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-The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes, by
-Averroes
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
-most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
-of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
-will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before
-using this eBook.
-
-Title: The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes
-
-Author: Averroes
-
-Translator: Mohammad Jamil-Ur-Rehman
-
-Release Date: June 27, 2021 [eBook #65708]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-Produced by: Wouter Franssen and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team
-             at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images
-             generously made available by The Internet Archive)
-
-*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY OF
-AVERROES ***
-
-
-
-
-_The Gaekwad Studies
-in
-Religion and Philosophy: XI._
-
-                                  THE
-                        PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
-                              OF AVERROES
-
-           Printed by Manibhai Mathurbhai Gupta at the “Arya
-            Sudharak” Printing Press, Raopura, Baroda, and
-            Published by A. G. Widgery, the College, Baroda
-                               1-1-1921
-
-
-
-
-                                  THE
-                        PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
-                              OF AVERROES
-
-                  Tractata translated from the Arabic
-
-                                  By
-
-                    MOHAMMAD JAMIL-UR-REHMAN M. A.
-
-                Professor of Islamic History, Hyderabad
-       Formerly Fellow of the Seminar for the Comparative Study
-                         of Religions, Baroda.
-
-                                BARODA
-
-
-
-
-                              DEDICATION
-                                  to
-                          Dr. AZIMUDDIN AHMAD
-
-
-SIR,
-
-It was at your feet that I first learned to appreciate historical and
-literary research, and the following pages constitute the earliest
-fruits of that literary labour of mine the impetus for which I am proud
-to have received from you. I crave your indulgence for my taking the
-liberty of dedicating the same to your revered name, with the hope that
-it will not fail to attract the same generous sympathy from you as you
-have always shown to your pupil.
-
-                                               MOHAMMAD JAMIL UR REHMAN
-
-
-
-
-                                PREFACE
-
-
-It was as a Fellow of the Seminar for the Comparative Study of
-Religions at the College, Baroda, that the present work was begun.
-The subject was taken up in the first place as a parallel study to
-that contained in a paper in the Indian Philosophical Review, Volume
-II, July 1918, pp. 24-32 entitled “Maimonides and the Attainment of
-Religious Truth.” But as I proceeded with my investigation I thought
-it might be best to let Averroes speak for himself. For this reason
-I have here translated certain treatises of Averroes, as edited in
-the Arabic text by D. H. Muller in “Philosophie und Theologie von
-Averroes.” Munich 1859. I am confident that the book will prove an
-interesting one and will explain itself to the reader without any
-introduction on my part. Though owing to my appointment at Hyderabad I
-resigned my position at Baroda soon after commencing this work I wish
-here to express my thanks to Professor Alban G. Widgery of Baroda for
-his constant sympathy with and encouragement for my work in and out of
-the Seminar. He has also kindly accepted the book for inclusion in the
-Gaekwad Studies in Religion and Philosophy. I am indebted to him for a
-complete revision of the manuscript and for the onerous work of seeing
-the book through the press. I am also indebted to my brother Mutazid
-Wali ur Rehman, B.A. for valuable help in rendering many obscure
-passages.
-
-                                               MOHAMMAD JAMIL UR REHMAN
-  _Osmania University,
-  Hyderabad._
-
-
-
-
-                               CONTENTS
-
-
- I. A Decisive Discourse on the Delineation of the Relation between
- Religion and Philosophy.
-
- I a. Appendix: On the Problem of Eternal Knowledge which Averroes has
- mentioned in his Decisive Discourse.
-
- II. An Exposition of the Methods of Argument concerning the Doctrines
- of the Faith, and a Determination of Doubts and misleading Innovation
- brought into the Faith through Interpretations.
-
-
-
-
-                                   I
-                A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION
-                                OF THE
-               RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY
-
-
-
-
-                A DECISIVE DISCOURSE ON THE DELINEATION
-                                OF THE
-             RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.[1]
-
-
-And after: Praise be to God for all His praiseworthy acts, and
-blessings on Mohammad, His slave, the Pure, the Chosen One and His
-Apostle. The purpose of the following treatise is to inquire through
-sacred Law[2] whether the learning of philosophy and other sciences
-appertaining thereto is permitted, or called dangerous, or commended
-by the Law, and if commended, is it only approved or made obligatory.
-We maintain that the business of philosophy is nothing other than to
-look into creation and to ponder over it in order to be guided to the
-Creator,--in other words, to look into the meaning of existence. For
-the knowledge of creation leads to the cognisance of the Creator,
-through the knowledge of the created. The more perfect becomes the
-knowledge of creation, the more perfect becomes the knowledge of
-the Creator. The Law encourages and exhorts us to observe creation.
-Thus, it is clear that this is to be taken either as a religious
-injunction or as something approved by the Law. But the Law urges
-us to observe creation by means of reason and demands the knowledge
-thereof through reason. This is evident from different verses of the
-Quran. For example the Quran says: “Wherefore take example _from them_,
-ye who have eyes.”[3] That is a clear indication of the necessity
-of using the reasoning faculty, or rather both reason and religion,
-in the interpretation of things. Again it says: “Or do they not
-contemplate the kingdom of heaven and earth and the things which God
-hath created.”[4] This is a plain exhortation to encourage the use of
-observation of creation. And remember that one whom God especially
-distinguishes in this respect, Abraham, the prophet. For He says: “And
-this did we show unto Abraham: the kingdom of heaven and earth.”[5]
-Further He says: “Do they not consider the camels, how they are
-created; and the heaven, how it is raised.”[6] Or still again: “And
-(who) meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord thou
-hast not created this in vain.”[7] There are many other verses on this
-subject: too numerous to be enumerated.
-
-Now, it being established that the Law makes the observation and
-consideration of creation by reason obligatory--and consideration
-is nothing but to make explicit the implicit--this can only be done
-through reason. Thus we must look into creation with the reason.
-Moreover, it is obvious that the observation which the Law approves
-and encourages must be of the most perfect type, performed with the
-most perfect kind of reasoning. As the Law emphasises the knowledge of
-God and His creation by inference, it is incumbent on any who wish to
-know God and His whole creation by inference, to learn the kinds of
-inference, their conditions and that which distinguishes philosophy
-from dialectic and exhortation from syllogism. This is impossible
-unless one possesses knowledge beforehand of the various kinds of
-reasoning and learns to distinguish between reasoning and what is not
-reasoning. This cannot be done except one knows its different parts,
-that is, the different kinds of premises.
-
-Hence, for a believer in the Law and a follower of it, it is necessary
-to know these things before he begins to look into creation, for
-they are like instruments for observation. For, just as a student
-discovers by the study of the law, the necessity of knowledge of legal
-reasoning with all its kinds and distinctions, a student will find out
-by observing the creation the necessity of metaphysical reasoning.
-Indeed, he has a greater claim on it than the jurist. For if a jurist
-argues the necessity of legal reasoning from the saying of God:
-“Wherefore take example _from them_ O ye who have eyes,”[8] a student
-of divinity has a better right to establish the same from it on behalf
-of metaphysical reasoning.
-
-One cannot maintain that this kind of reasoning is an innovation in
-religion because it did not exist in the early days of Islam. For legal
-reasoning and its kinds are things which were invented also in later
-ages, and no one thinks they are innovations. Such should also be our
-attitude towards philosophical reasoning. There is another reason why
-it should be so, but this is not the proper place to mention it. A
-large number of the followers of this religion confirm philosophical
-reasoning, all except a small worthless minority, who argue from
-religious ordinances. Now, as it is established that the Law makes the
-consideration of philosophical reasoning and its kinds as necessary
-as legal reasoning, if none of our predecessors has made an effort to
-enquire into it, we should begin to do it, and so help them, until the
-knowledge is complete. For if it is difficult or rather impossible for
-one person to acquaint himself single-handed with all things which it
-is necessary to know in legal matters, it is still more difficult in
-the case of philosophical reasoning. And, if before us, somebody has
-enquired into it, we should derive help from what he has said. It is
-quite immaterial whether that man is our co-religionist or not; for the
-instrument by which purification is perfected is not made uncertain
-in its usefulness, by its being in the hands of one of our own party,
-or of a foreigner, if it possesses the attributes of truth. By these
-latter we mean those Ancients who investigated these things before the
-advent of Islam.
-
-Now, such is the case. All that is wanted in an enquiry into
-philosophical reasoning has already been perfectly examined by the
-Ancients. All that is required of us is that we should go back to
-their books and see what they have said in this connection. If all
-that they say be true, we should accept it and if there be something
-wrong, we should be warned by it. Thus, when we have finished this
-kind of research we shall have acquired instruments by which we can
-observe the universe, and consider its general character. For so long
-as one does not know its general character one cannot know the created,
-and so long as he does not know the created, he can have no knowledge
-of the Creator. Thus we must begin an inquiry into the universe
-systematically, such as we have learned from the trend of rational
-inference. It is also evident that this aim is to be attained by the
-investigation of one part of the universe after another, and that help
-must be derived from predecessors, as is the case in other sciences.
-Imagine that the science of geometry and astronomy had become extinct
-in our day, and a single individual desired to find out by himself the
-magnitude of the heavenly bodies, their forms, and their distances from
-one another. Even though he were the most sagacious of men, it would be
-as impossible for him as to ascertain the proportion of the sun and the
-earth and the magnitude of the other stars. It would only be attainable
-by aid of divine revelation, or something like it. If it be said to him
-that the sun is a hundred and fifty or sixty times as big as the earth,
-he would take it to be sheer madness on the part of the speaker, though
-it is an established fact in the science of astronomy, so that no one
-learned in that science will have any doubt about it.
-
-The science which needs most examples from other sciences is that of
-Law. For the study of jurisprudence cannot be completed except in a
-very long time. If a man today would himself learn of all the arguments
-discovered by the different disputants of diverse sects, in problems
-which have always excited contentions in all the big cities, except
-those of Al-Maghrib, he would be a proper object to be laughed at on
-account of the impossibility of the task, in spite of the existence of
-every favourable circumstance. This is similar not only in the sciences
-but also in the arts. For no one is capable of discovering by himself
-alone everything which is required. And if this is so in other sciences
-and arts, how is it possible in the art of arts--philosophy?
-
-This being so, it becomes us to go back to the Ancients, and to see
-what observations and considerations they have made into the universe,
-according to the tests of inference. We should consider what they have
-said in this connection and proved in their books, so that whatever may
-be true in them we may accept and, while thanking them, be glad to know
-it, and whatever be wrong, we should be warned by it, be cautioned, and
-hold them excused for their mistake.
-
-From what has been said, it may be taken that a search into the books
-of the Ancients is enjoined by the Law, when their meaning and purpose
-be the same as that to which the Law exhorts us. Anyone who prevents a
-man from pondering over these things, that is, a man who has the double
-quality of natural sagacity and rectitude in the Law, with the merit of
-learning and disposition--turns away the people from the door by which
-the Law invites them to enter into the knowledge of God, and that is
-the door of observation which leads to the perfect knowledge of God.
-Such an action is the extreme limit of ignorance and of remoteness from
-God.
-
-If, by studying these books, a man has been led astray and gone wrong
-on account of some natural defect, bad training of the mind, inordinate
-passion, or the want of a teacher who might explain to him the true
-significance of things, by all or some of these causes, we ought not on
-this account to prevent one fit to study these things from doing so.
-For such harm is not innate in man, but is only an accident of training.
-
-It is not right that a drug which is medically useful by its nature
-should be discarded because it may prove harmful by accident. The
-Prophet told a man whose brother was suffering with diarrhea to
-treat him with honey. But this only increased the ailment. On his
-complaining, the Prophet said: “God was right and thy brother’s stomach
-was wrong.” We would even say that a man who prevents another fit for
-it, from studying the books of philosophy, because certain worthless
-people have been misled by them, is like a man who refused a thirsty
-man cold and sweet water, till he died, because some people under the
-same circumstances have been suffocated by it and have died. For death
-by suffocation through drinking cold water is accidental, while by
-thirst it is natural and inevitable.
-
-This state of things is not peculiar to this science only, but is
-common to all. How many jurists there are in whom jurisprudence has
-become the cause of worldliness and lack of piety? We should say that
-a large majority of jurists are of this kind, although their science
-should result in better action than other sciences which only lead to
-better knowledge.
-
-So far, then, the position is established. Now, we Muslims firmly
-believe that our Law is divine and true. This very Law urges us and
-brings us to that blessing which is known as the knowledge of God, and
-His creation. This is a fact to which every Muslim will bear testimony
-by his very nature and temperament. We say this, because temperaments
-differ in believing: one will believe through philosophy; while another
-will believe through dogmatic discourse, just as firmly as the former,
-as no other method appeals to his nature. There are others who believe
-by exhortation alone, just as others believe through inferences. For
-this reason our divine Law invites people by all the three methods,
-which every man has to satisfy, except those who stubbornly refuse to
-believe, or those, according to whom these divine methods have not been
-established on account of the waywardness of their hearts. This is why
-the mission of the Prophet has been declared common to the whole world,
-for his Law comprises all the three methods leading men towards God.
-What we say is quite clear from the following saying of God: “Invite
-men unto the way of the Lord, by wisdom and mild exhortation, and
-dispute with them in the most condescending manner.”[9]
-
-As this Law is true and leads to the consideration of the knowledge
-of God, we Muslims should believe that rational investigation is not
-contrary to Law, for truth cannot contradict truth, but verifies it and
-bears testimony to it. And if that is so, and rational observation is
-directed to the knowledge of any existent objects, then the Law may be
-found to be silent about it, or concerned with it. In the former case
-no dispute arises, as it would be equivalent to the absence of its
-mention in the Law as injunctory, and hence the jurist derives it from
-legal conjecture. But if the Law speaks of it, either it will agree
-with that which has been proved by inference, or else it will disagree
-with it. If it is in agreement it needs no comment, and if it is
-opposed to the Law, an interpretation is to be sought. Interpretation
-means to carry the meaning of a word from its original sense to a
-metaphorical one. But this should be done in such a manner as will
-not conflict with the custom of the Arabian tongue. It is to avoid
-the naming of an object, by simply mentioning its like, its cause,
-its attribute, or associate, etc. which are commonly quoted in the
-definition of the different kinds of metaphorical utterances. And if
-the jurist does so in many of the legal injunctions, how very befitting
-would it be for a learned man to do the same with his arguments. For
-the jurist has only his fanciful conjectures to depend upon, while a
-learned man possesses positive ones.
-
-We hold it to be an established truth that if the Law is apparently
-opposed to a truth proved by philosophy it admits of an interpretation
-according to the canons of the Arabic language. This is a proposition
-which a Muslim cannot doubt and a believer cannot mistrust. One who is
-accustomed to these things divine can experience for himself what we
-have said. The aim of this discourse is to bring together intellectual
-and traditional science. Indeed, we would even say that no logical
-conclusion will be found to be opposed to the Law, which when sifted
-and investigated in its different parts will be found in accordance, or
-almost so, with it.
-
-                   *       *       *       *       *
-
-That is why all Muslims are agreed that all the words of the Law are
-not to be taken literally, nor all of them given an interpretation.
-But they vary in verses, which are or are not to be interpreted.
-For example, the Asharites put an interpretation upon the verse
-of Equalisation[10] and on the Tradition of Descent,[11] while
-the Hanbalites take them literally. The Law has made two sides of
-these--exoteric and esoteric--because of the differences of human
-nature and minds in verifying a thing. The existence of an opposed
-esoteric meaning is in order to call the attention of the learned to
-find out a comprehensive interpretation. To this the following verse
-of the Quran refers: “It is he who hath sent down unto thee the book,
-wherein are some verses clear to be understood--they are the foundation
-of the book--and others are parabolical. But they whose hearts are
-perverse will follow that which is parabolical therein, out of love of
-schism, and a desire of the interpretation thereof; yet none knoweth
-the interpretation thereof except God. But they who are well grounded
-in knowledge say: We believe therein, the whole is from our Lord, and
-none will consider except the prudent.”[12]
-
-Here it may be objected that in the Law there are things which all
-Muslims have agreed to take esoterically, while there are others on
-which they have agreed to put an interpretation, while there are some
-about which they disagree. Is it justifiable to use logic in the
-interpretation of those which have been taken literally, or otherwise?
-We would say that if the agreement is positive there is no need to
-apply logic; but if it be conjectural there is. For this very reason
-Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) and Abu Ma’ali and other learned doctors have
-ordained that a man does not become an unbeliever by forsaking the
-common agreement and applying the principle of interpretation in such
-things. It will certainly be agreed that complete consensus of opinion
-is not possible in metaphysical questions, in the manner in which it is
-possible to establish it in practical things. For it is not possible to
-establish unanimity of opinion at any time, unless we confine ourselves
-to a small period and know perfectly all the learned doctors living in
-it, that is, their personalities, their number and their views about
-any question to be quoted to us directly from them without a break in
-the chain. With all this we should know for certain that the doctors
-living at that time are agreed that there is no distinction of exoteric
-and esoteric meanings in the Law, that the knowledge of no proposition
-should be concealed from anybody, and that the method of teaching the
-Law should be the same with all men. But we know that a large number
-of people in the early days of Islam believed in exoteric and esoteric
-meanings of the Law, and thought that the esoteric meanings should
-not be disclosed to an ignorant person who cannot understand them.
-For example, Bukhari has related on the authority of Ali that he said
-“Talk to men what they can understand. Do you intend to give the lie
-to God and His Apostle?” There are many Traditions to the same effect
-related from other people. So, how is it possible to conceive of any
-consensus of opinion coming down to us in metaphysical questions when
-we definitely know that in every age there have been doctors who take
-the Law to contain things the real significance of which should not be
-disclosed to all men? But in practical affairs it is quite different.
-For all persons are of opinion that they should be revealed to all men
-alike. In these things unanimity of opinion can be easily obtained if
-the proposition is published, and no disagreement is reported. That may
-be sufficient to obtain unanimity of opinion in practical things as
-distinct from the sciences.
-
-If it be maintained that one does not become an unbeliever by ignoring
-consensus of opinion in interpretation, as no unanimity is possible
-in it, what shall we say of such Muslim philosophers as Abu Nasr (Al
-Farabi) and Ibn Sina (Avicenna)? For Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) has
-charged them with positive infidelity in his book: _The Refutation
-of the Philosophers_, in regard to three things: The eternity of
-the world; God’s ignorance of particulars; and the interpretation
-concerning the resurrection of bodies and the state of the Day of
-Judgment. To this we should reply that from what he has said it
-is not clear that he has charged them positively with infidelity.
-For in his book _Al Tafriqah bain’al Islami w’al Zindiqah_ he has
-explained that the infidelity of a man who ignores the consensus of
-opinion is doubtful. Moreover we have definitely pointed out that it
-is not possible to establish a consensus of opinion in such matters,
-especially when there are many people of the early times who have
-held that there are interpretations which should not be disclosed to
-all but only to those who are fit for them and those are men who are
-“well grounded in knowledge”[13], a divine injunction which cannot
-be overlooked. For if such people do not know the interpretation in
-these matters they will have no special criterion of truth for their
-faith, which the common people have not, while God has described
-them as believing in Him. This kind of faith is always produced by
-the acceptance of the arguments, and that is not possible without a
-knowledge of interpretation. Otherwise, even the common people believe
-in the words of God without any philosophy whatever. The faith which
-the Quran has especially ascribed to the learned must be a faith
-strengthened with full arguments, which cannot be without a knowledge
-of the canons of interpretation. For God has said that the Law admits
-of interpretation which is its real significance, and this is what is
-established by arguments. Yet though this is so, it is impossible to
-establish any well grounded consensus of opinion in the interpretations
-which God has ascribed to the learned men. That is quite evident to
-anyone with insight. But with this we see that Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali)
-has made a mistake in ascribing to the Peripatetic Philosophers the
-opinion that God has no knowledge of particulars. They are only of
-opinion that the knowledge of God about particulars is quite different
-from ours. For our knowledge is the effect of the existence of a thing.
-Such knowledge is produced by the existence of a thing, and changes
-with changes in the thing. On the other hand the knowledge of God is
-the cause of an existent thing. Thus one who compares these two kinds
-of knowledge ascribes the same characteristics to two quite different
-things--and that is extreme ignorance. When applied both to eternal
-and to transitory things the word _knowledge_ is used only in a formal
-fashion, just as we use many other words for objects essentially
-different. For instance the word _Jalal_ is applied both to great and
-small; and _sarim_ to light and darkness. We have no definition which
-can embrace both these kinds of knowledge, as some of the Mutakallimun
-of our times have thought. We have treated this question separately at
-the request of some of our friends.
-
-How can it be supposed that the Peripatetic Philosophers say that God
-has no knowledge of particulars when they are of opinion that man is
-sometimes warned of the coming vicissitudes of the future through
-visions, and that he gets these admonitions in sleep, through a great
-and powerful Director, who directs everything? These philosophers
-are not only of opinion that God has no knowledge of details such as
-we have but they also believe that He is ignorant of universals. For
-all known universals with us are also the effect of the existence of
-a thing, while God’s knowledge is quite other than this. From these
-arguments it is concluded that God’s knowledge is far higher than that
-it should be called universal or particular. There is therefore no
-difference of opinion concerning the proposition, that is, whether they
-are called infidel or not.
-
-As to the eternal or transitory nature of the world: I think that in
-this matter the difference of opinion between the Asharite Mutakallimun
-and the Ancient Philosophers is for the most part a verbal difference,
-at least so far as the opinion of some of the Ancients is concerned.
-For they are agreed on the fact that there are three kinds of
-creation--the two extremes and a medial one. They again agree on the
-nomenclature of the two extremes, but they disagree as to the medial
-one. As to the one extreme, it has come into existence from something
-other than itself, or from anything else--that is from a generative
-cause or matter--while time existed before it. All those things whose
-existence is perceived by the senses, as water, animals, vegetation,
-etc., are included in this. All Ancient and Asharite philosophers are
-agreed in denominating this creation _Originated_.
-
-The other extreme is that which came into existence from nothing, not
-out of anything, and time did not precede it. The two parties are
-agreed in calling this _Eternal_. This extreme can be reached by logic.
-This is God, the Creator, Inventor, and Preserver of all.
-
-The medial kind of creation is that which has neither been made from
-nothing, “matter,” nor has time preceded it, but it has been created
-by some generative cause. In this is included the whole world. Again
-they all agree on the existence of all the three categories of the
-universe. The Mutakallimun admit, or they ought to admit, that
-before the universe there was no time, for according to them time is
-contemporaneous with motion and body. They are also agreed with the
-Ancients that future time and creation have no end, but they differ as
-to past time and its creation. The Mutakallimun are of opinion that it
-had a beginning.
-
-This is the belief of Plato and his disciples, while Aristotle and
-his followers are of opinion that it had no beginning, just as the
-future has no end. It is clear that the last mentioned kind of creation
-resembles both the _originated_ and the _eternal_ creation. So one who
-thinks that in the past creation there are more characteristics of the
-eternal than the originated takes it to be eternal and vice versa.
-But in reality it is neither truly originated nor eternal. For the
-originated creation is necessarily subject to destruction while the
-eternal is without a cause. There are some, for example, Plato and his
-followers, who have called it _infinitely originated_, for according
-to them time has no end. There is not here so great a difference about
-the universe, for it to be made the basis of a charge of infidelity.
-In fact, they should not be so charged at all, for opinions which are
-worthy of this are far removed from ours, those quite contrary to them,
-as the Mutakallimun have thought them to be in this proposition. I mean
-that they take the words _originated_ and _eternal_ to be contrary
-expressions, which our investigation has shown not to be the case.
-
-The strange thing about all these opinions is that they are not in
-agreement with the literal sense of the Law. For if we look closely
-we shall find many verses which tell us of the creation of the
-universe--that is, of its _originated_ nature. Creation and time are
-said to be without end. For according to the verse: “It is He who hath
-created the heavens and the earth in six days, but His Throne was above
-the waters before the creation thereof”[14] it is clear that there was
-a universe before this one, and that is the throne and the water, and
-a time which existed before that water. Then again the verse “The day
-will come when the earth shall be changed into another earth and the
-heavens into other heavens”[15] shows equally when taken literally that
-there will be a universe after this one. Again, the verse: “Then He set
-his mind to the creation of heaven and it was smoke”[16] shows that the
-heavens were created from something.
-
-Whatever the Mutakallimun say about the universe is not based on a
-literal sense of the Law, but is an interpretation of it. For the Law
-does not tell us that God was even before mere non-existence, and
-moreover, this is not found as an ordinance in it. How can we suppose
-that there could be any consensus of opinion about the interpretation
-of verses by the Mutakallimun? In fact, there is much in the sayings
-of some philosophers which supports what we have quoted from the Law,
-taken literally.
-
-Those who differ concerning these obscure questions have either reached
-the truth and have been rewarded; or have fallen into error and have
-to be excused. For it is compulsory rather than voluntary to believe
-a thing to be true, the proof of which has already been established;
-that is, we cannot believe or disbelieve it as we like, as it depends
-upon our will to stand or not to do so. So, if one of the conditions of
-verification be freedom of choice, a learned man, and he alone, should
-be held excused, if he makes a mistake on account of some doubt. Hence
-the Prophet has said that if a magistrate judges rightly he receives
-two rewards, and if he makes a mistake he deserves only one. But what
-magistrate is greater than one who judges the universe, whether it
-is so or not. These are the judges--the learned men--whom God has
-distinguished with the knowledge of interpretation.
-
-It is this kind of mistake of insight which learned people are
-quite apt to make when they look into those obscure questions the
-investigation of which the Law has imposed upon them. But the mistake
-the common people make in these matters is sin pure and simple, whether
-in theoretical or in practical things. As a magistrate, ignorant of
-Tradition, when he makes mistakes in judgment, cannot be held excused,
-so likewise a judge of the universe when not having the qualities of a
-judge is also not excusable, but is either a sinner or an unbeliever.
-If it be a condition that a magistrate shall have capacity of
-arbitration concerning the lawful and the forbidden, that is, knowledge
-of the principles of Law and their application through analogy--how
-much more befitting it is for an arbitrator of the universe to be armed
-with fundamental knowledge of the mental sciences, and the way of
-deducing results from them.
-
-Mistake in the interpretation of the Law is thus of two kinds--a
-mistake which can be excused in one fit to look into the thing in which
-it has been committed, just as an expert physician is excused if he
-commits an error in the application of his science; or a magistrate
-when he misjudges, and a mistake which is inexcusable in one not fit
-to investigate a thing. But the error which cannot be excused for
-anybody, and which, if it happens to show itself in relation to the
-very principles of the Law, is infidelity, and if in universals is an
-innovation, is that error which is committed in those things which have
-been settled by all arguments and so the knowledge of them is possible
-for everybody, for instance, the acknowledgement of the existence of
-God, of Prophecy, and of the happiness or the misery of the next world.
-This is so, because all these three principles are proved by those
-three methods, the justification of which a man cannot deny by any
-means, that is exhortative controversial and argumentative proofs. A
-denier of such things, which are the very root of the principle of the
-Law, is an unbeliever, a retrograde with his tongue and his heart, or
-through negligence, on account of his denying them in spite of proofs.
-For if he be a man believing in arguments, he can verify them through
-these or if he believes in controversy, he can verify through that;
-and if he believes in religions admonitions he can well justify them
-through these. And hence the Prophet has said: “I have been commanded
-to fight with men till they say: ‘There is no God but Allah’ and
-believe in me” that is, by any of these three means of attaining the
-Faith.
-
-But there are things which, on account of their obscurity, cannot be
-understood by inference. So, God has favoured such of his creatures
-as cannot understand logic, either on account of their nature, habit,
-or lack of mental training, by quoting examples and parables of such
-things and has urged them to testify as to their truth through them.
-For everyone has mental capacity enough to understand them by the
-help of dogmatic and exhortatory argument which are common to all
-men. This is why the Law has been divided into two kinds: exoteric
-and esoteric. The exoteric part consists of those examples which have
-been coined to express certain meanings; while the esoteric is the
-meanings themselves, which are not manifested except to the learned in
-philosophy.
-
-These are the very four or five kinds of methods of knowing reality
-mentioned by Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in his book called _Al Tafriqah
-bain al Islam wal Zindiqah_. If it so happens as we have said that
-we can know of a thing by any of the above mentioned three methods,
-then we do not stand in need of any examples for understanding them.
-Such things should be taken literally and interpretation should find
-no place with regard to them. If these things form a part of the
-principles of the Law, one who puts an interpretation upon them is an
-infidel. For instance, if a man believes that there is no happiness or
-misery in the next world, and that the teaching is only an artifice to
-safeguard the life and property of the people from one another and that
-there is no goal for men other than this life, then he is certainly an
-unbeliever.
-
-When this has once been established it will become clear to you that
-interpretation is not lawful in the exoteric part of the Law. If the
-canon of interpretation be used in the principles of the Law, it is
-infidelity, and if used in general things it is an innovation. But
-there is also a certain exoteric law which requires an interpretation
-from learned men. It is not misbelief for them to take it exoterically,
-but it is so or is at least an innovation in religion if ignorant men
-try to interpret or explain it.
-
-Among these is the verse of Equalisation and the Tradition of Descent.
-For the Prophet said of a Negro slave girl who told him that God was in
-heaven: “Emancipate her, for she is a believer.” For there are persons
-who cannot believe a thing except through their imagination, that is,
-it is difficult for them to believe a thing which they cannot imagine.
