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diff --git a/old/66530-0.txt b/old/66530-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 84f6542..0000000 --- a/old/66530-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32476 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 13, by International -Military Tribunal - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International - Military Tribunal, Vol. 13 - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: International Military Tribunal - -Release Date: October 13, 2021 [eBook #66530] -[Last updated: October 21, 2021] - -Language: English - -Produced by: John Routh PM, Cindy Beyer, and the online Distributed - Proofreaders Canada team at http://www.pgdpcanada.net - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR -CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 13 *** - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - N U R E M B E R G - 14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946 - - - [Illustration] - - - P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y - 1 9 4 8 - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME XIII - - - - O F F I C I A L T E X T - - I N T H E - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - P R O C E E D I N G S - - 3 May 1946—15 May 1946 - - - - - CONTENTS - - - One Hundred and Twentieth Day, Friday, 3 May 1946, - Morning Session 1 - Afternoon Session 44 - - One Hundred and Twenty-first Day, Saturday, 4 May 1946, - Morning Session 80 - - One Hundred and Twenty-second Day, Monday, 6 May 1946, - Morning Session 103 - Afternoon Session 129 - - One Hundred and Twenty-third Day, Tuesday, 7 May 1946, - Morning Session 166 - Afternoon Session 203 - - One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Day, Wednesday, 8 May 1946, - Morning Session 231 - Afternoon Session 246 - - One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Day, Thursday, 9 May 1946, - Morning Session 267 - Afternoon Session 296 - - One Hundred and Twenty-sixth Day, Friday, 10 May 1946, - Morning Session 330 - Afternoon Session 372 - - One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Day, Saturday, 11 May 1946, - Morning Session 410 - - One Hundred and Twenty-eighth Day, Monday, 13 May 1946, - Morning Session 437 - Afternoon Session 467 - - One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Day, Tuesday, 14 May 1946, - Morning Session 496 - Afternoon Session 523 - - One Hundred and Thirtieth Day, Wednesday, 15 May 1946, - Morning Session 559 - Afternoon Session 600 - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH DAY - Friday, 3 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Schacht resumed the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): The Tribunal will -sit in open session tomorrow at 10 o’clock and will adjourn into closed -session at 12 noon. - -Mr. Justice Jackson and Defendant Schacht: It is desired on behalf of -the interpreters that you should pause if possible after the question -has been put to you and if you find it necessary, owing to the condition -of the documents with which you are dealing, to read in English or speak -in English, to give an adequate pause so that those interpreters who are -interpreting from English into other languages can take over the -interpretation. Is that clear? - -MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): -I owe an apology constantly to the interpreters. It is hard to overcome -the habit of a lifetime. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is very difficult. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Turning to the defendant._] Dr. Schacht, by the -way, the photograph Number 10 which was shown you yesterday, that was -one of the occasions on which you wore the Party Badge which you -referred to, was it not? - -HJALMAR SCHACHT (Defendant): That may be. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You are quite sure of that, are you not? - -SCHACHT: I cannot distinguish it clearly; but it may be, and that would -prove that the picture must have been taken after 1937. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is what I wanted to prove. And as a matter of -fact, it was taken after 1941, was it not? As a matter of fact, Bormann -did not come to any important official position until after 1941, did -he? - -SCHACHT: Bormann? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Bormann, yes. - -SCHACHT: That I do not know. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, if we return to the Four Year Plan which began -in 1936, as I understand it you opposed the appointment of Göring to -have charge of the Four Year Plan on two grounds: First, you thought -that that new plan might interfere with your functions; and secondly, if -there were to be a Four Year Plan, you did not think Göring was fit to -administer it? - -SCHACHT: I do not know what you mean by “opposed.” I was not satisfied -with it and considered the choice of Göring not the right one for any -leading position in economics. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact you have described Göring as a -fool in economics, have you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes, as one does say such things in a heated conversation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Or in interrogation? - -SCHACHT: Interrogations are also sometimes heated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, very soon Göring began to interfere with your -functions, did he not? - -SCHACHT: He tried it repeatedly, I believe. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, he got away with it too, did he not? - -SCHACHT: I do not understand what you mean by “he got away with it.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, this American slang is difficult, I admit. I -mean he succeeded. - -SCHACHT: In July 1937 he had me completely against the wall. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That started over a proposal that he made or a -measure that he took with reference to mining? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He also made a speech to some industrialists, did -he not? - -SCHACHT: I assume that he made several speeches to industrialists. I do -not know to which one you are referring. I presume you mean the speech -in December 1936 or so. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am referring to the speech in which you said to -us in interrogation that Göring had assembled industrialists and said a -lot of foolish things about the economy which you had to refute. - -SCHACHT: That was the meeting of 17 December 1936. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then you wrote to Göring complaining about the -mining measures? - -SCHACHT: I assume that you mean the letter of 5 August? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Right. That document is Document EC-497, Exhibit -USA-775. And in that letter of August 1937 you said this, if I quote you -correctly: - - “Meanwhile I repeatedly stressed the need of increased exports - and actively worked towards that end. The very necessity of - bringing our armament up to a certain level as rapidly as - possible must place in the foreground the idea of as large - returns as possible in foreign exchange and therewith the - greatest possible assurance of raw material supplies.” - -Correct? - -SCHACHT: I assume it is. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also said this, I believe: - - “I have held this view of the economic situation which I have - explained above from the first moment of my collaboration.” - -That was also true, was it not? - -SCHACHT: Yes, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, both of those things were true, were they not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then you concluded, addressing Göring: - - “I ask you to believe me, my dear Prime Minister, that it is far - from me to interfere with your policies in any way whatsoever. I - offer no opinion, either, as to whether my views, which are not - in agreement with your economic policy, are correct or not. I - have full sympathy for your activities. I do believe, however, - that in a totalitarian state it is wholly impossible to conduct - two divergent economic policies.” - -And that was also true, was it not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was the basis on which you and Göring -disagreed so far as policy was concerned? - -SCHACHT: So far as what was concerned?—Policy? I do not understand what -you mean by policy. I mean the way business was conducted. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. - -SCHACHT: Entirely aside from other differences which we had. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: These other differences were personal differences. -You and Göring did not get along well together? - -SCHACHT: On the contrary. Until then we were on very friendly terms with -each other. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, were you? - -SCHACHT: Oh, yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So the beginning of your differences with Göring -was the struggle as to which of you would dominate the preparations for -war? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well... - -SCHACHT: I have to deny that absolutely. The differences... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you want to say anything more about it? - -SCHACHT: The differences which led to my resignation resulted from the -fact that Göring wanted to assume command over economic policies while I -was to have the responsibility for them. And I was of the opinion that -he who assumes responsibility should also have command; and if one has -command then he also has to assume the responsibility. That is the -formal reason why I asked for my release. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, I turn to your interrogation of 16 -October 1945, Document 3728-PS, Exhibit USA-636, and ask if you did not -give the following testimony: - - “After Göring had taken over the Four Year Plan—and I must say - after he had taken over the control of Devisen, already since - April 1936—but still more after the Four Year Plan in September - 1936, he had always tried to get control of the whole economic - policy. One of the objects, of course, was the post of - Plenipotentiary for War Economy in the case of war, being only - too anxious to get everything into his hands, he tried to get - that away from me. Certainly as long as I had the position of - Minister of Economics, I objected to that...” - -You made that statement? - -SCHACHT: I believe that is correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, and then you describe your last visit with him -after Luther for two months had endeavored to unite Göring and yourself. - -SCHACHT: That is a mistake; it is Hitler, and not Luther. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Very well. - -You described it as follows: - - “Then I had a last talk with Göring; and at the end of this talk - Göring said, ‘But I must have the right to give orders to you.’ - Then I said, ‘Not to me, but to my successor.’ I have never - taken orders from Göring; and I would never have done it, - because he was a fool in economics and I knew something about - it, at least. - - “Question: ‘Well, I gather that was a culminating, progressive, - personal business between you and Göring. That seems perfectly - obvious.’ - - “Answer: ‘Certainly.’” - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: Yes, certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then the interrogator went on: - - “Let us go into the duties of that job for a moment and see what - he was trying to take away from you. There are only two - possibilities, as it has been explained to me; if I am wrong, - correct me. One would be the preparation for a mobilization, and - the other would be the actual taking charge of this in the event - of war. Otherwise, the post had no meaning. So the things you - resisted his taking away from you, as I see it, were the right - to be in charge of the preparation for mobilization and, - secondly, the right to control in the event of war. - - “Answer: ‘Correct.’” - -Did you give that testimony? - -SCHACHT: Please, Mr. Justice, you are confusing the events in relation -to time. The differences with Göring about this so-called -Plenipotentiary for War Economy occurred in the winter 1936-37; and the -so-called last conversation with Göring which you have just mentioned -took place in November 1937. I stated, I believe in January 1937, that I -was prepared to turn over the office and the activity as Plenipotentiary -for War Economy immediately to Göring. That can be found in the -memorandum from the Jodl Diary which has been frequently mentioned here. - -At that time the War Ministry, and Blomberg in particular, asked to have -me kept in the position of Plenipotentiary for War Economy, since I was -the Minister of Economy, as long as I was the Minister of Economy. You -can find the correspondence about that, which I think has already been -submitted by you to the Tribunal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, all right; I think the dates appear in your -testimony. I am not concerned at the moment with the sequence of events; -I am concerned with the functions that you were quarreling over, and -which you described in your interrogations. And the questions and -answers which I read to you are correct; these are the answers you made -at the time, are they not? - -SCHACHT: Yes, but I must say the following: If you ask me about these -individual phases, it will give an entirely different picture if you do -not single out the different periods. Mr. Justice, surely you cannot -mention events of January and November in the same breath and then ask -me if that is correct. That is not correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, let us get what is wrong about this, if -anything. - -When was your last conversation with Göring in which you told him he -would give orders to your successor but not to you? - -SCHACHT: November 1937. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question as to the duties of the job has -nothing to do with relation to time, has it? That is, the -Plenipotentiary for War Economy, the disagreement between you and -Göring, and in order to make it perfectly clear I will read this -question and answer to you again, and I am not concerned with time; I am -concerned with your description of the job. - - “Question: ‘Let us go into the duties of that job for a moment - and see what he was trying to take away from you. Now, there are - only two possibilities, as it has been explained to me; if I am - wrong, correct me. One would be the preparation for a - mobilization, and the other would be the actual taking charge of - this in the event of war. Otherwise the post had no meaning. So - the things you resisted his taking away from you, as I see it, - were the right to be in charge of the preparation for - mobilization and, secondly, the right to control in the event of - war.’” - -And you answered, “correct,” did you not? - -SCHACHT: This difference... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you answer me first as to whether you did give -that answer to that question, that it was correct? - -SCHACHT: Yes, the minutes are correct. And now I should like... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. - -SCHACHT: But now please let me finish. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right, go ahead with your explanation. - -SCHACHT: Yes. Now I wish to say that that disagreement between Göring -and myself had absolutely nothing to do with the conversation of -November, and that it was not even a disagreement between Göring and -myself. That disagreement which you have just read about occurred in -January 1937, but it was not at all a difference of opinion between -Göring and myself because I said right away, “Relieve me of the post of -Plenipotentiary for War Economy and turn it over to Göring.” And the War -Ministry, that is, Herr Von Blomberg, protested against this, not I. I -was delighted to turn over that office to Göring. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything in writing about that, Dr. -Schacht? - -SCHACHT: The documents which you have submitted here. I would like to -ask my counsel to look for these documents and to present them during -the re-examination. They have been submitted by the Prosecution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, is it not a fact that your controversy with -Göring was a controversy of a personal character, between you and him, -for control and not a controversy as to the question of armament? You -both wanted to rearm as rapidly as possible. - -SCHACHT: I do not want to continue that play with words as to whether it -was personal or anything else, Mr. Justice. I had differences with -Göring on the subject; and if you ask whether it was on armament, speed, -or extent, I reply that I was at greatest odds with Göring in regard to -these points. - -I have never denied that I wanted to rearm in order to gain equality of -position for Germany. I never wanted to rearm any further. Göring wanted -to go further; and this is one difference which cannot be overlooked. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now I do not want to play upon words; and if you -say my reference to it as personal is a play upon words, you force me to -go into what you told us about Göring. - -Is it not a fact that you told Major Tilley this? - - “Whereas I have called Hitler an amoral type of person, I can - regard Göring only as immoral and criminal. Endowed by nature - with a certain geniality which he managed to exploit for his own - popularity, he was the most egocentric being imaginable. The - assumption of political power was for him only a means to - personal enrichment and personal good living. The success of - others filled him with envy. His greed knew no bounds. His - predilection for jewels, gold and finery, _et cetera_, was - unimaginable. He knew no comradeship. Only as long as someone - was useful to him did he profess friendship. - - “Göring’s knowledge in all fields in which a government member - should be competent was nil, especially in the economic field. - Of all the economic matters which Hitler entrusted to him in the - autumn of 1936 he had not the faintest notion, though he created - an immense official apparatus and misused his powers as lord of - all economy most outrageously. In his personal appearance he was - so theatrical that one could only compare him with Nero. A lady - who had tea with his second wife reported that he appeared at - this tea in a sort of Roman toga and sandals studded with - jewels, his fingers bedecked with innumerable jewelled rings and - generally covered with ornaments, his face painted and his lips - rouged.” - -Did you give that statement to Major Tilley? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And you say you had no personal differences -with Göring? - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, I ask here again that the different periods of -time should not be confused. I found out about all these things only -later and not at the time of which you speak, that is, the year 1936. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you dispute the testimony of Gisevius that in -1935 he told you about Göring’s complicity in the whole Gestapo setup? - -SCHACHT: I have testified here that I knew about the Gestapo camps which -Göring had set up and said that I was opposed to them. I do not at all -deny that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But your friendship continued despite that -knowledge. - -SCHACHT: I have never had a friendship with Göring. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well... - -SCHACHT: I surely cannot refuse to work with him, especially as long as -I do not know what kind of a man he is. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. Let us take up foreign relations, about -which you have made a good deal of complaint here. I think you have -testified that in 1937 when you were doing all this rearming, you did -not envisage any kind of a war, is that right? - -SCHACHT: No, what you are saying, Mr. Justice, is not correct. In 1937 I -did not do everything to rearm; but from 1935, from the fall of 1935 on, -I tried everything possible to slow down the rearming. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. I refer you to your interrogation of 16 -October 1945, and ask whether you gave these answers to these questions: - - “Question: ‘Let me ask you then, in 1937 what kind of war did - you envisage?’ - - “Answer: ‘I never envisaged a war. We might have been attacked, - invaded by somebody; but even that I never expected.’ - - “Question: ‘You did not expect that. Did you expect a - possibility of a mobilization and concentration of economic - forces in the event of war?’ - - “Answer: ‘In the event of an attack against Germany, certainly.’ - - “Question: ‘Now, putting your mind back to 1937, are you able to - say what sort of an attack you were concerned with?’ - - “Answer: ‘I do not know, Sir.’ - - “Question: ‘Did you have thoughts on that at the time?’ - - “Answer: ‘No, never.’ - - “Question: ‘Did you then consider that the contingency of war in - 1937 was so remote as to be negligible?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘You did?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” (Document Number 3728-PS) - -Did you give those answers? - -SCHACHT: I have made exactly the same statements as found in this -interrogation, here before the Tribunal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified that you tried to divert -Hitler’s plan which was to move and expand to the East—you tried to -divert his attention to colonies instead. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What colonies? You have never specified. - -SCHACHT: Our colonies. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And where were they located? - -SCHACHT: I assume that you know that exactly as well as I do. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You are the witness, Dr. Schacht. I want to know -what you were telling Hitler, not what I know. - -SCHACHT: Oh, what I told Hitler? I told Hitler we should try to get back -a part of the colonies which belonged to us and the administration of -which was taken away from us, so that we could work there. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What colonies? - -SCHACHT: I was thinking especially of the African colonies. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those African colonies you would regard as -essential to your plan for the future of Germany? - -SCHACHT: Not those, but generally any colonial activity; and of course, -at first, I could only limit my colonial desires to our own property. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your property, as you call it, was the African -colonies? - -SCHACHT: Not I personally called them that. That is what the Treaty of -Versailles calls them—“our property.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Any way you wish it, you wanted the colonies you -are talking about. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You considered that the possession and exploitation -of colonies was necessary to the sort of Germany that you had in mind -creating? - -SCHACHT: If you would replace the word “exploitation” by “development,” -I believe there will be no misunderstanding, and to that extent I agree -with you completely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, by “development” you mean trading, and I -suppose you expected to make a profit out of trade? - -SCHACHT: No, not only “trade” but “developing the natural resources” or -the economic possibilities of the colonies. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was your proposal that Germany should become -reliant upon those colonies instead of relying on expansion to the East? - -SCHACHT: I considered every kind of expansion within the European -continent as sheer folly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you agreed with Hitler that expansion, either -colonial or to the East, was a necessary condition of the kind of -Germany you wanted to create. - -SCHACHT: No, that I never said. I told him it was nonsense to undertake -anything toward the East. Only colonial development could be considered. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you proposed as a matter of policy that -Germany’s development should depend on colonies with which there was no -overland trade route to Germany and which, as you knew, would require a -naval power to protect them. - -SCHACHT: I do not think that at all—how do you get that idea? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not get to Africa overland, do you? -You have to go by water at some point, do you not? - -SCHACHT: You can go by air. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was your trade route? You were thinking only -of air developments? - -SCHACHT: No, no. I thought of ships also. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And Germany was not then a naval power? - -SCHACHT: I believe we had a merchant marine which was quite -considerable. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did your colonial plan involve rearmament by way of -making Germany a naval power to protect the trade routes to the colonies -that you were proposing? - -SCHACHT: Not in the least. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then your plan was to leave the trade route -unprotected? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no. I believed that international law would be sufficient -protection. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is what you disagreed with Hitler about. - -SCHACHT: We never spoke about that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in any event he rejected your plan for -colonial developments? - -SCHACHT: Oh, no. I have explained here that upon my urgent request he -gave me the order in summer 1936 to take up these colonial matters. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not give these answers in your -interrogation, Dr. Schacht? - - “Question: ‘In other words, at the time of your talks with - Hitler in 1931 and 1932 concerning colonial policy, you did not - find him, shall we say, enthusiastic about the possibility?’ - - “Answer: ‘Neither enthusiastic nor very much interested.’ - - “Question: ‘But he expressed to you what his views were - alternatively to the possibility of obtaining colonies?’ - - “Answer: ‘No, we did not go into other alternatives.’” - -Did you give those answers? - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after the Fritsch affair, at least, you knew -that Hitler was not intent upon preserving the peace of Europe by all -possible means. - -SCHACHT: Yes, I had my doubts. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And after the Austrian Anschluss you knew that the -Wehrmacht was an important factor in his Eastern policy? - -SCHACHT: Well, you may express it that way. I do not know exactly what -you mean by it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, do not answer anything if you do not know -what I mean, because we will make it clear as we go along. Except for -the suggestion of colonies you proposed no other alternative to his plan -of expansion to the East? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Never at any Cabinet meeting or elsewhere did you -propose any other alternative? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to the move into Austria, I think you gave -these answers: - - “Question: ‘Actually Hitler did not use the precise method that - you say you favored?’ - - “Answer: ‘Not at all.’ - - “Question: ‘Did you favor the method that he did employ?’ - - “Answer: ‘Not at all, Sir.’ - - “Question: ‘What was there in his method that you did not like?’ - - “Answer: ‘Oh, it was simply overrunning, just taking the - Austrians over the head—or what do you call it? It was force, - and I have never been in favor of such force.’” - -Did you give those answers? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have made considerable complaint here that -foreigners did not come to your support at various times in your efforts -to block Hitler, have you not? - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew at the time of the Austrian Anschluss the -attitude of the United States towards the Nazi regime, as expressed by -President Roosevelt, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew of his speech suggesting that the Nazi -menace ought to be quarantined to prevent its spread? - -SCHACHT: I do not remember; but I certainly must have read it at that -time, if it was published in Germany, as I assume it was. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goebbels let loose a campaign of attack on the -President as a result of it, did he not? - -SCHACHT: I assume I read that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact, you joined in the attack on -foreigners who were criticizing the methods, did you not? - -SCHACHT: When and where? What attacks? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. After the Austrian Anschluss, when force -was used, with your disapproval, you immediately went in and took over -the Austrian National Bank, did you not? - -SCHACHT: That was my duty. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Well, you did it. - -SCHACHT: Of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you liquidated it for the account of the Reich. - -SCHACHT: Not liquidated; I merged it, amalgamated it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I beg your pardon? - -SCHACHT: Amalgamated. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Amalgamated it. And you took over the personnel? - -SCHACHT: Everything. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And the decree doing so was signed by you. - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And you called the employees together on 21 -March 1938. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And made a speech to them. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did you say the following among other things... - -SCHACHT: Certainly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you have not heard it yet. - -SCHACHT: Yes, I heard it during the case of the Prosecution. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I would like to quote some of it to you and -remind you of it. - - “I think it is quite useful if we recall these things to our - mind in order to expose all the sanctimonious hypocrisy exuding - from the foreign press. Thank God, these things could after all - not hinder the great German people on their way, for Adolf - Hitler has created a communion of German will and German - thought. He has bolstered it up with the newly strengthened - Wehrmacht, and he has thereby given the external aspect to the - inner union between Germany and Austria. - - “I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give - offense; nor would I care to depart from this custom today.” - - “Hilarity” is noted at this point in your speech. - - “I know that there are even here in this country a few people—I - believe they are not too numerous—who find fault with the - events of the last few days. But nobody, I believe, doubts the - goal; and it should be said to all hecklers that you cannot - satisfy everybody. There are those who say they would have done - it in some other way, perhaps, but strange to say they did not - do it”—and in parentheses the word “hilarity” appears again. - Continuing with your speech—“it was done by our Adolf Hitler - (Long, continued applause); and if there is still something left - to be improved, then those hecklers should try to bring about - these improvements from within the German Reich and the German - community and not disturb it from without.” (Document EC-297) - -Did you use that language? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, you publicly ridiculed those who -were complaining of the methods, did you not? - -SCHACHT: If that is the way you see it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you also, in addressing the personnel of the -Austrian National Bank, which you were taking over, said this: - - “I consider it completely impossible that even a single person - will find a future with us who is not wholeheartedly for Adolf - Hitler. (Loud, continued applause; shouts of ‘Sieg Heil’).” - -Continuing with the speech: - - “Whoever does not do so had better withdraw from our circle of - his own accord. (Loud applause).” - -Is that what happened? - -SCHACHT: Yes, they all agreed, surprisingly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, had the Reichsbank before 1933 and 1934 been a -political institution? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Had politics been in the Reichsbank? - -SCHACHT: Never. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on this day, speaking to its employees, you -said this, did you not? - - “The Reichsbank will always be nothing but National Socialist, - or I shall cease to be its manager. (Heavy, protracted - applause).” - -Did that happen? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Sir, you have said that you never took the -oath to Hitler. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you if this is what you, as head of the -Reichsbank, required of the employees whom you were taking over in -Austria; and I quote: - - “Now I shall ask you to rise. (The audience rises.) Today we - pledge allegiance to the great Reichsbank family, to the great - German community; we pledge allegiance to our newly arisen, - powerful Greater German Reich, and we sum up all these - sentiments in the allegiance to the man who has brought about - all this transformation. I ask you to raise your hands and to - repeat after me: - - “I swear that I will be faithful and obedient to the Führer of - the German Reich and the German people, Adolf Hitler, and will - perform my duties conscientiously and selflessly. (The audience - takes the pledge with uplifted hands.) - - “You have taken this pledge. A bad fellow he who breaks it. To - our Führer a triple ‘Sieg Heil’.” - -Is that a correct representation of what took place? - -SCHACHT: The oath is the prescribed civil service oath and it is quite -in accordance with what I said here yesterday, that the oath is made to -the head of the state just as I have stated before too: “We stand united -before the German people”—I do not know exactly what the German -expression is. I hear your English version here. That oath is exactly -the same. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have referred to Document EC-297, Exhibit -USA-632, in the course of this. That is the exhibit I have been using. - -So you say that was to an impersonal head of state and not to Adolf -Hitler? - -SCHACHT: Yes. One obviously cannot take an oath to an idea. Therefore, -one has to use a person. But I said yesterday that I did not take an -oath to Herr Ebert or to Herr Hindenburg or to the Kaiser, but to the -head of State as representative of the people. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You told your employees that all of the sentiments -of this oath were summed up in the allegiance to the man, did you not? - -SCHACHT: No. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is that not what you said? - -SCHACHT: No, that is not correct. If you read it again, it does not say -to the man but to the leader as the head of State. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, no matter what you took the oath to... - -SCHACHT: [_Interposing._] Excuse me. There is a very great difference. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will get to that. Whatever you took the -oath to, you were breaking it at the very time, were you not? - -SCHACHT: No. I never broke the oath to this man as representative of the -German people, but I broke my oath when I found out that that man was a -criminal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you plotted to cause his death? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you want to explain to the Tribunal how you -could cause the death of Adolf Hitler without also causing the death of -the head of the German State? - -SCHACHT: There is no difference because unfortunately that man was the -head of the German nation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You say you never broke the oath? - -SCHACHT: I do not know what you want to express by that. Certainly I did -not keep the oath which I took to Hitler because Hitler unfortunately -was a criminal, a perjurer, and there was no true head of State. I do -not know what you mean by “breaking the oath,” but I did not keep my -oath to him and I am proud of it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you were administering to your employees an oath -which you at that moment were breaking and intended to break? - -SCHACHT: Again you confuse different periods of time, Mr. Justice. That -was in March 1938 when as you have heard me say before, I still was in -doubt, and therefore it was not clear to me yet what kind of a man -Hitler was. Only when in the course of 1938 I observed that Hitler was -possibly walking into a war, did I break the oath. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you find him walking into a war? - -SCHACHT: In the course of 1938 when, judging from the events, I -gradually became convinced that Hitler might steer into a war, that is -to say, intentionally. Then only did I break my oath. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you stated yesterday that you started to -sabotage the government in 1936 and 1937. - -SCHACHT: Yes, because I did not want excessive armament. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And we find you administering an oath to the -employees to be faithful and obedient. - -Now, I ask you if you did not make this statement in interrogation: - - “Question: ‘But you make this statement at the end of the oath, - after everybody has raised his hand and made his oath. Did you - say the following, “You have taken this pledge. A bad fellow he - who breaks it”?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, I agree to that and I must say that I myself - broke it.’ - - “Question: ‘Do you also say that at the time that you urged this - upon the audience, that you already were breaking it?’ - - “Answer: ‘I am sorry to say that within my soul I felt very - shaken in my loyalty already at that time, but I hoped that - things would turn out well at the end.’” - -SCHACHT: I am glad that you quote this because it confirms exactly what -I have just said; that I was in a state of doubt and that I still had -hope that everything would come out all right; that is to say, that -Hitler would develop in the right direction. So it confirms exactly what -I have just said. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am sure we want to be helpful to each -other, Dr. Schacht. - -SCHACHT: I am convinced that both of us are trying to find the truth, -Mr. Justice. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you remained in the Reichsbank after this -Anschluss, of course? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you remained there until later—until January -1939, if that is the date? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after this Anschluss, the mefo bills which had -been issued began to become due, did they not, in 1938 and 1939? - -SCHACHT: No, the maturity date of the first mefo bills must have been at -the earliest in the spring of 1939. They had all been issued for 5 years -and I assume that the first mefo bills were issued in the spring of -1934, so that the first mefo bills became due in the spring of 1939. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this is the question and the answer. Correct -me if I am wrong. - - “Question: ‘Well, did you in the Reichsbank utilize funds which - were available? Let me put it this way: As these mefo bills - became due, what did you do about them?’ - - “Answer: ‘I asked the Minister of Finance whether he could repay - them, because after 5 years he had to repay them, some in 1938 - or 1939, I think. The first mefo bills would have become due for - repayment and of course he said, “I cannot.”’” - -You had that conversation with the Finance Minister while you were still -President of the Reichsbank? - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, I said that throughout our financial dealings we -became somewhat worried as to whether we would get our bills paid back -or not. I have already explained to the Tribunal that in the second half -of 1938 the Finance Minister got into difficulties and he came to me in -order again to borrow money. Thereupon I said to him, “Listen, in what -kind of a situation are you anyway for you will soon have to repay the -first mefo bills to us. Are you not prepared for that?” And now it -turned out, that was in the fall of 1938, that the Reich Finance -Minister had done nothing whatever to fulfill his obligation to meet -payment of the mefo bills; and that, of course, in the fall of 1938, -made for exceedingly strained relations with the Reich Finance Minister, -that is, between the Reichsbank and the Reich Finance Minister. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, taxes did not yield any sufficient revenue to -discharge those bills, did they? - -SCHACHT: Yes; I explained already yesterday that the risk which was -taken in the mefo bills, which I have admitted from the very beginning, -was not really a risk if a reasonable financial policy were followed; -that is, if from 1938 on, further armament had not continued and -additional foolish expenditures not been made, but if instead, the money -accruing from taxes and bonds had been used for meeting the payment of -the mefo bills. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All I am asking you at the present moment, Dr. -Schacht, is whether these bills could not have been paid out of the -revenue from taxes. - -SCHACHT: Surely. Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They could have? - -SCHACHT: Of course, but that was the surprising thing, they were not -repaid; the money was used to continue rearming. May I add something in -order to give you further information? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I am really not concerned with the financing; I -am merely concerned with what kind of a mess you were in at the time you -resigned. - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The mefo bills were due and could not be paid? - -SCHACHT: Shortly. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They were shortly to mature? - -SCHACHT: Yes, but they could be paid. That is a mistake if you say that -they could not be paid. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, they could not be paid out of the current -year’s taxes, could they? - -SCHACHT: Yes, indeed. You are not interested and do not want me to tell -you, but I am quite ready to explain it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you have explained it pretty well to us. - -SCHACHT: You have just told me you were not interested. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your subscriptions to the Fourth Reich Loan of 1938 -had produced unsatisfactory results, had they not? - -SCHACHT: They were hardly pleasing. The capital market was not good. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you have reported on the loan that there had -been a shortage in the public subscription? And the result had been -unsatisfactory? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you not make this answer to the -interrogator’s question: - - “Question: ‘But I am asking you whether during that period from - 1 April 1938 to January 1939 you did not continue to finance - armaments?’ - - “Answer: ‘Sir, otherwise these mefo bills had to be refunded by - the Reich, which they could not be, because the Reich had no - money to do it; and I could not procure any money for refunding - because that would have had to come from taxes or loans. So I - had to continue to carry these mefo bills and that, of course, I - did.’” - -Did you give that answer? - -SCHACHT: Yes, that was quite in order—kindly let me speak, would you -not—because the Finance Minister did not make his funds available for -the repayment of the mefo bills, but instead gave them for armaments. If -he had used these funds to pay the mefo bills, everything would have -been all right. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you carried the mefo bills which let him use -current revenues to continue the plans of rearmament after 1938, did you -not? - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, this was the situation. A large part of the mefo -bills was already on the financial and capital market. Now, when that -market was too heavily burdened by the government, then the people -brought in the mefo bills to the Reichsbank, for the Reichsbank had -promised to accept them. That, precisely, was the great obstruction to -my policy. The Reich Finance Minister financed the armament instead of -honoring the mefo bills as he had promised. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was under those circumstances that you took -a position which would result in your retirement from the Reichsbank? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now we come to Czechoslovakia. Did you favor the -policy of acquiring the Sudetenland by threat of resort to arms? - -SCHACHT: Not at all. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you characterized the manner in which the -Sudetenland was acquired as wrong and reprehensible. - -SCHACHT: I do not know when I could have done that. I said that the -Allies, by their policy, gave the Sudetenland to Hitler, whereas I -always had expected only that the Sudeten Germans would be given -autonomy. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you approved of Hitler’s policy in handling -the Sudetenland situation? Is that what you want to be understood as -saying? - -SCHACHT: I never knew that Hitler, beyond autonomy, demanded anything -else. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your only criticism of the Czechoslovakian -situation relates to the Allies, as I understand you? - -SCHACHT: Well, it also applies to the Czechs, maybe to the Germans too; -for goodness sake, I do not want to play the judge here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now on 16 October 1945, in Exhibit USA-636, -Document 3728-PS, I ask if you did not make these replies to questions: - - “Question: ‘Now, I am coming back to the march against - Czechoslovakia which resulted in the appeasement policy, Munich, - and the cession of the Sudetenland to the Reich.’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘Did you at that time favor the policy of acquiring - the Sudetenland?’ - - “Answer: ‘No.’ - - “Question: ‘Did you favor at that time the policy of threatening - or menacing the Czechs by force of arms so as to acquire the - Sudetenland?’ - - “Answer: ‘No, certainly not.’ - - “Question: ‘Then I ask you, did it strike you at that time, did - it come to your consciousness, that the means which Hitler was - using for threatening the Czechs was the Wehrmacht and the - armament industry?’ - - “Answer: ‘He could not have done it without the Wehrmacht.’” - -Did you give those answers? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Continuing: - - “Question: ‘Did you consider the manner in which he handled the - Sudeten question wrong or reprehensible?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘You did?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, Sir.’ - - “Question: ‘And did you have a feeling at that time, looking - back on the events that had proceeded and in your own - participation in them, that this army which he was using as a - threat against Czechoslovakia was at least in part an army of - your own creation? Did that ever strike you?’ - - “Answer: ‘I cannot deny that, Sir.’” - -SCHACHT: Certainly not. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But here again, you turned in to help Hitler, once -he had been successful with it, did you not? - -SCHACHT: How can you say such a thing? I certainly did not know that -Hitler would use the army in order to threaten other nations. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After he had done it, you turned in and took over -the Czech bank, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Of course. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. You followed to clean up economically just so -far as Hitler got the territory, did you not? - -SCHACHT: But I beg your pardon. He did not take it with violence at all. -The Allies presented him with the country. The whole thing was settled -peacefully. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we have your testimony on the part the -Wehrmacht played in it and what part you played in the Wehrmacht. - -SCHACHT: Yes, I have never denied that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No. What I mean is this, referring to your -interrogation of 17 October (Exhibit US-616): - - “Question: ‘Now, after the Sudetenland was taken over by the - Munich agreement, did you, as the President of the Reichsbank, - do anything about the Sudeten territory?’ - - “Answer: ‘I think we took over the affiliations of the Czech - Bank of Issue.’ - - “Question: ‘And you also arranged for the currency conversion, - did you not?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -That is what you did after this wrong and reprehensible act had been -committed by Hitler, did you not? - -SCHACHT: It is no “wrong and reprehensible” act “committed” by Hitler, -but Hitler received the Sudeten German territory by way of treaty and, -of course, the currency and the institute which directed financing had -to be amalgamated with this field in Germany. There can be no talk of -injustice. I cannot believe that the Allies have put their signature to -a piece of injustice. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you think that everything up to Munich was all -right? - -SCHACHT: No. I am certainly of a different opinion. There was much -injustice. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you in this Court when Göring testified to his -threat to bomb Prague—“the beautiful city of Prague”? - -SCHACHT: Thanks to your invitation, I was here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. I suppose you approved that use of the force -which you had created in the Wehrmacht? - -SCHACHT: Disapproved; disapproved under all circumstances. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not think that was right dealing, then? - -SCHACHT: No, no, that was an atrocious thing. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we have found something we agree on, Doctor. -You knew of the invasion of Poland? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You regarded it as an unqualified act of aggression -on Hitler’s part, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The same was true of the invasion of Luxembourg, -was it not? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of Holland? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of Denmark? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of Norway? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of Yugoslavia? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of Russia? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely, sir; and you have left out Norway and Belgium. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; well, I got to the end of my paper. The entire -course was a course of aggression? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely to be condemned. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the success of that aggression at every step -was due to the Wehrmacht which you had so much to do with creating? - -SCHACHT: Unfortunately. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I intend to take up another subject and -perhaps it would be ... it is almost recess time. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): If it pleases the Tribunal, the -report is made that Defendant Von Neurath is absent. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, in your direct testimony you made -reference to a film, which was taken and exhibited in Germany for -propaganda purposes, of your demeanor on the occasion of Hitler’s return -after the fall of France. - -SCHACHT: May I correct that? Not I, but my counsel, spoke of this film; -and it was not mentioned that it was used for propaganda purposes. My -counsel merely said that it had been run in a newsreel, so it probably -was shown for about one week. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask to exhibit that film to the Tribunal. It -is a very brief film, and the movement in it is very rapid. There is -very little of translation involved in it, but the speed of it is such -that for myself I had to see it twice in order to really see what it is. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to put it on now? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I would like to put it on now. It will take only a -moment, and Dr. Schacht should be placed where he can see it for I want -to ask him some questions and [_Turning to the defendant_] particularly -I may ask you to identify the persons in it. - -I will ask, if I may, to have it shown twice, so that after all has been -seen you can once more see it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - -[_Moving pictures were then shown._] - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that I, in mentioning this exhibit which I -wish to offer in evidence, spoke of it as a “propaganda film.” That was -not the language of Dr. Dix. Dr. Dix described it as a “weekly newsreel” -and as a “weekly film.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] While our memory is fresh about that, will -you tell the Court as many of the defendants as you recognized present -in that picture? - -SCHACHT: In glancing at it quickly I could not see exactly who was -there. However, I should assume that almost all were present—I say that -from memory, not from the film—either in Hitler’s retinue or among -those who received him. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: While you were still President of the Reichsbank -and after the action in taking over the Czechoslovakian Bank you made a -speech, did you not, on 29 November 1938? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is Document EC-611, Exhibit USA-622. I am -advised that the film became Exhibit USA-835, and before I pass from it -I would like to offer the statement as to the personality of Hermann -Göring, which is Document 3936-PS, as Exhibit USA-836. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] In this speech of 29 November 1938, Dr. -Schacht, if I am correctly informed—and by the way, it was a public -speech was it not? - -SCHACHT: Inasmuch as it was made before the German Academy. It was -entirely public, and if it passed the censorship it certainly was also -mentioned in the papers. It was public; anyone could hear it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You used this language, did you not?: - - “It is possible that no bank of issue in peace times has carried - on such a daring credit policy as has the Reichsbank since the - seizure of power by National Socialism. With the aid of this - credit policy, however, Germany has created an armament second - to none, and this armament in turn has made possible our - political successes.” (Document EC-611) - -Is that correct? - -SCHACHT: That is absolutely correct, and—would you please mind letting -me talk in the future? That is correct and I was very much surprised -that it was necessary to do this in order to create justice in the -world. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The taking over of Czechoslovakia representing your -idea of justice? - -SCHACHT: I have already told you that Germany did not “take over -Czechoslovakia,” but that it was indeed presented to Germany by the -Allies on a silver platter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are you now saying that that was an act of justice, -or are you condemning it? I cannot get your position, Doctor. Just tell -us, were you for it? Are you today for it, or against it? - -SCHACHT: Against what? Will you please tell me against what and for -what? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Against the taking over of the Sudetenland by the -method by which it was done. - -SCHACHT: I cannot answer your question for the reason that, as I said, -it was no “taking over,” but was a present. If someone gives me a -present, such as this, I accept it gratefully. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Even though it does not belong to them to give? - -SCHACHT: Well, that I must naturally leave up to the donor. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And although it was taken at the point of a gun, -you still would accept the gift? - -SCHACHT: No, it was not taken “at the point of a gun.” - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will pass on to your speech. Did you say -also: - - “Instead of a weak and vacillating government a single, - purposeful, energetic personality is ruling today. That is the - great miracle which has happened in Germany and which has had - its effect in all fields of life and not last in that of economy - and finance. There is no German financial miracle. There is only - the miracle of the reawakening of German national consciousness - and German discipline, and we owe this miracle to our Führer, - Adolf Hitler.” (Document EC-611) - -Did you say that? - -SCHACHT: Certainly. That was what I was so greatly astonished at. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As Minister without Portfolio, what did your -Ministry consist of? - -SCHACHT: Nothing. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What employees did you have? - -SCHACHT: One female secretary. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What space did you occupy? - -SCHACHT: Two or three rooms in my own apartment which I had furnished as -office rooms. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So the government did not even furnish you an -office? - -SCHACHT: Yes, they paid me a rental for those rooms. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, and whom did you meet with as Minister without -Portfolio? - -SCHACHT: I do not understand. Whom I met with? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, did you have any meetings? Did you have any -official meetings to attend? - -SCHACHT: I have stated here repeatedly that, after my retirement from -the Reichsbank, I never had a single meeting or conference, official or -otherwise. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did anybody report to you, or did you report to -anybody? - -SCHACHT: No, no one reported to me, nor did I report to anyone else. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then I take it that you had no duties whatever in -this position? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely correct. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were Minister without Portfolio, however, -at the time that Hitler came back from France, and you attended the -reception for him at the railway station? And went to the Reichstag to -hear his speech? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, notwithstanding your removal as President of -the Reichsbank, the government continued to pay you your full salary -until the end of 1942, did it not? - -SCHACHT: I stated yesterday that that is not correct. I received my -salary from the Reichsbank, which was due to me by contract, but a -minister’s salary was not paid to me. I believe that as Minister I -received certain allowances to cover expenses, I cannot say that at the -moment; but I did not receive a salary as a Minister. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will return to your interrogation of 9 -October 1945 and ask you whether you gave these answers to these -questions on that interrogation: - - “Question: ‘What salary did you receive as Minister without - Portfolio?’ - - “Answer: ‘I could not tell you exactly. I think it was some - 24,000 marks, or 20,000 marks. I cannot tell you exactly, but it - was accounted on the salary and afterward on the pension which I - got from the Reichsbank, so I was not paid twice. I was not paid - twice.’ - - “Question: ‘In other words, the salary that you received as - Minister without Portfolio during the period you were also - President of the Reichsbank was deducted from the Reichsbank?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘However, after you severed your connection with the - Reichsbank in January 1939, did you then receive the whole - salary?’ - - “Answer: ‘I got the whole salary because my contract ran until - the end of June 1942, I think.’ - - “Question: ‘So you received a full salary until the end of June - 1942?’ - - “Answer: ‘Full salary and no extra salary, but from the 1st of - July 1942 I got my pension from the Reichsbank, and again the - salary of the Ministry was deducted from that, or vice versa. - What was higher, I do not know; I got a pension of about 30,000 - marks from the Reichsbank.’” - -And on 11 July 1945, at Ruskin, you were questioned and gave answers as -follows: - - “Question: ‘What was the date of your contract?’ - - “Answer: ‘From 8 March 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942. Four years. Four - years’ contract.’ - - “Question: ‘You were really then given a four-year appointment?’ - - “Answer: ‘That is what I told you. After 1942 I got a pension - from the Reichsbank.’ - - “Question: ‘What was the amount of your salary and all other - income from the Reichsbank?’ - - “Answer: ‘All the income from the Reichsbank, including my fees - for representation, amounted to 60,000 marks a year, and the - pension is 24,000. You see, I had a short contract but a high - pension. As Reich Minister without Portfolio, I had another, I - think also 20,000 or 24,000 marks.’” - -Now, is that correct? - -SCHACHT: The salaries are stated on paper and are correctly cited here -and I have indeed claimed that I was paid by one source only. I was -asked, “What salary did you receive as Reich Minister?” I stated the -amount, but I did not receive it, as it was merely deducted from my -Reichsbank salary. And the pension, as I see here, is quoted wrongly in -one case. I believe I had only 24,000 marks’ pension, while it says here -somewhere that it was 30,000 marks. In my own money affairs I am -somewhat less exact than in my official money affairs. However, I was -paid only once, and that is mainly by the Reichsbank up to—and that -also has not been stated here correctly. It was not the end of 1942, but -the end of June 1942, that my contract expired. Then the pension began -and it too was paid only once. How those two, that is, the Ministry and -Reichsbank, arranged it with each other is unknown to me. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you were entitled to a salary and a pension -both, and one was offset against the other; is that what you mean? And -that arrangement continued as long as you were a part of the regime? - -SCHACHT: It is still in effect today. It has nothing to do with the -regime. I hope that I shall still receive my pension; how else should I -pay my expenses? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, they may not be very heavy, Doctor. - -When General Beck resigned, he asked you to resign, did he not? - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute; it is quite unnecessary for anyone present -in Court to show his amusement by laughter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you asked to resign when General Beck -resigned? - -SCHACHT: No, he did not say that. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you in mind the testimony given by Gisevius -here? - -SCHACHT: Yes. It was a mistake on the part of Gisevius. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, well, in any event, when General Beck resigned, -it was called sharply to your attention? - -SCHACHT: He paid me a visit and told me about it a few days before his -retirement. I assume that was about the end of August or the beginning -of September of 1938. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you say that no proposal was made to you at -that time that you should resign along with Beck? - -SCHACHT: No, nothing was said about that. Beck saw me in my room; he did -not mention anything of this sort, and it was not discussed by us. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it ever occur to you that resignation would be -the appropriate way of expressing your protest against these things -which you now say you disapprove? - -SCHACHT: No, I do not at all believe that a resignation would have been -the means to achieve that which had to be done, and I also regretted it -very much that Beck retired. That which happened, Mr. Justice, was -caused by an entirely false policy—a policy that partly was forced upon -us, and partly, I am sorry to say, was not handled properly by us. In -February, Neurath was dismissed. In the fall Beck stepped out; in -January 1939 I was dismissed. One after the other was gotten rid of. If -it had been possible for our group—if I too may now speak of a -group—to carry out a common action, as we hoped for and expected, then -that would have been an excellent thing. However, these individual -retirements served no purpose whatsoever; at least, they had no success. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You felt that Beck should have stayed at his post -and been disloyal to the head of the State? - -SCHACHT: Absolutely. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, in all events, you continued in every public -way throughout the period, until the fall of France, to hold yourself -out as a part of the government and a part of the regime, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Well, I never considered myself a part of the regime exactly, -because I was against it. But, of course, ever since the fall of 1938 I -worked towards my own retirement, as soon as I saw that Hitler did not -stop the rearmament but continued it, and when I became aware that I was -powerless to act against it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, when did you start working towards your own -retirement? - -SCHACHT: Pardon me; I did not understand—to work towards what? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you start working towards your own -retirement from office. - -SCHACHT: After Munich and after we realized that we could no longer -expect disarmament or a stopping of rearmament by Hitler and that we -could not prevent a continuation of the rearmament; so, within the -circles of the Reichsbank Directorate, we began to discuss this question -and to realize that we could not follow the further course of -rearmament. That was the last quarter of 1938. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And all of these events of which you disapproved -never were of sufficient consequence to cause you to resign and withhold -a further use of your name from this regime? - -SCHACHT: Until then I had still hoped that I could bring about a change -for the better; consequently I accepted all the disadvantages entailed -with my remaining in office, even facing the danger that some day I -might be judged, as I am today. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You continued to allow your name to be used at home -and abroad despite your disapproval, as you say, of the invasion of -Poland? - -SCHACHT: I never was asked for my permission, and I never gave that -permission. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew perfectly well, did you not, that your -name meant a great deal to this group at any time and that you were one -of the only men in this group who had any standing abroad? - -SCHACHT: The first part of your statement I already accepted yesterday -from you as a compliment. The second part, I believe, is not correct. I -believe that several other members of the regime also had a “standing” -in foreign countries, some of whom are sitting with me here in the -prisoners’ dock. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Any foreign observer, who read affairs in Germany, -would have obtained the understanding that you were supporting the -regime continuously until you were deprived of the office of Minister -without Portfolio, would they not? - -SCHACHT: That is absolutely incorrect. As I have stated repeatedly -yesterday and also during my direct examination, I was always referred -to in foreign broadcasts as a man who was an opponent of this system, -and all my numerous friends and acquaintances in foreign countries knew -that I was against this system and worked against it. And if any -journalist can be mentioned to me today who did not know this, then he -does not know his business. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, do you refer to the letter which you wrote to -the New York banker Leon...? - -SCHACHT: Leon Fraser. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at the time you sent that letter to -Switzerland, there was a diplomatic representative of the United States -in Berlin, was there not? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew he had a pouch communication at least -once a week and usually once a day with Washington? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I did not know it, but I assumed it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, if you wanted to communicate with the -Government of the United States or with an official of the United -States, you might have communicated through the regular channels? - -SCHACHT: I did not desire to communicate with the American Government or -with an American official. I merely desired to re-establish my -connection with a friend who had invited me in January to come to the -United States, and I made reference to this previous correspondence -between him and me in January. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That disposes of the Fraser matter then. - -Now, Dr. Schacht, while you were Minister without Portfolio, aggressive -wars were instituted, according to your testimony, against Poland, -against Denmark and Norway in April of 1940, against Holland and Belgium -in May of 1940; in June there was the French armistice and surrender; in -September of 1940 there was the German-Japanese-Italian-Tripartite Pact; -in April of 1941 there was an attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, which you -say was aggressive; in June of 1941 there was the invasion of Soviet -Russia, which you say was aggressive; on 7 December 1941 Japan attacked -Pearl Harbor, and after the attack declared war on the United States; on -8 December 1941 the United States declared war on Japan, but not on -Germany; on 11 December 1941, Germany and Italy declared war on the -United States; and all of these things happened in the foreign field and -you kept your position as Minister without Portfolio under the Hitler -Government, did you not? - -SCHACHT: Mr. Justice... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you not and is that not a fact? - -SCHACHT: Yes, and I wish to add something to this. From dozens of -witnesses who have testified here, and from myself, you have heard again -and again that it was impossible unilaterally to retire from this office -because, if I was put in as a minister by the head of a government, I -could also be retired only with his signature. You have also been told -that at various times I attempted to rid myself of this ministerial -office. Besides the witnesses’ testimony from countless others, -including Americans, to the effect that it was well known that Hitler -did not permit anyone to retire from office without his permission. And -now you charge me with having remained. I did not remain for my -pleasure, but I remained because I could not have retired from the -Ministry without making a big row. And almost constantly, I should say, -I tried to have this row until finally in January 1943 I succeeded; and -I was able to disappear from office, not without danger to my life. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will deal with your explanation later. I am -now getting the facts. - -You did not have an open break with Hitler, so that you were not -entirely out of office until after the German offensive broke down in -Russia and the German armies were in retreat and until after the Allies -had landed in Africa, did you? - -SCHACHT: The letter by which I brought about the last successful row is -dated 30 November 1942. The row and its success dates from 21 January -1943, because Hitler and Göring and whoever else participated in -discussing it, needed 7 weeks to make up their minds about the -consequence of my letter. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then by your letter it plainly shows that you -thought the ship was sinking, was it not; that means that the war was -lost? - -SCHACHT: My oral and written declarations from former times have already -shown this. I have spoken here also about this. I have testified on the -letter to Ribbentrop and Funk; I have presented a number of facts here -which prove that I never believed in the possibility of a German -victory. And my disappearance from office has nothing whatsoever to do -with all these questions. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, meanwhile, while you were remaining as -Minister without Portfolio because you thought it might be dangerous to -resign, you were encouraging the generals in the army to commit treason -against the head of the State, were you not? - -SCHACHT: Yes, and I should like now to make an additional statement to -this. It was not because of threatening danger to my life that I could -not resign earlier. For I was not afraid of endangering my life because -I was used to that ever since 1937, having constantly been exposed to -the arbitrariness of the Party and its heads. - -Your question as to whether I tried to turn a number of generals to high -treason, I answer in the affirmative. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also tried to get assassins to assassinate -Hitler, did you not? - -SCHACHT: In 1938 when I made my first attempt, I was not thinking as yet -of an assassination of Hitler. However, I must admit that later I said -if it could not be done any other way, we would have to kill the man, if -possible. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say, “We will have to kill him,” or did you -say, “Somebody else will have to kill him,” Dr. Schacht? - -SCHACHT: If I had had the opportunity I would have killed him, I myself. -I beg you therefore not to summon me before a German court for attempted -murder because in that sense I am, of course, guilty. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now, whatever your activities, they were -never sufficiently open so that the foreign files in France, which you -say were searched by the Gestapo, had an inkling of it, were they? - -SCHACHT: Yes, I could not announce this matter in advance in the -newspapers. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the Gestapo, with all its searching of you, -never was in a position to put you under arrest until after the 20 July -attack on Hitler’s life? - -SCHACHT: They could have put me under arrest much earlier than that if -they had been a little smarter; but that seems to be a strange attribute -of any police force. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was not until 1943 that the Hitler regime -dismissed you? Until that time apparently they believed that you were -doing them more good than harm? - -SCHACHT: I do not know what they believed at that time, hence I ask you -not to question me about that. You will have to ask somebody from the -regime; you still have enough people here. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have now contended that you knew about the plot -of 20 July on Hitler’s life? - -SCHACHT: I knew about it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew that Gisevius says you did not know about -it? - -SCHACHT: I already stated yesterday that I was informed not only of -Goerdeler’s efforts but that I was thoroughly informed by General -Lindemann, and the evidence of Colonel Gronau has been read here. I also -stated that I did not inform my friends about this, because there was a -mutual agreement between us that we should not tell anyone anything -which might bring him into an embarrassing situation in case he were -tortured by the Gestapo. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you recall that Gisevius said that there were -only three civilians that knew about that plot which was carefully kept -within military personnel? - -SCHACHT: You see that even Gisevius was not informed on every detail. -Naturally, he cannot testify to more than what he knew. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And so, Dr. Schacht, we are to weigh your testimony -in the light of the fact that you preferred, over a long period of time, -a course of sabotage of your government’s policy by treason against the -head of the State, rather than open resignation from his cabinet? - -SCHACHT: You constantly refer to my resignation. I have told you and -proven that no resignation was possible. Consequently your conclusion is -wrong. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right! Now let us see. In your interrogation on -16 October 1945, Exhibit USA-636, some questions were asked you about -the generals of the Army, and I ask you if you were not asked these -questions and if you did not give these answers: - - “Question: ‘I say, suppose you were Chief of the General Staff - and Hitler decided to attack Austria, would you say you had the - right to withdraw?’ - - “Answer: ‘I would have said, “Withdraw me, Sir.”’ - - “Question: ‘You would have said that?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘So you take the position that any official could at - any time withdraw if he thought that the moral obligation was - such that he felt he could not go on?’ - - “Answer: ‘Quite.’ - - “Question: ‘In other words, you feel that the members of the - General Staff of the Wehrmacht who were responsible for carrying - into execution Hitler’s plan are equally guilty with him?’ - - “Answer: ‘That is a very hard question you put to me, Sir, and I - answer, “yes”.’” - -You gave those answers, did you not? Did you give those answers? - -SCHACHT: Yes, and I should like to give an explanation of this, if the -Tribunal permits it. If Hitler ever had given me an immoral order, I -should have refused to execute it. That is what I said about the -generals also, and I uphold this statement which you have just read. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am through with him, Your Honor, except that I -would like to note the exhibit numbers. The petition to Hindenburg -referred to yesterday is 3901-PS, and will become Exhibit USA-837. The -Von Blomberg interrogation of October 1945 is Exhibit USA-838. - -DR. HANS LATERNSER: (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the -German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I request that the statement of the -Defendant Schacht insofar as it was cited and becomes part of the -minutes be stricken from the record. The question, as I understood it, -was whether he considered the General Staff to be just as guilty as -Hitler. This question was answered in the affirmative by the Defendant -Schacht in this examination. The question and the answer—the question -to begin with is inadmissible and likewise the answer because a witness -cannot pass judgment on this. That is the task of the Court. And for -this reason I request that this testimony be stricken from the record. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I do not, of course, -offer this opinion of Schacht’s as evidence against the General Staff or -against any individual soldier on trial. The evidence, I think, was as -to the credibility of Schacht and as to his position. I do not think -that his opinion regarding the guilt of anybody else would be evidence -against that other person; I think that his opinion on this matter is -evidence against himself in the matter of credibility. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix. - -DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): The question by Justice -Jackson was not whether Schacht considered the generals guilty, but the -question was whether it was correct that Schacht, in an interrogation -previous to the Trial, had given certain answers to certain questions. -In other words, it was a question about an actual occurrence which took -place in the past and not a question about an opinion or a judgment -which he was to give here. As Schacht’s counsel, I am not interested in -this passage being stricken from the record, except to the extent that -these words remain: “I, Schacht, would never have executed an immoral -order and an immoral demand by Hitler.” So far as the rest of this -answer of Schacht is concerned I, as his defense counsel, declare that -it is a matter of indifference to me. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, after the declaration of Justice Jackson, -I withdraw my objection. - -MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): -Mr. President, may I begin my cross-examination? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Schacht, when answering the questions put to -you by your counsel, you informed us of the circumstances under which -you first became acquainted with Hitler and Göring. You even remembered -a detail such as the pea soup with lard which was served for supper at -Göring’s house. - -What I am interested in now are some other particulars, rather more -relevant to the case, of your relations with Hitler and Göring. Tell me, -on whose initiative did your first meeting with Hitler and Göring take -place? - -SCHACHT: I have already stated that my friend, Bank Director Von Stauss, -invited me to an evening in his home so that I might meet Göring there. -The meeting with Hitler then took place when Göring asked me to come to -his home—that is, Göring’s home—to meet Hitler. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: For what reasons did you, at that time, accept the -invitation to meet Hitler and Göring? - -SCHACHT: The National Socialist Party at that time was one of the -strongest parties in the Reichstag with 108 seats, and the National -Socialist movement throughout the country was extremely lively. -Consequently, I was more or less interested in making the acquaintance -of the leading men of this movement whom up to then I did not know at -all. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But you declared that you were invited by Göring -himself. Why did Göring especially invite you? - -SCHACHT: Please ask Herr Göring that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you not ask him yourself? - -SCHACHT: Herr Göring wished me to meet Hitler, or Hitler to meet me. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What for? With what aim in mind? - -SCHACHT: That you must ask Herr Göring. - -GEN, ALEXANDROV: Do you not think that Hitler and Göring intended—and -not unsuccessfully at that—to inveigle you into participating in the -fascist movement, knowing that in Germany you were an economist and -financier of repute who shared their views? - -SCHACHT: I was uninformed about the intentions of these two gentlemen at -that time. However, I can imagine that it was just as much a matter of -interest for these gentlemen to meet Herr Schacht as it was for me to -meet Herr Hitler and Herr Göring. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then it was a matter of purely personal interest; or -were other considerations involved, of a political nature? You yourself -understood that your participation in the fascist movement would be of -advantage to Hitler, inasmuch as you were a well-known man in your own -country? - -SCHACHT: As far as I was concerned, I was only interested in seeing what -kind of people they were. What motives these two gentlemen had are -unknown to me, as I have already stated. My collaboration in the fascist -movement was entirely out of the question, and it was not given... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, please... - -SCHACHT: Please let me finish. My collaboration was not given before the -July elections of 1932. As I have stated here, the acquaintance was made -in January 1931, which was 1½ years before these elections. Throughout -these 1½ years no collaboration took place. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, was your acquaintance with Hitler and Göring -exclusively limited to these meetings, or had you already met them -before Hitler came into power? - -SCHACHT: Until July 1932 I saw Hitler and Göring, each of them, perhaps -once, twice, or three times—I cannot recall that in these 1½ years. But -in any case there is no question of any frequent meetings. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then, how do you explain your letter to Hitler of 29 -August 1932 in which you offered your services to Hitler? You remember -this letter? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: How do you explain it? - -SCHACHT: I have spoken about this repeatedly. Will you be so kind as to -read it in the record? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please repeat it once more, briefly. - -THE PRESIDENT: If he has been over it once, that is sufficient. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: When, and by whom were you first invited to participate -in the future Hitlerite Government and promised the post of President of -the Reichsbank? - -SCHACHT: The President of the Reichsbank did not hold a position in the -government, but was a high official outside the government. The first -time that there was any talk in my presence about this post was on 30 -January 1933, when I accidentally ran into Göring in the lobby of the -Kaiserhof Hotel, and he said to me, “Ah, there comes our future -President of the Reichsbank.” - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: When answering the questions of your counsel, you -declared that the fascist theory of race supremacy was sheer nonsense, -that the fascist ideology was no ideology at all, that you were opposed -to the solution of the Lebensraum problem by the seizure of new -territories, that you were opposed to the Leadership Principle within -the Fascist Party and even made a speech on this subject in the Academy -of German Law, and that you were opposed to the fascist policy of -exterminating the Jews. - -Is this right? Did you say this when answering the questions put by your -counsel? - -SCHACHT: Yes, we both heard it here. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Well, then tell me, what led you to fascism and to -co-operation with Hitler? - -SCHACHT: Nothing at all led me to fascism; I have never been a fascist. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then what induced you to co-operate with Hitler since -you had adopted a negative attitude toward his theories and the theories -of German fascism? - -THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, he has told us what he says led him -to co-operate with Hitler. I think you must have heard him. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But it did, in fact, take place? - -[_Turning to the defendant._] In reply to a question by your counsel as -to why you did not emigrate, you stated that you did not wish to be a -simple martyr. Tell me, did you not know the fate which befell Germany’s -outstanding personalities, who held democratic and progressive ideas -when Hitler came to power? Do you know that they were all exiled or sent -to concentration camps? - -SCHACHT: You are confusing things here. I did not answer that I did not -want to be a martyr to the question of whether I wanted to emigrate; but -I said, “Emigrants—that is, voluntary emigrants—never served their -country,” and I did not want to save my own life, but I wanted to -continue to work for the welfare of my country. - -The martyr point was in connection with a question following, as to -whether I expected any good to have resulted for my country if I had -died as a martyr. To that I replied, “Martyrs serve their country only -if their sacrifice becomes known.” - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You related it somewhat differently. I shall, -nevertheless, repeat my question. - -THE PRESIDENT: I would be very grateful if you would repeat this -question. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know the fate which befell the foremost men of -Germany, men who held progressive and democratic ideas when Hitler came -to power? You know that all these people were either exiled or sent to -concentration camps? - -SCHACHT: I expressly stated here that when I spoke of emigrants I meant -those who were in exile, who did not leave the country under compulsion -but left voluntarily—those are the ones I was speaking about. The -individual fates of the others are not known to me. If you ask me about -individual persons, I will tell you regarding each one of these people, -whether I know his fate or not. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: The fate of these great men is universally known. You, -one of the few outstanding statesmen in democratic Germany, co-operated -with Hitler. Do you admit this? - -SCHACHT: No. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You testified—and I am obliged to refer once again to -the same question—that the entry in the Goebbels diary of 21 November -1932 was false. Once again I remind you of this entry which Goebbels -wrote, and I quote: - - “In a conversation with Dr. Schacht I found that he fully - reflects our viewpoint. He is one of the few who fully agrees - with the Führer’s position.” - -Do you continue to say that this entry does not conform to reality? - -This is the question which I am asking you. - -SCHACHT: I have never claimed that this entry was false. I only claimed -that Goebbels got this impression and he was in error about it. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But according to your statement this entry does not -conform to reality, to your attitude toward Hitler’s regime. Is that the -case or not? - -SCHACHT: In the general way in which Goebbels represents it there, it is -wrong; it is not correct. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Why did you not lodge a protest? After all, Goebbels’ -diary, including this entry, was published. - -SCHACHT: If I would have protested against all the inaccuracies which -were printed about me, I would never have come to my senses. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But do you not see, this is not exactly an ordinary -excerpt from Goebbels’ diary—and he was rather an outstanding statesman -in fascist Germany—for he describes your political views; and if you -were not in agreement with him it would have been appropriate for you, -in some way or other, to take a stand against it. - -SCHACHT: Permit me to say something to this. Either you ask me—at any -rate I should not like to have here a two-sided argument if it is only -one-sided. I say that the diary of Goebbels is an unusually common piece -of writing. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: The witness, Dr. Franz Reuter, your biographer and -close friend, in his written affidavits of 6 February 1946, presented to -the Tribunal by your counsel as Document Schacht-35, testified to the -following: “Schacht joined Hitler in the early thirties and helped him -to power...” - -Do you consider these affidavits of the witness Dr. Franz Reuter as -untrue, or do you confirm them? - -SCHACHT: I consider them wrong. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: How far did you personally participate to help bring -Hitler to power? I continue this question: Under what circumstances and -for what purpose did you, in February 1933, organize a meeting between -Hitler and the industrialists? This subject has already been mentioned -before. - -SCHACHT: I did not help Hitler to come to power in any way. All this has -been discussed here at great length. In February 1933 Hitler had already -been in power quite some time. As to finances and the industrial -meetings of February 1933, that has profusely been gone into. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: What particular role did you play in this conference? - -SCHACHT: This, too, has been discussed in detail. Please read about it -in the record. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have already familiarized myself with the reports but -you have not explained events sufficiently clearly. In order to shed -some more light on the question I shall refer to Defendant Funk’s -testimony of 4 June 1945. This is Document Number 2828-PS. I quote -Defendant Funk’s testimony: - - “I was at the meeting. Money was not demanded by Göring but by - Schacht. Hitler left the room, then Schacht made a speech asking - for money for the election. I was only there as an impartial - observer, since I enjoyed a close friendship with the - industrialists.” - -Does this testimony of the Defendant Funk represent the truth? - -SCHACHT: Herr Funk is in error. Document D-203 has been presented here -to the Court by the Prosecution... - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: But... - -SCHACHT: Please do not interrupt me. The Prosecution has submitted this -document, and this document shows that Göring directed the request for -financial aid and not I. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In this connection Defendant Funk declared that this -speech was made by you and not by Göring. I ask you now, which statement -represents the truth? - -SCHACHT: I have just told you that Herr Funk is in error and that the -evidence of the Prosecution is correct. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then what part did you play in connection with this -conference? - -SCHACHT: This, too, I have already stated in detail, I am... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already heard a long cross-examination -and it does not desire to hear the same facts or matters gone over -again. Will you tell the Tribunal whether you have any points which the -Soviet Union are particularly interested in, which have not been dealt -with in cross-examination? - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, in his statements the Defendant Schacht -did not reply in sufficient detail, nor were his answers sufficiently -clear. I am therefore obliged, in certain instances, to refer to these -questions again. It is, in particular, not clear to us what part the -Defendant Schacht played in this meeting of the industrialists. It -appears to me that Defendant Schacht did not give a sufficiently clear -or well-defined reply to the question which I had asked him. As for the -other questions, they are few in number and I imagine that after the -recess I can try and finish with them in about 30 or 40 minutes. All -these questions are of interest to us since they enable us to determine -the guilt of the Defendant Schacht. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. The Tribunal is not prepared to listen to -questions which have already been put. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Perhaps now you will find it desirable to declare a -recess, in order to continue the cross-examination after the recess. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, General Alexandrov, the cross-examination will -continue up to the recess. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you admit that, while acting as President of the -Reichsbank and as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary for War -Economy, you played a decisive part in preparing the rearmament of -Germany and consequently, in preparing for a war of aggression? - -SCHACHT: No, I categorically deny that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: You were Plenipotentiary for War Economy? - -SCHACHT: Well, we have spoken about that here ten times already. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I did not hear it from your own lips, not once. - -THE PRESIDENT: He has admitted throughout—and, of course, it is -obvious—that he was Plenipotentiary for War Economy; but what you put -to him was, whether he as Plenipotentiary for War Economy took part in -rearmament for aggressive war, and he has said over and over again that -that was not his object, that his object was to gain equality for -Germany. He said so, and we have got to consider whether that is true. -But that he said it is perfectly clear. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In my subsequent questions it will be quite clear why I -touch precisely on this question. - -How long did you occupy the post of Plenipotentiary for War Economy? - -SCHACHT: I have just stated that I do not understand the question—for -what duration? All this has certainly been stated here already. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have got the date when he became Plenipotentiary for -War Economy and the date when he ceased to be. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I should like to remind you of the duties imposed on -you as Plenipotentiary by the Reich Defense Act of 21 May 1935. I shall -quote a brief excerpt from Section 2 of this law, entitled -“Mobilization”: - - “Point 1: For the purpose of directing the entire war economy - the Führer and Reich Chancellor will appoint a Plenipotentiary - for War Economy. - - “Point 2: It will be the duty of the Plenipotentiary for War - Economy to utilize all economic possibilities in the interest of - the war and to safeguard the economic well-being of the German - people. - - “Point 3: Subordinate to him will be: the Reich Minister of - Economics, the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, the - Reich Labor Minister, the Chief Reich Forester, and all other - Reich officials directly subordinate to the Führer and Reich - Chancellor. - - “Further, he shall be responsible for the financing of the war - within the sphere of the Reich Finance Ministry and the - Reichsbank. - - “Point 4: The Plenipotentiary for War Economy shall have the - right to enact public laws within his official jurisdiction - which may differ from existing laws.” - -You admit that this law gave you extraordinary powers in the sphere of -war economy? - -SCHACHT: This document is before the Court and I assume that you have -read it correctly. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not asking you whether I have read this document -correctly; I am asking you whether you admit that by this law you were -given extraordinary powers in the sphere of the war economy? Do you -admit that? - -SCHACHT: I had exactly the full powers which are described in the law. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you admit that these were not ordinary powers, but -quite extraordinary powers? - -SCHACHT: No, I will not admit this at all. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, you considered that the Reich Defense -Law of 21 May 1935 was just an ordinary law? - -SCHACHT: It was simply an ordinary law. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: And you also considered the functions imposed on you by -this law as Plenipotentiary for War Economy ordinary functions? - -SCHACHT: As very common regulations which are customary with every -general staff. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Alexandrov. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, taking into consideration the Tribunal’s -desire, as well as the fact that Mr. Jackson has already questioned -Schacht in detail, and having read the minutes of this morning’s -session, it has been possible for me to shorten considerably the number -of questions in my examination. I have only two to put to Defendant -Schacht. - -Defendant Schacht, on 21 May 1935 the Reich Government made a decision -with regard to the Reich Defense Council. The decision was as follows, -citing Point 1: - - “It is the will of the Führer and Reich Chancellor that the - Plenipotentiary General for War Economy shall take over this - responsible directorate (Leitung), and is, as with the Reich War - Minister, holder of the executive power, independent and - responsible for his own sphere of activity to the Führer and - Reich Chancellor.” - -Do you admit that you carried through actively this decision of the -Reich Government; and that you took an active part in Germany’s economic -preparations for aggressive wars? - -SCHACHT: No, Mr. Prosecutor, I definitely do not admit that. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: On the 4th of March 1935, in your speech at the Spring -Fair in Leipzig, you said the following, citing Exhibit Number USA-627 -(Document Number EC-415): - - “My so-called foreign friends are doing neither me nor the cause - a service, nor a service to themselves, when they try to bring - me into conflict with the impossible, so they say, National - Socialist economic theories, and present me, so to speak, as the - guardian of economic reason. I can assure you that everything I - say and do is with the full consent of the Führer, and I shall - neither do nor say anything which he has not approved. - Therefore, the guardian of economic reason is not I but the - Führer.” - -Do you confirm this speech you made at the Spring Fair in Leipzig? - -SCHACHT: I admit it and would like to make a statement. - -I have said repeatedly, first, that my foreign friends, as far as I had -foreign friends, did not do me a service when they said publicly that I -was an adversary of Hitler, because that made my position extremely -dangerous. Secondly, I said in that speech I would not do anything which -would not be according to my conviction, and that Hitler did everything -I suggested to him, that is, that it was his opinion also. If I had said -anything to the contrary, that would have been expressed. I was in -complete accord with him as long as his policies agreed with mine; -afterwards I was not, and left. - -GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no more questions, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: I will put only a few questions which arose from the -cross-examination. - -During the cross-examination, the New Plan was again dealt with without -Dr. Schacht’s having had an opportunity of explaining it and of stating -what role, if any, that plan had in the economy of rearmament and who -was the originator, the responsible originator of the New Plan. -Therefore, may I put this question to Dr. Schacht now? - -SCHACHT: The New Plan was a logical consequence of the economic -development which followed the Treaty of Versailles. I mention again -only briefly that by the removal of German property abroad, the entire -organization for German foreign trade was taken away and therefore great -difficulties arose for German exports. - -Without those exports, however, payment of reparations, or such, was out -of the question. Nevertheless, all the great powers, particularly those -who were competing with Germany on the world market, resorted to raising -their tariffs in order to exclude German merchandise from their markets -or to make it more difficult for Germany to sell her goods, so that it -became more and more of a problem to develop German exports. - -When Germany, in spite of this, tried by lower prices, at the cost of -lower wages to maintain or to increase her export trade, the other -powers resorted to other means to meet German competition. I recall the -various devaluations of foreign currencies which were made, again -impeding the competition of German products. When even that did not -suffice, the system of quotas was invented; that is, the amount of -German goods which were imported into a country could not go beyond a -certain quota; that was prohibited. Such quotas for German imports were -established by Holland, France, and other nations; so here also German -export was made increasingly difficult. - -All these measures to hinder German export led to the situation that -German nationals also could no longer pay even private debts abroad. As -you have heard here, for many years I had warned against incurring these -debts. I was not listened to. It will be of interest to you to state -here briefly that Germany, against my advice, had within five years -contracted as large a foreign debt as the United States had throughout -the 40 years before the first World War. - -Germany was a highly-developed industrial nation and did not need -foreign money, and the United States at that time was going in more for -colonial development and could make good use of foreign capital. - -We now hit the bottom. When we were no longer able to pay our interest -abroad, some countries resorted to the method of no longer paying German -exporters the proceeds from the German exports, but confiscated these -funds, and out of this paid themselves the interest on our debts abroad; -that is, effecting a settlement, so to speak. That was the so-called -“clearing system.” The private claims were confiscated in order to meet -the demands of foreign creditors. - -To meet this development, I looked for a way out to continue German -exports. I set out a very simple principle: “I will buy only from those -who buy from me.” Therefore, I looked around for countries which were -prepared to cover their needs in Germany, and I prepared to buy my -merchandise there. - -That was the New Plan. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what we have to do with this, Dr. Dix. - -DR. DIX: Well, to make a long story short, the New Plan had nothing to -do with the intention to rearm, let alone with any aggressive -intentions. - -SCHACHT: Absolutely nothing. - -DR. DIX: In this connection, can you give an estimate as to what -percentage of German economic production was armament production? - -SCHACHT: That question has been put to me in previous interrogations and -at that time I was not able to answer it, because I could not recall -what amount Germany expended on her armament. Now, from the testimony of -Field Marshal Keitel, we have heard here that armament expenditure -during these years when the Reichsbank was still co-operating, 1934-35, -1935-36, 1936-37 and so on, amounted respectively to 5,000 million -Reichsmark, 7,000 million Reichsmark and 9,000 million Reichsmark; that -is the estimate of experts. The production of the entire German economy -during these years could be estimated approximately at 50-60,000 million -Reichsmark. If I compare that with the armament expenditure, which has -been stated here by a witness, then we find that armament expenditure -amounted to about 10 to 15 percent of the entire German economy during -the years when I had anything to do with it. - -DR. DIX: Then, in the course of the cross-examination, there came up the -question of your willingness or unwillingness to give up the office of -Plenipotentiary for War Economy, and in order to prove your statement -that General Von Blomberg did not wish you to give up that office, you -referred to a document which has been submitted by the Prosecution. I am -referring to Document EC-244, and it is a letter from the Reichswehr -Minister, Von Blomberg, to Hitler, of 22 February 1937. It has already -been read, so there is no need to do so now. May I only point out that -in the last paragraph Blomberg expressed the desire that the Führer -would direct or get the Reichsbank president to remain in office, so -that covers the statement made by Schacht. Furthermore, in the course of -cross-examination by Mr. Justice Jackson, mention was made of your -credibility concerning the statement on your colonial aspirations; and -from the point of view of colonial policy without mastery of the -sea—Germany had not the mastery of the sea—can Germany have any -colonial problems? That was the question and answer; and in that -connection I would like to ask you: Did Germany have colonies before -1914? - -SCHACHT: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Before 1914, or let us say between 1884 and 1914, that is, the -time when Germany had colonial possessions, did Germany have mastery of -the sea, especially as compared with Great Britain? - -SCHACHT: No, in no way. - -DR. DIX: That covers it. Then there is another problem from the point of -view of the credibility of your statements: Mention has been made of the -ethical conflicts concerning your oath to Hitler, as head of the State, -as you say, and the intentions which you have revealed to overthrow -Hitler, even to kill him. Do you not know of many cases in history where -persons holding high office in a state attempted to overthrow the head -of the state to whom they had sworn allegiance? - -SCHACHT: I believe you find these examples in the history of all -nations. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we are not concerned with past history, are we? -You do not think the question of whether there are historical instances -is a legitimate question to put to this witness? - -DR. DIX: Then I will not pursue that point any further; it is -argumentation and maybe I can use it later in my final pleadings. - -Now, returning to the question of colonies, is it not correct that, -apart from your personal colonial aspirations, Germany, the Reich -Government, had prepared officially for the acquisition of her colonies -and later their administration; and was not there a colonial policy -department until 1942 or 1943 or thereabouts? - -SCHACHT: Well, it is set out explicitly in the Party program that the -colonial demands are part of the Party program. Of course, the Foreign -Office also concerned itself with it and I believe also in the Party -there was a colonial policy department. - -DR. DIX: Under Ritter Von Epp? - -SCHACHT: Yes, under Ritter Von Epp. - -DR. DIX: Then concerning the question of the mefo bills, I only want to -summarize: Did you mean to imply that the mefo bills were to serve as a -brake on rearmament, because the signature of the Reich to these bills, -that is of the Reich Government, was binding for their repayment? - -SCHACHT: You see, I said very clearly that the limitation of the mefo -bills to 5 years, and making them mature in 5 years, would automatically -put a brake on armament. - -DR. DIX: Furthermore, Mr. Justice Jackson dealt with the point that the -name of Schacht, when he retained office as Minister without Portfolio, -had a propaganda value in favor of the Nazi regime abroad and therefore -served the aggressive intentions and their execution. In this connection -and in order to shorten the presentation of my documents, may I read -from my document book, Exhibit 37(a), Document Schacht-37(a); that is, -the English text is on Page 157 and the German on Page 149. On Page 5 of -that long affidavit Huelse states: - - “The foreign press drew from the dismissal”—that is, the - dismissal as Reichsbank President in 1939—“the correct - conclusions and interpreted it as a warning signal. In this - connection in repeated conversations, even at the end of 1938, - and in agreement with Dr. Schacht, I spoke with representatives - of foreign issuing banks, whom I had met at board meetings of - the Bank for International Settlement, and I informed them that - the resignation of Schacht and individual members of the - Reichsbank Directorate meant that things in Germany were - following a dangerous path.” - -Furthermore, the Prosecutor for the Soviet Union has accused Dr. -Schacht, because in the biography of Reuter it is stated expressly that -Schacht assisted the regime during the stage of the struggle for power. -At any rate, that is the substance. That is correct as a quotation from -Reuter’s book, but there is something else. I believe we still have to -submit Exhibit 35 (Document Schacht-35), Page 133 of the English text -and 125 of the German, and there we find on the second page of that long -affidavit the following sentences, which limit the authenticity of that -biography and prove it to be a biased piece of writing. Reuter says in -this affidavit, and I quote: - - “I had a biography of Dr. Schacht published twice, first at the - end of 1933 by the Publishing House R. Kittler in Berlin, and at - the end of 1936 by the German Publishing Institute in Stuttgart. - Besides its being a factual presentation of his life and his - work, it also served the purpose of shielding him from his - attackers. Therefore the principles of purely objective - historical research are not applicable to this publication, - because defensive views required by the situation at the time - has to be taken into consideration.” - -This must be known and read before one can estimate the evidential value -of that biography. - -And that concludes my questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can then retire. - -DR. DIX: I now call the witness Vocke with Your Lordship’s permission. - -[_The witness Vocke took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -WILHELM VOCKE (Witness): Wilhelm Vocke. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. DIX: Herr Vocke, you were a member of the Directorate of the -Reichsbank. When did you enter the Reichsbank Directorate, and when did -you resign from it? - -VOCKE: Reich President Ebert appointed me a member of the Reichsbank -Directorate in 1919, and Hitler dismissed me from office on 1 February -1939. Therefore, I was for about 20 years a member of the Reichsbank -Directorate, and for 10 of these years I was under Schacht. - -DR. DIX: Excuse me, but I must ask you, were you a member of the Party? - -VOCKE: No. - -DR. DIX: Were you a member of the SA? - -VOCKE: No. - -DR. DIX: Were you a member of the SS? - -VOCKE: No. - -DR. DIX: Were you a sponsoring member of the SA or SS? - -VOCKE: No. - -DR. DIX: You had no connection with the Party? - -VOCKE: No. - -DR. DIX: When did you meet Schacht? - -VOCKE: In 1915. I merely made his acquaintance then, but it was not -until he became Reichsbank Kommissar and Reichsbank President, that I -came to know him better. - -DR. DIX: I come now to the period of the first Reichsbank presidency of -Schacht, that is, the year 1923. At that time what was the attitude of -the Reichsbank Directorate to the candidature of Schacht as Reichsbank -President? - -VOCKE: A disapproving attitude. - -DR. DIX: And for what reason? - -VOCKE: We wanted Helferich as candidate for the presidency of the -Reichsbank, because Helferich, in close co-operation with the -Reichsbank, had created the Rentenmark and stabilization of currency. - -But as reason for our disapproval of Schacht, we mentioned an incident -contained in Schacht’s dossier which referred to his activity under Herr -Von Jung in 1915. According to this, Schacht, who had come from the -Dresdner Bank, had rendered assistance to the Dresdner Bank which Von -Jung did not consider quite correct, and that was the reason for -Schacht’s dismissal at that time. - -The Reich Government, however, did not heed the criticism which we made -against Schacht, and as Minister Severing told me recently, he followed -the proverb, “It is not the worst fruit which is eaten by worms,” and -Schacht was appointed President. - -DR. DIX: So that Schacht came to you as President, and he must have -known that the Directorate did not want him, or at any rate wanted -somebody else. Therefore, I assume the question is in order as to what -the relations were among that group, that is, the Reichsbank Directorate -and the new President. - -VOCKE: Schacht took up his office in January 1924. He called us all to a -meeting in which he spoke very frankly about the situation, and this was -the substance of what he said: Well, you disapproved of me for President -because I stole silver spoons; but now I am your President, and I hope -that we will work together, and we will get to see eye to eye—that was -the expression used by Schacht—however, if one or another of you feels -that he cannot work with me, well, then he will have to take the -consequences, and I will gladly assist him to find another position. - -Our relations with Schacht soon became good and we worked together -successfully. It was very good to work with Schacht. We quickly -recognized that he was an unrivalled expert in his and our branch, and -also in other respects his conduct was beyond reproach. He was clean in -his dealings and there was no nepotism. Neither did he bring with him -any men whom he wanted to push. Also he was a man who at all times -tolerated controversy and differing opinions—he even welcomed them. He -had no use for colleagues who were “yes men.” - -THE PRESIDENT: There is neither any charge nor any issue about this. - -DR. DIX: That is quite correct, Your Lordship, but I thought it would be -helpful to touch upon these things. But we are now at the end, and will -come to the Reichsbank presidency from 1933 on. - -[_Turning to the witness._] After his short period of retirement Schacht -again became President of the Reichsbank in 1933. Did you have any -conversations with him about his relations to Hitler and to the Party? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Would you like to describe to the Tribunal the kind of -statements Schacht made to you? - -VOCKE: First, I would like to mention two conversations which I remember -almost word for word. During the period when Schacht was not in office, -that is about three years, I hardly ever saw him, maybe three or four -times at occasions at the Wilhelmstift. He never visited me, nor did I -visit him, except once, when Schacht came into the bank—maybe he had -some business there—and visited me in my office. We at once... - -DR. DIX: When was that? - -VOCKE: That must have been in 1932, a comparatively short time before -the seizure of power. We immediately began to speak about political -questions, about Hitler and Schacht’s relations to Hitler. I used that -opportunity to warn Schacht seriously against Hitler and the Nazis. -Schacht said to me: “Herr Vocke, one must give this man or these people -a chance. If they do no good, they will disappear. They will be cleared -out in the same way as their predecessors.” - -I told Schacht: “Yes, but it may be that the harm done to the German -people in the meantime will be so great that it can never be repaired.” - -Schacht did not take that very seriously, and with some light remark, -such as: You are an old pessimist, or something like that, he left. - -The second conversation about which I want to report took place shortly -after Schacht’s re-entry into the bank. It was probably in March 1933, -or the beginning of April. Schacht at that time showed a kind of -ostentatious enthusiasm, and I talked to him about his relation to the -Party. I assumed that Schacht was a member of the Party. I told him that -I had no intention of becoming a member of the Party, and Schacht said -to me: “You do not have to. You are not supposed to. What do you think? -I would not even dream of becoming a member of the Party. Can you -imagine me bending under the Party yoke, accepting the Party discipline? -And then, think of it, when I speak to Hitler I should click my heels -and say, ‘Mein Führer,’ or when I write to him address him as ‘Mein -Führer.’ That is quite out of the question for me. I am and remain a -free man.” - -That conversation took place and those words were spoken by Schacht at a -time when he was at the apex of a rapprochement with Hitler, and many a -time I have thought about it, whether it was true, and remained true, -that Schacht was a free man. - -As things turned out, after a few years Schacht was forced to realize to -his sorrow that he had lost a great deal of his freedom, that he could -not change the course of the armaments financing scheme, upon which he -had embarked, when he wished to do so; that it had become a chain in the -hands of Hitler and that it would take years of filing and tugging for -it to break. - -But, in spite of that, his words were true inasmuch as they reflected -the inner attitude of Schacht towards Hitler. Schacht never was a blind -follower. It was incompatible with his character, to sign himself away -to somebody, to sell himself and follow with blind devotion. - -If one should seek to characterize Schacht’s attitude to Hitler thus: My -Führer, you command, I follow; and if the Führer ordered him to prepare -an armament program: I will finance an armament program, and it is for -the Führer to decide to what use it shall be put, whether for war or -peace—that would be incompatible with Schacht’s attitude and character. -He was not a man who thought along subaltern lines or who would throw -away his liberty; in that Schacht differed fundamentally from a great -many men in leading political and military positions in Germany. - -Schacht’s attitude, as I came to know it from his character and from his -statements, could be explained somewhat as follows: Schacht admired this -man’s tremendous dynamic force directed towards national aims, and he -took account of this man, hoping to use him as a tool for his own plans, -for Schacht’s plans towards a peaceful political and economic -reconstruction and strengthening of Germany. That is what Schacht -thought and believed, and I take that from many statements made by -Schacht... - -DR. DIX: That, I think, answers the question fully. Now the Prosecution -accuses Schacht and alleges that Hitler picked out Schacht to finance -armament for an aggressive war. You, Herr Vocke, were a member of the -Reichsbank Directorate and you worked with him during all those years. -Therefore, I ask you to tell the Tribunal whether anything transpired in -the course of conversations, or whether you noticed anything about -Schacht’s activities and work which would justify such a reproach. - -VOCKE: No. Schacht often expressed the view that only a peaceful -development could restore Germany and not once did I hear him say -anything which might suggest that he knew anything about the warlike -intentions of Hitler. I have searched my memory and I recall three or -four incidents which answer that question quite clearly. I should like -to mention them in this connection. - -The first was the 420 million gold mark credit which was repaid in 1933. -Luther, when the Reichsbank cover disintegrated in the crisis... - -DR. DIX: May I interrupt for the information of the Tribunal: Luther was -Schacht’s predecessor. - -VOCKE: ...in 1931 when the cover for the issue of notes had to be cut -down, Luther in his despair sent me to England in order to acquire a -large credit in gold from the Bank of England which would restore -confidence in the Reichsbank. Governor Norman was quite prepared to help -me, but he said that it would be necessary for that purpose to approach -also the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bank of France, and the -International Bank in Basel. That was done and the credit amounted to -420 million gold marks, but the inclusion of the Bank of France created -political difficulties which delayed the credit for about 10 or 12 days. - -When I returned to Berlin I was shocked to hear that the greater part of -the credit had already been used up. The gold was torn from our hands, -and I told Luther: The credit has lost its usefulness and we must repay -it immediately. Our honor is our last asset. The banks which have helped -us shall not lose a single pfennig. - -Luther did not have sufficient understanding for that, and he said in so -many words: What one has, one holds. We do not know for what purpose we -may still have urgent need of the gold. And so the credit was extended -and dragged out over years. - -When Schacht came to the bank in 1933, I told myself that Schacht would -understand me, and he did understand me immediately. He agreed with me -and repaid that credit without hesitation. It never entered his head for -what other purpose one might use that enormous sum of gold, and I say -here that if Schacht had known of any plans for a war, he would have -been a fool to pay back 420 million gold marks. - -As to the second incident, I cannot give the exact date, but I believe -it was in 1936. The Reichsbank received a letter from the Army Command -or the General Staff marked “Top Secret,” with the request to remove the -gold reserves of the Reichsbank, the securities and bank note reserves -from the frontier regions of Germany to a zone in the interior. The -reasons given were the following: In the event of a threat to attack -Germany on two fronts, the Army Command had decided to evacuate the -frontier areas and to confine itself to a central zone which could be -defended under all circumstances. I still remember from the map which -was attached to the letter that the line of defense in the East... - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems to the Tribunal that this is very remote from -any question we have to decide. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, that map which the witness wants to describe -shows clearly and beyond doubt that the attitude of the German High -Command in 1936 was a defensive attitude and one which accepted the -greatest strategic disadvantages, and this was communicated to the -Reichsbank under the presidency of Schacht. We can see from that -communication that nobody at that time even thought of aggressive -intentions of the Army Command. - -THE PRESIDENT: At what time? - -DR. DIX: 1936, I understood him to say that. Perhaps it is better that -he should give you the date. - -VOCKE: I cannot say exactly what the date was, but it must have been -about 1936, in my estimation. - -DR. DIX: I believe that it is rather relevant. May the witness continue? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -VOCKE: The line of defense in the East went from Hof straight up to -Stettin; I cannot remember so well where the western line was drawn, but -Baden and the Rhineland were outside of it. - -The Reichsbank was shocked to hear that and about the threat of a -two-front attack on Germany and the tremendous sacrifice of German -territory. It was also shocked at the idea that the Reichsbank, in the -event of an occupation of these regions by the enemy, would have to -leave these occupied territories without any financial support. -Therefore we refused the last-mentioned request, but, as far as the gold -was concerned, we placed it in Berlin, Munich, Nuremberg, and so on. - -We could no longer have any doubt, however, after this top secret -document, about the defensive character of our armaments and -preparations. - -I come to a third incident. That was in 1937. At that time, when the -economy was already racing ahead and more and more money was being put -up, Schacht asked for the support of the German professors of economy -and called them together to persuade them to work along his lines, that -is, to try to check this trend. At that meeting one of those present -asked Schacht the question: “What will happen if war breaks out?” -Schacht got up and said: “Gentlemen, then we are lost. Then everything -is over with us. I ask you to drop this subject. We cannot worry about -it now.” - -Now I come to the fourth incident, which also leaves no doubt about -Schacht’s attitude or the completeness of his information. That was a -conversation immediately after the outbreak of the war. In the first few -days Schacht, Huelse, Dreyse, Schniewind and I met for a confidential -talk. The first thing Schacht said was: “Gentlemen, this is a fraud such -as the world has never seen. The Poles have never received the German -offer. The newspapers are lying in order to lull the German people to -sleep. The Poles have been attacked. Henderson did not even receive the -offer, but only a short excerpt from the note was given to him verbally. -If at any time at the outbreak of a war, the question of guilt was -clear, then it is so in this case. That is a crime the like of which -cannot be imagined.” - -Then Schacht continued: “What madness to start a war with a military -power like Poland, which is led by the best French general staff -officers. Our armament is no good. It has been made by quacks. The money -has been wasted without point or plan.” - -To the retort: “But we have an air force which can make itself felt,” -Schacht said: “The air force does not decide the outcome of a war, the -ground forces do. We have no heavy guns, no tanks; in three weeks the -German armies in Poland will break down, and then think of the coalition -which still faces us.” - -Those were Schacht’s words and they made a deep impression on me; for me -they are a definite and clear answer to the question which Dr. Dix put -to me. - -DR. DIX: Now, in the course of those years from 1933 to 1939 did Schacht -ever speak to you about alleged or surmised war plans of Hitler? - -VOCKE: No, never. - -DR. DIX: What was Schacht’s basic attitude to the idea of a war; did he -ever mention that to you? - -VOCKE: Yes, of course, fairly often. Schacht always emphasized that war -destroys and ruins both the victor and the vanquished, and, in his and -our field, he pointed to the example of the victorious powers whose -economy and currency had been devaluated and partly even crippled. -England had to devaluate her currency; in France there was a complete -breakdown of the financial system, not to speak of other powers such as -Belgium, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. - -DR. DIX: Schacht made these statements? - -VOCKE: Yes, he did, and quite frequently. Schacht went into detail and -was very definite about the situation in neutral countries. Schacht said -again and again: There will be conflicts and war again, but for Germany -there is only one policy, absolute neutrality. And he quoted the -examples of Switzerland, Sweden, and so on, who by their neutral -attitude had grown rich and more powerful and become creditor nations. -Schacht again and again emphasized that very strongly. - -DR. DIX: In that connection you will understand my question. How can you -explain then, or rather, how did Schacht explain to you the fact that he -was financing armament at all? - -VOCKE: Schacht believed at that time that a certain quantity of -armaments, such as every country in the world possessed, was also -necessary for Germany for political... - -DR. DIX: May I interrupt you. I want you to state only the things which -Schacht told you; not your opinions about what Schacht may have thought, -but only what Schacht actually said to you. - -VOCKE: Yes. Schacht said a foreign policy without armament was -impossible in the long run. Schacht also said that neutrality, which he -demanded for Germany in case of conflict between the big powers, must be -an armed neutrality. Schacht considered armaments necessary, because -otherwise Germany would always be defenseless in the midst of armed -nations. He was not thinking of definite attack from any side, but he -said that in every country there was a militarist party which might come -to power today or tomorrow, and a completely helpless Germany, -surrounded by other nations, was unthinkable. It was even a danger to -peace because it was an incentive to attack her one day. Finally, -however, and principally Schacht saw in armaments the only means of -revitalizing and starting up German economy as a whole. Barracks would -have to be built; the building industry, which is the backbone of -economy, must be revitalized. Only in that way, he hoped, could -unemployment be tackled. - -DR. DIX: Now, events led to the militarization of the Rhineland, the -reintroduction of compulsory military service. Did you have -conversations with Schacht in which he said that if this policy of -Hitler was pursued it might lead to a war, at least to an armed -intervention by other nations which did not approve of such policies? -Were there any such conversations between you and Schacht? - -VOCKE: Not in the sense of your question. Schacht did speak to me about -the incidents when the Rhineland was reoccupied, that is to say, he -explained to me how at that time Hitler, as soon as France adopted a -somewhat menacing attitude, was resolved to withdraw his occupation -forces—Hitler had climbed down—and how he was only prevented in this -by Herr Von Neurath, who said to him: “I was against that step, but now -that you have done it, it will have to stand.” What Schacht told me at -that time about Hitler’s attitude was that Hitler would do anything -rather than have a war. Schacht also felt this, as he told me, when he -mentioned the friendship with Poland, the renunciation of his claim to -Alsace-Lorraine, and, in particular, Hitler’s policy during the first -years, all of which was a peaceful policy. Only later did he begin to -have misgivings as regards foreign policy. - -DR. DIX: What were Schacht’s principles and ideas in foreign policy and -how did these line up with his attitude to Hitler’s foreign policy? - -VOCKE: He definitely disapproved, especially, of course, since -Ribbentrop had gained influence in foreign politics; Schacht saw in him -the most incapable and irresponsible of Hitler’s advisers. But already -before that there were serious differences of opinion between Schacht -and Hitler on foreign policy. - -For instance, as regards Russia: Already from 1928-29 onwards Schacht -had built up a large trade with Russia by long term credits which helped -the economy of both countries. He has often been attacked on account of -that, but he said: “I know what I am doing. I also know that the -Russians will pay punctually and without bargaining. They have always -done it.” Schacht was very angry and unhappy when Hitler’s tirades of -abuse spoiled the relations with Russia and brought this extensive trade -to an end. - -Also, with regard to China, Schacht was convinced of the importance of -trade with China and was just about to develop it on a large scale, when -Hitler, by showing preference to Japan and recalling the German advisers -to Chiang Kai-Shek, again destroyed all Schacht’s plans. Schacht saw -that this was a fatal mistake and said that Japan would never be able -nor willing to compensate us for the loss of trade with China. - -Also Schacht always advocated close co-operation with the United States, -with England, and with France. Schacht admired Roosevelt and was proud -of the fact that Roosevelt, through the diplomat Cockerill, kept in -constant touch with him. Schacht was convinced of the necessity of -remaining on the best terms with England and France and for that very -reason he disapproved of Ribbentrop being sent to London and actively -opposed this plan. - -Schacht was against Hitler’s policy towards Italy. He knew that -Mussolini did not want to have anything to do with us, and he considered -him the most unreliable and the weakest partner. - -With regard to Austria, I know only that Schacht thought highly of -Dollfuss and was horrified and shocked when he heard of his murder. Also -after the occupation of Austria, he disapproved of much that happened -there. - -May I, in this connection, say a word about Schacht’s colonial policy, -which was a sort of hobby of Schacht’s, and about which he once gave a -lecture? I can best illustrate Schacht’s views by telling you about the -orders which he gave me. Schacht’s idea was to make an arrangement with -England, France, _et cetera_, whereby these powers should purchase part -of the Portuguese colony of Angola and transfer it to Germany, who would -not exercise any sovereign rights, but would exploit it economically; -and he had experts’ opinions... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that this is being given in -far too great length. - -DR. DIX: Well, we can leave out the individual examples. The late Field -Marshal Von Blomberg made a statement to the effect that the Reichsbank -received every year from the Reichswehr Ministry a written communication -about the state of the armaments. Do you, who were a member of the -Directorate, know anything about this communication? - -VOCKE: No, I have never heard anything about it. - -DR. DIX: From the whole of your experience in the Reichsbank and your -experience with Schacht’s attitude to his colleagues, do you consider it -possible that Schacht personally received that information, but did not -pass it on to any of his colleagues in the Reichsbank Directorate? - -VOCKE: It may be, but I consider it highly improbable. - -DR. DIX: Now, when did Schacht start to try to stop the financing of -armaments and thereby check rearmament; and, if he did try, and if you -can affirm it, what were his reasons? - -VOCKE: Schacht made the first attempts to limit armaments, I believe, -about 1936, when economy was running at top speed and further armament -seemed an endless spiral. The Reichsbank was blocked and, I believe, in -1936, Schacht himself started making serious attempts to put an end to -armaments. - -DR. DIX: And do you know from your own experience what these attempts -were? - -VOCKE: These attempts continued throughout the following years: First, -Schacht tried to influence Hitler and that proved to be in vain. His -influence decreased as soon as he made any such attempt. He tried to -find allies in the civic ministries, and also among the generals. He -also tried to win over Göring, and he thought he had won him over, but -it did not work. Schacht then put up a fight and at last he succeeded in -stopping the Reichsbank credits for armaments. That was achieved at the -beginning of March 1938. But that did not mean that he discontinued his -efforts to stop rearmament itself, and he continued to use every means, -even sabotage. - -In 1938 he issued a loan at a time when he knew that the previous loan -had not yet been absorbed—when the banks were still full of it; and he -made the amount of the new loan so big that it was doomed to failure. We -waited eagerly to see whether our calculations were correct. We were -happy when the failure became obvious and Schacht informed Hitler. - -Another way in which he tried to sabotage armaments was when the -industries which applied for loans to expand their factories were -prohibited from doing so by Schacht, and thus were prevented from -expanding. The termination of the Reichsbank credit did not only mean -that the Reichsbank could no longer finance armaments, but it dealt a -serious blow to armament itself. This was shown in 1938, when financing -became extremely difficult in all fields and, upon Schacht’s -resignation, immediately reverted to the direct credits of the issuing -bank, which was the only means of maintaining elastic credit, perpetual -credit, so to speak, which Hitler needed and could never have received -from Schacht. - -I know that from my personal recollection, because I protested against -that law which was put to me and which Hitler issued after Schacht’s -dismissal. I said to the Vice President: I am not going to have anything -to do with it. - -Thereupon, I was immediately dismissed ten days after the dismissal of -Schacht. - -DR. DIX: Well, Herr Vocke, for an outsider the motive for stopping the -financing of armaments might have been purely economic. Have you any -grounds, have you any experience which shows that Schacht was now also -afraid of war, and wanted to prevent a war by this stoppage of credit? - -VOCKE: Yes. At any rate, in 1938 the feeling that this tremendous -armaments program which had no limits would lead to war became stronger -and stronger, especially after the Munich Agreement. In the meantime -Schacht had realized, and I think the Fritsch affair had made it very -clear to him, that Hitler was the enemy, and that there was only one -thing to do; that was to fight against Hitler’s armament program and -warmongering by every possible means. These means, of course, were only -financial, such as the sabotage, _et cetera_, as I have already -described. The final resort was the memorandum by which Schacht forced -his resignation. - -DR. DIX: We will speak later about that. May I ask you another question? -The Tribunal knows about the method of financing this credit, namely, by -mefo bills, so you need not say anything about that. What I want to ask -you is now, in your opinion as a lawyer, could the financing of -armaments by these mefo bills be reconciled with banking law? - -VOCKE: The mefo bills and the construction of that transaction had, of -course, been legally examined beforehand; and the point of their -legality had been raised with us, and the question as to whether these -bills could be brought under banking law had been answered in the -affirmative. The more serious question, however, was whether these bills -fulfilled the normal requirements which an issuing bank should demand of -its reserves. To that question, of course, the answer is definitely -“no.” - -If one asks, why did not the bank buy good commercial bills instead of -mefo bills, the answer is that at that time there had been no good -commercial bills on the market for years—that is, since the collapse -due to the economic crisis. Already under Brüning schemes for assisting -and restoring economy and credit had been drawn up, all of which -followed similar lines, that is, they were sanctioned according to their -nature as normal credits along the lines of a semipublic loan; for the -Bank was faced with the alternative of standing by helplessly and seeing -what would happen to the economy or of helping the Government as best it -could to restore and support the economy. All issuing banks in other -countries were faced with the same alternative and reacted in the same -manner. Thus the armaments bills, which, economically speaking, were -nothing more than the former unemployment bills, had to serve the same -purpose. From the point of view of currency policy the Reichsbank’s -reserves of old bills, which had been frozen by the depression, were -again made good. - -All the regulations under banking law, the traditional regulations -concerning banking and bills policy, had only one aim, namely, to avoid -losses. - -DR. DIX: I believe, Herr Vocke, it will be sufficient for the Tribunal -if you could confirm that in the end the legal experts of the Reichsbank -pronounced the mefo bills to be legal. The reasons for this, if Your -Lordship agrees, we can omit. - -Now we come to the memorandum which you have already mentioned. I want -you to describe to the Tribunal the reasons which caused the Reichsbank -Directorate, with Schacht at the head, to submit that memorandum to -Hitler, and what the tactical purposes were which the Directorate, and -therefore Schacht, hoped to achieve by that memorandum. - -VOCKE: If we had been able to speak frankly, of course, we would have -said: You must stop armaments. But the Reichsbank itself could not do -this. Instead, we had to limit ourselves to the question of our -responsibility for the currency. Therefore, the Reichsbank memorandum -dealt with the question of currency. It said: If the financing of -armaments is continued, German currency will be ruined and there will be -inflation in Germany. - -The memorandum also spoke of limitless credits, of unrestrained -expansion of credits, and unrestrained expenditure. By expenditure we -meant armaments. That was quite clear. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have all seen the memorandum, have we not? - -DR. DIX: He is not speaking about the contents of the memorandum, but of -the reasons, the tactical reasons. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You understand, Herr Vocke, the Tribunal -knows the text of the memorandum, so please confine yourself to what I -have asked you. - -VOCKE: The memorandum had to deal with the question of currency, but at -the same time, we made quite clear what we wanted: Limitation of foreign -policy. That shows clearly what we wanted: Limitation of expenditure, -limitation of foreign policy, of foreign policy aims. We pointed out -that expenditure had reached a point beyond which we could not go, and -that a stop must be put to it. In other words, the expenditure policy, -that is the armaments program must be checked. - -DR. DIX: Now tell us, did you anticipate the effect that that memorandum -would have on Hitler? What did you expect, tactically? - -VOCKE: Either the memorandum would result in a halt of this intolerable -expenditure which had brought us to ruin—for at the end of 1938 there -was no more money available, instead there was a cash deficit of nearly -1,000 million. That had to be faced, and the Minister of Finance was on -our side. If this was not recognized, then the smash would come and we -would have to be released. There was no other alternative. We took the -unusual step of getting the whole Directorate to sign this document. - -DR. DIX: That, in my experience, is quite unusual, because generally an -official document of the Reichsbank is signed by the President or his -deputy, is it not? - -VOCKE: That is true. We wanted to stress that the entire Directorate -unanimously approved this important document which was to put an end to -armaments. - -DR. DIX: That, Witness, is clear. Have you any reason for believing that -Hitler recognized that fact? - -VOCKE: Yes, Hitler said something to the effect that that would be -“mutiny.” I think that is the word they use in the Army. I have never -been a soldier, but I think that when a complaint is signed by several -soldiers, it is looked upon as mutiny. Hitler had the same ideas. - -DR. DIX: Yes, something like that does exist. But you were not present -there. Who told you about that expression “mutiny”? - -VOCKE: I cannot remember that any more. I believe it was Herr Berger of -the Finance Ministry. But I cannot say exactly. - -DR. DIX: So there was talk about this expression in ministerial circles? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Now, that memorandum also contained a compliment to Hitler, a -reference to his success in foreign policy. - -VOCKE: Yes, Schacht had adopted the habit of using flattery in his -dealings with Hitler. The greater an opponent of the Hitler regime -Schacht became, the more he made use of this flattery. Therefore, in -that memorandum, at any rate at the beginning where he spoke of Hitler’s -successes, he also used those tactics. - -DR. DIX: And what was the consequence of that memorandum? Please tell us -briefly. - -VOCKE: The result was that first Schacht was dismissed, then Kreide and -Huelse, then I, Erhard, and Lessing. The result, however, was that they -knew abroad what things had come to in Germany. My colleague Huelse had -made unequivocal statements in Basel, and said that if we should be -dismissed, then our friends would know to what pass things had come. - -DR. DIX: Did Herr Huelse tell you that? - -VOCKE: Yes, Huelse told me that. - -DR. DIX: Your Lordship, shall we make a short pause here? I have not -much more, but I still have the documentary evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: How much longer do you think you will take before you -finish? - -DR. DIX: It is very short and then the documentary evidence is also very -short. Shall I continue? - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. DIX: Now, Witness, you have described to the Tribunal how that -dismissal of Schacht and yourself came about. Why did Schacht not take -that step before? Did he talk to you about it? - -VOCKE: No. Throughout the years 1936 and 1937 we could not make up our -minds. At first there was still hope that Hitler would steer a -reasonable course as a statesman. Finally, in 1938, we reached a crisis, -particularly in connection with the Munich Agreement and then after the -Munich Agreement. Then, indeed, there was real anxiety that things would -lead to war, and we then saw that we had to force the decision. - -However, one has to consider the following: As a bank we could not bring -up political or military arguments or demands which were not within our -competence. The danger of inflation, which we had stressed in that -memorandum, did not show until 1938, when the note circulation during -the last ten months had increased enormously—more than throughout the -five preceding years. - -DR. DIX: So that it was not until that year that, let us say, a pretext, -a means, was found to take that leap? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Now I will end with a general question. The high intelligence -of Dr. Schacht is not disputed—that he was disappointed in Hitler and -deceived by him, he says himself. You yourself, with your knowledge of -Schacht’s personality must probably have had your own ideas as to how -this mistake on the part of Schacht could be explained, how he could -have been so deceived. Therefore, if the Tribunal permits, I should be -grateful if you could give us your personal impressions about it, but... - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, may I make an objection? I do not -understand how the operations of Dr. Schacht’s mind can be explained by -someone else. I have had no objection to any facts which this witness -has known. We have even let him detail here at great length private -conversations. However, speculation on Schacht’s mental operations, it -seems to me, is beyond the pale of probative evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, as I think I have said before, you cannot give -by one witness the thoughts of another man; you can only give his acts -and his statements. - -DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship. When I put the question, I said “if the -Tribunal permits.” I, too, was aware of the question of admissibility... - -THE PRESIDENT: You have the answer now: The Tribunal does not allow it. - -DR. DIX: Then we will leave that question. May I ask Your Lordship this? -Of course, I can still put questions about the treatment of the Jews by -Schacht. I personally think that this chapter has been dealt with so -exhaustively that it is not necessary for this witness to give us more -examples of the attitude of Schacht. I would only ask to be permitted to -put the same question concerning the Freemasons, because nothing has -been stated about that. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know anything about the treatment of -Freemasons or the attitude of Schacht to Freemasons? - -VOCKE: Yes. The Party demanded that the Freemasons should be eliminated -from the Civil Service. Schacht said: “I refuse to let anybody tell me -what to do. Everybody knows that I myself am a Freemason; how can I take -action against officials simply because they belong to the Order of -Freemasons?” And as long as Schacht was in office he kept Freemasons in -office and promoted them. - -DR. DIX: Now, one last question. Do you know whether Schacht ever -received any gifts or had any economic advantages during Hitler’s time -beyond his regular income as an official? - -VOCKE: No; that was quite out of the question for Schacht. Besides, he -was never offered gifts. In all his dealings, as far as money was -concerned, he was absolutely clean and incorruptible. I can give -examples. For instance, when he left in 1930 he reduced his pension to -less than half the pension of the vice president or of any board member. -He said: “These people have devoted their whole life to the bank, -whereas I have given only a few years incidental service.” I could give -more examples of Schacht’s absolute correctness in that respect. - -DR. DIX: I believe, if the Tribunal does not wish so, it will not be -necessary to give further examples. That brings me to the end of my -interrogation of this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other counsel for the defense wish to ask any -questions? - -DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Witness, do -you remember the financial-political measures on the occasion of the -annexation of Austria in March 1938; that is to say, in general terms? - -At that time two laws were issued, both of 17 March 1938, one concerning -the conversion of schillings into marks, and the other for the taking -over of the Austrian National Bank by the Reichsbank. - -Dr. Schacht, as a witness, stated yesterday that on 11 March he was -asked what exchange rate he would consider correct in the event of an -entry into Austria, and he answered that question by saying that -according to the latest market rate two schillings for one Reichsmark -would be correct. - -After the Anschluss, my client, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, objected to the -under-valuation of the schilling, and he succeeded in getting the -schilling converted at 1.50 to the Reichsmark. Is that correct? - -VOCKE: Before the entry into Austria I had not heard of any ratio being -fixed by the Reichsbank Directorate. They were entrusted with that -question only after the entry into Austria, and as experts and bankers -they proposed a ratio which was in accordance with the conditions; and -only a slight modification was made for the exchange. It was for the -Government to make concessions, if it wanted to win over the Austrian -population or make it favorably inclined. - -DR. STEINBAUER: The second law deals with the Austrian National Bank. -The witness Dr. Schacht has said today that the Austrian National Bank -was not liquidated, but—as he expressed himself—amalgamated. I have -looked up that law and it states expressly in Paragraph 2 that the -Austrian National Bank was to be liquidated. That is Document Number -2313-PS. Now I ask you, Witness, do you know anything about it? Was the -Austrian National Bank left in function as an issuing bank, or was it -liquidated? - -VOCKE: The right to issue notes in Austria, of course, went to the -Reichsbank, which, as far as I know, took over the Austrian National -Bank in Vienna and carried it on. I do not remember any details. My -colleague Kesnick took care of that. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But maybe you will remember if I quote from the official -reports of the Austrian National Bank that the gold reserve of the -Austrian National Bank in March 1933 amounted to 243 million schillings -in gold and the foreign currency reserve to 174 million schillings, -which means that roughly over 400 million schillings in gold were taken -over by the Reichsbank from the Austrian National Bank. - -VOCKE: I do not recall these facts any more; but if it was done, it was -done by law, by the Government. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. I have that law of 17 March. I just wanted to -correct a mistake which Herr Schacht must have made today -unintentionally. The law he himself signed says “shall be liquidated.” I -have no other questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you said earlier that the fundamental difference -between Dr. Schacht and the high military leaders was that he remained a -free man in his attitude to the regime. I want to ask you now, since -that statement seems to imply an opinion of the high military leaders: -Which of the high military leaders do you know personally? - -VOCKE: Not a single one. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then would you maintain that opinion? - -VOCKE: In our circle of the Reichsbank Herr Keitel and other gentlemen -were considered too servile and too acquiescent toward Hitler. - -DR. LATERNSER: But since you had no personal acquaintance with these -people do you think that you can express a somewhat critical opinion on -them, as you have done? - -VOCKE: Yes, I think so. - -DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other counsel wish to cross-examine? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Witness, when you met Dr. Schacht first, as I -understood it, it was on the occasion of an official visit which you -paid to Von Lumm in Brussels? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During the first years of the first World War? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Schacht then held some position on Von Lumm’s -staff? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was his position, Schacht’s? - -VOCKE: I cannot say that. He was just one of the staff. How I came to -meet him was that on one occasion when I was sent to Brussels to discuss -something with Von Lumm, the latter took the opportunity to introduce -his collaborators and among them was Schacht. We were merely introduced. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what was Von Lumm’s position? What was he doing -in Brussels? - -VOCKE: He was Commissioner for Banking with the General Command. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: General Command of the German Army? - -VOCKE: Commissioner for the Banks with the Occupation Army. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Named by Germany. - -VOCKE: Without doubt. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, he was a German, not a Belgian? - -VOCKE: Yes, he was a German. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, some time after that Schacht was dismissed by -Von Lumm, was he not? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a discussion with Von Lumm about that -and also you had one with Schacht about it, did you not? Tell me whether -you had the visit... - -VOCKE: I read the official reports in Berlin about the dismissal of -Schacht. I was working in the Reich Office of the Interior. I only spoke -about these things with Schacht when he became Reichsbank President and -he spoke to me about it one day. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, before Schacht went on the staff of Von Lumm, -he was director of the Dresdner Bank. - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the dismissal was because Schacht had delivered -to that bank a considerable amount of Belgian francs. - -VOCKE: Yes. I do not know how large that amount was. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was considerable. - -VOCKE: Maybe. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that, Von Lumm thought, gave to the Dresdner -Bank an advantage which was incompatible with Schacht’s duties as a -public official? - -VOCKE: That, at any rate, was Von Lumm’s view. He took a very serious -view, which Schacht, not being a civil servant, could not quite -appreciate. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Von Lumm called a meeting and reproached -Schacht? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Schacht then gave an answer to Von Lumm which Von -Lumm considered was not sincere, but was merely a lie? - -VOCKE: Yes. That was Von Lumm’s point of view. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, that is what Von Lumm told you about? - -VOCKE: That was in the written report which I have read. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you came to talk to Schacht about it and -about his answer to Von Lumm, Schacht told you that it was perhaps not -quite an open answer, but not a lie? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, having heard both sides of it, you along -with all of the other directors of the Reichsbank were opposed to -Schacht’s appointment as President, as you have testified. - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you took the view, along with all the other -directors, that the behavior of Dr. Schacht in the Belgian bank affair -was not quite fair and not quite correct? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when Dr. Schacht came back to the Reichsbank -under the Nazi regime, as I understand it, there was a good deal of -resentment and reserve against him on the part of the Reichsbank -Directorate, because he “in our eyes then was a Nazi. He was in close -touch with Hitler and kept some things secret from us, his colleagues.” -That is correct, is it not? - -VOCKE: I could not say that. It is true there was a feeling against -Schacht. As I explained before, because we had assumed, and I had -assumed—though we were wrong about it—that he was a Nazi. It is -possible that Schacht did keep things secret from us, but at any rate I -do not know whether he did, or what those things were. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you not say in a statement that he was in -close touch with Hitler and kept some things secret from “us, his -colleagues”? - -VOCKE: I do not know whether he kept things secret from us. It is -possible, but I could not prove it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is it not true that years later, when already some -fatal moments were reached in the currency system, circulation, price -and wages system, “rumors came to our ears through semiofficial channels -that Dr. Schacht had given Hitler the promise to finance armaments”? Did -you not say that? - -VOCKE: That Schacht had given the promise to Hitler? Well, in certain -circles there were rumors of that nature. Whether it is true I could not -say. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you felt after the Munich Agreement and after -Hitler’s speech at Saarbrücken that that destroyed all hopes of peace, -did you not? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And from that date, together with Pilseck, you did -all in your power to persuade Schacht that a decision had to be forced? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht agreed with you, but hesitated to take -the decisive step? - -VOCKE: Yes. He said—Schacht was not against it in principle, but he -wanted to decide himself when our memorandum should be submitted, and as -this memorandum was to be signed by all of us, and each one of us wanted -to make corrections, the handing in of this memorandum was delayed from -October until 7 January. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The agreement was prepared by you and Pilseck? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you approached Dr. Schacht again and again on -it? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he kept the draft all this time and told you -that he was in doubt about the best moment to bring it before Hitler? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was not until Hitler refused to see him at -Berchtesgaden that he finally sent him the memorandum? - -VOCKE: That I do not know. I have heard here for the first time that -Hitler refused to receive Schacht at Berchtesgaden. It may be. I only -heard that Schacht was at Berchtesgaden, and after his return, according -to my recollection, he talked about his meeting with Hitler and that now -the moment had come to send him the memorandum. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, your memorandum is the only source of my -information, and according to my translation it says: “Finally, in -December 1938, he resolved to sign it after a last attempt to speak with -Hitler in Berchtesgaden.” - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At that time, there was something of a financial -crisis. - -VOCKE: Yes. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Considerable difficulty, inflation was just around -the corner, as you might say. - -VOCKE: The Government was confronted with the 3,000 million mefo bills -which were about to fall due and which had to be covered, and the -Minister of Finance had a cash deficit of 1,000 million. The Minister of -Finance came to see us and asked us to tide it over, because otherwise -he could not pay the salaries on 1 January. We refused. We did not give -him a single pfennig. We told him that the best thing that could happen -would be that bankruptcy should become manifest in order to show how -impossible it was to continue this system and this policy. He then -received money from private banks. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you and Huelse, particularly Huelse, had long -warned against this course of the Reichsbank, is that not true? - -VOCKE: No, that is not true. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Had not you and Huelse, long before this, warned -that this mefo business would end up in trouble? - -VOCKE: Of course, the Reichsbank had for years fought against the mefo -bills, which were to mature in March 1938, and from then on the -Reichsbank did not give any more armament credits. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after his dismissal from the Reichsbank, you -very frequently discussed matters with Schacht and you found that he had -turned very bitter against the Government. Is that not true? - -VOCKE: I did not have frequent meetings with Schacht. We met every few -months in the beginning and then, when Schacht went to Guehlen, our -meetings stopped; I saw him there only once or twice. But it was not -only after his dismissal that Schacht became a bitter enemy of Hitler, -but he had been that during the whole of 1938. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you said, “I think in his heart he hoped he -would be called after Hitler’s defeat to help build a new and better -order of things in Germany”? - -VOCKE: Certainly. Schacht spoke to me in Guehlen about the men who would -have to come after Hitler had been finally overthrown, and in -conversation we mentioned the ministers who then could save Germany from -despair, and Schacht was certain that he also would be called in to -assist. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No further questions, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Prosecution Counsel want to -cross-examine? - -DR. DIX: Herr Vocke, in reply to the questions of Mr. Justice Jackson, -you have explained the attitude and the statement of Herr Von Lumm about -the incident in Brussels. You also told the Tribunal about the statement -by Minister Severing, which he made about that incident not so long ago. - -VOCKE: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Did you not also speak to the President of the Supreme Court of -the Reich, Simons, who was at that time in the Foreign Office and knew -the case very well? Did you not speak to him about that case? - -VOCKE: Yes, I spoke to him and Ministerial Director Lewald. At that time -I was a young assistant judge. - -DR. DIX: You will have to tell the Tribunal who Lewald was. - -VOCKE: It is correct that I spoke to Simons, who later became President -of the Supreme Court of the Reich, and to His Excellency Lewald, who -later became Undersecretary of State in the Reich Office of the -Interior, about these matters which came officially to my knowledge in -my capacity as expert in the Reich Office of the Interior. - -Both gentlemen smiled at the self-important attitude of Von Lumm who -made mountains out of mole hills, and also at the misfortune of Herr -Schacht. They smiled benevolently and saw the whole thing as a -tremendous exaggeration. - -DR. DIX: Thank you, that is enough. I have no further questions. - -However, if the Tribunal will permit me, I should like to point out that -Schacht mentioned here that on 2 January 1939 he spoke at great length -to Hitler, in Berchtesgaden. I do not know whether I am confusing that -with a statement made by a witness or with a statement made by him. I -just wanted to point it out. If he were still sitting here as a witness, -he could tell us about it. - -Your Lordship, I bring that up because it was stated by Mr. Justice -Jackson that Hitler did not receive Schacht in Berchtesgaden and that -that was the cause of Schacht’s decision to forward that memorandum. I -only mention, as this witness here cannot know it, that Schacht did -speak to Hitler. If he did not say so this morning or yesterday, he will -say it at any time. - -I cannot remember now. Sometimes one confuses private information with -what one has heard in the courtroom. - -THE PRESIDENT: Put the microphone where the Defendant Schacht can speak -from there and ask him the question. - -[_The microphone was placed before the defendant._] - -DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you have witnessed the cross-examination. Would -you like to tell the Tribunal what happened? - -SCHACHT: When I spoke here I said that I had a long conversation on 2 -January 1939 with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on the Obersalzberg, and that -after that conversation, in which the suggestion was put to me to create -an inflation, I considered that the time had come to take that step -which the Reichsbank afterwards took, to dissociate itself from Hitler -and his methods. - -[_The microphone was returned to the witness._] - -THE PRESIDENT: There is one question I want to ask you, Witness. Did the -Defendant Schacht ever tell you that he had been appointed -Plenipotentiary General for War Economy? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: When? - -VOCKE: Well, I believe he was appointed to that office in 1935. I -believe that is the date. I could not say for certain. - -THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask you when he was appointed. I asked you when -he told you. - -VOCKE: I cannot recall that because we had nothing to do with these -things. I only know that either in 1935 or 1936—I believe it was -1935—he received such an appointment. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The question I asked you was: Did the Defendant -Schacht ever tell you that he had been appointed? - -VOCKE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: When did he tell you? - -VOCKE: I think in 1935. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -DR. DIX: May I put one last question to this witness? - -Witness, did you have any idea of the importance of that office? - -VOCKE: No. I never heard that Schacht had done anything in that function -except that he had special letter headings for this. His activity in the -Reichsbank continued in the same way as previously, without his -selecting a staff for that office, and without—at least as far as my -knowledge goes—his using the premises and facilities of the Reichsbank -for this new office. - -DR. DIX: Have you any knowledge as to whether he had a separate office -or a separate staff for carrying on his activity as Plenipotentiary? - -VOCKE: You mean commissioner general for armaments? - -DR. DIX: Plenipotentiary for War Economy. - -VOCKE: No, he had no separate office, and as I have said before, as far -as I know he never had a staff. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. DIX: May I begin with my documents? I can make the presentation of -documents very brief and I am sure that I will conclude it before the -end of the session, because I had an opportunity to submit a large -portion of my documents during the interrogation of witnesses. May I -make the general request that judicial notice be taken of everything I -have not read and everything I do not propose to read. In this -connection, I should like to point out that the entire contents of my -document book have, with one exception, either been submitted or will be -submitted now as exhibits. The exception, the document which has not -been submitted, is Exhibit Number 32. That is the frequently mentioned -article of the _Basler Nachrichten_ of 14 January 1946, which, for the -reasons mentioned yesterday, has not been and will not be submitted by -me. - -I come now to Volume I of my document book, to the exhibits which have -not yet been submitted; that is, first Exhibit Number 5 (Document -Schacht-5) Adolf Hitler’s Reichstag speech of 23 May 1933. That exhibit -was read by Schacht in the course of his interrogation and is now being -submitted. - -I further submit Exhibit Number 23 (Document Schacht-23), the letter -from Schacht to Hermann Göring, of 3 November 1942. Although that letter -has been submitted by the Prosecution, we submit it again, and for the -following reasons: In the copy which was submitted by the Prosecution, -the date and the year were left out and, of course, as it has been -translated literally, also in our copy. However, a confirmatory note by -Professor Kraus based on the testimony given by Schacht has enabled us -to make a note on it to the effect that it must be the letter of 3 -November 1942, because it was that letter which caused the dismissal in -January 1943. It is only submitted in order to make it easier for the -Tribunal to ascertain the date. That was Exhibit Number 23. - -Then I wish to submit Exhibit Number 27 (Document Schacht-27). I am not -going to read it; I only ask that judicial notice be taken of it. That -is the address given by Dr. Schacht at the celebration meeting of the -Reich Economic Chamber in January 1937. - -Then I submit Exhibit Number 29 (Document Schacht-29), excerpts from the -book by Gisevius, which we want to put into evidence, and I ask you to -take judicial notice. I will not read anything. - -Exhibit Number 33 (Document Number Schacht-33) in my document book is a -letter from a certain Morton, a former citizen of Frankfurt-on-Main, who -emigrated to England, a man who was highly respected in Frankfurt. The -letter is directed to the Treasury Solicitor in England and we have -received it here from the Prosecution. I also ask that judicial notice -be taken of its contents and want to read only one sentence on the last -page. I quote: - - “I last heard from Schacht indirectly. Lord Norman who was then - Mr. Montague Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, told me - confidentially in 1939 shortly before the outbreak of the war, - that he had just come back from Basel where he had seen Schacht - who sent me his greetings. Lord Norman also told me that - Schacht, who had returned to Germany from Basel, was in great - personal danger as he was very much in disgrace with the Nazis.” - -That concludes Volume I of my document book and I pass on to Volume II, -which begins with the affidavits. I must go through the individual -affidavits, but I shall not read any. - -The first is Exhibit Number 34 (Document Schacht-34), which has -frequently been quoted, the affidavit of the banker and Swedish Consul -General, Dr. Otto Schniewind, who is at present in Munich. It is a very -instructive and very exhaustive affidavit and in order to save -time—there are 18 pages which would take up a lot of time—I will -confine myself to what I have read from this affidavit; I ask the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of the remainder. It has already been -submitted. - -However, I still have to submit Exhibit Number 35 (Document Schacht-35), -which has not yet been submitted. I beg your pardon, but it has been -submitted before. It is the affidavit of Dr. Franz Reuter. I submitted -it when I spoke here about the biased nature of this biography. I ask -you to take judicial notice of the rest of this affidavit. - -The next Exhibit Number 36 (Document Schacht-36) is an affidavit by -Oberregierungsrat Dr. Von Scherpenberg, formerly Embassy Counsellor at -the Embassy in London, afterwards departmental chief at the Foreign -Office and now at the Ministry of Justice in Munich, the son-in-law of -Dr. Schacht. I have read a passage and I ask that judicial notice be -taken of the unread portion. - -The next is Exhibit Number-37(a) (Document Schacht-37(a)). It has been -submitted. Here also a passage on Page 154 of the German text has been -read, about the warning signal given abroad when Schacht resigned as -Reichsbank President. I ask that judicial notice be taken of the -remainder. - -The next affidavit is by the same gentleman, who was also a colleague of -Dr. Schacht in the Reichsbank Directorate at the same time as the -witness Vocke, whom we have just heard. I submit it. There is no need to -read anything. I only ask you to take judicial notice of its contents. - -The next affidavit, Exhibit Number-37(c) (Document Schacht-37(c)) is by -the same gentleman and has already been submitted. I ask you to take -judicial notice of its contents. There is no need to read anything. - -The next is Exhibit Number 38 (Document Schacht-38), an affidavit by -General Thomas. It has not been submitted yet, and I submit it now and -ask to be permitted to read one passage, beginning on the first page; -that is Page 172 of the English text and Page 164 of the German text: - - “Question: Schacht claims to have influenced Blomberg to delay - rearmament. Can you give any information on this matter? When - was it? - - “Answer: I was Chief of the Army Economic Staff, that is the - Army Economic and Armament Office at the High Command of the - Wehrmacht (OKW) from 1934 to the time of my dismissal in January - 1943. In this capacity I had connection with the Reich Minister - of Economics and Reich Bank President Hjalmar Schacht. Up till - 1936 Schacht undoubtedly promoted rearmament by making available - the necessary means. From 1936 on he used every opportunity to - influence Blomberg to reduce the tempo and extent of rearmament. - His reasons were as follows: - - “1. Risk to the currency. - - “2. Insufficient production of consumer goods. - - “3. The danger to the foreign policy, which Schacht saw in - excessive armament of Germany. - - “Concerning the last point he frequently spoke to Blomberg and - me and said that on no account must rearmament be allowed to - lead to a new war. These were also the reasons which led him to - hold out to Blomberg in 1936 and again in 1937 the threat that - he would resign. On both of these occasions I was delegated by - Blomberg to dissuade Schacht from carrying out his threat to - resign. I was present during the conference between Blomberg and - Schacht in 1937.” - -I ask you to take judicial notice of the remainder of that affidavit by -General Thomas. - -The next Exhibit is Number 39 (Document Schacht-39); parts of it have -been read, that is to say, the part Schacht played in the incident of -the 20th of July together with General Lindemann; it is the affidavit by -Colonel Gronau. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the -remainder. - -The same applies to the next Exhibit Number 40 (Document Schacht-40). -That is a sworn statement, also by a colleague of Schacht in the -Ministry of Economics, Kammerdirektor Asmus, now in retirement. I have -also read parts of this already, namely, the passages concerning the -happenings at the time of the dismissal as Minister of Economics; and I -ask you to take judicial notice of the remainder. - -Then we come to Exhibit Number 41 (Document Schacht-41), which is the -affidavit by State Secretary Carl Christian Schmid, also in retirement. -I have not yet read anything and I ask to be permitted to read two -passages. - -The first one is on Page 182 of the German text; Page 190 of the English -text: - - “When the Brüning Cabinet, which had been arranged by General - Von Schleicher...”—That is not legible. I think that should be - different, but it is not legible.—“When that was torpedoed by - Schleicher himself, Schacht considered the early appointment of - Hitler as head of the Government to be unavoidable. He pointed - out that the great mass of the German people said ‘Yes’ to - National Socialism, and that the Left as well as the Center had - come to a state of complete passive resignation. The short life - of the transition cabinets of Papen and Schleicher was clear to - him from the very beginning. - - “Schacht decisively advocated the co-operation in National - Socialism of men experienced in their respective fields, without - acceptance of its program as a whole, which he always referred - to ironically, later frequently calling it ‘a really bestial - ideology’ in conversation with me; but he held that the - influencing of developments from important inner power positions - was an absolute patriotic duty, and he strongly condemned - emigration and the resort to easy armchair criticism.” - -And then on Page 184 of the German text, 192 of the English text, two -very short passages: - - “I recall numerous talks with Dr. Schacht in which he stated - that war was an economic impossibility and simply a crazy idea, - as, for instance, when he was in Mülheim at the house of Dr. - Fritz Thyssen, who was closely associated with Göring and Hitler - before 1933 but was in strong opposition from 1934 on and also - opposed any idea of war as madness.” - -And, then, further down on the same page, only one sentence: - - “When Schacht spoke to me he used to refer ironically to the - Himmler-Rosenberg Lebensraum plans against Russia as an example - of the mad presumption of extremist Party circles. Schacht’s - special fad was an understanding with England,” - -and so on; and I ask you to take judicial notice of the remainder of the -document. - -The same applies to the whole of Exhibit Number 42 (Document -Schacht-42), an affidavit by the director of the Upper Silesian Coke -Works, Berckemeyer. - -I come now to Exhibit Number 43 (Document Schacht-43). That has already -been submitted and read in part. It is the correspondence between the -publisher of Ambassador Dodd’s Diary and Sir Nevile Henderson. I ask you -to take judicial notice of the part not yet read, and whatever comes -after Exhibit 43 has been submitted. I ask you to take judicial notice -of its contents, and I forego the reading of it. - -That brings me to the end of my presentation in the case of Schacht. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now the Tribunal will continue the case against the -Defendant Funk. - -DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): Mr. President, with your -permission I call first the Defendant Dr. Funk himself to the witness -box. - -[_The Defendant Funk took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -WALTER FUNK (Defendant): Walter Emanuel Funk. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I begin with one observation: The -Defendant Funk has been a sick man for many years now, and before he -came into the prison he had been in hospital for some time. He was -supposed to undergo an operation, which, however, due to conditions at -the time, could not be carried out. He still is under medical treatment. -In consideration of that fact, and because the defendant is extremely -anxious to conclude his own interrogation as soon as possible, I shall -put only those questions to the defendant which are absolutely necessary -to give you a clear picture about his person and his activities. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, when were you born? - -FUNK: On 18 August 1890. - -DR. SAUTER: So you are now 56? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: First, I want to put to you the most important particulars -of your life, and to simplify matters you may answer only with “yes” or -“no.” - -You are 56 years old. You were born in East Prussia? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: You come from a merchant’s family in Königsberg? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Then you studied in Berlin at the university, law and -political science, literature and music. You also come from a family -which has produced a number of artists. - -FUNK; Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: During the World War you were first in the Infantry, and in -1916, because of a bladder ailment, you became unfit for service? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Then you became an editor with several large newspapers, and -you told me that for a long time you could not make up your mind whether -to become a musician or a journalist. Then you decided for the latter, -and in 1922, I believe, you became editor in chief of the _Berliner -Börsenzeitung_. Is all that correct? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Now perhaps you will tell us what were the political -tendencies of that paper on which you worked for about ten years as -editor in chief? - -FUNK: The tendency of the paper was somewhere between the Center and the -Right. The newspaper was not tied to any party. It was owned by an old -Berlin family of publishers. - -DR. SAUTER: What was the attitude of that paper to the Jewish question -before you took on the editorship and during the time when you were -editor in chief? - -FUNK: Absolutely neutral. It did not deal in any way with the Jewish -question. - -DR. SAUTER: From an affidavit by Dr. Schacht, I have seen that at that -time—that is to say, during the twenties—you moved in circles which -were also frequented by Jews, and where economic and political matters, -such as gold currency, _et cetera_, were often discussed. Is that -correct? - -FUNK: I do not know anything about that. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Schacht has asserted that in an affidavit of 7 July 1945 -(Document Number 3936-PS). - -FUNK: I had a lot to do with Jews. That was in the nature of my -profession. Every day at the stock exchange I was together with 4,000 -Jews. - -DR. SAUTER: Then in 1931 you resigned your post as editor in chief? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: What were the reasons for that? - -FUNK: I was convinced that the National Socialist Party would come to -power in the Government, and I felt called upon to make my own political -and economic opinions heard in the Party. - -DR. SAUTER: Would you like to explain a little more in detail what kind -of opinions you had, Dr. Funk, especially concerning the clashes between -parties, between classes at that time? - -FUNK: The German nation at that time was in sore distress, spiritually -as well as materially. The people were torn by Party and class struggle. -The Government, or rather the governments, had no authority. The -parliamentary system was played out, and I myself, for 10 or 12 years -before that, had protested and fought publicly against the burden of the -Versailles reparations, because I was convinced that those reparations -were the chief cause of the economic bankruptcy of Germany. I, myself, -have fought all my life for private enterprise, because I was convinced -that the idea of private enterprise is indissolubly bound up with the -idea of the efficiency and worth of individual human beings. I have -fought for the free initiative of the entrepreneur, free competition, -and, at that time in particular, for putting an end to the mad class -struggle, and for the establishment of a social community on the basis -of the industrial community. - -All those were ideas to which I found a ready response in my -conversations, particularly, with Gregor Strasser. - -DR. SAUTER: Who was Gregor Strasser, would you tell the Tribunal -briefly? - -FUNK: Gregor Strasser at that time was leader of the Reich Organization -Office of the National Socialist Party and was generally considered to -be the second man after Adolf Hitler. I have... - -THE PRESIDENT: This is the time to break off. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED - AND TWENTY-FIRST DAY - Saturday, 4 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The defendant resumed the stand._] - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I continue the examination of the -Defendant Funk? - -Dr. Funk, yesterday you gave us a brief account of your life, told us -that you are 56 years of age, that you have been married for 25 years, -that you were editor of the _Berliner Börsenzeitung_ for 10 years; and -in conclusion you told us yesterday what your convictions were regarding -the future development of Germany. - -Perhaps you can again tell us something of your viewpoint, since you -were interrupted by the recess yesterday and since your health was in -such a poor state yesterday evening that you could scarcely remember -what you had told the Court. Well, what were your views on Germany’s -economic prospects at the time when you entered the Party? Perhaps you -can go over it briefly again. - -FUNK: At that time Germany was in the midst of a very difficult economic -crisis. This crisis was caused chiefly by the reparations, the way in -which these reparations had to be paid, and by the inability of the -governments then in office to master the economic problems. The most -disastrous feature of the reparations policy was that German mark -credits in immense sums were transferred to foreign countries without -receiving any equivalent in return. As a result there was a tremendous -surplus and over-pressure of Reichsmark abroad. It led to inflation in -Germany and the countries with stable currencies bought Germany out. -German industry incurred heavy debts and consequently came temporarily -under foreign control; German agriculture became indebted. The middle -classes, who were the chief representatives of German culture, were -impoverished. Every third German family was unemployed, and the -Government itself had neither the power nor the courage to master these -economic problems. And these problems could not be solved by means of -economic measures alone. The first essential was the presence of a -government possessing full authority and responsibility; and then the -development of a unified political will among the people. - -The National Socialists at that time captured 40 percent of the seats in -the Reichstag; the people streamed to this Party in ever-increasing -millions, especially the young people who were animated by idealism. The -fascinating personality of the Führer acted as a giant magnet. The -economic program of the Party itself was vague; and in my opinion it was -drawn up mainly with an eye for propaganda purposes. There were lively -arguments about it in Party circles with which I came in contact in -1931. - -At that time, therefore, I decided to give up my position as editor of a -paper with a large circulation among the middle classes and to start on -my own by editing an economic and political news service which went to -the most diverse sections of economy, to leading Party circles as well -as to economically interested parties siding with the German National -Party, the People’s Party, and even the Democrats. