and after that at a quarter to 1 it will +adjourn into a closed session. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I would like you to tell me exactly when +you received your first commission as an officer? + +KEITEL: On 18 August 1902. + +GEN. RUDENKO: What military training did you receive? + +KEITEL: I came into the army as an officer candidate. Starting as a +simple private I advanced through the various ranks of private first +class, corporal and ensign to lieutenant. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you about your military training. + +KEITEL: I was an army officer until 1909, and then for almost 6 years +regimental adjutant; then during the World War I, battery commander, and +then after the spring of 1915 I served on the general staff. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You were evidently not given a correct translation. Did +you pass the Staff College or any other college, that is to say, did you +receive preliminary training? + +KEITEL: I never attended the War Academy. Twice I participated in +so-called Great General Staff trips as regimental adjutant and in the +summer of 1914 I was detailed to the Great General Staff and returned to +my regiment later when the war broke out in 1914. + +GEN. RUDENKO: What military training and military rank did Hitler +possess? + +KEITEL: Only a few years ago I found out from Hitler himself that after +the end of World War I, he had been a lieutenant in a Bavarian infantry +regiment. During the war he was a private, then private first class and +maybe corporal during the last period. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not, therefore, conclude that you, with your +thorough military training and great experience, could have had an +opportunity of influencing Hitler, very considerably, in solving +questions of a strategic and military nature, as well as other matters +pertaining to the Armed Forces? + +KEITEL: No. I have to declare in that respect that, to a degree which is +almost incomprehensible to the layman and the professional officer, +Hitler had studied general staff publications, military literature, +essays on tactics, operations, and strategy and that he had a knowledge +in the military fields which can only be called amazing. May I give an +example of that which can be confirmed by the other officers of the +Wehrmacht. Hitler was so well informed concerning organization, +armament, leadership, and equipment of all armies, and what is more +remarkable, of all navies of the globe, that it was impossible to prove +any error on his part; and I have to add that also during the war, while +I was at his headquarters and in his close proximity, Hitler studied at +night all the big general staff books by Moltke, Schlieffen, and +Clausewitz and from them acquired his vast knowledge by himself. +Therefore we had the impression: Only a genius can do that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You will not deny that by reason of your military training +and experience you were Hitler’s adviser in a number of highly important +matters? + +KEITEL: I belonged to his closest military entourage and I heard a lot +from him; but I pointed out yesterday to the question of my counsel that +even in the simple, every-day questions concerning organization and +equipment of the Wehrmacht, I must admit openly that I was the pupil and +not the master. + +GEN. RUDENKO: From what date do you consider that your co-operation with +Hitler began? + +KEITEL: Exactly from the day when I was called into that position, 4 +February 1938. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That means that you were working with Hitler during the +entire period of preparation for and realization of aggressive warfare? + +KEITEL: Yes. I have already given all the necessary explanations as to +how, after I entered my new position in the beginning of February, +events followed in quick succession, often in a very surprising manner. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military leaders of the OKW +and the OKH had the rank of Reich Minister? + +KEITEL: The rank of Reich Minister was given to the three +commanders-in-chief of the sections of the Armed Forces, and among these +the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reich Marshal Göring, was also +Reich Minister of Aviation; likewise I received, as I said yesterday, +the rank but not the authority and title of a minister. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military collaborators of the +OKH and the OKW, signed decrees together with Hitler and the other Reich +Ministers? + +KEITEL: In the ministerial sector of the Reich Government, there was the +method of the signatures of the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the +Ministers immediately involved, and, finally of the Chief of the Reich +Chancellery. This did not hold good for the military sector, for +according to the traditions of the German Army and the Wehrmacht the +signatures were given by the principal experts who had worked on the +matter, by the Chief of Staff, or by whoever had given or at least +drafted the order, and an initial was added on the margin. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you said that you signed such decrees together +with other Ministers of the Reich. + +KEITEL: Yes, yesterday I mentioned individual decrees and also gave the +reasons why I signed them, and that in so doing I was not Reich Minister +and did not receive the function of a minister in office. + +GEN. RUDENKO: What organization exercised the function of the War +Ministry from February 1938 on? + +KEITEL: Until the last days of January, or the first days of February, +it was the former Reich Minister for War, Von Blomberg. Beginning with 4 +February there was neither a Minister for War nor a War Ministry. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely why I asked you what government +organization had replaced the War Ministry and exercised its function, +since I knew that this Ministry did not exist. + +KEITEL: I, myself, with the Wehrmachtsamt, the former Staff of the War +Ministry, whose chief I was, carried on the work and distributed it, as +I described in detail yesterday, that is, I transferred all command +functions to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht. +But this was not an order of mine but an order of Hitler’s. + +GEN. RUDENKO: From the diagram you have submitted to the Tribunal it +would appear that the OKW was the central, coordinating, and supreme +military authority of the Reich and that it was directly under Hitler’s +control. Would this conclusion be correct? + +KEITEL: Yes, that was the military staff of Hitler. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Who, in the OKW, directly supervised the drafting of +military and strategic plans? I am referring specifically to the plans +for the attack on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, +France, Norway, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. + +KEITEL: I believe that yesterday I stated that very precisely, saying +that the operational and strategic planning, after an order had been +given by Hitler, was prepared and then submitted to Hitler by the +commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht; that is to say, +for the Army, by the High Command of the Army and the General Staff of +the Army, and then further decisions were made with respect to it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to Yugoslavia I should like to ask you the +following question: Do you admit that a directive issued under your +signature, for the preliminary partition of Yugoslavia, is _per se_ a +document of great political and international importance, providing for +the actual abolition of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state? + +KEITEL: I did nothing more or less than to write down a decree by the +Führer and forward it to those offices which were interested and +concerned. I did not have any personal or political influence whatsoever +in these questions. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Under your own signature? + +KEITEL: As to the signatures which I have given, I made a complete +explanation yesterday, as to how they came about and what their +significance is. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, we did talk about it, we did hear about it, and I +shall ask some more questions on the subject later on. I should now like +to determine with greater precision your own position in the question of +Yugoslavia. Do you agree that you, with the direct participation of the +OKW, organized acts of provocation in order to find a reason for +aggression against Yugoslavia and a justification for this aggression in +the eyes of the world? + +KEITEL: This morning, in response to questions of the counsel of other +defendants, I answered clearly that I did not participate in any +preparation of an incident and that Hitler did not wish either that any +military offices should ever participate in the discussion, preparation, +deliberation, or the execution of incidents. I use “incident” here in +the sense of provocation. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Undoubtedly. What part did the OKW take to insure the +arming of the Free Corps in the Sudetenland? + +KEITEL: Which Free Corps, General? I do not know to which Free Corps you +refer. + +GEN. RUDENKO: The Free Corps of the Sudetenland. + +KEITEL: I am not informed as to whether any military office did any +gun-running, if I may say so, or secretly sent arms there. I have no +knowledge concerning that. An order to that effect was not given, or at +any rate did not pass through my hands. I cannot remember that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: By whom and for what reason was the order issued to occupy +Ostrau in Moravia and Witkovitz by German troops, on 14 March 1939, in +the afternoon, while President Hacha was still on the way to Berlin for +negotiations with Hitler? + +KEITEL: The order was eventually released and decided by the Führer. +There had been preparations to occupy by a _coup de main_ that area +where the well-known big and modern steel works were located near +Mährisch Ostrau—I cannot remember the name now—before the date of the +march into Czechoslovakia as originally set. As a justification for that +decision, Hitler had told me that it was done in order to prevent the +Poles from making a surprise attack from the north, and thereby perhaps +taking possession of the most modern rolling mill in the world. This he +gave as a reason, and the operation, that is, the occupation, actually +took place in the late hours of 14 March. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but during the same time, President Hacha was on the +way to Berlin to negotiate with Hitler? + +KEITEL: Yes, that is correct. + +GEN. RUDENKO: This is treachery! + +KEITEL: I do not believe that I need to add my judgement to the facts. +It is true that the occupation was carried out on that evening. I have +given the reasons, and President Hacha learned about it only after he +arrived in Berlin. + +Now I remember the name. The rolling mill was Witkovitz. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask you in connection with +the aggression against the Soviet Union. You testified to the Tribunal +yesterday on the subject. You explained your position, with regard to +the attack on the Soviet Union. But you informed the Tribunal that the +orders for preparing Plan Barbarossa were given at the beginning of +December 1940. Is that right? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you definitely remember and confirm this? + +KEITEL: I do not know of, or do not remember, any specific order by the +High Command of the Wehrmacht which called for the drawing up of this +plan called Barbarossa any earlier than that. I explained yesterday, +however, that some order had been issued, probably in September, +concerning transport and railway facilities and similar matters. I +cannot recall whether I signed that order, but yesterday I mentioned +such a preparatory order to improve transport conditions from the West +to the East. + +GEN. RUDENKO: In September? + +KEITEL: It may have been in September or October, but I cannot commit +myself as to the exact time. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to know the exact time. + +KEITEL: More accurate information may probably be obtained at a later +stage from General Jodl, who ought to know it better. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Of course we shall ask him about it during the course of +his interrogation. I should like you to recollect the following briefly: +Did you first learn of Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union in +the summer of 1940? + +KEITEL: No. In the summer of 1940 this conversation which is mentioned +in Jodl’s diary—I believe that is what you are referring to, you mean +the conversation from Jodl’s diary—I was not present at this obviously +very casual and brief conversation and did not hear it. My recollections +concerning that period also justify my belief that I was not present, +because I was on the move almost every day by airplane and was not +present at the discussions of the situation at that time. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And when did your conversation with Ribbentrop take place? + +KEITEL: That may have been during the last days of August; I believe, it +was in the beginning of September, but I cannot give the exact date any +more. I reconstruct the date by the fact that I did not return to +Berchtesgaden until 10 August, and that I wrote the memorandum which I +mentioned yesterday at a later date. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And so you assure the Tribunal that you first heard about +Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union from the conversation with +Ribbentrop? + +KEITEL: No, no. After having been absent from Berchtesgaden for about +two weeks, partly on leave and partly on duty in Berlin, I returned to +headquarters at Berchtesgaden; and then on one of the subsequent days, +probably during the middle of August, I heard for the first time ideas +of that kind from Hitler. That was the basis for my deliberation and my +memorandum. + +GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, have I put my question correctly in asking +whether you learned of Hitler’s schemes in the summer of 1940? + +KEITEL: Yes. The middle of August, after all, is still summer. + +GEN. RUDENKO: August is still summer, we will not quibble about that. +Further, I should like to remind you of the evidence of the witness +Paulus, which he gave here before the Tribunal, on 11 February of this +year. Paulus, as you will remember, informed the Tribunal that when he +entered the OKH on 3 September 1940, he found among other plans an +unfinished preliminary operational draft of a plan for attacking the +Soviet Union, known under the name of Barbarossa. Do you remember that +part of Paulus’ testimony? + +KEITEL: I remember it only insofar as he stated that it was a study or a +draft for a maneuver, and that he found a document on the occasion of +his transfer to the OKH, to the General Staff of the Army. This is not +known to me, and it could not be known to me because the documents, +files, and other reports of the General Staff of the Army were never at +my disposal; and I never had an opportunity to look at them. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to establish one fact. Do you deny that the OKH, in +September 1940, was elaborating plans in connection with Plan +Barbarossa? + +KEITEL: If we go by the testimony of Field Marshal Paulus, then I could +not say that it is not true, since I cannot know whether it actually was +true. I can neither deny nor affirm it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You informed the Tribunal that you were opposed +to the war with the Soviet Union. + +KEITEL: Yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You also stated that you went to Hitler with the +suggestion that he should change his plans with regard to the Soviet +Union. Is that correct? + +KEITEL: Yes, not only to change them, but to drop this plan and not to +wage war against the Soviet Union. That was the content of my +memorandum. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely what I asked you. I would like to ask +you now about a conference, evidently known to you, which was held 3 +weeks after Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, the conference of 16 +July 1941. Do you remember that conference, which dealt with the tasks +for the conduct of the war against the Soviet Union? + +KEITEL: No, at the moment I do not know what you mean. I do not know. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to submit that document to you at this +particular minute. You may remember that I submitted it to the Defendant +Göring, when the question of the dismemberment and of the annexation of +the Soviet Union arose. Do you remember? + +KEITEL: That is a document which I know. I believe it is marked on top +“BO-FU,” and during my interrogation here I have identified it as a +memorandum from Reichsleiter Bormann. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct. + +KEITEL: I made that statement. At that time I also testified that I was +called in only during the second part of the conference and that I had +not been present during the first part of it. I also testified that it +was not the minutes but a free summary made by Reichsleiter Bormann, +dictated by him. + +GEN. RUDENKO; But you do remember that even then, on 16 July, the +question was already being advanced about the annexation by Germany of +the Crimea, the Baltic States, the regions of the Volga, the Ukraine, +Bielorussia and other territories? + +KEITEL: No, I believe that was discussed at the first part of the +conference. I can remember the conference, from that stage on where +questions of personnel were discussed, that is, certain personalities +who were to be appointed. That I remembered. I have seen the document +here for the first time and did not know of it before; and did not +attend the first half of the conference. + +GEN. RUDENKO: In that case may I put the question differently: What were +the final aims pursued by Hitler and his entourage at that time, against +the Soviet Union? + +KEITEL: According to the explanations which Hitler had given me, I saw +the more profound reasons for this war in the fact that he was convinced +that a war would break out some way or other within the next years +between the Greater Slav Empire of Communism and the German Reich of +National Socialism. The reasons which were given to me were something +like this: If I believe or rather if I am convinced that such a conflict +between these two nations will take place, then it would be better now +than later. That is how I can put it. But I do not remember, at least +not at the moment, the questions which are in this document about the +dismemberment of several areas. Perhaps they were constructions of +fantasy. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And you tell the Tribunal under oath that you did not know +of the Hitlerite plans to seize and colonize the territories of the +Soviet Union? + +KEITEL: That has not been expressed in that form. It is true that I +believed that the Baltic provinces should be made dependents of the +Reich, and that the Ukraine should come into a closer connection from +the point of view of food supply or economy, but concrete plans for +conquest are not known to me and if they were ever touched upon I never +considered them to be serious problems. That is the way I looked at it +at that time. I must not explain how I see it today, but only how I saw +it at that time. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know that at this conference of 16 July Hitler +announced the necessity of razing the city of Leningrad to the ground? + +KEITEL: I do not believe that during that conference—I have read that +document here again. That it is contained in the document I cannot +remember now. But I have had this document here in my hands; I have read +it in the presence of the American Prosecutor; and if it is stated +therein, then the question of whether or not I have heard it depends +entirely on the moment at which I was called to that conference. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to hand you the document now, because it +has already been submitted several times. But in the minutes previously +quoted to the Defendant Göring, who read them himself, it is said, “The +Leningrad region is claimed by the Finns. The Führer wants to raze +Leningrad to the ground and then cede it to the Finns.” + +KEITEL: I can only say that it is necessary to establish from what +moment on I attended that conference. Whatever was said before that +moment I did not hear, and I can indicate that only if I am given the +document or if one reads the record of my preliminary interrogation. +That is what I told the interrogating officer at that time. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We shall give you the minutes of the conference +of 16 July immediately. While the passages required are being found, I +shall ask you a few more questions, and by that time the passages will +have been found. + +With regard to the destruction of Leningrad, did you not know about it +from other documents? + +KEITEL: I have been asked about that by the Russian Delegation and the +general who is present here in this courtroom. He has called my +attention to a document. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That was during the preliminary investigation, that is +quite right. + +KEITEL: I know the document which came from the Navy, from an admiral, +as well as a second document which contained a short directive, I +believe on the order of Jodl, concerning Leningrad. I have been +interrogated regarding both documents. As to that I can state only that +neither through artillery operations during the siege, nor by operations +of the Air Force, could the extent of destruction be compared with that +of other places we know about. It did not materialize, we did not carry +it out. It never came to a systematic shelling of Leningrad, as far as I +know. Consequently, only that can be stated which I said at that time +under oath to the gentlemen of the Soviet Delegation. + +GEN. RUDENKO: According to your knowledge was Leningrad never shelled? + +KEITEL: Certainly artillery was also used in the Leningrad area, but it +never went so far as to constitute shelling for the purposes of +destruction. That would have occurred, General, if it had come to an +attack on Leningrad. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Look at this document, and I shall then ask you a few +supplementary questions. [_The document was submitted to the +defendant._] + +KEITEL: It is very simple. My entry is exactly after the moment after +this remark had been made. I told the American interrogator at the time +that I just heard the discussion about the appointment of Gauleiter +Lohse when I entered the room. The preceding remarks I did not hear. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with those minutes of the +report on the conference of 16 July that deal with Leningrad? + +KEITEL: Yes, that is where I entered. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You saw that there was such an entry in the minutes of the +meeting. You arrived at the conference just as they had finished talking +about Leningrad? + +KEITEL: Yes. I entered the room when they were talking about the +qualifications of Gauleiter Lohse, whether or not he was suitable for an +administrative office. These were the first words which I heard. A +debate was going on about that subject just when I entered. + +GEN. RUDENKO: It states there quite clearly: “Raze the city of Leningrad +to the ground.” + +KEITEL: Yes, I have read that here. + +GEN. RUDENKO: The same is stated in the decree, is it not? + +KEITEL: Yes; but there is no direct connection with me. Do you mean the +order of the Navy, the order which was found with the Navy? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that there were two decrees, one issued by the +naval command and the other by the OKW, signed by Jodl? You do know +that, do you not? + +KEITEL: Yes, I have seen both these decrees here. They were submitted by +the Russian Delegation. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And you know that the decree signed by the Defendant Jodl +also refers to the destruction of the city of Moscow. + +KEITEL: That I do not remember exactly, any more since only Leningrad +was referred to at that time, when I glanced at it. But if it is stated +there, I will not doubt it at all. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you: Did the OKW issue decrees for the purpose +of having them obeyed? + +KEITEL: The order or communication of the Navy is first of all no OKW +order and how it originated is not known to me. The short order of the +OKW, signed “By order of Jodl,” was not drafted in my presence, as I +already stated yesterday. I would have signed it but I was absent and +therefore do not know either to which reasons or discussions this order +was due. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You have not replied to my question. I am asking you: The +directives issued by the OKW were given out to be obeyed? Can you reply +to me briefly? + +KEITEL: This is a directive but not an order, because an order can be +given only by the office of the local command of the army. It was +therefore a directive, an aim, an intention. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And are directives from the OKW not meant to be carried +out? + +KEITEL: Certainly they are meant to be carried out. + +GEN. RUDENKO: As to your statement that no one shelled Leningrad, it +does not even call for further denial, since it is a well-known fact. + +KEITEL: May I at least say that I did not issue that order. That is why +I do not know anything about it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that before the beginning of the war against +the Soviet Union the Defendant Göring issued a so-called Green Folder +containing directives on the economic matters in the territories of the +U.S.S.R. intended for occupation? + +KEITEL: Yes, that is known to me. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you affirm that in your directive of 16 June 1941 you +instructed all the German troops to obey these directives implicitly? + +KEITEL: Yes, there is a directive which makes known to all units of the +Army the organizations which are assigned for important tasks and what +their responsibilities are, and that all the military commands of the +Army must act in compliance therewith. That I passed on; it was not my +order, I passed it on. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Was it your own order or were you merely obeying the +Führer’s instructions? + +KEITEL: I merely passed on the orders received from the Führer, and I +could not give any orders at all to Reich Marshal Göring in that +respect. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You did not issue an order to Field Marshal Göring, but +addressed your order to the troops? + +KEITEL: I could not give him any orders either; I could only communicate +the will of the Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he had +to pass it on to his army groups. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You did not disagree with this will of the Führer’s? + +KEITEL: I did not raise any objection, since this did not concern a duty +of the OKW. I followed the order and passed it on. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that this order gave you instructions for the +immediate and complete economic exploitation of the occupied regions of +the Soviet Union in the interest of German war economy? + +KEITEL: I did not give such an order containing the aims and tasks which +were to be carried out by the organization Economic Staff Oldenburg, +since I had nothing to do with that. I only passed on the contents of +the Green Folder—it is known what this name stands for—to the High +Command of the Army for appropriate action. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that the directives contained in Göring’s +Green Folder were aimed at the plunder of the material wealth of the +Soviet Union and all her citizens? + +KEITEL: No. In my opinion nothing was said about destruction in the +Green Folder. Instead of destruction one ought to say, to make good use +of surplus, especially in the field of the food supply and the +utilization of raw materials for the entire war economy of Germany, but +not the destruction of them. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Please repeat what you have said. + +KEITEL: I said that in the Green Folder there were principles for the +utilization of present and future reserves which were considered +surplus, but never for their destruction. To let the Soviet population +starve at the same time, on account of this, that was not the case. I +have seen these things on the spot and therefore I am qualified to speak +about them. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You do not consider that plunder? + +KEITEL: The quibble about words, whether booty, or exploitation of +reserves found during the war, or looting, or the like, is a matter of +concepts which I believe need not be defined here. Everyone uses his own +expressions in this respect. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, do not let us argue about it. I have one last +question to ask you with regard to the attack on the Soviet Union: Do +you agree that the methods of warfare adopted by the German Army in the +East stood in striking contrast with the simplest concept of military +honor of an army and the exigencies of war? + +KEITEL: No, I cannot admit that in this form. I would rather say, the +fact that the brutalizing—I have used this term before—that the +brutalizing of the war against the Soviet Union and what occurred in the +East, is not to be attributed to instigation by the German Army but to +circumstances which I have stated in an affidavit submitted by my +counsel to the Tribunal. I would furthermore like to ask the Russian +Prosecutor to read it so that he can see my opinion about it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. To conclude the question of aggression and to +pass to the question of atrocities, I have to ask you the following +question, and I trust you will impart to the Tribunal the information +you possess in your capacity as Hitler’s closest adviser on the conduct +of the war. + +My question is the following: What tasks did the High Command of the +Armed Forces entrust to the German Army in case Germany fought to the +finish a victorious war against the Soviet Union? + +KEITEL: I do not know what you mean by that. Which demands were put to +the military leadership in case the war would be a success? May I ask +you to put this question differently. I did not understand it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I have in mind tasks for the further conduct of the war +after a successful conclusion of the Eastern campaign. + +KEITEL: There could have occurred what actually did occur later, that +is, the landing of the British and American forces in France, in +Denmark, or in Germany, _et cetera_. There were various possibilities of +warfare which might occur and which could not be anticipated at all. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I am not asking this question in general. You are +evidently acquainted with a document entitled, _Manual of Naval +Warfare_, which had already been drafted on 8 August 1941 and contained +plans for the subsequent conduct of the war after the conclusion of the +Eastern campaign. I refer here to the drafting of plans for an attack on +Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Do you know this document? + +KEITEL: It has not been submitted to me so far. It is a surprise at the +moment, and I cannot recall it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know this document. + +This document, Your Honors, is Number S-57; it was submitted to the +Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-336. I shall show it to you in a minute. +Please hand this document to the defendant. [_The document was submitted +to the defendant._] + +KEITEL: I see this document for the first time, at any rate here during +the proceedings. It begins with the sentence, “A draft of directives +concerning further plans after the end of the Eastern campaign was +submitted to the Naval Operations Staff.” This order or directive of the +Navy I have never seen nor could I have seen it. It is a draft of +directives which could come only from the High Command of the Wehrmacht. +In the Armed Forces Operations Staff there were officers from the Army, +the Navy, and the Air Force, and it is quite possible that ideas which +took the shape of drafts of directives were made known at the time to +the officers of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. I cannot remember any +such draft of directives of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, but perhaps +Generaloberst Jodl may possibly be in a position to give information +about that. I cannot remember it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember it? I shall not examine you about it +closely but you see that the document plans the seizure of Gibraltar +with the active participation of Spain. In addition it provides for an +attack on Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and so forth. And you say that you +know nothing of this document? + +KEITEL: I shall be glad to give information about that. An attack to +seize Gibraltar, the entrance to the Mediterranean straits, had already +been planned for the preceding winter but had not been carried out, that +is, during the winter of 1939-40. It was nothing new and the other +topics which have been mentioned were those which developed ideas based +on the situation existing north of the Caucasus as a result of the +operations. I do not at all mean to say that these ideas were not given +any thought, but I do not remember it and I did not read every document +or paper of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff when it was in the drafting +stage. + +GEN. RUDENKO: If you consider as mere scraps of paper documents +concerning the seizure of foreign countries, then what documents do you +consider as important? + +KEITEL: I can state only the following, which is true and sincere. In +wartime one makes many plans and considers various possibilities which +are not and cannot be carried out in the face of the hard facts of +reality; and therefore it is not permissible to regard such papers +afterwards from an historical point of view, as representing throughout +the will and intention of the operational and strategic war leadership. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I agree with you that from an historical point of view +this document is at present of no importance whatsoever. But taken in +conjunction with the plan of the German General Staff at a time when +this Staff thought it was going to defeat the Soviet Union, the document +does acquire a very different meaning. However, I shall not examine you +any further about this document, for the time being. + +I now pass on to the subject of atrocities and of your attitude towards +these crimes. Your counsel, Dr. Nelte, has already handed you the +principal documents of the Prosecution on the subject of atrocities. I +do not therefore intend either to submit them again or to enter into any +detailed argument on the subject. I shall merely examine you on the +basic principles of these documents which were submitted by your counsel +when he interrogated you. + +I shall first of all refer to a document entitled, “Directive on the +Introduction of Military Jurisdiction in Region Barbarossa and on the +Adoption of Special Military Measures.” Do you remember that document? +It was drawn up on 13 May 1941 more than a month before the outbreak of +war against the Soviet Union. Do you remember that in that document, +drawn up before the war, instructions were given that suspect elements +should immediately be brought before an officer and that he would decide +whether they were to be shot? Do you remember that directive? Did you +sign the document? + +KEITEL: Yes, I have never denied that. But I have given the necessary +explanations as to how the document came into being and who was its +originator. + +THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Document C-50, dated 13 May 1941. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +GEN. RUDENKO: [_To the defendant_]: Although you declare that you have +already elucidated the matter to your counsel, I am nevertheless obliged +to put this question to you in a slightly different form: Did you +consider that an officer had a right to shoot people without trial or +investigation? + +KEITEL: In the German Army there have always been courts-martial for our +own soldiers as well as for our enemies, which could always be set up, +consisting of one officer and one or two soldiers all three of whom +would act as judges. That is what we call a court-martial +(Standgericht); the only requisite is always that an officer must +preside at this court. But as a matter of principle I have to repeat the +statement which I have made yesterday... + +GEN. RUDENKO: One moment! Please reply to this question. Did not this +document do away with judicial proceedings in the case of so-called +suspects, at the same time leaving to an officer of the German Army the +right to shoot them? Is that correct? + +KEITEL: In the case of German soldiers it was correct and was permitted. +There is a military tribunal with judicial officers and there is a +court-martial which consists of soldiers. These have the right to pass +and to execute an appropriate sentence against any soldier of the German +Army in court-martial proceedings. + +THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. The question is, what +right does this document give, not what the orders in the German Army +are. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Can you reply to the following question? Did this document +do away with judicial proceedings and did it give the German officer the +right to shoot suspects, as stated herein? + +KEITEL: That was an order which was given to me by Hitler. He had given +me that order and I put my name under it. What that means, I explained +in detail yesterday. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You, a Field Marshal, signed that decree. You considered +that the decree was irregular; you understood what the consequences of +that decree were likely to be. Then why did you sign it? + +KEITEL: I cannot say any more than that I put my name to it and I +thereby, personally, assumed in my position a degree of responsibility. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And one more question. This decree was dated 13 May 1941, +almost a month before the outbreak of war. So you had planned the murder +of human beings beforehand? + +KEITEL: That I do not understand. It is correct that this order was +issued about 4 weeks before the beginning of the campaign Barbarossa, +and another 4 weeks earlier it had been communicated to the generals in +a statement by Hitler. They knew that weeks before. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know how this decree was actually applied? + +KEITEL: I have also told my opinion to the interrogating General of the +Soviet Army in the preliminary interrogations; whether generals +discussed this order with me has not been mentioned, but I wish to point +out that it says specifically here that the higher commanders have the +right to suspend this order concerning court jurisdiction as soon as +their area is pacified. I have given the same answer to every general +who has asked me about the reasons for this order and its effect. I said +that it provides that they were allowed to suspend this order as soon as +they considered their area to be pacified. That is an individual +subjective question for the discretion of the commanders and it is +provided therein. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And now for the final question in connection with this +order or directive. This order actually assured German soldiers and +officers impunity for arbitrary actions and actions of lawlessness? + +KEITEL: Within certain limits, within certain limits! The limit was +strictly defined in the oral order to the generals, namely, application +of severest disciplinary measures among their own troops. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I think, Defendant Keitel, that you have seen these +“certain limits” in the documents submitted to the Tribunal and in the +documentary films. + +I shall now ask you the following question: On 12 May 1941 the question +of the treatment of captured Russian political commissars and military +prisoners was under consideration. Do you remember that document? + +KEITEL: At the moment I cannot recall which one you mean. It is not +clear to me what you are referring to at the moment. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I refer to the document dated 12 May 1941, which +established that the political leaders of the Red Army should not be +recognized as prisoners of war but should be destroyed. + +KEITEL: I have seen only notes on it. I do not recall the document at +present but I know the facts. I cannot recall the document at the +moment. May I see it please? + +GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. [_The document was handed to the +defendant._] + +THE PRESIDENT: What number is it? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Number 884-PS. It is a document dated 12 May 1941 and +entitled: “Treatment of Political and Military Russian Functionaries.” + +KEITEL: It is not an order but a memorandum on a report by the +Department of National Defense, with the remark that decisions by the +Führer are still required. The memorandum probably refers to a suggested +order, I remember this now; I saw it at the time and the result of the +report is not mentioned but merely a suggestion which was put down for +the ruling. As far as I know, the ruling was taken on those lines then +communicated to the High Command of the Army as having been approved by +the Führer or having been attended to, or discussed, or agreed upon, +directly between the Führer and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. + +GEN. RUDENKO: What do you mean when you speak of “regulation”? We have +learned so many expressions from German Army terminology, such as +“regulation,” “special treatment,” “execution,” but they all, translated +into vulgar parlance, mean one thing, and one thing only—murder. What +are you thinking of when you say “regulation”? + +KEITEL: I did not say “regulation.” I do not know which word was +understood to mean regulation. I said that, in the sense of that +memorandum, according to my recollection, directives had been issued by +Hitler to the Army at that time, that is, an approval to the suggestion +which has been made in the memorandum. + +GEN. RUDENKO: In that case you do not deny that as far back as May, more +than a month before the outbreak of war, the document had already been +drafted which provided for the annihilation of Russian political +commissars and military personnel? You do not deny this? + +KEITEL: No, that I do not deny. That was the result of the directives +which had been communicated and which had been worked out here in +writing by the generals. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST DAY + Saturday, 6 April 1946 + + + _Morning Session_ + +GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I am asking you about the directive +concerning the so-called communist insurrectionary movement in the +occupied territories. Yesterday your counsel showed you this directive. +It is an order of 16 September 1941, Number R-98. I shall remind you of +one passage from this order. It states: + + “In order to nip in the bud any conspiracy, the strongest + measures should be taken at the first sign of trouble in order + to maintain the authority of the occupying power and to prevent + the conspiracy from spreading...”; + +and furthermore: + + “...one must bear in mind that in the countries affected human + life has absolutely no value and that a deterrent effect can be + achieved only through the application of extraordinarily harsh + measures.” + +You remember this basic idea of the order, that human life absolutely +does not amount to anything. Do you remember this statement, the basic +statement of the order, that “human life has absolutely no value”? Do +you remember this sentence? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You signed the order containing this statement? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider that necessity demanded this extremely +evil order? + +KEITEL: I explained some of the reasons for this order yesterday and I +pointed out that these instructions were addressed in the first place to +the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht offices in the Southeast; that +is, the Balkan regions, where extensive partisan warfare and a war +between the leaders had assumed enormous proportions, and secondly, +because the same phenomena had been observed and established on the same +or similar scale in certain defined areas of the occupied Soviet +territory. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Does this mean that you consider this order to have been +entirely correct? + +KEITEL: I have already explained in detail, in replying to questions, my +fundamental standpoint with regard to all orders concerning the +treatment of the population. I signed the order and by doing so I +assumed responsibility within the scope of my official jurisdiction. + +THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that you are not answering the +question. The question was perfectly capable of an answer “yes” or “no” +and an explanation afterwards. It is not an answer to the question to +say that you have already explained to your counsel. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more, do you consider this order, this +particular order—and I emphasize, in which it is stated that “human +life has absolutely no value”—do you consider this order correct? + +KEITEL: It does not contain these words; but I knew from years of +experience that in the Southeastern territories and in certain parts of +the Soviet territory, human life was not respected to the same degree. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You say that these words do not exist in the order? + +KEITEL: To my knowledge those exact words do not appear; but it says +that human life has very little value in these territories. I remember +something like that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: According to your recollection now, you remember that you +were interrogated by General Alexandrov on 9 November 1945. To a +question in regard to the meaning of this sentence you replied: “I must +admit that this sentence is authentic, although the Führer himself +inserted this sentence in the order.” + +Do you remember your explanation? + +KEITEL: That is correct. That is true. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I can produce this order for you. I did not produce it +because you were familiarizing yourself with it yesterday. + +KEITEL: I did not read through all the points yesterday. I merely +admitted its actual existence. + +THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal if you got a translation of +the document. When you are cross-examining upon a document and as to the +actual words of it, it is very inconvenient for us not to have the +document before us. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I shall at once present this order to the +defendant. + +[_Handing the document to the defendant._] + +THE PRESIDENT: Is it Document 389-PS? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, this is Document 389-PS. + +THE PRESIDENT: When you are citing a document it would be a good thing +if you would cite the number rather slowly because very often the +translation does not come through accurately to us. + +GEN. RUDENKO: All right, I shall observe this in the future, Mr. +President. I numbered this document R-98, but it has a double number, +R-98 and 389-PS. I cited Subparagraph 3 b) of this order. + +Defendant Keitel, have you familiarized yourself with the document? + +KEITEL: Yes. The text in the German language says that “in the countries +affected human life frequently has no value...” + +GEN. RUDENKO: And further? + +KEITEL: Yes, “...and a deterrent effect can be obtained only by extreme +harshness. To atone for the life of a German soldier...” + +GEN. RUDENKO: Quite clear. And in this same order, in this same +Subparagraph “b,” it is stated that: + + “To atone for the life of one German soldier, 50 to 100 + Communists must, as a rule, be sentenced to death. The method of + execution should strengthen the measure of determent.” + +Is that correct? + +KEITEL: The German text is slightly different. It says: “In such cases +in general, the death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists may be considered +adequate.” + +That is the German wording. + +GEN. RUDENKO: For one German soldier? + +KEITEL: Yes. I know that and I see it here. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is what I was asking you about. So now I ask you once +more... + +KEITEL: Do you want an explanation of that or am I not to say any more? + +GEN. RUDENKO: I shall now interrogate you on this matter. I ask you +whether, when signing this order you thereby expressed your personal +opinion on these cruel measures? In other words, were you in agreement +with Hitler? + +KEITEL: I signed the order but the figures contained in it are +alterations made personally by Hitler himself. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And what figures did you present to Hitler? + +KEITEL: The figures in the original were 5 to 10. + +GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, the divergence between you and Hitler +consisted merely in the figures and not in the spirit of the document? + +KEITEL: The idea was that the only way of deterring them was to demand +several sacrifices for the life of one soldier, as is stated here. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You... + +THE PRESIDENT: That was not an answer to the question. The question was +whether the only difference between you and Hitler on this document was +a question of figures. That admits of the answer, “yes” or “no.” Was the +only difference between you and Hitler a question of figures? + +KEITEL: Then I must say that with reference to the underlying principle +there was a difference of opinion, the final results of which I no +longer feel myself in a position to justify, since I added my signature +on behalf of my department. There was a fundamental difference of +opinion on the entire question. + +GEN. RUDENKO: All right. Let us continue. + +I would like to remind you of one more order. It is the order dated 16 +December 1942, referring to the so-called “Fight against the Partisans.” +This document was submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-16; I +shall not examine you in detail with regard to this order. It was +presented to you yesterday by your defense counsel. + +KEITEL: I do not remember that at the moment. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember? + +KEITEL: Not the one that was presented yesterday. + +GEN. RUDENKO: All right. If you do not remember I can hand you this +document in order to refresh your memory. + +THE PRESIDENT: What was the PS number of this document? + +GEN. RUDENKO: This is the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution +as Exhibit Number USSR-16 (Document Number USSR-16). + +THE PRESIDENT: I just took down that it was USA-516, but I suppose I was +wrong in hearing. It is USSR-16, is it? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, USSR-16. + +THE PRESIDENT: Very well. + +GEN. RUDENKO: [_Handing the document to the defendant._] I shall +interrogate you, Defendant Keitel, only on one question in connection +with this order. In Subparagraph 1 of this order, Paragraph 3, it is +stated, and I would draw your attention to the following sentence: + + “The troops are therefore authorized and ordered in this + struggle to take any measures without restriction even against + women and children, if that is necessary to achieve success.” + +Have you found this passage? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Have you found the order calling for the application of +any kind of measures you like without restriction, also against women +and children? + +KEITEL: “To employ without restriction any means, even against women and +children, if it is necessary.” I have found that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is exactly what I am asking you about. I ask you, +Defendant Keitel, Field Marshal of the former German Army, do you +consider that this order is a just one, that measures may be employed at +will against women and children? + +KEITEL: Measures, insofar as it means that women and children were also +to be removed from territories where there was partisan warfare, never +atrocities or the murder of women or children. Never! + +GEN. RUDENKO: To remove—a German term—means to kill? + +KEITEL: No. I do not think it would ever have been necessary to tell +German soldiers that they could not and must not kill women and +children. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You did not answer my question. + +Do you consider this order a just one in regard to measures against +women and children or do you consider it unjust? Answer “yes” or “no.” +Is it just or unjust? Explain the matter later. + +KEITEL: I considered these measures to be right and as such I admit +them; but not measures to kill. That was a crime. + +GEN. RUDENKO: “Any kind of measures” includes murder. + +KEITEL: Yes, but not of women and children. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but it says here “Any kind of measures against women +and children.” + +KEITEL: No, it does not say “any measures.” It says “...and not to +shrink from taking measures against women and children.” That is what it +says. + +No German soldier or German officer ever thought of killing women and +children. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And in reality...? + +KEITEL: I cannot say in every individual case, since I do not know and I +could not be everywhere and since I received no reports about it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: But there were millions of such cases? + +KEITEL: I have no knowledge of that and I do not believe that it +happened in millions of cases. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You do not believe it? + +KEITEL: No. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I shall proceed to another question. I shall now refer to +one question, the question of the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. +I do not intend to examine you in regard to the branding of Soviet +prisoners of war and other facts; they are sufficiently well known to +the Tribunal. I want to examine you in regard to one document, the +report of Admiral Canaris, which was presented to you yesterday. You +remember yesterday your counsel submitted to you the Canaris report; it +is dated 15 September 1941 and registered under Document Number EC-338. +As you will remember, even a German officer drew attention to the +exceptional arbitrariness and lawlessness admitted in connection with +the Soviet prisoners of war. Canaris in this report pointed to the mass +murders of Soviet prisoners of war and spoke of the necessity of +definitely eliminating this arbitrariness. Did you agree with the +statements advanced by Canaris in his report, with reference to +yourself? + +KEITEL: I did not understand the last statement. With reference to +myself? + +GEN. RUDENKO: The last question amounts to this: Were you, Keitel, +personally in agreement with the proposals made by Canaris in his +report, that the arbitrary treatment permitted should be done away with +where Soviet prisoners of war were concerned? + +KEITEL: I answered my counsel yesterday... + +GEN. RUDENKO: You can answer my question briefly; were you in agreement +with it? + +KEITEL: Yes, I will be brief—on receiving that letter, I immediately +submitted it to the Führer, Adolf Hitler, especially on account of the +enclosed publication by the Peoples’ Commissars, which was dated the +beginning of July, and I asked for a new decision. On the whole I shared +the objections raised by Canaris, but I must supplement that... + +GEN. RUDENKO: You shared them? Very well. I shall now present you with +the original copy of Canaris’ report, containing your decision. + +Mr. President, I shall now present to the defendant the document +containing his decision. This decision was not read into the record in +court and I shall also present the text of his final decision to the +Tribunal. + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the original? + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I gave it to the defendant. + +And now, Witness Keitel, will you please follow? + +KEITEL: I know the document with the marginal notes. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Listen to me and follow the text of the decision. This is +Canaris’ document, which you consider a just one. The following are the +contents of your decision: + + “These objections arise from the military conception of + chivalrous warfare. We are dealing here with the destruction of + an ideology and, therefore, I approve such measures and I + sanction them.” Signed: “Keitel.” + +Is this your resolution? + +KEITEL: Yes, I wrote that after it had been submitted to the Führer for +decision. I wrote it then. + +GEN. RUDENKO: It is not written there that the Führer said so; it is +said “I sanction them”—meaning Keitel. + +KEITEL: And I state this on oath; and I said it even before I read it. + +GEN. RUDENKO: This means that you acknowledge the decision. I will now +draw your attention to another passage of this document. I draw your +attention to Page 2. Please observe that the text of Canaris’ report +mentions the following: + + “The separation of civilians and prisoners of war who are + politically undesirable, and decisions to be made in regard to + their fate, is to be effected by task forces (Einsatzkommando) + belonging to the Security Police and the SD in accordance with + directives not known to the Wehrmacht establishments and whose + execution cannot be checked by the latter.” + +Canaris writes this; your decision, Defendant Keitel, is written in the +margin. It says, “Highly expedient.” Is that correct? + +KEITEL: Please repeat the last question. The last words I heard were +“Canaris writes.” + +GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, and I am now mentioning the fact that your decision +“Highly expedient” appears in the margin, opposite that paragraph, and +written by your own hand. Have you found this? + +KEITEL: Yes. The word “expedient” refers to the fact that the army +offices had nothing to do with these Einsatzkommandos and knew nothing +about them. It states that they are not known to the Wehrmacht. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And furthermore it refers to the fact that the Security +Police and the SD should wreak vengeance on civilians and prisoners of +war? You consider that expedient? + +KEITEL: No, I thought it expedient that the activities of these +Kommandos be unknown to the Armed Forces. That is what I meant. That +appears here and I underlined “unknown.” + +GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you, Defendant Keitel, known as Field Marshal +and one who, before this Tribunal, has repeatedly referred to yourself +as a soldier, whether you, in your own blood-thirsty decision of +September 1941, confirmed and sanctioned the murder of the unarmed +soldiers whom you had captured? Is that right? + +KEITEL: I signed both decrees and I, therefore, bear the responsibility +within the sphere of my office; I assume the responsibility. + +GEN. RUDENKO: That is quite clear. In this connection I would like to +ask you, since you have repeatedly mentioned it before the Tribunal, +about the duty of a soldier. I want to ask you: Is it in accordance with +the concept of a “soldier’s duty” and the “honor of an officer” to +promulgate such orders for reprisals on prisoners of war and on peaceful +citizens? + +KEITEL: Yes, as far as the reprisals of August and September are +concerned, in view of what happened to German prisoners of war whom we +found in the field of battle, and in Lvov where we found them murdered +by the hundreds. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, do you again wish to follow the path to +which you resorted once before, and revive the question of the alleged +butchery of German prisoners of war? You and I agreed yesterday that as +far back as May 1941, prior to the beginning of the war, you had signed +a directive on the shooting of political and military workers in the Red +Army. I have some... + +KEITEL: Yes, I also signed the orders before the war but they did not +contain the word “murder.” + +GEN. RUDENKO: I am not going to argue with you since this means arguing +against documents; and documents speak for themselves. + +I have a few last questions to ask you: You informed the Tribunal that +the generals of the German Army were only blindly carrying out Hitler’s +orders? + +KEITEL: I have stated that I do not know if any generals raised +objections or who they were, and I said that it did not happen in my +presence when Hitler proclaimed the principles of the ideological war +and ordered them to be put into practice. + +GEN. RUDENKO: And do you know that the generals, on their own +initiative, promulgated orders on atrocities and on the violation of the +laws and customs of war, and that these orders were approved by Hitler? + +KEITEL: I know that high authorities in the Army issued orders altering, +modifying, and even cancelling in part; for instance, as regards +jurisdiction, the March decree and other measures, because they also +discussed it with me. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You do not understand me. I did not ask about +modifications, but whether the generals, on their own initiative, ever +promulgated orders inciting to the violation of the laws and customs of +war. + +KEITEL: I do not know of that. I do not know what order you are +referring to, General. At the moment I cannot say that I know that. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I shall refer to one order only. What I have in mind is +General Field Marshal Reichenau’s order governing the conduct of troops +in the East. + +This document, Mr. President, was presented by the Soviet Prosecution as +Exhibit Number USSR-12 (Document Number USSR-12). The passages to which +I refer are underlined in this document, and I shall read into the +record one quotation from this order governing the conduct of troops in +the East: + + “Feeding the inhabitants and prisoners of war...is...a mistaken + humanity...” + +KEITEL: I know the order. It was shown to me during a preliminary +interrogation. + +GEN. RUDENKO: This order, issued on Reichenau’s initiative and approved +by Hitler, was distributed as a model order among all the army +commanders. + +KEITEL: I did not know that; I heard about it here for the first time. +To my knowledge I never saw the order either. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Of course you would, quite obviously, consider such orders +as entirely insignificant. After all, could the fate of Soviet prisoners +of war and of the civilian population be of any possible interest to the +Chief of the OKW, since their lives were of no value whatsoever? + +KEITEL: I had no contact with the commanders at the front and had no +official connection with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was +the only one who had. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing your cross-examination. When testifying +before the Tribunal you very often referred, as did your accomplices, +the Defendants Göring and Ribbentrop, to the Treaty of Versailles, and I +am asking you, were Vienna, Prague, Belgrade and the Crimea part of +Germany before the Treaty of Versailles? + +KEITEL: No. + +GEN. RUDENKO: You stated here that in 1944, after the law had been +amended, you received an offer to join the Nazi Party. You accepted this +offer, presented your personal credentials to the leadership of the +Party, and paid your membership fees. Tell us, did not your acceptance +to join the membership of the Nazi Party signify that you were in +agreement with the program, objectives, and methods of the Party? + +KEITEL: As I had already been in possession of the Golden Party Badge +for three or four years, I thought that this request for my personal +particulars was only a formal registration; and I paid the required +Party membership subscription. I did both these things and have admitted +doing them. + +GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, before this formal offer was ever made, +you already, _de facto_, considered yourself a member of the Nazi Party? + +KEITEL: I have always thought of myself as a soldier; not as a political +soldier or politician. + +GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not conclude, after all that has been said here, +that you were a Hitler-General, not because duty called you but on +account of your own convictions? + +KEITEL: I have stated here that I was a loyal and obedient soldier of my +Führer. And I do not think that there are generals in Russia who do not +give Marshal Stalin implicit obedience. + +GEN. RUDENKO: I have exhausted all my questions. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember on the 2d of October +1945 writing a letter to Colonel Amen, explaining your position? It was +after your interrogations, and in your own time you wrote a letter +explaining your point of view. Do you remember that? + +KEITEL: Yes, I think I did write a letter; but I no longer remember the +contents. It referred to the interrogations, however. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. + +KEITEL: And I think it contained a request that I be given a further +opportunity of thinking things over, as the questions put to me took me +by surprise and I was often unable to remember the answers. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to remind you of one passage and ask you +whether it correctly expresses your view: + + “In carrying out these thankless and difficult tasks, I had to + fulfill my duty under the hardest exigencies of war, often + acting against the inner voice of my conscience and against my + own convictions. The fulfillment of urgent tasks assigned by + Hitler, to whom I was directly responsible, demanded complete + self-abnegation.” + +Do you remember that? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want you to tell the Tribunal, +what were the worst matters in your view in which you often acted +against the inner voice of your conscience? Just tell us some of the +worst matters in which you acted against the inner voice of your +conscience. + +KEITEL: I found myself in such a situation quite frequently, but the +decisive questions which conflicted most violently with my conscience +and my convictions were those which were contrary to the training which +I had undergone during my 37 years as an officer in the German Army. +That was a blow at my most intimate personal principles. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted it to come from you, Defendant. Can you +tell the Tribunal the three worst things you had to do which were +against the inner voice of your conscience? What do you pick out as the +three worst things you had to do? + +KEITEL: Perhaps, to start with the last, the orders given for the +conduct of the war in the East, insofar as they were contrary to the +acknowledged usage of war; then something which particularly concerns +the British Delegation, the question of the 50 R.A.F. officers, the +question which weighed particularly heavy on my mind, that of the +terror-fliers and, worst of all, the Nacht und Nebel Decree and the +actual consequences it entailed at a later stage and about which I did +not know. Those were the worst struggles which I had with myself. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take the Nacht und Nebel. + +My Lord, this document and a good many to which I shall refer are in the +British Document Book Number 7, Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, and it +occurs on Page 279. It is L-90, Exhibit USA-503. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, I will give you the German +document book. It is 279 of the British document book, and 289... + +KEITEL: Number 731? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 289. I do not know which volume it +is; Part 2, I think it is. + +You see, the purpose of the decree is set out a few lines from the +start, where they say that in all cases where the death penalty is not +pronounced and not carried out within a week, + + “...the accused are in the future to be deported to Germany + secretly, and further proceedings in connection with the + offenses will take place here. The deterrent effect of these + measures lies in: (a) the complete disappearance of the accused; + + (b) the fact that no information may be given as to their + whereabouts or their fate.” + +Both these purposes, you will agree, were extremely cruel and brutal, +were they not? + +KEITEL: I said both at the time and yesterday, that I personally thought +that to deport individuals secretly was very much more cruel than to +impose a sentence of death. I have... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn to Page 281—291 of yours—281 of +the English Book? + +KEITEL: Yes, I have it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that this is your covering letter: + + “The Führer is of the opinion:”—Line 4—“In the case of + offenses such as these, punishment by imprisonment, or even + penal servitude for life, will be considered a sign of weakness. + Effective and lasting intimidation can only be achieved either + by capital punishment or by measures which keep the culprit’s + relatives and the population generally uncertain as to his + fate.” + +You will agree that there again these sentences of the Führer which you +are here transmitting were cruel and brutal, were they not? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I... + +KEITEL: May I add something? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, as shortly as you can. + +KEITEL: I made a statement yesterday on this subject and I drew your +attention particularly to the words: “It is the Führer’s long considered +will,” which were intended to convey to the generals who were receiving +these orders what was written between the lines. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, you know, Defendant, that that was by no +means the end of this series of orders, was it? This order was +unsuccessful despite its cruelty and brutality in achieving its purpose, +was it not? This order, the Nacht und Nebel Order, in that form was +unsuccessful in achieving its purpose; it did not stop what it was +designed to stop? Is that right? + +KEITEL: No, it did not cease. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that in 1944 you had to make a still more +severe order. Would you look at Document D-762? My Lord, that will +become Exhibit GB-298. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] It says: + + “The constant increase in acts of terror and sabotage in the + occupied territories, committed more and more by bands under + unified leadership, compels us to take the sternest + countermeasures in a degree corresponding to the ferocity of the + war which is forced upon us. Those who attack us from the rear + at the crisis of our fight for existence deserve no + consideration. + + “I therefore order: + + “All acts of violence committed by non-German civilians in the + occupied territories against the German Wehrmacht, the SS, or + the Police, or against installations used by them, are to be + combated in the following manner as acts of terrorism and + sabotage:”—(1)—“The troops,”—the SS and so on—“are to fight + down on the spot...all terrorists and saboteurs.”—(2)—“Those + who are apprehended later are to be handed over to the nearest + local Security Police and the SD office.”—(3)—“Accomplices, + especially women, who take no active part in the fighting, are + to be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.” + +Now, would you look at Paragraph II: + + “The Chief of the OKW will issue the necessary executive + instructions. He is entitled to make alterations and additions + as far as required by the exigencies of war operations.” + +Did you think that was a cruel and severe order or not? + +KEITEL: Yes, I do think so, but may I make one small correction? It must +have been incorrectly translated. The actual wording is: “Women are to +be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.” So it says in the +original version which I have before me. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “spared.” “Spared” meant that they were +not to be treated thus. I was careful to mention that. + +KEITEL: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had authority to make alterations and +additions. Did you, by your alterations and additions, attempt to +mitigate the severity of that order in any way? + +KEITEL: I have no recollection of having issued any additional orders to +mitigate its severity. I may also say that I never would have issued +anything without first presenting it to the Führer. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see what you did issue. Would you +look at Document D-764, which will be Exhibit GB-299? + +Now, that is your executive order, countersigned I think by the Senior +Military Judge, putting forward your order based on that decree; and +would you look at Paragraphs 4 and 5: + + “All legal proceedings now going on in connection with acts of + terrorism, sabotage, or other crimes committed by non-German + civilians in the occupied territories which imperil the security + or readiness for action of the occupying power are to be + suspended. Indictments are to be dropped. Sentences already + pronounced are not to be carried out. The culprits are to be + handed over with a report on the proceedings to the nearest + local Security Police and SD office. In the case of death + sentences which have already become final, the regulations now + in force will continue to apply. + + “Crimes affecting German interests but which do not imperil the + security or readiness for action of the occupying power do not + justify the retention of jurisdiction over non-German civilians + in the occupied territories. I authorize the commanders of the + occupied territories to draw up new regulations in agreement + with the Higher SS and the Police Leader.” + +And then you ask them to consider among the first, one handing them over +to the SD for forced labor. + +That was certainly not mitigation of the order, was it? You were not +making it any easier. + +KEITEL: There are a few sentences to be added here. This arose out of +the daily discussion of these matters which I dealt with later on the +same lines as the first decree. I made suitable annotations, and signed +them. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what you called terrorism and +sabotage. Let us look at what happened to people who were guilty of +something less than terrorism or sabotage. Look at Document D-763. That +will be GB-300. “Non-German civilians...” + +KEITEL: Yes. + + SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Non-German civilians in the occupied + territories who endanger the security or tactical preparedness + of the occupying power otherwise than through acts of terrorism + and sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD. Section I, Number + 3...”—that is the part that says women will be employed on + labor and children will be spared—“of the Führer’s order also + applies to them.” + +Well, you knew perfectly well what would happen to anyone who was handed +over to the SD, that he would probably be killed, certainly be put into +a concentration camp, did you not? + +KEITEL: I did not interpret it that way; the words “to be allocated on +labor” were always used; but it has become clear to me from what I have +learned that they frequently ended in the concentration camp. However, +it was always described to us, to me, as a labor camp. That was the +description, “labor camps of the Secret State Police.” + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But this is August 1944. You will agree that +that is a most severe course to take with people who have been guilty of +something less than terrorism or sabotage, do you not? + +KEITEL: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us... + +KEITEL: I assume that you do not wish me to discuss this origin and +development here. Otherwise I could explain them; but I will merely +answer the question. The answer is, yes, it was a very severe measure. +The explanation, if I may state it very briefly, is that, as is known, +during the interminable daily situation reports on the incidents in all +the occupied territories, I received from the Führer instructions and +orders which were afterwards crystallized in a form similar to this +document; and I think I have already described in detail the way in +which I discussed these things with him and how I worked, that on +principle I never issued or signed anything which did not agree in +principle with his wishes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was severe enough for you for only 3 weeks, +was it not, because on 4 September, which is barely 3 weeks later, you +issued another order, Document D-766, Exhibit GB-301. Now, this was +issued, as it shows, as an agreement with Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, the +Reich Minister of Justice and Dr. Lammers. Now look at I: + + “Non-German civilians in occupied territories who have been + sentenced by German courts for a criminal act against the + security or tactical preparedness of the occupying power, the + sentence having become final, and who are in custody in the + occupied territories or in the home front area, are to be handed + over, together with a report on the facts, to the nearest local + Security Police and SD office. An exception is made only in the + case of those sentenced to death for whom the execution of the + penalty has been ordered. + + “II. Persons convicted of criminal acts against the Reich or the + occupying power and prohibited, in accordance with the + directives...issued by the Führer for the prosecution of such + acts, from intercourse with the outside world, are to be given a + distinguishing mark.” + +Now, had you any idea how many people would be affected by that order? + +KEITEL: No, I cannot say anything about that. I know only that it was +made necessary by the increasing tension in the occupied territories, +due to lack of troops to keep order. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me remind you. You called a conference +to consider this matter. That is shown in Document D-765, and I also +show you D-767, the report of the conference. You need not worry about +765, which just says that there is to be a conference, but in Document +D-767, which will be Exhibit GB-303, there is a report of the +conference. The second paragraph says: + + “The Reichsführer SS”—Himmler—“demands in his letter the + immediate surrender to the SD of approximately 24,000 non-German + civilians who are under arrest or held for interrogation.”—Now + listen to this: “No answer was given to the question raised + during the discussion as to why they must be surrendered to the + SD at the present moment, in spite of the considerable amount of + administrative work involved.” + +Can you give any answer now as to why 24,000 people who had been +sentenced should be transferred to the tender mercies of the SD? + +KEITEL: May I read this note? I do not know it; may I read it now, +please? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. You will see that I did not trouble +you with it all, but it says what I had already put to you earlier, that +the Nacht und Nebel Decree had become superfluous as a result of the +terror and sabotage decree, and that the Wehrmacht Legal Department had +presented these things for discussion. + +Now, can you give us any answer as to why these 24,000 unfortunate +persons who had been sentenced should be handed over to the tender +mercies of the SD? + +KEITEL: I must say that I am surprised by the whole incident. I did not +attend the conference, and apparently I did not read the note since, as +a matter of principle, I always marked every document which had been +presented to me with my initials. I am not acquainted with the figures +quoted; this is the first time I have seen them; I am not acquainted +with them and I do not remember them, unless another order was... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will give you something which you have read. + +KEITEL: As regards the facts about which you ask, I must answer in the +affirmative. I do not know the figures, only the facts. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you cannot answer my question. You cannot +give us any reason as to why the Wehrmacht and these other offices were +sending the 24,000 people, who had been sentenced by ordinary courts, +over to the SD? You cannot give us any reason for that? + +KEITEL: No; I may say that up to a point I can. I think “SD” is a +misinterpretation. I think police custody was meant. That does not mean +the same thing. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly not. + +KEITEL: I do not know if it might have been the same thing. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely you have been at this Trial too long to +think that handing people over to the SD means police custody. It means +a concentration camp and a gas chamber usually, does it not? That is +what it meant in fact, whether you knew it or not. + +KEITEL: I did not know it, but it obviously led to the concentration +camp in the end. I consider it possible; in any case, I cannot say that +it was not. + +THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the last paragraph but one refers to the OKW. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I am just coming to that. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] If you will notice that, Defendant, two +paragraphs below the one I put to you it states: + + “As the OKW is not particularly interested in trying the minor + matters still remaining for the military tribunals, they are to + be settled by decrees to be agreed upon by local authorities.” + +It is quite clear that your office was deeply concerned in this +business, was it not, Defendant? + +KEITEL: I do not know exactly what it means, but it was obviously +mentioned at that conference. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I put the next document, I want you +to realize how we have been going. We started with the Nacht und Nebel +Decree, which disappeared, and we went on to the Terror and Sabotage +Decree. We then proceeded to acts which were less than terror and +sabotage, but were criminal acts under the rules of the occupying power. + +I now want you to consider what was done to people who simply refused to +work. Would you look at Document D-769? That is Exhibit GB-304. That is +a telegram from Luftwaffe General Christiansen, who was in the +Netherlands, Commander of the Air Forces in the Netherlands, through his +Chief of Staff. + +Now listen to this: + + “Owing to railway strike, all communications in Holland at + standstill. Railway personnel does not respond to appeals to + resume work. Demands for motor vehicles and other means of + transport for moving troops and maintaining supplies are no + longer obeyed by the civil population. According to the Führer’s + decree of 18 August 1944”—that is the Terror and Sabotage + Decree, which you have already had—“and the supplementary + executive instructions of the Chief of the OKW”—which we have + already seen—“troops may use weapons only against persons who + commit acts of violence as terrorists or saboteurs, whereas + persons who endanger the security or tactical preparedness of + the occupying power in any other way than by terrorism or acts + of sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD.” + +Then General Christiansen comes in with this: + + “This regulation has proved too complicated, and therefore + ineffective. Above all, we do not possess the necessary police + forces. The troops must again receive authority to shoot also, + with or without summary court-martial, persons who are not + terrorists or saboteurs in the sense of the Führer’s decree, but + who endanger the fighting forces by passive resistance. It is + requested that the Führer’s decree be altered accordingly, as + the troops cannot otherwise assert themselves effectively + against the population, which in its turn, appears to endanger + the conduct of operations.” + +Now, Defendant, will you agree that shooting, with or even without +trial, railway men who will not work, is about as brutal and cruel a +measure as could well be imagined by the mind of man? Do you agree? + +KEITEL: That is a cruel measure, yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your answer to that cruel measure? + +KEITEL: I cannot say. I do not recollect the incident at all, but +perhaps the answer is there. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at the Document D-770, which is, I +think, your answer; it is Exhibit GB-305. You will notice on the +distribution list that that goes to the Commander of the Armed Forces in +the Netherlands, and further to the signal which we have just been +looking at. Now, you say: + + “According to the Führer’s order of 30 July 1944, non-German + civilians in the occupied territories who attack us in the rear + in the crisis of our battle for existence deserve no + consideration. This must be our guiding principle in the + interpretation and application of the Führer’s decree itself and + the Chief of the OKW’s executive decree of 18 August 1944. + + “If the military situation and the state of communications make + it impossible to hand them over to the SD, other effective + measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently. There is, + naturally”—and I ask you to note the word “naturally”—“no + objection to passing and executing death sentences by summary + court-martial under such circumstances.” + +I can not remember, Defendant, whether you have ever had an independent +command yourself or not. Have you? Have you had an independent command, +apart from your division? I think that was the last independent command +you had. You have not had an independent command yourself, have you? +Don’t I make myself clear? + +KEITEL: I did not understand. What do you mean by “independent”? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I mean that you have not been a commander or +chief of an army or army group yourself, if I remember rightly, or of an +area, have you? + +KEITEL: No, I have not. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I ask you to put yourself in General +Christiansen’s position. That answer of yours was a direct +encouragement, practically amounting to an order, to shoot these railway +men out of hand, was it not? “To take other effective measures +ruthlessly and independently.” + +KEITEL: That is explained by the form of summary court-martial. It is +not left to the discretion of the individual; jurisdiction of summary +court-martial was provided. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the way it is put, Defendant. I +suggest to you that it is quite clear. One sentence states: “If handing +over to the SD is impossible, owing to the military situation and the +state of communications, other effective measures are to be taken +ruthlessly and independently.” + +Then, the next sentence: “There are, naturally”—look at the word +“naturally.” I suppose that it was “natürlich” in German. Is that +correct? + +KEITEL: I have not the word “natürlich” here. Two words, so far as I can +make out, have been inserted. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it says: “There are, naturally, no +objections to passing and executing death sentences by summary +court-martial procedure.” What you are saying is that, of course, there +is no objection to a summary court, but you are telling him, in addition +to that, that he is to take effective measures ruthlessly and +independently. If General Christiansen had shot these railway men out of +hand, after getting that letter from you, neither you nor any other +superior could have blamed him for it, could you? + +KEITEL: According to the last sentence, he was obliged to carry out +summary court-martial procedure. It says: “There are no objections to +the executing of this sentence by summary court-martial under such +circumstances.” That is how I meant it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what did you mean by “effective measures to +be taken ruthlessly and independently”? What did you mean by that, if it +was only an ordinary summary court procedure? + +KEITEL: Not apart from summary court procedure, but by means of the +same. That is what the last sentence means. It is already unusual to +appoint a summary court-martial in such cases. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, even on your basis, to use a military +summary court to shoot railway men who will not work is going rather far +even for you, is it not? It is going rather far, isn’t it? + +KEITEL: That was a very severe measure, yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that when you make all +these additions, taking you through the chain of additions that you make +to the order replacing the Nacht und Nebel Order, of which you +disapproved, do you say that you went to Hitler for every one of these +executive orders and answers that you made? + +KEITEL: Yes. I went to him on the occasion of every one of these orders. +I must emphasize the fact that I did not issue any of these orders +without previously submitting it to the Führer. I must expressly point +out that that was so. + +DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think a misunderstanding has crept into the +translation. The translation interprets “Standgericht” as summary court. +I do not believe that the words “summary court” reflect accurately what +we understand in the German language by “Standgericht.” I do not know +just what you understand in the English or American language by “summary +court,” but I can imagine that this means some summary procedure. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was taking it in favor of the Defendant that +it meant the court he referred to yesterday, one officer and two +soldiers. I was taking that. If I am wrong, the Defendant will correct +me. Is that right, Defendant? + +KEITEL: I described this Standgericht (summary court-martial procedure) +briefly yesterday, and the criterion of a summary court-martial was that +it was not always necessary for a fully trained legal expert to be +present, although it was desirable. + +THE PRESIDENT: While you are on the subject of translation, the +Defendant seemed to suggest that there was no word in the German which +is translated by the English word “naturally.” Is that true? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had it checked and I am told that the +translation is right. + +THE PRESIDENT: There is a German word which is translated by +“naturally”? I should like to know that from Dr. Nelte. + +DR. NELTE: I am told that a false conception or false judgment might be +produced in this connection since in British and American law a summary +court has no right to pass sentences of death. I am told that a summary +court... + +THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me, Dr. Nelte, I did not ask that question. The +question I asked you was whether there was any German word which is +translated into English by the word “naturally.” Is that not a clear +question? + +DR. NELTE: In the German text it says “under such circumstances, of +course.” I think the English translation is incorrect in using the word +“naturally” and in putting it after “in these circumstances” instead of +at the beginning, so that one is led to conclude that it means, “there +are naturally no objections (es gibt natürlich keine Einwendungen),” +whereas the German text says, “Against the passing and executing of +death sentences by summary court procedure there are—under such +circumstances, of course—no objections (Gegen die Verhängung und +Vollstreckung von Todesurteilen im standgerichtlichen Verfahren bestehen +unter solchen Verhältnissen selbstverständlich keine Bedenken).” + +THE PRESIDENT: Then the answer to my question is “yes.” There is a word +in the German which is translated “naturally.” + +DR. NELTE: Yes, but the words “naturally” and “under such circumstances” +are separated in the English version, while in the German version they +belong together. “Naturally” refers to “under such circumstances.” + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to come to another point. You told us +yesterday that with regard to forced labor you were concerned in it +because there was a shortage of manpower and you had to take men out of +industry for the Wehrmacht. Your office was concerned with using +military forces in order to try and round-up people for forced labor, +was it not? + +KEITEL: I do not think that is quite the correct conception. The +Replacement Office in the High Command of the Wehrmacht... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are going to deny it, I put the document +to you. I put General Warlimont’s views to you and see if you agree. I +think it saves time in the end. If you look at Document 3819-PS, which +will be Exhibit GB-306, Page 9 of the English version. It is the report +of a meeting at Berlin on 12 July 1944. You have to look on through the +document after the letters from the Defendant Sauckel and the Defendant +Speer, the account of a meeting in Berlin. I think it is Page 10 of the +German version. It starts with a speech by Dr. Lammers and goes on with +a speech from the Defendant Sauckel, then a speech from the witness Von +Steengracht, then a speech from General Warlimont: “The Deputy of the +head of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer +order.” Have you found the portion? I will read it if you have. + +KEITEL: Yes, I have found the paragraph “The Representative of the Chief +of the OKW...” + + SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The Representative of the Chief of the + OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer + order, according to which all German forces had to participate + in the task of raising manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was + stationed, if it was not employed exclusively in pressing + military duties (as, for example, in the construction of coastal + defenses), it would be available, but it could not be assigned + expressly for the purpose of the GBA. General Warlimont made the + following practical suggestions: + + “a) The troops employed in fighting the partisans are to take + over, in addition, the task of raising manpower in the partisan + areas. Everyone who cannot give a satisfactory reason for his + presence in these areas is to be recruited by force. + + “b) When large cities are wholly or partly evacuated on account + of the difficulty of providing food, those members of the + population suitable for labor are to be utilized for labor with + the assistance of the Wehrmacht. + + “c) The refugees from the areas near the front should be rounded + up with special vigor with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.” + +After reading this report of General Warlimont’s words, do you still say +that the Wehrmacht... + +KEITEL: I am not aware that the Armed Forces have ever received an order +mentioning the rounding-up of workers. I would like to say that I know +of no such demand and I have not found any confirmation of it. The +conference as such is unknown to me and so are the proposals you +mentioned. It is new as far as I am concerned. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear that General Warlimont is +suggesting that the Wehrmacht should help in the rounding-up of forced +labor, isn’t it? + +KEITEL: But as far as I know it has never happened. I do not know that +such an order was given. According to the record, this is a proposal +made by General Warlimont, yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps in those circumstances you should read +the three lines after the passage you have read. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I should. The next line: + + “Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks and + expressed the expectation that a certain amount of success could + be achieved by this means.” + +KEITEL: May I say something about that? May I ask that Gauleiter Sauckel +be asked at a given time whether and to what extent troops of the Armed +Forces did actually participate in such matters. It is not known to me. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No doubt the Defendant Sauckel will be asked a +number of questions in due time. At the moment I am asking you. You say +that you do not know anything about it? + +KEITEL: No, I do not recollect that any order was given in this +connection. I gather from the statement by Warlimont that discussions +took place. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to ask you a few questions about the +murder of various prisoners of war. I want to get it quite clear. Did +you mean yesterday to justify the order for the shooting of Commandos, +dated 18 October 1942? Did you wish to say that it was right and +justified, or not? + +KEITEL: I stated yesterday that neither General Jodl nor I thought that +we were in a position, or considered it possible, to draft or submit +such a written order. We did not do it because we could not justify it +or give reasons for it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next question that I put to you is this: Did +you approve and think right the order that was made that Commandos +should be shot? + +KEITEL: I no longer opposed it, firstly on account of the punishment +threatened, and secondly because I could no longer alter the order +without personal orders from Hitler. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that that order was right? + +KEITEL: According to my inner convictions I did not consider it right, +but after it had been given I did not oppose it or take a stand against +it in any way. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that your orders had contained +provisions for the use of parachutists being dropped for sabotage +purposes, don’t you? Your own orders have contained that provision of +parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes. Don’t you remember in +the Fall Grün against Czechoslovakia? I would put it to you if you like, +but I would so much prefer that you try to remember it yourself. Don’t +you remember that your own orders contained a provision for parachutists +being dropped for sabotage purposes in Czechoslovakia? + +KEITEL: No. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You don’t? + +KEITEL: No, I do not remember the order. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I refer you to it. My Lord, it is Page 21 and 22 +of the document book. + +KEITEL: Which document book, please? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. It ought to be your first document book, +and quite early on. It is part of the Fall Grün, which is Document +388-PS, and it is Item 11. I think it is somewhere about Page 15 or 16 +or 20. You remember the Schmundt minutes and then it is divided into +items. + +The Tribunal will find it at the foot of Page 21: + +[_Turning to the defendant._] + + “For the success of this operation, co-operation with the + Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the + Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops, and + with units of the sabotage service will be of importance.” + +KEITEL: May I read the paragraph that I think you mean? + +SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; it is headed “Missions for the Branches of +the Armed Forces...” + +KEITEL: “Missions for the Branches of the Armed Forces.” It states: + + “For success, co-operation with the Sudeten German frontier + population and the deserters from the Czechoslovakian Army, with + parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage + service can be of importance.” + +These parachutists and airborne troops were in fact to be set to work on +frontier fortifications, as I explained yesterday, since army +authorities believed that the artillery resources at our command were +insufficient to permit our combating them with artillery. + +This does not mean parachutists or saboteurs, but actual members of the +German Air Force, and the sabotage service is mentioned at the end. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sabotage service must be people who are +going to do sabotage if they are going to be of any use, must they not? +They do sabotage, don’t they? + +KEITEL: Undoubtedly; but not by means of airborne troops and +parachutists, but through saboteurs in the frontier areas who offer +their services for this kind of work. Yes, that is what they are +thinking of. We had many such people in the Sudeten region. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you, but I want to +have it clear. I now want to come to the way in which this order of the +Führer was announced. You will find the order—the Tribunal will find it +on Page 64—but what I want him to look at if he would be so kind, is +Page 66 of the book, Page 25, Defendant, of your book. The second +sentence of the Defendant Jodl’s “To the Commanders” about this order. +That is on Page 25, and Defendant Jodl says: “This order is for the +commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy +hands.” Was that because you and the Defendant Jodl were ashamed of the +order, that you had this secrecy provision put on it? + +KEITEL: I have not found it yet, and I would like to know the +connection. Page 25 is a teletype letter. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the Oberkommando Wehrmacht, dated 19 +October. Now have you got it, the second sentence? + +KEITEL: Dated 18 October 1942? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 19 October, issuing order of the 18th. “This +order is for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall +into enemy hands.” Was that because you were ashamed of the order, that +it was put like that? + +KEITEL: I have not seen the letter and I think General Jodl should be +asked about it. I do not know the contents, but I have already stated +the opinion of both of us. I cannot give you the reason. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t give me the reason for this secrecy? + +KEITEL: I do not know the motives behind it and I would ask you to put +this question to General Jodl. I have not seen it. But I have already +stated my own views and those of General Jodl. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want you to look at the way that +even Hitler expresses it with regard to this. If you look—I guess it is +Page 31 in our book. It is a report from Hitler wherein he says: + + “The report which should appear on this subject in the Armed + Forces communiqué will state briefly and laconically that a + sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and + exterminated to the last man.” (Document Number 503-PS) + +You were doing your best—and when I say “you,” I mean you collectively, +Hitler, yourself, and Jodl and everyone else concerned. You were doing +your best to keep quiet about this, about anything being known about +this order, weren’t you? + +KEITEL: That was not my impression; on the contrary, in every case we +subsequently published the facts in the Wehrmacht orders, the Wehrmacht +report. It is my recollection, namely, that in the Wehrmacht report we +stated that such and such an incident had occurred, followed by such and +such consequences. That is my recollection. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am now only going to ask you to look at one +document further on, because in that regard, you remember, after the +Soviet Union tried certain people at Kharkov, when you were trying to +get up some counterpropaganda—now, look at this document, about these +executions, it is Page 308, Document UK-57. You have got a copy of it. I +am going to ask you about only two incidents. You see it is a memorandum +and the passage that I want you to look at is Number 2, the fourth +memorandum, Paragraph 2, which is headed “Attempted Attacks on the +Battleship _Tirpitz_.” Do you see that? + +KEITEL: Just one moment, I have not found it yet. Battleship _Tirpitz_, +oh, yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got it? Just listen, now: + + “At the end of October 1942 a British Commando that had come to + Norway in a cutter, had orders to carry out an attack on the + Battleship _Tirpitz_ in Drontheim Fjord, by means of a two-man + torpedo. The action failed since both torpedoes, which were + attached to the cutter, were lost in the stormy sea. From among + the crew, consisting of six Englishmen and four Norwegians, a + party of three Englishmen and two Norwegians were challenged on + the Swedish border; however, only the British seaman in civilian + clothes, Robert Paul Evans, born 14 January 1922, in London, + could be arrested and the others escaped into Sweden. + + “Evans had a pistol pouch in his possession, such as are used to + carry weapons under the armpit, and also a knuckle duster.” + +And now the next page: + + “Violence representing a breach of international law could not + be proved.” + +Did incidents such as that, under this order, come to your attention? + +KEITEL: I do not remember the actual incident, but I can see that it has +been reported by the department. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now you have told us that you have been a +soldier for 41 years; that emphasizes your military position. What, in +the name of all military tradition, has that boy done wrong by coming +from a two-man torpedo to make an attack on a battleship; what had he +done wrong? + +KEITEL: No, this is an attack against a weapon of war, if carried out by +soldiers in their capacity of members of the armed forces, it is an +attack made with the object of eliminating a battleship by means of +sabotage. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But why, why should you not if you were prepared +to go on a two-man torpedo for an attack against a battleship, what is +wrong with a sailor doing that? I want to understand what is in your +mind. What do you, as a man who has been a soldier for 40 years, what do +you see wrong for a man doing that, towing out a torpedo against a +battleship? Tell us. I cannot understand what is wrong. + +KEITEL: This is no more wrong than an attack with an aerial bomb if it +is successful. I recognize that it is right, that it is a perfectly +permissible attack. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you did not see that incident I +will not go through putting the others in, as they are all just the +same, men in uniform coming up to the Gironde to attack German ships. + +What I want to understand is this. You were a Field Marshal, standing in +the boots of Blücher, Gneisenau, and Moltke. How did you tolerate all +these young men being murdered, one after the other without making any +protests? + +KEITEL: I have stated here in detail my reasons for not making any +further resistance or objection; and I cannot alter any statement now. I +know that these incidents occurred and I know the consequences. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Field Marshal, I want you to understand +this. As far as I know, in the German military code, as in every +military code, there is no obligation on the part of a soldier to obey +an order which he knows is wrong, which he knows is contrary to the laws +of war and law. It is the same in your army, and our army, and I think +in every army, isn’t that so? + +KEITEL: I did not personally carry out the orders of 18 October 1942. I +was not present either at the mouth of the Gironde or at the attack on +the battleship _Tirpitz_. I knew only that the order was issued, +together with all the threats of punishment which made it so difficult +for the commanders to alter or deviate from the order on their own +initiative. You, Sir David, asked me yourself whether I considered this +order to be right or to serve any useful purpose and I have given you a +definite answer: that I could not have prevented the action taken at the +mouth of the Gironde or in the case of _Tirpitz_ if I had wanted to. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my difficulty. I have given you only two +cases; there are plenty more. There are others which occurred in Italy +which we have heard. The point I am putting to you is this: You were the +representative; that you have told us a hundred times, of the military +tradition. You had behind you an officers corps with all its... + +KEITEL: No, Sir David, I must deny that. I was not responsible either +for the Navy or for the Army or for the Air Force. I was not a +commander; I was a Chief of Staff and I had no authority to intervene in +the execution of orders in the various branches of the Armed Forces, +each of which had its own Commander-in-Chief. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have heard about your staff rank, but I want +to make this point perfectly clear. You were a Field Marshal, Kesselring +was a Field Marshal, Milch was a Field Marshal, all, I gather, with +military training behind them and all having their influence if not +their command, among the Armed Forces of Germany. How was it that there +was not one man of your rank, of your military tradition, with the +courage to stand up and oppose cold-blooded murder? That is what I want +to know. + +KEITEL: I did not do it; I made no further objection to these things. I +can say no more and I cannot speak for others. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us pass if you can say no more than +that. I want to see what you did with regard to our French allies +because I have been asked to deal with some matters for the French +Delegation. + +You remember that on the Eastern Front you captured some Frenchmen who +were fighting with the Russians. Do you remember making an order about +that? You captured some De Gaullists, as you called them, that is Free +French people who were fighting for the Russians. Do you remember your +action with regard to that? + +KEITEL: I recollect the transmission of a Führer order in regard to the +surrender of these Frenchmen to their lawful government, which was +recognized by us. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not, of course, the part of the order I +want to put to you. + + “Detailed investigations are to be made in appropriate cases + with regard to relatives of Frenchmen fighting for the Russians. + If the investigation reveals that relatives have given + assistance to facilitate escape from France, then severe + measures are to be taken. + + “OKW/Wi. Rü is to make the necessary preparations with the + respective military commander or the Higher SS and Police Leader + in France.—Signed—Keitel.” + +Can you imagine anything more dreadful than taking severe measures +against the mother of a young man who has helped him to go and fight +with the allies of his country? Can you imagine anything more +despicable? + +KEITEL: I can think of many things since I have lost sons of my own in +the war. I am not the inventor of this idea; it did not originate with +me; I only transmitted it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate the difference, Defendant, +between the point which you made and the point which I make. Losing sons +in a war is a terrible tragedy. Taking severe measures against a mother +of a boy who wants to go and fight for his country’s allies, I am +suggesting to you, is despicable. The one is a tragedy; the other is the +height of brutality. Do you not agree? + +KEITEL: I can only say that it does not state the consequences of the +investigations and findings. I do not know. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is all the answer you can make I +will ask you to look at something else. + +KEITEL: No, I should like to add that I regret that any families were +held responsible for the misdeeds of their sons. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will not waste the time by taking up the +word “misdeed.” If you think that is a misdeed it is not worth our +discussing it further. I just want to protest against your word. + +Now, let us see; that was not an isolated case. Just look at Page 110 +(a) of the document book which you have, Page 122. This is an order +quite early on 1 October 1941. + + “Attacks committed on members of the Armed Forces lately in the + occupied territories give reason to point out that it is + advisable that military commanders always have at their disposal + a number of hostages of different political tendencies, namely: + + “(1) Nationalists, + + “(2) Democratic-bourgeois, and + + “(3) Communists. + + “It is important that these should include well-known leading + personalities, or members of their families whose names are to + be made public. + + “Hostages belonging to the same group as the culprit are to be + shot in case of attacks. + + “It is asked that commanders be instructed + accordingly.—Signed—Keitel.” (Document 1590-PS). + +Why were you so particular that, if you happened to arrest a +democratic-bourgeois, your commanders should have a sufficient bag of +democratic-bourgeois to shoot as hostages? I thought you were not a +politician. + +KEITEL: I was not at all particular and the idea did not originate with +me; but it is in accordance with the instructions, the official +regulations, regarding hostages which I discussed yesterday or on the +day before and which state that those held as hostages must come from +the circles responsible for the attacks. That is the explanation, or +confirmation, of that as far as my memory goes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with that as a course of action, +that if you found a member of a democratic-bourgeois family who had been +taking part in, say, sabotage or resistance, that you should shoot a +number of democratic-bourgeois on his behalf? Did you approve of that? + +KEITEL: I have already explained how orders for shooting hostages, which +were also given, were to be applied and how they were to be carried out +in the case of those deserving of death and who had already been +sentenced. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am asking you a perfectly simple question, +Defendant. Did you or did you not approve of a number of +democratic-bourgeois to be taken as hostages for one +democratic-bourgeois who happened to be... + +KEITEL: It does not say so in the document; it says only that hostages +must be taken; but it says nothing about shooting them. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you mind looking at it since you corrected +me so emphatically? Depending upon the membership of the culprit, that +is, whether he is a nationalist, or a democratic-bourgeois or Communist, +“hostages of the corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks.” + +KEITEL: If that is in the document then I must have signed it that way. +The document referring to the conference with the commanders shows +clearly how it was carried out in practice. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now answer my question. Did you approve of that? + +KEITEL: I personally had different views on the hostage system, but I +signed it, because I had been ordered to do so. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you had a different view. Will you just +look at a letter from Herr Terboven, who was in charge in Norway, +Document 870-PS, and it is Page 85, 71 (a), RF-281. This is a report +from Terboven for the information of the Führer and I want you to look +at Paragraph 2, “Counter-measures”, Subparagraph 4. Do you see it? Have +you got it, Defendant? I am sorry, I did give you the number; probably +you did not hear it, 71 (a), Page 71 (a) of the document book. So sorry +I did not make it clear. My Lord, I am told that this has been put in by +the French Prosecution as Exhibit RF-281. I gave it a GB number, as I +recall. + +THE PRESIDENT: What number is it? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: RF-281. + +[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you find Section 2, Paragraph 4? That +is: + + “Now I have just received a teleprint from Field Marshal Keitel, + asking for a regulation to be issued, making members of the + personnel, and, if necessary their relatives, collectively + responsible for cases of sabotage occurring in their + establishments (joint responsibility of relatives). This demand + serves a purpose and promises success only if I am actually + allowed to perform executions by firing squads. If this is not + possible, such a decree would have exactly the opposite effect.” + +Opposite the word “if I am actually allowed to perform executions by +firing squads” there is the pencil note from you, “Yes, that is best.” +So that is a third example where I suggest that you, yourself, are +approving and encouraging the shooting of next of kin for the act of +some member of their family. What do you say to that, your own pencil +mark? + +KEITEL: I did make that marginal note. An order given in this matter was +different. A reply was given which was different. I wrote that note. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to know. Why did you write +this remark, “Yes, that is best,” approving of a firing squad for +relatives of people who had committed some occupation offense in Norway? +Why did you think it was best that there should be a firing squad for +the relations? Why? + +KEITEL: It was not done and no order to that effect was given. A +different order was given. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I am asking, and I shall give +you one more chance of answering it. Why did you put your pencil on that +document, “Yes, that is best”? + +KEITEL: I am no longer in a position to explain that today, in view of +the fact that I see hundreds of documents daily. I wrote it and I admit +it now. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, unless it means something entirely +different from what you have written, it meant that you approved it +yourself and thought the best course was that the relations should be +shot by a firing squad. + +I think Your Lordship said that you wished to adjourn. + +THE PRESIDENT: Yes. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not finished, My Lord. I have a few matters +for Monday morning. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, the defendant can return to the dock, and we will +proceed with the other applications. + +[_The defendant left the stand._] + +Sir David, shall we deal with these applications in the same way as we +have done before? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The first one that I have is an +application on behalf of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner for a witness +called Hoess, who was former Commander of the Auschwitz Concentration +Camp. My Lord, there is no objection on the part of the Prosecution to +that. + +THE PRESIDENT: So that is the application which has to be made by a +great number of the defendants’ counsel. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, yes, Your Lordship is quite right. + +My Lord, as Commandant of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, the +Prosecution feel that he could contribute to the information of the +Tribunal, if no objection is forthcoming. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I see that you are among the counsel who +applied for him. Is there anything you wish to add about that? + +DR. STAHMER: I have nothing to add to my written application. + +THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Then the Tribunal will consider this, you see, +after you have dealt with them. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next one is Dr. Naville. Dr. +Naville was allowed as witness to the Defendant Göring, provided he can +be located. He has been located in Switzerland and I understand he has +informed the Tribunal that he sees no use in his coming here as a +witness for Göring, and he is now asked for by Dr. Nelte, Counsel for +Keitel, to prove that prisoners of war had been treated according to the +rules of the Geneva Convention, Dr. Naville having been a representative +of the Red Cross. Dr. Nelte, I am told, will be satisfied with an +interrogatory, and the Prosecution have no objection to an +interrogatory. + +THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte? + +DR. NELTE: That is correct; I agree, providing that I am allowed to put +my questions to Dr. Naville in writing. + +But may I add something here, not to this application to present +evidence, but with reference to another application, which I already +submitted to the Prosecution through the Translation Division yesterday +or the day before. My application, to admit Hitler’s stenographers as +witnesses was rejected by the Tribunal as irrelevant. I have now +received a letter and an affidavit from one of these stenographers, and +in that affidavit I find a passage which refers to Keitel’s attitude +towards Hitler at interviews and conferences with him. + +Public opinion has criticized the defendants as being in the habit of +quoting dead men whenever they want to say anything in their favor; and +similar statements have been made in this Court. The Defendant Keitel +requests that the part of the affidavit which I have already submitted +and which I intend to submit, be admitted as an affidavit so that the +witness can still be rejected and yet it will be possible for me to +submit that passage of the affidavit with the agreement of the +Prosecution. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Dr. Nelte, My Lord, will submit the passage, +we will consider it, but I have not had the chance of doing it up until +now. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you will carry out that course and if you want, +there is no objection to it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, you will let me have it, a copy of +it? + +DR. NELTE: Certainly. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next application is on behalf of +the Defendant Von Schirach, a request to submit an affidavit of Dr. Hans +Carossa. The gist of the affidavit is that the defendant tried to keep +himself independent of Party directives in matters of literature and art +and that, while Gauleiter in Vienna, he repeatedly intervened on behalf +of Jews and concentration camp inmates. My Lord, the Prosecution have no +objection to an affidavit being filed. + +The next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Funk for +interrogatories to be submitted to Mr. Messersmith, dealing with Funk’s +relation to the Party and his work in the Reich Ministry of Propaganda. +My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection, but remind the Tribunal that +the Defendant Funk has already, on the 15th of March, asked permission +to submit another affidavit to Mr. Messersmith, dealing with Mr. +Messersmith’s affidavit. The Prosecution did not raise any objections, +but the Tribunal has not, as far as we know, granted that yet. So I +wanted the Tribunal to know there was a previous request... + +THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean an affidavit or interrogatory on the 15th of +March? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Interrogatories. + +THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories? Surely we must have dealt with it. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is the information that my office +had. They have not seen the... + +THE PRESIDENT: I see. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In case the Tribunal had not dealt with it, we +want to point out that there is one outstanding. We have no objection to +either. + +Then the Defendant Rosenberg requests Hitler’s decree to Rosenberg of +June 1943. There is no objection on the part of the Prosecution. I am +told that we can not trace any previous application but the position at +the moment is that we haven’t any objection to it. + +Then, My Lord, the next is Von Neurath, an application for a +questionnaire for Professor Kossuth, long a resident of Prague. Really +they ask for interrogatories. My Lord, there is no objection to +interrogatories. + +Then, My Lord, there is an application in reverse, if I may put it so, +from Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht, the downgrading of Herr +Huelse, who was drafted as a witness, to an affidavit. My Lord, we have +no objection to that. + +DR. DIX: This is the witness Huelse. He was granted to me as a witness. +In order to shorten and simplify the proceedings, I have decided to +forfeit the right to hear the witness because there was an affidavit. I +have received the affidavit. While my application to dispense with the +witness was pending, however, the witness arrived in Nuremberg. He is +here now, and I think therefore, that it will be best for him to stay +and for me to be allowed to examine him by confronting him with his own +affidavit, asking him to confirm it, and then put some additional +questions to him. I think that would be much more practical than having +the witness here to no purpose, sending him back again and retaining +only the affidavit. My purpose, in any case, was partly to avoid the +complications connected with getting him here. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you withdraw the application to have the +affidavit... + +THE PRESIDENT: Is the witness Huelse a prisoner or not, or an internee? + +DR. DIX: He is a free witness. He is not in detention and he is free to +move about Nuremberg. + +THE PRESIDENT: Can he remain here until the Defendant Schacht’s case +comes on? + +DR. DIX: I hope so. He has told me that he can stay and that he is +willing to do so. + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have no objection. The Tribunal has +already granted him as a witness. If Dr. Dix wants him as a witness, of +course we have no objection to it. + +The next one is an application on behalf of the Defendant Streicher, for +an affidavit from a Dr. Herold. To put it quite shortly, the Prosecution +suggest that it should be interrogatories rather than an affidavit and +on that basis we would make no objection. + +My Lord, there is only one thing I have to say. I had a most useful +discussion with Dr. Dix last night, following out the Tribunal’s +suggestion of going through the documents. Dr. Dix was most helpful in +explaining the purpose of his documents and what they were. I do suggest +that if any of the Defense Counsel when they are explaining the +documents would also care to explain the purport of their witnesses—I +do not want to embarrass them in any way—but if they would voluntarily +explain the purport of witnesses, either to Mr. Dodd or myself, we might +be able to save them a great deal of time, by indicating whether the +evidence of that witness would be agreed to or might be the subject of +objection. + +I only throw it out now, as we are going to meet over the documents, and +if they would extend it to witnesses, I am sure we could achieve a most +profitable co-operation. + +THE PRESIDENT: You are suggesting, Sir David, are you, that they should +explain to you the nature of the evidence which the witness was going to +give? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: And if the Prosecution were not going to dispute it, that +it might be incorporated in an affidavit? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that we could probably dispense with the +witness, and probably incorporate that in an affidavit. Of course, I +have been told the general purport of the witness, because I attended on +the application, but if they could elaborate on it a little more as it +often happens when they see the witness and let me know what the scope +of the witness’ testimony would be, I could probably concede, either in +whole or in part, and save them a lot of work and the Tribunal a lot of +time. + +THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Tribunal would like to know whether the +defendants’ counsel think that is a possible course, whether it might +lead to some shortening of the defense. Could Dr. Dix possibly tell us +whether he thinks it would be possible? + +DR. DIX: Of course, I cannot make any statement on the views of my +colleagues, since I cannot read their minds. All I can say at the moment +is that I will recommend to my colleagues, as unusually helpful and +practical, the kind of conversation which I had the honor of having with +Sir David yesterday. Personally, I think that my colleagues too will +agree to this procedure unless there is any particular objection to it, +which is, of course, always possible. I cannot say any more at the +moment. + +THE PRESIDENT: You understand what Sir David was suggesting, that such a +conversation should apply not only to documents but also to witnesses +and if you could indicate rather more fully than you do in your +applications what the subject of their evidence was going to be, +possibly the Prosecution might be able to say in those circumstances +that upon those matters they should not propose to dispute the evidence +and therefore it might be incorporated in an affidavit? + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if Your Lordship allows me to +interject, if they care to bring a statement on a particular witness’ +testimony, the Prosecution would, I am sure, in many particulars be +prepared to say, “Well, you produce that statement on that point and we +will admit it, without any formality.” + +THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, Dr. Dix, you and the other counsel for the +defendants could consider that matter. + +DR. DIX: I have understood it to be exactly as Your Lordship has just +stated it. I discussed both the witnesses and the documents with Sir +David and that was very helpful; and in that sense I will... + +THE PRESIDENT: If that is all we need do at the moment, then... + +SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, yes. + +THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal will adjourn. + + [_The Tribunal adjourned until 8 April 1946 at 1000 hours._] + + + + + TRANSCRIBER NOTES + +Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious +printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for +periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; +however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus +“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes +French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: +hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout. + +Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb +tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the +tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations +between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in +the trial. + +An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as +possible to the original document presentation and layout. + +[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International +Military Tribunal Vol. 10_, by Various.] + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS +BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 10 *** + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so +the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. +Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this +license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and +trademark. 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