-Among these may be classed men who cannot understand a thing except
-with a reference to space, and hence believe in God as though physical,
-notwithstanding that these are the very persons who have dealt very
-harshly with those mentioned above. They ought to be told that things
-of his character are parabolical, and that we should pause and consider
-the saying of God: “Yet none knoweth the interpretation thereof except
-God.” Although learned men agree that these are to be interpreted, they
-differ in the interpretation according to their knowledge of principles
-of philosophy. There is a third part of the Law which occupies an
-intermediate position, on account of some doubt about it. Some say that
-it should be taken exoterically, and that no interpretation should
-be allowed in it; while there are others who say that they have some
-esoteric meaning, and should not be taken exoterically by the learned.
-This is on account of the obscurity of their meaning. A learned man may
-be excused if he makes a mistake about them.
-
-If the Law is divided into these three parts, it may be asked: to which
-of these does the description of the state of the Day of Judgment
-belong? We would reply that it is quite clear, on the very face of
-the question, that it belongs to that part in which there is some
-difference of opinion. For one group of men, who class themselves
-among philosophers, say that these things should be taken literally.
-For, according to them, there is not a single argument which makes
-their literal sense absurd and unreasonable. This is the method of the
-Asharites. But another group of philosophers interpret them; but they
-differ very widely in the interpretation itself. Amongst these may be
-mentioned Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) and a large number of Sufis. There
-are some who would amalgamate the two interpretations, as Abu Hamid has
-done in some of his books. These questions are among those in which, if
-the learned men err they are to be excused; otherwise, they are to be
-thanked and rewarded. For, if one acknowledges the reality of the Day
-of Judgment, and then begins to apply the principles of interpretation
-to the description, and not its reality, he does not in any way deny
-it. A denial of its reality is infidelity, for it is one of the
-fundamentals of the Law, and it can be easily verified by any of the
-three methods of argument common to all men. But one who is not learned
-should take it exoterically, an interpretation in his case is unbelief,
-for it leads to infidelity. We are thus of opinion that such people
-should accept the literal sense, for interpretation will certainly
-lead them to infidelity. A learned man who discloses the discussions
-of these things to the common people helps them towards unbelief and
-one who abets another in that direction is himself no better than an
-unbeliever. It is therefore unsuitable that these interpretations
-should be published in any other than learned books, for in this way
-they will reach none but the learned. But it is a mistake both in
-religion and philosophy if they are put in other books, with dogmatic
-and exhortative arguments, as Abu Hamid has done. Although the author’s
-intention was good, the idea thus to increase the number of learned
-men, he caused a good deal of mischief through it. For, on account of
-this method some people began to find fault with philosophy, and others
-to blame religion, and still others began to think of reconciling the
-two. It seems that this was the very aim which Abu Hamid had in view in
-writing these books. He has tried to awaken the nature of men, for he
-never attached himself to any particular way of thinking in his books.
-He was an Asharite with the Asharites, a Sufi with the Sufis and a
-philosopher with the philosophers, so much so that he was, as has been
-said: “I am a Yeminite when I meet a Yeminite; if I meet a Ma’adi I am
-one of Banu Adnan.”
-
-Hence, it is necessary for the doctors of Islam to prevent men, except
-the learned, from reading his books; as it is incumbent upon them to
-hinder them from reading controversial writings which should not be
-studied except by those fit to do so. As a rule the reading of these
-books is less harmful than those of the former. For the majority cannot
-understand philosophical books, only those endowed with superior
-natures. People are on the whole destitute of learning and are aimless
-in their reading which they do without a teacher. Nevertheless they
-succeed in leading others away from religion. It is an injustice to
-the best kind of men and the best kind of creation; for in their case
-justice consists in the knowledge of the best things by the best
-people, fit to know it. It should be remembered that the greater the
-thing is the higher will be the injustice done to it on account of
-ignorance. Hence God says: “Polytheism is a great injustice.”[17]
-
-These things we have thought proper to mention here, that is, in a
-discussion of the relation between philosophy and religion and the
-canons of interpretation in Law. If these matters had not become
-commonly known among men, we would not have said anything about them
-and would not have entered in a plea on behalf of the interpreters. For
-these things are suitable only for mention in philosophical books.
-
-You ought to be aware that the real purpose of the Law is to impart
-the knowledge of truth and of right action. The knowledge of truth
-consists in the cognisance of God and the whole universe with its
-inner significance, especially that of religion, and the knowledge
-of happiness or misery of the next world. Right action consists in
-following those actions which are useful for happiness and avoiding
-those which lead to misery. The knowledge of these actions has been
-called practical knowledge. This is divided into two kinds: external
-actions, the knowledge of which is called Fiqh, that is, Theology; and
-actions pertaining to feelings, such as gratitude, patience, and other
-points of character to which the Law has urged us or from which it has
-prohibited us. This is called the knowledge of continence and of the
-next world. Abu Hamid in his book _The Revivification of the Sciences
-of Religion_ seems to be inclined to this kind, and as the people have
-always turned away from the former kind of knowledge and have turned
-themselves to the second which leads them easily to piety, the book
-attained its name. But we have wandered from our own purpose and will
-now return to it.
-
-If the purpose of the Law is to impart the knowledge of truth and
-of right action, this cannot be attained except by one of the two
-methods: _viz_, by conception or verification such as Mutakallimun have
-maintained in their books. There are three methods of verification open
-to people: philosophy, dogmatics and exhortation. There are two methods
-of conception: either by the thing itself, or by its like. As all
-people cannot by their nature understand and accept philosophical and
-dogmatic arguments, together with the difficulty of learning the use of
-inferences and the long time it takes to learn them, and the purpose
-of the Law being to be quite common among men, it is necessary that it
-should contain all kinds of verifications and conceptions. Among the
-methods of verification there are some which are meant for the common
-people: that is, exhortative and dogmatic, the exhortative being more
-common than the other. There is one method which is meant solely for
-the learned, and that is the method of rational inference. Now, it is
-the primary aim of the Law to improve the condition of the many without
-neglecting the few, and hence the method of conception and verification
-adopted are common to the majority.
-
-These methods are of four kinds: the first is that which, while
-in particulars the same in both, that is, both exhortatively and
-dialectically, is still true by conception and verification. These
-are syllogisms of which the minor and the major premise are certain,
-besides being easily imagined and well known. These are set before the
-deductions which are drawn from them, and not from their likes. To
-this kind of religious injunction there is no interpretation, and one
-who denies them or puts an interpretation upon them is an infidel. The
-second kind is that the premises of which although well known or easily
-imagined are also positively established. Their conclusions are drawn
-by analogy. Upon these, that is, their conclusions, an interpretation
-may be put. The third kind is just the reverse of the second, that is,
-the conclusions are themselves intended and their premises are well
-known or easily imagined without being positively established. Upon
-these also--that is, upon the conclusions, no interpretation can be
-put, but the premises may sometimes be interpreted. The fourth kind is
-that the premises of which are well-known or conjectural without being
-positively established. Their deductions are by analogy when that is
-intended. It is the duty of the learned men to interpret them and of
-the common people to take them exoterically.
-
-In short, all that should be interpreted can be grasped by philosophy
-alone. So the duty of the learned person is to interpret, and of
-the common people to take it literally, both in conception and in
-verification. The reason for the latter is that they cannot understand
-more. A student of law sometimes finds interpretations which have a
-preference over others, in a general way by verification: that is,
-the argument is more convincing with the interpretations than with
-the literal meanings. These interpretations are common and it is
-possible for them to be admitted by any whose speculative faculties
-have been developed in controversy. Some of the interpretations of the
-Asharites and the Mutazilites are of this type, though the arguments
-of the Mutazilites are generally the more weighty. But it is the duty
-of the common people who are not capable of understanding more than
-exhortation to take them exoterically. Indeed, it is not proper for
-them to know the interpretations at all.
-
-Thus there are three groups into which men have been divided: Those who
-are not included amongst those who should know the interpretations.
-These are common people who are guided by exhortation alone. They
-form a vast majority: for there is not a single rational being who
-cannot accept a result by this method. The second are dogmatic
-interpreters. These are so, either by their nature only, or both by
-nature and habit. The third are those who can be definitely called
-interpreters. These are the philosophers, both by nature and by
-philosophical training. This kind of interpretation should not be
-discussed with the dogmatists, not to speak of the common people. If
-any of these interpretations are disclosed to those not fit to receive
-them--especially philosophical interpretations--these being far higher
-than common knowledge, they may be led to infidelity. For he wishes to
-nullify the exoteric meaning and to prove his interpretation. But if
-the exoteric meaning is shown to be false without the interpretation
-being established, he falls into infidelity, if this concerns the
-principles of the Law. So, the interpretations should not be disclosed
-to the common people, and ought not to be put into exhortative or
-doctrinal books--that is, books written with an expository purpose in
-view--as Abu Hamid has done.
-
-Hence, it is necessary that the common people should be told that those
-things which are exoteric, and yet cannot be understood easily, the
-interpretations of which it is impossible for them to understand, are
-parabolical, and that no one knows the interpretation thereof except
-God. We should stop at the following words of God: “None knoweth the
-interpretation thereof except God.”[18] This is also the answer to the
-question about some of those abstruse problems which the common people
-cannot understand: “They will ask thee concerning the spirit: answer:
-The spirit was created at the command of my Lord, but ye have no
-knowledge given to you, except a little.”[19] Again, one who interprets
-these to persons not fit to receive them is an infidel, because he
-leads others to infidelity, which is quite in opposition to the purpose
-of the Law. This is especially the case when corrupt interpretations
-are put on the principles of the Law, as some men of our own times
-do. We have known many people who think they are philosophers and
-hence claim to find out strange things through philosophy, which are
-in every way contrary to religion, and they do not admit of any other
-interpretation. They think they must disclose these things to the
-common people. But by the disclosure of wrong notions they lead them to
-eternal destruction.
-
-The difference between their aim and that of the jurists can be made
-clear by the following example. Since it is not possible to make every
-one an expert physician a certain physician laid down some principles
-for the preservation of health and the prevention of diseases, and he
-allowed the use of some things but prohibited others. Now a man comes
-and tells the people that the principles laid down by that physician
-are not correct and declares them to be false, and they become
-discredited in the eyes of the people; or says that they are capable
-of interpretations which they cannot understand and cannot verify by
-practice. Do you think that people in these circumstances will ever
-act upon those things which are useful for their health and for the
-prevention of diseases or that the man himself will ever be capable of
-acting on them? No, he will be quite incapable of doing so and thus
-will lead them all to destruction.
-
-This is the case when those interpretations which they cannot
-understand are correct, to say nothing of those that are wrong. For
-they will not believe in health to be preserved, nor disease to be
-prevented, to say nothing of the things which preserve health or
-prevent disease. This is the condition of that man who discloses
-interpretations of the Law to the common people and those not fit to
-receive them. And hence he is an unbeliever.
-
-The simile which we have described above is a real parallel, and not
-merely fanciful (as some may think) as it is correct in every respect.
-For the relation of the medicine to the body is the same as that of the
-Law to the soul. A physician is one who seeks to preserve the health
-when he finds it good and tries to restore it when it is missed. In the
-same way a religious law-giver is one who takes care of the health of
-souls, which is called piety. The Quran also makes clear its purpose,
-through religious action, by many verses. For instance: “O true
-believers, a fast is ordained unto you as it was ordained those before
-you, that ye may fear God”[20] and “Their flesh is not accepted of
-God, neither their blood; but your piety is accepted by Him”[21] and:
-“For prayer preserveth a man from filthy crimes and from that which is
-blameable.”[22] There are many other verses of the same nature in the
-Quran. Thus, we see, a religious law-giver seeks to establish this kind
-of health by religious knowledge and practice. This is the health upon
-which depends happiness and in the case of its absence the misery of
-the next world.
-
-This should have made it clear to you not merely that one should not
-speak of the wrong interpretation. But also that it is not proper to
-put even true ones in the books of the common people. These correct
-interpretations are of the faith which man has and of which the whole
-creation was afraid to bear the burden. By this we refer to the
-following verse of the Quran: “We proposed the faith unto the heavens,
-and the earth, and the mountains, and they refused to undertake the
-same, and were afraid thereof, but man undertook it: verily he is
-unjust to himself and foolish.”[23] These interpretations and the
-idea that their discussion is necessary in the Law have given rise to
-many sects in Islam, so much so that they have denounced one another
-with infidelity and innovations. This is especially the effect of
-wrong interpretations. The Mutazilites interpreted a large number
-of verses and Traditions and disclosed them to the people. So also
-did the Asharites, though their interpretations were less in number.
-They only succeeded in creating hatred and wars among men, destroying
-the Law, and disuniting the people completely. To add to this, the
-method which they have adopted in proving these interpretations is
-adapted neither to the common people nor to the learned. For if you
-look closely into it, you will find that it is not correct according
-to the norms of logic--this anyone who has had any training may see
-for himself without the least effort. In fact, many of the principles
-upon which the Asharites build their conclusions are sophistical in
-their nature. They deny many fundamentals, like the proof of accidence,
-the influence of one thing upon another, the necessity of cause and
-effects, abstract figures and the processes leading to them. Indeed,
-Asharite Mutakallimun have been in this respects unjust to Mohammadans,
-for one of their sects has denounced as infidels all those who do not
-recognise the existence of God by methods which they have devised for
-the knowledge of Him: but in truth they themselves are in the wrong and
-are unbelievers.
-
-It is upon this point that the difference of opinion arises. Some say
-that the first principle is of reason, while others allege that it is
-of faith. That is to say they have thought that faith, even before
-knowing the methods common to all and to which the Law has made a
-call on all, is the only method of arriving at truth. Thus they have
-mistaken the real purpose of the Law-giver, and being themselves in the
-wrong they have led others astray.
-
-If it be alleged that the method that the Asharites and other
-Mutakallimun have devised are not those general methods in the purpose
-of the Law-giver for the instruction of the common people, and that it
-is not possible without some method being adopted, then the question
-arises: What are those methods which are given in the Law? We maintain
-that these methods are to be found in the Quran alone. For, if we
-look closely we shall find that in the Quran all the three kinds of
-methods are laid down, for the whole of mankind, both for the majority
-and for the learned few. If we reflect we shall come to see that no
-better methods can be discovered for the instruction of the common
-people than those mentioned in the Quran. Anyone who changes them by
-interpretations which are neither clear in themselves nor clearer than
-others to the common people, makes null and void their philosophy and
-their effect, the goal of which is the happiness of mankind. This is
-quite evident from the early and the later condition of Islam, for in
-the early days Muslims sought perfect excellence and piety by acting
-on those principles without putting any interpretation upon them. And
-those among them who knew any interpretation did not disclose it. In
-the later days interpretations were used, and piety decreased, the love
-for others was lost, and they became divided into schisms and parties.
-
-Hence one who cares to remove this innovation from the Law, should
-turn to the Book, and should pick up from it the existing arguments
-for things whose belief is inculcated upon us. Further he should
-deeply think over the esoteric meanings, as far as possible, without
-putting interpretations upon them, except when they are not quite
-clear to all. The assertions of the Book for the instructions of the
-people, when thought over are things, with whose help we can reach a
-stage from which none but the learned in logic can differ about the
-esoteric meaning of that which is not clear. This peculiarity cannot
-be found in any other assertions but that of the Book. There are
-three peculiarities in the assertions, which have been explained in
-the Quran, for the common people. First, that nothing can be found
-more convincing and true than these. Secondly, that they can be
-accepted by every nature; and they are such that none can know their
-interpretations, if there be any, except the learned in logic. Thirdly,
-that they possess a call to the righteous, for correct interpretations.
-This is neither to be found in the school of the Asharites nor in
-that of the Mutazalites _i. e._ their interpretations are neither
-generally acceptable, nor do they make any call to the righteous, nor
-are they right in themselves. It is for this reason that innovation
-has increased, and it is our desire to write about it, as far as it is
-possible for us, provided that we get leisure for it, have power to do
-it, and God gives us a respite in life. It is just possible that this
-may be a beginning for the coming generation; because the breach of
-Law, due to evil passions, and changed beliefs is simply aggrieving and
-saddening. This is still enhanced by those, who ascribe themselves to
-philosophy, because an injury from a friend is worse than the injury
-from an enemy. Philosophy is a companion and a foster-sister to the
-Law. Hence an injury from this source is the worst kind of injury,
-even if we neglect the enmity, hatred, and animosity which is created
-between the two, although they are companions by nature and friends
-in reality. It has also been injured by many ignorant _friends_ who
-ascribe themselves to it. These are the schisms which exist in Islam.
-May God set all aright, help all to His love, and bring together their
-hearts for piety, and erase enmity and hatred by his favour and grace.
-
-Indeed God has removed much of evil, ignorance and the misleading
-ways through this strong government, and has led the many to good,
-especially the people who have walked in the path of scholasticism, and
-have a liking for the knowledge of the Truth. Because it has called
-the people to the knowledge of God by mediate paths, which are higher
-than the depressions of the blind followers: and lower than that of the
-high-sounding Mutakallimun; and has called the learned to their duty of
-considering fully the principles of Law.
-
-
-                               FOOTNOTES
-
-[Footnote 1: A translation of Averroes’ Kitab Fasl a’l Maqal wa Taqrir
-ma bain’a’l Shariata wa’l Hikmati mina’l Ittisal. Ed. by D. J. Muller,
-Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes, Munich 1859.]
-
-[Footnote 2: _i. e._ Shariat. Compare Jewish Torah.]
-
-[Footnote 3: Quran lix, 2.]
-
-[Footnote 4: Quran vii, 184.]
-
-[Footnote 5: Quran vi, 75.]
-
-[Footnote 6: Quran lxxxviii, 17.]
-
-[Footnote 7: Quran iii, 176.]
-
-[Footnote 8: Quran lix, 2.]
-
-[Footnote 9: Quran xvi, 126.]
-
-[Footnote 10: “It is he who hath created you whatsoever is on
-earth, and that set His mind to the creation of heaven and formed
-it into seven heavens; he knoweth all thing.” Quran ii, 29. For an
-interpretation of this see Raji’s _Tafsiri Kabir_ vol. I. p. 249 et
-seq. Cairo. 1307. A. H. and Tabari’s _Commentary_ vol. I. p. 146 et
-seq. Cairo. 1902 A. D.]
-
-[Footnote 11: “Verily God comes down every night to the earth” (Nibayah
-fi Gharibil Hadith by Ibu Athir vol. IV. p. 138 Cairo 1311 A. H.) For
-an interpretation see the above and Qustatain’s Commentary on Bukari,
-vol. IX p. 178. Cairo. 1307 A. H.]
-
-[Footnote 12: Quran iii, 5.]
-
-[Footnote 13: Quran iii, 5.]
-
-[Footnote 14: Quran xi, 9.]
-
-[Footnote 15: Quran xiv, 19.]
-
-[Footnote 16: Quran xli, 10.]
-
-[Footnote 17: Quran xxxi, 12.]
-
-[Footnote 18: Quran iii, 5.]
-
-[Footnote 19: Quran xvii, 87.]
-
-[Footnote 20: Quran ii, 79.]
-
-[Footnote 21: Quran xxii, 38.]
-
-[Footnote 22: Quran xxix, 44.]
-
-[Footnote 23: Quran xxxiii, 67.]
-
-
-
-
-                                  Ia.
-
-                               APPENDIX.
-
- ON THE PROBLEM OF ETERNAL KNOWLEDGE, WHICH AVERROES HAS MENTIONED IN
-                        HIS DECISIVE DISCOURSE.
-
-
-May God perpetuate your honour and bless you, and screen you always
-from the eyes of misfortune. Through your excellent intelligence and
-good understanding you have learned a great part of all these sciences,
-till your insight informed you of the doubt which arises concerning the
-eternal knowledge of God, with its being at the same time concerned
-with created things. Thus, in the interests of truth, it is now
-incumbent upon us to remove the doubt from your mind, after we have
-stated it clearly. For one who does not know the problem adequately
-cannot very well solve the doubt.
-
-The question may be stated thus: If all this universe was in the
-knowledge of God before its creation, then, was it in His knowledge
-after its creation as it was before it came into existence; or was it
-in His knowledge before its creation quite different from that after
-its coming into being? If we say that the knowledge of God about it
-after its creation is quite different from that which it was before
-its creation, it becomes necessary for us to admit that the eternal
-knowledge is changeable; or that when the universe came into existence
-out of non-existence, then there is an addition to the eternal
-knowledge; which is impossible. Again, if we say that the knowledge of
-it was the same in both the conditions, then it would be said: Was the
-created universe the same before its coming into existence as it was
-after its creation? To this objection it will have to be answered that
-it was not the same before its creation as it was after it, otherwise
-the existent and the non-existent thing would be the same. When the
-opponent has admitted this much, he may be asked whether the real
-knowledge does not consist in the cognizance of an existent thing as
-it is. If he says: “Yes,” then accordingly it becomes necessary that
-when a thing changes in itself the knowledge of it must also change,
-otherwise it would be a knowledge of something other than the real
-object. Thus it would then be necessary to admit one of two things:
-either the eternal knowledge itself will change, or the created things
-would be unknown to God. And both of these alternatives are impossible
-with regard to God. This doubt is still further strengthened by the
-apparent condition of man, that is, the relation of his knowledge
-about non-existent things by the supposition of their existence and
-its relation when the thing in question is found. It is self-evident
-that both kinds of knowledge are different, otherwise God would have
-been ignorant of its existence at the time he found it. The argument
-which the Mutakallimun advance to meet this objection does not by any
-means deliver us from the doubt. They say that God knows the things
-before their coming into being, as they would be after they come into
-existence. If they say that no change occurs, they fall into mistake.
-If on the other hand they admit a change, they may be asked whether
-this change was known in the eternal knowledge or not. Thus the first
-doubt occurs again. On the whole it is difficult to imagine that the
-knowledge of a thing before and after its existence can be one and the
-same.
-
-This is the statement of the doubt in the briefest terms possible, as
-we have put it for your sake. A solution of this doubt requires a very
-long discussion, but here we intend to state a point which might easily
-solve it. Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) has also tried to solve this doubt in
-his work: _The Refutation of the Philosophers_, but his method is by no
-means satisfactory. For he says something to this effect: he thinks the
-known and the knowledge are not connected with each other, so that when
-a change takes place in the one the other does not change in itself. So
-it is possible that it may happen in the case of Divine knowledge and
-the things existent, that is, they may change in themselves while God’s
-knowledge may remain the same. For instance a pillar may be on the
-right hand of Zaid, it may be changed to his left without any change
-taking place in Zaid himself. But the illustration is not at all a
-correct one, for the relation has changed, that is, that which was on
-the right side is now on the left. That in which no change has taken
-place is the condition of that relation--Zaid. It being so, and the
-knowledge is only the relation itself, it is necessary that it should
-change with a change in the thing known, as the change in the relation
-of the pillar to Zaid, for it is now on the left after being on the
-right.
-
-The view which might solve this question is that it should be
-maintained that the condition of eternal knowledge of existent things
-is quite other than the created knowledge with regard to them. For
-the existence of a thing is the cause and means of our knowledge of
-it, while the eternal knowledge is itself the cause and means of the
-existent thing. So if a change takes place in the eternal knowledge
-after the coming into being of an existent thing, as it does in the
-created knowledge then it is involved that the former cannot be
-the cause but only the effect of the existent things. Thus it is
-necessary that there should be no change in it, as there is in the
-created knowledge. This mistake always occurs by our taking eternal
-knowledge to be like the created one, by an analogy from the seen
-to the unseen. The error in this analogy has already been exposed.
-Just as no change takes place in any agent after the creation of his
-act--that is, change of kind which was not found before--so no change
-in the eternal knowledge of God after the creation of the thing which
-was in His knowledge. So this doubt is removed. At the same time it
-is not necessary for us to say that as there is no change in eternal
-knowledge, therefore, He does not know an existent at the time of
-its creation, as it is. But we must believe that He knows not by a
-created but by His eternal knowledge. For a change in knowledge with
-a change of the existent thing is a condition of the knowledge which
-depends upon the existent thing, such a knowledge being created. Thus
-the relation of the eternal knowledge with the existent things is not
-the same as that of the created knowledge. It is not that there is
-no connection between them at all as some philosophers are said to
-maintain, who as the people think, say, at the time of doubt, that
-God has no knowledge of particulars at all. But this is not as is
-commonly supposed. They only say that He does not know particulars by
-any created knowledge, one of the conditions of which is its being
-created by them, by which it is an effect and not a cause. This is the
-last of the things about it which must be remembered. For our reason
-leads us to the fact that God is the Knower of things, all of them
-emanating from Him. This is so because He is a knower, not because
-of His existence, nor of His existence in any form, but only because
-of His being a Knower. God has said, “Shall not He know all things
-who hath created them, since He is the sagacious, the knowing.”[24]
-The arguments also tell us that He knows by a knowledge which may be
-akin to created knowledge. So it is necessary that there should be
-some other knowledge for the existent things--and this is the eternal
-of God. Moreover, how is it possible to suppose that the Peripatetic
-Philosophers think that the eternal knowledge does not include
-particulars, while they say that these are a cause of admonition to us
-in our dreams, divine revelations, and other kinds of inspiration?
-
-That is what we think about the solution of the problem--a solution in
-which there is no doubt or suspicion. God is the only helper to right
-judgment, and leader to truth. Peace be upon you, and blessings of God
-and His beatitude. God is the best knower of truth: and to Him is the
-return and the refuge.
-
-
-                               FOOTNOTES
-
-[Footnote 24: Quran lxvi, 14.]
-
-
-
-
-                                  II
-
-  AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE BELIEFS OF
-   THE FAITH, AND A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS AND MISLEADING
-                    INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRETATIONS.
-
-
-
-
-         AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING
-                       THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH
-                                  AND
-                  A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS
-                                  AND
-            MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRETATIONS.[25]
-
-
-And after--Praise be to God, who sets apart anyone whom He will for His
-knowledge, rendering him fit for understanding His Law and following
-His path, informing him of the hidden recesses of His knowledge, the
-real meaning of His inspiration, and the purpose of sending the Apostle
-to creatures, in spite of what has become clear about the doubt of the
-doubters among the Prophet’s own followers, and changes of meanings
-introduced by the false among his own people. He has disclosed to him
-that there are interpretations which God and His Apostle have not
-ordered. May there be the most perfect blessings upon the Trusty of
-His inspiration, and the Seal of His prophets, and upon his family and
-relations.
-
-We have already described in the foregoing tractate the conformity of
-philosophy with the Law, and its other relations. We have said there
-that the Law is of two kinds: exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the
-common people is to follow the exoteric law; while the duty of learned
-men is to follow the esoteric one. So the duty of the common people
-is to follow the meanings of the Law in their literal sense, leaving
-aside every interpretation of it. The learned men are not permitted
-to expose their interpretations to the common people, as Ali, (upon
-whom be peace) has said, “Tell the people what they can understand. Do
-you wish to give the lie to God and His Apostle?” So I thought that
-in the present book I should examine the exoteric meanings which the
-Law intends the common people to follow, and in those, search the real
-purpose of the Law-giver, (on whom be peace) according to my ability
-and knowledge. For the people of His Law have been extremely disturbed,
-so much so that many misguided sects and different divisions, have been
-produced, every one of which thinks that it is following the best Law,
-and that he who disagrees is either an innovator or an infidel whose
-life and property is at stake. All this is directly opposed to the
-purpose of the Law-giver. Its cause lies in the misleading things about
-the Law which have been put forward.
-
-In our own times, there are four of these sects which are famous. In
-the first place, there is the sect of the Asharites, and these are
-the people who are commonly taken to be men of _Sunna_. Then there
-are Mutazilites, the sects of the Batinites, (Esoteric), and the
-sect of the Bombasts. Every one of these sects has its own peculiar
-beliefs about God, and has turned many an exoteric word of the law
-to interpretations, which they have applied to those beliefs. They
-think that theirs was the original Law which all the people are asked
-to follow, and he who deviates from it is either an innovator or an
-infidel. But when you look into all their views and then examine the
-purpose of the Law, it would appear that a great part of them are
-recent opinions and innovating interpretations. Of them I will mention
-here those indispensable beliefs in the Law, without which Faith does
-not become complete, and will search, in every one of them, the real
-purpose of the Law-giver, (peace be upon him,) beyond that which has
-been made the basis of the Law, and its beliefs before the coming
-into use of incorrect interpretations. I will begin by explaining the
-intention of the Law-giver as to the beliefs which should be held by
-the common people about God, and the methods which He adopted towards
-them. All this is contained in the Divine Book. We will begin by an
-exposition of the methods which leads to the knowledge of the existence
-of the Creator, for this is the first thing which a student ought to
-know. But before this, it is necessary that we should mention the
-opinions of the well-known sects.
-
-The _Bombasts_ hold that the method of obtaining knowledge of the
-existence of the Creator is by hearing and not by reason, that is,
-the belief in His existence, the verification of which is incumbent
-upon all men, is enough to be taught by the Law-giver, and believed
-as an article of Faith, as is the case with his teachings about the
-condition of the Day of Judgment, and others with which our reason has
-no power to deal. This is obviously a misleading sect, for it falls
-short of the purpose of the Law, as regards the method adopted towards
-all the people, leading them to the knowledge of the existence of God,
-and calling them to the confession of His belief. It is quite evident
-from many verses of the Divine Book, that in it the people have been
-called to verify the existence of the Creator by arguments of reason
-which are mentioned in it. For instance, there are the following verses
-of the Quran, “O men of Mecca, serve your Lord who has created you
-and those before you,”[26] and “Is there any doubt concerning God,
-the Creator of heaven and earth?”[27] and other verses on the subject
-found therein. It is not fit for a man to say, that if these arguments
-had been necessary for believing in God--that is, had his faith been
-not completed without understanding them--the Prophet would not have
-invited anybody to Islam without presenting to him all these arguments,
-for the Arabs already knew the existence of the Creator, so that God
-has said, “If thou asketh them who has created the heavens and the
-earth, they will surely answer, God,”[28] and hence there was no use
-giving arguments. It is impossible to find a man so stupid and dull,
-that he cannot understand the arguments advanced by Law for the common
-people, through the Prophet. This is to say the least. If there be
-found such a man, then it is his duty to believe in God by hearing
-alone. So much for the ideas of the _Bombasts_ about the exoterics of
-the Law.
-
-The _Asharites_ are of opinion that the verification of the existence
-of God cannot be attained but by reason. But about this they have
-adopted a method, which is not among the methods adopted by Law, and
-is not mentioned in the Quran, nor the people invited through it to
-believe. Their well-known method is founded upon the fact that the
-universe is a created thing, which is itself based upon the theory
-of the composition of atoms, and that the atom is a created thing,
-and that other bodies are created out of it. The method which they
-adopt for the exposition of the creation of an atom, which they call
-_al-Jauharat u’l Faridah_ (sole Essence), is a misleading one even for
-many religious men in the business of controversy, not to speak of the
-common people. And despite this it is a method devoid of philosophy,
-and does not lead to a belief in the existence of the Creator. For if
-we suppose the universe is a created thing, it becomes necessary, as
-they say, that its Creator must also be a “Created” object. But a doubt
-presents itself about the existence of this created thing, which is
-not in the power of scholastic theology to solve. And that is this,
-that we can take this thing to be neither eternal nor created. For if
-we take it as created, then it must require another created thing, and
-this another, and so on to infinity. This is impossible. On the other
-hand, if we take Him as eternal, then it is necessary that his action
-in connection with the result must also be eternal. In this way the
-results also become eternal. It is necessary for a created thing that
-its existence be dependent upon a created action. Their hypothesis can
-only be proved if they admit that a created action can be performed by
-an eternal agent. For the result of the action might be dependent on
-the action of the agent. But they do not admit it, for according to
-their principles what is coeval with created things is itself created.
-Moreover, if the agent sometimes acts and at other times remains
-inactive, it is necessary, that there be a condition better applicable
-in one state of things than in the other. Then about this condition
-the same question will rise, and so it will go on till infinity. And
-what the Mutakallimun say in answer to this objection that the created
-action is the result of eternal intention, does not relieve us of our
-doubt or satisfy our mind. For intention without action is dependent
-upon the act, and if the act is a created thing, then it is necessary
-that the intention in connection with it must also be a created thing.
-It makes no difference whether we take the intention as eternal or
-created, rising before the action or with it. So we may take it as
-we like. All the same it is necessary for them to admit either of
-the three things about the universe--either a created action, with a
-created intention or a created action and an eternal intention, or
-an eternal action with an eternal intention. But a created thing is
-impossible from an eternal action without any expedient, even if we
-admit for their sake, that it comes into existence by eternal action;
-and putting intention itself or the action, connected with the act is a
-thing which cannot be understood. This is supposing an act without an
-agent, with a result, without any intention. Intention is a condition
-of the action and not the action itself. Also it is necessary that this
-eternal intention, should be connected with non-existence of a created
-thing, for a period of time which is indefinite. So if a created thing
-be non-existence for an unknown period of time, then it does not become
-connected with the intention at the time of its creation, except after
-the completion of a time of which there is no limit, and that which has
-no limit has no end. So it becomes necessary that the intention should
-never take the form of action, or a time without limit should come to
-an end, which is impossible. This is the argument of the Mutakallimun,
-on which they rely in proving that the revolutions of the heavens are
-created. Moreover, it is necessary that to the intention which precedes
-the object, and is connected with it, at a certain time, there should
-be created in it at the time of creation of the object a determination
-for doing so. For the determination for the creation of an object
-cannot be found before that time, because if at the time of action
-there be found no additional quality in the agent, than that he had at
-the time of intention, then action from him at that time would not be
-quite as necessary from him as inactivity. We may go on in this way,
-finding all the obscure and intricate doubts, from which, not to speak
-of the common people, even clever men, learned in scholastic theology,
-in philosophy, cannot escape. So if the common people be burdened with
-a knowledge of these things, it would be an unbearable problem for them.
-
-Then again the methods adopted by the Asharites in proving the
-creation of the universe are defective for all classes of men. The
-common people, by their very nature, cannot understand them, and
-they are at the same time in no way reasonable. So they are neither
-fit for the learned, nor for the masses. We warn our readers of them
-and say: The methods which they adopt are of two kinds. One of them,
-the more famous of the two and upon which a majority of them relies,
-is based upon three premises, from which they derive the proof for
-the creation of the universe. They are: (1) that essences cannot be
-separated from accidents, that is, they cannot be devoid of them; (2)
-that the accidents are created things; (3) that that which cannot be
-separated from a created thing is itself created, that is, that which
-cannot be severed from the created thing is itself created. Now, if
-by the first premise which says that the essences cannot be separated
-from the accidents, they mean the bodies which stand by themselves,
-then the premise is correct. But if by essence they mean the particle
-which cannot be divided, which they call _Sole Essence_, then there is
-doubt about it, which is not easy to solve. For the existence of an
-indivisible essence is not well established in itself, and about it
-there are many opposite and highly contradictory opinions, and it is
-not in the power of scholastic theology to bring truth out of them.
-That is the business of philosophers who are very few in number.
-
-The arguments which Asharites use are for the most part exhortative.
-For their famous argument on this is that they say that our first
-knowledge about a thing is, for instance, that an elephant is bigger
-than an ant, for it is accepted that the former has more particles in
-it than the latter. If it be so, then it is made up of particles and is
-not a compact whole in itself. So when the body is destroyed it changes
-into particles, and when composed it is composed of them. But this is
-wrong. For they have taken a divisible quantity as a continuous one,
-and then thought that that which is applicable to the divisible is also
-applicable to the continuous. This is true about numbers, that is, we
-say that a certain number is more than the other, by its containing
-more particles in it, that is, more units. But it cannot be true of
-a continuous quantity, of which we say that it is bigger or greater.
-In this way everything may be enumerated without any reference to its
-bulk at all. And the science of mathematics becomes the science of
-number only. It is well-known that every bulk can be considered with
-regard to line, surface and volume. Moreover, a continuous quantity
-it is possible to cut in the middle and thus get two parts. But this
-is impossible in the units of number, nay, it is opposed to it. Then,
-again, the body and other particles of a continuous quantity are
-capable of being divided. But everything divisible is either divided
-into other divisible quantities, or into indivisible ones. If it is
-divided into indivisible ones then we have found particles which cannot
-be divided. And if it is divided into other divisible parts, then again
-the question arises whether these can be divided into divisible or
-indivisible parts. So if it can be divided a limitless number of times,
-there would be limitless particles in a limited thing. But it is one of
-the primary principles of knowledge that particles in a limited thing
-are limited.
-
-Among the obscure doubts which can be attributed to the Asharites
-is the question whether if an atom is brought into being, this is
-different from creation itself, for it is one of the accidents? When
-the created thing exists the act of creation is non-existent for
-according to their principles, the accidents cannot be separated from
-their essences. So this has compelled them to regard creation as
-pertaining to the existent things and not for it. Then they may be
-asked; if creation implies the non-existence of a thing, with what
-is the act of the agent connected, for, according to them, there is
-no mean between existence and non-existence. If this be so, and,
-according to them, the action of the agent is connected neither with
-non-existence, nor with that which is and nevertheless brings about an
-existence, it must be connected with a middle substance. This doubt
-has compelled the Mutazilites to say that there is a substance, even
-in non-existence, which they call Matter or First Element. They should
-admit that that which is non-existent can be made existent by action.
-Both of these sects must also admit the existence of a void. These are
-questions, which as you see, cannot be solved by dogmatics. Thus, it
-is clear that such a method cannot be made a basis of the knowledge
-of God, especially for the masses. We will shortly describe a clearer
-method of knowing God.
-
-Now as to the second premise, according to which it is said that all
-the accidents are created things:--This is a premise concerning which
-there are doubts, and its meaning is as hidden as the soul in a body.
-For we have observed many bodies to be created and such is also the
-case with some accidents. So there is no difference in transferring
-an observed object to the invisible, in both the cases. For if it is
-necessary, with regard to accidents, to apply what applies of the
-visible things to the invisible, that is, if we should suppose a thing
-which we have not seen, so created, by the analogy of that which we
-have observed, then we should also apply it to the essences. Thus we
-can become quite careless of proving the creation of accidents, as
-distinct from that of essences. The creation of the accidents of the
-heavenly bodies is extremely doubtful to the observer just as there is
-doubt in their essential creation. For the creation of their accidents
-is never perceived. So it is necessary that we should clearly observe
-them. This is the method which surely and certainly leads pious people
-to the knowledge of God. This is the method of the chosen men, and that
-with which God has particularly blessed the prophet Abraham. He says:
-“And thus did We show unto Abraham the kingdom of heaven and earth,
-that he might become of those who firmly believe.”[29] For the whole
-doubt concerns the heavenly bodies themselves. Many controversialists
-have stopped here and believed that these are so many gods.
-
-Again, time is one of the accidents, the creation of which it is
-impossible to imagine, for it is necessary that the non-existence of
-a thing be preceded by time. But in this case it cannot be imagined
-that the non-existence of a thing can be preceded by itself, except
-by accepting time as existent. So also it is difficult to imagine the
-creation of the space in which the universe is, for every existent
-thing occupies a former space. For if it is a void, as is the opinion
-of those who think that the void itself is space, its creation also,
-if we suppose it to be created, must been have preceded by another
-void. And if the space be a tangible body, as is the opinion of another
-group, then it should be contained in another body, which would require
-another, and so on without limit. These are all obscure problems
-and the arguments which are brought to disprove the eternity of the
-accidents, are necessary for one who believes in the eternity of those
-accidents which can be perceived; that is, one who asserts that not all
-the accidents are created. For they say that the accidents which can be
-perceived by the senses are created things. If they are not created,
-then they will move from one place to another, or will be latent in the
-place in which they are to appear, before they make their appearance.
-Then they disprove both of these arguments, and think that they have
-established that all the accidents are created things. But it has
-become apparent from what they have said, that the apparently created
-portions of the accidents are created, not those whose creation is not
-apparent, nor those in whose case there is doubt, such as the accidents
-which are in the heavenly bodies, in their movement, in their shape,
-etc., etc. So their arguments about the creation of all accidents, can
-be interpreted by the analogy of the visible to the invisible. This
-is an exhortative argument, except in the suggestion of reasonable
-arguments which depend here on the certainty of the similarity of the
-character of the visible and the invisible.
-
-The third premise which says, that that which cannot be separated
-from a created thing is itself created, is equivocal, for it can be
-understood in two ways: the thing which cannot be separated from the
-class of created things, but can be removed from its units; and that
-which cannot be separated from any one of the things in question, as if
-one were to say, “That which cannot be separated from this blackness
-in question.” The second meaning is the correct one, that is it cannot
-be separated from a certain accident, which is created, for it is
-absolutely necessary that it should also be a created thing. For if it
-be eternal it becomes devoid of that accident, from which we suppose
-that it cannot separate. This separation is impossible. The first
-explanation, and that is which they mean, does not necessarily involve
-the creation of place, that is, that which is not separated from the
-class of created things. For it is possible to imagine a single place,
-that is, a body upon which follow accidents without limit, either
-opposed to one another or otherwise, as you were to say, movements
-without limit. Such is the opinion of many ancient philosophers about
-the universe, that it is made little by little. This is why, when
-the Mutakallimun saw the weakness of this premise, they resolved to
-make it strong and secure, by making it clear, that according to
-them, limitless accidents cannot follow upon a single point. For they
-maintain that on this occasion it is necessary that there cannot be
-found any other accident, except that there be an unlimited number of
-accidents before it at the place in question. This helps them to the
-impossibility of their presence, for it is necessary that it should
-not be there, except after the completion of an unlimited number. As
-the limitless never ends, it follows that the thing which we have
-supposed should not be there. For instance, consider the movement
-of the heavenly bodies, as we know them today. If there were before
-it limitless movements, then it is inevitable that this particular
-movement should not occur. They give the example of a man, who said
-to another, “I will not give you this dinar, till I have given you
-before it a limitless number of dinars.” By this it is not possible
-for him to give the dinar in question at all. But this example is not
-a correct one. For in it there is a primary object, then a limit, and
-then another object between them, which is without limit. For he has
-said it in a limited time. So he has stipulated that he would give the
-dinar between the time in which he is, and the time of which he speaks,
-between which there is a time without limit. This is the period in
-which he would give him the dinars without limit, which is impossible.
-So it is quite clear that this example does not illustrate the object
-for which it is given. Their opinion that the existence of a thing
-which is found after limitless things, is impossible, is not correct
-in all the cases. For the things which happen one after another are of
-two kinds: those which come to pass in cycles, and those which occur in
-order and arrangement. The things which occur in cycles are necessarily
-unlimited, except that something may interfere to prevent them. For
-instance if the sun rises there must be its setting; if there is a
-setting then it must rise, and if it rise it must have risen before.
-In the same way, if there are clouds there must be vapours rising from
-the earth; if there rise vapours from the earth, then it must be wet,
-if the earth is wet, there must have been rain, and if there was rain
-there must have been clouds, and if thus there were clouds there must
-similarly have been clouds before them. Again among those things which
-happen by order, is, for instance, the creation of man from man, and of
-that man from another. If this happens by essence then it can be taken
-as limitless, for which the first link is not found, the last also
-cannot be ascertained. If this is by accident, as for instance, if man
-be really made by some one other than man, who must be his father, then
-the position of his father would be the same as that of an instrument
-in the hands of a maker. So it is not possible to find an agent doing
-limitless actions, with countless different instruments. All these
-views are not clear in this connection. We have mentioned them here,
-that it may become known, that the arguments which these people advance
-are no arguments at all, nor are they reasonings fit for the masses,
-that is, open and clear arguments which God has imposed upon all his
-creatures for the sake of belief. It must now have become clear to you
-that this method is neither philosophical nor according to Law.
-
-The other method is that which Abul Maali has deduced and described
-in one of his tractates known as _Nizamiyyah_. He has based it upon
-two premises: in the first place, that the universe and all that it
-contains may be conceived as other than what it really is. It may be
-quite consistent, for instance, if it may be imagined smaller than it
-is, or bigger, or of some other shape than it really has or having more
-bodies in number than it really contains or the movements which are
-made in it may go in the opposite direction from that which they take
-now. This may be so much so that it may become possible that a stone
-should go upwards, and fire downwards, or that the movement starting
-in the east should start in the west, or the western from the eastern.
-The second premise is that every transient thing is created, and for it
-there is a creator; that is, an agent who made it in this way better
-than in any other.
-
-The first premise is exhortative and very elementary. Its fallacy
-is quite apparent with regard to some aspects of the universe--for
-instance, the existence of man in some other form than he now
-possesses; while in some others there is doubt--for instance, whether
-the movement from the east might change to one from the west and _vice
-versa_, for this is not known in itself. It is possible that for this
-there may be a cause the existence of which is not evident, or it may
-be one of those causes which are hidden from man. It is possible that
-whatever of these things a man sees, is like one seeing for the first
-time things of the manufacture of which he is ignorant. For such a
-man may think that all or parts of the thing may possibly be made in
-just the opposite fashion from that in which they really are made; and
-still in spite of this idea the same work may be obtained from them
-for which they were made. In this case there would be no art in them.
-But its maker, and one who is associated with the maker in some of
-his knowledge, know that the whole thing is just the opposite of what
-that man has seen; and that there is nothing in it but that which is
-absolutely necessary, or the existence of which makes it more perfect
-and complete, though outwardly it may not seem quite necessary in it.
-It is quite clear that this manufactured thing, may in this connection,
-be taken as an illustration of God’s Creation--praised be its Great
-Creator.
-
-This premise in being exhortative might be fit for all, but being
-untrue and falsifying the wisdom of the Creator, is not fit for any.
-It falsifies philosophy, because philosophy is nothing else but the
-knowledge of the causes of things. If there be no necessary causes for
-a thing, which make its existence necessary in the form in which it
-exists, then there is no particular knowledge which may be attributed
-to the wise Creator. Just as if there had not been some necessary
-causes for the existence of any manufactured thing, there would have
-been no art at all, and no wisdom by which its maker might be praised,
-and which might not be found in any man other than the maker. Where
-would be found any wisdom in a man, if he could perform all his actions
-by any member of his body, or without any member at all, so much
-so that he could see with his ears, as he could see with his eyes,
-or smell with his eyes as he could with his nose. This is all only
-falsifying philosophy, and the meaning for which God has called himself
-Wise (_Hakim_)--High and Holy be his name from such imputations. We find
-that Avicenna has also adopted this doctrine, for many reasons. He says
-that everything, except the maker, when taken by itself, may either
-be possible or allowable. Of the latter--that is, things allowable,
-there are two kinds: One is allowable as regards its maker, the
-other is necessary as regards the maker; and possible as regards its
-essence. The only thing which is necessary, according to all reasons,
-is the first maker. This opinion is extremely incorrect. Because that
-which is possible in itself and its essence, will not possibly turn a
-necessity beyond its maker, but by a change of the possible nature into
-a necessary one. If it be said that by these words he means “Possible
-with regard to itself”, that is, when the maker arises it will rise
-also, then we would say that this rising is impossible. But this is
-not the place to discuss the matter with this man. We ventured to talk
-of him, because of the many views which he has invented. Now we would
-return to our former theme. The second premise, which says that every
-transient thing is created, is not in itself obvious. The philosophers
-have differed about it. Plato allows that the apparently transient
-thing may be eternal, while Aristotle denies it. It is a very intricate
-matter, and cannot be made clear except to the philosophers, that is,
-learned men, whom God has set apart for His knowledge, and has in His
-Book, coupled their witness with that of Himself and His angels.
-
-Abul Maali has tried to make the premise clear by some other premises.
-First, that there should be something unique in every transient thing,
-which may make it more preferable by one of the two qualities. Second,
-that this particular thing cannot be any other than that intended.
-Third, that the thing which exists by intention is created. Then he
-says that a transient thing comes into existence by our intention,
-that is it is produced by previous volition. For all the actions are
-performed either by nature or by intention. And nature is not one of
-the passing things which are alike, that is, it not only creates the
-dissimilar but does the both. For instance, sea-anemone will absorb
-the yellow lob in the right side of the body and not in the left.
-But intention is the thing which is particularly applicable to a
-thing opposed to its like. Then he adds that the universe is like its
-creation and exists in the position in the atmosphere where it was
-made. By the void he means another void in which the world was made. So
-he concluded that the universe was made by intention. The premise which
-says that it is intention which fixes the shape of a thing, is correct,
-but that universe is surrounded by a void is wrong, or at least not
-clear. Then again according to their notions, his act of placing the
-void is bad. That is, it must be eternal, otherwise it would require
-another void for it. The premise saying that in this connection
-intention is nothing but a created thing is not clear. For the
-intention of an action is connected with the desired act itself, for it
-is one of its adjuncts. And it is clear that when one adjunct is found
-with the action the other must be there, for example the father and the
-son. If one be found potentially the other must also be so. Hence if
-the intention of the action is created, then necessarily the desired
-act must also be created. If the intention of the action be eternal,
-then the thing desired by that action must also be eternal. The
-intention which precedes the intended object, is said to be a potential
-intention only; that is, the intention which has not yet brought its
-intended object into being. This is quite clear, for when the intended
-object has appeared, then it becomes an existent thing, which it was
-not before the appearance of the intended object in action. When this
-becomes the cause of the creation of an intended thing, only by means
-of action, then, if the Mutakallimun assert that intention is created,
-it becomes clear that the intended object must also be created. From
-the Law it is clear that there is no need to go so deeply into the
-problem as far as the masses are concerned. So it has not mentioned any
-eternal or created intention, but has only said that it exists and the
-things are created. So God says:--“Verily, Our speech upon anything
-when We will the same is, that We only say unto it, Be; and it is.”[30]
-This has been so because the masses cannot understand the idea of
-created things from an eternal intention. But the fact is that the Law
-has not mentioned whether the intention is created or eternal, this
-being a doubtful thing for many people. The Mutakallimun have also no
-certain argument to advance for providing the possibility of a created
-intention for creation. For the principle with which they maintain
-their position for negating the existence of intention as eternal, is
-the premise which we have already mentioned, that is, the thing which
-cannot be separated from the created thing is itself created. We will
-mention this again when talking of intention.
-
-From the foregoing it has become clear that the well-known methods
-adopted by Asharites for the knowledge of God are certain neither
-philosophical, nor by Law. This would be quite clear to anyone who
-would look closely into the kind of arguments advanced in the Divine
-Book about the knowledge of the existence of the Creator. For if you
-look closely into this matter you will find that the arguments comprise
-both qualities, those of being certain and at the same time clear,
-without being complex, that is, they have few premises.
-
-As to the Sufis their method in theorising is not a philosophical
-method--that is, made up of a number of premises, and syllogisms.
-They maintain that the knowledge of God, or of anything existent,
-is found in our own hearts, after its detachment from all physical
-desires, and concentration of mind upon the desired object. In support
-of their principle they bring many an argument from the exoteric side
-of Law. For instance they quote the Divine words, “And fear God, and
-God will instruct you,”[31] and, “Whoever do their best endeavour to
-prompt our true religion, We will direct them unto Our ways;”[32] and
-again, “If ye fear God, He will grant you a distinction,”[33] and
-many other verses of this kind which are considered to be helpful for
-their purpose. We say that this method, if we suppose it to be real,
-is not meant for all people. Had this method been satisfactory for all
-people then the philosophical method would have been quite futile, and
-its existence among the people would have been useless, and with it
-the existence of the Quran. For that always invites us to theorising,
-judging, and admonishing by way of philosophy. We of course do not
-deny that the control of physical desires is a condition for healthy
-thinking, as physical health is one of its conditions. For the control
-of desires is profitable in acquiring knowledge by itself, if it be
-made a condition for it, just as health is a condition for education,
-though it is not very useful for it. That is why our Law has invited
-all of us to this method and has insisted upon it, that is, for work,
-not that it is sufficient in itself, as these people think, but that
-it is useful for thinking as we have already described. This would be
-quite clear to any one who cares to ponder and think over it.
-
-As to the Mutazilites--their books have not reached us in sufficient
-number in this Peninsula (Spain) that we may be able to form a fair
-estimate of the method which they have adopted in this matter. But it
-seems that their methods are like those of the Asharites.
-
-If now that it is clear that none of these methods are in accordance
-with that by which the Law invites all the people, according to the
-difference in their dispositions, to a confession of the existence
-of God, it may be asked: What is that method which the Law has
-laid down in the Divine Book, and upon which the Companions of the
-Prophet depended? We would say that the method which the Divine Book
-has adopted, and by which it has invited all to believe, is, when
-thoroughly investigated from the Quran, dependent upon two principles.
-The one is a knowledge of God’s solicitude for man, and the creation of
-everything for his sake. We would call this the argument of solicitude.
-The second is the creation of the essences of the existent things, as
-for example, the creation of life in the minerals, and feeling and
-intelligence. We would call this method the “argument of creation.”
-The first method is founded upon two principles: first that all the
-existent things suit man; secondly, that this suitability must have
-existed in the mind of the Maker before He intended to make the object
-in question, for it cannot be obtained by chance alone. Now their
-suitability for the existence of man can be easily ascertained by the
-suitability of day and night, sun and moon, for the existence of man.
-Such is also the case with the suitability of the four seasons, and of
-the place in which he lives, that is, the earth. It is also apparent
-with respect to animals, vegetables, and minerals; and many other
-things, such as rain, rivers, seas, the whole of the earth, water,
-fire and air. It is also evident from the different members of his
-body, on account of their suitability for the preservation of his life
-and existence. On the whole, a knowledge of the benefit derived from
-all the existent things may be included in it. So it is necessary for
-a man who wants to know God perfectly, to investigate the benefits
-derived from existent things. In the argument of creation is included
-the existence of the animal world, the plant world, and the heavens.
-This method is again based upon two principles, which can be found out
-by every man by his very nature. The one is that all things have been
-made and created. This is quite clear in itself, in the case of animals
-and plants, as God has said, “Verily the idols which ye invoke, beside
-God, can never create a single fly, though they may all assemble for
-that purpose.”[34] We see an inorganic substance and then there is life
-in it. So we know for certain, that there is an inventor and bestower
-of life, and He is God. Of the heavens we know by their movements,
-which never become slackened, that they work for our benefit by divine
-solicitude, and are subordinate to our welfare. Such an appointed and
-subordinate object is always created for some purpose. The second
-principle is that for every created thing there is a creator. So it is
-right to say from the two foregoing principles that for every existent
-thing there is an inventor. There are many arguments, according to
-the number of the created things, which can be advanced to prove this
-premise. Thus it is necessary for one who wants to know God as He
-ought to be known, to acquaint himself with the essence of things, so
-that he may get information about the creation of all things. For who
-cannot understand the real substance and purpose of a thing, cannot
-understand the minor meaning of its creation. It is to this that God
-refers in the following verse, “Or do they not contemplate the heaven
-and the earth, and the things which God has created?”[35] And so a
-man who would follow the purpose of philosophy in investigating the
-existence of things, that is, would try to know the cause which led to
-its creation, and the purpose of it would know the argument of kindness
-most perfectly. These two arguments are those adopted by Law.
-
-The verses of the Quran leading to a knowledge of the existence of God
-are dependent only on the two foregoing arguments. It will be quite
-clear to anyone who will examine closely the verses, which occur in the
-Divine Book in this connection. These, when investigated, will be found
-to be of three kinds: either they are verses showing the “arguments of
-kindness,” or those mentioning the “arguments of creation,” or those
-which include both the kinds of arguments. The following verses may
-be taken as illustrating the argument of kindness. “Have we not made
-the earth for a bed, and the mountains for stakes to find the same?
-And have we not created you of two sexes; and appointed your sleep
-for rest; and made the night a garment to cover you; and destined the
-day to the gaining of your livelihood and built over you seven solid
-heavens; and placed therein a burning lamp? And do we not send down
-from the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down in abundance,
-that we may thereby produce corn, and herbs, and gardens planted thick
-with trees?”[36] and, “Blessed be He Who hath placed the twelve signs
-in the heavens; hath placed therein a lamp by day, and the moon which
-shineth by night;”[37] and again, “Let man consider his food.”[38]
-The following verses refer to the argument of invention, “Let man
-consider, therefore of what he is created. He is created of the seed
-poured forth, issuing from the loins, and the breast bones;”[39] and,
-“Do they not consider the camels, how they are created; the heaven,
-how it is raised; the mountains, how they are fixed; the earth how it
-is extended;”[40] and again, “O man, a parable is propounded unto you;
-wherefore hearken unto it. Verily the idols which they invoke, besides
-God, can never create a single fly, though they may all assemble for
-the purpose.”[41] Then we may point to the story of Abraham, referred
-to in the following verse, “I direct my face unto Him Who hath created
-heaven and earth; I am orthodox, and not of the idolators.”[42] There
-may be quoted many verses referring to this argument. The verses
-comprising both the arguments are also many, for instance, “O men,
-of Mecca, serve your Lord, Who has created you, and those who have
-been before you: peradventure you will fear Him; Who hath spread the
-earth as a bed for you, and the heaven as a covering, and hath caused
-water to descend from heaven, and thereby produced fruits for your
-sustenance. Set not up, therefore, any equals unto God, against your
-own knowledge.”[43] His words, “Who hath created you, and those who
-have been before you,” lead us to the argument of creation; while the
-words, “who has spread the earth” refer to the argument of divine
-solicitude for man. Of this kind also are the following verses of the
-Quran, “One sign of the resurrection unto them is the dead earth; We
-quicken the same by rain, and produce therefrom, various sorts of
-grain, of which they eat;”[44] and, “Now in the creation of heaven and
-earth, and the vicissitudes of night and day are signs unto those who
-are endowed with understanding, who remember God standing, and sitting,
-and lying on their sides; _and meditate on the creation of heaven and
-earth, saying O Lord, Thou hast not created this in vain, far be it
-from Thee, therefore deliver us from the torment of hell fire_.”[45]
-Many verses of this kind comprise both the kinds of arguments.
-
-This method is the right path by which God has invited men to a
-knowledge of His existence, and informed them of it through the
-intelligence which He has implanted in their nature. The following
-verse refers to this fixed and innate nature of man, “And when the
-Lord drew forth their posterity from the loins of the sons of Adam,
-and took them witness against themselves, Am I not your Lord? They
-answered, Yea, we do bear witness.”[46] So it is incumbent for one who
-intends to obey God, and follow the injunction of His Prophet, that
-he should adopt this method, thus making himself one of those learned
-men who bear witness to the divinity of God, with His own witness, and
-that of His angels, as He says, “God hath borne witness, that there is
-no God but He, and the angels, and those who are endowed with wisdom
-profess the same; who executeth righteousness; there is no God but He;
-the Mighty, the Wise.”[47] Among the arguments for both of themselves
-is the praise which God refers to in the following verse, “Neither is
-there any thing which doth not celebrate his praise; but ye understand
-not their celebration thereof.”[48]
-
-It is evident from the above arguments for the existence of God that
-they are dependent upon two categories of reasoning. It is also clear
-that both of these methods are meant for particular people; that is,
-the learned. Now as to the method for the masses. The difference
-between the two lies only in details. The masses cannot understand the
-two above mentioned arguments but only what they can grasp by their
-senses; while the learned men can go further, and learn by reasoning
-also, besides learning by sense. They have gone so far that a learned
-man has said, that the benefits the learned men derive from the
-knowledge of the members of human and animal body are a thousand and
-one. If this be so, then this is the method which is taught both by
-Law and by Nature. It is the method which was preached by the Prophet
-and the divine books. The learned men do not mention these two lines
-of reasonings to the masses, not because of their number, but because
-of a want of depth of learning on their part about the knowledge of a
-single thing only. The example of the common people, considering and
-pondering over the universe, is like a man who looks into a thing, the
-manufacture of which he does not know. For all that such a man can know
-about it is that it has been made, and that there must be a maker of
-it. But, on the other hand the learned look into the universe, just as
-a man knowing the art would do; try to understand the real purpose of
-it. So it is quite clear that their knowledge about the Maker, as the
-maker of the universe, would be far better than that of the man who
-only knows it as made. The atheists, who deny the Creator altogether,
-are like men who can see and feel the created things, but would not
-acknowledge any Creator for them, but would attribute all to chance
-alone, and that they come into being by themselves.
-
-
-                          OF THE UNITY OF GOD
-
-Now then if this is the method adopted by the Law, it may be asked:
-What is the way of proving the unity of God by means of the Law; that
-is, the knowledge of the religious formula that “there is no god, but
-God.” The negation contained in it is an addition to the affirmative,
-which the formula contains, while the affirmative has already been
-proved. What is the purpose of this negation? We would say that the
-method, adopted by the Law, of denying divinity to all but God is
-according to the ordinance of God in the Quran, contained in the
-following three verses. First, “If there were either in heaven or on
-earth gods beside God, verily both would be corrupted.”[49] Secondly,
-“God has not begotten issue; neither is there any other God with him;
-otherwise every other God would surely take away that which he has
-created; and some of them had enabled themselves over the others. Far
-be it that from God, which they affirm of Him.”[50] Thirdly, “Say,
-unto the idolators, if there were gods with Him, as ye say, they would
-surely seek an occasion of making some attempt against the possessor of
-the Throne.”[51] The argument contained in the first verse is implanted
-in our dispositions by our very nature. For it is well-known that if
-there be two kings, and the orders of the one be as effectual as those
-of the other, it is not possible to have even a single city under their
-guidance. It is impossible to have one action of a single kind from
-two actors. So it is necessary that, if both of them begin work at the
-same time, the city would be ruined, except in the case that one should
-work and the other remain inactive. This is against our conception of
-divinity. For when the two actions of the same kind are gathered upon
-a single object, then that object must necessarily be destroyed. This
-is the meaning of the verse, “If there were either in the heaven or on
-earth gods besides God, both would be corrupted.” The verse, “Every god
-has surely taken away that which he had created,” has been revealed in
-refutation of the argument of those who believe in many gods, entrusted
-with different works. For in this case it becomes incumbent that the
-gods doing different works be independent of one another, and that they
-should not be existent at one and the same time. But as the world is
-one it is necessary that there be not in it gods with different duties.
-The third verse, “Say unto the idolators if there were gods with him,
-as ye say, they would surely seek an occasion of making some attempt
-against the Possessor of the Throne,” is like the first, an argument
-to prove the impossibility of the existence of two gods, whose duties
-are the same. This verse means that had there been in the world any
-other god, but the present one, able to create the world and those in
-it, so that his relation to it be that of a creator, then he must live
-with God on the Throne. Thus there would be found two existent things
-of the same kind in a single place. But this is impossible. For when
-the relation is one, the related must also be one, that is, they cannot
-be gathered in a single place as they cannot live in it. The relation
-of God to the Throne is just its opposite: the Throne exists for Him,
-and not He for the Throne. That is what God has said, “His Throne is
-extended over heaven and earth, and the preservation of them is no
-burden unto him.”[52] This is the argument by nature or by Law for
-proving the unity of God. The difference between the learned and the
-masses is that the learned know more about the creation of the world,
-and the purpose of its different parts, like a single body, than the
-common people. It is to this that the latter part of the verse refers,
-“God forbid! and far, very far, be that which they utter! The seven
-heavens praise him, and the earth, and all who are therein: neither is
-there anything which doth not celebrate His praise; but ye understand
-not their celebration thereof: He is gracious and merciful.”[53] The
-argument which the Asharites deduce from this verse, calling it the
-“argument of impossibility,” is neither in accordance with natural nor
-legal arguments. It is not in accordance with nature, because what
-they say is without any proof at all; while it is insufficient by Law,
-because the common people cannot understand it, not to speak of their
-being satisfied with it. They say, that if there be two gods, then it
-is more probable that they would differ. If this were to happen, then
-there would be one of the following three cases, there being no fourth
-alternative. Either the desire of both of them would be accomplished,
-or the desire of neither would not. They say that it is impossible that
-the desire of neither of them be accomplished, but if it be so then the
-universe would neither be existent nor non-existent. If the desire of
-both of them be accomplished, then the universe would be both existent
-and non-existent at the same time. So there remains no alternative
-but that the desire of one be accomplished, the other’s remaining
-unfulfilled. So one whose desire remains unfulfilled is helpless, and
-the helpless cannot be a God. The weakness of this argument is that
-as it is possible to suppose that they differ, it is just as possible
-to presume that they agree, a fact more becoming to the gods than
-difference of opinion. If they agree about the creation of the world,
-they would be like two craftsmen agreed upon making something. If it
-be so then it must be said that their actions help them to work and
-live in a single place, except that some one may say, that perhaps one
-would do one thing and the other quite another thing, or perhaps they
-would work by turns. But this is an objection which cannot be advanced
-by the masses. But if any sceptic controversialist were to advance it,
-he may be told that one who has power to create one thing has power
-to create the whole. So now again it comes to the same thing, whether
-they agree or not, and how can they help each other in work? As to
-working by turn, it would be a defect in both of them. It is more
-probable that if there be two gods, there must be two universes. But
-as the universe is one, its Maker must also be one, for a single work
-can only be done by one maker. So it is not necessary that we should
-understand the verse of God, “and some of them had enabled themselves
-over the other,” as pointing to disagreement alone, but it may be taken
-as true even in the case of argument, for this also leads to the same
-result as disagreement would do. Here lies the difference between us
-and the Mutakallimun, about the meaning of this verse, though Abul
-Maali has said something almost expressing our own views. By the
-foregoing you would understand that the argument which the Mutakallimun
-have deduced from this verse is not the one which it really contains.
-The impossibility to which their argument leads is not one which
-should be deduced from the verse in question. The impossibility which
-is deduced from the argument which they think is contained in the
-verse, is more than one impossibility, by their dividing it into
-three parts, while there is no division in the verse itself. So the
-argument which they use is the one which is known to the logicians as
-disjunctive syllogism, and is known in their science as definition
-and division. But the argument contained in the verse is one which is
-known in logic as hypothetical syllogism, which is quite different
-from disjunctive syllogism. Any one who would look most cursorily
-into this science would know the difference between the two. Then,
-again, the impossibility which their argument points out is not that
-to which the argument of the Book leads. They say that universe will
-either be neither existent nor non-existent, or it will be existent
-and non-existent at the same time, or its god would be a helpless and
-weak god. These are impossible for ever, because of the impossibility
-of more than one. The impossibility which the verse refers to, is not
-so for ever, for in it it depends upon a certain period of time, that
-is when the universe is found corrupted at the time of its existence.
-For he says “If there be any other god but God,” the universe would
-be found corrupted. Then he has made an exception that it is not
-corrupted, and hence there must not be more than one God. So now it has
-become quite clear that this is the method by which God has invited the
-people to believe in His existence, and negate the divinity of all but
-Him. These are the two propositions which are contained in the article
-of Faith, “There are no gods but He.” So one who thinks over these two
-propositions, and believes in them by the method which we have pointed
-out, is a Muslim in reality, with a belief which is truly Islamic. But
-he whose belief is not based upon these arguments, though he confesses
-the article, he is a Muslim with the other Muslims, only on account of
-the similarity of names.
-
-
-                         ON DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
-
-The attributes which the Divine Book has assigned to the Creator and
-Maker of the universe, are only the perfect forms of those which are
-found in man, and these are seven in number: Knowledge, life, power,
-volition, hearing, seeing and talking.
-
-Now as to knowledge, God in his Divine Book has said the following
-“Shall he not know all things who has created them?”[54] The argument
-contained in this verse is that a created thing always shows, by the
-arrangement which it possesses,--its different parts being made for
-the sake of one another for the benefit intended to be derived from
-that thing,--that its maker is not nature only, but it must have been
-made by one who has arranged all for the end in view. So he must have
-a knowledge of it. For instance, when a man looks at a house he knows
-that the foundation was laid for the sake of the walls, and the walls
-have been raised for the roof. So it becomes clear to him that the
-house must have been built by a man knowing the art of building.
-
-This quality is eternal, for it is not fitting that God should possess
-it for a time only. But we should not go down deep into this matter,
-and should not say, like the Mutakallimun, that He knows the created
-things at the time of their creation, by His eternal knowledge,
-for then it becomes necessary that the knowledge of the created
-thing at the time of its non-existence be the same which is absurd,
-when knowledge is said to be dependent upon the existent things.
-As an existent thing is sometimes an action, and sometimes only a
-potentiality, it is necessary that the knowledge of the two existence
-be different, as its time of being in potentiality is quite different
-from the time of its being in action. But this the Law does not
-explain. On the other hand it maintains quite an opposite position:
-that God knows the created thing at the time of its creation, as He
-has said, “There falleth no leaf, but He knoweth it; neither is there
-a single grain in the dark parts of the earth; neither a green thing,
-nor a dry thing, but it is written in the perspicuous book.”[55] So
-it is necessary that we should lay down in Law that He knows a thing
-before it comes into being; knows a thing when it is, and not when
-it should have been; and knows when a thing has been destroyed at
-the time of its destruction. This is what the injunctions of the Law
-establish. It has been so because the masses cannot understand the
-universe through visible things, except in this way. The Mutakallimun
-have no argument to advance against it, except that they say that the
-knowledge which changes with a change in the existent thing is itself
-created, while with God nothing created can be attached. They say so
-because they think that that which cannot be separated from the created
-thing is itself created. But we have already exposed the fallacy of
-this argument. So it is established by the rules described, and it
-should not be said that he knows the creation of the created, and the
-corruption of the corrupted things, neither by created nor by eternal
-knowledge. This is an innovation in Islam, “And is thy Lord forgetful
-of thee?”[56]
-
-The attribute of life is quite evident from the attribute of Knowledge.
-For our observation shows that one of the conditions of knowledge is
-life. According to the Mutakallimun the conditions of an observed
-object can be applied to the unseen. What they have said about this is
-quite true.
-
-The attribute of volition needs no proof, because it is one of the
-conditions of bringing forth a thing, that its maker must intend it.
-Such is also the case with power: He must possess power. But to say
-that He intended created things by eternal intention is innovation
-in religion, which was not known to the learned in Law, and cannot
-satisfy the masses who have reached the stage of dogmatics. We should
-say that He intends making a thing at the time of its creation, but
-does not intend at the time of its non-existence. So God says: “Verily
-our speech unto anything when we will the same is that we say unto it,
-Be; and it is.”[57] For, as we have said, the common people are never
-compelled to advance the argument that He intends doing a thing by
-eternal intention, but, as the Mutakallimun have said, that that by
-which the created things exist, is itself created.
-
-Now if it be asked, how the attribute of Speech be assigned to and
-proved in God, we would say that it can be ascribed to him on account
-of the attributes of Knowledge and Power of creation. For speech
-is nothing more than act on the part of the speaker to show to the
-one addressed the knowledge which he has, or to disclose to him the
-knowledge which is in him. This is one of the actions of the maker. And
-when that created thing, which is really a creator, man, has power over
-this faculty, because he knows and is powerful, how befitting it is
-that it should be found in the real Creator. There is another condition
-for this action, among the things which we can observe, and that is
-that which must be the means of performing it: words. This being so,
-it becomes necessary that that action should be performed by God in
-the heart of somebody, His chosen servant. It is not necessary that
-it should always be through the medium of words, and so created. But
-it may happen either through an angel; or through divine inspiration,
-that is without the medium of words which He may create, but through an
-act to the hearer, which discloses to him the true nature of the thing
-meant, or through words which He may create in the ears of him who has
-been specialised to hear His words. It is to these three methods that
-the verse of the Quran refers, “It is not fit for a man that God should
-speak unto him otherwise than by private revelation, or from behind
-a veil, or by sending a messenger to reveal, by His permission, that
-which He pleaseth.”[58] So revelation is the disclosure of the intended
-secrets to the inspired person without the medium of words which He
-created, but through an action done on the mind of the one addressed.
-So God says, “Afterwards He approached the Prophet and drew unto
-him; until He was at the distance of two bows’ length from him or yet
-nearer; and He revealed unto His servant that which He revealed.”[59]
-The speech from behind the veil is one which is performed through the
-medium of words. This is the real speech, and that is the one which God
-specially bestowed upon Moses, and so He has said, “And God spake unto
-Moses, discoursing with him.”[60] Now as to his words, “or by sending a
-messenger to reveal,” this is the third kind mentioned above, that is,
-through the medium of some angels. Sometimes God speaks to the learned
-men, who are the successors of the prophets, by disclosing arguments
-to them. On account of these causes it is true, when the learned men
-say, that the Quran is the speech of God. It has now become clear to
-you that the Quran, which is the speech of God, is eternal, but the
-words expressing it are created by him, and are not human. From it are
-excepted the Quranic words which we commonly use in our speech, that
-is, these words are our own actions, by the command of God, while the
-words of the Quran are those created by God. He who does not understand
-these things by this method, cannot understand this argument and cannot
-grasp as to how the Quran is the word of God. The alphabets used in the
-Quran are our own invention, by the command of God. We have to respect
-them, because of them are formed the words created by God, for the
-purpose which is not itself created. He who thought of words and not
-of meaning, that is, did not separate them, said that the Quran was
-created; while he who thought of the meaning which these words express,
-said the Quran was not created. But the truth lies in the middle of
-these two extreme views. The Asharites deny that the speaker is the
-maker of his own speech, for they think that if they admit it, they
-must also admit that God is the maker of His speech. Again, when they
-believe, that the speech can only exist with the speaker, they think,
-they must also believe, taking in view the two foregoing principles,
-that God is Himself the creator of His words. In this case He Himself
-becomes the place of created things. So they assert that God is the
-maker of speech, but it is an eternal attribute in him, like knowledge,
-etc. This is the time of the speech in our mind, but not of the speech
-which expresses what we have in our mind, that is, the words. As the
-Mutazilites thought that speech is the action of the speaker, they said
-that by speech is meant only the words uttered. So they believed that
-the Quran is “Created.” Since according to them the word is an action
-of the speaker, so it is not one of its conditions that it should exist
-with the speaker. The Asharites on the other hand, insist that it is
-one of its conditions that it should exist only with the speaker.
-This is true in both the cases, that is in the case of ideas in our
-minds, and the words which express them. But in the case of God, it
-is the ideas which stand with Him, and not the words expressing them.
-So when the Asharites laid it down as a condition, that the speech be
-absolutely dependent upon the speaker, they deny that the speaker is
-the maker of his speech; while on the other hand, the Mutazilites, when
-they laid it down as a condition that the speaker is the maker of his
-speech, ignored the existence of ideas in our minds. In this way there
-is some truth, and some falsehood, in the opinions of both of these
-sects, as must have become clear by what we have said.
-
-Now we come to the attributes of hearing and seeing. The Law has proved
-them to be possessed by God by saying that hearing and seeing are the
-two essential qualities for knowing the meaning of things, which cannot
-be acquired by intellect. So a maker must know everything about the
-object which he is making, it is necessary that he should possess the
-two senses of hearing and seeing. So He must have these two faculties.
-All this proves their existence in God, by means of the Law, through
-the teaching of the knowledge which is found in him. Moreover, One
-on whom the name of God and the Adorned is applied must necessarily
-possess all the senses. For it is useless for man to worship him
-who cannot know that he is being worshipped, as God has said, “O my
-father, why dost thou worship that which heareth not, neither seeth,
-nor profiteth thee at all;”[61] and, “Do you therefore worship, beside
-God, that which cannot profit you at all, nor can it hurt you?”[62]
-This is the power which has been ascribed to God, and which the Law has
-commanded the common people to know and nothing else.
-
-Of the innovation which this question of attributes has given rise
-to, one is whether they are the same as Divine Essence or something
-added to it, that is, whether they are found in the essence itself
-(_Nafsiyyah_), or are only applied to it, (_Maanawiyyah_). By
-_Nafsiyyah_ we mean those attributes which are found in the thing
-itself, and are not attached to it for the purpose of adding something
-to the essence, for existence, we say one or eternal. By _Maanawiyyah_
-we mean the attributes which are applied to a thing for some purpose
-which is found in it. The Asharites say that these attributes are only
-_Maanawiyyah_, that is qualities which are only added to the Divine
-Essence. So they say that he knows by a knowledge which has been added
-to His essence, and lives by life attached to it and so on. This has
-compelled them to admit that the Creator has a body, for there must be
-the quality and the qualified, the bearer and the borne. This is the
-condition of the body, so they must say that the essence is existent
-by itself, and the qualities exist through it, or they must say that
-these attributes are independent of each other, then there must be a
-number of gods. This is the belief of the Christians, who say that the
-three personifications are those of Existence, Life and Knowledge. God
-has said about it the following, “They are certainly infidels, who
-say, God is the third of the three.”[63] One of them stands by itself,
-the others being dependent upon the former. So it becomes necessary
-that there should be essence, existing in itself, and the accidents
-depending on something else. The place in which the essence and the
-accidents are found together must necessarily be a body. Such is also
-the case with the Mutazilites about the question, that the essence and
-the attributes are one and the same thing. This they think, is for
-the primary principles of knowledge or may be opposed to them. For
-they think that according to the primary principles knowledge must be
-existent without the one knowing. But knowledge and the one knowing
-cannot be the same, except that it may be possible that the two may be
-very close to each other, just as the father and the son. This teaching
-is very remote for the understanding of the masses, and to explain
-it to them in detail is innovation, for it would more likely mislead
-than guide them to the right path. The Mutazilites have no argument
-to advance in proof of their proposition, for they have none. Such is
-also the condition of the Mutakallimun in the case of denying a body
-to God. For when they have established it, they are compelled to admit
-the creation of the body, because it is a body. We have already said
-that they have no argument for it. Those who have such are the learned
-people, the philosophers. It is at this point that the Christians have
-erred. They believe in the multiplicity of attributes that they are
-essences existing not by the help of another, but by themselves, like
-the self, (_Zat_). They also believe that the qualities with these
-attributes are two in number--knowledge and life. So they say that
-God is one from the three causes. That He is three they say because
-He exists, lives and knows. They say that He is one, because He is a
-collection of all the three qualities. And so there are three religious
-opinions among them. One party believes that they are all the self
-(_Zat_) alone without any number; the other only believes in numbers of
-qualities. This is divided into two parties: one which thinks that they
-exist by themselves, and the other which makes them exist by something
-else. All this is in contrast with the purpose of the Law.
-
-It being so, it is necessary that one who wants to teach the knowledge
-of these things to the common people should tell them as much as the
-Law orders him to do--and that is only a confession of their existence
-without entering into details. For it is not possible for the common
-people to believe and understand them at all. By common people here I
-mean all those who are unacquainted with the laws of reasoning, though
-they may or may not know the science of scholastic theology. It is not
-in the power of scholastic theology to know of these things even when
-it is said that it is not a science of reasoning but of dogmatics, for
-these things can never be clearly understood by dogmatics alone. So,
-by now, the extent of these questions which should be disclosed to the
-common people, and the method adopted for this purpose must have become
-clear to you by what we have said.
-
-
-                         OF DIVINE PERFECTION
-
-We have already described the way which the Law pursues in teaching
-the common people the existence of God, the denial of His having any
-associates, and thereby the knowledge of His attributes, and the
-extent to which they have been explained in details in it, one after
-another. It is really an addition to, and deduction from, and change
-and interpretation of this very limit and extent which has not been
-productive of good to any and all the people. Now it remains for us
-to know the method which the Law has adopted in explaining to the
-common people the perfection of God and freedom from all defects, and
-the length to which it has gone in detailing it, and the cause of
-restricting its knowledge to them. Then we should mention the methods
-which it adopts in teaching the people the knowledge of His actions,
-and the latitude which it has allowed in this respect. Having done so,
-we shall have accomplished the purpose for which we began this book.
-
-So we say that the knowledge of things known as perfection and holiness
-are found in many verses of the Quran, the most clear and definite of
-them being the following, “There is nothing like Him, and it is He who
-heareth and seeth;”[64] and, “Shall God, therefore, Who createth, be
-as he who createth not.”[65] The second verse is an argument for the
-verse “there is nothing like Him.” For it is one of the characteristics
-of the dispositions of all the people to think that the Creator must
-either be unlike the things which He has created, or having qualities
-which may be different from these which He has given to the created;
-otherwise he who is himself created cannot be a Creator. When we
-have admitted that the created cannot be the creator then it becomes
-incumbent upon us to say that the qualities of the created should
-either be not found in the Creator, or found in Him in some different
-way than they are in the created. We say, “in some different way,”
-because we have proved the divine qualities to be those which are
-found in the noblest of God’s creatures, man, as knowledge, life,
-power, volition and so on. This is the meaning of the Tradition of
-the Prophet, “God created Adam after His own image.” So it has been
-established that the Law has denied the similarity between the Creator
-and the created with fitting arguments. The denial of similarity is
-of two kinds, first, that there may not be found in the Creator many
-qualities of the created; and secondly; there may be found in him the
-qualities of the created in so perfect and excellent a form as could
-not be imagined. Of these two kinds it should be seen which one the Law
-has explained, and about which it is reticent. We would also try to
-find out the cause for this reticence.
-
-We would say that the qualities of the created which have been denied
-by Law as pertaining to God are those which show some defects; for
-example, death, as God says, “And do ye not trust in him who liveth,
-and dieth not,”[66] or sleep and things which lead to negligence and
-carelessness, as regards senses and the protection of the existent
-things, as He says, “Neither slumber nor sleep seizeth Him.”[67] Of
-such qualities are error and forgetfulness, as God has said, “The
-knowledge thereof is with my Lord, in the book of His decrees: my
-Lord erreth not, neither doth He forget.”[68] A knowledge of those
-qualities the existence of which has been denied in God is one of the
-necessary things of common education and is why the Law has been very
-explicit about them. It only warns us not to meddle with those things
-which are far from the primary principles of knowledge, because it
-knows the small limits of human knowledge, as God has said in many
-different verses of the Quran, “But the greater part of men do not
-understand.” For example He says, “Verily the creation of heaven and
-earth is more considerable, than the creation of man; but the greater
-part of men do not understand,”[69] and “The institution of God to
-which He has created mankind disposed; there is no change in what God
-hath created. This is the right religion; but the greater part of men
-know it not.”[70] Now it may be said, what is the proof--that is, the
-proof advanced by the Law--of the fact that these defects are not found
-in God. We would say that it is apparent from the universe itself. It
-is quite safe. No confusion or corruption overtakes it. Had the Creator
-been subject to negligence, carelessness, error or forgetfulness the
-whole of the universe would have been destroyed. God has made this
-clear in many verses of the Quran. He says, “Verily God sustaineth the
-heaven and the earth, lest they fail: and if they should fail, none
-could support the same besides him;”[71] and, “The preservation of both
-is not burden unto him, He is the high, the mighty.”[72]
-
-If our opinion be asked about the anthropomorphic attributes of God,
-whether the Law has denied them as attributes to the Creator or is
-only silent about them, we would say, that it is evident that the Law
-is quite silent about them, and their mention in it is quite near to
-their denial altogether. It has come to be so because the Quran in
-many verses speaks of His hands and face, and these verses are taken
-as showing physical attributes which the Creator has bestowed upon the
-created, just as He has given him the qualities of power, volition and
-so on--qualities which are common between the Creator and created,
-except that they are more perfect in the former. On account of this
-many Muslims believed that the Creator has a body different from all
-other bodies. Such is the case with the Hanbalites and their many
-followers. But in my opinion we should follow the path of the Law; and
-this should neither deny nor try to prove them, and whenever asked
-by the common people to do so, we should answer with words of God,
-“There is nothing like him; and it is He who heareth and seeth,”[73]
-in this way preventing them from questioning. It is so because of
-three reasons. It is neither near to the first, nor to the second, nor
-to the third grade. This would be quite clear to you from the method
-adopted by the Mutakallimun. They say that the proof of the fact that
-He is not a body is that it has been proved that all bodies are created
-things. If they are asked to point out the method of proving the latter
-proposition, they adopt the method, which we have already pointed
-out, concerning the creation of accidents, that that which cannot be
-separated from created things is itself created. You have already seen,
-from what we have said, that this method is not a philosophical one,
-and had it been so, even then a majority of the common people would not
-have grasped it. Moreover, whatever these people have said about God,
-that He is a Self (_Zat_) and divine attributes added to it, proves
-by itself that He has a body, on account of the denial of creation,
-rather an argument denying anthropomorphism. This is the first reason
-why the Law does not speak of these things in clear terms. The second
-reason is that common people think that all that is existent they can
-imagine and feel, all else being non-existent to them. So when they
-are told that there exists One who has no body, their imagination does
-not work and He becomes almost non-existent to them, particularly so
-when they are told that He is neither outside our knowledge nor in
-it, neither above nor below. That is why the sect which believes in
-anthropomorphism thinks of those who deny it, that they also believe
-in it; while, on the other hand, the party thinks its opponents to
-be believing in a number of gods. The third reason is that had the
-Law denied anthropomorphism altogether there would have arisen many a
-misgiving about what has been said concerning the Day of Judgment, and
-other beliefs.
-
-Of these one is the problem of Divine Vision which we find stated in
-authentic Traditions. Those who have been very explicit in denying it
-are the two sects of the Asharites and the Mutazilites. The belief
-of the latter has driven them to deny the vision altogether; while
-the Asharites have tried to make the two things agree, but this was
-impossible for them to do. So they have taken refuge in many sophistic
-arguments, the weakness of which we would show when talking of the
-Divine Vision. Another problem which rises out of this is that it
-evidently gives rise to a denial of the direction in which God is. For
-if He has no body then the Law becomes an allegory. For the advent of
-the prophets is founded upon the fact that Divine Revelation is sent
-to them from the heaven. Upon this very principle is also based our
-religion, for the Divine Book has come down from the heavens, as God
-says, “Verily we have sent down the same (the Quran) on a blessed
-night.”[74] The descending of the divine revelation from heaven is
-based upon the fact of God’s being there. So also is the descending
-and ascending of angels from heaven, as God says, “Unto him ascendeth
-the good speech; and the righteous work will He exalt;”[75] and says
-He, “The angels ascend up unto and the spirit.”[76] We would mention
-all the things which the deniers of direction bring to prove their
-proposition when we come to talk of this problem.
-
-Another difficulty which arises is that with the denial of
-anthropomorphism we shall have to deny movement to God, after which
-it would be difficult to explain with regard to the Day of Judgment,
-that He would appear to the people at that moment, and would himself
-superintend their judgment, as He says, “Thy Lord shall come and the
-angels rank by rank.”[77] It would also be difficult to explain the
-famous Tradition of Descent, though its explanation would be, on the
-whole easier than that of the former in spite of all that has been said
-about it in the Law. So it is necessary that there should be disclosed
-to the common people nothing which might lead them to a disbelief in
-the literal meanings of these things. This would be its effect upon the
-mind of the people if taken exoterically. But when it is interpreted
-it would come to either of two interpretations. Either interpretation
-would overcome the exoteric side of it and of other things like it,
-thus destroying the Law altogether, and falsifying their purpose;
-or it will be said about all of them that they are only allegories,
-which would destroy the Law, and efface it from the mind of the people,
-while the man doing it would not know the sin he has committed with
-regard to Law. With all this, if you were to look into the arguments
-which the interpreters advance about these things, you would find
-all of them unreasonable, while the exoteric meanings are much more
-satisfactory, that is, verification through them is more common and
-much better. This should become clearer to you when we begin to review
-the arguments which they advance for a denial of anthropomorphism, and
-discuss the question of direction, as we may shortly do. You should
-also know that the Law never intended to disclose the question of the
-denial of this attribute completely to the common people, since it can
-be done by an explanation of the soul, and the Law has not explained
-to the masses what the soul was. God says in the Quran, “They will
-ask thee concerning the Soul; answer, The Soul was created at the
-command of my Lord; but ye have no knowledge given unto you except a
-little.”[78] This is so, because it is difficult to establish reasons
-for the common people for the existence of a thing existing by itself,
-without a body. Had the denial of this attribute been understood by the
-masses then it would not have been enough for prophet Abraham to say in
-his discussion with the infidel, “When Abraham said, My Lord is He who
-giveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and I kill.”[79] On
-the other hand he would have said, “Thou art a body, and God has not
-one, for every body is created,” as the Asharites would argue. So also
-it would have sufficed for Moses in his discussion with Pharoah about
-his divinity; and for the Holy Prophet in case of the anti-christ,
-telling the Faithful of the falsehood of his claims for divinity,
-because he would have a body while God has none. On the other hand
-he told them that our God was not one-eyed. An argument proving the
-physical defect in him was enough to falsify him. So you see that all
-these are innovations in Islam, and have become the cause of its being
-split up into sects, into which the Prophet tells us that his people
-would be divided.
-
-Now some one may object that the Law has not made it clear to the
-common people that God has or has not a body, then what should they
-believe about him. This is a question which will naturally arise in the
-mind of every man, and cannot be put away from him. So it would not
-satisfy the common people to let them know of a thing, the existence
-of which they should believe, that it is not made of matter. We should
-say that they should be answered with the answer given by Law--That
-He is the Light, for this is the quality which God has assigned to
-himself in His Book, for describing himself, He says, “God is the
-light of heaven and earth.”[80] The prophet has also assigned to him
-the game quality in an authentic Tradition. It says that he was asked
-whether he had seen God, and he answered, “He was Light, and I saw
-him.” The Tradition of the Night Journey says that when the Prophet
-neared the lote-tree,[81] it was completely covered with light, which
-did not hide it from his sight. There is also a Tradition in the book
-of Muslim which says that God is a curtain of light, which, if opened,
-would burn the opener, and yet God would not be seen. In some other
-readings of this very Tradition it is said that He is seventy curtains
-of light. It should be known that this illustration is especially fit
-for God, for it comprises the two things, that He can be felt, our
-eyes and intellect being powerless to see or comprehend him, and in
-spite of this He is not a body too. Now according to the common people
-the existent thing is one which can be felt, while the non-existent
-thing is that which they cannot feel. So light being the best of the
-things felt, it is but fitting that the best existing thing should be
-likened unto it. There is another cause for it which should be noticed.
-The condition of His existence to the learned people, when they begin
-to ponder over him, is like the condition of the eyes when they look
-towards the sun. But such is not the condition of the eyes of the bat.
-So this quality fittingly describes the condition of the two classes of
-people. Moreover, God is the cause of the existence of things, and of
-our knowledge of them. This is also the quality of the light in showing
-colours, and of our seeing them. So God has very fittingly named
-himself Light. When it is said that He is Light then there remains no
-doubt as to His Vision on the Day of Judgment. From these it must have
-become clear to you what the primary belief of the Law was about this
-attribute, and what are the innovations which rose in it afterwards.
-The Law is silent about it because there is not found in the universe
-anything unseen without a body, except that which is found by arguments
-among things seen as existent with this quality, and that is the soul.
-As the belief of the soul was impossible for the masses, it was also
-impossible for them to understand the existence of a Being who exists
-without a body. Hence they cannot understand it about God.
-
-
-                             OF DIRECTION
-
-This is a quality which all the people learned in Law have tried to
-prove, until the Mutazilites denied it, and were followed by the
-later Asharites, like Abul Maali and those who follow him. All the
-exoterics of the Law go to prove it. For God says, “And eight shall
-bear the Throne of thy Lord on that Day;”[82] and “He governeth all
-the things from heaven even to the earth: hereafter shall they return
-unto him, on the Day whose length shall be a thousand years, of those
-which ye compute.”[83] Again, He says, “The angels ascend unto him
-and the spirit;”[84] and, “Are Ye secure that He who dwelleth in
-heaven will not cause the earth to swallow you up? and behold, it
-shall shake.”[85] There are many other verses of this kind which, if
-interpreted, would turn the whole of the Law into interpretation; and
-if taken allegorically, would make it an allegory. All the religious
-laws are based upon the principle that God is in heaven, from whence
-he sends down angels to His Prophets with revelations, that from the
-heaven, the religious books used to descend, and that towards it was
-the Night Journey of the Prophet, till he reached near the lote-tree.
-All the philosophers are, moreover, agreed that God and His Angels
-are in heaven, as is the case with all the religions. The doubt which
-led them to deny this idea of direction was that they thought that by
-believing in direction it would be necessary to believe in space, which
-in its turn leads to a belief in anthropomorphism. But we say that this
-is not necessarily the case, for direction can exist without space. It
-is nothing but the surfaces of the body surrounding it, which are six
-in number. That is why we say that there is an above and a below, right
-and left and before and behind for an animal. Or they are the surfaces
-of a body surrounded by another body having the above-mentioned six
-directions. So the directions, which are the surfaces of the body
-itself, are not the spaces of the body in any respect. But the surfaces
-of the surrounding bodies are space for it. The atmosphere surrounding
-man, and the surfaces of the sky surrounding the surfaces of the
-atmosphere, for they are the spaces for it. Such is also the case with
-different surrounding and forming spaces for one another. As to the
-last sky it is evident that beyond it there must be no body. For had it
-been so, it would be necessary that beyond it be another body and so
-on to infinity. So there is no space at all for the last body of the
-universe, for it is not possible that in it be found any body, it being
-necessary that there be found a body in every space. So when there
-is an argument for the existence of a thing in that direction, it is
-necessary that it be not a body. So one who denies His existence there
-goes against his own ideas. He is existent, has a body, is not existent
-without a body. They cannot say that beyond the universe is a void.
-For the impossibility of a void has been made quite certain in the
-philosophical sciences. For that upon which the name void is commonly
-applied, are nothing but dimensions (_Abad_), in which there are no
-bodies. For when these dimensions are once removed, there remains
-nothing but non-existence. But if the void be supposed as existent, it
-is necessary to admit the existence of accidents in something not a
-body, for dimensions are accidents by their having a quality. But it is
-said by the Ancients and established by past religions that that place
-is the dwelling place of the spirits, God and angels. This place has no
-space, and is not governed by time, because everything governed by time
-and space can be corrupted. And it is necessary that the things there
-be uncorrupted and uncreated. This has been made quite clear by what
-I have said, for there cannot be found in that place anything but one
-which is existent and at the same time can be felt, or is altogether
-non-existent. It is self-evident that an existent object is always
-referred to by its existence; that is, it is said that it exists, that
-is, it has an existence. So if anything exists there, it must be the
-noblest of all, and it is necessary that that existent thing should
-be referred to by the best portion of the universe, which are the
-heavens. God has said concerning the nobility of the heavens, “Verily
-the creation of heaven and earth is more considerable than the creation
-of man: but the greater part of men do not understand.”[86] All this is
-perfectly clear to the learned men “Well grounded in knowledge.”[87]
-
-Now it has become clear to you that belief in direction is necessary
-by religion and reason, and that it forms a part of the Law, which
-is based upon it. A denial of the principles is a denial of all the
-religions. The cause of the difficulty in their understanding this, and
-in their denial of anthropomorphism is, that there cannot be found in
-the visible world an illustration of such a thing. This was just the
-reason why the Law did not expressly deny an anthropomorphism. For to
-the common people verification of an invisible object can only come
-when its existence be known in the visible world, as knowledge, which
-being a condition for their own existence as visible, could to them
-become a condition for the existence of an invisible Maker. Now as
-the case of the visible was unknown in the visible on the part of the
-many, and none knew it but those who were well-grounded in knowledge,
-the Law-giver forbade an inquiry into it, as for example knowledge of
-the Soul. If it be needful for the common people to know anything,
-then the Law gives examples from the visible world. And if one example
-did not suffice for the understanding of the problem in view, then
-many examples are given, as in the case of an account of the Day of
-Judgment. The doubt which arises out of a denial of direction, on the
-part of those denying it, is that the common people cannot comprehend
-it, particularly so, because they have not been given before hand to
-understand that God has no body. So it is necessary to take the action
-of the Law as our example, otherwise we will have to interpret that
-which the Law itself has not expressly said.
-
-With regard to these problems of the Law, the people may be divided
-into three classes. In the first place there are people who cannot
-notice any doubt arising out of them, especially in things which the
-Law has left to be taken exoterically. These people are the greatest
-in number, and may be described as the masses. Then the second group
-of men is one which has doubts; but has not power to solve them. These
-are above the masses and below the learned people. It is for them
-that there are found in the Law allegorical sayings, and it is they
-whom God has censured. For there is no allegory in the Law for the
-learned or the common people, and it is in this light that all the
-allegorical sayings of the Quran should be understood. Their example
-as regards the Law is like the example of the bread of wheat which
-though a useful cereal for the large number of human beings, may prove
-harmful to some. Such is also the case with religious teaching: it
-is useful for the many but sometimes becomes harmful to some. The
-following words of God point to the same thing. “He will not thereby
-mislead any except the transgressors.”[88] But this is found only in
-a few verses of the Quran about a few people. Most of the verses are,
-however, those which speak of things invisible for which there is no
-example in the visible world. So they are expressed by the things
-nearest to them in the visible world, on account of their similarity.
-Some people take the illustration as the thing illustrated, and hence
-they fall into confusion and doubt. This is what is called allegorical
-in the Law, and is not meant for the learned or the common people,
-which in reality form two groups of men. For these are the people who
-are really healthy, and delicate food is only fit for them. The other
-group is a group of sick men who are always few in number. So God has
-said, “But they whose hearts are perverse will follow that which is
-parabolical therein, out of love of schism.”[89] These are the dogmatic
-and the scholastic theologians. The worst which these people have
-done in respect to the Law is that they have interpreted much which
-they thought was not to be taken literally, and then said that their
-interpretation was the thing intended, and that God had mentioned it
-parabolically only to test and try His creatures. God forbid that
-we should ever have such an idea about Him. The Divine Book is a
-miracle of clearness and lucidity. So it is far from the real purpose
-of the Law for one to say about a thing which is not parabolical,
-that it is so, and then set about interpreting it according to his
-own ideas, telling the people that their duty lies in believing
-his interpretations. They have done so in the case of the verse of
-Equalisation on the Throne, and others, saying that their exoteric
-meaning is only parabolical. On the whole many interpretations, which
-these people maintain to be the real purpose of the Law, when intently
-looked into and deciphered, are found wanting in arguments, and not
-serving the purpose which the exoteric meaning would have with regard
-to the common people. The primary purpose of knowledge for the common
-people is action, so that which is most useful in action is most
-suitable for them. But for the learned men, the purpose of knowledge
-is both knowledge and action. The man who interprets anything of the
-Law, thinking that his interpretation is the real purpose of it, and
-then discloses it to the common people, is like a man, who finds a
-medicine which an expert physician had compounded to preserve the
-health of all, or of a majority of the people; then there came a man
-with whom that medicine did not agree on account of the coarseness
-of his disposition. He presented it to some people, and then thought
-that by some drug, which the first physician had clearly specified, as
-composing that universally useful medicine, he did not mean the drug
-commonly known by that name--but another which he really meant, but
-used this name for it by a far-fetched metaphor. So he took out the
-first drug from the compound, and placed another in its stead, which
-he thought to be the one intended by the first physician. Then he
-told the people that this was the medicine intended. The people began
-to use that “improved” medicine, and many of them got injured by it.
-Then there came another group of men, who, seeing the people sick on
-account of that medicine, thought of curing them. So they changed some
-of its drugs with some other than the first one, then presented it to
-the people for quite another disease than that intended by the first
-physician. Then there appeared another group which interpreted the
-medicine in quite another way than the two preceding groups had done.
-The fourth group gave a new interpretation to the drug and prescribed
-it for a fourth kind of disease. So as time went on with that great
-medicine, the interpretations of it took hold of the people instead of
-the drugs, and they changed and transformed it altogether. As a result
-the people were attacked by many different kinds of diseases, till the
-usefulness of the medicine was altogether lost. Such is the condition
-of those sects which have risen in Islam. For every one of them has
-made interpretations quite different from the others, and maintained
-that its interpretation shows the real purpose of the Law, which was
-at last rent to piece, and lost its primary purpose altogether. The
-Prophet, knowing that a thing like this would necessarily happen among
-his people, said, “My people will shortly be divided into seventytwo
-sects. All of them will be in hell, except one.” By this one he meant
-the sect which followed the exoteric meanings of the Law, without
-making any interpretations which may be disclosed to the people. If you
-were to look into the Law and see the corruption which it has suffered
-up to this time, through interpretations, the truth of this example
-would become clear to you.
-
-The first to make a change in the religion--the great medicine--were
-the Kharijites, who were followed by the Mutazilites. They were
-succeeded by the Asharites, after whom came the Sufis. Last of all came
-Al-Ghazzali, who went to the extreme and corrupted everything. He it is
-who explained philosophy to the common people, and disclosed to them
-the opinions of the philosophers as he understood them to be. This he
-did in a book called _Al-Maqasid_, in which he thought he was refuting
-them. He planned his _Refutation of the Philosophers_, and charged
-them with infidelity in respect to three questions, tearing them to
-pieces, as he thought, in regard to consensus of opinion; and calling
-them innovators as regards other opinions. In this book he has advanced
-many specious arguments and confused reasonings, which have led astray
-many people both from religion and philosophy. Then he said in his
-book _Jawahir al-Quran_ that the arguments which he had mentioned in
-his _Refutation_ were controversial in their nature, while in fact
-they were mentioned in his _Al Maznun ala Ghairi Ahlihi_. Then in his
-_Mishkat ul Anwar_ he mentions grades of men really knowing God. He
-says that all but those who believe that God is not the mover of the
-first heaven, and that it is not He from whom this movement originates,
-are precluded from it. This is an explanation from him of men learned
-in divine science. He has said in many places that divine science
-exists only by guesses, as opposed to certainties in other science. In
-his book _Munqidh min al Dalal_ he has gone against the philosophers
-and maintained that knowledge can only be acquired by privacy and
-meditation, and that those in this rank are all very near to the
-rank of the prophets. He has mentioned this very fact in his _Kimiya
-i Saadat_. Men have become divided into parties on account of this
-confusion. One party chose to censure the philosophers, while the other
-agreed to interpret the Law, and make it conform to philosophy. All
-this is wrong. The Law should be taken literally; and the conformity of
-religion to philosophy should not be told to the common people. For by
-an exposition of it we should be exposing the results of philosophy to
-them, without their having intelligence enough to understand them. It
-is neither permitted nor desirable to expose anything of the result of
-philosophy to a man who has no arguments to advance, for there are no
-arguments either with the learned people who have a mastery over both
-the subjects, or with the common people who follow the exoteric of the
-Law. So his action brought disorder in respect to both of these things,
-religion and philosophy, in the mind of the common people, while he
-saved them for the others. The disorder in religion came through his
-exposing those interpretations which should not be exposed; and so
-also the disorder in philosophy was the result of his mentioning those
-things in his books which should not be put in the works on philosophy.
-Now it was the result of his treatment of the subjects that many people
-do not know the difference between the two, because of his bringing
-both of them together. He has also insisted upon the fact that he knew
-the cause of doing so, as he did in his _Al Tafriqa bain al Islami
-wa-z Zindiqah_. In it he has noted down many kinds of interpretations
-and has decided that their interpreters were not infidels though they
-may go against the consensus of opinion. Since he has done so, he is
-dangerous to the Law for some reasons, to philosophy for others, and to
-both for some other reasons. So this man, by disclosing them, has shown
-that he is dangerous for both the things in reality and profitable to
-them only by accident. For teaching philosophy to one who is not fit
-for it, will either falsify philosophy or religion absolutely or will
-show conformity between them by accident only. The right thing would
-have been not to disclose philosophy to the common people at all. But
-if teaching of it was absolutely necessary, then only that section of
-the people should have been taught who saw that religion was opposed
-to philosophy, in order to show them that it was not so. And also it
-might have been taught to those people who thought that philosophy
-is opposed to religion. This may have been shown to either of these
-sections, that in reality they did not possess a knowledge of their
-substance and truth, that is, of religion and philosophy. Moreover,
-they would know that the opinion about religion, that it was opposed to
-philosophy was one which was either about some innovation in religion,
-and not about its principles, or is an error in understanding that is,
-a wrong interpretation of it, as was shown in the case of knowledge
-about particulars and other things. That is why we were compelled in
-this book to explain the principles of religion. These principles,
-when intently looked into will be found in perfect agreement with
-philosophy. Such is also the case with the opinion which says this
-philosophy is opposed to religion. It only shows that the man has not
-had a sufficient training in either philosophy or religion. This is the
-reason that we were compelled to explain it in our tractate entitled
-_Fasl al Maqal fi Muwafiqat il Hikmat lil Sharia_.
-
-Now that this has become clear we would return to our former theme.
-The only problem which remains for us to solve, out of those which we
-proposed is that of Divine Vision. It is thought for some reasons,
-that it forms a part of the problem which we have just discussed, on
-account of the words of God, “The sight comprehendeth him not, but He
-comprehendeth the sight.”[90] And hence the Mutazilites have denied
-it, setting aside the arguments found in the Law, in spite of their
-greatness in number and fame, a very shameful act on their part. The
-cause of this doubt of the Law that since the Mutazilites denied
-physical attributes, and believed in exposing their ideas to every one,
-it became necessary for them to deny direction also. And having once
-denied direction they must also deny the Vision, for the thing seen
-must be in some direction to one who sees it. To prove their point they
-are constrained to set aside the traditional religion. They neglected
-the Traditions because they were only isolated things which should not
-be believed, if found opposed to the teachings of the Quran, that is,
-opposed to the verse, “The sight comprehendeth Him not.” The Asharites
-tried to mix together the two beliefs, that is, the denial of physical
-attributes, and the possibility of vision of One having no body, by
-means of our senses. It became difficult for them to prove it, and
-they took refuge in many sophistical and conjectural arguments, that
-is arguments which are thought to be correct but are in reality wrong.
-It is so because it is possible to have the same grades in arguments
-as there are among men. Just as there may be found men with perfect
-excellence and those below them, till we may have a man who thinks
-himself learned and yet he is not, being only a pedant, so there are
-arguments which are extremely certain, and those below them, then,
-there are specious arguments, and those which though really false seem
-to be true. The statements of the Asharites in regard to this question
-are of two kinds: those refuting the arguments of the Mutazilites, and
-those proving the possibility of the Vision of One having no body, and
-that there is no difficulty in our believing it. The statements by
-which they have opposed the Mutazilites in their argument, that the
-thing seen must have a direction for one who sees it, is that some
-of them say that it is applied only to the visible, and not to the
-invisible, world; and that it is not one of those cases in which the
-condition of the one can be applied to the other. According to them
-it is possible for a man to see an object having no direction, for he
-sees by his power of sight only that which comes before his eyes. In
-this they have mixed together the senses of sight with intelligence,
-for the latter can perceive that which has no direction, that is, no
-space; but for the perception of the eye there is a condition, that the
-thing to be perceived be in a direction, not only that but a particular
-direction too. So if we take the eye to be endowed with the power of
-seeing, then it is not possible except under very limited conditions.
-These are three in number-light, the intervention of a transparent body
-between the eye and the object seen, and the possession of necessary
-colours by the object. A refutation of these conditions in the eyes is
-also a refutation of those primary principles of knowledge which are
-known to all. It would be a refutation of the sciences of philosophy
-and mathematics. The Asharites also maintain that one of the conditions
-as we have said, for example, is that every rational being has a life,
-it being apparent in the visible world as a condition for knowledge.
-Hence we say to them that these are also conditions for seeing things
-in the visible world. So according to their own principle is the
-case of the visible and the invisible. In his book _Al Maqasid_ Abu
-Hamid (Al Ghazzali) intended to oppose the premise that every object
-perceivable must be in some direction to the one seeing it. He says
-that a man sees himself reflected in a mirror and sees himself not in
-any other direction but the opposite one. Hence he can see his self in
-an opposite direction too. But this is a mistake, because what he sees
-is not his self but only an image of it. This image is in the opposite
-direction, being in the mirror, placed there.
-
-Of the arguments which they advance to prove the vision of an object
-having no body, two are famous ones. Of these the more famous is one
-which says that an object seen is either because it has some colour, or
-because it has a body, or it is a colour, or because it is existent.
-Sometimes they mention many other causes than really do exist. They
-say that it is wrong to suppose that it must be a body, otherwise, no
-colour would be visible, it being also incorrect to suppose the space
-to be the colour. Now when all the kinds of suppositions in the premise
-have been refuted we shall have to believe that only an existent object
-will be seen. The mistake in this statement is quite clear. For an
-object is visible because of itself. This is the case with the colour
-and the body: the colour being visible by itself, and the body through
-the colour. That is why a thing which has no colour cannot be seen.
-Had the existence of a thing been the only condition of visibility, it
-would have been possible to see the sound and the senses. In that case
-seeing, hearing, in fact all the five senses would have been only one,
-which is quite contrary to our reason. This problem and others like it
-have obliged the Mutakallimun to admit that it is possible to _hear_
-the colour, and _see_ the sounds. But this is against nature, as man
-has understood it to be. For it is absolutely evident that the sense of
-seeing is quite different from that of hearing. Their actions are quite
-distinct from one another, and the organ of the one cannot work as the
-organ of the other. It is just as impossible to turn hearing as to turn
-colour into sound. Those who say that sometimes sound can be seen,
-should be asked to define the sense of seeing. They would necessarily
-answer that it is a faculty which perceives those things which can be
-seen, such as colour and so on. Then they should be asked to define the
-sense of hearing. They would surely say that it is one sense by which
-sounds can be heard. Then they should be asked whether at the time of
-sound it is the sense of hearing only or seeing too. If they say that
-it is hearing only, they admit that it cannot perceive colours. If
-they say that it is seeing only, then it cannot hear sounds. If it is
-neither alone, for it perceives colours, then it is seeing and hearing
-both. But in this way everything can be proved to be one, even in the
-case of contradictory things. This is a thing which our Mutakallimun
-admit or they are compelled to do so. But it is clear that it is a
-philosophical opinion which is only fit for those ancient people famous
-for it.
-
-Now the second method which Mutakallimun have adopted for proving the
-possibility of Divine Vision is that which has been mentioned by Abul
-Maali in his book, _Al Irshad_. It says that the senses can only feel
-the substance (_Zat_) of things, but that which separates the existent
-thing from one another is not to be found in the substance only. So
-the senses cannot perceive the substance, which is common to all the
-existent things. They can only perceive a thing because it exists.
-But all this is absurd, which is quite clear from the fact that if
-sight were only able to perceive things then it would not have been
-possible for it to differentiate between white and black, for there is
-no difference between things about those qualities which are common
-to all. This also becomes impossible as regards all the other senses.
-The sense of seeing could not perceive different kinds of colours;
-the sense of hearing cannot differentiate between tastes. It would be
-necessary that the objects perceived by the senses be all of a kind,
-and there should be no difference between objects perceived by seeing
-and apprehended by hearing. This is contrary to that which man commonly
-understands. In reality the senses perceive the substance of things by
-the power which is vouchsafed to them. The cause of this mistake lies
-in the fact that that which perceives a substance, is thought to be the
-thing perceived. Had there not been said so much about these things,
-and so much respect for those who said it, it would not have satisfied
-anybody with a strong common sense.
-
-The cause of such a perplexing situation in the Law, which has
-compelled its votaries to take refuge in such worthless arguments,
-as would bring a smile to the lips of anybody who has made the least
-effort to distinguish between different kinds of arguments, is the
-exposition of anthropomorphic qualities of God to the common people,
-a fact which has been prohibited by God and His Prophet. It is so
-because it is very difficult for a man to believe at the same time that
-there exists One without a body, who can be seen with our eyes. For
-the things which the senses comprehend are in the bodies or the bodies
-themselves. Hence the Mutakallimun have tried to prove that the Divine
-Vision will be an addition to our existing qualities at that moment.
-This also should not have been disclosed to the common people. For
-since their intellect cannot go beyond their imagination that which
-they cannot imagine is non-existent for them. To imagine a thing which
-has no body is not possible, and hence a belief in the existence of
-an object which they cannot imagine, is impossible for them. It was
-for this reason that the Law refused to disclose this secret to them,
-and described God, for their sake, in terms which they can imagine,
-ascribing to him the attributes of hearing, seeing, having a face, &c.
-&c., at the same time telling them that He is not like anything which
-can be imagined. Had the intention of the Law been to make clear to
-the masses the fact of His having no body, it would not have mentioned
-these things in detail. But as light was the highest of imaginable
-things, it was given to them as an illustration of God, for it is the
-best known of the things both to the senses and to the imagination.
-
-Such is also the case in respect to the possibility of their
-understanding the things of the Day of Judgment. These have also
-been mentioned in terms which they can imagine. So now when the Law
-has adopted this course about the apparent description of God, there
-arises no doubt about him. For when it is said that He is Light or that
-there is a curtain of light upon Him, as is mentioned in the Quran and
-authentic Traditions, and when it is said that the Faithful will see
-Him on the Day of Judgement as they see the sun, there arises no doubt
-or suspicion out of it for the common or the learned people. It is so
-because to the learned it is quite clear that that condition will be
-an addition to our former knowledge. But when this is disclosed to
-the common people, they cannot understand it, and hence they either
-disbelieve the whole of the Law, or consider its exponent to be an
-infidel. So one who adopts a method other than that laid down by the
-Law in this respect, certainly goes astray. If you look a little
-intently it will become clear to you, that in spite of the fact that
-the Law has not given illustration of those things for the common
-people, beyond which their imagination cannot go, it has also informed
-the learned men of the underlying meanings of those illustrations. So
-it is necessary to bear in mind the limits which the Law has set about
-the instruction of every class of men, and not to mix them together.
-For in this manner the purpose of the Law is multiplied. Hence it is
-that the Prophet has said, “We, the prophets, have been commanded to
-adapt ourselves to the conditions of the people, and address them
-according to their intelligence.” He who tries to instruct all the
-people in the matter of religion, in one and the same way, is like a
-man who wants to make them alike in actions too, which is quite against
-apparent laws and reason.
-
-From the foregoing it must have become clear to you that the divine
-vision has an exoteric meaning in which there is no doubt, if we take
-the words of the Quran about God as they stand, that is, without
-proving or disproving the anthropomorphic attribute of God. Now since
-the first part of the Law has been made quite clear as to God’s purity,
-and the quantity of the teaching fit for the common people, it is time
-to begin the discussion about the actions of God, after which our
-purpose in writing this tractate will be over.
-
-
-                         OF THE ACTIONS OF GOD
-
-In this section we will take up five questions, around which all others
-in this connection revolve. In the first place a proof of the creation
-of the universe; secondly, the advent of the prophets; thirdly,
-predestination and fate; fourthly, Divine justice and injustice; and
-fifthly, the Day of Judgment.
-
-First Problem: the Creation of the Universe:--The Law teaches that the
-universe was invented and created by God, and that it did not come
-into being by chance or by itself. The method adopted by the Law for
-proving this is not the one upon which the Asharites have depended.
-For we have already shown that those methods are not specially certain
-for the learned, nor common enough to satisfy all the classes of men.
-The methods which are really serviceable are those which have a very
-few premises, and the results of which fall very near to the commonly
-known ideas. But in instructing the common people the Law does not
-favour statements composed of long and complete reasonings, based
-upon different problems, So everyone who, in teaching them, adopts a
-different course, and interprets the Law according to it, has lost
-sight of its purpose and gone astray from the true path. And so also,
-the Law in giving illustrations for its reasonings uses only those
-which are present before us. Whatever has been thought necessary for
-the common people to know, has been explained to them by the nearest
-available examples, as in the case of the Day of Judgment. But whatever
-was unnecessary for them to know, they have been told that it was
-beyond their knowledge, as the words of God about the Soul.[91] Now
-that we have established this, it is necessary that the method adopted
-by the Law for teaching the creation of the universe to the common
-people be such as would be acknowledged by all. It is also necessary
-that since there cannot be found anything present to illustrate the
-creation of the universe the Law must have used the examples of the
-creation of things in the visible world.
-
-So the method adopted by Law is that the universe was made by God. If
-we look intently into the verse pertaining to this subject we shall
-see that the method adopted is that of divine solicitude, which we
-know to be one of those which prove the existence of God. When a man
-sees a thing made in a certain shape, proportion and fashion, for a
-particular advantage is derived from it, and purpose which is to be
-attained, so that it becomes clear to him, that had it not been found
-in that shape, and proportion, then that advantage would have been
-wanting in it, he comes to know for certain that there is a maker of
-that thing, and that he had made it in that shape and proportion, for
-a set purpose. For it is not possible that all those qualities serving
-that purpose be collected in that thing by chance alone. For instance,
-if a man sees a stone on the ground in a shape fit for sitting, and
-finds its proportions and fashion of the same kind, then he would
-come to know that it was made by a maker, and that he had made it and
-placed it there. But when he sees nothing in it, which may have made
-it fit for sitting then he becomes certain that its existence in the
-place was by chance only, without its being fashioned by any maker.
-Such is also the case with the whole of the universe. For when a man
-sees the sun, the moon, and all the stars, which are the cause of the
-four seasons, of days and nights, of rain, water and winds, of the
-inhabitation of the parts of the earth, of the existence of man, and
-of the being of all the animals and the plants and of the earth being
-fit for the habitation of a man, and other animals living on it; and
-the water fit for the animals living in it; and the air fit for birds,
-and if there be anything amiss in this creation and edifice, the whole
-world would come to confusion and disorder, then he would come to know
-with certainty that it is not possible that this harmony in it for the
-different members of the universe--man, animals, and plants--be found
-by chance only. He will know that there is one who determined it, and
-so one who made it by intention, and that is God, exalted and magnified
-may He be. He would know with certainty that the universe is a created
-thing, for he would necessarily think that it is not possible that in
-it should be found all this harmony, if it be not made by some one,
-and had come into existence by chance alone. This kind of argument is
-quite definite and at the same time clear, and some have mentioned it
-here. It is based upon two principles which are acknowledged by all.
-One of them being, that the universe, with all its component parts, is
-found fit for the existence of man and things; secondly, that which is
-found suitable in all its parts, for a single purpose, leading to a
-single goal, is necessarily a created thing. So those two principles
-lead us naturally to admit that the universe is a created thing, and
-that there is a maker of it. Hence “the argument of analogy” leads to
-two things at one and the same time, and that is why it is the best
-argument for proving the existence of God. This kind of reasoning is
-also found in the Quran in many verses in which the creation of the
-universe is mentioned. For instance, “Have We not made the earth a
-bed, and the mountains for shelter to fix the same? And have We not
-created you of two sexes; and appointed your sleep for rest and made
-the night a garment to cover you, and destined the day to a gaining of
-a livelihood; and built over you seven heavens, and placed therein a
-burning lamp? And do We not send down from the clouds pressing forth
-rain, water pouring down in abundance, that We may hereby produce corn
-and herbs, and gardens planted thick with trees.”[92] If we ponder over
-this verse it would be found that our attention has been called to the
-suitability of the different parts of the universe for the existence
-of man. In the very beginning we are informed of a fact well-known to
-all--and that is that the earth has been created in a way which has
-made it suitable for our existence. Had it been unstable, or of any
-other shape, or in any other place, or not of the present proportion,
-it would not have been possible to be here, or at all created on it.
-All this is included in the words, “Have We not made the earth a
-bed for you?” for in a bed are collected together all the qualities
-of shape, tranquility, and peace, to which may be added those of
-smoothness and softness. So how strange is this wonderful work and
-how excellent this blessedness, and how wonderful this collection of
-all the qualities! This is so because in the word _mihad_ (bed) are
-brought together all those qualities, which are found in the earth,
-rendering it suitable for the existence of man. It is a thing which
-becomes clear to the learned after much learning and a long time, “But
-God will appropriate His mercy unto whom He pleaseth.”[93] Then as to
-the divine words, “And the mountains for stakes,”--they tell us of the
-advantage to be found in the tranquility of the earth on account of
-the mountains. For had the earth been created smaller than it is now,
-that is, without mountains it would have been quivered by the motion
-of other elements, the water and the air, and would have been shaken
-and thus displaced. This would naturally have been the cause of the
-destruction of the animal world. So when its tranquility is in harmony
-with those living on it, it did not come into being by chance alone,
-but was made by some one’s intention, and determination. Certainly it
-was made by One who intended it, and determined it, for the sake of
-those living on it. Then He calls our attention to the suitability of
-the existence of night and day for animals. He says, “And made the
-night a garment to cover you; and destined the day to a gaining of your
-livelihood.” He means to say that He has made the night like a covering
-and clothing for all the things, from the heat of the sun. For had
-there been no setting of the sun at night, all the things, whose life
-has been made dependent upon the sun, would have perished--that is, the
-animals and the plants. As clothing protects the people from the heat
-of the sun, in addition to its being a covering, so God likened the
-night to it. This is one of the most beautiful of the metaphors. There
-is also another advantage in the night for the animals: their sleep in
-it is very deep, after the setting of the sun, which keeps faculties in
-motion, that is, wide awake. So God has said, “And appointed your sleep
-for rest,” on account of the darkness of the night. Then He says, “And
-built over you seven heavens, and placed therein a burning lamp.” Here
-by the word building He means their creation, and their harmony with
-the created things, and their arrangement and system. By strength He
-means that power of revolution and motion which is never slackened, and
-never overtaken by fatigue; and they never fall like other roofs and
-high edifices. To this refer the words of God, “And made the heaven a
-roof well-supported.”[94] By all this He shows their fitness in number,
-shape, fashion, and movement, for the existence of those who live on
-the earth round it. Were one of the heavenly bodies, not to speak of
-all, to stop for a moment all would be chaos on the face of the earth.
-Some people think the blast of the last trumpet, which will be the
-cause of the thunderbolt, will be nothing but a stop in the revolution
-of the heavenly bodies. Then He tells us of the advantage of the sun
-for those living on the earth and says, “And placed therein a burning
-lamp.” He calls it a lamp because in reality it is all darkness, and
-light covers the darkness of the night, and if there be no lamp, man
-can get no advantage out of his sense of sight at night time; and in
-the same way if there were no sun the animals can have no benefit of
-their sense of seeing. He calls our attention to this advantage of the
-sun, ignoring others because it is the noblest of all the advantages
-and the most apparent of all. Then He tells us of His kindness in
-sending down rain, for the sake of the plants and the animals. The
-coming down of rain in an appointed proportion, and at an appointed
-season, for the cultivated fields cannot be by chance alone, but is
-the result of divine solicitude for us all. So He says, “And do We
-not send down from the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down
-in abundance that We may hereby produce corn and herbs, and gardens
-planted thick with trees.” There are many verses of the Quran on this
-subject. For instance, He says, “Do ye not see how God hath created the
-seven heavens, one above another, and hath placed the moon therein for
-a light, and hath appointed the sun for a taper? God hath also provided
-and caused you to bring forth corn from the earth.”[95] If we were to
-count all such verses and comment upon them showing the kindness of
-the Creator for the created, it would take too many volumes. We do not
-intend to do it in this book. If God should grant us life and leisure
-we shall write a book to show the kindness of God to which He has
-called our attention.
-
-It should be known that this kind of argument is just contrary to that
-which the Asharites think leads to the knowledge of God. They think
-that the creation does not lead us to the knowledge of God through any
-of His goodness, but through possibility, that is, the possibility
-which is found in all things, which we can understand to be of his
-shape or of quite a contrary one. But if this possibility be found
-alike in both the cases, then there is no wisdom in the creation of the
-universe, and there is found no harmony between man and the parts of
-it. For, as they think, if it is possible for the things to have any
-other form than they have now, then there can exist no harmony between
-man and other existent things by the creation of which God has obliged
-man and commanded him to be thankful to Him. This opinion, by which the
-creation of man, as a part of the universe, is just as possible, for
-instance, as his creation in the void, is like the opinion of those who
-say that man exists but he could have been created in quite a different
-shape, and yet could perform actions like a man. According to them it
-is also possible that he may have formed the part of another universe
-quite different from the existing one. In that case the blessing of the
-universe can have no obligation for man, for they are not necessary for
-his purpose. Hence man is quite careless of them and they of him. So
-their existence is no blessing to him. This is all against the nature
-of man.
-
-On the whole, a man who denies the existence of the effects arranged
-according to the causes in the question of arts, or whose wisdom
-cannot understand it, then he has no knowledge of the art of its
-Maker. So also a man who denies the existence of an order of effects
-in accordance with causes in this universe, denies the existence of
-the Creator altogether. Their saying that God is above these causes,
-and that they cannot have any bearing on the effects by His command,
-is very far from the true nature of philosophy, nay, it is a destroyer
-of it. For if it is possible to have the same effects with other than
-the prescribed causes just in the same degree as by them, then where
-is the greatness in producing the effects from the known Causes? It is
-so because the effects from the causes have one of the following three
-reasons. Either the existence of the causes will be in place of the
-effects by compulsion, as a man’s taking his food; or their being more
-perfect that is, the effect becoming better and more perfect through
-them, as a man’s having two eyes, or they may have neither a better nor
-a more compulsive effect. In this case the existence of the effect and
-the cause would be by chance, without any intention at all; and hence,
-there would be no greatness found in it. For instance, if the shape
-of human hand, the number of the fingers, and their length be neither
-necessary nor adding any perfection in its work in seizing things of
-different kind, then the actions of the hand from this shape, and
-number of parts, would be by chance alone. If it be so, then it makes
-no difference whether a man is given a hand or a hoof, or something
-else, like the different animals, for their particular actions. On the
-whole, if we ignore the causes and their effects, then there remains
-nothing to refute the arguments of those who believe in the creation of
-the universe by chance alone, that is, those who say that there is no
-Creator at all, and that which has come into being in this universe is
-the result of material causes. For taking one of the two alternatives
-it is not more possible that it may have happened by chance, than done
-by an independent Actor. So when the Asharites say that the existence
-of one or more possibilities shows that there is a particular Maker of
-these things, they can answer and say that the existence of things by
-one of these possibilities was by chance alone, for intention works as
-one of the causes, and that which happens without any means or cause
-is by chance. We see that many things come into being in this way.
-For example, the elements mix together by chance, and then by this
-unintentional mixing there is produced a new thing. They mix again,
-and this quite unintentionally produces quite a new thing. In this
-way every kind of creation may be said to have come into existence by
-chance.
-
-We say that it is necessary that there be found order and arrangement,
-the more perfect and finished than what can be imagined. This mixing
-together of elements is limited and prearranged, and things produced
-by them are sure to happen, and no disorder has ever happened in them.
-But all this could not happen by chance alone, for that which happens
-in this way by chance is of the least value. It is to this that God
-refers, “It is the work of the Lord, who has rightly disposed all
-things.”[96] I would like to know what completeness can be found in
-things made by chance, for such things are by no means better than
-their opposites. To this God refers in the following words, “Thou
-canst not see in the Creation of the most Merciful any unfitness or
-disproportion. Lift thy eyes again to heaven, and _look whether thou
-seest any flaw_.”[97] But what defect can be greater than that all the
-things can be found with any other quality than they really possess.
-For the non-existent quality may be better than the existing one.
-In this way, if one thinks that were the Eastern movement to become
-Western and vice versa, there would be no difference in the universe,
-then he has destroyed philosophy altogether. He is like a man who
-thinks that were the right side of the animals to become left, and
-vice versa, there would be no difference at all for one of the two
-alternatives is there. For as it is possible to say that it is made
-according to one alternative by an independent Maker, so it is possible
-to assert that it was all made by chance alone. For we see so many
-things coming into being by themselves.
-
-It is quite clear to you that all the people see that lower kinds of
-creation could have been made in a different way from that in which
-they really are and as they see this lower degree in many things they
-think that they must have been made by chance. But in the higher
-creation they know that it is impossible to have been made in a more
-perfect and excellent form than that given to it by the Creator. So
-this opinion, which is one of the opinions of the Mutakallimun is both
-against the Law and philosophy. What we say is that the opinion of
-possibility in creation is closer to a complete denial of God, than
-leading us nearer to Him. At the same time it falsifies philosophy. For
-if we do not understand that there is a mean between the beginnings
-and ends of the creation, upon which is based the ends of things, then
-there can neither be any order nor any method in it. And if they be
-wanting then there can be no proof of the existence of an intelligent
-and knowing Maker; for taking them together with cause and effect
-we are led to the fact that they must have been created by wisdom
-and knowledge. But on the other hand the existence of either of two
-possibilities shows that they may have been performed by a not-knowing
-Maker and by chance alone. Just as a stone falling on the earth may
-fall in any place, on any side, and in any form. It will show the want
-of the existence either of a creator at all or at least of a wise and
-knowing Creator. The thing which has compelled the Mutakallimun of the
-Asharites to adopt this opinion is a denial of the action of those
-natural forces which God has put in all things, as He has endowed them
-with life, power and so forth. They avoided the opinion that there was
-any other creator but God, and God forbid that there be any other, for
-he is the only creator of the causes and they are made effective by
-His command only. We will talk of this in detail when discoursing on
-Fate and Predestination. They were also afraid that by admitting the
-natural causes they might be accused of saying that the universe came
-into being by chance only. They would have known that a denial of it
-means a denial of a great part of the arguments, which can be advanced
-for a proof of the existence of God. One who denies any part of God’s
-creation denies His work which falls very near to a denial of a part
-of His attributes. On the whole as their opinion is based upon hasty
-conclusions, which come to the mind of a man by superficial thought
-and as apparently it appears that the word “intention” can be applied
-to one who has power to do bad or otherwise, they saw that if they did
-not admit that all the creation is possible, they would not be able to
-say that it came into existence by the action of an intending creator.
-So they say that all the creation is possible so that they may prove
-that the creator is an intelligent one. They never thought of the order
-which is necessary in things made, and with that their coming from an
-intelligent creator. These people have also ignored the blame they will
-have to bear in thus denying wisdom to the creator; or maintaining that
-chance should be found governing creation. They know, as we have said,
-that it is necessary, on account of the order existent in nature, that
-it must have been brought into being by some knowing creator, otherwise
-the order found in it would be by chance. When they were compelled to
-deny the natural forces, they had to deny with them a large number of
-those forces which God has made subservient to His command for the
-creation and preservation of things. For God has created some things
-from causes which He has produced from outside, these are the heavenly
-bodies; there are other things which He has made by causes placed in
-the things themselves, that is, the soul, and other natural forces,
-by which he preserves those things. So how wicked is the man who
-destroyeth philosophy, and “inventeth a lie about God.”[98]
-
-This is only a part of the change which has taken place in the Law,
-in this and other respects, which we have already mentioned, and will
-mention hereafter. From all this it must have become clear to you
-that the method which God had adopted for teaching His creatures that
-the universe is made and created by Him is the method of kindness
-and wisdom, towards all His creatures and especially towards man.
-It is a method which bears the same relation to our intellect, as
-the sun bears to our senses. The method which it has adopted towards
-the common people about this problem, is that of illustration from
-things observed. But as there was nothing which could be given as an
-illustration, and as the common people cannot understand a thing, an
-illustration of which they cannot see, God tells us that the universe
-was created in a certain time out of a certain thing, which He made.
-He tells us His condition before the creation of the universe, “His
-throne was above the waters.”[99] He also says, “Verily your Lord is
-God who created the heavens and the earth in six days,”[100] and “Then
-He set His mind to the creation of the heavens, and it was smoke.”[101]
-In addition to these there are other verses of the Book, pertaining to
-this subject. So it is incumbent that nothing out of them should be
-interpreted for the common people, and nothing should be presented to
-them in explaining it but this illustration. For one who changes it,
-makes the wisdom of the Law useless. If it be said that the Law teaches
-about the universe that it is created, and made out of nothing and in
-no time, then it is a thing which even the learned cannot understand,
-not to speak of the common people. So we should not deviate in this
-matter of the Law, from the method laid down in it for instructing
-the common people, and should not tell them except this regarding the
-creation of the universe, which is found alike in the Quran, the Bible,
-and other revealed books. The wonder is that the example in the Quran
-is quite in accordance with the creation of the things in the visible
-world. But the Law does not say so, which is a warning to the learned
-people that the creation of the universe is not like the creation of
-all other things. He has used the words _creation_ and _flaw_, because
-they connote two things,--Conception of the things that can be seen,
-and the creation of the things which the learned prove in the invisible
-world. So the use of the words _creation_ (Huduth) and _eternal_ is an
-innovation in religion, and the cause of great doubt and corruption of
-the belief of the common people, especially of the argumentative among
-them. This has greatly perplexed the Mutakallimun of the Asharites,
-and has proved them in great doubt. For if they explain that God
-intends doing things by an eternal intention--which, as we said, is an
-innovation--they have put it down that the universe is _created_. Then
-they are asked how can a created thing come from an eternal intention.
-They answer that the eternal intention became connected with the action
-at the time of the creation especially, and that is the time in which
-the universe was made. Then they may be asked, that if the relation
-of the intending Creator towards the created thing at the time of its
-non-existence be the same as at the time of its creation, then that
-created thing is by no means better than the other thing, when at the
-time of its making, the action which was not found in its non-existence
-is not connected with it. If the relation be different then there must
-necessarily be a created intention otherwise the created result of an
-action would come from an eternal action, for what is necessary of it
-in action, is necessary also in intention. If it be said that when the
-time of its making comes it is found done; it may be asked: is it so
-by an eternal or a created action? If they say by an eternal action,
-they admit the existence of a created thing by an eternal action; and
-if they say by a created action, then there must be a created intention
-also. They may say that intention is the action itself, but this is
-impossible. For intention is the only cause of the action in the
-intender. If an intender, intending to do an act in a certain time,
-finds that act quite another than that which he intended, then that
-act would have come into being without any intender at all. At the
-same time, if it is thought that from a created intention there can
-only be a created thing, then as a rule an eternal intention should
-give an eternal thing, otherwise the result of a created or eternal
-intention would be the same, which is impossible. All these doubts
-are found in Islam only through the Mutakallimun, by their explaining
-things in Law, which God had forbidden them to do. For in the Quran it
-is not said whether intention is created or eternal. So they neither
-adhere to the exoteric meanings of the Law, which may have given them
-beatitude and salvation, nor did they attain the degree of certain and
-exact knowledge, so that they may have had this blessing. Hence they
-are neither to be counted among the learned nor among the masses, who
-believe and have strong faith. They are the people “whose hearts are
-perverse”[102] and “whose hearts are diseased.”[103] They say things by
-their tongues which are quite contrary to those which they believe in
-their hearts, a cause of which is their tenacity, and love of upholding
-their opinions at any cost. By a repetition of attitudes like these
-they become quite devoid of all philosophy, as we see the case of
-those who are completely accustomed to the Asharite school of thought,
-and are well pleased with it, even to the degree of love. They are
-certainly veiled on account of their habit and environment.
-
-What we have said about this question is enough for our purpose. Now we
-would take up the second problem.
-
-Problem Second: Prophetic Mission:--There are two points which are to
-be discussed in this problem. First, the proof of the coming of the
-prophets; and secondly an explanation of the fact that the man claiming
-to be a prophet is really so and does not lie. Many people are desirous
-of proving the existence of the prophets by analogy--and such are the
-Mutakallimun. They say that it is proved that God speaks and intends,
-and is the master of His creatures. It is quite consistent for such a
-being in the visible world to send a messenger to his dependent people.
-Hence such a thing is also possible in the unseen world. They have
-thought of making this valid for proving the advent of the prophets, by
-absurd and far-fetched arguments which only Brahmins should use. They
-say that it is possible both in the observed and unseen world. In the
-observed world it is quite evident, that when a man stands up before a
-king and says, “O ye men, I am the messenger of the king towards you”
-and produces credentials for his claim, it is necessary to acknowledge
-him to be true. They say that in the case of the prophets, the
-credentials are the miracles which they perform. For certain reasons
-this method is quite fit and satisfactory for the common people,
-but when investigated there appear many flaws in the principle. Our
-acknowledgement of a man who claims to be the messenger of a king is
-not true unless we know that the symbols which he has are those of the
-royal messenger, which can only happen, if a king tells his subjects
-that whenever they happen to see such and such symbols with a man,
-which are particularly his, they should take him as his messenger. When
-this is so, one can object, from where does it appear that performance
-of miracles is the special sign of the prophets? This can be proved
-neither by law nor by reason. To prove it by religion is still more
-impossible; it does not admit it. Reason alone cannot affirm that they
-are the special symbols of prophecy, except that in many cases they
-were found in people who claimed to be prophets and in none other. So
-in this case a proof of anyone’s prophecy is based upon two premises.
-First, the man who claims to be a prophet has performed a miracle, and
-secondly, everyone who performs a miracle is a prophet.
-
-Now as to the premise that the claimant for prophecy has performed
-miracles we can say that it pertains to our senses after we have
-admitted that there are actions performed by men, which can neither
-be made by wondrous workmanship or by some particular forces, but are
-beyond our conception. The second premise can only be true when we
-admit the existence of the prophets, and that the miracles are only
-performed by those who are the true claimants for prophetic mission.
-We would say that this premise is not true but for those who believe
-the existence of the prophets and the miracles. For instance if it has
-become clear to man, that the universe is created, then he certainly
-knows that the world exists and the Creator too. This being so, a man
-can object and say how can we say that one who performs the miracles
-is a prophet, when the prophetic mission itself remains unproved? Even
-after we admit the existence of miracle in the manner in which it
-may seem quite impossible, it is necessary that the two sides of the
-premise be admitted first and then the one can be applied to the other.
-One cannot say that the existence of the prophets can be proved by
-reason, because of its possibility. For the possibility to which they
-refer is in fact really ignorance, and is not found in the nature of
-things. For instance, if we say that it is possible that it will rain
-or not, then the possibility is found in the nature of things, that
-is, it is felt that a thing may sometimes be, and at others not be, as
-in the case of rain. Here, reason can exactly decide the possibility
-of a thing by its nature. The necessary (_wajib_) is quite contrary to
-it; that is, it is a thing the existence of which is always found.
-In this case reason can always decide without a mistake, because its
-nature cannot be changed or transformed. So when one party admits the
-existence of a prophet, at a certain time it appears that the prophetic
-mission is a thing whose existence is possible and the other party says
-that it cannot feel it, then that possibility becomes mere ignorance in
-its case. Now we believe in the existence of this possibility because
-we have known the prophets. We say that a knowledge of the messengers
-from man, leads us to a belief in the existence of messengers from God,
-as the existence of a messenger from Anir, leads us to the conclusion
-of there being a messenger from Zaid also. This requires a similarity
-in the natural dispositions of both men and it is here where the
-difficulty lies. If we suppose this possibility by itself even in the
-future, it will only be by the means of the known fact and not by our
-knowledge and reason. Now one of the premises of this possibility has
-come into existence. For the possibility is in our knowledge, and the
-fact in itself is an established one, by one of the two alternatives,
-that is, whether he sent a messenger or did not. So we have nothing
-in this case but sheer ignorance, as is the doubt whether Anir sent
-any messengers in the past or did not, which is quite different from
-our doubting, whether or not he will send any in future. So when we do
-not know about Zaid, for instance, whether he has or has not sent any
-messenger in the past, it is not correct for us to suppose anybody to
-be his messenger, if he happens to have his symbols upon him. We can
-admit his claim only after we know that Zaid did send a messenger. So
-when we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, and the miracles,
-then how can it be correct for us to say that one who performs the
-miracles is a prophet. We cannot believe in this by hearing only, for
-this faculty is not the thing by which such things can be proved. At
-the same time we cannot claim this premise to be true by experience
-and habit, except that the miracles performed by the prophets can be
-seen by one who believes in their mission, and has never seen them to
-have been performed by anybody else, so that they may be taken as a
-convincing sign for distinguishing a prophet of God, from one who is
-not, that is a distinction between one whose claim is right, and one
-whose claim is wrong.
-
-By these things it is seen that the Mutakallimun have missed the
-whole purpose of the argument from miracles because they have put
-possibility in the place of real existence, possibility which is in
-reality ignorance. Then they have believed in the premise that every
-one who performs miracles is a prophet, which cannot be true except
-when the miracles prove the prophetic mission itself, and the sender of
-messengers. It is not by reason that we can believe in these marvelous
-things, which happen again and again, and are divine, as a conclusive
-proof of the existence of prophetic mission, except that one who can do
-such things is an excellent person, and that such persons cannot lie.
-But it can prove the prophetic mission of a person only when we admit
-that the mission does exist, and that such marvelous things cannot be
-performed by any person, however good he may be, except by one who is a
-a prophet. The miracles cannot prove the prophetic mission of a person,
-because there is no connection between them and reason, except that
-we admit that the miracles are one of the works of the prophets, just
-as curing is the work of the physicians, so that one who can cure is
-certainly a physician. This is one of the fallacies of the argument.
-Moreover, if we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, by
-putting the idea of possibility, which is in fact ignorance, in place
-of certainty, and make miracles a proof of the truth of man who claims
-to be a prophet it becomes necessary that they should not be used by a
-person, who says that they can be performed by others than prophets,
-as the Mutakallimun do. They think that the miracles can be performed
-by the magicians and saints. The condition which they attach with them
-is that miracles prove a man to be a prophet, when he at the same time
-claims to be so, for the true prophet can perform them as opposed to
-the false ones. This is an argument without any proof, for it can be
-understood either by hearing or reason. That is, it is said that one
-whose claims to prophecy are wrong, cannot perform miracles, but as
-we have already said, when they cannot be performed by a liar, then
-they can only be done by the good people, whom God has meant for this
-purpose. These people, if they speak a lie, are not good, and hence
-cannot perform the miracles. But this does not satisfy the people who
-think miracles to be possible from the magicians, for they certainly
-are not good men. It is here that the weakness of the argument lies.
-Hence some people have thought that the best thing is to believe that
-they cannot be performed but by the prophets and hence magic is only
-imagination, and not a change of essence. Among these are also men who
-deny all sorts of marvelous things from the saints.
-
-It is clear to you from the life of the prophet, peace be upon him,
-that he never invited any man or community to believe in his prophecy,
-and that which he has brought with him from God, by means of the
-performance of any miracles, in support of his claim, such as changing
-one element into another. Whatever miracles did appear from him were
-only performed in the natural course of things, without on his part
-any intention of contention or competition. The following words of
-the Quran will make this clear; “And they say: We will by no means
-believe in thee, until thou cause a spring of water to gush forth
-for us out of the earth, and thou have a garden of palm-trees and
-vines, and thou cause rivers to spring forth from the midst thereof in
-abundance; or thou cause the heaven to fall down in pieces upon us, as
-thou hast given out, or thou bring down God and the angels to vouch
-for thee; or thou have a house of gold, or thou ascend by a ladder to
-heaven; neither will we believe thy ascending thither alone, until
-thou cause a book to descend unto us, bearing witness of thee which we
-may read. Answer: My Lord be praised, Am I other than a man sent as
-an apostle?”[104] Then again, “Nothing hindered us from sending thee
-with miracles, except that the former nations have charged them with
-imposture.”[105] The thing by which we invited the people to believe in
-him, and with which he vied with them is the Quran. For says God, “Say,
-verily, if men and genii were purposely assembled, that they might
-produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like unto
-it, although the one of them assigned the other.”[106] Then further he
-says, “will they say, He hath forged the Quran? Answer, bring therefore
-ten chapters like unto it forged by yourself.”[107] This being the case
-the miracle of the Prophet with which he vied with the people and which
-he advanced as an argument for the truth of his claim to the prophetic
-mission, was the Quran. If it be said, that this is quite clear, but
-how does it appear that the Quran is a miracle, and that it proves his
-prophecy, while just now we have proved the weakness of the proof of
-prophecy by means of miracles without any exceptions in the case of
-any prophet. Besides the people have differed in taking the Quran to
-be a miracle at all. For in their opinion one of the conditions of a
-miracle is that it should be quite different from any act which may
-have become habitual. But the Quran is of this sort, because it is only
-word, though it excels all created words. So it becomes a miracle by
-its superiority only, that is, the impossibility for people bringing
-anything like it, on account of its being highly eloquent. This being
-the case it differs from the habitual, not in genus but in details
-only, and that which differs in this way is of the same genus. Some
-people say that it is a miracle by itself, and not by its superiority.
-They do not lay it down as a condition for miracles that they should
-be quite different from the habitual, but think that it should be
-such a habitual act, as men may fall short of accomplishing. We would
-reply that it is as the objectors say, but the thing about it is not
-as they have thought. That the Quran is an evidence of his prophecy,
-is based, we believe, upon two principles, which are found in the Book
-itself. The first being that the existence of the class of men called
-prophets and apostles is well-known. They are the men who lay down
-laws for the people by divine revelation, and not by human education.
-Their existence can be denied only by the people who deny repeated
-action, as the existence of all things which we have not seen--the
-lives of the famous thinkers and so forth. All the philosophers, and
-other men are agreed, except those who pay no regard to their words,
-(and they are the Materialists), that there are men to whom have been
-revealed many commandments for the people, to perform certain good
-actions, by which their beatitude may be perfected; and to make them
-give up certain wrong beliefs and vicious actions. This is the business
-of divine apostles. The second principle is, that everyone who does
-this work, that is, lays down laws by revelation, is a prophet. This
-principle is also quite in accordance with human nature. For as it
-is known that the business of medicine is to cure a disease, and one
-who can cure is a physician, so it is also known that the business of
-the prophets is to give law to the people by divine revelation, and
-one who does so is a prophet. The Book mentions the first principle
-in the following:--“Verily We have revealed Our will unto thee, as We
-have revealed it unto Noah, and the prophets who succeeded him, and
-We have revealed it unto Abraham, and Ishmael, and Isaac and Jacob,
-and the tribes, and unto Jesus, and Job, and Jonas, and Aaron and
-Solomon; and we have given thee the Quran as We gave the Psalms unto
-David; some apostles have We sent, whom We have mentioned unto thee,
-and God spake unto Moses discoursing with him,”[108] and again: “Say,
-I am not alone among the apostles.”[109] The second principle is that
-Mohammed, peace be upon him, has done the work of a prophet, that is,
-has given Law to the people by divine revelation. This also can be
-known from the Quran, where God mentions it. He says, “O men, now is
-an evident proof come unto you from your Lord, and We have sent down
-unto you manifest light.”[110] By _manifest light_ is meant the Quran.
-Again He says, “O men, now is the apostle come unto you from your Lord;
-believe, therefore, it will be better for you,”[111] and again, “But
-those among them who are well-grounded in knowledge, and faithful, who
-believe in that which hath been sent down unto thee, and that which
-hath been sent down unto the prophets before thee;”[112] and again “God
-is the witness of the revelation which He hath sent down unto thee; He
-sent it down with his special knowledge; the angels are also witness
-thereof; but God is a sufficient witness.”[113] If it be said, how can
-the first principle be known, that is, that there is a class of men
-who give the Law to the people by divine revelation; and so also, how
-to know the second principle, that is, that which the Quran contains,
-about beliefs and actions, is of divine origin? We would answer that
-the first principle can be known by the information which these men
-give about the existence of things, which were not found before, but
-come into existence after they have informed the people about them, and
-in a specified time; and by their command for doing certain things, and
-teaching certain precepts which do not resemble the common things and
-actions, which can be taught by human agency. This is so because if the
-miracles be of the kind of laying down Laws, proving that they cannot
-be laid down by human education, but only through divine revelation,
-then it is prophecy. But the miracles which do not take the form of
-laws, as the dividing of the sea, etc., do not necessarily prove the
-prophecy of anyone. But they can only be used as supplements to the
-former, if they fall very near to it. But standing alone they cannot
-prove it, and so by themselves alone they do not lead to a cognizance
-of the prophets, if the other kind of miracles, which are its
-conclusive proofs, be not found in them. So according to this principle
-must be understood the proofs of prophecy afforded by miracles, that
-is, the miracles of knowledge and deeds are its conclusive proofs
-while others only make it strong, and can be used as witnesses. So
-now it has become clear to you that men of this kind do exist, and
-how can men be sure of them, except by their repeated appearance; as
-is the case with physicians and other kinds of men. If it be asked:
-How can it be proved that the Quran is a conclusive proof that is a
-miracle which is the business of the prophets to perform, as curing is
-the business of a physician, we would say that this can be known in
-many ways:--First, the precepts which it contains about knowledge and
-deeds, cannot be acquired by learning, but only by divine revelation;
-secondly, by the information which it gives about hidden things; and
-thirdly, by its poetry, which is quite different from that which can
-be achieved by imagination or repetition of verses, that is, it is
-known that it is of quite a different kind from the poetry of Arabic
-speaking people, whether the language be acquired and learned, as is
-the case with non-Arabs, or it be the mother-tongue, as it is with the
-Arabs themselves. The first reason is the most weighty one. If it be
-asked how can it be known that the laws which contain both knowledge
-and precepts about deeds are of divine origin, so much so that they
-deserve the name of the word of God, we would say also that this also
-can be known in many ways. First, a knowledge of the laws cannot be
-acquired except after a knowledge of God, and of human happiness and
-misery; and the acts by which this happiness can be acquired, as
-charity and goodness and the works which divert men from happiness
-and produce eternal misery, such as evil and wickedness. Again the
-knowledge of human happiness and misery requires a knowledge of the
-soul and its substance, and whether it has eternal happiness or not.
-If it be so, then what is the quantity of this happiness, or misery;
-and also what amount of good would be the cause of happiness. For the
-case of goodness and evil is just the same as with food, which does
-not give health, if taken in any quantity and at any time; but must be
-used in a specified quantity and at an appointed time. For this reason
-we find these limited in the religious laws. All this, or a greater
-part of it, cannot be known but by divine revelation, or at least a
-knowledge through it would be better. Again a perfect knowledge of God
-requires a knowledge of existent things. Then a law-giver must know the
-quantity of this knowledge which would be good to be imparted to the
-common people, and the method to be adopted in teaching them. All this,
-or at least a greater part of it, cannot be acquired by education,
-learning or philosophy. This can be clearly known from imparting
-learning, and especially the giving of laws, making regulations, and
-giving information about the conditions of the Day of Judgment. When
-all this is found in the Quran in the most perfect form, there can be
-no doubt that it is a divine revelation and His word, given through
-the agency of His prophet. So God has said, informing the people about
-it, “Say, verily if man and genii were purposely assembled, that they
-might produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like
-it.” This idea is further strengthened, nay, comes near exact surety
-and certainty, when it is known that the prophet was an unlettered
-man, and lived among a people, uneducated, wild, and nomadic by habit,
-who had never tried to investigate the universe, as was the case with
-the Greeks, and other nations, among whom philosophy was perfected in
-long periods of time. To this very fact refer the words of God, “Thou
-couldst not read any book before this; neither couldst thou write
-it with thy right hand, then had gainsayers justly doubted of the
-divine origin thereof.”[114] Hence God has repeatedly told the people
-this quality of His prophet. “It is He who hath raised up among the
-illiterate Arabians an apostle from among themselves,”[115] and, “Those
-who shall follow the Apostle the illiterate Prophet.”[116] This matter
-can also be known by another method--that of comparison of this Law
-with the others. For, if the business of the prophets be the giving
-of laws by divine revelation, as has been acknowledged by all who
-believe in the existence of the prophets, then if you look into the
-teachings of useful knowledge and actions leading to happiness, which
-are contained in the Quran, and compare them with other divine books
-and religious systems, you will find it excelling all the others in an
-unlimited degree. On the whole, if there are books worthy to be called
-the words of God, on account of their wondrous nature, and separation
-from the genius of human words and their peculiarity by what they
-contain in regard to knowledge and deeds, then it is clear that the
-Quran is much more worth thy, and many times fitter, than they are to
-be called the words of God. This would be still clearer to you if you
-could know the past books--the Old and New Testaments. But that is not
-possible because they have been changed to a great extent. Were we to
-describe the superiority of one Law over another, and the superiority
-of the teachings given to us about the knowledge of God, and the Day
-of Judgment to the laws given to the Jews and the Christians, it would
-require many volumes with a confession of our own short-comings in
-dealing with the subject. For this very reason, the Law of ours has
-been called the last of the divine dispensations. The Prophet, peace be
-on him, has said, “Had Moses lived in my time, he could not have helped
-following me,” and the Prophet was right, on account of the universal
-nature of the teachings of the Quran, and its regulations. That is it
-is able to satisfy the needs of all, being meant for the whole of the
-human race. So God has said, “say, O men, Verily I am the messenger of
-God unto you all.”[117] The Prophet has said, “I have been sent both to
-the white and the black nations.”
-
-The case of religions is just the same as that of God. There are some
-foods which agree with all, or most of the people. Such is the case
-with religions also. So the dispensations before our own were meant
-for some particular peoples, ignoring all others, but our religion was
-meant for the whole of the human race. This being the case, our Prophet
-excels all the other Prophets, to him comes the divine revelation,
-which makes a man fit to be called a prophet. So the Prophet has said
-informing us of his superiority over other prophets, “There is no
-prophet to whom has not been given a sign by which all the men would
-have believed. I have been given divine revelation, and I hope that my
-followers would be in the majority on the Day of Judgment.” All that we
-have said must have made it clear to you that the proof of the prophecy
-of the prophet from the Quran is not of the same kind as that of
-turning a staff into a serpent for the proof of the prophecy of Moses,
-or of giving life to the dead, and curing the blind and leprous for the
-prophecy of Jesus. For these, although never performed by any but the
-prophets, and sufficient to satisfy the common people, are not by any
-means conclusive proofs of prophecy, when taken by themselves,--they
-not being acts which make a prophet.
-
-Now as to the Quran, its case is just like curing by medicine. For
-instance, suppose two men were to claim to be physicians, and one were
-to say that he could walk on water, and the other were to assert that
-he could cure a disease, and so one walked on the water, and the other
-cured a sick man. In this case, our verification for medicine would be
-only for one who has cured a sick man, but in the case of the other, it
-would be outward satisfaction alone. The first is far better. The only
-reason by which the common people can be satisfied in this respect is
-that one who can walk on water, which is against the nature of men, can
-certainly cure a disease, which is what men can do. This also is one of
-the reasons of the connection between miracle, which is not one of the
-conditions of prophecy, and the sign which makes a man deserve the name
-of a prophet: divine revelation. Of this quality is also the fact, that
-there comes nothing to the mind of such a man except that which God has
-ordained for this unique work, and specialised him for it, among all
-his fellow-men. So it is not inconsistent if he were to claim that God
-distinguished him with his revelations.
-
-On the whole, when once it is laid down that the prophets do exist,
-and that the miracles cannot be performed except by them, they can
-become a prophecy, that is the miracles which are not in any way fit
-to be received as a proof for it. This is the method to be adopted
-with regard to the common people. For the doubts and objections which
-we have described about unnatural miracles are not perceived by the
-masses. But if you look intently you will find that the Law depends
-upon suitable and natural miracles, and not upon unnatural ones. What
-we have said about this problem is enough for our purpose and for the
-sake of truth.
-
-Problem Third: Of Fate and Predestination. This is one of the most
-intricate problems of religion. For if you look into the traditional
-arguments about this problem you will find them contradictory; such
-also being the case with arguments of reason. The contradiction in the
-arguments of the first kind is found in the Quran and the Traditions.
-There are many verses of the Quran, which by their universal nature,
-teach that all the things are predestined, and that man is compelled
-to do his acts; then there are verses which say that man is free in
-his acts and not compelled in performing them. The following verses
-tell us that all the things are by compulsion, and are predestined,
-“Everything have We created bound by a fixed degree;”[118] again, “With
-Him everything is regulated according to a determined measure.”[119]
-Further, He says, “No accident happeneth in the earth, nor in your
-persons, but the same was entered in the Book verily it is easy with
-God.”[120] There may be quoted many other verses on this subject. Now,
-as to the verses which say that man can acquire deeds by free will,
-and that things are only possible and not necessary, the following may
-be quoted: “Or He destroyeth them (by ship-wreck), because of that
-which their crew have merited; though He pardoneth many things.”[121]
-And again, “Whatever misfortune befalleth you is sent you by God,
-for that which your hands have deserved.”[122] Further, He says,
-“But they who commit evil, equal thereunto.”[123] Again, He says,
-“It shall have the good which it gaineth, and it shall have the evil
-which it gaineth.”[124] and, “And as to Thamud, We directed them,
-but they loved blindness better than the true directions.”[125]
-Sometimes contradiction appears even in a single verse of the Quran.
-For instance, He says, “After a misfortune hath befallen you (you had
-already attained two equal advantages), do you say, whence cometh
-this? Answer, This is from yourselves.”[126] In the next verse, He
-says, “And what happenth unto you, on the day whereon the two armies
-met, was certainly by permission of the Lord.”[127] Of this kind also
-is the verse, “Whatever good befalleth thee, O man, it is from God;
-and whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from thyself;”[128] while the
-preceding verse says, “All is from God.”[129]
-
-Such is also the case with the Traditions. The Prophet says, “Every
-child is born in the true religion; his parents afterwards turn him
-into a Jew or a Christian.” On another occasion he said, “The following
-people have been created for hell, and do the deeds of those who are
-fit for it. These have been created for heaven, and do deeds fit for
-it.” The first Tradition says that the cause of disbelief is one’s own
-environments; while faith and belief are natural to man. The other
-Tradition says that wickedness and disbelief are created by God, and
-man is compelled to follow them.
-
-This condition of things has led Muslims to be divided into two
-groups. The one believed that man’s wickedness or virtue is his own
-acquirement, and that according to these he will be either punished
-or rewarded. These are the Mutazilites. The belief of the other party
-is quite opposed to this. They say that man is compelled to do his
-deeds. They are the Jabarites. The Asharites have tried to adopt a mean
-between these two extreme views. They say that man can do action, but
-the deeds done, and the power of doing it, are both created by God.
-But this is quite meaningless. For if the deed and the power of doing
-it be both created by God, then man is necessarily compelled to do the
-act. This is one of the reasons of the difference of opinion about this
-problem.
-
-As we have said there is another cause of difference of opinion
-about this problem, than the traditional one. This consists of the
-contradictory arguments advanced. For if we say that man is the creator
-of his own deeds, it would be necessary to admit that there are things
-which are not done according to the will of God, or His authority.
-So there would be another creator besides God, while the Muslims are
-agreed that there is no creator but He. If, on the other hand, we were
-to suppose that man cannot act freely, we admit that he is compelled
-to do certain acts, for there is no mean between compulsion and
-freedom. Again, if man is compelled to do certain deeds, then on him
-has been imposed a task which he cannot bear; and when he is made to
-bear a burden, there is no difference between his work and the work
-of inorganic matter. For inorganic matter has no power, neither has
-the man the power for that which he cannot bear. Hence all people have
-made capability one of the conditions for the imposition of a task,
-such as wisdom we find Abul Maali, saying in his _Nizamiyyah_, that
-man is free in his own deeds and has the capability of doing them. He
-has established it upon the impossibility of imposing a task which one
-cannot bear, in order to avoid the principle formerly disproved by the
-Mutazilites, on account of its being unfit by reason. The succeeding
-Asharites have opposed them. Moreover if man had no power in doing a
-deed, then it will be only by chance that he may escape from evil,
-and that is meaningless. Such also would be the case with acquiring
-goodness. In this way all those arts which lead to happiness, as
-agriculture etc., would become useless. So also would become useless
-all those arts the purpose of which is protection from, and repulsion
-of danger as the sciences of war, navigation, medicine etc. such a
-condition is quite contrary to all that is intelligible to man.
-
-Now it may be asked that if the case is so, how is this contradiction
-which is to be found both in tradition and reason to be reconciled we
-would say, that apparently the purpose of religion in this problem is
-not to divide it into two separate beliefs, but to reconcile them by
-means of a middle course, which is the right method. It is evident that
-God has created in us power by which we can perform deeds which are
-contradictory in their nature. But as this cannot be complete except
-by the cause which God has furnished for us, from outside, and the
-removal of difficulties from them, the deeds done are only completed
-by the conjunction of both these things at the same time. This being
-so the deeds attributed to us are done by our intention, and by the
-fitness of the causes which are called the _Predestination_ of God,
-which He has furnished for us from outside. They neither complete the
-works which we intend nor hinder them, but certainly become the cause
-of our intending them--one of the two things. For intention is produced
-in us by our imagination, or for the verification of a thing, which in
-itself is not in our power, but comes into being by causes outside us.
-For instance, if we see a good thing, we like it, without intention,
-and move towards acquiring it. So also, if we happen to come to a thing
-which it is better to shun, we leave it without intention. Hence our
-intentions are bound and attached to causes lying outside ourselves.
-To this the following words of God, refer “Each of them hath angels,
-mutually succeeding each other, before him and behind him; they watch
-him by the command of God.”[130] As these outside causes take this
-course according to a well defined order and arrangement, and never
-go astray from the path which their Creator hath appointed for them,
-and our own intentions can neither be compelled, nor ever found, on
-the whole, but by _their_ fitness, so it is necessary that actions
-too should also be within well-defined limits, that is, they be found
-in a given period of time and in a given quantity. This is necessary
-because our deeds are only the effects of causes, lying outside us;
-and all the effects which result from limited and prearranged causes,
-are themselves limited, and are found in a given quantity only. This
-relation does not exist only between our actions and outside causes,
-but also between them and the causes which God has created in our
-body, and the well-defined order existing between the inner and outer
-causes. This is what is meant by Fate and predestination, which is
-found mentioned in the Quran and is incumbent upon man. This is also
-the “Preserved Tablet.”[131] God’s knowledge of these causes, and that
-which pertains to them, is the cause of their existence. So no one
-can have a full knowledge of these things except God, and hence He
-is the only Knower of secrets, which is quite true; as God has said,
-“Say, None either in heaven or earth, knoweth that which is hidden
-besides God.”[132] A knowledge of causes is a knowledge of secret
-things, because the secret is a knowledge of the existence of a thing,
-before it comes into being. And as the arrangement and order of causes
-bring a thing into existence or not at a certain time, there must be
-a knowledge of the existence or non-existence of a thing at a certain
-time. A knowledge of the causes as a whole, is the knowledge of what
-things would be found or not found at a certain moment of time. Praised
-be He, Who has a complete knowledge of creation and all of its causes.
-This is what is meant by the “keys of the secret,” in the following
-words of God, “with Him are the keys of secret things; none knoweth
-them besides Himself.”[133]
-
-All that we have said being true, it must have become evident how we
-can acquire our deeds, and how far they are governed by predestination
-and fate. This very reconciliation is the real purpose of religion by
-those verses and Traditions which are apparently contradictory. When
-their universal nature be limited in this manner, those contradictions
-should vanish by themselves, and all the doubts which were raised
-before, about the contradictory nature of reason, would disappear. The
-existent things from our volition are completed by two things: our
-intention and the other causes. But when the deeds are referred to
-only by one of these agencies, doubts would rise. It may be said is a
-good answer, and here reason is in perfect agreement with religion,
-but it is based upon the principles that these are agreed that there
-are creative causes bringing into existence other things; while the
-Muslims are agreed that there is no Creator but God. We would say that
-whatever they have agreed upon is quite right, but the objection can
-be answered in two ways. One of them is that this objection itself can
-be understood in two ways; one of them being that there is no Creator
-but God, and all those causes which He has created, cannot be called
-creators, except speaking figuratively. Their existence also depends
-upon Him. He alone has made them to be causes, nay, He only preserves
-their existence as creative agents, and protects their effects after
-their actions. He again, produces their essences at the moment when
-causes come together. He alone preserves them as a whole. Had there
-been no divine protection they could not have existed for the least
-moment of time. Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) has said that a man who makes
-any of the causes to be co-existent with God is like a man who makes
-the pen share the work of a scribe in writing; that is, he says
-that the pen is a scribe and the man is a scribe too. He means that
-_writing_ is a word which may be applied to both, but in reality they
-have no resemblance in anything but word, for otherwise there is no
-difference between them. Such is also the case with the word _Creator_,
-when applied to God and the Causes. We say that in this illustration
-there are doubts. It should have been clearly shown, whether the scribe
-was the Creator of the essence (_Jawhar_) of pen, a preserver of it, as
-long as it remains a pen, and again a preserver of the writing after
-it is written, a Creator of it after it has come in touch with the
-pen, as we have just explained that God is the Creator of the essences
-(_Jawahir_) of everything which come into contact with its causes, which
-are so called only by the usage. This is the reason why there is no
-creator but God--a reason which agrees with our feelings, reason and
-religion. Our feelings and reason see that there are things which
-produce others. The order found in the universe is of two kinds: that
-which God has put in the nature and disposition of things; and that
-which surround the universe from outside. This is quite clear in the
-movement of the heavenly bodies. For it is evident that the sun and the
-moon, the day and night, and all other stars are obedient to us; and it
-is on this arrangement and order which God has put in their movements
-that our existence and that of all other things depends. So even if we
-imagine the least possible confusion in them, with them in any other
-position, size and rapidity of movement which God has made for them,
-all the existent things upon the earth would be destroyed. This is so
-because of the nature in which God has made them and the nature of the
-things which are effected by them. This is very clear in the effects
-of the sun and the moon upon things of this world; such also being the
-case with the rains, winds, seas and other tangible things. But the
-greater effect is produced upon plants, and upon a greater number,
-or all, on the animals. Moreover, it is apparent that had there not
-been those faculties which God has put in our bodies, as regulating
-them that could not exist even for a single moment after birth. But
-we say, had there not been the faculties found in all the bodies of
-the animals, and plants and those found in the world by the movement
-of the heavenly bodies, then they would not have existed at all, not
-even for a twinkling of the eye. So praised be the “Sagacious, the
-Knowing.”[134] God has called our attention to this fact in His book,
-“And He hath subjected the night and the day to your service; and the
-sun and the moon and the stars, which are compelled to serve by His
-Command;”[135] again, “Say, what think ye, if God should cover you with
-perpetual night, until the day of Resurrection;”[136] and again, “Of
-His mercy, He hath made you night and the day, that ye may rest in the
-one, and may seek to obtain provision for yourselves of His abundance,
-by your industry; in the other;”[137] and, “And He obligeth whatever is
-in heaven or on earth to serve you.”[138] Further He says, “He likewise
-compelleth the sun and the moon, which diligently perform their
-courses, to serve you; and hath subjected the day and night to your
-service,”[139] There may be quoted many other verses on the subject.
-Had there been any wisdom in their existence by which God has favoured
-us, and there would not have been those blessings for which we are to
-be grateful to Him.
-
-The second answer to the objection is, that we say that the things
-produced out of it are of two kinds: essences and substances; and
-movements, hardness, coldness and all other accidents. The essences
-and substances are not created by any but God. Their causes effect
-the accidents of those essences, and not the essences themselves. For
-instance, man and woman are only the agents, while God is the real
-creator of the child, and the life in it. Such is also the case with
-agriculture. The earth is prepared and made ready for it, and the seed
-scattered in it. But it is God who produces the ear of the corn. So
-there is no creator but God, while created things are but essences. To
-this refer the words of God. “O men, a parable is propounded unto you,
-therefore, hearken unto it. Verily the idols which ye invoke, besides
-God, can never create a single fly, although they may all assemble for
-the purpose; and if the fly snatch anything from them they cannot turn
-the same from it. Weak is the petitioner and the petitioned.”[140]
-This is where the unbeliever wanted to mislead Abraham, when he said,
-“I give life and kill.”[141] When Abraham saw that he could understand
-it, he at once turned to the conclusive argument and said, “Verily, God
-bringeth the sun from the east; do thou bring it from the west.”
-
-On the whole, if the matter about the creator and the doer be
-understood on this wise, there would be no contradiction, either in
-Tradition or in reason. So we say that the word Creator does not
-apply to the created things by any near or far-fetched metaphor, for
-the meaning of the creator is the inventor of the essences. So God
-has said, “God created you, and that which ye know.” It should be
-known that one who denies the effect of the causes on the results of
-them, also denies philosophy and all the sciences. For science is
-the knowledge of the things by their causes, and philosophy is the
-knowledge of hidden causes. To deny the causes altogether is a thing
-which is unintelligible to human reason. It is to deny the Creator, not
-seen by us. For the unseen in this matter must always be understood by
-a reference to the seen.
-
-So those men can have no knowledge of God, when they admit that for
-every action there is an actor. It being so, the agreement of the
-Muslims on the fact that there is no Creator but God cannot be perfect,
-if we understand by it the denial of the existence of an agent in the
-visible world. For from the existence of the agent in it, we have
-brought an argument for the Creator in the invisible world. But when we
-have once admitted the existence of the Creator in the invisible world,
-it becomes clear that there is no Creative agent except one by His
-command and will. It is also evident that we can perform our own deeds,
-and that one who takes up only one side of the question is wrong, as is
-the case with the Mutazilites and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the
-middle Course, like the Asharites, for discovering the truth, cannot
-find it. For they make no difference for a man between the trembling
-and the movement of his hand by intention. There is no meaning in their
-admitting that both the movements are not by ourselves. Because if
-they are not by ourselves we have no power to check them, so we are
-compelled to do them. Hence there is no difference between trembling
-of hand and voluntary movement, which they would call acquired. So
-there is no difference between them, except in their names, which never
-effect the things themselves. This is all clear by itself.
-
-Fourth Problem:--Divine Justice and Injustice. The Asharites have
-expressed a very peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason and
-religion; about this problem. They have explained it in a way in which
-religion has not, but have adopted quite an opposite method. They
-say that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite
-opposed to the visible. They think that God is just or unjust within
-the limits of religious actions, so when a man’s action is just with
-regard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls
-it to be unjust; He is unjust. They say that whatever has not been
-imposed as a divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within
-the four walls of religion. He is neither just or unjust, but all His
-actions about such things are just. They have laid down that there
-is nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say
-that there is nothing which may in itself be called good or bad is
-simply intolerable. Justice is known as good, and injustice as bad.
-So according to them, polytheism is in itself neither injustice nor
-evil, but with regard to religion, and had religion ordained it, it
-would have been just and true. Such also would have been the case with
-any kind of sin. But all this is quite contrary to our traditions and
-reason. As to tradition God has described himself as just, and denied
-injustice to himself. He says “God hath borne witness that there is
-no God but He; and the angels and those who are endowed with wisdom
-profess the same, who executeth righteousness;”[142] and “Thy God is
-not unjust towards His servants;”[143] and again, “Verily God will not
-deal unjustly with men in any respect; but men deal unjustly with their
-own souls.”[144] It may be asked, What is your opinion about misleading
-the people, whether it is just or unjust, for God has mentioned in many
-a verse of the Quran, “That He leads as well as misleads the people?”
-He says, “God causeth to err whom He pleaseth, and directeth whom
-He pleaseth;”[145] and, “If we had pleased, we had certainly given
-every soul its direction.”[146] We would say that these verses cannot
-be taken exoterically, for there are many verses which apparently
-contradict them--the verses in which God denies injustice to himself.
-For instance, He says, “He liketh not ingratitude (_Kufr_) in His
-servant.”[147] So it is clear that as He does not like ingratitude even
-from them, He certainly cannot cause them to err. As to the statement
-of the Asharites that God sometimes does things which He does not like,
-and orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding
-such a view about him, for it is pure infidelity. That God has not
-misled the people and has not caused them to err will be clear to you
-from the following verses: “Wherefore be thou orthodox and set thy
-face towards true religion, the institution of God, to which He hath
-created man kindly disposed;”[148] and, “when thy Lord drew forth
-their posterity from the lions of the sons of Adam.”[149] A Tradition
-of the Prophet says, “Every child is born according to the divine
-constitution.”
-
-These being contradictions in this problem we should try to reconcile
-them so that they may agree with reason. The verse, “Verily God will
-cause to err whom He pleaseth, and will direct whom He pleaseth”
-refers to the prearranged divine will, with which all things have
-been endowed. They have been created erring, that is, prepared to go
-astray by their very nature, and led to it by inner and outer causes.
-The meaning of the verse, “If we had pleased, we have given unto every
-soul its direction,” is that He thought of not creating people ready to
-err, by their nature, or by the outer causes or by both, He could have
-done so. But as the dispositions of men are different the words may
-mislead the one and direct the other. For these are the verses which
-speak of misleading the people. For instance, “He will thereby mislead
-many, and will direct many thereby: but He will not mislead any thereby
-except the transgressors”[150]; and, “We have appointed the vision
-which we showed thee, and also the tree cursed in the Quran,”[151] and
-the verses about the number of angels of hell. “Thus doth God cause
-to err whom He pleaseth and He directeth whom He pleaseth.”[152] It
-means that for evil natures, these verses are misleading, as for the
-sick bodies even good drugs are injurious. But some one may object and
-ask, what was the need of creating a class of men already prepared
-to err, for this is the worst kind of injustice? We would say that
-divine wisdom designated it so. The injustice would have consisted in
-its being otherwise. For the nature and constitution of men, in His
-very creation, are such that they require some men, though very few,
-to be wicked and evil by their nature. Such is also the case with the
-outer causes, made for directing the people to the right path, which
-requires that some men must be bad. If many had been good then the
-divine law would not have been fulfilled, because either there had not
-been created things in which there is little evil and much good, for
-the good would have disappeared on account of that little evil; or
-there had been created things with much good and little evil. Now it is
-well known that the existence of many good ones with a few evil ones,
-is better than the non-existence of much good for the sake of little
-evil. This very evil was the thing which remained hidden to the angels
-when God informed them that He was going to create upon the earth, a
-vicegerent, that is, a man. “When God said to the angels, I am going
-to place a substitute on earth, they said, wilt thou place there one
-who will do evil therein, and shed blood? but we celebrate thy praise,
-and sanctify Thee. God answered, Verily I know that which ye know
-not.”[153] He means that the thing which is hidden from them is that
-when there is found both good and evil in a thing, and good overpowers
-the evil, reason requires the creation of the one for the destruction
-of the other. So from all these it is clear how misleading can be
-attributed to Him, in spite of His justice, and injustice disproved.
-The causes of misleading are created, because from them appear the
-causes of direction to good. For some people have not been given causes
-of direction to good in which there is found nothing which may lead to
-erring. Such is the condition of the angels. So also the causes of good
-have those evil, though in their nature much evil be not found; this
-applies to man. It may be asked: What is the use of these contradictory
-verses, thus compelling the people to take refuge in interpretations,
-which you have absolutely forbidden? We would say that to explain this
-problem to the common people, they have been compelled to adopt this
-method. For they should know that God is just, and that He is the
-Creator of all good and evil, instead of believing, as many nations
-have done, that there are two Gods, the creator of good, and the
-creator of evil. So now they know that He is the Creator of both. As
-misleading is evil, and as there is no Creator but He, it was necessary
-that it should be attributed to Him, like the creation of evil. But
-this should be done without qualifying it, that is, that He created
-good for its own sake, and evil for the sake of good--on account of
-their connection with one another. In this way His creation of evil
-would be quite just. To illustrate: fire has been made because of its
-necessity for the existence of things, and without it they could not
-have existed at all. It also destroys things by its very nature. But
-if you think of the destruction and evil which it causes, and compare
-it to the advantages which we derive out of it, you will find that its
-existence is better than non-existence, that is,--good. Now the verse
-of the Quran “No account shall be demanded of him for what He shall do;
-but an account shall be demanded of them,” means that He does nothing
-because it is incumbent upon him for it is degrading to him, to need
-doing a thing. If it be so, God needs that thing for His own existence,
-because of necessity or to be more perfect in His Being--and God is
-free from such imperfections. Man is just because he gains something
-good by being so, which he cannot gain otherwise. God is just, not that
-He may become more perfect by His justice, but because His perfection
-requires him to be just. When we understand it in this way it would be
-evident, that He is not just in the same way as man is just. But it is
-not right to say that He is not just at all, and that all His actions
-are neither just nor unjust, as the Mutakallimuns have thought. For
-it cannot be understood by human intellect, and is at the same time
-falsifying religion. These people knew the meaning but were misled. For
-if we say that He is not at all just, we falsify the principle that
-there are things which are just and good in themselves and others which
-are evil and unjust. Again, if we suppose that He is just in the same
-way as man is, it becomes necessary to admit there is some defect in
-him. For one who is just, his existence is for the sake of things for
-which he is just, and so he is dependent upon another.
-
-It should now be known that it is not necessary for all the people to
-be told this interpretation in its entirety. Only those should be told
-it who have some doubts about this problem. For not every one among the
-common people is confronted by these contradictions in the universal
-verses, and Tradition. Such people must believe in the exoteric
-meanings of them. There is another reason for these verses. The common
-people cannot differentiate between possible and impossible, while to
-God is not ascribed power over the impossible. If they be told what is
-impossible (_Mustahil_) and they think that God has power over it, and
-then told that God has no power, they begin to think that there is some
-defect in God, because He cannot do a certain thing and hence He is
-weak. As the existence of things free from evil was possible according
-to the masses, God has said, “If we had pleased, we had certainly given
-every soul its direction; but the word which hath proceeded from Me
-must necessarily be fulfilled, when I said, Verily I will fill the hell
-with genii and men, altogether.”[154] This verse means one thing to
-the common people, and the other to the learned. The former take it to
-mean that it is not incumbent upon him that He should create a class of
-men to whom evil may be attached. But it really means: Had we thought
-we could create men with whom evil could not be attached, but would
-have been good in all and all, and hence every one had been given his
-guidance. This much is enough for this problem. Now we would deal with
-the fifth question.
-
-Problem fifth: Of the Conditions of the Day of Judgment:--The Day of
-Judgment is a thing in which all the religions are agreed, and all the
-learned men have proved it by arguments. The religions differ about
-the conditions of its existence; nay, in reality they do not differ
-about its condition, but about the visible things by which they should
-explain to the common people the conditions of the unseen. There are
-some religions which have made it only spiritual, that is, meant only
-for the souls; while others have thought it to be both physical and
-spiritual. The reconciliation in this matter depends upon the testimony
-of divine revelation, and the necessary arguments of all the learned
-men, that is, that for a man there are two blessings: of the present
-world, and of the world to come, which is itself established upon
-principles, admitted by all to be true. One of them is that when it is
-clear that all the existent things have not been created in vain, but
-for some particular work assigned to them, which is the sum total of
-their life, then man is far fitter to be placed under this category.
-God himself has warned us of the existence of this purpose in all the
-created things. He says in the Quran, “We have created the heavens and
-the earth, and whatever is between them, in vain. This is the opinion
-of the unbelievers.”[155] Again, He says, describing and praising
-the learned men, who have understood, the real and inner purpose of
-this existence, “Who remember God standing, and sitting, and lying
-on their sides; and meditate on the creation of heaven and earth,
-saying, O Lord, thou hast not created this in vain; far be it from thee
-therefore, deliver us from the torment of hell fire.”[156] The ultimate
-purpose in the creation of man is still more evident in him, than in
-other things. God has informed us of it in many a verses of the Quran.
-He says, “Did ye think that we had created you in sport; and that ye
-should not be brought again before us,”[157] and, “Doth man think, that
-he shall be left at full liberty, without control?”[158] and further
-on He says, “I have not created genii and men for any other end, but
-that they should serve me.”[159] That is the genius out of all creation
-which could know him. Again, He says, informing us of the importance
-of knowing God, “What reason have I that I should not worship him who
-hath created me? for unto him shall ye return.”[160] Now it being clear
-that man has been created for a certain work, it is evident that the
-work should be of a particular kind. For we see that everything has
-been created for a certain work, which is found in it, and in none
-other; that is, it is specialised in it. This being so, it is necessary
-that the real purpose of man’s creation be those deeds which are found
-in him, and in no other animal. These deeds pertain to his rational
-powers. As there are two portions of the rational powers,--practical
-and theoretical--it is evident that the first kind of thing is demanded
-of him. That is, that his faculties of knowledge and science should be
-found in their perfection. The deed by which soul acquires perfection
-in those two faculties are goodness and virtue, and those that retard
-it are evil and wicked. And as these actions are most of them fixed by
-divine revelation, religions appeared to fix them. With that there also
-appears a knowledge of those qualities, exhorting the people towards
-them. They ordered men to act upon goodness, and shew evil. They taught
-them the quantity of the deeds which will be good for all the people,
-both in practice and in knowledge taken together. They also taught
-them the theoretical knowledge of things, which all the people should
-know, such as the knowledge of God, angels, of higher creation, and of
-goodness. In this way they also taught them the quantity of the acts
-which would be necessary to make the souls excel in virtue. This is
-especially the case with our religion, Islam, for when compared with
-other religions, it is found that it is absolutely _the_ best religion.
-Hence it was the last of divine dispensations.
-
-Now divine revelation has informed us in all the religions that the
-soul will live, and all the argument of the learned people have
-established the same. The souls are freed from physical desires after
-death. If they be pure, their purity is doubled by this freedom from
-desires. If they be evil this separation increases their depravity,
-for they are troubled by the evil which they have already earned, and
-their regret increases about the opportunities which they lost before
-their separation from the body, for this purification is not possible
-without it. It is to this that following verse refers:--A soul would
-say, “Alas, for that I have been negligent in my duties towards God:
-Verily I have been one of the scorners.”[161] All the religions agree
-about this condition of man, and call it his last goodness or misery.
-This being so, there could not be found in the visible world anything
-which may be given as an illustration, so there is a difference in its
-description in the revelations given to different prophets. We mean
-to say, that there is a difference in illustrating the condition of
-the good and bad soul on that occasion. There are some which have not
-given any illustrations of that happiness or misery which the good and
-bad souls will have there. They have only said that the conditions
-there would be only spiritual, and pleasures angelic. Others have
-given instances from the visible world; that is, they have given the
-examples of the pleasures here for the pleasures of the next world,
-after deducting the trouble borne in acquiring them, and in the same
-way, they have illustrated the misery there, by the example of misery
-here, after deducting the pleasure which we derive from it. Either the
-people of these religions received from God revelations which those did
-not receive who made the next world purely spiritual, or they saw, that
-illustrations from things visible are best understood by the common
-people and that they are best led so or checked from an action through
-them. So they said that God will put back the good souls in their
-respective bodies, and the best possible ease--in paradise. The bad
-souls will also return to their bodies, where they will be in the worst
-possible misery, which they call hell-fire.
-
-This is true of our religion, Islam, in illustrating the conditions
-of the next world. There are many verses of the Quran which contain
-arguments as to the possibilities of the conditions of that world,
-which can be understood and verified by all. For our reason cannot
-apprehend these things more than the possibility of knowing which is
-common to all, and which is of the kind of analogy of the existence
-of the like from the being of the like, that is of its coming into
-being. It is an analogy of the coming into being of the small from the
-existence of the big and the great. For instance, God says, “And He
-propoundeth unto us a comparison and forgetteth His Creation.”[162]
-In these verses the argument used is the analogy of the return of the
-beginning, when both are equal. In the following verse the argument of
-those is refuted who differentiate between the real and _return_ of the
-same thing. He says, “He giveth you fire out of a green tree.”[163]
-The doubt is that the birth was from heat and moisture, while the
-return will be from cold and dryness. So this doubt is met by the fact
-that God can create the contrary from the contrary, as He can create
-the like from the like. The analogy is drawn from the existence of
-the little from the great. For example, God says, “Is not He who has
-created the Heavens and the earth able to create new creatures like
-unto them! yea, certainly; for He is the wise Creator.”[164] These
-verses have two arguments for proving the resurrection and at the same
-time refuting the arguments of those denying it. Were we to quote the
-verses which give this proof our discourse would be lengthened. But all
-of them are of the kind we have mentioned.
-
-So, as we have already said, all the religions are agreed that there
-is a blessing or misery for the human soul after death, but differ in
-illustrating the conditions of that moment and in explaining it to
-the common people. It seems that the illustration in our religion is
-the most perfect of all for the understanding of the people, and at
-the same time most inciting of them all to gain for their souls the
-advantages of that day. And it is the many with whom lies the primary
-purpose of religion. The spiritual illustration would be least inciting
-to the common people for desiring the things of hereafter. So they
-would have little liking for it, while they would fear the physical
-illustration. So it seems that the physical illustration would be most
-exciting to them, than the spiritual, while the latter would appeal
-only to the controversialists among the scholastic theologians, who are
-always very few in number. Hence we find that the Muslims have been
-divided into three parties about the meaning of the conditions of the
-Day of Judgment. One party says that that existence would be just like
-our present one, as regards pleasures and enjoyments, that is, they
-think that both are of the same genius, but differ in perpetuity and
-termination: the one is for ever and the others come to an end. The
-other party thinks that the two existences are different. But this is
-again subdivided into two parties. The one thinks that that existence
-with our present faculties is spiritual, but has been described as
-physical. For this there are many religious arguments which it would
-be useless to repeat here. The other party says that that existence is
-physical only; but they at the same time believe, that the body will
-be different from our present body. This is only transient, that will
-be eternal. For this also there are religious arguments. It seems that
-even Abdullah B. Abbas held this view. For it is related of him that he
-said, “There is nought in this world of the hereafter, but names.” It
-seems that this view is better suited to the learned men because its
-possibility is based upon principles, in which there is no disagreement
-according to all men: the one being that the soul is immortal, and the
-second is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look
-so impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because
-the material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one
-body to another, i. e.; one and the same matter is found in many people
-and in many different times. The example of bodies cannot be found, for
-their matter is the same. For instance a man dies and his body becomes
-dissolved into earth. The earth ultimately becomes dissolved into
-vegetable, which is eaten by quite a different man from whom another
-man comes into being. If we suppose them to be different bodies, then
-our aforesaid view cannot be true.
-
-The truth about this question is that man should follow that which he
-himself has thought out but anyhow it should not be the view which
-may deny the fundamental principle altogether. For this would be
-denying its existence. Such a belief leads to infidelity, on account
-of a distinct knowledge of this condition being given to man, both
-by religion and by human reason, which is all based upon the eternal
-nature of the soul. If it be said whether there is any argument or
-information in the Law about this eternal nature of the soul, we would
-say that it is found in the Quran itself. God says, “God taketh unto
-himself the souls of men at the time of their death; and those which
-die not He also taketh in their sleep.”[165] In this verse sleep and
-death have been placed upon the same level, on account of the change
-in its instrument, and in sleep on account of a change in itself. For
-had it not been so it would not have come to its former condition
-after awakening. By this means we know that this cession does not
-effect its essence, but was only attached to it on account of change
-in its instrument. So it does not follow that with a cessation of the
-work of the instrument, the soul also ceases to exist. Death is only
-a cessation of work, so it is clear that its condition should be like
-that of sleep. As someone has said that if an old man were to get the
-eyes of the young, he would begin to see like him.
-
-This is all that we thought of in an exposition of the beliefs of our
-religion, Islam. What remains for us is to look into things of religion
-in which interpretation is allowed and not allowed. And if allowed,
-then who are the people to take advantage of it? With this thing we
-would finish our discourse.
-
-The things found in the Law can be divided into five kinds. But in the
-first place, there are only two kinds of things: indivisible and the
-divisible. The second one is divided into four kinds. The first kind
-which is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear in its meanings. The
-second is that in which the thing mentioned is not the thing meant
-but is only an example of it. This is again divided into four kinds.
-First, the meanings which it mentions are only illustrations such that
-they can only be known by the far-fetched and compound analogies,
-which cannot be understood, but after a long time and much labour.
-None can accept them but perfect and excellent natures; and it cannot
-be known that the illustration given is not the real thing; except by
-this far-fetched way. The second is just the opposite of the former:
-they can be understood easily, and it can be known that the example is
-just what is meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily known that it is
-merely an illustration, but what it is the example of is difficult to
-comprehend. The fourth kind is quite opposite to the former. The thing
-of which it is an example, is easily understood; while it is difficult
-to know that it is an example at all. The interpretation of the first
-kind is wrong without doubt. The kind in which both the things are
-far-fetched: its interpretation particularly lies with those who are
-well-grounded in knowledge; and an exposition of it is not fit for any
-but the learned. The interpretation of its opposite--that which can be
-understood on both the sides--is just what is wanted, and an exposition
-of it is necessary. The case of the third kind is like the case of the
-above. For in it illustration has not been mentioned because of the
-difficulty for the common people to understand it: it only incites the
-people to action. Such is the case with the tradition of the prophet;
-“The black stone is God’s action on Earth,” etc. etc. That which can
-be easily known that is an example, but difficult to know of which it
-is example, should not be interpreted but for the sake of particular
-persons and learned men. Those who understand that it is only an
-illustration, but are not learned enough to know the thing which it
-illustrates, should be told either that it is allegorical and can be
-understood by the well-established learned men; or the illustration
-should be changed in a way which might be near to their understanding.
-This would be the best plan to dispel doubts from their minds.
-
-The law about this should be that which has been laid down by Abu Hamid
-(Al Ghazzali) in his book, _Al Tafriga bainal Islam wal Zindiga_. It
-should be understood that one thing has five existences which he calls
-by the name of _essential_ (_Zati_); sensual (_Hissi_); rational (_Agli_);
-imaginative (_Khayali_) and doubtful (_Shilbhi_). So at the time of doubt
-it should be considered which of these five kinds would better satisfy
-the man who has doubts. If it be that which he has called _essential_
-then an illustration would best satisfy their minds. In it is also
-included the following traditions of the Prophet, “Whatever the
-earlier prophets saw I have seen it from my place here, even heaven
-and hell.” “Between my cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a
-garden of paradise;” and “The earth will eat up the whole of a man
-except the extremity of the tail.” All these, it can easily be known
-are but illustrations, but what is the thing which they illustrate,
-it is difficult to comprehend. So it is necessary in this case to
-give an instance to the people which they may easily understand. This
-kind of illustration, when used on such an occasion is allowable; but
-when used irrelevantly it is wrong. Abu Hamid has not decided about
-the occasion when both the sides of the question--the illustration
-and the illustrated--be both far-fetched and difficult to understand.
-In this case there would apparently be a doubt, but a doubt without
-any foundation. What should be done is to prove that the doubt has no
-basis, but no interpretation should be made, as we have shown in many
-places in our present book against the Mutakallimun, Asharites and the
-Mutazalites.
-
-The fourth kind of occasion is quite opposite to the former. In this
-it is very difficult to understand that it is an example, but when
-once understood, you can easily comprehend the thing illustrated.
-In the interpretation of this also, there is a consideration: about
-those people who know that if it is an example, it illustrates such
-and such a thing; but they doubt whether it is an illustration at
-all. If they are not learned people, the best thing to do with them
-is not to make any interpretation, but only to prove the fallacy of
-the views which they hold about its being an illustration at all. It
-is also possible that an interpretation may make them still distant
-from the truth, on account of the nature of the illustration and the
-illustrated. For these two kinds of occasions if an interpretation is
-given, they give rise to strange beliefs, far from the law which when
-disclosed are denied by the common people, Such has been the case with
-the Sufis, and those learned men who have followed them. When this work
-of interpretation was done by people who could not distinguish between
-these occasions, and made no distinction between the people for whom
-the interpretation is to be made, there arose differences of opinion,
-at last forming into sects, which ended in accusing one another with
-unbelief. All this is pure ignorance of the purpose of the Law.
-
-From what we have already said the amount of mischief done by
-interpretation must have become clear to you. We always try to acquire
-our purpose by knowing what should be interpreted, and what not, and
-when interpreted, how it should be done; and whether all the difficult
-portions of the Law and Traditions are to be explained or not. These
-are all included in the four kinds which have already been enumerated.
-
-The purpose of our writing this book is now completed. We took
-it up because we thought that it was the most important of all
-purposes--connected with God and the Law.
-
-
-                               FOOTNOTES
-
-[Footnote 25: A translation of _Al-Kashf’an Manhij i’l Adillah fi
-Aqaid il Millah, we Tarif ma Waqa fiha bi Hasb i’l Ta’wil min Shubhi’l
-Muzighah wa Bid’ill Mudillah_.]
-
-[Footnote 26: Quran ii, 19.]
-
-[Footnote 27: Quran xiv, 11.]
-
-[Footnote 28: Quran xxxix, 39.]
-
-[Footnote 29: Quran vi, 75.]
-
-[Footnote 30: Quran xvi, 42.]
-
-[Footnote 31: Quran ii, 282.]
-
-[Footnote 32: Quran xxix, 69.]
-
-[Footnote 33: Quran viii, 29.]
-
-[Footnote 34: Quran xxii, 72.]
-
-[Footnote 35: Quran vii, 184.]
-
-[Footnote 36: Quran lxxvii, 6-16.]
-
-[Footnote 37: Quran xxv, 62.]
-
-[Footnote 38: Quran lxxx, 24.]
-
-[Footnote 39: Quran lxxxvi, 6.]
-
-[Footnote 40: Quran lxxxviii, 17.]
-
-[Footnote 41: Quran xxii, 72.]
-
-[Footnote 42: Quran vi, 79. The story referred to will be found in the
-preceding verses.]
-
-[Footnote 43: Quran ii, 19.]
-
-[Footnote 44: Quran xxxvi, 33.]
-
-[Footnote 45: Quran iii, 188.]
-
-[Footnote 46: Quran vii, 171.]
-
-[Footnote 47: Quran iii, 16.]
-
-[Footnote 48: Quran xvii, 46.]
-
-[Footnote 49: Quran xxi, 22.]
-
-[Footnote 50: Quran xxiii, 93.]
-
-[Footnote 51: Quran xvii, 44.]
-
-[Footnote 52: Quran ii, 256.]
-
-[Footnote 53: Quran xvii, 45, 46.]
-
-[Footnote 54: Quran lxxvii, 14.]
-
-[Footnote 55: Quran vi, 59.]
-
-[Footnote 56: Quran xix, 65.]
-
-[Footnote 57: Quran xvi, 42.]
-
-[Footnote 58: Quran xlii, 50.]
-
-[Footnote 59: Quran liii, 8, 10.]
-
-[Footnote 60: Quran iv, 162.]
-
-[Footnote 61: Quran xix, 43.]
-
-[Footnote 62: Quran xxi, 67.]
-
-[Footnote 63: Quran v, 77.]
-
-[Footnote 64: Quran xlii, 9.]
-
-[Footnote 65: Quran xvi, 17.]
-
-[Footnote 66: Quran xxv, 60.]
-
-[Footnote 67: Quran ii, 256.]
-
-[Footnote 68: Quran xx, 54.]
-
-[Footnote 69: Quran xxxv, 39.]
-
-[Footnote 70: Quran xxx, 29.]
-
-[Footnote 71: Quran xxxv, 41.]
-
-[Footnote 72: Quran ii, 256.]
-
-[Footnote 73: Quran xlii, 9.]
-
-[Footnote 74: Quran xliv, 2.]
-
-[Footnote 75: Quran xxxv, 10.]
-
-[Footnote 76: Quran lxx, 4.]
-
-[Footnote 77: Quran lxxxix, 23.]
-
-[Footnote 78: Quran xvii, 87.]
-
-[Footnote 79: Quran ii, 260.]
-
-[Footnote 80: Quran xxiv, 35.]
-
-[Footnote 81: He also saw him another time, by the lote-tree, beyond
-which there is no passing: near it is the garden of eternal abode.
-_When the lote-tree covered that which it covered_, his eye-sight
-turned not aside, nor did it wander: and he really beheld some of the
-greater signs of his Lord. (Quran lii, 16, 18.) The lote-tree is the
-limit beyond which neither angel nor man can pass. It stands in the
-seventh heaven, on the right hand of the Throne of God.]
-
-[Footnote 82: Quran lxix, 17.]
-
-[Footnote 83: Quran xxxii, 2.]
-
-[Footnote 84: Quran lxx, 4.]
-
-[Footnote 85: Quran lxvii, 16.]
-
-[Footnote 86: Quran xl, 59.]
-
-[Footnote 87: Quran iii, 5.]
-
-[Footnote 88: Quran ii, 24.]
-
-[Footnote 89: Quran iii, 5.]
-
-[Footnote 90: Quran vi, 103.]
-
-[Footnote 91: They will ask the concerning the Soul: answer, The Soul
-was created at the command of my Lord: but ye have no knowledge given
-unto you, except a little.--(Quran xxii, 85.)]
-
-[Footnote 92: Quran lxxvii, 3, et. seq.]
-
-[Footnote 93: Quran ii, 99.]
-
-[Footnote 94: Quran xxi, 33.]
-
-[Footnote 95: Quran lxxi, 14-16.]
-
-[Footnote 96: Quran xxvii, 90.]
-
-[Footnote 97: Quran lxvii, 3.]
-
-[Footnote 98: Quran iii, 88.]
-
-[Footnote 99: Quran xi, 9.]
-
-[Footnote 100: Quran vii, 52.]
-
-[Footnote 101: Quran xli, 10.]
-
-[Footnote 102: Quran iii, 5.]
-
-[Footnote 103: Quran ii, 8.]
-
-[Footnote 104: Quran xvii, 92-95.]
-
-[Footnote 105: Quran, xvii, 61.]
-
-[Footnote 106: Quran xvii, 90.]
-
-[Footnote 107: Quran xi, 16.]
-
-[Footnote 108: Quran iv, 161, 162.]
-
-[Footnote 109: Quran xlvi, 8.]
-
-[Footnote 110: Quran iv, 173.]
-
-[Footnote 111: Quran iv, 168.]
-
-[Footnote 112: Quran iv, 160.]
-
-[Footnote 113: Quran iv, 164.]
-
-[Footnote 114: Quran xxix, 47.]
-
-[Footnote 115: Quran lxii, 2.]
-
-[Footnote 116: Quran vii, 156.]
-
-[Footnote 117: Quran vii, 156.]
-
-[Footnote 118: Quran liv, 49.]
-
-[Footnote 119: Quran xiii, 9.]
-
-[Footnote 120: Quran lvii, 22.]
-
-[Footnote 121: Quran xlii, 32.]
-
-[Footnote 122: Quran xlii, 32.]
-
-[Footnote 123: Quran x, 28.]
-
-[Footnote 124: Quran ii, 278.]
-
-[Footnote 125: Quran xli, 16.]
-
-[Footnote 126: Quran iii, 159.]
-
-[Footnote 127: Quran iii, 160.]
-
-[Footnote 128: Quran iv, 81.]
-
-[Footnote 129: Quran iv, 80.]
-
-[Footnote 130: Quran xiii, 12.]
-
-[Footnote 131: Quran lxxxv, 22.]
-
-[Footnote 132: Quran xxvii, 67.]
-
-[Footnote 133: Quran vi, 59.]
-
-[Footnote 134: Quran lxvii, 14.]
-
-[Footnote 135: Quran xvi, 12.]
-
-[Footnote 136: Quran xxviii, 71.]
-
-[Footnote 137: Quran xviii, 73.]
-
-[Footnote 138: Quran xlv, 12.]
-
-[Footnote 139: Quran xiv, 37.]
-
-[Footnote 140: Quran xxii, 72.]
-
-[Footnote 141: “Hast thou not considered him who disputed with Abraham
-concerning his Lord, because God had given him the Kingdom? When
-Abraham Said, My Lord is He who giveth life and killeth: he answered,
-I give life and kill, Abraham said, verily God bringeth the sun from
-the east do thou bring it from the west; whereupon the infidel was
-confounded; for God directeth not the ungodly people.” Quran ii, 260.]
-
-[Footnote 142: Quran iii, 16.]
-
-[Footnote 143: Quran xli, 46.]
-
-[Footnote 144: Quran x, 45.]
-
-[Footnote 145: Quran xiv, 4.]
-
-[Footnote 146: Quran xxxii, 11.]
-
-[Footnote 147: Quran xxxix, 9.]
-
-[Footnote 148: Quran xxx, 29.]
-
-[Footnote 149: Quran vii, 171.]
-
-[Footnote 150: Moreover, God will not be ashamed to propound in a
-parable of a great, or even a more despicable thing: for they who
-believe will know it to be true from their Lord; but the unbelievers
-will say, what meaneth by this parable? He will thereby mislead etc.
-(Quran ii, 24).]
-
-[Footnote 151: Quran xvii, 62. By the _vision_ may be meant the
-Prophet’s night journey to heaven or the vision which he saw at
-Hudaibiyyah, seeing himself entering Mecca or his vision about the
-Omayyeds.]
-
-[Footnote 152: Quran lxxiv, 34.]
-
-[Footnote 153: Quran ii, 28.]
-
-[Footnote 154: Quran xxxii, 14.]
-
-[Footnote 155: Quran xxxviii, 26.]
-
-[Footnote 156: Quran iii, 188.]
-
-[Footnote 157: Quran xxiii, 117.]
-
-[Footnote 158: Quran lxxv, 36.]
-
-[Footnote 159: Quran li, 56.]
-
-[Footnote 160: Quran xxxvi, 21.]
-
-[Footnote 161: Quran xxxix, 57.]
-
-[Footnote 162: Quran xxxvi, 78.]
-
-[Footnote 163: Quran xxxvi, 80.]
-
-[Footnote 164: Quran xxxxvi, 81.]
-
-[Footnote 165: Quran xxxix, 43.]
-
-
-                        Transcriber’s Notes
-
-The cover image was created by the transcriber, and is placed in the
-Public Domain. Obvious typographical errors and variable spelling
-were corrected. Quran reference formatting has been made uniform to
-e.g. “Quran xxv, 60.” The following corrections have been made to the
-text:
-
- Page   Original               New
- ----------------------------------------------------------------
- 14     cogniscance            cognisance
- 28     heavena                heavens
- 30     concensus              consensus
- 53     cogniscance            cognisance
- 60     necessarry             necessary
- 60     shonld                 should
- 60     interpretes            interprets
- 64     Qnran                  Quran
- 67     tbe                    the
- 69     Mutazalites            Mutazilites
- 71     Mutakallimum           Mutakallimun
- 76     he                     be
- 91     upo                    upon
- 97     nevertheles            nevertheless
- 98     nonexistent            non-existent
- 129    no                     not
- 135    s                      is
- 137    controvertialist       controversialist
- 143    Mutakalimun            Mutakallimun
- 147    bows                   bows’
- 161    Quran                  Quran xxx, 28. [Footnote 46]
- 162    Quran                  Quran xxxv, 41. [Footnote 47]
- 166    ii                     10 [Footnote 51]
- 174    Maati                  Maali
- 186    by                     be
- 193    Quran                  Quran vi, 103. [Footnote 66]
- 194    th                     the
- 198    imposible              impossible
- 207    excep                  except [Footnote 67]
- 219    beeause                because
- 222    pre-arranged           prearranged
- 244    there-of               thereof
- 251    repeatsd               repeated
- 251    appearence             appearance
- 257    Qnran                  Quran [Footnote 93]
- 259    distingished           distinguished
- 261    Quran LIVI             Quran liv,
- 262    Quarn                  Quran [Footnote 102]
- 265    Mutazlites             Mutazilites
- 265    intellegible           intelligible
- 266    perfom                 perform
- 266    use                    us
- 269    YXVII                  XXVII [Footnote 108]
- 270    things                 things:
- 274                           [Removed duplicate footnote 111. Numbers
-                               of the subsequent footnotes corrected.]
- 276    [118]                  [Removed second, unused footnote anchor]
- 277    alsays                 always
- 277    in                     an
- 278    thay                   they
- 278    their                  there
- 278    there                  their
- 279    Injusitce              Injustice
- 280                           [Added footnote anchors,
-                               footnotes on next page]
- 282                           [Added footnote anchors]
- 282    Quran, XXXV, 9         [Removed footnote, as no matching 
-                               quran quote was found in the text]
- 283                           [Added footnote anchors]
- 285    in-spite               in spite
- 285                           [Added footnote anchor]
- 286    contradictary          contradictory
- 286    Crertor                Creator
- 286    attributd              attributed
- 289    131 Quran, XXX, 14.    131 Quran, XXXII, 14.
- 292    that                   That
- 293    theoratical            theoretical
- 295    that is, ... world;    [Removed duplicate part]
- 296    mirsery                misery
- 296    possiblities           possibilities
- 299    divded                 divided
- 300    enternal               eternal
- 300    reilgious              religious
- 304    farfetched             far-fetched
- 305    than                   then
- 306    occassion              occasion
- 306    irrelevently           irrelevantly
- 306    Mutazalites            Mutazilites
- 307    man                    men
- 308    interperetation        interpretation
-
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