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, you said before, approximately, that according to -the opinion you expressed in 1931, only a government with full authority -and full responsibility, that is, only a strong state and a unified -political will, could lead Germany out of the crisis of that time, which -was, of course, merely a part of the world crisis. Did you at that time -ever reflect as to whether the Leadership Principle which was later -developed to an increasing extent—whether this Leadership Principle -could be made to harmonize with your ideas of economic policy? Or, -putting it negatively, did you at that time anticipate great wrongs as a -result of this Leadership Principle? - -What can you say on this point? - -FUNK: As to a principle of government, well, that is, a Leadership -Principle, one can never say _a priori_ whether it is good or bad. It -depends on existing circumstances and, above all, on those who do the -governing. The democratic-parliamentary principle had not been -successful in Germany. Germany had no parliamentary and democratic -tradition, such as other countries had. Conditions, finally, were such -that when the government made decisions, the few votes of the economic -party were decisive; and these were mostly bought. Therefore, another -principle had to be made the dominant one; and in an authoritarian -government, if those who bear the authority and the responsibility are -good, then the government also is good. The Leadership Principle meant, -in my opinion, that the best men and the best man should rule and that -authority would then be exercised from above downwards and -responsibility from below upwards. And in conversations with Hitler and -other leading personalities of the Party in 1931 and, as I said, from -the faith and enthusiasm which the German people brought to this -political movement, I formed the opinion that this Party would have to -come into power and that through it alone salvation could come. I, -myself, wanted to put my own economic ideas into practice in this Party. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, you have just been speaking of the personality of -Hitler. Through whom did you meet Hitler?—that is, who were persons in -the Party by whom you were first won over to the Party? - -FUNK: Chiefly, Gregor Strasser, as I said yesterday, who arranged my -first meeting with Hitler. Not until much later, in Berlin, did I meet -Hermann Göring. Apart from them I had very few acquaintances in the -Party at that time and played no role in it myself. - -DR. SAUTER: When you met Hitler what impression did he make on you at -that time? I should like to say beforehand, you were at that time—1931, -I think—a mature man of over forty. What impression did you have at -that time of Hitler’s personality and aims, _et cetera_? - -FUNK: My first conversation with Adolf Hitler was very reserved. That -was not surprising as I came from a world which was entirely strange to -him. I immediately received the impression of an exceptional -personality. He grasped all problems with lightning speed and knew how -to present them very impressively, with great fluency and highly -expressive gestures. He had the habit of then becoming absorbed in the -problems, in long monologues, so to speak, in this way lifting the -problems to a higher sphere. At that time I explained to him my economic -ideas and told him especially that I upheld the idea of private -property, which for me was the fundamental tenet of my economic policy -and which was inseparable from the concept of the varying potentialities -of human beings. He, himself, heartily concurred with me and said that -his theory of economics was also based on selectivity, that is, the -principle of individual productivity and the creative personality; and -he was very glad that I wanted to work on those lines in the Party and -to arrange contacts and support for him in the economic field—which I -actually did. In the meantime, however, my relations with the Führer -became no closer then, because he said to me himself, “I cannot, at -present, commit myself to an economic policy; and the views expressed by -my economic theorists, such as Herr Gottfried Feder, are not necessarily -my own.” - -The economic policy section which existed at that time was directed by a -Dr. Wagner. - -DR. SAUTER: The economic policy section of what? Of the Reich Party -Directorate? - -FUNK: The economic policy section of the Reich Party Directorate was -directed by a certain Dr. Wagner. I was not invited to political talks. -A close connection with the Führer—or a closer connection with the -Führer—I really had only in the year 1933 and the first half of 1934, -when, as press chief of the Reich Government, I reported to him -regularly. At that time it once even happened that he suddenly -interrupted the press conference, went into the music room with me, and -made me play the piano for him. - -Then our relations became a little cooler again, and when I became -Minister of Economics the Führer kept me more and more at a -distance—whether he had special reasons for this, as Lammers testified -here, I do not know. During my office as Minister, I was called in by -the Führer for consultations perhaps four times—five at the most. But -he really did not need me because his economic directives were given to -the Reich Marshal, the responsible head of economic affairs, and later, -from 1942 on, to Speer, since armament dominated the entire economy; -and, as I said, I had close connections with him only in 1933 and in the -first half of 1934 until the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, you have got a long way ahead. We would like to -return now to 1931 or 1932, to the time when you entered the Party. When -was that? - -FUNK: In the summer of 1931. - -DR. SAUTER: The summer of 1931. You have already told the Court that you -did not object to the Leadership Principle for the reasons you have -stated. - -FUNK: No, on the contrary, the Leadership Principle was absolutely -necessary. - -DR. SAUTER: On the contrary, you considered the Leadership Principle -necessary for the period of emergency that then obtained. Now, I would -be interested in knowing: There were other points of view, of course, -also represented in the Party program which worked out unfavorably later -on and have, in the course of this Trial, been used extensively against -the defendants. I point out one example, for instance, the slogan of -“Lebensraum”; you have heard it again and again during this Trial. The -Defendant Dr. Schacht dealt with this problem also. Perhaps you can give -us briefly your own position on this problem and on this question? - -FUNK: The problem of living (Lebensproblem) is no slogan; and the -problem of living was really a problem for the German people at that -time. By “Lebensproblem”... - -DR. SAUTER: You mean “Lebensraum”? - -FUNK: ...or “Lebensraum”—I did not mean the conquest of foreign -countries at that time; the thought of war was just as strange to me as -it was probably to most other Germans. By “Lebensraum” I meant the -opening up of the world for the vital interests of Germany, that is, the -participation of the German people in the profitable utilization of the -world’s goods of which there was a superabundance. - -Whether that was to be done by colonies, or concessions, or -international trade agreements, I did not trouble to find out at that -time. - -The expansion of Germany in the world economy before the first World War -was the decisive factor which determined me to become an economic -journalist. The participation of Germany in the Rumanian petroleum -industry, the concession of the Bagdad Railway, the growing German -influence in South America, in China, generally in the Far East—all -this inspired me very much. At that time already I became acquainted -with such men as Franz Günther of the Discount Bank, Arthur Von Gwinner -of the Deutsche Bank, Karl Helferich, the big Hamburg importer, -Witthöft, and many other German economic pioneers, and started on my -profession with all the enthusiasm of the young journalist. - -“Lebensraum” was thus for me at that time the fulfilling of these -economic claims, that is, Germany’s participation in the world’s goods -and the abolition of the restraints which hemmed us in on all sides. It -was sheer nonsense that Germany on her part should have to pay -reparations and debts while the creditor nations on their part refused -to accept payment in the only form possible, that is, payment in goods -and products. - -That period marked the beginning of a great wave of protective tariffs -in the world. I recall the American economic policy at that time; I -recall the Ottawa agreements, and this mistaken economic policy led to a -world economic crisis in 1929 and 1930 by which Germany also was badly -hit. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, have you finished? [_The defendant nodded -assent._] - -Dr. Funk, the Prosecution in their trial brief have contended that you -participated in the formulation of the Nazi program. What can you tell -us about that? - -FUNK: I do not know what the Prosecution understands by Nazi program. - -DR. SAUTER: I think—the Party program. - -FUNK: That is quite impossible. The Party program, as far as I know, was -formulated in 1921. At that time I did not know anything about National -Socialism or of Adolf Hitler. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution has further accused you of setting -up the so-called reconstruction program, the economic reconstruction -program of 1932, that is, a program for the rehabilitation of German -economic life. Is it correct that you established this economic -reconstruction program? - -FUNK: In 1932 I compiled for a speech by Gregor Strasser some points for -an economic program which Strasser himself marked as originating from -me. He passed these on to the various Party offices as instructions and -propaganda matter. - -This economic reconstruction program, which in the words of the -Prosecution was to become the economic bible for the Party organizers, -is, I believe, in no way revolutionary or even sensational; and it -could, I believe, be adopted and accepted by every democratic -government. I believe it is pointed out in a book from which the -Prosecution has taken various bits of information. - -DR. SAUTER: Perhaps it is printed, Witness, in the book by Dr. Paul -Oestreich which has been repeatedly quoted. This book contains your -biography under the title, _Walter Funk, A Life for Economy_, and has -been used by the Prosecution under Document 3505-PS, Exhibit USA-653. - -Dr. Funk, I have the text of this program before me. - -FUNK: Please read it. - -DR. SAUTER: The whole program covers half a page only and in the main -sets forth really nothing which might be considered as characteristic of -National Socialist trends of thought? - -FUNK: Well, at that time I was not yet a National Socialist or, at -least, but quite a young member of the Party. - -DR. SAUTER: This economic reconstruction program must be actually read -in order to convince oneself how little it contains of the -characteristic National Socialist demands. This is a program which Funk -says might be accepted by almost any liberal or democratic or other -bourgeois party. The program is called, “Direct creation of employment -through new State and private investments.” That is the first demand. -Then productive providing of credit by the Reichsbank but no inflation, -rather the re-establishment of a sound currency and a sound financial -and credit economy to promote production. - -General lowering of rates of interests paying attention to individual -conditions of the economy. Creation of a foreign trade office and a -central foreign exchange office. Reorganization of economic relations -with foreign countries, giving preference to the vital necessities of -the domestic market but with special attention to the export trade -absolutely necessary for Germany. Restoration of sound public finances, -including public insurances. Abolishment of the untenable methods of -balancing the budget. State protection for agriculture. Reorganization -of the system of house and land ownership in accordance with the -principles of productivity and national health. Expansion of the German -raw material basis, the establishment of new national industries and -trades, organization of manufactories on the basis of technical -innovations. That is all, which is comprised in this so-called economic -reconstruction program. - -FUNK: This program was to be, as the Prosecution has said, the official -Party dogma on economic matters. I would have been glad if the Party had -professed these principles. In later years I had great difficulties with -these various Party offices in connection with my basic attitude on -economic policy. I was always considered, even in Party circles, as a -liberal and an outsider... - -DR. SAUTER: A liberal? - -FUNK: Yes. I combated all tendencies towards collectivism; and, for this -reason, I constantly came into conflict with the Labor Front. I was -supported, especially in my views regarding private property, by Reich -Marshal Hermann Göring. Even during the war, he had parts of the Hermann -Göring Works denationalized at my suggestion. I was an opponent of a -nationalized economy because a nationalized economy will always produce -only average results. Nationalized economy means sterile economy. An -economy which is without keen competition and individual rivalry will -remain stagnant and will achieve but average results. The Führer had, -formerly, always agreed enthusiastically with these principles of mine. -And it was a great disappointment to me when finally, in the last years, -the Führer turned so sharply against the bourgeois world for that meant -practically that the whole of my life’s work had failed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks he might get on to -something more important than his view on state economy and private -enterprise. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Dr. Funk, you know that it was precisely -on account of the big problem of unemployment at the time that Hitler -was able to grasp power. What plans did you have for the elimination of -unemployment, since you knew that just that very promise... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, we have heard nearly all the defendants on -the conditions which obtained in Germany at that time. And there is no -charge against these defendants for German economy between the years -1933 and 1939. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I wanted to ask the Defendant Dr. Funk just -how he thought that unemployment could be abolished; for from the -testimony of other defendants, I gathered that they planned to eliminate -it by other means, such as rearmament, and so forth. As far as I know, -this was not so in his case; and I think that in judging the Defendant -Funk, the question of how he proposed to handle the elimination of -unemployment, whether by rearmament or by some other means, is of some -importance. I do not think it will take much time, Mr. President. The -Defendant Funk, I am sure, will be very brief. - -Perhaps he can... - -THE PRESIDENT: He can answer that in a sentence, I should think. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Funk, be as brief as possible. - -FUNK: If I am to answer this in one sentence, I can say only that at -that time I envisioned the elimination of unemployment by a very precise -plan, but at any rate without rearmament, without armament... - -DR. SAUTER: But, instead? - -FUNK: By methods which I would have to explain. But in any event, -armament never came into question then... - -DR. SAUTER: But—can you perhaps tell us in a few telling words? - -FUNK: First of all, opportunities to work were offered everywhere so to -speak. It was imperative to set up a large-scale road-building program -in Germany; it was necessary to revitalize the engine industry, -especially the automobile industry, which, of course, had to be -appropriately protected. An extensive house building program was needed; -hundreds of thousands of houses were required... - -DR. SAUTER: In short... - -FUNK: Agriculture lacked mechanization and motorization. - -I should like to give here, however, only two figures, two ratios, which -throw light on the whole situation. Up to the war two-thirds of -Germany’s total production went to private consumption and only -one-third for public needs. Up to that point, therefore, the armament -industry did not play a decisive role. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, now we will turn to another chapter. - -You will remember that the Prosecution contended in their trial brief -that the evidence against you was largely circumstantial. I assume, -therefore, that it was based upon your offices rather than your actions. -For this reason I should be interested to know which Party offices you -held during the period which followed. - -FUNK: Only once, in the year 1932... - -DR. SAUTER: That is to say in the Party—not government offices. - -FUNK: I understand. Only in the year 1932, and then for only a few -months, did I receive Party assignments, because Gregor Strasser wanted -to set up for me an office of my own, for private economy. This office, -however, was dissolved a few months later when he himself resigned from -the Party and from his offices. Then in December 1932 I was instructed -to take charge of a committee for economic policy. - -DR. SAUTER: In December 1932? - -FUNK: Yes. And in February 1933, that is, 2 months afterwards, I gave up -this office again. Both assignments were unimportant and never really -got going in the short time they lasted. All the gentlemen in the dock -who were in leading positions in the Party at that time can confirm -this. I never had any other Party office; so that after 1933 I received -no further assignments from the Party and no Party office either. - -DR. SAUTER: Then this so-called Office for Private Economy (Amt für -Privatwirtschaft), if I understood you correctly, existed for just a few -months in the year 1932 but did not actually function. And in December -1932 you were made head of the other office, the Committee for Economic -Policy as it was called. Then a month later, in January 1933... - -FUNK: February 1933. - -DR. SAUTER: February 1933, shortly after the seizure of power, you gave -up this so-called office. Is that correct? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Now for your connection with the Party. Were you a member of -any organization of the Party—SA, SS, or any other section of the -Party? - -FUNK: I never belonged to any organization of the Party, neither SA nor -SS, nor any other organization; and as I have already said, I did not -belong to the Leadership Corps. - -DR. SAUTER: You did not belong to the Leadership Corps? - -FUNK: No. - -DR. SAUTER: You know, Dr. Funk, that the Party functionaries, that is, -the Party veterans, and so forth, met annually in November at Munich. -You have yourself seen a film showing this anniversary meeting. - -Were you ever invited to these gatherings on 8 and 9 November? - -FUNK: I do not know whether I received invitations; it is possible. But -I have never been at such a gathering, for these meetings were specially -intended for old Party members and the Party veterans, in commemoration -of the March on the Feldherrnhalle. I never participated in these -gatherings, as I was averse to attending large gatherings. During all -this time I attended a Party rally only once, just visiting one or two -functions. Mass gatherings always caused me physical pain. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, did you receive the Golden Party Badge, after you -became Minister for Economics? - -FUNK: No; I received that when I was still press chief of the Reich -government. - -DR. SAUTER: You did not get it as Minister? - -FUNK: No. - -DR. SAUTER: How long were you a National Socialist deputy of the -Reichstag? - -FUNK: For just a few months. - -DR. SAUTER: From when to when? - -FUNK: From July 1932 to February 1933. I did not get another seat, -because the Chairman of the Party, the chairman of the parliamentary -group, Dr. Frick, informed me that, by a directive of the Führer, only -the old Party members would receive mandates; and I had received a state -position in the meantime. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, in regard to the laws which are of particular -importance in this Trial, such as the Enabling Act, which practically -eliminated the Reichstag; the law forbidding political parties; or the -law for the unity of Party and State—in respect to all these laws, -which were in preparation for later developments, were you still a -member of the Reichstag at that time or had you already ceased to be -one? - -FUNK: I was no longer a Reichstag deputy. But even so, I considered -these laws necessary. - -DR. SAUTER: That is another question. But you were no longer a Reichstag -deputy? - -FUNK: No; and I was not a member of the Cabinet, either. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, we have frequently seen and heard of an affidavit -by the American Consul General, Messersmith, dated 28 August 1945, -Document 1760-PS. He says in the passage which concerns you: - - “He had been the editor of one of the leading financial journals - in Berlin before the Nazis came in and had very little open Nazi - sympathy when they did come in.” - -He goes on to say: - - “...later he became an ardent Nazi and one of their most - effective instruments because of his undoubted capacities in - various fields.” - -That is what the American Consul General, Messersmith, says about you. I -should like to remind you of another passage from the book by Dr. -Oestreich, which I have already mentioned and which has the title -_Walter Funk, A Life for Economy_. That is 3505-PS, which has already -been used and submitted in these proceedings. - -In this book the author says that the assignments given to you by the -Party, even if they covered a period of a few months only, might be -regarded as particularly important. - -What can you tell us about these two quotations? - -FUNK: I have already stated that I declared myself for the Party and -took up my Party work with enthusiasm. I was never attached to the -propaganda organization, as has been asserted by Mr. Messersmith. I -cannot remember that I ever knew Mr. Messersmith at all; nor do I -remember discussing Austria with him, which he also asserts. - -DR. SAUTER: Nor the Anschluss of Austria to Germany? - -FUNK: I cannot remember that, although of course I considered the union -of Germany and Austria necessary; but I do not recall discussing it with -Mr. Messersmith. - -As far as Dr. Paul Oestreich’s book is concerned, I am sorry that the -Prosecution has used this book as a source of information. Mistakes have -arisen which could have been avoided and which I would not have to -refute here now. Oestreich was a man who was quite outside the Party. - -DR. SAUTER: What was he? - -FUNK: He owned a German newspaper in Chile, and for some years he was -political editor of the _Berliner Börsenzeitung_. - -DR. SAUTER: Political editor? - -FUNK: First of all, he naturally wanted to secure a market for his book; -and for that reason he exaggerated the importance of my position in the -Party. He may have thought that in this way he would do me a particular -favor. In any case, as things have been described there, they are not -correctly stated. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, in Document Number 3563-PS, submitted by the -Prosecution, there is a statement to the effect that you, Dr. Funk, were -described in several publications as Hitler’s adviser on economic -policy; and in another passage you are said to be Hitler’s -“Wirtschaftsbeauftragter” (Economic Plenipotentiary). Was this a Party -office, or what precisely was meant by this term? What functions is it -supposed to indicate? - -FUNK: It was neither a Party office nor a Party title. The press -frequently called me so on account of my activity on behalf of the Party -in 1932, and it was obviously adopted by writers from the newspapers. -But it was neither an office nor a title. It is really nonsense to -consider my activities at that time so important; for if they had -actually been of importance, I should certainly have retained these -offices when the Party came to power. - -The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture was also a Reichsleiter; -State Secretary Reinhardt, of the Finance Ministry, was the head of the -Department for Financial Policy in the Reich Party Directorate -(Reichsleitung), _et cetera_. But there never was a “Reichsleiter für -die Wirtschaft.” When the Party came to power I left the Reichstag and -all Party organizations. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, a Reich Economic Council of the Party—I repeat -the term: Reich Economic Council of the Party—has been mentioned once -or twice in the course of this Trial. What do you know about your part -in this Party organization and about the duties and domain of this Party -organization? - -FUNK: I had to think for a long time before I could remember this group -at all, especially as neither Hess, Rosenberg, nor Frank remembered -anything of the kind. But I remember dimly that Gottfried Feder had a -Circle of people whom he used to call in for consultation and to which -he gave the rather pompous name of “Reich Economic Council of the -Party.” After the seizure of power this group ceased to exist. I never -attended any of its sessions, and I was very much surprised to learn -from the Indictment that I was supposed to have been the deputy chairman -of this group. This group was of no importance whatsoever. - -DR. SAUTER: You mentioned Gottfried Feder. - -FUNK: He was responsible for the economic program and tenets of the -Party from its establishment until it came to power. - -DR. SAUTER: So he was the economic theorist of the Party from its -foundation until it came to power? - -FUNK: Yes. Dr. Wagner and Keppler overshadowed him later on. Keppler was -always given the title of Economic Adviser to the Führer in public. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, if I understood you correctly, the persons whom -you mentioned just now are those whom you consider as the economic -advisers of Hitler? - -FUNK: No, that is wrong. - -DR. SAUTER: Well? - -FUNK: Hitler did not allow anyone to advise him, especially on economic -matters. These were merely the men who dealt with problems of economic -policy in the Party leadership, both before and after my time. - -DR. SAUTER: Also from the publicity angle, like Gottfried Feder? - -FUNK: He did a good deal of writing; he treated the problem of the -lowering of the rate of interest, for example, in great detail. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, those were your real or supposed Party offices. -Now I turn to your State offices. After the seizure of power—that is, -at the end of January 1933—you became press chief under the Reich -Government. In March 1933, when the Propaganda Ministry was created, -that being a State Ministry, you became State Secretary in this -Propaganda Ministry under Minister Goebbels. How did that come about? - -FUNK: May I give a short summary of these matters? - -DR. SAUTER: One moment... - -FUNK: It would go much faster than asking each question separately. - -DR. SAUTER: Then I would ask you to consider at the same time the -question of why you entered the Propaganda Ministry and were made press -chief of the Reich Government, although you were usually always occupied -with economic questions. - -FUNK: The Reich Marshal has already stated in his testimony; firstly, -that he never knew that I had been active in the Party at all before -1933, and secondly, that, as he himself rightly believed, my appointment -as press chief of the Reich Government came as a complete surprise. On -29 January 1933 the Führer told me that he had no one among the old -Party members who was intimately acquainted with the press and that he, -therefore, wanted to ask me to take over the position of press chief, -especially as this appointment involved regular reports to the Reich -President. The Reich President knew me and, as I may mention again later -on, very much liked me. I was often a guest at his home and was on -friendly terms with his family. - -DR. SAUTER: That is, Hindenburg? - -FUNK: Yes, Hindenburg. - -These were the reasons which prompted Hitler to make me press chief of -the Reich Government. The press chief of the Reich Government was also a -ministerial director in the Reich Chancellery, and I did not like the -idea of suddenly becoming a civil servant, for I never had any ambitions -in that direction. But I accepted the appointment, influenced by the -general enthusiasm of that period and in obedience to the Führer’s -summons. - -I gave regular press reports to him, in the presence of Lammers. These -conferences went on for a year and a half only, until the death of the -Reich President, after which they stopped. The Führer issued -instructions to the press through the Reich press chief of the Party, -Dr. Dietrich, who was later also made a State Secretary in the -Propaganda Ministry. - -When the Propaganda Ministry was founded the Führer asked me to organize -this ministry, so that Goebbels would not have to deal with problems of -administration, organization, and finance. Then the Press Department of -the Reich Government, of which I had so far been in charge, was -incorporated in the Propaganda Ministry and placed under the direct -control of Goebbels. It also had its own special chief. - -From that time on—that is, after only 6 weeks activity as press chief -of the Reich Government—my activities regarding the information and -instruction of the press were at an end. From then on this was done by -Goebbels himself, who generally drew a sharp line between the political -and administrative tasks of the Ministry. He brought with him his old -collaborators from the propaganda leadership of the Party to look after -propaganda. - -My services were not required for political propaganda. Goebbels took -care of it through the Party organ, of which I was not a member. I had, -for instance, as Chairman of the Supervisory Council, to be responsible -for the finances of the German Broadcasting Corporation—a matter of a -hundred million—but I never broadcasted propaganda speeches. Nor did I -speak at any of the big State or Party rallies. Naturally, I fully -appreciated the importance of propaganda for state leadership and -admired the truly gifted manner in which Goebbels conducted his -propaganda; but I myself played no part in active propaganda. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, if I understood you correctly, your functions in the -Propaganda Ministry, which was, of course, a state ministry, were of a -purely administrative and organizational nature; and you left the actual -propaganda to the Minister, Dr. Goebbels, and the people he brought into -the Ministry from the Party propaganda instrument. Is that correct? - -FUNK: Yes. Goebbels naturally claimed the exclusive right to dispose of -all propaganda material. I did not appear beside him in the field of -propaganda at all; and other considerable restrictions were imposed on -my position as State Secretary by the fact that many assignments, looked -after in other ministries by the State Secretary, were in this case -taken care of by Goebbels’ expert, Hahnke, who was later made State -Secretary and Gauleiter. - -DR. SAUTER: Hahnke? - -FUNK: Yes. I do not believe that during the entire period of my activity -in the Propaganda Ministry I signed even three times as Goebbels’ -deputy. One of these signatures has been nailed down by the Prosecution. -It is a signature appended to an order for the execution of a directive -and fixing the date on which it is to come into force. - -DR. SAUTER: What kind of directive was that? - -FUNK: The decree for the application of the law of the Reich Chamber of -Culture. The Reich Cabinet decreed legislation in connection with the -Reich Chamber of Culture. I was not a member of the Reich Cabinet; but -as State Secretary to the Propaganda Ministry I was, of course, formally -responsible, and naturally I promoted propaganda, as did everyone else -who occupied a leading position in the official or the intellectual life -of Germany. The entire cultural life of the nation was permeated with -this propaganda in a measure appropriate to the overwhelming, -fundamental significance which was rightly attached to propaganda in the -National Socialist State. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, the Prosecution has held you responsible for laws -decreed during your term of office as press chief of the -Reichsregierung. I refer, for instance, to the laws submitted under -Documents Number 2962-PS and 2963-PS. These are the laws well known to -you and which concern the abolition of civil rights in Germany and the -abolition of the parliamentary form of government. I ask you to explain, -what did you have to do with these laws? Did you as press chief under -the Reich Government have any influence on the contents and promulgation -of these laws? - -FUNK: No. This question has already been answered in the negative by -both the Reich Marshal and Dr. Lammers. All I had to do was to pass on -the contents of these laws to the press, in accordance with instructions -given to me by the Führer. - -DR. SAUTER: So you were surely present at the sessions of the Reich -Cabinet... - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And you took note of the deliberations and resolutions of -the Reich Cabinet... - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: That was the reason of your presence there; but your sole -duty—and please tell me if I am correct—was to inform the press, after -the cabinet sessions, of the decisions made? Is that correct? - -FUNK: Yes, that is correct. - -DR. SAUTER: So you had no influence on the drafting or on the contents -of the laws, nor on the voting? Is that right? - -FUNK: Yes, that is right. I had neither a seat nor a vote in the -Cabinet. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you responsible for the press policy of the Reich -Government—and I stress: the Reich Government and not the Party? - -FUNK: I have already said that I received my instructions for the press -from the Führer; that went on for 6 weeks. Then Dr. Goebbels took charge -of press policy. - -DR. SAUTER: You have already said that the press reports to Reich -President Von Hindenburg ended with his death in August 1934? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And also, from the same date, your press reports to Hitler, -who was then Reich Chancellor, is it not so? - -FUNK: Yes, that is correct. Reich President Hindenburg had died in the -meantime. - -DR. SAUTER: And afterwards the Reich press chief, that is the Party -official, Dr. Dietrich, tended more and more to occupy your place? - -FUNK: Yes, Dr. Dietrich was one of the Führer’s closest collaborators; -and through him the Führer gave his instructions to the press. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, the book by Dr. Oestreich, 3505-PS, Exhibit -USA-653, which we have already dealt with, contains the following -quotation on your press policy; and I quote: - - “Many of the journalists who worked in Berlin and the provinces - are grateful to Funk for the way in which he attended to their - wishes and their complaints, especially during the transition - period. - - “Funk is responsible for the much-quoted saying that the press - must not be a ‘barrel-organ,’ with which he protested against - the uniformity”—to use a German word, the one-sided modeling - and leveling—“of the press and demanded individuality for it. - But he also protected the press from efforts made by various - offices to ‘grind their own ax....’” - -Is that correct? - -FUNK: Yes; I probably did write that; and that was my opinion. So far as -it lay within my power, I tried to protect the press from -standardization and arbitrary treatment, especially at the hands of the -government offices. - -DR. SAUTER: You have already said, I believe, that you took no part in -the political direction of the Propaganda Ministry—I stress, the -political direction of the Propaganda Ministry—or in the actual work of -propaganda. Is that correct? - -FUNK: Yes, that is correct. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I turn now to a new complex. Do you wish to -have the recess now, Your Honor? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we will go straight on. We are going to adjourn -at 12 o’clock. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I come now to your attitude on the question of -anti-Semitism. I do so because you are held more or less responsible, -along with others, for the excesses committed against the Jews. Will you -tell us on what principles your attitude was based? - -FUNK: I was never anti-Semitic on the basis of racial principles. At -first I thought that the anti-Semitic demands of the Party program were -a matter of propaganda. At that time the Jews in many respects held a -dominant position in widely different and important fields of German -life; and I myself knew many very wise Jews who did not think that it -was in the interest of the Jews that they should dominate cultural life, -the legal profession, science, and commerce to the extent that they did -at the time... - -The people showed a tendency toward anti-Semitism at that time. - -The Jews had a particularly strong influence on cultural life and their -influence seemed to me particularly dangerous in this sphere because -tendencies which I felt to be definitely un-German and inartistic -appeared as a result of Jewish influence, especially in the domain of -painting and music. The law concerning the Reich Chamber of Culture was -created, radically excluding the Jews from German cultural life but with -the possibility of making exceptions. I applied these exceptions -whenever I was in a position to do so. The law, as I have stated, was -decreed by the Reich Cabinet, which bears the responsibility for it. I -was at that time not a member of the Cabinet. During the period of my -activities in the Propaganda Ministry, I did what I could to help the -Jews and other outsiders in cultural life. - -Everyone who knows me from my activities during that period can and must -testify to that. - -DR. SAUTER: I have submitted two affidavits in my document book; -Documents Number Funk-1 and 2. The first was made by the editor of the -_Frankfurter Zeitung_, Albert Oeser; and the second by a lawyer, Dr. -Roesen. I ask you to take judicial notice of both these documents. The -first affidavit proves that the Defendant Funk took a great deal of -trouble to protect the interests of the above-mentioned Albert Oeser, -the editor of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, and those of a number of the -staff of this newspaper, although by doing so he was endangering his own -position. In particular, he persisted in retaining members of the staff -who were not of Aryan descent and who, therefore, in accordance with the -intentions of the Party, should no longer have been employed. - -FUNK: It was not in accordance with the intentions of the Party, but in -accordance with the law passed for the Chamber of Culture that they were -no longer to be employed. - -DR. SAUTER: In accordance with the law passed for the Chamber of -Culture, also. - -Then Document Number 2 of the document book, an affidavit made by Dr. -Roesen, who confirms that the Defendant Funk also intervened, for -instance, on behalf of the family of the composer, Dr. Richard Strauss, -and his non-Aryan grandchildren and by so doing incurred certain -personal danger. These are just a few examples; but the defendant can -probably tell you of other cases in which he looked after people’s -interests. - -THE PRESIDENT: What exhibit number are you offering those as? - -DR. SAUTER: Numbers Funk-1 and 2 in the document book. I have submitted -the originals. - -THE PRESIDENT: 1 and 2? - -DR. SAUTER: 1 and 2. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Dr. Funk, I have just said that perhaps -you could—quite briefly—give us some more examples of cases where you -used your official position to protect intellectuals and artists, whose -views had got them into difficulties. - -FUNK: Richard Strauss is a special case. That most remarkable living -composer found himself in great difficulties on account of a libretto -written by the Jew, Stefan Zweig. - -I succeeded in having Richard Strauss again received by the Führer, and -the whole affair was dismissed. - -Dr. Wilhelm Furtwängler found himself in similar difficulties because he -wrote an article praising the composer Hindemith; and composers with -Jewish wives, such as Lehar, Künnecke, and others who were always in -difficulties because of their efforts to evade the ban placed on the -performance of their works. I always succeeded in getting permission for -these composers to have their works performed. - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can say that he helped hundreds of Jews, -but that does not really destroy the fact that he may have acted -hostilely by signing decrees against the Jewish race—his helping a few -Jewish friends. Anyhow, I do not think that it need be gone into any -detail. - -DR. SAUTER: We are of the opinion, Mr. President, that in order to judge -the character and personality of the defendant, it may be important to -know whether he signed decrees which were in any way anti-Semitic -because as an official he considered himself bound by his oath to carry -out the law of the land, or whether he signed them because he himself -was an anti-Semite who wished to persecute Jewish citizens and to -deprive them of their rights, and for this reason only... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks that you have made the -point quite clearly that he helped Jewish friends, but it isn’t a -question which need be gone into in detail. - -DR. SAUTER: I come now, in any case, Mr. President, to another point. I -want to ask the defendant how his activities in the Propaganda Ministry -developed in later years. - -FUNK: In exactly the same direction that I have described here. By -degrees I came to be in charge of a large cultural economic -concern—film companies, broadcasting corporations, theaters. I was -director and chairman of the supervisory board of the Philharmonic -Orchestra and on the Council of German Economy, which dealt collectively -with the economic activities in the entire economic field at home and -abroad with the active participation of the economy itself. Those were -the main parts of my work. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Prosecution has submitted under Document Number -3501-PS an affidavit by the former Reich chief of the press—I -believe—Max Amann, in regard to your activities in the Propaganda -Ministry. I want to refer to this now. In that affidavit, we find the -statement that Dr. Funk—and I quote literally: - - “...was to all intents and purposes Minister in the Propaganda - Ministry...”—And it says further on—and I quote again—“Funk - exercised complete control over all means of expression in - Germany: press, theater, radio, and music.” - -Now, I ask you to comment on that; but you can do so quite briefly -because I have already submitted an affidavit by Max Amann to the -contrary to which I will refer later. - -FUNK: Amann knew the Ministry only from the outside; and, therefore, he -had no exact knowledge of its internal affairs. My work was done in the -manner I have described. It is completely absurd to assert that under a -Minister such as Dr. Goebbels the Ministry could have been led by -someone else who was not the Minister. - -Dr. Goebbels assumed such exclusive and all-embracing functions in the -field of propaganda that he dwarfed everyone else. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have submitted an affidavit by that same -former Reichsleiter Amann, dealing with the same subject, in the -appendix to the Funk Document Book, under Document Number Funk-14—that -will be Exhibit Number 3—and I ask you to take judicial notice of this -affidavit. I do not think I have to read it. I administered that -affidavit in the presence of and with the co-operation of a member of -the Prosecution. The essential part of this affidavit of 17 April 1946 -is that Reichsleiter Max Amann also admits that Funk had nothing to do -with propaganda as such. That is to say, he did no broadcasting and -indulged in no propaganda speeches but was mainly concerned with the -organization and administration of the Ministry. Now, Mr. President, I -come to the defendant’s position as Reich Minister of Economics. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Dr. Funk, you were State Secretary in the -Propaganda Ministry until 1937. At the end of November 1937 you became -Reich Minister of Economics, after your predecessor, Dr. Schacht, had -left that post. Can you tell us with the necessary brevity—of -course—how that change took place and why you were called to that post? - -FUNK: That took me completely by surprise, too. During a performance at -the opera, the Führer, who was present, took me aside in the vestibule -during an interval and told me that the differences between Schacht and -Göring could no longer be bridged and that he was therefore compelled to -dismiss Schacht from his office as Minister of Economics and was asking -me to take over the post of Minister of Economics, as he was very well -acquainted with my knowledge and experience in the field of economics. -He also asked me to contact Reich Marshal Göring who would explain -everything else. - -That was the only conversation which I had with the Führer on the -subject. - -DR. SAUTER: And then you spoke to Göring himself? Will you tell us about -that? - -FUNK: Then I went to the Reich Marshal who told me that he had really -only intended to put a state secretary in charge of the Reich Ministry -of Economics but that later he decided that the extensive machinery of -the Four Year Plan should be merged with the machinery of the Ministry -of Economics. However, the minister would have to work in accordance -with his directives and in particular the plenipotentiaries for the -individual decisive branches of economy would be maintained and would -receive their directives directly from the Delegate for the Four Year -Plan. In order to proceed with the necessary reorganization, the Reich -Marshal himself took over the direction of the Reich Economic Ministry; -and in February 1938 he transferred it to me. - -DR. SAUTER: So Göring himself was to all intents and purposes the head -of the Reich Ministry for Economics for a period of about 3 months. - -FUNK: The reorganization was effected under his control. The control of -economic policy was in his hands then as well as later. - -The main control offices under the Four Year Plan were maintained; for -instance, the Foreign Currency Control Office, which gave directives to -the Reichsbank; there was the Food Control Office, which gave directives -to the Food and Agriculture Ministry; the Allocation of Labor Control -Office, which gave directives to the Labor Ministry; and also the -plenipotentiaries for the separate branches of economics: coal, iron, -chemicals, _et cetera_, which were under the direct control of the -Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Some offices were also transferred in -this way to the Ministry of Economics from the Four Year Plan, which -continued to function quite independently. They included the Reich -Office for Economic Development and Research, which was under the -direction of Professor Strauch, and the Reich Office for Soil Research, -directed by State Secretary Kempner, mentioned here in connection with -Slovakia and Austria. - -I tried to restore the independence of these offices. I am still in -ignorance of what these offices did. In any case, they thought -themselves responsible to the Four Year Plan rather than to the Minister -of Economy. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, the essential point of what you have just said -seems to me to be that you received the title of minister but that in -reality you were not a minister, but might have had the position of a -state secretary and that your so-called Ministry of Economics was -completely subordinated to the directives of the Four Year Plan—your -Codefendant Göring in other words—and was compelled to follow these -directives. - -Did I understand it correctly? - -FUNK: The latter point is correct. The Reich Marshal has clearly -expressed and confirmed that here. But the first statement is not -correct because formally, at least, I held the position of minister, -which involved a gigantic administrative domain to which the Reich -Marshal, of course, could not pay attention. The very purpose of the -reorganization was that the Reich Marshal reserved for himself the -direction and control of economic policy in the most important and -decisive matters and gave me corresponding directives, but the execution -of these was naturally in the hands of the Ministry and its -organizations. But it is true that the position of minister, in the -usual meaning of the term, did not exist. There was, so to speak, a -higher ministry. But that has happened to me all my life. I arrived at -the threshold, so to speak; but I was never permitted to cross it. - -DR. SAUTER: That is not the case as far as this Trial is concerned. - -Dr. Funk, the Prosecution asserts that, although you were not really a -minister with the usual responsibility and independence of a minister, -you, as Dr. Funk, Reich Economic Minister, still exercised supervision -over those parts of the German economy which were grouped under war and -armaments industry, that is, in particular, raw materials and -manufactured materials as well as mining, the iron industry, power -stations, handicrafts, finance and credit, foreign trade and foreign -currency. I refer you, Dr. Funk, to the statements on Page 22 of the -German translation of the trial brief, which I discussed with you -several days ago. - -FUNK: That is formally correct. But I have already explained how matters -really were. I had nothing to do with the armament industry. The -armament industry was at first under the High Command of the Armed -Forces, under the Chief of the Armament Office, General Thomas, who was -a member of Schacht’s conspiracy, of which we have heard here. The -Armament Minister Todt, who was appointed in 1940, at once took over -from me the entire power economy; and later on I turned over all the -civilian production to Armament Minister Speer. - -DR. SAUTER: What do you mean by civilian production? - -FUNK: Coal, chemicals, consumer, and other goods. The main production -branches in that field already mentioned here were, as I said before, -under the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Thus it came about that the -Ministry of Economics gradually became a new Ministry of Commerce, which -dealt only with the distribution of consumer goods. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, perhaps we might let him go on for a few -seconds longer; because I would then come in a second to the subject of -the Reichsbank President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - -DR. SAUTER: Will you please continue briefly? You stopped. I believe you -wanted to say more about manpower, gold, and foreign currency—about the -competent authorities there. - -FUNK: The Foreign Currency Control Office under the Four Year Plan was -the competent authority for that; and the Reichsbank had to act in -accordance with its directives—in my time, at least. - -DR. SAUTER: And the direction of foreign trade? - -FUNK: That was in the hands of the Foreign Office. The Minister for -Foreign Affairs obstinately laid claim to that. - -DR. SAUTER: And what did the Ministry of Economics do? - -FUNK: The Ministry of Economics and the Reichsbank attended to the -technical execution in this sphere, that is, the technical execution of -clearing agreements, balances, _et cetera_. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I come now to a separate theme. I should like -now to discuss his position as President of the Reichsbank. I believe it -might be a good moment to adjourn. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED - AND TWENTY-SECOND DAY - Monday, 6 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Funk resumed the stand._] - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I will continue my questioning of the -Defendant Dr. Funk. On Saturday we were discussing the appointment of -Dr. Funk as Reich Minister of Economics and now I turn to his -appointment as President of the Reichsbank. - -Witness, I believe it was in January 1939 when you also became President -of the Reichsbank as successor to Dr. Schacht. How did that appointment -come about? - -FUNK: I had just returned from a journey about the middle of January -1939. I was called to the Führer and found him in a state of great -agitation. He told me that the Reich Minister of Finance had informed -him that Schacht had refused the necessary financial credits and that -consequently the Reich was in financial straits. The Führer told me, in -great excitement, that Schacht was sabotaging his policies, that he -would not tolerate the Reichsbank’s interference with his policies any -longer and the gentlemen in the Reichsbank Directorate were utter fools -if they believed that he would tolerate it. No government and no chief -of state in the world could possibly make policy dependent on -co-operation or non-co-operation of the issuing bank. - -The Führer further declared that from now on he himself, on the -suggestions and demands of the Reich Minister of Finance, would fix all -credits to be given by the Reichsbank to the Reich. He had given Lammers -instructions to formulate a decree, together with the Reich Minister of -Finance, by which the status of the Reichsbank, as established by the -provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, would be changed, and whereby -the terms for the granting of credits to the Reich would be determined -by himself alone in the future. - -The Führer further said that he was asking me to take over the direction -of the Reichsbank, whereupon I replied that I would be glad to comply -with his wish, but that first of all I had to have confirmation from him -that the conditions for stabilization of currency would be maintained. - -The opinion, which was voiced here by a witness, that inflation would be -brought about through a further grant of credits at that time is wrong -and totally untenable. Although 12,000 millions of credit can have an -inflationary effect, 20,000 millions of credit will not necessarily tend -toward inflation if the state has the necessary authority to stabilize -prices and wages and to carry out the regulation and administration of -prices, and if the people maintain the proper discipline in this -respect, and if, finally, the money which as a result of increased -credits represents excess purchasing power is diverted through taxes or -taken up through loans; then, as far as the currency is concerned, there -is absolutely no danger. - -It is a fact that the Reichsmark, up to the final collapse, was kept on -a stable basis. As far as the essentials of life are concerned, the -purchasing power of money in Germany was secure. Of course, its value -was limited insofar as consumers’ goods were produced only on a very -limited scale, for almost all production was turned over to armaments. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, have you concluded? - -FUNK: Just one moment, please. I believe this is a very important -question. - -In other countries as well, large credits were issued during the war -which did not in any way cause an inflation. The national debt in the -United States as well as in England was relatively, and in part even -absolutely, higher than that in Germany. And in these countries, too, a -correct financial policy overthrew the old thesis that a war would, of -necessity, bring about the destruction of the monetary value. - -The German people, up to the very end, until the terrible collapse, -maintained admirable discipline. Money as a function of the state will -have its value and currency will function so long as the state has -authority to maintain it on a stable basis, to keep the economy under -control, and as long as the people themselves maintain the necessary -discipline. - -Thus I took over this office not with the knowledge that Germany was now -entering an inflation period but, on the contrary, I knew well that -through maintenance of a suitable governmental policy the currency could -be protected, and it was protected. However, the basic difference -between Schacht’s position and my position lay in the fact that during -Schacht’s time the Reichsbank could determine the granting of credits to -the Reich, whereas this authority was taken from me, and the -responsibility for domestic finances, therefore, was turned over to the -Minister of Finance or of course to the Führer himself. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, I have another question. Perhaps, despite your -poor state of health today, you might be able to speak a little more -loudly so that the stenographers might understand you more easily. -Please try, and we will make this as brief as possible. - -Witness, then in addition to these offices of yours which we have -discussed up to now, you finally had a further office as successor of -Dr. Schacht, namely, that of Plenipotentiary General for Economy. Can -you give us some details of your view in this connection in order to -clarify your situation, your activity, and your achievements? - -FUNK: This of all the positions I had was the least impressive. As the -Reich Marshal correctly stated, and as Dr. Lammers confirmed, it existed -merely on paper. That, too, was an essential difference between the -position which Schacht had and the one which I had. - -Schacht had been appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy. I, -on the other hand, was the Plenipotentiary General for Economy. -According to the Reich Defense Law of 1938, the Plenipotentiary General -for Economy was to co-ordinate the civil economics departments in -preparing for a war. But, in the meantime, these economic departments -had been subordinated to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, and I, as -Plenipotentiary General for Economy, was also subordinate to the -Delegate for the Four Year Plan. - -Consequently, there was confusion and overlapping in matters of -competence and authority as they had been laid down formally. The result -was a directive of the Führer just a few months after the beginning of -the war which _de jure_ and formally transferred the authority of the -Plenipotentiary General for Economy, as far as the civil economic -departments were concerned, to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. - -DR. SAUTER: When was that? - -FUNK: That was in December of 1939. There remained only a formal -authority to issue directives, that is, I could sign directives on -behalf of the five civil economic departments, which, according to the -Reich Defense Law, were subordinate to the Plenipotentiary. I retained -authority over the Ministry of Economics and the Reichsbank, which I had -in any case. - -DR. SAUTER: But you were subordinate even in these functions to the -Delegate for the Four Year Plan; is that correct? - -FUNK: Yes, like all civil economic departments. Only with the Ministry -of Economics itself did I have a closer connection. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, in August 1939, that is, immediately before the -beginning of the Polish campaign, you in your capacity as -Plenipotentiary General for Economy summoned the civil economic offices -to a meeting for discussions, and Document 3324-PS refers to this -meeting. It seems to me important that you define your attitude on this -point also, and especially with reference to the fact that apparently -your letter to Hitler, dated 25 August, was a result of this meeting. -This matter is mentioned in your trial brief on Page 24. Will you -comment on it? - -FUNK: In Schacht’s time there existed an office for the Plenipotentiary -General for Economy, and a working committee was set up which consisted -of the representatives of the various economic departments, as well as -of the Ministry of the Interior, the Plenipotentiary for Administration, -the OKW, and above all, of the Four Year Plan. - -When Schacht resigned, the direction of this committee and of the office -of the Plenipotentiary for Economy was transferred to Dr. Posse, his -former State Secretary, whereas under Schacht State Counsellor Wohlthat -had headed the office and the committee. These people, of course, had -constant consultations, in which they discussed measures necessary in -the economic sphere for waging war. And this was the organization of the -Plenipotentiary for Economy which I dealt with in my speech in Vienna -which had been mentioned here. It existed alongside the Four Year Plan, -and in the main was charged with a smooth conversion of the civilian -economy into a war economy in the case of war, and with the preparation -of a war economy administration. - -When, in August of 1939, there was a threat of war with Poland, I called -together the chiefs of the civil economic departments, as well as the -representatives of the Four Year Plan, and, in joint consultation, we -worked out measures necessary for converting the civilian economy into a -war economy in the case of a war with as little disturbance as possible. - -These were the proposals which I mentioned in my letter to the Führer -dated 25 August 1939, at a time when the German and Polish Armies -already faced each other in a state of complete mobilization. - -It was, of course, my duty to do everything to prevent dislocations of -the civilian economy in the case of a war, and it was my duty as -President of the Reichsbank to augment gold and foreign exchange assets -of the Reichsbank as much as possible. - -This was necessary first of all because of the general political tension -which existed at the time. It would also have been necessary if war had -not broken out at all, but even if only economic sanctions had been -imposed, as was to be expected from the general foreign political -tension which existed at the time. And it was equally my duty, as -Minister of Economics, to do everything to increase production. - -But I did not concern myself with the financial demands of the -Wehrmacht, and I had nothing to do with armament problems, since, as I -have already said, the direction of peacetime as well as war economy had -been turned over to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. - -The explanation for the fact that at that time I kept aloof from the -work of that committee is the following: - -I personally did not believe that there would be war, and everyone who -discussed this subject with me at that time will confirm this. In the -months before the beginning of the war I concentrated my entire activity -on international negotiations for bringing about a better international -economic order, and for improving commercial relations between Germany -and her foreign partners. - -At that time it was arranged that the British Ministers Hudson and -Stanley were to visit me in Berlin. I myself was to go for negotiations -to Paris where, in the year 1937, I had come to know some members of the -Cabinet when I organized a great German cultural fête there. - -The subject of short-term foreign debts had again to be discussed and -settled—the so-called moratorium. I had worked out new proposals for -this, which were hailed with enthusiasm, especially in England. In June -of 1939, an international financial discussion took place in my offices -in Berlin, and leading representatives of the banking world from the -United States, from England, from Holland, France, Belgium, Switzerland, -and Sweden, took part in it. - -These discussions led to results which satisfied all parties. At the -same time I carried out the exchange or transfer of Reichsbank assets in -foreign countries. This exchange of gold shares also was considered very -fair and satisfactory in foreign banking circles and the foreign press. - -In June of that year I went to Holland to negotiate trade agreements. I -also participated in the customary monthly discussions of the -International Clearing Bank at Basel as late as the beginning of July -1939, and despite the strong political tension which existed at the time -I was convinced that a war would be avoided and I voiced this conviction -in all my discussions, at home and abroad. And this is why during those -months I was barely interested in the discussions and consultations on -the financing of the war and the shape of war economy. - -I had, of course, given instructions to the Reichsbank to use its -available economic assets abroad as far as possible to obtain gold and -generally to increase our foreign assets. But in the few months of my -activity in this sphere before the war, the success of this endeavor of -mine was slight. Our gold assets and foreign assets, as they were turned -over to me by Schacht, remained on the whole unchanged until the war. - -In my questionnaire to the Reichsbank Vice President, Puhl, I requested -enlightenment on these transactions, since the Directorate of the -Reichsbank and its managing director who, at that time, was Puhl, are -bound to have information on this matter. The answer to this -questionnaire, I am sorry to say, has not as yet arrived. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you gave these details obviously to show that -despite the political tension at the time you did not even think -seriously of war. - -FUNK: Not until August 1939. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, in the course of these proceedings, we have heard about -a series of discussions which Hitler had with generals and other -personalities, and which concerned military and political matters. All -these were discussions which we must say today stood in closest -connection with preparations for war. - -At which of these discussions were you present, and what did you gather -from them? - -FUNK: I was never called into political and military discussions, and I -did not participate in any of these discussions which were mentioned -here in connection with the charge of planning an aggressive war, so far -as discussions with the Führer are concerned. I was also not informed -about the contents of these discussions. And as far as I can remember, I -was hardly ever present at the discussions with the Reich Marshal, when -they dealt with this topic. - -I have been confronted here with a meeting which took place in October -of 1938. - -DR. SAUTER: 14 October 1938? I can tell you the document number. It is -1301-PS. - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you present at that meeting? - -FUNK: No. - -DR. SAUTER: That was the meeting... - -FUNK: Yes, that was the meeting in which, according to the indictment -against me, Göring pointed out that he had been instructed by the Führer -to increase armament to an abnormal extent. The Luftwaffe was to be -increased fivefold, as speedily as possible. - -The Prosecutor, according to the official record (Volume V, Pages 163, -164), asserts that, in this discussion, Göring addressed me in the words -of a man who was already at war. I was not even in Germany those days -but in Bulgaria, and consequently I could not participate in this -meeting. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, as proof of the fact that the Defendant Funk -was not in Germany at the time of this discussion with Göring on 14 -October 1938 I have submitted several documents in the Document Book -Funk; they are extracts from the _Völkischer Beobachter_, Numbers 5, 6, -7, and 8 of the Funk Document Book. These documents are submitted -chiefly because they show that in fact from 13 October 1938 until 15 -October 1938 Funk was at Sofia in Bulgaria, and therefore could not have -been present at the Göring meeting on 14 October 1938. - -What Funk said in Bulgaria about economic relations I need not read in -detail. But I would like to refer especially to his speech of 15 October -1938, Funk Document Book Number 7, in which the Defendant Funk, -particularly in the first paragraph, declared publicly that the thought -of an economic union between the German economy and the Southeastern -European economy was in his mind, and in which Funk quite definitely -rejected a one-sided dependence of the economy of the southeastern -states on the economic system of Germany. - -Therefore I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these documents -as evidence and in order to save time I will not go into them further. - -Witness, under Document Number PS-3562 the Prosecution has submitted a -document dealing with a conference on 1 June 1939. You yourself did not -attend this meeting, but according to the list of those present several -representatives of your Ministry were there, as well as the -representative of the Reichsbank. At this meeting the probable financial -needs of the Reich in case of a war, the productive capacity of the -Germany economy, and that of the Protectorate in case of a war were -discussed. There is a marginal note in this record which says that the -record was to be submitted to you. Can you state very briefly whether -this was actually done? - -FUNK: No, it was not done. I have the document here. If this record had -been submitted to me I would have affixed my initials “W. F.” to it. -Besides, this document deals with the continuous discussions, which I -have already mentioned, about the financing of the war, and the measures -to be taken in the field of civilian economy in case of a war. The -decisive measures for the financing were naturally prepared by the Reich -Minister of Finance, and these measures were discussed at length in this -conference at which the question of meeting the expenses through taxes -was one of the chief topics. In any event, a variety of such discussions -was carried on continuously at that time among the representatives of -the various departments, and they took place in the office of the -leading staff of the Plenipotentiary for Economy. By chance I have now -found this name which earlier I could not remember: this was the -institution—the committee—which was founded in the days of Schacht and -was later continued. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, on 30 March 1939 you made a statement of your -program in a speech before the Central Committee of the Reichsbank. - -I have included these excerpts from the speech which have a bearing on -this Trial in the Funk Document Book under Number 9. I am coming back to -this speech because it was delivered before the Central Committee -shortly after the defendant assumed his office as President of the -Reichsbank, and represents his program as President of the Reichsbank in -connection with various matters which have played a part here. - -Dr. Funk, perhaps with just a few brief words you might give us the -essential relevant points of your speech, insofar as the Prosecution is -interested in them. - -FUNK: I do not believe I need do that. I briefly mentioned a while ago -that in these months I carried on international discussions about the -necessity for a new order in international economic relations, and that -I also pointed out Germany’s readiness to play a positive part. -Therefore, I do not think I need read anything more from this speech; it -is only meant to show that at that time I did not work on preparations -for war but endeavored to bring about international economic -understanding, and that these, my efforts were recognized publicly in -foreign countries, especially in England. - -DR. SAUTER: This intention to establish favorable and confident -relations with foreign countries, that is, with their financial and -economic circles, was, I am sure, a deciding factor in a later measure -to which you already referred a little while ago, namely that -compensation to foreign shareholders in the Reichsbank, who, I believe, -existed chiefly in England, Holland, and Switzerland, was assessed and -paid in a particularly loyal manner. - -FUNK: Yes, I have stated that already. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, you mentioned earlier a letter which you wrote to -Hitler. This letter would be interesting to me insofar as I would like -to know just why you wrote it, and why in it you spoke of “your -proposals,” even though in the main they were concerned with things -which did not actually originate with you. Perhaps you will say a few -words about this letter. - -FUNK: The tone and contents of this letter can be explained from the -general mood which existed everywhere in Germany at that time. Beyond -that it is a purely personal letter to the Führer: In it I thanked him -for his congratulations on my birthday. For this reason the letter is a -little emphatic in its style. When I spoke of “my proposals,” this may -be traced back to the fact that I had personally some time before -explained to the Führer what measures would be necessary if a war broke -out. And in the main, those were the measures which were adopted later -as a result of conferences with the other economic offices, and to which -I referred in this letter. Thus it was not quite correct for me to say -“my proposals.” I should really have said, “The proposals worked out -together with the other economic offices.” - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, have you concluded? - -FUNK: No. I would like to explain this whole letter with just a few -words, since it is apparently one of the pillars of the Prosecution’s -case against me. - -As I have said, it was the time when the two mobilized armies faced each -other. It was the time when the entire German people were in a state of -great excitement because of the constant provocations and the -ill-treatment of the German population in Poland. I personally did not -believe that we would actually have war, for I was of the opinion that -diplomatic negotiations could again be successful in preventing the -threat of war and indeed in avoiding war itself. After the Führer’s -almost miraculous successes in foreign policy, the heart of every true -German had to beat faster in the expectation that in the East also -Germany’s wishes would be fulfilled; that is, that my separated home -province of East Prussia would be reunited with the Reich, that the old -German city of Danzig would again belong to the Reich, and that the -problem of the Corridor would be solved. - -The overwhelming majority of the German people, including myself, did -not believe that this question would end in war. We were rather -convinced that England would be successful in exerting pressure on -Poland so that Poland would acquiesce in the German demands on Danzig -and the Corridor and would not bring on a war. The testimony of the -witness Gisevius must have made clear to everyone in the world that -England did nothing at that time to exert a soothing and conciliatory -influence on Poland. For if the British Government knew that a -conspiracy existed in Germany in which the Chief of the General Staff, -the Chief of the OKW, the Chief of German Armament and other leading -military personalities and generals were involved, and that an overthrow -had been prepared for the event of war, then the British Government -would have been foolish indeed if they had done anything to assuage and -conciliate Poland. The British Government must have been convinced that -if Hitler should go to war, a _coup d’état_, a revolution, an overthrow -would take place, and that, in the first place, there would be no war -and, secondly, that the hateful Hitler regime would be removed. Nobody -could hope for more. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, we do not want to talk politics, but rather return -to this letter of 25 August 1939. May I repeat the number, 699-PS. Let -us at present deal only with this letter. If I understood you correctly, -I can summarize your testimony as follows: This rather enthusiastic -letter to Hitler was written because you were hopeful that Hitler would -succeed in reuniting your home province of East Prussia with the Reich, -and would now finally settle the Corridor problem without a war. Did I -understand you correctly? - -FUNK: Yes, but at the same time I feel I must state that I on my part -did everything to ensure that in the event of war, peacetime economy -would without disturbance be converted into a war economy. But this was -the only time at which, as Plenipotentiary for Economy, I was active at -all with regard to the other economic departments and the fact that I -referred to my position in this letter may be explained quite naturally, -because I was proud that I had for once done something in this official -position—for every man likes to be successful. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, we are still concerned with the question of -whether you knew of Hitler’s intent to bring about a war, especially to -wage aggressive war and to make conquests through aggressive wars. I -would like to put to you a few questions which, for the sake of -simplicity, you can answer with “yes” or “no”; I would like to know only -whether your knowledge and your presentiment agree with the statements -made by a few witnesses and some codefendants. - -For example, Reich Minister Lammers testified that you found it -especially difficult to see Hitler at all, that an audience was granted -you only once in a long while, and that even on one occasion I believe -you waited for days with Lammers at headquarters for the promised -audience, and that you had to leave again without having gained -admittance. Is that correct? - -FUNK: Yes, I am sorry to say. - -DR. SAUTER: Now a further question: We have been confronted with several -documents which say explicitly—I believe they are records of -Lammers—that the Reich Minister of Economics, and at one time also the -Reich Foreign Minister, had requested to be called in to these -discussions, that Minister Lammers did his best to bring this about, but -that Hitler did not allow it, that he expressly barred you and the Reich -Foreign Minister from attending these discussions even though you -pointed out that important matters of your department were being dealt -with. Is that correct? Perhaps you can answer with just “yes” or “no.” - -FUNK: The meeting which you mention is concerned with the deployment of -labor. I myself had no direct connection with that, and the Foreign -Minister probably did not have any marked interest in it either. So I -assume that for these reasons the Führer did not need me, for as I said -yesterday his directives for the conduct of economy were given, up to -the year 1942, to the Reich Marshal as the man responsible for that -field, and after 1942 the directives were given to Speer, because from -that date on armaments dominated the entire economic life, and all -economic decisions, by express order of the Führer, had to give way to -armament needs. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, in his testimony on 8 April, stated—I quote: - - “The Führer objected many times, namely against Funk. There were - various reasons for objecting to Funk. Hitler was skeptically - inclined toward Funk and did not want him.” - -Thus for the testimony of the witness Dr. Lammers. Can you explain why -Hitler was disinclined toward you? - -FUNK: No, only by the objective explanation that he did not need me. - -DR. SAUTER: In other words, he considered any discussions with you -superfluous. - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, in connection with the topic of aggressive wars, I -would be interested in the following: In the Indictment, on Page 30 of -the German trial brief, it is set forth that you personally and through -your official representatives, that is you personally as well as through -the representatives who were appointed by you, participated in the -preparation for the aggressive war against Russia, and as the sole proof -for this Document Number 1039-PS, Exhibit USA-146, is submitted. From -this document it appears that you, Defendant, at the end of April 1941, -allegedly had a discussion with Rosenberg—who was responsible for the -Eastern Territories—about the economic questions which would arise if -the plans for attack in the East were to be carried through. I ask you, -Dr. Funk, to note the date of this discussion: the end of April 1941, -just a short time before the beginning of the war against Russia. In -order to refresh your memory I want to point out that at that time, that -is, before the war against Russia, Rosenberg had already been nominated -as Hitler’s plenipotentiary for the uniform handling of problems in the -Eastern Territories. I am asking you now to define your position and to -say whether it can be derived from this discussion that you participated -in an aggressive war against Russia or its planning and preparation, and -if you did participate, how? - -FUNK: I knew nothing about an aggressive war against Russia. I was very -much surprised when I learned from Lammers that the Führer had made -Rosenberg plenipotentiary for Eastern European problems. Lammers stated -here that he had me advised of this nomination for personal reasons, -because he knew that I was very much interested in economic relations -with Russia. Indeed, our mutual efforts, Russia’s as well as Germany’s, -had succeeded in considerably expanding our trade relations; for in -earlier times, that is, before the first World War, German trade with -Russia had been the decisive factor in the balance of German trade and -had amounted to several thousand million gold marks. - -The Russians—I must say this here—furnished us grain, manganese ore, -and oil very promptly, while our deliveries of machines lagged behind -for the natural reason that the machines had first to be produced since -the Russian orders were mainly for specialized machines. To what extent -army supplies were sent to Russia, I do not know, as I did not deal with -these. - -And so I was surprised by the appointment of Rosenberg. He called on me -for a short discussion in which he told me that the task given to him by -the Führer also included handling of economic problems. Thereupon I -placed a ministerial director in my ministry, Dr. Schlotterer, at -Rosenberg’s disposal to work on these problems. And when the Ministry -for Eastern Affairs was founded, as far as I know, in July, Dr. -Schlotterer, with some of his colleagues, took over the direction of the -economic department in Rosenberg’s Ministry. And simultaneously, as far -as I remember, Dr. Schlotterer became a member of Economic Operational -Staff East. This was the institution of the Four Year Plan which has -been mentioned repeatedly here during the proceedings and which dealt -with all economic problems in the Occupied Eastern Territories. - -Beyond that, I had nothing to do with these matters. Naturally I asked -Lammers as well as Rosenberg just what this signified, and both of them -told me that the Führer was of the opinion that a war with Russia would -become unavoidable, that along the entire Eastern Front the Russians had -concentrated large reinforcements, that the discussions with Molotov, in -which I had no part at all, had been unsatisfactory, that the Russians -were making demands regarding the Baltic, the Balkan regions, and the -Dardanelles, which could not be accepted by Germany, by the Führer. At -any rate, this affair was as complete a surprise to me as to the German -people, and I am convinced that this war was a great shock to the German -people. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness spoke of July. Did he mean July 1940? - -DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, July 1941. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean July 1941? That was after the war with Russia -had begun. The witness can answer for himself, I suppose, can he not? - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you mean July 1940? - -FUNK: The discussion with Rosenberg was at the end of April or the -beginning of May 1941, and the Rosenberg Ministry was founded in July -1941. - -DR. SAUTER: I now turn to a different point raised by the Prosecution. -You are accused of having, as Reich Minister of Economics, committed -punishable acts in connection with the criminal plan to persecute the -Jews and to eliminate them from economic life. These are the happenings -of November 1938. Will you therefore now describe your activity in this -respect. - -FUNK: May I ask the Tribunal to give me time for a rather detailed -account on this topic. Then the points which we will treat later can be -dealt with much more briefly. This is the charge of the Prosecution -which really affects me most gravely. - -When I took over the Ministry of Economics in February 1938, I very soon -received demands from the Party, and especially from Goebbels and Ley, -to eliminate the Jews from economic life, since they could not be -tolerated. I was told that people were still buying in Jewish stores, -and that the Party could not permit its members to buy in such stores; -the Party also took offense at the fact that some high state officials, -and in particular their wives, were still shopping in such stores. The -sectional chairmen of the Labor Front refused to work with Jewish -managers. There were constant clashes, I was told, and there would be no -peace if the measures which had already been introduced here and there -were not extended gradually to eliminate the Jews completely from -economic life. - -The Law for the Organization of National Labor, which was decreed under -my predecessors and which was also carried through by them in agreement -with the German Labor Front, had assigned political and Party functions -also to domestic economy. The plant manager was also responsible to the -Party and above all to the State. - -Some Jewish managers readily succumbed to the pressure and sold their -businesses and enterprises to people and at prices of which we did not -approve at all. I had made private agreements with individual Jewish -leading men in banking, heavy industry, and the big stores, and had thus -brought about their withdrawal from positions in economic life. There -was no peace, and we had to try within a certain time and in line with -certain legal decrees to force back and gradually eliminate Jewish -influence from economic life. In this connection, I personally always -represented the view that, first of all, the process should be carried -out slowly, with intervals of time; secondly, that the Jews should be -given adequate compensation, and thirdly, that one might leave certain -economic interests in their hands, especially their security holdings; -and I particularly emphasized this in the meeting with Göring which has -been mentioned here so frequently. - -Now while these developments were taking shape, the terrible happenings -of the night of 9-10 November 1938, originating in Munich, burst upon us -and affected me personally very deeply. When I drove to my ministry on -the morning of 10 November, I saw on the streets and in the windows of -the stores the devastation which had taken place and I heard further -details from my officials in the Ministry. I tried to reach Göring, -Goebbels, and I think Himmler, but all were still traveling from Munich. -Finally I succeeded in reaching Goebbels. I told him that this terror -was an affront against me personally, that through it valuable goods -which could not be replaced had been destroyed, and that our relations -with foreign countries, upon which we were particularly dependent at -this time, would now be disturbed noticeably. - -Goebbels told me that I personally was responsible for this state of -affairs, that I should have eliminated the Jews from economic life long -ago, and that the Führer would issue an order to Reich Marshal Göring -according to which the Jews would have to be completely eliminated from -economic life; I would receive further details from the Reich Marshal. -This telephone conversation with Goebbels was confirmed by him later, -and witnesses will verify this. - -The next day, 11 November, I was informed that there was to be a meeting -on the 12th with Göring in his capacity as Delegate for the Four Year -Plan, for the purpose of settling the Jewish problem. The Delegate for -the Four Year Plan had given instructions to the Ministry to prepare a -draft for a decree which was to be the basis of laws for the elimination -of the Jews from economic life. - -On the 12th this meeting, which has been discussed here frequently, took -place. There was a discussion with the Reich Marshal in the morning at -which the Gauleiter were present. The Reich Marshal was highly excited; -he said that he would not tolerate this terror and that he would hold -the various Gauleiter responsible for what had happened in their Gaue. - -After this meeting I was therefore comparatively relieved, but at the -meeting, of which the record has been read here several times, Goebbels -very soon produced his very radical demands and thereby dominated the -whole of the proceedings. - -The Reich Marshal became increasingly angry and in this mood he gave way -to the expressions noted in the record. Incidentally, the record is full -of gaps and very incomplete. After this meeting it was clear to me that -now indeed the Jews would have to be eliminated from economic life, and -that in order to protect the Jews from complete loss of their rights, -from further terror, attacks, and exploitation, legal measures would -have to be decreed. I made provisions, and so did the Minister of -Finance, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Justice, and so -on, for the execution of the original decree of the Delegate for the -Four Year Plan in which the transfer of Jewish businesses and Jewish -shares to trustees was stipulated. The Jews were compensated by 3 -percent bonds, and I always saw to it that, as far as the Ministry of -Economics was involved in this, this decision was carried out faithfully -and according to the law and that the Jews did not suffer further -injustice. There was at that time certainly no talk of an extermination -of the Jews. However, a plan for the organized emigration of the Jews -was briefly discussed at that meeting. I personally did not participate -in any way in the terroristic, violent measures against Jews. I -regretted them profoundly and sharply condemned them. But I had to -authorize the measures for the execution of those laws in order to -protect the Jews against a complete loss of rights, and to carry through -in an orderly manner the legal stipulations which were made at that -time. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk... - -THE PRESIDENT: We had better adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, before the intermission we last spoke of your -activity concerning the decrees for the exclusion of Jews from economic -life and you told us about the minutes of the session with Göring on 12 -November 1938. That is Document Number 1816-PS. - -You have already mentioned that the minutes of that conference were -poorly edited and are full of omissions, but we can see from these -minutes that you openly and definitely exerted a restraining influence -and that you tried to save one thing or another for the Jews. I see, for -instance, from the minutes that during the conference you repeatedly -maintained that the Jewish stores should be reopened again speedily. Is -that correct? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: You also pleaded, according to the minutes, that the Jews -should be able to keep their shares and interests. That is shown in a -question which you put. Is that correct? - -FUNK: I have already said that I had thought, up to the time of that -conference, that the Jews could keep their securities; and in the course -of the conference I said that it was quite new to me that the Jews -should also surrender the securities they possessed. Ultimately they got -3 percent government bonds in settlement, but they had to hand over all -their shares and other interests. - -I was also against a ruling of that kind because the Government would -then take over a huge number of securities and the conversion of such -securities was of course difficult. - -DR. SAUTER: From the minutes it also appears that Heydrich was in favor -of placing the Jews in ghettos, and you recall that the Prosecution has -already mentioned that here. - -What was your attitude, Dr. Funk, to Heydrich’s proposal at that time? - -FUNK: I was against ghettos for the simple reason that I considered a -ghetto a terrible thing. I did not know any ghettos, but I said that 3 -million Jews can surely live among 70 million Germans without ghettos. -Of course, I said that the Jews would have to move together more -closely, and one would have to assist the other, for it was clear to me, -and I also said so during the conference, that the individual Jew could -not exist under the conditions which were now being created for him. - -DR. SAUTER: In that connection, Mr. President, may I be permitted to -point out two affidavits which I included in the Funk Document Book -under Number 3 and Number 15, and may I ask you to take official notice -of their complete contents as evidence? - -Affidavit Number 3 in the document book, on Page 12 of the text, is one -by the defendant’s wife, signed by her about the beginning of the Trial -on 5 November 1945. From that affidavit, of which I shall summarize the -essential passages, we can see that at the time of the excesses against -the Jews in November 1938 the defendant, together with his wife and his -niece, was in Berlin, and therefore not in Munich where the so-called -“Old Fighters” were assembled and where Minister Dr. Goebbels quite -suddenly and to the surprise of everyone gave the order for these Jewish -pogroms. Frau Funk confirms in her affidavit that her husband, as soon -as he heard of these excesses, called Dr. Goebbels over the telephone in -great excitement and asked him: - - “Have you gone crazy, Goebbels, to commit such outrages? It - makes one ashamed to be a German. Our whole prestige abroad is - being lost. I am trying day and night to preserve the national - patrimony and you throw it recklessly out of the window. If this - beastly mess does not stop immediately, I will throw everything - overboard.” - -That literally was the telephone conversation which at that time the -defendant had from Berlin with Dr. Goebbels. And the remaining contents -of that affidavit are concerned with intercessions which the defendant -made for individual Jewish acquaintances. And, Gentlemen, there is a -similar vein in the affidavit by Heinz Kallus, who was ministerial -counsellor in the Ministry of Economics under the Defendant Funk. - -I have submitted this affidavit as Number 15 of the Funk Document Book. -It is dated 9 December 1945, and this witness also confirms that Funk -was, of course, extremely surprised by these excesses, and that he -thereupon immediately got in touch with the competent authorities in -order to prevent further outrages. - -Thus these affidavits largely confirm the account which the Defendant -Funk himself has given. In connection with this affair concerning the -Jews, I should like to return to Document Number 3498-PS, which can be -found on Page 19 of the trial brief against Funk. That is a circular -letter by Funk of 6 February 1939, published in the official gazette of -the Reich Ministry of Economics, and from it I quote: - - “To what extent and rate the authority of the Four Year Plan is - to be used depends on instructions given by me in accordance - with the directives of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.” - -I quote this because, here again, in an official publication of that -time, the Defendant Funk expresses clearly that, in this field too, he -had merely to obey and to execute the directives of the Four Year Plan. -Is that correct, Dr. Funk? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, you said earlier that in keeping with your entire -past and your basic principles, and in keeping with your entire -philosophy, you considered as particularly severe the charge concerning -the elimination of Jews from economic life. And in this connection I -want to put to you that during an interrogation in Nuremberg on 22 -October 1945, you finally broke into tears and told the interrogating -officer, “At that time I should have resigned. I am guilty.” And this -was quoted literally on one occasion in the course of the proceedings. -Perhaps you can tell us how that remark and that breakdown on your part -occurred which I find mentioned in the record. - -FUNK: I had at that time just been brought from hospital into prison. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, one question... - -FUNK: I did not know before that I had been accused of being a murderer -and a thief and I do not know what else. I was sick for 9 or 10 weeks, -and from the hospital bed I was brought here during the night. During -those days my interrogations here started immediately. I must admit that -the American officer who interrogated me, Colonel Murrey Gurfein, -conducted the interrogation with extreme consideration and forbearance -and again and again called a halt when I was unable to go on. And when I -was reproached with these measures of terror and violence against the -Jews I suffered a spiritual breakdown, because at that moment it came to -my mind with all clearness that the catastrophe took its course from -here on down to the horrible and dreadful things of which we have heard -here and of which I knew, in part at least, from the time of my -captivity. I felt a deep sense of shame and of personal guilt at that -moment, and I feel it also today. But that I issued directives for the -execution of the basic orders and laws which were made, that is no crime -against humanity. In this matter I placed the will of the State before -my conscience and my inner sense of duty because, after all, I was the -servant of the State. I also considered myself obliged to act according -to the will of the Führer, the supreme Head of the State, especially -since these measures were necessary for the protection of the Jews, in -order to save them from absolute lack of legal protection, from further -arbitrary acts and violence. Besides, they were compensated and, as can -be seen from the circular letter which you have just quoted, I gave -strict instructions to my officials to carry out these legal directives -in a correct and just way. - -It is terribly tragic indeed that I in particular am charged with these -things. I have said already that I took no part in these excesses -against the Jews. From the first moment I disapproved of them and -condemned them very strongly, and they affected me personally very -profoundly. I did everything, as much as was within my power, to -continue helping the Jews. I never thought of an extermination of the -Jews, and I did not participate in these things in any way. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, as you are just speaking of the fact that you did -not think of an extermination, an annihilation of the Jews, I want to -refer to a document which has been quoted before: Number 3545-PS; it was -submitted by the Prosecution. As you may recall, this is the photostat -of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of 17 November 1938, an issue which -appeared only a few days after the incidents with which we are now -concerned. In that issue of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ a speech of yours -was published in which you deal with the legal measures for the -exclusion of Jews from German economic life, and you will recall that -the Prosecutor, in his speech of 11 January 1946, charged you, and I -quote: “...that the program of economic persecution of the Jews was only -part of a larger program for their extermination.” - -And that is in conformity with a phrase in your trial brief which says -that it was merely a part of, literally, “a larger program for the -extermination of the Jews.” Now, in all the statements which you made -during that time, I nowhere find an indication that you favored an -extermination, an annihilation of the Jews, or that you had demanded it. -What can you say about that view of the Prosecution? - -FUNK: Never in all my life, orally or in writing, have I demanded an -extermination or annihilation of the Jews or made any statement to that -effect. Apparently this is an utterance of the Prosecutor, which, in my -opinion, is based only on imagination or the state of mind in which he -has viewed the things from the beginning. I myself have never advocated -the extermination of the Jews and I did not know anything of the -terrible happenings which have been described here. I did not know -anything. I had nothing to do with them; and afterwards, as far as I -recall, I never took part in any measures against the Jews, since these -matters were no longer dealt with in my departments. With the exception -of these legal measures, these executive orders, I do not believe that -within my departments I ever again authorized anything further connected -with Jewish affairs. - -DR. SAUTER: Is it correct, Dr. Funk, that in connection with the -carrying out of these directives which you had to issue, you yourself -intervened on behalf of a large number of individuals who had to suffer -under these directives and who approached you personally for aid, and -that you did this in order to mitigate the effect of these decrees? - -FUNK: I saw to it that these directives were followed in a fair way and -according to the laws. However, the carrying out of these decrees was -the responsibility not of the Ministry but of the district president and -of the offices dependent on the Gauleiter in the Reich. Many complaints -reached me about the manner in which Aryanization was carried out, and -my officials will confirm that I intervened in every case when I was -informed of such abuses. I even dismissed an official of that department -when I heard of incorrect behavior; later I also parted with the -department head. - -DR. SAUTER: Why? - -FUNK: Because these abuses had occurred. Just as previously I had done -everything in my power to aid the Jews to emigrate by making foreign -currency available to them, so now, in carrying out these directives, I -did everything in my power within the scope of possibility to make -things bearable for the Jews. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, this question as to what Funk’s attitude was -in practice toward the carrying out of these decrees which he himself as -an official had to issue—this question I have also treated in a -questionnaire approved by you, which has been submitted to the former -State Secretary Landfried. That questionnaire was returned some time ago -but it was discovered that a wrong questionnaire had been sent out by -the office, and the correct answer was received only on Saturday. It is -now being translated and I assume that this correct answer, this -testimony of State Secretary Landfried, will be submitted to you in the -course of the day and that it can then be entered in the appendix as -Document Number 16. I presume, nevertheless, that there will be no -objection to my reading the short answer of the witness Landfried in -connection with this matter. Herr Landfried was from 1939 to 1943 state -secretary... - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution seen the document? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, the Prosecution has the document. - -MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): We -haven’t seen this document. We have seen the German text. I don’t read -German and I haven’t had an opportunity to read it. It hasn’t been -translated. - -THE PRESIDENT: The document can be submitted after the Prosecution has -seen it. You needn’t submit it at this moment. Have you any other -witness or not? - -DR. SAUTER: Not in connection with this topic. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, no, but are there any other witnesses at all? - -DR. SAUTER: One witness, Dr. Heidler, but for other subjects. - -THE PRESIDENT: And presumably the defendant will be cross-examined. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: These documents will be translated by then. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. Mr. President, if you so desire, then I will have to -submit that document later, separately. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, I come now to an accusation which, according to my -knowledge, has not been mentioned in the trial brief yet; it concerns -the problem of the occupied territories, that is, the spoliation of the -occupied territories, costs of occupation, clearing systems, -stabilization of currency, and the like. The Prosecution asserts that -you actively participated in the program of criminal exploitation in the -occupied territories. That can be found in the record of the proceedings -on 11 January 1946 (Volume V, Page 167). That accusation is not further -specified, but in the session of 21 February (Volume VIII, Page 60) -there is a mere reference to a decree of the Reich Minister for the -Occupied Eastern Territories, the Defendant Rosenberg. That decree was -submitted by the Prosecution as Document Number 1015-PS; it is a decree -by the Minister for the East, Rosenberg, to the Reich commissioners in -the Occupied Eastern Territories. The decree informs the Reich -commissioners of the task of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg—it has already -been mentioned here on several occasions—namely, that of safeguarding -objects of cultural value. I think I may assume that the Reich Ministry -of Economics had nothing to do with cultural treasures as such. But—and -that is very peculiar—it appears from Rosenberg’s letter of 7 April -1942 that a copy of it went not only to various other offices but also -to you, that is to say, to the Reich Minister of Economy. And from that -fact—apparently from that fact alone—the Soviet prosecutor has deduced -the charge that you actively participated in the spoliation of the -occupied territories. I had to explain the connection in such detail in -order to show exactly with what we are dealing. Can you speak quite -briefly about it? - -FUNK: Up to the time of this Trial I did not even know what the -Einsatzstab Rosenberg was, what its tasks were, what it was doing. I -have no knowledge that the Ministry of Economics had anything at all to -do with the safeguarding of cultural treasures. I cannot say anything -about it. - -DR. SAUTER: You cannot say anything about this? - -FUNK: No, not with regard to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. About the policy -in the occupied territories, I can say a great deal... - -DR. SAUTER: That does not interest us now. - -FUNK: But you will probably want to hear that later. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, Dr. Funk, in the questionnaire sent to Dr. Landfried -which I have mentioned before, I asked five or six questions concerning -your attitude to the economic policies in the occupied territories. I -also put questions to him on whether you had given directives to the -military commanders or the Reich commissioners for the occupied -territories, or the heads of the civil administration in -Alsace-Lorraine, and so on. Furthermore, I asked whether it is correct -that economic directives also for the occupied territories did not come -from you as Reich Minister of Economics but from the Delegate for the -Four Year Plan. Then I asked about your attitude toward the question of -exploitation of occupied territories, particularly in the West, the -black market, devaluation of currency, and the like. - -I cannot read the statements of the witness Landfried at this moment, -because, through an error in the office, the answers from Landfried -arrived only last Saturday. Since your personal testimony is now being -heard, do you yourself wish to add anything to these questions, or would -you just like to underline what I shall submit to the Tribunal as soon -as I have received the translation? I put this question because it is -practically the last opportunity for you to refer to these subjects. - -FUNK: I should like to state my position on various matters, but the -details of these problems can naturally be better explained by the state -secretaries than by myself. - -Concerning the directives to occupied territories, the Reich Marshal, as -well as Reich Minister Lammers, has stated here that I, as Reich -Minister for Economics, had no authority to issue instructions. The -Reich Marshal, during his testimony here, stated, and I marked it down, -“For the directives and the economic policies carried out by the -Minister of Economics and Reichsbank President Funk, the responsibility -is fully and exclusively mine.” - -And concerning the occupied territories, he also said that if I had -issued special instructions in the course of official business between -the ministry and the administrative offices in the occupied territories, -then they derived from the general directives of the Reich Marshal and, -as he said, were always based on his personal responsibility. - -The position was that directives to the occupied territories in the -economic field could only be given by the Delegate for the Four Year -Plan. The carrying out of economic policy was the task of the military -commanders or the Reich commissioners who were directly subordinate to -the Führer. The military commanders, as well as the Reich commissioners, -had under them officials from the various departments; among them, of -course, also officials from the Ministry of Economics and the -Reichsbank; and even private enterprise was represented. There was, of -course, close co-operation between the offices of the military -plenipotentiaries, the Reich commissioners, and the representatives of -the various home departments, with the exception of occupied territories -in Russia where the Reich commissioners were subordinate to a special -minister, that is, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern -Territories. This was an exception, but if we as a ministry wanted to -have anything done by the military commanders or the Reich -commissioners, we had to make a request or procure an order from the -Delegate for the Four Year Plan. - -The same applies to the heads of the civil administration in -Alsace-Lorraine and in other territories where a civil administration -had been set up. Here also, the numerous departments of the Ministry of -Economics and the Reichsbank had no direct authority to issue -directives. - -However, I emphasize again that of course close official contact existed -between the directing authorities in the occupied territories and the -respective departments in Germany. - -I myself—and witnesses will confirm this in questionnaires still -outstanding, or in person—made the greatest efforts to protect the -occupied territories from exploitation. I fought a virtually desperate -struggle throughout the years for the maintenance of a stable currency -in these territories, because again and again it was suggested to me -that I should reduce the exchange rate in the occupied territories so -that Germany could buy more easily and more cheaply in these countries; -I did everything that could be thought of to maintain economic order in -these territories. In one case, in Denmark, I even succeeded, in the -face of opposition from all other departments, in raising the value of -the Danish krone, because the Danish National Bank and the Danish -Government requested it for justifiable reasons. - -I opposed the increase of occupation costs in France in 1942 as well as -in 1944. The memorandum of the Reichsbank which I authorized was quoted -here by the American Chief Prosecutor. - -The occupation costs were determined not by the Minister of Economics -and the President of the Reichsbank but by the Minister of Finance and -the Quartermaster General—in other words, by the highest Wehrmacht -commands—and in the case of France, Denmark, and other countries, also -by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. - -Therefore, I did whatever I could possibly do—whatever was within my -power—to keep the economy of the occupied territories in good order. I -was successful finally in persuading the Reich Marshal to issue a decree -which prohibited all German personnel from buying on the black market; -but that happened only after many abuses in this respect had already -occurred. - -I want to emphasize also that I considered it necessary for the -maintenance of order in the occupied territories that social life there -should not be disturbed, and that, therefore, as a matter of principle I -was always against the forced or excessive deportation of foreign -workers from the occupied territories to Germany. - -I also expressed this in a conference with Lammers, which has been -mentioned here. My state secretaries can confirm that. On the other hand -it was naturally clear to me that Sauckel was in a very difficult, -indeed desperate, situation. Again and again manpower for German economy -was demanded of him. But, particularly after I had turned over the -entire civil production to Speer and engaged in central planning, it was -not only not to my advantage, from the point of view of my work, that -manpower was brought to Germany from abroad, but it was indeed in my -interest that the workers should remain in the occupied territories -since the production of consumer goods had been transferred to a large -degree to these territories; for as minister responsible for providing -consumer goods to the population I had a great interest in seeing that -orderly work should be done in the occupied territories and that no -economic or social disturbances should occur. - -I believe, however, that it will be more to the purpose if my two state -secretaries and the Vice President of the Reichsbank, the acting -Director of the Reichsbank, Puhl, make detailed statements on these -problems, because they were more closely connected than I with carrying -matters into practice. - -If the accusation is made against me that with the aid of the clearing -arrangements we spoliated occupied territories and foreign countries, I -can only say that the clearing arrangement was not originally introduced -by us in our dealings with the occupied territories or during the war, -but that it was the normal method of trade between Germany and her -business partners. It was a system which had been forced upon us—and -that has been pointed out by Schacht—when other nations resorted to -using the proceeds of German exports for the payment and amortization of -German debts. - -At all times, however, I have emphasized that the clearing debts were -real debts for merchandise, and that is important. I have said again and -again that this clearing debt was a genuine debt of the Reich and would -be repaid at the rate, the purchase value which was in force at the time -when we entered into these obligations. I especially stated that, in -detail and as clearly as possible, in my last speeches in Vienna in -March 1944, and in Königsberg in July 1944. - -Beyond that, in July, I made the suggestion that after the war the -clearing debt should be transformed into a European loan, so that it -should not remain on the narrow plain of a bilateral exchange of goods -but be effectively commercialized; from this can be seen distinctly that -I always considered that clearing debt a genuine debt, so that the -nations in the occupied territories who had such claims on Germany could -and would be satisfied with the war—and, as I constantly emphasize, at -the same rates that existed at the time when the debt was incurred. If, -however, the countries would have had to pay reparations on the basis of -peace treaties, then these reparations of course, quite reasonably, -could only have been paid in goods; and then, equally reasonably, it -would have been possible to create a balance between German debts and -German claims. - -But I never left any doubt about the fact that the clearing debt was to -be considered a true debt. Therefore, I have to reject the accusation -that with the aid of the clearing system we exploited the occupied -territories. And I have to reject even more strongly the accusation that -I share responsibility for the burden of unbearable expenses, -particularly occupation costs and other outlays of money, which were -imposed on the occupied territories. It can be proved that I always -objected to excessive financial burdening of the occupied territories. -The witnesses will later testify and confirm this. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the defendant has referred to two speeches -which he made in Vienna and in Königsberg. These are two addresses which -deal in part with the subject of clearing debts, and in part also with -the defendant’s favorite subject of a European economic union between -Germany and her neighbor nations, that is to say, an economic union on -the basis of full equality. - -In the interest of time, may I just ask that judicial notice be taken of -these speeches, the essential content of which has been stated partly by -the defendant and partly by me: The speech of the defendant at Vienna on -10 March 1944, Number 10 in my document book, and the speech in -Königsberg on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the university of -his home province, on 7 July 1944, Number 11 in my document book. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, if this Document Number 11 is offered by the -defense for the purpose of showing what this defendant’s policy was -toward the occupied countries, then I think it is proper for me to point -out that the speech did not refer to the occupied countries but rather -to the satellite states of Germany. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I also call attention to Document Number -3819-PS, which has already been submitted by the Prosecution. That is -the record, which the defendant has mentioned, of the meeting with -Minister Lammers on 11 July 1944. - -According to this record, the Defendant Funk was present at that -meeting, and mention is made of him in one sentence only; I quote, on -Page 8 at the bottom: “Reich Minister Funk expects considerable -disturbances of production in non-German territories in case of ruthless -raids.” - -This sentence, if taken from its context, is difficult to understand, -but viewed in its proper connection, it makes it clear that the -Defendant Funk wanted to warn against violent action in the recruitment -of foreign workers for German production and for German armaments. He -warned against any violent measures—against raids, as they are called -in the protocol, because thereby, in his opinion, production in the -occupied territories would be disturbed. - -Then, Mr. President, may I mention another document. It is Document -Number 2149-PS, and it contains the following: A statement of the -Reichsbank, dated 7 December 1942, “concerning the question of -increasing French contributions to occupation costs.” - -May I say in advance that the cost of occupation in France was -increased, but not upon the suggestion of the Defendant Funk and not -with his approval, but in spite of his protest. And this statement to -which the Defendant Funk has referred, and which I have just quoted—it -is dated 11 December 1942—lists in detail the reasons why Funk and his -Reichsbank very definitely protested against any increase in the cost of -occupation. - -In this connection, may I be permitted to question the Defendant Dr. -Funk on the cost of occupation in Greece. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you hear the testimony of the witness -Dr. Neubacher, who was Minister to Romania and Greece, and who confirmed -that there, also, you tried to reduce the cost of occupation? - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, I believe, Mr. President, it would be better if we -adjourned now. I still have to put a few questions. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at half-past -four. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I would like to return to the question of the -so-called spoliation of the occupied countries. As Reich Minister of -Economics, which you were at the time, you can certainly inform us from -your personal experience and observation of the contribution of the -occupied territories to Germany’s war effort. - -FUNK: The achievements of the occupied territories for the joint -carrying on of the war were without doubt of great significance. I have -always regarded the occupied territories synchronized with the total -German economy as one great productive organism for carrying on the war, -which would lead to a new order in Europe. Usually the same basic -economic principles applied in the occupied countries as in Germany. In -1944 I had statistics compiled to show just how much the occupied -countries had produced for the war effort in the 3 years of 1941, 1942, -and 1943, and we reached the figure of 90,000 million Reichsmark. That -is certainly an extraordinarily high figure, but one must not forget -that the currencies of the various countries were converted into -Reichsmark. That is, the reduced purchasing power of the various -currencies is not expressed in these figures. In truth, therefore, the -production is lower than these Reichsmark figures might show. - -At the same time Germany utilized at least two-thirds of her entire -production, that is, about 260,000 million marks worth, for the European -war effort, in other words, almost three times as much as the occupied -countries. Almost up to the time of the invasion I succeeded, in the -case of France, in regulating the financial and monetary system and thus -also the economic and social order to such an extent that, at the end of -the German occupation, French finances were actually much healthier than -German finances, and if it had not been for the circumstances resulting -from the elementary impact of the war, France would have been able to -construct a healthy monetary system on this basis. - -My statistics are confirmed to a certain degree by a document which was -submitted here. This is Exhibit RF-22 (Document Number F-515), and deals -with the French deliveries to Germany. It is an official report to the -French Government about forced labor in France. In this report there are -tables on Pages 38, 39, and 40 showing the amount of French deliveries -to Germany in proportion to the entire French production. These figures -show that out of the entire French production with which we are dealing, -in these three years an average of 30 to 35 percent was sent to Germany -for the joint war effort. In some fields, and especially those which are -necessary for the provisioning of the French population, such as -textiles, pharmaceutical supplies, gas, electricity, and so forth, these -figures are considerably lower and in some cases amount to only 5 or 6 -percent. But as an economist I admit without hesitation that if these -matters are not regarded from the point of view of the joint carrying on -of the war and the joint economic relationship, a deduction of 35 -percent means a lot and must naturally have serious repercussions for -the entire economy. - -I have no specific figures at hand for the Russian territories. The -Ministry of Economics itself was entirely excluded from the war economy -of these territories; we merely attempted to allow certain firms or -companies to operate in these territories as private enterprises there, -that is to say, they were to buy and sell at their own risk. I did not -participate otherwise in the management of these regions outside of the -fact that I was chairman of the supervisory board of the Continental Oil -Company, which operated in these regions in conformity with the -provisions of the Four Year Plan and the orders of the Wehrmacht. But I -personally, as chairman of the supervisory board, had only to manage the -financial affairs of this company. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, at the end of this morning’s session you spoke of -the so-called Central Planning Board, a body about which we have heard a -good deal. You stated, although quite briefly, that as Minister of -Economics you had no interest in the fact that foreign workers were -transported to Germany, no matter whether for armament or other -purposes. Did I understand you correctly? - -FUNK: That applies to the time when I became a member of the Central -Planning Board. - -DR. SAUTER: When was that? - -FUNK: I was called into the Central Planning Board in the fall of 1943, -when I turned over all production matters to Speer and when, for the -first time, on 22 November 1943 I attended a session of the Board. At -that time I not only had no interest in having foreign workers brought -to Germany but actually, from the economic aspect, I wanted to have the -workers remain abroad, for the production of consumer goods had, to a -large extent, been shifted from Germany to the occupied countries so -that in other words this production, that is, French production or -Belgian production, could work unhindered for the German populace; I did -not want the workers taken away, and particularly I did not want them to -be taken away by force, for in that way the entire order and the whole -social life would be disturbed. - -Before that time, as Minister of Economics, I was naturally interested -in seeing that the German economy had workers. However, these questions -were not dealt with in the Ministry of Economics, but either in the Four -Year Plan, where a Plenipotentiary General for Labor had been active -from the beginning... - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] Surely we heard all this this morning. -It was all given this morning. - -DR. SAUTER: In connection with the Central Planning Board, perhaps I -might refer to one more document, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the witness._] And this, Witness—and please confine your -answer to this letter only—is a letter which you once wrote to Field -Marshal Milch and which was submitted, I think, by the French -Prosecution as Exhibit RF-675, (Document Number RF-675). In this letter, -Herr Funk, you apologized for participating so very infrequently in the -meetings of the Central Planning Board. And at that time you sent two -experts from your ministry to the session, that is, two experts in the -field of administrating civilian supplies and of the export trade. As -deputy of your State Secretary, Dr. Hayler, who will be called later as -a witness, a certain Ohlendorf participated at this meeting of the -Central Planning Board. You have already seen this man, Ohlendorf, in -this courtroom on the witness stand. I should be interested to know what -were the functions of this man Ohlendorf who apparently belonged to your -ministry. - -FUNK: As far as the negotiations of the Central Planning Board were -concerned, I was essentially interested only in the fact that in that -meeting the necessary raw materials were allocated for the -administration of consumer goods and the export trade. For that reason -Ohlendorf and two other experts for the administration of consumer goods -and the export trade were sent to the meeting. Ohlendorf was brought -into my Ministry by State Secretary Hayler. Before that I had only known -Ohlendorf vaguely from one or two meetings and I had had an -extraordinarily favorable impression of him, for he had an extremely -lucid mind and could always express his thoughts in a most impressive -way. Before that time I didn’t even know that Ohlendorf had another -position in the Reich Security Main Office, for he was introduced to me -as a manager of the Main Organization for German Trade. Hayler was the -chief of this organization, of the Reichsgruppe Handel, and Ohlendorf -was his manager and was introduced to me as such. Therefore I had no -objections to Ohlendorf being brought into the ministry and taking over -that field which corresponded to his private business activities up to -now—the province of administration of consumer goods. - -Then through Hayler I discovered that Ohlendorf was active also in the -RSHA—or whatever the name is—as an office chief in the SD. However, I -took no exception to this activity, for I was not fully acquainted with -these assignments and in any case I was not convinced that anything was -taking place which was unacceptable for the Ministry. Ohlendorf was -active chiefly as manager of the Reichsgruppe Handel. As far as I know, -he only had an auxiliary occupation in the RSHA, or however it was -called. Naturally I was very much affected and painfully surprised when -I heard here about assignments which Ohlendorf with his “Einsatzstab” -had had in previous years in Russia. I had never heard one word about -this activity of Ohlendorf. He himself never mentioned these things to -me and until this time I did not know the type of assignments such -“Einsatzstäbe” had. - -Ohlendorf never talked about his activity in the SD. Hayler, who knew -him much better and more intimately than I did, is better qualified to -give information. In any event I knew nothing of this activity of -Ohlendorf, which after all he had carried on in years prior to this -date, and I was very much affected to find that this man had done such -things. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I must ask you to state your position in regard to -the testimony given by another witness, whom we have seen and heard in -this courtroom. This witness is Dr. Blaha, who made a report in this -courtroom about the conditions in the concentration camp at Dachau and -who testified—as you probably will recall—that in and around Dachau it -was common talk that the Reich Minister of Economics, Dr. Funk, had also -been present at one of these official visits to the camp. As you recall, -this witness replied to my question that he himself had not seen you, -but that your name had been mentioned in this connection by other -inmates. Were you ever at Dachau or at any other concentration camp? - -FUNK: No, I was neither at Dachau nor in any other concentration camp. - -DR. SAUTER: Can you say that with a clear conscience under your oath? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: The witness, Dr. Blaha, has also testified to the fact that -this inspection of Dachau took place following a discussion among the -finance ministers which had taken place at Berchtesgaden or Reichenhall, -or somewhere in that vicinity. Therefore I ask you: Did you ever -participate in a meeting of finance ministers, or at least at the time -Blaha claims? - -FUNK: No, I never participated in a meeting of finance ministers, -because I myself was never such a minister. And at that time I did not -participate in any international discussions at all. No. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, as far as your health is concerned, this is not a -good day for you. You have complained about the bad pains which you are -suffering today. Consequently, I do not wish to put any further -questions to you, except one in conclusion, which I am sure you will be -able to answer briefly. - -Why did you remain in your office as Reich Minister of Economics and as -President of the Reichsbank until the very end? - -FUNK: I considered myself bound to remain in this position as long as I -could, in order to serve and be of use to my people. It was precisely -during the last few years of the war that my position was a very -difficult one. The administration became greatly disorganized and I had -to make exceptional efforts in order to procure supplies for the people, -especially those who had been bombed out. I continually had to protect -the supplies and supply depots from arbitrary seizures by the Gauleiter. -In the case of one Gauleiter, I had to call the police. I did not follow -the “scorched earth” policy which the Führer had decreed, so that even -after occupation by the enemy powers the supplies which were left could -be used by the German people. - -I had had instructions from the Führer to issue a decree according to -which the acceptance of allied invasion currency would be high treason -and punishable by death. I did not issue that decree. I made every -effort to prevent State property and State money from being destroyed -and wasted. I saved the gold deposits and foreign exchange deposits of -the Reichsbank which were in the greatest danger. Briefly, until the -last minute I believed it was my duty and responsibility to carry on in -office and to hold out until the very end. Especially when we Germans -learned that, according to the Morgenthau Plan, the status of the German -people was to be degraded into that of shepherds and goatherds; that the -entire industry would be destroyed, which would have meant the -extermination of 30 million Germans. And especially after Churchill had -declared personally that the German people would suffer from hunger and -that epidemics would break out, only one thing was possible for me and -for every decent German, and that was to remain at his post and do -everything within his power in order to prevent this chaos. - -I had no talent for being a traitor or a conspirator, but I always loved -my fatherland passionately and my people as well, and up to the end I -tried to do everything possible to serve my country and my people and to -be of use to them. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, perhaps in connection with this alleged visit -to a concentration camp I might refer to a questionnaire which we -received from the witness Dr. Schwedler, and which is found in the -supplementary volume for the Funk case as Document Number 14. This -affidavit, of the contents of which I would like to have you take -official notice, essentially confirms that, since 1 February 1938, the -witness Dr. Schwedler was the daily companion of the Defendant Funk; -that Dr. Funk never visited a concentration camp; and that the witness -would have to know of it if it were the case. - -With these words, Mr. President, I conclude my examination of the -Defendant Funk. I thank you very much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of Defendants’ Counsel wish to ask questions? - -Dr. Sauter, you said you were referring to an affidavit of Dr. -Schwedler? Which was Number 14? You said you were referring to Dr. -Schwedler’s affidavit which you said was Number 14 in your supplementary -book. It does not seem to be in ours. - -DR. SAUTER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, it is Number 13. I made a -mistake. It is Number 13; in the supplementary volume, Number 13, Dr. -August Schwedler. It is a questionnaire. - -DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, I have one -question which I would like to put to you. The Prosecution has accused -the Defendant Keitel as chief of the OKW, you as Plenipotentiary for the -Economy and Minister Frick as Plenipotentiary for Administration, on a -common ground. The men in these three offices are mentioned in the Reich -Defense Law of 1938. Undoubtedly, they probably exerted certain -functions which might be of significance. The Prosecution in this -connection spoke of a Three Man College and attributed much authority -and significance to this Three Man College in connection with the point -the Prosecution is making of the planning and preparation of aggressive -wars. - -Now I ask you: Was there such a Three Man College and what were the -functions of these three offices which have been mentioned, according to -the Reich Defense Law? - -FUNK: Due to the confusion reigning in the German administration we -ourselves could scarcely keep things straight; so it is not surprising -if the Prosecution is in error on this point. I myself never heard of -this three-man committee or Three Man College until this proceeding. I -did not know that I belonged to such a three-man committee or Three Man -College or triumvirate or anything else. On the basis of the Reich -Defense Law similar powers were given to the Chief of the OKW, to the -Plenipotentiary for Administration and to the Plenipotentiary for -Economics. These three, in deviation from the existing laws, could issue -directives in which they had mutually to participate. - -But it was the purport of this order that these directives could only be -of a subordinate nature, which on the whole applied solely to the sphere -of activity of the offices involved. Legislation for more important -matters was made either by the Ministerial Council for Defense of the -Reich—later only by way of circulating the bill from one minister to -the other—or by Führer decrees. As far as I know there were only three, -four, or five meetings of this body. Later, the decrees of the Führer -were the real, the essential way of issuing laws. They were issued by -the Führer personally, and the offices involved were frequently only -informed of the same. Therefore the three-man committee is only a -fiction. - -DR. NELTE: Thank you. I have no further questions. - -DR. DIX: Dr. Funk, you spoke of the law for the regulation of national -labor and you said that that law was issued under your predecessor. You -spoke about “my predecessor.” - -FUNK: No, you are wrong; I said “predecessors.” - -DR. DIX: Predecessors. Can you tell the Tribunal under which Reich -Minister of Economics that was issued? - -FUNK: This law was issued under Reich Minister of Economics Dr. Schmitt, -as far as I remember. And the subsequent agreement with the German Labor -Front probably took place in part under Schacht. I particularly remember -the so-called Leipzig Resolutions. - -DR. DIX: Then you also mentioned that there was an office subordinate to -Schacht as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. You will remember that the -witness Vocke denied the existence of such an office of Schacht’s as -Plenipotentiary of War Economy, and Schacht did the same thing. Which -office did you mean? Describe the office that you mean. - -FUNK: It was not an office in the sense in which it might have been -interpreted here. It was a committee of experts of the various -departments which was led by the representative of the Plenipotentiary -for War Economy, who was Schacht, and later by my representative as -Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Under Schacht’s term of office it was -State Counsellor Wohlthat and in my term of office it was Schacht’s -former State Secretary, Posse. - -DR. DIX: Certainly. Now is it identical with the working committee which -originated on the basis of the old Reich Defense Law and which existed -before 1933? - -FUNK: I am not familiar with that. - -DR. DIX: In any event, this working committee was composed of the -various departments? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Together with the OKW? - -FUNK: With the OKW, with the Ministry of the Interior, and later, with -the decisive participation of the Four Year Plan representative. - -DR. DIX: And the expert for Schacht during Schacht’s term was Dr. -Wohlthat? - -FUNK: As far as I know, yes. - -DR. DIX: Then one more question. You talked about the so-called -triumvirate with reference to a question by my colleague for the -Defendant Keitel. The creation of the triumvirate, this activity which -you have described, was after Schacht’s time, I believe. - -FUNK: Yes, I believe so. But there was no activity. - -DR. DIX: No. - -FUNK: I never participated in any session of the so-called Three Man -College. - -DR. DIX: No. You said it was a fiction. - -FUNK: Furthermore, no meeting of these three men ever took place. - -DR. DIX: No; you said it was a fiction. - -DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I have a question -regarding the wages of the foreign workers. Did Sauckel make any special -efforts in connection with the transfer of the wages? Do you know -anything about that? - -FUNK: Yes. Sauckel insisted very frequently at the Reichsbank and the -Reich Ministry for Economics that there should be a large-scale transfer -of wages to foreign countries and the occupied territories. Naturally we -were in a very difficult position here, because especially in the -southeastern European countries the currencies had been greatly -devaluated, and the purchasing power of German money had sunk -considerably, whereas I maintained the stable rate of exchange so that -the inflationary tendencies in these countries would not be strengthened -and result in complete economic chaos through the fault of the currency -control. Therefore we had to make additions to the payments to make up -somewhat for the devaluation of the money in the occupied and other -countries. Altogether, considerable sums were transferred. I would -estimate these sums to be at least 2,000 million Reichsmark. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know whether Sauckel tried to do something about -the clothing for foreign workers? Was anything done? - -FUNK: He made considerable efforts, and this was particularly hard on -the Ministry of Economics, because with the small amount of raw -materials which the Central Planning Board had made available this -Ministry had to take care of the population, and through the ever -growing number of people bombed out we received ever greater demands for -supplies. Yet, in spite of that, we tried to comply with the demands of -Sauckel as far as possible, but of course we could not do so entirely. - -DR. SERVATIUS: To what extent was clothing material delivered? Can you -give any figures? - -FUNK: No, I cannot. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know anything about Sauckel’s attitude towards -Himmler, since, according to the Prosecution, he collaborated with him? - -FUNK: I remember one particular incident. When I had fled to Thuringia -with my gold reserve and the rest of my foreign exchange I called on -Sauckel one evening; State Secretary Keppler, who has been mentioned -here frequently, was also present. - -In the course of the conversation Sauckel and Keppler got into a -terrific dispute with Himmler. Sauckel told Himmler quite plainly that -he had destroyed the administrative unity in Germany; that he was mainly -responsible for the disorganization of the German administration, for -through the SS he had created a state within a state. Sauckel said -further, “How can the people keep discipline if the top men of the Reich -themselves cannot keep discipline?” - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Defendant Von Papen): Is it true -that after Von Papen’s speech at Marburg in June 1934 Hitler asked you -to go to Reich President Von Hindenburg at his country estate in Neudeck -and to tell him the following: - -Vice Chancellor Von Papen, because he was forbidden to make his speech -public, had asked to be allowed to resign. This resignation would have -to be granted, because Von Papen through his speech at Marburg was -guilty of a severe breach of Reich Cabinet discipline. - -FUNK: When Reich President Von Hindenburg was at his estate at Neudeck -he frequently invited me to visit him. I have already mentioned that I -associated with him on familiar terms. A visit like this took place when -the matter of the Von Papen speech at Marburg arose, and the Reich -Marshal suggested to the Führer, as far as I recall, to have me inform -the Reich President about this incident. The Führer had me do this, and -I told the Reich President that a conflict had arisen between the Führer -and Von Papen because of a certain speech. I did not know the contents -of this speech, since in the meantime its publication had been -forbidden. Then the Reich President simply replied, “If he does not -maintain discipline, then he must be prepared to take the consequences.” - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. - -DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Witness, when and -where did you meet your Codefendant Fritzsche? - -FUNK: When he was active in the press section of the Propaganda -Ministry. One day he appeared before me and wanted money for -“Transocean,” and I granted him this money. - -DR. FRITZ: You were State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry at that -time? - -FUNK: Yes. - -DR. FRITZ: That was in what year? - -FUNK: That must have been in 1933 or 1934. - -DR. FRITZ: When he came to you, did you know what position Fritzsche had -in the Propaganda Ministry at that time? - -FUNK: I knew that he was in the press section. - -DR. FRITZ: Was this a leading position which he had? Was he perhaps head -of a department? - -FUNK: No. At that time the head of this department was Dr. Hahnke as far -as I remember. Later it was Berndt. - -DR. FRITZ: Could you observe whether Fritzsche was in any close contact -with Dr. Goebbels? - -FUNK: I was never called in to attend any of the discussions which Dr. -Goebbels had daily with his experts. That was done through his personal -assistant, Dr. Hahnke who later became State Secretary. But since -Fritzsche was not the head of a department I assume that he was not -called in to these discussions either. As far as I know mostly the heads -of departments were called to these discussions, but certainly not -Fritzsche. - -DR. FRITZ: Then according to your knowledge, in your capacity as State -Secretary at that time, he was not one of the closer collaborators of -Dr. Goebbels, if I understood you correctly. - -FUNK: At that time I do not believe so. Of course, I do not know what -took place later. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution? - -MR. DODD: Witness, can you hear me? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: We have listened to your testimony since late Friday -afternoon, and, as we understand it from your statements, you admit none -of the charges made against you in the Indictment in any degree, with -possibly one exception; I am not clear as to whether or not you were -making an admission this morning with respect to your part in the -persecution of the Jews. Would you tell us now whether or not you -intended to admit your own guilt or the part that you played in the -persecution of the Jews? - -FUNK: I said this morning that I had a deep sense of guilt and a deep -sense of shame about the things which were done to the Jews in Germany, -and that at the time when the terror and violence began I was involved -in a strong conflict with my conscience. I felt, I could almost say, -that a great injustice was being done. However, I did not feel guilty in -respect to the Indictment against me here, that is, that according to -the Indictment I was guilty of Crimes against Humanity because I signed -the directives for carrying out laws which had been issued by superior -offices—laws that had to be made so that the Jews would not be entirely -deprived of their rights, and so that they would be given some legal -protection at least in regard to compensation and settlement. I am -admitting a guilt against myself, a moral guilt, but not a guilt because -I signed the directives for carrying out the laws; in any event not a -guilt against humanity. - -MR. DODD: All right. That’s what I wanted to thoroughly understand. You -also told the Tribunal, that you—I think you used the expression “often -at the door but never let in,” and I understand that to mean that in -your own judgment you were really a little man in this Nazi -organization. Is that so? - -FUNK: Yes... - -MR. DODD: All right. That’s an answer. You might want to explain it -later, but for the present purposes that will do. - -FUNK: May I give an explanation to this. I wanted to state that in the -position I held, there were always higher authorities which made the -final decision. That was the case in all the positions I held in the -State. - -MR. DODD: Well, let’s both examine some of the evidence, and see whether -or not you were in fact always subordinated and always a little man who -didn’t get in. - -First of all, there’s one matter that I do want to clear up before going -into the general examination. You recall when the Defendant Schacht was -on the stand, he told the Tribunal that after he left the Reichsbank he -had an office in his apartment, is that so? - -FUNK: Yes, he said that. - -MR. DODD: Now of course you have told us, on another occasion, that he -continued to have an office in the Reichsbank. Isn’t that so? - -FUNK: I don’t know whether I said and where I said that, but it may be -so. I was informed, at the time when he resigned, that he still went to -the Reichsbank rather frequently, and that a room was reserved there for -him. In addition he still had some personnel, a secretary whom he had -taken with him from the Reichsbank—and that is all I know. - -MR. DODD: Another question. You told us, on another occasion, that he -had an office in the Reichsbank where he worked on certain bank data and -where he still kept in touch with you every now and then. Isn’t that so? -Do you remember telling us that or not? - -FUNK: No, it wasn’t like that. Schacht seldom... - -MR. DODD: If you don’t remember, then I perhaps can help you a little -bit. Do you remember being interrogated by Major Hiram Gans of the -United States Army on June 2, 3, and 4 of 1945? Do you remember that? -You know who was there—Göring was there, Von Krosigk was there, Lammers -was there.... - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: All right. You were asked this question, weren’t you, or -rather, preceding this answer there were some questions? - -Question: “Did Schacht retain any governmental position after his -dismissal as President of the Reichsbank?” Then Göring put in an answer: -“Reich Minister.” Then another question: “Did he have any functions?” -Göring again answered: “He remained Minister without Portfolio.” Then -another question: “Were there any Cabinet meetings he attended?” Göring -answered again: “There were no Cabinet meetings at that time.” Question: -“Then it was purely honorary?” Göring said: “Practically.” - -Then you interposed with this statement (Funk is speaking): “Schacht, -after his dismissal, kept an office in the Reichsbank, where he worked -on statistical data of the Reichsbank and where he still kept in touch -with me every now and then.” Question: “How long did this last?” Answer: -“This lasted until Schacht’s dismissal as Minister, probably in 1943.” - -You made those answers, that answer, did you not? - -FUNK: That is not correct. I did not express myself that way. I said -only that I had been informed that he came to the Reichsbank frequently, -that there was a room reserved for him and that he very seldom spoke to -me. He seldom called on me. That was not translated correctly. - -MR. DODD: You know what I am reading from, do you not? You know this -Document, Number 2828-PS? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: Parts of this are already in evidence as Exhibit USA-654. And -later, in another form, I shall submit this part which I have just read. - -Counsel Sauter, for you, this morning referred to a letter which you had -written to Hitler, I believe it was in 1939, a very fulsome letter which -you said was somewhat due to the general feeling at the time and also to -the fact that it was about your 50th birthday. Is that so? There was -another reason for your writing that letter in connection with your -birthday, wasn’t there? Do you know to what I refer? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You received 520,000 Reichsmark from Hitler as a birthday -present? - -FUNK: No, that is not correct. - -MR. DODD: Didn’t you receive a present from Göring and Goebbels... - -FUNK: Yes... - -MR. DODD: Wait a minute till I get through—you don’t seem to -remember—you received a present from Göring and Goebbels in the first -instance which had been made up of 250,000 Reichsmark from leading -businessmen in Germany and 270,000 Reichsmark which came out of special -accounts maintained by Göring and Goebbels. Then Hitler heard about that -and ordered you to return that money because of the fact that some of it -came from industry, and he himself gave you a so-called donation to the -sum of 520,000 Reichsmark, isn’t that so? - -FUNK: The first is not correct, but the latter is correct. But may I -explain the details; they are of a completely different nature. - -MR. DODD: Go ahead. - -FUNK: On my fiftieth birthday the President and Directorate of the Reich -Chamber of Economics, the chief organization of the entire German -economy, called on me and declared that because of my more than 20 years -of service to German economy they wanted, with the approval of the -Führer, to make me a gift of an estate in Bavaria. That was a doubtful -present, for later I had much worry and trouble because of it. A large -house was built there because, as I was told, the Führer had said that -he also wanted me to work there. The taxes were so high, however, that I -could not pay them, nor the remaining construction costs, either. -Thereupon I did not appeal to Göring, but Göring heard about it and had -300,000 Reichsmark given to me in order to help me out of my financial -straits. I did not receive any money from Goebbels, but with the -approval of Goebbels the film corporation joined the Chamber of -Economics in giving me this money. When the Führer heard of the -difficulties I had in paying taxes and making other payments he put a -sum of 500,000 Reichsmark at my disposal. With the other money I -received I made two donations, one of 500,000 Reichsmark to the -Reichsbank for the families of the members of the Reichsbank killed -during the war and another of 200,000 Reichsmark to the Reich Ministry -of Economics for the families of members of that office who died in the -war. I was able to live in, and pay for the upkeep of, this large house -and grounds only because I had a relatively large income. However, from -the beginning, when I saw the tremendous costs and expenses connected -with it particularly in taxes, _et cetera_, I decided, in agreement with -my wife, that after my death this estate should again be donated either -to the Reichsbank or to my East Prussian homeland. I also discussed this -several times with the Reichsbank Directorate. - -MR. DODD: I am not much concerned with what you did with it, I only want -to know if you got it. And you got it, didn’t you? You got 520,000 -Reichsmark. - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You also made a present out of public funds on your own -account to the Defendant Frick on one occasion, didn’t you? Didn’t you -give Frick a birthday present of 250,000 Reichsmark on 12 March 1942? - -FUNK: That I don’t know. - -MR. DODD: You don’t remember? You don’t remember that? Do you know -anything about the other gifts that were given to any of these other -defendants out of public funds, either through your position as -President of the Reichsbank or as an important functionary of the Nazi -Party? Do you know anything about these other men and what they have got -from the public treasury? - -FUNK: These moneys were not given by me. They were given from the fund -of the Führer by Lammers. I did not dispense such moneys. - -MR. DODD: They were public funds, were they not? They did not come from -anywhere else except the public? You don’t know then that Rosenberg got -250,000 Reichsmark? Did you know that? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: In January 1944; you were then President of the Reichsbank? - -FUNK: Yes, but these moneys never came from the Reichsbank. These were -moneys from funds which were administered by Lammers and I assume that -the moneys came from the Adolf Hitler donation or from other funds. But -the Reichsbank had nothing to do with these funds. - -MR. DODD: Do you know that Von Neurath got 250,000 Reichsmark on 2 -February 1943? Do you know anything about that? You were the President -of the Reichsbank then. - -FUNK: I know nothing about that. - -MR. DODD: You heard about Lammers and his 600,000 Reichsmark. You know -that Keitel got 250,000 Reichsmark on 22 September 1942. You never heard -about that? - -FUNK: The Reichsbank had nothing at all to do with these things. - -MR. DODD: You know that Von Ribbentrop got 500,000 Reichsmark on 30 -April 1943. You never heard of that? General Milch got 500,000 -Reichsmark in 1941; none of these things ever came to your attention? - -FUNK: I never had anything to do with these matters. They were Lammers’ -concern and the money did not come from the Reichsbank. - -MR. DODD: Now, I understood you to say that you were not the economic -advisor in fact to Hitler or to the Nazi Party of the early days. That -is in your own judgment you were not. It is a fact, however, that you -were generally regarded as such by the public, by industrialists, by -Party members and the high Party officials. Is that not so? - -FUNK: I was called that, as I said here, on the basis of my activity in -1932. I acted as a mediator in conversations between the Führer and some -leading economists and for a short while carried out the activity in the -Party which has been described here. - -MR. DODD: You have called yourself the economic advisor on occasion, -have you not? At least on one occasion, during an interrogation, did you -not refer to yourself as the economic advisor for the Party? You -remember that? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: I think you will agree that you were generally recognized as -such, but the really important thing is that the public thought you -were. - -FUNK: I have testified here that I was called that by the press and from -the press this designation apparently went into record. I did not use -this term myself. - -MR. DODD: Were you the principal contact man between the Nazi Party and -industry in the very early days? - -FUNK: In 1932, and this is the only year which we need consider in -connection with Party activities on my part, because I was not active in -the Party before or after this year. I did arrange discussions between -Hitler and leading men of industry, whom I can name. But other men also -acted in that capacity; for example, State Secretary Keppler. - -MR. DODD: I am not asking you about other men, I am asking you whether -or not you were not a principal contact man. Actually you were -encouraged by industry, were you not, to become active in the Party? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You acted as a go-between for the Nazis and the big business -in Germany. - -FUNK: It did not take up much time, but I did it. - -MR. DODD: Whether it took much of your time or not, that doesn’t -interest us. It took a little bit of your time. That’s what you were -doing? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You remember Document Number EC-440 perhaps. It is really a -statement that you made and prepared on the relationship of German -industry to the Party in the National Socialist leadership of the State. -You remember that paper you drew up on 28 June 1945? You may recall that -you yourself said, “Keppler, who later became State Secretary, and who -served as economic advisor to the Führer before me....” You used that -terminology. You recall that? - -FUNK: Keppler? - -MR. DODD: Yes, he was the advisor before you. You remember that? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Now, in the Propaganda Ministry, if I understand you -correctly, you want the Tribunal to believe that you were something of -an administrative functionary and not a very important man, and you did -not really know what was going on. Is that your position? - -FUNK: No. I had quite a large task, and that was the direction of an -extensive cultural and economic concern. I stated that here. It -consisted of film companies, theaters, orchestras, the German Trade -Publicity Council, and the administration of the entire German radio, an -undertaking worth a hundred millions, that is to say, a very extensive -activity, an organizational, economic and financial activity. But -propaganda was taken care of solely and exclusively by Goebbels. - -MR. DODD: Yes. You knew the policies and the purposes of the Propaganda -Ministry; there isn’t any doubt about that? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You knew that, did you not? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: All right. Now, we can pass on to one other matter that I -referred to earlier, to clear up another matter. Do you recall that the -Defendant Schacht, when he was on the stand, said, I believe, at that -now famous meeting where a number of industrialists were gathered to -greet Hitler, that he did not take up the collection? Schacht said he -did not do it. I think he said that Göring did it or somebody else. Do -you remember that testimony about Schacht on the stand? You remember -being interrogated about that subject yourself? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Do you remember what you told us at the time? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: What did you tell us? - -FUNK: I said that Schacht after addresses by Göring and Hitler made a -brief speech, and that he asked those present to, so to say, go to the -cashier and subscribe, that is, raise money for the election fund. He -took over the collection and said that the coal industry... - -MR. DODD: Who? - -FUNK: He said... - -MR. DODD: Who was the one who took up the collection? I don’t understand -whom you mean by “he.” - -FUNK: Schacht. - -MR. DODD: That’s all I wanted to know about that. When did you first -learn that the uprisings of November 1938 were not spontaneous? - -FUNK: On the morning of 9 November, on my way from my home to the -Ministry, I saw for the first time what had taken place during the -night. Before that I had not had the slightest hint that such excesses -and terror measures had been planned. - -MR. DODD: I think you misunderstood me. I did not ask you when you first -came to know about the uprisings; I asked you when you first learned -that they were not spontaneous; when you first learned that they were -instigated and planned by somebody else. - -FUNK: I only found out about that later. - -MR. DODD: Well, how much later? - -FUNK: I believe very much later. Later on there was much discussion -about this matter and it was never clear just who had been the -instigator of these measures of terror and violence and where the order -had originated. We knew that it had come from Munich. We had learned -that in the meantime on 9 November; but, whether it was Goebbels or -Himmler, and to what extent the Führer himself participated in this -measure, I was never able to find out clearly. From my telephone -conversation with Goebbels, which I mentioned today, one thing was -clear: The Führer must have known about this matter, for he told me that -the Führer had decreed, and Göring also said this, that the Jews were -completely to be eliminated from economic life. From this I had to -conclude that the Führer himself knew about this matter. - -MR. DODD: Now from that telephone conversation we can also see one other -thing. You knew that Goebbels had started this business, did you not, -and that was the day after it happened? You knew it was not spontaneous -and that is why you called up Goebbels and got after him; is that not -so? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: How many days later did you make that inflammatory speech -about what should be done to the Jews? About six days afterwards, did -you not? I am referring to the one that was published in the -_Frankfurter Zeitung_; your counsel referred to it this morning. - -FUNK: Yes, to begin with... - -MR. DODD: And in that speech you tried to make it appear to the public -that that was a spontaneous uprising, did you not? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: That was not true, was it? - -FUNK: I did not know that at the time. At that time I still believed -that it was really something favored by large elements of the -population. Very much later I found out that routine machinery had been -put in motion. - -MR. DODD: Are you telling this Tribunal now that on the morning of your -telephone call to Goebbels, when you in effect blamed him for these -uprisings, you were not well aware then that he had started it? Is that -your position? - -FUNK: At that time I did not know who had started this regime of terror -and how it had been carried through; that was entirely new to me. - -MR. DODD: If you did not know who started it, you knew that somebody -started it and that it was not spontaneous? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And still in your speech of 15 November you tried to make it -appear to the public that it was just an uprising on the part of the -German people, did you not? - -FUNK: I based that on the attempted assassination of—I do not know who -he was; some attaché in Paris—and actually the attempt caused much -agitation. There is no doubt of it. - -MR. DODD: Now I think you understand my question, Witness. You said on -that occasion, you used these words: “The fact that the last violent -explosion of the indignation of the German people because of a criminal -Jewish attack against the German people took place,” and so on, and you -went on. You were trying to make it appear there that this was a -spontaneous reaction of the German people, and I insist that you knew -better and had known it for some days, had you not? - -FUNK: But I did not know that that is what took place. I admit that I -knew that an impulse had come from some office or other. - -MR. DODD: Well, all right. When did you coin the expression “crystal -week”? Do you know what that expression is; where it came from? - -FUNK: “Crystal week?” - -MR. DODD: Yes. - -FUNK: Yes, I did use these words once in connection with this action. - -MR. DODD: You coined the phrase. - -FUNK: Because much was shattered. - -MR. DODD: You are the fellow who started that expression. You are the -man, are you not? that was your expression? - -FUNK: Yes, I used it. - -MR. DODD: And you were using it—because you made this _Frankfurter -Zeitung_ speech? - -FUNK: I once characterized that action with that term, it is true, -because much had been shattered. - -MR. DODD: Now, let us move on a little bit to the well-known meeting of -12 November, when Göring and Goebbels and all of the other people made -their remarks about the Jews and you said you were present. You did not -make any objection that day to anything that was said, did you? - -FUNK: No. I merely attempted to have certain things put through in order -to save something for the Jews, for example, their securities and -stocks. Then I managed to have the stores reopened, so that things would -move less rapidly, and I did more, too. - -MR. DODD: I understand that, but I thought this morning you were really -pretty sensitive about the terrible things that had happened to the -Jews, and you remember some of the suggestions that were made that day -by Göring and Goebbels; they were pretty nasty things, were they not? - -FUNK: Yes, I openly admitted that I was much shaken... - -MR. DODD: Were you? Well... - -FUNK: And that my conscience bothered me. - -MR. DODD: All right. You went on after that and made your _Frankfurter -Zeitung_ speech and you carried out these decrees, even though your -conscience was bothering you; is that so? - -FUNK: But the decrees had to be issued. I have already emphasized that -several times here. I had no pangs of conscience because the decrees -were issued. I had pangs of conscience because of the reasons for them. -But the decrees themselves— - -MR. DODD: That is what I’m asking you about. - -FUNK: But the decrees had to be issued. The reasons for them—yes; I -admit that. - -MR. DODD: You know Schacht said on the stand that if he had been the -Minister of Economy he did not think those things would have happened? -Do you remember him saying that here the other day, do you? - -FUNK: Yes. He must have had very powerful and influential connections in -the Party, otherwise he could not have been successful. - -MR. DODD: You did not have these connections in the Party, did you? You -were not in the Party, you were a Minister? - -FUNK: No, I did not have these connections and I could not prevent these -terror actions. - -MR. DODD: Well, we will see about that. Your counsel has submitted on -your behalf an affidavit from one Oeser, O-e-s-e-r; do you remember that -man? O-e-s-e-r, do you remember him? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Do you remember him? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And his affidavit—interrogatory, I believe it was... - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, we will adjourn for a bare 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. DODD: Witness, I was inquiring about this man Oeser when we -recessed—O-e-s-e-r; do you recall him? He was one of your employees in -the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, was he not? - -FUNK: Yes, he was the chief of the Berlin administration office of the -_Frankfurter Zeitung_, a respected journalist. - -MR. DODD: Yes. You know, do you not, that you have an interrogatory or -an affidavit from him, which you are submitting to this court; it is in -your document book? - -FUNK: He volunteered to do that. - -MR. DODD: Well, I’m not asking you—that is all right—whether he did or -not; I just wanted to establish that you know that he did. - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Now, in that affidavit, as I read it, Oeser maintains that you -were really being quite decent about the Jews in that newspaper. Is that -not so? Is that not the sense of it; that you saved them from dismissal -and so on, you put them under the exceptions provided in the decrees? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -FUNK: I allowed quite a number of editors to come under these -exceptions. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I know. Now I want to ask you this: There was a real -reason, other than decency towards Jews, for your conduct with reference -to that particular paper, was there not? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, now, wait a minute. - -FUNK: I do not know these people personally. - -MR. DODD: I do not say that you knew the people personally. I say that -there was a reason, other than your feeling for Jews as people, but -which you have not told the Tribunal about yet, another reason maybe. - -FUNK: In the case of the editors of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_? - -MR. DODD: Yes. - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: Now, is it not a fact that you and probably Hitler, and -certainly Goebbels, and some of the other higher-ups of the Nazi Party, -decided that that paper should be left in _status quo_ because of its -vast influence abroad? Is that not true? - -FUNK: We did not talk about that at that time. That issue came up later. -It came when the Führer demanded that almost all leading daily -newspapers should either be taken over by the Party or merged with Party -papers. And on that occasion I succeeded in having exception made for -the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, and the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ continued to -exist for a long time. But that was much later. Here, in fact, the only -reason was to help a few Jewish editors. - -MR. DODD: Well... - -FUNK: It was a purely humane reason. - -MR. DODD: You can answer this. I just wanted to get your answer on the -record because I’ll have more to say about it later. Do I understand you -to deny that it was your established policy to preserve the _status quo_ -of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ because of its influence abroad? - -FUNK: No, it was always my opinion that the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ should -remain as it was. - -MR. DODD: Well, was it for the reason that I suggest, because these -people were well known in the financial world abroad, and you did not -want to impair the usefulness of that paper abroad? That’s what I’m -getting at, and I say that that is why you kept them on, and not because -you felt badly about their plight as Jews. - -FUNK: No, not in this case. In this case that was not the reason. - -MR. DODD: Very well; now, with respect to your activities as the -Plenipotentiary for Economy and their relationship to the wars waged -against Poland and the other powers, I have some questions that I would -like to ask you. Now I will tell you what it is about first, so you will -be aware. You are not maintaining, are you, that your position as -Plenipotentiary for Economy did not have much to do with the affairs of -the Wehrmacht? - -FUNK: Yes, I assert that. With the Wehrmacht... - -MR. DODD: Now, I have in my hand here a letter which Von Blomberg wrote -to Göring. Do you remember that letter? It is a new document and you -have not seen it in this Trial, but do you remember any such letter? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, I ask you to be handed Document Number EC-255. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] Mr. President, this -becomes Exhibit USA-839. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, in this letter from Von Blomberg, I -am only concerned now with the last sentence, really. You will notice -that Von Blomberg, in this letter, refers to the fact that Schacht had -been appointed, but the last sentence says, or in the next to the last -paragraph he first urges that you be appointed immediately, and that is -underlined in his letter; and in the last paragraph he says: - - “The urgency of unified further work on all preparations for the - conduct of the war does not admit of this office being paralyzed - until 15 January 1938.” - -This letter, by the way, was written on 29 November 1937. Certainly Von -Blomberg thought that the job that he was suggesting you for would have -some very great effect upon the conduct of the war, did he not? - -FUNK: That may be, but in the first place, I do not know about that -letter and, secondly, I was not immediately appointed Plenipotentiary -for Economy but only in the course of 1938. Quite some time after I had -been appointed Minister for Economics I asked Lammers why my appointment -as Plenipotentiary for Economy had taken so long; he replied that my -relationship to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan had to be cleared up -first. That was the reason why several months passed before I became -Plenipotentiary for Economy, because it had to be ascertained that -Göring had the decisive authority for war economy... - -MR. DODD: You really do not need to go into all that. - -FUNK: I do not know about that letter, and I have never spoken to Von -Blomberg about the affair. - -MR. DODD: All right. You do recall perhaps that the OKW, after you were -appointed, made some objection about the amount of authority that you -had. Do you remember that? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: Now, I am holding here another new document, Number EC-270, -which I will ask that you be shown, which will become Exhibit USA-840. -While you are waiting for it, I will tell you that it is a letter -written on 27 April 1938. You will notice that in the first paragraph of -this letter from the OKW it says that the interpretation which has been -put on the decree of the Führer—the decree of 4 February 1938—does not -correspond to the necessities of total warfare. - -And then you go down to the third paragraph on that first page and you -will find other objections with respect to your authority. Apparently at -this time the OKW thought you had too much to do with what would be the -war effort, and finally on the last page, Mr. Witness, if you will look -at this paragraph, you will see this sentence—on the last page of the -English, anyway; near the end of the letter this sentence appears: - - “The war economy, which is subordinated to the Plenipotentiary, - represents the economic rear area of the armaments industry.” - -And I want you to observe carefully those words “armaments industry.” - -And then it goes on to say: - - “If this stage fails, the striking power of the Armed Forces - becomes questionable.” - -I ask that you pay attention to the words “armaments industry,” because -I recall that this morning you said you had absolutely nothing to do -with the armaments industry; but apparently the OKW thought that you -did, on 27 April 1938. Is that not so? - -FUNK: I do not know this letter either. I do not know the attitude of -the OKW but I do know this: The OKW, especially the Codefendant Field -Marshal Keitel, was of the opinion at that time that I, as -Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, should assume the authority and -competence of Schacht; but there was a conversation between the Reich -Marshal and Field Marshal Keitel—Keitel confirmed this to me—in which -the Reich Marshal clearly declared; “The war economy will not be turned -over to Funk.” I can honestly and sincerely say that I did not have the -slightest idea of all these things. I did not know what kind of position -the OKW intended me to have. I never had that function because the -administration for the armaments industry was never included in the -Ministry of Economics. I do not remember the matter. - -MR. DODD: All right. That is your answer. I suppose at the time you were -also aware, as you told the Tribunal, that you were really subordinate -to Göring and in a very inferior position about all of these things. Is -that so? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: I am going to ask you to look at another Document, Number -EC-271, which will become Exhibit USA-841, and this document consists of -a letter which you wrote to Lammers, a letter which Lammers wrote to the -Chief of the High Command, Field Marshal Keitel, and one or two other -letters not pertinent for the purposes of this present inquiry. It was -written on 31 March 1938, and I want you to turn to the second page -because that is where your letter appears. The first page is just a -letter of transmittal from Lammers to Keitel, but let us look at the -second page. Have you got it? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You are writing to Lammers and you say—I am not going to read -the whole letter, but the second paragraph. You wrote to Lammers and you -say among other things: - - “On the occasion of a trip to Austria I have, among other - matters, also talked to Field Marshal Göring about the position - of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy. I pointed out in this - conversation that, contrary to the attitude of the OKW, of which - I was informed, the decree of 4 February 1938 concerning the - leadership of the Wehrmacht did not change the position of the - Plenipotentiary for War Economy.” - -And you go on—aside from the fact that the decree applied exclusively -to the command of the Armed Forces, and so on, and that especially the -last paragraph of that decree stated that you were dependent upon -instructions of the Führer—to say: - - “Moreover, among the instructions of the Führer is included the - decision of the Reich Government of 21 May 1935, according to - which the Plenipotentiary for War Economy, in his sphere of duty - as supreme Reich authority, is immediately subordinated to the - Führer. - - “General Field Marshal Göring assured me that my interpretation, - as mentioned above, was correct in every respect and also - corresponds with the Führer’s opinion. Thereupon I asked him to - give me a brief written confirmation. Field Marshal Göring - promised to grant this request.” - -Now, you wrote that letter to Lammers, did you not, on 31 March 1938, -“yes” or “no?” - -FUNK: Certainly. - -MR. DODD: All right. You were trying to have supreme authority and make -yourself answerable only to the Führer and that is what this contest was -about, and that is what Document Number EC-271 referred to and this is -your answer to the OKW’s objection that you had too much power. This -does not look like you were a little man, does it, Mr. Witness? - -FUNK: Yes. I wanted to clarify the position, but later it was not -clarified in that sense but in the sense that I was dependent upon the -directives of the Reich Marshal. I wrote this letter in order to try to -obtain a clarification, but I do not remember this letter in detail. - -MR. DODD: You told Lammers... - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, is not this letter that you have just read the -very letter which is referred to in the letter which you put to him -immediately before? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir, it is. It referred to EC-271. I am sorry, I said -271, I meant 270. - -THE PRESIDENT: GB Number 649/38 is the letter you just read. Will you -look at the first paragraph of EC-270; the letter referred to there, -criticizing, is the Defendant Funk’s letter you just read. - -MR. DODD: Yes, it is, your Honor. - -[_Turning to the witness._] My point here, Mr. Witness, is that, you -see, you told the Tribunal that you really just worked for Göring; that -you did not have much to say about these things, but now we find that -you were writing a letter asserting your supreme authority and saying -now, “it is a fact that I am really only answerable to Hitler,” and, you -see, those two are quite inconsistent. What have you got to say about -that? - -FUNK: Yes; in fact, I was never successful. - -MR. DODD: Now, let us see if you were not. Now you turn another page in -that document and you will find another letter from Lammers, written on -6 April 1938, and it is written to you, and he tells you that you are -just right in what you understood to be your position; that you are -indeed only subordinate to the Führer and that he has sent a copy of -your letter to both Field Marshal Göring and the Commander of the OKW. -Now, what do you say about that? - -FUNK: I see from this that I tried at that time to achieve that post, -but in fact I never succeeded because the Reich Marshal himself stated -later that he would never turn over the war economy to me. The formal -authority of the Plenipotentiary for Economy was turned over to the Four -Year Plan by a decree of the Führer of December 1939. - -MR. DODD: Well, is that your answer? Now, you also have told the -Tribunal, as I understood you at least, that you really did not have -much to do with the planning of any aggressive wars, and that your -activities were restricted to regulating and controlling the home -economy, so to speak. Now, actually on 28 January 1939, which was some -months before the invasion of Poland, you were considering the use of -prisoners of war, were you not? - -FUNK: That I do not know. - -MR. DODD: Are you sure about that? Now I will ask that you be shown -another document, Number EC-488 which becomes Exhibit USA-842. This is -an unsigned letter, a captured document from your files. This letter, by -the way, was transmitted under the signature of Sarnow. You know who he -was; he was your deputy. Now, this letter, dated 28 January 1939, says -that its subject is “Re: Employment of Prisoners of War.” Then it goes -on to say: - - “Under the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938* I have the - direction for the economic preparations for the Reich defense, - except the armament industry.” - -Then it goes on, “For the utilization of labor...” and so on. But what I -want to call your attention to particularly is the sentence in the -second paragraph which says: - - “The deficit in manpower may force me to the employment of - prisoners of war as far as possible and practical. The - preparations, therefore, have to be made in close co-operation - with the OKW and GBW. The offices under my jurisdiction will - duly participate therein.” - -Remember that communication? - -FUNK: No, I have never seen that letter, and never signed it. But that -letter belongs to the matters about which I spoke this morning. The -office of the Plenipotentiary for Economy—moreover, I see -“Plenipotentiary for War Economy” is scratched out—was continuously -occupied with these things. I personally had nothing to do with it. - -MR. DODD: Well now, that is rather playing with words. This was your -Ministry that was making these suggestions, and your principal deputy -who transmitted this letter, is that not so? - -FUNK: No, that was... - -MR. DODD: Now, you look up in the right hand corner of that letter and -see if it doesn’t say “The Plenipotentiary for the Economy,” and then it -gives the address and date. - -FUNK: Yes, and it is signed “By Order: Sarnow.” - -MR. DODD: That is right, and he was your principal deputy, was he not? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: What was he? - -FUNK: He only worked in the office of the Plenipotentiary General. My -main deputy, who was in charge of those things, was Dr. Posse. - -MR. DODD: Well now, at any rate... - -FUNK: As I have said before, I personally had nothing to do with these -things whatsoever. - -MR. DODD: It has just been called to my attention that if you say the -man was Posse, then in the second paragraph of that letter you can find -his name: “I can refer to the statements of Generaloberst Keitel, State -Secretary Dr. Posse...” At any event, important people in your -organization were involved in this thing, were they not? - -FUNK: Certainly. - -MR. DODD: All right. Now, you remember the Document Number 3562-PS. It -was introduced here as Exhibit USA-662. It is the minutes of a meeting -set out by Dr. Posse, your deputy, which discussed a memorandum for -financing the war, and you talked about that this morning and you said -that despite the fact that there is a note on it “to be shown to the -Minister,” you never saw it. - -FUNK: I would have had to initial it if I had seen it. - -MR. DODD: Well, whether that is so or not, I am not concerned about -right now. Instead, I want you to listen while I read an excerpt from -it. If you would like to see the document you can have it, but I hardly -think it is necessary. You recall that in that document one of your -memoranda is referred to, is it not? Do you remember? Do you remember -that Posse said: - - “It was pointed out that the Plenipotentiary for Economy is - primarily concerned with introducing into the legislation for - war finance the idea of financing war expenditures by - anticipating future revenues, to be expected after the war.” - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: All right. That is all I have to ask about that document. We -can move right along here. - -Referring again to your own direct testimony, I understood you to tell -the Tribunal that insofar as the war against Poland was concerned, you -did not really know until some time in August that there was even a -likelihood of war with Poland; some time in August you thought it would -be settled by diplomatic means. Is that not so? - -FUNK: In all probability not. For months there was a latent danger of -war, but even in August one could see that it was imminent. - -MR. DODD: Had you been planning or making economic plans for war with -Poland for more than a year before the attack on Poland? You can answer -that “yes” or “no.” - -FUNK: I do not know. - -MR. DODD: You mean you did not know whether you had or not? What do you -mean by that kind of an answer? Do you not remember? - -FUNK: I do not remember. - -MR. DODD: All right. Then I can help you. There is a Document, Number -3324-PS, which is already in evidence. You must remember it; it is -Exhibit USA-661. That is a speech that you made. Is that not so? Do you -not remember saying in it that you had been planning in secret for well -over a year for the war on Poland? Do you remember that? Would you like -to see the document? - -FUNK: Yes, please. - -MR. DODD: The sentence is here: - - “Although all the economic and financial departments were - utilized in the tasks and work of the Four Year Plan, under the - leadership of Field Marshal Göring, the war economic preparation - of Germany on another branch has also been advanced in secret - for years...” - -Do you remember that? - -FUNK: Yes, now I know. - -MR. DODD: You will notice it says here “for well over a year,” and you -went on to say this had been done under you. Is that true? - -FUNK: Yes, that was the activity of the Plenipotentiary for civilian -economy. I already explained that this morning. - -MR. DODD: All right. Well, that is all right. I just wanted to get your -answer... - -FUNK: I did not speak of Poland. - -MR. DODD: Well, that is the only war that was on when you made this -speech. It was October 1939. - -FUNK: The preparations were not made for a specific war, it was... - -MR. DODD: All right. - -FUNK: It was a general preparation. - -MR. DODD: Now, actually you and Göring were even in a contest for power -to some extent, were you not? Was the Göring door one of those that you -were also trying to get in? You can answer that very simply. You told us -you were trying to get in these various doors, but you would get up -there and never get in. I now ask you if the Göring door was one of -those. - -FUNK: I do not believe that I was so presumptuous as to want to get -Göring’s post. That was far from being my intention. I had very little -ambition at all. - -MR. DODD: I did not say that you wanted to get his post, but you wanted -to get some of his authority, did you not? Or do you not remember? Maybe -that is the solution. - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, your man Posse was interrogated here by representatives -of the Prosecution and the document is Number 3894-PS. He was asked -these questions: - - “Question: ‘What was the nature of the conflict between the - Plenipotentiary for Economy and the Four Year Plan?’ - - “Answer: ‘The struggle for power.’ - - “Question: ‘The struggle for power between Funk and Göring?’ - - “Answer: ‘The struggle for power between Funk and Göring, - between Funk and the Ministry for Agriculture and the Ministry - of Communications.’ - - “Question: ‘How was the struggle finally resolved?’ - - “Answer: ‘Never. It was a struggle always continuing under the - surface.’” - -Then we move on: - - “Question: ‘Did Funk, who had very important powers as Minister - of Economics and later as Reichsbank President and as Chief - Plenipotentiary for Economy, actually exercise these powers?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes. But the powers of Göring were stronger.’ - - “Question: ‘Nevertheless, Funk did exercise important powers?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, as President of the Reichsbank, Minister of - Economics, and Plenipotentiary for Economy.’” - -Posse was your chief deputy, was he not? - -FUNK: Yes, but Posse’s position was somewhat apart. My deputy was -Landfried, and in the Reichsbank, Puhl. They knew these things better -than Herr Posse. - -MR. DODD: Well, all right. - -FUNK: They should know more about it than Posse. - -MR. DODD: You do not think he really knew what he was talking about when -he said you were in the struggle for power? Is that your answer? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: [_Turning to the Tribunal._] That becomes Exhibit USA-843. We -have not offered it up to now. - -Now, Mr. Witness, I want to ask you about when you first heard of the -impending attack on Russia. I understood you to tell the Tribunal that -you heard about it some time—I think you said—in May. Is that right? -Or June? - -FUNK: When Rosenberg was appointed. - -MR. DODD: Well, that is what we want to know. When Rosenberg, in April -of 1941, was appointed, you knew then there was to be an attack on -Russia, did you not? But this morning I do not think you made that -clear. Is that not right, Dr. Funk? - -FUNK: Yes, I said that the reason given us for that appointment was that -the Führer considered a war with Russia to be possible. - -MR. DODD: Yes, but you know what you told the Tribunal this morning. You -said that Lammers sent you notice of Rosenberg’s appointment because of -your interest in improving the trade relations with Russia. That is the -answer you made this morning. Now, that was not so, was it? - -FUNK: Yes, Lammers has said that here, too. - -MR. DODD: I do not care what Lammers said. I am asking you now if it is -not a fact that you were told by Lammers because you were to co-operate -with Rosenberg in making ready for the occupation of those territories -after the attack began. Now you can answer that very simply. Is that not -true? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: Now, we will see. You know, on another occasion you have given -another answer, by the way, I might say, parenthetically. Do you -remember telling the interrogator that you first heard from Hess about -the impending attack on Russia? Do you remember you gave that answer at -one time as the source of your first knowledge? Do you remember telling -us that? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: I’ll tell you about that in a minute. We will stay now on this -Rosenberg business. - -There is a Document Number 1031-PS and it is dated 28 May 1941, which -would be a little more than a month after the Rosenberg appointment: -“Top secret notes; meeting with Reich Minister Funk.” Do you know what -you were talking about that day, about counterfeiting money for use in -Russia and the Ukraine and the Caucasus? Do you remember it? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: You do not remember it? Well, you had better take a look at -the Document. It is Number 1031-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-844. Do -you not remember the day that your Reichsbank Director Wilhelm said it -should not appear that you were counterfeiting so-called ruble bills for -use in the occupied countries? Rosenberg was at that meeting. It is a -very short memorandum. Have you read it? Oh, it is on Page 4, I think, -of the document that you have; I am sorry. Do you find it? It starts -out: “In the Ukraine and the Caucasus, however, it would become -necessary to maintain the present currency, the ruble...” and so on. You -were talking about money problems in the territory that you expected to -occupy, and that was, well, about a month before the attack and about a -month after Rosenberg’s appointment, was it not? Can you not give me an -answer? - -FUNK: I have not found the passage yet. Yes, if these countries were -conquered, it was necessary to deal with these questions. - -MR. DODD: The point is that certainly by that time you knew about the -impending attack on the countries that had to be conquered, did you not? - -FUNK: I knew nothing of an attack. I only knew of an imminent danger of -war. - -MR. DODD: Well, all right, you have it your way. The important thing is -that you were talking about using money in the Ukraine and in the -Caucasus, and it happened about a month later. - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: All right. There are quite a few questions I want to ask. I -would like to close this examination before the adjournment time is due. -Do you have anything you want to say to that? I only offered to show you -that you had knowledge about the impending attack. You knew that -something was going to happen in the East. That is all I wanted to ask. -I think you will agree with that, will you not? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -FUNK: Since the appointment of Rosenberg—and I explained that quite -clearly this morning—I knew that a war with Russia was threatening. - -MR. DODD: We are all in agreement. We do not need to go further. I -understood you to say this morning that you did not know. That is all -right. I misunderstood you then. I now understand you to say that you -did know it. - -FUNK: I said quite clearly this morning that I was informed that the -Führer was expecting a war with Russia, but I am not sure about this -document, as to who has written it. - -MR. DODD: Well, I do not know either. I can simply tell you that it was -captured, among other documents, from Rosenberg’s files. I cannot tell -you anything more about it. I think we can talk about something else, if -you will permit me. I really do not think there is any need to go on -with it. - -FUNK: Yes, but it is important insofar as these things about the ruble -have been attributed to me. - -MR. DODD: I will say it is, too. - -FUNK: It says here that I said that the use of the -Reichskreditkassenscheine and the determining of the rate of exchange -involved considerable danger. In other words, I was very doubtful in -regard to the proposals made in this respect. - -MR. DODD: All right. I am glad to have your observations about it. Now, -I want to talk to you a little bit about when you took over the -Reichsbank. Posse was your principal deputy in your Ministry of -Economics, was he not? - -FUNK: Landfried was my main deputy. - -MR. DODD: And by the way, he was at the same meeting that we have just -been talking about. Who was your principal assistant in the Reichsbank? - -FUNK: Puhl. - -MR. DODD: He was a holdover from the Schacht days, was he not? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Did you induce him to remain? Did you ask him to remain? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: You said that you selected your personnel. That is what you -told the Tribunal this morning. - -FUNK: No. Puhl remained and also Kretschmann and Wilhelm. - -MR. DODD: I am not interested in going through your roster of personnel. -I am only asking—and I will tell you the purpose. Puhl was a reliable -banking man, was he not? He was well known in the international banking -circles. He had been offered a position in the Chase Bank in New York at -one time, did you know that? - -FUNK: No, I did not know that. - -MR. DODD: Well, it is true. In any event, he was quite a man, and he is -a reliable man, is he not? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You asked for him as a witness, did you not? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And you wanted him to come here because you believe him and -you know he... - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Now, I want to talk a little bit about the gold in the -Reichsbank. How much gold did you have on hand at the end of the year -1941, roughly? Do not give me a long story about it, because I am not -too much interested. I am merely trying to find out if you were short on -gold in 1941. - -FUNK: The gold reserve which I took over amounted to about 500 million -Reichsmark when I received the post of Schacht. - -MR. DODD: Well, all right. - -FUNK: It was increased in any substantial manner only by the Belgian -gold, as far as I know. - -MR. DODD: That is really—it is interesting to hear all about it, but I -have another purpose in mind. From whence did you obtain gold after you -took over? Where did you get any new gold reserves from? - -FUNK: Only by changing foreign currency into gold, and then, after I -took over the post, we got in addition the gold reserve of the Czech -National Bank. But we mainly increased our reserve through the Belgian -gold. - -MR. DODD: All right. Now, of course, gold became very important to you -as a matter of payment in foreign exchange. You had to pay off in gold -along in 1942 and 1943, did you not? Is that so? - -FUNK: It was very difficult to pay in gold. - -MR. DODD: I know it was. - -FUNK: Because the countries with which we still had business relations -introduced gold embargoes. Sweden refused to accept gold at all. Only in -Switzerland could we still do business through changing gold into -foreign currency. - -MR. DODD: I think you have established that you had to use gold as -foreign exchange in 1942 and 1943 and that is all I wanted to know. When -did you start to do business with the SS, Mr. Funk? - -FUNK: Business with the SS? I have never done that. - -MR. DODD: Yes, sir, business with the SS. Are you sure about that? I -want you to take this very seriously. It is about the end of your -examination, and it is very important to you. I ask you again, when did -you start to do business with the SS? - -FUNK: I never started business with the SS. I can only repeat what I -said in the preliminary interrogation. Puhl one day informed me that a -deposit had been received from the SS. First I assumed that it was a -regular deposit, that is, a deposit which remained locked and which was -of no further concern to us, but then Puhl told me later that these -deposits of the SS should be used by the Reichsbank. I assumed they -consisted of gold coins and foreign currency, but principally gold -coins, which every German citizen had had to turn in as it was, and -which were taken from inmates of concentration camps and turned over to -the Reichsbank. Valuables which had been taken from the inmates of -concentration camps did not go to the Reichsbank but, as we have several -times heard here, to the Reich Minister of Finance, that is... - -MR. DODD: Just a minute. Were you in the habit of having gold teeth -deposited in the Reichsbank? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: But you did have it from the SS, did you not? - -FUNK: I do not know. - -MR. DODD: You do not know? - -Well, now, if Your Honor please, we have a very brief film, and I think -we can show it before we adjourn, and I would like to show it to the -witness before I examine him further on this gold business in the -Reichsbank. It is a picture that was taken by the Allied Forces when -they entered the Reichsbank, and it will show gold teeth and bridges and -so on in their vaults. - -FUNK: I know nothing about it. - -MR. DODD: I think perhaps before I show the film I would like—I think I -can do it in the time; I do want to complete this this afternoon—to -read you an affidavit from this man Puhl who, you told me a few minutes -ago, was a credible, well-informed man and whom you called as a witness. -This affidavit is dated 3 May 1946. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I protest against the reading of this -affidavit by Herr Puhl. This affidavit most probably—I’m not sure—was -taken here in Nuremberg. We do not know its contents. The Prosecution -surprises us today with an affidavit of which we know nothing, and -within ten minutes a dozen documents are thrown at us, of which the -Prosecution asserts they are only short documents, whereas, for -instance, one affidavit among them contains twelve pages, I believe. It -is quite impossible for us, in the course of the extreme speed at which -this examination is taking place, to follow these statements and these -documents. Therefore I have to protest against the use of an affidavit -of that kind at this moment. - -MR. DODD: Well, this affidavit was taken at Baden-Baden, Germany, on the -3rd day of May. We have been trying for a long time to put this part of -this case together, and we have finally succeeded. Certainly we did not -turn it over to Dr. Sauter, because we wanted to use it for just the -purposes that I am trying to put it to now. And it is an affidavit of -his assistant Puhl, whom he called as a witness and from whom he expects -to have an interrogatory. It has to do with a very important part in -this case. I might say that if we are permitted to use it, certainly Dr. -Sauter will have a chance to re-examine on it and he will have all night -to study it if he would like to look it over. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, are you wanting to cross-examine the witness -about this document? - -MR. DODD: Yes, I want to read it to him and I want to ask him a couple -of questions about it. I want him to know it because it is the basis for -two or three questions of cross-examination, and to impeach him for -statements he has already made about the gold. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may do that. But Dr. Sauter, of course, will be able, -if he wishes to do so, to apply afterwards that the witness should be -produced for cross-examination. And he will have time in which he can -consider the affidavit and make any comments that he wants to about it. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I make just one statement? Today a case -occurred where the Prosecution protested against the fact that a -document was used of which the Prosecution had not previously received -an English translation. The representative of the Prosecution told me he -did not understand German, and therefore the document had to be -translated. I am of the opinion that the Defense should get the same -right as the Prosecution. - -If one English document after the other is thrown at me without my -having the slightest idea of the contents, then I cannot answer them. -Difficulties are constantly increasing. For instance, I have received -documents here which contain 12 pages. One sentence is read out of such -a document. The defendant is not given time to read even one single -further paragraph. I myself am not given time. And in spite of that it -is expected that the defendant immediately explains one single sentence -taken out of the context, without having the possibility of examining -the document. That, in my opinion, is asking too much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you had a translation in German of nearly -every document, if not every document. And you have also been given -every opportunity to consider documents when they have been translated -into German. And that opportunity will be given to you hereafter and if -there are any documents which are being used in cross-examination now -which are not in German, they will be translated into German, and you -will have them then. But once the witness is under cross-examination, -the documents may be used. If you want to re-examine upon the documents -after you have them in German, you will be able to do so. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, we Defense Counsel also desire to further the -proceedings and not to delay them. But it does not help me at all if, in -a week or two, when I shall finally have been able to examine the -documents thrown today on the table, I must turn to you, Mr. President, -with the request to be permitted to question the witness again. We are -glad once we are through with the examination of the witnesses. But we -simply cannot follow Mr. Dodd’s method. I cannot follow, and the -defendant cannot either. One cannot expect the defendant to explain an -isolated sentence taken out of the context, if he had no chance to -examine the document as a whole. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd. - -MR. DODD: May I proceed to examine on the document? - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, have you got any objection to Dr. Sauter’s -seeing the document? - -MR. DODD: Yes, indeed I have. I think it would be a new rule. Ever since -this Defense opened, we have presented and confronted documents for the -purpose of impeaching the credibility of various witnesses, and used -these documents, and it goes to the very foundation of -cross-examination. If we have to turn such documents over to the Defense -before we cross-examine, the whole purpose of cross-examination is gone. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, if you are putting the document in and putting -it to the witness as a document, then his counsel is entitled, I should -have thought, to have it at the same moment. - -MR. DODD: We are perfectly willing to give him a German copy right now. -It is here for him, if he wants to have it, and we were ready with it -when we came in the courtroom. - -THE PRESIDENT: In German? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the best thing will be for us to adjourn now, and -then you will hand to Dr. Sauter when you use the document a translation -of it in German. - -MR. DODD: Yes; tomorrow morning, when we use it. - -THE PRESIDENT: When you use it. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Sir. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED - AND TWENTY-THIRD DAY - Tuesday, 7 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Funk resumed the stand._] - -MR. DODD: Witness, you had a conference with Dr. Sauter last night after -we recessed Court, did you not, for about an hour? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Now we were talking yesterday, when the Tribunal rose, about -the gold deposits in the Reichsbank, and I had asked you when you -started to do business with the SS, and as I recall, you said you did -not do any business with the SS. And then we went along a little further -and you did say that the SS did deposit some materials, some property -belonging to people in concentration camps. Do I properly understand -your testimony to have been, in substance, as I have stated it? - -FUNK: No. I said that Herr Puhl—I do not remember in what year—told me -one day that a gold deposit had arrived from the SS and he also told -me—and he said it somewhat ironically—it would be better that we -should not try to ascertain what this deposit was. As I said yesterday, -it was impossible in any case to ascertain what was deposited. When -something was deposited, the Reichsbank had no right to look into it to -see of what it consisted. Only later, when Herr Puhl made another report -to me, did I realize that when he used the word “deposit” it was a wrong -term; it was not a deposit but it was a delivery of gold. There is of -course a great difference. I personally assumed that it concerned a gold -deposit, that this gold consisted of gold coins or other foreign -currency or small bars of gold or something similar, which had been -brought in from the inmates of the concentration camps—everybody in -Germany had to hand these things over—and that it was being handed to -the Reichsbank, which would use it. Since you mentioned this matter, I -remember another fact of which I was not conscious until now. I was -asked about it during my interrogation, and during this interrogation I -could not say “yes” to it because at that time I did not remember it. I -was asked during my interrogation whether I had the agreement of the -Reichsführer that the gold which was delivered to the Reichsbank should -be utilized by the Reichsbank. I said I did not remember. However, if -Herr Puhl makes such a statement under oath, I will not and cannot -dispute it. It is evident that if gold were delivered which should come -to the Reichsbank, then the Reichsbank had the right to utilize such -gold. I certainly never spoke more than twice or at most three times to -Herr Puhl about this matter. What these deposits or these deliveries -consisted of and what was done with these deliveries, how they were -utilized, I do not know. Herr Puhl never informed me about that either. - -MR. DODD: Well now, let us see. You were not ordinarily in the habit, in -the Reichsbank, of accepting jewels, monocles, spectacles, watches, -cigarette cases, pearls, diamonds, gold dentures, were you? You -ordinarily accepted that sort of material for deposit in your bank? - -FUNK: No; there could be no question, in my opinion, that the bank had -no right to do that, because these things were supposed to be delivered -to an entirely different place. If I am correctly informed about the -legal position, these things were supposed to be delivered to the Reich -Office for Precious Metals and not to the Reichsbank. Diamonds, jewels, -and precious stones were not the concern of the Reichsbank because it -was not a place of sale for these things. And in my opinion, if the -Reichsbank did that, then it was unlawful. - -MR. DODD: That is exactly right. - -FUNK: If that happened, then the Reichsbank committed an illegal act. -The Reichsbank was not authorized to do that. - -MR. DODD: And is it your statement that if it was done you did not know -anything about it? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: You did not know? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: You were frequently in the vaults of the Reichsbank, were you -not? As a matter of fact you liked to take visitors through there. I -say, you were frequently in the vaults of the bank yourself? - -FUNK: Yes, I was, where the gold bars were kept. - -MR. DODD: I will come to the gold bars in a minute. I just want to -establish that you were in the vaults frequently, and your answer, as I -understand it, is “yes” that you were? - -FUNK: It was the usual thing if someone came to visit us, particularly -foreign visitors, to show them the rooms where the gold was kept and we -always showed them the gold bars and there was always the usual joke as -to whether one could lift a gold bar or not. But I never saw anything -else there except gold bars. - -MR. DODD: How heavy were these gold bars that you had in the vaults? - -FUNK: They were the usual gold bars which were used in commerce between -banks. I think they varied in weight. I think the gold bars weighed -about 20 kilograms. Of course, you can figure it out. If one... - -MR. DODD: That is all right. That is satisfactory. When you were in the -vaults you never saw any of these materials that I mentioned a few -minutes ago—jewels, cigarette cases, watches, and all that business? - -FUNK: Never. I was in the vaults at the most four or five times and then -only to show this very interesting spectacle to visitors. - -MR. DODD: Only four or five times from 1941 to 1945? - -FUNK: I assume so. It was not more often. I only went down there with -visitors, particularly foreign visitors. - -MR. DODD: Are you telling the Tribunal that as head of the Reichsbank -you never made an inspection, so to speak, of the vaults, never took a -look at the collateral? Did you not ever make an inspection before you -made your certifications as to what was on hand? Certainly every -responsible banker does that regularly, does he not? What is your -answer? - -FUNK: No, never. The business of the Reichsbank was not conducted by the -President. It was conducted by the Directorate. I never bothered about -individual transactions, not even gold transactions, or even about -slight variations in the individual gold reserves, _et cetera_. If large -deliveries of gold were expected, the Directorate reported to me. The -Directorate conducted the business, and I believe the detailed -transactions were probably known only to the director responsible for -that particular department. - -MR. DODD: Now, did you ever do any business with pawnshops? - -FUNK: With what? - -MR. DODD: Pawnshops. Do you not know what a pawnshop is? There must be a -German word for that. - -FUNK: Pfandleihe. - -MR. DODD: Whatever it is, you know what they are, do you not? - -FUNK: Where you pawn something. - -MR. DODD: Yes. - -FUNK: No, I never did any... - -MR. DODD: All right, we will get to that a little later too. Right now, -since you do not seem to recall that you ever had any or saw any such -materials as I have described in your vaults, I ask that we have an -opportunity to show you a film which was taken of some materials in your -vaults when the Allied Forces arrived there. - -[_Turning to the President._] I would ask, Mr. President, that the -defendant be permitted to come down, where he can watch the film, so -that his memory will be properly refreshed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may have him brought down. - -[_Moving pictures were then shown._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, at some stage, I take it, you will offer -evidence as to where that film was made. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I will. There will be an affidavit as to the -circumstances under which the film was made, who was present, and why; -but, for the information of the Tribunal, it was taken in Frankfurt when -the Allied Forces captured that city and went into the Reichsbank -vaults. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, Witness, having seen these pictures -of materials that were found in your Reichsbank vaults a year ago, or a -little earlier than a year ago, you now recall that you did have such -material on hand over a period of 4 or 5 years, 3 or 4 years, 3 years—I -think actually a little longer than 3 years? - -FUNK: I have never seen anything of this sort. I also have the -impression that a large part of these things which were shown in the -film came from deposits, because people, thousands of them, had locked -deposits which they delivered to the Reichsbank, in which they put their -jewels and other valuables, as we have just seen. Probably some were -hidden valuables, which they should have given up, such as foreign -money, foreign exchange, gold coins, _et cetera_. As far as I know we -had thousands of closed deposits into which the Reichsbank could not -look. I never saw a single item such as these shown in the film, and I -cannot imagine where these things came from, to whom they belonged, and -to what use they were put. - -MR. DODD: Well, that is an interesting answer. I asked you yesterday, -and I ask you again now, did you ever hear of anybody depositing his -gold dentures in a bank for safekeeping? [_There was no response._] - -You saw that film, and you saw the gold bridgework, or mouth-plates, did -you not, and the other dental work? Certainly nobody ever deposited that -with a bank. Is that not a fact? - -FUNK: As far as the teeth are concerned, this is a special case. Where -these teeth came from I do not know. It was not reported to me, nor do I -know what was done with those teeth. I am convinced that items of this -sort, when they were delivered to the Reichsbank, had to be turned over -to the Office for Precious Metals, for the Reichsbank was not a place -where gold was worked. Neither do I know whether the Reichsbank even had -the technical facilities to work this metal. I do not know about that. - -MR. DODD: And not only did people not deposit gold teeth, but they never -deposited eyeglass rims, did they, such as you saw in the picture? - -FUNK: That is right. These things are, of course, no regular deposits. -That goes without saying. - -MR. DODD: And you saw there were some objects that obviously were in the -process of being melted down. Practically the last scene in that film -showed something that looked as if it had been in the process of being -melted, did it not? You saw it? - -Well, will you answer me, please, “yes” or “no”? Did you see it? - -FUNK: I cannot say that exactly. I do not know whether they were melting -it down. I have no knowledge of these technical matters. To be sure, now -I see quite clearly what was not known to me until now, that the -Reichsbank did the technical work of melting down gold articles. - -MR. DODD: Well, now, let us see what your assistant, Mr. Puhl, says -about that, the man who you told us yesterday was a credible gentleman, -and whom you asked the Tribunal to call as a witness on your behalf. I -am holding in my hand an affidavit executed by him on the 3rd day of May -1946 at Baden-Baden, Germany. - - “Emil Puhl, being duly sworn, deposes and says: - - “1. My name is Emil Puhl. I was born on 28 August 1889 in - Berlin, Germany. I was appointed a member of the Board of - Directors of the Reichsbank in 1935 and Vice President of the - Reichsbank in 1939, and served in these positions continuously - until the surrender of Germany. - - “2. In the summer of 1942 Walter Funk, President of the - Reichsbank and Reich Minister of Economics, had a conversation - with me and later with Mr. Friedrich Wilhelm, who was a member - of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank. Funk told me that - he had arranged with Reichsführer Himmler to have the Reichsbank - receive in safe custody gold and jewels for the SS. Funk - directed that I should work out the arrangements with Pohl, who, - as head of the economic section of the SS, administered the - economic side of the concentration camps. - - “3. I asked Funk what the source was of the gold, jewels, bank - notes, and other articles to be delivered by the SS. Funk - replied that it was confiscated property from the Eastern - Occupied Territories, and that I should ask no further - questions. I protested against the Reichsbank handling this - material. Funk stated that we were to go ahead with the - arrangements for handling the material, and that we were to keep - the matter absolutely secret. - - “4. I then made the necessary arrangements with one of the - responsible officials in charge of the cash and safes - departments for receiving the material, and reported the matter - to the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank at its next meeting. - On the same day Pohl, of the economic section of the SS, - telephoned me and asked if I had been advised of the matter. I - said I would not discuss it by telephone. He then came to see me - and reported that the SS had some jewelry for delivery to the - Reichsbank for safekeeping. I arranged with him for delivery and - from then on deliveries were made from time to time, from August - 1942 throughout the following years. - - “5. The material deposited by the SS included jewelry, watches, - eyeglass frames, dental gold, and other gold articles in great - abundance, taken by the SS from Jews, concentration camp - victims, and other persons. This was brought to our knowledge by - SS personnel who attempted to convert this material into cash - and who were helped in this by the Reichsbank personnel with - Funk’s approval and knowledge. In addition to jewels and gold - and other such items, the SS also delivered bank notes, foreign - currency, and securities to the Reichsbank to be handled by the - usual legal procedure established for such items. As far as the - jewelry and gold were concerned, Funk told me that Himmler and - Von Krosigk, the Reich Minister of Finance, had reached an - agreement according to which the gold and similar articles were - on deposit for the account of the State and that the proceeds - resulting from the sale thereof would be credited to the Reich - Treasury. - - “6. From time to time, in the course of my duties, I visited the - vaults of the Reichsbank and observed what was in storage. Funk - also visited the vaults from time to time. - - “7. The Golddiskontobank, at the direction of Funk, also - established a revolving fund which finally reached 10 to 12 - million Reichsmark for the use of the economic section of the SS - to finance production of materials by concentration camp labor - in factories run by the SS. - - “I am conversant with the English language and declare that the - statements made herein are true to the best of my knowledge and - belief.” - -Document Number 3944-PS; it is signed by Emil Puhl and duly witnessed. - -Mr. President, I would like to offer this affidavit as Exhibit USA-846 -and the film as Exhibit USA-845. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, Witness, having heard this affidavit -from your close associate and your brother director of the Board of -Directors of the Reichsbank, and the man who, you admitted yesterday was -a credible and truthful man, what do you now say to this Tribunal about -your knowledge of what was going on between your bank and the SS? - -FUNK: I declare that this affidavit by Herr Puhl is not true. I spoke to -Herr Puhl about the entire matter of these gold deposits, as I have -repeatedly stated, three times at most, but I believe it was only twice. -I never exchanged a word with Herr Puhl regarding precious stones and -jewelry. It is incredible to me that a man who most certainly also -carried out certain functions in his agreements with the SS—that is, -with Herr Pohl—now tries to put the blame on me. On no account will I -take this responsibility and I request that Herr Puhl be called here, -and that in my presence he may declare in all detail when, where, and -how he has spoken to me about these different items, and to what extent -I told him what to do. - -I repeat my statement that I knew nothing about jewelry and other -deliveries from concentration camps, and that I have never spoken to -Herr Puhl about these things. I can only say again what I said at the -beginning, that Herr Puhl once told me that a gold deposit had arrived -from the SS. I remember it now, it had escaped me as I did not pay too -much attention to the entire matter. I remember that, urged by him, I -spoke to the Reichsführer about whether the Reichsbank could utilize -these items. The Reichsführer said, “Yes.” But at no time did I speak to -the Reichsführer about jewelry and precious stones and watches and such -things. I spoke only of gold. - -Concerning what Puhl states about a financing scheme—I believe that -goes back a number of years—I know Herr Puhl came to me one day and -said that he was asked to give a credit for certain factories of the SS -and somebody was negotiating with him about the matter. I asked him, “Is -this credit secure? Do we get interest?” He said, “Yes, up till now they -have had a credit from the Dresdner Bank and it must now be repaid.” I -said, “Very well, do that.” After that I never heard anything more about -this matter. It is news to me that this credit was so large, that it was -made by the Golddiskontobank. I do not remember it, but it is entirely -possible. However, I never heard any more about this credit, which Herr -Puhl had given to certain factories. He always spoke about factories, -about businesses; it was a bank credit which had previously been given -by a private bank. I remember I asked him once, “Has this credit been -repaid?” That was some considerable time later. He said, “No, it has not -been repaid yet.” That is all I know about these matters. - -MR. DODD: All right. Now, what do you know about this—one part of the -affidavit you have not covered—what do you know about the last part -that says you established a revolving fund for the SS for the building -of factories near the concentration camps? Do you remember that? I read -it to you. Puhl says, “The Reichsbank, at the direction of Funk, -established a revolving fund which finally reached 10 to 12 million -Reichsmark for the use of the economic section of the SS to finance -production of materials by concentration camp labor in factories run by -the SS.” Do you admit that you did that? - -FUNK: Yes, that is what I just mentioned; that Herr Puhl told me one -day, I believe in 1939 or 1940, that some gentlemen from the economic -section of the SS had spoken to him regarding a credit, which until that -time had been granted by the Dresdner Bank and which they would now like -to have from the Reichsbank. I asked Herr Puhl, “Will we get interest; -is the credit secure?” He said, “Yes.” So I said, “Give them this -credit,” and later on I said just what I mentioned above. That is all I -know about the matter. I know nothing more. - -MR. DODD: Now, you also got a fee for handling these materials that you -saw in the film, did you not, from the SS? The bank was paid for -carrying on its part of this program? - -FUNK: I did not understand that. - -MR. DODD: I say, is it not a fact that you received payment from the SS -over this period of more than 3 years for handling these materials which -they turned over to you? - -FUNK: I do not know about that. - -MR. DODD: Well, you would know, would you not, as President of the bank, -if you did receive payment? How could you help knowing? - -FUNK: These were probably such small payments that no one ever reported -them to me. I do not know anything about any payment from the SS. - -MR. DODD: What would you say if I tell you that Herr Puhl said that the -bank did receive payment during these years, and that there were -altogether some 77 shipments of materials such as you saw here this -morning? Do you say that is untrue, or do you agree with it? - -FUNK: That might be quite true, but I was never informed about these -things. I know nothing about it. - -MR. DODD: Is it conceivable that you, as President of the Reichsbank, -could not know about 77 such shipments and about a transaction that you -were being paid to handle? Do you think that is a likely story? - -FUNK: If the Board of Directors did not report to me about these things, -I cannot have known about them, and I declare again quite definitely -that I was not informed about these details. On one occasion I was told -about a gold deposit of the SS which was brought to us. Later on it -transpired that it was a delivery from the SS. And then I knew about -this credit transaction. That is all I know about these matters. - -MR. DODD: Now, let me tell you something that may help you a little bit. -As a matter of fact, your bank sent memoranda to people concerning this -material from time to time, and I think you know about it, do you not? -You made up memoranda stating what you had on hand and whom you were -transferring it to. Are you familiar with any such memoranda? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, then you had better take a look at Document Number -3948-PS, Exhibit USA-847, and see if it refreshes your memory. That is -3948-PS. - -[_The document was handed to the defendant._] - -Now, this document is a memorandum apparently addressed to the Municipal -Pawn Brokerage in Berlin, and it is dated 15 September 1942. Now, I am -not going to read all of it, although it is a very interesting document, -but as you can see, the memorandum says, “We submit to you the following -valuables with the request for the best possible utilization.” Then you -list 247 platinum and silver rings, 154 gold watches, 207 earrings, -1,601 gold earrings, 13 brooches with stones—I am just skipping -through; I am not reading all of them—324 silver wrist watches, 12 -silver candle sticks, goblets, spoons, forks, and knives, and then, if -you follow down here quite a way, diverse pieces of jewelry and watch -casings, 187 pearls, four stones said to be diamonds. And that is signed -“Deutsche Reichsbank, Hauptkasse” and the signature is illegible. -Perhaps, if you look at the original, you might tell us who signed it. - -FUNK: No, I do not know who signed it. - -MR. DODD: You have the original? - -FUNK: I do not know. - -MR. DODD: Well, look at the signature there and see if you recognize it -as the signature of one of your workers. - -FUNK: It says—somebody from our cashier’s office signed it. I do not -know the signature. - -MR. DODD: Somebody from your bank, was it not? - -FUNK: Yes, from the cashier’s department. I do not know the signature. - -MR. DODD: Do you want this Tribunal to believe that employees and people -in your bank were sending lists out to municipal pawn brokers without it -ever coming to your attention? - -FUNK: I know nothing at all about these events. They can only be -explained in that things were apparently delivered to the Reichsbank -which it was not supposed to keep. That is obvious. - -MR. DODD: Well, I would also like you to look at Document Number -3949-PS, which is dated 4 days later, 19 September 1942, Exhibit -USA-848. Now, you will see this is a memorandum concerning the -conversion of notes, gold, silver, and jewelry in favor of the Reich -Minister of Finance, and it also says that it is “a partial statement of -valuables received by our precious metals department.” Again I think it -is unnecessary to read it all. You can look at it and read it, but the -last two paragraphs, after telling what the shipments contained as they -arrived on 26 August 1942, say: - - “Before we remit the total proceeds, to date 1,184,345.59 - Reichsmark to the Reichshauptkasse for the account of the Reich - Minister of Finance, we beg to be informed under what reference - number this amount and subsequent proceeds should be - transferred. - - “It might further be of advantage to call the attention of the - responsible office of the Reich Minister of Finance in good time - to the amounts to be transferred from the Deutsche Reichsbank.” - -And again that is signed, “Deutsche Reichsbank, Hauptkasse,” and there -is a stamp on there that says, “Paid by check, Berlin, 27 October 1942, -Hauptkasse.” - -FUNK: For this document, that is, this note to the Reich Minister of -Finance, I believe I am able to give an explanation, and that is on the -basis of testimony given here by witnesses who came from concentration -camps. The witness Ohlendorf, if I remember correctly, and another one, -have testified that the valuables which had been taken from the inmates -of concentration camps had to be turned over and were delivered to the -Reich Minister of Finance. Now, I assume that the technical procedure -was that these things were first brought to the Reichsbank by mistake. -The Reichsbank, however—and I keep repeating it—could do nothing with -the pearls, jewelry, and similar items which are mentioned here, and -therefore turned over these items to the Reich Minister of Finance or -they were used for the account of the Reich Minister of Finance. That is -apparent from this document. In other words, this merely is a statement -of account sent by the Reichsbank for the Reich Minister of Finance. -That is, I believe, the meaning of this document. - -MR. DODD: Well, indeed, you did hear Ohlendorf say that these -unfortunate people who were exterminated in these camps had their -possessions turned over to the Reich Minister of Finance. I believe he -testified to that effect here. Now, you also... - -FUNK: That is what I heard here. These things were news to me. However, -I did not know that the Reichsbank... - -MR. DODD: You have told us that twice already. - -FUNK: ...that the Reichsbank dealt with these matters in such detail. - -MR. DODD: Are you telling us that you did not know they dealt with them -in such detail, or that you did not know they dealt with them at all? I -think that is important. What is your answer, that you did not know they -went into them in such detail or that you did not know anything about -it? - -FUNK: I personally had nothing to do with it at all. - -MR. DODD: Did you know about it? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. DODD: You never heard of it? - -FUNK: I did not know at all that any jewelry, watches, cigarette cases, -and so forth were delivered to the Reichsbank; that is news to me. - -MR. DODD: Did you know that anything came from concentration camps to -the Reichsbank? Anything at all? - -FUNK: Yes, the gold, of course. I already said that. - -MR. DODD: Gold teeth? - -FUNK: I have said that—no. - -MR. DODD: What gold from the concentration camps? - -FUNK: The gold about which Herr Puhl had reported to me, and I assumed -that these were coins and other gold which had to be deposited at the -Reichsbank anyway, and which the Reichsbank could utilize according to -the legal regulations. Otherwise, I know nothing about it. - -MR. DODD: Just what did Himmler say to you and what did you say to -Himmler when you had this conversation, as you tell us, about this gold -from the concentration camp victims? I think the Tribunal might be -interested in that conversation. What did he say, and what did you say, -and where was the conversation held? - -FUNK: I do not remember any more where the conversation was held. I saw -Himmler very rarely, perhaps once or twice. I assume that it was on the -occasion of a visit in the field quarters of Lammers, where Himmler’s -field quarters were also located. It must have been there. On that -occasion we spoke very, very briefly about that. - -MR. DODD: Wait just a minute. Will you also tell us when it was? - -FUNK: Possibly during the year 1943; it might have been 1944, I do not -remember. - -MR. DODD: All right. - -FUNK: I attached no importance whatsoever to this matter. In the course -of the conversation I put the question, “There is a gold deposit from -you, from the SS, which we have at the Reichsbank. The members of the -board of directors have asked me whether the Reichsbank can utilize -that.” And he said, “Yes.” I did not say a word about jewelry or things -of that kind or gold teeth or anything of that sort. The entire -conversation referred only very briefly to this thing. - -MR. DODD: Do you mean to tell us that an arrangement was made with your -bank independently of you and Himmler, but by somebody in the SS and -somebody in your bank—that you were not the original person who -arranged the matter? - -FUNK: That is right. It was not I. - -MR. DODD: Who in your bank made that arrangement? - -FUNK: Possibly it was Herr Puhl or maybe somebody else from the -Reichsbank Directorate who made the arrangement with one of the -gentlemen of the economic section in the SS. And I was only informed of -it by Herr Puhl very briefly. - -MR. DODD: Did you know Herr Pohl, P-o-h-l, of the SS? - -FUNK: I imagine it was he. Herr Pohl never spoke to me about it. - -MR. DODD: You do not know the man? - -FUNK: I must certainly have seen him at some time, but Herr Pohl never -spoke to me about these matters. I never spoke to him. - -MR. DODD: Where did you see him, in the bank? - -FUNK: Yes, I saw him once in the bank when he spoke to Puhl and other -gentlemen of the Reichsbank Directorate during a luncheon. I walked -through the room and I saw him sitting there but I personally never -spoke with Herr Pohl about these questions. This is all news to me, this -entire matter. - -MR. DODD: Well, do you recall the testimony of the witness Hoess in this -courtroom not so long ago? You remember the man? He sat where you are -sitting now. He said that he exterminated between 2½ and 3 million Jews -and other people at Auschwitz. Now, before I ask you the next question I -want you to recall that testimony and I will point something out for you -about it that may help you. You recall that he said that Himmler sent -for him in June 1941, and that Himmler told him that the final solution -of the Jewish problem was at hand, and that he was to conduct these -exterminations. Do you recall that he went back and looked over the -facilities in one camp in Poland and found it was not big enough to kill -the number of people involved and he had to construct gas chambers that -would hold 2,000 people at a time, and so his extermination program -could not have got under way until pretty late in 1941, and you observe -that your assistant and credible friend Puhl says it was in 1942 that -these shipments began to arrive from the SS? - -FUNK: No, I know nothing about the date. I do not know when these things -happened. I had nothing to do with them. It is all news to me that the -Reichsbank was concerned with these things to this extent. - -MR. DODD: Then I take it you want to stand on an absolute denial that at -any time you had any knowledge of any kind about these transactions with -the SS or their relationship to the victims of the concentration camps. -After seeing this film, after hearing Puhl’s affidavit, you absolutely -deny any knowledge at all? - -FUNK: Only as far as I have mentioned it here. - -MR. DODD: I understand that; there was some deposit of gold made once, -but no more than that. That is your statement. Let me ask you something, -Mr. Funk... - -FUNK: Yes; that these things happened consistently is all news to me. - -MR. DODD: All right. You know you did on one occasion at least, and -possibly two, break down and weep when you were being interrogated, you -recall, and you did say you were a guilty man; and you gave an -explanation of that yesterday. You remember those tears. I am just -asking you now; I am sure you do. I am just trying to establish the -basis here for another question. You remember that happened? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And you said, “I am a guilty man.” You told us yesterday it -was because you were upset a little bit in the general situation. I am -suggesting to you that is it not a fact that this matter that we have -been talking about since yesterday has been on your conscience all the -time and that was really what is on your mind, and it has been a shadow -on you ever since you have been in custody? And is it not about time -that you told the whole story? - -FUNK: I cannot tell more to the Tribunal than I have already said, that -is the truth. Let Herr Puhl be responsible before God for what he put in -the affidavit; I am responsible for what I state here. It is absolutely -clear that Herr Puhl is now trying to put the blame on me and to -exculpate himself. If he has done these things for years with the SS, it -is his guilt and his responsibility. I have only spoken to him two or -three times about these things, that is, about the things I have -mentioned here. - -MR. DODD: You are trying to put the blame on Puhl, are you not? - -FUNK: No. He is blaming me and I repudiate that. - -MR. DODD: The trouble is, there was blood on this gold, was there not, -and you knew this since 1942? - -FUNK: I did not understand. - -MR. DODD: Well, I would like to ask you one or two questions about two -short documents. It will take but a short time. You told the Tribunal -yesterday that you had nothing to do with any looting of these occupied -countries. Do you know what the Roges corporation was? - -FUNK: Yes. I do not know in detail what they did. I know only that it -was an organization which made official purchases for various Reich -departments. - -MR. DODD: This Roges corporation purchased on the black market in France -with the surpluses from the occupation cost fund, did it not? - -FUNK: I was against this type of purchases in the black market. - -MR. DODD: I am not asking you whether you were for it or against it. I -was simply asking you if it is not a fact that they did it. - -FUNK: I do not know. - -MR. DODD: All right. You had better take a look at Document Number -2263-PS, which is written by one of your associates, Dr. Landfried, whom -you also asked for as a witness here and from whom you have an -interrogatory. This is a letter dated 6 June 1942, addressed to the -Chief of the OKW Administrative Office: - - “In answer to my letter of 25 April 1942”—and so on—“100 - million Reichsmark were put at my disposal from the Occupation - Cost Fund by the OKW. This amount has already been disposed of - except for 10 million Reichsmark, since the demands of the Roges - (Raw Material Trading Company), Berlin, for the acquisition of - merchandise on the black market in France, were very heavy. In - order not to permit a stoppage in the flow of purchases which - are made in the interest of the prosecution of the war, further - amounts from the occupation cost fund must be made available. - According to information from Roges and from the economic - department of the Military Commander in France, at least 30 - million Reichsmark in French francs are needed every 10 days for - such purchases. - - “As, according to information received from Roges, an increase - of purchases is to be expected, it will not be sufficient to - make available the remaining 100 million Reichsmark in - accordance with my letter of 25 April 1942, but over and above - this, an additional amount of 100 million Reichsmark will be - necessary.” - -It is very clear from that letter written by your associate Landfried -that the Roges corporation, which was set up by your Ministry, was -engaged in black market operations in France with money extorted from -the French through excessive occupation costs, is it not? - -FUNK: That the Roges made such purchases is true. These things have -already been dealt with here in connection with the orders and -directives which the Four Year Plan gave for these purchases on the -black market. However, these are purchases which were arranged and -approved by the state organization. What we especially fought against -were the purchases without limits in the black market. I already -mentioned yesterday that I finally succeeded in getting a directive from -the Reich Marshal that all purchases in the black market were to be -stopped because through these purchases naturally merchandise was -withdrawn from the legal markets. - -MR. DODD: You told us that yesterday. That was 1943. There was not much -left in France on the black market or white market or any other kind of -market by that time, was there? That country was pretty well stripped by -that time, as is shown in the letters. - -FUNK: In 1943 I believe a great deal was still coming from France. There -was continuous production going on in France and it was considerable. -The official French statistics show that even in 1943 large quantities -of the total production were being diverted to Germany. These quantities -were not a great deal less than in 1941 and ’42. - -MR. DODD: Well, in any event I also want you to talk a little bit about -Russia, because I understood you to say yesterday you did not have much -to do with that. Schlotterer was your man who was assigned to work with -Rosenberg, was he not? - -FUNK: From the beginning I assigned Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer -to Rosenberg, so that only one economic department, the competent -department for the Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories, would -work in Russia, and not two. - -DR. DODD: That is all I want to know. He was assigned. And he -participated in the program of stripping Russia of machines, materials, -and goods, which went on for some considerable period of time; you knew -about it. - -FUNK: No, that is not true. This man did not have this task. These -transactions were handled by the Economic Department East which, I -think, came under the Four Year Plan. As far as I know these -transactions were not handled by Minister Rosenberg and certainly not by -the Ministry of Economics. - -MR. DODD: It is a different story on different occasions. I think the -best way is to read your interrogation. On 19 October 1945 you were -interrogated here in Nuremberg. You were asked this question: - - “And part of the plan was to take machines, materials and goods - out of Russia and bring them into Germany, was it not?” - -And you answered: - - “Yes, most certainly, but I did not participate in that. But in - any case it was done.” - -The next question: - - “Question: Yes, and you yourself participated in the discussions - concerning these plans, and also your representative, Dr. - Schlotterer? - - “Answer: I myself did not participate. - - “Question: But you gave the power to act for you in that - connection to Dr. Schlotterer? - - “Answer: Yes; Schlotterer represented me in economic questions - in the Rosenberg Ministry.” - -FUNK: No, that is not true. This testimony is completely confused, -because Schlotterer joined the Rosenberg Ministry. He became head of the -economic department there. Also, this testimony is not true to this -extent, since we certainly sent more machines into Russia than we took -out of Russia. When our troops came to Russia everything had been -destroyed, and in order to put the economy there in order, we had to -send large quantities of machinery and other goods to Russia. - -MR. DODD: Do you mean to say that you did not make these answers that I -have just read to you when you were interrogated? - -FUNK: Those answers are not correct. - -MR. DODD: You know, it is very interesting that you told us yesterday -that the answers to the questions put to you by Major Gans were -incorrect. I posed another interrogation to you yesterday and you said -that was incorrect. Now a third man has interrogated you, and you say -that one is incorrect. - -FUNK: No, I say what I said is wrong. - -MR. DODD: Well, of course, that is what I am talking about. - -FUNK: That is wrong. - -MR. DODD: I will submit that interrogation in evidence; it is not in -form to be submitted, but I would like to submit it a little later, with -the Tribunal’s permission. - -THE PRESIDENT: You will inform us, when you do, as to the number and so -on? - -MR. DODD: Yes, I will. I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecutors wish to cross-examine? - -STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant Prosecutor for the -U.S.S.R.): After Mr. Dodd’s cross-examination I have a few supplementary -questions to ask. - -Defendant Funk, you testified yesterday that your Ministry at the time -of the attack on the Soviet Union had very limited functions, and that -you yourself were not a minister in the true sense of the word. In this -connection I want to ask you a few questions regarding the structure of -the Ministry of Economics. Tell me, are you familiar with the book by -Hans Quecke, entitled, _The Reich Ministry of Economics_? Do you know -about this book? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You do not know? Are you familiar with the name -of Hans Quecke? - -FUNK: Hans Quecke? - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes. Hans Quecke. He was a counsellor in the -Ministry of Economics. - -FUNK: Quecke was a ministerial director in the Ministry of Economics. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And he, of course, knew about the structure of -the Ministry of Economics and about its functions. Am I right? - -FUNK: Certainly. He must have known about that. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I present this book in evidence to the Tribunal -as Exhibit USSR-451, and you, Witness, will receive a photostat copy of -the section of this book in order that you can follow me. Please open it -at Page 65, last paragraph. Have you found the passage in question? - -FUNK: I have not found it yet. I can only see... - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Page 65, last paragraph of the page. - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You have found it, yes? - -FUNK: The structure of the Reich Ministry of Economics? - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: It gives the structure of the Ministry of -Economics as on 1 July 1941. Your permanent deputy was a certain Dr. -Landfried. Is that the same Landfried whose testimony was presented by -the Defense Counsel? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I must ask you to follow the text: - -“Landfried had under him a special department which was in charge of -fundamental questions of supply of raw materials for the military -economy.” - -Defendant Funk, I am asking you... - -FUNK: Just a moment. Where is that? - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: It is in Section 2, Part II. Have you found it? - -FUNK: No, there is nothing here about war economy. I do not see anything -about war economy. Auslands-Organisation... - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Part II, Subparagraph 2. - -FUNK: It says nothing about war economy here. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I shall read the entire paragraph into the -record. We shall get down to the Auslands-Organisation in good time. - -FUNK: This is a special section. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, a special section. - -FUNK: Directly subordinate to the State Secretary here is Section S, -Special Section, basic questions of the supply of raw materials, basic -questions of war economy, basic questions of... - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: It is precisely about this war economy that I -wish to speak. He was also in charge of the fundamental market policy -and of economic questions in the border territories. The ministry -consisted of five main departments. Am I right? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: The third main department was headed by -Schmeer? Am I right? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You had a special department entitled, -“Elimination of the Jews from Economic Life.” That was in 1941? Am I -right? - -FUNK: Yes; that was the time we dealt with these matters; in that -department the regulations for carrying out these orders were dealt -with. We discussed them at length yesterday. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Defendant Funk, I ask you to follow the text: -“The fourth main department was headed by Ministerialdirektor Dr. -Klucki, and this department was in charge of banks, currency, credit and -insurance matters.” Is that a fact? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I presume that you must know the structure of -your own ministry and we need not waste time in further discussions. You -must know that the fifth main department was headed by State Secretary -Von Jagwitz. This department was in charge of special economic problems -in different countries. The fifth section of this department attended to -questions of military economy connected with foreign economy. Am I -right? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: The same department dealt with special foreign -payments as well as with the blocked deposits... - -FUNK: I do not understand. This is the Foreign Trade Department. They -merely dealt with the technical carrying-out of the foreign exports. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Take the section dealing with foreign -currencies. Have you found the passage? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You have found that it deals with blocked -deposits. Were you at all connected with the collaboration existing -between your ministry and the Office of Foreign Affairs of the NSDAP? Is -my question clear to you? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And your ministry had a special section dealing -with these matters? - -FUNK: Only this office. That can be explained in this manner. The Under -State Secretary, Von Jagwitz, who was the head of this main department, -was also active in the Auslands-Organisation. He had created a liaison -office for himself in the ministry to deal with economic questions which -came to the ministry—to this department, which was the Export -Department, the Foreign Department—via the Auslands-Organisation. This -concerned Von Jagwitz only, who at the same time was active in the -Auslands-Organisation and maintained a liaison office. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Then we are to understand that the Foreign -Political Department had special economic functions abroad, and that it -co-operated with your ministry in this sense? Is that correct? - -FUNK: No, that is not correct. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Then why did this department exist? - -FUNK: It was not a department, but the Under State Secretary, Von -Jagwitz, was at the same time active in the Auslands-Organisation. I do -not know in what position. He was active in the Auslands-Organisation -before he was taken into the ministry by the Reich Marshal. Then he -himself created a kind of liaison office between his department and the -Auslands-Organisation. That is, frequently economists from abroad -belonging to the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP came to Berlin, and -these people came to Under State Secretary Von Jagwitz and discussed -their business with him and they reported to him about their experience -and knowledge of foreign countries. I do not know any more about it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You wish to convince us that this was the -personal initiative of Von Jagwitz, and that you as minister knew -nothing at all about it? - -FUNK: Certainly, I knew about it. He did it with my knowledge, with my -knowledge and approval... - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Please follow the text and you had better -listen to what I want to say. I read the last paragraph which states: - - “To the Main Department V is attached the office of the - Auslands-Organisation with the Reich Ministry of Economics. This - office secures the co-operation between the ministry and the - Auslands-Organisation of the Nazi Party.” - -This means that no mention is made of any private initiative of Von -Jagwitz, as you tried to persuade us, but this department really was a -part of your ministry. Have you found the passage? - -FUNK: Yes. Herr Von Jagwitz had this liaison office and essentially it -was limited to his person. It was a liaison office for collaboration -with the Auslands-Organisation, which was a perfectly natural procedure -in many cases. I do not see why this should be unusual or criminal. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We shall come back to the question at a later -stage. Mr. President, I should like to pass over to another part. Would -it be convenient to have a short recess now? I have a few more questions -to ask. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well; the Tribunal will recess. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You mentioned yesterday that you were the -Plenipotentiary for Economy, but not a plenipotentiary in the full sense -of the word. Schacht was the true plenipotentiary and you were merely a -secondary one. Do you remember your article entitled “Economic and -Financial Mobilization”? Do you remember what you wrote at that time? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, we are not going to waste any time on -that question. I shall remind you of it. I submit to the Tribunal in -evidence Exhibit USSR-452 (Document Number USSR-452), an article by -Funk, published in the monthly journal of the NSDAP and of the German -Labor Front, entitled “Der Schulungsbrief,” in 1939. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You wrote at that time: - - “As the Plenipotentiary for Economy appointed by the Führer, I - must see to it that during the war all the forces of the nation - should be secured also from the economic point of view.” - -Have you found this passage? - -FUNK: Yes, I have found it. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Further on you wrote: - - “The contribution of economy to the great political aims of the - Führer demands not only a strong and unified direction of all - the economic and political measures, but also above all careful - co-ordination.... Industry; food, agriculture, forestry, timber - industry, foreign trade, transport, manpower, the regulation of - wages and prices, finance, credits must be coordinated, so that - the entire economic potential should serve in the defense of the - Reich. In order to fulfill this task, the authorities of the - Reich in charge of these spheres are included in my authority in - my capacity as Plenipotentiary for Economy.” - -Do you confirm that this is precisely what you wrote in 1939? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Is that question not quite clear to you? - -THE PRESIDENT: He said, “Yes.” - -FUNK: I said, “Yes”; I certainly wrote that. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You confirm it. You know about the issue in -June 1941 of the so-called “Green File” of Göring? It was read into the -record here. These are directives for the control of economy or, rather, -directives for the spoliation of the occupied territories of the -U.S.S.R. How did you personally participate in the planning of these -directives? - -FUNK: I do not know that. I do not know any more whether or not I -participated at all. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You do not remember? How is it possible that -these documents were planned without you, Reich Minister of Economics, -the President of the Reichsbank, and Plenipotentiary for Economy and the -armament industry? - -FUNK: First, at that time I was no longer Plenipotentiary for Economy. I -was never plenipotentiary for the armament industry. The powers of the -Plenipotentiary for Economy, shortly after the beginning of the war, -were turned over to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. That has been -repeatedly confirmed and emphasized and what I did personally at that -time concerning economy in the Occupied Eastern Territories can only -have been very, very little. I do not remember it because the -administration of economy in the Occupied Eastern Territories was in -charge of the Economic Staff East and the Delegate of the Four Year -Plan, and that office, of course, co-operated with the Rosenberg -Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Personally I remember -only that, as I mentioned yesterday, in the course of time the Ministry -of Economics sent individual businessmen, merchants, from Hamburg and -from Cologne, _et cetera_, to the East in order to secure private -economic activities in the Eastern Occupied Territories. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, we have already heard what “activities” -you dealt with. Your name for spoliation is “private economic -activities.” Do you remember the Prague Conference of December 1941—the -meeting of the economic organization—or must I remind you of it? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Not necessary? - -FUNK: During the interrogations my attention was called by General -Alexandrov to this speech, and I told him at that time already that -there was a wrong newspaper report about me which I had rectified later -or after a short time. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Just a minute, Defendant Funk. You are slightly -anticipating events. You do not yet know what I am going to ask you. -First listen to me and then reply. You have informed the Tribunal that -you never attended any meeting of Hitler’s at which the political and -economic aims of the attack on the Soviet Union were discussed, that you -did not know of any purpose and of any declared plans of Hitler for the -territorial dismemberment of the Soviet Union, and yet you yourself -declared in your statement that “the East will be the future colony of -Germany,” Germany’s colonial territory. Did you say that the East would -be the future colonial territory of Germany? - -FUNK: No; I denied that in my interrogation. I immediately said, after -this was presented to me, that I was speaking of the old German colonial -territories. General Alexandrov can confirm that. He questioned me at -that time. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I have no intention of calling General -Alexandrov as a witness. I am only asking you if you did say so; was it -written as stated? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You stated that you did not have to be -reminded, but that is precisely what was mentioned in your speech, and I -am going to quote verbatim from this speech: - - “The vast territories of the eastern European region, containing - raw materials which have not yet been opened up to Europe, will - become the promising colonial territory of Europe.” - -And exactly what Europe were you discussing in December 1941 and what -former German territories did you wish to mention to the Tribunal? I am -asking you. - -FUNK: I have not said that. I said that I did not speak about colonial -territories, but of the old colonization areas of Germany. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, but we are not speaking here of old -territories; we are speaking here of new territories which you wished to -conquer. - -FUNK: The area had been conquered already. We did not have to conquer -that. That had been conquered by German troops. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No. It was not known that they were conquered, -since you were already retreating from them. - -You said that you were the President of the Continental Oil Company. -This company was organized for the exploitation of the oil fields of the -Occupied Eastern Territories, especially in the districts of Grozny and -Baku. Please answer me “yes” or “no.” - -FUNK: Not only of the Occupied Territories—this company was concerned -with oil industries all over Europe. It had its beginnings in the -Romanian oil interests and whenever German troops occupied territories -where there were oil deposits, that company, which was a part of the -Four Year Plan, was given the task by the various economic offices, -later by the armament industry, of producing oil in these territories -and of restoring the destroyed oil-producing districts. The company had -a tremendous reconstruction program. I personally was the president of -the supervisory board and I mainly had to do the financing of that -company only. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That I have already heard. But you have not -answered my question. - -I asked you if this company had as object the exploitation of the Grozny -and Baku oil wells. Did the oil wells of the Caucasus form the basic -capital of the Continental Oil Company? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No? I am satisfied with your reply. - -FUNK: That is not right. We had not conquered the Caucasus and therefore -the Continental Oil Company could not be active in the Caucasus. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. But Rosenberg at that time had -already made a report on the conquest and exploitation of the Caucasus. -Do you remember that here, before the Tribunal, a transcript of the -minutes of a meeting held at Göring’s office on 6 August 1942 with the -Reich Commissioners of the Occupied Territories was read into the -record? Do you remember that meeting? - -FUNK: Yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Did you participate in this meeting? - -FUNK: That I do not know. Did they speak about the oil territories of -the Caucasus in that meeting? That I do not know. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No, I do not wish to say anything as yet. I -shall ask you a question and you will answer. I ask you: Did you -participate in that meeting? - -FUNK: I cannot remember. It may very well be. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You do not remember? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In that case you will be shown a document. It -has already been submitted to the Tribunal, and was here read into the -record. It is Exhibit Number USSR-170; it has already been presented. As -stated at that meeting, the most effective measures for the economic -spoliation of the Occupied Territories of the U.S.S.R., Poland, -Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and other countries were discussed. At this -meeting Defendant Göring addressed himself to you. Do you remember -whether you were present at that meeting or not? - -FUNK: Yes, indeed. I remember that. But what Göring told me then refers -to the fact that, a long time after the Russian territories had been -occupied, we sent businessmen there to bring into those territories any -goods that might interest the population. For instance it says here: -“Businessmen must be sent there.... We must send them to Venice to buy -up these things in order to re-sell them in the occupied Russian -territories.” That is what Göring told me on that occasion. At least, -that is what can be read here. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I did not ask you about that, Defendant Funk. -Were you present at that meeting or not? Could you answer that question? - -FUNK: Of course. Since Göring talked to me, I must have been there. It -was on 7 August 1942. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Defendant Funk, you have replied here to -certain questions asked by Mr. Dodd regarding the increase of the gold -reserve of the Reichsbank; I should like to ask you the following -question: You have stated that the gold reserves of the Reichsbank were -increased only by the gold reserves of the Belgian Bank; but did you not -know that 23,000 kilograms of gold were stolen from the National Bank of -Czechoslovakia and transferred to the Reichsbank? - -FUNK: I did not know that it had been stolen. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Then what do you know? - -FUNK: I stated explicitly here yesterday that the gold deposits had been -increased mostly by the taking over of the gold of the Czech National -Bank and the Belgian Bank. I spoke especially of the Czech National Bank -yesterday. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, but I am not asking you about the Belgian -Bank, but about the Bank of Czechoslovakia. - -FUNK: Yes, I mentioned it yesterday. I said so yesterday... - -THE PRESIDENT: He said that just now. He said that he had spoken about -the Czechoslovakian gold deposits. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, he did not mention -Czechoslovakia yesterday and I am asking him this question today. But if -he replies to this question in the affirmative, I shall not interrogate -him any further on the matter, since he will have confirmed it. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I now pass on to the next question, to the -question of Yugoslavia. On 14 April 1941, that is, prior to the complete -occupation of Yugoslavia, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army -issued a directive for the occupied Yugoslav territories. This is -Exhibit USSR-140; it has already been submitted to the Tribunal. -Subparagraph 9 of this directive determines the compulsory rate of -Yugoslav exchange—20 Yugoslav dinars to the German mark. And the same -compulsory rate of exchange, which had been applied to the Yugoslav -dinar, was also applied to the Reich credit notes issued by the Reich -Foreign Currency Institute. - -These currency operations permitted the German invaders to export from -Yugoslavia at a very cheap rate various merchandise as well as other -valuables. Similar operations were carried out in all the Occupied -Eastern Territories, and I ask you: Do you admit that such operations -were one of the means for the economic spoliation of the Occupied -Eastern Territories? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. - -FUNK: That depends on the relation of the exchange rate. In some cases, -in particular in the case of France, I protested against the -underevaluation... - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Excuse me just one minute, Defendant Funk. You -have already spoken about France and I do not want to take up the time -of the Tribunal unnecessarily. I think you ought to answer my question. - -FUNK: At the moment I do not know what the exchange rate between the -dinar and the mark was at that time. In general, insofar as I had -anything to do with it—I did not make the directive; that came from the -Minister of Finance and from the Armed Forces—insofar as I had anything -to do with it I always urged that the rate should not differ too greatly -from the rate which existed and which was based on the purchasing power. -At the moment I cannot say what the exchange rate for dinars was at that -time. Of course, Reich credit notes had to be introduced with the troops -because otherwise we would have had to issue special requisition -vouchers, and that would have been much worse than introducing an -official means of payment, as is now being done here in Germany by the -Allies, because working with requisition vouchers is much more -disadvantageous and harmful for the population and the entire country -than working with a recognized means of payment. We invented the Reich -credit notes ourselves. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In other words, you wish to state that you had -nothing to do with it and that the entire matter rested with the -Ministry of Finance. Then tell me please, are you aware of the testimony -given by your assistant, Landfried, whose affidavit was submitted by -your defense counsel? You will remember that Landfried stated and -affirmed something totally different. He said that in the determination -of exchange rates in the occupied territories yours was the final and -determining voice. Do you not agree with this statement? - -FUNK: When these rates were determined, I, as President of the -Reichsbank, was of course consulted and, as can be confirmed by every -document, I always advocated that the new rates should be as close as -possible to the old rates established on the basis of the purchasing -power, that is to say, no underevaluation. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Consequently, the compulsory rate of exchange -in the occupied countries was introduced with your knowledge and -according to your instructions? - -FUNK: Not on the basis of my directives. I was only asked for advice. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Your advice? - -FUNK: I had to give my approval. That is, the Reichsbank Directorate -formally gave the approval, but... - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I am satisfied with your reply. I now go on to -the next question. On 29 May 1941 the Commander-in-Chief in Serbia -issued an order regarding the Serbian National Bank, which order has -already been submitted as Exhibit USSR-135. This order liquidated the -National Bank of Yugoslavia and divided the entire property of the bank -between Germany and her satellites. Instead of the National Bank of -Yugoslavia a fictitious so-called Serbian Bank was created, whose -directors were appointed by the German Plenipotentiary for National -Economy in Serbia. Tell me, do you know who was the Plenipotentiary for -National Economy in Serbia? - -FUNK: It was probably the Consul General Franz Neuhausen, the -representative of the Four Year Plan. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes. It was Franz Neuhausen. Was he a -collaborator in the Ministry of Economics? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: He never worked in the Ministry of Economics? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: He never worked there? - -FUNK: Neuhausen? No, he never worked in the Ministry of Economics. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was he a collaborator of Göring’s? - -FUNK: Yes, that is correct. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, he was a collaborator of Göring’s. Do you -admit that such specific currency operations, as a result of which the -Yugoslavian Government and its citizens were robbed of several million -dinars, could not have been carried out without your participation and -without the co-operation of the departments within your jurisdiction? - -FUNK: I do not know in detail the directives according to which the -liquidation was carried out and by which the new Serbian National Bank -was founded, but it goes without saying that the Reichsbank participated -in such a transaction. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I want to ask you two more questions. Together -with the unconcealed spoliation, consisting in the confiscations and -requisitions which the German invaders carried out in the Occupied -Territories of Eastern Europe, they also exploited these countries to -the limit of their economic resources by applying various exchange and -economic measures, such as depreciation of currency, seizure of the -banks, artificial decrease of prices and wages, thus continuing the -economic spoliation of the occupied territories. Do you admit that this -was precisely the policy of Germany in the Occupied Territories of -Eastern Europe? - -FUNK: No. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: You do not admit this? - -FUNK: In no way whatsoever. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I now submit to the Tribunal Document USSR-453. -This is a new document, consisting of notes on a conference held by the -Reich Commissioner for the determination of prices on 22 April 1943. -Price experts from all the occupied territories attended this -conference. I shall now read into the record some excerpts from this -document. It says on Page 2: - - “The 5½ million foreign workers are composed of: 1½ million - prisoners of war, 4 million civilian workers.” - -The document further says: - - “1,200,000 from the East, 1,000,000 from the former Polish - territories... 200,000 citizens of the Protectorate... 65,000 - Croatians, 50,000 remainder of Yugoslavia (Serbia)”—and so on. - -Further this document also says in connection with the equalization of -prices: - - “Price equalization should be operated to the debit of the - producer countries, that is, through the Central Clearing - Office, which for the most part is to the advantage of the - occupied countries.” - -On Page 14 it is stated: - - “These price deliberations were of no importance for the - occupied territories, since the main interest did not lie in the - welfare of the population but in the utilization of all the - economic forces of the country.” - -On Page 16 we find the following, excerpt: - - “Concerning the Occupied Eastern Territories, Ministerial - Counselor Roemer has stated that prices there are far below - German prices, and so far the Reich has already reaped large - import profits.” - -Mention is made, on Page 19, of Germany’s clearing debt, which amounted -to 9,300,000 marks. At the same time the clearing balance for -Czechoslovakia showed a deficit of 2,000,000; for the Ukraine of -82,500,000; for Serbia of 219,000,000; for Croatia of 85,000,000; and -for Slovakia of 301,000,000 marks. - -And finally, on Page 22 of the document, it says: - - “The prices in the Occupied Eastern Territories are kept at the - lowest possible level. We have already realized import profits - which are being used to cover Reich debts. Wages are generally - only one-fifth of what they are in Germany.” - -You must admit that the planned robbery perpetrated by the German -invaders on so gigantic a scale could never have been carried out -without your active participation as Minister of Economics, President of -the Reichsbank, and Plenipotentiary for Economy? - -FUNK: I must again stress that during the war I was no longer -Plenipotentiary for Economy. But may I state my position to this -document? First, there is the figure of the number of the workers which -were brought from the occupied territories and other foreign countries -into Germany. I have emphasized, myself, and it has been confirmed by -other statements, that I was basically against bringing in foreign -manpower from occupied territories to such an extent as to impair the -economic order in those territories. I am not even speaking about -recruitment of forced labor. I also opposed that. When an expert whom I -do not know says that the deliberations about price policy were of no -importance for the occupied territories, because the main interest did -not lie with the welfare of the population but in the exploitation of -economic forces, I must contradict that point of view. In any case, it -is not my point of view. I do not know who the man was who said that, -but it is a matter of course that a territory cannot produce well unless -the economy is kept on a good footing and prices are fixed at a level -which enables the people to exist and to maintain social order. So I -have to oppose this point of view also. As far as the clearing debt is -concerned, I explained yesterday in detail that the clearing system was -in common usage for Germany, and that I have always recognized and -confirmed that these clearing debts were genuine debts which, after the -war, had to be repaid in the currency in which they were incurred, based -on the purchasing power at that time. I do not see any spoliation here. - -Moreover, I must again stress the fact that I was not competent for the -economy in the occupied territories, that I had no power to give a -directive there and that I participated only insofar as I detailed -officials to individual offices, just as all other departments did, and -that, of course, there was co-operation between these offices and the -department at home. But I cannot assume responsibility for the economy -in the occupied territories. The Reich Marshal definitely admitted that -as far as economic questions are concerned, it was his responsibility. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I understand. You collaborated, and now you do -not wish to bear the responsibility. You say that the expert has made -the statement. But do you remember your testimony which you gave on 22 -October 1945? - -FUNK: I do not know what interrogation... - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: When you were asked about the compulsory -mobilization of foreign workers you were also asked if you knew about it -and if you had ever protested against it. Is that correct? You replied, -“No, why should I be the one to protest against it?” - -FUNK: That is not correct. I protested against the compulsory -recruitment of workers and against so many workers having been taken out -of occupied territory that the local economy could no longer produce. -That is not correct. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I have one last question to ask you. Do you -remember an article published in the newspaper Das Reich, dated 18 -August 1940, in connection with your 50th birthday? This article is -entitled, “Walter Funk, Pioneer of National Socialist Economic Thought.” -I shall read into the record a few excerpts from this article: - - “From 1931 on, Walter Funk, as personal economic adviser and - Plenipotentiary of the Führer for Economics, and therefore the - untiring middleman between the Party and German economy, was the - man who paved the way to the new spiritual outlook of the German - industrialists. - - “If in the outbreak of 1933 the differences which had existed - for more than a decade in the public life of Germany between - politics and economy, and especially between politics and the - industrialists, disappeared overnight, if from the outset, the - guiding rule of all labor has been an ever-increasing - contribution towards a common end, this is due to the pioneering - work of Funk, who since 1939 has directed his speeches and his - writings to that end.” - -And in the last paragraph of this article: - - “Walter Funk remained true to himself because he was, and is, - and will remain a National Socialist, a fighter who dedicates - all his work to the idealistic aims of the Führer.” - -The whole world knows what the ideals of the Führer were. - -Do you admit that this article gives a correct appreciation of your -personality and your activities? - -FUNK: Generally, yes. - -MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I have no more questions to ask. - -[_Dr. Dix approached the lectern._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is it you wish to say, Dr. Dix? - -DR. DIX: I have only one question for the witness, which was brought up -by the cross-examination of Mr. Dodd. I could not put this question any -sooner, since I am asking it only because of what Mr. Dodd said. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. - -DR. DIX: Witness, Mr. Dodd has put to you a record of your -interrogation, according to which Schacht, after leaving the Reichsbank, -still had a room there. You have heard the testimony of Schacht here. He -testified clearly that he did not have a room at the Reichsbank but that -the Reich Government put a room in his apartment at his disposal and -contributed to the rent, and that the Reich Government paid a secretary -whom he took with him from the Reichsbank, but who was now paid by the -Reich Government and not by the Reichsbank. That was the testimony of -Schacht. By your answer given to Mr. Dodd it was not quite clear whether -you have any doubt about the correctness of that statement by Schacht. I -ask for your opinion. - -FUNK: I do not know anything about the apartment of Dr. Schacht. I was -told at the time that he still came frequently to the Reichsbank and -that a room was reserved for him. If that information was not correct, -then it is not my fault. I do not doubt that what Dr. Schacht said is -correct. He must know the arrangements concerning his apartment better -than I do. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, do you wish to re-examine? - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, we have found this final questioning of the -Defendant Dr. Funk harder to follow than the other cases, because the -translation caused serious difficulties. I have to admit, frankly, that -I have been able to understand only part of what has been said here. The -defendant may probably have had the same difficulty and therefore I -should like to reserve the right Mr. President, after I receive the -stenographic record, to make one or two corrections, if the transcript -should show this to be necessary. It has also been made more difficult -for us, Mr. President, because in the course of cross-examination a -large number of extensive documents was submitted to the Defendant Dr. -Funk. We are gradually becoming used to those surprises. Moreover, the -Defendant Funk was supposed to give answers to questions concerning -documents which he had not issued which had nothing to do with his -activities, which he... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal saw no sign at all of the -Defendant Funk not being able to understand thoroughly every question -put to him. And I think that therefore there is no reason for any -protest on your behalf and you should go on to put any question you wish -to put in re-examination—let us say, questions which arise out of the -cross-examination. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, on our earphones, at least on this side, we -could not understand quite a number of questions. Whether it applied to -these particular earphones or to the entire apparatus I do not know. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, if the Defendant Funk did not understand any -questions put to him, he could have said so. He did not say so. He -answered all the questions from a logical point of view, perfectly -accurately. You can ask him if you like, if he did not understand any of -the questions put to him. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, Herr Funk, the Prosecution among other things has put -to you that you participated in the exploitation, the spoliation of -France. In this connection is it correct that the merchandise, the -consumer goods which came from France, were in many cases manufactured -from raw materials which had come from Germany? - -FUNK: Certainly. We continuously delivered coal, coke, iron, and other -raw materials in France, so that they could produce goods—we delivered -especially those raw materials which the French did not have in the -country themselves. There was a very active exchange of production and a -very close productive co-operation between the German and French -economy. Even the same organizational methods were used. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Funk, excerpts from an article which appeared on the -occasion of your birthday have been read before. Do you know the author -of that article? - -FUNK: Yes, from the earlier years. - -DR. SAUTER: Did he receive any factual material from you for that -article? - -FUNK: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Did he not ask for it? - -FUNK: No, I did not know anything about that article beforehand. I did -not order a birthday article for myself. - -DR. SAUTER: Precisely. So you did not know anything about that article -and therefore, if I understand you correctly, there is no guarantee that -what is said in this article is completely true. - -FUNK: No. But I find that the tendency of the article is generally very -good. The tendency... - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the American prosecutor confronted you yesterday -with the matter of your negotiations with Rosenberg in the spring of -1941 and the fact that at that time, a few months before the march into -Russia, you had these negotiations with Rosenberg. He apparently wanted -to conclude that you had admitted, or wanted to admit, that you had -known about the intention of Hitler to wage an aggressive war against -Russia. You did not have a chance to say anything on this yesterday. -Therefore I should like to give you another opportunity now to state -very clearly what your belief was at that time concerning the intentions -of Hitler in the spring of 1941, when you negotiated with Rosenberg, and -what you knew about any possible causes for war before that time. - -FUNK: As to the question of the American prosecutor, I did not -understand it to mean that I knew anything about an aggressive war -against Russia. The prosecutor spoke explicitly about preparations for -war with Russia. I myself had already made it quite clear that I was -completely surprised when the task was assigned to Rosenberg, and I was -informed by Dr. Lammers as well as by Herr Rosenberg, that the reason -for the assignment was that the Führer was expecting a war against -Russia, because Russia was deploying large numbers of troops along the -entire eastern border, because Russia had entered Bessarabia and -Bukovina and because his negotiations with Molotov brought proof that -Russia maintained an aggressive policy in the Balkans and the Baltic -area, whereby Germany felt herself threatened. Therefore preparations -had to be made on the part of Germany for a possible conflict with -Russia. Also, concerning the meeting which the American prosecutor has -mentioned, I said explicitly that the measures concerning currency which -were discussed there were approved by me, because we created thereby -stable currency conditions in the Occupied Eastern Territory. I was -therefore opposed to the idea that the German Reichsmark, which the -Russian population would not have accepted because they could not even -read it, should be introduced there. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Soviet Russian prosecutor has pointed out again -and again that you were not only Reichsbank President and Reichsminister -of Economics, but also Plenipotentiary for Economy. You have corrected -that already and pointed out that from the very beginning when you were -appointed, your authority as Plenipotentiary for Economy was practically -taken over by Göring, and that, I believe, in December of 1939, your -authority as Plenipotentiary for Economy was also formally turned over -to Göring. - -MR. DODD: I wish to enter an objection not only to the form this -examination is taking, but as to its substance. Counsel is in effect -testifying himself, and he is testifying about matters that the witness -testified to on direct examination, and it seems clear to us that this -cannot be helpful at all to the Tribunal as a matter of re-direct -examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, is it really proper for you to get the -witness to go over again the evidence which he has already given? The -only object of re-examination is to elucidate any questions which have -not been properly answered in cross-examination. The witness has already -dealt with the topics with which you are now dealing, in the same sense -which you are now putting into it. - -DR. SAUTER: I have repeated the statements only because I want to put a -question to the witness now concerning a document which was submitted -only yesterday, which had not been submitted until then, and to which I -could therefore not take any position; and because the Soviet Russian -prosecutor has again made the assertion here that the defendant also -during the war was Plenipotentiary for Economy, although that is not -correct. Mr. President... - -THE PRESIDENT: I have heard myself the witness say over and over again -that he was not the Plenipotentiary General for Economy during the war. -He has repeatedly said that. - -DR. SAUTER: But it has been repeated from this side. Mr. President, -yesterday a document was submitted which bears the Document Number -EC-488. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the document you want to deal with? - -DR. SAUTER: Number EC-488. It was presented yesterday, and is a letter -dated 28 January 1939. On the front page it is marked in large letters -“Secret.” Here in the original is the heading, which is in capital -letters, and it reads, “The Plenipotentiary for War Economy.” So much -for the heading of the letter paper. Then the word “War” is crossed out, -so that you can read only, “The Plenipotentiary for Economy.” - -Therefore, before 28 January 1939 the title of Plenipotentiary for War -Economy must have been changed to a new title, “Plenipotentiary for -Economy.” I now ask that the defendant... - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. The copy that we have before us has not got -the word “War” in it at all. - -DR. SAUTER: It can be seen on the photostat. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see it. But what is the question you want to put? - -DR. SAUTER: At the time when this letter was written, the -Plenipotentiary was the Defendant Funk. I should like to ask to be -permitted to put the question to him, how it can be explained that the -title of his office—that is, Plenipotentiary for War Economy—was -changed. The question would be how it could be explained that the title -of his office, “Plenipotentiary for War Economy” had been changed to the -new title, “Plenipotentiary for Economy.” - -FUNK: The reason is... - -DR. SAUTER: One moment, Dr. Funk, please. - -THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask you to stop putting your question. You can -put your question. Go on. What is the question? - -DR. SAUTER: Go on, Dr. Funk. - -FUNK: The reason was that according to the old Reich Defense Law, -Schacht had been appointed Plenipotentiary for War Economy, and on the -basis of this second Reich Defense Law, which appointed me, I was -appointed Plenipotentiary for Economy, because at that time it was quite -clear that the special tasks concerning war economy—that is to say, -armament industry, war economy proper—could no longer remain with the -Plenipotentiary for Economy, but that he had essentially to co-ordinate -the civilian economic departments. - -DR. SAUTER: In connection with that, Mr. President, may I call your -attention to another document which was submitted yesterday. That is -Number 3562-PS. Here the heading already has the correct new title, -“Plenipotentiary for Economy.” That is no more “Plenipotentiary for War -Economy,” and that is also a new document which was submitted only -yesterday. Mr. President... - -MR. DODD: Just to keep the record straight, Mr. President, that Document -3562-PS is in evidence, and it was submitted by Lieutenant Meltzer at -the time he presented the case against the individual Defendant Funk. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, am I not right in thinking that the Defendant -Funk stated from the outset in his examination in chief that he was -appointed Plenipotentiary General for Economy? - -MR. DODD: Yes, indeed, Sir. That is as I thoroughly understand it. - -THE PRESIDENT: And you have not challenged that? - -MR. DODD: We have not challenged the fact that he said so. But we do -challenge the fact that he, in fact, was only for economy. We do -maintain that he, in fact, had much to do with the war effort as the -Plenipotentiary. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But he was not to be named that? - -MR. DODD: No. And that Document EC-488 was not offered, anyway, for that -purpose, but rather to show that the defendant was engaged in talking -about what prisoners of war would do after an attack. - -DR. SAUTER: Yesterday a document was produced about the interrogation of -a certain Hans Posse. It is Document 3894-PS. The witness Hans Posse was -formerly State Secretary in the Ministry of Economics and as such Deputy -Plenipotentiary for Economy. That record has been submitted by the -Prosecution in order to show that allegedly there was a struggle for -power, as it says here, between Funk and Göring. - -However, I should like to quote to the witness a few other points from -that record so that several other points can also be used as evidence: - -Witness, State Secretary Hans Posse says, for instance—and I should -like to ask whether this is still your opinion today—that is Document -3894-PS, Page 2 of the German translation, at the bottom of the page—he -was asked, “How often did you report to Funk in connection with your -duties as Deputy to the Plenipotentiary?” - -The witness answered then, “The Plenipotentiary for Economy never really -went into action.” - -FUNK: I must repeat what I said again and again, and what has been -confirmed by everybody who has been heard on that question. That was a -post which was merely on paper. - -DR. SAUTER: Then the witness was asked to what final end you, Dr. Funk, -had worked. - -It says, “Dr. Posse, is it correct that the office of Plenipotentiary -for Economy was established to the final end of uniting all economic -functions with a view to the preparation for war?” - -Then the witness answered, “The purpose was what I have just said—to -co-ordinate the various conflicting economic interests. But there was no -talk about the preparation for war.” - -And on the same page, on Page 4, at the bottom, the witness says, I -quote: - - “It is correct that the aim was to co-ordinate all economic - questions, but the purpose was not to prepare for war. Of - course, if war preparation should become necessary, it was the - task of the Plenipotentiary for Economy to concern himself with - these questions and to act as a co-ordinator.” - -FUNK: Herr Posse was an old, sick man, whom I had put in this post. He -was formerly State Secretary under Schacht, and when I took over the -ministry, I received a new State Secretary through Göring who, -unfortunately, later became insane. And then State Secretary Dr. -Landfried came to me, and Posse, who formally was still in the Ministry -of Economics as State Secretary, was without a job. Therefore I made him -an executive officer attached to the Plenipotentiary for Economy. - -Here, of course, he had constant difficulties from the very beginning. -The High Command of the Armed Forces or the War Economy Staff wanted to -reduce the authority of the Plenipotentiary, as can be seen from the -letter which was presented yesterday. And the civilian economy -department did not want to follow his directives because they already -had been subordinated to and had to follow the directives of the -Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Therefore, as a matter of fact, that -unhappy Plenipotentiary for Economy held a post which to all intents and -purposes existed only on paper. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would this not be a convenient time to break off now? - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have two more questions which I wish to put -to the Defendant Dr. Funk. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Dr. Funk, before the recess we stopped at -Document 3894-PS, the testimony of your State Secretary Posse. I should -like to read one passage on Page 7 of the German text and ask you -whether you agree with it. The witness Posse was asked by the -Prosecution whether he, as Deputy Plenipotentiary for Economy, knew -about the international relations, especially about the war situation -and so forth, and he says, on Page 7, in the middle: - - “We never knew anything about the international situation and we - never heard anything about it, and if the international - situation was mentioned in our discussions we could always voice - merely our personal opinions.” - -And a few lines further down: - - “We”—he means apparently himself and you, Dr. Funk—“We always - hoped that there would be no war.” - -Do you agree with this opinion of your former State Secretary Posse? - -FUNK: Yes. I have said repeatedly that until the end I did not believe -that there would be a war, and the same is true of my colleagues, and -everyone who spoke to me at that time will corroborate this. Herr Posse -was, of course, still less informed about political and military events -than I was. Consequently, that also applies to him. - -DR. SAUTER: Then I have a final question to put, Witness. You have seen -the film which the Prosecution has presented. Now, you were the -President of the Reichsbank. Consequently you are familiar, possibly -only superficially with the conditions in the vaults of the Reichsbank, -at least, I assume, in Berlin, if not in Frankfurt, where the film was -taken; and you also know how, especially during the war, these items -which had been deposited with the bank in trunks or packages and the -like were safeguarded. Possibly, Dr. Funk, on the basis of your own -knowledge of the conditions you can make a statement regarding this -short film which we have seen. - -FUNK: I was completely confused by this film and most deeply shocked. -Photography and especially films are always very dangerous documents -because they show many things in a light different from what they really -are. I personally have the impression, and I believe the Prosecution -will probably corroborate this, that all these deposits of valuables and -this entire collection of valuable items came from the potassium mines -where, at my instigation, all gold, foreign currency and other valuables -of the Reichsbank had been stored away when, because of a terrific -bombing attack on Berlin, we were no longer able to work in the -Reichsbank. The Reichsbank building alone in this one raid on 3 February -1945 was hit by 21 high explosive bombs; and it was only by a miracle -that I was able to reach the surface from this deep cellar together with -5,000 other people. Gold, foreign currency, and all other deposits of -valuables were then taken to a potassium mine in Thuringia and from -there apparently to Frankfurt, I assume. So this concerns, to a large -extent, normal deposits by customers who had placed their valuables, -their property, in these safe deposits which could not be got at by the -Reichsbank. Consequently I cannot tell from this film which of these -items were deliveries by the SS and which were genuine deposits. The -Prosecutor certainly is correct when he says that no one would deposit -gold teeth in a bank. It is, however, quite possible that certain -functionaries of concentration camps made genuine deposits in the -Reichsbank which contained such articles, to safeguard them for future -use. I think that is possible. However, in conclusion I must say once -more that I had no knowledge whatsoever of these things and of the fact -that jewelry, diamonds, pearls, and other objects were delivered from -concentration camps to the Reichsbank to such an extent. I knew nothing -about it; it was unknown to me, and I personally am of the opinion that -the Reichsbank was not authorized to do this kind of business. It is -certainly clear from one document, which contains an account for the -Minister of Finance, that most likely everything from the concentration -camps was first brought to the Reichsbank and then the unfortunate -officials of the Reichsbank had to sort it, send it on to the Minister -of Finance—or rather to the pawnbroker who was under the Minister of -Finance—and prepare a statement of account. Therefore, I must request -that someone be examined on these matters—first of all Herr Puhl -himself, and perhaps someone else who was concerned with these -things—in order to explain what actually took place and above all, to -show that I personally had no knowledge whatsoever of these matters -except for the few facts which I myself have described to the Court. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have finished my interrogation of the -Defendant Funk, and I should now like to ask permission to examine the -only witness whom I can call at this time, the witness Dr. Hayler. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: [_Interposing._] Mr. President, may I raise one matter before -the witness is excused? This Document 3894-PS, that we have quoted from -and that the defendant has quoted from, contains a number of other -quotations and I think it would be well if we submitted the whole -document in the four languages; and I shall be prepared to do that so -the Tribunal will have the benefit of the whole text. So far we have -both been quoting from it, but I think it would be most helpful to the -Court if it had the whole text. - -And may we ask, Mr. President, shall we make arrangements or should I do -anything about getting the witness Puhl here? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, have you any request to make with reference -to the witness Puhl, who made an affidavit? - -DR. SAUTER: Regarding the witness Emil Puhl I beg to request, Mr. -President, that he be brought here for cross-examination. I was going to -make that request in any case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Sauter, the witness Puhl should be -brought here. He will be brought here as soon as possible. - -DR. SAUTER: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now the defendant can return to the dock. - -[_The witness Dr. Hayler took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -HAYLER (Witness): Franz Hayler. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Hayler, how old are you? - -HAYLER: 46 years. - -DR. SAUTER: Are you a professional civil servant, or how did you get -into the Ministry of Economics under Dr. Funk? - -HAYLER: I was an independent business man and merchant and as such first -became the head of the “Economic Group Retail Trade” within the -organization of industrial economy. In this capacity I had very close -contact with the Ministry of Economics. After Minister Funk had been -appointed Minister for Economics I reported to him regarding the scope -of my work, and on that occasion I made his acquaintance. When I was -then put in charge of the “Reich Group Trade,” the working relations -between the organization directed by me and the Ministry, especially -between the then State Secretary Landfried and the Minister himself, -became very friendly. - -After the separation of the ministries in the autumn of 1943, the main -task of the Ministry of Economics was to provide for the German people, -that is, the civilian population. As head of the trade organization I -was the person responsible for the sale of merchandise, that is, for the -procurement of supplies, and during a conference with Minister Funk -regarding the co-operation between trade and the Ministry, Herr -Landfried, who was then State Secretary, made the suggestion that -Minister Funk call me into his Ministry and make me his deputy. Herr -Landfried believed that under the existing conditions he himself was not -strong enough to carry out this difficult task since the Ministry had -been deprived of its influence on production. Then, when Minister Funk -told him in reply to his suggestion that he, Landfried, was the deputy -of the Minister, Landfried replied that he could not continue to carry -out these tasks and that he asked to be permitted to retire and proposed -that I be his successor. About two or three weeks later I was put in -charge of the affairs of the State Secretary. - -DR. SAUTER: When was this conference? - -HAYLER: This conference took place in October 1943; my appointment came -on 20 November 1943. - -DR. SAUTER: So that until the autumn of 1943, Dr. Hayler, you were -employed in your organizations only in an honorary capacity? - -HAYLER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: That was, I think, retail trade? - -HAYLER: Yes, trade. - -DR. SAUTER: And as from 1943 you became official in the Reich Ministry -of Economics in the capacity of State Secretary? - -HAYLER: I became an official with this position of State Secretary on 30 -January 1944. - -DR. SAUTER: In this position you were one of the closest collaborators -of Dr. Funk? - -HAYLER: I was his deputy. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Hayler, during a conference that we had on the day -before yesterday, I discussed with you the question of whether the -Defendant Dr. Funk was a particularly radical man or whether, on the -contrary, he acted with moderation and consideration toward others. What -do you have to say to this question which may have certain importance in -forming an opinion on the personality of the Defendant Funk? - -HAYLER: Funk is above all very human, and always has been. Radicalism is -quite foreign to his entire character and being. He is more of an -artist, a man of very fine artistic feeling and scholarly ideas. I -believe one can say that at no time was he a doctrinaire or dogmatic. On -the contrary, he was conciliatory and anxious to settle disputes. For -this reason, in Party circles in particular, he was considered too soft, -too indulgent, in fact he was accused many times of being too weak. He -tried to protect domestic economy from political encroachment and from -unnecessary severity; and because of his respect and his regard for -enterprising endeavor and out of his own responsibility to economy and -to the people, he fought against unnecessary intervention in various -enterprises even during the war. He protected industry against mergers -and closures. This finally led to his being deprived of the -responsibility for production in the decisive phase of the war. - -I recall from the time of my collaboration with him, when I was still in -charge of the trade organization, that Funk on various occasions -interceded for men in the industrial world who were in political -difficulties. I believe, however, that because of these individual -cases, such as his intervention on behalf of Consul General Hollaender -or of Herr Pietsch, and because of his attempts to promote peace, he at -that time had to expect grave consequences; also because of his -intervention in the case of Richard Strauss, as is surely known, and in -similar cases. I do not think these individual cases are of such -importance as perhaps the following: After the catastrophe of 9 November -1938 the process of Aryanization was to be intensified in the Ministry -of Economics; and at that time a few political men were forced upon the -Ministry, especially Herr Schmeer. I remember distinctly that at that -time Landfried in particular, as well as Funk, slowed down considerably -this radicalization of the Ministry; and Funk and the Ministry were -blamed for doing so. - -After 8 and 9 November I once had a conference regarding the events of -that date with Himmler, in which I voiced my complaints. Himmler on that -occasion finally reproached both Funk and myself by saying, among other -things: - - “Finally, you people on the economic side and connected with the - economic management are also to blame that things have gone too - far. People like Herr Schacht cannot be expected to do anything - except go slow all the time and oppose the will of the Party; - but if you and Funk and all you people on the economic side had - not slowed things down so much, these excesses would not have - happened.” - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, Dr. Hayler; another question. You also worked with Dr. -Funk in matters concerning the economy of the occupied territories. Dr. -Funk is accused of having played a criminal part in despoiling the -occupied territories as well as in destroying their currency and -economic systems. Could you enlighten the Court as briefly as possible -on the Defendant Funk’s attitude and activities? As briefly as possible. - -HAYLER: I believe two facts must be stated first of all: First, the -influence of the Ministry of Economy on the occupied territories was -relatively limited. Secondly, during the year in which I was in the -Ministry these questions were no longer particularly important. - -Generally speaking, the position was as follows: Funk was constantly -accused of thinking more of peace than of war. The opinions he -proclaimed both in his speeches and in print referred to a European -economic policy; and I assume that these talks and publications or -articles are before the Court. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, they are here. - -HAYLER: Funk looked at the occupied territories from exactly the same -point of view. He raised repeated objections to the over-exploitation of -the occupied territories and expressed the view that wartime -co-operation should form the basis of later co-operation in peace. His -view was that confidence and willingness to co-operate should be -fostered in the occupied territories during the war. He expressed the -view that the black market cannot be combated by the black market and -that, since we were responsible for the occupied territories, we must -avoid anything likely to disturb the currency and economic system of -these territories. - -I think I remember that he also discussed the question with the Reich -Marshal and defended his own point of view. He also repeatedly opposed -unduly heavy occupation expenses, and always favored the reduction of -our own expenditure, that is, of German expenditure in the occupied -territories. In other words, he regarded the occupied territories in -exactly the same way as other European countries; and this attitude is -best illustrated by the speech he made in Vienna, I believe, in which he -publicly acknowledged as genuine debts the clearing debts, the high -totals of which were due mainly to differences in price, that is, -inflationist tendencies, in the countries which delivered the goods. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Hayler, the Defendant Funk is furthermore accused of -playing a criminal part in the enslavement of foreign workers. This -accusation applies particularly to the period during which you were a -co-worker of Dr. Funk. Can you tell us briefly how Funk thought and -acted in regard to this point? - -HAYLER: There can be no question of Funk’s co-operation in questions -regarding the employment of foreign labor at this time, but only within -the scope of his responsibility in the Central Planning Board. But it -remains to be seen whether the Central Planning Board was at all -responsible for the employment of workers or whether the Central -Planning Board did nothing more than ascertain the manpower needs of the -various production spheres. However, regardless of what the tasks of the -Central Planning Board may have been, Funk’s position in the Central -Planning Board was the following: - -Funk, as Minister of Economy, was responsible for the supplies for the -civilian population and for export. In the period following the -separation of the ministries, no additional foreign worker I believe was -employed in the production of supplies for civilians or for export. On -the contrary, Funk was constantly confronted with the fact that during -that time German and foreign workers were continually being removed from -the production of consumer goods and put into armament production. -Consequently, I cannot imagine that an accusation of this sort can be -made against Funk with reference to this period of time. - -On this occasion I should like to emphasize another point which seems -important to me. Provisioning the foreign workers was a very serious -question. I believe that even Herr Sauckel will corroborate the fact -that, when this question came up, Funk was at once ready—even though -there was already a great scarcity of provisions for the German people -due to many air raids and destructions—to release large quantities of -supplies and put them at the disposal of the foreign workers. - -DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, he tried to see to it that -the foreign workers who had to work in Germany were supplied as well as -was possible with consumer articles: food, shoes, clothes, and so on. - -HAYLER: Particularly shoes and clothing; Funk was not the competent -authority for food. - -DR. SAUTER: Shoes and clothing? - -HAYLER: Yes, I have specific knowledge of this. And as a result Funk had -considerable difficulty; for the Gauleiter, in view of the great -scarcity of goods, did their best to secure supplies for the inhabitants -of their own Gaue for whom they were responsible, and in so doing used -every means which came to hand. Funk constantly had to oppose the -arbitrary acts of the Gauleiter, who broke into the supply stores in -their Gaue and appropriated stocks intended for the general use. - -DR. SAUTER: Dr. Hayler, do you know whether Dr. Funk—I am still -referring to the time when you worked with him—represented the -viewpoint that the foreign worker should not be brought to Germany to -work here but that rather the work itself should be taken from Germany -into the foreign countries so that the foreign worker could perform his -work in his home country and remain at home? Please answer that. - -HAYLER: I know very well that Funk represented that viewpoint; and it is -in accordance with his general attitude, for the political disquiet and -dissatisfaction which accompany the displacement of such large masses of -human beings temporarily uprooted was in opposition to the policy of -appeasement and reconstruction which was definitely Funk’s goal. - -DR. SAUTER: I now come to the last question which I wish to put to you, -Dr. Hayler. When the German armies retreated and when German territories -were occupied by enemy armies, difficulties arose regarding the -supplying of these territories with money. At that time Hitler is -supposed to have planned a law according to which the acceptance and -passing on of foreign occupation money was to be punished even by death. -I am not interested now, Dr. Hayler, in finding out why Hitler planned -to do this; but I am interested in finding out, if you can tell me, how -the Defendant Funk reacted to this demand by Hitler and what success he -had. - -HAYLER: Two facts can be established in regard to this point, which -should be of interest to the Tribunal. I have rarely seen Funk as -depressed as at that time, after he had received information about the -so-called “scorched earth decree.” I believe he was the first minister -to issue at that time two very clear decrees, one from the Ministry of -Economics, in which he gave definite instructions that wherever German -people were an administration of economy in some sort of form must -remain; where it is necessary that people be provided for, the State -must continue to provide for these people. - -The second decree was issued at the same time by the President of the -Reichsbank, in which he decreed that the money market had to be cared -for by the remaining offices of the Reichsbank in the same way that -economy was to be cared for. - -Regarding your question itself, I recall very distinctly that the Führer -himself, it was said, had demanded of the Ministry of Economics the -issuing of a legal regulation according to which the acceptance of -occupation money was forbidden to every German on pain of death. Herr -Funk opposed this demand very energetically, I believe with the help of -Herr Lammers. He himself telephoned headquarters repeatedly and finally -succeeded in having the Führer’s directive withdrawn. - -DR. SAUTER: Have you finished, Dr. Hayler? - -HAYLER: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the -witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do the other Defendants’ Counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -[_No response._] - -Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? - -MR. DODD: When did you join the Nazi Party, Mr. Witness? - -HAYLER: Did I understand you correctly—when did I become a member of -the NSDAP? - -MR. DODD: That is right. - -HAYLER: December 1931. - -MR. DODD: Did you hold any offices in the Party at any time? - -HAYLER: No; I never held office in the Party. - -MR. DODD: You were the head of a trade group in 1938, the Reichsgruppe -“Handel”? - -HAYLER: I was the head of the Economic Group “Retail Trade” from 1934 -on, and from 1938 on, head of the Reich Group “Trade.” This organization -was a part of the organization of industrial economy and was under the -Reich Ministry of Economics. - -MR. DODD: Membership in the group that you were the head of was -compulsory, wasn’t it? - -HAYLER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: When did you join the SS? - -HAYLER: I joined the SS in 1933, in the summer. - -MR. DODD: That was a kind of Party office, wasn’t it, of a sort? - -HAYLER: No, it was not an office. I became connected with the SS because -of the fact that in Munich 165 businessmen were locked up and because I -knew Himmler from my student days—I had not seen him again until -then—the businessmen in Munich asked me to intercede for them in the -summer of 1933. But I had no office in the Party or in the SS. - -MR. DODD: When did you become a general in the SS? - -HAYLER: I never was a general in the SS. After I had been appointed -State Secretary, the Reichsführer bestowed on me the rank of a -Gruppenführer in the SS. - -MR. DODD: A Gruppenführer—isn’t that the equivalent of a general in the -SS? - -HAYLER: Yes and no. In the SS there was the rank of Gruppenführer and -there was the rank of Gruppenführer and general of the Police or of the -Waffen-SS; but the Gruppenführer was not a general if it was only an -honorary rank. This could easily be seen from our uniforms, because we -did not wear a general’s epaulets or a general’s uniform. - -MR. DODD: You know Ohlendorf pretty well, don’t you? - -HAYLER: Yes. - -MR. DODD: He worked for you at one time. He was under your supervision. -Isn’t that so? - -HAYLER: I worked with Ohlendorf from 1938 on. - -MR. DODD: You know, he has testified before this Tribunal that he -supervised the murdering of 90,000 people; did you know that? - -HAYLER: I heard about that. - -MR. DODD: Did you know about it at the time that it was going on? - -HAYLER: No. - -MR. DODD: Did you know Pohl, the SS man—P-o-h-l? - -HAYLER: May I ask you for that name again? - -MR. DODD: Pohl—P-o-h-l? - -HAYLER: I do not remember knowing an SS man Pohl. - -MR. DODD: Do you know a man called Obergruppenführer Pohl of the SS? - -HAYLER: No—Yes, I know an Obergruppenführer Pohl. Obergruppenführer -Pohl was the chief of the administrative office of the SS. - -MR. DODD: Did you have conversations and meetings with him from time to -time? - -HAYLER: Officially I had a few conversations with Pohl. Usually they -were very unpleasant. - -MR. DODD: Well, that’s another matter. How often would you say, between -1943 and the end, the time of your surrender, that you met with Pohl to -discuss matters of mutual interest between the SS and your own Ministry -of Economics? Approximately, because I don’t expect you to give an -accurate account, but about how many times, would you say? - -HAYLER: I must give a short explanation about this. Between the... - -MR. DODD: Give that afterwards. Give me the figure first. - -HAYLER: Yes. Perhaps three or four times, perhaps only twice. I do not -know exactly. - -MR. DODD: Are you telling us three or four times a year or three or four -times during the whole period between 1943 and 1945? - -HAYLER: During my time in office, yes, three or four times; it was only -one year. - -MR. DODD: Did you talk to him about the Reichsbank’s or the Ministry of -Economics’ co-operating in the financing of the building of factories -near the concentration camps? - -HAYLER: No. - -MR. DODD: You know about that, do you? - -HAYLER: No. This question was never discussed with me. - -MR. DODD: What did you talk to him about? - -HAYLER: A great controversy had arisen between the Ministry of Economics -and the SS because after I had taken over the State Secretariat in the -Ministry of Economics, Himmler had instructed me to turn over to the SS -a factory which belonged to the Gau Berlin. I fought against this and -did not obey Himmler’s instructions. The files about this must surely -still be in existence. I then was instructed to discuss this matter with -Pohl. In these conferences and in a personal conversation which Himmler -requested and ordered, I still fought against Himmler’s instructions, -because I was fundamentally against the SS having industrial enterprises -of its own. - -MR. DODD: Did you talk to the Defendant Funk about this difficulty with -Himmler and Pohl? - -HAYLER: Yes, because these difficulties resulted in Himmler’s writing me -a letter in December in which he told me that he ceased to have -confidence in me and that he had no desire to work with me any more. I -reported this to the Defendant Funk in December. - -MR. DODD: Did Funk tell you that his bank was helping Himmler out in the -building of factories near the concentration camps? - -HAYLER: I know nothing about that. - -MR. DODD: You never heard of that before now? - -HAYLER: Up until now I have never heard anything about Funk’s or the -Ministry of Economics’ co-operation in the financing of such buildings -or about anything of the sort. - -MR. DODD: It is perfectly clear, I think, but I want to make certain, -that from 1943 to 1945, while you were the deputy to Funk in the -Ministry of Economics, the questions of purchasing on the black market, -and so on, in the occupied countries ceased to be of any real -importance, didn’t they? You said that; I understood you to say that a -few minutes ago yourself. - -HAYLER: In 1944—and my time in office virtually did not start until -1944, since in December I had a Ministry which was totally bombed out -and we did not get started working again until January 1944—these -questions were no longer of decisive importance, since a process of -retrogression had already set in. - -MR. DODD: All right. You also were, Mr. Witness, at the Vienna speech to -which you referred, which was made in 1944; and it had nothing to do -with the occupied countries but was directed only at the satellite -states. Are you aware of that or not? - -HAYLER: The speech in Vienna? - -MR. DODD: Yes, the speech in Vienna in 1944. - -HAYLER: Yes, it is true; I have already said that. Both the speech in -Königsberg and the speech in Vienna did not deal directly with the -occupied territories, but with Europe as a whole. I... - -MR. DODD: Did it deal with the occupied territories directly or -indirectly? Now, have you read that speech? - -HAYLER: I heard the speech. Quite definitely it had nothing to do with -them directly. - -MR. DODD: Finally, in view of your testimony concerning Funk and what he -thought about forced labor, you know, don’t you, that he took an -attitude of unconcern about the forcing of people to come to Germany? Do -you know that? - -HAYLER: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, you know he has said on interrogation that he didn’t -bother his head about it, although he knew that people were being forced -to go to Germany against their will. Are you aware of that? - -HAYLER: No, I am not aware of that. I had with Funk... - -MR. DODD: All right. If you did know it, would that make some difference -to you; and would you change your testimony some? - -HAYLER: I am not aware of the fact that Funk is supposed to have had -this attitude or... - -MR. DODD: Very well. Perhaps I can help you by reading to you from his -interrogation of 22 October 1945, made here in Nuremberg. Among other -things, he was asked these few questions and made a few answers: - - “As a matter of fact, you were present at many meetings of the - Central Planning Board, were you not?” - -Funk answered and said: - - “I was present at the meetings of the Central Planning Board - only when something was required for my small sector; that is to - say, something which had to do with the export and consumer - goods industries as, for example, iron. I had to put up a fight - on each occasion to get just a few thousand tons for my consumer - goods industry.” - -The next question was: - - “Yes, but during those meetings you attended, you heard, did you - not, discussions concerning forced labor?” - -Funk answered: “Yes.” - - “Question: ‘And you knew from those meetings that the policy was - to bring in more and more foreign workers to the Reich against - their will?’” - -Funk answered: “Yes, certainly.” - - “Question: ‘And you never objected to that, I take it?’” - -Funk answered: - - “No, why should I have objected? It was somebody else’s task to - bring these foreign workers into the Reich. - - “Did you believe it was legal to take people against their will - from their homes and bring them into Germany?” was the last - question that I want to quote to you. He answered: “Well, many - things happen in wartime which aren’t strictly legal. I have - never racked my brains about that.” - -Now, if you know that to be his attitude from his statements made under -oath on an interrogation here, would that change your view about Funk -and would it cause you to change the testimony which you have given -before the Tribunal here today? - -HAYLER: I can testify only to those things which I myself know. I cannot -remember any such statements by Funk. I do know and I remember -distinctly that we frequently spoke about the occupied territories, -about the later development in Europe which was to, and could, result -from co-operation. We also spoke about the procuring of workers and that -Funk fundamentally had a viewpoint different from the one that prevailed -and that he was not in agreement with these things. I can merely repeat -this and if you question me here as a witness, I can say only what I -know. - -MR. DODD: Did you go over all of your questions and answers with Dr. -Sauter before you took the stand? You knew what you were going to be -asked when you came here, didn’t you? - -HAYLER: Dr. Sauter gave me an idea what he would question me about and -what he was interested in. - -MR. DODD: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the Prosecution wish to -cross-examine? Dr. Sauter, do you want to re-examine? - -DR. SAUTER: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, there are a few interrogatories missing, some -of which have already arrived and are being translated. I request that -at a later occasion, perhaps after the case against Defendant Schirach, -I be permitted to read these interrogatories. And then, Mr. President, I -should like to say something of a general nature. I have already read -extracts from various documents and requested that all of them be -admitted as evidence and I should like to repeat this request for all -these documents. With that I shall have finished my case for Funk. - -Mr. President, may I make another request of you at this moment, namely, -that during the next few days the Defendant Von Schirach be excused from -being present at the sessions in Court so that he can prepare his case. -In his absence I shall look after his interests or else, when I am not -here, my colleague Dr. Nelte will. Thank you very much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is appearing for the Defendant Schirach? - -DR. SAUTER: I am; and when I cannot be present, then Dr. Nelte will. One -of us will always be in Court and look after his interests. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well, Dr. Sauter. Now the Tribunal will adjourn -for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, there was a document which you didn’t refer -to. I think it was an affidavit of a witness called Kallus. Were you -offering that in evidence? It was an interrogatory of Heinz Karl Kallus. - -DR. SAUTER: The Kallus interrogatory, Mr. President, has already arrived -and at the moment it is in the process of translation, I shall submit it -as soon as the translation has been received by the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got a translation into English. - -DR. SAUTER: I believe, Mr. President, that what you have is an affidavit -by Kallus, and in addition there is a Kallus interrogatory, which is in -process of translation and which I shall submit later. - -THE PRESIDENT: This takes the form of an interrogatory, questions and -answers, what I have in my hand. I am only asking whether you want to -offer that. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, I offer that in evidence. I request that judicial -notice be taken of it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you gave it a number then, did you? What -number will it be? - -DR. SAUTER: Exhibit Number 5, if you please. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Kranzbühler. - -FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Mr. -President, first I should like to ask the permission to have a -secretary, in addition to my assistant, in the courtroom, in order to -facilitate the submission of documents. - -With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall first submit a number of -documents; and I shall use the document book of the Prosecution and the -document books which I have submitted. These document books consist of -four volumes. The table of contents is in Volume I and in Volume III. - -In the first document of the document book of the Prosecution, Exhibit -USA-12 (Document Number 2887-PS), I should like to correct an error in -translation which may be of significance. It says there, in the German -text, under “1939,” “Konteradmiral, Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote,” and -that in the English text has been translated by “Commander-in-Chief.” -The correct translation should be “Flag Officer of Submarines.” That -point is of importance in regard to the fact that Admiral Dönitz, until -his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in 1943, was not a -member of the group which the Prosecution terms criminal. - -I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal back to Exhibit -GB-190 (Document Number D-652 (a-b)). That is a sea-chart which the -Prosecution has submitted. This chart shows the position of the German -submarines to the west of England on 3 September 1939, and the -Prosecution uses that chart as evidence for the question of aggressive -war. - -The Prosecution says, rightly, that these U-boats must have left their -home bases at an earlier date. The first document, which I offer as -Dönitz-1, is to prove, first, that this belongs in the category of -measures resorted to in times of crisis such as were taken by every -nation in Europe at this time, and that they were in no way preparatory -measures for an aggressive war against England, because such a war was -not planned. - -I shall read from this document—document book, Page 1. It is an excerpt -from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of September 1939, and -I read the entry of 15 August: - - “Prepared (for Case White) the following measures:” - -THE PRESIDENT: What page? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Page 1 of the document book, Volume I. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: - - “15. 8. Prepared (for Case White) the following measures: - - “On 15. 8. _Spee_ and all Atlantic submarines ready to sail. - - “On 22. 8. Transport _Westerwald_ ready to sail. - - “On 25. 8. _Deutschland_ ready to sail.” - -And then we find the list of these ships: - - “21. 8. Report B-service about emergency measures of French - fleet. - - “23. 8. Report B-service: Continuation of French emergency - measures of fleet to 3rd grade. English and French blockade - measures off ports. - - “25. 8. B-service reports: German and Italian steamers are being - watched and reported by France.” - -And then the instructions: - - “31. 8. Arrival Order I of OKW for conduct of war: Forcible - solution in the East, attack against Poland 1 September, 0445 - hours. In the West responsibility for starting hostilities - unequivocally to be left to England and France. Strictly respect - neutrality of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland. The - western border not to be crossed. At sea no hostile actions or - such that could be interpreted as hostile. Air Force only in - defense. - - “In case of opening of hostilities by Western Powers: Defense - only, economical use of forces. Reserve start of aggressive - operations. The army to hold the ‘Westwall.’ Naval economic war - concentrated against England. To augment effect probable - declaration of zones of danger. Prepare these and submit them. - The Baltic to be safeguarded against enemy invasion.” - -So far this document. With the next document, Dönitz-2, I should like to -prove that the British submarines, too, were active before the start of -the war and appeared in the Bay of Helgoland at the very beginning of -the war. It is on Page 2 of the document book. I probably need only -point out that as early as 1 September electric motor noises were heard -in the Bay of Helgoland and that on 4 September several reports arrived -concerning English submarines sighted in the Bay of Helgoland. - -I come now to the document with reference to which Admiral Dönitz is -accused of participating in the planning of the attack against Norway. -That is Exhibit GB-83 (Document Number C-5). The Prosecution has -submitted it as proof of the fact that Admiral Dönitz played a decisive -part in the occupation of Norway. I shall refer to this document in more -detail when examining the witness. I merely want to establish certain -dates now. On the document—and I am about to submit the original to the -Tribunal—there is a stamp which establishes when the document was -received at the High Command. This stamp shows the date 11 October 1939. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of GB-83? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. And I refer now to Exhibit GB-81 -(Document Number C-66), Page 6 of my document book. According to this -the decisive report by Grossadmiral Raeder to the Führer had already -been made on 10 October 1939, that is, a day before GB-83 was received -at the High Command. - -With the next document I should like to prove that considerations as to -bases had nothing to do with the question of an aggressive war, as far -as the Flag Officer of Submarines, Admiral Dönitz, was concerned. I am -submitting Documents Dönitz-3 and Dönitz-4. They are on Page 3 and 5 of -the Document Book. Dönitz-3 is a war diary of the Flag Officer of -Submarines of 3 November 1939, and I read from the second paragraph, the -10th line from the top: - - “At the same time Naval Operations Staff reports that there are - possibilities for the establishment of a ‘Base North’ which seem - to be very promising. In my opinion the immediate introduction - of all possible steps in order to arrive at a clear judgment of - the existing possibilities is of the greatest importance.” - -And then there follows a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages -of such a base, which is absolutely identical with the considerations -mentioned in GB-83. It is a question of Murmansk in connection with Base -North, as can be seen from Document Dönitz-4; and it is known that these -considerations were in full accord with the Soviet Union. - -Furthermore, I should like to show that the question of bases -continuously comes up in enemy navies without reference to... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you are going a little bit fast over -these documents and I am not quite sure that I am quite following what -use you are making of them. This base mentioned in the report is -Murmansk? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes; Murmansk. And I want to use it as -proof, Mr. President, that the question of bases has nothing to do with -the question of whether one wants to wage aggressive war with the -country in which these bases are situated. The considerations as to -Murmansk were taken in full accord with the Soviet Union, and in the -same manner Admiral Dönitz took the question of Norwegian bases into -consideration. That is the subject of my proof. - -THE PRESIDENT: But the fact that Murmansk was suggested as a base, to be -taken with the consent of the Soviet Union—if it was the case—doesn’t -have any relevance, does it, to taking a base in Norway without the -consent of Norway. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, the relevancy seems to me to -exist in the fact that Admiral Dönitz, as Commander of U-boats, in both -cases received merely the order to state his opinion about bases in a -certain country but that in the last analysis he had as little to say in -the case of Narvik and Trondheim as in the case of Murmansk. - -COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U. S. S. R.): -In Document Number 3, the one just being referred to by the defense -counsel for the Defendant Dönitz, mention is definitely made of the -northern bases; but nothing is said in this document of any plans of the -Soviet Union. And to discuss, here and now, some plan or other of the -Soviet Union is in my opinion quite out of order, since there are no -plans of the Soviet Union in connection with the northern bases, and -there never have been. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If the representative of the Soviet Union -has any doubts that these bases were considered in full accord with the -Soviet Union, then I shall prove that by calling a witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Anyhow, the document doesn’t say anything about it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The document says nothing about it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal doesn’t think you ought to make statements -of that sort without any evidence; and at the moment you are dealing -with a document which doesn’t contain any evidence of the fact. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I perhaps read Document Number Dönitz-4? - -THE PRESIDENT: It is Dönitz-3, isn’t it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have already come to Dönitz-4. I had read -from Dönitz-3. I shall now read from Dönitz-4 the entries for 17 April -1939: - - “Commander of U-boats receives instructions from Naval - Operations Staff to try out Base North. Naval Operations Staff - considers the trying out of the base by _U-36_ due to sail - within the next days, highly desirable. Supply goods for tanker - _Phoenizia_ in Murmansk going with fishing steamer to Murmansk - on 22 November.” - -It seems to me that this entry very clearly shows that that could have -happened only in accord with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, I want to -show that considerations as to bases... - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal thinks you -oughtn’t to make these observations on these documents which really -don’t support what you are saying. Document Number 3, for instance, -doesn’t bear any such interpretation, because it refers to attacks which -it was suggested should be made against ships coming from Russian ports, -in Paragraph 2. And equally the other document you referred to, -Dönitz-4, on Page 5, doesn’t bear the interpretation which you are -putting upon it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I am afraid that the contents -of both documents have been presented too quickly by me. For anyone who -is familiar with such war diaries, many things are self-evident which -otherwise are not so easy to understand. - -Document Dönitz-3 states in that part which I have read that -possibilities for the establishment of a Base North exist. These -possibilities can be only political possibilities, because one can -establish a base in a foreign country only if that country agrees. -Document Dönitz-4 shows that the base in question is Murmansk and that -this base is being tried out with a supply ship, a fishing steamer, and -a U-boat. That convincingly shows in my opinion... - -THE PRESIDENT: The objection the Tribunal was raising was to the -statement by you that the Soviet Union had agreed, and these documents -do not bear out any such statement. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am of the opinion that in Document -Dönitz-4 that can clearly be seen. It is not possible... - -COL. POKROVSKY: I definitely protest against the fact that, apart from -what has been stated in the documents, certain unfounded conjectures or -assertions have been made with a view to interpreting the documents in -the manner in which Dr. Kranzbühler has endeavored to interpret them -from the initial stages of his defense. I do not belong to the category -of fortune tellers and palmists. I cannot conjecture what hypothetical -conclusions may be drawn from one or another of the documents. I am a -lawyer and I am accustomed to operate with documents such as they -appear, and I am accustomed to operate with the contents of a document -such as they are expressed. - -I consider that the Tribunal has quite correctly expressed to the -defense counsel the absolute impossibility of drawing the conclusions he -is attempting to reach, and I would ask that counsel for the defense be -reminded of his duty to limit himself exclusively to such -interpretations as may be deduced from the document. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -Your Honor, I would be grateful if the Tribunal would consider a general -point of procedure. We have a number of objections to a considerable -number of Dr. Kranzbühler’s documents. I have got out a short list -grouping, as far as is possible, our objections, which I can hand to the -Tribunal and, of course, to Dr. Kranzbühler, now. It is a matter for -consideration by the Tribunal whether it would be useful to see that -list before the Tribunal adjourns tonight, and maybe here tender certain -observations of Dr. Kranzbühler upon them. Then the Tribunal might be -able to give a decision with regard to certain of the documents before -sitting again tomorrow and thereby save some time. I suggest that to the -Tribunal for their consideration as perhaps the most profitable -procedure under the circumstances. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting that at a certain point of time we -should adjourn for the consideration of your list and then hear Dr. -Kranzbühler on it? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is what you suggest? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Sir. I was going to explain my list, put my -list to the Tribunal, and explain it; and then the Tribunal could hear -Dr. Kranzbühler upon it and adjourn at whatever time it is suitable. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I make a statement in that regard, Mr. -President? - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I do not agree with such a proceeding, Mr. -President. Before this Tribunal I have said very little as defense -counsel so far; but I am of the opinion that it is my turn now and that -I have to be granted permission to submit my documents in that order in -which I plan to and which I consider correct for my defense. - -I ask the Tribunal just to imagine what would have happened if, before -the presentation of their case by the Prosecution, I had said that I -should like to speak about the relevancy of the documents of the -Prosecution. I believe that this comparison shows that I should not have -thought of proceeding in this way. I shall try, before submitting my -documents, to explain their relevancy to a greater extent than I have -thought necessary until now. But I ask the Tribunal to grant that I -present my case now and to limit the Prosecution to making their -suggestions when I submit my documents individually. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The inconvenience of that course, My Lord, is -that I shall then be interrupting Dr. Kranzbühler every two or three -documents and making a specific objection to an individual document, -which will take a great deal of time. I thought it would be more -convenient if I indicated to the Tribunal my objections to the documents -in the usual way by classes rather than individually. - -I put it to the Tribunal to rule on whatever method they think would be -most convenient for them. The last thing I want is to interfere with Dr. -Kranzbühler’s presentation; but, on the other hand, the method that he -suggests will mean individual objections, because, of course, an -objection is useless if it is put in after Dr. Kranzbühler has developed -the document. Or, if it is not useless, it is at any rate of very much -less weight. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, supposing that Sir David presents his -objections to the documents now, whether in groups or in whatever way he -likes, and you then answer him individually upon each document, pointing -out the relevance in your view of each document; how does it harm you? -The Tribunal will then consider your arguments and will rule upon them, -and then you will know what documents the Tribunal has ruled out, and -you can then refer to any of the other documents in any way you please. - -The only object of it and the only effect of it is to prevent the -Prosecution’s having to get up and interrupt, put on the earphones, and -take the time for an individual objection to each document to which they -wish to object as it turns up. I cannot see that it can interfere with -you in the least. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have no objection to the -Prosecution’s stating their objections now. I merely wish to avoid my -having to reply to each individual objection. If I am permitted to state -my views when each individual document comes up, then I have no -objection to the Prosecution’s stating their objections now to -individual documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like you to state now your -objections to these documents. They will then allow Dr. Kranzbühler to -proceed with his discussion of the documents, answering your argument as -to the admissibility of each document that you object to when he comes -to it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please. Will Your Lordship just -allow me a moment to get my papers? I am afraid I have only the -Prosecution’s objections in English, but it may help those of the -Tribunal who do not understand English to have the numbers, at any rate, -in front of them. - -My Lord, the first group are documents which the Prosecution submits -have no probative value. These are D-53. My Lord, the “D” in this case -stands for Dönitz Document Book 53, Page 99; and D-49, Pages 130 and -131; D-51 and D-69. - -My Lord, the first of these, D-53, is a letter from a prisoner-of-war -camp, purporting to be signed by 67 U-boat commanders and in purely -general terms. The Prosecution submits that that is not helpful, either -from its form or from its material. - -My Lord, D-49, which is at Pages 130 to 131, is again in entirely -general terms and contains no indication of the moral or legal basis for -the opinion expressed. - -D-51 and D-69 are both newspaper reports. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Sir David. 130? I have not got a Page 131. -Is it an affidavit, or was it called an affidavit? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: “On the basis of the documents of the Navy Court archives -at...” - -Oh yes, I think the Document Book has got a bit out of order. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, maybe so. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it a sworn affidavit by somebody or other? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. 130 comes immediately before. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have got it now, yes, 131 comes somewhere before 130. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is it, My Lord. It is an affidavit by a -former fleet judge, and Your Lordship sees that the description which -the Prosecution gives of it as being in entirely general terms is, I -submit, justified by the wording of the document, and it is difficult to -see the basis which the learned opponent seems to profess for his -statements. - -My Lord, D-51, Page 134, is an extract from the _Völkischer Beobachter_ -of March 1945, and the Prosecution submits that the topic on which it is -is irrelevant to the matters developed against the Defendant Dönitz. -Number 69 is another newspaper report from the same paper of 14 November -1939, giving a list of armed British and French passenger ships. Now, My -Lord, the second group which we developed are those irrelevant -documents, D-5, D-9, D-10, D-12, D-13, D-29, D-48, D-60, D-74. - -Now, My Lord, the first of these, D-5, on the subject of Norway, seeks -to introduce by way of a footnote a summary of the documents which the -Tribunal dealt with when considering the documents in the case of the -Defendant Raeder, with regard to which the Tribunal expressed its -doubts, although it allowed them to be translated. The Tribunal will -remember that with regard to the Dönitz documents it was thought -convenient to have them translated without a preliminary argument. Now, -My Lord, the same argument applies to a footnote, to a speech of the -Defendant Von Ribbentrop, a summary of documents which came into German -possession long after the speech of the Defendant Ribbentrop was made. -The Prosecution submits it is irrelevant. - -And the documents 9, 10, 12, and 13 deal with the rescue of Allied -survivors in the years 1939 to 1941 inclusive. - -THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that last statement, “and all -apparently unsworn,” is an error. It ought to be that D-13 is apparently -unsworn. - -Now, My Lord, with regard to that the position is that whereas it is -quite true that a nonrescue order was issued by the defendant before 27 -May 1940, the really important period is round about 17 September 1942. -It seemed to the Prosecution unnecessary to go into these details for -the earlier period. There is no real doubt that there were some rescues. -The only point which the Prosecution is putting against the defendant is -that he did issue an order, which the Prosecution has proved, forbidding -rescue when there was any danger. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was the date you gave us, 17 November 1942? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the nonrescue order is before 27 May -1940. We cannot give the exact date, but we know from a reference in -another order that it must have been before 27 May 1940. And the order -with regard to the destruction of the crews of merchant ships is 17 -September 1942. - -Now, My Lord, the Document Number 29 contains four documents dealing -with the evidence of the witness Heisig. The first purports to be an -affidavit by a witness who speaks to the sort of statements the -Defendant Dönitz usually made and does not remember what was said on the -particular occasion referred to by the witness Heisig; and it contains a -good deal of argument. - -The second is a letter sent to counsel for the Defendant Dönitz, and, -with the exception of one sentence, denying that the defendant spoke in -the sense alleged by Heisig; the remainder of the statement which, of -course, is unsworn, is either argument or is vague or irrelevant. The -remaining two documents, both apparently unsworn, contain allegations -against the character of the witness Heisig. The Tribunal will remember -that no allegations were made against him; that there was no -cross-examination in regard to his character when he gave his evidence. -And the second deals with other lectures which are not those in -question. - -Now, My Lord, the next document, D-48, deals with the alleged good -treatment of Allied prisoners in German Naval prisoner-of-war camps, on -which subject no issue has been raised with this defendant. D-60, Page -209 deals with Italian- and French-declared danger zones, which, the -Prosecution submits, has no relevance to those declared by the Germans. -D-74 and D-60, Page 256, deal with the relationship between the British -and French merchant marines and their respective navies; and the -Prosecution submits that they are irrelevant as far as the British Navy -is concerned, if they have any relevance cumulative of D-67. - -Now, My Lord, the third group are details of the Contraband Control -System and they are D-60, Pages 173 to 198; D-72; D-60, Pages 204 and -205 and Pages 219 to 225. My Lord, these documents deal with the details -of the contraband control, what articles were contraband, declarations -of different governments; and it is submitted that details of the -contraband control are remote from the issues raised and entirely -irrelevant. I do not think in the presentation against either of the -Naval defendants questions of declarations of contraband were mentioned -at all, certainly not in regard to the Defendant Dönitz; and, in the -submission of the Prosecution, it’s really introducing matters which -are, I am sure, not helpful to the problems of this case. - -The fourth group, which can only be described in very general terms, are -allegations against the Allies. My Lord, the general objection I set out -in the first paragraph is this: Those documents consist of various -allegations against the Allies; they appear to have little or no -relevance to the issues and, if submitted, might necessitate the -Prosecution’s seeking the facilities to rebut the allegations; in which -case a large volume of evidence in rebuttal might be entailed. - -Then I have isolated those which deal with allegations that the Allies -did not pick up survivors; there are two: 43, 67; Pages 96 and 90. 31 -and 32 deal with Allied attacks on German air-sea rescue planes; 33 -accuses a Soviet submarine of sinking a hospital ship. - -And three, Numbers 37, 38, and 40, the last being a newspaper report, -allege that the Allies shot survivors. My Lord, the question of Allied -treatment of survivors is dealt with exhaustively by extract from the -German Naval Diary and, My Lord, that we are not objecting to because -there it is important not as evidence of the facts stated but as -evidence of the matters that had an effect on the German Naval Command. -For that purpose I am quite ready that Dr. Kranzbühler should put them -in and the Tribunal should consider them. And there is another document -which deals with that point quite fully, and I am quite prepared to let -that go in. - -Then, My Lord, the remainder allege either ruthless actions or breaches -of International Law by the Allies; and these are Number 19, Page 24, -the Göring exhibit; Numbers 7 and C-21, Page 91; 47, Pages 120, 121, -which is also a newspaper report; 52, 60, Pages 152 and 208; D-75, 81, -82, 85, and 89. - -Now, as I understand the defense that is developed here—the allegation -with regard to the order which we say sets out the destruction of -survivors—it is not that it was a reprisal, but the defense is that the -order did not mean destruction but merely meant nonrescue. On that basis -it seems difficult, indeed impossible, to appreciate how these matters -become relevant at all. - -And similarly with regard to the order for shooting Commandos. The -justification alleged for the order is set out in the order itself. I -haven’t heard any defendant develop any justification of that order in -giving evidence before the Tribunal. Every one of the defendants so far -has said this order was given by Hitler and “whether we approved of it -or not we had to carry it out.” - -So that, in my submission, there isn’t even the argument which is -foreshadowed, that breaches of the laws and usages of war can be in -certain occasions properly committed as reprisals. It is not put forward -from that point of view; there is no admission here, as I understand the -Defense, of breaches for which reprisal is the answer. Therefore, the -Prosecution submits that these documents are also irrelevant. - -My Lord, again I tried to put it as shortly as possible because I didn’t -want to occupy too much time, but I tried to correct them and describe -those which seemed of greatest importance. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know why this matter of the -admissibility of these documents hasn’t been argued before. In the other -cases with which we have dealt, the question of the admissibility has -been dealt with first of all by your offering your criticisms and -objections, and then the defendant’s counsel’s being heard in reply. -Then the Tribunal has ruled. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand the position, we did -put in objections to the documents and Dr. Kranzbühler suggested that he -would very much prefer the documents to be translated and the objections -taken at a later stage. And I was certainly informed that the Tribunal -agreed with that and ordered the document to be translated. - -THE PRESIDENT: That may be, for the purposes of translation. But that -doesn’t mean that they are necessarily admissible. And in most of the -other cases, if not all, as you will remember, we have had an argument -in open session in which you, or one other member of the Prosecution, -have made your objections, and then the defendant’s counsel has replied -to those objections. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Dr. Kranzbühler has just handed—yes... - -The ruling is: - - “The Tribunal has ruled that the documents mentioned in your - application may be translated, but that the question of their - admissibility is to be decided later.” - -My Lord, I am afraid I am at fault there. It didn’t occur to me, if I -may be quite frank with the Tribunal, that I should have come before the -beginning of the case Dönitz to make this argument. I am very sorry, and -I must accept responsibility. I assumed, without real justification, -that that meant the argument of admissibility would come at the -beginning, or at some convenient time, in the case of Dönitz. I am very -sorry, My Lord, and I can only express my regret. - -My Lord, there is this excuse: We had three of the books on Saturday, -and we only got the last one yesterday. Therefore, we really couldn’t -have done it before today, even if I had thought of it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal considers that in view of -the large number of documents to which the Prosecution objects, it will -be highly inconvenient to have you answer Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s -argument as you go through your documents; and therefore that you must -answer now and deal with them in the way in which the other counsel have -dealt with these objections to the admissibility of documents. Then the -Tribunal will be able to consider the arguments that Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe has put forward and the arguments that you put forward in -support of the documents. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I should like to point out -that just because of the many objections which the Prosecution makes -against the documents, I have for practical purposes to present all my -documents, for the line of thought pursued in presenting documentary -evidence implies a definite order of presentation and I cannot take out -one document or another without disturbing this line of thought. -Therefore, I believe it would save considerable time if the Tribunal -would permit me to answer the objections when I come to the particular -document. - -THE PRESIDENT: What difference could it make, assuming that the decision -of the Tribunal is the same, whether you argue the matter now or whether -you argue the matter afterwards? The documents which will remain, which -will have been held to be admissible, will be the same. Therefore, there -is no difference. I can’t see any argument in favor of what you are -saying. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, my documentary material, -exactly like that of the Prosecution, is organized with a definite -purpose in mind and according to a definite idea. If, of the 50 -documents which are contained in my documentary material, I have to -argue about 40, then 10 are lacking. Therefore, it seems to me proper -for me to discuss all 50, in the order in which I intended to submit -them to the Tribunal. - -If the Tribunal is of the opinion that the reasons given for the -relevancy of the different documents are not sufficient, then the -objectionable document can be withdrawn or refused. However, it seems -expedient to me that I present my arguments in the order which I have -been intending to follow, and not in the order in which the Prosecution -is now making its objections. That defeats my purpose and disturbs my -line of thought and, as defense counsel, I believe it is my task to -present my own line of thought and not to reply to the line of thought -pursued by the Prosecution or to their objections. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, if that is so, then you can present your argument -upon the relevancy of the documents in the order in which they come. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: But you have to do it now. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can begin with D-5, which is the first, and then go -on with D-9 and D-10; take them in the order in which they stand. - -Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal doesn’t see any reason why you should be -dealt with in a different way from which the other defendants have been -treated. Therefore, they think that you ought to be prepared to deal -with these documents in the way in which they are grouped here. They -would prefer that you should deal with them now, if you can deal with -them in a reasonably short space of time. Then they will be able to -determine the question of which documents shall be admitted during the -adjournment. Otherwise, they will have to adjourn tomorrow for a -consideration of that matter, which will still further hold up the -trial. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, of course, I can make general -statements as to the groups which the Prosecution has referred to, but I -cannot refer to the individual documents with the necessary detail to -establish their relevancy unequivocally. That is impossible for me, -confronted as I am by a list which I have not seen before. Therefore I -should like to ask, if I am to give reasons for each individual document -now, that I be given an opportunity to do that tomorrow morning. -However, if the Tribunal wishes only to hear general remarks about the -groups, I can do that right now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Kranzbühler. The Tribunal will adjourn -now, and we will hear you upon these documents at 9:30 tomorrow morning. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In open session, Mr. President? - -THE PRESIDENT: In open session, certainly, yes. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 8 May 1946, at 0930 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED - AND TWENTY-FOURTH DAY - Wednesday, 8 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant -Schirach is absent. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, with the permission of the -Tribunal, I shall now state my opinion on the documents to which the -Prosecution has objected. - -Before I refer to the individual documents, I should like to say two -things concerning the groups. - -First: I ask the Tribunal to recall that in general questions on naval -warfare I also defend Admiral Raeder. I already mentioned, when I first -applied for documents, that all the charges against naval warfare cannot -be dealt with separately as concerning Dönitz or Raeder; therefore Dr. -Siemers and I agreed that I should deal with these charges together. I -ask the Tribunal in evaluating the question to take into consideration -whether the charges are relevant. - -Second: A large number of the objections which the Prosecution has made -are directed against the fact that the war measures of the Allies are -mentioned in the documents. I believe that I have been completely -misunderstood especially in this field. I am not interested and it is -not my intention to disparage any war methods, and I shall demonstrate -later in detail that the documents are not suitable for this. But I -should like to state from the beginning that I want to show with these -documents what naval warfare was really like. I could not demonstrate -this by showing only the German methods; but I also have to submit to -this Tribunal the methods of the Allies in order to prove that the -German methods, which are similar to the Allies’ methods, were legal. -The Tribunal has even recognized this to be correct by approving the use -of British Admiralty orders and an interrogatory of the -Commander-in-Chief of the American Navy, Admiral Nimitz. - -I am very grateful that these documents were approved; and my own -documents in this field are along the same line. - -I shall now refer to the individual documents against which objections -have been raised; first to the Document Dönitz-5, which is in Document -Book 1, Page 7. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal has examined all these -documents; so I think you can deal with them as far as possible in -groups. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well. - -THE PRESIDENT: If possible, follow the order of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, it will not be possible for -me to follow the order of Sir David, because then I shall have to return -repeatedly to the line of ideas which I have already mentioned. I -believe it will facilitate and speed up the proceedings if I form groups -according to the order in which I intended to present them; and I should -like to remind the Tribunal that that was expressly approved for me -yesterday. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, it would be very much more convenient to -the Tribunal if you followed the order in the groups. But if you find -that impossible, the Tribunal would not make it a matter of an order. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should be very grateful, Mr. President, if -I could keep the order which I had prepared. It corresponds to the order -of Sir David. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Concerning the question of aggressive war, I -have another document to submit which is Dönitz-5. It is an excerpt from -_Documente der Deutschen Politik_, and concerns the question of bases in -Norway. I consider this document relevant because it shows that on the -part of the British Admiralty an interrogatory was prepared on the -question of the necessity of such a base, which corresponds exactly to -the one with which the Prosecution has charged Admiral Dönitz in -Document GB-83 as proof for aggressive war. - -Thereby I wish to say that the answers on such interrogatories have -nothing to do with any considerations concerning an aggressive war, -which a subordinate office could not even make. The document is in Group -2 of Sir David’s classification. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that the footnote stands on the same -footing as the other part of the document? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The footnote is the essential part for me, -Mr. President. I had the other part copied only to keep the connection -with the footnote. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, who wrote the footnote? Doesn’t the footnote -represent information which was not before the German Admiralty at the -time? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, no. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, does the footnote state that it was before the -German Admiralty at the time? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, Mr. President. The footnote was not -known to the German Admiralty at the time. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is what I said; the footnote was not known to the -German Admiralty. Who wrote it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The footnote is part of this document, which -can be found in the collection _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_... - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the Defendant Ribbentrop the author of it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, Mr. President. The _Dokumente der -Deutschen Politik_ are an official collection, and the footnotes have -been written by the editor of that collection on the basis of official -material. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I come to the documents concerning naval -warfare in general. A large part of those are in Sir David’s Group 3. -The first document is Dönitz-60, on Page 152. It concerns an American -note of 6 October 1939, and is in connection with the Document -Dönitz-61, to which the Prosecution has not objected. It is in Volume -III of the document book, Mr. President. Volume III, Page 152. This -document is an American reply to the document which you will find two -pages before this, on Page 150. Both documents deal with the warning of -neutral nations against suspicious actions of their merchant vessels. -The question is relevant in respect to Exhibit GB-193 of the -Prosecution. In this document a charge is made against an order that -ships which act suspiciously—that is, proceed without lights—should be -sunk. - -The next document is from Sir David’s Group 1, Dönitz-69, on Page 170, -in Book 3. It is an excerpt from several copies of the _Völkischer -Beobachter_ of November and December 1939. In these copies are published -lists of armed British and French passenger ships. This document also is -in connection with a preceding document and the one following. All these -documents deal with the question of treatment of passenger ships by the -naval warfare command. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better give the numbers of the documents. -You said the next document and the one before it. I think you had better -give the numbers of the documents. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. That is Document 69, Mr. President, -Dönitz-69, and it is on Page 170, in Book 3. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is, but you said something about documents -that were akin, or some words to that effect, to the documents next to -it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is in relation to Dönitz-68, on Page 169 -of the document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was that objected to? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then, you need not bother with it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I only wanted to show, Mr. President, that -this document is only part of the proof about the treatment of passenger -ships, and should prove that the German press had warned against the -using of armed passenger ships. The next documents objected to by the -Prosecution concern Group 3, “The Contraband and Control System.” These -are the documents Dönitz-60, from Page 173 to Page 197 of the document -book, and I should like to form three groups of these. - -The first group, from Page 173 to Page 181, concerns the question of -contraband. I consider this question relevant because Document GB-191 -has stated that the German U-boats sank a large number of Allied ships -while these ships were on a legal merchant trip. The development of -rules against contraband will show the Tribunal that from 12 December -1939 on, a legal import to England no longer existed but actually only -contraband. These documents concerning contraband are important, -furthermore, for the German point of view, which became known under the -slogan of “Hunger Blockade” and which played an important part in all -German deliberations about the conduct and the intensification of naval -warfare. The documents contain in detail the German contraband -regulations, the British regulations, and two German statements -concerning these contraband regulations. - -The next group is Dönitz-60, from Page 183 to Page 191. That concerns -the regulations about putting into control ports; that is to say, the -British Admiralty removed the control over neutral merchant shipping -from the high seas into certain British ports. This group is also -relevant in connection with Exhibit GB-191 because in this document the -German Naval Operations Staff is accused of carrying out war measures -against England without consideration of the danger to neutrals. The -group which I have dealt with shows that it was not possible for the -British Admiralty either to take war measures without endangering the -neutrals, because, by the establishment of control ports, the neutrals -were forced into German zones of operations and thereby, of course, -endangered. This danger was confirmed by the neutrals themselves, and -the documents on Pages 186 to 189 will prove this. - -An excerpt from the document of the Prosecution GB-194 on Page 198 -belongs to that same group. It contains a renewed American protest -against the control ports. - -The third group goes from Page 192 to 197, also Dönitz-60, and is -concerned with the question of an export embargo. This export blockade -was declared against Germany in an Order in Council of 27 November 1939. -This measure is important in the question of legal trade because thereby -legal export was no longer possible either. The export blockade -therefore is a basis for the total blockade which was later declared by -Germany against England. Since the Exhibit GB-191 disputes the legality -of a total blockade I must prove the basic grounds and also the export -blockade. - -The next document objected to is Dönitz-72 on Page 185. It deals with a -note by Great Britain to Belgium of 22 September. In this note the -British Government states that they will not tolerate any increase of -trade between Belgium and Germany. I use it as evidence for the fact -that the economic pressure which can be seen from this note was a -natural and accepted means of warfare. This question is relevant -concerning the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-224. There on -Page 6 under heading (c) it is stated that Germany would necessarily -have to exert economic pressure on the neutrals, and these statements -were submitted by the Prosecution as measures contrary to international -law. - -The next group contains the following documents: Dönitz-60, Page 204; -Dönitz-72, Page 207; Dönitz-60, Page 208; Dönitz-60, Page 209; and -Dönitz-75, Page 218. All of these documents concern the development of -German zones of operation and the recognition of the zones of operation -which were declared by the opponents. These documents are relevant for -the question of the treatment of neutrals. In Exhibit GB-191 the charge -was made against the Naval Operations Staff that without any -consideration it had given the order to torpedo neutral ships. My -evidence shall prove that that happened only in those areas which the -neutrals had been warned against using and that this is a permissible -measure of warfare, as shown also by the practices of the enemy. - -I should like to refer individually to two documents which concern the -practices of the opposing side. Dönitz-60, Page 208, concerns the -statement by Mr. Churchill of 8 May 1940 regarding the torpedoing of -ships in the Jutland area. This document and the next one, Dönitz-60, -Page 209, I wanted to put to a witness. Dönitz-60, Page 209, concerns a -French statement about a danger zone near Italy. I am using both -documents as evidence for the practical state of naval warfare and -should like to discuss them with a witness. It goes without saying that -the methods of the enemy also had some influence on German practices. - -The next group contains documents Dönitz-60, Pages 219, 222, and 224. -They deal with the British system of navicerts. The navicerts, as can be -seen from these documents, were certificates which all neutral ships had -to get from the British Consulate before they could put to sea. Ships -which refused to use navicerts were confiscated. The navicert system is -relevant in two respects. - -First, it is mentioned in the German statement concerning the total -blockade against England on 17 August 1940 as one reason for that -blockade. Secondly, from the German point of view it was a nonneutral -act on the part of the neutrals if they submitted to that system. This -question plays a considerable part in determining to what extent Germany -herself from that time on took consideration of neutrals in the zones of -operations. Finally, the navicert system shows the development of an -entirely new naval warfare law, and that is a very important subject for -me. - -The next document is Dönitz-60, Page 256. It is a French decree of 11 -November 1939 concerning the creation of insignia for the crews of -merchant ships who could be mobilized. This document is relevant for the -question of whether the crews of merchant ships at that stage of the war -should be considered combatants or noncombatants. The details of the -decree seem to me to show that they would have to be considered -combatants. - -With the two following documents I should like to object to the -probative value of the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-191. This -concerns my Documents Dönitz-81, Page 233, and Dönitz-82, Page 234. I -had said that these two documents would dispute the probative value of -the Document GB-191. That is the report of the British Foreign Office -about German naval warfare. On Page 1 this report attacks Article 72 of -the German Prize Regulations in which it states that ships can be sunk -if they cannot be brought into port. Document GB-191 says that this is -contrary to the traditional British conception. - -My Document Dönitz-81 shows the sinking of the German freighter Olinda -by the British cruiser _Ajax_ on the first day of the war. It is only -one example to show that the statement made in the report of the British -Foreign Office, according to which the British fleet had not sunk ships -if they could not or would not bring them to port, is incorrect. - -In the same report of the British Foreign Office, German U-boats are -accused of never differentiating between armed and unarmed merchant -ships. Later I shall submit to the Court the orders concerning armed and -unarmed merchant ships. - -By my next document I merely wish to defend the U-boats against having -each mistake interpreted as bad intent. Therefore, in Dönitz-82, I -submit a statement by the British Foreign Office which confirms that it -is extremely difficult, if not impossible, in some cases to distinguish -between armed merchant ships and unarmed merchant ships. - -The next document, Dönitz-85, Page 242, contains a statement by the -American Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, concerning the question of -keeping secret the sinking of German U-boats by American naval forces. -For me it is essential in connection with the document of the -Prosecution, Exhibit GB-194. In this document the measures which the -naval war staff took to keep secret the sinkings by U-boats, that is, -using as a pretense the fiction of sinking through mines, are presented -as fraudulent. I should like to give this as an example that during a -war military measures can naturally be kept secret, but that that is no -proof for or against their legality. - -The next document is Dönitz-89, on Page 246. It is a list drawn up by -the Naval Operations Staff of violations of neutrality committed by the -United States from September 1939 to 29 September 1941. The document is -essential to counter the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-195, -which contains an order from Adolf Hitler of July 1941 in which it is -stated that in the future even the merchant ships of the United States -must be treated within the German zone of blockade in the same manner as -all other neutral ships, that is to say, they should be sunk. - -The Prosecution has interpreted this order as proof of a cynical and -opportunistic conduct of U-boat warfare by Admiral Dönitz. I wish to -show, by submitting this list, that from the German point of view it was -completely understandable and is justifiable if in the summer of 1941 -one did not grant the United States a better position than any other -neutral. - -Now I come to the subject of the treatment of shipwrecked survivors. -These documents are in Volume I of the document book. The first -document, Dönitz-9, on Page 11, offers a description of over-scrupulous -measures taken by German U-boats to save survivors in September and -October 1939. This is essential for Admiral Dönitz... - -THE PRESIDENT: There must surely be a group of these, is there not? -Haven’t you got a number of documents which deal with shipwrecks? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, there are a number of documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you not deal with them all together? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I can assemble them. -They are Documents Dönitz-9, Page 11, Dönitz-10, Page 12, Dönitz-12, -Page 18, and Dönitz-13, Pages 19 to 26, and Page 49, and Dönitz-19 on -Page 34. All these documents are related to Exhibit GB-196 of the -Prosecution. That is an order from the winter of 1939-1940 in which the -rescue measures of U-boats are limited. Sir David objected to that group -that it was not important if, after this order of the winter 1939-1940, -rescues were still carried out. I cannot share this opinion. If the -Prosecution accuses Admiral Dönitz of having given an order about the -limitation of rescue measures in the winter of 1939-1940, then it is -essential to point out for what reasons such an order was issued and -what practical consequences it had in fact. It is my assertion that that -order can be traced, first, to the fighting conditions of the U-boats -along the British coasts, and second, to over-scrupulous rescue measures -taken by the commanders. The order did not prohibit measures of rescue -generally, and that will be shown by the statements made by the -commanders, which I have submitted under Dönitz-13. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it possible for you to give us a page where we can -find these GB documents? For instance, GB-196. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. It is in the British document book on -Page 33. In the document book of the Prosecution, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: GB-195? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Page 32, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to state my position on a -formal objection. Some of these statements are not sworn statements. I -refer to Article 19 of the Charter, according to which the Tribunal is -to use all matters of evidence which have probative value. I believe -that a written report by an officer about his activity as commanding -officer has probative value, even if it is not sworn to. A report of -this kind before a German naval court would be accepted in evidence -without question. - -The last document in this group, Dönitz-19, Page 34, concerns the -document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-199. It is a radio message on -Page 36 of the British document book of the Prosecution. It concerns a -radio message which the U-boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Schacht -received from Admiral Dönitz, and deals with the rescue or nonrescue of -Englishmen and Italians. - -Document Dönitz-19 is a log book of Schacht’s U-boat and shows, first, -the armament and crew of the _Laconia_, whose crew is the one in -question, and second, it explains why comparatively few of the numerous -Italians and comparatively many of the less numerous Englishmen were -rescued. The events were known to Admiral Dönitz from radio messages. - -Document Dönitz-29... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, as I told you, the Tribunal has read all -of these documents and examined them, and therefore it isn’t necessary -for you to go into them as a small group, and it isn’t necessary for you -to go into each document, if you will indicate the nature of the groups. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I should like to mention the Documents -Dönitz-29 on Pages 54 to 59 of the document book; Dönitz-31, Page 64; -Dönitz-32 on Page 65; Dönitz-33 on Page 66; Dönitz-37 on Page 78; -Dönitz-38 on Page 80 and Dönitz-40 on Page 86; these documents are also -concerned with the subject of survivors. Dönitz-29 is concerned with a -statement of the witness Heisig. - -The Prosecution has declared that I could not question the character of -the witness Heisig because I had not made that point during the -cross-examination of Heisig. In this connection I wish to state that in -my opinion I attacked the credibility of Heisig during the -cross-examination as far as it was possible at the time. I knew of the -existence of that witness only three days before he appeared here. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you are now proceeding to deal with each -document. You have given us quite a number of documents which all fall -in this group, of the treatment of shipwrecks and we have already seen -those documents and therefore, we can consider them as a group. We do -not need to have these details about the question of the credibility of -Heisig, which is already before us. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I believe it is very -difficult to judge the relevancy of documents if I am not permitted to -say what the connection is. For instance, the next three documents, -Dönitz-31, 32 and 33, are related to GB-200. That is an order by the -Flag Officer of the U-boats dealing with the treatment of so-called -rescue ships. The Tribunal will recall that the Prosecution has stated -it did not object to the order as such with reference to the sinking of -rescue ships, but only to the tendency to kill the survivors also by -sinking rescue ships. - -My documents pertaining to this issue are to show that thus they apply -moral standards which do not exist in wartime. I wish to show this -comparison with the sea rescue planes. The sea rescue planes were -rightfully shot down by the British Air Force, because there was no -agreement which prohibited that. The British Air Force was therefore -naturally not kept from shooting down rescue planes by moral -consideration, if international law permitted it; and we have exactly -the same point of view concerning the rescue ships. - -In the case of the sinking of the steamer _Steuben_, I should like to -correct an error. That is Document Dönitz-33. It does not deal, as Sir -David mentioned yesterday, with the sinking of a hospital ship by a -Russian U-boat, but it concerns the sinking of a German transport ship -which carried wounded. This sinking was, therefore, completely justified -and I would like to show with this document that the Naval Operations -Staff did not for a moment consider it unjustified. I believe, Mr. -President, that I shall have to speak in more detail about the Documents -Dönitz-37, 38, and 40, for it is precisely these documents which have -been objected to by the Prosecution, because they show the conduct of -the Allies in certain war measures. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, as I have told you more than once, the -Tribunal does not wish to hear you on each individual document. We have -already considered the documents and we want you to deal with them in -groups. You have already given us the documents in a group and have -indicated to what subject they relate. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, may I at least mention the -documents of the Prosecution to which my documents refer? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Dönitz-37 refers to a document of the -Prosecution, Exhibit GB-638. That is the statement by Admiral Dönitz -concerning the case of the _Athenia_. At the end of that statement the -question of the punishment of the U-boat commander is mentioned and the -Prosecution apparently accuses Admiral Dönitz of not punishing the -commander except in a disciplinary manner. I want to prove with this -Document Dönitz-37 that a commanding officer will tolerate certain war -measures once even if they were not correct or at least partly not -correct. - -Dönitz-38 is in connection with Document Dönitz-39, which has not been -objected to by the Prosecution. It brings out only one detail from the -Document Dönitz-39. This document states the attitude of the Naval -Operations Staff to alleged reports about the Allies’ firing on -survivors and similar incidents. By Dönitz-38 I only intend to show that -the very careful attitude of the Naval Operations Staff was not based on -lack of proof for they even had affidavits to prove it, and in spite of -that rejected any possibility of reprisals. - -Dönitz-40 is in connection with Document Dönitz-42 which I submitted and -against which no objection has been raised. In this document quite sober -considerations are raised as to whether survivors could be fired on or -not. I should like to show that such considerations perhaps appear -inhumane and impossible after a war, but that during war such questions -are examined and in certain cases are answered in the affirmative, -according to military necessity. - -The next two documents, Göring-7, on Page 89, and C-21, on Page 91, deal -with the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-205. That was a radio -message concerning the sinking of an Allied sailing cutter. GB-205 is on -Page 53 of the Prosecution’s document book. The Prosecution in -connection with this document has accused our naval warfare command of -trying to terrorize the crews of neutral ships. Both my documents, -Göring-7 and C-21, give only a few examples to the effect that that -terrorizing is nothing illegal but that naturally each belligerent in -taking military measures considers the psychological effect of these -measures on the enemy. - -The next group is Document Dönitz-43, on Page 95; Dönitz-90, on Page -258, and Dönitz-67, on Page 96. They all deal with the subject of -whether a ship is obliged to carry out rescues if this would endanger -the ship itself, and relates to the document of the Prosecution, GB-196 -on Page 33 of the document book of the Prosecution and GB-199 on Page 36 -of the Prosecution’s book. They show first the methods of the British -navy... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you have told us the subject they relate -to. That is to say, they relate to the subject whether a ship is obliged -to rescue if in danger, and that, you say, is an answer to GB-196 and -199. Why should you tell us anything more than that? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If that is sufficient, then I shall proceed, -Mr. President. The last document in this group is Dönitz-53, Page 99. It -is a statement signed by some 60 U-boat commanders from an English -prisoner-of-war camp, and it deals with the fact that they never -received an order to kill survivors. The Prosecution objected to it -because it was considered too general and was not sworn to. I believe -that it contains a very concrete statement concerning the alleged order -for destruction. Furthermore, it is an official report by the German -commanders as prisoners of war to their superior, the English camp -commandant; and I received it through the British War Office. I request -the Tribunal particularly to approve this document, because it has a -high probative and moral value for myself and for my client. - -The last group of the documents objected to comes under the heading -“Conspiracy.” It is in the document book, Volume II, Mr. President, -Dönitz-47, and relates to Exhibit GB-212. Dönitz-47 is on Page 120. The -document of the Prosecution is Exhibit GB-212. On Page 75 an incident is -mentioned, namely, that Admiral Dönitz approved the fact that a traitor -in a prisoner-of-war camp was done away with. Dönitz-47 will show that -the removal of traitors is an emergency measure which is approved by all -governments in time of war. - -Dönitz-48 deals with the subject of the treatment of prisoners of war. -It is related to the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-209. -Dönitz-48 is on Page 122 in my document book, and GB-209 is on Page 68 -of the document book of the Prosecution. In connection with GB-209, -which deals with the possibility of abandoning the Geneva Convention, -the Prosecution accuses Dönitz of wanting to risk the lives of 150,000 -American and over 50,000 British prisoners of war without scruple. In my -opinion, it is not sufficient merely to dispute such a statement which -is made by the Prosecution, but I must prove that those prisoners of war -for whom Admiral Dönitz himself was responsible were not only treated -according to international law but in an exemplary manner and as can be -seen from a British statement, which is contained in evidence, “with -fairness and consideration.” - -The next document Dönitz-49 deals with the treatment of native -populations. It is on Page 130. It is relevant to the documents of the -Prosecution GB-210, Prosecution document book Page 69, and GB-211, -Prosecution document book Page 72. According to these two documents of -the Prosecution Admiral Dönitz is connected with the conspiracy for -committing crimes against the native populations of occupied -territories. Here again, I would like to show that in that sector for -which he was personally responsible, he did everything necessary to -protect the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Therefore I have -submitted evidence concerning the sentences imposed by the naval courts -for the protection of the inhabitants, which have been confirmed by -Admiral Dönitz even in the case of death sentences against German -soldiers. - -The Prosecution states that this document is also very general. The -document has an appendix with about 80 individual examples of sentences. -I have not included these examples, in order to save the translators -this work; but if the Tribunal considers it necessary, I will certainly -have that appendix translated. - -The last group contains Dönitz-51, on Page 134, and Dönitz-52, on Page -135. They are in connection with the Prosecution’s Document GB-188, on -Page 10 of the British document book. That is the speech made by Admiral -Dönitz on the occasion of Adolf Hitler’s death. In connection with that -document and another, the Prosecution has accused him of being a -fanatical Nazi and, as such, of prolonging the war at the expense of the -men, women, and children of his country. The very documents of the -Prosecution, however, show that he considered a delay of capitulation -necessary in order to make it possible to get as many people as possible -from the East to the West and thus bring them to safety. - -The Documents Dönitz-51 and Dönitz-52 will prove that in fact many -hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of German people were brought to -safety during these last weeks of the war. - -THE PRESIDENT: We shall see that from the documents presumably. That is -part of the details in the documents, isn’t it, what you say? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I do not need to say anything further about -it, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are these all the documents? Dr. Kranzbühler, the -Tribunal is inclined to think that it would save time after the Tribunal -has ruled upon these documents, if you called the Defendant Dönitz -first. Would you be willing to do that? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I was not prepared for it, -but I am in a position to do so. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the object of it of course is to try and save time, -and the Tribunal thinks that in the course of the examination of the -defendant a considerable number of these documents might possibly be -dealt with in the course of direct and cross-examination. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The difficulty, however, -is that during the examination of Admiral Dönitz I should like to count -on the knowledge of the contents of the documents; and I should also -like to discuss some documents with him. But I do not know whether the -Tribunal will approve these documents now or not. - -THE PRESIDENT: But what I am suggesting is that the Tribunal should -consider now the relevance of these documents, the admissibility of -these documents, and then tell you—make a rule—as to what documents -are admitted. You will then know what documents are admitted. Then you -can call Admiral Dönitz and of course examine him with reference to the -documents which are admitted; and as I have told you, the Tribunal has -already looked at these documents. They will now reconsider them, in -order to see whether they are admissible, and the Tribunal will in that -way, to a large extent, be fully acquainted with the documents. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I agree to that, Mr. President. I will -call Admiral Dönitz if the Tribunal deems it proper. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you have been dealing with a Document -Dönitz-60, which contains a great number of pages to which you wish to -refer. When we have ruled upon them you will have to give separate -exhibit numbers to each one of the documents—to each one of the pages -which we will rule are admissible and which you wish to offer in -evidence. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, may I point out that this is -one book. Dönitz-60 is one book. That is why I have not given it an -exhibit number, because I submit it as one. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but it contains so many pages that it will be more -convenient, will it not, to give each separate page a separate exhibit -number? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems to relate to a great variety of subjects. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, a collection of documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now as you dealt with the various subjects in entirely -different order than the way in which Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe dealt with -them, I think it would be convenient if we heard anything he wants to -say about it. Only if you do wish to say something, Sir David. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord. My Lord, I have heard the -Tribunal say that they have had an opportunity of examining the -documents and therefore I propose to be extremely brief in any remarks I -have to make: and may I make one explanation before I deal with the very -few points? - -My friend, Colonel Pokrovsky, wanted to make it clear—as I think it was -clear to the Tribunal yesterday—that there had been no objection to -Documents 3 and 4 because in these they deal with a secret base in the -North which is only of importance for the attacks against wood -transports from the North Russian ports. The objectionable matter, as I -think the Tribunal pointed out, was introduced in a statement of Dr. -Kranzbühler which has no foundation in the documents. Colonel Pokrovsky -was very anxious that I should make that clear on behalf of the -Prosecution. - -My Lord, I think there are really only two points which I need emphasize -in reply to the Tribunal. The first is on my Group 3, the details of the -Contraband Control System. My Lord, I submit that on this there is an -essential _non sequitur_ in Dr. Kranzbühler’s argument. He says that, -first of all, the carrying of contraband by merchant ships, to carry his -argument to its logical conclusion, would entitle a belligerent to -sinking at sight. That, I submit, with great respect to him, is -completely wrong; and it does not follow that because you establish -certain rules and lists of contraband that the right to sink at sight is -affected at all. - -Similarly, his second point with regard to the British navicert system. -That system was used in World War I and is a well-known system. But -again, the essential _non sequitur_ or absence of connection is this, -that if a neutral goes to one of the control ports and gets a navicert, -that does not put that neutral into so un-neutral an act as to make it -the equivalent of a ship of war, which is the position that my -friend—that Dr. Kranzbühler—would have to take if that argument were -to succeed. - -His third division wishes to put in documents showing economic pressures -on, for example, Belgium, with regard to the import of goods. The naval -defendants are not being charged with economic pressure; they are -charged with killing people on the high seas. Now again, I have dealt -with it very shortly, and the Prosecution submits and takes the view -very strongly that the whole of that documentary evidence is several -steps removed from the issues in the case. - -Now the second group of matters which I wanted to refer to. I can take -as an example the document making several score of allegations of -un-neutral acts against the United States. The case for the Prosecution -on sinking at sight is that sinking at sight against various groups of -neutrals was adopted as a purely political matter, according to the -advantage or, when it was abstained from, the disadvantage which Germany -might get from her relations with these neutrals. And it does not help -in answering that allegation of the Prosecution. That is a matter of -fact which can be judged, whether the Prosecution is right. It does not -help on that to say that the United States committed certain nonneutral -acts. If anything, it would be supporting the contention of the -Prosecution that sinking on sight was applied arbitrarily according to -the political advantages which could be obtained from it. - -And the only other point—and again my friend, Colonel Pokrovsky, wishes -me to emphasize it—is that these, the collection of unsworn statements, -are of course in a very different position, from any legal standard, -from reports made by officers in the course of their duty. Those are -admissible in all military courts, probably in every country in the -world. These are an _ad hoc_ collection. They are not only unsworn but -they are vague, indefinite, and insufficiently related to the order -which is adhered to in the case of the Prosecution. - -My Lord, I have tried to cut it very short, but I did want the Tribunal -to appreciate that on all these groups and especially, if I may say so, -on Groups 3 and 4, the Prosecution feels very strongly on this matter in -the case. I am grateful to the Tribunal for giving me the opportunity of -saying this. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is absent -from this session. - -THE PRESIDENT: I will deal with the documents in the order in which they -were dealt with by Fleet Judge Kranzbühler. - -The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-5, Page 7 of the document book. - -The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-60, Page 152. - -The Tribunal allows Dönitz-69, Page 170. - -The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-60, Pages 173 to 197. - -The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-72, Page 185. - -The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-60, Page 204. - -It rejects Dönitz-74, Page 207. - -It allows Dönitz-60, Page 208. - -It rejects Dönitz-60, Page 209. - -It rejects Dönitz-75, Page 218. - -It rejects Dönitz-60, Page 219, Page 222 and Page 224. - -It allows Dönitz-60, Page 256. - -It rejects Dönitz-81, Page 233 and 234; 234 being Dönitz-82. - -It rejects Dönitz-85, Page 242. - -It rejects Dönitz-89, Page 246. - -It allows Dönitz-9, Page 11, and Dönitz-10, Page 12. - -It rejects Dönitz-12, Page 18. - -It allows Dönitz-13, Pages 19 to 26, and Page 49. - -It allows Dönitz-19, Page 34. - -It allows Dönitz-29, Pages 54 to 59, leaving out—that is to say, not -allowing—Page 58. - -It rejects Dönitz-31, Page 64. - -It rejects Dönitz-32, Page 65. - -It rejects Dönitz-33, Page 66. - -It allows Dönitz-37, Page 78. - -It rejects Dönitz-38, Page 80. - -It rejects Dönitz-40, Page 86. - -It rejects Göring Number 7, Page 89. - -With reference to the next exhibit, Page 91, the Tribunal would like to -know from Fleet Judge Kranzbühler whether that is already in evidence or -not. It is Page 91 in the Dönitz Document Book in English, Volume II, -Page 91. - -It is headed “C-21, GB-194.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is an excerpt from a document which the -Prosecution has submitted here and which is therefore already in -evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then; we need not be troubled about it. - -The Tribunal rejects Dönitz-43, Page 95. - -It allows Dönitz-90, Page 258. - -It allows Dönitz-67, Page 96. - -It allows Dönitz-53, Page 99. - -It rejects Dönitz-47, Page 120. - -It allows Dönitz-48, Page 122. - -It rejects Dönitz-49, Page 131. - -It rejects Dönitz-51 and 52, Pages 134 and 135. - -That is all. - -The Tribunal will adjourn today at a quarter to five and it will be -sitting in closed session thereafter. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call -Admiral Dönitz as witness. - -[_The Defendant Dönitz took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -KARL DÖNITZ (Defendant): Karl Dönitz. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, since 1910 you have been a -professional officer; is that correct? - -DÖNITZ: Since 1910 I have been a professional soldier, and an officer -since 1913. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. During the World War, the first World -War, were you with the U-boat service? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, from 1916. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Until the end? - -DÖNITZ: Until the end of the war. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: After the first World War, when did you -again have contact with the U-boat service? - -DÖNITZ: On 27 September 1935 I became the commanding officer of the -U-boat Flotilla Weddigen, the first German U-boat flotilla after 1918. -As an introduction to taking up that command, that is, in September -1935, I spent a few days in Turkey, in order to go there in a U-boat and -to bridge the gap from 1918. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thus from 1918 to 1935 you had nothing to do -with U-boats? - -DÖNITZ: No, nothing at all. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was your rank when you went to the -U-boat service in 1935? - -DÖNITZ: I was a Fregattenkapitän. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did the German U-boat service at that -time consist of? - -DÖNITZ: The U-boat Flotilla Weddigen, of which I became the commanding -officer, consisted of three small boats of 250 tons each, the so-called -“Einbäume.” Besides, there were six somewhat smaller boats which were in -a U-boat school, which was not under my command, for the purpose of -training. Then there were afloat and in service perhaps another six of -these small boats. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who informed you of that command as C. O. of -the U-boat flotilla? - -DÖNITZ: Admiral Raeder. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Raeder on that occasion issue -the order that the U-boat arm should be prepared for a specific war? - -DÖNITZ: No. I merely received the order to fill in that gap from 1918, -to train the U-boats for the first time in cruising, submersion, and -firing. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you prepare the U-boats for war against -merchant shipping? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. I instructed the commanders as to how they should behave if -they stopped a merchantman and I also issued an appropriate tactical -order for each commander. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean to say that the preparation for -war against merchantmen was a preparation for war according to Prize -Regulations? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is to say, the preparations were -concerned with the stopping of ships on the surface? - -DÖNITZ: The only instruction which I gave concerning the war against -merchantmen was an instruction on how the U-boat should behave in the -stopping and examining, the establishing of the destination and so on, -of a merchantman. Later, I believe in the year 1938, when the draft of -the German Prize Regulations came, I passed this on to the flotillas for -the instruction of the commanders. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You developed a new tactic for U-boats which -became known under the name “wolf pack tactics.” What was there to these -pack tactics, and did that mean anything in connection with the warfare -against merchantmen according to the Prize Regulations? - -DÖNITZ: The U-boats of all navies had so far operated singly, contrary -to all other categories of ships which, by tactical co-operation, tried -to get better results. The development of the “wolf pack tactics” was -nothing further than breaking with that principle of individual action -for each U-boat and attempting to use U-boats exactly in the same manner -as other categories of warships, collectively. Such a method of -collective action was naturally necessary when a formation was to be -attacked, be it a formation of warships, that is, several warships -together, or a convoy. These “wolf pack tactics,” therefore, have -nothing to do with war against merchantmen according to Prize -Regulations. They are a tactical measure to fight formations of ships, -and, of course, convoys, where procedure according to Prize Regulations -cannot be followed. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you given the mission, or even obliged -to prepare for war, against a definite enemy? - -DÖNITZ: I did not receive such a general mission. I had the mission of -developing the U-boat service as well as possible, as it is the duty of -every front-line officer of all armed forces of all nations, in order to -be prepared against all war emergencies. Once, in the year 1937 or 1938, -in the mobilization plan of the Navy, my order read that, in case France -should try to interrupt the rearmament by an attack on Germany, it would -be the task of the German U-boats to attack the transports in the -Mediterranean which would leave North Africa for France. I then carried -out maneuvers in the North Sea with this task in mind. If you are asking -me about a definite aim or line of action, that, so far as I remember, -was the only mission which I received in that respect from the Naval -Operations Staff. That occurred in the year 1936 or 1937. According to -my recollection, that plan had been issued lest the rearmament of -Germany, at that time unarmed, might be interrupted by some measure or -other. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the year 1939, then, was the German -U-boat service prepared technically and tactically for a naval war -against England? - -DÖNITZ: No. The German U-boat service, in the fall of 1939, consisted of -about thirty to forty operational boats. That meant that at any time -about one-third could be used for operations. In view of the harsh -reality the situation seemed much worse later. There was one month, for -instance, when we had only two boats out at sea. With this small number -of U-boats it was, of course, only possible to give pinpricks to a great -naval power such as England. That we were not prepared for war against -England in the Navy, is, in my opinion, best and most clearly to be seen -from the fact that the armament of the Navy had to be radically changed -at the beginning of the war. It had been the intention to create a -homogeneous fleet which, of course, since it was in proportion much -smaller than the British fleet, was not capable of waging a war against -England. This program for building a homogeneous fleet had to be -discontinued when the war with England started; only these large ships -which were close to completion were finished. Everything else was -abandoned or scrapped. That was necessary in order to free the building -capacity for building U-boats. And that, also, explains why the German -U-boat war, in this last war, actually only started in the year 1942, -that is to say, when the U-boats which had been ordered for building at -the beginning of the war were ready for action. Since peacetime, that is -in 1940, the replacement of U-boats hardly covered the losses. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has repeatedly termed the -U-boat arm an aggressive weapon. What do you say to this? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that is correct. The U-boat has, of course, the assignment -of approaching an enemy and attacking him with torpedoes. Therefore, in -that respect, the U-boat is an aggressive weapon. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean to say by that that it is a -weapon for an aggressive war? - -DÖNITZ: Aggressive or defensive war is a political decision and, -therefore, it has nothing to do with military considerations. I can -certainly use a U-boat in a defensive war because, in defensive war -also, the enemy’s ships must be attacked. Of course, I can use a U-boat -in exactly the same way in a politically aggressive war. If one should -conclude that the navies which have U-boats are planning an aggressive -war, then all nations—for all the navies of these nations had U-boats, -in fact many had more than Germany, twice and three times as -many—planned aggressive war. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your capacity as Flag Officer of U-boats, -did you yourself have anything to do with the planning of the war as -such? - -DÖNITZ: No, nothing at all. My task was to develop U-boats militarily -and tactically for action, and to train my officers and men. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before the beginning of this war did you -give any suggestions or make any proposals concerning a war against a -definite enemy? - -DÖNITZ: No, in no instance. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you do so after this war had started -concerning a new enemy? - -DÖNITZ: No, not in that case either. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has submitted some documents -which contain orders from you to the U-boats and which date from before -the beginning of this war. An order for the placing of certain U-boats -in the Baltic and west of England, and an order before the Norway action -for the disposition of U-boats along the Norwegian coast. I ask you, -therefore, when, at what time, were you as Flag Officer of U-boats, or -from 1939 on as Commander of U-boats, informed about existing plans? - -DÖNITZ: I received information on plans from the Naval Operations Staff -only after these plans had been completed; that is to say, only if I was -to participate in some way in the carrying out of a plan, and then only -at a time necessary for the prompt execution of my military task. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Let us take the case of the Norway action, -Admiral. When did you find out about the intention to occupy Norway, and -in what connection did you receive that information? - -DÖNITZ: On 5 March 1940 I was called from Wilhelmshaven, where I had my -command, to Berlin, to the Naval Operations Staff, and at that meeting I -was instructed on the plan and on my task. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I present you now with an entry from the War -Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, which I will submit to the Tribunal -as Dönitz Exhibit Number 6. It is on Page 8 of Document Book 1. - - “5 March 1940: The Flag Officer of U-boats participates in a - conference with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff - in Berlin. - - “Object of the conference: Preparation of the occupation of - Norway and Denmark by the German Wehrmacht.” - -Is that the meeting which you have mentioned? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the case of Norway, or in the previous -case of the outbreak of war with Poland, did you have the opportunity to -examine whether the tactical instructions which you had to give to your -U-boats led or were to lead to the waging of an aggressive war? - -DÖNITZ: No, I had neither the opportunity nor indeed the authority to do -that. I should like to ask what soldier of what nation, who receives any -military task whatsoever, has the right to approach his general staff -and ask for examination or justification as to whether an aggressive war -can evolve from this task. That would mean that the soldiers... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal has itself to decide as a -matter of law whether the war was an aggressive war. It does not want to -hear from this witness, who is a professional sailor, what his view is -on the question of law. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I believe my question has -been misunderstood. I did not ask Admiral Dönitz whether he considered -the war an aggressive war or not; but I asked him whether he had the -opportunity or the task, as a soldier, of examining whether his orders -could become the means for an aggressive war. He, therefore, should -state his conception of the task which he had as a soldier, and not of -the question of whether it was or was not an aggressive war. - -THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us what his task was as a matter of fact, but -he is not here to argue the case to us. He can state the facts—what he -did. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does one not also, Mr. President, have to -allow a defendant to say what considerations he had or what -considerations he did not have? What I mean is that the accusations of -the Prosecution arise from this, and the defendant must have the -opportunity of stating his position regarding these accusations. - -THE PRESIDENT: We want to hear the evidence. You will argue his case on -his behalf on the evidence that he gives. He is not here to argue the -law before us. That is not the subject of evidence. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall question him on his considerations, -Mr. President. - -Admiral, in connection with the orders which you issued to the U-boats -before the war or in connection with the orders which you issued before -the beginning of the Norway action—did you ever have any considerations -as to whether it would lead to aggressive war? - -DÖNITZ: I received military orders as a soldier, and my purpose -naturally was to carry out these military tasks. Whether the leadership -of the State was thereby politically waging an aggressive war or not, or -whether they were protective measures, was not for me to decide; it was -none of my business. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: As Commander of U-boats, from whom did you -receive your orders about the waging of U-boat warfare? - -DÖNITZ: From the Chief of the SKL, the Naval Operations Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who was that? - -DÖNITZ: Grossadmiral Raeder. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the orders which you received at -the beginning of the war, that is, the beginning of September 1939, for -the conduct of U-boat warfare? - -DÖNITZ: War against merchantmen according to the Prize Regulations, that -is to say, according to the London Pact. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What ships, according to that order, could -you attack without previous warning? - -DÖNITZ: At that time I could attack without warning all ships which were -guarded either by naval vessels or which were under air cover. -Furthermore, I was permitted to exercise armed force against any ship -which, when stopped, sent radio messages, or resisted the order to stop, -or did not obey the order to stop. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, there is no doubt that, a few weeks -after the beginning of the war, the war against merchantmen was -intensified. Did you know whether such an intensification was planned, -and if you do, why it was planned? - -DÖNITZ: I knew that the Naval Operations Staff intended, according to -events, according to the development of the enemy’s tactics, to -retaliate blow for blow, as it says or said in the order, by intensified -action. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the measures of the enemy and, on -the other hand, what were your own experiences with the measures taken -by the enemy which led to an intensification of action? - -DÖNITZ: Right at the beginning of the war it was our experience that all -merchantmen not only took advantage of their radio installations when an -attempt was made to stop them, but that they immediately sent messages -as soon as they saw any U-boat on the horizon. It was absolutely clear, -therefore, that all merchantmen were co-operating in the military -intelligence service. Furthermore, only a few days after the beginning -of the war we found out that merchantmen were armed and made use of -their weapons. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What orders on the part of Germany resulted -from these experiences? - -DÖNITZ: They first brought about the order that merchantmen which sent -radio messages on being stopped could be attacked without warning. They -also brought about the order that merchantmen whose armament had been -recognized beyond doubt, that is, whose armament one knew from British -publication, could be attacked without warning. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This order concerning attacks on armed -merchantmen was issued on 4 October 1939; is that right? - -DÖNITZ: I believe so. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there a second order, soon after that, -according to which all enemy merchantmen could be attacked, and why was -that order issued? - -DÖNITZ: I believe that the Naval Operations Staff decided on this order -on the basis of the British publication which said that now the arming -of merchantmen was completed. In addition, there was a broadcast by the -British Admiralty on 1 October to the effect that the merchantmen had -been directed to ram German U-boats and furthermore—as stated at the -beginning—it was clear beyond doubt that every merchantman was part of -the intelligence service of the enemy, and its radio messages at sight -of a U-boat determined the use of surface or air forces. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have reports about that from -U-boats, according to which U-boats were actually endangered by these -tactics of enemy merchantmen and were attacked by enemy surface or air -forces? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. I had received quite a number of reports in this -connection, and since the German measures were always taken about 4 -weeks after it had been recognized that the enemy employed these -tactics, I had very serious losses in the meantime—in the period when I -still had to keep to the one-sided and, for me, dangerous obligations. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By these obligations, are you referring to -the obligation to wage war against merchantmen according to the Prize -Regulations during a period when the enemy’s merchant ships had -abandoned their peaceful character? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you protest later against the directives -of the Naval Operations Staff which led to an intensification of the war -on merchantmen, or did you approve these directives? - -DÖNITZ: No, I did not protest against them. On the contrary, I -considered them justified, because, as I said before, otherwise I would -have had to remain bound to an obligation which was one-sided and meant -serious losses for me. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this intensification of the war against -merchantmen by the order to fire on armed merchantmen, and later the -order to attack all enemy merchantmen, based on the free judgment of the -Naval Operations Staff, or was it a forced development? - -DÖNITZ: This development, as I have said before, was entirely forced. If -merchantmen are armed and make use of their arms, and if they send -messages which summon protection, they force the U-boat to submerge and -attack without warning. - -That same forced development, in the areas which we patrolled, was also -the case with the British submarines, and applied in exactly the same -way to American and Russian submarines. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If, on one side, a merchantman sends a -message and opens fire, and on the other side the submarine, for that -reason, attacks without warning, which side has the advantage of this -development, according to your experience? The side of the merchantman -or the side of the submarine? - -DÖNITZ: In an ocean area where there is no constant patrolling by the -enemy, by naval forces of any kind or by aircraft, as along the coast, -the submarine has the advantage. But in all other areas the ship -acquires the main attack weapons against a submarine, and the submarine -is therefore compelled to treat that ship as a battleship, which means -that it is forced to submerge and loses its speed. Therefore, in all -ocean areas, with the exception of coastal waters which can be -constantly controlled, the advantage of arms lies with the merchantman. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are you of the opinion that the orders of -the Naval Operations Staff actually remained within the limits of what -was militarily necessary due to enemy measures, or did these orders go -beyond military necessity? - -DÖNITZ: They remained absolutely within the bounds of what was -necessary. I have explained already that the resulting steps were always -taken gradually and after very careful study by the Naval Operations -Staff. This very careful study may also have been motivated by the fact -that for political reasons any unnecessary intensification in the West -was to be avoided. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, these orders we have mentioned were -based at that time only on German experiences and without an accurate -knowledge of the orders which had been issued on the British side. Now, -I should like to put these orders to you; we now have information on -them through a ruling of the Tribunal, and I should like to ask you -whether these individual orders coincide with your experiences or -whether they are somewhat different. I submit the orders of the British -Admiralty as Exhibit Dönitz-67. It is on Page 163 in Document Book 3. As -you know, this is the Handbook of the British Navy of 1938, and I draw -your attention to Page 164, to the paragraph on reporting the enemy. - -DÖNITZ: There is no pagination here. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is D. M. S. 3-1-55, the paragraph on -radio. The heading is “Reporting the Enemy.” - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I will read the paragraph to you: - - “As soon as the master of a merchant ship realizes that a ship - or aircraft in sight is an enemy, it is his first and most - important duty to report the nature and position of the enemy by - wireless telegraph. Such a report promptly made may be the means - of saving not only the ship herself but many others; for it may - give an opportunity for the destruction of her assailant by our - warships or aircraft, an opportunity which might not recur.” - -Then there are more details which I do not wish to read, on the manner -and method, when and how these radio signals are to be given. Is this -order in accordance with your experience? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. In this order, there is not only a directive to send -wireless signals if the ship is stopped by a U-boat—that alone would, -according to international law, justify the U-boat in employing armed -force against the ship—but beyond that it is stated that as soon as an -enemy ship is in sight this signal is to be transmitted in order that -the naval forces may attack in time. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So this order is in accord with the -experiences which our U-boats reported? - -DÖNITZ: Entirely. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall draw your attention now to the -Paragraph D. M. S. 2-VII, on Page 165, that is the paragraph on opening -fire: “Conditions under which fire may be opened.” - - “(a) Against enemy acting in accordance with international - law.—As the armament is solely for the purpose of self-defense, - it must only be used against an enemy who is clearly attempting - to capture or sink the merchant ship. On the outbreak of war it - should be assumed that the enemy will act in accordance with - international law, and fire should therefore not be opened until - he has made it plain that he intends to attempt capture. Once it - is clear that resistance will be necessary if capture is to be - averted, fire should be opened immediately. - - “(b) Against enemy acting in defiance of international law.—If, - as the war progresses, it unfortunately becomes clear that in - defiance of international law the enemy has adopted a policy of - attacking merchant ships without warning, it will then be - permissible to open fire on an enemy vessel, submarine, or - aircraft, even before she has attacked or demanded surrender, if - to do so will tend to prevent her gaining a favorable position - for attacking.” - -Is this order, that is to say, the order “(a)” and “(b),” in accord with -the experiences made? - -DÖNITZ: In practice no difference can be established between “(a)” and -“(b).” I should like to draw attention in this connection to D. M. S. -3-III, Page 167, under IV; that is the last paragraph of “(b)” of the -number mentioned. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, do you mean “(b)-V”? - -DÖNITZ: It says here “(b)-IV”. There... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is not printed, Mr. President. - - DÖNITZ: “In ships fitted with a defensive armament, open fire to - keep the enemy at a distance”—that is (b)-IV—“if you consider - that he is clearly intending to effect a capture and that he is - approaching so close as to endanger your chances of escape.” - -That means therefore that as soon as the ship sights a U-boat, which -during war must be assumed to be there for a reason to effect a -capture—the ship will, in its own defense, open fire as soon as it -comes within range; that is when the submarine has come within range of -its guns. The ship, in using its guns for an offensive action, can act -in no other way. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, did the armed enemy vessels act -then in the manner which you have described; that is, did they really -fire as soon as a submarine came within range? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. As early as—according to my recollection, the first report -came from a U-boat about that on 6 September 1939. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With this order, however, we find a further -supplement under AMS 1-118, dated 13 June 1940, on Page 165, and here we -read: - - “With reference to D.M.S. Part 1, Article 53, it is now - considered clear that in submarine and aerial operations the - enemy has adopted a policy of attacking merchant ships without - warning. Subparagraph (b) of this article should therefore be - regarded as being in force.” - -That means, then, that the order which we read before, “(b)” was to be -considered in effect only from 13 June 1940. Do you mean to say that -actually before that, from the very beginning, you acted according to -the order “(b)”? - -DÖNITZ: I have already stated that between an offensive and defensive -use of armament on the part of a ship against a submarine, there is -practically no difference at all, that it is a purely theoretical -differentiation. But even if one did differentiate between them, then -beyond doubt the Reuter report—I believe dated 9 September—which said -incorrectly that we were conducting unlimited submarine warfare was -designated to inform ships’ captains that now case “(b)” was valid. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I put to you now a directive on the handling -of depth charges on merchant ships. It is on Page 168, the reference -list. The heading is “Reference List (D),” the date is “14 September -1939.” I read: - - “The following instructions have been sent out to all W.P.S.’s: - It has now been decided to fit a single depth charge chute, with - hand release gear and supplied with 3 charges, in all armed - merchant vessels of 12 knots or over.” - -Then there are more details and at the end a remark about the training -of the crews in the use of depth charges. The distribution list shows -numerous naval officers. - -Did you experience this use of depth charges by merchant vessels and -were such depth charge attacks by merchant ships observed? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, repeatedly. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Speaking of a ship with a speed of 12 knots -or more, can one say that a depth charge attack against a U-boat is a -defensive measure? - -DÖNITZ: No. Each depth charge attack against a submarine is definitely -and absolutely an offensive action; for the submarine submerges and is -harmless under water, while the surface vessel which wants to carry out -the depth charge attack approaches as closely as possible to the -position where it assumes the U-boat to be, in order to drop the depth -charge as accurately as possible on top of the U-boat. A destroyer, that -is, a warship, does not attack a submarine in any different way. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are therefore basing the manner in which -you attacked enemy ships on these tactics employed by enemy merchantmen. -However, neutral ships also suffered, and the Prosecution charges the -German U-boat command expressly with this. What do you have to say to -that? - -DÖNITZ: Neutral merchantmen, according to the political orders, the -orders of the Naval Operations Staff, were only attacked without warning -when they were found in operational zones which had been definitely -designated as such, or naturally only when they did not act as neutrals -should, but like ships which were participating in the war. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has offered a document in -evidence, according to which, in certain ocean areas, attack without -warning against neutrals was authorized, beginning January 1940. I am -referring to Prosecution Document GB-194. I will read to you the -sentence which the Prosecution is holding against you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where it is? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is in the British document book, Page 30, -Mr. President. In the document book of the Prosecution, Page 30. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I will read you the sentence which is held -against you: - - “In the Bristol Channel, attack without warning has been - authorized against all ships where it is possible to claim that - mine hits have taken place.” - -This order is dated 1 January 1940. Can you tell me whether at that time -neutrals had already actually been warned against using this shipping -lane? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. Germany had sent a note to the neutrals on 24 November -1939, warning them against using these lanes and advising neutrals to -use the methods of the United States, whereby American ships—in order -to avoid any incidents—had been forbidden to enter the waters around -England. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I will hand you the note of which you speak, -and I will at the same time submit it to the Tribunal as Exhibit -Dönitz-73, to be found on Page 206 of the document book. It is in -Document Book 4, Page 206. - -This is an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, -dated 24 November 1939. It has the following text: - - “To the Missions, according to enclosed list. - - “Telegram. - - “Supplement to wire release of 22 October. - - “Please inform the Government there of the following: - - “Since the warning issued on (date to be inserted here) - regarding the use of English and French ships, the following two - new facts are to be recorded: - - “a) The United States has forbidden its ships to sail in a - definitely defined area. - - “b) Numerous enemy merchant ships have been armed. It is known - that these armed ships have instructions to use their weapons - aggressively and to ram U-boats. - - “These two new facts give the Reich Government occasion to renew - and emphasize its warning, that in view of the increasingly - frequent engagements, waged with all means of modern war - technique, in waters around the British Isles and in the - vicinity of the French coast, the safety of neutral ships in - this area can no longer be taken for granted. - - “Therefore the German Government urgently recommends the choice - of the route south and east of the German-proclaimed danger - zone, when crossing the North Sea. - - “In order to maintain peaceful shipping for neutral states and - in order to avoid loss of life and property for the neutrals, - the Reich Government furthermore feels obliged to recommend - urgently legislative measures following the pattern of the U.S. - Government, which in apprehension of the dangers of modern - warfare, forbade its ships to sail in an exactly defined area, - in which, according to the words of the President of the United - States, the traffic of American ships may seem imperiled by - belligerent action. - - “The Reich Government must point out that it rejects any - responsibility for consequences brought about by disregarding - recommendations and warnings.” - -This is the note to which you referred, Admiral? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In other words, in your opinion, these -sinkings in the Bristol Channel could be carried out lawfully as from 1 -January? - -DÖNITZ: Yes; these ocean areas were clearly limited areas in which -hostilities took place continuously on both sides. The neutrals had been -warned expressly against using these areas. If they entered this war -area, they had to run the risk of being damaged. England proceeded -likewise in its operational areas in our waters. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Since you considered these sinkings legal, -why was the order given to attack without being sighted, if possible, in -order to maintain the fiction that mine hits had taken place? Doesn’t -that indicate a bad conscience? - -DÖNITZ: No. During a war there is no basic obligation to inform the -enemy with what means one does one’s fighting. In other words, this is -not a question of legality, but a question of military or political -expediency. - -England in her operational areas did not inform us either as to the -means of fighting she uses or did use; and I know how many headaches -this caused me when I was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, later, in -endeavoring to employ economically the small means we had. - -That is the principle. At that time when, as Commander of U-boats, I -received this order to simulate mine hits where possible, I considered -this as militarily expedient, because the counterintelligence were left -in doubt as to whether mine sweepers or U-boat defense means were to be -employed. - -In other words, it was a military advantage for the nation conducting -the war, and today I am of the opinion that political reasons also may -have influenced this decision, with the object of avoiding complications -with neutral countries. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How could complications with neutral -countries come into being, in your opinion, if this naval warfare -measure was a legal one? - -DÖNITZ: During the first World War we had experienced what part is -played by propaganda. Therefore I think it possible that our Government, -our political leaders, for this reason, too, may have issued this order. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From your own experience you know nothing -about these political reasons? - -DÖNITZ: Nothing at all. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Up to now you have spoken about the orders -which were received by the U-boats, first for combating enemy ships, and -secondly for combating or searching neutral ships. Were these orders -then actually executed? That was primarily your responsibility, was it -not? - -DÖNITZ: No U-boat commander purposely transgressed an order, or failed -to execute it. Of course, considering the large number of naval actions, -which ran into several thousands within the 5½ years of war, a very few -individual cases occurred in which, by mistake, such an order was not -followed. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How could such a mistake occur? - -DÖNITZ: Every sailor knows how easily mistakes in identification can -occur at sea; not only during a war, but also in peacetime, due to -visibility, weather conditions, and other factors. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is it also possible that submarines operated -on the borders of the operational areas, although they were already -outside these borders? - -DÖNITZ: That is, of course, also possible. For again every sailor knows -that after a few days of bad weather, for instance, inaccuracy in the -ship’s course happens very easily. This occurs, however, not only in the -case of the submarine, but also of the ship, which perhaps is under the -impression of having been outside the operational area when torpedoed. -It is very difficult to establish the fact in such cases. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What steps did you, as Commander of U-boats, -take when you heard of such a case, a case in which a U-boat had -transgressed its orders, even if by mistake? - -DÖNITZ: The main thing was the preventive measures, and that was done -through training them to be thorough and to investigate quietly and -carefully before the commander took action. Moreover, this training had -already been carried on in peacetime, so that our U-boat organization -bore the motto: “We are a respectable firm.” - -The second measure was that during the war every commander, before -leaving port, and after returning from his mission, had to report to me -personally. That is, before leaving port he had to be briefed by me. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Admiral. That did not -continue when you were Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, did it? - -DÖNITZ: That was limited after 1943, after I had become -Commander-in-Chief. Even then it did continue. In any case, it was the -definite rule during my time as Commander of U-boats, so that a -commander’s mission was considered completed and satisfactory only after -he had reported to me in full detail. If, on such an occasion, I could -establish negligence, then I made my decision according to the nature of -the case, as to whether disciplinary action or court-martial proceedings -and punishment had to take place. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have found here an entry GB-198, on Page -230, in Document Book 4 of the Prosecution, which I would like to read -to you. This is a war diary of the Commander of U-boats, that is, -yourself. - -I read the entry of 25 September 1942: - - “_U-512_ reports that the _Monte Corbea_ was recognized as a - neutral ship before being torpedoed. Assumed suspicions of being - a camouflaged English ship are insufficient and do not justify - the sinking. The commander will have to stand court-martial for - his conduct. All boats at sea will be informed.” - -Two days later, on 27 September 1942, a radio signal was sent to all. I -read: - - “Radio signal to all: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy has personally and expressly - ordered anew that all U-boat commanders are to comply exactly - with the orders concerning the treatment of neutral ships. - Violations of these orders will have incalculable political - consequences. This order is to be disseminated at once to all - commanders.” - -Will you please tell me what resulted from the court-martial which you -ordered here? - -DÖNITZ: I had sent my radio signal to the commander stating that after -his return he would have to be answerable before a court-martial, -because of the sinking. The commander did not return from this mission -with his boat. Therefore this court-martial did not take place. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you, in any other case, have experience -as to how the courts-martial treated the difficult task of the U-boat -commanders when you had ordered a court-martial? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. I remember a case against Kapitänleutnant Kraemer, who had -to be acquitted by the court-martial because it was proven that, before -the attack, before firing the shot, he had taken note once more through -the periscope of the identification of the ship—it was a German -blockade-runner—and, in spite of that, was of the opinion that it was a -different ship, an enemy ship, and that he was justified in sinking it. -In other words, it was not a case of negligence, and therefore in this -case he was acquitted. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Taking into consideration all the results of -your measures for training and punishing personnel, do you have the -impression that enough was done to make the U-boat commanders obey your -orders, or did the U-boat commanders in the long run disobey your -orders? - -DÖNITZ: I do not think it is necessary to discuss this question at all. -The simple facts speak for themselves. During the 5½ years, several -thousand naval actions were engaged in by submarines. The number of -incidents is an extremely small fraction and I know that this result is -only due to the unified leadership of all submarine commanders, to -co-ordination and also to their proper training and their -responsibility. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has offered a document, -GB-195 on Page 32 of the Prosecution’s document book. In this document -is entered an order of the Führer, dated 18 July 1941, and it reads as -follows: - - “In the original operational area, which corresponds in extent - with the U.S. prohibited zone for U.S. ships and which is not - touched by the U.S.-Iceland route, attacks on ships under - American or British escort or U.S. merchantmen sailing without - escort are authorized.” - -In connection with this order by the Führer, the Prosecution, Admiral, -termed your attitude cynical and opportunistic. Will you please explain -to the Tribunal what the meaning of this order actually is? - -DÖNITZ: In August 1940 Germany had declared this operational area in -English waters. U.S. ships were, however, expressly excluded from attack -without warning in this operational area because, as I believe, the -political leaders wanted to avoid any possibility of an incident with -the U.S.A. I said the political leaders. The Prosecution has accused me, -in my treatment and attitude, my differing attitude toward the neutrals, -of having a masterful agility in adapting myself, that is guided by -cynicism and opportunism. It is clear that the attitude of a state -toward neutrals is a purely political affair, and that this relation is -decided exclusively by the political leadership, particularly in a -nation that is at war. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mean to say, in other words, that you -had nothing to do with the handling of this question? - -DÖNITZ: As a soldier I had not the slightest influence on the question -of how the political leadership believed they had to treat this or that -neutral. Regarding this particular case, however, from knowledge of the -orders I received through the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff from -the political leadership, I should like to say the following: I believe -that the political leadership did everything to avoid any incident on -the high seas with the United States. First, I have already stated that -the U-boats were actually forbidden even to stop American ships. -Second... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. To stop them where, in -the operational area or outside the operational area? - -DÖNITZ: At first, everywhere. - -Second, that the American 300-mile safety zone was recognized without -any question by Germany, although according to the existing -international law only a three-mile zone was authorized. - -Third, that... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, an interesting distinction which may be -drawn between the United States and other neutrals is not relevant to -this Trial, is it? What difference does it make? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In connection with the document cited by me, -GB-195, the Prosecution has made the accusation that Admiral Dönitz -conducted his U-boat warfare cynically and opportunistically: that is, -in that he treated one neutral well and the other one badly. This -accusation has been made expressly, and I want to give Admiral Dönitz -the opportunity to make a statement in reply to this accusation. He has -already said that he had nothing to do with the handling of this -question. - -THE PRESIDENT: What more can he say than that? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, according to the principles -of the Statute, a soldier is also made responsible for the orders which -he executed. For this reason it is my opinion that he must be able to -state whether on his side he had the impression that he received cynical -and opportunistic orders or whether on the contrary he did not have the -impression that everything was done to avoid a conflict and that the -orders which were given actually were necessary and right. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have dealt with this order about the United States -ships, now. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I have almost finished. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you want to say something more about -the third point, Admiral? - -DÖNITZ: I wanted to mention two or three more points on this subject. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I think that is possible. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may go on, but we hope that you will deal with this -point shortly. It appears to the Tribunal to be very unimportant. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Sir. - -DÖNITZ: For instance, I had suggested that mines be laid before Halifax, -the British port of Nova Scotia, and before Reykjavik, both bases being -important for warships and merchant shipping. The political leaders, the -Führer, rejected this because he wanted to avoid every possibility of -friction with the United States. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I formulate the question this way, that -you, from the orders for the treatment of U.S. ships, in no way had the -impression that opportunism or cynicism prevailed here, but that -everything was done with the greatest restraint in order to avoid a -conflict with the United States? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. This went so far, in fact, that when the American -destroyers in the summer of 1941 received orders to attack German -submarines, that is, before war started, when they were still neutral -and I was forbidden to fight back, I was then forced to forbid the -submarines in this area to attack even British destroyers, in order to -avoid having a submarine mistake an American for a British ship. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 9 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED - AND TWENTY-FIFTH DAY - Thursday, 9 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Dönitz resumed the stand._] - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will -continue my examination of the witness. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, how many merchant ships were sunk -by German U-boats in the course of the war? - -DÖNITZ: According to the Allied figures, 2,472. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many combat actions, according to your -estimate, were necessary to do this? - -DÖNITZ: I believe the torpedoed ships are not included in this figure of -2,472 sunk ships; and, of course, not every attack leads to a success. I -would estimate that in 5½ years perhaps 5,000 or 6,000 actions actually -took place. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the course of all these actions did any -of the U-boat commanders who were subordinate to you voice objections to -the manner in which the U-boats operated? - -DÖNITZ: No, never. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What would you have done with a commander -who refused to carry out the instructions for U-boat warfare? - -DÖNITZ: First, I would have had him examined; if he proved to be normal -I would have put him before a court-martial. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You could only have done that with a clear -conscience if you yourself assumed full responsibility for the orders -which you either issued or which you transmitted? - -DÖNITZ: Naturally. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In battle engagements with U-boats, crews of -merchant ships no doubt lost their lives. Did you consider crews of -enemy merchantmen as soldiers or as civilians, and for what reasons? - -DÖNITZ: Germany considered the crews of merchantmen as combatants, -because they fought with the weapons which had been mounted aboard the -merchant ships in large numbers. According to our knowledge one or two -men of the Royal Navy were on board for the servicing of these weapons, -but where guns were concerned the rest of the gunners were part of the -crew of the ship. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many were there for one gun? - -DÖNITZ: That varied according to the size of the weapon, probably -between five and ten. Then, in addition, there were munitions men. The -same applied to the servicing of depth charge chutes and depth charge -throwers. - -The members of the crew did, in fact, fight with the weapons like the -few soldiers who were on board. It was also a matter of course that the -crew was considered as a unit, for in a battleship we cannot distinguish -either between the man who is down at the engine in the boiler room and -the man who services the gun up on deck. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did this view, that the members of the crews -of hostile merchant ships were combatants, have any influence on the -question of whether they could or should be rescued? Or did it not have -any influence? - -DÖNITZ: No, in no way. Of course, every soldier has a right to be -rescued if the circumstances of his opponent permit it. But this fact -should have an influence upon the right to attack the crew as well. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean that they could be fought as -long as they were on board the ship? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, there can be no question of anything else—that means -fought with weapons used for an attack against a ship as part of naval -warfare. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know that the Prosecution has submitted -a document about a discussion between Adolf Hitler and the Japanese -Ambassador, Oshima. This discussion took place on 3 January 1942. It is -Exhibit Number GB-197, on Page 34 of the document book of the -Prosecution. In this document Hitler promises the Japanese Ambassador -that he will issue an order for the killing of the shipwrecked, and the -Prosecution concludes from this document that Hitler actually gave such -an order and that this order was carried out by you. - -Did you, directly or through the Naval Operations Staff, receive a -written order of this nature? - -DÖNITZ: I first heard about this discussion and its contents when the -record of it was submitted here. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, may I ask you to answer my -question? I asked, did you receive a written order? - -DÖNITZ: No, I received neither a written nor a verbal order. I knew -nothing at all about this discussion; I learned about it through the -document which I saw here. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When did you see Hitler for the first time -after the date of this discussion, that is, January 1942? - -DÖNITZ: Together with Grossadmiral Raeder I was at headquarters on 14 -May 1942 and told him about the situation in the U-boat campaign. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There is a note written by you about this -discussion with the Führer, and I would like to call your attention to -it. It is Dönitz-16, to be found on Page 29 of Document Book Number 1. I -submit the document, Dönitz-16. I will read it to you. The heading runs: - - “Report of the Commander of Submarines to the Führer on 14 May - 1942 in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the - Navy”—that is, Grossadmiral Raeder. - - “Therefore it is necessary to improve the weapons of the - submarines by all possible means, so that the submarines may - keep pace with defense measures. The most important development - is the torpedo with magnetic detonator which would increase - precision of torpedoes fired against destroyers and therefore - would put the submarine in a better position with regard to - defense; it would above all also hasten considerably the sinking - of torpedoed ships, whereby we would economize on torpedoes and - also protect the submarine from countermeasures, insofar as it - would be able to leave the place of combat more quickly.” - -And now, the decisive sentence: - - “A magnetic detonator will also have the great advantage that - the crew will not be able to save themselves on account of the - quick sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of men - will no doubt cause difficulties in the assignment of crews for - the great American construction program.” - -Does this last sentence which I read imply what you just referred to as -combating the crew with weapons...? - -THE PRESIDENT: You seem to attach importance to this document. -Therefore, you should not put a leading question upon it. You should ask -the defendant what the document means, and not put your meaning on it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, what did these expositions mean? - -DÖNITZ: They mean that it was important to us, as a consequence of the -discussion with the Führer at his headquarters, to find a good magnetic -detonator which would lead to a more rapid sinking of the ships and -thereby achieve the results noted in this report in the war diary. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell me what successes you mean by -this, as far as the crews are concerned? - -DÖNITZ: I mean that not several torpedoes would be required, as -heretofore, to sink a ship by long and difficult attack; but that one -torpedo, or very few, would suffice to bring about a more speedy loss of -the ship and the crew. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you, in the course of this discussion -with the Führer, touch on the question... - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment—the question whether other means -might be envisaged to cause loss of life among the crews? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what way and by whom? - -DÖNITZ: The Führer brought up the fact that, in the light of experience, -a large percentage of the crews, because of the excellence of the rescue -means, were reaching home and were used again and again to man new -ships, and he asked whether there might not be some action taken against -these rescue ships. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean by action taken? - -DÖNITZ: At this discussion, in which Grossadmiral Raeder participated, I -rejected this unequivocally and told him that the only possibility of -causing losses among the crews would lie in the attack itself, in -striving for a faster sinking of the ship through the intensified effect -of weapons. Hence this remark in my war diary. I believe, since I -received knowledge here through the Prosecution of the discussion -between the Führer and Oshima, that this question of the Führer to -Grossadmiral Raeder and myself arose out of this discussion. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There exists an affidavit by Grossadmiral -Raeder about this discussion. You know the contents. Do the contents -correspond to your recollection of this discussion? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, completely. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I would like to submit to the Tribunal, -as Dönitz-17, the affidavit of Grossadmiral Raeder; since it has the -same content, I may dispense with the reading of it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was going to say in case it might help the -Tribunal, I understand the Defendant Raeder will be going into the -witness box; therefore, I make no formal objection to this affidavit -going in. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It has the Number Dönitz-17 and is found on -Page 33 of Document Book 1. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You just said that you rejected the -suggested killing of survivors in lifeboats and stated this to the -Führer. However, the Prosecution has presented two documents, an order -of the winter of 1939-40 and a second order of the autumn of 1942, in -which you limited or prohibited rescue measures. Is there not a -contradiction between the orders and your attitude toward the proposal -of the Führer? - -DÖNITZ: No. These two things are not connected with each other in any -way. One must distinguish very clearly here between the question of -rescue or nonrescue, and that is a question of military possibility. -During a war the necessity of refraining from rescue may well arise. For -example, if your own ship is endangered thereby, it would be wrong from -a military viewpoint and besides, would not be of value for the one to -be rescued; and no commander of any nation is expected to rescue if his -own ship is thereby endangered. - -The British Navy correctly take up a very clear, unequivocal position in -this respect: that rescue is to be denied in such cases; and that is -evident also from their actions and commands. That is one point. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you spoke only about the safety of -the ship as a reason for not carrying out rescue. - -DÖNITZ: There may of course be other reasons. For instance it is clear -that in war the mission to be accomplished is of first importance. No -one will start to rescue, for example, if after subduing one opponent -there is another on the scene. Then, as a matter of course, the -combating of the second opponent is more important than the rescue of -those who have already lost their ship. - -The other question is concerned with attacking the shipwrecked, and that -is... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, whom would you call shipwrecked? - -DÖNITZ: Shipwrecked persons are members of the crew who, after the -sinking of their ship, are not able to fight any longer and are either -in lifeboats or other means of rescue or in the water. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -DÖNITZ: Firing upon these men is a matter concerned with the ethics of -war and should be rejected under any and all circumstances. In the -German Navy and U-boat force this principle, according to my firm -conviction, has never been violated, with the one exception of the -affair Eck. No order on this subject has ever been issued, in any form -whatsoever. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I want to call to your attention one of the -orders submitted by the Prosecution. It is your permanent War Order -Number 154; Exhibit Number GB-196 and in my document book on Pages 13 to -15. I will have this order given to you, and I am asking you to turn to -the last paragraph, which was read by the Prosecution. There it says, I -read it again: - - “Do not rescue any men; do not take them along; and do not take - care of any boats of the ship. Weather conditions and proximity - of land are of no consequence. Concern yourself only with the - safety of your own boat and with efforts to achieve additional - successes as soon as possible. We must be hard in this war. The - enemy started the war in order to destroy us, and thus nothing - else matters.” - -The Prosecution has stated that this order went out, according to their -records, before May 1940. Can you from your knowledge fix the date a -little more exactly? - -DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, I issued this order at the end of -November or the beginning of December 1939, for the following reasons: - -I had only a handful of U-boats a month at my disposal. In order that -this small force might prove effective at all, I had to send the boats -close to the English coast, in front of the ports. In addition, the -magnetic mine showed itself to be a very valuable weapon of war. -Therefore, I equipped these boats both with mines and torpedoes and -directed them, after laying the mines, to operate in waters close to the -coast, immediately outside the ports. There they fought in constant and -close combat and under the surveillance of naval and air patrols. Each -U-boat which was sighted or reported there was hunted by U-boat-chasing -units and by air patrols ordered to the scene. - -The U-boats themselves, almost without exception or entirely, had as -their objectives only ships which were protected or accompanied by some -form of protection. Therefore, it would have been suicide for the -U-boat, in a position of that sort, to come to the surface and to -rescue. - -The commanders were all very young; I was the only one who had service -experience from the first World War. And I had to tell them this very -forcibly and drastically because it was hard for a young commander to -judge a situation as well as I could. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did experience with rescue measures already -play a part here? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. In the first months of the war I had very bitter -experiences. I suffered very great losses in sea areas far removed from -any coast; and as very soon I had information through the Geneva Red -Cross that many members of crews had been rescued, it was clear that -these U-boats had been lost above the water. If they had been lost below -the water the survival of so many members of the crews would have been -impossible. I also had reports that there had been very unselfish deeds -of rescue, quite justifiable from a humane angle, but militarily very -dangerous for the U-boat. So now, of course, since I did not want to -fight on the open sea but close to the harbors or in the coastal -approaches to the harbors, I had to warn the U-boats of the great -dangers, in fact of suicide. - -And, to state a parallel, English U-boats in the Jutland waters, areas -which we dominated, showed, as a matter of course and quite correctly, -no concern at all for those who were shipwrecked, even though, without a -doubt, our defense was only a fraction of the British. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You say that this order applied to U-boats -which operated in the immediate presence of the enemy’s defense. Can -you, from the order itself, demonstrate the truth of that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes; the entire order deals only with, or assumes, the presence -of the enemy’s defense; it deals with the battle against convoys. For -instance it reads, “Close range is also the best security for the -boat...” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What number are you reading? - -DÖNITZ: Well, the order is formulated in such a way that Number 1 deals -at first with sailing, not with combat. But the warning against enemy -air defense is given there also, and in this warning about -countermeasures it is made clear that it is concerned entirely with -outgoing ships. Otherwise I would obviously not have issued an order -concerning sailing. Number 2 deals with the time prior to the attack. -Here mention is made of moral inhibitions which every soldier has to -overcome before an attack. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you need only refer to the figures -which show that the order is concerned with fighting enemy defense. - -DÖNITZ: Very well. Then I will quote from 2(d). It says there: - - “Close range is also the best security for the boat. - - “While in the vicinity of the vessels”—that is, the - merchantmen—“the protecting ships”—that is, the - destroyers—“will at first not fire any depth charges. If one - fires into a convoy from close quarters”—note that we are - dealing with convoys—“and then is compelled to submerge, one - can then dive most quickly below other ships of the convoy and - thus remain safe from depth charges.” - -Then the next paragraph, which deals with night conditions, says: - - “Stay above water. Withdraw above water. Possibly make a circle - and go around at the rear.” - -Every sailor knows that one makes a circle or goes around at the rear of -the protecting enemy ships. Further, in the third paragraph, I caution -against submerging too soon, because it blinds the U-boat, and I say: - - “Only then does the opportunity offer itself for a new attack, - or for spotting and noting the opening through which one can - shake off the pursuing enemy.” - -Then the figure “(c),” that is, “3(c),” and there it says: - - “During an attack on a convoy one may have to submerge to a - depth of 20 meters to escape from patrols or aircraft and to - avoid the danger of being sighted or rammed....” - -Thus we are talking here about a convoy. Now we turn to point “(d)” and -here it says: - - “It may become necessary to submerge to depth when, for example, - the destroyer is proceeding directly toward the periscope...” - -And then follow instructions on how to act in case of a depth charge -attack. Plainly, the whole order deals with... - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it is necessary to go into all of these -military tactics. He has made a point on Paragraph “e.” He has given his -explanation of that paragraph, and I don’t think it is necessary to go -into all of these other tactics. - -DÖNITZ: I only want to say that the last paragraph about nonrescue must -not be considered alone but in this context: First, the U-boats had to -fight in the presence of enemy defense near the English ports and -estuaries; and secondly, the objectives were ships in convoys, or -protected ships, as is shown clearly from the document as a whole. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said that this order was given about -December 1939. Did the German U-boats after the order had been issued -actually continue rescues? What experiences did you have? - -DÖNITZ: I said that the order was issued for this specific purpose -during the winter months. For the U-boats which, according to my memory, -went out into the Atlantic again only after the Norwegian campaign, for -these U-boats the general order of rescue applied; and this order was -qualified only in one way, namely that no rescue was to be attempted if -the safety of a U-boat did not permit it. The facts show that the -U-boats acted in this light. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean then that you had reports from -U-boat commanders about rescue measures? - -DÖNITZ: I received these reports whenever a U-boat returned, and -subsequently through the combat log books. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When was this order which we have just -discussed formally rescinded? - -DÖNITZ: To my knowledge this order was captured or salvaged by England -on the U-13 which was destroyed by depth charges in very shallow water -in the Downs near the mouth of the Thames. For this boat, of course, -this order may still have applied in May 1940. Then in the year 1940, -after the Norway Campaign, I again made the open waters of the Atlantic -the central field of operations, and for these boats this order did not -apply, as is proved by the fact that rescues took place, which I just -explained. - -I then rescinded the order completely for it contained the first -practical instructions on how U-boats were to act toward a convoy and -later on was no longer necessary, for by then it had become second -nature to the U-boat commanders. To my recollection the order was -completely withdrawn in November 1940 at the latest. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, I have here the table of contents -of the “Standing War Orders of 1942,” and that may be found on Page 16 -of Document Book Number 1. I will submit it as Dönitz-11. In this table -of contents the Number 154 which deals with the order we have just -discussed is blank. Does that mean that this order did not exist any -more at the time when the “Standing War Orders of 1942” were issued? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, by then it had long since ceased to exist. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When were the standing orders for the year -1942 compiled? - -DÖNITZ: In the course of the year 1941. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When you received reports from commanders -about rescue measures, did you object to these measures? Did you -criticize or prohibit them? - -DÖNITZ: No, not as a rule; only if subsequently my anxiety was too -great. For example, I had a report from a commander that, because he had -remained too long with the lifeboats and thus had been pursued by the -escorts perhaps—or probably—summoned by wireless, his boat had been -severely attacked by depth charges and had been badly damaged by the -escorts—something which would not have happened if he had left the -scene in time—then naturally I pointed out to him that his action had -been wrong from a military point of view. I am also convinced that I -lost ships through rescue. Of course I cannot prove that, since the -boats are lost. But such is the whole mentality of the commander; and it -is entirely natural, for every sailor retains from the days of peace the -view that rescue is the noblest and most honorable act he can perform. -And I believe there was no officer in the German Navy—it is no doubt -true of all the other nations—who, for example, would not consider a -medal for rescue, rescue at personal risk, as the highest peacetime -decoration. In view of this basic attitude it is always very dangerous -not to change to a wartime perspective and to the principle that the -security of one’s own ship comes first, and that war is after all a -serious thing. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what years was the practice you have just -described followed, that U-boats did not rescue when they endangered -themselves? - -DÖNITZ: In 1940, that is towards the end of 1939, economic warfare was -governed by the Prize Ordinance insofar as U-boats were still operating -individually. Then came the operations, close to the enemy coast, of -1939-40 which I have described; the order Number 154 applied to these -operations. Then came the Norway campaign, and then when the U-boat war -resumed in the spring of 1940, this order of rescue, or nonrescue if the -U-boat itself was endangered, applied in the years 1940, 1941, and 1942 -until autumn. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this order put in writing? - -DÖNITZ: No, it was not necessary, for the general order about rescue was -a matter of course, and besides it was contained in certain orders of -the Naval Operations Staff at the beginning of the war. The stipulation -of nonrescue, if the safety of the submarine is at stake, is taken for -granted in every navy; and I made a special point of that in my reports -on the cases which I have just discussed. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In June of 1942 there was an order about the -rescue of captains. This has the Number Dönitz-22; I beg your pardon—it -is Dönitz Number 23, and is found on Page 45 of Document Book 1, and I -hereby submit it. It is an extract from the War Diary of the Naval -Operations Staff of 5 June 1942. I quote: - - “According to instructions received from the Naval Operations - Staff submarines are ordered by the Commander of U-boats to take - on board as prisoners captains of ships sunk, with their papers, - if this is possible without endangering the boat and without - impairing fighting capacity.” - -How did this order come into being? - -DÖNITZ: Here we are concerned with an order of the Naval Operations -Staff that captains are to be taken prisoners, that is, to be brought -home and that again is something different from rescue. The Naval -Operations Staff was of the opinion—and rightly—that since we could -not have a very high percentage, say 80 to 90 percent, of the crews of -the sunk merchantmen brought back—we even helped in their rescue, which -was natural—then at least we must see to it that the enemy was deprived -of the most important and significant parts of the crews, that is, the -captains; hence the order to take the captains from their lifeboats on -to the U-boats as prisoners. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did this order exist in this or another form -until the end of the war? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, it was later even incorporated into the standing orders, -because it was an order of the Naval Operations Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it carried out until the end of the war, -and with what results? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, according to my recollection it was carried out now and -then even in the last few years of the war. But in general the result of -this order was very slight. I personally can remember only a very few -cases. But through letters which I have now received from my commanders -and which I read, I discovered that there were a few more cases than I -believed, altogether perhaps 10 or 12 at the most. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: To what do you attribute the fact that -despite this express order so few captains were taken prisoner? - -DÖNITZ: The chief reason, without doubt, was that on an increasing -scale, the more the mass of U-boats attacked enemy convoys, the convoy -system of the enemy was perfected. The great bulk of the U-boats was -engaged in the battle against convoys. In a few other cases it was not -always possible by reason of the boat’s safety to approach the lifeboats -in order to pick out a captain. And thirdly, I believe that the -commanders of the U-boats were reluctant, quite rightly from their -viewpoint, to have a captain on board for so long during a mission. In -any event, I know that the commanders were not at all happy about this -order. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, now I turn to a document which is -really the nucleus of the accusation against you. It is Document GB-199, -Page 36 of the British document book. This is your radio message of 17 -September, and the Prosecution asserts that it is an order for the -destruction of the shipwrecked. It is of such importance that I will -read it to you again. - - “To all Commanding Officers: - - “1. No attempt of any kind must be made to rescue members of - ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water - and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and - handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the most - elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships - and crews. - - “2. Orders for bringing back captains and chief engineers still - apply. - - “3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of - importance for your boat. - - “4. Be harsh. Bear in mind that the enemy takes no regard of - women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.” - -Please describe to the Tribunal the antecedents of this order, which are -decisive for its intentions. Describe first of all the general military -situation out of which the order arose. - -DÖNITZ: In September of 1942 the great bulk of the German U-boats fought -convoys. The center of gravity in the deployment of U-boats was in the -North Atlantic, where the protected convoys operated between England and -America. The U-boats in the north fought in the same way, attacking only -the convoys to Murmansk. There was no other traffic in that area. The -same situation existed in the Mediterranean; there also the objects of -our attack were the convoys. Beyond that, a part of the boats was -committed directly to American ports, Trinidad, New York, Boston, and -other centers of congested maritime traffic. A small number of U-boats -fought also in open areas in the middle or the south of the Atlantic. -The criterion at this time was that the powerful Anglo-American air -force was patrolling everywhere and in increasingly large numbers. That -was a point which caused me great concern, for obviously the airplane, -because of its speed, constitutes the most dangerous threat to the -U-boat. And that was not a matter of fancy on my part, for from the -summer of 1942—that is, a few months before September, when this order -was issued—the losses of our U-boats through air attacks rose suddenly -by more than 300 percent, I believe. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, for clarification of this point, I -am giving you a diagram which I would like to submit in evidence to the -Tribunal as Dönitz-99. Will you, with the use of the diagram, explain -the curve of losses? - -DÖNITZ: It is very clear that this diagram showing the losses of U-boats -corroborates the statements which I have just made. One can see that up -to June 1942 U-boat losses were kept within reasonable limits and -then—in July 1942—what I have just described happened suddenly. -Whereas the monthly losses up till then varied as the diagram shows -between 4, 2, 5, 3, 4, or 2 U-boats, from July the losses per month -jumped to 10, 11, 8, 13, 14. Then follow the two winter months December -and January, which were used for a thorough overhauling of the ships; -and that explains the decrease which, however, has no bearing on the -trend of losses. - -These developments caused me the greatest concern and resulted in a -great number of orders to the submarine commanders on how they were to -act while on the surface; for the losses were caused while the boats -were above water, since the airplanes could sight or locate them; and so -the boats had to limit their surface activities as much as possible. -These losses also prompted me to issue memoranda to the Naval Operations -Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When? - -DÖNITZ: The memoranda were written in the summer, in June. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In June of 1942? - -DÖNITZ: In June 1942 or July. At the pinnacle of my success, it occurred -to me that air power might some day stifle us and force us under water. -Thus, despite the huge successes which I still had at that time, my -fears for the future were great, and that they were not imaginary is -shown by the actual trend of losses after the submarines left the -dockyard in February 1943; in that month 18 boats were lost; in March, -15; in April, 14. And then the losses jumped to 38. - -The airplane, the surprise by airplane, and the equipment of the planes -with radar—which in my opinion is, next to the atomic bomb, the -decisive war-winning invention of the Anglo-Americans—brought about the -collapse of U-boat warfare. The U-boats were forced under water, for -they could not maintain their position on the surface at all. Not only -were they located when the airplane spotted them, but this radar -instrument actually located them up to 60 nautical miles away, beyond -the range of sight, during the day and at night. Of course, this -necessity of staying under water was impossible for the old U-boats, for -they had to surface at least in order to recharge their batteries. This -development forced me, therefore, to have the old U-boats equipped with -the so-called “Schnorchel,” and to build up an entirely new U-boat force -which could stay under water and which could travel from Germany to -Japan, for example, without surfacing at all. It is evident, therefore, -that I was in an increasingly dangerous situation. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, in order to characterize this -situation I want to call your attention to your war diary of this time. -This will have the Number Dönitz-18, reproduced on Page 32, Volume I. I -want to read only the contents of the entries from the 2nd until the -14th of September, Page 32: - - “On 2 September U-256 surprised and bombed by aircraft; unfit - for sailing and diving; - - “On 3 September aircraft sights U-boat; - - “On 4 September U-756 has not reported despite request since 1 - September when near convoy; presumed lost. - - “On 5 September aircraft sights U-boat; - - “On 6 September U-705 probably lost because of enemy aircraft - attack; - - “On 7 September U-130 bombed by Boeing bomber; - - “On 8 September U-202 attacked by aircraft in Bay of Biscay. - - “On 9 September...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the defendant has already told us of the -losses and of the reason for the losses. What is the good of giving us -details of the fact that U-boats were fighting aircraft? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I wanted to show, Mr. President, that the -testimony of Admiral Dönitz is confirmed by the entries in his diary of -that time. But if the Tribunal... - -THE PRESIDENT: That’s a matter of common knowledge. We can read it. -Anyhow, if you just draw our attention to the document we will read it. -We don’t need you to read the details of it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. I will do it that way. - -DÖNITZ: That is a typical and characteristic entry in my war diary of -those weeks and days just before the issuance of my order; but I wanted -to add the following: The aircraft were very dangerous especially for -psychological reasons: when no aircraft is on the scene, the commander -of the U-boat views his situation as perfectly clear but the next moment -when the aircraft comes into sight, his situation is completely -hopeless. And that happened not only to young commanders, but to old -experienced commanders who remembered the good old times. Perhaps I may, -quite briefly, give a clear-cut example. A U-boat needs one minute for -the crew to come in through the hatch before it can submerge at all. An -airplane flies on the average 6,000 meters in one minute. The U-boat, -therefore, in order to be able to submerge at all—and not to be bombed -while it is still on the surface—must sight the aircraft from a -distance of at least 6,000 meters. But that also is not sufficient, for -even if the U-boat has submerged it still has not reached a safe depth. -The U-boat, therefore, must sight the airplane even earlier, namely, at -the extreme boundary of the field of vision. Therefore, it is an -absolute condition of success that the U-boat is in a state of constant -alert, that above all it proceeds at maximum speed, because the greater -the speed the faster the U-boat submerges; and, secondly, that as few -men as possible are on the tower so that they can come into the U-boat -as quickly as possible which means that there should be no men on the -upper deck at all, and so on. Now, rescue work, which necessitates being -on the upper deck in order to bring help and take care of more people -and which may even mean taking in tow a number of lifeboats, naturally -completely interrupts the submarine’s state of alert, and the U-boat is, -as a consequence, hopelessly exposed to any attack from the air. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I wish now to take up the -_Laconia_ matter itself which I would be reluctant to have interrupted. -If it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I would suggest that we have a -recess now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you have just described the enemy’s -supremacy in the air in September 1942. During these September days you -received the report about the sinking of the British transport -_Laconia_. I submit to the Tribunal the war diaries concerning that -incident under Numbers Dönitz-18, 20, 21, and 22. These are the war -diaries of the commanders of U-boats and of the commanders of the -submarines which took part in this action, Kapitänleutnants Hartenstein, -Schacht and Würdemann. They are reproduced in the document book on Page -34 and the following pages. I shall read to you the report which you -received. That is on Page 35 of the document book, 13 September, 0125 -hours. I read: - - “Wireless message sent on America circuit: - - “Sunk by Hartenstein British ship _Laconia_.” - -Then the position is given and the message continues: - - “Unfortunately with 1,500 Italian prisoners of war. Up to now - picked up 90...” - -then the details, and the end is: “Request orders.” - -I had the document handed to you... - -THE PRESIDENT: Where are you now? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Page 35, Mr. President, the entry of 13 -September, time 0125 hours, the number at the beginning of the line; at -the bottom of the page. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I had the documents handed to you to -refresh your memory. Please tell me, first, what impression or what -knowledge you had about this ship _Laconia_ which had been reported -sunk, and about its crew. - -DÖNITZ: I knew from the handbook on armed British ships which we had at -our disposal that the _Laconia_ was armed with 14 guns. I concluded, -therefore, that it would have a British crew of at least about 500 men. -When I heard that there were also Italian prisoners on board, it was -clear to me that this number would be further increased by the guards of -the prisoners. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please describe now, on the basis of the -documents, the main events surrounding your order of 17 September, and -elaborate, first, on the rescue or nonrescue of British or Italians and -secondly, your concern for the safety of the U-boats in question. - -DÖNITZ: When I received this report, I radioed to all U-boats in the -whole area. I issued the order: - -“Schacht, Group Eisbär, Würdemann and Wilamowitz, proceed to Hartenstein -immediately.” - -Hartenstein was the commander who had sunk the ship. Later, I had to -have several boats turn back because their distance from the scene was -too great. The boat that was furthest from the area and received orders -to participate in the rescue was 710 miles away, and therefore could not -arrive before two days. - -Above all I asked Hartenstein, the commander who had sunk the ship, -whether the _Laconia_ had sent out radio messages, because I hoped that -as a result British and American ships would come to the rescue. -Hartenstein affirmed that and, besides, he himself sent out the -following radio message in English... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is on Page 36, Mr. President, under -time figure 0600. - -DÖNITZ: “If any ship will assist the shipwrecked _Laconia_ crew, I will -not attack her, provided I am not being attacked by ship or air force.” - -Summing up briefly, I gained the impression from the reports of the -U-boats that they began the rescue work with great zeal. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many U-boats were there? - -DÖNITZ: There were three or four submarines. I received reports that the -numbers of those taken on board by each U-boat were between 100 and 200. -I believe Hartenstein had 156 and another 131. I received reports which -spoke of the crew being cared for and taken over from lifeboats; one -report mentioned 35 Italians, 25 Englishmen, and 4 Poles; another, 30 -Italians and 24 Englishmen; a third, 26 Italians, 39 Englishmen, and 3 -Poles. I received reports about the towing of lifeboats towards the -submarines. All these reports caused me the greatest concern because I -knew exactly that this would not end well. - -My concern at that time was expressed in a message to the submarines -radioed four times, “Detailed boats to take over only so many as to -remain fully able to dive.” It is obvious that, if the narrow space of -the submarine—our U-boats were half as big as the enemy’s—is crowded -with 100 to 200 additional people, the submarine is already in absolute -danger, not to speak of its fitness to fight. - -Furthermore, I sent the message, “All boats are to take on only so many -people...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Are these messages in the document? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, where are they? Why did he not refer to the time of -them? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: They are all messages contained in the three -diaries of the U-boats. The first message is on Page 36, Mr. President, -under group 0720. I will read it. - - “Radio message received”—a message from Admiral - Dönitz—“‘Hartenstein remain near place of sinking. Maintain - ability to dive. Detailed boats to take over only so many as to - remain fully able to dive.’” - -DÖNITZ: Then I sent another message: - - “Safety of U-boat is not to be endangered under any - circumstances.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This message is on Page 40, Mr. President, -under the date of 17 September, 0140 hours. - - DÖNITZ: “Take all measures with appropriate ruthlessness, - including discontinuance of all rescue activities.” - -Furthermore, I sent the message: - - “Boats must at all times be clear for crashdiving and underwater - use.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is on Page 37, under 0740, Heading 3. - -DÖNITZ: “Beware of enemy interference by airplanes and submarines.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “All boats, also Hartenstein, take in only -so many people that boats are completely ready for use under water.” - -DÖNITZ: That my concern was justified was clearly evident from the -message which Hartenstein sent and which said that he had been attacked -by bombs from an American bomber. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This message, Mr. President, is on Page 39, -under 1311 hours. It is an emergency message, and under 2304 hours there -is the whole text of the message which I should like to read. - -DÖNITZ: At this occasion... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. The message reads: - - “Radiogram sent: From Hartenstein”—to Admiral Dönitz—“Bombed - five times by American Liberator in low flight when towing four - full boats in spite of a Red Cross flag, 4 square meters, on the - bridge and good visibility. Both periscopes at present out of - order. Breaking off rescue; all off board; putting out to West. - Will repair.” - -DÖNITZ: Hartenstein, as can be seen from a later report, also had 55 -Englishmen and 55 Italians on board his submarine at that time. During -the first bombing attack one of the lifeboats was hit by a bomb and -capsized, and according to a report on his return there were -considerable losses among those who had been rescued. - -During the second attack, one bomb exploded right in the middle of the -submarine, and damaged it seriously; he reported that it was only by a -miracle of German shipbuilding technique that the submarine did not fall -to pieces. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where has he gone to now? What page is he on? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: He is speaking about the events which are -described on Pages 38 and 39, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal, you know, if you kept some -sort of order instead of going on to one page and then to 40, and then -back to 38. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The reason is that we are using two -different war diaries, Mr. President. - -Admiral, would you tell us now what measures you took after -Hartenstein’s report that he had been attacked repeatedly in the course -of the rescue measures? - -DÖNITZ: I deliberated at length whether, after this experience, I should -not break off all attempts at rescue; and beyond doubt, from the -military point of view, that would have been the right thing to do, -because the attack showed clearly in what way the U-boats were -endangered. - -That decision became more grave for me because I received a call from -the Naval Operations Staff that the Führer did not wish me to risk any -submarines in rescue work or to summon them from distant areas. A very -heated conference with my staff ensued, and I can remember closing it -with the statement, “I cannot throw these people into the water now. I -will carry on.” - -Of course, it was clear to me that I would have to assume full -responsibility for further losses, and from the military point of view -this continuation of the rescue work was wrong. Of that I received proof -from the submarine U-506 of Würdemann, who also reported—I believe on -the following morning—that he was bombed by an airplane. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That report, Mr. President, is on Page 42 in -the war diary of Würdemann, an entry of 17 September, at 2343 hours. He -reported: - - “Transfer of survivors to _Annamite_ completed.”—Then come - details—“Attacked by heavy seaplane at noon. Fully ready for - action.” - -DÖNITZ: The third submarine, Schacht’s, the U-507, had sent a wireless -message that he had so and so many men on board and was towing four -lifeboats with Englishmen and Poles. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the report on Page 40, the first -report. - -DÖNITZ: Thereupon, of course, I ordered him to cast off these boats, -because this burden made it impossible for him to dive. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the second message on Page 40. - -DÖNITZ: Later, he again sent a long message, describing the supplying of -the Italians and Englishmen in the boat. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is on Page 41, at 2310 hours. I shall -read that message: - - “Transferred 163 Italians to _Annamite_.”—The _Annamite_ was a - French cruiser which had been called to assist in the - rescue.—“Navigation officer of _Laconia_ and another English - officer on board. Seven lifeboats with about 330 Englishmen and - Poles, among them 15 women and 16 children, deposited at Qu. FE - 9612, women and children kept aboard ship for one night. - Supplied all shipwrecked with hot meal and drinks, clothed and - bandaged when necessary. Sighted four more boats at sea-anchor - Qu. FE 9619.” - -Then there are further details which are not important. - -DÖNITZ: Because I had ordered him to cast off the lifeboats and we -considered this general message as a supplementary later report, he was -admonished by another message; and from that, the Prosecution wrongly -concluded that I had prohibited the rescue of Englishmen. That I did not -prohibit it can be seen from the fact that I did not raise objection to -the many reports speaking of the rescue of Englishmen. - -Indeed, in the end I had the impression that the Italians did not fare -very well in the rescue. That this impression was correct can be seen -from the figures of those rescued. Of 811 Englishmen about 800 were -rescued, and of 1,800 Italians 450. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, I want once more to clarify the -dates of the entire action. The _Laconia_ was torpedoed on 12 September. -When was the air attack on the lifeboats? - -DÖNITZ: On the 16th. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the night of the 16th? On the 17th? - -DÖNITZ: On the 16th. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On the 16th of September. So the rescue took -how many days altogether? - -DÖNITZ: Four days. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And afterwards was continued until when? - -DÖNITZ: Until we turned them over to the French warships which had been -notified by us. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, what is the connection between this -incident of the _Laconia_, which you have just described, and the order -which the Prosecution charges as an order for destruction? - -DÖNITZ: Apart from my great and constant anxiety for the submarines and -the strong feeling that the British and Americans had not helped in -spite of the proximity of Freetown, I learned from this action very -definitely that the time had passed when U-boats could carry out such -operations on the surface without danger. The two bombing attacks showed -clearly that in spite of good weather, in spite of the large numbers of -people to be rescued who were more clearly visible to the aviators than -in normal heavy sea conditions when few people have to be rescued, the -danger to the submarines was so great that, as the one responsible for -the boats and the lives of the crews, I had to prohibit rescue -activities in the face of the ever-present—I cannot express it -differently—the ever-present tremendous Anglo-American air force. I -want to mention, just as an example, that all the submarines which took -part in that rescue operation were lost by bombing attack at their next -action or soon afterwards. The situation in which the enemy kills the -rescuers while they are exposing themselves to great personal danger is -really and emphatically contrary to ordinary common sense and the -elementary laws of warfare. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the opinion of the Prosecution, Admiral, -you used that incident to carry out in practice an idea which you had -already cherished for a long time, namely, in the future to kill the -shipwrecked. Please, state your view on this. - -DÖNITZ: Actually, I cannot say anything in the face of such an -accusation. The whole question concerned rescue or nonrescue; the entire -development leading up to that order speaks clearly against such an -accusation. It was a fact that we rescued with devotion and were bombed -while doing so; it was also a fact that the U-boat Command and I were -faced with a serious decision and we acted in a humane way, which from a -military point of view was wrong. I think, therefore, that no more words -need be lost in rebuttal of this charge. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, I must put to you now the wording -of that order from which the Prosecution draws its conclusions. I have -read it before; in the second paragraph it says, “Rescue is contrary to -the most primitive laws of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships -and crews.” - -What does that sentence mean? - -DÖNITZ: That sentence is, of course, in a sense intended to be a -justification. Now the Prosecution says I could quite simply have -ordered that safety did not permit it, that the predominance of the -enemy’s air force did not permit it—and as we have seen in the case of -the _Laconia_, I did order that four times. But that reasoning had been -worn out. It was a much-played record, if I may use the expression, and -I was now anxious to state to the commanders of the submarines a reason -which would exclude all discretion and all independent decisions of the -commanders. For again and again I had the experience that, for the -reasons mentioned before, a clear sky was judged too favorably by the -U-boats and then the submarine was lost; or that a commander, in the -role of rescuer, was in time no longer master of his own decisions, as -the _Laconia_ case showed; therefore under no circumstances—under no -circumstances whatsoever—did I want to repeat the old reason which -again would give the U-boat commander the opportunity to say, “Well, at -the moment there is no danger of an air attack”; that is, I did not want -to give him a chance to act independently, to make his own decision, for -instance, to say to himself, “Since the danger of air attack no longer -permits.” That is just what I did not want. I did not want an argument -to arise in the mind of one of the 200 U-boat commanders. Nor did I want -to say, “If somebody with great self-sacrifice rescues the enemy and in -that process is killed by him, then that is a contradiction of the most -elementary laws of warfare.” I could have said that too. But I did not -want to put it in that way, and therefore I worded the sentence as it -now stands. - -THE PRESIDENT: You haven’t referred us back to the order, but are you -referring to Page 36 of the Prosecution’s trial brief, or rather British -Document Book? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, Page 36 of the British -Document Book. - -THE PRESIDENT: There are two orders there, are there not? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No. It is one order with four numbered -parts. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, there are two paragraphs, aren’t there? There is -Paragraph 1 and there is Paragraph 2 of 17 September 1942. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I think you mean the excerpt from the war -diary of the Commander of the U-boats, which is also on Page 36 in the -document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Hadn’t you better read the phrase that you are referring -to? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. I am speaking now of the second -sentence, dated 17 September, under heading 1, on Page 36 of the -document book of the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The second sentence reads, “Rescue is -contrary to the most elementary laws of warfare for the destruction of -enemy ships and crews.” That is the sentence on which Admiral Dönitz -commented just now. - -THE PRESIDENT: On Page 36, the first order is an order to “All -Commanding Officers” and Paragraph 1 of it begins, “No attempt of any -kind must be made at rescuing members of ships...” Is that the paragraph -you are referring to? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, and of that I mean the second sentence, -Mr. President. “Rescue is contrary to the most primitive laws of warfare -for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What about the next paragraph, 17 September 1942, -Paragraph 2? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I just wanted to put that to him. That is an -entry in the war diary on which I would like to question him now. - -Admiral, I now put to you an entry in your war diary of 17 September; -there we find: - - “All commanders are again advised that attempts to rescue crews - of ships sunk are contrary to the most elementary laws of - warfare after enemy ships and their crews have been destroyed. - Orders about picking up captains and chief engineers remain in - force.” - -THE PRESIDENT: It is differently translated in our document book. You -said: “After enemy ships have been destroyed...” In our translation it -is “.... by annihilating enemy ships and their crews.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I think it should be “by,” Mr. President, -not “after.” - -DÖNITZ: This entry in the war diary refers to the radio order, the four -regular radio messages which I sent during the _Laconia_ incident and -which were also acknowledged. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. Please explain to the -Tribunal first how such entries in the war diary were made. Who kept the -war diary? Did you yourself keep it or who did that? - -DÖNITZ: Since I am not to conceal anything here, I have to say that the -keeping of the war diary was a difficult matter for me because there -were no reliable officers available for this task. That entry, as I -suspected and as has been confirmed to me here, was made by a former -chief petty officer who tried to condense my orders during the entire -case into an entry of this sort. Of course, I was responsible for each -entry; but this entry had in reality no actual consequences; my radio -order was the essential thing. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, the decisive point here, in my -opinion, is whether that entry is a record of your actual reflections or -whether it is only an excerpt from the wireless order, an extract which -had been noted down by a subordinate according to his best knowledge and -ability. - -DÖNITZ: The latter is correct. My own lengthy deliberations were -concerned with the order of the Naval Operations Staff, the order of the -Führer, and my own serious decision, whether or not I should discontinue -that method of warfare; but they are not included in the war diary. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, will you explain what is meant in -the war diary by the entry, “All commanders are advised again,” and so -on. - -DÖNITZ: I do not know exactly what that means. My staff, which is here, -has told me that it referred to the four radio messages which I had -sent; because before the _Laconia_ case no statement on this subject had -been made. “Again,” therefore, means that this was the fifth radio -message. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thus the order of 17 September 1942 was, for -you, the end of the _Laconia_ incident? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: To whom was it directed? - -DÖNITZ: According to my best recollection, it was directed only to -submarines on the High Seas. For the various operation areas—North -Atlantic, Central Atlantic, South Atlantic—we had different radio -channels. Since the other submarines were in contact with convoys and -thus unable to carry out rescue measures, they could simply shelve the -order. But I have now discovered that the order was sent out to all -submarines, that is, on all channels; it was a technical matter of -communication which of course could do no harm. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said that the fundamental consideration -underlying the entire order was the overwhelming danger of air attack. -If that is correct, how could you in the same order maintain the -directive for the rescue of captains and chief engineers? That can be -found under Heading 2. - -DÖNITZ: There is, of course, a great difference in risk between rescue -measures for which the submarine has to stop, and men have to go on -deck, and a brief surfacing to pick up a captain, because while merely -surfacing the submarine remains in a state of alert, whereas otherwise -that alertness is completely disrupted. - -However, one thing is clear. There was a military purpose in the seizure -of these captains for which I had received orders from the Naval -Operations Staff. As a matter of principle, and generally, I would say -that in the pursuit of a military aim, that is to say, not rescue work -but the capture of important enemies, one must and can run a certain -risk. Besides, that addition was not significant in my view because I -knew that in practice it brought very meager results, I might say no -results at all. - -I remember quite clearly having asked myself, “Why do we still pick them -up?” It was not our intention, however, to drop a general order of that -importance. But the essential points are, first the lesser risk that the -state of alert might not be maintained during rescue and, secondly, the -pursuit of an important military aim. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean by the last sentence in the -order, “Be harsh”? - -DÖNITZ: I had preached to my U-boat commanders for 5½ years, that they -should be hard towards themselves. And when giving this order I again -felt that I had to emphasize to my commanders in a very drastic way my -whole concern and my grave responsibility for the submarines, and thus -the necessity of prohibiting rescue activities in view of the -overwhelming power of the enemy air force. After all it is very definite -that on one side there is the harshness of war, the necessity of saving -one’s own submarine, and on the other the traditional sentiment of the -sailor. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You heard the witness Korvettenkapitän Möhle -state in this Court that he misunderstood the order in the sense that -survivors should be killed, and in several cases he instructed submarine -commanders in that sense. - -DÖNITZ: Möhle is... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. I want to put a -question first. As commanding officer, do you not have to assume -responsibility for a misunderstanding of your order? - -DÖNITZ: Of course, I am responsible for all orders, for their form and -their contents. Möhle, however, is the only person who had doubts about -the meaning of that order. I regret that Möhle did not find occasion to -clarify these doubts immediately, either through me, to whom everybody -had access at all times, or through the numerous staff officers who, as -members of my staff, were either also partly responsible or participated -in the drafting of these orders; or, as another alternative, through his -immediate superior in Kiel. I am convinced that the few U-boat -commanders to whom he communicated his doubts remained quite unaffected -by them. If there were any consequences I would of course assume -responsibility for them. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are acquainted with the case of -Kapitänleutnant Eck, who after sinking the Greek steamer _Peleus_ in the -spring of 1944 actually fired on lifeboats. What is your view of this -incident? - -DÖNITZ: As Kapitänleutnant Eck stated at the end of his interrogation -under oath, he knew nothing of Möhle’s interpretation or Möhle’s doubts -nor of the completely twisted message and my decision in the case of -_U-386_. That was the incident which Möhle mentioned when the submarine -met pneumatic rafts with fliers, and I voiced my disapproval because he -had not taken them on board. A written criticism of his actions was also -forwarded to him. On the other hand, some authority pointed out that he -had not destroyed these survivors. Eck knew nothing about the -interpretation or the doubts of the Möhle order, nor of this affair. He -acted on his own decision, and his aim was not to kill survivors but to -remove the wreckage; because he was certain that otherwise this wreckage -would on the following day give a clue to Anglo-American planes and that -they would spot and destroy him. His purpose, therefore, was entirely -different from the one stated in the Möhle interpretation. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Eck said during his examination that he had -counted on your approval of his actions. Did you ever hear anything at -all about the Eck case during the war? - -DÖNITZ: No. It was during my interrogation here that I heard about it, -for Eck was taken prisoner during that same operation. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you approve of his actions, now that you -know of them? - -DÖNITZ: I do not approve his actions because, as I said before, in this -respect one must not deviate from military ethics under any -circumstances. However, I want to say that Kapitänleutnant Eck was faced -with a very grave decision. He had to bear responsibility for his boat -and his crew, and that responsibility is a serious one in time of war. -Therefore, if for the reason that he believed he would otherwise be -spotted and destroyed—and that reason was not unfounded, because in the -same operational area and during the same time four submarines, I think, -had been bombed—if he came to his decision for that reason, then a -German court-martial would undoubtedly have taken it into consideration. - -I believe that after the war one views events differently, and one does -not fully realize the great responsibility which an unfortunate -commander carries. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Apart from the Eck case did you, during the -war, or after, hear of any other instance in which a U-boat commander -fired on shipwrecked people or life rafts? - -DÖNITZ: Not a single one. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know, do you not, the documents of the -Prosecution which describe the sinking of the ships _Noreen Mary_ and -_Antonico_? Do you or do you not recognize the soundness of these -documents as evidence according to your experience in these matters? - -DÖNITZ: No. I believe that they cannot stand the test of an impartial -examination. We have a large number of similar reports about the other -side, and we were always of the opinion, and also stated that opinion in -writing to the Führer and the OKW, that one must view these cases with a -good deal of skepticism, because a shipwrecked person can easily believe -that he is being fired on, whereas the shots may not be aimed at him at -all, but at the ship, that is, misses of some sort. - -The fact that the Prosecution gives just these two examples proves to me -that my conviction is correct, that apart from the Eck case no further -instances of this kind occurred during those long years in the ranks of -the large German U-boat force. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mentioned before the discussion with the -Führer in May 1942, during which the problem whether it was permissible -to kill survivors was examined, or at least touched upon by the Führer. -Was that question re-examined at any time by the Commander-in-Chief of -U-boats or the Naval Operations Staff? - -DÖNITZ: When I had become Commander-in-Chief of the Navy... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That was in 1943? - -DÖNITZ: I think in the summer of 1943 I received a letter from the -Foreign Office in which I was informed that about 87 percent of the -crews of merchant ships which had been sunk were returning home. I was -told that was a disadvantage and was asked whether it was not possible -to do something about it. - -Thereupon I had a letter sent to the Foreign Office in which I wrote -that I had already been forced to prohibit rescue because it endangered -the submarines, but that other measures were out of the question for me. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There is an entry in the War Diary of the -Naval Operations Staff which deals with this case. I submit this entry -as Dönitz-42, on Pages 92 to 94 in Volume II of the document book. - -I shall read as introduction the first and second sentences of Page 92. -The entry is dated 4 April 1943. - - “The German Foreign Office pointed out a statement of the - British Transport Minister according to which, following - sinkings of merchant vessels, an average of 87 percent of the - crews were saved. On the subject of this statement the Naval - Operations Staff made a comprehensive reply to the Foreign - Office.” - -Then there is the reply on the next pages, and I should like to call to -your attention a part of it first, under Heading 1, about the number of -convoy ships sunk. What is the importance of that in this connection? - -DÖNITZ: That so many people certainly returned home. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Furthermore, under Heading 2, it is -mentioned that the sailors do not need a long period of training, with -the exception of officers, and that an order for the picking up of -captains and chief engineers already existed. What is the meaning of -that? - -DÖNITZ: It is intended to emphasize that a matter like that is being -judged in the wrong light. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. By “a matter like -that,” you mean the usefulness, from a military point of view, of -killing the shipwrecked? - -DÖNITZ: I mean that crews were always available to the enemy, or -unskilled men could very quickly be trained. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Under Heading 4, you point to the great -danger of reprisals against your own submarine crews. Did such reprisals -against German U-boat crews occur at any time in the course of the war? - -DÖNITZ: I do not know. I did not hear anything about reprisals in that -respect. I only received reliable reports that when U-boats were bombed -and destroyed from the air, the men swimming in the water were shot at. -But whether these were individual acts or reprisals carried out on -orders, I do not know. I assume they were individual acts. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The decisive point of the entire letter -seems to be in Heading 3; I shall read that to you: - - “A directive to take action against lifeboats of sunken vessels - and crew members drifting in the sea would, for psychological - reasons, hardly be acceptable to U-boat crews, since it would be - contrary to the innermost feelings of all sailors. Such a - directive could only be considered if by it a decisive military - success could be achieved.” - -Admiral, you yourself have repeatedly spoken about the harshness of war. -Are you, nevertheless, of the opinion that psychologically the U-boat -crews could not be expected to carry out such an order? And why? - -DÖNITZ: We U-boat men knew that we had to fight a very hard war against -the great sea powers. Germany had at her disposal for this naval warfare -nothing but the U-boats. Therefore, from the beginning—already in -peacetime—I trained the submarine crews in the spirit of pure idealism -and patriotism. - -That was necessary, and I continued that training throughout the war and -supported it by very close personal contacts with the men at the bases. -It was necessary to achieve very high morale, very high fighting spirit, -because otherwise the severe struggle and the enormous losses, as shown -on the diagram, would have been morally impossible to bear. But in spite -of these high losses we continued the fight, because it had to be; and -we made up for our losses and again and again replenished our forces -with volunteers full of enthusiasm and full of moral strength, just -because morale was so high. And I would never, even at the time of our -most serious losses, have permitted that these men be given an order -which was unethical or which would damage their fighting morale; much -less would I myself ever have given such an order, for I placed my whole -confidence in that high fighting morale and endeavored to maintain it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said the U-boat forces were replenished -with volunteers, did you? - -DÖNITZ: We had practically only volunteers. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Also at the time of the highest losses? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, even during the time of highest losses, during the period -when everyone knew that he took part in an average of two missions and -then was lost. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How high were your losses? - -DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, our total losses were 640 or 670. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And crew members? - -DÖNITZ: Altogether, we had 40,000 men in the submarine force. Of these -40,000 men 30,000 did not return, and of these 30,000, 25,000 were -killed and only 5,000 were taken prisoner. The majority of the -submarines were destroyed from the air in the vast areas of the sea, the -Atlantic, where rescue was out of the question. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I come now to a new subject. -Would this be a suitable time to recess? - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am turning now to the theme of the -so-called conspiracy. The Prosecution is accusing you of participating -from 1932, on the basis of your close connections with the Party, in a -conspiracy to promote aggressive wars and commit war crimes. Where were -you during the weeks of the seizure of power by the National Socialists -in the early part of 1933? - -DÖNITZ: Immediately after 30 January 1933, I believe it was on 1 -February, I went on leave to the Dutch East Indies and Ceylon, a trip -which lasted well into the summer of 1933. This leave journey had been -granted me, at Grossadmiral Raeder’s recommendation, by President -Hindenburg. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: After that, you became commander of a -cruiser at a foreign station? - -DÖNITZ: In the autumn of 1934 I went as captain of the cruiser _Emden_ -through the Atlantic, around Africa into the Indian Ocean, and back. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before this sojourn abroad or after your -return in 1935 and until you were appointed Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy in the year 1943 were you politically active in any way? - -DÖNITZ: I was not active politically until 1 May 1945, when I became -head of the State, not before then. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has submitted a document, -namely, an affidavit by Ambassador Messersmith. It bears the number -USA-57 (Document Number 1760-PS) and I have the pertinent extracts in my -document book, Volume II, Page 100. In this affidavit, Ambassador -Messersmith says that from 1930 until the spring of 1934 he acted as -Consul General for the United States in Berlin. Then, until July 1937, -he was in Vienna and from there he went to Washington. He gives an -opinion about you with the remark, “Among the people whom I saw -frequently and to whom my statements refer were the following....” Then -your name is mentioned. From this one must get the impression that -during this period of time you were active in political circles in -Berlin or Vienna. Is that correct? - -DÖNITZ: No. At that time I was Lieutenant Commander and from the end of -1934 on I was Commander. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal I sent -an interrogatory to Ambassador Messersmith in order to determine upon -what facts he was basing his opinion. This interrogatory was answered -and I am submitting it as Exhibit Dönitz-45. The answers will be found -on Page 102 of the document book, and I quote: - - “During my residence in Berlin and during my later frequent - visits there as stated in my previous affidavits, I saw Admiral - Karl Dönitz and spoke to him on several occasions. However, I - kept no diary and I am unable to state with accuracy when and - where the meetings occurred, the capacity in which Admiral - Dönitz appeared there, or the topic or topics of our - conversation. My judgment on Dönitz expressed in my previous - affidavit is based on personal knowledge and on the general - knowledge which I obtained from the various sources described in - my previous affidavits.” - -Did you, Admiral, see and speak with Ambassador Messersmith anywhere and -at any time? - -DÖNITZ: I never saw him, and I hear his name here for the first time. -Also, at the time in question, I was not in Berlin. I was in -Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea coast or in the Indian Ocean. If he -alleges to have spoken to me it would have had to be in Wilhelmshaven or -in the Indian Ocean. Since neither is the case, I believe that he is -mistaken and that he must have confused me with somebody else. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you a member of the NSDAP? - -DÖNITZ: On 30 January 1944 I received from the Führer, as a decoration, -the Golden Party Badge; and I assume that I thereby became an honorary -member of the Party. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When did you become acquainted with Adolf -Hitler and how often did you see him before you were appointed -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy? - -DÖNITZ: I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time when, in the presence of -Grossadmiral Raeder in the autumn of 1934, I informed him of my -departure for foreign parts as captain of the cruiser _Emden_. I saw him -again on the day following my return with the _Emden_. From the autumn -of 1934 until the outbreak of war in 1939, in 5 years, I saw him four -times in all, including the two occasions when I reported to him as -already mentioned. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what were the other two occasions? Were -they military or political occasions? - -DÖNITZ: One was a military matter when he was watching a review of the -fleet in the Baltic Sea and I stood next to him on the bridge of the -flagship in order to give the necessary explanations while two U-boats -showed attack maneuvers. - -The other occasion was an invitation to all high-ranking army and navy -officers when the new Reich Chancellery in the Voss Strasse was -completed. That was in 1938 or 1939. I saw him there but I did not speak -with him. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many times during the war, until your -appointment as Commander-in-Chief, did you see the Führer? - -DÖNITZ: In the years between 1939 and 1943 I saw the Führer four times, -each time when short military reports about U-boat warfare were being -made and always in the presence of large groups. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Until that time had you had any discussion -which went beyond the purely military? - -DÖNITZ: No, none at all. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When were you appointed Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy as successor to Grossadmiral Raeder? - -DÖNITZ: On 30 January 1943. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the war which Germany was waging at that -time at an offensive or defensive stage? - -DÖNITZ: At a decidedly defensive stage. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your eyes was the position of -Commander-in-Chief, which was offered to you, a political or a military -position? - -DÖNITZ: It was self-evidently a purely military position, namely, that -of the first soldier at the head of the Navy. My appointment to this -position also came about because of purely military reasons which -motivated Grossadmiral Raeder to propose my name for this position. -Purely military considerations were the decisive ones in respect to this -appointment. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know, Admiral, that the Prosecution -draws very far-reaching conclusions from your acceptance of this -appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, especially with reference -to the conspiracy. The Prosecution contends that through your acceptance -of this position you ratified the previous happenings, all the endeavors -of the Party since 1920 or 1922, and the entire German policy, domestic -and foreign, at least since 1933. Were you aware of the significance of -this foreign policy? Did you take this into consideration at all? - -DÖNITZ: The idea never entered my head. Nor do I believe that there is a -soldier who, when he receives a military command, would entertain such -thoughts or be conscious of such considerations. My appointment as -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy represented for me an order which I of -course had to obey, just as I had to obey every other military order, -unless for reasons of health I was not able to do so. Since I was in -good health and believed that I could be of use to the Navy, I naturally -also accepted this command with inner conviction. Anything else would -have been desertion or disobedience. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy you -came into very close contact with Adolf Hitler. You also know just what -conclusions the Prosecution draws from this relationship. Please tell me -just what this relationship was and on what it was based? - -DÖNITZ: In order to be brief, I might perhaps explain the matter as -follows: - -This relationship was based on three ties. First of all, I accepted and -agreed to the national and social ideas of National Socialism: the -national ideas which found expression in the honor and dignity of the -nation, its freedom, and its equality among nations and its security; -and the social tenets which had perhaps as their basis: no class -struggle, but human and social respect of each person regardless of his -class, profession, or economic position, and on the other hand, -subordination of each and every one to the interests of the common weal. -Naturally I regarded Adolf Hitler’s high authority with admiration and -joyfully acknowledged it, when in times of peace he succeeded so quickly -and without bloodshed in realizing his national and social objectives. - -My second tie was my oath. Adolf Hitler had, in a legal and lawful way, -become the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, to whom the Wehrmacht had -sworn its oath of allegiance. That this oath was sacred to me is -self-evident and I believe that decency in this world will everywhere be -on the side of him who keeps his oath. - -The third tie was my personal relationship: Before I became -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I believe Hitler had no definite -conception of me and my person. He had seen me too few times and always -in large circles. How my relationship to him would shape itself was -therefore a completely open question when I became Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy. My start in this connection was very unfavorable. It was made -difficult, first, by the imminent and then the actual collapse of U-boat -warfare and, secondly, by my refusal, just as Grossadmiral Raeder had -already refused, to scrap the large ships, which in Hitler’s opinion had -no fighting value in view of the oppressive superiority of the foe. I, -like Grossadmiral Raeder, had opposed the scrapping of these ships, and -only after a quarrel did he finally agree. But, despite that, I noticed -very soon that in Navy matters he had confidence in me and in other -respects as well treated me with decided respect. - -Adolf Hitler always saw in me only the first soldier of the Navy. He -never asked for my advice in military matters which did not concern the -Navy, either in regard to the Army or the Air Force; nor did I ever -express my opinion about matters concerning the Army or the Air Force, -because basically I did not have sufficient knowledge of these matters. -Of course, he never consulted me on political matters of a domestic or -foreign nature. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said, Admiral, that he never asked you -for advice on political matters. But those matters might have come up in -connection with Navy questions. Did you not participate then either? - -DÖNITZ: If by “political” you mean, for instance, consultations of the -commanders with the so-called “National Socialist Leadership Officers,” -then, of course, I participated, because this came within the sphere of -the Navy, or rather was to become a Navy concern. That was naturally the -case. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Beyond those questions, did Hitler ever -consider you a general adviser, as the Prosecution claims and as they -concluded from the long list of meetings which you have had with Hitler -since 1943 at his headquarters? - -DÖNITZ: First of all, as a matter of principle, there can be no question -of a general consultation with the Führer; as I have already said, the -Führer asked for and received advice from me only in matters concerning -the Navy and the conduct of naval warfare—matters exclusively and -absolutely restricted to my sphere of activity. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: According to the table submitted, between -1943 and 1945 you were called sometimes once and sometimes twice a month -to the Führer’s headquarters. Please describe to the Tribunal just what -happened, as far as you were concerned, on a day like that at the -Führer’s headquarters—what you had to do there. - -DÖNITZ: Until 2 or 3 months before the collapse, when the Führer was in -Berlin, I flew to his headquarters about every 2 or 3 weeks, but only if -I had some concrete Navy matter for which I needed his decision. On -those occasions I participated in the noontime discussion of the general -military situation, that is, the report which the Führer’s staff made to -him about what had taken place on the fighting fronts within the last 24 -hours. At these military discussions the Army and Air Force situation -was of primary importance, and I spoke only when my Naval expert was -reporting the naval situation and he needed me to supplement his report. -Then at a given moment, which was fixed by the Adjutant’s Office, I gave -my military report which was the purpose of my journey. When rendering -this report only those were present whom these matters concerned, that -is, when it was a question of reinforcements, _et cetera_, Field Marshal -Keitel or Generaloberst Jodl were generally present. - -When I came to his headquarters every 2 or 3 weeks—later in 1944 there -was sometimes an interval of 6 weeks—the Führer invited me to lunch. -These invitations ceased completely after 20 July 1944, the day of the -attempted assassination. - -I never received from the Führer an order which in any way violated the -ethics of war. Neither I nor anyone in the Navy—and this is my -conviction—knew anything about the mass extermination of people, which -I learned about here from the Indictment, or, as far as the -concentration camps are concerned, after the capitulation in May 1945. - -In Hitler I saw a powerful personality who had extraordinary -intelligence and energy and a practically universal knowledge, from whom -power seemed to emanate and who was possessed of a remarkable power of -suggestion. On the other hand, I purposely very seldom went to his -headquarters, for I had the feeling that I would best preserve my power -of initiative that way and, secondly, because after several days, say 2 -or 3 days at his headquarters, I had the feeling that I had to disengage -myself from his power of suggestion. I am telling you this because in -this connection I was doubtless more fortunate than his staff who were -constantly exposed to his powerful personality with its power of -suggestion. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said just now, Admiral, that you never -received an order which was in violation of military ethics. You know -the Commando Order of the autumn of 1942. Did you not receive this -order? - -DÖNITZ: I was informed of this order after it was issued while I was -still Commander of the U-boats. For the soldiers at the front this order -was unequivocal. I had the feeling that it was a very grave matter; but -under Point 1 of this order it was clearly and unequivocally expressed -that members of the enemy forces, because of their behavior, because of -the killing of prisoners, had placed themselves outside the Geneva -Convention and that therefore the Führer had ordered reprisals and that -those reprisal measures, in addition, had been published in the -Wehrmacht report. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, the soldier who received this -order had no right, no possibility, and no authority to demand a -justification or an investigation; does this mean such an order was -justified? As Commander of the U-boats did you have anything to do with -the execution of this order? - -DÖNITZ: No, not in the slightest. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: As far as you remember, did you as -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy have anything to do with the carrying out -of this order? - -DÖNITZ: As far as I remember I was never concerned with this order as -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. One should not forget, first, that this -decree excludes expressly those taken prisoner in battles at sea and, -second, that the Navy had no territorial authority on land, and for this -latter reason found itself less often in a position of having to carry -out any point of this order. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know the document submitted by the -Prosecution, which describes how in the summer of 1943 a Commando unit -was shot in Norway. I mean the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-208. The -incident is described there as showing that the crew of a Norwegian -motor torpedo boat were taken prisoner on a Norwegian island. This motor -torpedo boat was charged with belligerent missions at sea. The document -does not say who took the crew prisoner, but it does say that the -members of the crew were wearing their uniforms when they were taken -prisoner, that they were interrogated by a naval officer, and that on -the order of Admiral Von Schrader they were turned over to the SD. The -SD later shot them. Did you know about this incident or was it reported -to you as Commander-in-Chief? - -DÖNITZ: I learned about this incident from the trial brief of the -Prosecution. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you explain the fact that an incident of -this nature was not brought to your attention? Would this not have had -to be reported to you? - -DÖNITZ: If the Navy was concerned in this matter, that is, if this crew -had been captured by the Navy, Admiral Von Schrader, who was the -commander there, would absolutely have had to report this matter to the -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. I am also convinced that he would have -done so, for the regulations regarding this were unequivocal. I am also -convinced that the naval expert at the Navy High Command, who was -concerned with such matters, would have reported this to me as -Commander-in-Chief. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What is your opinion about this case now -that you have learned about it through the document of the Prosecution? - -DÖNITZ: If it is correct that it concerns the crew of a motor torpedo -boat which had belligerent missions at sea, then this measure, the -shooting which took place, was entirely wrong in any case, for it was in -direct opposition even to this Commando Order. But I consider it -completely out of the question, for I do not believe that Admiral Von -Schrader, whom I know personally to be an especially chivalrous sailor, -would have had a hand in anything of this sort. From the circumstances -of this incident, the fact that it was not reported to the High Command, -that this incident, as has now been ascertained by perusal of the German -newspapers of that time, was never mentioned in the Wehrmacht -communiqué, as would have been the case if it had been a matter -concerning the Wehrmacht, from all these circumstances I assume that the -incident was as follows: - -That the police arrested these people on the island; that they were -taken from this island by vessel to Bergen; that there one or two, if I -remember correctly, naval officers interrogated them, since the Navy, of -course, was interested in this interrogation; and that then these people -were handed over to the SD, since they had already been taken prisoner -by the SD. I cannot explain it otherwise. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You wish to say, then, that in your opinion -these men had never been prisoners of the Navy? - -DÖNITZ: No. If they had been, a report to the High Command would have -been made. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Quite apart from these questions I should -like to ask you, did you not in your position as Commander-in-Chief, and -during your visits to the Führer’s headquarters, have experiences which -made you consider disassociating yourself from Adolf Hitler? - -DÖNITZ: I have already stated that as far as my activity was concerned, -even at headquarters, I was strictly limited to my own department, since -it was a peculiarity of the Führer’s to listen to a person only about -matters which were that person’s express concern. It was also -self-evident that at the discussions of the military situation only -purely military matters were discussed, that is, no problems of domestic -policy, of the SD, or the SS, unless it was a question of SS divisions -in military service under one of the army commanders. Therefore I had no -knowledge of all these things. As I have already said, I never received -an order from the Führer which in any way violated military ethics. Thus -I firmly believe that in every respect I kept the Navy unsullied down to -the last man until the end. In naval warfare my attention was focused on -the sea; and the Navy, small as it was, tried to fulfill its duty -according to its tasks. Therefore I had no reason at all to break with -the Führer. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Such a reason would not necessarily refer to -a crime; it could also have been, for political considerations, having -nothing to do with crimes. You have heard the question broached -repeatedly as to whether there should have been a Putsch. Did you enter -into contact with such a movement or did you yourself consider or -attempt a Putsch? - -DÖNITZ: No. The word “Putsch” has been used frequently in this courtroom -by a wide variety of people. It is easy to say so, but I believe that -one would have had to realize the tremendous significance of such an -activity. - -The German nation was involved in a struggle of life and death. It was -surrounded by enemies almost like a fortress. And it is clear, to keep -to the simile of the fortress, that every disturbance from within would -without doubt perforce have affected our military might and fighting -power. Anyone, therefore, who violates his loyalty and his oath to plan -and try to bring about an overthrow during such a struggle for survival -must be most deeply convinced that the nation needs such an overthrow at -all costs and must be aware of his responsibility. - -Despite this, every nation will judge such a man to be a traitor, and -history will not vindicate him unless the success of the overthrow -actually contributes to the welfare and prosperity of his people. This, -however, would not have been the case in Germany. - -If, for instance, the Putsch of 20 July had been successful, then a -dissolution, if only a gradual one, would have resulted inside -Germany—a fight against the bearers of weapons, here the SS, there -another group, complete chaos inside Germany—for the firm structure of -the State would gradually have been destroyed and disintegration and a -reduction of our fighting power at the front would have inevitably -resulted. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the defendant is making a long -and political speech. It really hasn’t very much to do with the -questions with which we have to deal. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I was of the opinion that the -question of whether a Commander-in-Chief is obliged to bring about a -Putsch was regarded as a main point by the Prosecution, a point having a -bearing on the question of whether he declared himself in agreement or -not with the system which is being characterized as criminal. If the -Tribunal considers this question irrelevant I do not want to press it -further. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think the Prosecution has put forward the view -that anybody had to create a Putsch. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It seemed to me a self-evident view of the -Prosecution. - -Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted two documents, dating from the -winter of 1943 and May 1945, containing speeches made by you to the -troops. You are accused by the Prosecution of preaching National -Socialist ideas to the troops. Please define your position on this -point. - -DÖNITZ: When in February 1943 I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I -was responsible for the fighting power of the entire Navy. A main source -of strength in this war was the unity of our people. And those who had -most to gain from this unity were the Armed Forces, for any rupture -inside Germany would perforce have had an effect on the troops and would -have reduced that fighting spirit which was their mission. The Navy, in -particular, in the first World War, had had bitter experiences in this -direction in 1917-18. - -Therefore in all of my speeches I tried to preserve this unity and the -feeling that we were the guarantors of this unity. This was necessary -and right, and particularly necessary for me as a leader of troops. I -could not preach disunity or dissolution, and it had its effect. -Fighting power and discipline in the Navy were of a high standard until -the end. And I believe that in every nation such an achievement is -considered a proper and good achievement for a leader of troops. These -are my reasons for talking the way I did. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On 30 April 1945 you became head of the -State as Adolf Hitler’s successor; and the Prosecution concludes from -this that prior to that time also you must have been a close confidant -of Hitler’s, since only a confidant of his would have been chosen to be -Hitler’s successor where matters of state were concerned. Will you tell -me how you came to be his successor and whether Hitler before that time -ever spoke to you about this possibility? - -DÖNITZ: From 20 July 1944 on I did not see Hitler alone, but only at the -large discussions of the military situation. He never spoke to me about -the question of a successor, not even by way of hinting. This was -entirely natural and clear since, according to law, the Reich Marshal -was his successor; and the regrettable misunderstanding between the -Führer and the Reich Marshal did not occur until the end of April 1945, -at a time when I was no longer in Berlin. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where were you? - -DÖNITZ: I was in Holstein. Therefore, I did not have the slightest -inkling, nor did the Führer, that I was to become his successor. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just how, through what measures or orders, -did that actually come about? - -DÖNITZ: On 30 April 1945, in the evening, I received a radio message -from headquarters to the effect that the Führer was designating me his -successor and that I was authorized to take at once all measures which I -considered necessary. - -The next morning, that is on 1 May, I received another radio message, a -more detailed directive, which said that I was to be Reich President; -Minister Goebbels, Reich Chancellor; Bormann, Party Minister; and -Seyss-Inquart, Foreign Minister. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you adhere to this directive? - -DÖNITZ: This radio message first of all contradicted the earlier radio -message which clearly stated: “You can at once do everything you -consider to be right.” I did not and as a matter of principle never -would adhere to this second radio message, for if I am to take -responsibility, then no conditions must be imposed on me. Thirdly, under -no circumstances would I have agreed to working with the people -mentioned, with the exception of Seyss-Inquart. - -In the early morning of 1 May I had already had a discussion with the -Minister of Finance, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, and had asked him to -take over the business of government, insofar as we could still talk -about that. I had done this because in a chance discussion, which had -taken place several days before, I had seen that we held much the same -view, the view that the German people belonged to the Christian West, -that the basis of future conditions of life is the absolute legal -security of the individual and of private property. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you know the so-called “Political -Testament” of Adolf Hitler, in which you are charged with continuing the -war. Did you receive an order of this sort at that time? - -DÖNITZ: No. I saw this Testament for the first time a few weeks ago -here, when it was made public in the press. As I have said, I would not -have accepted any order, any restriction of my activity at the time when -Germany’s position was hopeless and I was given the responsibility. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has submitted a document in -which you exhorted the war leaders in the spring of 1945 to carry on -tenaciously to the end. It is Exhibit GB-212. You are accused in this -connection of being a fanatical Nazi who was ready to carry on a -hopeless war at the expense of the women and children of your people. -Please define your position in respect to this particularly grave -accusation. - -DÖNITZ: In this connection I can say the following: In the spring of -1945 I was not head of the State; I was a soldier. To continue the fight -or not to continue the fight was a political decision. The head of the -State wanted to continue the fight. I as a soldier had to obey. It is an -impossibility that in a state one soldier should declare, “I shall -continue to fight,” while another declares, “I shall not continue the -fight.” I could not have given any other advice, the way I saw things; -and for the following reasons: - -First: In the East the collapse of our front at one point meant the -extermination of the people living behind that front. We knew that -because of practical experiences and because of all the reports which we -had about this. It was the belief of all the people that the soldier in -the East had to do his military duty in these hard months of the war, -these last hard months of the war. This was especially important because -otherwise German women and children would have perished. - -The Navy was involved to a considerable extent in the East. It had about -100,000 men on land, and the entire surface craft were concentrated in -the Baltic for the transport of troops, weapons, wounded, and above all, -refugees. Therefore the very existence of the German people in this last -hard period depended above all on the soldiers carrying on tenaciously -to the end. - -Secondly: If we had capitulated in the first few months of the spring or -in the winter of 1945, then from everything we knew about the enemy’s -intentions the country would, according to the Yalta Agreement, have -been ruinously torn asunder and partitioned and the German land occupied -in the same way as it is today. - -Thirdly: Capitulation means that the army, the soldiers, stay where they -are and become prisoners. That means that if we had capitulated in -January or February 1945, 2 million soldiers in the East, for example, -would have fallen into the hands of the Russians. That these millions -could not possibly have been cared for during the cold winter is -obvious; and we would have lost men on a very large scale, for even at -the time of the capitulation in May 1945—that is, in the late -spring—it was not possible in the West to take care of the large masses -of prisoners according to the Geneva Convention. Then, as I have already -said, since the Yalta Agreement would have been put into effect, we -would have lost in the East a much larger number of people who had not -yet fled from there. - -When on 1 May I became head of the State, circumstances were different. -By that time the fronts, the Eastern and Western fronts, had come so -close to each other that in a few days people, troops, soldiers, armies, -and the great masses of refugees could be transported, from the East to -the West. When I became head of the State on 1 May, I therefore strove -to make peace as quickly as possible and to capitulate, thus saving -German blood and bringing German people from the East to the West; and I -acted accordingly, already on 2 May, by making overtures to General -Montgomery to capitulate for the territory facing his army, and for -Holland and Denmark which we still held firmly; and immediately -following that I opened negotiations with General Eisenhower. - -The same basic principle—to save and preserve the German -population—motivated me in the winter to face bitter necessity and keep -on fighting. It was very painful that our cities were still being bombed -to pieces and that through these bombing attacks and the continued fight -more lives were lost. The number of these people is about 300,000 to -400,000, the majority of whom perished in the bombing attack of Dresden, -which cannot be understood from a military point of view and which could -not have been predicted. Nevertheless, this figure is relatively small -compared with the millions of German people, soldiers and civilian -population, we would have lost in the East if we had capitulated in the -winter. - -Therefore, in my opinion, it was necessary to act as I did: First while -I was still a soldier, to call on my troops to keep up the fight, and -afterwards, when I became head of the State in May, to capitulate at -once. Thereby no German lives were lost; rather they were saved. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Defendants’ Counsel wish to -ask questions? - -DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Admiral Dönitz, you -have already explained that Grossadmiral Raeder and the Navy in the -summer of 1939 did not believe, despite certain ominous signs, that war -was about to break out. Since you saw Grossadmiral Raeder in the summer -of 1939, I should like you briefly to supplement this point. First of -all, on what occasion did you have a detailed conversation with -Grossadmiral Raeder? - -DÖNITZ: Grossadmiral Raeder embarked in the middle of July 1939 for -submarine maneuvers of my fleet in the Baltic Sea. Following the -maneuvers... - -DR. SIEMERS: May I first ask you something? What sort of maneuvers were -they? How large were they and where did they take place? - -DÖNITZ: All submarines which had completed their tests I had assembled -in the Baltic. I cannot remember the exact figure, but I think there -were about 30. In the maneuvers I then showed Grossadmiral Raeder what -these submarines could accomplish. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were all those submarines capable of navigating in the -Atlantic? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, they were, and in addition there were the smaller -submarines of lower tonnage, which could operate only as far as the -North Sea. - -DR. SIEMERS: That means, therefore, that at that time you had no more -than two dozen submarines capable of navigating in the Atlantic; is that -right? - -DÖNITZ: That figure is too high. At that time we had not even 15 -submarines capable of navigating in the Atlantic. At the outbreak of -war, as far as I remember, we went to sea with fifteen submarines -capable of navigating in the Atlantic. - -DR. SIEMERS: During those few days when you were with Raeder at the -maneuvers did you talk to him privately? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. Grossadmiral Raeder told me—and he repeated this to the -entire officers’ corps during his final speech in Swinemünde—that the -Führer had informed him that under no circumstances must a war in the -West develop, for that would be _Finis Germaniae_. I asked for leave and -immediately after the maneuvers I went on leave on 24 July for a -6-weeks’ rest at Bad Gastein. I am merely stating that because it shows -how we regarded the situation at that time. - -DR. SIEMERS: But then the war came rather quickly, did it not, and you -had to break off the leave which you had planned? - -DÖNITZ: I was called back by telephone in the middle of August. - -DR. SIEMERS: These words, that there would be no war with England, and -the words, _Finis Germaniae_, did Raeder speak them during a private -conversation or only in this speech at Swinemünde? - -DÖNITZ: As far as the sense is concerned, yes. As far as the exact words -are concerned, I cannot remember now what was said in the main speech -and what was said before. At any rate he certainly said it during the -main speech. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. - -DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, on 30 January 1943 you became Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy and thereby a member of the group which is indicted here, -the General Staff and the OKW? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to ask you whether, after you were appointed, -you had discussions with any of the members of these groups regarding -plans or aims as outlined in the Indictment? - -DÖNITZ: No, with none of them. - -DR. LATERNSER: After you came to office, you dismissed all the senior -commanders in the Navy. What were the reasons for this? - -DÖNITZ: Since I was between 7 and 10 years younger than the other -commanders in the Navy, for instance, Admiral Carls, Admiral Boehm, and -others, it was naturally difficult for both parties. They were released -for those reasons and, I believe, in spite of mutual respect and esteem. - -DR. LATERNSER: How many commanders in the Navy were involved in this -case? - -DÖNITZ: I think three or four. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was there close personal and official contact between the -Navy on the one hand, and the Army and Air Force on the other? - -DÖNITZ: No, not at all. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you know most of the members of the indicted group? - -DÖNITZ: No. Before my time as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I knew -only those with whom I happened to find myself in the same area. For -instance, when I was in France I knew Field Marshal Von Rundstedt. After -I became Commander-in-Chief I knew only those whom I met by chance when -I was at headquarters where they had to submit some army report at the -large military situation conference. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then you did not know most of the members of these -groups? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did those commanders who were known to you have a common -political aim? - -DÖNITZ: As far as the Army and the Air Force are concerned, I cannot -say. As far as the Navy is concerned, the answer is “no.” We were -soldiers, and I was interested in what the soldier could accomplish, -what his personality was; and I did not concern myself in the main about -a political line of thought, unless it affected his performance as a -soldier. - -I want to mention, as an example, the fact that my closest colleague who -from 1934 until the very end in 1945 always accompanied me as my -adjutant and later as Chief of Staff, was extremely critical of National -Socialism—to put it mildly—without our official collaboration or my -personal attitude toward him being affected thereby, as this long period -of working together shows. - -DR. LATERNSER: May I inquire the name of this Chief of Staff to whom you -have just referred? - -DÖNITZ: Admiral Godt. - -DR. LATERNSER: Admiral Godt. Do you know of any remarks made by Hitler -regarding the attitude of the generals of the Army? The question refers -only to those who belong to the indicted group. - -DÖNITZ: At the discussions of the military situation, I naturally heard -a hasty remark now and then about some army commander, but I cannot say -today why it was made or to whom it referred. - -DR. LATERNSER: You were quite often present during the situation -conferences at the Führer’s headquarters. Did you notice on such -occasions that commanders-in-chief put forward in Hitler’s presence -views strikingly different from his? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that certainly happened. - -DR. LATERNSER: Can you remember any particular instance? - -DÖNITZ: I remember that when the question of falling back in the -northern sector in the East was discussed, the army commander of this -sector of the front was not of the same opinion as the Führer, and that -this led to an argument. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was that commander successful with his objections? - -DÖNITZ: I think so, partly; but I should like you to ask an army officer -about that because naturally I do not know these details so clearly and -authentically. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the high military leaders of the Navy have anything -to do with the Einsatzgruppen of the SD? - -DÖNITZ: The Navy, no. As far as the Army is concerned, I do not believe -so and I assume they did not. But please do not ask me about anything -but the Navy. - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. This question referred only to the Navy. And now, -some questions about regional Navy commanders. Did the commanders of the -regional Navy Group Commands—Marine-Gruppenkommando—have extensive -territorial authority? - -DÖNITZ: No. According to the famous KG-40, that is War Organization -1940, the Navy had no territorial powers ashore. Its task ashore was to -defend the coast under the command of the Army and according to sectors, -that is, under the command of the divisions stationed in that particular -sector. Apart from that they took part in battle in coastal waters. - -DR. LATERNSER: So that regional commanders in the Navy were therefore -simply troop commanders? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the commanders of these regional Navy Group Commands -have any influence on the formulation of orders regarding submarine -warfare? - -DÖNITZ: No, none whatever. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did they influence decisions regarding what ships were to -be sunk? - -DÖNITZ: No, not at all. - -DR. LATERNSER: And did they influence orders regarding the treatment of -shipwrecked personnel? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now the holder of the office Chief of Naval Operations -Staff also belongs to this group. What were the tasks of a Chief of -Naval Operations Staff? - -DÖNITZ: That was a high command, the office which worked out the purely -military, tactical, and operational matters of the Navy. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the Chief of Naval Operations Staff have powers to -issue orders? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -DR. LATERNSER: Then his position was similar to that of Chief of General -Staff of the Air Force or of the Army? - -DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, I must first get the idea clear. - -I assume that by “Chief of Naval Operations Staff” you mean the Chief of -Staff of Naval Operations Staff? In Grossadmiral Raeder’s time the name -“Chief of Naval Operations Staff” was the same as “Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy.” The position about which you are asking was called “Chief of -Staff of Naval Operations Staff” while I was Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy; the name “Chief of Staff of Naval Operations Staff” was changed to -“Chief of Naval Operations Staff,” but it was the same person and he was -under the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. - -DR. LATERNSER: Was there in the Navy a staff of Admirals corresponding -to the Army General Staff? - -DÖNITZ: No, that did not exist. Such an institution did not exist. The -necessary consultants, “Führungsgehilfen,” as we called them, came from -the front, served on the staff and then returned to the front. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now I shall ask one last question. The witness Gisevius -has stated in this courtroom that the highest military leaders had -drifted into corruption by accepting gifts. Did you yourself receive a -gift of any kind? - -DÖNITZ: Apart from the salary to which I was entitled, I did not receive -a penny; I received no gifts. And the same applies to all the officers -of the Navy. - -DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions. - -DR. NELTE: Witness, you were present when the witness Gisevius was being -examined here. That witness, without giving concrete facts, passed -judgment in the following manner: “Keitel had one of the most -influential positions in the Third Reich.” And at another point he said, -“I received very exact information regarding the tremendous influence, -which Keitel had on everything relating to the Army and accordingly also -on those who represented the Army to the German people.” - -Will you, who can judge these matters, tell me whether that judgment of -Defendant Keitel’s position, his function, is correct? - -DÖNITZ: I consider it very much exaggerated. I think that Field Marshal -Keitel’s position has been described here so unequivocally that it ought -to be clear by now that what is contained in these words is not at all -correct. - -DR. NELTE: Am I to gather from this that you confirm as correct the -description of the position and functions as given by Reich Marshal -Göring and Field Marshal Keitel himself? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, it is perfectly correct. - -DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius judged these matters, not on the basis -of his own knowledge, but on the basis of information received from -Admiral Canaris. Did you know Admiral Canaris? - -DÖNITZ: I know Admiral Canaris from the time when he was still a member -of the Navy. - -DR. NELTE: Later on, when he was Chief of the Intelligence Service for -foreign countries in the OKW, did you not have discussions with him? Did -he not come to see you in his capacity as Chief of the Intelligence -Service? - -DÖNITZ: After I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, he visited me and -he made a report about information matters which he thought he could -place at the disposal of the Navy, my sphere of interest. But that was -his last report to me. After that, of course, I received from him or his -department written information reports which concerned the Navy. - -DR. NELTE: Is it right for me to say that the position of Admiral -Canaris as Chief of Intelligence, that is, espionage, counterespionage, -sabotage, and intelligence, was of great importance for the entire -conduct of the war? - -DÖNITZ: His office or his department? - -DR. NELTE: He was the chief of the whole department, was he not? - -DÖNITZ: Of course, he worked for the entire Armed Forces, all three -branches of the Armed Forces; and I must say in that connection, if you -ask me about the importance, that I was of the opinion that the -information which we received from him and which interested the Navy was -very meager indeed. - -DR. NELTE: Did Canaris ever complain to you that Field Marshal Keitel at -the OKW in any way obstructed and hampered him in carrying out his -activity and that he could not pass on his intelligence and his reports? - -DÖNITZ: He never did that and, of course, he could have done so only -during the first report. No, he never did that. - -DR. NELTE: With reference to Canaris I should like to know whether you -can tell me anything about his character and consequently about his -credibility as a source of information; whether you consider him -reliable? - -DÖNITZ: Admiral Canaris, while he was in the Navy, was an officer in -whom not much confidence was shown. He was a man quite different from -us—we used to say he had seven souls in his breast. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, we don’t want to know about Admiral Canaris -when he was in the Navy. I don’t think there is any use telling us that -Admiral Canaris was in the Navy. The only possible relevance would be -his character afterwards when he was head of the intelligence. - -DR. NELTE: Mr. President, do you not think that, if someone is -unreliable and not credible as a commodore, he might also be so as an -Admiral in the OKW? Do you think that that could have changed during -these years? - -[_Turning to the defendant._] But, nevertheless, I thank you for the -answer to this question and I now ask you to answer the following -question. Is it true that Hitler forbade all branches of the Armed -Forces to make reports on any political matters and that he demanded -that they confine themselves to their own sphere of work? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that is true. - -DR. NELTE: Witness Gisevius has stated that Field Marshal Keitel -threatened the officers under his command that he would hand them over -to the Gestapo if they concerned themselves with political matters, and -I ask you: Is it true that, according to the regulations applying to the -Armed Forces, the Police—including the Gestapo, the SD, and the -Criminal Police—had no jurisdiction at all over members of the Armed -Forces, no matter what their rank was? - -DÖNITZ: That is correct. - -DR. NELTE: And is it also correct that the branches of the Armed Forces -and also the OKW were at great pains to preserve this prerogative as far -as the Police were concerned? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that is true. - -DR. NELTE: So that any alleged threat, as mentioned by Gisevius, namely, -the handing over of these people to the Gestapo, could not have been -carried out? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -DR. NELTE: And it is correct for me to say that all officers of the OKW -to whom such a statement might have been made naturally knew that, too? - -DÖNITZ: Naturally. A soldier was subject to military jurisdiction, and -nobody could interfere with the Armed Forces. - -DR. NELTE: Moreover, did Field Marshal Keitel, as Chief of the OKW, have -any right to deal with officers serving in the OKW without the knowledge -and consent of the Commander-in-Chief of the branch of the Armed Forces -to which the officer belonged? Could he promote such an officer, dismiss -him, or anything like that? - -DÖNITZ: An officer in a branch of the Armed Forces—for instance the -Navy—was detailed to the OKW for a definite office and thus was sent by -the Navy to the OKW. If this officer was to be given a different office -in the OKW, then the branch of the Armed Forces to which he belonged -would of course have to be consulted. - -DR. NELTE: Is it not correct to say that these officers were still on -the roster of their own branch of the Armed Forces, since the OKW was -not a branch of the Armed Forces and was not a formation; in other -words, if there was a promotion, for instance, it would be ordered by -the Navy? If Canaris was to have been promoted, you, as -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, would have had to order this promotion, -assuming, of course, that you were in agreement with this proposal? It -was merely a question of the actual command and of personnel? - -DÖNITZ: These officers were detailed to the OKW. As far as I can -recollect, they were still on the Navy roster under the heading, -“Detailed from the Navy to the OKW.” - -DR. NELTE: But they did not leave the Navy as a branch of the Armed -Forces, did they? - -DÖNITZ: Promotion of such officers, I think, was decided by the -Personnel Office of the Navy in agreement with the OKW, and I think also -that no one could be detailed—I consider this self-evident—without -agreement of the branch of the Armed Forces concerned. - -DR. NELTE: Witness Gisevius has stated that certain men, among them -Field Marshal Keitel for military matters, had formed a close ring of -silence around Hitler so that nobody they did not want to let through -could approach him. I ask you, was it possible for Field Marshal Keitel -to keep you, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, away from Hitler, if you -wanted to make a report to him? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -DR. NELTE: In the same way, was it possible for Field Marshal Keitel to -keep the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force away, if the latter wanted -to report to the Führer? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -DR. NELTE: And how was it with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army? - -DÖNITZ: I know nothing about that. When I was Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy, there was no such position. - -DR. NELTE: Then how was it with the Chief of General Staff of the Army? -Could he at any time report to the Führer without going by way of Field -Marshal Keitel? - -DÖNITZ: It was not possible for Field Marshal Keitel to keep anyone -away, and he would never have done so anyway. - -DR. NELTE: In reply to a question of the Prosecution, witness Gisevius -stated in this courtroom that his group forwarded reports to Field -Marshal Keitel, by way of Admiral Canaris, which dealt with the crimes -against humanity which have been adduced here by the Prosecution. These -reports had been camouflaged as “foreign reports.” - -I ask you, was a camouflaged “foreign report” of this sort ever -submitted to you or sent to you by Canaris? - -DÖNITZ: No, never. - -DR. NELTE: From your knowledge of Keitel’s personality, do you consider -it possible that he would have withheld from the Führer an important -report which was submitted to him? - -DÖNITZ: I consider that absolutely out of the question. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think that is a proper question for you to put. - -DR. NELTE: With this question I wanted to end my inquiries on this -point; but I still have one other question, which can be quickly dealt -with. - -Mr. President, in your communication of 26 March 1946, you gave me -permission to submit an affidavit from Admiral Dönitz concerning the -function and the position of the Chief of the OKW. I received this -affidavit and handed it over to the Prosecution on 13 April for -examination, and I understand that there are no objections to this -affidavit. I have, however, not yet got back the original, which was -handed over on 13 April, and I do not know whether it has in the -meantime been submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution or not. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know anything about the affidavit that you are -dealing with. - -DR. NELTE: I shall therefore be forced to put questions to Admiral -Dönitz, which in large part are the same questions which I have already -put to Field Marshal Keitel himself. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution object to the affidavit at all? - -DR. NELTE: No, they did not raise any objections. Therefore, if it had -been returned I would have submitted it as an exhibit, without reading -it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. NELTE: Thank you. - -DR. DIX: Witness, you have stated that the SD and the Gestapo, in fact, -the whole Police had no jurisdiction over members of the Armed -Forces—for instance, they could not arrest members of the Armed Forces. -Did I understand you correctly? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Do you know, Witness, that all the officers, or in any case -most of them, who were suspected of being involved in the affair of 20 -July, were arrested by members of the SD and sent for questioning by the -SD and the SD office, where they were arrested, to prisons under the SD -and there held under SD guard and not under any military guard? - -DÖNITZ: No, I don’t know that, because after 20 July, as far as I can -remember, an order was issued specifically stating that the SD were to -give to branches of the Armed Forces the names of those soldiers who had -participated in the Putsch and that these soldiers were then to be -dismissed from the branches of the Armed Forces, particularly to keep -the principle of noninterference in the branches of the Armed Forces -from being violated, and that then the SD would have the right to take -action. - -DR. DIX: That order did come out, but perhaps we can come to an -explanation of this order if you answer further questions which I want -to put to you. - -Do you know, Witness, that the examination, the interrogation of those -officers arrested in connection with 20 July, was carried out -exclusively by officials of the SD or the Gestapo and not by officers, -that is, members of military courts? - -DÖNITZ: I can only judge as to the two cases which I had in the Navy. I -received information that these two officers had participated. I had -questions put to them, and they confirmed it. Thereupon these officers -were dismissed from the Navy. After that the interrogation was, of -course, not carried out by the Navy; but I know that my Navy court -judges still concerned themselves about the officers and the -interrogation. - -DR. DIX: Who dismissed these men? - -DÖNITZ: The Navy. - -DR. DIX: That is you. - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -DR. DIX: Do you know, Witness, that following upon the investigation -regarding 20 July a committee of generals was formed under the -chairmanship of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I heard about that. - -DR. DIX: And that this committee, on the basis of the records of the SD, -decided whether the officer in question was to be dismissed from the -Army or would have to leave the Army, so that he could be turned over to -the civil court, namely, the People’s Court? - -DÖNITZ: That is not known to me. - -DR. DIX: May I put it to you that I am of the opinion that the order -which you have described correctly... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, you are bound by his answer. He said he didn’t -know anything about it. You can’t then put to him what you say happened. -If he says he doesn’t know anything about it, you must accept his -answer. - -DR. DIX: I just wanted to put to him that the order to which I referred -earlier, which actually exists and which deals with the decision of -whether a person is to be dismissed from the Army and surrendered to the -civil authorities, has to do with this committee presided over by Field -Marshal Von Rundstedt, which had to decide whether the officer in -question was to be dismissed and thereby turned over, not to a military -court, but to the People’s Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: I understood the witness to say he didn’t know anything -about it. I think you are bound by that answer. - -DR. DIX: May I add something? - -THE PRESIDENT: Who are you offering these questions for? You are counsel -for the Defendant Schacht. - -DR. DIX: My colleague’s questions concerning Keitel were put to -challenge the credibility of the witness Gisevius. Schacht’s defense is -naturally interested in the credibility of the witness Gisevius. The -Defense has put three questions in connection with Gisevius’ -credibility, therefore, concerning the case for Schacht. May I add -something? - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. DIX: I ask the questions to which your Lordship is objecting only -because I think it possible that the answer of the witness may have been -based on a mistake, namely, that he confused the general regulation -stating that the soldier concerned must be dismissed before the SD could -lay hands on him with the order stating that Von Rundstedt’s committee -would have to decide whether the officer in question was to be dismissed -from the Army so that he could be handed over to the People’s Court, not -to the SD. The SD merely carried out the investigation, the preliminary -interrogation. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is it you want to ask him now? - -DR. DIX: Admiral, I think you have understood my question, or do you -want me to repeat it? - -DÖNITZ: I cannot tell you any more than I have already done. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, as Commander of Submarines, you did once have -some official contact with Sauckel? - -DÖNITZ: No, not official but private. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was the occasion? - -DÖNITZ: A submarine, which was to go into the Atlantic for 8 weeks, had -reported to me that it had been discovered after leaving port that -Gauleiter Sauckel had crept aboard. I immediately sent a radio message -ordering the submarine to turn back and put him on the nearest outpost -steamer. - -DR. SERVATIUS: What was Sauckel’s motive? - -DÖNITZ: No doubt a belligerent one. He wanted to go to sea again. - -DR. SERVATIUS: But he was a Gauleiter. Did he not have particular -reasons in order to show that he too was ready to fight in the war and -did not want to remain behind? - -DÖNITZ: It surprised me that he, as a Gauleiter, should want to go to -sea; but, at any rate, I considered that here was a man who had his -heart in the right place. - -DR. SERVATIUS: You believe that his motives were idealistic? - -DÖNITZ: Certainly. Nothing much can be got out of a submarine trip. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Admiral, do you remember that in your capacity as head -of the State on 1 May 1945 you ordered the Reich Commissioner for the -Occupied Netherlands to come to Flensburg to report to you? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you also remember that on this occasion my client -asked you to cancel the order originally sent to the Commander-in-Chief -in the Netherlands to the effect that all locks and dykes should be -blown up in the event of an attack, and to give the order that the mined -blasting points be rendered harmless? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, he did do that. It was in accordance with my own -principles, for when I became head of the State I gave the order that -all destruction in occupied territories, including for instance -Czechoslovakia, should cease forthwith. - -DR. STEINBAUER: At the end of his report, did he ask you for permission -to return to his station in the Netherlands instead of remaining in -Germany? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, he did so repeatedly. He tried to get back—the weather -situation was difficult—to the Netherlands by a motor torpedo boat. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you very much. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I want you first of all to answer -some questions on your record after becoming Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy on 30 January 1943. As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy you had the -equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich; is that not so? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had also the right to participate in -meetings of the Reich Cabinet; had any such meetings taken place? - -DÖNITZ: I was authorized to participate if such a meeting, or my -participation in such a meeting, was ordered by the Führer. That is the -wording of the order. But I must say that no meeting of the Reich -Cabinet took place at the time I was Commander-in-Chief from 1943 on. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the time that you became Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy, the government of the Reich was in a sense carried on from -Hitler’s headquarters; isn’t that so? - -DÖNITZ: That is correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was a military dictatorship in which the -dictator saw those people he wanted at his military headquarters; that -is right, is it not? - -DÖNITZ: One cannot say “military dictatorship.” It was not a -dictatorship at all. There was a military sector and a civilian sector, -and both components were united in the hands of the Führer. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I will take the last part of your answer, -and we will not argue about the first. - -Now, you saw him on 119 days in just over 2 years; do you agree to that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. But in that connection it must be stated that from 30 -January 1943, when I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, until the -end of January 1945—that is, approximately 2 years—the number was, I -think, 57 times. The larger figure arises from the fact that in the last -months of the war I took part in the noontime conferences on the -situation which took place daily in the Voss Strasse in Berlin. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you about certain of these. At a -number of these meetings the Defendant Speer was present, was he not? - -DÖNITZ: I cannot remember that he was present in person at the -discussions of the military situation. Actually Minister Speer as a -civilian had nothing to do with a discussion of the military situation. -But it is possible that he was there on some occasions, for instance, -when tank production and other matters were discussed which were -directly connected with the Führer’s military considerations. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was exactly what I was going to put to you, -that the occasions when the Defendant Speer were present were when you -were going into matters of supply; that is, supply for the various -services, including supply for the Navy. - -DÖNITZ: Supply questions of the Navy were never discussed at the large -conferences on the military situation. I discussed these matters with -the Führer alone, as I have already said, usually in the presence of -Jodl and Keitel. I submitted these matters to the Führer after I had -come to an understanding with Minister Speer, to whom I had delegated -all matters of naval armament when I became Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy. That, in general, was the situation. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, like the head of every service, you would -have had to learn about priorities and materials and labor. You would -want to know how labor was going to be allocated during the next period, -would you not? - -DÖNITZ: I tried to bring it about that by a decision of the Führer -Minister Speer would be given the order to build the largest possible -number of new U-boats which I had to have at the time. But there were -limitations as to the quantities to be allotted to each branch of the -Armed Forces by Speer’s Ministry. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, therefore, you would be very interested in -discovering the figure of manpower for labor for naval supplies and for -the other supplies, to see that you were getting your fair share, would -you not? - -DÖNITZ: I am very sorry, but I cannot give you an answer to that. I -never knew, and I do not know today, how many workers Speer was using -for the armament supply for the Navy. I do not even know whether Speer -can give you the answer, because construction of submarines, for -instance, was taking place all over the German Reich in many industrial -plants. Parts were then assembled in the shipyards. Therefore I have no -idea what the labor capacity allotted to the Navy was. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember describing Speer as the man who -holds the production of Europe in his hand? That was on 17 December -1943. I shall put the document to you in a little time. But do you -remember describing him as that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes; I know that quite well. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And don’t you know quite well also that Speer -was getting his labor from foreign labor brought into the Reich? - -DÖNITZ: I knew, of course, that there were foreign workers in Germany. -It is just as self-evident that as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy I was -not concerned as to how these workers were recruited. That was none of -my business. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did not Gauleiter Sauckel tell you on the -occasion of this trip that he had got 5 million foreign workers into the -Reich, of whom only 200,000 had come voluntarily? - -DÖNITZ: I did not have a single conversation with Gauleiter Sauckel. I -have never had a discussion with anyone about questions referring to -workers. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, you were head of a service -department in the fifth and sixth years of the war. Wasn’t Germany, like -every other country, searching around to scrape the bottom of the barrel -for labor for all its requirements? Weren’t you in urgent need of labor, -like every other country in the war? - -DÖNITZ: I, too, think that we needed workers. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not -know after these conferences with Hitler and with Speer that you were -getting this labor by forcing foreign labor to come into the Reich and -be used? - -DÖNITZ: During my conferences with Hitler and Speer, the system of -obtaining these workers was never mentioned at all. The methods did not -interest me at all. During these conferences the labor question was not -discussed at all. I was interested merely in how many submarines I -received, that is, how large my allotment was in terms of ships built. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You tell the Tribunal you discussed that with -Speer and he never told you where he was getting his labor? Is that your -answer on this point? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that is my answer, and it is true. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember, just before we passed from the -industrial side of it, that at certain meetings the representatives for -coal and transport, and Gauleiter Kaufmann, the Reich Commissioner for -Shipping, were present at meetings which you had with the Führer? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may take it from me that they are listed as -being present at these meetings. Were you dealing with general problems -of shipping and transport? - -DÖNITZ: Never. As far as sea transport is concerned—that is true. I was -thinking of things on land. I thought you meant on land. I have already -stated that at the end of the war I was keenly interested in the tonnage -of merchant vessels because this tonnage, which I needed in order to -carry out military transports from Norway, from and to the East, and for -refugee transports, was not under my jurisdiction but under that of -Gauleiter Kaufmann, the Reich Commissioner for shipping. So at meetings -and discussions which dealt with the sea transport situation I was, of -course, present. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another subject of these 119 days. -On 39 of these days the Defendant Keitel was also present at the -headquarters and at about the same number, the Defendant Jodl. - -DÖNITZ: I am sorry; I did not understand the date. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put it again. At 39 of these meetings -between January 1943 and April 1945 the Defendant Keitel was present and -at about the same number, the Defendant Jodl. Now, is it right that you -discussed or listened to the discussion, in their presence, of the -general strategical position? - -DÖNITZ: I might say that the word “meeting” does not quite describe the -matter. It was rather, as I... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you choose the word; you give us the -word. - -DÖNITZ: It was, as I described it, a large-scale discussion of the -military situation; and at this discussion I heard also, of course, -reports about the army situation. That I explained before. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get it quite clear that over -these 2 years you had every opportunity of understanding and -appreciating the military strategical position; that is so, isn’t it? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, on 20 of these occasions the Defendant -Göring was present. The Defendant Göring has put himself forward in two -capacities; as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and as a politician. -What was he doing on these 20 occasions? - -DÖNITZ: Reich Marshal Göring was there as Commander-in-Chief of the Air -Force when the military situation was discussed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so from the Defendant Göring you would have -a full knowledge and appreciation of the air situation and the position -of the Luftwaffe during this period? - -DÖNITZ: Insofar as my occasional presence at these discussions, in which -only segments were dealt with—an over-all picture was never given at -such a discussion—insofar as I could form an opinion from these -segments, which naturally was always fragmentary. That was the reason -why I have never made statements about military matters outside the -Navy. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me ask you just one further question on this -point. Following up what Dr. Laternser asked, on 29 June 1944, apart -from Keitel and Jodl and Göring, these defendants, Marshal Von Rundstedt -and Marshal Rommel were also present; and may I remind you that that was -3 weeks after the Allies had invaded in the West. You were being given -the opportunity, were you not, of getting the appreciation of the -strategical position after the Allied invasion of Normandy, isn’t that -so? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, from that I gained an impression of the situation in -Normandy after the enemy had set foot there. I was in a position to -report to the Führer which of my new small striking devices I could put -to use in that sector. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us change to another aspect of the -government in general. - -On a number of occasions the Reichsführer-SS Himmler was present at -these conferences—shall I call them—isn’t that so? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. If the Reichsführer-SS Himmler was there, and as far as I -remember that happened once or twice, it was because of his Waffen-SS. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may take it from me that he is shown as -being there on at least seven occasions, and that Fegelein, who was his -representative at the Führer’s headquarters, is shown as being present -on five occasions. What did Himmler discuss about the Waffen-SS—the -doings of the Totenkopf division? - -DÖNITZ: That cannot be right. Fegelein was always present during the -discussions of the military situation; he never missed, because he was a -permanent representative. If the Reichsführer was present during these -discussions, he reported only on the Waffen-SS, those divisions of the -Waffen-SS which were being used somewhere under the Army. I do not know -the name of these individual divisions. I do not think they included the -Totenkopf; I never heard they did; there was a Viking or... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was because they were being largely -occupied in concentration camps, and you say that Himmler never -mentioned that? - -DÖNITZ: That Totenkopf divisions were used in concentration camps I -learned here in Nuremberg. It wasn’t mentioned there. I have already -said that during the military discussions only military matters were -discussed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is only -reported as being present once, on 26 February 1945, when there was -quite a considerable gathering of SS notabilities. What were you -discussing with him then? - -DÖNITZ: It is not correct that Kaltenbrunner was there only once. As far -as I remember, he was there two, three, or four times; at any rate, -during the last months of the war I saw him two, three, or four times. -Kaltenbrunner never said a word there; as far as I remember, he just -listened and stood about. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want you to tell the Tribunal is: What -was the subject of conversation when you had, not only the Defendant -Kaltenbrunner there, but you had SS Obergruppenführer Steiner, your own -captain in attendance, and Lieutenant General Winter? What were these -gentlemen there for, and what were you hearing from them? - -DÖNITZ: Who is the captain and who is Lieutenant General Günther? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Captain Von Assmann; I took it he was the -captain in attendance on you, though I may have been wrong—Kapitän zur -See Von Assmann. Then there was Lieutenant General Winter, SS -Obergruppenführer Steiner, and SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner. What -were you discussing on the 26th of February 1945? - -DÖNITZ: I must mention one fact in this connection: Captain Von Assmann -was present at every discussion of the general situation. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment. You can tell us something -afterwards, but first of all listen to my question. What were you -discussing with these people from the SS on 26 February 1945? - -DÖNITZ: I cannot remember that now. I do remember, however, that Steiner -received an order in regard to the army groups in Pomerania which were -to make the push from the north to the south in order to relieve Berlin. -I think that when Steiner was present perhaps this question, which did -not concern me, was discussed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want you to think, before I leave -this point. You have agreed with me that at a number of meetings, a -large number, there were present Keitel and Jodl, at not quite so many -Göring, who would give you the army and air situation in Germany; there -was present the Defendant Speer, who would give you the production -position; there was present Himmler, or his representative Fegelein, who -would give you the security position; and you yourself were present, who -would give the naval position. At all meetings there was present the -Führer who would make the decisions. - -I put to you, Defendant, that you were taking as full a part in the -government of Germany during these years as anyone, apart from Adolf -Hitler himself. - -DÖNITZ: In my opinion that description is not correct. At these -discussions of the general situation neither Speer nor anybody else -supplied a complete survey of the work being done. On the contrary, only -acute questions of the day were discussed. As I have said, the -happenings of the last 24 hours were discussed, and what should be done. -That there was a staff there which in its reports gave an over-all -picture—that was quite out of the question; it was not at all like -that. The only one who had a complete picture of the situation was the -Führer. At these discussions of the military situation the developments -of the last 24 hours and the measures to be taken were discussed. These -are the facts. - -Therefore, one cannot say that any one of the participants had an -over-all picture. Rather every one had a clear view of his own -department for which he was responsible. An over-all picture in the mind -of any of the participants is out of the question. Only the Führer had -that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I won’t argue with you; but I suppose, -Defendant, that you say—as we have heard from so many other -defendants—that you knew nothing about the slave-labor program, you -knew nothing about the extermination of the Jews, and you knew nothing -about any of the bad conditions in concentration camps. I suppose you -are going to tell us you knew nothing about them at all, are you? - -DÖNITZ: That is self-evident, since we have heard here how all these -things were kept secret; and if one bears in mind the fact that everyone -in this war was pursuing his own tasks with the maximum of energy, then -it is no wonder at all. To give an example, I learned of the conditions -in concentration camps... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want your answer for the moment, and you -have given it to me. I want you to come to a point which was well within -your own knowledge, and that is the order for the shooting of Commandos, -which was issued by the Führer on 18 October 1942. You have told us that -you got it when you were Flag Officer of U-boats. Now, do you remember -the document by which the Naval Operations Staff distributed it? Do you -remember that it said this: - - “This order must not be distributed in writing by flotilla - leaders, section commanders, or officers of this rank. - - “After verbal notification to subordinate sections the above - officers must hand this order over to the next higher section, - which is responsible for its withdrawal and destruction.” - -Do you remember that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I read that again when I saw the order here. But on the -other side it says also that this measure had already been announced in -the Wehrmacht order. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know from you is: Why was there -this tremendous secrecy about this order in the naval distribution? - -DÖNITZ: I did not understand that question. I do not know whether -tremendous secrecy was being observed at all. I am of the opinion that -in 1942 all naval officers had been informed about it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is on 28 October, 10 days after the order -was issued. I am not going to quarrel with you about adjectives, -Defendant. Let me put it this way: Why did the naval distribution -require that degree of secrecy? - -DÖNITZ: I do not know. I did not make up the distribution chart. As an -officer at the front I received this order at that time. I do not know. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Within 3 months you were Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy. Did you never make any inquiries then? - -DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you never make any inquiries? - -DÖNITZ: No, I did not. I have told you that I saw this order as -Commander of U-boats and that as far as my field of activities was -concerned this order did not concern me in the least and, secondly, that -men captured during naval engagements were expressly excepted; so, as -far as that goes, this order at that time had no actual, no real -significance. In view of the enormous number of things that I had to -deal with when I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, it was quite -natural that it did not occur to me to take up the question of this new -order. I did not think of the order at all. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to put to you when the time comes a -memorandum from the Naval Staff showing that it was put before you. -Don’t you remember that? - -DÖNITZ: If you are referring to the memorandum which is in my trial -brief, then I can only say that this memorandum was not submitted to me, -as can be clearly seen from this note. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to ask you before the Tribunal -adjourns is: Did you approve of this order or did you not? - -DÖNITZ: I have already told you, as I... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you haven’t. I want you to tell the Tribunal -now, and you can answer it either “I approved” or “I did not approve.” -Did you or did you not approve this order to your commanders? - -DÖNITZ: Today I do not approve of that order since I have learned here -that the basis was not so sound... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with it when you were -Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy at the beginning of 1943? Did you -approve of it then? - -DÖNITZ: As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy I was not concerned with this -order. While I was Commander of U-boats, as I have already explained to -you, I considered it simply a reprisal order. It was not up to me to -start an investigation or to take it up with the office which had issued -the order to find out whether the basis was correct or not. It was not -up to me to start an investigation on the basis of international law. -And it was quite clear in Point 1 of the order that here the enemy, the -opponent, had placed himself outside the bounds of the Geneva -Convention, because they were murdering prisoners, and that therefore we -had to do certain things as reprisals. Whether these reprisal measures -were necessary or whether they were fully justified by the conditions in -Point 1, that is something I did not and could not know. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is the last question. I want you to try and -answer it with a straight answer if you can. At the beginning of 1943 -did you or did you not approve of this order? - -DÖNITZ: I cannot give you an answer, because at the beginning of 1943 I -did not think of the order and was not concerned with it. Therefore I -cannot say how that order affected me at that particular time. I can -tell you only how it affected me when I read it as Commander of U-boats; -and I can also tell you that today I reject this order, now that I have -learned that the basis on which it was issued was not so sound. And -thirdly, I can tell you that I personally rejected any kind of reprisals -in naval warfare—every kind, in every case, and whatever the proposal. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will ask some more questions about it -tomorrow, as the time has come to break off. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED - AND TWENTY-SIXTH DAY - Friday, 10 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The Defendant Dönitz resumed the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I understand there are some supplementary -applications for witnesses and documents, which would probably not take -very long to discuss. Is that so? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not actually received the final -instructions. I can find out in a very short time. I will get Major -Barrington up. I am told that is so. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, therefore, proposes to sit in open session -tomorrow until a quarter to 12 dealing with the Trial in the ordinary -course and then to take the supplementary applications at a quarter to -12 and then to adjourn into closed session. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we shall be ready for them at a quarter -to 12 tomorrow. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, the first document that I want you to -look at with regard to the Führer Commando Order of 18 October 1942 is -on Page 65 of the English document book and on Page 98 of the German -document book. It is Document Number C-178, Exhibit USA-544. You will -see that that document is dated 11 February 1943. That is some 12 days -after you took over as Commander-in-Chief and you will see from the -reference that it went to “1.SKL Ii.” That is the international law and -prize law division of your operations staff, isn’t it—Admiral Eckardt’s -division? - -DÖNITZ: No. It is addressed to the first section of the Naval Operations -Staff, that is, the operational section. It originates with Eckardt and -is sent to the first section, that is, to the section chief. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I think I am quite right—the reference -about which I asked you, 1.SKL Ii, that is Admiral Eckardt’s department. -That is the reference for Admiral Eckardt’s international law -department? - -DÖNITZ: No, no, no. It is the department in which Admiral Eckardt was -also an official. Admiral Eckardt was an official in that department. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the third SKL in the next line is the press -department as you said, isn’t it? - -DÖNITZ: No. The third section of the SKL collected information sent in -for the Navy and reported on it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I note it was intelligence and press. Is that -right or not? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, it was intelligence and press. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to help the Tribunal on -three points in this document. You remember I asked you yesterday about -the secrecy standard of the original Führer order of 18 October. If you -will look at the second paragraph you will see that it says: - - “... was given the protection of top secret merely because it is - stated therein (1) that ... sabotage organization ... may have - portentous consequences ... and (2) that the shooting of - uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried - out even after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for - pardon.” - -Do you see that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I have read it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that that was one of the reasons for -giving the order top secrecy? - -DÖNITZ: This exchange of notes between Eckardt and the section chief was -not submitted to me, as is obvious from the initials noted in the -book... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the reason for you not answering my -question? Do you agree that that is the reason for giving top secrecy to -this document? - -DÖNITZ: I do not know. I cannot tell you that, because I did not issue -this Commando Order. It says in the Commando Order, on the one hand that -these people had killed prisoners. That is the way I had read it as -Commander, U-boat Fleet; and on the other hand... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I shall give you one more opportunity of -answering my question. You were Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. -Do you say that you are not able to answer this question: Is the reason -stated in Paragraph 2 of this document a correct reason for attaching -top secrecy to the Führer order of 18 October? Now you have this final -opportunity of answering that question. Will you answer it or won’t you? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I will do that. I consider it possible, particularly as the -legal expert here thinks so. I do not know if it is correct, because I -did not issue the order. On the other hand, it says in the order that -these things would not be published in the army orders. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the next point. The next paragraph says -that what is to be published in the army orders is the annihilation of -sabotage units in battle, not, of course, if they are shot—as I would -say, murdered—quietly, by the SD after battle. I want you to note the -next paragraph. The next paragraph raises the difficulty as to how many -saboteurs were to be considered as a sabotage unit and suggests that up -to ten would certainly be a sabotage unit. - -Now, if you look at the last paragraph—I will read it to you quite -slowly: - - “It is to be assumed that Counterintelligence III is acquainted - with the Führer orders and will therefore reply accordingly to - the objections of the Army General Staff and the Air Force - Operations Staff. As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to - be seen whether or not this case should be used to make - sure”—note the next words—“after a conference with the - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that all departments concerned - have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of - members of Commando units.” - -Are you telling the Tribunal that after that minute from Eckardt’s -department, which was to be shown to 1.SKL, your Chief of Staff’s -department, that you were never consulted upon it? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I do say that, and I will prove by means of a witness that -there are no initials or distribution list here; and this witness will -prove quite clearly that I did not receive a report on it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Admiral Wagner was your Chief of Staff? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, we will not occupy further time. - -DÖNITZ: He was not my Chief of Staff; he was chief of this section. He -was Section Chief 1. SKL, to which this order was directed. He knows -beyond doubt that no report was made to me. The circumstances are -perfectly clear. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will leave that, if you say that you -have not seen it; and I will ask you to look at Document Number 551-PS. - -My Lord, I will pass the Tribunal a copy. This is Exhibit USA-551, and -it was put in by General Taylor on 7 January. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, that is a document which is dated 26 -June 1944; and it deals with the Führer order; and it says how it will -apply after the landing of the Allied Forces in France; and if you will -look at the distribution, you will see that Number 4 is to the OKM, 1. -SKL. That is the department on which you were good enough to correct me -a moment ago. Now, did you—were you shown that document, which says -that the Führer order is to apply to Commando units operating outside -the immediate combat area in Normandy? Were you shown that document? - -DÖNITZ: No, that was not shown to me in any circumstances—and quite -rightly, as the Navy did not take part in the affair. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told me yesterday that you were concerned -with the matter and that you had small boats operating in the Normandy -operations. That is what you told me yesterday afternoon. You have -changed your recollections since yesterday afternoon? - -DÖNITZ: No, not at all. But these one-man submarines were floating on -water and had nothing to do with Commandos on the land front. That is -clear from this document, too—I do not know if it is the original of -the 1. SKL because I cannot see the initial. I am convinced, however, -that it was not submitted to me, because it had nothing to do with the -Navy. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Will you just look at Document Number -537-PS, which is dated 30 July 1944. - -My Lord, that is Exhibit USA-553, also put in by General Taylor on 7 -January. - -DÖNITZ: Where is it? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sergeant major will point to the place. That -is the document applying the Commando Order to “military missions,” and -you will see again later that the distribution includes OKM, Department -SKL. Did you see that order? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I can see it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you see it at the time that it was -distributed, at the end of July 1944? - -DÖNITZ: It is quite certain that this order was not submitted to me -because again it has nothing to do with the Navy. The Navy had nothing -to do with fighting partisans. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now just to look very quickly, -because I do not want to spend too much time on it, at Document Number -512-PS. - -My Lord, that is Exhibit USA-546, which was also put in by General -Taylor on 7 January. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, that is a report dealing with the -question of whether members of Commandos should not be murdered -immediately in order that they could be interrogated, and the question -is whether that is covered by the last sentence of the Führer order, and -I call your attention to the fact that it refers, with regard to -interrogations, in the second sentence: - - “Importance of this measure was proven in the cases of - Glomfjord, the two-man torpedo at Trondheim, and the glider - plane at Stavanger.” - -DÖNITZ: I cannot find it at the moment. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is 512-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps you ought to read the first sentence. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -DÖNITZ: This document dates from 1942. At that time I was Commander of -U-boats from the Atlantic Coast to the Bay of Biscay. I do not know this -paper at all. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your answer, but it is 14 December 1942; -and the point is put up which is raised in the first sentence which My -Lord has just directed be read: - - “Top secret: According to the last sentence of the Führer order - of 18 October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time - being in order to keep them for interrogation.” - -Then follows the sentence I have read. That was the point that was -raised, and what I was going to ask you was, did that point come up to -you when you took over the Commandership-in-Chief of the Navy in January -1943? Just look at the last sentence. - - “The Red Cross and the BDS protested against the immediate - carrying out of the Führer order...” - -DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but I still cannot find where that is. I have -not yet found the last sentence. Where is it? - -THE PRESIDENT: Our translation says “after the immediate carrying -out....” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “After,” My Lord: I am sorry. It is my fault. I -am greatly obliged to Your Lordship. “Protested after the immediate....” -I beg Your Lordship’s pardon—I read it wrong. - -DÖNITZ: That dates from December 1942. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is only six weeks before you took over. - -DÖNITZ: Yes. I do not know this teleprint. In any case, that is probably -not Red Cross, but probably Reiko See, Reich Commissioner for -Shipping—or so I assume. BDS is probably the SS leader in Norway. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the point that I thought might have some -interest for you was the two-man torpedoes. I thought that might have -been referred to you as a matter of Navy interest. However, if it was -not I will come to a document after you took over. Give the defendant -Document Number 526-PS, on 10 May 1943. - -My Lord, that is USA-502, and was put in by my friend Colonel Storey on -2 January. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You see that that is an account—it is -from the Defendant Jodl’s department, and it is annotated for the -Defendant Jodl’s department—about an enemy cutter which carried out an -operation from the Shetlands, a cutter of the Norwegian Navy; and it -gives its armament, and it says that it was an organization for -sabotaging strong points, battery positions, staff and troop billets, -and bridges and that the Führer order was executed by the SD. That was a -cutter which was blown up by the Norwegian Navy, I suppose after they -were attacked, and ten prisoners were murdered. Was that brought to your -attention? - -DÖNITZ: This was shown to me during an interrogation, and I was also -asked if I had not had a telephone conversation with Field Marshal -Keitel. It was afterwards found to be the Wehrmacht area commander who -had contacted the OKW. It was a matter for the Army and for the SD, not -for the Navy. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you deny that you ever heard about that, will -you turn to Page 100 of the document book. - -My Lord, it is Page 67 of the British document book. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] And that is a summary, a summary of the -trial of the SD... - -DÖNITZ: Where is it? I cannot find it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 100, I have told you. If you will look for -it, I think you will find it. It is Page 67 of the English, if you -prefer to follow it in that language. - -Now I will explain to you; I think you have read it before because you -have referred to it. That is a summary by the judge advocate at the -trial of the SS men of the evidence that was given, and I just want to -see that you have it in mind. - -If you will look at Paragraph 4, you will see that they set out from -Lerwick, in the Shetlands, on this naval operation for the purpose of -making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coasts and -for the purpose of laying mines. Paragraph 5: - - “The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was - wearing uniform at the time of capture; and there was abundant - evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that - they were wearing uniforms at all times after their capture.” - -Now, you mentioned this yesterday. You see that in Paragraph 6: - - “Deponent states that the whole of the crew was captured and - taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command - of Admiral Von Schrader, the Admiral of the West Coast. The crew - were taken to the Bergenhus; and there they were interrogated by - Lieutenant H. P. K. W. Fanger, a lieutenant of the Naval - Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitän Egon Drascher, both - of the German Naval Counterintelligence; and this interrogation - was carried out upon the orders of the Admiral of the West - Coast. Lieutenant Fanger reported to the officer in charge of - the intelligence branch at Bergen that, in his opinion, all - members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of - war and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing - to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of - the West Coast.”—And that is Admiral Von Schrader. - -Now I want just to read you the one sentence which, in view of that, I -do not think you will think is taken out of context of the evidence -given by Lieutenant Fanger at this trial. He was asked: - - “Have you any idea at all why these people were handed over to - the SD?” - -In answering that question I want you to tell me who was responsible for -their being handed over. This was your officers, your outfit; that was -the general in command of the Norwegian coast, Admiral Von Schrader in -command of this section, whose people captured the crew. That is your -own officers. Is it true what you told the Court yesterday that the crew -were captured by the SD? Have you any reason to believe Lieutenant -Fanger is not telling the truth? - -THE PRESIDENT: What is that you were quoting from then? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the shorthand notes taken on the trial of -the SS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has it been admitted? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, it has not been, but it was within -Article 19. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I do not know the document which has been -used. May I have it, please? Shorthand notes which I have not seen are -being used; and according to the Tribunal’s ruling on cross-examinations -they must be given to me when the witness is heard. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, with great respect, but this point -arose yesterday when the defendant made certain statements with regard -to Admiral Von Schrader. I am questioning these statements, and the only -way I can do it is to use documents which I did not otherwise intend to -use. I shall, of course, let Dr. Kranzbühler see them in due course. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you a copy of the German? That was to have been -given in German, that evidence. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have only the English transcript and I am -willing to let Dr. Kranzbühler see it, but it is all I have. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any other copy you can hand him? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I only was sent one copy. - -THE PRESIDENT: After you are through with it, will you please hand that -copy to Dr. Kranzbühler? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, have you any reason to suppose, Defendant, -that your officer, Lieutenant Fanger, is not telling the truth when he -says that these men were captured by Admiral Von Schrader? - -DÖNITZ: I have no reason to question that statement because the whole -affair is completely unknown to me. I have already stated that the -incident was not reported to me nor—as I can prove—to the High Command -of the Navy; and I told you yesterday that I could only assume, in -consequence, that these men—here it is, in Paragraph 6—were captured -on an island, not by the Navy but by a detachment of the Police. -Consequently Admiral Von Schrader said that they were not Navy prisoners -but Police prisoners and must be handed back to the Police; and for this -reason he did not make a report. - -I assume that that is what happened. I myself cannot furnish the full -details of this story or explain how it came about, because it was not -reported to me at the time. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the point I will get to in a moment. It -nowhere states in this document that they were captured by the Police, -and in fact that they were captured by the forces under Admiral Von -Schrader, who attacked this island to which this boat was moored. - -DÖNITZ: I do not know about that. The document says that the men reached -the island—the reason is not clear. That the men were brought back from -the island afterwards in some sort of boat is quite clear; but naturally -they might remain Police prisoners if they were captured there by the -Police or the coast guards. That is the only explanation I can think of, -in view of Admiral Von Schrader’s personality. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just asked you—your own officer, Lieutenant -Fanger, says they were captured by Admiral Von Schrader’s troops, and -you say if Lieutenant Fanger says that you have no reason to believe he -is not telling the truth, is that right? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. My estimate of Von Schrader’s personality caused me to -assume yesterday that it happened like that. Since I am informed today -of a Lieutenant Fanger’s statement, things may have happened differently -for I may be wrong. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you look at the end of Paragraph 8, the -last sentence: - - “There was an interview between Blomberg of the SS and Admiral - Von Schrader....” - -And then the last sentence: - - “Admiral Von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this - torpedo boat were to be handed over in accordance with the - Führer orders to the SD.”—and then they were handed over. - -And the official of the SD who carried out this interrogation stated at -the trial: - - “...that after the interrogation he was of the opinion that the - members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of - war, and that he so informed his superior officer.” - -Despite this report and the representations of a superior officer the -crew were dealt with under the Führer order and executed, and it -describes how they were shot and their bodies secretly disposed of. Do -you say you never heard about that? - -DÖNITZ: No. I do say that and I have witnesses to prove it. If the SD -official thought that these men did not come under that head, he would -have been obliged to report that to his superiors and his superiors -would have been obliged to take the appropriate steps. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say, you already take the position that the -Navy had interrogated them, the Navy Intelligence said they should be -treated as prisoners of war, and Admiral Von Schrader said they should -be handed over to the SS and that the SS examined them and said they -should be treated as prisoners of war, and despite that these men are -murdered? And you say you knew nothing about it? Did your Kapitän zur -See Wildemann say anything to you concerning this? W-i-l-d-e-m-a-n-n. - -DÖNITZ: I do not know him. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me try to bring him to your recollection. At -this time he was an officer on the staff of Admiral Von Schrader and -dealt with this matter. Now, Kapitän Wildemann, and I suppose we should -assume, unless you know anything to the contrary, that he is a -trustworthy officer, says: - - “I know that Von Schrader made a written report on this action, - and I know of no reason why the handing over of the prisoners to - the SD should not have been reported on.” - -Do you still say you never got any report from Von Schrader? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I still say that I did not receive any report, and I am -equally convinced that the High Command of the Navy did not receive it -either. I have a witness to prove that. I do not know where the report -went. Admiral Von Schrader was not directly responsible to the High -Command of the Navy; and the report may have been sent to the OKW, if -this report was made at all. At any rate the High Command of the Navy -did not receive a report on this particular matter, hence my assumption -that these men were captured on the island in the first place by the -Police. Otherwise, I think Admiral Von Schrader would have reported it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Before you make any further statement, I would -like you to have in mind something further that Kapitän Wildemann said, -which you know probably quite well, “After the capitulation Admiral Von -Schrader many times said that the English would hold him responsible for -handing over the prisoners to the SD,” and Admiral Von Schrader was -under orders to proceed to England as a prisoner when he shot himself. -Did you know Admiral Von Schrader shot himself? - -DÖNITZ: I heard it here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know he was worried about being held -responsible for this order? - -DÖNITZ: No, I had not the slightest idea of that. I only heard of his -suicide here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you still telling the Tribunal that Admiral -Von Schrader made no report to you? Do you remember a few days after the -capture of this M.T.B. Admiral Von Schrader received the Knight’s Cross -of the Iron Cross? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, but that has no connection with this matter. He did not -make a report on this matter and he did not go to Berlin for his -Knight’s Cross either, as far as I remember. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Two other officers, Oberleutnant Nelle and -Seeoberfähnrich Böhm were decorated; and in the recommendations and -citations the capture of this M.T.B. was given as the reason for this -decoration. You say you knew nothing about it? - -DÖNITZ: I know nothing about it and I cannot know anything about it, -because the competent superior officers would have dealt with these -decorations and not myself. The High Command of the Navy did not receive -a report on this matter; otherwise it would have been passed on to me. I -have that much confidence in my High Command, and my witness will -testify that he did not receive it either and that he must have done so -if it had gone to the Navy. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My final question, and I leave this subject: -Admiral Von Schrader was your junior officer, and according to you, a -very gallant officer. Do you want the Tribunal to understand that the -responsibility which broke and made Admiral Von Schrader commit suicide -was his responsibility, that he never consulted you and you were taking -no responsibility for his acts? Is that what you want the Tribunal to -understand? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. I will swear to that; because if Admiral Von Schrader -really committed suicide on account of this incident, then he did make a -mistake because he treated naval personnel, engaged in a naval -operation, in a wrong manner. If that is correct, he acted against -orders. In any case, not even the slightest hint of the affair reached -me. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, will you ask the witness what he meant when he -said that Von Schrader was not directly under the Navy? He was under -Admiral Ciliax, wasn’t he, who was on leave at this time? - -DÖNITZ: I said that he was not directly under the High Command of the -Navy in Berlin. So if Admiral Von Schrader made any report on the -affair, the report did not come to me directly but went to his immediate -superior, who was in Norway. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that immediate superior was Admiral Ciliax -who was on leave—but omit the leave for the moment; his immediate -superior was Admiral Ciliax? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to put it perfectly fairly: Do you mean -that for operations in Norway Admiral Ciliax was acting under the -commander—correct me if I am wrong—was it General Von Falkenhorst? I -cannot remember, perhaps you can help me. Do you remember that this -Admiral was acting under the commander-in-chief in Norway so that you -will tell the Tribunal... - -DÖNITZ: Yes, as far as territory was concerned Admiral Ciliax was not -under the High Command of the Navy but under the Wehrmacht Commander for -Norway, General Von Falkenhorst; but I can only say that if Schrader’s -suicide is connected with this affair, then the Commando Order was not -properly carried out when these men, who were naval personnel and had -been sent into a naval action, were not treated as prisoners of war. If -that is what happened—I do not know—then a mistake was made locally. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But at any rate you say that despite these -decorations for this action you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy knew -nothing about it at all. That is what you say? - -DÖNITZ: I awarded the Knight’s Cross to Admiral Von Schrader for -entirely different reasons. I awarded it. I knew nothing about -decorations awarded to the other people you mentioned. It has nothing to -do with me because their immediate superiors would attend to that. Nor -do I know whether these awards are really connected with the story or if -they were given for other reasons. I still cannot imagine—and I do not -believe—that a man like Admiral Von Schrader would treat naval -personnel in this way. The document does not say that they were killed -in a naval action but that they were captured on an island. It seems to -me peculiar that the High Command of the Navy should have received no -report on it, since orders to that effect had been given, and that the -Wehrmacht report should make no reference to it in accordance with the -Commando Order. All these factors are against it. I personally am unable -to form an opinion as to the affair. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am not going into details. You may -take it from me that the evidence at the trial has been that this cutter -was attacked by two naval task forces. If Dr. Kranzbühler finds I am -wrong I will be happy to admit it. But we will pass on to another -subject. Time is going. - -Would you turn to Page 105 of the document book? - -DÖNITZ: Then I can only say that it is a clear violation of orders and -that the High Command of the Navy was not informed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to come to this next point, 105 in -the German, 71 in the English document book. Now we needn’t have any -trouble about this document because it is signed by you. It is a -memorandum about the question of more labor for shipbuilding; and you -are probably very familiar with it. But will you look at the first -sentence? - -DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but what page is it? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 105, Exhibit GB-211 (Document Number -C-195), English Page 71. - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you would look at the first sentence. - - “Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working party - by prisoners from the concentration camps.” - -I don’t think we need trouble with coppersmiths, but if you will look at -the end of the document, the very last, you will see Item 2 of the -summing-up reads: - - “12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the - shipyards as additional labor. Security service agrees to this.” - -Now, that is your document, so... - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So we may take it that you were familiar with -the fact of the existence of concentration camps? - -DÖNITZ: I have never denied it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I think you went further, didn’t you, when -asked about this on 28 September? At that time you said: - - “I generally knew that we had concentration camps. That is - clear. - - “Question: ‘From whom did you learn that?’ - - “Answer: ‘The whole German people knew that.’” - -Don’t you remember saying that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. The German people knew that concentration camps existed; -but they did not know anything about the conditions and methods therein. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It must have been rather a surprise for you when -the Defendant Von Ribbentrop said he only heard of two: Oranienburg and -Dachau? It was rather a surprise to you, was it? - -DÖNITZ: No, it was not at all surprising, because I myself only knew of -Dachau and Oranienburg. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you say here you knew there were -concentration camps. Where did you think you were going to get your -labor from? What camps? - -DÖNITZ: From these camps. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that all your labor was going to -be German or that it was going to be partly foreign labor? - -DÖNITZ: I did not think about that at all. I should like to explain now -how these demands came to be made. - -At the end of the war I was given the task of organizing large-scale -transports in the Baltic Sea. Gradually the necessity arose to move the -hundreds of thousands of poverty-stricken refugees out of the coastal -areas of East and West Prussia where they were exposed to starvation, -epidemics, and bombardment and to bring them to Germany. For this reason -I made enquiries about merchant shipping, which was not actually under -my jurisdiction; and in so doing I learned that out of eight ships -ordered in Denmark, seven had been destroyed by saboteurs in the final -stage of construction. I called a meeting of all the departments -connected with those ships and asked them, “How can I help you so that -we get shipping space and have damaged ships repaired more quickly?” I -received suggestions from various quarters outside the Navy, including a -suggestion that repair work, _et cetera_, might be speeded up by -employing prisoners from the concentration camps. By way of -justification, it was pointed out, in view of the excellent food -conditions, such employment would be very popular. Since I knew nothing -about the methods and conditions in the concentration camps, I included -these proposals in my collection as a matter of course, especially as -there was no question of making conditions worse for them, since they -would be given better food when working. And I know that if I had done -the opposite I could have been accused here of refusing these people an -opportunity of having better food. I had not the slightest reason to do -this, as I knew nothing about any concentration camp methods at the -time. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure we are grateful for your explanation. -But I just want you to tell me, after you had proposed that you should -get 12,000 people from concentration camps, did you get them? - -DÖNITZ: I do not know. I did not do anything more about that. After the -meeting I had a memorandum prepared and submitted to the Führer... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Keep to the answer. The answer is that you do -not know whether you got them or not, assuming that you did get them. - -DÖNITZ: I did not get them at all. I had nothing to do with shipyards -and consequently I do not know how those responsible for the work in the -shipyards received their additional workers. I just do not know. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you held a position of some responsibility; -if you get 12,000 people from concentration camps into the shipbuilding -industry, they would have to work alongside people who weren’t in -concentration camps, would they not? - -DÖNITZ: Certainly, yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling this Tribunal that when you ask -for and you may have got 12,000 people out of concentration camps, who -work alongside people not in concentration camps, that the conditions -inside the concentration camps remain a secret to the other people and -to all the rulers of Germany? - -DÖNITZ: First of all, I do not know whether they came. Secondly, if they -did come, I can very well imagine that they had orders not to talk; and -thirdly, I do not even know what camps they came from and whether they -were not people who had already been put into other camps on account of -the work they accomplished. At any rate, I did not worry about the -execution or methods, _et cetera_, because it was none of my business; I -acted on behalf of the competent non-naval departments which required -workmen in order to carry out repairs more quickly, so that something -could be done about repairs for the merchant navy. That was my duty, -considering the arrangements which I had to make for the re-transport of -these refugees. I would do exactly the same thing again today. That is -the position. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look a little down the document -to the fourth paragraph, after it says, “Translator’s note.” If you will -look at the English, the paragraph beginning: “Since elsewhere...” Have -you found that? This is as you have told us, after you express your -worry about the sabotage in the Danish and Norwegian shipyards. I just -want you to look at your proposal to deal with saboteurs. - - “Since elsewhere measures for exacting atonement taken against - whole working parties among whom sabotage occurred have proved - successful and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was - completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the - Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.” - -That is what you were suggesting, Defendant, a collective penalty -against the whole working party where any sabotage occurred; isn’t that -so? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. May I give an explanation in that connection? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all right. But otherwise, it is so? - -DÖNITZ: Agencies outside the Navy connected with shipbuilding stated at -that meeting that sabotage had been prevented in France by the -introduction of certain measures for exacting atonement. Through an -affidavit by an officer who attended the meeting and drafted the minutes -or the short memorandum, I have now ascertained that these measures at -that time meant the withholding of the additional rations issued by the -management of the shipyard. That is what that meant. And, secondly, to -come to Norway and Denmark, I told these people: - - “It is impossible for us to build ships there with our foreign - currency and our materials, only to have them smashed up by - sabotage—and assuredly with the co-operation of the shipyard - workmen—when they are nearly ready. What can we do against - that?” - -The answer I received was that the only way was to keep them away from -saboteurs and to round them up in camps. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The whole of this explanation that you have -given us is in this document which is in front of the Tribunal. Have you -anything to add to what is in the document? - -DÖNITZ: Right. I have to add that the workmen were to be treated in -exactly the same way as our own workmen who were also housed in -barracks. The Danish and Norwegian workers would not have suffered the -slightest discomfort. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at one more sentence: - - “By the employment of the working parties concerned as - concentration camp workers, their output would not only be - increased by 100 percent but the cessation of their previously - good wages might possibly result in their being considerably - deterred from sabotage...” - -That fairly represents your view of the way to treat Norwegian and -Danish workers, does it not? - -DÖNITZ: This was a safety measure to allow us to get control of the -sabotage. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just turn back to Page 70 of the -English document book, Page 103 in the German document book. This is an -extract from the minutes of a meeting between you and Hitler on 1 July -1944, signed by yourself. Have you got it? - -DÖNITZ: Not yet. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 70 in the English, Page 112 in the German -text (Exhibit Number GB-210). - -DÖNITZ: I have got it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In connection with the general strike in -Copenhagen, the Führer says: - - “The only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court-martial - proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such - men are on everybody’s lips whereas there is silence with regard - to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar - circumstances without court-martial proceedings.” - -Silence with regard to those who are condemned without trial! Do you -agree with that statement of Hitler’s? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why did you distribute it to Operations for -circulation if you didn’t approve of it? - -DÖNITZ: I do not agree with this procedure, but it expresses an idea of -the Führer’s. This was not a discussion between the Führer and myself; -it represents notes on the military situation generally, made by the -officer who accompanied me, and contains widely differing points. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you try and answer my question? It is a -perfectly simple one. It is: Why did you distribute that to Operations -for circulation? What was there in these few lines that was of interest -to your officers? What did you think was valuable for your officers to -know in that dreadful piece of savagery that I have just quoted to you? - -DÖNITZ: It is very easy to explain that. The officer who made the -minutes included it in order to inform our shipyard establishments that -there was a general strike in Copenhagen. That one paragraph from the -long situation discussions was included so that the shipyard -establishments would know that there was a strike in Copenhagen. That -was the whole point. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am suggesting to you, Defendant, that you -circulated that to your officers to inculcate ruthlessness among them. -That is my suggestion. What do you say to that? - -DÖNITZ: I say that is entirely wrong. I may tell you also that I did not -even hear the Führer make that statement, but it is possible that it was -taken down by the accompanying officer, Wagner, for the reason which I -have just given you, to warn our people of the general strike in -Copenhagen. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I am not going to argue with you -about your knowledge of documents you have signed. I have questions -which deal with documents you haven’t signed, so let’s pass on to the -next one. - -DÖNITZ: I know the document. I know it because I have signed it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 69, that is Page 4 in the English document -book or Page 102 in the German document book (Exhibit Number GB-209), -the minutes of the conference on 19 February 1945, between you and -Hitler. - -DÖNITZ: No, that is not correct. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I beg your pardon. It is an extract from the -minutes of the Hitler conference on 19 February 1945; and then there is -a note... - -DÖNITZ: No. It says here: Participation by the Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy in situation discussion with the Führer. It was not a special -conference on the general military situation. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not mean to say “special.” I said the -Hitler conference on the 19th. - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now the first sentence of Paragraph 1 says: - - “The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should - renounce the Geneva Convention.” - -The last sentence: - - “The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to - consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion - as soon as possible.” - -And if you look down at the next minutes of the conference on 20 -February, which is headed, “Participation of C-in-C Navy at a Führer -conference on 20 February at 1600 hours,” it reads as follows: - - “The C-in-C Navy informed the Chief of the Armed Forces - Operations Staff, Generaloberst Jodl, and the representative of - the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Führer’s headquarters, - Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany’s possible - renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a military - standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the - conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the - disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Even from a general - standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that - this measure would bring no advantage.” - -Now look to the last sentence: - - “It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary - without warning and at all costs to save face with the world.” - -That means, put in blunt and brutal language, “Don’t denounce the -convention, but break it whenever it suits you,” doesn’t it? - -DÖNITZ: No, that is not true. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does it mean? Let’s take it word for word. -“It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary....” -Aren’t these measures contrary to the rules of the Geneva Convention? - -DÖNITZ: I must give an explanation of that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Answer my question first and then make a -statement. You have done it before but try to answer my question: “These -measures considered necessary”—If they don’t mean measures contrary to -the terms of the Geneva Convention, what do they mean? Answer that -question first. - -DÖNITZ: They are measures against our own troops. I had heard, or I was -told that the Führer intended, or had said, that because the front was -yielding in the West and he feared that American and British propaganda -might induce men to desert, he intended to leave the Geneva Convention, -so I said to my staff, “How is it possible in this connection to -contemplate abandoning lock, stock, and barrel a system of international -law almost a century old?” I may have said something like this, “The -necessary measures must be taken.” There was no thought of concrete -measures in that connection and no such measures were introduced. My own -views on the treatment of prisoners of war can best be heard from the -8,000 British prisoners of war who were in my camps. That is the -situation regarding this matter. All the chiefs of the Wehrmacht -branches protested against the idea of renouncing the Geneva Convention. -They were not in favor of this idea. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that your total explanation of “to carry out -measures considered necessary”? You have nothing else to add on that -point? Well, I shall pass to another one. Do you remember saying to Dr. -Kranzbühler yesterday that when you became Commander-in-Chief of the -Navy the war was purely a defensive war? Do you remember saying that to -your counsel yesterday? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was not your fault, was it? It was not your -fault that it remained limited to the countries engaged when you took -over? Do you remember your advice to Hitler on the meeting of 14 May -1943? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me just suggest to you, do you -remember the discussion about the sea transport for Sicily and Sardinia? -Do you remember having a discussion on that, and do you remember your -warning Hitler that your U-boat losses were 15 to 17 U-boats a month and -that the position as to the future of the U-boat war looked rather -gloomy? Do you remember that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I do. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember Hitler saying, “These losses -are too heavy. This cannot go on.” And did you say to Hitler: - - “Now our only small outlet for sorties is the Bay of Biscay, and - control of this involves great difficulties and already takes up - ten days. C-in-C Navy sees best strategic solution in occupation - of Spain, including Gibraltar.” - -And did Hitler remark: - - “In 1940 this would still have been possible with the - co-operation of Spain; but now, and against the will of Spain, - our resources are no longer adequate.” - -Do you remember suggesting that to Hitler on 14 May 1943, and Hitler -saying his resources were no longer adequate? - -DÖNITZ: I do not think that I had proposed to the Führer that we should -occupy Spain. I described the situation very clearly; I said that we -were blocked in that small corner of the Bay of Biscay and that the -situation would be different if there was much more room. That, however, -does not suggest that, in consideration of the defensive situation, we -should occupy Spain. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us get it clearly, I am quoting you now from -Admiral Assmann’s headline diary, a verbatim translation. - -The original is in London, My Lord. I will get the copy and put it in -and certify it. This point again only arose yesterday and I haven’t got -it. I will have the original given and I will show Dr. Kranzbühler this -entry. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] These are the words that Admiral Assmann -records: - - “C-in-C Navy continues: ‘Now our only small outlet for sorties - is the Bay of Biscay, and control of this involves great - difficulties and already takes up 10 days.’ - - “C-in-C Navy sees best strategic solution in occupation of - Spain, including Gibraltar.” - -Did you say that “the best strategic solution lies in the occupation of -Spain, including Gibraltar”? - -DÖNITZ: That is possible. If that is the wording you have got there, it -is possible that that is the way I said it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was going to pass on from these -general... - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you passed altogether from C-158 on Page -69? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I had, but I can easily return to it, -My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the second sentence in Paragraph 1 appears to have -some bearing upon the answers which the defendant has given. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry, but I tried to cut it as -short—to the bare bone—and I am sorry if I omit matters. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, would you return to the last -document, C-158. That’s the one about the Geneva Convention; it’s Page -69 of the English book; 102 of the German, whichever you’re following. -The sergeant major will help you to find it. - -Now, if you’ll look at the first paragraph, after the sentence I read, -“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the -Geneva Convention,” it goes on: - - “Not only the Russians but also the Western Powers are violating - international law by their actions against the defenseless - population and the residential districts of the towns. It - therefore appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to - show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means - for our existence and, also, through this measure to urge our - people to resist to the utmost.” - -Were not these, that are referred to there as the “same course”—were -not these the “measures considered necessary” to which you were -referring in the second minute? - -DÖNITZ: The witness who drew up these two records will be able to -explain exactly where and when this information was given. I myself was -only told, just as the Reich Marshal testified, that the Führer was -upset because our Western Front was not holding, and men were quite -pleased to become American and English prisoners of war. That was how -the whole thing began; and that was the information which I originally -received. - -I cannot give an opinion on these minutes which were drawn up by an -officer. The best thing would be for Admiral Wagner to give more exact -details of these matters. I cannot say more than that under oath. I was -of the opinion that the renunciation of the Geneva Convention was in -principle a great mistake and was wrong. I have given practical proof of -my views on the treatment of prisoners of war. Everything else is wrong. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to make quite clear the point that the -Prosecution put against you as this: That you were prepared not to -denounce the Convention, but you were prepared to take action contrary -to the Convention and say nothing about it; and that’s what I suggested -is the effect of the last sentence, especially when read with these -words in the first paragraph. - -My Lord, I am going to pass to the war at sea. - -DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but may I say one thing more? If measures are -taken against desertion, they must be made public. They must have a -deterrent effect; and so it never entered my head to keep them secret. -On the contrary my only thought was, “How is it possible to leave the -Geneva Convention at all?” And that is what I was expressing. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The document is clear. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, did you know that on the first day of -the war the Navy put up to the Foreign Office that the maximum damage to -England could only be achieved, with the naval forces you had, if -U-boats were permitted the unrestricted use of arms without warning -against Allied and neutral shipping in a wide area? From the first day -of the war, did you know that the Navy put that up to the German Foreign -Office? - -DÖNITZ: I do not believe that the Naval Operations Staff at the time -sent me a memorandum of that kind, if it was ever set up, which I do not -know. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to try and remember because it’s -quite important. You say that the naval command never informed the Flag -Officer of U-boats that that was their view of the war? - -DÖNITZ: I do not know. I cannot remember that the Naval War Staff ever -informed me of such a letter to the Foreign Office. I do not believe -they did; I do not know. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, perhaps it would assist your memory -if you looked at the letter. - -My Lord, this is Document Number D-851 and it will become Exhibit Number -GB-451. - -DÖNITZ: No, I do not know this paper. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just will take it by stages because, of -course, you wouldn’t know the first part; but I’ll read it to you and -then we’ll look at the memorandum together. - - “Submitted respectfully to the Secretary of State”—that would - be Baron von Weizsäcker—“with the enclosed memorandum. - - “The Chief of the Operational Department of the Naval High - Command, Captain Fricke, informed me by telephone that the - Führer was already dealing with this matter. The impression had, - however, arisen here that the political connections had again to - be gone into and brought to the Führer’s notice anew. Captain - Fricke had therefore sent Korvettenkapitän Neubauer to the - Foreign Office in order to discuss the matter further.” - -That’s signed by Albrecht on 3 September 1939. Then there is the -memorandum: - - “The question of an unlimited U-boat war against England is - discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the Naval High - Command. - - “The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage - to England, which can be achieved with the forces available, can - only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted - use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping - in the prohibited area indicated in the enclosed map. - - “The Navy does not fail to realize that (a) Germany would - thereby publicly disregard the agreement of 1936 regarding the - prosecution of economic warfare, and (b) a military operation of - this kind could not be justified on the basis of the hitherto - generally accepted principles of international law.” - -And then it goes on to deal with it. - -Are you telling the Tribunal that the Defendant Raeder never consulted -or informed you before these data were submitted to the Foreign Office? - -DÖNITZ: No, he did not do so, and that is shown by the fact that it is a -memorandum from the Chief of the Operations Department to the Secretary -of State, that is to say, a negotiation between Berlin and the Foreign -Office; and the front-line commander, whose station was on the coast and -who, for all practical purposes, was in charge of the U-boats, had -nothing to do with it. - -I do not know this letter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, are you saying that you went on with your -activities at the beginning of the war without knowing that this was the -view of the Naval High Command? - -DÖNITZ: I was not informed about this letter. I have said already that -my knowledge of it... - -THE PRESIDENT: That wasn’t an answer to the question. The question was -whether you knew at the time that this was the view of the Naval High -Command. Answer the question. - -DÖNITZ: No, I did not know that. I knew that the view of the Naval High -Command was to follow the measures of the enemy step by step. I knew -that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, that is the entire difference, -Defendant. That is what you said at great length in giving your evidence -the day before yesterday and yesterday, that you were answering, step by -step, the measures of the enemy. You gave that evidence. Do you say that -you didn’t know that this was the view of the Defendant Raeder, formed -on the first day of the war? Do you say you didn’t know it at all, you -had no inkling that that was Raeder’s view? - -DÖNITZ: No; I did not know that because I did not know of this letter; -and I do not know if that is Herr Raeder’s view. I do not know. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, again I don’t want to argue with you; but -if the Commander, the Chief of the Navy—and I think at that time he -called himself chief of the naval war staff as well—allows the chief of -his Operational Department to put this view forward to the Foreign -Office—is it the practice of the German Navy to allow post captains to -put forward a view like that when it is not held by the -Commander-in-Chief? - -It is ridiculous, isn’t it? No Commander-in-Chief would allow a junior -officer to put forward that view to the Foreign Office unless he held -it, would he? - -DÖNITZ: Will you please ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder. -I cannot give any information as to how this letter came to be written. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will do that with very great pleasure, -Defendant; but at the moment, you see, I have got to question you on the -matters that you put forward, and my next question is: Was it not in -pursuance of the view and desire expressed in that memorandum that the -U-boat command disregarded from the start the London Treaty about -warning ships? - -DÖNITZ: No, on the contrary, entirely on the contrary. In the West we -wanted to avoid any further complications, and we endeavored as long as -possible to fight according to the London Agreement. That can be seen -from all the directives that the U-boats received. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought you perhaps to draw his attention to the -penultimate paragraph in that memorandum? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I probably should. My Lord, I will read -the three, because if you will notice it goes on: - - “The High Command does not assert that England can be beaten by - unrestricted U-boat warfare. The cessation of traffic with the - world trade center of England spells serious disruptions of - their national economy for the neutrals, for which we can offer - them no compensation. - - “Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using - military method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England - gives us a justification, by her method of waging war, to order - this form of warfare as a reprisal. - - “It appears necessary, in view of the great importance in the - field of foreign politics of the decision to be taken, that it - should be arrived at not only as a result of military - considerations, but taking into full account the needs of - foreign politics.” - -I am greatly obliged, Your Lordship. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you hear of any qualification of this -view which was arrived at on considerations of foreign politics? Did you -hear anything about that? - -DÖNITZ: No, I can only repeat that I saw this document here for the -first time. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well now, I would like you, just before -we go on to the question, to look at Page 19 of the English document -book, Page 49 of the German. - -My Lord, the whole of the treaty, which is very short, is set out there. -My Lord, I have the formal copy if Your Lordship would like to see it, -but it is set out in these two paragraphs. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You see: - - “1. In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must - conform to the rules of international law to which surface - vessels are subjected. - - “2. In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to - stop on being duly summoned or of active resistance to visit or - search, a warship, whether a surface vessel or submarine, may - not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel - without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship’s papers - in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship’s boats are not - regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the - passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather - conditions by the proximity of land, or the presence of another - vessel which is in position to take them on board.” - -I had better remind you of that because I have some questions to put to -you upon it. - -Would you turn over the page and look at the foot of Page 20 in the -English document book—it is either Page 50 or 51 in the German document -book—where there are some figures set out. - -Have you got the page? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I have read it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read it. You see that it says in the two -sentences before: - - “In a certain number of early cases the German commander allowed - the crew of the merchant vessel to get clear; and he even made - some provision for them before he destroyed the vessel. Such - destruction was in accordance with Article 72 of the Prize - Ordinance; and therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the - Germans have been given the benefit of the doubt in such cases.” - -The following are the figures on record. This is for the first year of -the war: - - “Ships sunk: 241. - - “Recorded attacks: 221. - - “Illegal attacks: 112. At least 79 of these 112 ships were - torpedoed without warning. This does not, of course, include - convoy ships.” - -I wanted you to be quite clear, Defendant, that it excludes, first of -all, ships where any measures had been taken for the safety of the crew -and secondly, it excludes convoy ships. - -Now, do you dispute these figures in any way, that there were 79 attacks -without warning in the first year of the war? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I do. These figures cannot be checked. Yesterday I stated -that in consequence of the use of arms by ships we had to take other -measures. So I cannot check whether this report, which for other reasons -looks very like propaganda to me, takes into consideration the behavior -of the crews and their resistance, _et cetera_. That is to say, it is -impossible for me to check these figures or to say on what they are -based. At any rate, the German point of view was that it was legal -considering that the ships were armed and that they transmitted -intelligence—were part of an intelligence organization—and that from -now on action would be taken against these ships without warning. I have -already mentioned the fact that England acted in exactly the same way, -and so did other nations. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to ask you some questions about that, -but let’s just take one example. Was any warning given before the -_Athenia_ was sunk? - -DÖNITZ: No, I have already stated that that was a mistake; the _Athenia_ -was taken for an auxiliary cruiser. The sinking of an auxiliary cruiser -without warning is quite legal. I have also stated already that on a -thorough examination of the case, I have found that the commander should -have been more cautious and that is why he was punished. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get your view, Defendant. Did it -ever occur to you that in the case of a merchant ship, if it were sunk -without warning, it meant either death or terrible suffering to the crew -and to these merchant seamen? Did that ever occur to you? - -DÖNITZ: If merchant ships... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just answer the question. - -DÖNITZ: If a merchant ship acts like a merchant ship, it is treated as -such. If it does not, then the submarine must proceed to attack. That is -legal and in accordance with international law. The same thing happened -to the crews of German merchant ships. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That isn’t what I asked you. I wanted to know, -because it is important on some of these points: Did it ever occur to -you, did you ever consider, that you were going to cause either death or -terrible suffering to the crews of merchant ships who were sunk without -warning? - -Just tell us, did it occur to you or didn’t it? - -DÖNITZ: Of course; but if a merchant ship is sunk legally, that is just -war, and there is suffering in other places, too, during the war. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you view with pride of achievement the fact -that 35,000 British merchant seamen lost their lives during the war? Do -you view it as a proud achievement or do you view it with regret? - -DÖNITZ: Men are killed during wars and no one is proud of it. That is -badly expressed. It is a necessity, the harsh necessity of war. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at Page 29 in the English -document book, or Page 58 in the German, whichever you care to look at. -It is Document Number C-191, Exhibit GB-193. This is 22 September, 19 -days after the beginning of the war. - - “Flag Officer, U-boats, intends to give permission to U-boats to - sink without warning any vessel sailing without lights. - - “Previous instructions, permitting attacks on French war and - merchant ships only as a defensive measure, purely French or - Anglo-French convoys only north of the latitude of Brest and - forbidding attacks on all passenger ships, give rise to great - difficulties to U-boats, especially at night. In practice, there - is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot - identify the target, which is a shadow, in a way that entirely - obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such - that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be - forbidden to make any night attacks in waters where French and - English naval forces or merchant ships may be moving. On the - other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be - expected, the measure desired by the Flag Officer, U-boats, can - be carried out. Permission to take this step is not to be given - in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of - the Naval Operations Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed - by word of mouth”—and note the last line—“and the sinking of a - merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to - possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.” - -Now, just tell me—take your choice—do you consider that sailing -without lights is either persistent refusal to stop on being duly -summoned or active resistance to visit and search, within the Treaty? -Which of either of these things do you consider it to be? - -DÖNITZ: If a merchant ship acts like a warship... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: First of all, you must answer my question, if -the Tribunal does not rule otherwise; and then you can give your -explanation. My question is this: Do you consider that sailing without -lights is either persistent refusal to stop or active resistance to -visit and search? Do you consider it to be either one or the other, or -both of these things? Do you? - -DÖNITZ: The question is not correctly expressed, because we are dealing -with a certain operational area in which British and French... - -THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you will answer the question, please. - -DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you consider that sailing without lights is -either persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, which is one -of the matters in the Treaty, or active resistance to visit and search, -which is the other matter set out in the Treaty? Now, do you consider -that sailing without lights is either or both of these matters mentioned -in the Treaty? - -DÖNITZ: If a merchant ship sails without lights, it must run the risk of -being taken for a warship, because at night it is not possible to -distinguish between a merchant ship and a warship. At the time the order -was issued, it concerned an operational area in which blacked-out troop -transports were traveling from England to France. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your answer is that it is not covered by the -Treaty, but by one of the matters in the Treaty; but your explanation -was that you thought you were entitled to torpedo without warning any -ship that might be mistaken for a warship. That is your answer, is it? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why didn’t the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and all -these naval advisers stipulate for that when Germany adhered to this -Treaty, if you were going to interpret it in that way? Were you ever -asked about it before Germany adhered to this Treaty in 1936? - -DÖNITZ: I was not asked before Germany signed this Treaty; Germany -adhered to the Treaty in practice, as I know very well, until -countermeasures were introduced; and then I received orders to act -accordingly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us go through this document and see if -you can help me perhaps a little more on some other points. Why was this -action to be based on the unspoken approval of the naval war staff? Why -hadn’t the naval war staff the courage to speak its approval in an -ordinary order if it was all right? - -DÖNITZ: Yes; the paper you are showing me is a note or memorandum made -by a young official on the Naval Operations Staff. In fact—it was the -idea of that particular officer on the Naval Operations Staff; and as I -have pointed out here, I did not know of the matter—in actual fact, the -Naval Operations Staff never gave me such an order. The contents of that -paper are fiction. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, of course, they weren’t to issue an order at -all. You see, this states with great frankness that you were to act on -the unspoken approval of the naval war staff, so that the naval war -staff could say, as you have said now, “We didn’t issue an order;” and -the junior officers would be acting on an unspoken word, and I want to -know—you have been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy—why is it -done in this way, why is it done by unspoken words, on oral orders? - -DÖNITZ: No, precisely that is not correct. That was this young officer’s -idea. The order which I received from the Naval Operations Staff stated -explicitly that blacked-out vessels could be sunk in this area where -English transports were traveling from England to France. So, you see, -it contained none of the things stated in this memorandum. There is no -doubt that the section chief and likewise the Chief of the Naval -Operations Staff refused and rejected that entirely impossible idea and -gave me that short and explicit order. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you suggesting to the Tribunal that on these -vitally important points—“unspoken approval of the war staff, U-boat -commanders informed by word of mouth”—that a young staff officer is -allowed to put in an incorrect memorandum and get away with it -uncorrected? Is that the way, is that the state of efficiency of the -staff of the German Navy? - -DÖNITZ: No, that is a misunderstanding. It actually has been corrected. -That is a note submitted by the official on the Naval Operations Staff, -of which his superiors on the Naval Operations Staff did not approve. It -was corrected. There was no unspoken agreement but an explicit and clear -order to myself; so that young officer’s idea had already been turned -down by the Naval Operations Staff itself. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that the original is initialed by -Admiral Von Friedeburg? - -DÖNITZ: No, that is quite wrong, that is impossible. “Fd” is written -there—that means Fresdorf. That was Kapitänleutnant Fresdorf. He was an -official on the Naval Operations Staff—not Friedeburg. He was a young -officer in the first department of the Naval Operations Staff. These are -all things which I learned of here. His chief, Admiral Wagner, had -condemned it already. It was not Friedeburg, but Fresdorf. That is the -way this young officer thought about it, but actually a definite order -was issued without these things. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Take the next bit. “The sinking of a merchant -ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion -with a warship or auxiliary cruiser.” Do you agree with faking the -records after you have sunk a ship? - -DÖNITZ: No, and it was not done. That also belongs to the same -category—the ideas of that officer. No order for that has ever been -given. The order of the Naval Operations Staff issued to me in that -connection has been submitted and that is a clear and concise order, -without the things mentioned here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, you appreciate that these things, -according to this memorandum, are to be stated without orders. There has -to be no order because an order might come out—because if it is done -without an order it won’t come out. Are you suggesting—you are putting -it on the shoulders of this lieutenant commander, that he invented these -three damning facts: Unspoken approval, oral instructions to commanders, -and faking the orders? You say that these existed only in the mind of a -Kapitänleutnant? Is that what you are telling the Tribunal? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, yes, of course, because the clear, concise order was given -by the Naval Operations Staff to me in which these things were not -mentioned. And quite as clearly I passed my orders on. That is how it -is. This memorandum, or these ideas of that officer, was already -disapproved by his chief of department in Berlin. A clear order was -given to me, however, and there was nothing in it about a War Diary and -all these things mentioned here. That order is available. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we shall be able to ask, I understand, -Admiral Wagner as to where this Kapitänleutnant got hold of these ideas, -is that so, or whether he made them out? Is that what you are telling -us, that Wagner will be able to deal with this, will he? - -DÖNITZ: Admiral Wagner ought to know all about it, because this official -was in his department in Berlin. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, if you put that onto the -Kapitänleutnant, let’s pass on to another point. In mid-November... - -DÖNITZ: I am not laying any blame on anybody, but they are ideas of a -young officer which were already disapproved of by his chief of -department. I am blaming no one. I do not accuse anybody. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I thought you were. - -Well, now, let’s pass to another point. In mid-November of 1939, Germany -gave warning that she would sink, without warning, merchant ships, if -armed. Don’t you know that before that warning—if you want to see the -point you will find it on Page 21 of the English document book or 51 to -52 of the German document book. It is just before the break, about five -lines. - - “By the middle of November, a score of”—that is 20—“British - merchantmen had already been illegally attacked by gunfire or - torpedoed from submarines.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page did you say? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Page 21, about ten lines before the -break. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] You see, what I am suggesting, Defendant, -is that the statement, the warning, that you would sink merchant ships, -if armed, made no difference to the practice you had already adopted of -sinking unarmed ships without warning. - -DÖNITZ: In the beginning of October, if I remember correctly, I received -the order or the permission, the legal permission, to sink armed -merchantmen. From that moment on I acted accordingly. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just tell me: Was it your view that the mere -possession of arms, a gun, on the merchant ship, constituted active -resistance to visit or search within the Treaty; or was this a new -addition for the guidance of German U-boat warfare which you were -introducing completely independent of the Treaty? - -DÖNITZ: It is a matter of course that if a ship has a gun on board she -will use it. It would have been a one-sided obligation if the submarine, -in a suicidal way, were then to wait until the other ship fired the -first shot. That is a reciprocal agreement, and one cannot in any -circumstances expect the submarine to wait until it gets hit first. And, -as I said before, in practice the steamers used their guns as soon as -they came within range. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you know, the arming of merchant ships, -Defendant, was well known in the last war. It was well known for 20 -years before this Treaty was signed. And you will agree with me, won’t -you, that there is not a word in the Treaty forbidding the arming of -merchant ships? Why didn’t you give these ships the opportunity of -abstaining from resistance or of stopping? Why did you go in the face of -the Treaty which you had signed only 3 years before? That is all I want -to know. If you can’t tell me, if you say it is a matter for argument, I -will ask Admiral Raeder. At the moment, will you tell us, or can you -tell us, why didn’t you keep to the Treaty? - -DÖNITZ: That was not an infringement of the Treaty. I am not an expert -on international law. I am soldier; and I acted according to my military -orders. Of course, it is suicide for a submarine to wait till it -receives the first hit. It goes without saying that the steamer is not -carrying guns for fun, but to make use of them. And I have already -explained what use was made of them. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just one other matter, because I must -cover these points in view of your evidence. - -Did you order your commanders to treat the use of wireless as active -resistance? Did you consider that the use of wireless for merchant ships -was active resistance within the Treaty? - -DÖNITZ: On 24 September, the Naval Operations Staff’s order... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, just answer the question first, -Defendant, and then give your explanation. I said that to you quite 20 -times yesterday and today. Did you consider the use of wireless by -merchant ships as active resistance? - -DÖNITZ: It is generally laid down by international law that a merchant -ship can be fired on if it makes use of its wireless when stopped. That -is also in the French Ordinance, for instance. In order to avoid more -severe measures we had not, as a rule, done so yet. Not until the end of -September, when I received a definite order or permission to do so, was -that rule, which is in accordance with international law, put into -effect. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me, didn’t the German Admiralty know in -1936 that most merchantmen had wireless? - -DÖNITZ: Of course, but according to the International Conference on -International Law—I happen to know this because it appeared as a -footnote in the Prize Ordinance—according to this conference of 1923, -they were not allowed to use wireless when being stopped. That is -international law and is found in all instructions. I know for certain -that the French instructions say this too. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate again, the German Admiralty and the -German Foreign Office did not make any mention of use of wireless in -this Treaty. - -What I am suggesting—I want to put it quite clearly to you—is that you -were not bothering about this Treaty at all in any case where it didn’t -suit you in the operations in this war. - -DÖNITZ: That is not true. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s pass on to neutrals. I haven’t heard -you suggest that you were dealing with neutrals because they were armed, -but let’s take a concrete example. - -“On 12 November 1939...” - -DÖNITZ: I have never said that neutrals were armed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I thought. Well, we will rule that -out. We will take the example. - -My Lord, it is given on Page 20 of the document book, and in the middle -of the middle paragraph (Exhibit Number GB-191). - -[_Turning to the defendant._] - - “On 12 November, the Norwegian _Arne Kjode_ was torpedoed in the - North Sea without warning at all. This was a tanker bound from - one neutral port to another.” - -Now, Defendant, were you classing tankers bound from one neutral port to -another as warships; or for what reason was that ship torpedoed without -warning? The master and four of the crew lost their lives. The others -were picked up after many hours in an open boat. Why were you torpedoing -neutral ships without warning? This is only the 12th of November in the -North Sea, a tanker going from one neutral port to another. - -DÖNITZ: Well, the submarine commander in this case could not see, first -of all, that the ship was traveling from one neutral port to the other, -but this ship... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Therefore... - -DÖNITZ: No, not for that reason; no. But that ship was heading for -England, and he confused it with an English ship. That is why he -torpedoed it. I know of that case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You approve of that action by the submarine -commander? - -DÖNITZ: No; that is an assertion made by yourself and it is in practice -refuted by our clean submarine warfare and by the fact that it was done -by mistake. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When in doubt, torpedo... - -DÖNITZ: That is one of the cases... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you approve of that: when in doubt, -torpedo without warning? Is that your view? - -DÖNITZ: No, no; that is merely what you assert. If one or two instances -of mistakes are found in the course of 5½ years of clean submarine -warfare, it proves nothing; but it does contradict your assertion. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, now, let’s look at your clean U-boat -warfare, if you want. Will you turn to Page 30 of the English book or -Page 59 to 60 of the German book. - -Now, the first of these—this is the note on the intensification of -U-boat warfare. You say that on the directive of the Armed Forces High -Command of 30 December—this is on the 1st of January 1940: - - “...the Führer, on report by the C-in-C Navy”—that is the - Defendant Raeder—“has decided: (a) Greek merchant vessels are - to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone around Britain - declared barred by the U.S.A.” - -There is a mistake, My Lord, in the translation. You see it says -“blockaded by the U.S.A. and Britain.” The proper translation should be -“in the zone around Britain declared barred by the U.S.A.” - -Now, Defendant, I don’t want to make any bad point, at any rate -intentionally. Were you including Greek ships because you believed that -most of the Greek merchant navy was on British charter, was being -chartered by Britain? Was that the reason? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. That was probably why the Naval Operations Staff gave the -order, because of the Greek fleet sailing in England’s service. I -assumed that those were the reasons of the Naval Operations Staff. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Assumed that was the reason. I do not want to -occupy time on the point. What I want to know is this: Did that mean -that any Greek ship in these waters would be sunk without warning? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. It says here that they were to be treated like enemy ships. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In sum, then, that means that a Greek -merchantman from then on would be sunk without warning if it came into -the zone around the British coast. - -Now, you mentioned the Bristol Channel, and you have given your -explanation of the next sentence. You say all ships may be attacked -without warning. For external consumption, these attacks should be given -out as hits by mines. - -I just want to get it clear from you. You are not suggesting that the -reason of the Naval High Command was to conceal the maze of operations -of the U-boats; the reason was to avoid trouble with neutrals whose good -will you wanted to keep, was it not? - -DÖNITZ: I already stated my position on that yesterday. These are -matters connected with the political leadership and I know nothing about -them. I myself, as Commander of U-boats, looked at them only from the -angle of military advantage or expediency, just as England did in -similar cases. What the political reasons may have been, I cannot say. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is my whole suggestion to you, you know, -Defendant, that you were acting on the military necessity stated in that -memorandum of the Naval Command that the maximum damage to England could -only be achieved with unrestricted use of arms without warning. But let -us just look at the next one now. - -DÖNITZ: There were certain areas which neutrals had been warned not to -cross. I stated yesterday that the same procedure was followed in -English operational areas. If a neutral in spite of these warnings -entered those areas, where military actions were constantly being -carried on by one side or the other, it had to run the risk of suffering -damage. Those are the reasons which induced the Naval Operations Staff -to issue these orders. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As you mentioned that, I shall deal first with -your areas. Your zone, which is published, was from the Faroes to -Bordeaux and 500 miles west of Ireland. That is, your zone was 750,000 -square miles; isn’t that right? Your zone around Britain was from the -Faroes to Bordeaux, and 500 miles west of Ireland? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that is the operational area of August 1940. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, of August 1940. - -DÖNITZ: And it is in accord in extent with the so-called combat zone -which America forbade her merchant ships to enter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say it is in accord. Let us just look at it -and see what the two things were. The United States at that time said -that its merchant ships were not to come into that zone. You said that -if any merchant ship came into that zone, 750,000 square miles in -extent, none of the laws and usages of war applied, and that ship could -be destroyed by any means you chose. - -That was your view, was it not? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that is the German point of view in international law, -which was also applied by other nations, that operational areas around -the enemy are admissible. I may repeat that I am not a specialist in -international law but a soldier, and I judge according to common sense. -It seems to me a matter of course that an ocean area, or an ocean zone, -around England could not be left in the undisturbed possession of the -enemy. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think you are disputing it at all; but -I want to get it quite clear. It was your view that it was right that if -you fixed an operational zone of that extent, any neutral ship—and you -agree that it is a neutral ship—coming unarmed into that zone could be -destroyed by any means that you cared to use? That was your view of the -way to conduct a war at sea; that is right, is it not? - -DÖNITZ: Yes; and there are plenty of British statements which declare -that in wartime—and we were at war with England—one cannot permit -neutrals to enter and give aid to the belligerents, especially if they -had previously been warned against doing so. That is quite in accordance -with international law. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will discuss the matter of law with the -Tribunal. I want to get at the facts. - -That is the position which you adopt? And equally, if you found a -neutral vessel outside the zone using its wireless, you would treat it -as if it were a ship of war of a belligerent power, would you not? If a -neutral vessel used its wireless after seeing the submarine, you would -treat it as a ship of war of a belligerent power, would you not? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, according to the regulations of international law. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. As I say, the matters of law rest with -the Tribunal. I am not going to argue these with you. But, apart -altogether from international law, did it ever strike you that that -method of treating neutral ships was completely disregarding the life -and safety of the people on the ships? Did that ever strike you? - -DÖNITZ: I have already said that the neutrals had been warned not to -cross the combat zones. If they entered the combat zones, they had to -run the risk of suffering damage, or else stay away. That is what war -is. For instance, no consideration would be shown on land either to a -neutral truck convoy bringing ammunition or supplies to the enemy. It -would be fired on in exactly the same way as an enemy transport. It is, -therefore, quite admissible to turn the seas around the enemy’s country -into a combat area. That is the position as I know it in international -law, although I am only a soldier. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. - -DÖNITZ: Strict neutrality would require the avoidance of combat areas. -Whoever enters a combat area must take the consequences. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is your view? I do not think it -could possibly be put more fairly. - -DÖNITZ: And for that reason the United States explicitly prohibited -entry into these zones in November, because it refused to enter the -combat zone. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In your view, any neutral ship which entered a -zone of 750,000 square miles around Britain was committing an un-neutral -act and was liable to be sunk without warning at sight. That is your -view of how war at sea should be conducted; that is right, is it not? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. Special lanes were left open for the neutrals. They did not -have to enter the combat area unless they were going to England. Then -they had to run the risk of war. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell me, if you will look -back to Document C-21; that is, on Page 30 of the English book and Pages -59 to 60 of the German, you see that in all these cases—you take the -one in Paragraph 2, Page 5: - - “Conference with the Chief of Naval Operations Staff”—on 2 - January; that was the “intensified measures” in connection with - the “Case Yellow,” that is, the invasion of Holland and - Belgium—“the sinking by U-boats... without any warning, of all - ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can - be employed.” - -Why, if, as you have just told the Tribunal several times, you were -acting in accordance with what you believe to be international law, why -did you so act only in areas where mines could be employed? - -DÖNITZ: I have already explained that that was a question not of -legality but of military expediency. For military reasons I cannot give -the enemy explicit information as to the means of combat I am using in -an area which may be mined. You operated in the same way. I remind you -of the French danger zone which was declared, corresponding to the mined -areas around Italy. You did not state which weapons you were using, -either. That has nothing to do with legality. That is purely a question -of military expediency. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, I think you will appreciate that the -point that I am putting to you is this: That you were pretending to -neutrals that you were acting in accordance with the London Treaty, -whereas you were actually acting not in accordance with the Treaty, but -in accordance with instructions you laid down for yourself, based on -military necessity. - -What I am suggesting to you is that what the Naval High Command was -doing was pretending to, and getting the advantage fraudulently of -appearing to, comply with the Treaty. And that, I suggest, is the -purpose of these orders that you would only do this where mines could be -laid. Isn’t that what was in your mind? - -DÖNITZ: It is not true that we tried to fool the neutrals. We warned the -neutrals explicitly that combat actions were going on in these -operational areas and that if they entered they would suffer damage. We -pretended nothing; we told them explicitly: “Do not enter these zones.” -England did the same. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, doesn’t the next sentence bear upon that? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Your Lordship; I am very much obliged to -Your Lordship. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Would you look at the next sentence in -II-1, where it says the following? - - “By the present order, the Navy will be authorized, in keeping - with the general intensification of the war, to sink by U-boats, - without any warning, all ships in those waters near the enemy - coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for - external consumption, pretense should be made that mines are - being used. The behavior of, and use of weapons by, U-boats - should take this into consideration.” - -Do you say, in the face of that sentence, that you were not trying to -fool the neutrals—to use your own phrase? Do you still say you were not -trying to fool the neutrals? - -DÖNITZ: No, we did not fool them because we warned them beforehand. In -wartime I do not have to say what weapon I intend to use; I may very -well camouflage my weapon. But the neutrals were not fooled. On the -contrary, they were told, “Do not enter these zones.” After that, the -question of which particular military method I use in these areas no -longer concerns the neutrals. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to tell the Tribunal, what was -your view of your responsibility to the seamen from boats that were -sunk? Would you have in mind the provisions of the London Treaty, and -will you agree that your responsibility was to save seamen from boats -that were sunk wherever you could do so without imperiling your ship? Is -that, broadly, correct? - -DÖNITZ: Of course, if the ship herself behaved according to the London -Agreement, or unless it occurred within the operational areas mentioned. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh? Do you really mean that? That is, if you -sank a neutral ship which had come into that zone, you considered that -you were absolved from any of your duties under the London Agreement to -look after the safety of the crews? - -DÖNITZ: In operational areas I am obliged to take care of the survivors -after the engagement, if the military situation permits. The same held -good in the Baltic and in many operational areas. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I put to you, Defendant. Please -believe me, I don’t want to make any false point. I put to you: If they -could do so without imperiling their ships, that is, without risking -losing their ships. Let us get it quite clear: Do you say that in the -zone which you fixed there was no duty to provide for the safety of the -crew, that you accepted no duty to provide for the safety of the crew? - -DÖNITZ: I have stated that I was obliged to take care of the survivors -after the engagement, if the military situation permitted. That forms -part of the Geneva Convention or the agreement on its application. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then it didn’t matter whether the sinking was in -the zone or out of the zone. According to what you say, you undertook -exactly the same duty towards survivors whether it was in the zone or -outside the zone. Is that right? - -DÖNITZ: No, that is not correct, because outside the zone neutrals were -treated according to the Prize Ordinance, only inside the zone they were -not. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I can’t understand is this—and really, I -hope I am not being very stupid—what was the difference? What -difference did you consider existed in your responsibility towards -survivors if the sinking was inside the zone or outside the zone? That -is what I want to get clear. - -DÖNITZ: The difference was that neutrals outside the zone were treated -according to the Prize Ordinance. According to the London Agreement, we -were obliged, before sinking the ship, to see that the crew were safe -and within reach of land. There was no obligation to do so inside the -zone. In that case we acted according to the Hague Agreement for the -application of the Geneva Convention, which provides that the survivors -should be taken care of after the fight if the military situation -permits. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree that an order in express terms to -annihilate, to kill, the survivors of a ship that is sunk would be an -appalling order to give? - -DÖNITZ: I have already stated that the attacks on survivors were -contrary to a soldier’s idea of fair fighting and that I have never put -my name to any order which could in the slightest degree lead to -anything of the kind—not even when it was proposed to me as a reprisal -measure. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree that even with the discipline in -your own branch of the service, there was a possibility that some U-boat -commanders would have refused to comply with an order to annihilate -survivors? - -DÖNITZ: No such order was ever given. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it is quite a fair question. What if it -were given in express terms, “Annihilate survivors after you sink a -ship”? You know your officers. Would there, at any rate, have been some -danger that some of them would have refused to carry out that order? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. As I know my U-boat forces, there would have been a storm -of indignation against such an order. The clean and honest idealism of -these would never have allowed them to do it; and I would never have -given such an order or permitted it to be given. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what I put to you. - -Now, just look at Page 33 of the English document book. That contains -your own Standing Order Number 154 (Exhibit Number GB-196). Let me read -it to you, rather slowly, if the Tribunal does not mind. It says: - - “Do not pick up survivors and take them with you; do not worry - about the merchant ship’s boats; weather conditions and distance - from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and - strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We - must be harsh in this war.” - -First of all, tell me, what do you mean by “your next success”? Doesn’t -that mean the next attack on a vessel? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just look at that order of yours and -compare it with the words of the London Treaty. The Treaty, you -remember, says that a warship, including a submarine, may not sink or -render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without first having -placed passengers, crew, and ship’s papers in a place of safety. For -this purpose, the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety -unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing -sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land or the presence of -another vessel. - -Defendant, you had that article of the London Treaty in front of you, -had you not, when you were drafting this order? And you were -deliberately excluding from your order the matters mentioned in the -London Treaty? Listen to your order: “Do not worry about the boats; -weather conditions”—one thing mentioned in the Treaty—“and distance -from land”—another thing mentioned in the Treaty—“play no part.” - -Your order could have been put in other language almost as clearly: -“Disregard all the matters that are stated in Paragraph 2 of the London -Treaty.” - -Now tell me, didn’t you have the London Treaty in front of you when you -drew that order? - -DÖNITZ: Of course I had the London Treaty in my mind and in front of me. -I stated in detail yesterday, however, that we were thinking in terms of -an engagement, a ship under escort, as is shown by the order as a whole. -You have taken just one paragraph. There was, therefore, no question of -applying the London Agreement, which does not refer to ships under -escort. - -Secondly, we were thinking of an area in the immediate vicinity of the -permanent positions, enemy defenses off the harbors on the British -coast. The London Agreement has nothing to do with fighting ships under -escort. Those are two entirely different things; and that order applied -to this area and the combating of ships under escort. I explained that -in detail yesterday. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if you say that that only applied when it -was a question of attacking ships in convoy, would you look at Page 26 -of the English document book and at Page 57 of the German document book? -There you will find the account of the sinking of the _Sheaf Mead_ on 27 -May 1940. And if you will look at the U-boat’s log, opposite the time -group 1648 hours—which is on Page 27 of the English and Page 57 of the -German (Exhibit Number GB-192)—this is what the log says: - - “A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify - the name. The crew have saved themselves on wreckage and - capsized boats. We fish out a buoy; no name on it. I ask a man - on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head ‘Nixname.’ A young - boy in the water calls, ‘Help, help, please.’ The others are - very composed; they look damp and somewhat tired and have a look - of cold hatred on their faces. Then on to the old course.” - -If you turn to Page 57 of the German document book, or Page 28 of the -English, you will find the last sentence from the survivors’ report -describes the submarine as doing this: - - “They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us - in the water. Otherwise they just watched us but said nothing. - Then she submerged and went off without offering us any - assistance whatever.” - -There you see the point, Defendant, that your own commander says that -there was a young boy in the water calling, “Help, help, please,” and -your submarine takes a few photographs, submerges, and then goes off. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought you not to refer to the passage just -after the name of the vessel, under 1648, “It is not clear....”? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “It is not clear whether she was sailing as a -normal merchant ship. The following seemed to point to the contrary.” - -And then, My Lord, it gives a number of matters. - -Of course, My Lord, I am on the point of survivors at the moment. I am -not taking this instance as a matter of wrongful sinking; I am taking it -as an instance of carrying out this order. - -I am very much obliged to Your Lordship, but that is why I didn’t do it. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant has now had the opportunity of looking -at the log of _U-37_. Was it not your practice in May 1940 to see -personally the logs of all U-boats when they arrived? - -DÖNITZ: I had the commanders of submarines report verbally to me every -time. The logs, which arrived or were finished several weeks later or -some time after the entries were made since they had to be written in -the port, were only submitted to me by my Chief of Staff if they -contained something special in addition to the verbal report. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you remember seeing the log of _U-37_ that -was involved in this incident? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now observe that the _Sheaf Mead_ was not -sailing in convoy? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I know that. And I know that she was an armed ship and -that, according to the orders which the commander had, he was justified -in sinking her as an armed ship. It also appears from his log that he -could not decide on firing the torpedo until he had ascertained that the -ship was armed. That is very clearly expressed here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I please explain to His Lordship that I am -not on the question of sinking. I am on the question of survivors. Did -you take any action with the U-boat commander, Kapitänleutnant Ernst, -for not having assisted in the rescue of survivors? - -DÖNITZ: No. But I did tell him that if he was on the spot where this -rescue went on he should also have helped. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was he not simply carrying out your Order 154 of -November or December 1939? - -DÖNITZ: No, he was not. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now... - -DÖNITZ: I have already stated to which waters it applied and that it -only applied to ships which were protected. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look at Page 34 in the -English document book, Page 69 in the German document book. That is the -report of the conversation between Hitler and Oshima, and you say that -you were told nothing about it. Now I want you just to follow about -halfway down, halfway through the extract, where it says: - - “After having given further explanations on the map, the Führer - pointed out that however many ships the United States built, one - of its main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that - reason merchant ships would be sunk without warning, with the - intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it - gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, - the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new - people. The training of seagoing personnel takes a long time.” - -Now, did you agree with that argument of Hitler’s that once it gets -around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans -would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people? Did you think that -that was a sound argument on the question of sea warfare against the -United States? - -DÖNITZ: I have already given my answer to that question in writing to -the Foreign Office, and I clearly stated my opinion, which was that I -did not believe that it would take a long time to train seamen, and that -America had no lack of them. Consequently I would also not be of the -opinion that this would serve as a deterrent if they had enough men. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you do not agree with the Führer’s reasoning -on that point? - -DÖNITZ: No, I do not agree with the last part, namely, that there would -be a shortage of seamen. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, it is the first point that I want your -opinion on expressly: “Once it gets around that most of the seamen are -lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in -enlisting new people.” That is, I suggest to you, that the new people -would be scared off by the news of the sinking and killing of the first -people. Did you agree that that was a sound argument? That is what I -want your view on. - -DÖNITZ: That is his personal point of view. Whether they would be scared -off or not is an American matter which I cannot judge. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at your own document book, Volume -I, Page 29 in the English version, which is your report to the Führer on -14 May 1942. Do you see the last sentence where you are advocating a -range pistol? You say: - - “A range pistol will also have the great advantage that the crew - will not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick - sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of crews will - no doubt cause difficulties for the assignment of crews for the - great American construction program.” - -DÖNITZ: It is perfectly clear, it is correct. If I have not got the old -crews any more, I have to have new ones. It makes it more difficult. It -says nothing about scaring off there, but the positive fact is stated -that new crews have to be trained. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So are we to take it that you did not think that -would have any frightening or terrorizing effect on the getting of new -crews, if the old crews were sunk under conditions where they would -probably lose their lives. - -DÖNITZ: That is a matter of opinion, it depends on the courage, the -bravery of the people. The American Secretary Knox said that if in -peacetime—in 1941—the sinkings of German U-boats were not published he -expected it would have a deterrent effect on my U-boats. That was his -opinion. I can only say that the silent disappearance through American -sinkings in peacetime did not scare off my U-boats. It is a matter of -taste. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, on 14 May the Führer was pressing you to -take action against the crews after the vessel was sunk. Is that not so? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. He asked whether we could not take action against the crew -and I have already said, after I heard of the Oshima discussion here, -that I believe this question to Grossadmiral Raeder and myself was the -result of that Oshima discussion. - -My answer to that, of course, is known; it was “no.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your answer was “no,” it would be far better to -have a range pistol and kill them while they were still on the boat. -That was your answer, was it not? - -DÖNITZ: No. My answer was: Taking action against shipwrecked personnel -is out of the question, but it is taken for granted that in a fight one -must use the best possible weapon. Every nation does that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but the object of your weapon, as quite -clearly set out, was that the crew would not be able to rescue -themselves on account of the quick sinking of the ship. That is why you -wanted to use the range pistol. - -DÖNITZ: Yes. And also of course, because we considered the crews of the -steamers as combatants since they were fighting with weapons. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going back to deal with that -point again, but that was in your mind. Now, the Führer raised this -point again on 5 September 1942, as is shown in your document book, -Volume II, Page 81. - -DÖNITZ: I do not have it. Where is it? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It begins with the discussion in the OKW on 5 -September 1942. It is Exhibit Dönitz-39, Page 81, and it is in the -English document book, Volume II. - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I have it now. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It arises out of an incident of the sinking of -the mine boat, _Ulm_, and there is a question of whether British -destroyers had fired with machine arms on soldiers in lifeboats; and the -Führer gave orders to the Naval Command to issue an order, according to -which “our warships would use reprisals”; and if you look a little lower -down, you will see that the matter had been investigated by your -operations staff, and it is stated: - - “It could not be proved beyond a doubt that the fire had been - aimed at the crew boarding the lifeboats. The enemy fire was - evidently aimed at the ship itself.” - -Then you discuss the question of applying reprisals, at the foot of that -page, and you say: - - “It is the opinion of the Naval Operations Staff that before - issuing reprisal orders, one should take into consideration - whether such measures, if applied by the enemy against us, would - not in the end be more harmful to us than to the enemy. Even now - our boats are able only in a few cases to rescue shipwrecked - enemy crews by towing the lifeboats, _et cetera_, whereas the - crews of sunken German U-boats and merchant vessels have so far, - as a rule, been picked up by the enemy. The situation could - therefore only change in our favor if we were to receive orders, - as a measure of reprisal, that shipwrecked enemy crews should - not only not be saved, but that they should be subdued by fire. - It is significant in this respect that so far it could not be - proved that in the cases on record where the enemy used arms - against shipwrecked Germans such action was the result of, or - was covered by, an order of an official British agency. We - should therefore bear in mind the fact that knowledge of such a - German order would be used by enemy propaganda in such a manner - that its consequences could not easily be foreseen.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I object against this manner -of procedure. The document about which this cross-examination is being -made is a document from me, and I have not submitted it yet. I do not -know whether it is customary in this Trial that exhibits of the Defense -are submitted by the Prosecution. For this reason I had suggested at the -time to begin with the documentary evidence so that the Prosecution -should also have an opportunity to use my exhibits in cross-examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objection to the document which is in your -document book being offered in evidence? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I only want to avoid having my documents -presented by the Prosecution in cross-examination because this upsets my -entire documentary evidence. This particular case does not play a -decisive role for me, but if the Prosecution proposes to present other -documents of mine which have not yet been submitted, I should like to -ask that the cross-examination be interrupted and I first be afforded an -opportunity to submit my documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: That will only waste time, will it not? It would not do -any good; it would only waste time. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I do not think it would be a -waste of time if I, as Defense Counsel, ask that I be allowed to submit -my own documents to the Tribunal myself and that they shall not be -quoted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution from my document book, because -the manner of presentation and the questions asked by the Prosecution -do, of course, give these documents a quite definite meaning. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal thinks there is no -objection to the course that is being taken. You have had the -opportunity already of putting this document to the witness. You will -have a further opportunity of putting it to him again in re-examination. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that there was fresh pressure put on you to -take this course, that is, to fire on the crews of sunken vessels and -that in September, was there not? - -DÖNITZ: No, that is not correct. I only learned of this document of the -naval war here; I was not under pressure, therefore; but it is true -that, in accordance with this document, the Naval Operations Staff had -apparently had orders from the OKW to compile a list of all such cases -and that the Naval Operations Staff very correctly took the point of -view that one would have to be very careful in judging these cases and -that it advised against reprisal measures. It appears to me that the -compilation of this document served to convince us that in principle one -should keep away from these reprisal measures. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that on the instructions of Hitler -the OKW had put through an inquiry to the naval war command on this -point in September? - -DÖNITZ: No, I did not know that. I just said I do not know about this -entry in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff and the appendix -which is attached to it. I first heard of it here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You first heard of it here? - -DÖNITZ: I did not know about the entry in the War Diary of the Naval -Operations Staff. That was done in Berlin, and I was Commander of the -Submarine Fleet in France at the time. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you tell the Tribunal that you did not -know about it in September, then we will pass on to another document. -That is what you say, that you did not know about it in September 1942? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you—I do not want to -take you through the _Laconia_ in any detail, but I want you just to -tell me about one, I think, one or two entries. I think it is Page 40 of -your own document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that not on Page 41? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] It is Page 41, at the bottom. It is on 20 -September, 1320 hours. That is your wireless message to the U-boat -_Schacht_. Do you see that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, and I explained that in great detail yesterday. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to know: Is it true what is stated -in your wireless message that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian -allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that -true? - -DÖNITZ: That is correct, because the vessel had reported to me that it -had four boats in tow—and it says on Page 40, “...with British in tow.” -It was clear, considering the whole situation, that a submarine with -vessels in tow could not remain on the surface without the greatest -danger to itself. Hence on Page 40 under heading 2 the order and the -instructions given, “Boats with British and Poles to be cast adrift.” I -wanted to get rid of the boats. That was the only reason. And it was -only afterwards—Page 41—when a long radio message came from him, which -in itself was a repetition but which was interpreted to mean that after -the two air attacks had taken place he had again endangered his boat by -stopping and picking up men, only then did he receive this wireless -message, after it had gradually dawned on me—during the first four -days, or perhaps three days, I had nothing against rescuing the -British—that the Italians, who after all were our allies, were getting -the worst of it, which indeed proved to be the case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given a long explanation. Now, is that -wireless message true, that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian -allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that -true or not true? - -DÖNITZ: Of course; this wireless message contained both instructions and -it becomes unequivocally clear from these two instructions as well as -from the impression I had that the British who were rescued far -outnumbered the Italians, who were left to drown. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is one point I want you to make a -little clearer. When you were interrogated about this matter, you said -that you were under great pressure at the time; and, I think, that the -pressure came to you from Hitler only through Captain Fricke. Is that -right? - -DÖNITZ: No, “only” is not correct. It was “also.” The pressure, as I -have very clearly explained here, was due to worry and anxiety regarding -the fate of my submarines, because I knew that they were now being -greatly jeopardized. We had evidence of that already from the bombing -attacks; secondly, of course, from the Führer’s orders which Fricke -gave. But I have also stated here that in spite of that order, even if -it was not militarily correct to act in this way, I continued rescuing. -However, the pressure, my worry and anxiety, were mostly caused by the -fate of the submarines themselves. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that at this time you had had the report to -the Führer on 14 May; you had then had the _Laconia_ incident, and -during that incident you had had the pressure from the Führer. Now, was -it not because of this... - -DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Allow me to ask my question. - -DÖNITZ: I think there is an error that has crept in here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, I will correct it. You had had the -report to the Führer on 14 May. You have told me that. There was then -the _Laconia_... - -DÖNITZ: That has nothing to do with the Führer’s order in the case of -the _Laconia_. In the case of the _Laconia_ the Führer had given orders, -and quite rightly, that no boats should be endangered by the rescue. -That is something quite different from the subject of 14 May. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am trying to assemble for the moment what -matters you had to deal with. You had had the 14th of May, the _Laconia_ -incident, and then an order to stop, coming through from the Führer. - -DÖNITZ: No, in the case of the _Laconia_ incident I never thought at all -of the order or of the discussion of 14 May with the Führer, and I could -not, because that was an entirely different subject. This is quite -another matter, here it was purely a matter of rescue. There is no -connection whatsoever between the two. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will see about that. Turn to Page 36 in the -British document book, or Pages 71 to 75 in the German document book. - -Now, you have told us that what mainly concerned you was the safety of -your own boats and of your own personnel. - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you put into the order, “The elementary -demands of warfare for the destruction of ships and crews are contrary -to rescuing”? What was the point of putting these words in, unless you -meant to encourage people to destroy enemy ships and crews? - -DÖNITZ: I explained that in great detail yesterday. I preached during -all these years: You must not rescue when your own safety is in danger. -In the case of the _Laconia_ I myself in my anxiety and worry wirelessed -that to the troops many times. Apart from that, I found again and again -that submarine commanders were taking the danger from the air too -lightly. I also showed how that is to be explained psychologically. I -described yesterday the overwhelming increase of the air force, and -consequently in no circumstances would I have again given my people as a -reason that, if there is danger from the air, or since you are being -endangered from the air, _et cetera_, you must not rescue, or rescuing -would be contrary to the elementary demands of warfare; because I did -not want to leave it to my commanders to discuss whether there was -danger from the air or not. After all my experience of the losses -suffered and in view of the ever-present air force, which as history has -shown was becoming stronger and stronger, I had to give a clear-cut -order to the commanders based on that experience: “You cannot go on like -that, or while we rescue the enemy we shall be attacked and killed by -the enemy.” Therefore this reasoning must not enter into it. I did not -wish to give the commanders another opportunity of deliberating or -discussing. I told you already yesterday that I could have added, “If -now, in view of the danger from the air, we are killed by that self-same -enemy while rescuing him, then rescue is contrary to the elementary -demands of warfare.” I did not want to do that, because I did not want -any more discussion. We all had the impression that this refrain, “Do -not rescue if there is danger from the air,” was outworn, because this -would have meant that the commanders would nevertheless lose their -liberty of action, and might slip into this thing. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if you had simply said, “You are forbidden -to rescue,” and if you had wanted to give a reason, “You are forbidden -to rescue because in view of the Allied air cover it is a matter of too -great danger for the safety of yourself and your boat ever to rescue at -all,” that would have been quite clear. Why did you not put it that way? - -DÖNITZ: No, that is just what I could not do. I have just said so, -because some commander in some naval theater might get the idea that -there was no danger from the air, and the next moment the plane would -appear and he would be struck down. I have already said all that in -reply to your suggestion. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had two experienced staff officers with -you at the time that you got this order out—Captains Godt and Hessler, -had you not? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that is right. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler -advised you strongly against the issue of this order, did they not? - -DÖNITZ: As far as I can remember, they said something like this, “The -bulk of the submarines”—I have said that here—“the bulk of the -U-boats, that is, more than 90 percent of the U-boats, are already -fighting the convoys, so that such an order is out of the question for -them.” - -That was the question: Should we issue such a general order at all, and -would not the further developments which forced us all the time to issue -new orders, namely, “Remain on the surface as little as possible,” make -such an order superfluous? However, since I was responsible for warding -off every possible danger to a submarine, I had to give this order and -my staff agreed with me perfectly as far as this measure was concerned. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not say when you were interrogated on 22 -October and on other occasions: “Godt and Hessler told me, ‘Do not send -this wireless message—you see, one day there may be a wrong impression -about it; there may be a misinterpretation of that.’” Did you not say -that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I said that, and it is true too that such a remark may have -been made. But it was not misinterpreted by the U-boats; nobody thought -of that or we would not have issued the order. But we were thinking of -the effects on the outside world. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And was not the effect that you wanted to -produce: That you would have an order which could be argued was merely a -prohibition of rescue, and would encourage the submarine commanders who -felt that way to annihilate the survivors of the crews? - -DÖNITZ: No, that is absolutely wrong, and it is also proved by the -documents which we have submitted. - -Apart from the Möhle case, nobody misunderstood this order and when we -compiled the order we were aware of that fact. That becomes clear from -the communications which we had with U-boat commanders, and it becomes -clear from my searching inquiries when I asked whether they had in any -way thought of that. The order does not show that at all, neither does -the reason which led to it. The fact is that we were rescuing for all we -were worth. The question was, “to rescue or not to rescue,” and nothing -else. That is the key to the _Laconia_ case. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said that “we issued the order.” Do you -remember saying this in an interrogation on 6 October: “I am completely -and personally responsible for it, because Captains Godt and Hessler -both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or -likely to be misinterpreted.” - -Do you remember saying that, “I am completely and personally -responsible” because both your staff officers had pointed out that it -was ambiguous? Did you say that? - -DÖNITZ: I do not think so. I cannot think I said it that way. I am not -sure, but I will say the following: - -During the interrogation I was told that Captains Godt and Hessler made -this order, and in reply to that I said, “It is quite immaterial, I am -responsible for the order.” Moreover, the main point of discussion on -that order was whether one ought to issue such an order. That it should -ever have entered Captain Godt’s or Captain Hessler’s mind that such an -order could be misunderstood by us—by the U-boats—is completely -erroneous. I emphatically stated that, too, during the interrogation. I -clearly stated that this consideration and the discussion of the -question whether the order was to be issued or not had nothing whatever -to do with it as far as these two gentlemen were concerned. That is -quite clear; and that also was contained in the interrogation. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were making clear that it was the first -occasion. I made it clear that you were not blaming your junior officer -who had advised you against this, and you were taking the responsibility -on this occasion yourself. That is true, these junior officers advised -you against it? In your own words, they both expressly stated that they -considered the telegram ambiguous and liable to be misinterpreted; that -is right, is it not, they did say that? - -DÖNITZ: I did not see the discussion after it was put down, and I did -not sign it. I can tell you quite clearly—and this is clear from -another discussion—that I said that I myself will assume full -responsibility. For me that was the essential thing. The only reason why -the whole question came up was because the interrogating officer told me -these officers had drafted the order, and then, as I recall it, the idea -was that on no account should these officers be held responsible for my -order. That was the point of the matter. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate, you are not changing what you -said a few minutes ago that both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler -advised you against issuing this order, are you? - -DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, at first both advised against it. -I have now heard that both are saying they did not advise against it, -but that perhaps I or somebody else might have advised against it. I do -not know for certain. I recollect that at first both advised me against -issuing such an order at a time when 90 percent of our submarines were -already engaged in fighting convoys and when we were being forced under -the water anyway and it was absolutely impossible to make any more -rescues since we were below the surface; and I said, “No; there will -surely still be cases where such a thing can happen and where the -commander will be faced with an awkward situation and in that case I -want to relieve him of such a decision.” That was the reason and the -meaning of the discussion, nothing else. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will continue. That is the first part of the -order. Now take Paragraph 2, “Orders for bringing in captains and chief -engineers still apply.” Now, Defendant, you know perfectly well that in -order to find the captain or chief engineer, the U-boat has got to go -around the lifeboats or wreckage and make inquiries, “Where is the -captain?” And you know very well that the usual practice of the British -merchant navy was to try and hide the captain and prevent them finding -out who he was. Is that not the practical position that had to be met, -that you had to go around the lifeboats asking for the captain if you -wanted to bring him in? Is that not so? - -DÖNITZ: Not exactly, no. I stated quite clearly yesterday that, first, -the risk of taking aboard one man was much less as far as time was -concerned, and would not limit the crashdiving ability of the boat, -whereas rescuing activities would limit severely the crashdiving -ability. Secondly, that that had a military aim ordered by the Naval -Operations Staff for which, as is always the case in war, a certain risk -would have to be taken; and, thirdly, that the significance of that -paragraph appeared to all of us to be unimportant, the results being -always poor. This order, if you want to construe it like this and take -it out of its context, militates against your contention that I wanted -to destroy these people; because I wanted to take prisoners, and if I -intended to kill somebody first, then I certainly could not have taken -him prisoner. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting it to you that the second part of -the order is that you are to bring in captains and chief engineers to -find out what you can from them. - -Look at the third paragraph: “Rescue ship crews only if their statements -will be of importance for U-boats,” that is, of importance for you to -learn from them the position of Allied ships or the measures the Allies -are taking against submarines. That is the point against two and three, -is it not? You are only to take prisoners if you can find out some -useful thing from them? - -DÖNITZ: I think it is taken for granted that we should try to get as -much information as possible, and since I cannot take the whole crew as -prisoners on a U-boat, I have to confine myself to the most important -persons. Therefore I remove these people from further engagement, -whereas the others may engage again. Of course, in view of the limited -room on a U-boat, I do not take unimportant people but the important -ones. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not want to take up a lot of time, but I -want you to tell me this: Did I understand your explanation of the word -“again” in the War Diary to be that you had drawn the attention of -certain submarine commanders to your telegrams during the _Laconia_ -incident, is that your explanation? - -DÖNITZ: No, it did not refer to U-boat commanders; and I believe the -word “again,” as my staff says, referred to those four wireless messages -which we have read as meaning this during the last few days and which -were submitted to the Tribunal yesterday. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you a moment ago a question and you -said the “again” refers to the messages you sent out during the -_Laconia_ incident. I think you agree with that, do you not? Do not be -afraid to agree with what I say. When was that? - -DÖNITZ: Yesterday it was explained to me that there were four wireless -messages, and I assumed that the person was summarizing the whole event, -and that was probably his way of putting it. He was a chief petty -officer and I do not know what he meant when he used the word “again.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you say you had never heard of the Hitler -and Oshima conversations which I put to you a few moments ago? - -DÖNITZ: No. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Therefore, one may assume, may one not, that -Lieutenant Heisig, who gave evidence, had not heard of the Hitler and -Oshima conversations either; do you not think he could not have heard -about it? - -DÖNITZ: I assume it was out of the question. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you notice that Heisig said in his evidence -that during a lecture he heard you put forward the same argument as -Hitler put forward in his conversations with Oshima? - -DÖNITZ: First of all I want to state that Heisig here in this witness -box said something different from what he said during his interrogation. -During cross-examination he has admitted here that I have not said -anything about fighting against shipwrecked personnel; secondly, -everything else he said is so vague that I do not attach much value to -its credibility; thirdly, he stated quite clearly that I did not say -this in a lecture but during a discussion, which is in itself of no -importance; and fourthly, it may well be that the subject of America’s -new construction program and the manning of the new ships by trained -crews was discussed. It was possible during that discussion. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now say you agree you never opened any -discussion having reference to the American shipbuilding program and the -difficulty of finding crews? Do you agree with Heisig on that? - -DÖNITZ: The German press was full of that. Everybody read and knew about -the shipbuilding program. Pictures were made... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the argument I am suggesting to you, you -know, was that the building program would be useless if you could -destroy or frighten off sufficient merchant navy crews. That is the -point in Hitler’s conversation, and that Heisig said you said. Did you -say that? - -DÖNITZ: I have always taken the view that losses of crews would make -replacement difficult, and this is stated in my war diary together with -similar ideas, and perhaps I said something of the kind to my -midshipmen. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Page 37 of the Prosecution -document book, Page 76 in the German translation? It is an order dated 7 -October 1943 (Document Number D-663, Exhibit Number GB-200). I just want -you to look at the last sentence: “In view of the desired destruction of -ships’ crews, their sinking is of great value.” - -DÖNITZ: I have read it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “In view of the desired destruction of ships’ -crews, their sinking is of great value,” and it is continually pressing, -the need for ships’ crews. - -DÖNITZ: Yes, of course, but in the course of fighting. It is perfectly -clear that these rescue ships were heavily armed. They had aircraft and -could be sunk just like other convoy ships. If there were steamer crews -on hand it was naturally our desire to sink them since we were justified -in sinking such crews. Moreover they were used as U-boat traps near the -steamers. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the question of the rightness or wrongness of -sinking rescue ships, the destruction of ships’ crews, now, I want to -ask you one or two questions about Möhle. He commanded the U-boat -Flotilla from 1942 until the end of the war. That is nearly three years; -and as he told us, he has a number of decorations for gallant service. -Are you telling the Tribunal that Commander Möhle went on briefing -submarine commanders on a completely mistaken basis for three years -without any of your staff or yourself discovering this? You saw every -U-boat commander when he came back. - -DÖNITZ: I am sorry that Korvettenkapitän Möhle, being the only one who -said he had doubts in connection with this order, as he declared here, -did not report this right away. I could not know that he had these -doubts. He had every opportunity of clearing up these doubts and I did -not know, and nobody on my staff had any idea, that he had these -thoughts. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I have a letter here, a letter from a widow -of one of your submarine commanders. I cannot get the commander and this -is a letter from his widow. I want you to say what you think of a -passage in it. - -She says—in the second paragraph—“Captain Möhle says he has not found -one U-boat commander who objected to the order to fire at helpless -seamen who were in distress in the water.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I object to the use of this letter. I think -this is the sort of letter which cannot be used as an exhibit. It is not -sworn, and it is a typical example of the kind of letter which Mr. -Justice Jackson has already repeatedly characterized. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The only point I make is this: The man himself -has not come back. His widow can give information as to how he -understood his orders before he went out. I should have submitted it -with probative value. I think it occurs in Article 19. I will not use it -if there is the slightest doubt about it before the Tribunal. - -DÖNITZ: It is full of incorrect statements, too. It says there that he, -Prien, died in a concentration camp, which is not true. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute. - -DÖNITZ: It is not true. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have only just finished -reading the whole letter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is considering the matter at the -moment. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I state one argument in this connection -first? - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have heard your argument and we are considering -the matter. - -The Tribunal thinks that it is undesirable and that this document should -not be used. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As Your Lordship pleases. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Now I want to deal just for one moment -with a passage in your own document book which Dr. Kranzbühler put to -you yesterday. It is Volume II, Page 92, Exhibit 42. Before I ask you a -question about it, there is one point that I would like you to help me -on. In your interrogation you said that on 22 October that about two -months after that order of 17 September you issued orders forbidding -U-boats to surface at all. Is that right? You gave orders forbidding -U-boats to surface, is that right? - -DÖNITZ: So far as it is possible for a submarine not to do so at all. We -were always making changes, day and night, and it depended upon the -degree of danger and weather conditions whether we gave orders for the -U-boats to surface and recharge when on the move. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were not to surface after attacks, were not -to surface at all before or after attacks; is that not the effect of -your order? - -DÖNITZ: Of course submarines, for example at night, had to be on the -surface for attacks, but the main thing was to avoid every risk when on -the move. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then two months later there was an order that -they were to surface as little as possible, and you tell me it was your -order? - -DÖNITZ: As far as possible they were to try by all means to avoid danger -from the air. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you give orders as to surfacing? - -DÖNITZ: I gave them quite a number of orders, as I have already said, -according to the weather, according to what part of the sea they were -in, and whether it was day or night. The orders were different according -to these factors, because the danger depended on these elements and -varied accordingly. There were changes too; if we had bad experiences, -if we found that night was more dangerous than day, then we surfaced -during the day. We had the impression that in the end it was better to -surface during the day, because then one could at least locate -beforehand the aircraft attacking by direction-finding, so we changed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is a fact that quite soon after this -order the Allied air cover became so heavy that—I quote your own words; -you say, “Two months later submarines were no longer in a position to -surface.” That is, as I understood it, surfacing became very difficult -in view of the heavy nature of Allied air attacks, is that right? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, they did not have a chance to come to the surface in -certain waters without being attacked immediately. That is just the -point. The submarines were however in readiness, in the highest degree -of readiness—and that is the big difference, for in rescue work -readiness is disrupted; yet these heavy losses and difficulties occurred -at the height of readiness. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to look at Page 93. It is the -page after the one I referred you to in Volume II of your document book; -do you see Paragraph 1? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - - SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The percentage of merchant vessels sunk - out of convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 percent; in the entire - year of 1942 to barely 30 percent; in the last quarter of 1942 - to 57 percent; in January 1943, to about 65 percent; in February - to about 70 percent; and in March to 80 percent.” - -Your worst period was the first three quarters of 1942, is that not so? -That appears from your own figures. - -DÖNITZ: Which “worst period”? What do you mean? I do not understand. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is Page 93, Paragraph 1. - -DÖNITZ: Yes, but how do you mean, “worst period”? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the percentage of sunk merchant vessels in -convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 percent. - -DÖNITZ: You mean merchant ships? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I am reading your own war diary, or rather -the naval war staff War Diary. “In the entire year of 1942 to barely 30 -percent...” - -DÖNITZ: From convoys? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Convoys, yes. So that the worst period that you -had was the first three quarters of 1942? - -DÖNITZ: No. In 1942, as I have already said in my description of the -entire situation, a large number of submarines were just outside the -ports, they were off New York, off Trinidad, _et cetera_, so that they -are not mentioned here. In this list only the sinkings carried out by -those packs which were attacking the convoys in the North Atlantic are -mentioned. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But is it not right that these figures mean that -your worst period was the first three quarters of 1942? It must have -been around 30 percent. - -DÖNITZ: No, my most successful period was the year 1942. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how can you call it the most successful -period if for the entire year of 1942 your percentage of sunk merchant -vessels in convoys is only 30 percent, whereas in January and February -and March 1943, it got up to 65, 70, and 80 percent? - -DÖNITZ: Quite right, that is so. Of the merchant ships sunk in 1942, 30 -percent were sunk in the Atlantic, but the total figure was much larger -than, for instance, in 1943, when 65 and 70 percent were sunk; and that -is simply because at that time in 1943 we could no longer remain outside -a port like New York. This indicates percentages of sinkings in the -Atlantic from convoys only. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see what I am putting to you is this, that -in 1942, when your percentage from convoys was low, when you had had -that pressure that I have gone into with you before, there was every -reason for you to issue an unequivocal order which would have the effect -of getting submarine commanders to destroy the crews of the ships. In -1943 your U-boats were not surfacing, your convoy proportions had gone -up, and there was not any reason to make your order more explicit. That -is what I am suggesting to you, Defendant. - -DÖNITZ: I consider that that is quite wrong. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want to... - -DÖNITZ: It was like this. As I already said, from the summer of 1942 -onwards we found that the danger from the air suddenly increased. This -danger from the air was making itself felt in all waters, also in those -waters where submarines were not fighting convoys or were not fighting -just outside the ports. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want you to help me on one other -point. Dr. Kranzbühler put to you yesterday that Kapitänleutnant Eck -said that if he had come back he would not have expected you to have -objected or been angry with him for shooting up the crew of the -_Peleus_. You said you knew that Eck was carrying this order of yours in -his locker when he did shoot up the crew of the _Peleus_? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, but I also know that this order did not have the slightest -effect on his decision but that, as Eck has expressly said, his decision -was to shoot up the wreckage; and he had quite a different aim, namely, -to remove the wreckage because he was afraid for his boat which would -have been smashed to pieces just like other boats in those wakes. He -stated clearly that there was no connection whatsoever in his mind -between the order with reference to the _Laconia_, which he had on board -quite accidentally, and his decision. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you know there are two other cases before -the Tribunal, the _Noreen Mary_ and the _Antonico_, which are on Pages -47 and 52 of the Prosecution’s document book, where witnesses give -specific evidence of the U-boat carrying out attacks on them when they -are in one case on wreckage and in the other case in the lifeboat. Will -you look at the _Noreen Mary_ on Page 47 of the document book? The -testament of the survivor is on Pages 49 and 50. He deals with this -point; he says in the fourth paragraph—Page 85 of the German book... - -DÖNITZ: I have the English document book. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 50 of the English one; I have got the -English document: - - “I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our - lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top - of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge but deliberately - steamed in my direction and when only about 60 to 70 yards away - fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As - their intention was quite obvious I fell into the water and - remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, - after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat.” - -The statement by the Brazilian gentleman you will find on Page 52. Have -you got it? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I have got it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Fifteen lines from the foot, he says, “...the -enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in Number 2 -lifeboat...” - -Assuming—of course one has to assume—that Mr. McAllister and Senhor de -Oliveira Silva are speaking the truth, are you saying that these U-boat -officers were acting on their own? - -DÖNITZ: It is possible that the men might have imagined these -happenings. I want to point out, however, that in a night fight—let us -take the case of the _Antonico_ first—which lasted 20 minutes, it could -very easily have been imagined that these were shots, or that shots -directed against the ship hit a lifeboat. At any rate, if someone makes -a report on a night attack lasting 20 minutes, then it is a subjective -report and everyone who knows how these reports vary, knows how easily a -seaman can make a mistake. If, during such a night fight, the U-boat had -wanted to destroy these people, then it would not have left after 20 -minutes, particularly as the person states that he could not see the -submarine in the darkness. These are certainly all very vague -statements. - -The case of the _Noreen Mary_ is quite similar. A large number of -statements are made in this deposition which certainly are not true; for -instance, that the submarine bore a swastika. Not a single submarine -went to sea painted in any way. If someone is on some wreckage or in a -lifeboat and there are shots nearby, then he very easily feels that he -is being shot at. It was for this very reason that quite a number of -cases of the Anglo-American side have been mentioned by us; not because -we wanted to make an accusation, but because we wanted to show how very -skeptical one has to be regarding these individual reports. - -And the only cases in 5½ years of war, during several thousand attacks, -are the ones brought up here. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, and of course for the 2½ of these years -that the submarine commanders have been shooting up survivors, you are -not likely to get many cases, are you? I just want to ask you one other -point... - -DÖNITZ: Submarine commanders with the exception of the case of Eck have -never shot up shipwrecked persons. There is not a single instance. That -is not true. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what you say. - -DÖNITZ: In no case is that proved. On the contrary, they made the utmost -efforts to rescue. No order to proceed against shipwrecked people has -ever been given the U-boat force, with the exception of the case of Eck, -and for that there was a definite reason. That is a fact. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, tell me this: Did you know that the -log of the _Athenia_ was faked, after she came in? - -DÖNITZ: No, it was not faked, but there was a clear order that the case -of the _Athenia_ should be kept secret for political reasons and, as a -result, the log had to be changed. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You do not like the word “faked.” Well, I -will use the word “changed”; that a page was cut out of the log and a -false page had been put in. Did you know about that? - -DÖNITZ: I cannot tell you that today. It is possible. Probably Captain -Lemp received the order either from me or my staff: “The case is to be -kept secret.” And following that, he or the flotilla took the log, which -went to ten different departments of the Navy, and altered it. What else -could he do? He could not do otherwise. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, was it your order and with your -knowledge that that log was altered from, I suppose, the truth into the -falsity in which it exists today? That is a simple question. Can you -answer it? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. Either it was done by my order or, if it had not been done, -then I would have ordered it, because the political instructions existed -that “it must be kept secret.” The fighting men had no other choice, -therefore, but to alter the log. The U-boat commanders never received -the order to make a false entry, but in the particular case of the -_Athenia_, where it was ordered afterwards that it must be kept secret, -it was not noted in the log. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I have only one other point to deal -with you, and I can deal with it quite shortly. You were a firm adherent -of ideological education for service personnel, were you not? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I have explained my reasons. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want to get this, and then you can -explain your reasons afterwards. You thought it nonsense that a soldier -should have no politics, did you not? If you want to... - -DÖNITZ: Of course. The soldier had nothing to do with politics; but, on -the other hand, he naturally had to stand by his country during the war. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you wanted your commanders to indoctrinate -the Navy with Nazi ideology, did you not? - -DÖNITZ: I wanted the troops’ commanders to tell them that the unity of -the German people as it existed then was a source of strength for our -conduct of the war and that consequently, since we enjoyed the -advantages of this unity, we also should see to it that the unity should -continue, because during the World War we had had very bad experiences -precisely because of that. Any lack of unity among the people would have -necessarily affected the conduct of the war. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at Page 7 in the English document book -(Document Number D-640, Exhibit Number GB-186). I think it puts it -almost exactly as in my question. The last sentence: - - “From the very start the whole of the officers’ corps must be so - indoctrinated that it feels itself coresponsible for the - National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the - exponent of the State. The idle chatter that the officer is - nonpolitical is sheer nonsense.” - -That is your view, is it not? - -DÖNITZ: I said that. But you have also got to read from the beginning, -where it says that our discipline and our fighting strength is miles -above that of 1918 and the reason is because the people as a whole are -behind us, and if that had not been the case then our troops would have -become disintegrated long ago; that is the reason why I said that. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me, how many men were you attempting to -apply this to, or how many men had you got in the Navy on the 15th of -February 1944? I want to see what body you were trying to affect. How -many? A quarter of a million? - -DÖNITZ: 600,000 or 700,000. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you to turn to the next -page, Page 8 in the British document book, which gives your speech on -Heroes’ Day, 12 March 1944. You say this: - - “What would have become of our country today if the Führer had - not united us under National Socialism? Split parties, beset - with the spreading poison of Jewry, and vulnerable to it because - we lacked the defense of our present uncompromising ideology, we - would long since have succumbed under the burden of this war and - delivered ourselves up to the enemy who would have mercilessly - destroyed us.” (Document Number 2878-PS) - -What did you mean by the “spreading poison of Jewry”? - -DÖNITZ: I meant that we were living in a state of unity and that this -unity represented strength and that all elements and all forces... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is not what I asked. I am asking you, -what did you mean by the “spreading poison of Jewry”? It is your phrase, -and you tell us what you meant by it. - -DÖNITZ: I could imagine that it would be very difficult for the -population in the towns to hold out under the stress of heavy bombing -attacks if such an influence was allowed to work, that is what I meant. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, can you tell me again; what do you -mean by the “spreading poison of Jewry?” - -DÖNITZ: It means that it might have had a disintegrating effect on the -people’s power of endurance, and in this life-and-death struggle of our -country I, as a soldier, was especially anxious about this. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what I want to know. You were -the Supreme Commander and indoctrinated 600,000 or 700,000 men. Why were -you conveying to them that Jews were a spreading poison in party -politics? Why was that? What was it that you objected to in Jews that -made you think that they had a bad effect on Germany? - -DÖNITZ: That statement was made during my memorial speech on Heroes’ -Day. It shows that I was of the opinion that the endurance, the power to -endure, of the people, as it was composed, could be better preserved -than if there were Jewish elements in the nation. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This sort of talk, “spreading poison of Jewry,” -produced the attitude in the mind which caused the death of five or six -million Jews in these last few years. Do you say that you knew nothing -about the action and the intention to do away with and exterminate the -Jews? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, of course I say that. I did not know anything at all about -it and if such a statement was made, then that does not furnish evidence -that I had any idea of any murders of Jews. That was in the year 1943. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, what I am putting to you is that you are -joining in the hunt against this unfortunate section of your community -and leading six or seven hundred thousand of the Navy on the same hunt. - -Now, just look at Page 76 of the document book in this last reference to -you... - -DÖNITZ: Nobody among my men thought of using violence against Jews, not -one of them, and nobody can draw that conclusion from that sentence. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at Page 76. This is where -you are dealing with the promotion of under officers and men who have -shown themselves to be personalities in warfare. You first of all say: - - “I want the leaders of units responsible for ratings and the - flotilla commanders and other commanders superior to them to - interest themselves more in the promotion of those petty - officers and men who have shown in special situations in the war - that, thanks to their inner attitude and firmness, their - energetic and inner drive, in short, owing to their personal - qualities, they are capable of taking the right decisions - independently and of carrying them out without wavering in their - aim and with willing acceptance of responsibility. - - “One example: On the auxiliary cruiser _Cormoran_, which was - used as a place of detention in Australia, a warrant officer, - acting as senior camp officer, had all communists who made - themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camps - systematically and unobtrusively done away with. This petty - officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and its - execution; and after his return I shall do everything I can to - promote him, as he has, shown he is fitted to be a leader.” - -Was that your idea of leadership in this National Socialist -indoctrinated Navy; that he should murder political opponents in a way -that would not be found out by the guards? - -DÖNITZ: No, it was not so. It has been reported to me that there was an -informer there who, when new crews were brought in, was smuggled into -the camp and, after listening around, passed information on to the -enemy. The result was that on the strength of that information U-boats -were lost. And it was then that the senior man in the camp, a petty -officer, decided to remove that man as a traitor. That is what was -reported to me and what I shall prove by a witness. In my opinion, and -every nation will recognize that, the man acted like anyone else who -finds himself in an extremely difficult situation and he had to... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you not say that, Defendant? If you had -stated that this man had killed a spy, who by the spreading of -information was dangerous, I would not have put this to you. But what -you say is that it was communists who made themselves noticeable, and -this man had killed them without knowledge of the guard. Why do you put -communists in your order if you mean a spy? - -DÖNITZ: I think this is an order from a Baltic station. I had been told -that it concerned a spy, and it is something that a witness will prove. -If there were reasons—perhaps intelligence reasons—for not divulging -that... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you putting the responsibility for this -order on one of your junior officers? Are you saying it was one of your -junior officers who put the order out like this? It was not what you -meant at all? Is that what you are saying? - -DÖNITZ: I have merely said how the order came about; up to now, I have -not once shirked the responsibility. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination? - -COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lord, the Soviet Prosecution has several questions -to ask the Defendant Dönitz. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Dönitz, your address to the -German people and your order to the Armed Forces in connection with -Hitler’s death were drafted by you on 30 April 1945, is that not so? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In these documents you informed the people that Hitler’s -successor, appointed by Hitler himself, was you. That is correct, is it -not? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Did you ask yourself then for what particular reason -Hitler selected you? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I put that question to myself when I received that -telegram, and came to the conclusion that after the Reich Marshal had -been removed, I was the senior officer of an independent branch of the -Armed Forces, and that that was the reason. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In your address to the Army and to the people, you -demanded the continuation of military operations, and all those who were -opposed to resistance were called traitors and cowards, is that not so? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: A few days afterwards, you gave an order to Keitel to -capitulate unconditionally, is that not right? - -DÖNITZ: Yes. I said quite clearly in the first order that I would fight -in the East until troops and refugees could be rescued from the East and -brought to the West and that I would not fight one moment longer. That -was my intention, and that is also clearly expressed in that order. - -COL. POKROVSKY: By the way, there was not a word about it in this order, -but that is not so important. Do you agree that on 30 April... - -DÖNITZ: I... - -COL. POKROVSKY: First listen to my question and then answer. Do you -agree with the fact that on 30 April also, right on the day when you -published the two documents that we are talking about now, it was -absolutely clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was -absolutely aimless and useless? - -Do you understand my question? Do you agree with that? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I understood the question. May I say the following: I had -to continue fighting in the East in order to rescue the refugees who -were moving to the West. That is certainly very clearly stated. I said -that we would continue to fight in the East only until the hundreds and -thousands of families from the German eastern area could be safely -transferred to the West. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Still you did not answer my question, Dönitz, did you, -even though it was very clearly put. I repeat it once again so that you -can manage to understand it. Do you agree with the fact that already on -30 April it was fully clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany -was absolutely aimless and useless? Answer me “yes” or “no.” - -DÖNITZ: No, that was not clear. From the military point of view the war -was absolutely lost, and there was then only the problem of saving as -many human beings as possible, and therefore we had to continue -resistance in the East. Therefore that resistance in the East had a -purpose. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, I understand you, but will you deny that your -order, which called for a continuation of the war, led to further -bloodshed? - -DÖNITZ: That is extremely small, compared to the one or two millions -which otherwise would have been lost. - -COL. POKROVSKY: One moment, please; will you wait. Do not try and make -any comparisons. First answer and then explain. That is the order that -we have to follow here all the time. First “yes” or “no,” and then an -explanation, please. - -DÖNITZ: Of course, in the fighting in the East during those few days -there might be further losses, but they were necessary in order to save -hundreds of thousands of refugees. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You did not answer my question. I shall repeat it for -the third time. - -THE PRESIDENT: He did answer; he said “yes,” that bloodshed would be -caused. That is an answer to your question. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I would like you to explain exactly the -question of whether you look upon yourself, first and foremost, as a -politician, or do you look upon yourself as a soldier who obeyed direct -orders of his own superiors without any analysis of the political -meaning and content of such orders? - -DÖNITZ: I do not understand that question completely. As head of State, -from 1 May on, I was a political man. - -COL. POKROVSKY: And before that time? - -DÖNITZ: Purely a soldier. - -COL. POKROVSKY: On 8 May 1946, at 1635 hours, in this room you -mentioned, “As a soldier I did not have in mind such political -considerations as might have been in existence.” On 10 May, at 1235 -hours, here, you said, when the question of submarine warfare was taken -up, “All this concerns political aims; but I, as a soldier, was -concerned with military problems.” Is that not so? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, it is quite correct. I said that before 1 May 1945 I was -purely a soldier. As soon as I became the head of State I relinquished -the High Command of the Navy because I became the head of State and -therefore a political personality. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, about 15 minutes ago, addressed -you also and referred to two documents, and in particular to Document -GB-186, D-640; and he cited one sentence from this, one sentence which -grossly contradicts what you said just now. You remember this sentence -“idle chatter”? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I know exactly what you mean. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I want to ask you: How can you reconcile these two -extremely contradictory statements, the statement about “idle chatter,” -about the fact that the officer is not a politician. This statement took -place on 15 February 1944, at the time when you were not the supreme -head of the State. Is that not so? - -DÖNITZ: If a soldier during the war stands firmly behind his nation and -his government, that does not make him a politician; that is said in -that sentence and that was meant by that sentence. - -COL. POKROVSKY: All right. We will be more exact about whether this is -really the fact. Several times, in a very definite manner, you testified -here before the Tribunal that for many years before the war and during -the war you were indoctrinating the Navy in the spirit of pure idealism -and firm respect for the customs and laws of war. Is that so? - -DÖNITZ: Right; yes. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In particular, on 9 May, yesterday, at 1254 hours, you -said, “I educated the submarine fleet in the pure idealism and I -continued such education during the war. It was necessary for me in -order to achieve high fighting morale.” Five minutes later on the same -day, you said, when speaking about the Navy, “I never would have -tolerated that orders were given to these people which would be -contradictory to such morale, and it is out of the question that I -myself could have given such an order.” You acknowledge that those were -your words, or approximately your words, allowing for the possible -inexactness of translation; is that not so? - -DÖNITZ: Of course, that is what I said. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at the document which is -in your possession now, the document presented by your defense counsel -as Dönitz-91. In this document your defense counsel presents an excerpt -from the testimony, the affidavit made by Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. In order -not to waste the Tribunal’s time, I would like you to tell us briefly in -one word, “yes” or “no,” whether Rudolphi is correct in his testimony; -that you always strongly opposed the introduction into the German Armed -Forces of the Hitlerite so-called “People’s Courts.” Did you understand -me? - -DÖNITZ: I was against handing over legal cases from the Navy to other -courts. I said that, if one bears the responsibility for a branch of the -Armed Forces, one also must have court-martial jurisdiction. That is -what it says. - -COL. POKROVSKY: And you are familiar with Rudolphi’s affidavit? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I know it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You remember that on the first page of that excerpt -presented to the Tribunal it says: - - “Early in the summer of 1943, the first threatening attempt to - undermine the nonpolitical jurisdiction of the Armed Forces was - made.” - -Is Rudolphi correct in explaining this question and is it true that you -were against this attempt to introduce special political courts into the -Navy and Armed Forces? Is that correct? - -DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, my resistance began in the summer -1943. It may be that already in the spring the jurisdiction of the -Wehrmacht was threatened. That may be, but I did not learn of it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Do you acknowledge, Dönitz, or not, that these so-called -“People’s Courts” were to deal, as Rudolphi puts it, with anything that -smacked, even remotely, of politics? That is his sentence which you can -find on the first page of Document D-91. - -DÖNITZ: As I have already stated, my point of view was the following: I -wanted to keep my soldiers under my own jurisdiction. I could not judge -proceedings outside the Navy, because I did not know the legal -procedure. My point was that my soldiers should remain with me and be -sentenced by me. - -COL. POKROVSKY: For all kinds of crimes, including political crimes, is -that not so? Did I understand you correctly? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, I meant that; I have stated that I was of the opinion that -they should remain under Navy jurisdiction. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Will you deny, Dönitz, that you were always preaching -and always encouraging in every way the murder of defenseless people -from among the members of the German Armed Forces for purely political -reasons and that you always looked upon such murders as acts of military -valor and heroism? - -DÖNITZ: I do not understand you. I do not know what you mean. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You did not understand my question? - -DÖNITZ: No, I have not understood the meaning of your question at all. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I can repeat it. Perhaps it will be clearer to you. I am -asking you: Will you deny the fact that you preached in favor of the -murder of members of the German Armed Forces, by other members of the -German Armed Forces and purely for political reasons? Now, is the -question clear to you? - -DÖNITZ: How do you come to ask this question? - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not find your question quite clear. - -COL. POKROVSKY: What I have in mind, My Lord, is the Order Number 19 for -the Baltic Fleet, which in part was dealt with by Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe. There is one point of this order which elucidates, with -absolute precision, the motives for publishing and promulgating this -order. One idea is expressed there in a very clear manner—and with your -permission I shall read one paragraph from this document. “One -example”—it says in Order Number 19, last paragraph but one—“On the -auxiliary cruiser _Cormoran_, which was used as a place of detention in -Australia a warrant officer...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Which paragraph? - -COL. POKROVSKY: The last paragraph but one of Document D-650, Page 4 of -the English text. I beg your pardon, Page 4 of the German text, and the -last paragraph on the third page of the English copy. - -THE PRESIDENT: It was read already in cross-examination. - -COL. POKROVSKY: This particular part was not read in the -cross-examination, and it is really very important for the case. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have just heard this very question, this very example, -read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, not half an hour ago. - -COL. POKROVSKY: But Sir David, in reading this example, did not read one -particular sentence which is of great importance to me and which -clarifies Dönitz’ position; and that is the reason why I permitted -myself to come back to this particular passage. It is only one sentence -which interests me. - -THE PRESIDENT: What sentence are you referring to? - -COL. POKROVSKY: The first sentence in the second paragraph from the end. -It is the paragraph which begins, “One example: In a prisoner-of-war -camp...” - -THE PRESIDENT: You are entirely wrong. He read the whole of the -paragraph. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe read the whole of the paragraph. - -COL. POKROVSKY: When, with your permission, I shall read these few -words, then you will convince yourself, Sir, that these particular words -were not read. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have a note in my notebook made at -the time, which shows that the whole of this was read; that the -defendant was cross-examined about the meaning of the word “communist”; -and that he explained it by saying that he was referring to a spy among -the crew who might give away submarine secrets. The whole matter was -gone into fully by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, and the Tribunal does not -wish to hear any more about it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: It is absolutely necessary for me to read two -expressions from this sentence which were not read into the record here, -and I ask your permission to read these two words. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which two words do you say were not read? State the two -words. - -COL. POKROVSKY: “Systematically” and “unobtrusively,” that is, according -to plan. They are not talking about one particular instance, but they -are talking about the whole definite plan, about the system. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that was all read, Colonel Pokrovsky. You must -have missed it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I am not saying that Sir David has omitted that. - -THE PRESIDENT: That was read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and put to the -witness, to the defendant. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps Sir David may have accidentally omitted this, -but it is really very important for me, because Dönitz testified here to -the killing of only one spy; but what is really meant here is that there -was a plan to exterminate all communists, or rather men who were -supposed to be communists, according to the idea of some petty officer. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is exactly what Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe put to the -witness. He said, “How can you say that this refers to a case of spies -or one spy, when it is referring to all communists”? It is exactly the -question he put to him. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps I did not understand quite correctly what our -interpreter translated, but in our translation this was not mentioned. - -Then with your permission I will go to the next question. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you deny, Dönitz, that in this order, -as the one example of high military valor—that military valor which -serves as the basis or the reason for extraordinary promotion of -noncommissioned officers and officers—you used, as one example, the -treacherous and systematic murder of people for political reasons? Do -you deny that this order was correctly understood? - -DÖNITZ: No, that is quite wrong. This order refers to one incident in a -prisoner-of-war camp, and it should be considered in what serious -dilemma the senior member of the camp found himself and that he acted in -a responsible and correct manner by removing in the interests of our -warfare as a traitor that communist who was at the same time a spy. It -would have been easier for him if he had just let things take their -course, which would have harmed the U-boats and caused losses. He knew -that after his return home he would have to account for it. That is the -reason why I gave this order. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you will agree that the incidents, as you -explain them now, are absolutely different from what is written in your -order. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that the Tribunal does not wish -to hear further cross-examination upon this subject. You are now -continuing to do that, and I must draw your attention again clearly to -the ruling of the Tribunal that the Tribunal will not hear further -cross-examination upon this subject. - -COL. POKROVSKY: In the light of this document, I ask you how do you -explain your statements about your alleged objections in principle to -special political courts being introduced into the Navy, that is, the -considerations in principle which were testified to by Dr. Rudolphi? How -do you explain this contradiction? - -DÖNITZ: I did not understand what you said. - -COL. POKROVSKY: You say here that the document does not deal with -political acts, whereas the order is formulated very precisely and Dr. -Rudolphi testified to the fact that you were against introducing -political courts into the Army and the Navy. Obviously there is a -contradiction in terms here, and I would like to have this contradiction -explained. - -DÖNITZ: I do not see any contradiction, because Dr. Rudolphi says that I -was against handing over legal cases to courts outside of the Navy and -because the case of the _Cormoran_ deals with an action by the senior -camp member, far away in a prisoner-of-war camp in a foreign land. He -decided on this action only after grave deliberation, knowing that at -home he would have to answer for it before a military court. He did this -because he considered it necessary, in the interests of the conduct of -the war, to stop the loss of submarines by treason. Those are two -entirely different things. Here we deal with an individual case in the -_Cormoran_ camp. - -COL. POKROVSKY: What you are testifying to now is a repetition of what -you said before; and, as you heard, the Tribunal does not want to listen -to it any more. This is really not an answer to my question. - -DÖNITZ: Yes. In answering your question I cannot say anything but the -truth, and this is what I have done. - -COL. POKROVSKY: Of course our ideas of truth may be altogether -different. I, for instance, look upon this question in an altogether -different manner. This fact... - -DÖNITZ: Will you excuse me. I am under oath here, and you do not want to -accuse me of telling an untruth, do you? - -COL. POKROVSKY: We are not talking about false testimony, but we are -talking about a different approach to the idea of truth. I, for -instance, consider that by this order you revealed yourself as a real... - -DÖNITZ: No, I cannot agree with that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly put the question if you want to put a -question? - -COL. POKROVSKY: I want to ask him one question, My Lord, and I must -explain to him why I am asking this question. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I consider this order a revelation of your -loyalty, your fanatical loyalty, to fascism; and in this connection I -want to ask you whether you consider that it was because of the fact -that you showed yourself to be a fanatical follower of fascism and -fascist ideas that Hitler chose you to be his successor—because you -were known to Hitler as a fanatical follower who was capable of inciting -the Army to any crime in the spirit of the Hitlerite conspirators and -that you would still call these crimes pure idealism. Do you understand -my question? - -DÖNITZ: Well, I can only answer to that that I do not know. I have -already explained to you that the legitimate successor would have been -the Reich Marshal; but through a regrettable misunderstanding a few days -before his appointment, he was no longer in the game, and I was the next -senior officer in command of an independent branch of the Wehrmacht. I -believe that was the determining factor. That fact that the Führer had -confidence in me may also have had something to do with it. - -COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, My Lord, has no more questions -to ask of this defendant. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, do you want to re-examine? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to put a few more questions, -Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the defendant._] Admiral, during the cross-examination by -Sir David you were asked about your knowledge of conditions in -concentration camps; and you wanted to make an additional statement, -which you could not do at the time. What personal connections did you -have with any inmates of concentration camps, or did you have any -connections at all? - -DÖNITZ: I had no connections with anybody who had been sent to a -concentration camp; with the exception of Pastor Niemöller. Pastor -Niemöller was a former comrade of mine from the Navy. When my last son -was killed, he expressed his sympathy; and on that occasion I asked him -how he was. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When was that? - -DÖNITZ: That was in the summer of 1944, and I received the answer that -he was all right. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you write him directly, or how did it -happen? - -DÖNITZ: No. I received this information through a third person. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that the only message you received from -a concentration camp? - -DÖNITZ: The only one I received. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the cross-examination a report by Captain -Assmann was presented about a conference with the Führer in May 1943. -You remember its contents. You are alleged to have said that in view of -the present naval war situation, it was desirable that Germany should -get possession of Spain and Gibraltar. Did you make a positive -suggestion in that direction? One cannot see that from the document. - -DÖNITZ: Of course, when I discussed the situation, I mentioned the -danger of the narrow strip along the Bay of Biscay; and I said that it -would be more favorable to us if we could start our U-boats from a wider -area. At that time nobody even contemplated a move against Spain, either -with the consent of Spain or in the form of an attack. It was quite -obvious that our forces were in no way sufficient for that. On the other -hand, it is quite understandable that, in showing my concern about that -narrow strip, I should say that it would have been better if the area -had been larger. That is what I meant by that statement. I was referring -to U-boat warfare and not to any move against Spain on land. It -certainly would have been impossible for me as a naval officer to make a -suggestion to attack Spain. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In connection with the sinking of the -_Athenia_ it has been hinted that your statement was considered an -excuse; that is, that the commanding officer of the submarine confused -the _Athenia_ with an auxiliary cruiser. Therefore, I should like to put -to you an excerpt from the war diary of the officer commanding in that -action and I want you to confirm that it is really by the same -commanding officer. I shall read from the document of the Prosecution, -Exhibit GB-222, on Page 142 of my document book, Volume III. It is the -war diary of the submarine U-30. The excerpt is dated 11 September 1939, -Page 142 in document book, Volume III. - - “Sighted a blacked-out vessel. Got on its trail. In zigzag - course recognized as merchant ship. Requested to stop by morse - lantern. Steamer signals ‘not understood,’ tries to escape in - the thick squall and sends out SOS ‘chased by submarine’ and - position by radiotelegraphy. - - “Gave ‘stop’ signal by radio and morse lantern. - - “Ran ahead. First 5 shots with machine gun C/30 across the bow. - Steamer does not react. Turns partly, about 90°, directly toward - the boat. Sends ‘still chased.’ Therefore, fire opened from aft - bearing with 8.8 cm. English steamer _Blairlogie_, 4,425 tons. - - “After 18 shots and three hits, steamer stops. Crew boards - boats. Last message by radio, ‘Shelled, taking to boats.’ Fire - immediately ceased when emergency light was shown and steamer - stopped. - - “Went over to lifeboats, gave orders to pull away toward south. - Steamer sunk by torpedo. Afterwards both boat crews supplied - with Steinhäger and cigarettes. 32 men in two boats. Fired red - stars until dawn. Since American steamer, _American Skipper_, - was nearby, we departed. Crew was rescued.” - -Can you confirm, Admiral, that this was an entry by the same commanding -officer who nine days before had torpedoed the _Athenia_? - -DÖNITZ: Yes, that is the same commander of the same operation who -shortly before had committed this error. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the cross-examination it was once more -maintained, and very definitely, that you had sent an order to destroy -to the commanders. I should like to put to you a letter which is signed -by various U-boat commanders. You know the letter and know the -signatures, and I should like to ask you to tell me whether the U-boat -commanders who signed were taken prisoner before September 1942, that -is, before your alleged orders to destroy, or whether they were captured -afterwards. - -I am reading from the document book, Volume II, Page 99, Dönitz-53, -which I submit to the Tribunal. It is addressed to the camp commander of -the prisoner-of-war camp, Camp 18, in the Featherstone Park camp in -England. I received it through the British War Ministry and the General -Secretary of the Court. I read under the date of 18 January 1946, and -the text is as follows: - - “The undersigned commanders, who are now here in this camp and - whose U-boats were active on the front, wish to make the - following statement before you, Sir, and to express the request - that this statement should be forwarded to the International - Military Tribunal in Nürnberg. - - “From the press and radio we learn that Grossadmiral Dönitz is - charged with having issued the order to destroy survivors from - the crews of torpedoed ships and not to take any prisoners. The - undersigned state under oath that neither in writing nor orally - was such an order ever given by Grossadmiral Dönitz. There was - an order that for reasons of security of the boat, because of - increased danger through defense measures of all kinds, we were - not to surface after torpedoing. The reason for that was that - experience had shown that if the boat surfaced for a rescue - action, as was done in the first years of the war, we had to - expect our own destruction. This order could not be - misunderstood. It has never been regarded as an order to - annihilate shipwrecked crews. - - “The undersigned declare that the German Navy has always been - trained by its leaders to respect the written and unwritten laws - and rules of the sea. We have always regarded it as our honor to - obey these laws and to fight chivalrously while at sea.” - -Then come the signatures of 67 German submarine commanders who are at -present prisoners of war in British hands. - -I ask you, Admiral—you know these signatures—were these commanders -captured before September 1942 or after September 1942? - -DÖNITZ: Most of them beyond doubt were made prisoner after September -1942. In order to examine that exactly from both sides, I should like to -see the list again. But most of them beyond doubt were captured after -September 1942. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is enough. I have no further questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to clarify only one point -which came up during the cross-examination. - -Admiral, during the cross-examination you have stated that you were -present at the situation conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945, and you -said... - -DÖNITZ: No, that this date... - -DR. LATERNSER: I made a note of it and you will recognize the conference -at once. During the situation conference of 19 February, Hitler is -alleged to have made the suggestion to leave the Geneva Convention. I -ask you now to tell me: Which high military leaders were present during -that situation conference? - -DÖNITZ: I believe there is a mistake here. I did not hear this question -or suggestion of the Führer from his own lips, but I was told about it -by a naval officer who regularly took part in these situation -conferences. Therefore I do not know for certain whether the date is -correct, and I also do not know who was present when the Führer first -made that statement. In any case, I remember the matter was again -discussed the next day or two days later; and then I believe the Reich -Marshal, and of course Jodl and Field Marshal Keitel, were present. At -any rate, the whole of the Wehrmacht were unanimously against it; and to -my recollection, the Führer, because he saw our objection, did not come -back to this question again. - -DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock. - -[_The defendant left the stand._] - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, after the experience of the -cross-examination of today, I consider it proper to submit my documents -to the Tribunal now, if it pleases the Tribunal, before I call further -witnesses. I believe that I can thereby shorten the questioning of the -witness and that it will be more easily understood. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Kranzbühler. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I first remind the Tribunal that the -Prosecution Exhibits GB-224 and GB-191 contain the same general -accusations against U-boat warfare as are referred to in many of my -following documents. The documents dealing with these general -accusations are in Document Books 3 and 4. - -First, I submit Document Dönitz-54 which contains the German declaration -of adherence to the London Submarine Protocol. I do not need to read it -because it has already been mentioned repeatedly. - -Then, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the German Prize -Ordinance, an excerpt of which can be found on Page 137. I should like -to point out that Article 74 agrees word for word with the regulations -of the London Protocol. - -May I point out at the same time that, as shown on Page 138, this Prize -Ordinance was not signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. That is -a contribution to the question as to whether the Commander-in-Chief of -the Navy was a member of the Reich Government. He had no authority to -sign this ordinance. - -The next document which I submit is Dönitz-55. That is the order of 3 -September 1939, with which the U-boats entered the war. I do not know -whether these documents are so well known to the Tribunal that I need -merely sum them up or whether it is better to read parts of them. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you might mention them together, really, -specifying shortly what they relate to. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. The order of 3 September directs the -boats to pay strict attention to all the rules of naval warfare. It -orders the war to be conducted according to the Prize Ordinance. -Furthermore, it provides for a preparatory order for the intensification -of economic warfare, because of the arming of enemy merchant ships. This -order is on Page 140. Since I shall refer to that later when examining a -witness, I need not read it now. - -I should like to read to the Tribunal from an English document, to show -that the boats were really acting according to these orders. It is -Exhibit Number GB-191. It is in the original on Page 5, Mr. President. -That sentence is not in the English excerpt, and that is why I will read -it in English from the original: - - “Thus the Germans started with the Ordinance which was, at any - rate, a clear, reasonable, and not inhuman document. - - “German submarine commanders, with some exceptions, behaved in - accordance with its provisions during the first months of the - war. Indeed, in one case, a submarine had ordered the crew of a - trawler to take to their boat as the ship was to be sunk. But - when the commander saw the state of the boat, he said: ‘Thirteen - men in that boat! You English are no good, sending a ship to sea - with a boat like that.’ And the skipper was told to re-embark - his crew on the trawler and make for home at full speed, with a - bottle of German gin and the submarine commander’s compliments.” - -That is an English opinion taken out of a document of the Prosecution. - -My next document is Dönitz-56, an excerpt from the War Diary of the -Naval Operations Staff of 9 September 1939, on Page 141. - - “English information office disseminates the news through - Reuters that Germany has opened total U-boat warfare.” - -Then, as Dönitz-57, on Page 143, I should like to submit to the Tribunal -an account of the experiences which the Naval Operations Staff had in -U-boat warfare up to that date. It is an entry of 21 September 1939 in -the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. I read under Figure 2: - - “The commanders of U-boats which have returned report the - following valuable experiences: - - “...(b) English, partly also neutral steamers, sharp zigzags, - partly blacked-out. English steamers, when stopped, immediately - radio SOS with exact position. Thereupon English planes come in - to fight U-boats. - - “(c) English steamers have repeatedly tried to escape. Some - steamers are armed, one steamer returned fire. - - “(d) Up to now no cases of abuse by neutral steamers.” - -The document on Page 144 of the document book is already in evidence. It -is an excerpt from Exhibit GB-222, war diary of the U-boat U-30, of 14 -September. I will only read a few sentences from the beginning: - - “Smoke clouds. Steamer on sharp zigzag course. Easterly course. - Ran towards her. When recognized, turns to counter-course and - signals SOS. - - “English steamer _Fanad Head_, 5200 tons, bound for Belfast. - - “Pursued at full speed. Since steamer does not react to order to - stop, one shot fired across her bows from a distance of 2,000 - meters. Steamer stops. Crew takes to the boats. Boats pulled out - of the danger zone.” - -I summarize the following: It shows how the U-boat, as a result of the -wireless message from the steamer, was attacked by airplanes, what -difficulties it had in getting the prize crew on board again, and how, -in spite of the bombing attacks of the planes, it did not sink the -steamer until two English officers who were still on deck had jumped -overboard and had been rescued by the U-boat. The depth charge pursuit -lasted for ten hours. - -The next document, Dönitz-58, shows that merchant ships acted -aggressively against U-boats; and that also is an excerpt from the War -Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. I read the entry of 24 September: - - “Commander, Submarine Fleet, reports that on 6 September the - English steamer _Manaar_, on being told to stop by _U-38_ after - a warning shot, tried to escape. Steamer sent wireless message - and opened fire from rear gun. Abandoned ship only after four or - five hits, then sank it.” - -Then, another message of 22 September: - - “English reports that, when the English steamer _Akenside_ was - sunk, a German U-boat was rammed by a steam trawler.” - -From the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is copied on -Page 147, I should only like to point out the opinion from the point of -view of the Naval Operations Staff as to radio messages. I read from -Figure 2, two sentences, beginning with the second: - - “In almost every instance English steamers, on sighting U-boats, - have sent out wireless SOS messages and given their positions. - Following these SOS messages from the ship, after a certain time - English airplanes always appeared which makes it clear that with - the English it is a matter of a military measure and organized - procedure. The SOS call together with the giving of the position - may therefore be considered as the giving of military - information, even as resistance.” - -The next document, Dönitz-59, shows the approval of the entry submitted -by the Commander of the Submarine Fleet that ships which used their -wireless when stopped should be sunk. I read the entry of 24 November -1939. It is quite at the bottom, Figure 4: - - “On the basis of the Führer’s approval, the following order is - given to Groups and Commander, Submarine Fleet: - - “4) Armed force should be employed against all merchant vessels - using wireless when ordered to stop. They are subject to seizure - or sinking without exception. Efforts should be made to rescue - the crew.” - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 May 1946, at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED - AND TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY - Saturday, 11 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I continue to submit -documents concerning naval warfare. My next document is printed on Page -149 of Document Book Number 3. It is a declaration of 26 September 1939 -by the British First Lord of the Admiralty concerning the arming of the -British merchant fleet. In this declaration he announces that within a -short time the entire British merchant fleet will be armed. Then he -speaks about the training of the crews, and in conclusion he thanks his -predecessors for the care with which they prepared that work before the -beginning of the war. - -I submit Document Dönitz-60. Dönitz-60 is a large collection of -documents concerning laws of naval warfare. It contains altogether 550 -documents. In accordance with the request of the President, I have given -special numbers to the later documents. - -I come now to some documents which deal with the treatment of ships -which acted suspiciously and were for that reason attacked by U-boats. -The first document of this series is Dönitz-61, Page 150. It is a -warning to neutral shipping against suspicious tactics. That warning was -sent in a note to all neutral missions. At the end it points out that -ships should avoid being mistaken for enemy warships or auxiliary -cruisers, especially during the night. There is a warning against all -suspicious tactics, for instance, changing course, use of wireless on -sighting German naval forces, zig-zagging, blacking-out, not stopping -upon demand, and the acceptance of enemy escort. - -That warning is repeated in Document Dönitz-62, which is on Page 153, a -renewed note of 19 October 1939 to the neutral governments. Document 63 -is an example of how a neutral government, namely the Danish Government, -in accordance with the German notes, warned its merchant shipping -against suspicious conduct. It is found on Page 154. I should like to -remind you again that the first warning was given on 28 September. - -My next Document, Dönitz-64, shows that on 2 October the order was -issued to the submarines to attack blacked-out vessels in certain -operational areas close to the British coast. That order is particularly -significant in view of the cross-examination of yesterday where the -question was put as to whether an order of that kind had been issued at -all, or whether that subject was transmitted to the commanders orally -with instructions to falsify their logs. I read the order of 2 October -1939 on Page 155. - - “Order by the SKL (Naval Operations Staff) to the Front: - - “Inasmuch as it must be assumed that blacked-out vessels - encountered on the English and French coasts are warships or - auxiliary warships, full armed action is authorized against - blacked-out vessels in the following waters.” - -An area around the British coast follows. The excerpt under it is taken -from the War Diary of Commander of Submarines of the same date and shows -the transmission of this order to the submarines. - -The readiness of British merchant shipping to commit aggression against -German submarines is motivated or furthered by the next document which I -am going to show. It is numbered Dönitz-101 and is on Page 156. The old -number was Dönitz-60, Mr. President. It is an announcement by the -British Admiralty, which I will read: - - “The British Admiralty circulated the following warning to the - British merchant marine on 1 October: - - “Within the last few days some German U-boats have been attacked - by British merchant marine vessels. In this connection the - German radio announces that the German U-boats have so far - observed the rules of international law in warning the merchant - marine vessels before attacking them. - - “Now, however, Germany intends to retaliate by considering every - British merchant marine vessel as a warship. While the - first-mentioned fact is absolutely untrue, it may indicate an - immediate change in the policy of German submarine warfare. - - “Be prepared to meet it. Admiralty.” - -On Page 157 there is a second report of the same date. “The British -Admiralty announces that German submarines are pursuing a new strategy. -English boats are called upon to ram every German submarine.” - -The next document, Dönitz-65, contains orders issued as a result of the -armament of, and armed resistance by, merchant vessels. I read the order -of 4 October 1939, which was issued by the SKL to the Front. - - “Immediate attack in any manner available is permitted - submarines against enemy merchant vessels which are obviously - armed or have been proclaimed as such on the basis of conclusive - evidence received by the Naval Operations Staff. As far as - circumstances permit, measures are to be taken to save the crew - after every possibility of danger for the submarine has been - eliminated. Passenger ships not used to transport troops are - still not to be attacked, even if armed.” - -The excerpt below shows the transmission of the order to the submarines. -The experiences gained in the war up to that period are summarized in a -document on Page 159, which is an excerpt from the Prosecution’s Exhibit -GB-196, “Standing War Order 171,” by Commander of Submarines. I should -only like to read from Paragraph 4, the first sentence: - - “Tactics of Enemy Merchant Vessels. The following instructions - have been issued for British shipping...” - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this document? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The document was issued before May 1940. I -shall have to call on a witness to give the correct date, Mr. President; -I assume it was in October 1939: - - “The British Merchant Navy has received the following - instructions: - - “(a) To fight every German submarine with all the means at hand, - to ram it or attack it with depth charges, if equipped to do - so.” - -Further details follow. - -Experiences drawn, from the entire operations of the British Merchant -Service are summarized in the next document in an order. It has been -numbered Dönitz-66, and is on Page 161. I shall read the order, which is -dated 17 October 1939: - - “At 1500 hours the following order was issued to Commander of - Submarines: - - “Submarines are permitted immediate and full use of armed force - against all merchant vessels recognizable with certainty as - being of enemy nationality, as in every case attempts to ram or - other forms of active resistance may be expected. Exceptions to - be made as hitherto in the case of enemy passenger boats.” - -On Page 162 I have reproduced another part of Document Dönitz-62, which -has been submitted already. It is a note to the neutral countries dated -22 October 1939, defining conduct on the part of ships which is, -according to German opinion, incompatible with the peaceful character of -a merchant ship. I read from the long paragraph, the second sentence: - - “According to previous experiences such tactics may be expected - with certainty from English and French boats, particularly when - sailing in convoys: inadmissible use of wireless, sailing - without lights, and in addition armed resistance and aggressive - action.” - -In the next, the German Government warns neutral nations against the use -of enemy ships for this reason. The German orders were issued in -consequence of the experiences gained by our U-boats. - -I have already submitted the next document, Dönitz-67, on Page 163 _et -sequentes_ and I only wish to explain on the basis of a report made by -the British Admiralty, which is on Page 163, that the orders for -merchant shipping were published in the _Handbook for the Defense of -Merchant Ships_ of January 1938—they were issued before the war. - -Now I come to several documents dealing with the treatment of passenger -ships. They have an important bearing on the _Athenia_ case, since the -_Athenia_ was a passenger ship. - -Document Dönitz-68 presents some evidence on the treatment of passenger -ships. First comes an order issued on 4 September 1939, which I should -like to read: - - “On the Führer’s orders, no hostile action is to be taken - against passenger ships for the time being, even when in - convoy.” - -The next excerpt from the same page contains reports on the use of -passenger ships as troop transports. - -I will now read an excerpt from the Directives for the Conduct of the -War against Merchant Shipping, from October to the middle of November -1939, Page 3. As the fullest possible use was made of enemy passenger -boats for the transport of troops, it was no longer possible to justify -their being spared, at least when they were sailing in convoy. The -following order was issued on 29 October: I will read the order, which -is dated 29 October. It is at the bottom of the page: - - “Passenger liners in enemy convoys may be subjected to immediate - unrestricted armed attack by U-boats.” - -The next document, Dönitz-69, on Page 170, is to show that in November -and December the German press issued a warning against the use of armed -passenger ships by publishing lists of these ships. - -The next document is Dönitz-70, on Page 171. It is an order issued on 7 -November 1939 by the SKL to Commander of U-boats. I read the order: - - “U-boats are permitted to attack immediately with all weapons at - their command all passenger ships which can be identified with - certainty as enemy ships and whose armament is detected or is - already known.” - -That was about 6 weeks after permission to attack other armed ships had -been given. - -Dönitz-71 shows that the U-boats were also not permitted to attack -blacked-out passenger ships until as late as 23 February 1940, 5 -months—no, 4 months—after they were given permission to attack other -ships. - -Now I come to the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-224, which is reproduced on -Pages 199 to 203 in Volume IV of my document book. I should like to -emphasize again that the object of this document was to incriminate -Admiral Raeder in particular; and that it was described by the -Prosecution as a cynical denial of international law. I should like to -point out, to begin with, that according to the title it concerns -deliberations by the Naval Operations Staff on the possibilities of -intensifying economic warfare against England. I shall read a few -paragraphs, or give a short account of them, to show that a very -thorough investigation of international law was made. The first -paragraph is headed “War Aims.” - - “The Führer’s proposal to restore a just and honorable peace and - establish a new political order in Central Europe has been - rejected. The enemy powers want war, with Germany’s destruction - as the goal. In the struggle in which Germany is now forced to - defend her existence and rights, Germany must employ her weapons - ruthlessly while fully respecting the rules of soldierly conduct - in warfare.” - -Then there follows a paragraph in which it is stated that the enemy is -also ruthless in carrying out his plans. On the next page, Page 200, -there are a few sentences of basic importance which I should like to -read. I read from the paragraph “Military Requirements” the fourth -sentence: - - “It is still desirable to base military measures on the existing - principle of international law; but military measures recognized - as necessary must be taken if they seem likely to lead to - decisive military successes, even if they are not admitted by - international law. For that reason, the military weapon which - effectively breaks the enemy’s powers of resistance must on - principle be given a legal base, even if new rules of naval - warfare have to be created for the purpose. - - “After weighing political, military, and economic considerations - with regard to the war as a whole, Supreme War Command must - decide on the military procedure and legal rules of warfare to - be applied.” - -Then there are a number of excerpts to show the way in which the Naval -Operations Staff investigated the legal aspect of the situation; that is -to say, the present legal aspect of the situation, the situation which -would arise in the case of a siege of England or a blockade against -England. The end, which is on Page 203, emphasizes the political -character of the final decision. I shall read it: - - “The decision as to the form to be taken by the intensification - of economic warfare and the time fixed for changing over to the - most intensified and therefore final form of naval warfare in - this war is of far-reaching political importance. It can be made - only by the Supreme War Command, which will weigh the military, - political, and economic requirements against each other.” - -I should like to add that this document is dated 15 October 1939. - -At the end of November 1939 the Naval Operations Staff took the -consequent... - -THE PRESIDENT: In our document it is 3 November. You said just now it -was some date in October. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: 15 October, Mr. President. It is a -memorandum dated 15 October, which was submitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought you were dealing with Exhibit GB-224. -That is the one you have been reading just now. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is headed on our Page 199, 3 November 1939. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The 3rd of November is -the date on which the memorandum was distributed to the High Command of -the Armed Forces and to the Foreign Office. I have just been told that -in the English text, above the word “Memorandum,” the date is apparently -not printed. In the original it says, right above the word “Memorandum,” -“Berlin, 15 October 1939.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have already submitted Document Dönitz-73, -on Page 206, in which neutrals are warned against entry into the zone -which corresponds to the American combat zone declared by President -Roosevelt on 4 November. - -The German point of view, that entry into this zone constitutes a danger -to all neutrals by their own action, was also published in the press. -Therefore, I submit Document Dönitz-103 on Page 210. It is an interview -given by Admiral Raeder to a representative of the National Broadcasting -Company, New York, on 4 March 1940. I should like to read a few -sentences from that document. In the second paragraph Admiral Raeder -points out the danger existing for neutral merchant ships if they act in -a warlike manner and are consequently taken for enemy ships. The last -sentence of that paragraph reads: - - “The German standpoint may be concisely expressed by the - formula: Whoever depends on the use of arms must be prepared for - attack by arms.” - -I shall read the two last paragraphs: - - “In discussing the possibility that there might be frequent - differences of opinion, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - mentioned President Roosevelt’s order prohibiting American - shipping in the dangerous zones around England. He said, ‘This - prohibition is the best proof against England’s practice of - forcing neutrals to sail through these zones without being able - to guarantee their security. Germany can only advise all - neutrals to imitate the policy of your President.’ - - “Question: ‘Thus, according to this state of affairs, there is - no protection for neutral shipping in the war-endangered zones?’ - - “Answer: ‘Probably not, so long as England adheres to her - methods....’” - -With the collapse of France, the entire U.S.A. combat zone was declared -a German blockade area. That is shown by the next document, Dönitz-104, -Page 212. I read from the middle of the long paragraph on that page: - - “The entire sea area around England has thus become a theater of - operations. Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being - destroyed not only by mines but also by other combat means....” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, did you call that Exhibit Dönitz-60 -or... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That was originally also one of the -documents from Dönitz-60, Mr. President, to which I have now given a new -number. It is now Dönitz-104. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. - - FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “Every ship sailing this zone runs - the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also by other - combat means. For that reason the German Government issues a - fresh and most urgent warning against sailing in the danger - zone.” - -At the end of the note, the German Government refuses to assume any -responsibility for damage or loss incurred in this area. - -I produce as the next document, on Page 214, with the new Exhibit Number -Dönitz-105, an official German statement made on the occasion of the -announcement of the total blockade of 17 August 1940. I only want to -mention it. - -I now come to several documents dealing with the treatment of neutrals -outside the declared danger zones. As the first document, I submit, on -Page 226, an excerpt of the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-196. It is a -standing war order from the Commander of U-boats which was also issued -before May 1940. I read the first sentences: - - “Not to be sunk are: - - “(a) All ships readily recognized as neutral so long as they do - not (1) move in any enemy convoy, (2) move into a declared - danger zone.” - -The next document, Dönitz-76, Page 227, shows the concern of the Naval -Operations Staff that the neutrals should really be recognizable as -such. I read the first sentences of the entry of 10 January 1942: - - “In view of the further extension of the war, the Naval - Operations Staff has asked the Foreign Office to point out again - to the neutral seafaring nations, with the exception of Sweden, - the necessity of carefully marking their ships in order that - they shall not be mistaken for enemy ships.” - -The next Document, Dönitz-77, on Page 228, is an entry dated 24 June -1942, from the War Diary of the Flag Officer of U-boats: - - “All commanders will again be given detailed instructions as to - their conduct toward neutrals.” - -I have already submitted Dönitz-78—excuse me, it has not been -submitted. Dönitz-78, Page 229, contains examples of the consideration -which the Commander of U-boats showed to neutrals. The entry of 23 -November 1942 shows that a submarine was ordered to leave one area -solely because there was a great deal of neutral traffic in that area. -The second entry of December 1942 specifies that Portuguese naval -tankers had to be treated in accordance with directives, in other words, -allowed to proceed. - -On Page 230 there is a document which I have already mentioned. It -contains an account of court-martial proceedings taken against a -commanding officer who had torpedoed a neutral by mistake. - -The next document, Dönitz-79, on Page 231, is an order decreeing the -manner of treating neutrals which remained in force up to the end of the -war. I do not think I have to read it. It again stresses the necessity -of neutral ships being easily recognizable as such and refers to -shipping agreements which have been made with a number of countries, -such as Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the correct date of it? You said... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: August 1944, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is on the original... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The original date was 1 April 1943. The -order was revised on 1 August 1944 on the basis of the revisions -necessitated by the shipping agreements. - -So far I have dealt with the general principles which have been attacked -by the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-191 and GB-224. Now I should like to -submit several documents on individual points contained in the -Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-191. Mention is made there of a speech by Adolf -Hitler ending with the words: - - “Every ship, with or without escort, which comes within range of - our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed.” - -I now wish to present as Dönitz-80, on Page 232, an excerpt from that -speech. It shows that in that context the Führer’s statement only -applied to ships carrying war materials to England. - -I now come to two examples mentioned in GB-191 as characteristic -examples of illegal German naval warfare. The first is the case of the -Danish steamer _Vendia_. The Prosecution’s document says: - - “On 30 September 1939 the first sinking of a neutral ship by a - submarine took place without a warning signal having been given. - On that occasion some people lost their lives. The ship was the - Danish steamer _Vendia_.” - -With reference to this I am submitting Dönitz-83, on Page 235. That is -the War Log of Submarine U-3, which sank the _Vendia_. I should like to -read parts of it on account of its importance. I begin with the second -sentence: - - “The steamer turns away gradually and increases speed. The boat - comes up only very slowly. Obvious attempt to escape. The - steamer is clearly recognizable as the Danish steamer _Vendia_. - Boat reduces speed and uncovers her machine gun. Several warning - shots are fired across the steamer’s bow. Thereupon the steamer - stops very slowly; nothing more happens for a while. Then some - more shots are fired. The _Vendia_ lies into the wind. - - “For 10 minutes nothing is visible on deck to remove suspicion - of possible intended resistance; at 1124 hours I suddenly see - bow waves and screw movements. The steamer swings sharply round - toward the boat. The officer on watch and the first mate agree - with my view that this is an attempt at ramming. For this reason - I turn in the same angle as the steamer. A torpedo is fired 30 - seconds later; point of aim, bow; point of impact, extreme rear - of stern. The stern is torn off and goes down. The front part - remains afloat. - - “By risking the loss of our own crew and boat (heavy sea and - numerous floating pieces of wreckage) six men of the Danish crew - are rescued, among them the captain and helmsman. No further - survivors can be seen. In the meantime the Danish steamer - _Swawa_ approaches and is stopped. She is requested to send her - papers across in a boat. She is carrying a mixed cargo from - Amsterdam to Copenhagen. The six persons rescued are transferred - to the steamer for repatriation.” - -I read the second to the last sentence on the next page: - - “After the crew of the steamer had been handed over, it was - learned that the engineer artificer of the steamer had told the - stoker Blank that the captain had intended to ram the - submarine.” - -The document on Page 237, an excerpt from the Prosecution’s Exhibit -GB-82, shows that the _Vendia_ case formed the subject of a protest by -the German Government to the Danish Government. - -I shall deal now with the sinking of the _City of Benares_ on 18 -September 1940. In this connection I should like first to read several -sentences from the Prosecution’s document, because in my opinion it is -characteristic of the probative value of the entire Exhibit GB-191. I -read from the British Document Book, Page 23, starting at the passage -where the Prosecution stopped reading. The Tribunal will remember that -the _City of Benares_ had children on board. The Foreign Office report -says here: - - “The captain of the U-boat presumably did not know that there - were children on board the _City of Benares_ when he fired the - torpedoes. Perhaps he did not even know the name of the ship, - although there the evidence suggests strongly that he had been - dogging her for several hours before torpedoing her. He must - have known, however, that this was a large merchant ship, - probably with civilian passengers on board, and certainly with a - crew of merchant seamen. He knew the state of the weather, and - he knew that they were six hundred miles from land and yet he - followed them outside the blockade area and deliberately - abstained from firing his torpedo until after nightfall when the - chances of rescue would be enormously reduced.” - -The next document I submit is Dönitz-84, Page 238, the War Log of U-boat -48, which sank the _City of Benares_. I read the entry of 17 September -1940: - - “Time 1002. Convoy sighted. Course about 240 degrees, speed 7 - nautical miles. Contact maintained, since underwater attack is - no longer possible because of the heavy swell. No escort can be - seen with the convoy.” - -I will summarize the entry of 18 September 1940. - -It describes the firing of a torpedo on a ship belonging to that -convoy—the _City of Benares_. - -A few minutes later, at 0007 hours, the submarine attacked a second ship -in the convoy, the British steamer _Marina_. Both ships sent wireless -messages. Twenty minutes later the submarine again had an artillery -combat with a tanker from the convoy. That is the true story of the -_City of Benares_. - -I reproduce the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-192 again on Page 240. It -concerns the sinking of the _Sheaf Mead_. In this connection I should -like to point out that that ship was heavily armed and that it probably -was no merchant vessel but a submarine trap. The Prosecution’s Exhibit -GB-195, which was dealt with in yesterday’s hearing, contains an order -issued by the Führer in July 1941 concerning attacks on United States -merchant vessels in the blockade zone which had been declared around -England. On the basis of this document, the Prosecution charges Dönitz -with conducting a cynical and opportunistic warfare against neutrals. - -My next document is Donitz-86, Page 243. It shows the efforts which were -made to avoid a conflict with the United States. I read the entry, dated -5 March 1940, from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff: - - “With reference to the conduct of economic warfare, orders are - given to the Naval Forces that U.S. ships are not to be stopped, - seized, or sunk. The reason is the assurance given by the - Commander-in-Chief to the American Naval Attaché, whom he - received on 20 February, that German submarines had orders not - to stop any American ships whatsoever. All possibility of - difficulties arising between the U.S.A. and Germany as a result - of economic warfare are thereby to be eliminated from the - start.” - -This order means, therefore, that prize law measures were renounced. - -The next document, Dönitz-87, Page 244, shows the practical recognition -of the American zone of neutrality. It reads: - - “4 April 1941. The following WIT message is directed to all - ships at sea: - - “American neutrality zone from now on to be observed south of - 20° North only at a distance of 300 nautical miles from the - coast. For reasons of foreign policy, the hitherto existing - limitation will for the time being continue to be observed north - of the above-mentioned line.” - -That means full recognition of the neutral zone. - -The next document, Dönitz-88, shows President Roosevelt’s attitude to -the question of neutrality toward Germany in that war. It is an excerpt -from the speech of 11 September 1941 and is well known: - - “Hitler knows that he must win the mastery of the seas if he - wants to win the mastery of the world. He knows that he must - first tear down the bridge of ships which we are building over - the Atlantic and over which we constantly transport the war - material that will help, in the end, to destroy him and all his - works. He has to destroy our patrols on the sea and in the air.” - -I should like to say a few words about the view also expressed in -Exhibit GB-191, namely, that the crews of enemy merchant ships were -civilians and noncombatants. On Page 254 of the document book I have -reproduced part of Document Dönitz-67, which I have already submitted. -It is an excerpt from the confidential Admiralty Fleet Orders and deals -with gunnery training for the civilian crews of merchant ships. I only -wish to refer to the first page of these orders which say that, as a -general rule, there should be only one navy man at a gun, all the rest -being taken from the crew of the ship. I read from the paragraph headed -“Training,” Section (d): - - “In addition to the gunlayer and the men specially trained for - serving guns, five to seven men more—depending on the size of - the gun—are needed to complete the gun crew and to bring - ammunition from the magazine.” - -This is followed by regulations for training in port and gunnery drill -for the crews. - -The next document, re-numbered Dönitz-106, is a circular decree issued -by the French Minister for the Merchant Marine on 11 November 1939. It -deals with the creation of a special badge for men serving on merchant -ships who are liable for military service. That is on Page 256. I should -like to point out that this decree was signed by the head of the -Military Cabinet, a rear admiral. The character of the order is -demonstrated by the second to the last paragraph: - - “This armband may only be worn in France or in the French - colonies. In no case may men issued the armband wear it in - foreign waters.” - -I come now to several documents dealing with the question of the rescue -of survivors. These documents can be found in Document Books 1 and 2. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, do you not think it would be sufficient -if you were to refer to these documents and give us the numbers without -reading from them? They are all dealing, as you say, with rescue. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I believe I can do this with most of them. -On Page 9 there is reproduced the Hague Convention regarding the -application of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare. Page 10 is -Document Dönitz-8, the order of 4 October 1939 concerning the sinking of -armed merchantmen. It contains the order already read, namely, that -rescues should be effected wherever possible without endangering their -own ship. - -Dönitz-9, Page 12, gives examples of exaggerated rescue measures by -German submarines which even let enemy ships pass without attack while -so engaged. Dönitz-10 deals with the same subject and gives a further -example. - -The collection of statements made by commanding officers in Dönitz-13 -can be found on Pages 19 to 26. I should like to deal with it along with -War Order 154, which is the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-196. These -statements contain numerous examples, taken from all the war years, of -rescue measures on the part of German submarines. One of these -statements is supplemented by photographs—Page 21—which are included -in the original. The facts stated in these statements are confirmed by -Document Dönitz-14, Page 27, where there is a report on rescue measures -in the war diary of a submarine; and at the end we find the sentence: -“Taking British airmen on board is sanctioned.” It is signed by the -Commander of U-boats. - -The next document, Donitz-15, is again an excerpt from the war diary, -giving an example of rescue measures after a battle with a convoy on 21 -October 1941. It is on Page 28. The next two documents concern the -_Laconia_ order. The Tribunal has permitted me to use Standing War -Orders 511 and 513 in cross-examining Möhle. They deal with the capture -of captains, chief engineers, and air crews. I submit them as Dönitz-24 -and 25, and they can be found on Pages 46 and 47. I should like to point -out that both orders explicitly state that capture should only be -effected as far as is possible without endangering the boats. - -Document Dönitz-24 explains that the British Admiralty, on their part, -had issued orders to prevent the capture of British captains by German -submarines. The next excerpt, on Page 48, cites an example showing that -this British order was carried out and that a U-boat searched in vain -among the lifeboats for the captain. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, could you inform the Tribunal what -Paragraph 2 on Page 46 refers to and means? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The paragraph refers to Standing War Order -Number 101, that is, the order specifying which neutral ships can be -sunk. That is, of course, in the blockade area. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would it mean that those officers have to be sunk with -the ship, or what? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, Mr. President. That means that captains -and ships’ officers of neutral ships might be left in the lifeboats and -need not be taken aboard the submarine from the lifeboats. The fact that -it was actually much safer in the lifeboats than on the submarine is -seen from the English order instructing captains to remain in the -lifeboats and hide from the U-boats. - -THE PRESIDENT: What if they do not have lifeboats? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I believe, Mr. President, that that case has -not been ruled on here. I know of no case where a ship did not have -lifeboats, especially in 1943, in which year the order originated. Every -ship was provided not only with lifeboats but also with automatically -inflating rafts. - -Figure 2 refers only to the question of capture of neutral captains. May -I continue, please? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A number of instances showing that captains -were rescued after these orders were issued are quoted in the statements -by commanders reproduced on Pages 22, 25, and 26, under Exhibit Number -Dönitz-13. - -I now come to the case of Submarine _U-386_, which figures very largely -in Korvettenkapitän Möhle’s statement. The Tribunal will remember that -this case was the decisive reason for the way in which Möhle interpreted -the _Laconia_ order. With reference to this case, I submit Exhibit -Number Dönitz-26, the affidavit made by Captain Witt. I should like to -read a few paragraphs from that. - -THE PRESIDENT: What page? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Page 50, Mr. President. - - “In November 1943, in the course of my official duties as a - member of the staff of Commander of U-boats, I had to interview - Lieutenant Albrecht, commander of U-boat _U-386_, on his - experiences during the action which had just terminated. - Albrecht reported to me that in the latitude of Cape Finisterre - he had sighted in daylight a rubber boat with shipwrecked - British airmen in the Bay of Biscay. He did not take any steps - to rescue them because he was on his way to a convoy in process - of formation. He could only reach his position by continuing - without a stop. Besides he was afraid...” - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, is it necessary to go into the details -of each particular case? I mean, they all depend upon their own -particular circumstances. You need not read the documents very -carefully. It is not necessary at this stage of the case. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well, Mr. President, I shall only -report. - -The affidavit states briefly that the commander has been informed that -he should have brought the airmen back. That is, in other words, the -opposite of what Möhle has said in this courtroom. The correctness of -Captain Witt’s statements is confirmed by the next document, Dönitz-27, -which is the U-boat’s war log and contains the comments of the Commander -of U-boats expressing disapproval of the fact that the Englishmen -floating on the raft were not taken aboard. - -The fact that Admiral Dönitz’ attitude toward rescues was not based on -cruelty but on military expediency is shown by Page 53 of the following -document, Dönitz-28. He is considering the rescue of our own personnel -and comes to the conclusion that military considerations may forbid such -a rescue. The following Document Dönitz-29 deals with the statement made -by witness Heisig. It is on Page 54 and the following. It begins with an -affidavit made by the Adjutant, Kapitänleutnant Fuhrmann, who describes -the general ideas on which Admiral Dönitz’ talks were based. At the end -he stresses the fact that he was never, in connection with Admiral -Dönitz’ pronouncements, approached by young officers, who expressed any -doubts as to the treatment of shipwrecked persons. - -On Page 56 there is a statement made by Lieutenant Kress, who was -present at the same lecture as Heisig. He says that neither directly nor -indirectly did Admiral Dönitz order the survivors to be killed. - -That is confirmed by Lieutenant Steinhoff’s statement on Page 59. The -considerations which weighed with the Naval Operations Staff at that -time in the question of fighting the crews are illustrated by the -following document, Donitz-30, which is reproduced on Pages 60 and 61. -Here again, no mention is made of the killing of survivors. It is the -record of a conference with the Führer on 28 September 1942, which was -attended by Admiral Raeder and Admiral Dönitz. - -The Tribunal will remember Exhibit GB-200 which describes rescue ships -as desirable targets. The same document states that they have the -significance of submarine traps. For that reason I have reproduced on -Page 63 Standing War Order Number 173, dated 2 May 1940. That order -States that, in accordance with instructions from the British Admiralty, -U-boat traps are employed in convoys. Document Dönitz-34, on Page 67 of -Document Book 2, shows that the treatment of rescue ships has nothing to -do with the sanctity of hospital ships. It is the last of the Standing -Orders referring to hospital ships and is dated 1 August 1944. It begins -with the words, “Hospital ships must not be sunk.” - -My next document, Dönitz-35, is meant to show that the Naval Operations -Staff actually went beyond the provisions of international law in regard -to the sanctity of hospital ships, for, as the entry of 17 July 1941 -proves, the Soviet Government on its part rejected the hospital ship -agreement, basing its action on violations of international law -committed by Germany on land. According to Article 18 of the hospital -ship agreement, this meant that the agreement was no longer binding on -any of the signatories. - -In Document Dönitz-36, Pages 69 and following, I submit the only known -instance of a U-boat commander’s actually firing on means of rescue. -This is the interrogation of Kapitänleutnant Eck, carried out on 21 -November 1945 by order of this Tribunal. That was 10 days before he was -shot. - -According to the wish of the Tribunal, I shall confine myself to a -summary. - -After sinking the Greek steamer _Peleus_, Eck tried to sink the -lifeboats and wreckage by means of gunfire. The reason he gave was that -he wanted in this way to get rid of the debris and avoid being detected -by enemy aircraft. He states that he had the _Laconia_ order aboard, but -that this order had no influence whatsoever upon his decision. In fact, -he had not even thought of it. He had received his instructions from -Möhle but had heard nothing about the killing of survivors which is -alleged to have been desired; and he knew nothing about the instance of -_U-386_. At the end of his examination, Eck states that he expected his -action to be approved by Admiral Dönitz. A further reference was made in -cross-examination yesterday to the question of whether Admiral Dönitz... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, we will adjourn now for a few -minutes—only for a short time. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal, as you know, was going to -deal with the applications for documents and witnesses, but if you could -finish your documents in a short time, they would like to go on with -that and get them finished, if you can. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I believe that even at my -present speed, I shall need about an hour. I should like to ask you, -therefore, for permission to continue on Monday morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Kranzbühler, if you think it will be as long as -that, of course we must put it off to Monday morning, but the Tribunal -does hope that you would not take anything like so long as that, because -going in detail into these documents does not really help the Tribunal. -They have all got to be gone into again in great detail, both in your -speeches and in further consideration by the Tribunal. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall confine myself to making clear the -connections, Mr. President, but in spite of that, I think it would be -better if I did so on Monday morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, yes. Then the Tribunal will now deal with the -applications. Yes, Sir David. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, the first application -is on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach, who asked for one Hans -Marsalek as a witness for cross-examination. The Prosecution have -already introduced an affidavit from this man, and they have no -objection to him being called for cross-examination. - -My Lord, the second application on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach -is in respect of one Kaufmann. The Defense desires to administer -interrogatories to Kaufmann in lieu of calling Kaufmann, who has already -been allowed as a witness. There is no objection to that. - -My Lord, the next matter is an application by Dr. Seidl on behalf of the -Defendant Hess, and it is a request for five documents relating to the -German-Soviet agreements in August and September 1939. And it is also a -request for the calling of Ambassador Gaus as a witness in connection -with the above. But the position with regard to previous applications is -somewhat lengthy, and without going into details, I tell the Tribunal -that this matter has already been before them on six occasions. I have -the details if the Tribunal would like them. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, because the Tribunal made an order, did they not, -that these documents were to be translated? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: And that they would then be considered by the Tribunal? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. The Tribunal made an order -for them to be translated on 25 March and, My Lord, if I may just remind -Your Lordship of the bare facts, on 28 March Fräulein Blank, the private -secretary of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, was asked about the -agreement. Your Lordship may remember that my friend General Rudenko -objected, but the Tribunal ruled that the questions were admissible, and -the witness said she knew of the existence of the secret pact, but gave -no details. - -Then, on 1 April, in the course of Dr. Seidl’s cross-examination of the -Defendant Von Ribbentrop, the Gaus affidavit was read, and on 3 April, -Dr. Seidl applied for Hilger and Weizsäcker to be called as witnesses on -this point, and on 15 April Dr. Seidl applied for Ambassador Gaus to be -called. - -Now, My Lord, it was discussed before the Tribunal on 17 April, when I -said that in view of the Tribunal’s previous ruling I could not contest -the question of the agreement, but I objected to the witnesses. General -Rudenko, I think, stated that he had submitted written objections, and -the Tribunal said they would consider the matter. The position today -appears to be, taking the five documents, that the affidavit of Dr. Gaus -is already in evidence. My Lord, that is the first affidavit. But the -second affidavit of Dr. Gaus is not in evidence. With regard to the -Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, that is -already in evidence. As to the Secret Supplementary Protocol appended to -the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, the -substance is already in evidence. It was given in the Gaus affidavit. - -Then, My Lord, we have the German-Soviet Frontier and Friendship Pact of -28 September 1939, and the Secret Supplementary Protocol to that pact. -The Prosecution submit that these documents have no relevance to the -defense of the Defendant Hess, and they cannot see any reason for them -being wanted. If necessary, my Soviet colleague can deal further with -the matter, but that is the general position. And we also submit that -the second affidavit of Ambassador Gaus is unnecessary in view of his -previous affidavit, and without stating them again, I refer to and -repeat my objections to witnesses to the discussions preceding the -conclusion of the agreement. It is submitted that this is really an -irrelevant matter, and unnecessary to occupy the time of the Tribunal -regarding it. My Lord, I do not know whether it is convenient... - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal, as I have said, is going to -consider this matter. They have not yet had an opportunity to consider -these documents, but I should like to ask you whether there is any -reason why Ambassador Gaus should be called as a witness. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: None at all, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: He has already stated the substance of these documents, -as has the Defendant Ribbentrop, and if the documents are now produced -and supposing that the Tribunal took the view that they ought to be -admitted, it would be entirely irrelevant to call Gaus as a witness. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In my submission that is so, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Tribunal had better consider these -documents, as they had stated in their order they were going to do when -the documents had been produced. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. - -Now, My Lord, the next application is on behalf of the Defendant Funk, -and he requests permission to read the affidavit of the witness Kallus. -The permission was previously granted to the Defendant Funk to submit an -interrogatory to Kallus, which has been done, and the interrogatory has -already been introduced in evidence. The affidavit now in question has -been received and supplements the interrogatory, and the Prosecution -have no objection. - -The next application is on behalf of the Defendant Streicher, and he -desires to call the witness Gassner as a witness, and he is desired to -speak as to the _Stürmer_ and the size of the circulation and the -profits. The Prosecution submit that it is unnecessary to call a witness -as to the form of the _Stürmer_ after 1933. A representative number of -copies of the newspaper are before the Tribunal and the form of the -newspaper can be seen from them. - -On the second point, both the Defendant Streicher and the witness Hiemer -have given evidence as to the _Stürmer’s_ circulation, and it is -respectfully submitted that the takings of the _Stürmer_ and the use to -which they were put are irrelevant. - -Then, My Lord, the next application, on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel, -is for one Biedermann as a witness, instead of a witness allowed -previously who cannot be found. The Prosecution have no objection to -that, and they have no objection to the documents that are asked for, so -with the approval of the Tribunal I shall not go through them in detail. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we should like to know when you think the most -appropriate time would be to hear the evidence on behalf of those -defendants whose cases have already been presented, whether to hear it -at the end of all the evidence or to hear it earlier? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I should have thought that it was -better to hear it earlier if the Tribunal could put aside a Saturday -morning for it, or something of that kind, before the cases of the -various defendants have gone too far into the background. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that and let you know. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. Now, My Lord, the next -application is in behalf of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, and he asks for -an interrogatory to be submitted to Dr. Stuckart to complement the -testimony of the witness Lammers. The Prosecution have no objection to -such an interrogatory. They reserve the right, or they ask the Tribunal -to let them reserve the right, to put in a cross-interrogatory. The -Defendant Frick asks for Dr. Konrad as a witness on the question of -Church persecution, and the Prosecution suggest that an interrogatory -would be sufficient on this point. I think there is a little confusion -here; I think that what is desired is an affidavit. The original -application says: - - “Contrary to the charge to the effect that the defendant - participated in the persecution of the Churches, an affidavit by - the witness is to establish that Frick strongly defended Church - interests.” - -So the only question is between an affidavit and interrogatory, not -between an oral witness and an interrogatory. Then, if I might leave the -next one, the application on behalf of the Defendant Göring, to my -friend Colonel Pokrovsky, who is going to deal with that. I pass to the -applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank. That is Dr. Seidl’s -application; and if I might just read what is stated in the Secretary -General’s note, it is official information from the ministry of war of -the United States of America, or another ministerial service official of -the Office of Strategic Services. It is stated that such a report is -desired to show that the witness Gisevius had perjured himself on the -witness stand and that they desire to show this to attack his -credibility. It is alleged that the perjuring consists of his denial -under cross-examination that he acted on behalf of foreign powers and -his denial of receiving any favors from any power at war with Germany, -which is supposed to be at variance with his statement that he had -friendly and political relations with the American Secret Service and -with some subsequently published reports. Confirmation of these two -factors, alleged to be at variance with his prior statements, is sought -by requesting official statement; and they ask for United States -Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson, as a witness for the essential points, -in case the Tribunal does not consider an official report admissible or -sufficient or the United States ministry of war refuses the information. - -Now, My Lord, I deal with this matter simply as a question of -jurisprudence on which I submit that the English view is a sound one and -should be followed by this Tribunal. The law of England, as I understand -it, is that when you cross-examine a witness to credit, you are bound by -his answers. There is only one exception to that which, in my -recollection, is contained in a note in Roscoe’s Criminal Evidence, that -when you have cross-examined a witness to credit, you may call a witness -to say that, knowing the general reputation of the witness who has been -cross-examined to credit, on that general reputation, and only on that -general reputation, the witness would not believe him on it. That is the -only exception that I know in English Law. - -THE PRESIDENT: And, of course, if he is cross-examined as to a crime or -a misdemeanor, he may be contradicted. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly; Your Lordship is quite right. I -should have put that as an exception; that if he is cross-examined as to -a specific conviction, then the conviction may be proved. I am very -grateful to Your Lordship. But, My Lord, what is not permissible in -English jurisprudence is that when a witness has been cross-examined to -credit on particular facts other than a conviction by the State, -evidence may be adduced as to these particular facts. I should submit -that the principle which I am sure obtains in all systems of -jurisprudence, _interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium_ must apply -and support that condition. Now, I will put it in English—I am sorry. -“It is in the interest of the community that there should be an end of -the legal proceedings.” - -My Lord, if one did not apply the limit which English jurisprudence has -applied, one would then call evidence to attack the credit of witnesses -for the Prosecution. The Prosecution would then render a rebuttal and -call evidence to attack the credit of each of these witnesses who had -attacked the credit of the Prosecution’s witnesses and there would never -be an end to legal proceedings at all. My Lord, on that point which is a -general point—and I do not mean to be academic; it is a point of -practical importance for preserving some decent limit to legal -proceedings—I would submit that this application should be refused. My -Lord, I think that covers all the points except the question of the -Defendant Göring’s application with which my friend Colonel Pokrovsky -will deal. - -COL. POKROVSKY: The Defendant Göring is applying, My Lord, for the -calling of supplementary witnesses in connection with the Katyn Forest -shootings to clarify the matter from the point of view of the Wehrmacht. -That is to say he intends to prove that German Armed Forces were not in -any way concerned with this Hitler provocation. The Prosecution of the -Soviet Union categorically protests. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we have this matter fully in our mind -as we have already had to consider it; therefore, it is not necessary -for you to deal with it in detail, for I understand that these are new -witnesses who have not before been applied for. - -COL. POKROVSKY: I had in mind the fact that the new witnesses have been -called and I would like to inform the Tribunal of our exact point of -view with regard to the calling of the new witnesses, without going into -detail about the Katyn Forest incident. The Soviet Prosecution, from the -very beginning, considered the Katyn Forest incident as common -knowledge. The Tribunal can see, by the limited space allotted to this -crime in the Indictment and by the fact that we found it possible to -limit ourselves to reading into the record only a few short excerpts -from the report of the Commission, that we consider this episode to be -only an episode. If the question mentioned by Sir David should be -raised, that is, the fact that the Tribunal may have doubts about the -credibility of certain witnesses or certain documents accepted as -evidence—then, once again, we would be forced to present new evidence -in order to discredit the new material again presented by the Defense. - -Thus, if the Tribunal considers it necessary to admit two new witnesses -relative to the Katyn Forest shootings, the Soviet Prosecution will find -itself obliged to call about ten more new witnesses who are experts and -specialists, and to present to the Tribunal new evidence put at our -disposal and which we have recently received—new documents. - -Furthermore, we shall have to return to the question of reading into the -record all of the documents of the Special Commission, excerpts from -which were read before the Tribunal. We think that it will greatly delay -the proceedings, and it will not be a matter of hours but of days. So -far as we are concerned, there is no necessity for doing this, and I -think that this request should be refused, since there is absolutely no -basis or reason for it. That, My Lord, is what I wanted to say in regard -to the Defendant Göring’s application. - -I would also like to add a few words to what Sir David said in regard to -Dr. Seidl’s application. I will not go into all our motives. We -certainly support Sir David fully, and we consider that Dr. Seidl’s -applications should be refused. But I want to report to you that this -morning I signed a document which is being sent to you, Your Honor, and -which contains a full and detailed statement of our motives and -considerations in regard to this question; and this document is -presented to the Tribunal. Therefore, without taking up your time, I -have found another way of informing the Tribunal about our position. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, it is not necessary, I think, to ask counsel for the -Defendant Schirach to address the Tribunal, because there is no -objection to those two applications with reference to the witness -Marsalek and the interrogatory of Kaufmann. - -With reference to the Hess matter, the Tribunal will consider that. They -are going to consider it as they said they would in their previous -order. - -With reference to the Defendant Funk, there is no objection to the -affidavit of Kallus, and so unless counsel for Funk wants to address us -upon it, we need not bother about that. - -With reference to Streicher, there is an objection to Gassner as a -witness, so perhaps the counsel for Streicher had better say anything -that he wishes to say. - -[_There was no response._] - -Well, the Tribunal will consider that, then. - -As to Sauckel there has been no objection. As to Seyss-Inquart, an -interrogatory—there is no objection there. - -As to the Defendant Frick, Sir David suggested an interrogatory. It was -not quite clear whether the application meant that. Is counsel for the -Defendant Frick here or not? - -[_There was no response._] - -Well, we will consider that. And with reference to Göring, the Tribunal -will consider the applications for the Defendant Göring. - -And with reference to Hess and Frank, as to Gisevius’ evidence—Dr. -Seidl, do you wish to say anything about that? - -DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): Mr. President, -the application regarding the obtaining of official information from the -minister of war was made for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence as -to the credibility of the witness Gisevius. Afterwards I made another -application to examine Secretary of War Patterson by means of an -interrogatory dealing with the same subject. On the following day I made -an application to examine the Chief of the O.S.S., General Donovan, also -by means of an interrogatory. I think that this new application is in -the hands of the Tribunal. - -I have made this further application only because the first-named -witness, Patterson, was minister of war for only a comparatively short -period, and because it seemed helpful to have the chief of that -organization himself as an additional witness. As a reason for these -applications, I refer to my written statement of 1 May this year, which -I have also submitted as Appendix 1 of the form. I further refer to -Appendix 2, a report by Associated Press on this incident. I should like -to reply very briefly to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s statement here. - -The Tribunal does not appear to be bound by any particular rules in -dealing with the question of additional witnesses in connection with the -credibility of other witnesses. Neither the Charter of the International -Military Tribunal nor the regulations governing its procedure contain -any definite rules. In my opinion, it is rather left exclusively to the -free judgment of the Tribunal whether such additional evidence referring -to the credibility of a witness should be admitted or not, and in what -circumstances. In German criminal procedure such evidence is admissible -without question. - -However, since the Tribunal in setting up this procedure is not bound by -any rules of procedure, I see no reason why the decision should be based -on any of the customary Anglo-American legal procedure, since the -Charter is not based on either the Anglo-American legal procedure or the -continental European legal procedure. This Tribunal and its rules of -procedure are entirely independent and give complete freedom to the -judgment of the court. - -That is all I wanted to say in that connection. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Dr. Seidl. Do the questions which you wish to -put with reference to the witness Gisevius relate solely to credit? - -DR. SEIDL: In my written application I have already said that as far as -I am concerned, it is not a question of whether in certain circumstances -the witness Gisevius was guilty of an action which from the German legal -standpoint might constitute the crime of treason. I only put that -question in connection with the examination of the credibility of the -witness before the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is what I thought. Now, one other question I wanted -to ask you. Are these pacts or agreements, which you say existed between -the Soviet Republics and Germany—are they published in print? Have all -the documents which you wish to use been typewritten or mimeographed and -circulated to the Tribunal? - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, on 13 November of last year, I gave six copies -of those five documents to the Secretary General, and I also gave a -corresponding number of documents to the Prosecution. All these -documents are typewritten, or, rather, they are mimeographed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -DR. SEIDL: Perhaps I might add one point. On an earlier occasion the -Tribunal admitted as evidence an affidavit made by Ambassador Gaus. This -first affidavit is a statement of the contents of these secret -agreements. It is my opinion... - -THE PRESIDENT: I know that, yes. - -DR. SEIDL: ...that if we have the agreements, we should refer to the -agreements themselves and not merely to a summary. If the Tribunal so -desires, and considers it necessary, then I should be prepared, now or -at some later date, to discuss the relevancy of these agreements. - -I have noted down eight points from which only these agreements appear -relevant as evidence, and perhaps I may point out that these additional -agreements... - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ordered that these documents -should be submitted, and they will then consider them and that is what -they propose to do; so it is not necessary to go into them in detail. We -will consider the matter. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, during the examination of Defendant Funk, a -film was shown here on the screen and an affidavit by a -witness—Puhl—was read—Emil Puhl, the Vice President of the -Reichsbank. At that time, following an application of mine, the Tribunal -decided that this witness, Emil Puhl, should be called here for -examination. Now I should like to ask you to amend your decision in one -respect. I think it would be useful to show to the witness Puhl the film -which you saw on this screen a few days ago, so that he may state -whether in fact the steel vaults of the Reichsbank looked as they were -shown in this film. - -I should like to ask, therefore, Mr. President, that you order this -short film which we were shown twice recently to be shown also to the -witness Puhl before his examination. It is, of course, not necessary -that this should be done during a session of the Tribunal; it can be -done in the presence of the prosecutor and myself, outside this -courtroom. I have various questions to put to the witness Puhl, and for -that it is necessary that he should first see this film. I wanted to -make this application today so that there may be no delay when the -witness Puhl is examined. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the witness Puhl know the vaults in Frankfurt which -were photographed? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: He was a director in Berlin, was he not? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes; but I assume, Mr. President, that the witness Puhl, who -was the managing Vice President, would also know the steel vaults in -Frankfurt. Apart from that, I believe that these vaults in the various -branches of the Reichsbank were all built on the same pattern, and were -also treated in the same way in practice. He will be able, also, to -state whether the method of safekeeping shown in the film was the type -actually used by the Reichsbank in looking after deposits. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution anything to say about this? - -MR. RALPH G. ALBRECHT (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): -If Your Honor please, I think, as it is a document belonging to the -case, we would be very glad to show them to the witness before he is -cross-examined by Dr. Sauter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And perhaps the most convenient way would be, as Dr. -Sauter suggests, that he should be shown the film in some room in this -court; not actually in this room, but in another room. - -MR. ALBRECHT: Yes; we can do so in the presence of the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then you can arrange that between yourself and Dr. -Sauter? - -MR. ALBRECHT: Very well, Sir. - -DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much indeed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, has any time been arranged for the calling of -Puhl? - -DR. SAUTER: No; nothing has been arranged yet. As far as I have heard, -the witness is already here. I do not know when he is to be heard. I -shall leave that entirely to the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: What would be the most convenient time? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Mr. Dalton suggests to me, at the close -of the case of the Defendant Dönitz. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be convenient? Would it not be better to put -it after the Defendant Raeder—I do not know, they are rather connected -cases? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If the Tribunal would prefer that, we could make -it after Raeder. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether Dr. Kranzbühler and Dr. Siemers -would prefer that. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you could arrange that with them. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is to say, we would take Puhl’s evidence as soon as -convenient, either after the evidence on behalf of the Defendant Dönitz -or after the evidence on behalf of the Defendant Raeder, whichever you -prefer. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship prefers, we will do that. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to inform the Tribunal that -my colleague Dr. Stahmer’s applications for the Defendant Göring, which -were made with a view to clarifying the Katyn case, are also of interest -to me with reference to my clients. I gathered from the application made -by the Russian prosecutor that this complex, too, was submitted to -implicate the General Staff and the OKW, although no evidence has been -submitted to suggest that these events took place either by order or -with the approval of the General Staff and the OKW. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does this not, perhaps, interest all the defendants? - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. But I only wish to inform the Tribunal that I am -interested in my colleague Dr. Stahmer’s applications, and that I also -request you to allow them. We have agreed to share the task, and that is -my colleague Dr. Stahmer’s reason for making the application. I wanted -first to inform the Tribunal of that arrangement. - -I should also like to remind the Tribunal that some time ago, when my -colleague Dr. Nelte, acting on behalf of the Defendant Keitel, forfeited -the examination of the witness Halder, I pointed out to the Tribunal -that this action encroached upon my privileges, and that the witness -Halder must be allowed for cross-examination by the Russian Prosecution. -At that time, I was told that the witness Halder would probably appear -for examination, and I have checked it in the record. When I referred to -the point during that session, the Tribunal said that it would announce -its decision in a few days. Although some considerable time has elapsed -since then, no announcement has been made. I merely draw the attention -of the Tribunal to this point. - -THE PRESIDENT: Your witnesses have not been dealt with yet, have they? -You have not applied for your witnesses yet? They have not been -proffered? The matter has not been dealt with? - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President; this is a repetition of the -misunderstanding which arose when I pointed out to you at that time that -the forfeiture of the witness Halder constituted an infringement of my -rights. The situation at the time was that the Russian Prosecution -submitted an affidavit made by General Halder, and when the Defense -objected, which at that time was done in my name too, the Tribunal -decided that the witness Halder would have to appear for examination -here. I have the right to cross-examine him, and therefore this is the -proper time to call that to the attention of the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the convenient time is the question. You will -have the opportunity to cross-examine him. But the question is when. You -want to cross-examine him yourself on behalf of the High Command? - -DR. LATERNSER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that, Dr. Laternser. - -The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 13 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED - AND TWENTY-EIGHTH DAY - Monday, 13 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal I would -like to submit my remaining documents, and then call Admiral Wagner as -my first witness. - -The next document I come to is Dönitz-37. It is an extract from -_Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_ on the _Altmark_ case. I do not -propose to read it. It concerns a report of the captain of the -_Altmark_, which shows how the sailors of the _Altmark_ were shot at -while trying to escape by water and across the ice. There were seven -dead. It can be found, Mr. President, on Page 78 of Volume II; from Page -79 it can be seen that this action on the whole found full recognition -in spite of the casualties which, no doubt were regretted by the -Admiralty too. - -The next document, Dönitz-39, has partly been read by Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe during cross-examination. It can be found on Page 81 and -the following pages. It deals with the question of reprisals following a -report received regarding the shooting of survivors of the German -mine-layer _Ulm_. - -On Page 83 there is a summary regarding the incidents which had been -reported to the Naval Operations Staff at that time and which contained -examples dealing with cases where survivors were shot at by Allied naval -forces. I am not so much interested in these 12 actual examples as in -the attitude adopted by the Naval Operations Staff in transmitting these -examples to the OKW. It is so important that I would like to read the -three sentences. They are on Page 83, at the top. - - “The following accounts deal with incidents which have already - been reported, and in making use of them it must also be - considered that: - - “a) some of these incidents occurred while fighting was still - going on; - - “b) shipwrecked persons swimming about in the water easily think - that shots which missed their real target are directed against - them; - - “c) so far no evidence whatsoever has been found that a written - or oral order for the shooting of shipwrecked persons has been - issued.” - -The idea of reprisals did not only occur to the Command, but it also -occurred to the personnel serving on the ships at the front. - -Now, we come to Document Dönitz-41, which is on Page 87 and deals with a -conversation between Admiral Dönitz and a commander. The conversation -took place in June 1943, and it is dealt with in an affidavit made by -Korvettenkapitän Witt. Following descriptions of attacks made by British -fliers on shipwrecked German submarine crews, the opinion was expressed -by the crews that in reprisal the survivors of enemy ships should also -be shot at. - -The affidavit also says in the third paragraph: - - “The Admiral sharply declined the idea of attacking an enemy - rendered defenseless in combat; it was incompatible with our way - of waging war.” - -In connection with the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-205 I shall submit a -document of my own which deals with the question of terroristic actions. -It is an extract from Exhibit GB-194 of the Prosecution, and it can be -found on Page 91. It deals with the question of whether the crews of -scuttled German ships should be rescued or not. The French press tends -to say they should not, in view of the pressing need of the Allies for -freight space. The same entry contains a report according to which -British warships also had special instructions to prevent further -scuttling of German ships. - -I now shall try to prove that the principle according to which no -commander undertakes rescue actions if he thereby endangers a valuable -ship is justified. For that purpose I refer to Document Dönitz-90, which -is in the Volume IV of the document book, Page 258. It is an affidavit -of Vice Admiral Rogge, retired. He reports that in November 1941 his -auxiliary cruiser was sunk from a great distance by a British cruiser -and that the survivors had taken to the boats. They were towed away by a -German submarine to a German supply ship and this supply ship too, a few -days later, was sunk from a great distance by a British cruiser. Once -again the survivors took to the boats and to floats. The affidavit -closes with the words: - - “At both sinkings no attempt was made, presumably due to danger - involved for the British cruiser, to save even individual crew - members.” - -The principle that a valuable ship must not risk rescue actions to save -even members of its own crew is expressed with classical clarity and -severity in the British Admiralty Orders which I have already submitted -as Dönitz-67. The extract is printed on Page 96. There it says: - - “Aid to ships attacked by submarines: No British ocean-going - merchant ship should aid a ship attacked by U-boats. Small - coastal ships, fishing steamers, and other small ships with - little draught should give all possible aid.” - -The next document I submit is Dönitz-44, which is on Page 97. It is a -questionnaire for Vice Admiral Kreisch who, according to a decision by -the Tribunal, was interrogated in a British camp for prisoners of war. -From January 1942 to January 1944 he was the officer in charge of -submarines in Italy, which means that he was responsible for submarine -warfare in the Mediterranean. According to his statements he knows of no -order or suggestions regarding the killing of survivors. He advised his -commanders that rescue measures must not endanger the task and safety of -their own ships. - -In connection with the question whether Admiral Dönitz was a member of -the Reich Government I should like to ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of the German Armed Forces Law of 1935 which can be found on Page -105 of Volume II of my document books. Paragraph 3 will show that there -was only one Minister for the German Armed Forces and that was the Reich -Minister of War. On the following page in Paragraph 37 it is shown that -this one Minister was assigned the right to issue legislative orders. - -On Page 107 I again have the decree which has been submitted to the -Tribunal as Document 1915-PS, in which, dated 4 February, the post of -the Reich Minister of War is abolished and the tasks of his Ministry are -transferred to the Chief of the OKW. No new Ministry for the Army or the -Navy is established. - -The Prosecution has described Admiral Dönitz as a fanatical follower of -the Nazi Party. The first document to prove this statement is dated 17 -December 1943; it is Exhibit GB-185. Considering the time factor, I -shall refrain from reading a few sentences from it to show that anything -that Admiral Dönitz may have said about political questions was said -from the point of view of the unity and strength of his sailors. May I -ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, which again -appears on Pages 103 and 104 of Volume II. - -I only want to draw your attention to the last paragraph on Page 104. It -deals with the handing over of Navy shipyards to the Ministry of -Armament in the autumn of 1943. It is an important question, important -for the responsibility regarding the use of labor in the shipyards, and -has been touched upon repeatedly in this Court. This sole tendency -toward unity becomes clear from yet another document of the Prosecution -from which I propose to read one sentence. It is Exhibit GB-186. In the -British trial brief it is on Page 7. I shall only read the second and -third sentences: “As officers we have the duty to be guardians of this -unity of our people. Any disunity would also affect our troops.” The -following sentence deals with the same thought at greater length. - -THE PRESIDENT: British trial brief, Page 7? Mine has only five pages. -You mean the document book? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is the British document book; not the -trial brief, but the document book, second and third sentences on Page -7, which I have read, Mr. President. - -The fact that Admiral Dönitz was not a fanatical follower of the Party -but on the contrary fought against a political influence exercised upon -the Armed Forces by the Party is shown in my following document, -Dönitz-91. It is on Page 260 of Document Book 4. It is an affidavit from -the chief of the legal department in the High Command of the Navy, Dr. -Joachim Rudolphi. The Soviet Prosecution has already used this document -during its cross-examination. I should like to give a brief summary of -the contents: - -In the summer of 1943 Reichsleiter Bormann made an attempt through the -Reich Minister of Justice to deprive the Armed Forces courts of their -jurisdiction in so-called political cases. They were to be transferred -to the Peoples’ Court and other courts. The attempt, however, failed. It -failed due to a report which Admiral Dönitz made verbally to the Führer -on this subject and during which he violently opposed the intentions of -the Party. After the assassination attempt on 20 July, Bormann renewed -his attempt. Again Admiral Dönitz raised objections, but this time -without success. A decree was issued on 20 September 1944 which deprived -the Armed Forces courts of their jurisdiction regarding so-called -political perpetrations. This decree, which was signed by Adolf Hitler, -was not carried out in the Navy by explicit order of the -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. - -I shall read the last paragraph but one of the affidavit, which says: - - “This attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy made it - possible for the Navy, as the only branch of the Armed Forces - until the end of the war, not to have to transfer to the - Peoples’ Court or to a special court any criminal procedures of - political coloring.” - -On page 113 in Volume II of my document book I have included a lengthy -extract from Exhibit GB-211, a document of the Prosecution; and this is -an application by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy addressed to the -Führer and asking for supplies for the construction and repair of naval -and merchant ships. During the interrogation and cross-examination of -Admiral Dönitz this document has already been referred to. I should -merely like to point out that this is a memorandum containing more than -20 pages; the Prosecution took up two points contained therein. - -The origin of the document is dealt with in Document Dönitz-46, Page 117 -and the following pages. This is an affidavit from the officer who had -drafted this memorandum. I can summarize the contents. The memorandum is -concerned with measures which did not actually come within the sphere of -the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It arose on the basis of a -discussion which took place between all departments taking part in the -construction and repair of war and merchant vessels. All these measures -are summarized in this memorandum. The point objected to in particular -by the Prosecution as amounting to a suggestion in favor of punitive -measures against sabotage in shipyards is dealt with in detail on Page -119. I should like to point out particularly that at that time seven out -of eight ships under construction were destroyed by sabotage. - -It was not a question of terror measures but of punitive measures -entailing the forfeiting of certain advantages and, if necessary, the -concentration of workers in camps adjoining the shipyards, so as to cut -them off from any sabotage agents. - -Following Exhibit GB-209 of the Prosecution, which deals with the -alleged renunciation of the Geneva Convention, I submit Dönitz-48, which -is on Page 122 and the following pages. It will show the model treatment -afforded Allied prisoners of war in the only prisoner-of-war camp which -was under the jurisdiction of Admiral Dönitz as the Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy. - -To begin with, the document contains an affidavit from two officers who -dealt with prisoner-of-war affairs in the High Command of the Navy. This -statement is to the effect that all the suggestions of the International -Red Cross regarding these camps were followed. - -The next extract is a report by the last commandant of that camp, -Korvettenkapitän Rogge, and I should like to read the second paragraph -from that report: - - “In the camp Westertimke there were housed at my time about - 5,500 to 7,000, at the end 8,000, prisoners of war and internees - of different nations, mainly members of the British Navy. The - camp had a good reputation, as was generally known. It was the - best in Germany. This was expressly stated at a congress of - British and other prisoner-of-war physicians of all German - camps, which took place in Schwanenwerder near Berlin at the - villa of Goebbels about December 1944. This statement was - confirmed by the British chief camp physician in Westertimke, - Major Dr. Harvey, British Royal Army, whom I am naming as a - witness.” - -I shall also read the last paragraph on Page 126: - - “As I was deputy commandant I stayed at the camp up to the - capitulation and gave up the camp in the regular way to British - troops who were quite satisfied with the transfer. Squadron - Leader A. J. Evans gave me a letter confirming this. I enclose a - photostat of this letter.” - -This photostat copy appears on the following page, and it says: - - “Korvettenkapitän W. Rogge was for 10 months chief camp officer - at the Marlag Camp at Westertimke. Without exception all the - prisoners of war in that camp have reported that he treated them - with fairness and consideration.” - -Then follows another affidavit from the intelligence officer in that -camp. I should like to point out that this officer was born in February -1865 and that his age alone would, I think, exclude the use of any -terror measures. I shall read from Page 129, the third from the last -paragraph: - -“No means of pressure were employed at Dulag Nord. If a man told -falsehoods he was sent back to his room and was not interrogated for 2 -or 3 days. I believe I can say that no blow was ever struck at Dulag -Nord.” - -I should now like to refer briefly to the accusation raised against the -defendant according to which he as “a fanatical Nazi” prolonged a -hopeless war. I submit Dönitz-50, which contains statements made by -Admiral Darlan, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr. Churchill in 1940. They will be -found on Pages 132 and 133 of the document book and they will show that -the afore-mentioned persons also considered it expedient in a critical -situation to call upon the nation—partly with success and partly -without—to render the utmost resistance. - -During his examination Admiral Dönitz gave as the reason for his views -that he wanted to save German nationals in the East. As evidence for -this I draw your attention to Exhibit GB-212, which can be found on Page -73 of the British document book. It is a decree of 11 April 1945, and I -shall read two sentences under heading 1: - - “Capitulation means for certain the occupation of the whole of - Germany by the Allies along the lines of partition discussed by - them at Yalta. It also means, therefore, the ceding to Russia of - further considerable parts of Germany west of the river Oder. Or - does anyone think that at that stage the Anglo-Saxons will not - keep to their agreements and will oppose a further advance of - the Russian hordes into Germany with armed forces, and will - begin a war with Russia for our sake? The reasoning, ‘Let the - Anglo-Saxons into the country; then at least the Russians will - not come,’ is faulty, too.” - -I shall also quote from Exhibit GB-188, which is on Page 10 of the -document book of the Prosecution—I beg your pardon, Page 11. It is an -order to the German Armed Forces dated 1 May 1945. I shall quote the -second paragraph: - - “The Führer has designated me to be his successor as head of - State and as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. I am taking - over the Supreme Command of all branches of the German Armed - Forces with the will to carry on the struggle against the - Bolsheviks until the fighting forces and hundreds of thousands - of families of the German eastern areas have been saved from - slavery and destruction.” - -This, Mr. President, is the end of my documentary evidence. - -Two interrogatories are still outstanding. One is that of Kapitän zur -See Rösing and the other of Fregattenkapitän Suhren. Furthermore—and -this is something I particularly regret—the interrogatory from the -Commander-in-Chief of the American Navy, Admiral Nimitz, has still not -been received. I will submit these documents as soon as I have received -them. - -And now, with permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call my -witness, Admiral Wagner. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, while the witness is being called in, I would -like to raise one matter with the Tribunal. On Saturday I understand -that the question of when the witness Puhl would be called was raised -before the Tribunal. And as I understand it from the record, it was left -for counsel to settle the matter as to whether he should be called -before the Raeder case comes on or after the Raeder case. - -I should like to say that we have some reasons for asking that he be -called before the Raeder case, and there are two: First of all, he is -here in the prison under a kind of confinement different from that under -which he has been held by the French in the French territory; and -secondly, the officer, Lieutenant Meltzer, who has been assisting in the -Funk case, is very anxious—for compelling personal reasons—to return -to the United States, and of course he will not be able to do so until -we have concluded the Funk case. And, Mr. President, it will not take -very long in my judgment to hear this witness. He is only here for -cross-examination on his affidavit and we would appreciate it if he -could come on at the conclusion of the Dönitz case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd, he can be brought for -cross-examination after the Dönitz case. - -[_The witness Wagner took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please? - -GERHARD WAGNER (Witness): Gerhard Wagner. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, when did you join the Navy? - -WAGNER: On 4 June 1916. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which positions did you hold in the High -Command of the Navy, and at what time? - -WAGNER: From summer 1933 until the summer of 1935 I was adviser in the -operational department of the High Command. I was Kapitänleutnant and -then Korvettenkapitän. In 1937, from January until September, I had the -same position. From April 1939 until June 1941 I was the head of the -operational group, known as “IA,” in the operations section of the Naval -Operations Staff. From June 1941 until June 1944 I was the chief of the -operations section of the Naval Operations Staff. From June 1944 until -May 1945, I was admiral for special tasks attached to the -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So that during the entire war you were a -member of the Naval Operations Staff? - -WAGNER: Yes, that is so. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the general tasks of the Naval -Operations Staff? - -WAGNER: The tasks of the Naval Operations Staff included all those -involved in naval warfare, both at sea and in the defense of the coasts, -and also in the protection of our own merchant shipping. As far as -territorial tasks were concerned, the Naval Operations Staff did not -have any, neither at home nor in the occupied territories. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Naval Operations Staff part of the -High Command of the Navy, the OKM? - -WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff was part of the High Command of the -Navy. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the relationship between the Naval -Operations Staff and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the OKW? - -WAGNER: The OKW passed on the instructions and orders of Hitler, who was -the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, regarding the conduct of the -war; usually, as far as naval warfare particularly was concerned, after -examination and review by the Naval Operations Staff. General questions -of the conduct of the war were decided without previous consultations -with members of the Naval Operations Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In which manner were the preparations of the -High Command of the Navy for a possible war carried out? - -WAGNER: Generally speaking, they consisted of mobilization preparations, -tactical training, and strategic considerations for the event of a -possible conflict. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff during your -time receive an order to prepare for a definite possibility of war? - -WAGNER: The first instance was the order for “Case White,” the war -against Poland. Before that, only tasks regarding security measures were -given us. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were plans elaborated for the naval war -against England? - -WAGNER: A plan for the war against England did not exist at all before -the beginning of the war. Such a war seemed to us outside the realm of -possibility. Considering the overwhelming superiority of the British -fleet, which can hardly be expressed in proportionate figures, and -considering England’s strategical domination of the seas such a war -appeared to us to be absolutely hopeless. The only means by which -Britain could have been damaged effectively was by submarine warfare; -but even the submarine weapon was by no means being given preferential -treatment nor was its production accelerated. It was merely given its -corresponding place in the creation of a well-balanced homogeneous -fleet. - -At the beginning of the war all we had were 40 submarines ready for -action, of which, as far as I can remember, barely half could have been -used in the Atlantic. That, in comparison with the earth-girdling naval -means at the disposal of the first-ranking world power England, is as -good as nothing. As a comparison, I should like to cite the fact that -both the British and the French Navy at the same time had more than 100 -submarines each. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the then Captain Dönitz, as chief of the -submarines, have anything to do with the planning of the war? - -WAGNER: Captain Dönitz at that time was a subordinate front-line -commander, under the command of the chief of the fleet and he, because -of his warfare experience, had the task of training and tactically -guiding the inexperienced submarine personnel. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he in turn make any suggestions or -instigate any plans for the war? - -WAGNER: No, these preparations and this war planning, in particular for -the “Case White,” were exclusively the task of the Naval Operations -Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Dönitz at any previous time hear about -the military intentions of the Naval Operations Staff? - -WAGNER: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz hear of the military -intentions of the Naval Operations Staff at a time earlier than -necessary for the carrying out of the orders given him? - -WAGNER: No, he heard of it by means of the orders reaching him from the -Naval Operations Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, you know of the London -Agreement of 1936 regarding submarine warfare. Did the Naval Operations -Staff draw any conclusions from that agreement for their preparation for -a war, in particular, for carrying on a possible economic war? - -WAGNER: The Prize Regulations still existing from the last war were -revised and made to conform with the London Agreement. For that purpose -a committee was formed which included representatives from the High -Command of the Navy, the Foreign Office, the Reich Ministry of Justice, -and scientific experts. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these new Prize Regulations made known -to the commandants some time before the war or were they communicated to -them just when they were published shortly before the outbreak of the -war? - -WAGNER: These new Prize Regulations were published in 1938 as an -internal ordinance of the Navy, which was available for the purpose of -training officers. During the autumn maneuvers of the Fleet in 1938 a -number of exercises were arranged for the purpose of acquainting the -officer corps with these new regulations. I, myself, at that time... - -THE PRESIDENT: Where are the new Prize Regulations you are referring to? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am talking about the regulations published -on 26 August 1939, which are contained in my document book. They are on -Page 137, in Volume III of my document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President; the date -is not 26, but 28 August. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness was saying that exercises were carried out? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, in the year 1938. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: [_Turning to the witness._] Which -conceptions did the Naval Operations Staff have after the beginning of -the war regarding the development of the naval war against Britain? - -WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff thought that Great Britain would -probably start in where she had stopped at the end of the first World -War. That meant that there would be a hunger blockade against Germany, a -control of the merchandise of neutral countries, introduction of a -system of control, the arming of merchant ships, and the delimitation of -operational waters. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to have the battle order of 3 -September 1939 shown to you. It is Document Dönitz-55. It can be found -on Page 139, in Volume III of the document book. You will see from this -that submarines, like all naval forces, had orders to adhere to this -Prize Ordinance in the economic warfare. - -Then, at the end, you will find an order which I propose to read to you. -This is on Page 140: - - “Order prepared for intensifying the economic war because of the - arming of enemy merchant ships. - - “1) Arming of, and therefore resistance from, the majority of - English and French merchant ships is to be expected. - - “2) Submarines will stop merchant ships only if own vessel is - not endangered. Attack without warning by submarines is allowed - against plainly recognized enemy merchant ships. - - “3) Battleships and auxiliary cruisers will watch for - possibility of use of arms by merchant ships when stopped.” - -I should like to ask you whether this order was prepared long ago or -whether it was improvised at the last moment? - -WAGNER: At the beginning of the war we were forced to improvise a great -many orders we were issuing, because they were not prepared thoroughly. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did this order become operative at all? - -WAGNER: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why not? - -WAGNER: After consultation with the Foreign Office, we had decided that -we would strictly adhere to the London Agreement until we had clear-cut -evidence of the British merchant navy being used for military purposes. -We remembered from the last war the power which the enemy propaganda -had, and we did not under any circumstances want to give anyone cause -once more to decry us as pirates. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When, at what stage, did the military use of -enemy merchant ships become clear to the Naval Operations Staff? - -WAGNER: The fact that enemy merchant vessels were armed became clear -after a few weeks of the war. We had a large number of reports about -artillery fights which had occurred between U-boats and armed enemy -merchant ships. Certainly one, and probably several boats were lost by -us. One British steamer, I think it was called _Stonepool_, was praised -publicly by the British Admiralty for its success in combating -submarines. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Tribunal already has knowledge of the -order of 4 October allowing attacks against all armed merchant ships of -the enemy and also of the order of 17 October allowing attacks on all -enemy merchant ships with certain exceptions. - -Were these orders the result of experiences which the Naval Operations -Staff had regarding the military use of enemy merchant ships? - -WAGNER: Yes, exclusively. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Both orders contain exceptions favoring -passenger ships. They were not to be attacked even when they were -members of an enemy convoy. To what were these exceptions due? - -WAGNER: They were due to an order from the Führer. At the beginning of -the war he had stated that Germany did not have any intention of waging -war against women and children. He wished, for that reason, that also in -naval war any incidents in which women and children might lose their -lives should be avoided. Consequently, even the stopping of passenger -ships was prohibited. The military necessities of naval warfare made it -very difficult to adhere to this order, particularly where passenger -ships were traveling in enemy convoys. Later on, step by step, this -order was altered as it became evident that there was no longer any -peaceful passenger traffic at all and that enemy passenger ships were -particularly heavily armed and used more and more as auxiliary cruisers -and troop transport ships. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the orders of the German Naval -Operations Staff regarding the combating of armed enemy ships and later -enemy ships as a whole made known to the British Admiralty? - -WAGNER: Neither side made its war measures known during the war, and -that held true in this case also. But in October the German press left -no doubt whatsoever that every armed enemy merchant ship would be sunk -by us without warning, and later on it was equally well known that we -were forced to consider the entire enemy merchant marine as being under -military direction and in military use. - -These statements by our press must no doubt have been known to the -British Admiralty and the neutral governments. Apart from that, and I -think this was in October, Grossadmiral Raeder gave an interview to the -press on the same theme. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff -was issued in the middle of October: “On the Possibilities of -Intensifying the War against Merchant Shipping”; I am going to have this -memorandum shown to you. Its number is GB-224. After looking at this -memorandum please tell me what its purpose was and what the memorandum -contains. - -Mr. President, some extracts can be found on Page 199, in Volume IV of -the document book. - -WAGNER: This memorandum was issued due to the situation that existed -since the beginning of the war. On 3 September 1939 Britain had begun a -total hunger blockade against Germany. Naturally that was not directed -only against the fighting men, but against all nonfighting members, -including women, children, the aged, and the sick. It meant that Britain -would declare all food rations, all luxury goods, all clothing, as well -as all raw materials necessary for these items, as contraband and would -also exercise a strict control of neutral shipping of which Germany -would be deprived insofar as it would have to go through waters -controlled by Great Britain. Apart from that, England exercised a -growing political and economic pressure upon the European neighbors of -Germany to cease all commerce with Germany. - -That intention of the total hunger blockade was emphatically confirmed -by the Head of the British Government, Prime Minister Chamberlain, -during a speech before the House of Commons at the end of September. He -described Germany as a beleaguered fort; and he added that it was not -customary for beleaguered forts to be accorded free rations. That -expression of the beleaguered fort was also taken up by the French -press. - -Furthermore, Prime Minister Chamberlain stated around the beginning of -October—according to this memorandum it was on 12 October—that in this -war Britain would utilize her entire strength for the destruction of -Germany. From this we drew the conclusion, aided by the experiences of -the last World War, that England would soon hit German exports under -some pretext or other. - -With the shadow of the total hunger blockade, which no doubt had been -thoroughly prepared during long years of peace, creeping in upon us we -now had a great deal to do to catch up, since we had not prepared for -war against Great Britain. We examined, both from the legal and military -point of view, the possibilities at our disposal by which we in turn -might cut off Britain’s supplies. That was the aim and purpose of that -memorandum. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are saying, therefore, that this -memorandum contains considerations regarding means for countering the -British measures with correspondingly effective German measures? - -WAGNER: Yes, that was definitely the purpose of that memorandum. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Studying that memorandum you will find a -sentence—C. 1. is the paragraph—according to which the Naval -Operations Staff must remain basically within the limits of -international law, but that decisive war measures would have to be -carried out even if the existing international law could not be applied -to them. - -Did this mean that international law was to be generally disregarded by -the Naval Operations Staff, or what is the meaning of this sentence? - -WAGNER: That question was duly studied by the Naval Operations Staff and -discussed at great length. I should like to point out that on Page 2 of -the memorandum, in the first paragraph, it states that obedience to the -laws of chivalry comes before all else in naval warfare. That, from the -outset, would prevent a barbarous waging of war at sea. We did think, -however, that the modern technical developments would create conditions -for naval warfare which would certainly justify and necessitate further -development of the laws of naval warfare. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which technical developments do you mean? - -WAGNER: I am thinking mainly of two points: First, the large-scale use -of the airplane in naval warfare. As a result of the speed and wide -range of the airplane, militarily guarded zones could be created before -the coasts of all warfaring nations, and in respect to these zones one -could no longer speak of freedom of the seas. Secondly, the introduction -of electrical orientation equipment which made it possible, even at the -beginning of the war, to spot an unseen opponent and to send fighting -forces against him. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It says in this memorandum that decisive war -measures are to be taken even though they create new laws at sea. Did -occasion arise for such measures? - -WAGNER: No; at any rate, not at once. In the meantime, I think on 4 -November, the United States of America declared the so-called American -combat zone, and the specific reason given for it was that in that zone -actual belligerent actions rendered the sea dangerous for American -shipping. By this announcement some of the points of that memorandum -were in immediate need of being revised. As a rule we remained within -the limits of the measures as they had been employed by both parties -during the first World War. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By these measures do you mean the warning -against navigating in certain zones? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: According to some of the exhibits used by -the Prosecution, Numbers GB-194 and 226, submarines were permitted to -attack all ships without warning in certain areas, beginning with -January 1940. The attacks were to be carried out, if possible, unseen, -while maintaining the fiction that the ships struck mines. - -Will you please tell the Tribunal which sea lanes or areas were -concerned in this? I shall have a sea-chart handed to you for that -purpose. I am submitting it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Dönitz-93. - -Will you please explain what can be seen on that map. - -WAGNER: In the middle of the map you will find the British Isles. The -large part of the ocean which is shaded on the edge shows the -afore-mentioned American combat zone. The shaded parts of the sea near -the British coast are those parts which were ordered to be German -submarine operational zones. They were given letters from A to F in -accordance with the time when they were set up. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell us up to which depth these -German operational zones went? - -WAGNER: I think perhaps as far as the 200 meter line. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this depth guarantee favorable use of -mines? - -WAGNER: Yes, down to 200 meters the use of anchored mines is possible -without any difficulty. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these operational zones certain dates -have been entered. Will you please explain how it happened that on those -particular dates, and in that sequence, these territories were made -operational zones? - -WAGNER: All those areas were declared to be operational zones where our -fighting forces came into contact with enemy traffic and a concentration -of the enemy defense, resulting in main combat areas. - -To begin with, they were the zones at the northern and southern end of -the German-mined zones which had been declared along the British East -Coast and in the Bristol Channel. You can see, therefore, that Zone A -lies to the east of Scotland and is dated 6 January. The Bristol Channel -Zone is dated 12 January, and finally at the southern end of this danger -zone, that is, to the east of London, there is the date of 24 January. - -Later on, according to the fluctuations of the actual fighting, further -areas around the British Isles and then off the French Coast were -designated. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Up to what date did this development -continue? - -WAGNER: The last zone was declared on 28 May 1940. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had neutrals been warned against navigating -in these zones? - -WAGNER: Yes, an official note had informed neutral countries that the -entire U.S.A. fighting zone had to be considered as being dangerous, and -that they should negotiate the North Sea to the east and to the south of -the German mine area which was north of Holland. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What difference is there between the -situation as shown by this map, and the German declaration of a blockade -of 17 August 1940? - -That is, Mr. President, the declaration I have submitted as Dönitz-104, -which can be found on Page 214 in Volume IV of the document book. - -WAGNER: As far as the limits of the danger zone are concerned, there was -really no difference. This fact was also stated by Prime Minister -Churchill in the House of Commons at the time. However, the difference -which did exist was that up to that time we confined ourselves to the -area I have just described, near the British Coast, whereas now we -considered the entire U.S.A. combat zone as an operational zone. - -The declaration regarding a blockade was based on the fact that in the -meantime France had been eliminated from the war, and that Britain now -was the focal point of all belligerent action. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the German blockade zone in its entirety -correspond exactly or more or less with the U.S.A. combat zone? - -WAGNER: It was nearly exactly the same as the U.S.A. combat zone. There -were merely a few insignificant corrections. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I am submitting another -sea-chart as Dönitz-92, in which... - -THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that would be a good time to break off -then. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, Mr. President, as Dönitz-94, I submit a -chart of the German blockade zone dated 17 August. - -Admiral Wagner, just for the sake of repeating, what were the limits of -the German blockade region in relation to the U.S. fighting zone? - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already told us that. You told us that -the blockade zone was the same as the American zone, didn’t you? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I thought that we had -not been understood quite correctly before the recess. - -[_Turning to the witness._] What was the naval practice of the enemy as -far as this operational zone was concerned? Was there any practice that -they followed? - -WAGNER: Yes, the practice on the part of the enemy was identical with -ours. In the areas controlled by us in the Baltic, in the eastern part -of the North Sea, around Skagerrak and later on in the Norwegian and -French waters, the enemy used every suitable weapon without giving -previous warning, without notifying us in advance by which means of -combat other ships were to be sunk—submarines, mines, aircraft, or -surface vessels. In these regions the same thing applied to neutrals, -and especially to Sweden. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, I would like to confront you with a -statement by the First Lord of the British Admiralty. You will find this -on Page 208 of the document book, Volume IV. This statement is dated 8 -May 1940, and I have ascertained, Mr. President, that unfortunately it -is wrongly reproduced in the British document book; so I shall quote -from the original. - - “Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the - submarines. In order to make this work as effective as possible, - the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of - our submarines were relaxed. As I told the House, all German - ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as - opportunity served.” - -I should like to submit this as Exhibit Dönitz-102. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the difference that you were making in the copy -we have before us—“...all ships were to be sunk by day and German ships -by night...” Is that it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. It should be corrected -to read, “all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be -sunk.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I see; I said it wrong—“and all ships by night.” Yes, -very well. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, what was the significance of -this statement and this practice so far as the German ships were -concerned? - -WAGNER: It means that all German ships by day and by night in this area -were to be sunk without warning. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what does it mean for the neutral ships? - -WAGNER: It means that without warning all neutral ships in this area by -night... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, surely the document speaks for itself. -We don’t need to have it interpreted by a witness who isn’t a lawyer. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Then, tell me, please, from what period of -time onward, according to German experiences, did this practice exist in -the Skagerrak? - -WAGNER: With certainty from 8 April 1940, but I believe I recall that -even on 7 April this practice was already in existence. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had this area at this period of time, that -is, the 7th or 8th of April, already been declared a danger zone? - -WAGNER: No, the first declaration of danger zone for this area took -place on 12 April 1940. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I shall have a sea-chart handed to you -dealing with the British danger zones, and this shall be Dönitz-92. -Please explain the significance of this chart briefly to the Tribunal. - -WAGNER: This chart shows the danger zones in European waters as declared -by England on the basis of German data. The following areas are of -special significance: - -First of all, the area in the Bay of Helgoland which on 4 September -1939, that is, on the second day of the war, was declared dangerous. -Then the afore-mentioned danger zone, Skagerrak and the area south of -Norway, which was declared on 12 April 1940. Then the danger zone in the -Baltic, on 14 April 1940; and following upon that, the other danger -zones as declared in the course of the year 1940. - -I should like to remark also that, according to my recollection, these -danger zones were all declared mine danger zones, with the exception of -the Channel zone and of the Bay of Biscay, on 17 August 1940. These were -generally dangerous zones. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these areas actually dominated by the -British sea and air forces, or did German traffic still continue? - -WAGNER: In these areas there was even very lively German traffic. Thus -the Baltic Sea, which in its entire expanse from East to West, about 400 -nautical miles in length, had been declared a danger zone, was in -reality controlled by us during the entire war. In this area there was -an extensive freight traffic, the entire ore traffic from Sweden and the -corresponding exports to Sweden. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there only traffic of German ships or -also of neutral ships? - -WAGNER: This traffic was in German and Swedish ships, but other neutrals -also participated in this traffic, for instance, Finland. A similar -situation applied in the Skagerrak where, besides the German supply -traffic, a large part of the foodstuffs for the Norwegian population was -transported. Of course, during this time both German and neutral ships -were lost. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I assume, therefore, that both German and -neutral seamen lost their lives. Is that correct? - -WAGNER: Of course, personnel losses took place as well. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the German merchantmen, at the time -when these operational zones were declared, armed—that is, at the end -of 1939 or the beginning of 1940? - -WAGNER: Until the middle of 1940 German merchantmen were not at all -armed. From then on they were comparatively slightly armed, especially -with antiaircraft weapons. - -Transport ships of the Navy had always been armed, that is, government -ships, which supplied German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers in the -Atlantic. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I shall submit to you a document of the -Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is found in the Prosecution’s -document book on Page 29. This document deals with a proposal by the -Commander of the U-boats that “...in the Channel, ships with blacked-out -lights may be sunk without warning.” Can you tell me just whose ideas we -are dealing with in the statements set forth in this document? - -WAGNER: From the signature found in this document it appears that we are -concerned with a document by a U-boat expert in the Naval Operations -Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who was that? - -WAGNER: Lieutenant Fresdorf, who was my subordinate. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are these statements in accord with the -actual circumstances and were they approved by the Naval Operations -Staff, or just what was the situation? - -WAGNER: Here we are concerned with the rather romantic ideas of a young -expert, ideas which were in no way commensurate with the situation. The -situation was rather as follows: At this time, that is, in September -1939, the second wave of the British Expeditionary Corps left England -for France. The transports ran mostly during the night and were blacked -out. At this same time an order existed according to which French ships -were neither to be stopped nor attacked; this was still in force for -political reasons. - -It is quite obvious that at night a blacked-out French ship cannot be -told from a blacked-out English ship, just as at night a merchant ship -cannot, or only with difficulty, be told from a warship. - -These orders, therefore, meant that at night, in order to avoid a -mistake, practically no shooting could be done, and therefore the -English troop transport was entirely unhampered. This brought about -really grotesque situations. It was ascertained that a German U-boat in -a favorable position of attack let a fully-loaded English troop -transport ship of 20,000 tons pass by, since there was the possibility -of making a mistake. The Naval Operations Staff agreed completely with -the commanders of the U-boats that no naval war could be carried on in -this manner. If a blacked-out ship sails in a belligerent area, better -still, in an area where there is a large supply and troop transport -traffic, it is liable to suspicion and cannot expect the war to be -halted at night for its sake. - -Therefore it was not a question of our explaining or excusing ourselves -for sinking a ship without warning because we had mistaken it, but the -obvious fact at hand was that the blacked-out ship alone was to blame if -it was not properly recognized and was sunk without warning. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these notes we find that the commanders -of U-boats, when sinking a merchant ship without warning, were required -to make the notation in their log that they had taken it for a warship -and that an order, a verbal order, to this effect was to be given to the -commanders of the U-boats. Is that correct, and was it done in actual -practice? - -WAGNER: No, we never did anything like that. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Flag Officer of the U-boats given -strict and clear orders that blacked-out ships at night in the Channel -might be attacked without warning? - -WAGNER: Yes. This clear order was issued, but nothing more. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If the statements of this young officer are -not correct, and if no orders were issued accordingly, how is it that -these things can be found in the War Diary of the Naval Operations -Staff? - -WAGNER: This paper is not a direct part of the War Diary of the Naval -Operations Staff. The War Diary itself, in which the daily happenings -were recorded, was signed by me, by the Chief of Staff of the Naval -Operations Staff, and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Here we are -concerned with the entry of an expert which was destined for a file -collection and motivated by the War Diary. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That means, then, that the considerations -and opinions of experts were collected and filed no matter whether they -were approved of or put into actual practice? - -WAGNER: Yes. All of these files were collected for later purposes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff receive news -of the incidents which happened after the sinking of the _Laconia_, and -did it approve of the measures taken by the Commander of the U-boats? - -WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff, then as always, listened in on all -the wireless messages of the Commander-in-Chief in the _Laconia_ case. -It approved of the measures taken by him, but it would not have been at -all surprised if the Commander of the U-boats had stopped the entire -rescue work at the very first air attack upon the U-boats. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff know of the -order of the Commander of the U-boats, dated 17 September, in which -rescue work by U-boats was expressly prohibited? - -WAGNER: This order given by the Commander of the U-boats was also heard -by wireless. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this order interpreted by the Naval -Operations Staff to the effect that it was to be an order for the -shooting of shipwrecked people? - -WAGNER: No; no one ever had this idea. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, at this point I should like -to put several questions to the witness which have a bearing on the -credibility of the statements made by the witness Heisig. But I should -like to ask in advance whether there are any objections to my putting -these questions, since my documents referring to the witness Heisig were -not ruled admissible. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was the object of the questions which you were offering -to put to this witness to show that the witness Heisig was not a witness -who could be believed upon his oath? Was that your object? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The general object is to show how the -testimony of this witness originated; that is, the testimony which was -submitted to the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “originated”? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is to say, what influence on the -witness Heisig forms the basis of this testimony. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the exact question you wanted to ask? You may -state it, and we will let the witness wait until we have seen what the -question is. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to ask the witness, “Did the -witness Heisig report to you about the manner in which his affidavit, -which was submitted to the High Tribunal as evidence by the Prosecution, -originated?” - -THE PRESIDENT: The question that you put, as I took it down, was: What -did the witness Heisig report to you about the way his affidavit came -about? Is that the question? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: What are you purporting to prove by getting the reports -that Heisig may have made to this witness? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to prove therewith, Mr. -President, that Heisig was under a certain influence, that is, that he -wrongly assumed that he could help a comrade through his testimony. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who applied for Heisig’s affidavit? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I did not understand, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Heisig has given an affidavit, has he not? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: That was for the Prosecution, was it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is right. - -THE PRESIDENT: And have you asked to cross-examine him? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I interrogated him about this affidavit, Mr. -President. - -THE PRESIDENT: You did? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I did question him; and I called his -attention to the contradictions between his affidavit and his testimony -here in Court. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not read the transcript on this -point for about 10 days. But I did read it then, and my recollection is -that it was never suggested to the witness Heisig that he gave his -affidavit under pressure, which I gather is the suggestion now. Your -Lordship will remember that although we had the affidavit, we called the -witness Heisig. He said that what was in his affidavit was true; and -then he gave his evidence, giving a detailed account of all the relevant -matters. So we made it perfectly possible for Dr. Kranzbühler to -cross-examine him at the time and to show any differences, as Dr. -Kranzbühler just said he purported to do, between the affidavit and his -oral evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler has just said, I think, that he did -actually cross-examine him. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did cross-examine him on that point—on any -differences that appeared between his affidavit and his oral testimony. -But he was here to be cross-examined, and if it is going to be suggested -that the affidavit was obtained by improper means, that suggestion ought -to have been made at the time, and then it could have been dealt with. - -My Lord, I object to its coming in at this stage, after the witness -Heisig has been away, and therefore no opportunity has been given to us -either to investigate the matter or to have the evidence there, which -could have been done when Heisig gave his evidence; and we could have -been prepared for any contradictory evidence now. - -My Lord, as a matter of strictness, surely, if I may put it that way, -there are two distinct lines. If it was a question of whether Heisig’s -evidence was admissible or whether it had been obtained under pressure, -then it would be quite possible to have this trial within a trial as to -whether it was admissible or not. But if this evidence is, broadly, -merely directed to the credibility of Heisig’s evidence, then I -respectfully submit it falls within the same objections I made on -Saturday to general evidence directed against the credibility of a -witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is suggested that there was any -pressure put by the Prosecution upon Heisig. I do not understand that -that is what you are suggesting, Dr. Kranzbühler, is it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, no pressure; but the picture as drawn -was not true. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I understood Dr. Kranzbühler—if I misunderstood -him, so much the easier—I understood him to say that he wanted to give -this evidence as to certain influence. I thought that was the word used. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think he meant, not influence exerted by the -Prosecution, but exerted by a mistaken notion in the witness’ own mind -that he was helping a friend. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. My Lord, then that merely goes to -credibility and it does then fall within my general objection; that is, -if we are going to have evidence as directed on credibility, we go on -_ad infinitum_. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal will allow this question to -be put in this particular instance, but they make no general rule as to -the admissibility of such questions. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you very much, Mr. President. - -Admiral Wagner, in December you were in the prison here together with -the witness Heisig. Is that correct? - -WAGNER: Yes, from the first until the fifth of December. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what did Heisig tell you about the -underlying considerations of his affidavit? - -WAGNER: He told me the following personally: At the interrogation he had -been told that Lieutenant Hoffmann, officer of the watch of -Kapitänleutnant Eck, had testified that at that time he had listened to -the speech by Admiral Dönitz at Gotenhafen in the autumn of 1942, and -that he had considered this as a demand for the killing of survivors of -shipwrecks. Heisig had been told: - - “If you confirm this testimony of Hoffmann, then you will save - not only Eck and Hoffmann, but also two others who would have - been sentenced to death. You will prevent any kind of judicial - proceeding against Captain Möhle from being instituted. Of - course, you will thus incriminate Grossadmiral Dönitz but the - material against Admiral Dönitz is of such tremendous weight - that his life has been forfeited anyway.” - -Further he told me, and without prompting, that at that time, on the -occasion of the speech by the Admiral Dönitz, he had been deeply -distressed. He had just returned from Lübeck, where he had experienced -and seen the frightful consequences of an air attack; that is he had -perhaps not experienced it, but at least he had seen the consequences. -His mind was set on revenge for these brutal measures, and he considered -it possible that this emotional state might have influenced his -interpretation of Grossadmiral Dönitz’ speech. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now we shall turn to a different point. - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: If the Prosecution desire to do so, they can, of course, -recall Heisig for the purpose of investigating this further. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, Heisig is no longer -here; that is the difficulty when this is done in this order. However, -we can consider the matter, My Lord, and we are grateful to the Tribunal -for the permission. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is Heisig not in custody? Is that what you mean? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, he is no longer in custody. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: He is studying medicine at Munich; he can be -very easily reached. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From when on were you admiral for special -tasks attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and what were your -tasks in that capacity? - -WAGNER: From the end of June 1944 onward, and the purpose of my -assignment was the following: After the success of the Anglo-Saxon -invasion in northern France, Admiral Dönitz counted on an increased -tension in the military situation. He believed that one day he might be -forced to leave the Naval Operations Staff, either to remain permanently -at the Führer’s headquarters, or at least for a longer period of time, -in order to keep up with the development of the entire war situation, or -because a transfer of the Naval Operations Staff might be necessary -because of the increasingly heavy air attacks on Berlin. For this -purpose the Grossadmiral wanted an older and experienced naval officer -in his immediate vicinity, an officer who was well-versed in the -problems of sea warfare and who was acquainted with the duties and tasks -of the Naval Operations Staff. - -My mission was, therefore, a sort of liaison between the -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Naval Operations Staff and the other -offices of the High Command for the duration of the Grossadmiral’s -absence from the High Command. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you accompany the Grossadmiral regularly -on his visits to the Führer’s headquarters? - -WAGNER: Yes; from the period mentioned I was present regularly. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I hand you a list of these visits which -has been submitted by the Prosecution as GB-207. This may be found in -the document book of the Prosecution on Page 56. Please look at this -list and tell me whether the dates recorded there are essentially -correct. - -WAGNER: The dates are essentially correct. At the end the list is not -complete, for the period from 3—no; from 10 April until 21 April 1945 -is missing. On that day the Grossadmiral participated for the last time -at the conferences in the Führer’s headquarters. Beyond that, it seems -to me that the list of the people present is incomplete. I also do not -know according to what point of view or with what idea in mind this was -compiled. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If you carefully examine this list of -people, can you tell me whether Admiral Dönitz was always with these -people on the dates mentioned, or does this mean only that these persons -were at the Führer’s headquarters at the same time he was? Can you still -recall these points? - -WAGNER: Yes. If these people participated in the military conferences, -then Admiral Dönitz at least saw them. Of course, people in high -positions were frequently at the Führer’s headquarters who did not -participate in the military conferences and whom the Grossadmiral did -not see unless he had special conversations with them. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: For what reason did Admiral Dönitz... - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, upon this point, if the witness is -saying that any one of these minutes is incomplete, I should be very -grateful if he would specify it, because we can get the original German -minutes here and confirm the affidavit. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I believe the witness said only that -additional people participated in these discussions and that, at the -end, some of the conferences are lacking. However, I do not know just -what details I should question him about. Perhaps the Prosecution will -deal with that matter later in cross-examination? - -THE PRESIDENT: But Sir David wants him to specify which are the ones, if -he can. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Can you tell me more specifically as to any -one of these dates, whether those present are correctly named or whether -there were other people present, or whether Grossadmiral Dönitz was not -present? - -WAGNER: I can tell you exactly that this list is incorrect because it -never occurred that neither Field Marshal Keitel nor Generaloberst Jodl -was present at the headquarters. For example, on 4 March 1945 neither -one of these men is mentioned, nor on 6 March or 8 March. Therefore I -conclude that this list cannot be complete. In other places, however, -the name of Jodl appears; for example, on 18 March 1945. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The decisive point seems to be whether -Admiral Dönitz was present in the Führer’s headquarters on all of these -days. Can you confirm that point? - -WAGNER: Of course, from memory I cannot confirm that with reference to -every single day. However, I am under the impression that the list is -correct in that connection, for the frequency of the visits of the -Grossadmiral corresponds with the notes in this list, and spot checks -show me that the dates are correct. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why did Grossadmiral Dönitz come to the -Führer’s headquarters? What were the reasons? - -WAGNER: The chief reason for the frequent visits, which became even more -frequent toward the end of the war, was the desire to keep up with the -development of the general war situation so that he, Dönitz, could lead -the Navy and carry on the naval war accordingly. Beyond that, questions -usually came up which the Admiral could not decide for himself out of -his own authority and which, because of their importance, he wanted to -bring up personally or to discuss with the representatives of the OKW -and of the General Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In each of these cases was there a personal -report of the Grossadmiral to the Führer? - -WAGNER: This is what happened: Most of the problems and reports for the -Führer were taken care of during the conference in connection with the -Admiral’s report on the naval warfare situation. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment. Was the Admiral always present -at the military conferences when he was at the headquarters? - -WAGNER: The Admiral took part at least in the discussion of the main -session every day. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what is the main session? - -WAGNER: At noon every day there was a military conference which lasted -several hours. This was the main conference. In addition, for months, -sessions, including special sessions, were held in the evening or at -night, at which the Admiral participated only when very important -matters were to be discussed—matters of special importance for the -conduct of the war. Then, as I said, he participated. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now you say that most of the questions which -the Grossadmiral had to put to the Führer were taken care of at the -military conference. Were there any personal reports besides this? - -WAGNER: Personal reports on the part of the Grossadmiral to Hitler took -place very seldom; on the other hand, personal discussions with the OKW -and the other military offices at the headquarters took place daily. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, I would like to know something more in -detail about this so-called “Lagebesprechung,” the conferences. - -The Prosecution seem to consider this as a sort of War Cabinet at which, -for instance, Ribbentrop would report about foreign policies, Speer -about questions of production, Himmler about security questions. Is this -a correct picture? Who took part in these sessions, what people -participated regularly and who attended only once in a while? - -WAGNER: The participants at the conferences were generally the -following: - -Regular participants: from the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, General Jodl, -General Buhle, Post Captain Assmann, Major Büchs, and a few more Chiefs -of Staff. Then the Chief of the General Staff of the Army with one or -two aides, and as a rule also the Chief of the General Staff of the Air -Force with one aide. Further regular participants were: the Chief of the -Army Personnel Office, who was Chief Adjutant to the Führer; General -Bodenschatz, until 20 July 1944; Vice Admiral Voss who was the permanent -deputy of the Grossadmiral; Gruppenführer Fegelein, as Himmler’s -permanent deputy; Ambassador Hewel; Minister Sonnleitner, permanent -deputy of the Foreign Minister; Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. -Frequently the following participated: the Commander-in-Chief of the -Luftwaffe; less frequently, Himmler. In addition to these there was a -varying participation on the part of special officers, mainly from the -General Staff of the Army, and on the part of higher front commanders of -the Army and of the Air Force who happened to be in headquarters. Beyond -that, toward the end of the war Reich Minister Speer in his capacity as -Armament Minister also participated in an increasing measure, and in -rare cases the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, both as listeners -at the conferences. I believe that is the complete list. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who reported at these conferences and what -was reported on? - -WAGNER: These sessions were for the sole purpose of informing Hitler -about the war situation—about the Eastern situation through the General -Staff of the Army, and through the OKW about the situation in all other -theaters of war and concerning all three branches of the Wehrmacht. The -report took place as follows: - -First of all, the Chief of General Staff of the Army reported about the -Eastern situation; then Generaloberst Jodl reported on the situation in -all other theaters of war on land. Next, Post Captain Assmann of the OKW -reported on the naval situation. In between, frequent, often hour-long, -conversations took place which dealt with special military problems, -panzer problems, aerial problems and such. And after the aerial problems -were dealt with the discussion was at an end, and we left the room. I -frequently saw that Ambassador Hewel went in to Hitler with a batch of -reports, apparently from the Foreign Office, and reported on them -without the rest of us knowing what they contained. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these conferences was there voting or was -there consultation, or who gave the orders? - -WAGNER: In these conferences all military questions were discussed and -frequently decisions were reached by the Führer, that is, if no further -preparations were necessary for a decision. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What for example did the Foreign Minister -Von Ribbentrop do there when he was present? - -WAGNER: I only saw Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop perhaps five or six -times at these conferences, and I cannot remember that he ever said -anything during the entire session. He was only present at the -conference for his own information. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How about Minister Speer, what did he do? - -WAGNER: Minister Speer also very seldom brought in armament problems -during the discussion. I know that questions of armament were always -discussed between Hitler and Speer in special discussions. However, some -exceptions may have occurred. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was Himmler doing there, or his -permanent deputy Fegelein? Did they discuss questions of security, or -what was their mission? - -WAGNER: No. During the military conference security problems were never -discussed. Himmler and his deputy appeared very frequently in connection -with the Waffen-SS, and Fegelein had always to give reports about the -setup, organization, arming, transportation and engagement of the SS -divisions. At this time the SS divisions, according to my impression, -still played a very important part, for ostensibly they represented a -strategic reserve and were much discussed. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have a record of the meeting which was -written by you. It has the Number GB-209. It is not found in the -document book. It says in the third paragraph—and I am just reading one -sentence: - - “The Deputy of the Reichsführer-SS at the Führer’s headquarters, - SS Gruppenführer Fegelein, transmits the request of the - Reichsführer as to when he can count on the arrival of the - ‘Panther’”—those are tanks—“coming from Libau.” - -Is this typical of SS Gruppenführer Fegelein’s work? - -WAGNER: Yes. That was the kind of questions which were dealt with at -every one of these sessions. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner appeared -several times also. Did he speak or report? - -WAGNER: I cannot remember one single utterance on Kaltenbrunner’s part -during one of these military conferences. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What role did Admiral Dönitz play at the -session discussions? - -WAGNER: Even when Grossadmiral Dönitz was present the naval situation -was reported by the deputy from the OKW, Commodore Assmann. However, the -Admiral used this occasion to present, in connection with the individual -theaters of war, or in summary at the end, those questions which he had -in mind. The Admiral was neither asked nor did he give any opinion on -questions dealing with air or land warfare which had no connection with -the conduct of the naval war. In his statements he strictly confined -himself to the sphere of the Navy, and very energetically objected if -someone else during the session tried to interfere in questions of naval -warfare. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have come to a break. If -the Tribunal agrees to declare a recess... - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30 in order -to sit in closed session. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, as time went on a close -relationship developed between Admiral Dönitz and Adolf Hitler. Was this -due to the fact that the Admiral was particularly ready to comply with -the Führer’s wishes? - -WAGNER: No, not at all. Admiral Dönitz’ activity as Commander-in-Chief -of the Navy began with a very strong opposition to Hitler. It was -Hitler’s intention to scrap the large ships of the Navy, that is to say, -the remaining battleships and cruisers. Admiral Raeder had already -rejected that plan. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That story is already known, Admiral. You -need not go into it in detail. - -WAGNER: Very well. Apart from that, Hitler’s respect for Dönitz was due -to the fact that every statement which the Admiral made was absolutely -reliable and absolutely honest. The Admiral attached particular -importance to the fact that particularly unfavorable developments, -failures, and mistakes were to be reported at headquarters without -digression, objectively, and simply. As an example, I should like to -mention that the Admiral had given me the order... - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we need examples of that sort of thing. -Surely the general statement is quite sufficient. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Admiral in any way show himself -particularly willing to comply with the Führer’s political wishes or -those of the Party? - -WAGNER: No. Such wishes of the Party were, in my opinion, only put to -the Navy in three cases. One was the question of the churches, which for -the most part came up during the time of Admiral Raeder. I think it is -generally known that the Navy retained its original religious -organization and, in fact, extended it as the Navy grew. - -The second request made by the Party was that, modeled on the Russian -example, political commissars should be set up within the Armed Forces. -On that occasion Admiral Dönitz went to see Hitler and prevented the -carrying out of that plan. When after 20 July 1944 Bormann nevertheless -succeeded in getting the so-called “NSFO”—the National Socialist -Leadership Officers—introduced into the Armed Forces, it did not happen -in the way the Party wished, by appointing political commissars. It was -merely done by using officers who were under the jurisdiction of the -commander and who could not in any way interfere with the leadership of -the troops. The third case was the intention on the part of the Party to -take away from, the Armed Forces the political penal cases. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This case is also already known, Admiral. -You kept the records of the visits at the Führer’s headquarters, is that -correct? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A number of these records have been -introduced as evidence in this Court. Will you please explain to the -Tribunal what was the purpose of keeping these records of visits of -commanders-in-chief to the Führer’s headquarters? - -WAGNER: The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, the Chief of the Naval -Armaments, and the Chief of the General Navy Department—that is to say, -the three leading men in the High Command of the Navy—were to be -informed by means of these records of all happenings which took place in -the presence of the Admiral, as far as they were of any interest to the -Navy. That was one of my tasks. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have just said “informed about -happenings which took place in the presence of the Admiral.” Does that -mean that he himself must have heard everything that has been put down -in these records? - -WAGNER: Not necessarily. It happened quite frequently that during -situation reports, when they took place in a large room and when -subjects were discussed which did not interest him so much, the Admiral -would retire to another part of the room and deal with some business of -his own or discuss Navy questions with other participants in the -meeting. It was possible that on such occasions I heard things and put -them down in the record which the Admiral himself did not hear. But, of -course, he would know about them later when he saw my record. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am going to have shown to you one of your -own records of discussions on 20 February 1945. It is Exhibit Number -GB-209, and it is on Page 68 of the document book of the Prosecution. -This deals with considerations regarding the renouncing of the Geneva -Convention. Will you please describe exactly what happened as you -remember it? - -WAGNER: Approximately two or three days before the date in this -record—in other words, on or about 17 or 18 February 1945—Admiral Voss -telephoned me from headquarters, which at that time was situated in -Berlin, and informed me that in connection with Anglo-Saxon propaganda -to induce our troops to desert in the West, Hitler had stated his -intention to leave the Geneva Convention. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did he hope to achieve? - -WAGNER: According to my first impression at the time, the intention was -evidently to express to the troops and the German people that captivity -would no longer bring any advantage. Thereupon, I immediately telephoned -to the Naval Operations Staff, since I considered the intention to be -completely wrong, and I asked them for a military opinion and an opinion -from the point of view of international law. - -On the 19th, when taking part in the situation discussion, Hitler once -more referred to this question, but this time not in connection with -happenings on the western front; but in connection with the air attacks -by the western enemies on open German towns—attacks had just been made -on Dresden and Weimar. - -He ordered the Admiral to examine the effects of leaving the Geneva -Convention from the point of view of naval warfare. An immediate answer -was not expected and it was not given. Generaloberst Jodl was also quite -strongly opposed to these intentions and he sought the Admiral’s -support. Thereupon it was agreed to have a conference and that is the -conference which is mentioned in the record under Figure 2. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the conference of 20 February, -Admiral? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who participated in that conference? - -WAGNER: Admiral Dönitz, Generaloberst Jodl, Ambassador Hewel, and -myself. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the subject? - -WAGNER: The subject was the Führer’s intention of renouncing the Geneva -Convention. The result was the unanimous opinion that such a step would -be a mistake. Apart from military consideration we especially held the -conviction that by renouncing the Geneva Convention both the Armed -Forces and the German people would lose confidence in the leadership, -since the Geneva Convention was generally considered to be the -conception of international law. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your notes there is a sentence, “One -would have to carry out the measures considered necessary without -warning and at all costs ‘to save face’ with the outer world.” What is -the significance of that sentence? - -WAGNER: That sentence means that on no account should there be any -irresponsible actions. If the leaders considered it necessary to -introduce countermeasures against air attacks on open German towns, or -against the propaganda for desertion in the West, then one should -confine oneself to such countermeasures which appear necessary and -justifiable. One should not put oneself in the wrong before the world -and one’s own people by totally repudiating all the Geneva Conventions -and announce measures which went far beyond what appeared to be -necessary and justifiable. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were any concrete measures discussed in this -connection or were any such measures even thought of? - -WAGNER: No. I can remember very well that no specific measures were -discussed at all during the various conferences. We were mainly -concerned with the total question of whether to repudiate the Geneva -Convention or not. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever learn anything about a -so-called intention on Adolf Hitler’s part to shoot 10,000 prisoners of -war as a reprisal for the air attack on Dresden? - -WAGNER: No, I have never heard anything about that. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The expression “to save face”—doesn’t that -mean secrecy, hiding the true facts? - -WAGNER: In my opinion it was certain that there was no question of -secrecy, for neither the countermeasures against air attacks nor the -measures of intimidation against desertion could be effective if they -were concealed. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How long did this whole conversation which -you recorded last? - -WAGNER: Will you please tell me which conversation you mean? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The discussion of 20 February which contains -the sentences which I have just read to you. - -WAGNER: It took perhaps ten minutes or a quarter of an hour. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So that your record is a very brief -condensed summary of the conversation? - -WAGNER: Yes, it only contains the important points. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz also submit his -objections to the Führer? - -WAGNER: As far as I recollect, it never reached that point. One became -convinced that Hitler, as soon as he put his questions to the Admiral, -could gather from the Admiral’s expression and the attitude of the -others that they rejected his plans. We passed our views on to the High -Command of the Armed Forces in writing and heard no more about the whole -matter. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to show you another record -which is submitted under GB-210. It is on the next page of the document -book of the Prosecution and it refers to conferences at the Führer’s -headquarters from 29 June to 1 July 1944. - -You will find an entry under the date of 1 July which reads, “In -connection with the general strike in Copenhagen, the Führer says that -terror can be subdued only with terror.” Was this statement made during -a conversation between Hitler and Admiral Dönitz or in which connection? - -WAGNER: This is a statement made by Hitler during a situation discussion -and addressed neither to Admiral Dönitz nor to the Navy. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Well, if it was not addressed to the Navy, -then why did you include it in your record? - -WAGNER: I included in my record all statements which could be of any -interest to the Navy. The High Command of the Navy was, of course, -interested in the general strike in Copenhagen because our ships were -repaired in Copenhagen; and apart from that Copenhagen was a naval base. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And to whom did you pass this record? Who -received it? - -WAGNER: According to the distribution list on Page 4, the paper went -only to the Commander-in-Chief and department 1 of the Naval Operations -Staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff have anything -to do with the treatment of shipyard workers in Denmark? - -WAGNER: No, nothing at all. From 1943 on the shipyards were entirely -under the Ministry of Armaments. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution sees in this statement and -its transmission to a department of the OKW an invitation to deal -ruthlessly with the inhabitants. Does that in any way tally with the -meaning of this record? - -WAGNER: There can be no question of that. The only purpose of this -record was to inform the Departments of the High Command. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to have another document -shown to you. It is Exhibit Number USA-544. It is in the document book -of the Prosecution on Pages 64 and 65. It is a note by the international -law expert in the Naval Operations Staff regarding the treatment of -saboteurs. Do you know this note? - -WAGNER: Yes. I have initialed it on the first page. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of that note you will find the -sentence: - - “As far as the Navy is concerned, it should be investigated - whether the occurrence cannot be used, after reporting to the - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, to make sure that the treatment - of members of Commando troops is absolutely clear to all the - departments concerned.” - -Was this report made to Admiral Dönitz who at that time had been -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for ten days? - -WAGNER: No, that report was not made, as the various remarks at the head -of it will show. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you explain that, please? - -WAGNER: The international law expert in the Naval Operations Staff IA -made this suggestion through the Operations Office IA to me as Chief of -the Operational Department. The chief of the IA Section in a handwritten -notice beside his initials, wrote, “The subordinate commanders have been -informed.” That means that he had objected to the proposal of the -international law expert and considered that an explanation of the -orders within the Navy was superfluous. I investigated these matters and -I decided that the operations officer was right. I sent for the -international law expert, Dr. Eckardt, informed him orally of my -decision, and returned this document to him. Thus the suggestion to -report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy made in connection with the -explanation of this order was not actually carried out. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember whether Admiral Dönitz on -some later occasion received reports on this Commando order? - -WAGNER: No, I have no recollection of that. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have submitted to you GB-208, which is a -record regarding the case of a motor torpedo boat at Bergen. It is the -case which is contained in the British document book on Pages 66 and 67. -Have you ever heard about this incident before this Trial? - -WAGNER: No. I heard about it for the first time on the occasion of -interrogations in connection with these proceedings. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I gather from the files of the British -court-martial proceedings, which have been submitted by the Prosecution -during cross-examination, that before the shooting of the crew of that -motor torpedo boat there had been two telephone conversations, between -the Chief of the Security Service in Bergen and the SD at Oslo, and -between the SD at Oslo and Berlin. Can you recollect whether such a -conversation took place between the SD at Oslo and yourself or one of -the representatives in the High Command? - -WAGNER: I certainly had no such conversation, and as far as I know -neither did any other officer in my department or in the High Command. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider it at all possible that the -SD at Oslo might get in touch with the High Command of the Navy? - -WAGNER: No, I consider that quite out of the question. If the SD in Oslo -wanted to get in touch with a central department in Berlin then they -could only do so through their own superior authority, and that is the -RSHA. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now put to you another document; it is -Exhibit GB-212 which appears on Page 75 of the document book of the -Prosecution. It mentions an example of a commandant of a German -prisoner-of-war camp and it says he had communists who had attracted -attention among the inmates suddenly and quietly removed by the guards. -Do you know of this incident? - -WAGNER: Yes, such an episode is known to me. I think we received the -report from a prisoner-of-war—a man who had been severely injured and -who had been exchanged—that the German commandant of a prisoner-of-war -camp in Australia, in which the crew of the auxiliary cruiser _Cormoran_ -were detained, had secretly had a man of his crew killed because he had -been active as a spy and traitor. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But this order does not mention the word -“spy.” It says “communist.” What is the explanation? - -THE PRESIDENT: It does not say “communist.” It says “communists” in the -plural. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “Communists,” plural. - -WAGNER: In my opinion the only explanation is that the true state of -affairs was to be concealed so as to prevent the enemy intelligence from -tracing the incident and making difficulties for the senior sergeant in -question. Thus, a different version was chosen. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It was the opinion of the Soviet Prosecution -that this showed there was a plan for the silent removal of communists. -Can you tell us anything about the origin of this order, whether such a -plan existed and whether it had ever come under discussion? - -WAGNER: First of all the order was addressed to those personnel offices -which were responsible for choosing young potential officers and -noncommissioned officers in the Navy. There were about six or seven -personnel offices. Beyond that I can only say that of course... - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just a moment, Admiral, please. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, is it necessary to go into all this -detail? The question is, was there an order with reference to making -away with the people of this sort or was there not—not all the details -about how the order came to be made. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In that case I shall put the question this -way: Was there any order or any desire in the Navy to kill communists -inconspicuously and systematically? - -WAGNER: No, such an order or such a plan did not exist. Of course, there -were a considerable number of communists in the Navy. That was known to -every superior officer. The overwhelming majority of those communists -did their duty as Germans just as any other German in the war. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Dönitz has been accused by the -Prosecution because as late as the spring of 1945 he urged his people to -hold out obstinately to the end. The Prosecution considers that evidence -of the fact that he was a fanatical Nazi. Did you and the majority of -the Navy consider this to be so? - -WAGNER: No, the Admiral’s attitude was not considered to be political -fanaticism. To them it meant that he was carrying out his ordinary duty -as a soldier to the last. I am convinced that this was the view of the -great majority of the entire Navy, the men and the noncommissioned -officers as well as the officers. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions -to put to this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask any -questions? - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Wagner, you have already briefly sketched the -positions you have held. In supplementing I should like to make quite -sure who held a leading position in the Naval Operations Staff under -Grossadmiral Raeder in the decisive years before and after the outbreak -of the war. Who was the Chief of Staff during the two years before the -war, and at the beginning of the war? - -WAGNER: The Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff from 1938 until -1941 was Admiral Schniewind. From 1941 until after Raeder’s retirement -it was Admiral Fricke. - -DR. SIEMERS: Those, therefore, were the two officers who worked in the -highest posts under Admiral Raeder in the Naval Operations Staff? - -WAGNER: They were the immediate advisers of the Admiral. - -DR. SIEMERS: And the Naval Operations Staff had several departments? - -WAGNER: Yes, it consisted of several departments, which were given -consecutive numbers. - -DR. SIEMERS: And which was the most important department? - -WAGNER: The most important department of the Naval Operations Staff was -the Operations Department, which was known as Number 1. - -DR. SIEMERS: And the other departments, 2, 3—what did they do? - -WAGNER: They were the Signals and Communications Department and the -Information Department. - -DR. SIEMERS: Who was the chief of the Operations Department? - -WAGNER: From 1937 until 1941 it was Admiral Fricke. From 1941 until -after Raeder’s retirement I was the chief of that department. - -DR. SIEMERS: In other words, for many years you worked under Admiral -Raeder. First of all I should like to ask you to speak briefly about -Raeder’s basic attitude during the time you were working in the Naval -Operations Staff. - -WAGNER: Under Admiral Raeder the Navy was working for a peaceful -development in agreement with Britain. The foremost questions were those -regarding the type of ships, training, and tactical schooling. Admiral -Raeder never referred to aggressive wars during any conference which I -attended. Nor did he at any time ask us to make any preparations in that -direction. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that in 1940 and in 1941 Raeder declared -himself emphatically against a war with Russia? - -WAGNER: Yes, he was very strongly opposed to a war with Russia, and that -for two reasons; first, he considered that to break the treaty of -friendship with Russia was wrong and inadmissible, and secondly, for -strategic reasons he was convinced that our entire strength should be -concentrated against Britain. When in the autumn of 1940 it appeared -that the invasion of Britain could not be carried out, the Admiral -worked for a strategy in the Mediterranean to keep open an outlet -against Britain’s policy of encirclement. - -DR. SIEMERS: The Navy had rather a lot to do with Russia during the -friendship period between Russia and Germany in the way of deliveries. -As far as you know did everything in that respect run smoothly? - -WAGNER: Yes, I know that a large number of deliveries from the Navy -stocks went to Russia; for instance, uncompleted ships, heavy guns, and -other war material. - -DR. SIEMERS: And the Navy, of course, always made efforts to maintain -the friendly relations laid down in the Pact? - -WAGNER: Yes, that was the Admiral’s opinion. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Wagner, Admiral Raeder has been accused by the -Prosecution that he had never bothered about international law and that -he broke international law conventions as a matter of principle if it -suited him. Can you express a general opinion about Raeder’s attitude in -that respect? - -WAGNER: Yes; that is completely wrong. Admiral Raeder considered it most -important that every measure for naval warfare should be examined from -the point of view of international law. For that purpose we had a -special expert on international law in the Naval Operations Staff with -whom we in the Operations Department had almost daily contact. - -DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Raeder has been accused by the Prosecution of -advising a war against the United States and trying to get Japan to go -to war with the United States. May I ask for your opinion on that? - -WAGNER: I consider this charge completely unjustified. I know that -Admiral Raeder attached particular importance to the fact that all naval -war measures—especially in the critical year of 1941—were to be -examined very closely as to the effects they might have on the United -States of America. In fact he refrained from taking quite a number of -militarily perfectly justified measures in order to prevent incidents -with the U.S.A. For instance, in the summer of 1941 he withdrew the -submarines from a large area off the coast of the U.S.A. although that -area could certainly be regarded as the open sea. He forbade mine-laying -action which had already begun against the British port of Halifax, -Canada, to prevent, at all costs, the possibility of a United States -ship striking a mine. And finally, he also forbade attacks on British -destroyers in the North Atlantic because the fifty destroyers which had -been turned over to England by the United States created the dangerous -possibility of confusing the British and American destroyers. All this -was done at a time when the United States, while still at peace, -occupied Iceland, when British warships were being repaired in American -shipyards, when American naval forces had orders that all German units -should be reported to the British fleet, and when finally President -Roosevelt in July 1941 gave his forces the order to attack any German -submarines they sighted. - -DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder ever make a statement in the Naval -Operations Staff that there was no risk in a war against America and -that the fleet or the American submarines were not much good? - -WAGNER: No, Admiral Raeder as an expert would never have made such a -statement. - -DR. SIEMERS: On the contrary, did not Raeder expressly speak of the -strength of the American fleet and that one could not fight -simultaneously two such great sea-powers as America and Great Britain? - -WAGNER: Yes, it was perfectly clear to him and to us that America’s -entry into the war would mean a very substantial strengthening of the -enemy forces. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now on one occasion Admiral Raeder suggested in his war -diary that Japan should attack Singapore. Was there any discussion about -Pearl Harbor in connection with that in the Naval Operations Staff? - -WAGNER: No, not at all. The attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a -complete surprise, both to the Admiral and to the Naval Operations Staff -and, in my opinion, to every other German department. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were there no continuous naval-military discussions and -conferences between Japan and Germany? - -WAGNER: No, before Japan’s entry into the war there were no military -discussions according to my conviction. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should now like to show you Document C-41, Mr. President, -this is Exhibit GB-69. Later on, the British Delegation will submit it -in Document Book 10a for Raeder. I do not know whether the Tribunal -already has it. It is as yet not contained in the trial brief against -Raeder. In the newly compiled: Document Book 10a, it is on Page 18. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can offer it in evidence now, if you want to, so you -can put it to the witness. - -DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has submitted it; yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SIEMERS: This concerns a document signed by Admiral Fricke, and it -is dated 3 June 1940. It is headed “Questions of Expansion of Areas and -Bases.” That document contains detailed statements on future plans. - -[_Turning to the witness._] I should like to ask you if Raeder gave the -order to prepare this memorandum or how did this memorandum come to be -written? - -WAGNER: Admiral Raeder did not give the order to draft this memorandum. -This constitutes the personal, theoretical ideas of Admiral Fricke -regarding the possible developments in the future. They are quite -fantastic, and they had no practical significance. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was this study or this note talked about or discussed in -any large group in the Naval Operations Staff? - -WAGNER: No, in my opinion only the Operations officers had knowledge of -this document, which by its very form shows that it is not a -well-thought-out study made by order of Grossadmiral Raeder but an _ad -hoc_ jotting-down of thoughts which occurred to Admiral Fricke at the -moment. - -DR. SIEMERS: Was this study or this document passed on to any outsiders -at all? - -WAGNER: I think I can remember that this document was not sent to any -outside office but remained in the Operations Department. The -Grossadmiral, too, in my opinion did not have knowledge of it, -particularly since this document shows that he did not initial it. - -DR. SIEMERS: You have a photostat copy of that document? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Are there any other initials on it which might show that it -was put before Admiral Raeder? How was this sort of thing generally -handled in the Naval Operations Staff? - -WAGNER: Every document that was to be put before the Admiral had on its -first page in the left margin a note: “v.A.v.,” which means “to be -submitted before dispatch,” or “n.E.v.,” “to be submitted after -receipt,” or else “to be reported during situation reports.” And then at -that place the Admiral would initial it with a green pencil, or the -officers of his personal staff would make a note indicating that it had -been submitted to him. - -DR. SIEMERS: And there are no such marks on this document? - -WAGNER: No. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like to show you Document C-38, which is a -document of the Prosecution bearing the number Exhibit GB-223. It is -contained in the Prosecution’s document book on Raeder, Page 11. - -The war between Germany and Russia began on 22 June 1941. According to -the last page but one of the document which you have before you, the OKW -as early as 15 June—a week before the outbreak of the war—ordered the -use of arms against enemy submarines south of the Memel line, the -southern tip of Oeland, at the request of the Naval Operations Staff. - -The Prosecution is basing the accusation on this document and once more -referring to an aggressive war. Unfortunately, the Prosecution has only -submitted the last page of this document. It did not produce the first -and second page of the document. If it had done so, then this accusation -would probably have been dropped. May I read to you, Witness, what is -contained there; and I quote: - - “On 12 June at 2000 hours one of the submarines placed as - outposts on both sides of Bornholm, as precautionary measure, - reported at 2000 hours an unknown submarine in the vicinity of - Adlergrund (20 miles southwest of Bornholm) which had surfaced - and was proceeding on a westerly course and which answered a - recognition signal call with a letter signal which had no - particular significance.” - -That ends the quotation. - -May I ask you to explain what it means that this submarine did not reply -to the recognition signal call? - -WAGNER: In time of war the warships of one’s own fleet have an -arrangement of recognition signals; that is to say, the recognition -signal has a call and a reply which immediately identifies the ship as -belonging to one’s own fleet. If a recognition signal is wrongly -answered, it proves that it is a foreign vessel. - -DR. SIEMERS: As far as you can remember, were there any other clues -showing that ships appeared in the Baltic sea which were recognized as -enemy ships? - -WAGNER: Yes. I remember that there were individual cases where unknown -submarines were observed off the German Baltic ports. Subsequently it -was found, by comparing the stations of our own submarines, that these -were indeed enemy vessels. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were these facts the reason which caused the Naval -Operations Staff to ask for the use of weapons? - -WAGNER: Yes, these very facts. - -DR. SIEMERS: A similar case has been made the subject of an accusation -in connection with Greece. It has been ascertained here in Court from -the War Diary that on 30 December 1939 the Naval Operations Staff asked -that Greek ships in the American blockade zone around Great Britain -should be treated as hostile. Since Greece was neutral at the time, -there has been an accusation against Raeder of a breach of neutrality. - -May I ask you to tell us the reasons which caused the Naval Operations -Staff and the Chief, Raeder, to make such a request to the OKW? - -WAGNER: We had had news that Greece had placed the bulk of its merchant -fleet at the disposal of England and that these Greek vessels were -sailing under British command. - -DR. SIEMERS: And it is correct that Greek vessels in general were not -treated as hostile, but only vessels in the American blockade zone -around England? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: The next case, which is somewhat similar, is that which -occurred in June 1942, when the Naval Operations Staff made an -application to the OKW to be allowed to attack Brazilian ships, although -Brazil at that time was still a neutral. The war with Brazil started -some two months later on 22 August. What reasons were there for such a -step? - -WAGNER: We were receiving reports from submarines from the waters around -South America, according to which they were being attacked by ships -which could only have started from Brazilian bases. The first thing we -did was to refer back and get these questions clarified and confirmed. -Moreover, I think I can remember personally that at that time it was -already generally known that Brazil was giving the use of sea and air -bases to the United States with whom we were at war. - -DR. SIEMERS: So that this was due to a breach of neutrality on the part -of Brazil? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like to submit to you Documents C-176 and D-658. -Document C-176 has the number Exhibit GB-228. These two documents are -based on the Commando Order, that is, the order to destroy sabotage -troops. The Prosecution has charged Raeder with an incident which -occurred in December 1942 in the Gironde estuary at Bordeaux. In -Document C-176, on the last page, you will find something which I would -like to quote. - - “Shooting of the two captured Englishmen took place by a - firing-squad, numbering one officer and 16 men, detailed by the - port commander at Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the - SD and by order of the Führer.” - -Previous entries, which I do not want to quote separately and which -portray the same things, show that the SD had intervened directly and -had got into direct touch with the Führer’s headquarters. - -I now ask you whether the Naval Operations Staff had heard anything at -all about this matter before these two prisoners were shot, or whether -they knew anything about this direct order from Hitler which is -mentioned in this connection? - -WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff had nothing to do with a direct order -for the shooting of people in Bordeaux. The Naval Operations Staff knew -the tactical course of events of this sabotage undertaking in Bordeaux -and nothing at the time beyond that. - -DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, this case was not put to the Naval Operations -Staff or to Admiral Raeder, and it was not discussed by them? - -WAGNER: Yes. I am certain that that was not the case. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I ask the Tribunal to take notice of the -fact that this war diary is by no means the war diary which has been -frequently mentioned, the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, but -the war diary of the Naval Commander west, and was therefore unknown to -the Naval Operations Staff. That is why the Naval Operations Staff did -not know of this case. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are referring now to Document C-176? - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, and also to D-658, which is the War Diary of the Naval -Operations Staff. - -THE PRESIDENT: What was the reference to it? - -DR. SIEMERS: This is D-658, which shows the following: According to the -OKW communiqué, these two soldiers had in the meantime been shot. The -measure would be in keeping with the special order by the Führer. That -has been submitted by the Prosecution, and it shows—and I shall refer -to this later—that the Naval Operations Staff knew nothing about the -entire episode because this shows an entry dated 9 December, whereas the -whole affair happened on the 11th. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I am now submitting to you Document UK C-124. - -Mr. President, C-124 corresponds to USSR-130. This document deals with a -communication from the Naval Operations Staff, dated 29 September 1941, -addressed to Group North, and it deals with the future of the city of -Petersburg. This report to Group North says that the Führer had decided -to wipe the city of Petersburg from the face of the earth. The Navy -itself had nothing to do with that report. Despite that, this report was -sent to Group North. - -Witness, I will return to this point, but I, would like to ask you -first—you have a photostatic copy of the original—to tell me whether -Raeder could have seen this document before it was dispatched? - -WAGNER: According to my previous statements Admiral Raeder did not see -this document since there are no marks or initials to that effect. - -DR. SIEMERS: And now the more important question on this point. In view -of the terrible communication which is mentioned by Hitler in Point 2, -why did the Naval Operations Staff transmit it even though the Navy -itself had nothing to do with it? - -WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff had asked that in bombarding, -occupying or attacking Leningrad the dockyards, wharf installations, and -all other special naval installations be spared so that they might be -used as bases later on. That request was turned down by Hitler’s -statement as contained in this document, as can be seen from Point 3. - -We had to communicate this fact to Admiral Carls so that he could act -accordingly and because in the case of a later occupation of Leningrad -he could not count on this port as a base. - -DR. SIEMERS: Because of the significance of this testimony, I would like -to quote to the Tribunal the decisive point to which the witness just -referred, and that is III of USSR-130. I quote: - - “The original requests of the Navy to spare the dock, harbor, - and other installations important from the Navy viewpoint are - known to the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Compliance with - these requests is not possible, because of the fundamental aim - of the action against Petersburg.” - -That was the decisive point which the SKL told Admiral Carls as -commander of Group North. - -WAGNER: That was the sole reason for this communication. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether Admiral Carls did anything with this -document? Did he transmit it to any one, or do you not know anything -about that? - -WAGNER: As far as I am informed, this communication was not passed on; -and it was not the intention that it should be passed on for it was -meant solely for Group North. On the strength of this document, Admiral -Carls stopped the preparations which had already been made for using the -Leningrad naval installations later on and made the personnel available -for other purposes. That is the only measure which the Navy took on the -basis of this communication and the only measure which could have been -taken. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should tell the Tribunal that accordingly I will submit, -under Number 111 in my Document Book Raeder, an affidavit which contains -this fact, which the witness also points out, that nothing was passed on -by Group North so that the commanding naval officers never learned of -this document. - -This concerns an affidavit by Admiral Bütow who at that time was -Commander-in-Chief in Finland, and I shall come back to this point when -I present the case on behalf of Admiral Raeder. - -I have no more questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of defendants’ counsel wish to ask -any questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -The Prosecution may cross-examine. - -COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it -please the Tribunal, with regard to the questions asked by Dr. Siemers, -I was going to leave the cross-examination on those points to the -cross-examination of the Defendant Raeder so as to avoid any -duplication. - -[_Turning to the witness._] As I understand the evidence which the -Defendant Dönitz has given and your evidence, you are telling the -Tribunal that with respect to the treatment of neutral merchant ships, -the German Navy has nothing to reproach itself with. Is that right? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And the Defendant has said that the German Navy was -scrupulous in adhering to orders about the attitude towards neutral -shipping, and the neutrals were fully warned of what they should and -should not do. Is that right? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Admiral Dönitz has also said that there was no question -of deceiving neutral governments; they were given fair warning of what -their ships should not do. Do you agree? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want just to remind you of what steps were taken -as regards neutrals, as they appear from the defense documents. - -First of all, on 3 September orders were issued that strict respect for -all rules of neutrality and compliance with all agreements of -international law which were generally recognized were to be observed. - -My Lord, that is D-55, Page 139. - -THE PRESIDENT: In the British document book? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: In the Defense document book—Dönitz-55. - -And then, on 28 September, a warning was sent to neutrals to avoid -suspicious conduct, changing course, zig-zagging, and so on. That is -Dönitz-61, at Page 150. On 19 October that warning was repeated and -neutrals were advised to refuse convoy escort. That is Dönitz-62, at -Page 153. On 22 October there was a repetition of the warning, that is -Dönitz-62, Page 162; and on 24 November the neutrals were told that the -safety of their ships in waters around the British Isles and in the -vicinity of the French coast could no longer be taken for granted. That -is Dönitz-73, at Page 206; and then from 6 January onwards, certain -zones were declared dangerous zones. That is right, is it not? - -WAGNER: No. On 24 November a general warning was issued that the entire -United States fighting zone was to be considered dangerous. The specific -zones which since January were used as operational zones were not made -public, since they came within the scope of the first warning and served -only for internal use within the Navy. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: That is the point I want to be clear about. The zones -that you declared from 6 January onwards were not announced. Is that the -point? - -WAGNER: Yes, the neutrals were warned on 24 November that all of those -zones which had been specifically declared as operational zones since -January would be dangerous for shipping. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: But when you fixed the specific zones from 6 January -onwards, no further specific warning was given. Is that the case? - -WAGNER: That is correct. After the general warning, we issued no further -specific warnings about parts of this zone. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, you are not suggesting, are you, that by these -warnings and by this declaration of an enormous danger zone, you were -entitled to sink neutral shipping without warning? - -WAGNER: Yes. I am of the opinion that in this zone which we, as well as -the United States of America before us, regarded as dangerous for -shipping it was no longer necessary to show consideration to neutrals. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you mean to say that from 24 November onwards every -neutral government was given fair warning that its ships would be sunk -without warning if they were anywhere in that zone? - -WAGNER: What I want to say is that on 24 November all the neutral -countries were notified officially that the entire United States of -America zone was to be considered as dangerous and that the German Reich -could assume no responsibility for losses in combat in this zone. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: That is quite a different case. Do not let us have any -mistake about this. Are you saying that by that warning you were -entitled to sink neutral ships anywhere in that zone without warning, -sink on sight? - -WAGNER: I did not quite catch the last few words. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you suggesting that you were entitled to sink at -sight neutral shipping anywhere in that zone, as from 24 November? - -WAGNER: I am of the opinion that we were justified from that period of -time onwards in having no special consideration for neutral shipping. If -we had made exceptions in our orders to our U-boats, it would have meant -in every case that they could not have sunk enemy ships without warning. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not a question of any special consideration. Do -you say that you became entitled to sink at sight any neutral ship, or -sink it deliberately, whether you recognized it as neutral or not? - -THE PRESIDENT: Surely you can answer that question “yes” or “no.” - -WAGNER: Yes, I am of that opinion. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell me how that squares with the submarine -rules? - -WAGNER: I do not feel competent to give a legal explanation of these -questions because that is a matter of international law. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: At any rate, that is what you proceeded to do, is it -not? You proceeded to sink neutral ships at sight and without warning -anywhere in that zone? - -WAGNER: Yes; not just anywhere in this zone, but in the operational -zones stipulated by us neutral ships were... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: But wherever you could—wherever you could? - -WAGNER: In the operational zones stipulated by us we sank neutral ships -without warning, for we were of the opinion that in this case we were -concerned with secured zones near the enemy coast which could no longer -be considered the open sea. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And that is what you desired to do at the very start of -the war, was it not? That is what you decided to do? - -WAGNER: From the beginning of the war we decided to adhere strictly to -the London Agreement. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you look at the document which was put in -yesterday? My Lord, it is D-851. It is put in as GB-451. It is a -memorandum of 3 September. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is it? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it was the only new document that Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe put in in cross-examination. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Would you look at the third paragraph: - - “The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage - to England can be achieved with the forces available only if the - U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without - warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited - area indicated on the enclosed map.” - -Do you still say that you did not intend from the start of the war to -sink neutral shipping without warning as soon as you could get Hitler to -agree to let you do so? Do you still say that? - -WAGNER: Yes, absolutely. In this document, in the first paragraph, it -says: - - “In the attached documents sent to the Navy by the OKW the - question of unrestricted U-boat warfare against England is - discussed.” - -I cannot judge these documents if they are not submitted to me. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You were in the general staff at that time. You were in -charge of the Department IA. This point of view must have been put -forward by your department? - -WAGNER: Yes. I have said already that we had decided, after consulting -with the Foreign Office, to adhere strictly to the London Agreement -until we had proof that English merchant shipping was navigated -militarily and was being used for military purposes. Here we are -apparently concerned solely with information, with an exchange of -opinions with the Foreign Office... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I did not ask for your general view on the document. We -can read that for ourselves. Your object was to terrorize the small -neutrals and frighten them from sailing on their ordinary lawful -occasions. Is that not right? - -WAGNER: No. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And is that not why in the orders you issued in January -of 1940 you excepted the larger countries from this “sink at sight” -risk? Would you look at Document C-21. That is GB-194, at Page 30 of the -Prosecution document book in English; Pages 59 and 60 in the German. -Now, just look at the second entry on Page 5, 2 January 1940: “Report by -IA.” That is you, is it not? That was you, was it not? - -WAGNER: Yes, but I cannot find the point which you are quoting. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Page 5 of the original, under the date of 2 January -1940. Report by IA on directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30 -December, referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in -connection with Case Yellow: - - “Through this directive the Navy will authorize, simultaneously - with the beginning of the general intensification of the war, - the sinking by U-boats without any warning of all ships in those - waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In - this case, for external consumption, the use of mines should be - simulated. The behavior of, and use of weapons by, U-boats - should be adapted to this purpose.” - -That has nothing to do with the arming of British merchant ships. That -is not the reason that is given, is it? The reason is because it fitted -in with your operations for Case Yellow. - -WAGNER: I did not understand the last sentence. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not give as your reason that the British were -arming their merchant ships. The reason you give is that it was -necessary in connection with intensified measures for Case Yellow. Why -is that? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The German translation is so inadequate that -it is almost impossible to understand the question. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I will put the question to you again. The excuse for -this directive is to be the intensification of measures in connection -with Case Yellow. You notice, do you not, that nothing is said about the -arming of British merchant ships as justifying this step? That is -correct, is it not? - -WAGNER: May I have time, please, to peruse these papers first? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Certainly. This was written by yourself, you know. - -WAGNER: No, that was not written by me. This measure really came within -the warning which was given to the neutrals on 24 November 1939. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Nothing is said about the warning of 24 November. If -you were entitled, as you have told us, under that to sink neutral -ships, there would not be any need for this special directive, would -there? - -WAGNER: No. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: No. Now, let us just... - -WAGNER: For military and political reasons we ordered that a hit by a -mine was to be simulated, and that is a special point of this order. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And just before we leave that document, have a look at -the entry on 18 January, will you? Have you got it? 18 January. - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: That is the actual order for sinking without warning. -You notice the last sentence: “Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan, -and Russia are exempted from these attacks.” - -And then Spain is added in pencil. Is it not right that you were out to -terrorize the small neutrals and to bully them, but you were not running -any risks with the big ones? - -WAGNER: No, that is not correct. The explanation is, of course, that one -must take military disadvantages into the bargain if one can obtain -political advantages for them. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, yes, it was just entirely a question of how it paid -you politically. That is all it was, was it not? - -WAGNER: Of course, all military actions were strongly influenced by the -political interests of one’s own country. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And because the Danes and the Swedes were not in any -position to make any serious protest, it did not matter sinking their -ships at sight. That is right, is it not? - -WAGNER: The motivation you give to this conduct is entirely incorrect. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, but what is the difference? - -WAGNER: We sank the ships of all neutrals in these areas with the -exception of those countries where we had a special political interest. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, you had no special political interest at this time -for Norway and Sweden and Denmark, so you sank their ships at sight. -That is right, is it not? - -WAGNER: We sank them because they entered this area despite warning. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, but if a Russian ship or a Japanese ship did that, -you would not sink it. - -WAGNER: No, not at that period of time. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I just want to show you what you actually did. Would -you look at Documents D-846 and 847? - -My Lord, they are two new documents. They will be GB-452 and 453. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Will you look at the first of these, that is -D-846? That is a telegram from your Minister at Copenhagen, dated 26 -September 1939. That is before your first warning and before any of -these zones had been declared. The second sentence: - - “Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines has - caused great anxiety here about Danish food transports to - England.” - -You see, you had started sinking ships of the small neutrals right away -in the first three weeks of the war, had you not? - -WAGNER: In single cases, yes; but there was always a very special reason -in those cases. I know that several incidents occurred with Danish and -Swedish ships in which ships had turned against the U-boat and the -U-boat in turn because of this resistance was forced to attack the ship. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You do not think it was because the blame could be put -upon mines? - -WAGNER: At this period not at all. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the second telegram, if you would; 26 March -1940, again from the German Minister at Copenhagen. It is the first -paragraph: - - “The King of Denmark today summoned me to his presence in order - to tell me what a deep impression the sinking of six Danish - ships last week, apparently without warning, had made on him and - on the whole country.” - -And then, passing on two sentences: - - “I replied that the reason why the ships sank had not yet been - clarified. In any case, our naval units always kept strictly to - the Prize Regulations; but vessels sailing in enemy convoy or in - the vicinity of the convoy took upon themselves all the risks of - war. If there were any cases of sinking without warning, it - seemed that they could be traced back to the German - notifications made to date. - - “At the same time I stressed the danger of the waters around the - British coast, where neutral shipping would inevitably be - involved in compromising situations on account of measures taken - by the British. The King assured me emphatically that none of - the Danish ships had sailed in convoy, but it would probably - never be possible subsequently to clear up without possibility - of doubt the incidents which had led to the sinking.” - -Have you any doubt that those six ships were sunk deliberately under -your sink-at-sight policy? - -WAGNER: Without checking the individual cases, I cannot answer this -question; but I am of the opinion that possibly these ships were sunk in -that area off the English coast where, because of heavy military -defenses, there would no longer be any question of open sea. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. We will come to an incident where I think I -can supply you with the details. Would you look at Document D-807? - -My Lord, that is a new document, it becomes GB-454. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You see, this document is dated 31 January -1940; and it refers to the sinking of three neutral ships, the -_Deptford_, the _Thomas Walton_, and the _Garoufalia_. The document is -in three parts. It first sets out the facts as they were known to you. -The second part is a note to the Foreign Office, and the third is a -draft reply for your Foreign Office to send to the neutral governments; -and if you look at the end of the document you will see “IA”; it -emanates from your department. - - “It is proposed in replying to Norwegian notes to admit only the - sinking by a German U-boat of the steamship _Deptford_, but to - deny the sinking of the two other steamers.” - -Would you follow it. - - “According to the data attached to the notes presented by the - Norwegian Government, the grounds for suspecting a torpedo to - have been the cause of the sinkings do in fact appear to be - equally strong in all these cases. According to the Norwegian - Foreign Minister’s speech of 19 January, the suspicion in Norway - of torpedoing by a German U-boat appears, however, to be - strongest in the case of the steamship _Deptford_, whereas in - the other two cases it is at least assumed that the possibility - of striking mines can be taken into account; this is considered - improbable in the case of the steamship _Deptford_, because - other vessels had passed the same spot. - - “The possibility that the steamship _Thomas Walton_ struck a - mine can be supported, since the torpedoing occurred towards - evening and nothing was observed, and also because several - explosions took place in the same area owing to misses by - torpedoes. - - “In the case of the steamship _Garoufalia_, a denial appears - expedient, if only because a neutral steamer is concerned, which - was attacked without warning. Since it was attacked by means of - an electric torpedo, no torpedo wake could be observed.” - -Do you say in the face of that that you did not deceive the neutrals? -That is the advice you were giving to the Defendant Raeder as his staff -officer, is it not? - -WAGNER: This memorandum did not emanate from me; it emanated from “Iia.” - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Where does it originate? - -WAGNER: That is the assistant of the expert on international law. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You would not have seen it? - -WAGNER: I do not recall this document. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Why do you say it emanated from “Iia?” It has “Ia” at -the end of it. - -WAGNER: If this memorandum was dispatched then I also saw it... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I will just read the next part of the note to remind -you. - - “The following facts have thus been ascertained:”—this is what - you are writing to the Foreign Office— - - “The steamer _Deptford_ was sunk by a German U-boat on 13 - December...” - -I am sorry. I should have started earlier. - - “It is suggested that Norwegian notes regarding the sinking of - the steamships _Deptford_, _Thomas Walton_, and _Garoufalia_ be - answered somewhat in the following manner: - - “As a result of the communication from the Norwegian Government, - the matter of the sinking of the steamships _Deptford_, _Thomas - Walton_, and _Garoufalia_ has been thoroughly investigated. The - following facts have thus been ascertained: - - “The steamer _Deptford_ was sunk by a German U-boat on 13 - December, as it was recognized as an armed enemy ship. According - to the report of the U-boat commander, the sinking did not take - place within territorial waters but immediately outside. The - German Naval Forces have strict instructions not to undertake - any war operations within neutral territorial waters. Should the - U-boat commander have miscalculated his position, as appears to - be borne out by the findings of the Norwegian authorities, and - should Norwegian territorial waters have been violated in - consequence, the German Government regrets this most sincerely. - As a result of this incident, the German Naval Forces have once - again been instructed unconditionally to respect neutral - territorial waters. If a violation of Norwegian territorial - waters has indeed occurred, there will be no repetition of it. - - “As far as the sinking of the steamships _Thomas Walton_ and - _Garoufalia_ is concerned, this cannot be traced to operations - by German U-boats, as at the time of the sinking none of them - were in the naval area indicated.” - -And then there is a draft reply put forward which is on very much the -same lines. - -And you say in the face of that document that the German Navy never -misled the neutrals? - -WAGNER: The neutrals had been advised that in these areas dangers of war -might be encountered. We were of the opinion that we were not obliged to -tell them through which war measures these areas were dangerous, or -through which war measures their ships were lost. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Is that really your answer to this document? This is a -complete lie, is it not? You admit the one sinking that you cannot get -away from. And you deny the others. You deny that there was a German -U-boat anywhere near, and you are telling this Tribunal that you were -justified in order to conceal the weapons you were using. Is that the -best answer you can give? - -WAGNER: Yes, certainly. We had no interest at all in letting the enemy -know what methods we were using in this area. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You are admitting that one of them was sunk by a -U-boat. Why not admit the other two as well? Why not say it was the same -U-boat? - -WAGNER: I assume that we were concerned with another area in which the -situation was different. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the difference? Why did you not say, “One of -our U-boats has made a mistake or disobeyed orders, and is responsible -for all these three sinkings?” Or, alternatively, why did you not say, -“We have given you fair warning, we are going to sink at sight anyone in -this area. And what is your complaint?” - -WAGNER: Obviously I did not consider it expedient. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It was considered expedient to deceive the neutrals. -And you, an Admiral in the German Navy, told me you did not do that ten -minutes ago. As a matter of fact, these three boats were all sunk by the -same U-boat, were they not? - -WAGNER: I cannot tell you that at the moment. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I say they were all sunk by _U-38_, and the dates of -sinking were: the _Deptford_, on 13 December, the _Garoufalia_ on the -11th, and the _Thomas Walton_ on the 7th. Do you dispute that? - -WAGNER: I did not understand the last sentence. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you dispute those details, or do you not remember? - -WAGNER: I cannot recall; but I actually believe it is impossible. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you another instance of deceiving the -neutrals, and this time it was your friends, the Spanish. Would you look -at C-105? - -My Lord, that is a new document; it becomes GB-455. It is an extract -from the SKL War Diary for 19 December 1940. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You kept the SKL War Diary yourself at that -time, did you not? - -WAGNER: No, I did not keep it, but I signed it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You signed it. Did you read it before you signed it? - -WAGNER: The essential parts, yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You see, it reads: “News from the Neutrals,” and it is -headed “Spain”: - - “According to a report from the naval attaché, Spanish fishing - vessel was sunk by a submarine of unknown nationality between - Las Palmas and Cape Juby. In the rescue boats the crew was - subjected to machine gun fire. Three men badly wounded. Landed - at Las Palmas on 18 December. Italians suspected. (Possibility - it might have been _U-37_).” - -Then on 20 December, the next day: - - “Commander, Submarine Fleet, will be informed of Spanish report - regarding sinking of Spanish fishing vessel by submarine of - unknown nationality on 16 December between Las Palmas and Cape - Juby, and requested to conduct an investigation. On the - responsibility of the Naval Operations Staff it is confirmed to - our naval attaché in Madrid that, regarding the sinking, there - is no question of a German submarine.” - -When you reported that, you thought it possible, did you not, that it -might have been _U-37_; is that not so? - -WAGNER: It seems to me that in the meantime it became known that it was -not _U-37_. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I will read on. This is under date of 21 December: - - “_U-37_ reports: a torpedo fired at a tanker of the _Kopbard_ - type (7329) ran off in a circle and probably hit an Amphitrite - submarine in the tanker’s convoy. Tanker burned out. Spanish - steamer _St. Carlos_ (300) without distinguishing marks, through - concentrated gunfire. Nine torpedoes left. - - “Then _U-37_ torpedoed French tanker _Rhone_ and the submarine - _Sfax_ and sank the Spanish fishing vessel.” - -And then, if you will read the next entry. - - “We shall continue to maintain to the outside world that there - is no question of a German or Italian submarine in the sea area - in question being responsible for the sinkings.” - -Do you still say that you did not deceive the neutrals? - -WAGNER: This case is doubtless a deception, but I do not remember for -what particular reason this deception was carried through. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: But it is pretty discreditable, is it not? Do you -regard that as creditable to the German Navy, that conduct? - -WAGNER: No, this... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did the Defendant Raeder sign the War Diary? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you tell the Defendant Dönitz what answer you were -giving to the Spaniards and the Norwegians? - -WAGNER: That I do not recall. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: He would get a copy, would he not? - -WAGNER: I did not understand you. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You would send him a copy, would you not, of your note -to the Foreign Office? - -WAGNER: That is possible. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, does the signature of the Defendant -Raeder appear at the end of this document, C-105? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I regret to say I have not checked that. But -as the witness has said, the practice was that he was to sign the War -Diary, and that the Commander-in-Chief was to sign it periodically. - -Is that right, Witness? - -WAGNER: Yes. On the next page, on 21 December my signature appears as -well as those of Admiral Fricke, Admiral Schniewind, and Admiral Raeder. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I would be very grateful to the Prosecution -if the documents which concern the Defendant Raeder would also be given -to me, for it is relatively difficult for me to follow the situation -otherwise. I have received none of these documents. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I am extremely sorry, My Lord. That is my fault, and I -will see that Dr. Siemers has the copies tonight. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now at this point until tomorrow morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED - AND TWENTY-NINTH DAY - Tuesday, 14 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The witness Wagner resumed the stand._] - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember the sinking of the _Monte Corbea_ in -September 1942? - -WAGNER: I have some recollection of it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: That was the ship in respect to which the Defendant -Dönitz sent a telegram to the U-boat commander, threatening him with -court-martial on his return because he had sunk the ship after -recognizing it as a neutral. Now, in 1942 the friendship of Spain was -very important to Germany, was it not? - -WAGNER: I assume so. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You told us yesterday that Admiral Raeder was -considering Mediterranean policy—recommending it. Now that was the -reason, was it not, why the U-boat commander was threatened with -court-martial, that it mattered in 1942 if you sank a Spanish ship? - -WAGNER: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the commander -of the U-boat in question had obviously not acted according to the -directives of the Commander of U-boats. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It did not matter in 1940 when you thought you were -winning the war, but in September 1942 I suggest to you it became -politically inexpedient to sink a Spanish ship; is that not right? - -WAGNER: You will have to ask the political departments of the German -Reich about that. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: If that is the answer, do you think it is unfair to -describe your attitude to the sinking of neutral ships as cynical and -opportunist? - -WAGNER: No, I reject that absolutely. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I want to ask you one or two questions about the -witness Heisig. You spoke yesterday of a conversation in the jail here -in the first week of December 1945. - -WAGNER: In December 1945? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. You knew at the time you spoke to Heisig that he -was going to be called as a witness, did you not? - -WAGNER: That could be assumed from his presence here at Nuremberg. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And you knew you were going to be called as a witness, -did you not? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not tell the -defense lawyers about this conversation until quite recently? - -WAGNER: I did not understand the sense of your question. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not report -this conversation with Heisig to the defense lawyers until quite -recently? - -WAGNER: I think it was in February or March when I told the Defense -Counsel about this conversation. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now I just want to put the dates to you. The U-boat -Commander Eck was sentenced to death on 20 October. Do you know that? - -WAGNER: I did not know the date. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Death sentence was passed by the Commission on 21 -November and he was executed on 30 November. That is to say he was -executed before you had this conversation. Did you know that? - -WAGNER: No. I just discovered that now. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: At any rate, the witness Heisig knew it before he gave -his evidence, did he not? - -WAGNER: Obviously not. Otherwise, he would most likely have told me -about it. Previously, he had for 10 days... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you just listen to a question and answer from his -cross-examination. It is Page 2676 of the transcript (Volume V, Page -227). This is a question by Dr. Kranzbühler: - - “In your hearing on 27 November were you not told that the death - sentence against Eck and Hoffmann had already been set?” - - Answer: “I do not know whether it was on 27 November. I know - only that here I was told of the fact that the death sentence - had been carried out. The date I cannot remember. I was in - several hearings.” - -Now if that is right... - -THE PRESIDENT: What date was that evidence given? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: That was given on 14 January, My Lord; Page 2676 of the -transcript (Volume V, Page 227). - -WAGNER: I did not understand who gave this testimony. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: The witness Heisig, when he gave evidence here in -Court. So that whether or not he was deceived, as you suggest, before he -gave his affidavit, he at least knew the true facts before he gave -evidence here to the Tribunal? - -WAGNER: Then he told an untruth to me. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you one question on the order of 17 -September 1942. That is the order that you say you monitored in the -naval war staff and saw nothing wrong with it. Did the Defendant Raeder -see that order? - -WAGNER: That I cannot say with certainty. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You were Chief of Staff Operations at that time? - -WAGNER: Yes, but one cannot expect me to remember every incident in 6 -years of war. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, no, but this was an important order, was it not? - -WAGNER: Certainly, but there were many important orders in the course of -6 years. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you normally show an important operational order -to the Commander-in-Chief? - -WAGNER: It was my task to submit all important matters to the Chief of -Staff of the Naval Operations Staff, and he decided which matters were -to be submitted to the Grossadmiral. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you saying that you would not have shown this to -the Chief of Staff? - -WAGNER: No. I am sure he had knowledge of it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Have you any doubt that this order would have been -shown to Admiral Raeder? - -WAGNER: That I cannot say; I do not recall whether he received it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now I want to ask one or two questions about your tasks -as Admiral, Special Duties. You became Admiral, Special Duties, in June -1944, is that right? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And from then on you attended the important conferences -with Admiral Dönitz and in his absence represented him, did you not? - -WAGNER: I never participated in any discussions as his representative. -Dönitz was represented by the Chief of the SKL. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now at that stage of the war all questions were -important insofar as they affected military operations in one way or -another, were they not? - -WAGNER: At every stage of the war all military questions are of -importance. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: What I am putting to you is that at that stage of the -war the importance of all questions chiefly depended on how they -affected the military situation. - -WAGNER: Yes, that, I imagine, one has to admit. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And during that period Germany was virtually governed -by the decisions taken at the Führer’s headquarters, was it not? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now I want you to look at a record of one of Admiral -Dönitz’ visits—My Lord, this is D-863; it is a new document and becomes -Exhibit GB-456. - -Now that is a record of a visit to the Führer’s headquarters on 28 and -29 of August 1943. You were not there yourself, but your immediate -superior Vice Admiral Meisel accompanied Admiral Dönitz, and the names -of the Naval Delegation are set out at the top of the page: Admiral -Dönitz, Vice Admiral Meisel, Kapitän zur See Rehm, _et cetera_. And your -program as set out was: After your arrival, at 1130, conversation with -Commander-in-Chief Navy, Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe; 1300, situation -conference with the Führer, closing with a further conversation between -the Commander-in-Chief Navy and the Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe; then -at 1600 the Commander-in-Chief Navy left. After that Admiral Meisel had -a conversation with Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office. Then a -conversation with General Jodl, an evening conference with the Führer, -and then at midnight a conference with Reichsführer-SS Himmler. On the -next day the usual conference with the Führer; then a conference with -the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. And then he left. - -Now, is that a fair sample of what went on whenever Admiral Dönitz -visited; that he had conversations, various conferences with other -officials? - -WAGNER: That is a typical example of a visit of the Grossadmiral at the -headquarters, insofar as he participated only in situation conferences -with the Führer, and in addition he had military discussions with the -Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And that shows, does it not, the whole business of -government being carried on at the Führer’s headquarters? - -WAGNER: No, not at all. I have already said the Grossadmiral only -participated at the situation conference, that is, the military -situation conference with the Führer and beyond that one or even two -discussions with the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And with General Jodl or Field Marshal Keitel, somebody -from the Foreign Office, and so on? - -WAGNER: Otherwise the Grossadmiral had no discussions of any sort, as -can be seen from the document, for on 28 August at 1600 hours he -returned by air. The other discussions were discussions of the Chief of -Staff of the SKL, the... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: But I was putting it to you that this was a typical -visit. If Admiral Dönitz had not left, he would have had these other -conversations and not Admiral Meisel, is that not right? - -WAGNER: No, not at all. The Chief of Staff of the SKL very rarely had -the opportunity of coming to headquarters; and according to the record -here, he obviously used his opportunity to contact a few of the -leading... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I do not want to waste time with it. I suggest to you -that when Admiral Dönitz went there he normally saw many other ministers -and conversed with them on any business affecting the Navy. - -WAGNER: Naturally, the Admiral discussed all questions affecting the -Navy with those who were concerned with them. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you one or two questions on the -minutes with regard to the Geneva Convention—that is C-158, GB-209, -Page 69 of the English Prosecution’s document book, or Page 102 of the -German. Will you look at Page 102. - -Now you, as you told us yesterday, initialed those minutes, did you not; -and a copy was marked to you, is that not right? - -WAGNER: Yes, I signed these minutes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes; were they accurate? - -WAGNER: They contained salient points about the things which had -happened at headquarters. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: They were an accurate record, were they? - -WAGNER: Undoubtedly I believed that things had taken place as they are -recorded here. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, did you agree with Admiral Dönitz’ advice that it -would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without -warning and at all costs to save face with the outer world? Did you -agree with that? - -WAGNER: I already explained yesterday, clearly and unequivocally, how I -interpreted this sentence which was formulated by me; and I have nothing -to add to that statement. In the sense which I stated yesterday, I agree -completely. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And the step which Hitler wanted to take was to put -prisoners of war in the bombed towns, was it not? Was that not the -breach of the Convention that he wanted to make? - -WAGNER: No, it was the renunciation of all the Geneva agreements; not -only the agreement about prisoners of war, but also the agreement on -hospitals ships, the Red Cross agreement, and other agreements which had -been made at Geneva. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Then what were the measures considered necessary which -could be taken without warning? Just look at that sentence. - -WAGNER: I do not understand that. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the last sentence, “It would be better to carry -out the measures considered necessary.” What were those measures? - -WAGNER: They were not discussed at all. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you see any difference between the advice which -Admiral Dönitz was giving them and the advice which you described as the -rather romantic ideas of a young expert on the document about sinking -without warning at night? Let me put it to you; what the naval officer -said on the Document C-191 was: “Sink without warning. Do not give -written permission. Say it was a mistake for an armed merchant -cruiser...” - -We have Admiral Dönitz saying, “Do not break the rules, tell no one -about it and at all costs save face with the world.” - -Do you see any difference? - -WAGNER: I already testified yesterday that the difference is very great. -Admiral Dönitz opposed the renunciation of the Geneva Convention and -said that even if measures to intimidate deserters or countermeasures -against bombing attacks on cities were to be taken, the Geneva -Convention should not be renounced in any case. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to put to you a few questions about -prisoners of war. So far as naval prisoners of war were concerned, they -remained in the custody of the Navy, did they not? - -WAGNER: I am not informed about the organization of prisoner-of-war -camps. According to my recollection they were first put into a naval -transit camp. Then they were sent to other camps; but I do not know -whether these camps were under the jurisdiction of the Navy or the OKW. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Have you not seen the defense documents about the Camp -Marlag telling us how well they were treated? Have you not seen them? - -WAGNER: No. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, naval prisoners, when they were captured by your -forces, their capture was reported to the naval war staff, was it not? - -WAGNER: Such captures were, in general, reported as part of the -situation reports. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, do you remember the Commando Order of 18 October -1942? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You actually signed the order passing that Führer Order -on to commands, did you not? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the document is C-179, and that was put in as -United States Exhibit 543 (USA-543). It is in that bundle that Sir David -Maxwell-Fyfe handed to the Tribunal when cross-examining the defendant. -I think it is either the last or very near to the last document in the -bundle. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Did you approve of that order? - -WAGNER: I regretted that one had to resort to this order, but in the -first paragraph the reasons for it are set forth so clearly that I had -to recognize its justification. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You knew what handing over to the SD meant, did you -not? You knew that meant shooting? - -WAGNER: No, that could have meant a lot of things. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: What did you think it meant? - -WAGNER: It could have meant that the people were interrogated for the -counterintelligence; it could have meant that they were to be kept -imprisoned under more severe conditions, and finally it could have meant -that they might be shot. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: But you had no doubt that it meant that they might be -shot, had you? - -WAGNER: The possibility that they might be shot undoubtedly existed. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, and did that occur to you when you signed the -order sending it on to commanders? - -WAGNER: I would like to refer to Paragraph 1 of this order, where it... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you mind answering the question? Did it occur to you -that they might be shot when you signed the order sending it on to -commanders? - -WAGNER: Yes, the possibility was clear to me. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness was asked whether he approved of -this order. I do not think that Colonel Phillimore can cut off the -witness’ answer by saying that he may not refer to Paragraph 1 of the -order. I believe that Paragraph 1 of the order is of decisive importance -for this witness. Mr. President, the witness Admiral Wagner... - -THE PRESIDENT: You have an opportunity of re-examining the witness. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then why do you interrupt? - -DR. SIEMERS: Because Colonel Phillimore has interrupted the answer of -the witness and I believe that even in cross-examination the answer of -the witness must be at least heard. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal does not agree with you. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I understood him to have already made some -point that the defendant made once? I only interrupted him when he -sought to make it again. - -[_Turning to the witness._] I put my question once again. When you -signed the order sending this document on to lower commanders, did it -occur to you then that these men would probably be shot? - -WAGNER: The possibility that these people who were turned over to the SD -might be shot was clear to me. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Was it also... - -WAGNER: I have not finished yet. But only those people who had not been -captured by the Wehrmacht were to be handed over to the SD. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did it also occur to you that they would be shot -without trial? - -WAGNER: Yes, that can be concluded from the order. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And what do you mean by saying that it only referred to -those not captured by the Wehrmacht? Would you look at Paragraph 3. - - “From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in - Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are - to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, - whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be - slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference - whether they landed from ships or airplanes for their actions of - whether they were dropped by parachutes. Even if these - individuals when found should apparently seem to give themselves - up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each - individual case full information is to be sent to the OKW for - publication in the OKW communiqué.” - -Are you saying it did not refer to men captured by the military forces? - -WAGNER: Yes, I maintain that statement. There is nothing in the entire -paragraph which says these men who were captured by the Wehrmacht were -to be turned over to the SD. That was the question. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, read on in the last paragraph. - - “If individual members of such Commandos, such as agents, - saboteurs, _et cetera_, fall into the hands of the military - forces by some other means, for example through the Police in - occupied territories, they are to be handed over immediately to - the SD.” - -WAGNER: Yes. It is expressly stated here that only those people are to -be turned over to the SD who are not captured by the Wehrmacht but by -the Police; in that case the Wehrmacht could not take them over. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Indeed it is not. That capture by the Police is given -as one possible instance. But you know, you know in practice, do you -not, that there were several instances where Commandos were captured by -the Navy and handed over to the SD under this order? Do you not know -that? - -WAGNER: No. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, let me just remind you. Would you look at -Document 512-PS. - -That is also in that bundle, My Lord, as United States Exhibit 546 -(USA-546). It is the second document. According to the last sentence of -the Führer Order of 18 October: - - “Individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order - to keep them for interrogation. Importance of this measure was - proven in the cases of Glomfjord, the two-man torpedo at - Trondheim, and the glider plane at Stavanger, where - interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy - intentions.” - -And then it goes on to another case, the case of the Geronde. - -Do you say that you do not remember the two-man torpedo attack on the -_Tirpitz_ in Trondheim Fjord? - -WAGNER: No, no. I am not asserting that I do not remember it. I do -remember it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Did you not see in the Wehrmacht communiqué after -that attack what had happened to the man who was captured? - -WAGNER: I cannot recall it at the moment. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Let me just remind you. One man was captured, Robert -Paul Evans, just as he was getting across the Swedish border, and he -was—that attack took place in October 1942—he was executed in January -1943, on 19 January 1943. - -My Lord, the reference to that might be convenient; it is Document -UK-57, which was put in as Exhibit GB-64. - -[_Turning to the witness._] - -Do you say that you do not remember seeing any report of his capture or -of his shooting or of his interrogation? - -WAGNER: No, I believe I remember that, but this man... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now what do you remember? Just tell us what you -remember. Do you remember seeing his capture reported? - -WAGNER: I no longer know that. I remember there was a report that a -considerable time after the attack on the _Tirpitz_ a man was captured, -but to my knowledge not by the Navy. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you look at the Document D-864, a sworn -statement. - -My Lord, through some error I am afraid I have not got it here. May I -just put the facts, and if necessary put in the document if I can -produce it in time. - -[_Turning to the witness._] I suggest to you that Robert Paul Evans, -after his capture, was personally interrogated by the -Commander-in-Chief, Navy, of the Norwegian North Coast. Do you say you -know nothing of that? - -WAGNER: Yes, I maintain that I do not remember it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You see, this was the first two-man torpedo attack by -the British Navy against the German naval forces, was it not? That is -so, is it not? - -WAGNER: Yes, that is possible. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: No, but you must know that, do you not? You were Chief -of Staff Operations at the time. - -WAGNER: I believe it was the first time. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you say that the results of that important -interrogation were not reported to you in the naval war staff? - -WAGNER: They were certainly reported, but nevertheless I cannot remember -that the Commanding Admiral in Norway actually conducted this -interrogation. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you see a report by that admiral? - -WAGNER: I do not know where it originated, but I am certain I saw a -report of that kind. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Was it clear to you that that report was based on -interrogation? - -WAGNER: Yes, I think so. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And you say you did not know that this man Evans, some -two months after his capture, was taken out and shot under the Führer -order? - -WAGNER: Yes, I maintain that I do not remember that. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I will put you another instance. Do you remember the -Bordeaux incident in December 1942? - -That is 526-PS, My Lord. That is also in the bundle. It was originally -put in as United States Exhibit 502 (USA-502). - -[_Turning to the witness._] I am sorry; it is the Toftefjord incident I -am putting to you, 526-PS. Do you remember this incident in Toftefjord -in March 1943? - -WAGNER: I do remember that about this time an enemy cutter was seized in -a Norwegian fjord. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. And did you not see in the Wehrmacht communiqué -“Führer Order executed”? - -WAGNER: If it said so in the Wehrmacht communiqué then I must have read -it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Have you any doubt that you knew that the men captured -in that attack were shot, and that you knew it at the time? - -WAGNER: Apparently he was shot while being captured. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: If you look at the document: - - “Enemy cutter engaged. Cutter blown up by the enemy. Crew, 2 - dead men, 10 prisoners.” - -Then look down: - - “Führer Order executed by SD.” - -That means those 10 men were shot, does it not? - -WAGNER: It must mean that. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Now I just put to you the document that I referred -to on the Trondheim episode, D-864. This is an affidavit by a man who -was in charge of the SD at Bergen and later at Trondheim, and it is the -second paragraph: - - “I received the order by teletype letter or radiogram from the - Commander of the Security Police and the SD, Oslo, to transfer - Evans from Trondheim Missions Hotel to the BDS, Oslo. - - “I cannot say who signed the radiogram or the teletype letter - from Oslo. I am not sure to whom I transmitted the order, but I - think it was to Hauptsturmführer Hollack. I know that the - Commanding Admiral of the Norwegian Northern Coast had - interrogated Evans himself.” - -And then he goes on to deal with Evans’ clothing. - -I put it to you once again: Do you say that you did not know from the -Admiral, Northern Coast himself that he had interrogated this man? - -WAGNER: Yes, I am asserting that. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, I will take you to one more incident which you -knew about, as is shown by your own war diary. Would you look at the -Document D-658. - -My Lord, this document was put in as GB-229. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, that is an extract from the SKL War -Diary, is it not? - -WAGNER: Let me examine it first. I do not have the impression that... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You said yesterday that it was from the war diary of -the Naval Commander, West France, but I think that was a mistake, was it -not? - -WAGNER: I did not make any statement yesterday on the origin of the war -diary. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Just read the first sentence. I think it shows clearly -it was the SKL War Diary. - - “9 December 1942. The Naval Commander, West France, - reports”—and then it sets out the incident. And then, the third - sentence: - - “The Naval Commander, West France, has ordered that both - soldiers be shot immediately for attempted sabotage if their - interrogation, which has been begun, confirms what has so far - been discovered; their execution has, however, been postponed in - order to obtain more information. - - “According to a Wehrmacht report”—I think that is a - mistranslation; it should be “According to the Wehrmacht - communiqué”—“both soldiers had meanwhile been shot. The measure - would be in accordance with the Führer’s special order, but is - nevertheless something new in international law, since the - soldiers were in uniform.” - -That is from the SKL War Diary, is it not? - -WAGNER: I do not think that this is the War Diary of the SKL; but rather -it would seem to be the war diary of the Naval Group Command, West, or -the Commanding Admiral in France. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, I will get the original here and clear the matter -up later, but I suggest to you that this is the SKL War Diary, which at -the time... - -WAGNER: I cannot recognize that assertion until it is proved by the -original. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And I suggest to you that you, who were Chief of Staff -Operations at the time, must have been fully aware of that incident. Do -you deny that? - -WAGNER: I deny—I maintain that I do not remember that affair. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you say that a matter of that sort would not be -reported to you? - -WAGNER: I have been told here that the order to shoot these people was -obtained from headquarters directly by the SD. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, finally, I put to you the incident of the capture -of the seven seamen, six of the Norwegian Navy and one of the Royal -Navy, at Ulven near Bergen in July 1943. That is the document D-649 in -the Prosecution document book, GB-208. - -Do you remember this incident? Do you remember the capture of these -seven men by Admiral Von Schrader with his two task forces? - -WAGNER: I saw this paper while I was being interrogated, and that is why -I remember it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: But do you remember the incident? - -WAGNER: No, not from my personal recollection. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You were still Chief of Staff Operations. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is Page 67 of the English document book, -Page 100 in the German. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Do you say that as Chief of Staff Operations -you do not remember any of these incidents? - -WAGNER: Yes, I assert and maintain what I have already said about this. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did not your operational—did your commanders not -report when they captured an enemy Commando? - -WAGNER: I must assume that those things were also reported in the -situation reports. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, you are really suggesting that you have forgotten -all about these incidents now? - -WAGNER: In all my testimony I have strictly adhered to what I personally -remember. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know what happened to these men? You know they -were captured in uniform, do you not? There was a naval officer with -gold braid around his arm. That is a badge you use in the German Navy, -is it not? - -WAGNER: I have already said that I do not recall this affair. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, let me just tell you and remind you. After -interrogation by naval officers and officers of the SD, both of whom -recommended prisoner-of-war treatment, these men were handed over by the -Navy to the SD for shooting. They were taken to a concentration camp, -and at 4 o’clock in the morning they were led out one by one, -blindfolded, fettered, not told they were going to be shot, and shot one -by one on the rifle range. Do you know that? - -WAGNER: No. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you know that is what handing over to the SD meant? - -WAGNER: I have already said that handing over to the SD implied several -possibilities. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know that then their bodies were sunk in the -fjord with charges attached, and destroyed, as it says in the document, -“in the usual way”—Paragraph 10 of the affidavit—and their belongings -in the concentration camp were burned? - -WAGNER: No, I do not know that. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. A further point: Do you remember that in -March or April 1945, at the very end of the war, do you remember that -this order, the Führer Order, was cancelled by Keitel? - -That is Paragraph 11 of the affidavit, My Lord. - -Do you remember that? Just read it. - -WAGNER: Yes, I have heard of that. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. You thought you were losing the war by then, and -you had better cancel the Commando Order, is that not the fact? - -WAGNER: I do not know for what reasons the OKW rescinded orders. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Is not this right: You did not worry about this order -in 1942 when you thought you were winning the war, but when you found -you were losing it, you began to worry about international law. Is not -that what happened? - -WAGNER: It is absolutely impossible for me to investigate orders. This -paragraph of the Commando Order states clearly and distinctly that these -Commandos had orders—that these Commandos were composed partly of -criminal elements of the occupied territories—that they had orders to -kill prisoners whom they found a burden, that other Commandos had orders -to kill all captives; and that orders to this effect had fallen into our -hands. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you ever make any inquiries to see whether that was -true? - -WAGNER: It is absolutely impossible for me to investigate official -information which I receive from my superiors. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You were Chief of Staff Operations; you received every -report on the Commando raids, did you not? - -WAGNER: I gave detailed evidence in each individual case, but I cannot -make a general statement. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: When you were Chief of Staff Operations, did you not -receive a full report every time there was a British Commando raid? - -WAGNER: I have already said that I believe such incidents formed part of -the situation reports to the SKL. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I suggest you can answer that question perfectly -straight if you wanted to. Here you were, a Senior Staff Officer, -Commando Raids. Are you saying you did not personally see and read a -full report on every one? - -WAGNER: I am not asserting that. I have answered each individual -question by stating exactly what I remember. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you say that taking these men out and shooting them -without a trial, without telling them they were going to be shot, -without seeing a priest, do you say that... - -WAGNER: With regard to the Navy... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you say that was not murder? - -WAGNER: I do not wish to maintain that at all. I do maintain that I was -presumably told about the cases in which men were shot by the Navy, and -I am of the opinion that these people who were captured as saboteurs -were not soldiers, but were criminals who, in accordance with their -criminal... - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Let us get it perfectly clear. Are you saying that the -action taken in shooting these Commandos on all these occasions—are you -saying that was perfectly, proper and justified? I thought you agreed -with me it was murder, just now. Which is it? - -WAGNER: I would like to answer that in each individual case. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a very simple question to answer generally and it -takes less time. Do you say that men captured in uniform should be taken -out and shot without trial? - -WAGNER: I cannot consider men of whom I know that they have orders to -commit crimes, as soldiers, within international law. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you saying that this action was perfectly -proper—are you? - -WAGNER: Yes, entirely and perfectly. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Shoot helpless prisoners without trial, bully little -neutrals who cannot complain? That is your policy, is it? - -WAGNER: Not at all. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: What crime did Robert Paul Evans commit, who attacked -the _Tirpitz_ in a two-man torpedo? - -WAGNER: I am convinced it was proved that he belonged to a sabotage -unit, and that besides the purely naval character of the attack on the -ship, there were other aspects which marked him as a saboteur. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And you said just now that you did not remember the -incident? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you agree on this, will you agree with me, that if -this shooting by the SD was murder, you and Admiral Dönitz and Admiral -Raeder, who signed the orders under which this was done, are just as -guilty as the men who shot them? - -WAGNER: The person who issued the order is responsible for it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And that person who passed it and approved it; is not -that right? - -WAGNER: I assume full responsibility for the transmission of this order. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Your Lordship, I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, D-658 was an old exhibit, was it not? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you given new exhibit numbers to all the new -documents? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I am very much obliged, Your Lordship. I did omit to -give a new exhibit number to the affidavit by Flesch. - -THE PRESIDENT: D-864. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: D-864. My Lord, it should be GB-457. My Lord, I am very -sorry. I was not advised, but I got it. - -THE PRESIDENT: And all the others you have given numbers to? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Is there any other cross-examination? Then, -does Dr. Kranzbühler wish to re-examine? Dr. Kranzbühler, I see it is -nearly half-past eleven, so perhaps we had better adjourn for ten -minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Before Dr. Kranzbühler goes on with his re-examination, I -shall announce the Tribunal’s decisions with reference to the -applications which were made recently in court. - -The first application on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach was for a -witness Hans Marsalek to be produced for cross-examination, and that -application is granted. - -The second application was for interrogatories to a witness Kaufmann, -and that is granted. - -The next matter was an application on behalf of the Defendant Hess for -five documents; and as to that, the Tribunal orders that two of the -documents applied for under Heads B and D in Dr. Seidl’s application -have already been published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, and one of them -is already in evidence, and they will, therefore, be admitted. - -The Tribunal considers that the documents applied for under Heads C and -E of Dr. Seidl’s application are unsatisfactory and have no evidential -value; and since it does not appear from Dr. Seidl’s application and the -matters referred to therein that the alleged copies are copies of any -original documents, the application is denied in respect thereof. But -leave is granted to Dr. Seidl to file a further affidavit by Gaus -covering his recollection of what was in the alleged agreements. - -The application on behalf of the Defendant Funk for an affidavit by a -witness called Kallus is granted. - -The application on behalf of the Defendant Streicher is denied. The -application on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel firstly for a witness -named Biedermann is granted, and secondly for four documents; that -application is also granted. - -The application on behalf of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart for an -interrogatory to Dr. Stuckart is granted. - -The application on behalf of the Defendant Frick is granted for an -interrogatory to a witness, Dr. Konrad. - -The application on behalf of the Defendant Göring with reference to two -witnesses is granted in the sense that the witnesses are to be alerted. - -The application on behalf of the Defendants Hess and Frank for official -information from the ministry of war of the United States of America is -denied. - -That is all. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I would like to put another question to you -on the subject of the Commando Order. - -Did the Naval Operations Staff have any part in introducing this order? - -WAGNER: No, no part at all. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you, did the Naval Operations Staff have -the possibility, either before or during the drafting of the order, of -investigating the correctness of the particulars mentioned in Paragraph -1 of the order? - -WAGNER: No, such a possibility did not exist. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The treatment of a man who had attacked the -_Tirpitz_ with a two-man torpedo in October 1942 has just been discussed -here. Did you know that a year later, in the autumn of 1943, there was a -renewed attack on the _Tirpitz_ with two-man torpedoes, and that the -British sailors who were captured at that time were treated in -accordance with the Geneva Convention by the Navy, who had captured -them? - -WAGNER: The second attack on the _Tirpitz_ is known to me. I do not -remember the treatment of the prisoners. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mentioned that the Naval Operations -Staff possibly received reports on the statements made by men of -Commando units. From what aspect did those reports interest the Naval -Operations Staff? Did operational questions interest you, or the -personal fate of these people? - -WAGNER: Naturally we were interested in the tactical and operational -problems so that we could gather experiences and draw our conclusions -from them. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you actually remember seeing such a -report? - -WAGNER: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just now a document was shown to you dealing -with the treatment of a Commando unit captured in a Norwegian fjord. It -is Number 526-PS. Do you still have that document? - -WAGNER: Possibly, some documents are still lying here. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you have a look at that document. I am -having the document handed to you. In the third paragraph you will find -a reference to the fact that this Commando unit was carrying 1,000 -kilograms of explosives. Is that correct? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you understand my question? - -WAGNER: I answered “yes.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am sorry, I did not hear you. - -In the fifth paragraph you will find that the Commando unit had orders -to carry out sabotage against strong points, battery positions, troop -barracks, and bridges, and to organize a system for the purpose of -further sabotage. Is that correct? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did these assignments have anything to do -with the Navy? - -WAGNER: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you see any indication in the whole -document which would suggest that the Navy had anything at all to do -with the capture or the treatment of this Commando unit? - -WAGNER: No, the document does not contain an indication of that sort. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were asked this morning about the case -of the _Monte Corbea_. In connection with a court-martial ruling against -the commander, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, sent -a wireless message at that time to all commanders. This radiogram is -recorded in Document Dönitz-78 in the document book, Volume IV, Page -230. I shall read that wireless message to you: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy has personally and expressly - renewed his instructions that all U-boat commanders must adhere - strictly to the orders regarding the treatment of neutral ships. - Any infringement of these orders has incalculable political - consequences. This order is to be communicated to all commanders - immediately.” - -Do you see any suggestion here that the order is restricted to Spanish -ships? - -WAGNER: No, there is no such suggestion in this order. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I submit to you a document which was used -yesterday, D-807. It deals with notes to the Norwegian Government on the -sinking of several steamers and contains the drafts of these notes of -the High Command of the Navy. Does this document yield any indication at -all that the notes were actually sent, or is it impossible to tell from -the drafts that the notes themselves were ever dispatched? - -WAGNER: Since there are no initials or signatures on either of these -letters; they may be drafts. At any rate, proof that they were actually -sent is not apparent from this document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the page number of it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It was submitted yesterday, Mr. President. -It is not in any document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now read to you the first sentence from -another document which was put to you yesterday. Its number is D-846 and -it concerns a discussion with the German Minister to Denmark, -Renthe-Fink, on 26 September 1939. I shall read the first sentence to -you: - - “Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines have - caused considerable concern here on account of the Danish food - transports to Great Britain.” - -Does this report give any indication that these sinkings took place -without warning, or were these ships sunk because contraband was -captured on them in the course of a legitimate search? - -WAGNER: The sentence which you have just read does not show how these -ships were sunk. As far as I remember the document from yesterday, it -does not contain any reference to the way in which these ships were -sunk, so that it must be assumed as a matter of course that they were -sunk in accordance with the Prize Ordinance. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were asked yesterday whether you -considered the German note to the neutral countries of 24 November 1939 -a fair warning against entering certain waters and you answered the -question in the affirmative. Is that right? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And then you were asked whether we had -deceived the neutrals, and you answered that question with “no.” Did -this negative answer apply to the previous question on the warning -against sailing in certain waters, or did it refer to all the political -measures with regard to neutral states which the German Government took -in order to conceal their own political intentions? - -WAGNER: The answer in that context referred to the previous questions -which had been asked about warning the neutrals promptly of the measures -which we adopted for the war at sea. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I want to make this point quite clear. Do -you have any doubt whatever that the pretense of minefields in the -operational zones around the British Coast served not only the purpose -of deceiving the enemy defense, but also the political purpose of -concealing from the neutrals the weapons which we employed in the war at -sea? - -WAGNER: Yes, I expressly confirm this two-fold purpose. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The two-fold purpose of secrecy? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you have any doubt whatever that the -German Government denied to neutral governments that certain ships were -sunk by U-boats, although they had in fact been sunk by U-boats? - -WAGNER: Yes. Or rather, no. I have no doubt that the denials were -formulated in that way, as a generally accepted political measure -adopted wherever indicated. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yesterday you admitted the possibility that -Admiral Dönitz, as Commander-in-Chief of U-boats, may have received -knowledge from the Naval Operations Staff of the handling of political -incidents caused by U-boats. Can you, after careful recollection, name a -single instance when he did in fact receive from the SKL information on -the political measures adopted? - -WAGNER: No, I do not remember such an instance. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have explained the basis of the Commando -Order, as far as the Naval Operations Staff is concerned, by referring -to Hitler’s definite assertions that he had in his possession enemy -orders saying that prisoners were to be killed. In connection with this -Commando Order Colonel Phillimore dealt with the case of the British -sailor Evans in great detail. In my opinion that case has not so far -been clarified. Colonel Phillimore spoke of the murder of a soldier. I -think that in spite of the soundness of the documents the Prosecution is -mistaken about the facts, also in a legal respect. Will you once more -look at both documents, Document D-864... - -Mr. President, that is Exhibit GB-457, discussed by Colonel Phillimore -this morning. - -This is an affidavit by Gerhard Flesch. The Prosecution quoted the -sentence which states that the Commanding Admiral of the Northern Coast -of Norway had interrogated Evans personally. Admiral Wagner, does that -sentence show that Evans was a prisoner of the Navy? - -WAGNER: No. - -DR. SIEMERS: What was the situation according to the Flesch affidavit? -Will you please clarify it? - -WAGNER: According to the second paragraph of that affidavit, Evans must -have been in the hands of the SD. - -DR. SIEMERS: That is right. - -And, Mr. President, may I add that at the beginning of the affidavit -Flesch states that he was the commander of the Security Police. The -Security Police had captured Evans; he was therefore a prisoner of the -SD. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Is it correct, therefore, that the British -sailor Evans was available to the German admiral in Norway for the sole -purpose of being interrogated? - -WAGNER: Undoubtedly. - -DR. SIEMERS: And the admiral was interested in interrogating him merely -to obtain purely factual information on the attack on the _Tirpitz_. Is -that correct? - -WAGNER: Quite correct. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you to look at the next paragraph of the -Affidavit D-864? There it mentions Evans’ clothes, and says: - -“It is not known to me that Evans wore a uniform. As far as I can -remember, he was wearing blue overalls.” - -Does this mean that Evans was not recognizable as a soldier? - -WAGNER: No, probably not. - -DR. SIEMERS: Will you now pass on to the Document UK-57 submitted by -Colonel Phillimore? - -Mr. President, this is Exhibit GB-164 and should be in the original -Document Book Keitel, but I think it was newly submitted today. - -[_Turning to the witness._] You have a photostat copy, have you not? - -WAGNER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Will you, please, turn to the fourth page. First, a -question: Is it possible that this document was known to the Naval -Operations Staff? Does the document indicate that it was sent to the -Naval Operations Staff? - -WAGNER: These are informal conference notes of the OKW which were -apparently not sent to the Naval Operations Staff. - -DR. SIEMERS: If I understand it correctly then, this is a document of -the Intelligence Service of the OKW, is it not? - -WAGNER: Yes. That is correct. - -DR. SIEMERS: Under Figure 2 it says “attempted attack on the battleship -_Tirpitz_.” The first part was read by Colonel Phillimore: - - “Three Englishmen and two Norwegians were held up at the Swedish - frontier.” - -Can one, on the strength of this, say that they were presumably -apprehended by the Police and not by the Wehrmacht? - -WAGNER: Presumably, yes. Certainly not by the Navy; but probably by the -Police, who controlled the frontiers, so far as I know. - -DR. SIEMERS: Do you not think, Admiral, that this is not only probable -but certain if you think back to the affidavit of 14 November 1945 by -Flesch, the commander of the Security Police, who brought Evans from the -frontier to Oslo? - -WAGNER: If you take the two together, then in my opinion it is certain; -I do not think there is any doubt about it. - -DR. SIEMERS: Will you then look at the following sentence? - -Mr. President, that is under Figure 2, the last sentence of the first -paragraph. I quote: - - “It was possible to take only the civilian-clothed British - sailor Robert Paul Evans”—born on such and such a date—“into - arrest. The others escaped into Sweden.” - -Therefore, I think we may assume with certainty that Evans was not -recognizable as a soldier. - -WAGNER: Yes, no doubt. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then, will you look at the following sentence. There it -says—I quote: - - “Evans had a pistol holster used for carrying weapons under the - arm-pit, and he had a knuckle duster.” - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it says nothing about civilian clothes -in the English copy. I do not want to make a bad point, but it is not in -my copy. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I do not have the document before me. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the English copy that I have simply -has, “However, only the British seaman, Robert Paul Evans, born 14 -January 1922, at London, could be arrested. The others escaped into -Sweden.” - -My Lord, I think it can be checked afterwards. - -THE PRESIDENT: Exact reference to the document? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that was Document UK-57, and it is a -report of the OKW, Office for Ausland Abwehr, of 4 January 1944. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did Colonel Phillimore put it in this morning? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it in, My Lord, I think it was—certainly -in cross-examining the Defendant Keitel. It has been in before, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see, it has already been put in with this lot. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should be grateful to the Tribunal if the mistake were -rectified in the English translation. In the German original text the -photostat copy is included, therefore the wording “civilian-clothed” -must be correct. - -Witness, we were discussing the sentence—I quote: - - “Evans had a pistol holster used for carrying weapons under the - arm-pit, and he had a knuckle duster.” - -How does this bear on the fact that he was wearing civilian clothes? - -WAGNER: It shows that he... - -DR. SIEMERS: Sir David would like me to read the next sentence too: - - “Acts of force contrary to international law could not be proved - against him. Evans made detailed statements regarding the action - and, on 19 January 1943, in accordance with the Führer Order, he - was shot.” - -How does this bear on the fact that he was wearing civilian clothes? -Does this show that he did not act as a soldier in enemy territory -should act? - -THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. The Tribunal considers that that is a -question of law which the Tribunal has got to decide, and not a question -for the witness. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall forego the answer. - -May I ask you to turn to the next page of the document and to come back -to the Bordeaux case, a similar case which has already been discussed. -You have already explained the Bordeaux case insofar as you said that -the Naval Operations Staff was not informed about it. I now draw your -attention to the sentence at the bottom of Page 3: - - “After carrying out the explosions, they sank the boats and - tried, with the help of the French civilian population, to - escape into Spain.” - -Thus did the men concerned in this operation also not act like soldiers? - -WAGNER: That, according to this document, is perfectly clear. - -DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. And now one last question. At the end of his -examination Colonel Phillimore asked you whether you considered -Grossadmiral Raeder and Grossadmiral Dönitz guilty in the cases which -have just been discussed, guilty of these murders as he termed them? Now -that I have further clarified these cases I should like you to answer -the question again. - -WAGNER: I consider that both admirals are not guilty in these two cases. - -DR. SIEMERS: I have no further questions. - -DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, during cross-examination you explained your -views on the Commando Order. I wanted to ask you: Were your views -possibly based on the assumption that the order was examined by a -superior authority as to its justification before international law? - -WAGNER: Yes. I assumed that the justification for the order was examined -by my superiors. - -DR. LATERNSER: Furthermore, during cross-examination you stated your -conception of what happened when a man was handed over to the SD. I -wanted to ask you: Did you have this conception already at that time, or -has it taken form now that a great deal of material has become known to -you? - -WAGNER: There is no question that this conception was considerably -influenced by knowledge of a great deal of material. - -DR. LATERNSER: You did not, therefore, at that time have the definite -conception that the handing over of a man to the SD meant certain death? - -WAGNER: No, I did not have that conception. - -DR. LATERNSER: Now, a few questions regarding the equipment of the -Commando units. Do you not know that automatic arms were found on some -members of these units and that, in particular, pistols were carried in -such a manner that if, in the event of capture, the man raised his arms, -that movement would automatically cause a shot to be fired which would -hit the person standing opposite the man with raised arms? Do you know -anything about that? - -WAGNER: I have heard of it. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did you not see pictures of it? - -WAGNER: At the moment I cannot remember seeing such pictures. - -DR. LATERNSER: Did the Germans also undertake sabotage operations in -enemy countries? - -THE PRESIDENT: What has it got to do with that, Dr. Laternser? - -DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to ascertain by means of this question whether -the witness had knowledge of German sabotage operations, and -furthermore, whether he had received reports about the treatment of such -sabotage units. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is the very thing which we have already ruled cannot -be put. - -You are not suggesting that these actions were taken by way of reprisal -for the way in which German sabotage units were treated? We are not -trying whether any other powers have committed breaches of international -law, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes; we are trying whether -these defendants have. - -The Tribunal has ruled that such questions cannot be put. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not know what answer the witness is -going to give. I merely wanted, in case, which I do not know... - -THE PRESIDENT: We wanted to know why you were putting the question. You -said you were putting the question in order to ascertain whether German -sabotage units had been treated in a way which was contrary to -international law, or words to that effect, and that is a matter which -is irrelevant. - -DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, it would show at least that doubt -existed about the interpretation of international law with regard to -such operations and that would be of importance for the application of -the law. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the question is inadmissible. - -DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you also stated during your cross-examination -that until 1944 you were chief of the Operational Department of the -Naval Operations Staff. Can you give information on whether there were -strong German naval forces or naval transport ships in the Black Sea? - -WAGNER: The strength of naval forces and transport ships in the Black -Sea was very slight. - -DR. LATERNSER: For what were they mostly needed? - -WAGNER: For our own replacements and their protection. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, how does this arise out of the -cross-examination? You are re-examining now, and you are only entitled -to ask questions which arise out of the cross-examination. There have -been no questions put with reference to the Black Sea. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I learned during the examination that for -a long time the witness was chief of the Operational Department; and I -concluded that he was one of the few witnesses who could give me -information regarding the facts of a very serious accusation raised by -the Russian Prosecution, namely, the accusation that 144,000 people had -been loaded on to German ships, that at Sebastopol those ships had gone -to sea and had then been blown up, and that the prisoners of war on the -ships were drowned. The witness could clarify this matter to some -extent. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you knew, directly this witness began his -evidence, what his position was; and you, therefore, could have -cross-examined him yourself at the proper time. You are now -re-examining; you are only entitled—because we cannot have the time of -the Court wasted—you are only entitled to ask him questions which arise -out of the cross-examination. In the opinion of the Tribunal this -question does not arise out of the cross-examination. - -DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, please, would you, as an exception, admit -this question? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal has given you a great -latitude and we cannot continue to do so. - -The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: You have finished, have you not, Dr. Kranzbühler, with -this witness? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And now I should like to call my next -witness, Admiral Godt. - -[_The witness Godt took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -EBERHARD GODT (Witness): My name is Eberhard Godt. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -You may sit down. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Godt, when did you enter the Navy as -an officer cadet? - -GODT: On 1 July, 1918. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How long have you been working with Admiral -Dönitz, and in what position? - -GODT: Since January 1938; first of all as First Naval Staff Officer -attached to the Commander, U-boats, and immediately after the beginning -of the war as Chief of the Operations Department. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Chief of the Operations Department with the -Chief of Submarines? - -GODT: Yes, attached to the Chief of Submarines, later Flag Officer, -U-boats. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you collaborate since 1938 in the -drafting of all operational orders worked out by the staff of the Flag -Officer, U-boats? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many officers were on this staff at the -beginning of the war? - -GODT: At the beginning of the war there were four officers, one chief -engineer, and two administrative officers on that staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you Document GB-83 of the -Prosecution’s document book Page 16, which is a letter from Commander -U-boats, dated 9 October 1939. It refers to bases in Norway. How did -this letter originate? - -GODT: At that time I was visiting the Naval Operations Staff in Berlin -on other business. On the occasion of that visit I was asked whether -Commander, U-boats, was interested in bases in Norway and what demands -should be made in that connection. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you informed how those bases in Norway -were to be secured for the use of the German Navy? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has quoted an extract from -the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff dating from the same period. - -Mr. President, I am thinking of the extract reproduced on Page 15 of the -document book. - -[_Turning to the witness._] That extract contains four questions. -Questions (a) and (d) deal with technical details regarding bases in -Norway, whereas (b) and (c) deal with the possibility of obtaining such -bases against the will of the Norwegians, and the question of defending -them. - -Which of these questions was put to you? - -GODT: May I ask you to repeat the questions in detail first of all. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The first question is: Which places in -Norway can be considered for bases? - -GODT: That question was put. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you show me from the letter from -Commander, U-boats, whether the question was answered and where it is -answered? - -GODT: The question was answered under Number 1 (c) at the end of Number -1. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There it says, “Trondheim or Narvik are -possible places.” - -GODT: Yes, that is right. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Question Number 2 is: “If it is impossible -to obtain bases without fighting, can it be done against the will of the -Norwegians by the use of military force?” Was that question put? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell me if the question was answered -in the letter from Commander, U-boats? - -GODT: This question was not answered. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The third question is: “What are the -possibilities of defense after occupation?” Was that question put to -you? - -GODT: No, that question was not put. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is it replied to in the letter? - -GODT: III-d refers to the necessity of adopting defense measures. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is that reference connected with the fourth -question I put to you now: “Will the harbors have to be developed to the -fullest extent as bases, or do they already offer decisive advantages as -possible supply points?” - -GODT: These two questions are not connected. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that fourth question put to you? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it answered? - -GODT: Not in this letter. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What is the significance of the figures II -and III? Do they not answer the question of whether these ports must be -developed as bases or whether they can be used just as supply points? - -GODT: They indicate what was thought necessary in order to develop them -to the fullest extent as bases. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please read the last sentence of -the document? There it says, “Establishment of a fuel supply point in -Narvik as an alternative supply point.” Is that not a reply to the -question asking whether a supply point is enough? - -GODT: Yes; I had overlooked that sentence. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can I sum up, therefore, by saying that the -first and fourth questions were put to you and answered by you, whereas -questions 2 and 3 were not put to you and not answered by you? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the War Diary of the Naval Operations -Staff there is a note which says, “Commander, U-boats, considers such -ports extremely valuable even as temporary supply and equipment bases -for Atlantic U-boats.” Does that note mean that Admiral Dönitz was -working on this question before your visit to Berlin? Or what was the -reason for the note? - -GODT: That was my own opinion, which I was entitled to give in my -capacity as Chief of the Operations Department. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that the first time that plans for bases -were brought to your notice? - -GODT: No. We had been considering the question of whether the supply -position for U-boats could be improved by using ships—in Iceland, for -instance. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these considerations in any way -connected with the question whether one ought to start a war against the -country concerned? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you Document GB-91. This -appears on Page 18 of the Prosecution’s document book. It is an -operational order issued by Commander, U-boats, on 30 March 1940 and -dealing with the Norwegian enterprise. Is it true, that this is your -operational order? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many days before the beginning of the -Norwegian action was that order released? - -GODT: Approximately ten days. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Paragraph II, Section 5, contains the -following sentence: “While entering the harbor and until the troops have -been landed, the naval forces will probably fly the British naval -ensign, except in Narvik.” Is that an order given by Commander, U-boats, -to the submarines under his command? - -GODT: No. That passage appears under the heading: “Information on our -own combat forces.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what is the meaning of this allusion? - -GODT: It means that U-boats were informed that in certain circumstances -our own naval units might fly other flags. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why was that necessary? - -GODT: It was necessary so as to prevent possible mistakes in identity. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are there any other references to mistakes -in identity in this order? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where? - -GODT: In Paragraph IV, Section 5. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please read it? - -GODT: There it says, “Beware of confusing our own units with enemy -forces.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Only that sentence. Did this order instruct -U-boats to attack Norwegian forces? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please indicate what the order says -about that? - -GODT: IV, a2 states, “Only enemy naval forces and troop transports are -to be attacked.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was meant by “enemy” forces? - -GODT: “Enemy” forces were British, French, and Russian—no, not Russian. -It goes on: “No action is to be taken against Norwegian and Danish -forces unless they attack our own forces.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please look at Paragraph VI-c? - -GODT: Paragraph VI says: “Steamers may only be attacked when they have -been identified beyond doubt as enemy steamers and as troop transports.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was Commander, U-boats, informed of the -political action taken with regard to incidents caused by submarines? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what way? - -GODT: U-boats had orders to report immediately by wireless in the case -of incidents, and to supplement the report later. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I do not think you quite understood my -question. I asked you, was Commander, U-boats, informed as to how an -incident caused by a submarine would later on be settled with a neutral -government? - -GODT: No, not as a rule. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember any individual case where -he was informed? - -GODT: I remember the case of the Spanish steamer _Monte Corbea_. Later -on I learned that Spain had been promised reparations. I cannot remember -now whether I received the information through official channels or -whether I just heard it accidentally. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should now like to establish the dates of -certain orders which I have already presented to the Tribunal. I shall -show you Standing Order Number 171, which is on Page 159 of Volume III -of the document book. What is the date on which that order was issued? - -GODT: I shall have to look at it first. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please do. - -GODT: That order must have originated in the winter of 1939-1940. -Probably 1939. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On what do you base that conclusion? - -GODT: I base it on the reference made in 4a to equipment for depth -charges. This was taken for granted at a later stage. I also gather it -from the reference made in 5b to the shifting of masts and colored -lights, something which was formulated then for the first time. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell us the exact month in 1939? - -GODT: I assume that it was November. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to show you another order, -Standing War Order Number 122. It appears on Page 226 in Volume IV of my -document book. Up to now all we know is that this order was issued -before May 1940. Can you give us a more exact date? - -GODT: This order must have been issued about the same time as the first, -that is to say, about November 1939. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you. How was the conduct of U-boat -warfare by Commander, U-boats, organized in practice? Will you explain -that to us? - -GODT: All orders based on questions of international law, _et cetera_, -originated with the Naval Operations Staff. The Naval Operations Staff -also reserved for itself the right to determine the locality of the -center of operations—for instance, the distribution of U-boats in the -Atlantic Theater, the Mediterranean Theater, and the North Sea Theater. -Within these various: areas U-boat operations were, generally speaking, -entirely at the discretion of Commander, U-boats. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the standing orders for U-boats given -verbally or in writing? - -GODT: In writing. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were there not verbal orders as well? - -GODT: Verbal instructions personally issued by Commander, U-boats, -played a special part and amounted to personal influence on commanders, -as well as to explanations of the contents of written orders. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On what occasions was that personal -influence exerted? - -GODT: Particularly when reports were being made by the commanders after -each action. There must have been very few commanders who did not make a -personal and detailed report to Commander, U-boats, after an action. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it possible for written orders to be -changed in the course of verbal transmission, or even twisted to mean -the opposite? - -GODT: Such a possibility might have existed, but it never actually -happened. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When they made these verbal reports, could -the commanders risk expressing opinions which were not those of -Commander, U-boats? - -GODT: Absolutely. Commander, U-boats, even asked his commanders in so -many words to give him their personal opinions in every case, so that he -could maintain direct personal contact with them and thus remain in -close touch with events on the front, so that he could put matters -right, where necessary. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this personal contact used for the -verbal transmission of shady orders? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution holds that an -order—apparently a verbal order—existed, prohibiting the entry in the -log of measures considered dubious or unjustifiable from the point of -view of international law. Did such a general order exist? - -GODT: No; there was no general order. In certain individual cases—I can -remember two—an order was given to omit certain matters from the log. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which cases do you remember? - -GODT: The first was the case of the _Athenia_; and the second was the -sinking of a German boat, which was coming from Japan through the -blockade, by a German submarine. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before I ask you to give me details of that, -I should like to know the reason for omitting such matters from the log. - -GODT: It was done for reasons of secrecy. U-boat logs were seen by a -great many people: First, in the training stations of the U-boat service -itself; and, secondly, in numerous offices of the High Command. Special -attention had therefore to be paid to secrecy. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many copies of each U-boat war log were -made? - -GODT: I should say six to eight copies. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the omission of such an item from the -log mean that all documentary evidence was destroyed in every office; or -did certain offices keep these documents? - -GODT: These records were received by Commander, U-boats, and probably by -the Naval Operations Staff as well. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there a standing war order prescribing -treatment of incidents? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the contents? - -GODT: It stated that incidents must be reported immediately by wireless -and that a supplementary report must be made later, either in writing or -by word of mouth. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this standing order contain any -allusion to the omission of such incidents from the log? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please tell me now how this -alteration was made in the log in the case of the _Athenia_? - -GODT: In the case of the _Athenia_ Oberleutnant Lemp reported on -returning that he had torpedoed this ship, assuming it to be an -auxiliary cruiser. I cannot now tell you exactly whether this was the -first time I realized that such a possibility existed or whether the -idea that this might possibly have been torpedoed by a German submarine -had already been taken into consideration. Lemp was sent to Berlin to -make a report and absolute secrecy was ordered with regard to the case. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By whom? - -GODT: By the Naval Operations Staff, after a temporary order had been -issued in our department. I ordered the fact to be erased from the war -log of the U-boat. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And that, of course, was on the orders of -Admiral Dönitz? - -GODT: Yes, or I ordered it on his instructions. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you participate in the further handling -of this incident? - -GODT: Only with regard to the question of whether Lemp should be -punished. As far as I remember, Commander, U-boats, took only -disciplinary action against him because it was in his favor that the -incident occurred during the first few hours of the war, and it was held -that in his excitement he had not investigated the character of the ship -as carefully as he might have done. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did I understand you correctly as saying -that the detailed documentary evidence in connection with the sinking of -the _Athenia_ was retained by both Commander, U-boats, and, you believe, -the Naval Operations Staff? - -GODT: I can say that with certainty only as far as Commander, U-boats, -is concerned. That is what happened in this case. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mentioned a second case just now where a -log book had been altered. Which case was that? - -GODT: That incident was as follows: A German blockade breaker, that is -to say, a merchant vessel on its way back from Japan, was accidentally -torpedoed by a German submarine and sunk in the North Atlantic. This -fact was omitted from the log. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So it was only a question of keeping matters -secret from German offices? - -GODT: Yes. The British learned the facts from lifeboats as far as I -know; and these facts were to be concealed from the crews of other -blockade-breaking vessels. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Documents submitted to the Tribunal by the -Defense show that until the autumn of 1942, German U-boats took steps to -rescue crews as far as was possible without prejudicing the U-boat’s -safety and without interfering with their own assignment. Does this -agree with your own experiences? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should now like to put a few questions to -you regarding the so-called _Laconia_ order which still require -clarification. I refer to Document GB-199. As you know, the Prosecution -calls this order an order to kill survivors. Who formulated this order? - -THE PRESIDENT: Where is it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is the document book of the Prosecution -on Page 36, Mr. President. - -GODT: I cannot now tell you that for certain. Generally speaking, such -an order was discussed by Commander, U-boats, the First Naval Staff -Officer, and myself; Commander, U-boats, decided on the general terms of -the order and then it was formulated by one of us. It is quite possible -that I myself worded the order. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But, at any rate, Admiral Dönitz signed it, -did he not? - -GODT: He must have; yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Dönitz thought that he remembered -that you and Captain Hessler were opposed to this order. Can you -remember this, too; and if so, why were you against it? - -GODT: I do not remember that. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the meaning of the order? - -GODT: The meaning of the order is plain. It prohibited attempts at -rescue. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why was that not forbidden by a reference to -Standing War Order Number 154, which was issued in the winter of -1939-40? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, surely a written order must speak for -itself. Unless there is some colloquial meaning in a particular word -used in the order, the order must be interpreted according to the -ordinary meaning of the words. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I was not proposing to go into the question -any further, Mr. President. - -[_Turning to the witness._] I should like to repeat my last question. -Why, instead of issuing a new order, did they not simply refer -commanders to Standing War Order Number 154, which was issued in the -winter of 1939-40? - -I refer, Mr. President, to Document GB-196, on Page 33 of the -Prosecution’s document book. - -You remember that order, don’t you. I have shown it to you. - -GODT: Yes, I do. That order had already been canceled when the so-called -_Laconia_ order was issued. Apart from that, a mere reference to an -order already issued would have lacked the character of actuality which -orders should have. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean by that that your staff, as a -matter of principle, did not issue orders by references to earlier -orders? - -GODT: That was avoided, whenever possible; that is to say, almost -always. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you explain to me why that order was -issued as “top secret”? - -GODT: The order appeared after an operation in which we nearly lost two -boats, and contained a severe reprimand for the commanders concerned. It -was not customary for us to put such a reprimand in a form accessible to -any one except the commanders and all the officers. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which is the severe reprimand? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please explain of what this severe -reprimand for the commander consisted? - -GODT: It is understandable in the light of previous events—namely, -those very things which it forbids. It is largely contained in the -sentence beginning: “Rescue is against the most elementary demands” and -it is also implied by the harshness, whereby the commander is reproached -with being softhearted. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this mean that the commanders were -accused of having endangered their boats too much in connection with the -rescue action of the _Laconia_ and of acting in a manner which was not -in accordance with the dictates of war? - -GODT: Yes, and that after having been repeatedly reminded during the -action of the necessity for acting in a manner in accordance with the -dictates of war. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were interrogated on this order after -the capitulation, as you told me; but you could not at the moment -remember its exact wording. How was it possible for you not to remember -this order? - -GODT: There were certain orders which had to be kept in collective files -and which one therefore saw very frequently. This order was not one of -them, but was filed separately after being dealt with. After it had been -issued I never saw it again until the end of the war. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did an order intended for inclusion in -such a collection look like on the outside? - -GODT: It had to be a “Current Order” or an “Admonition Message.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did that occur in the text of the order -concerned? - -GODT: It would be in the heading of the order concerned. That is not the -case here. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So we may conclude from the fact that this -wireless message is not headed either “Admonition Message” or “Current -Order” that it did not belong to a collection of orders? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But then, how is it possible that -Korvettenkapitän Möhle gave lectures on this order apparently until the -end of the war? - -GODT: Korvettenkapitän Möhle had access to all wireless messages issued -by Commander, U-boats. He was entitled to select from these signals -anything he thought necessary for the instruction of commanders about to -go to sea. It made no difference whether the order was marked -“Admonition” or “Current Order.” He had obviously taken out this message -and had had it among the material to be used for these instructions to -the commanders. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Möhle ever ask you about the -interpretation of that order? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever hear of any other source -interpreting this order to mean that survivors were to be shot? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you judge from your own experience -whether this order had, or could have had, any effect practically on -Allied naval losses? - -GODT: That is very difficult to judge. At that time something like 80 -percent of all U-boat attacks were probably carried out under conditions -which made any attempt at rescue impossible. That is to say, these -attacks were made on convoys or on vessels in close proximity to the -coast. - -The fact that some 12 captains and engineers were brought back as -prisoners by U-boats is an indication of what happened in the other -cases. It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty whether it -was possible to take rescue measures in all cases. The situation was -probably such that the Allied sailors felt safer in the lifeboats than -they did, for instance, aboard the U-boat and probably were glad to see -the U-boat vanish after the attack. The fact that the presence of the -U-boat involved danger to itself is proved by this same case of the -_Laconia_, where two U-boats were attacked from the air while engaged in -rescuing the survivors. - -I do not think it is at all certain that this order had any effect one -way or the other. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean “one way or the other”? - -GODT: I mean whether it meant an increase or a decrease in the number of -losses among enemy seamen. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There is one argument I did not quite -understand. You pointed to the fact that approximately 12 captains and -chief engineers were made prisoner after this order was issued. Do you -mean by that that only in these few cases was it possible, without -endangering the submarine, to carry out the order to transfer such -officers from the lifeboats? - -GODT: It is too much to say that it was only possible in these few -cases, but it does afford some indication of the number of cases in -which it was possible. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you the wireless message -which went to Kapitänleutnant Schacht. It is on Page 36 of the -Prosecution’s document book. This message, too, was sent as “top -secret.” What was the reason for that? - -GODT: It is a definite and severe reprimand for the commander. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How far was that reprimand justified? -Schacht had not received previous instruction to rescue Italians only? - -GODT: No, but it had been assumed that U-boats would realize that it was -of primary importance that allies should be rescued, that is, that they -should not become prisoners of war. Apart from that, several reminders -had been issued in the course of operations warning commanders to be -particularly careful. After that came Schacht’s report, which appeared -at the time to indicate that he had disobeyed orders. Viewed -retrospectively, Schacht’s action must have taken place before -Commander, U-boats, issued the order in question, so that in part at -least, the accusation was unjustified. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were any further rescue measures carried out -by U-boats after this order was issued in September 1942? - -GODT: In isolated cases, yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Commander, U-boats, object to these -rescues? - -GODT: I have no recollection of that. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: To your knowledge, did German U-boats -deliberately kill survivors? - -GODT: The only case I know of—and I heard of it after the -capitulation—is that of Kapitänleutnant Eck. We heard an enemy -broadcast which hinted at these happenings, but we were unable to draw -any conclusions from that. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now hand to you the Prosecution’s Exhibit -GB-203, which is regarded by the Prosecution as proof of the shooting of -survivors. This is the war log of _U-247_ from which I mimeographed an -extract on Page 74 of Volume II of my document book. This extract -describes an attack made by the U-boat on a British trawler. You have -already seen this war log. After his return, did the commander make a -report on this action? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he report anything about the shooting of -survivors on that occasion? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: According to a statement made by a survivor -named McAllister this trawler, the _Noreen Mary_, had a gun aboard. Do -you know whether trawlers had guns mounted fore or aft? - -GODT: They were almost always in the bows. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember, with the help of this -extract from the war log and on the strength of your own recollection of -the commander’s report, the exact details of this incident? - -GODT: Originally the U-boat when submerged encountered a number of -vessels escorting trawlers close to Cape Wrath. It tried to torpedo one -of the trawlers. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the witness trying to reconstruct this from the -document, reconstruct the incident? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am asking him to tell us what he remembers -of the event, basing his account on his own recollection of the -commander’s report supplemented by the entry in the war log. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, he hasn’t said whether he ever saw the commander. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Oh yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well then, all he can tell us is what the commander told -him. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, have him do that then. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you please tell us what you remember -after reading the log. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. If he remembers anything about what the -commander told him he can tell us that, but the log speaks for itself -and he can’t reconstruct it out of that. He must tell us what he -remembers of what the officer said. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well, Sir. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Will you please speak from memory. - -GODT: The commander reported that he had encountered a number of -trawlers extraordinarily close to the coast, considering conditions at -the time. Failing in his attempt to torpedo one of them, he sank it with -gunfire. That was all the more remarkable because, in the first place, -the incident occurred quite unusually near the coast and, in the second -place, the commander risked this artillery fight regardless of the -presence of other vessels nearby. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these other ships also armed trawlers? - -GODT: It was to be assumed at the time that every trawler was armed. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The witness McAllister thought that the -submarine surfaced 50 yards away from the trawler. In the light of your -own recollections and experiences, do you think this is possible? - -GODT: I do not remember the details; but it would be an unusual thing -for a U-boat commander to do. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: McAllister also stated the U-boat used -shells filled with wire. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Dr. Kranzbühler, the -Tribunal thinks that the witness oughtn’t to express opinions of this -sort. He ought to give us the evidence of any facts which he has. He is -telling us in his opinion it is impossible that a naval commander would -ever bring his submarine up within 50 yards of another vessel. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is not a matter for him to say. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I was going to ask the -witness next whether German U-boats used shells filled with wire as -stated by the witness McAllister. Is that question admissible? - -THE PRESIDENT: Shells filled with wire? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, that is the question I want to put. - -Will you answer that question, Witness. - -GODT: There were no such shells. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this attack by the submarine on the -_Noreen Mary_ reported by wireless immediately? Do you know anything -about it? - -GODT: Do you mean the U-boat commander’s report? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, by the British. - -GODT: As far as I remember, a wireless message sent by a British vessel -was intercepted, reporting a U-boat attack in the area. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A signal is entered in the war log under -0127 hours. It is intended for Matschulat, which means that it was sent -by you to the commander, and it reads, “English steamer reports attack -by German U-boat west of Cape Wrath.” - -GODT: That is the message intended to inform the U-boat that a wireless -signal sent by a British steamer concerning a submarine attack in that -area had been intercepted. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should now like to ask you something about -Standing War Order Number 511. This is in Volume I of my document book, -Page 46. When I presented this order, the Tribunal was not sure of the -significance of Paragraph 2, which I am going to read: - - “Captains and officers of neutral ships which may be sunk - according to Standing Order Number 101, (such as Swedish except - Göteborg traffic), must not be taken on board, since internment - of these officers is not permitted by international law.” - -Can you tell me first the experiences or calculations which led to the -inclusion of Paragraph 2 in the order? - -GODT: On one occasion a U-boat brought a Uruguayan officer—a captain -whose ship had been sunk—to Germany. We were afraid that if we released -this captain he might report some of the things he had seen while he was -interned aboard the U-boat. The reason for this order was to avoid -difficulties of that kind in the future; for the Uruguayan captain had -to be released and was, in fact, released. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What is the meaning of the reference to -neutral ships which might be sunk according to Standing War Order Number -101? - -GODT: May I please see the order for a minute? - -[_The document was submitted to the witness._] - -The Standing War Order Number 101 contains the following directives in -connection with the sinking of neutral ships: Once inside the blockade -zone, all neutral ships can be sunk as a matter of principle, with two -main exceptions, or shall we say, two general exceptions. - -To begin with, ships belonging to certain neutral countries, with whom -agreements had been made regarding definite shipping channels, must not -be sunk; further, ships belonging to certain neutral states which might -be assumed not to be working exclusively in the enemy’s service. Outside -the blockade zone neutral ships might be sunk; first, if they were not -recognizable as neutrals and therefore must be regarded as enemy vessels -by the submarine in question and, second, if they were not acting as -neutrals. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: As, for instance, those traveling in enemy -convoy? - -GODT: Yes, those traveling in convoys, or if they reported the presence -of U-boats, _et cetera_, by wireless. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Paragraph 2 mean that the captains of -neutral ships would in the future be in a worse position than captains -of enemy ships, or would they be in a better position? - -GODT: This is not a question of better or worse, it is a question of -taking prisoners. They were not to be taken prisoners because they could -not be detained as such. Whether this meant that their positions would -be better or worse is at least open to doubt. Captains of enemy ships -usually tried to avoid being taken aboard the U-boat probably because -they felt safer in their lifeboats. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you know about orders to respect -hospital ships at the beginning of the invasion? - -GODT: At the beginning of the invasion the rule in this area, as in any -other area, was that hospital ships were not to be attacked. Commanders -operating in the invasion zone then reported that there was a very large -number of hospital ships sailing. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From where to where? - -GODT: Between the Normandy invasion area and the British Isles. -Commander, U-boats, then had investigations made by the competent -department as to whether hospital traffic was really as heavy as alleged -in these reports. That was found to be the case. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean by that? - -GODT: It means that the number of hospital ships reported corresponded -to the estimated number of wounded. After that it was expressly -announced that hospital ships were not to be attacked in the future. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the strict respect paid to hospital -ships at that stage of the war in our own interests? - -GODT: At that time we only had hospital ships in the Baltic where the -Geneva Convention was not recognized by the other side; so we had no -particular interest in respecting hospital ships. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know of any case of an enemy hospital -ship being sunk by a German U-boat during this war? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did it happen the other way round? - -GODT: The German hospital ship _Tübingen_ was, I think, sunk by British -aircraft in the Mediterranean. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Presumably because of mistaken identity? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the question on German hospital ships -which were sunk isn’t relevant, is it? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I was going to show by it, Mr. President, -that the possibility of mistaken identity does exist and that a hospital -ship was in fact sunk in consequence of such a mistake. My evidence -therefore goes to show that from the sinking of a ship it must not be -concluded that the sinking was ordered. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite realize that mistakes may be made in -sea warfare. It is a matter of common knowledge. Should we adjourn now? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Godt, you have known Admiral Dönitz -very well since 1934; and you have had a good deal to do with him during -that time. Did he have anything to do with politics during that time? - -GODT: Nothing at all, to my knowledge, before he was appointed -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he -made occasional speeches outside the Navy; for instance, he addressed -dock workers, made a speech to the Hitler Youth at Stettin, and gave a -talk over the air on “Heroes’ Day” and on 20 July; I remember no other -occasions. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these speeches not always directly -connected with the tasks of the Navy—for instance, the address to the -dock laborers—shipbuilding? - -GODT: Yes, when he spoke to the dock laborers. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And to the Hitler Youth? - -GODT: The Hitler Youth, too. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what was the connection there? - -GODT: As far as I remember, the speech was concerned with recruiting for -the Navy. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he select his staff officers for their -ideological or military qualifications? - -GODT: Their military and personal qualities were all that mattered. -Their political views had nothing to do with it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The question of whether Admiral Dönitz knew, -or must have known, of certain happenings outside the Navy is a very -important one from the Tribunal’s point of view. Can you tell me who his -associates were? - -GODT: His own officers and officers of his own age, almost exclusively. -As far as I know, he had very few contacts beyond those. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did matters change much in this respect -after he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy? - -GODT: No. He probably had a few more contacts with people from other -branches, but on the whole his circle remained the same. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where did he actually live at that time, -that is, after his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy? - -GODT: After his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, he was mainly at the -headquarters of the Naval Operations Staff near Berlin. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he live with his family or with his -staff? - -GODT: He made his home with his family; but the main part of his life -was spent with his staff. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And where did he live when his staff was -transferred to the so-called “Koralle” quarters in the neighborhood of -Berlin in the autumn of 1943? - -GODT: He lived at his headquarters, where his family also lived—at -least for some time. His official discussions, however, usually lasted -till late in the evening. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In other words, from that time on he lived -constantly in the naval officers’ quarters? - -GODT: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were in a better position than almost -any of the other officers to observe the Admiral’s career at close -quarters. Can you tell me what you think were the motives behind the -military orders he issued? - -THE PRESIDENT: You can’t speak about the motives of people. You can’t -give evidence about other people’s minds. You can only give evidence of -what they said and what they did. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I still think that an officer -who lived with another officer for years must have a certain knowledge -of his motives, based on the actions of the officer in question and on -what that officer told him. However, perhaps I may put my question -rather differently. - -THE PRESIDENT: He can give evidence about his character, but he can’t -give evidence about his motives. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I shall question him on his character, -Your Honor. - -Witness, can you tell me whether Admiral Dönitz ever expressed selfish -motives to you in connection with any other orders he gave or any of his -actions? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, that is the same thing, the same -question again, really. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I meant it -to be a different question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Nobody is charging him with being egotistical or anything -of that sort. He is charged with the various crimes that are charged -against him in the Indictment. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I shall ask a direct question based on -the Prosecution’s opinion. - -The Prosecution judged Admiral Dönitz to be cynical and opportunistic. -Does that agree with your own judgment? - -GODT: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How would you judge him? - -GODT: As a man whose mind was fixed entirely on duty, on his work, his -naval problems, and the men in his service. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions -to put to this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel want to -ask any questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, might I first mention the documents that I put -in in cross-examination this morning, or rather it was a document which -had been in before. It was D-658, GB-229. That is the document dealing -with Bordeaux, and there was a dispute as to whether it was from the -Bordeaux Commando Raid. The dispute was as to whether it was from the -SKL, that is the Naval War Staff Diary, or from the war diary of some -lower formation. My Lord, I have had the matter confirmed with the -Admiralty, and I will produce the original for defense counsel; it comes -from the SKL War Diary, Tagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, and it is from -Number 1 Abteilung, Teil A—that is part A—for December 1942. So it is -from the War Diary of the Defendant Raeder and the witness. - -You have said, Witness, that you don’t recollect protesting against this -order of 17 September 1942. - -GODT: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I will try and refresh your memory. Would you look at a -document, D-865? - -That’s GB-458, My Lord; that is an extract from an interrogation of -Admiral Dönitz on 6 October. I should say that the record was kept in -English and therefore the translation into German does not represent -necessarily the Admiral’s actual words. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Would you look at the second page of that -document at the end of the first paragraph. It is the end of the first -paragraph on Page 207 in the English text. The Admiral is dealing with -the order of 17 September 1942, and in that last sentence in that -paragraph he says: - - “I remember that Captain Godt and Captain Hessler were opposed - to this telegram. They said so expressly because, as they said, - ‘it might be misunderstood.’ But I said, ‘I must pass it on now - to these boats to prevent this 1 percent of losses. I must give - them a reason, so that they do not feel themselves obliged to do - that.’” - -Do you remember protesting now, saying “That can be misunderstood”? - -GODT: No, I do not recall that. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And a further extract on Page 3 of the English -translation, the bottom of Page 2 of the German: - - “So I sent a second telegram to prevent further losses. The - second telegram was sent at my suggestion. I am completely and - personally responsible for it, because both Captain Godt and - Captain Hessler expressly stated they thought the telegram - ambiguous or liable to misinterpretation.” - -Do you remember that now? - -GODT: No, I do not recall that. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you look at a further statement to the same -effect, on Page 5 of the English, first paragraph; Page 4 of the German -text, third paragraph. He has been asked the question: - - “Why was it necessary to use a phrase like the one that I read - to you before: Efforts to rescue members of the crew were - counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the - destruction of enemy ships and crews?” - -It is the last clause of the first sentence, and he answered: - - “These words do not correspond to the telegram. They do not in - any way correspond to our actions in the years of 1939, 1940, - 1941 and 1942, as I have plainly shown you through the _Laconia_ - incident. I would like to emphasize once more that both Captain - Godt and Captain Hessler were violently opposed to the dispatch - of this telegram.” - -Do you still say that you don’t remember protesting against the sending -of that telegram? - -GODT: I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you one more extract, Document D-866, which -will become GB-459. That is a further interrogation on 22 October. The -first question on the document is: - - “Do you believe that this order is contrary to the Prize - Regulations issued by the German Navy at the beginning of the - war?” - -And the last sentence of the first paragraph of the answer is: - - “Godt and Hessler said to me, ‘Don’t send this message. You see, - it might look odd some day. It might be misinterpreted.’” - -You don’t remember using those words? - -GODT: No. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You were an experienced staff officer, were you not? - -GODT: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You knew the importance of drafting an operational -order with absolute clarity, did you not? - -GODT: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: These orders you were issuing were going to young -commanders between 20 and 30 years of age, were they not? - -GODT: Certainly not as young as 20. They would be in their late -twenties, most probably. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Do you say that this order is not ambiguous? - -GODT: Yes. Perhaps if you take one sentence out of the context you might -have some doubt, but not if you read the entire order. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the point of the words: “Rescue runs counter -to the most elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy -ships and crews”? - -[_There was no response._] Show it to him, will you? - -[_The document was submitted to the witness._] - -What was the point of those words, if this was merely a nonrescue order? - -GODT: It was served to motivate the remainder of the order and to put on -an equal level all the ships and crews which were fighting against our -U-boats. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You see, all your orders were so clear, were they not? -Have you got the Defense documents there in the witness box? - -GODT: I think so—no. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at the Defense Document Number Dönitz-8, Page 10. -It is on Page 10 of that book. Let me just read you the second -paragraph: - - “U-boats may instantly attack, with all the weapons at their - command, enemy merchant vessels recognized with certainty as - armed, or announced as such, on the basis of unimpeachable - evidence in the possession of the Naval Operations Staff.” - -The next sentence: - - “As far as circumstances permit, measures shall be taken for the - rescue of the crew, after the possibility of endangering the - U-boat is excluded.” - -Now, no commander could go wrong with that order, could he? It is -perfectly clear. - -Look at another one, D-642, at Page 13. It is the last paragraph of the -order, on Page 15. Now, this is a nonrescue order. Have you got it? -Paragraph E, Standing Order 154: - - “Do not rescue crew members or take them aboard and do not take - care of the ship’s boats. Weather conditions and distance from - land are of no consequence. Think only of the safety of your own - boat and try to achieve additional success as soon as possible. - - “We must be harsh in this war. The enemy started it in order to - destroy us; and we have to act accordingly.” - -Now, that was perfectly clear, was it not? That was a “nonrescue” order? - -GODT: It was just as clear as the order we are talking about. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Look at one or two more and then let me come back to -that order; Page 45, another order: - - “Order from Flag Officer, U-boats”—reading the third line—“to - take on board as prisoners captains of sunk ships with their - papers, if it is possible to do so without endangering the boat - or impairing its fighting capacity.” - -It is perfectly clear to anybody exactly what was intended, is it not? - -GODT: That is not an order at all; it only reproduces an extract from -the War Diary. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, reciting the words of the order; and then, on the -next page in Paragraph 4: - - “Try under all circumstances to take prisoners if that can be - done without endangering the boat”—Again, perfectly clear. - -Look at the next page, Page 47, Paragraph 1 of your order of the 1 June -1944, the last sentence: - - “Therefore every effort must be made to bring in such prisoners, - as far as possible, without endangering the boat.” - -Now, you have told us that this order of 17 September 1942 was intended -to be a nonrescue order; that is right, is it not? - -GODT: Yes, certainly. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: I ask you again, what was meant by the sentence: -“Rescue runs counter to the most elementary demands of warfare for the -destruction of enemy ships and crews”? - -GODT: That is the motivation of the rest of the order, which states that -ships with crews armed and equipped to fight U-boats were to be put on -the same level. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Why do you speak about the destruction of crews if you -do not mean the destruction of crews? - -GODT: The question is whether the ships and their crews were to be -destroyed; and that is something entirely different from destroying the -crews after they had left the ship. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And that is something entirely different from merely -not rescuing the crews; isn’t that a fact? - -GODT: I do not quite understand that question. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Destruction of crews is quite different from nonrescue -of crews? - -GODT: Destruction—as long as the ship and crew are together. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question, are you? But if you -want it again: Destruction of crews is quite different from nonrescue of -crews? - -GODT: The destruction of the crew is different from the nonrescue of -survivors, yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Were those words merely put in to give this order what -you described as a “lively character,” which an order should have? - -GODT: I cannot give you the details; I have already said that I do not -remember in detail the events leading up to this order. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal has already said to the -witness that the document speaks for itself. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Would you just look at the next document in -the Prosecution book, that is D-663, at the last sentence of that -document? In view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, are you -saying that it was not your intention at this time to destroy the crews -if you could? - -GODT: I thought we were talking about survivors. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, it is the same thing, to some extent, is it not; -ships’ crews, once they are torpedoed, become survivors? - -GODT: Then they would be survivors; yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you now answer the question? Was it not your -intention at this time to destroy the crews, or survivors if you like, -if you could? - -GODT: If you mean survivors; the question can refer to two things. As -regards survivors—no. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: If you are not prepared to answer the question, I will -pass on. - -Do you remember the case of Kapitänleutnant Eck? - -GODT: I only heard of the case of Kapitänleutnant Eck from American and -British officers, and only after I came to Germany. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know that he was on his first voyage when his -U-boat sank the _Peleus_ and then machine-gunned the survivors? Do you -know that? - -GODT: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: He had set out from the 5th U-boat flotilla at Kiel -where Möhle was briefing the commanders, had he not? - -GODT: He must have. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Now, if—instead of taking the whole blame upon -himself for the action which he took—if he had defended his action -under this order of 17 September 1942, are you saying that you could -have court-martialed him for disobedience? - -GODT: It might have been possible. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: In view of the wording of your order, do you say that? - -GODT: That would have been a question for the court-martial to decide. -Moreover, Eck, as far as I heard, did not refer to this order. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you explain to the Tribunal how the witness Möhle -was allowed to go on briefing that this was an annihilation order, from -September 1942 to the end of the war? - -GODT: I do not know how Möhle came to interpret this order in such a -way. In any case he did not ask me about it. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You realize that he is putting his own life in great -jeopardy by admitting that he briefed as he did, don’t you. - -GODT: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: You also know, don’t you, that another commander he -briefed was subsequently seen either by yourself or by Admiral Dönitz -before he went out? - -GODT: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Again when he came back? - -GODT: In general, yes, almost always. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: In general. Are you seriously telling the Tribunal that -none of these officers who were briefed that this was an annihilation -order, that none of them raised the question either with you or with -Admiral Dönitz? - -GODT: In no circumstances was this order discussed. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: But I suggest to you now that this order was very -carefully drafted to be ambiguous; deliberately, so that any U-boat -commander who was prepared to behave as he did was entitled to do so -under the order. Isn’t that right? - -GODT: That is an assertion. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you and Hessler, you tried to stop this order -being issued? - -GODT: I have already said that I do not remember this. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination? Do you wish to -re-examine, Dr. Kranzbühler? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that Korvettenkapitän Möhle has -testified before this Tribunal that he told only a very few officers -about his interpretation of the _Laconia_ order? - -GODT: I read that in the affidavit which Möhle made before British -officers last year. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that Möhle testified here -personally that he did not speak to Admiral Dönitz, yourself, or Captain -Hessler about his interpretation of the _Laconia_ order, although he -repeatedly visited your staff? - -GODT: I know that. I cannot tell you at the moment whether I know it -from the affidavit which Möhle made last year or from another source. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have been confronted with Admiral -Dönitz’ testimony that you and Captain Hessler opposed the _Laconia_ -order. You stated that Admiral Dönitz gave an exaggerated account of -your objection to this order, so as to take the whole responsibility -upon himself? - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think you can ask him that -question, Dr. Kranzbühler, whether it is possible that the Admiral was -over-emphasizing what he said. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then I will not put this question. Your -Honor, I have no further question to put to this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then with the permission of the Tribunal I -would like to call Captain Hessler as my next witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -[_The witness Hessler took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -GÜNTHER HESSLER (Witness): Günther Hessler. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and will add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Captain Hessler, when did you enter the -Navy? - -HESSLER: In April 1927. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was your last grade? - -HESSLER: Fregattenkapitän. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are related to Admiral Dönitz. Is that -correct? - -HESSLER: Yes. I married his only daughter in November 1937. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When did you enter the U-boat service? - -HESSLER: I started my U-boat training in April 1940. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you given any information during your -period of training on economic warfare according to the Prize Ordinance? - -HESSLER: Yes. I was informed of it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the so-called “prize disc” used which -has just been submitted to you? - -HESSLER: Yes, I was instructed about it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you tell the Tribunal briefly just what -the purpose of this “prize disc” is? - -HESSLER: It was a system of discs by means of which, through a simple -mechanical process in a very short time one could ascertain how to deal -with neutral and enemy merchant ships—whether, for instance, a neutral -vessel carrying contraband could be sunk or captured, or whether it must -be allowed to pass. - -This disc has another great advantage in that it indicates at the same -time the particular paragraph of the Prize Ordinance in which the case -in question may be found. This made it possible to cut down the time -required for the investigation of a merchant ship to a minimum. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That means that the disc was in the nature -of a legal adviser to the commander? - -HESSLER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now submit this disc to the Tribunal as -Exhibit Dönitz-95. - -In your training were you told what attitude you were required to adopt -toward shipwrecked survivors? If so, what was it? - -HESSLER: Yes. The rescuing of survivors is a matter of course in naval -warfare and must be carried out as far as military measures permit. In -U-boat warfare it is utterly impossible to rescue survivors, that is, to -take the entire crew on board, for space conditions in the U-boat do not -permit of any such action. The carrying out of other measures, such as, -approaching the lifeboats, picking up swimmers and transferring them to -the lifeboats, handing over provisions and water, is, as a rule, -impossible, for the danger incurred by the U-boat is so great throughout -the operational zone that none of these measures can be carried out -without endangering the boat too much. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You yourself went out on cruises as -commander soon after receiving these instructions? - -HESSLER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From when to when? - -HESSLER: From October 1940 till November 1941. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In what areas did you operate? - -HESSLER: South of Iceland, west of the North Channel, in the waters -between Cape Verde and the Azores, and in the area west of Freetown. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What success did you have against merchant -shipping? - -HESSLER: I sank 21 ships, totaling more than 130,000 tons. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You received the Knight’s Cross? - -HESSLER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How did you act toward the survivors of the -crews of the ships you sank? - -HESSLER: In most cases the situation was such that I was compelled to -leave the scene of the wreck without delay on account of danger from -enemy naval or air forces. In two cases the danger was not quite so -great. I was able to approach the lifeboats and help them. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the ships concerned? - -HESSLER: Two Greek ships: the _Papalemos_ and _Pandias_. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How did you help the lifeboats? - -HESSLER: First of all I gave the survivors their exact position and told -them what course to set in order to reach land in their lifeboats. In -the second place, I gave them water, which is of vital importance for -survivors in tropical regions. In one case I also furnished medical aid -for several wounded men. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did your personal experience with torpedoed -ships dispose you to caution with regard to rescue measures? - -HESSLER: Yes. The experienced U-boat commander was justifiably -suspicious of every merchantman and its crew, no matter how innocent -they might appear. In two cases this attitude of suspicion saved me from -destruction. - -This happened in the case of the steamer _Kalchas_, a British 10,000 ton -ship which I torpedoed north of Cape Verde. The ship had stopped after -being hit by the torpedo. The crew had left the ship and were in the -lifeboats, and the vessel seemed to be sinking. I was wondering whether -to surface in order at least to give the crew their position and ask if -they needed water. A feeling which I could not explain kept me from -doing so. I raised my periscope to the fullest extent and just as the -periscope rose almost entirely out of the water, sailors who had been -hiding under the guns and behind the bulwark, jumped up, manned the guns -of the vessel—which so far had appeared to be entirely abandoned—and -opened fire on my periscope at very close range, compelling me to -submerge at full speed. The shells fell close to the periscope but were -not dangerous to me. - -In the second case, the steamer _Alfred Jones_, which I torpedoed off -Freetown, also seemed to be sinking. I wondered whether to surface, when -I saw in one of the lifeboats two sailors of the British Navy in full -uniform. That aroused my suspicions. I inspected the ship at close -range—I would say from a distance of 50 to 100 meters—and established -the fact that it had not been abandoned, but that soldiers were still -concealed aboard her in every possible hiding-place and behind boarding. -When I torpedoed the ship this boarding was smashed. I saw that the ship -had at least four to six guns of 10 and 15 centimeter caliber and a -large number of depth charge chutes and antiaircraft guns behind the -bulwarks. Only a pure accident, the fact that the depth charges had not -been timed, saved me from destruction. - -It was clear to me, naturally, after such an experience, that I could no -longer concern myself with crews or survivors without endangering my own -ship. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When did you enter the staff of the -Commander, U-boats. - -HESSLER: In November 1941. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You were First Naval Staff Officer? - -HESSLER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it your task to instruct the commanders -on orders issued before they left port? - -HESSLER: Yes, I did that. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what was the connection between the -instructions given by you and those to be given by the flotilla -chiefs—Korvettenkapitän Möhle, for instance? - -HESSLER: The commanders whom I had to instruct received a complete -summary of all questions concerning procedure at sea. The flotilla -chiefs were charged with ascertaining that all commanders should receive -a copy of the most recent orders issued by Commander, U-boats. I might -say that these were limited instructions, compared with the full -instructions they received from me. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did these full instructions include the -instructions to the commanders regarding the treatment of survivors? - -HESSLER: Yes, in much the same style as the instructions I received -during my training in the U-boat school. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was any change made in the manner of -instruction after the _Laconia_ order of September 1942? - -HESSLER: Yes. I related the incident briefly to the commanders and told -them: - - “Now the decision as to whether the situation at sea permits of - rescue attempts no longer rests with you. Rescue measures are - prohibited from now on.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you mean to say that during the whole of -the rest of the war—that is, for 2½ years—the commanders continued to -be told about the _Laconia_ incident, or was that only done immediately -after this incident in the autumn of 1942? - -HESSLER: I would say up to January 1943 at the latest. After that, no -further mention was made of it. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mean, no further mention of the -incident? - -HESSLER: No further mention of the _Laconia_ incident. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But the orders issued as a result of it were -mentioned? - -HESSLER: Yes, that a specific order not to take any more rescue measures -had been issued. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the commanders at any time receive -orders or suggestions from you or from one of your staff to shoot at -survivors? - -HESSLER: Never. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the commanders told by you about the -order to take captains and chief engineers on board, if possible? - -HESSLER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it emphasized in those instructions that -this was only to take place when it could be done without endangering -the U-boat? - -HESSLER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know of the incident of U-boat -_U-386_ which passed some airmen shot down in the Bay of Biscay? - -HESSLER: I remember this incident very distinctly. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then you also remember that this incident -took place in the autumn of 1943? - -HESSLER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Commander, U-boats, think, with regard -to this incident, that the U-boat commander should have shot at the -airmen in the rubber dinghy? - -HESSLER: No, on the contrary, he was annoyed because the crew of the -aircraft had not been brought along by the U-boat. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did any other person or persons on the staff -put forward the view I have just expressed? - -HESSLER: No, we knew every one on the staff, and it is out of the -question that any member of the staff held a different opinion. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Korvettenkapitän Möhle testified that he -asked Korvettenkapitän Kuppisch, who was a member of your staff, for an -explanation of the _Laconia_ order and that Kuppisch told him about the -incident of the _U-386_; and told it in such a way as to make it appear -that Commander, U-boats, ordered the shooting of survivors. - -HESSLER: That is impossible. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why? - -HESSLER: Because Kuppisch took his U-boat out to sea in July 1943 and -never returned from that cruise. The incident of _U-386_ happened in the -autumn of 1943, which was later. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Korvettenkapitän Möhle in his first -statement left the possibility open that this story about _U-386_ might -have come from you. Did you discuss this matter with him? - -HESSLER: No. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are you certain of that? - -HESSLER: Absolutely certain. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you hear of the interpretation given by -Korvettenkapitän Möhle to this _Laconia_ order? - -HESSLER: After the capitulation—that is, after the end of the war and -then through a British officer. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How do you explain the fact that of the very -few officers who received these instructions from Möhle, none raised the -question of the interpretation of this order with Commander, U-boats? - -HESSLER: I have only one explanation of this; and that is that these -officers thought Korvettenkapitän Möhle’s interpretation completely -impossible, and not in agreement with the interpretation of Commander, -U-boats. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, they did not think that -clarification was necessary? - -HESSLER: They did not think that clarification was necessary. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution’s charges against Admiral -Dönitz are based to a great extent on extracts from the War Diary of the -SKL and Commander, U-boats, documents which are in the possession of the -British Admiralty. How is it possible that all these data fell into the -hands of the British Admiralty—and _in toto_? - -HESSLER: It was the Admiral’s desire that the war diaries of the U-boats -and of Commander, U-boats, which formed part of the Navy archives, -should be preserved and not be destroyed. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he say anything to you about this? - -HESSLER: Yes, in that form, when I told him that our own staff data had -been completely destroyed. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did he give any reason as to why he did not -want the Navy archives destroyed? - -HESSLER: He wanted to keep these data until after the war, and the Naval -Operations Staff had nothing to conceal. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is that your opinion or is that the opinion -which Admiral Dönitz expressed to you? - -HESSLER: He told me, “We have a clear conscience.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Immediately after the capitulation you were -repeatedly interrogated on questions of U-boat warfare and you asked the -senior officer present whether the German U-boat command would be -accused by the British Navy of criminal acts. Is that right? - -HESSLER: Yes. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what answer did you receive? - -HESSLER: An unhesitating “No.” - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any defendant’s counsel wish to ask any questions? - -[_There was no response._] - -The Prosecution? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: With the Tribunal’s permission I would not propose to -cross-examine and ask leave to adapt my cross-examination of the last -witness because it is the same ground substantially. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -Does any other Prosecutor wish to cross-examine? - -Yes, Dr. Kranzbühler? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions to ask the -witness, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: In the interrogation of the Defendant Dönitz he said that -Godt and Hessler—that is you, is it not...? - -HESSLER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: ...told him, “Don’t send that signal. You see, one day it -might appear in the wrong; it might be misinterpreted.” Did you say -that? - -HESSLER: I do not remember. As consulting officers, we often had to -oppose orders which were being drafted, and we were entitled to do so; -but I do not remember whether Admiral Godt and I did so in this case. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then later in this interrogation the Defendant Dönitz -said: - - “I am completely and personally responsible for it”—that is - that order—“because Captains Godt and Hessler both expressly - stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or liable - to be misinterpreted.” - -Did you say that this telegram was ambiguous or liable to be -misinterpreted? - -HESSLER: I do not remember that point. I do not think I thought the -telegram was ambiguous. - -THE PRESIDENT: And lastly the Defendant Dönitz said this: - - “I would like to emphasize once more that both Captain Godt and - Captain Hessler were violently opposed to the sending of the - telegram.” - -Do you say that you were not violently opposed to the sending of the -telegram? - -HESSLER: It is possible that we opposed the dispatch of the telegram -because we did not consider it necessary to refer to the matter again. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you say anything to the Defendant Dönitz about this -telegram at all? - -HESSLER: At the drafting of the telegram we talked it over, just as we -discussed every wireless message drafted by us. As time went on, we -drafted many hundreds of wireless messages so that it is impossible to -remember just what was said in each case. - -THE PRESIDENT: You began your answer to that question: “At the drafting -of this telegram...” - -Do you remember what happened at the drafting of this telegram? - -HESSLER: I can remember only that in the course of the so-called -_Laconia_ incident a great many wireless messages were sent and -received; that many wireless messages were drafted; and that, in -addition, U-boat operations were going on in the Atlantic, so that I -cannot recall details of what happened when the message was drafted. - -THE PRESIDENT: You said now that it was possible that you and Admiral -Godt were opposed to the sending of this telegram. Is that your answer? - -HESSLER: It is possible, but I cannot say. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Kranzbühler, the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, this morning I had already -advised the Prosecution that I shall not call the fourth witness -scheduled—that is Admiral Eckardt. Therefore, my examination of -witnesses has been concluded. - -THE PRESIDENT: And that concludes your case for the present? - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That concludes my case, but with the -permission of the Tribunal I would like to clarify one more question -which deals with documents. - -The Tribunal has refused all documents which refer to contraband, -control ports, and the “Navicert” system. These questions are of some -importance if I am to give a correct exposition later on. - -May I interpret the Tribunal’s decision as saying that these documents -are not to be used now as evidence but that I may have permission to use -them later on in my legal exposition? - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal thinks that is a question -which may be reserved until the time comes for you to make your speech. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you, Mr. President. Then I have -concluded my case. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 May 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH DAY - Wednesday, 15 May 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -[_The witness Emil Puhl took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -EMIL PUHL (Witness): Emil Johann Rudolf Puhl. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness Puhl, you were formerly Vice President of the -Reichsbank? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: If I am correctly informed, you were a member of the -Directorate of the Reichsbank already at the time of Dr. Schacht? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: When Dr. Schacht left, you were one of the few gentlemen who -remained in the Reichsbank? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: You were then named by Hitler, on the suggestion of the -Defendant Funk, to be Managing Vice President of the Reichsbank? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: When was that? - -PUHL: During the year 1939. - -DR. SAUTER: During the year 1939. You have said that you were Managing -Vice President, and I presume this was due to the fact that banking was -not the special field of the Defendant Funk while you were a banking -expert, and that Funk in addition had charge of the Reich Ministry of -Economics. Is that correct? - -PUHL: Yes, but there was another reason, namely, the division of -authority between official business on one side, and the handling of -personnel on the other. - -DR. SAUTER: The actual conduct of business was apparently your -responsibility? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Hence, the title Managing Vice President? - -PUHL: Yes. May I make a few comments on this? - -DR. SAUTER: Only if it is necessary in the interests of the case. - -PUHL: Yes. The business of the Directorate of the Reichsbank was divided -among a number of members of the Directorate. Every member had full -responsibility for his own sphere. The Vice President was the _primus -inter pares_, his main task was to act as chairman at meetings to -represent the President in the outside world and to deal with problems -of general economic and banking policy. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, the Defendant Funk referred to you as a witness as -early as December. You know that, don’t you? And accordingly, you were -interrogated at the camp where you are now accommodated, I believe in -Baden-Baden... - -PUHL: Near Baden-Baden. - -DR. SAUTER: ...interrogated on 1 May? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Two days later you were again interrogated? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: On 3 May? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know why the matters on which you were questioned on -3 May were not dealt with during the interrogation on 1 May? - -PUHL: I have before me the affidavit dated 3 May. - -DR. SAUTER: 3 May. That deals with these business affairs with the SS. - -PUHL: Yes. But I was questioned on this subject already on 1 May, only -very briefly, and on 3 May there was a second interrogation for the -purpose of discussing it in more detail. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you not mention these business affairs of the Reichsbank -with the SS during your interrogation on 1 May? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you mention them? - -PUHL: A short statement was made. - -DR. SAUTER: During the interrogation of 1 May? - -PUHL: Yes. At any rate, the statement on 3 May made during the -interrogation was only a more detailed record of what had already been -briefly discussed before. - -DR. SAUTER: I have the record of your interrogation on 1 May before me; -I read through it again today. But as far as I can see, it contains no -mention at all of business affairs with the SS. You must be speaking now -of another interrogation? - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think perhaps I can be helpful in this -apparent confusion. The interrogatory which was authorized by the -Tribunal was taken on 1 May, but on that same day, and independent of -these interrogatories, a member of our staff also interviewed this -witness. But it was a separate interview. It wasn’t related to the -interrogatory, and I think that is the source of the confusion. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you interrogated twice about these transactions with -the SS? - -PUHL: Yes, twice during the days around 1 May; that is correct. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you still remember the affidavit which you signed on 3 -May? - -PUHL: On 3 May, yes. - -DR. SAUTER: It is the affidavit which deals with these transactions with -the SS. Are your statements in this affidavit correct? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, have you been interrogated on these matters again -since that time, since 3 May? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: When? - -PUHL: Here in Nuremberg. - -DR. SAUTER: When were you interrogated? - -PUHL: During the last few days. - -DR. SAUTER: I see. Today is Wednesday, when was it? - -PUHL: Friday, Monday, Tuesday. - -DR. SAUTER: Yesterday? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: On this matter? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Was a film also shown to you here? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Once or twice? - -PUHL: Once. - -DR. SAUTER: Had you seen this film before? - -PUHL: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you recognize clearly what was presented in the film? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: I ask because, as you know, the film runs very quickly and -is very short; the Prosecution showed it twice in the courtroom so that -one might follow it fairly well. Did one showing suffice to make clear -to you what the film contained? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Then will you tell me what you saw in it, only what you saw -in the film, or what you think you saw. - -PUHL: Yes. The film was taken in front of the safes of our bank at -Frankfurt-on-Main, the usual safes with glass doors, behind which one -could see the locked cases and containers, which had apparently been -deposited there. It was the usual picture presented by such strong -rooms. In front of these safes were several containers which had been -opened so that their contents could be seen—coins, jewelry, pearls, -bank notes, clocks. - -DR. SAUTER: What sort of clocks? - -PUHL: Large alarm clocks. - -DR. SAUTER: Nothing else? Didn’t you see anything else in the film? - -PUHL: Apart from these objects? - -DR. SAUTER: Apart from these, shall we say, valuables, didn’t you see -anything else that is alleged to have been kept there? - -PUHL: No, no. - -DR. SAUTER: Only these valuables? Please go on. - -PUHL: I noticed that among these valuables there were coins, apparently -silver coins, and also bank notes, obviously American bank notes. - -DR. SAUTER: Correct. - -PUHL: It was astonishing that these things were given to us for -safekeeping, because if they had come to the knowledge of our officials, -then no doubt... - -DR. SAUTER: Speak slowly, please. - -PUHL: ...no doubt the bank notes would have been immediately turned over -to the foreign exchange department, since, as is known, a general order -existed for the turning in of foreign bank notes which particularly were -much in demand. - -Something similar applies to the coins. These, too, ought to have been -transferred to the treasury in accordance with the regulations and -routine of business, that is to say, they should have been purchased for -the accounts of the Reich. - -DR. SAUTER: That is what you noticed in the film? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And nothing else? - -PUHL: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, valuable articles entrusted to the Reichsbank for -safekeeping were supposed to have been kept in the Reichsbank in that -way. Now I have been asking myself whether your Reichsbank really stored -the valuables entrusted to it in the manner apparent from the film and I -therefore want to ask this question of you: Do you as Managing Vice -President of the Reichsbank know how valuables which were handed over -for safekeeping in the strong-rooms were kept, for instance, in Berlin -or in Frankfurt, where this film was taken? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Please tell the Court. - -PUHL: The outer appearance of the safe installations in Berlin was -somewhat similar to that in Frankfurt, and probably similar to any other -large bank. These things were known to us as “closed deposits,” a -banking term, and were kept, as the name indicates, in closed -containers. Space for these was provided by us and paid for by the -depositors, according to the size in each case. - -DR. SAUTER: Were these things kept—for instance, in Berlin or in -Frankfurt—exactly as shown in the film? - -PUHL: Well, I had the impression that the things of which we are now -talking had been put there expressly for the purpose of taking the film. - -DR. SAUTER: For the film. Do you recollect seeing a sack, which I think -was shown in the film, with the label “Reichsbank Frankfurt?” - -PUHL: Yes, I saw a sack labeled “Reichsbank”; I cannot say whether -“Reichsbank Frankfurt.” - -DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, it had “Reichsbank Frankfurt” on it. For -that reason we assumed that the film was taken at Frankfurt, and the -Prosecution confirmed that. - -MR. DODD: I don’t like to interrupt but I think we should be careful -about this statement. There have been two mistakes of some slight -importance already. We didn’t show the film twice before this Tribunal -and that bag doesn’t bear the legend “Frankfurt.” It simply says -“Reichsbank.” And it was the Schacht film that was shown twice here, -because it moved rather quickly. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, will you continue with your reply to the question. -I can put it in this way: Did the Reichsbank keep gold articles and the -like in such sacks? - -PUHL: If I understand you correctly, you are asking this: When valuables -were deposited with us, were they deposited in open sacks? Is that -correct? - -DR. SAUTER: I do not know what procedure you had. - -PUHL: We at any rate had closed deposits, as the name implies. Of -course, it may be a sack which is closed; that is quite possible. - -DR. SAUTER: So far as I saw in banks at Munich, the things which were -deposited there in increased measure during the war were without -exception deposited in closed boxes or cases and the like, so that -generally the bank did not know at all what was contained in the cases -or boxes. Did you in the Reichsbank follow a different procedure? - -PUHL: No, it was exactly the same. And the noticeable thing about this -sack, as has been said, is the label “Reichsbank.” Obviously it is a -sack belonging to us and not to any private person. - -DR. SAUTER: Then you too, if I may repeat this to avoid any doubt, you -too kept in a closed container the valuables, which had been deposited -as “closed deposits.” - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Or they went to the strongboxes? - -PUHL: The word “deposits” might be misleading. The closed containers -went to the strong-room. The strong-room consisted of strongboxes where -these cases or containers were deposited. Quite independent of that -arrangement, we had the “open deposits.” Open deposits are those which -by initial agreement are administered openly. The strong-rooms for these -were located in quite a different part of the building from the -so-called main strong-room. - -DR. SAUTER: But presumably, we are not concerned here with these open -deposits? - -PUHL: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, Witness, I come to the deposits of the SS. These -deposits were not in Frankfurt but presumably in Berlin in the central -bank. - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, will you give details about the discussions which the -Defendant Funk had with you regarding the SS deposits. And may I ask you -to consider your replies and search your memory very carefully before -answering my questions. Naturally I shall allow you time. - -First of all, what did you and the Defendant Funk discuss when you -talked about these deposits of the SS for the first time? - -PUHL: I refer here to my affidavit of 3 May. I had a very simple talk -with Herr Funk. It turned on the request of the SS to make use of our -bank installations by depositing valuables for which, it was said, there -was not sufficient protection in the cellars of the SS building. -Perhaps, for the sake of completeness, I may add that “SS,” in this -connection, always means the Economic Department of the SS. - -DR. SAUTER: What did the Defendant Funk speak of at the time? Did he -specify exactly what should be accepted for safekeeping? - -PUHL: He mentioned valuables which the SS had brought from the Eastern -Territories, which were then in their cellars and which, above all, they -requested us to keep in safety. - -DR. SAUTER: But did the Defendant Funk tell you in detail what these -valuables were? - -PUHL: No, not in detail, but he said that in general they were gold, -foreign currency, silver, and jewelry. - -DR. SAUTER: Gold, foreign currency, silver, jewelry... - -PUHL: To which I may add that gold and foreign currency had of course to -be surrendered to the Reichsbank at any rate. - -DR. SAUTER: Gold, foreign currency, silver and jewelry? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And that was supposed to have been confiscated in the -Eastern Territories? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Did the Defendant Funk tell you at the time why these -confiscations had been made, or who had been affected by them? - -PUHL: No, that was not stated; the talk, as I have said, was brief. - -DR. SAUTER: And what was your reply? - -PUHL: I said that this sort of business with the SS would at least be -inconvenient for us, and I voiced objections to it. I may add that we, -as the Reichsbank, were always very cautious in these matters, for -example, when valuables were offered us by foreign exchange control -offices, customs offices, and the like. - -DR. SAUTER: What was the actual reason for your objections in the case -of the SS? - -PUHL: Because one could not know what inconvenient consequences a -business connection of this sort might produce. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, that answer does not satisfy me. Did you or the -Defendant Funk not wish to have anything to do with the SS at all, or -was there some other reason for your objections? - -PUHL: The first part of your question I answer with “no.” There was no -objection on principle, nor could there be; for, after all, every German -organization or institution had the legal right to enjoy the services of -the Reichsbank. - -The circumstances arising out of these confiscations were uncomfortable, -like the confiscations of the foreign exchange control offices, _et -cetera_, which I mentioned, because one never knew what difficulties -might result. - -DR. SAUTER: So that, if I understand you well—please correct me if I -interpret it wrongly—you voiced objections because these business -affairs were somewhat uncomfortable for the Reichsbank, they fell -outside the normal scope of business, and were as little welcome to you -as, for instance, deposits of the customs authorities or the foreign -exchange control offices, and so forth? Only for this reason? - -PUHL: Yes. But I have to add something; we were asked whether we would -assist the SS in handling these deposits. It was immediately clear, of -course, and also expressly stated, that these deposits included foreign -currency, and also securities and all sorts of gold coins, _et cetera_, -and that the SS people did not quite know how to deal with these things. - -DR. SAUTER: Did these things arrive subsequently? - -PUHL: Yes. But something else happened before that. After this -conversation the head of the Economic Department of the SS, whose name -was Pohl, Obergruppenführer Pohl, contacted me. I asked him to come to -my office, and there he repeated, what I already knew, namely that he -would welcome it if we would take over these valuables as soon as -possible. - -DR. SAUTER: What was your answer? - -PUHL: I confirmed what we had arranged and said, “If you will designate -officials from your department, I shall inform our department, and -together they can discuss the technical details.” - -DR. SAUTER: To revert to an earlier stage: What did the Defendant Funk -say when you explained during your first conversation with him that you -would not willingly take over those things because one often had a lot -of trouble with such matters? - -PUHL: My objections were subordinated to the broader consideration of -assisting the SS, all the more—and this must be emphasized—because -these things were for the account of the Reich. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you discuss whether these things, particularly gold, -should be converted by the Reichsbank or melted down? - -PUHL: No, not in detail; it was merely said that the officials of the -Reichsbank should offer their good services to the SS. - -DR. SAUTER: I do not quite understand. The good services of the -Reichsbank officials consist in receiving these valuables into -safekeeping and locking them up? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Were the services of your officials to go beyond that? - -PUHL: Yes, inasmuch as the SS people were to come and remove from the -containers whatever had to be surrendered. - -DR. SAUTER: For instance, gold coins, foreign currency, _et cetera_? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Then did you see—to come back to the question already -put—did you see what arrived, what the SS delivered? - -PUHL: No, not personally. This happened far away from my office, in -quite a different building, downstairs in the strong-rooms which I, as -Vice President of the Reichsbank, would not normally enter without a -special reason. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you, as Vice President, visit these strong-rooms -frequently? - -PUHL: It was a habit of mine, sometimes at an interval of three months -or longer, to go through the strong-rooms; if there was some occasion -for it, for instance, when there was a visitor to be conducted or some -new installation to be discussed, or when there was something of -importance beyond mere attendance on the safes and the clients. - -DR. SAUTER: But, of course, as Vice President, you had nothing to do -with attending to customers? - -PUHL: No. - -DR. SAUTER: And I should like to put the same question to you with -regard to the Defendant Funk. Did the Defendant Funk, who moreover -belonged to the Reichsbank only in part, go to the strong-rooms often? - -If so, how often and for what reason? And did he see what had been -handed in by the SS? - -PUHL: The answer is that Funk, too, went to the strong-rooms on special -occasions, for example, when there were foreign visitors. Naturally, I -would not know how often, nor whether he saw the SS deposits. That -depends on whether the strong-room officials who were conducting him -pointed them out to him. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you, Witness, see the things which came from the SS—did -you see them yourself? - -PUHL: No, never. - -DR. SAUTER: Never? - -PUHL: Never. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you think that the Defendant Funk saw them? - -PUHL: I cannot tell that, of course; it depends on whether the -strong-room officials pointed out specifically: “Here is the deposit of -the SS.” - -DR. SAUTER: Then I presume you cannot give us any information on how -these things of the SS were actually kept or how they were packed? - -PUHL: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Whether in boxes or... - -PUHL: No, I do not know that. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you talk again about this whole affair of the SS -deposits with the Defendant Funk? - -PUHL: Hardly at all, as far as I can remember. But I must certainly have -talked to him a second time, after Herr Pohl had visited me, since it -was, of course, my task and my duty to keep Funk informed of everything. - -DR. SAUTER: Did the members of the Reichsbank Directorate, the board of -directors, attach a special significance to this whole matter so that -there might have been occasion to discuss it more frequently? Or was it -regarded as just an unpleasant but unimportant sort of business? - -PUHL: No. At the beginning there was probably a report on it to the -meeting of the Directorate, but then it was not mentioned again. - -DR. SAUTER: You cannot recollect having later again talked of the matter -with Funk? But it is possible, if I understood you correctly, that after -the settlement with SS Obergruppenführer Pohl, you may again have -reported about it briefly? Did I understand you correctly? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, Witness, in your affidavit under Figure 5, you say that -among the articles deposited by the SS were jewelry, watches, spectacle -frames, gold fillings—apparently these dental fillings—and other -articles in large quantities which the SS had taken away from Jews and -concentration camp victims and other persons. How do you know that? - -PUHL: I know that from my interrogations at Frankfurt. - -DR. SAUTER: You were told about these things during your interrogations -in Frankfurt after your arrest? - -PUHL: And they were shown to me. - -DR. SAUTER: You had no knowledge of them while you were free and -administered the Reichsbank as Vice President? - -PUHL: No, because, I repeat it again, we never discussed this in the -Directorate, since it was of no basic significance for currency or -banking policy or in any other respect. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, if at that time in 1942 you had known that these -were articles which the SS had taken away from many concentration camp -victims, would you have received them into safekeeping? - -PUHL: No. - -DR. SAUTER: What would you have done? - -PUHL: Then we would have come to some decision on the attitude which the -bank as a whole should adopt toward this problem. - -DR. SAUTER: Who would have had the decisive word? - -PUHL: The decision would have been made by the Directorate of the -Reichsbank as an executive group, as a corporate body, and then it would -have been submitted to the President for countersignature. - -DR. SAUTER: Earlier—I must fill in this gap in connection with your -affidavit—you expressed yourself in a rather misleading way. You stated -earlier: “This was brought to our knowledge, because the SS personnel -attempted to convert this material into gold, into cash.” And today you -say that you heard of it only after your arrest. Apparently, if I -understand you correctly, there must be... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I do not understand why you say “earlier.” It -is the sentence which followed the sentence which you put to him. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say “earlier” then? Why do you say “earlier”? - -DR. SAUTER: In his affidavit—if the wording of the affidavit is correct -and there is no misunderstanding—the witness said... - -THE PRESIDENT: What I am pointing out to you is that the first sentence -reads like this: “The material deposited by the SS included all these -items taken from Jews, concentration camp victims, and other persons by -the SS.” And it then goes on, “This was brought to our knowledge by the -SS personnel who attempted to convert this material into cash.” What you -are now putting to him is that that acceptance was put to him earlier. -At least that is what I understood you to say. - -DR. SAUTER: No; the witness said today that he was told only during his -interrogations in Frankfurt-on-Main that these articles had been taken -from concentration camp victims, _et cetera_. The affidavit, however, -can and must be interpreted in my opinion as saying that he received -this information, already before his arrest, through the SS personnel -and that apparently is not true. For that reason I asked the witness -whether this expression in the affidavit is not a misunderstanding. - -Now, Witness, if I may repeat this: You first heard that these articles -belonged to concentration camp victims at your interrogation? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And when did you learn what was contained in this deposit; -when did you know that, to pick out one example, gold teeth were -contained in it? - -PUHL: Not at all. No details of this transaction were submitted to the -Directorate by the strong-room or safe officials. - -DR. SAUTER: So of this, too, you heard only after your arrest? - -PUHL: Of the details, yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Good. Now, you speak of an agreement which, according to the -statement of Funk, Himmler, the Reichsführer of the SS, is said to have -made with the Reich Minister of Finance. What do you know about this -agreement? - -PUHL: That is the agreement I have already mentioned. It was clear from -the beginning that the value of the things deposited with us was to be -credited to the Ministry of Finance. - -DR. SAUTER: Not to the SS? - -PUHL: No, not to the SS. - -DR. SAUTER: Why not? The SS were the depositors, were they not? - -PUHL: Yes, but they maintained that their actions were carried out in -the name and on behalf of the Reich and its accounts. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know whether these valuables, which in some -way had been confiscated or stolen by the SS in the East, were placed as -a matter of principle at the disposal of the Reich Ministry of Finance? - -PUHL: I did not quite understand the question. Are you referring to -these articles or to confiscated articles, valuables in general? - -DR. SAUTER: To all valuables. I am speaking of gold, foreign currency, -and so forth, all these valuables acquired by the SS in the East; were -they all to be placed at the disposal of the Reich Ministry of Finance, -and not of the Reichsbank? - -PUHL: The equivalent value? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, the equivalent value. - -PUHL: The equivalent value was credited to the Reich Ministry of -Finance. - -DR. SAUTER: In this connection, Witness, may I show you two accounts. I -do not know whether you have seen them. They are two accounts of the -chief cashier’s office of your bank. - -PUHL: Yes, to us. - -DR. SAUTER: I should like you, then, to look at them, and to tell me -whether you have seen them before and what you know about them? - -PUHL: I saw these two copies—photostat copies—during my -interrogations. - -DR. SAUTER: But not earlier? - -PUHL: No, not earlier. And from these photostat copies it is clear—we -have just discussed it—that the equivalent value was to be credited to -the Reich Chief Cashier’s Office, as it says here; the Reich Chief -Cashier’s Office was a part of the Ministry of Finance. - -DR. SAUTER: So apparently it is connected with this agreement, of which -you heard, that finally all these things belonged to the Reich Ministry -of Finance, to the Reich. - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Now I have one more question on this subject. And I would -like to know whether perhaps there is a misunderstanding in this case -too. You say in the affidavit that Funk told you this matter should be -kept absolutely secret; that is the wording. You did not mention this -point at all today, although we have the affidavit in front of us. Will -you say now whether this is true or whether it is a misunderstanding? - -PUHL: That it should be kept secret? No. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -PUHL: Of course, this matter was to be kept secret, but then everything -that happens in a bank must be kept secret. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, this statement cannot, of course, satisfy us. Did -you, during your interrogation of 3 May, say what is contained in this -document, namely, that the matter was to be kept absolutely secret, or -did you express yourself in different words? - -PUHL: No, the wording of the affidavit is correct; the matter was to be -kept absolutely secret. - -DR. SAUTER: Why? - -PUHL: Why? Because, plainly, such matters are usually kept secret and -are not publicized; furthermore, these things came from the East. I -repeat what I said before, that our attitude towards confiscated -articles was always to avoid them. - -DR. SAUTER: Did it strike you as unusual that the Defendant Funk spoke -of keeping the matter secret? - -PUHL: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Or did it not strike you as unusual? - -PUHL: Not as unusual. - -DR. SAUTER: Not as unusual? - -PUHL: No. It was merely decided in the conversation that since we were -not willing to accept the confiscated articles of the foreign exchange -control offices and the customs offices, we should, naturally, insist on -secrecy in accepting these articles. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. But from your account of the matter, it appears that, -on one hand, you considered the business to be perfectly legal, and you -yourself say that it was perfectly legal; on the other hand, secrecy was -for you, as an old banking expert, a matter of course. Now the question -arises, why then was the subject of keeping the matter secret discussed -at all? - -PUHL: Herr Funk himself had been asked to keep the matter as secret as -possible, and he passed on that request. - -DR. SAUTER: When did Funk tell you that he had been asked to keep it -secret? - -PUHL: I do not remember that. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you not ask him why it should be kept secret, absolutely -secret, as you say? I do not know whether you still maintain “absolutely -secret”? - -PUHL: Yes, a special duty of observing secrecy was to be imposed on the -officials. - -DR. SAUTER: Well, what did you, as Vice President, as Managing Vice -President, say to that? - -PUHL: I did not say anything because, if that had been agreed upon, then -this wish would have to be complied with. - -DR. SAUTER: But you do not know whether it had been agreed upon? - -PUHL: Well, I assume that it was agreed upon. - -DR. SAUTER: You consider it possible? - -PUHL: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And—to repeat this—you did not at all see the articles -which arrived? - -PUHL: No, not at all. - -DR. SAUTER: And probably you do not know how many there were? - -PUHL: No, I do not know that either; and, as I said before, I never saw -an account; that was not in conformity with our procedure, as individual -transactions were not submitted to the members of the Directorate. - -DR. SAUTER: I ask because recently, when this case was discussed, it was -asserted that whole truckloads of such articles, whole truckloads had -arrived. You are already laughing and you will laugh more when I tell -you that 47 truckloads of gold were said to have arrived at your bank; -and you knew nothing about them? - -PUHL: I have never heard of that. - -DR. SAUTER: You heard nothing about that? Witness, we will leave this -point and turn to the second point in your affidavit of May, with which -we can deal very briefly. - -I think you knew Herr Pohl, SS Obergruppenführer Pohl, of whom you spoke -just now, already in 1942? - -PUHL: Yes, but none the less this was the first occasion on which Pohl -came to my office. - -DR. SAUTER: This is no reproach, I just wanted to establish a fact. You -knew him as a result of this first credit transaction which took place -at an earlier time. - -PUHL: Yes, that may be. - -DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Funk says, you see, that as far as he can -remember this credit matter—and he did not attach any special -significance to it at the time—it was negotiated about 1940, some time -before the other transaction. Can that be true? Approximately? - -PUHL: I can neither deny nor confirm that; I no longer recall the date -of the credit. - -DR. SAUTER: Well, in your affidavit you state, with reference to this -credit, that the Reichsbank had granted a credit of 10 or 12 millions to -the SS, I believe to pay off a loan which the SS had taken up with -another bank. And you say that this credit was used for financing -production in factories directed by the SS, where workers from -concentration camps were employed. - -Witness, I am not primarily interested in this credit as such because it -was, of course, part of your business as a bank; and the figure of, I -think, 10 or 12 millions was also not unusual. But I am interested in -how you knew that this money was to be used for SS factories in which -workers from concentration camps were employed. How did you know that? - -PUHL: The application for credit came from the Economic Department of -the SS which I have mentioned before. This department was directing a -number of factories in Germany, and needed money for that purpose. The -Gold Discount Bank was prepared to give this credit, but only in the -form of regular business credits. In other words, the debtor had to -submit a balance sheet to us and at regular intervals had to report on -his production, his general financial position, his plans for the -immediate future, in short, all matters on which a debtor is bound to -inform his creditor. - -The board of directors of the Gold Discount Bank conducted these -negotiations, in which the representatives of the Economic Department, -who submitted the balance sheets, naturally discussed their production -program, which was remarkable insofar as the wage figures affecting the -balance were comparatively low. And so the natural question arose: Why -is your wage account so low? The director of the Gold Discount Bank -reported on this subject to the board meeting of the Gold Discount Bank. - -DR. SAUTER: You always refer to the Gold Discount Bank. The Tribunal -would be interested to know whether the Gold Discount Bank is identical -with the Reichsbank, whether it was also under the jurisdiction of the -Defendant Funk and your own, and what was its position? - -PUHL: The Gold Discount Bank was an institute subsidiary to the -Reichsbank; it was founded in the twenties for various purposes, not -only for the promotion of exports, but also for the increase of -production. The capital structure... - -DR. SAUTER: No, we are not interested in that. - -PUHL: Practically all the shares were in the hands of the Reichsbank. -The Gold Discount Bank had a Board of Directors always headed by the -President of the Reichsbank; it also had a deputy chairman who was the -Second Vice President of the Reichsbank, and the Board of Directors -itself included a number of members of the Directorate of the -Reichsbank, and also the State Secretaries of the Ministry of Economics -and of the Ministry of Finance. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is not interesting to us to know who the exact -directors of the Gold Discount Bank were. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I wanted, in fact, to interrupt you earlier, and -tell you that what you have just related is without significance for the -Trial. To me and to the Tribunal it is only of interest to hear whether -the Defendant Funk, as far as you definitely remember, had knowledge of -these matters, of the purpose of this credit and whether he knew that in -these factories people from the concentration camps were employed? Do -you, or do you not know? - -PUHL: I might assume that, but I cannot know it. At any rate, it was -known that the credit was destined for these factories. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, I cannot be satisfied with that answer because the -SS, as you have probably heard in the meantime, directed various -undertakings in which no concentration camp inmates were employed. To my -knowledge, for example, the porcelain factory at Allach did not -apparently employ concentration camp inmates. Then for example, the -entire personnel at the spas... - -MR. DODD: I object to testimony by counsel. He is practically giving the -answer to this witness before he asks the question. - -DR. SAUTER: Do you know whether the SS had undertakings in which no -concentration camp inmates were employed? - -PUHL: I did not, of course, know every individual business run by the -SS, nor could I know in each case whether prisoners were or were not -employed. - -DR. SAUTER: Was the Defendant Funk present at all during the meeting at -which this credit was discussed? - -PUHL: No, he was not present; the records of the proceedings were -submitted; we always adopted that procedure. - -DR. SAUTER: Then did the Defendant Funk talk at all with the people who -had given information on the unusual figures of the wage account? - -PUHL: No, that was done by the Board of Directors of the Gold Discount -Bank. - -DR. SAUTER: That was done by the board of the Gold Discount Bank, not by -the Defendant Funk? - -Then, Mr. President, I have no further questions for the witness. - -MR. DODD: I have just a few questions to ask, Your Honor. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Whom have you talked to besides -representatives of the Prosecution since you have arrived here in -Nuremberg? Did you look at any paper? - -PUHL: I do not know all their names, I believe a Mr. Kempner, Mr. -Margolis... - -MR. DODD: I am not asking you about the gentlemen of the Prosecution. I -am asking you whom else you have talked to, if anybody, since you -arrived here in Nuremberg. That doesn’t require very much thought. Have -you talked to anybody else since you arrived here or not? - -PUHL: Only to the other prisoners in the corridor of our prison. - -MR. DODD: To no one else? - -PUHL: No one else. - -MR. DODD: Now, are you absolutely sure about that? - -PUHL: Yes, absolutely. - -MR. DODD: Did you talk to Dr. Stuckart over in the witness wing, and -about your testimony that you were going to give here this morning? -Answer that question. - -PUHL: Dr. Stuckart is one of the prisoners in the corridor of our -witness wing. - -MR. DODD: I didn’t ask you that. I asked you if you didn’t talk to him a -day or two ago about your testimony in this case? - -PUHL: No. - -MR. DODD: Now, I think it is awfully important to you that I remind you -that you are under oath here. I am going to ask you again if you didn’t -talk to Dr. Stuckart over in this witness wing about your testimony or -about the facts concerning Funk in this case? - -PUHL: No, I talked about all sorts of general matters. - -MR. DODD: You didn’t talk to four or five of those other people over -there either about your testimony or about the facts here? - -PUHL: No, absolutely not. - -MR. DODD: All right. You know a man by the name of Thoms, T-h-o-m-s? - -PUHL: T-h-o-m-s? He was an official of the Reichsbank who worked in the -vaults of the Reichsbank in Berlin. - -MR. DODD: You know the man, you do know him? - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Now, you talked to him about these deposits put in by the SS, -didn’t you, Herr Puhl? - -PUHL: To Herr Thoms, no. - -MR. DODD: You didn’t talk to him? - -PUHL: No, I have not seen Herr Thoms at all in Nuremberg, and only from -a distance in Frankfurt. - -MR. DODD: I am not referring to Nuremberg now. We will get away from -that for a minute. I mean during the time that these deposits were being -made in the Reichsbank. Did you not talk to Herr Thoms about the -deposits? - -PUHL: Yes, as has been stated here in the affidavit. - -MR. DODD: Well, never mind the affidavit for a few minutes. I have a few -questions I want to ask you. I am particularly interested in this matter -of secrecy. What did you tell Thoms about the requirement of secrecy -with respect to these SS deposits? Did you tell Thoms about the -requirement of secrecy with respect to these SS deposits? - -PUHL: I must add that I really talked with Herr Tonetti, because he was -the person responsible; and Herr Thoms was only called in. I told both -gentlemen that it was desired the matter be kept secret. - -MR. DODD: Did you say that it had to be kept a secret and that they must -not discuss it with anybody else; that it was highly secret, a special -transaction, and if anybody asked him about it, he was to say that he -was forbidden to speak about it? Did you tell that to Herr Thoms in the -Reichsbank? - -PUHL: Yes, that was the sense of what I said. - -MR. DODD: Well, that is what I am asking you. Why did you tell Thoms -that he was not to speak about it; that it was absolutely forbidden; -that it was highly secret, if it was just the ordinary confidence -reposed in bank officials attached to a business relationship? - -PUHL: Because the Reichsbank President Funk personally conveyed this -wish to me. - -MR. DODD: Well, now, I think perhaps there is some confusion in our -minds. You see, I clearly understood, and I expect others as well as the -Tribunal may have in the courtroom this morning, that you were telling -counsel for Funk that the secrecy attached to these transactions was not -extraordinary but just the ordinary secrecy or confidence that banking -people attach to their relationship with customers. Now, of course, that -wasn’t so, was it? - -PUHL: The position, as I explained it earlier, is this: These -confiscated valuables were usually rejected by us when brought to the -bank; and if an exception was now being made, then it was a matter of -course that a greater amount of secrecy, a special obligation to -maintain secrecy, should be observed. - -MR. DODD: I wish you would answer this question very directly. Wasn’t -there a special reason for special secrecy with respect to these -deposits by the SS? You can answer that Yes or No. - -PUHL: No, I did not perceive a special reason. - -MR. DODD: Then why were you telling Thoms that it was highly secret and -he was to tell anybody who asked him about it that he was forbidden to -speak about it? You didn’t ordinarily instruct your people to that -effect, did you? - -PUHL: Because I myself had received this instruction. - -MR. DODD: That may be so, but that was a special secrecy, wasn’t it? -That wasn’t your ordinary and customary way of doing business? - -PUHL: The confiscated articles were usually rejected when they reached -us; if the exception which we made in this case became known, then it -would immediately have provided an example for others; and that we -wanted to avoid under all circumstances. - -MR. DODD: You didn’t want to discuss this matter on the telephone with -Pohl of the SS, did you? You asked him to come to your office rather -than talk about it on the telephone? - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Why was that, if it was just an ordinary business transaction? - -PUHL: Because one never knew to what extent the telephone was being -tapped, and thus the transaction might have become known to others. - -MR. DODD: Well, you didn’t talk to anybody much on the telephone; is -that right? You were a man that never used the telephone out of the -Reichsbank? Now, I think you realize fully well that there was a special -reason in this case for not wanting to talk on the telephone and I think -you should tell the Tribunal what it was. - -PUHL: Yes; the reason was, as I have said repeatedly, that from the -beginning special secrecy was desired, this desire was respected and -adhered to everywhere, also as to this telephone call. - -MR. DODD: And you are still insisting that this transaction was not a -special secret transaction that you told Dr. Kempner was a -“Schweinerei.” Do you know what that word means? - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: What does it mean? It means it smelled bad, doesn’t it? - -PUHL: That we should not have done it. - -MR. DODD: Now, you called up Thoms on more than one occasion to ask him -how the deposits from the SS were coming in, didn’t you? - -PUHL: No, I saw Thoms relatively seldom, often not for months, as he -could hardly come to my office. - -MR. DODD: I didn’t ask you if you saw him often. I asked you if you -didn’t call him on the telephone and ask him how the deposits were -coming along? - -PUHL: No, I took no further interest in the conduct of this particular -transaction. Moreover, the requesting of a report from the cashier would -have been the proper procedure. - -MR. DODD: Did you tell him to get in touch with Brigadeführer Frank or -Gruppenführer or Obergruppenführer Wolff of the SS? Did you tell that to -Thoms? - -PUHL: Yes, I repeat what I said earlier; when Pohl was in my office he -told me that he would appoint two people to negotiate the transaction -with the Reichsbank, and they were the two people just mentioned; I -passed on their names to the cashier’s office. - -MR. DODD: What was the name under which these deposits were known in the -Reichsbank? - -PUHL: I heard of the name under which these deposits were known in the -Reichsbank for the first time in Frankfurt, when I saw it in the files. - -MR. DODD: Don’t you know the name Melmer, M-e-l-m-e-r? - -PUHL: Yes, from my time in Frankfurt. - -MR. DODD: Didn’t you on one occasion call Herr Thoms on the telephone -and ask him how the “Melmer” deposits were coming along? - -PUHL: I am afraid I didn’t quite understand. - -MR. DODD: Well, I say, didn’t you on one occasion at least call Herr -Thoms on the telephone in the Reichsbank and ask him how the “Melmer” -deposits were coming along? - -PUHL: No, I could not have put that question because I did not know the -word “Melmer.” - -MR. DODD: You don’t know that Melmer was the name of an SS man? You -don’t know that? - -PUHL: No, I did not know that. - -MR. DODD: I want you to look at an affidavit by Mr. Thoms, executed the -8th day of May 1946. You have seen this before, by the way; haven’t you, -you saw it yesterday? Answer that question, will you please, Mr. -Witness. You saw this affidavit yesterday, the one I just sent up to -you? You saw that yesterday, didn’t you? - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You will observe in Paragraph 5 that Thoms, who executed this -affidavit, said that he went to see you and that you told him that the -Reichsbank was going to act as custodian for the SS and the receipt and -disposition of deposits and that the SS would deliver the property, -namely gold, silver and foreign currency; and you also explained that -the SS intended to deliver numerous other kinds of property such as -jewelry, and “we must find a way to dispose of it,” and that he -suggested to you, Mr. Puhl, that: - - “We transmit the items to the Reichshauptkasse, as we did in the - case of Wehrmacht booty, or that the items could be given by the - Reichsführer-SS directly to the pawnshop for disposition, so - that the Reichsbank had no more to do with it than it did in the - case of confiscated Jewish property. Puhl told me that it was - out of the question and that it was necessary that we arrange a - procedure for handling this unusual property in order to hold - the whole business secret.” - -Then he goes on to say: - - “This conversation with Puhl occurred just a short time, - approximately two weeks, before the first delivery, which - occurred on 26 August 1942. The conversation was in the office - of Herr Puhl; nobody else was present. I don’t remember if Herr - Frommknecht was present during the whole time; and Puhl said it - was very important not to discuss this with anybody, that it was - to be highly secret, that it was a special transaction, and if - anybody asked about it that I should say I was forbidden to - speak about it.” - -And on the next page you find, in Paragraph 8, Herr Thoms says: - - “I was told by Herr Puhl that if I had any questions on this - matter I was to get in touch with Brigadeführer Frank or with - Gruppenführer or Obergruppenführer Wolff of the SS. I remember - getting the telephone number of this office, and I think I - recall it was furnished me by Herr Puhl. I called Brigadeführer - Frank about this, and he stated that the deliveries would be - made by truck and would be in charge of an SS man by the name of - Melmer. The question was discussed whether Melmer should appear - in uniform or civilian clothes, and Frank decided it was better - that Melmer appear out of uniform.” - -And so on. - -Then, moving on down, he says, in Paragraph 10: - - “When the first delivery was made, however, although Melmer - appeared in civilian clothes, one or two SS men in uniform were - on guard; and after one or two deliveries most of the people in - the Hauptkasse and almost everybody in my office knew all about - the SS deliveries.” - -Then moving on again, Paragraph 12: - - “Included in the first statement sent by the Reichsbank, and - signed by me, to Melmer was a question concerning the name of - the account to which the proceeds should be credited. In answer - to that I was orally advised by Melmer that the proceeds should - be credited to the account of ‘Max Heiliger.’ I confirmed this - on the telephone with the Ministry of Finance; and in my second - statement to Melmer, dated 16 November 1942, I confirmed the - oral conversation.” - -Now, the next paragraph is 13: - - “After a few months, Puhl called me and asked me how the Melmer - deliveries were going along and suggested that perhaps they - would soon be over. I told Puhl that the way the deliveries were - coming in it looked as though they were growing.” - -And then I call your attention to the next paragraph: - - “One of the first hints of the sources of these items occurred - when it was noticed that a packet of bills was stamped with a - rubber stamp, ‘Lublin.’ This occurred some time early in 1943. - Another hint came when some items bore the stamp, ‘Auschwitz.’ - We all knew that these places were the sites of concentration - camps. It was the tenth delivery, in November 1942, that dental - gold appeared. The quantity of the dental gold became unusually - great.” - -Now, there is another paragraph, but I particularly want to call your -attention to the fact that Thoms says you called him and asked him how -the Melmer deliveries were going, and also to the fact that you, as he -states in here, impressed upon him the need for absolute secrecy. - -And now, I want to ask you, after having seen that affidavit again—and -you will recall that you told our people yesterday that that affidavit, -insofar as your knowledge was concerned, was absolutely true—now I am -going to ask you if it isn’t a fact that there was a very special reason -for keeping this transaction secret. - -PUHL: In reading this statement, it is obvious that the desire for -secrecy came from the SS; and this tallies exactly with what I said -before, namely, that the SS emphasized that the desire for secrecy -originated with them. And as we heard, they went so far as to invent an -account—“Max Heiliger”—which was obviously, as is also clear from the -statement, an account for the Reich Ministry of Finance. In other words, -this tallies with what I have been saying, namely, that the obligation -to keep the matter secret, this special obligation, was desired by the -SS, and was carried out; and it applied even to the transfer of the -equivalent value. As regards the second point, that I am supposed to -have talked to Thoms, I already stated yesterday that I do not remember -such a conversation among the very great number of conversations which I -had at the bank daily. Nor can I imagine that I went to see him. That -would have been a very unusual procedure. - -I do not recall the expression “Melmer deliveries” in that connection; -but I suggest that it is used in this statement for simplicity’s sake, -just to refer briefly to the subject under discussion. - -MR. DODD: It isn’t too important, but of course he says you called him -on the telephone, that you didn’t go to see him. However, I offer this -as Exhibit USA-852. - -THE PRESIDENT: This statement we have before us doesn’t appear to be -sworn. - -MR. DODD: Well, the witness is here in Nuremberg. I will withdraw it and -have it sworn to and submit it at a later date. I wasn’t aware that it -wasn’t sworn to. He is here and available. I had him brought here in -case any question, was raised about him. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Now, the Defendant Göring knew something -about these deposits, too, didn’t he? Now that we are talking this thing -all out, what about that? - -PUHL: I was not aware that Herr Göring knew anything about these things. - -MR. DODD: I show you a document that was found in the files of the Reich -Treasury, the Reichsbank, rather. It is Number 3947-PS, and it is a new -document. You haven’t seen this, by the way. - -Now, this is a memorandum in the files, dated 31 March 1944, and it -says, its subject is: - - “Utilization of jewels, and so forth, which have been acquired - by official agencies in favor of the Reich. - - “According to an oral confidential agreement between the Vice - President, Mr. Puhl, and the chief of one of Berlin’s public - offices, the Reichsbank has taken over the converting of - domestic and foreign moneys, gold and silver coins, precious - metals, securities, jewels, watches, diamonds, and other - valuable articles. These deposits will be processed under the - code name ‘Melmer.’ - - “The large amounts of jewelry, and so forth, acquired hereby - have previously been turned over—after checking the number of - pieces and, insofar as they had not been melted down, the - approximate weights given—to the Municipal Pawn Shop, Division - III, Main Office, Berlin N 4, Elsässer Strasse 74, for the best - possible realization of value.” - -I am not going to read all of it. It goes on with more material about -the pawnshop, but I want to call your attention to the paragraph -beginning: - - “The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich, the Delegate for - the Four Year Plan, informs the Reichsbank in his letter of 19 - March 1944, copy of which is enclosed, that the considerable - amounts of gold and silver objects, jewels, and so forth at the - Main Office of Trustees for the East (Haupttreuhandstelle Ost) - are to be delivered to the Reichsbank according to an order - issued by Reich Ministers Funk and Graf Schwerin von Krosigk. - The converting of these objects must be accomplished in the same - way as the ‘Melmer’ deliveries. - - “At the same time the Reich Marshal informs us on the converting - of objects of the same kind which have been acquired in the - occupied western territories. We do not know to which office - these objects have been delivered and how they are liquidated.” - -Then there is more about an inquiry and more about this whole business, -the pawnshops, and so on. But, first of all, I want to ask you: In the -first paragraph it says “according to a confidential oral agreement -between you and the chief of one of Berlin’s public offices”—who was -this chief of the Berlin public office who had a confidential agreement -about this business with you? - -PUHL: That was Herr Pohl. This is the agreement of which we spoke this -morning. - -MR. DODD: That was Herr Pohl of the SS, wasn’t it? - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And that was this whole transaction; this whole SS transaction -that this memorandum is about, that much of it is about? - -PUHL: This is a report from our cashier, and in line with the obligation -of secrecy the words “SS Economic Department” have been avoided and the -more general term “the head of a Berlin public office” is used. - -MR. DODD: And later on in the paragraph it refers to the incoming -objects to be processed under the code name “Melmer,” M-e-l-m-e-r. That -is the name I asked you a few minutes ago if you recognized, isn’t it? - -PUHL: I didn’t understand the question. - -MR. DODD: Well, the last sentence in this paragraph says: “All incoming -deposits will be processed under the code name ‘Melmer.’” M-e-l-m-e-r. -That is the name I asked you about a few minutes ago, and you said you -didn’t know it. - -PUHL: Yes, and this statement also shows that I couldn’t have known it, -because only now, in this statement, is it disclosed that the name -“Melmer” was used. - -MR. DODD: I think if you will read it you will see that it shows just -the opposite. It says, according to the oral confidential agreement -between you and Pohl of the SS the Reichsbank took over the selling, and -so on, of gold, silver coins, and so forth. “All incoming deposits will -be processed under the code name ‘Melmer.’” - -You are not telling this Tribunal that a transaction like this was going -on in your bank over which you were Vice President, under a code name, -and you didn’t know it, and you were the man who was dealing directly -with the SS man. Are you seriously saying that to this Court? - -PUHL: Yes. The word “Melmer” was never used in my presence. But our -treasury directors could use code words for the accounts of clients who -preferred not to give their own names and the names of their -institutions; and the treasury made use of a code word in this case too. - -MR. DODD: You will observe that this is the second time this morning -that we have run across the name Melmer. Herr Thoms says you used that -term in talking to him, and now we find it in one of your own bank -memorandums, which is a captured document. Are you still saying that you -don’t know the term? - -PUHL: This memorandum wasn’t made for me, but for the responsible -treasury official. And specifically in order to acquaint him with the -arrangements made by the treasury, the memorandum states under what code -name this transaction will be carried out. - -MR. DODD: Herr Puhl, look up at me a minute, will you. Didn’t you tell -Lieutenant Meltzer, Lieutenant Margolis, and Dr. Kempner, when they were -all together with you, that all of this business with the SS was common -gossip in the Reichsbank? These gentlemen who are sitting right here, -two of them at the United States table and one up here. You know them. -Now I want you to think a minute before you answer that question. - -PUHL: We talked of the fact that the secret was not kept, and in the -long run it is not possible to keep a permanent secret in a bank; but -that has nothing to do with it. What we were speaking of just now were -the technical details, how this sort of transaction was carried out; -those details did not become general knowledge. What naturally could not -be avoided was the transaction as such becoming known. - -MR. DODD: Now, in case you don’t understand me, we are not talking about -that. I think you cannot help but remember because this is only a day or -so ago, and in this building, you had a conversation with these -gentlemen, didn’t you? And I am now asking you if it isn’t a fact that -you told them that this whole SS transaction with the bank was common -gossip in the bank. - -PUHL: There was a general whisper in the bank about this transaction; -but details were, of course, not known. - -MR. DODD: Are you worried about your part in this? I think that is a -fair question in view of your affidavit in your testimony. Are you -concerned about what you had to do with this business? Are you? - -PUHL: No. I myself, once the matter had been set in motion, had nothing -further to do with it. And in the statement, which you have submitted, -Herr Thoms himself admits that he did not see me at all for months. The -Directorate never discussed this matter in its meetings and was never -approached for a decision. - -MR. DODD: You know, when the Defendant Funk was on the stand, he said -that you were the one who first told him about the SS business. Is that -your version of it? - -PUHL: No. My recollection is that the first conversation took place in -the office of President Funk; and he told me, for reasons which I stated -earlier, that we wanted to oblige the SS by taking over these -“deposits”—that was the word used. - -MR. DODD: You put it more strongly than that the other day when you -thought about it, when you said “Can you imagine Himmler talking to me -instead of Funk”? Do you remember saying that to these gentlemen? - -PUHL: I’m sorry I didn’t understand the last question. - -MR. DODD: Well, it is not too important. I say, don’t you remember -telling these gentlemen, Lieutenant Meltzer, Lieutenant Margolis, don’t -you remember making this statement that Himmler wouldn’t talk to you as -Vice President of the Bank, but that he would talk to Funk. You were -quite upset when we told you that Funk had said that you were the man -who originated this. - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: You got terribly upset about it. Don’t you remember that? - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Finally, this question: Are you serious in saying that you -didn’t know about these deposits until you were interrogated in -Frankfurt, or what the nature of them was? In view of the Thoms -affidavit, this exhibit that I have just shown you, and the whole -examination this morning, do you want your testimony to close with the -statement that you actually didn’t know what was in these deposits at -any time? - -PUHL: I saw the statement put before me today, the statement by the -treasury official put before me today, for the first time in Frankfurt, -and never before. Moreover, I did not and could not, as Vice President, -concern myself with the details of this transaction, for I was -responsible for general economic and currency policy and for credits and -such things. Besides, we had a whole staff of highly qualified officials -in our treasury office; and if it had been necessary, they would have -had to make a report to the Directorate of the Reichsbank. - -MR. DODD: Of course you don’t deny that you knew there were jewels and -silver and all these other things in the deposits, do you? - -PUHL: The German term “Schmucksachen,” jewelry, was always used. - -MR. DODD: All right! Let’s see what you did know was in the deposits? -You knew there was jewelry, some jewelry, there. You knew there was some -currency. You knew there were coins. You knew there were other articles. -Now, the only thing you didn’t know was the dental gold; is that so? - -PUHL: That is true, certainly. It was known from the outset, and Herr -Pohl had told me, that the greater part of these deposits contained -mainly gold, foreign currency, silver coins, and, he added, also “some -jewelry.” - -MR. DODD: Well, now, the question I think you can answer simply is: -Everything that is mentioned in your affidavit except the dental gold -you did know was on deposits from the SS. Don’t you understand that -question? I don’t think it is complicated. You don’t need to read -anything, Herr Puhl. If you will just look up here, I am asking you if -you know about everything that is mentioned in your affidavit except the -dental gold. - -PUHL: Well, I knew about jewelry, but I did not know in detail what kind -of jewelry it was. - -MR. DODD: I am not asking you about details. I am simply asking if you -did know it was there. You knew there was currency there, and you knew -there were other articles there. Those are about the only things that -are mentioned excepting the dental gold, and that is the one thing you -seem now not to have known. - -PUHL: Yes, I knew, in general, that the deposits contained gold and -foreign currency, and I repeat that the jewelry... - -MR. DODD: And jewelry? - -PUHL: I knew that there was jewelry. - -MR. DODD: So the only thing you say now you didn’t know was the dental -gold. That is all I am asking you. Why don’t you answer that? It doesn’t -take very long. Isn’t that so? The only thing you didn’t know was the -dental gold. - -PUHL: No. - -MR. DODD: Well, what else is mentioned you didn’t know about? - -PUHL: Spectacle frames, for example, were also mentioned. - -MR. DODD: You didn’t know about those either? All right, I will include -those, spectacle frames and dental gold. These are the two things you -didn’t know about? - -PUHL: Information I received contained only the general term “jewelry.” - -MR. DODD: They are the two matters that you had the most to worry about, -aren’t they, eyeglass frames and dental gold? - -I have no further questions, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment, please. Don’t take that man away. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Have you got a copy of your affidavit before -you? - -PUHL: Of 3 May, yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you only got one copy of it? - -PUHL: I must just look—Yes, I have another copy. - -THE PRESIDENT: Let me have it, please, will you? - -This document will be identified, and form part of the record. It had -better be given whatever the appropriate number is. - -MR. DODD: I believe, Mr. President, that it is already in evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Not this particular document, it is not. This is the -particular document he had before him; it has got a number of manuscript -notes on it, and is in the English language. - -Mr. Dodd, you had better look at it. - -MR. DODD: All right, Sir. - -I believe it would become Exhibit USA-851; I think that is the next -number in sequence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit USA-851; very well. - -MR. DODD: I might say I think there is one question that might be -helpful to the Tribunal with respect to this affidavit. - -Herr Puhl, you personally typed up a large part of this affidavit -yourself, did you not, or wrote it up, or dictated it? - -PUHL: A complete draft was put before me, and I altered it accordingly. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment; and then signed it after you had altered it? - -[_The witness nodded assent._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Do not nod; please answer. You said, “A complete draft -was put before me, and I altered it.” And I ask you, did you then sign -it? - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And did you also initial those places that you altered on the -original? Did you not put your initials in each place that you wanted to -make a change? - -Isn’t that so? - -PUHL: No; we copied it again, it was completely rewritten... - -MR. DODD: I know you copied it anew. Did you not mark the places that -you wanted changed and say how you wanted it changed? You did, did you -not? - -PUHL: Yes; but that is of minor importance; for instance, the word for -“Reichsbank” was changed to “Gold Discount Bank,” and there were similar -editorial changes. - -MR. DODD: Well, I thought it might be helpful to the Tribunal to know -that it was rewritten and initialed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Mr. -Witness, I want to ask you a few questions. The first you heard about -these transactions was from the Defendant Funk, was it not? - -PUHL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did Funk tell you who had told him about them -in the SS? - -PUHL: Himmler. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Himmler had spoken to Funk about this? Who -else, besides Himmler and Funk, was present when Funk talked to Himmler -about this? - -PUHL: That I do not know. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You do not know if Pohl was there also? - -PUHL: That I cannot say but I can say that from the very beginning the -name of the Minister of Finance was mentioned in this connection. But -whether he was personally present, I do not know. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did Funk say to you what Himmler said to him? - -PUHL: He asked that the facilities of the Reichsbank be placed at the -disposal of the SS for this purpose. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then shortly after that, you took the matter -up at the meeting of the Board of Directors? - -PUHL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Funk at that meeting? - -PUHL: No, he was not. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What did you say to the Board of Directors? - -PUHL: I reported to the Directorate briefly on the transaction. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What did you say to them? - -PUHL: In a few words I described my conversation with Herr Funk and my -conversation with Herr Pohl, and I confirmed the fact that the -Reichsbank would take the valuables of the SS into their vaults. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And then did the Board of Directors approve -the action? - -PUHL: Yes; there was no objection. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the defendant Funk said to you that -these objects had come “from the East,” did he not? - -PUHL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What did you understand that he meant by that -phrase, “from the East”? - -PUHL: Principally Poland, occupied Poland. But some Russian territories -might also have been included in that phrase. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You knew that this was confiscated property, -I presume? - -PUHL: Yes. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you told Pohl that the Bank would -perform certain services in handling the property, did you not? - -PUHL: Pohl asked me to place the good services of the Bank at the -disposal of his men. That I agreed to do. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And did those services include arranging the -property, putting it in sacks and describing it? - -PUHL: That was not talked about. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you whether it was talked -about. I asked you whether the services included arranging the property -and putting it in different kinds of containers and sacks. Is that what -you did? - -PUHL: Yes, that was a matter for the decision of the treasury directors; -if they considered it necessary, they could do it. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was that done? - -PUHL: That I cannot know. It is a treasury matter. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I put two more questions, two very brief -questions? - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Sauter. - -DR. SAUTER: The one question, Witness, is this: You have been repeatedly -asked here who has talked to you during the past few days. - -PUHL: Here in Nuremberg? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, in Nuremberg. You know that several members of the -Prosecution have discussed this with you during the last few days. I -should like to establish here: Have I talked to you? - -PUHL: No, I am seeing you for the first time in my life today. - -DR. SAUTER: I just wanted to establish this, for the sake of -correctness. And the second question is this—actually you have already -confirmed this, but after the charge of the Prosecution I should like to -hear it from you again—in all these negotiations or in the documents -which have been submitted and which you have of course read, was mention -ever made of the fact that these things came from concentration camps? - -PUHL: The word “concentration camp” was used neither during the -conversation with Herr Funk nor during the conversation with Herr Pohl. - -DR. SAUTER: And Herr Funk did not give you an indication of that sort, -either. - -PUHL: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Then I have no further questions, Mr. President; thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire, and the Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you did offer 3947-PS as an exhibit, did you -not? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir, I did, as Exhibit USA-850, I believe it was. - -THE PRESIDENT: 850, was it? Yes, and then that copy of the Puhl -affidavit was USA-851? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir, that is right. I did not offer the other affidavit -because we discovered it wasn’t sworn to as yet. I propose to do so and -with your permission I delay the date. I have that witness here. This -thing can’t go on interminably, and I don’t want to drag it on; but I -would like to offer it as an affidavit when I can have him swear to it, -and if there is going to be any demand for him I might respectfully -suggest that Dr. Sauter states it now. He is not a prisoner, Mr. -President, the witness Thoms. He is a free man in this country. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are suggesting that he should be called now? - -MR. DODD: If he is going to be called, I would suggest that it be done -soon. - -THE PRESIDENT: If he wants to cross-examine him he should be called now. - -MR. DODD: I should be glad to have him now. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I am representing Attorney Dr. Kauffmann for -the Defendant Göring. The Defendant Göring asked me to put two questions -to the witness Puhl during his re-examination. The questions would -probably be connected with the document which the Prosecution brought up -in cross-examination of the witness Puhl, Document 3947-PS, of which the -Prosecution read Page 2, Paragraph 3, beginning, “The Reich Marshal of -the Greater German Reich, Delegate for the Four Year Plan...” - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Dr. Seidl. If you want to put questions to -the witness Puhl on behalf of the Defendant Göring you can do so and -Puhl will be recalled for that purpose. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the difficulty consists of something else. The -Defendant Göring says, and I think rightly, that he can put his -questions to the witness with reason only if he has an opportunity of -seeing the document to which the Prosecution referred. Therefore, during -the cross-examination I wanted to have the guard pass on Document -3947-PS to Defendant Göring. That was refused, however, on the grounds -that, by an order of the Commandant of the Prison, during the -proceedings documents can no longer be handed to those defendants whose -cases have already been concluded. - -THE PRESIDENT: Although the document was read over the earphones the -Defendant Göring and yourself shall certainly see the document, but the -witness must be called during this sitting. You may see the document and -the Defendant Göring may see the document, but the witness must be -recalled for any questions at once. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, only excerpts were read from the document. In -my opinion the Defendant Göring is right in saying: If I am to ask a -sensible question I must know the whole document. I think there are only -two possibilities; either the Prosecution must refrain from presenting -new material during cross-examination of the defendants whose cases are -said to have already been concluded, or the defendant must be given the -opportunity of seeing this evidence... - -THE PRESIDENT: Don’t go too fast! - -DR. SEIDL: ...or the defendant must be given the opportunity of seeing -the evidence newly introduced, and when only excerpts of a document are -read, he must have access to the whole document. - -THE PRESIDENT: The document is only just over one page and there is only -one paragraph in it which refers to Göring. And that paragraph has -already been read. When I say one page, it is just one page of this -English copy. I think you have a German translation before you. - -DR. SEIDL: I have 3½ pages. - -THE PRESIDENT: There is only one paragraph which relates to Göring. - -DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, it is only a question of whether in the main -proceedings I may give this photostat copy to the Defendant Göring or -not. If this is possible, and... - -THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast! - -DR. SEIDL: ...and I see no reason why it should not be possible, then I -will shortly be able to ask the witness Puhl any question that may be -necessary; but I think the defendant is right in saying that he would -like to see the entire contents of a document from which only excerpts -have been read. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I might be a little bit helpful. I would like -to point out that Dr. Seidl had the document for 10 minutes anyway -during the recess; and also I would like to point out that we did not -preclude him, as members of the Prosecution, from having it. It is a -security measure altogether. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it will satisfy you, Dr. Seidl, if we order that -the witness Puhl be recalled at 2 o’clock for Dr. Seidl to put any -questions to him that you wish. And of course he would have the -document. He has got the document now, and of course Göring will have -the document, too. - -DR. SEIDL: That is the difficulty, Mr. President. I have the document, -but on account of the existing instructions I cannot hand it to the -Defendant Göring. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can give the document to Göring now. - -DR. SEIDL: I am not allowed to do that. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am telling you to do it, and they will let you do it. - -Dr. Sauter, do you wish to cross-examine the man who has made a -statement? Do you wish to cross-examine Thoms? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, if I may. - -THE PRESIDENT: You do? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. Mr. President, may I comment on what Dr. Seidl has just -said? It isn’t only a question concerning this one document which Dr. -Seidl just wanted to give to the Defendant Göring, but it is a general -question of whether during the session a defense counsel is authorized -to hand to a defendant documents which have been submitted. Hitherto -this has been allowed, but now the security ruling is that defendants -whose cases have been completed for the present may no longer be given -any documents in the courtroom by their defense counsel. Defense Counsel -feel that this is an unfair ruling, since, as the case of Göring shows, -it can very easily happen that a defendant is in some way involved in a -later case. And the request which we now direct to you and to the Court -is that Defense Counsel should again be permitted to give the defendants -documents here during the session, even if the case of the defendant in -question has already been concluded. That is what Dr. Seidl wanted to -ask you. - -Mr. President, may I say something else? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Sauter? You wanted to say something more to me? - -DR. SAUTER: May I also point out the following: In the interrogation -room down in the prison we have so far not been allowed to hand any -documents to the prisoners with whom we were speaking. Thus, if I want -to discuss a document with my client, I have to read the whole of it to -him. And when 10, 12, or 15 defense counsel are down there in the -evening, it is almost... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal is of the opinion that any -document which is handed to the defendants’ counsel may be handed to the -defendants themselves by the counsel and that it does not make any -difference that a particular defendant’s case has been closed with -reference to that rule. - -DR. SAUTER: We are very grateful to you, Mr. President, and we hope that -your ruling will not in practice encounter any difficulties. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well then now, you want to cross-examine Thoms? - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is Thoms here? Can he be brought here at once? - -MR. DODD: He is on his way—he is probably right outside the door. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, would the Marshal see if he is available. - -MR. DODD: I have not had time, Mr. President, to have the affidavit -sworn to because I have not seen the man. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, but as far as his cross-examination is concerned, he -can be put under oath here. - -MARSHAL: No, Sir, he is not here yet. - -MR. DODD: He is on his way. - -THE PRESIDENT: He is not available. - -MR. DODD: He is on his way. He was in Lieutenant Meltzer’s office a -minute ago and he went out to get him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, he can be called then at 2 o’clock after the other -witness. - -Now, Dr. Siemers, would you be ready? - -DR. SIEMERS: Your Honors, may I say, first of all, how I intend to -proceed in the presentation of my case? - -In accordance with the suggestion of the Court, I should like to call -Raeder as a witness in connection with all the documents which the -Prosecution has submitted against him. I have given all these documents -to Raeder so that he will have them before him on the witness stand, and -no time will be lost by handing him each one individually. The British -Delegation has kindly compiled the documents which were not included in -the Raeder Document Book, in a new Document Book 10a. I assume that this -document book is in the possession of the Tribunal. - -Thus, to facilitate matters, I shall give the page number of the English -Document Book 10a or the English Document Book 10 in the case of each -document. - -At the same time, if the Tribunal agrees, I intend already now to submit -from my own document books those documents which in each case are -connected with the matter under discussion. Thank you. - -May I then ask that Admiral Raeder be called to the witness stand. - -[_The Defendant Raeder took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name. - -ERICH RAEDER (Defendant): Erich Raeder. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Raeder, may I ask you first to tell the Tribunal -briefly about your past and your professional career? - -RAEDER: I was born in 1876 in Wandsbek near Hamburg. I joined the Navy -in 1894 and became an officer in 1897. Then normal promotion: two years -at the naval academy; in each year, three months leave to study -languages; in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. 1906 to 1908 in the -Reich Navy Office, in Von Tirpitz’ Intelligence Division, responsible -for the foreign press and the publications _Marine Rundschau_ and -_Nautikus_. - -1910 to 1912, Navigation Officer on the Imperial Yacht Hohenzollern. -1912 to the beginning of 1918, First Chief Naval Staff Officer and Chief -of Staff to Admiral Hipper who was in command of the battle cruisers. - -After the first World War in the Admiralty, as Chief of the Central -Division with Admiral Von Trotha. Then two years of writing at the naval -archives: history of naval war. From 1922 to 1924, with the rank of Rear -Admiral, Inspector of Training and Education in the Navy. 1925 to 1928, -as Vice Admiral, chief of the Baltic naval station at Kiel. - -On 1 October 1928 Reich President Von Hindenburg named me Chief of the -Navy Command in Berlin, at the suggestion of Reich Minister of Defense, -Gröner. - -In 1935 I became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and on 1 April 1939 -Grossadmiral. - -On 30 January 1943 resigned as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; I -received the title of Admiral Inspector of the Navy, but remained -without any official duties. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like to come back to one point. You said that in -1935 you became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. This was only, if I am -right, a new name? - -RAEDER: It was only a new name. - -DR. SIEMERS: So you were head of the Navy from 1928 to 1943? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: After the Versailles Treaty Germany had an army of only -100,000 men, and a navy of 15,000 men, with officers. In relation to the -size of the Reich, the Wehrmacht was thus extremely small. - -Was Germany in the twenties in a position to defend herself with this -small Wehrmacht against possible attacks by neighboring states, and with -what dangers did Germany have to reckon in the twenties? - -RAEDER: In my opinion, Germany was not at all in a position to defend -herself effectively against attacks, even of the smallest states, since -she had no modern weapons; the surrounding states, Poland in particular, -were equipped with the most modern weapons, while even the modern -fortifications had been taken away from Germany. The danger which -Germany constantly faced in the twenties was... - -DR. SIEMERS: One moment. Now continue, please. - -RAEDER: The danger which Germany constantly faced in the twenties was a -Polish attack on East Prussia with the object of severing this -territory, already cut off from the rest of Germany by the Corridor, and -occupying it. The danger was especially clear to Germany, because at -that time Vilna was occupied by the Poles, in the midst of peace with -Lithuania; and Lithuania took away the Memel area. In the south, Fiume -was also taken away, without objection being raised by the League of -Nations or anyone else. It was, however, quite clear to the German -Government of those days that one thing which could not be allowed to -happen to Germany during that time of her weakness was the occupation of -East Prussia and its separation from the Reich. Our efforts were -therefore aimed at preparing ourselves to oppose a Polish invasion of -East Prussia with all possible means. - -DR. SIEMERS: You said that it was feared that such an invasion might -take place. Did not several border incidents actually occur in the -twenties? - -RAEDER: Yes, indeed. - -DR. SIEMERS: Is it true that these dangers were recognized, not only by -you and by military circles, but also by the governments in the -twenties, especially by the Social Democrats and by Stresemann? - -RAEDER: Yes. I already said that the government, too, realized that such -an invasion could not be allowed to happen. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now, the Prosecution has accused you of conduct contrary to -international law and contrary to existing treaties, even in the time -before Hitler. - -On 1 October 1928 you became Chief of the Navy Command, and thus rose to -the highest position in the German Navy. Did you, in view of the dangers -you have described, use all your power to build up the German Navy -within the framework of the Versailles Treaty, particularly with the -object of protecting East Prussia? - -RAEDER: Yes, I exerted all my strength for the reconstruction of the -Navy, and I came to consider this as my life work. In all stages of this -period of naval reconstruction, I met with great difficulties; and as a -result, I had to battle in one way or another constantly throughout -those years in order to put this reconstruction into effect. Perhaps I -became rather one-sided, since this fight for the reconstruction of the -Navy filled all my time and prevented me from taking part in any matters -not directly concerned with it. In addition to material reconstruction, -I put every effort into the formation of a competent officer corps and -well-trained, especially well-disciplined, crews. - -Admiral Dönitz has already commented on the result of this training of -our men and officers, and I should like only to confirm that these -German naval men earned full recognition in peacetime, both at home and -abroad, for their dignified and good behavior and their discipline; and -also during the war, when they fought to the end in an exemplary manner, -in complete unity, with irreproachable battle ethics, and, in general, -did not participate in any kind of atrocities. Also in the occupied -areas to which they came, in Norway for instance, they earned full -approval of the population for their good and dignified conduct. - -DR. SIEMERS: Since for fifteen years you were head of the Navy and -reconstructed it in those years, can it be said that as chief of the -Navy you are responsible for everything that happened in connection with -this reconstruction? - -RAEDER: I am fully responsible for it. - -DR. SIEMERS: If I am correct, the only qualification would be the date 1 -October 1928. - -RAEDER: As regards the material rebuilding. - -DR. SIEMERS: Who were your superiors, as regards the reconstruction of -the Navy? You could not, of course, act with complete independence. - -RAEDER: I was subordinate, firstly, to the Reichswehrminister and, -through him, to the Reich Government, since I was not a member of the -Reich Government; and secondly, I also had to obey the -Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in these matters. From 1925 to 1934 -the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht was Reich President Field -Marshal Von Hindenburg, and after his death on 1 August 1934, Adolf -Hitler. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in this connection may I submit Exhibit -Number Raeder-3, a short excerpt from the Constitution of the German -Reich. It is Number Raeder-3, in Document Book 1 on Page 9. Article 47 -reads: - - “The Reich President has the supreme command of all the Armed - Forces of the Reich.” - -I also submit the Reich Defense Law, as Exhibit Number Raeder-4, -Document Book 1, Page 11. I have to return to it later, but now I refer -to Article 8 of the Reich Defense Law, which reads as follows: - - “The command is exclusively in the hands of the lawful - superior... - - “The Reich President is the Commander-in-Chief of all Armed - Forces. Under him, the Reich Minister for Defense has - authoritative powers over all the Armed Forces. At the head of - the Reich Army is a General, as Chief of the Army Command; at - the head of the Reich Navy, an Admiral, as Chief of the Naval - Command.” - -These paragraphs remained in full effect under the National Socialist -regime. I refer to them only because they confirm what the witness has -said. In regard to naval reconstruction, he was thus third in authority: -Reich President, Reich Minister of Defense, and then the head of the -branches of the Wehrmacht. - -Admiral, the Prosecution accuses you of building up the Navy: First, in -violation of the Versailles Treaty; secondly, behind the back of the -Reichstag and the Reich Government; and thirdly, with the intention of -waging aggressive wars. - -I should like to ask you now whether the reconstruction of the Navy was -undertaken for aggressive or defensive purposes. Make a chronological -distinction, however, and speak first about the period overshadowed by -the Versailles Treaty, that is, from 1928 until the Naval Agreement with -England on 18 June 1935. - -My question is: Did the reconstruction of the Navy in this period take -place for purposes of aggression as the Prosecution has asserted? - -RAEDER: The reconstruction of the Navy did not in any respect take place -for the purposes of aggressive war. No doubt it constituted some evasion -of the Versailles Treaty. Before I go into details, I should like to ask -permission to read a few short quotations from a speech which I made in -1928 in Kiel and Stralsund, the two largest garrisons of my naval -station. This speech was delivered before the public during a week -devoted to an historical anniversary; and when I took up my duties in -Berlin, it was handed as my program to Minister Severing, who regarded -me with some suspicion at that time. That is the... - -DR. SIEMERS: One moment. Raeder’s statements in the year 1928 show his -attitude of that time much more clearly than his present recollections; -and for that reason I think the Tribunal will agree that I submit this -speech as Exhibit Number Raeder-6, Document Book 1, Page 15. The speech -itself begins on Page 17. I shall read... - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes? - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it would take five or ten minutes, so may I -ask whether this is a proper time to adjourn? I am willing to continue, -however. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, will you please grant permission for the -Defendant Sauckel to be absent from the courtroom from the sessions of -the 16th to the 18th inclusive so that he may prepare his defense? - -THE PRESIDENT: Be absent in order to prepare his defense? Yes, -certainly. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I would like to suggest that, before the -witness Puhl is recalled, the witness Thoms be called. I think it will -save some of the Tribunal’s time. I think, from what I know of the -prospective testimony, there may be questions that will arise in the -mind of the Tribunal which it would like to put to the witness Puhl -after having heard the witness Thoms. - -And also I would ask, so as to be absolutely fair to all concerned, that -the witness Puhl be in the courtroom when the witness Thoms testifies. I -think he should have that opportunity. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objections, Dr. Sauter? - -DR. SAUTER: No, I have no objections. - -MR. DODD: May we call the witness Thoms? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, call Thoms, and have Puhl somewhere in the courtroom -where he can hear. - -[_The witness Thoms took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name? - -ALBERT THOMS (Witness): Albert Thoms. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the -Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will -withhold and add nothing. - -[_The witness repeated the oath._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am aware that he has been called for -cross-examination. However, there are one or two matters, now material, -which were not included in the affidavit, and to save time I would like -to bring those out before the cross-examination takes place. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: Herr Thoms, you executed a statement on the 8th day of May -1946. Is that so? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And you signed it? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And everything in it was true? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: And is true now, of course? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: I wish you would just look at it for the purposes of certainty -and identify it now. Is that the statement that you signed, Herr Thoms? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: All right. Now, I have one or two questions to ask you about -it. I wish to offer it, Mr. President, as Exhibit USA-852. You know this -gentleman sitting to your left, do you not? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: That is Mr. Puhl, is it not? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: He was the Vice President of the Reichsbank when you were -employed there. - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Now, did you ever have a conversation with Herr Puhl about any -special deposit which was coming to the Reichsbank and about which you -should maintain the utmost secrecy? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Tell us when that conversation took place, what was said, and -if anyone else was present at the time. - -THOMS: This conversation took place in the summer of 1942. I was called -to Vice President Puhl’s office by Herr Frommknecht, a Treasury -official. Herr Frommknecht took me to Herr Puhl, and there Herr Puhl -disclosed the fact that a special transaction with the office of the -Reichsführer-SS was to be undertaken. Do you want me to explain it in -detail? - -MR. DODD: Tell us everything that he said to you. - -THOMS: Herr Puhl told me that the affair was to be kept absolutely -secret and confidential. Not only would articles be delivered which -would be automatically taken over in the ordinary course of business of -the Reichsbank, but also the disposal of jewelry and other articles -would have to be effected. Upon my objection that we had no expert men -for such matters, he replied that we would have to find a way to convert -these articles. First I made the suggestion that these special articles -should then be sent to the Reich Main Treasury—that is, the Main -Treasury of the Reich Government—which also held all booty of the Army. -However, Herr Puhl thought that this matter should not go through the -Reich Main Treasury, but should be handled by the Reichsbank in some -other way. Thereupon I suggested that these articles could be sent to -the Municipal Pawnbroker’s Office in Berlin, exactly as the deliveries -from the confiscated Jewish property had been dealt with before. Herr -Puhl agreed to this suggestion. - -MR. DODD: Now, when did the first of these shipments arrive? - -THOMS: The first delivery came to the Reichsbank during the month of -August, as far as I can remember. - -MR. DODD: 1942? - -THOMS: 1942. - -MR. DODD: Does the name Melmer mean anything to you? - -THOMS: Melmer was the name of the SS man who subsequently brought these -valuables to the Reichsbank. Under this code word all deliveries of the -SS were later entered in the books of the bank. - -MR. DODD: Did you ever mention the name or the word “Melmer” to Puhl, -and did he ever mention it to you? - -THOMS: The name “Melmer” was not mentioned by Vice President Puhl to me, -but was mentioned by me to Vice President Puhl as I had to inform him -about the start of the entire transaction and particularly about the -carrying out of the transaction regarding the conversion of the -valuables. In accordance with the suggestion of the office of the -Reichsführer-SS, the money equivalent was transferred to the Reich -Ministry of Finance into an account which was given the name “Max -Heiliger.” I duly informed Vice President Puhl briefly about these -facts. - -MR. DODD: Did you ever tell Puhl the nature of the material that you -were receiving in the SS shipments? - -THOMS: After some months Vice President Puhl asked me how the “Melmer” -affair was getting along. I explained to him that, contrary to the -expectation that there would really be very few deliveries, deliveries -were increasing and that apart from gold and silver coins they contained -particularly a great deal of jewelry, gold rings, wedding rings, gold -and silver fragments, dental gold, and all sorts of gold and silver -articles. - -MR. DODD: What did he say when you told him there were jewels and silver -and dental gold and other articles? - -THOMS: May I first of all add a few things. I drew his attention -especially to the fact that on one occasion something like 12 kilograms -of pearls had been collected and that I had never before seen such an -unusual amount in all my life. - -MR. DODD; Wait a minute! What was it? - -THOMS: They were pearls and pearl necklaces. - -MR. DODD: Did you also tell him you were receiving a quantity of -eyeglass rims? - -THOMS: I cannot swear to that at the moment, but I described the general -character of these deliveries to him. Therefore, I think, I probably -used “spectacles,” and similar words; but I would not like to state it -on my oath. - -MR. DODD: Was Puhl ever in the vaults when this material was being -looked through? - -THOMS: On several occasions he visited the strong-rooms of the bank to -inspect the gold stored there and particularly to inform himself about -the type of stores. The deliveries of the “Melmer” transactions were -kept in a special part of one of the main safes, so that on those -occasions Herr Puhl must also have seen the boxes and sacks full of -those deliveries. Nearby in the corridor of the vault the articles of -the “Melmer” deliveries were being dealt with. - -I am firmly convinced that when he walked through the strong-rooms, Herr -Puhl must have seen these objects, as they were lying quite openly on -the table and everyone who visited the strong-room could see them. - -MR. DODD: There were about 25 or 30 people that sorted this stuff out, -were there not, before it was shipped away for melting and for sale in -the pawnshops? - -THOMS: I would say that there were not 25 to 30 people who sorted these -things—in the course of a day perhaps 25 to 30 people would visit the -strong-rooms to carry out some official business there. For this -particular business some four or five officials were occupied in sorting -out the things, getting them ready. - -MR. DODD: And everyone under your supervision was sworn to secrecy? They -didn’t talk about this business; they were forbidden to do so, were they -not? - -THOMS: There were strict instructions in the bank that secret matters -must not be discussed, not even with a colleague of one’s own -department, if that colleague did not himself also work at the same job. -So that... - -MR. DODD: Well, this was a super-secret matter, wasn’t it? It wasn’t the -ordinary secrecy that attended. Wasn’t there a special secrecy -surrounding these deliveries? - -THOMS: Quite right. It was quite an exceptional affair and it had to be -kept especially secret. I would say that it went beyond the limits of -top secrecy. For even I had been strictly forbidden to talk to anybody -about it; and I said at the time when I left Vice President Puhl, after -the first conversation, that I would however inform the leading -officials in the Treasury, because after all my superiors must be -informed about this business. - -MR. DODD: Was there a report made about these “Melmer” deposits to the -Directorate? - -THOMS: No. The matter was treated as a verbal agreement. It was after -all an exceptional case and only one account was kept of the deliveries -made, which was called the “Melmer account.” This account was -transmitted by the head cashier’s office to the foreign exchange -department which, in turn, had to take further steps with the -Directorate of the Reichsbank. - -MR. DODD: Well, the Directorate had to approve the handling of this type -of thing, did it not? You weren’t allowed to handle materials like this -without the approval of the bank Directorate? - -THOMS: In matters concerning gold particularly instructions had to be -given and approved respectively by the Board of Directors. I could -therefore never act independently. Generally the instructions were given -to the Treasury in writing and they were signed by at least two -officials and one member of the Board of Directors. So that it was quite -unique that in this case instructions were given in a verbal form. - -MR. DODD: By the way, Herr Thoms, you have seen the film this noontime? -We have shown you a film, haven’t we? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: After seeing that film, are you able to say whether or not -that represents a fair representation of the appearance of some of the -shipments that were received by the Reichsbank from the SS? - -THOMS: I may say that this film and the pictures which I have seen in it -were typical of the “Melmer” deliveries. Perhaps I should qualify that -by saying that the quantities shown in this film were in excess of the -quantity of dental gold and particularly jewelry which came with the -first deliveries. Only later did these amounts increase, so that the -quantities which we have seen in this film had actually not yet been -seen by the Reichsbank because they were contained in boxes or trunks -which until then had remained locked. But generally the material which I -have seen in that film is typical of the “Melmer” deliveries. - -MR. DODD: All right, sir. Now, approximately—I don’t expect a -completely accurate answer, but approximately how many shipments did you -receive of this stuff from the SS? - -THOMS: As nearly as I can remember at the moment, there must have been -more than 70 deliveries, possibly 76 or 77. I can’t tell you exactly at -the moment, but that must be about the right figure. - -MR. DODD: Very well, I have no further questions. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, what is your occupation? - -THOMS: A councillor of the Reichsbank. - -DR. SAUTER: Where do you live? - -THOMS: Berlin-Steglitz. Then I—after my home was bombed I lived at -Potsdam, Neu-Fahrland. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you volunteer for the examination of the Prosecution or -how did you happen to be interrogated... - -THOMS: I was... - -DR. SAUTER: Please, will you wait until I have finished my question so -that the interpreters can keep up with us? Will you please make a pause -between question and answer. - -THOMS: I was ordered here. - -DR. SAUTER: By whom? - -THOMS: Probably by the Prosecution. - -DR. SAUTER: Are you a free man? - -THOMS: Yes, I am free. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you receive the summons in writing? - -THOMS: No. I was asked orally yesterday in Frankfurt to come to -Nuremberg. - -DR. SAUTER: Frankfurt? Are you living in Frankfurt at the moment? - -THOMS: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Herr Thoms, where were you living on 8 May? That is a week -ago today? - -THOMS: On 8 May of this year? - -DR. SAUTER: You are Herr Thoms, aren’t you? - -THOMS: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, on 8 May, a week ago today. - -THOMS: In Frankfurt. - -DR. SAUTER: You were interrogated there, weren’t you? - -THOMS: That is quite right. I was interrogated at Frankfurt. - -DR. SAUTER: That is the affidavit which the Prosecutor has just put to -you? - -THOMS: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: How did you come to make the affidavit? Did you volunteer as -a witness, or how did this happen? - -THOMS: I want to point out to you that already a year ago when I was -working at Frankfurt, I voluntarily gave the American offices the -details of the transactions which were known to me in the matter of the -gold of the Reichsbank. - -DR. SAUTER: I see. So last year you already offered yourself as a -witness? - -THOMS: I wouldn’t say as a witness in this matter. I merely placed -myself at their disposal for the clarification of Reichsbank affairs for -American purposes. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes. Did you ever discuss this matter with the President of -the Reichsbank, Funk? - -THOMS: No. During my term of service, I never had an opportunity of -talking to Minister Funk. - -DR. SAUTER: Have you any positive knowledge, perhaps from some other -source, as to whether President of the Reichsbank Funk had exact -knowledge of these things, or is that also unknown to you? - -THOMS: I cannot say anything about that either, because these matters -happened on a higher level, which I could not judge. - -DR. SAUTER: Then I would be interested in hearing something about this -deposit, or whatever you call it, which was under the name “Melmer”? - -THOMS: I want to point out that this was not a deposit, but that these -were deliveries which were delivered under the name “Melmer.” Insofar as -the transactions were those which the Reichsbank had to deal with, the -Reichsbank took over these articles directly, and insofar as it was a -question of matters not pertaining to the bank, the Reichsbank to a -certain extent was the trustee for the conversion of these things. - -DR. SAUTER: More slowly, more slowly. Why was this matter, whether we -call it a deposit or anything else, not dealt with under the name “SS,” -why was it given the name “Melmer”? Did you ask anybody about that, -Witness? - -THOMS: I have already mentioned at the beginning of the examination that -this was a particularly secret affair in connection with which the name -of the depositor was not to appear. In this case, therefore, it was Vice -President Puhl who had to decide the way this affair was to be dealt -with; and he desired and ordered this. - -DR. SAUTER: Did only officials of the Reichsbank come to the strong-room -where these things were kept, or did other persons also have access to -it, for instance, people who had a safe in the strong-room? - -THOMS: The Reichsbank did not have any private depositors, that is to -say, we did not have any locked deposits which belonged to customers of -the Reichsbank—at least not in those vaults. Deposits from private -customers were in another vault so that there was no contact between the -deposits of the bank and the deposits of the customers. - -DR. SAUTER: But quite a number of officials went down there. You have -already said that. - -There is one thing I am not clear about: On the one hand, you have told -us that these articles were lying about openly on tables so that -everybody could see them; and on the other hand, you said previously -towards the end of your statement that these things were kept in locked -boxes and trunks. How does that tally? - -THOMS: I have stated that these things were delivered in closed boxes -and trunks, and stored in them. When from time to time the deliveries -were inventoried, the delivery which was to be dealt with naturally had -to be opened and the contents counted, examined, and re-weighed. That, -of course, could only be done by spreading out the contents, counting -them, checking the weight, and then locking them in new containers. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you perhaps on your own initiative tell Herr Puhl—after -all, you were a bank councillor, therefore also a senior official—that -you had misgivings about the whole business? Please think over the -question and give your answer very carefully, because you are under -oath. - -THOMS: First of all, I have to say that I belonged to the group of -officials of middle rank, but that is just in passing. Then, of -course—or let me put it this way—when an official has worked for -thirty years or longer for a concern and if throughout the long years of -his career he has always had the feeling that the directors were -irreproachable, then, I believe, he could have no misgivings if in a -special case he is instructed to keep silent about a certain -transaction. He would not object to carrying out this order. I have -already said that the term “booty” was not unknown to us officials in -the Reichsbank, because there was the order that all booty goods which -came in from the Army were to be delivered directly to the Treasury, -that is the Treasury of the Reich Government; and we in the Bank -thought, of course, that the booty from the SS troops was to go through -the Reichsbank. An official of the Reichsbank cannot very well oppose -such an order. If the Directors of the Bank give him instructions, then -he has to carry them out, because of the oath which he has sworn. - -DR. SAUTER: So that, Witness, if I understand you correctly, you are -telling us that at the beginning, at any rate, you considered that the -matter was in order, and there was nothing wrong with it? - -THOMS: At the beginning? As a matter of fact, I considered it correct -that it should be carried right through. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you ever have any doubts that this might be, let us say, -criminal? - -THOMS: Certainly I would have had doubts if I had had the knowledge and -experience then which I have today. - -DR. SAUTER: That is the same with everyone. - -THOMS: Yes, quite right. As far as that is concerned, I had to suppress -any doubts; I would not admit any doubts, because the affair was not -known only to me, it was known to the Reichsbank Directorate and in the -administration office of the Main Treasury. The valuables in the -strong-room were checked every night by a deputy director of the Main -Treasury, so that I was responsible only for the technical carrying out -of this business; and the responsibility for the correctness of this -transaction was not within my competence. - -DR. SAUTER: I do not know about the responsibility but, Witness, I asked -you, did you ever have any doubts, and at what precise moment did you -consider the whole affair criminal? Did you consider it criminal? - -THOMS: We assumed that these were goods which the SS—after they had -partly burned down towns in the East, particularly in the battle for -Warsaw—we thought that afterwards they captured this booty in the -houses and then delivered this booty to our Bank. - -DR. SAUTER: As booty? - -THOMS: Yes. If a military department delivers booty goods it does not -follow that an official who is entrusted with the handling of these -things would have to consider these deliveries as being criminal. - -DR. SAUTER: When taking over these articles, did you think, or did Vice -President Puhl tell you, or at least hint to you, that these gold -articles might have been taken from victims in the concentration camps? - -THOMS: No. - -DR. SAUTER: You did not think of that, did you? - -THOMS: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Not at all? - -THOMS: Once we saw the name “Auschwitz,” and another time the name -“Lublin,” on some slips of paper which we found. I said that in -connection with Lublin we found this inscription on some packets of bank -notes which came in to be dealt with and which were then returned to the -Polish Bank to be cashed. Strangely enough, the same packets came back -later after they had been dealt with by the bank. Consequently, here the -explanation was that these could not be deliveries from a concentration -camp, since they had come to us through official bank channels. As -regards the camp at Auschwitz—well, I cannot say today with what sort -of deliveries these slips of paper were found, but it is possible that -they were slips attached to some notes, and perhaps they may have been -deliveries of foreign bank notes, from the concentration camps. But then -there were arrangements according to which prisoners of war, or -prisoners, could exchange their notes for other money in the camp, so -that such deliveries could have been made through legal channels. - -DR. SAUTER: If I understand you correctly, Witness, then, the meaning of -what you have just told us is that you still considered the matter legal -or lawful even when in 1943 you saw the inscription “Auschwitz” and -“Lublin” on some items. Even then you considered the matter legal, -didn’t you? - -THOMS: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Well, then, why did you in your affidavit of 8 May 1946—it -is true it is not a sworn affidavit—tell the story somewhat -differently? Perhaps I can read the sentence to you... - -THOMS: Please, do. - -DR. SAUTER: ...and you can then tell me if I misunderstood you or -whether the official took it down incorrectly. It says there, after -first of all saying that you considered the matter to be legal: - -“One of the first indications of the origin of these articles was when -it was noticed that a packet of bills, presumably bonds...” - -THOMS: No, they were bank notes. - -DR. SAUTER: “...were stamped ‘Lublin.’” - -THOMS: This occurred early in 1943. - -DR. SAUTER: “Another indication was the fact that some articles bore the -stamp ‘Auschwitz.’ We all knew these places were the sites of -concentration camps. In connection with the tenth delivery in November -1942”—that is, previously—“gold teeth appeared, and the quantity of -gold teeth grew to an unusual extent.” - -So much for the quotation from your unsworn statement of 8 May 1946. -Now, will you please tell us: Does that mean the same as you said a -little earlier, or does it mean something different in your opinion? - -THOMS: That in my opinion tallies with my statement. We could not assume -that deliveries which came through the concentration camp had to be -absolutely illegal. We only observed that gradually these deliveries -became larger. A delivery of notes from a concentration camp need not be -illegal because of this. It might have been an official calling-in, -especially as we did not know the regulations applicable to -concentration camps. It would be perfectly possible that these people -had the right to sell the articles in their possession or give them in -payment. - -DR. SAUTER: The dollars which you have also seen in that film would -hardly be sold by anybody. - -THOMS: May I point out to you that I was not of the opinion that these -bank notes necessarily came from concentration camps. I merely said that -the word “Lublin” was on some of the packets of bank notes. That might -have pointed to their having come from a concentration camp; but it did -not necessarily mean that these particular notes came from that -concentration camp, and the same applies to “Auschwitz.” The name -“Auschwitz” cropped up. There may have been a certain suspicion, but we -had not any proof, and we did not feel that we were in any way called -upon to object to these deliveries of the SS. - -DR. SAUTER: Consequently, Witness, apparently because you put this -construction on it, you did not use the occasion to make a report to -Vice President Puhl or the Directorate, or to voice any doubts; you did -not have any cause for that? - -THOMS: I called Vice President Puhl’s attention to the composition of -these deliveries as early as a few months after the arrival of the first -delivery. Therefore, the general character of these deliveries was known -to Herr Puhl. He knew the contents of the deliveries. - -DR. SAUTER: But you told us earlier that the character of these -deliveries did not seem peculiar to you. You considered that it was -booty. And now you want to say that you called Vice President Puhl’s -attention to it and that he must have noticed something peculiar. - -THOMS: I did not say that. I did not say that Herr Puhl must have -noticed something peculiar. I merely said that, if any objections were -to be raised, then they would have to come from Herr Puhl, since he was -as well aware of the character of these deliveries as I was. And, if -there was any suspicion, then Herr Puhl’s suspicion would probably have -been aroused more strongly than mine. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you told us earlier that special secrecy was -ordered in this connection, but at the same time you mentioned that -quite apart from this SS affair, there were also other business matters -which apparently had to be handled with special secrecy. Is that true? - -THOMS: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: You need not give us any names, but I would only like to -know what the other affairs were? - -THOMS: These are matters which had to do with the conduct of the war. -There were transactions in gold, and perhaps also in foreign currency, -_et cetera_. - -DR. SAUTER: They were not criminal affairs, therefore? - -THOMS: No, not criminal. - -DR. SAUTER: Then, Witness... - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks that this is getting too -far away from the point really to ask him about other deliveries. - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, but the question is already answered, Mr. President. - -Witness, because of this secrecy in connection with the SS deliveries -which reached the Reichsbank, I should be interested in knowing, insofar -as they were realized by the Reichsbank, whether any accounts were -rendered, as I assume to be the case from the documents before us? - -THOMS: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: By your Main Treasury? - -THOMS: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: To whom were these accounts sent? - -THOMS: They were sent to the Reichsführer-SS office direct; that is to -say, they were collected by Melmer directly from the bank. - -DR. SAUTER: Did they not go to any other office? - -THOMS: And then they were officially passed on to the Foreign Currency -Department. - -DR. SAUTER: To the Foreign Currency Department, that is, to a State -Department? - -THOMS: No, that is a department of the Reichsbank which in turn is the -link with the Directorate. - -DR. SAUTER: Were not these accounts also transmitted, or did they not -go, to the Reich Ministry of Finance? - -THOMS: The liaison man, Melmer, always received two accounts, that is, -in duplicate. Whether the Reichsführer’s office sent one copy to the -Reich Ministry of Finance, I do not know. - -DR. SAUTER: Were these accounts really treated confidentially, that is, -kept secret? - -THOMS: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: For instance, the accounts with the Municipal Pawn Broker’s -Office? - -THOMS: In the account with the Municipal Pawn Broker’s Office the -depositor was not named. - -DR. SAUTER: What happened to these gold teeth? - -THOMS: They were melted down by the Prussian State Mint. The gold was -then refined and the fine gold was returned to the Reichsbank. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, you said earlier that at the beginning of 1943 -certain articles had arrived stamped “Auschwitz.” I think you said at -the beginning of 1943. - -THOMS: Yes, but I cannot tell you the exact date now. - -DR. SAUTER: You said “We all knew that there was a concentration camp -there.” Did you really know that as early as the beginning of 1943, -Witness? - -THOMS: Naturally, now I can... - -DR. SAUTER: Yes, now of course, we all know it. I am talking about the -time at which this happened. - -THOMS: I cannot say that for certain. I made that statement on the -strength—I beg your pardon, that is, probably—these deliveries were -probably not handled until as late as 1945 or 1944 in the late autumn. -It is possible that something about Auschwitz had already leaked out. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, you said under Number 14 of your statement that one of -the first clues to the source of these articles—apparently meaning the -concentration camps—was the fact that a parcel of paper was stamped -“Lublin.” This was early in 1943. And another indication was the fact -that some items bore the stamp “Auschwitz.” “We all knew”—I’ve already -emphasized this before for a very good reason—“we all knew that these -places were the sites of concentration camps.” That’s your statement, -and I now repeat the question. Of course we all know it now; but did -you, Herr Reichsbank Councillor, know at the beginning of 1943 that -there was this huge concentration camp at Auschwitz? - -THOMS: No. To that positive type of question I must say no, I did not -know it, but... - -THE PRESIDENT: He did not say anything about a huge concentration camp -at Auschwitz. - -DR. SAUTER: No, that was a rhetorical exaggeration of mine. I said that -we knew from the Trial that there was a huge concentration camp there. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did he know it? Did he know that there was a huge -concentration camp in 1943? He has not said so. - -THOMS: I can answer “no” to your question, but this is the point: I -assume that this slip marked “Auschwitz” came from a delivery which was -probably made in 1943, but was not dealt with until much later; and I -made that statement when I was already in Frankfurt, so that the name -“Auschwitz” was familiar to me. I admit that there may be an -exaggeration insofar as I did retrospectively tell myself that that was -a concentration camp, you see. But I know that at the time, somehow, our -attention was drawn to the name “Auschwitz,” and I think we even asked a -question about the connection; but we received no answer and we never -asked again. - -DR. SAUTER: Well then, Witness, I have one last question. The -Prosecution has shown us the Document 3947-PS. I repeat, 3947-PS. -Apparently this is the draft of a memorandum which some department in -the Reichsbank seems to have prepared for the Directorate of the -Reichsbank. It is dated 31 March 1944, and it contains the sentence on -Page 2 which I shall read to you because it refers to Defendant Funk and -to Defendant Göring. This is the sentence: - - “The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich, the Delegate for - the Four Year Plan, hereby informs the German Reichsbank, in a - letter of 19 March 1944, copy of which is - enclosed,”—incidentally, the copy is not here, at least I have - not got it—“that the considerable amounts of gold and silver - objects, jewels, and so forth, at the Main Trustee Office East - should be delivered to the Reichsbank according to the order - issued by Reich Minister Funk”—the defendant—“and Graf - Schwerin-Krosigk, Reich Finance Minister. The conversion of - these objects should be accomplished in the same way as the - ‘Melmer’ deliveries.” - -That is the end of my quotation. - -Defendant Funk tells me, however, that he knew nothing about such -instructions, and that such an agreement or such a letter was entirely -unknown to him and that he did not know anything at all about the -“Melmer” deliveries. - -MR. DODD: I must object to the form of the question. I have objected -before that it is a long story anticipating the answer to the question -put to the witness. I think it is an unfair way to examine. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you know, do you not, that you are not -entitled to give evidence yourself? You are not entitled to say what -Funk told you, unless he has given the evidence. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, this is not one of our witnesses. This is a -witness who has volunteered for the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, it is not a question of whose witness he is. -You were stating what Funk told you, and you were not referring to -anything that Funk had said in evidence, and you are not entitled to do -that. - -DR. SAUTER: As you were Reichsbankrat I should be interested to know -whether you knew anything about these orders which are mentioned in the -letter of 31 March 1944 from an office of the Reichsbank, and whether -the Defendant Funk was concerned with this? - -THOMS: I think I can remember that instructions actually did exist which -stated that gold from the Main Trustee Office East should be delivered -to the Reichsbank. I am not absolutely certain whether this sentence is -from a note written by the Deputy Director of the Main Treasury, Herr -Kropp, to the Directorate of the Reichsbank at the time. I am fairly -certain that originally such instructions were actually given, but I -want to point out that the Main Treasury through the Precious Metal -Department was against accepting these valuables because technically -they were not in a position permanently to assume responsibility for -such considerable deliveries of miscellaneous articles. This instruction -was cancelled later on through Herr Kropp’s intervention. The deliveries -from the Main Trustee Office East to the Reichsbank, especially to the -Main Treasury, were not undertaken. I believe, however, I am right in -saying that originally instructions of the type which you have just -described did exist. - -DR. SAUTER: Did you see that instruction yourself? - -THOMS: I think that in the files of the Precious Metals Department, -which are in the hands of the American Government, there will be carbon -copies of these instructions. - -DR. SAUTER: Was that instruction signed by the Defendant Funk? - -THOMS: That I cannot say. - -DR. SAUTER: Or by some other office? - -THOMS: I really cannot tell you at the moment, but I cannot assume that -it is the case because if the text reads, “from the Finance Minister and -Herr Funk,” then some other department must have signed. - -DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have no further questions. - -MR. DODD: May I ask one or two questions on re-direct examination. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Herr Thoms, there wasn’t any exaggeration about the fact that -you did find a slip of paper with the word “Auschwitz” written on it -among one of these shipments, was there? - -THOMS: No. I found the note. - -MR. DODD: Now, I suppose you found lots of things among these shipments -with names written on them. There must have been something that made you -remember “Auschwitz,” isn’t that so? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Well, what was it? - -THOMS: I must assume—I mean that I know from my recollection that there -was some connection with a concentration camp, but I cannot say. I am of -the opinion that it must have happened later. It is really... - -MR. DODD: Well, I don’t care to press it. I just wanted to make -perfectly clear to the Tribunal that you told us that you did remember -“Auschwitz” and it had such a meaning for you that you remembered it as -late as after the surrender of Germany. That is so, isn’t it? - -THOMS: Yes. - -MR. DODD: I have no further questions. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You said there were about 77 deliveries, is -that right? - -THOMS: Yes, there were over 70. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How large were the deliveries? Were they in -trucks? - -THOMS: They varied in size. Generally they arrived in ordinary cars, but -sometimes they arrived in trucks. It depended. When there were bank -notes, for instance, the bulk was smaller and the weight was less. If it -was silver or silver articles, then the weight was greater and a small -lorry would bring it. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): There were several lorries, or trucks, in -each delivery, usually? - -THOMS: No, the deliveries were not so large as that. There was at the -most one truck. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And one other question: Do I understand you -to say that these articles were transferred to new containers? - -THOMS: Yes, they were put into ordinary bags by the Reichsbank. The bags -were labeled “Reichsbank.” - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Bags marked with the Reichsbank’s name on the -bag? - -THOMS: Yes, on which the word “Reichsbank” was written. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -[_The witness Puhl took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl, do you want to ask the witness Puhl a few -questions? - -Witness, you remember that you are still on oath? - -PUHL: Yes, Sir. - -DR. SEIDL: Witness, in connection with Document 3947-PS, USA-850, I have -several questions to put to you. - -You heard earlier when the witness Thoms was examined that this letter -contains a paragraph which refers to Reich Marshal Göring and which is -connected with the Main Trustee Office East. Is it true that this Main -Trustee Office was an office which had been established by a Reich law -and that its right to confiscate had also been specifically outlined by -Reich law? - -PUHL: I cannot answer the second part of your question without looking -it up since I am not a legally trained man. The Main Trustee Office East -was an officially established office—whether by a law or by a decree, -is something I cannot tell you at the moment. - -DR. SEIDL: To your knowledge, did the Main Trustee Office East have any -connection with the SS Economic Administration headquarters, that is to -say, with the office of Pohl? - -PUHL: I have never observed that. - -DR. SEIDL: Is it obviously out of the question, at least when you read -the letter, that the Main Trustee Office East and its deliveries could -in any way be connected with the “Melmer” action? - -PUHL: That very probably is so, yes. - -DR. SEIDL: You mean there was no connection? - -PUHL: That there was no connection. - -DR. SEIDL: You mentioned this morning that among the business -transactions which the Reichsbank handled very unwillingly were those -with the Customs Investigation and the Currency Control Offices. The -last part of this paragraph which refers to the Defendant Göring -contains a sentence which refers to the conversion of objects of a -similar type which were taken from the occupied western territories. Is -it true that, particularly in the occupied western territories, both the -Currency Control Offices and the Customs Investigation Offices obtained -rich booty? - -PUHL: The total of the valuables which were brought in by both these -offices is unknown to me. I rather doubt that it was extraordinarily -big. However, they were fairly large sums, mostly, of course, in foreign -currency. - -DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you want to ask him anything? - -MR. DODD: After having heard Herr Thoms’ testimony, do you wish to -change any of your testimony that you gave this morning? - -PUHL: No. - -MR. DODD: And your affidavit that you gave under oath, do you wish to -have it remain as it is? - -PUHL: Yes. - -MR. DODD: That is all I have. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who Kropp, who signed under the word -“Hauptkasse” in the letter of 31 March 1944, Document 3947-PS, is? - -PUHL: Herr Kropp was an official of our Treasury Department. He had a -comparatively responsible position. - -THE PRESIDENT: Of which department? - -PUHL: The Treasury Department. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. The witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -Dr. Siemers. - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral Raeder, will you come up to the witness stand? - -[_The Defendant Raeder took the stand._] - -May I remind you that I put the basic question whether the construction -of the Navy was to serve aggressive or defensive purposes. - -The witness wishes to answer that question by referring to parts of the -speech he made in 1928. It is Exhibit Number Raeder-6, Document Book 1, -Page 5, and the speech itself begins on Page 17. - -Please go ahead. - -RAEDER: First of all, I want to say that Minister Severing, whom I had -asked for as one of my witnesses, brought this speech along of his own -free will, as he still remembers the year 1928. - -DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is to be found on Page 16 of the -document book. It is Raeder’s letter to Minister Severing, dated 8 -October 1928. Severing gave me this speech when he came to Nuremberg to -appear as a witness. - -RAEDER: I shall quote from Page 17, the fifth line from the bottom, to -shorten the sentence somewhat for the interpreters: - - “The Armed Forces—I am speaking of course primarily for the - Navy, but I know that today it is the same with the Army, - because since 1919 its inner solidarity and training has been - perfected with the greatest devotion and loyalty to duty—in - their present structure, whether officer or soldier, in their - present form of development and their inner attitude, are a firm - and reliable support, I might even say, because of their - inherent military might and in view of conditions within the - Reich, the firmest and most reliable support of our German - fatherland, the German Reich, the German Republic, and its - Constitution; and the Armed Forces are proud to be that.” - -I then turn to Page 3, and it is the sixth line: - - “If, however, the State is to endure, this power must be - available only to the constitutional authorities. No one else - may have it; that is, not even the political parties. The - Wehrmacht must be completely nonpolitical and be composed only - of servicemen who, in full realization of this necessity, refuse - to take part in any activity of domestic politics. To have - realized this from the outset and organized the Wehrmacht - accordingly is the great and enduring achievement of Noske, the - former Reichswehrminister, whom the meritorious Minister Dr. - Gessler followed on this road with the deepest conviction.” - -Then I talk about the composition of the Navy, and on the fourth page I -continue, Line 7. Perhaps this is the most important sentence: - - “In my opinion, one thing is of course a prerequisite for the - inner attitude of the serviceman, namely, that he is willing to - put his profession into practice when the fatherland calls upon - him. People who never again want war cannot possibly wish to - become soldiers. One cannot take it amiss if the Wehrmacht - infuses into its servicemen a manly and warlike spirit; not the - desire for war or even a war of revenge or a war of aggression, - for to strive after that would certainly in the general opinion - of all Germans be a crime, but the will to take up arms in the - defense of the fatherland in its hour of need.” - -Then I pass on to the last paragraph on Page 4. - - “One must understand—for it is in accordance with the essence - of the Wehrmacht—if it strives to be as far as possible in a - position to fulfil its tasks, even under the conditions today, - dictated by the limitation of the Versailles Treaty.” - -I then refer to the tasks of the small Navy, and that is on Page 5, -second paragraph, Line 6. - - “Consider the extent of the German coast line in the Baltic and - North Sea, chiefly the Prussian coast line, which would be open - to invasion and to the ravages of even the smallest maritime - nation, had we not at our disposal modern mobile naval forces at - least up to the strength permitted by the provisions of the - Versailles Treaty. Above all, think of the position of East - Prussia, which in the event of the closing of the Corridor would - be wholly dependent on overseas imports, imports which would - have to be brought past the bases of foreign nations and in the - event of war would be endangered to the utmost, or even be made - impossible if we were not in possession of fighting ships. I ask - you to remember the reports about the effect of the visits of - our training ships and of our fleet to foreign countries, when, - already in 1922, the model conduct of our ship crews testified - to an improvement in the internal conditions of the Reich, and - increased considerably the esteem for the German Reich.” - -So much for this speech. - -THE PRESIDENT: Since you are passing from that now, we might perhaps -adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, hanging over this Trial are the words: “Wars of -Aggression are Crimes.” - -We have just seen from your speech that, as early as January, 1928, you -used these words, before the Kellogg Pact. In conclusion, I should like -to ask you, did this principle of January 1928 remain your principle -during the whole time of your command of the Navy? - -RAEDER: Of course. - -DR. SIEMERS: In connection with the Versailles Treaty, I should now like -to submit an affidavit, because some figures are necessary here which -are easier to present in writing than by interrogation. I shall submit -Affidavit II by Vice Admiral Lohmann, Exhibit Number Raeder-8, Document -Book 1, Page 39. - -For the guidance of the Tribunal, so that there may be no -misunderstanding, I should like to point out that Vice Admiral Lohmann -has nothing to do with the Captain Lohmann who was well-known, almost -famous, in the twenties. - -The Tribunal may remember that the Lohmann affair was mentioned in -connection with the breaches of the Versailles Treaty. Captain Lohmann -died in 1930, and has nothing to do with the present author of this -affidavit, Vice Admiral Lohmann. I also remind the Court that the -Lohmann affair took place before Admiral Raeder was in charge of the -Navy, before 1928. - -I quote from the Lohmann affidavit the statement under Numeral I. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you wanting to call this Admiral Lohmann as a -witness? - -DR. SIEMERS: No, I did not name him as a witness; I was satisfied with -an affidavit, because of the many figures. The British Prosecution has -already agreed to the affidavit being submitted, but asked that Admiral -Lohmann might be cross-examined. It was arranged between Sir David and -myself. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see, yes. You do not need to go into all these figures -of tons, do you? You do not need to read all these, do you? - -DR. SIEMERS: No. I did not want to read the individual figures. I would -point out that this affidavit does not deal with tonnage; it concerns -Number Raeder-8, Page 39. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got the one. There are a good many tons in -it, though. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like to read under Numeral I: - - “Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build - eight armored ships. Germany, however, built only three armored - ships, the _Deutschland_, the _Admiral Scheer_, and the _Graf - Spee_.”—I will skip the following. - - “II. Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to build - eight cruisers. Germany, however, built only six cruisers.” - -I shall omit the details according to the wish of the Tribunal. - - “III. Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was permitted to - build 32 destroyers and/or torpedo boats. Germany, however, - built only 12 destroyers and no torpedo boats.” - -According to this, in building up the Navy, Germany in no way took -advantage of the possibilities of the Versailles Treaty, and if I -understand correctly, she specifically omitted the construction of -offensive weapons, namely, the large ships. - -May I ask you to make a statement about this. - -RAEDER: That is entirely correct. It is astonishing that at this period -of time so little advantage was taken of the Versailles Treaty. I was -reproached for this later when the National Socialist government came to -power. They did not bear in mind, however, that the government at that -time, and the Reichstag, were not inclined to let us have these ships. -We had to fight hard for permission. But this failure to build up the -Navy to the strength permitted has no relationship to the small breaches -of the Versailles Treaty, which we committed mainly in order to build -up, one could say, a pitiable defense of the coast in the event of -extreme emergency. - -DR. SIEMERS: I shall come back to Document C-32. It is established that -during the time of the Versailles Treaty, Germany did not take advantage -of the provisions of the Treaty, particularly in regard to offensive -weapons. On the other hand, on the basis of the documents submitted by -the Prosecution, it has been established and it is also historically -known, that the Navy in building itself up committed breaches of the -Versailles Treaty in other directions. I should like to discuss with you -the individual breaches which were presented with great precision by the -Prosecution. But first I should like to discuss the general accusation, -which I have already mentioned, that these breaches were committed -behind the back of the Reichstag and the Government. - -Is this accusation justified? - -RAEDER: Not at all. I must repeat that I was connected with these -breaches only when on 1 October 1928, I became Chief of the Navy Command -in Berlin. I had nothing to do with things which had been done -previously. - -When I came to Berlin, the Lohmann case, which you mentioned previously, -had already been concluded. It was in the process of being liquidated; -and the Reich Defense Minister Gröner, when the affair was first -discovered, ordered the Army as well as the Navy to report to him all -breaches which were in process; and from then on he was going to deal -with these things together with Colonel Von Schleicher, his political -adviser. He liquidated the Lohmann affair, and this liquidation was -still in progress when I came there. - -On 1 October 1928 he had already come to the decision to transfer the -responsibility for all these evasions and breaches of the Versailles -Treaty to the Reich Government, as a whole, at that time the -Müller-Severing-Stresemann Government, since he believed that he could -no longer bear the responsibility alone. - -As a result on 18 October, when I had just become acquainted with these -matters, he called a cabinet meeting to which the Chief of the Army -Command, General Heye, and I, as well as some office chiefs in both -administrations, were called. At this cabinet meeting, General Heye and -I had to report openly and fully before all the Ministers as to what -breaches there were on the part of the Army and the Navy. The -Müller-Severing-Stresemann government took full responsibility and -exonerated the Reich Defense Minister, who, however, continued to be -responsible for carrying things through. We had to report to the Reich -Defense Minister everything which happened in the future and were not -allowed to undertake any steps alone. The Reich Defense Minister handled -matters together with the Reich Minister of the Interior, Severing, who -showed great understanding for the various requirements. - -DR. SIEMERS: At this cabinet meeting you and General Heye as Chief of -the Army Command submitted a list of the individual small breaches? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: And thereupon the Government told you, “We will take the -responsibility”? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Accordingly, in the following years did you always act in -agreement with the Reich Government? - -RAEDER: Yes, the Reich Defense Minister, Gröner, was extremely sensitive -on this point. He had dissolved all the so-called “black” funds which -existed and insisted absolutely that he should know about everything and -should sanction everything. He thought that only in this way could he -take the responsibility towards the Government. - -I had nothing whatever to do with the Reichstag. The military chiefs -were not allowed to have contact with the members of the Reichstag in -such matters. All negotiations with the Reichstag were carried out -through the Reich Defense Minister or by Colonel Von Schleicher on his -behalf. I was therefore in no position to go behind the back of the -Reichstag in any way. I could discuss budget matters with the Reichstag -members only in the so-called Budget Committee, where I sat next to the -Reich Defense Minister and made technical explanations to his -statements. - -DR. SIEMERS: From 1928 on, that is from your time on, there were no -longer any secret budgets within the construction program of the Navy -without the approval of the Reich Government? - -RAEDER: Without the approval of the Reich Government and, above all, of -the Reich Defense Minister who allotted the money to us exactly as the -other budgets were allotted. - -DR. SIEMERS: May I ask the Tribunal in this connection to look at -Document Exhibit Number Raeder-3 which has already been submitted, -“Constitution of the German Reich,” Document Book 1, Page 10, Article -50; it is brief and reads: - - “In order to be valid, all decrees and orders issued by the - Reich President, including those pertaining to the Armed Forces, - must be countersigned by the Reich Chancellor or the competent - Reich Minister. By the act of countersigning, responsibility is - accepted by the Reich Chancellor.” - -That is the constitutional principle which the Reich Government at that -time—Stresemann, Müller, Severing—insisted upon in October 1928. - -An important part of the building up of the Navy consisted in renewing -the old capital ships and cruisers from the last war. In this -connection, I take the liberty of submitting to the Tribunal Exhibit -Number Raeder-7, Document Book 1, Page 23. This document deals with the -so-called ship replacement construction plan. This ship replacement -construction plan was, as Page 24 of the document book shows, Paragraph -2, Figure 2, submitted by a resolution of the Reichstag. I should like -to refer you to Page 24, Figure 3, of the document which shows that this -ship replacement construction plan covered three armored ships, and it -adds that the construction might last until 1938. - -May it please the Tribunal, this figure is important. The Prosecution -desired to construe the chance fact that in 1933 a construction plan was -drawn up to extend until 1938, to mean that there were aggressive -intentions. - -This ship replacement construction plan of the year 1930 had the same -goal in 1938 and, as the Prosecution will admit, can have nothing to do -with a war of aggression. - -The plan was submitted then, Witness, through the Reich Government and -you did only the preparatory work? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Is this only true of the ship replacement plan for 1930, or -was it always handled in the same way in subsequent years? - -RAEDER: The plan as submitted was approved in principle by the -Reichstag. Each individual ship, however, had to be approved again in -the budget plan of the year in which the construction was to begin. The -whole construction program was thus always in close agreement with the -Reich Government and the Reichstag. - -DR. SIEMERS: In connection with this ship replacement program within the -framework of the documentary evidence, I should like to refer to two -points which will greatly shorten the questioning of the witness. - -For the time being I do not want to quote from Page 26. I ask you to -take judicial notice of the rest of the contents, and wish merely to -point out that this refers to the great age of all capital ships, and -their replacement which this necessitated. - -On Page 27 of the document book it expressly mentions that the Reichstag -in its 89th session of 18 June 1929 asked the Reich Government for an -extension of the period for the construction program. The general -opinion at that time was, as the ship replacement program shows, set out -in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of 15 August 1928, where the _Frankfurter -Zeitung_ points out that an armored cruiser gains its full value only -when it forms part of a squadron. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ was, as is -well known, the best German newspaper; and it was banned only in 1943 -during the war by the National Socialist dictatorship which was growing -ever stronger. - -I should like to refer to Page 29 and quote one sentence: - - “The building of battleships will be extended as far as - possible, so as to keep the naval yards at Wilhelmshaven - occupied continuously. The ideal time of construction is about - three years; and it is then explained that, working on the - principle of giving as long employment as possible, the building - time is prolonged as much as possible.” - -I believe this shows there was no aggressive intention, since otherwise -the building program would have been speeded up. - -Then I ask you to take judicial notice of Page 30, the construction cost -of an armored ship having a tonnage of 10,000 tons, where it mentions -that it was about 75 million marks. This figure is important to me as -evidence in view of the further course of the testimony, where the cost -of the breaches of the Versailles Treaty will be shown. - -Finally may I quote from Page 30 a few lines which give the principle -for the employment of the Wehrmacht. I quote: - - “Since carrying out the disarmament program, which so far the - German Republic alone among all the Great Powers has effected, - for the Wehrmacht, which serves to protect the borders and - peace, the following eventualities for the taking up of arms - comes into consideration: (a) defense against the stealing of - territories, (b) defense of neutrality in conflicts among third - parties.” - -[_Turning to the defendant._] I should like to refer to the individual -breaches of the Treaty of which the Prosecution has accused you. In this -connection, I submit Exhibit Raeder-1, in Document Book 1, Page 1, and I -refer to Page 3, Article 191. It concerns the accusation that Germany, -contrary to the Versailles Treaty, constructed submarines. Article 191 -reads, and I quote, “The construction and acquisition of all submersible -craft, even for commercial purposes, is forbidden to Germany.” - -I will soon put a question to you in regard to the established fact that -the Navy was interested in a firm which dealt with the designing of -submarines in Holland and in a general construction program for ships -and submarines, which was being carried out in Holland; but in order to -save time, it will be simpler if I read from the Lohmann affidavit which -I submit as Exhibit Raeder-2, in Document Book 1, Page 4. I quote a -short paragraph under 1: - - “According to the Treaty of Versailles, the German Reich was - neither to build nor to acquire U-boats. When in July, 1922, the - firm N. V. Ingenieurskantoor Voor Scheepsbouw was established in - the Hague, the Navy acquired an interest in it in order to keep - informed on modern U-boat construction. The intention was to use - the experience gained thereby for the German Navy, when later on - the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles would be annulled by - negotiations and Germany would be again permitted to build - U-boats. Moreover, the Navy wanted, for the same purpose, to - train a small nucleus of skilled personnel. The Dutch firm was - strictly a designing bureau.” - -May it please the Tribunal, as a precaution I should like to point out -in this passage that there is a translation mistake in the English copy. -The word “Konstruktion” has been translated “construction,” and -construction means “building” in German. It was not a construction -bureau. As far as I know, “Konstruktion” must be translated “design.” -Since in view of Article 191 this point is important, I want to correct -this. - -I quote further: - - “The first German U-boat was commissioned 29 June 1935. The - procuring of parts to build U-boats had started correspondingly - earlier.” - -I wish to remind you that, when the first submarine was commissioned, -the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, according to which submarine -construction was permitted, was already in existence. I will ask if this -statement of Admiral Lohmann is correct. - -RAEDER: Yes. It entirely corresponds with the facts. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to Prosecution Document C-141, Exhibit USA-47. -This is in the Raeder Document Book Number 10, on Page 22, in the -compilation of the British Delegation. This is your letter of 10 -February 1932 in regard to torpedo armament of the S-boats, the speed -boats. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this in Document Book 10a or 10? - -DR. SIEMERS: Document Book 10. The old document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: I’ve got my pages wrongly marked somehow. It is all -right. - -DR. SIEMERS: Please excuse me. That is how the page numbers were given -to me. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is correct in the other members’ books. - -DR. SIEMERS: The torpedo armament of speed boats was not expressly -permitted in the Versailles Treaty and for that reason you are accused -in this connection. Did this involve only the five speed boats mentioned -in this document? - -RAEDER: Yes. There were five boats which we had ordered for use as -patrol boats in the shipbuilding replacement program and which in -themselves had no armament. - -DR. SIEMERS: How big were these boats? - -RAEDER: Certainly not bigger than 40 tons, probably considerably -smaller. - -DR. SIEMERS: Were more boats of this type built during the Versailles -Treaty? - -RAEDER: I cannot say with certainty. In any case, we had no armed boats -in addition. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, excuse me, that is what I mean—more armed boats. - -RAEDER: No. We could build 12 plus 4, which makes 16 torpedo boats of -200 tons. A torpedo boat of 200 tons could not be produced in a -practical manner at that time because of the question of the motors and -the question of seaworthiness. For that reason we did not build these -torpedo boats for the time being but kept in service a number of quite -old torpedo boats, built at the beginning of the century, in order to be -able to train crews with them. We could no longer use these boats for -fighting. But so that—as long as we could not replace these boats—we -might have a few boats capable of action, however small, which could be -of use in blocking the Baltic, I ordered that these patrol boats should -be equipped to take torpedo tubes on board. - -However, so that in 1932 we should not make our situation worse by open -breaches of the Treaty, when we hoped that at the Disarmament Conference -we might make some progress, I had one boat at a time armed in order to -fit and test the armament; and I then had the armament dismounted again -so that there was always only one boat available with armament at any -one time. We planned to put the torpedo tubes on board the speed boats -only if the political situation, that is, the situation after the -Disarmament Conference, would permit it. That is what I say in Number 3 -in the concluding sentence. - -DR. SIEMERS: I can take it then that we were allowed to build 16 torpedo -boats making 3,200 tons in all? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: And instead we built only five speed boats totalling 200 -tons? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Concerning the accusation made by the Prosecution that you -did not count the speed boats against the torpedo boats you actually did -not intend to keep anything secret; but you wanted to discuss it with -the Control Commission when the time came? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the most extensive document in regard to -breaches which the Prosecution submitted, Document C-32, USA-50. The -document is in Document Book 10a, Page 8; in the new document book of -the British Delegation. - -In this list all breaches are included under date 9 September 1933. The -Prosecution justly points out that this compilation is very thorough; -and the Prosecution presented it just as thoroughly, although, as I -believe I can prove, they are, in the last analysis, small matters. I am -compelled to ask the witness to answer these points in detail since they -were brought up in detail. Breach Number 1 concerns the exceeding of the -permitted number of mines. In Column 2 it states that according to the -Versailles Treaty, that is, by the Commission, 1,665 mines were -permitted; but we owned 3,675 mines. That is 2,000 too many. Will you -please tell the Court the significance of this breach; it doubtlessly -was a breach. - -RAEDER: I should like to say in advance that this list was prepared for -our Navy representative at the Disarmament Conference, so that if these -things should be mentioned, he could give them an explanation. That is -why it was so explicit, even though most of the things it contains are -of minor importance. I should like to add to what I said previously, in -regard to the danger of attacks by Poland, that in view of the political -situation at that time we always feared that the Poles, if they should -undertake an invasion of our country, might receive certain support from -the sea by France, inasmuch as French ships, which at that time often -visited the Polish port of Gdynia, could attack our coast through the -Baltic entrances, the Belt, and the Sound. For this reason the defense -of the Baltic entrances by mines played an important role. Thus, we -undertook this breach of the Treaty in order to be able to close at -least the Baltic entrances at the narrow points, which was of course -possible only for a certain time. With these mines only a stretch of 27 -nautical miles could have been closed. Thus, we would have been able to -close a part of Danzig Bay on which Gdynia was situated, or a part of -the Belt, by laying several rows of mines. This was the only method -which could be effective for any length of time. This was purely a -question of defense, but still they exceeded the number of mines -permitted from the war supplies still available. - -DR. SIEMERS: Just now in the calculation of the 27 nautical miles you -included the total number which Germany had at that time. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Not just the number which exceeded that which was -permitted? - -RAEDER: No, the total. - -DR. SIEMERS: So that the number in excess is only half this number? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: And then I should like to have an approximate comparison. I -was told, by way of comparison, that the British in the first World War -laid about 400,000 to 500,000 mines in the North Sea. Do you recall if -this number is approximately right? - -RAEDER: Approximately it may be right. I cannot say exactly from memory. - -DR. SIEMERS: I believe the approximation suffices to give a picture of -the relative values. - -A second small question now. Is it true that for mining English ports -Reich Marshal Göring’s Luftwaffe in one action alone used 30,000 to -50,000 mines? Do you know of that? - -RAEDER: I have heard so. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then there is a second point. I quote, “Continuous storing -of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries.” - -This involves 96 guns, only 6 of which are of large caliber, the others -of smaller caliber. May I ask you to explain this breach of the Treaty? - -RAEDER: This is quite a small breach. We were allowed a comparatively -large number of guns on the North Sea coast. On the other hand, -according to plans the Baltic coast was comparatively bare of guns, -since they wanted to retain free entry to the Baltic, whereas we had the -greatest interest in closing the Baltic against attacks. For this reason -we stored the gun barrels, which belonged in the North Sea but which had -been brought to the Baltic for repairs, in sheds in the Baltic area for -a long time in order to be able to mount these guns on the Baltic coast -in case of attack. The North Sea coast had many guns; and because of the -shallowness, it was much easier to defend than the Baltic coast. That -was the breach. - -DR. SIEMERS: In practice it only involved moving them from the North Sea -to the Baltic coast. That is, not mounting them, but merely storing -them. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then under Figure 3, another charge, “non-scrapping of -guns.” A total of 99 guns is mentioned of which the ten largest, of 28 -centimeters, were actually scrapped. Please comment on this. - -RAEDER: When we acquired new guns, as for example, for the battleship -_Deutschland_, six 28-centimeter guns were constructed, or for the -_Deutschland_ and the cruisers, forty-eight 15-centimeter guns, we had -to scrap a corresponding number of old guns. Ten of this number were -actually scrapped. All the guns were turned over to the Army for -scrapping and we received a receipt for them, saying that the guns had -been scrapped. We learned, however, that the Army in fact had not -scrapped the guns, but with the exception of the ten 28-centimeter guns, -it intended to use them for arming the fortifications to be built in -case of attack, since the Army had no such guns at all. - -DR. SIEMERS: I should like to make the time clear. This must have been a -breach of the Treaty which occurred long before the time you took office -as Chief of the Navy Command. - -RAEDER: This happened between 1919 and 1925 for the most part. In any -case I had nothing to do with these matters. - -DR. SIEMERS: Number 4 is very simple: “Deviation from the places settled -by the Entente for the disposition of coastal batteries.” - -RAEDER: Previously, up to the time of the World War, especially the -heavy batteries and the medium-sized batteries were placed very close to -each other, or rather in the batteries the guns were placed very close -to each other. According to our experience in the World War the heavy -and medium-sized guns within the batteries were placed further apart, so -that a single hit would not destroy several guns at once. For this -reason we re-arranged these heavy and medium batteries and moved the -guns a little further apart. For that reason they were no longer exactly -in the places where they had been at the time of the Treaty. Otherwise -nothing was changed. - -DR. SIEMERS: Would not these things have been approved by the Control -Commission because they were purely technical? - -RAEDER: I cannot say, I never took part in these negotiations. - -DR. SIEMERS: Number 5 concerns the laying of gun platforms for artillery -batteries and the storing of A. A. ammunition. In Column 2 there is -again the question of changing to a different place than that allowed by -the Entente. Does the same thing apply here as to Number 4? - -RAEDER: No, not completely. We wanted to put the A. A. batteries where -they were particularly useful and could be fully utilized, whereas the -Commission did not want to have them at these places. As a result we -left the A. A. batteries where they were; but at other points we -prepared so-called gun platforms, which were improvised wooden -platforms, so that in case of attack from any enemy we could set up the -A. A. guns in order to use them most effectively. In the same way... - -DR. SIEMERS: This is only a question then of platforms for an A. A. -battery, only the foundations for a defense? - -RAEDER: Yes, only foundations. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then comes Number 6: “Laying gun platforms in the Kiel -area.” - -RAEDER: The Kiel area was especially bared of guns, because the entrance -through the Belt to Kiel was to be as little armed and as open as -possible. For this reason the setting up of guns in the Kiel area was -especially forbidden; and in order to be able to set up some guns in a -hurry, in case of necessity, gun platforms were prepared there also. - -DR. SIEMERS: The next point the Prosecution gives comes under Number 7: -“Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal batteries.” “Coastal -batteries” shows that it is for defense, but nevertheless it was brought -up as an accusation. - -RAEDER: Yes. It says here that instead of six 15-centimeter, three -17-centimeter guns were built. Of course, it is a deviation, insofar as -the guns were to stay there; but it is open to doubt whether these six -15-centimeter guns might not have been better along the coast than the -three 17-centimeter guns. - -DR. SIEMERS: I see, you mean that they are actually less than the number -permitted? - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Instead of five 15-centimeter there were only three -17-centimeter? - -RAEDER: Instead of six. - -DR. SIEMERS: Yes, instead of six only three, and the caliber was 2 -centimeter larger. - -RAEDER: Yes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then comes Number 8, the arming of M-boats. M-boats are -mine sweepers. - -RAEDER: We had the old mine sweepers which in case of attack on the -Baltic were to serve the double purpose of finding the mines and of -guarding the mine barrage which we wanted to lay in the exits of the -Belt in order to close the Baltic, and of defending it against light -enemy forces. For this reason we gave each one a 10.5-centimeter gun and -one machine gun C-30. - -DR. SIEMERS: Actually a minimum armament? - -RAEDER: Yes, quite a minimum armament. - -DR. SIEMERS: Number 9 can be quickly settled, I believe: “Arming of six -S-boats and eight R-boats.” - -The six S-boats are those which were discussed in the Document C-141? - -RAEDER: Yes, it says here boats armed with torpedoes. - -DR. SIEMERS: Number 10: “Setting up practice A. A. batteries.” Is that a -breach of the Treaty? - -RAEDER: Yes, it was, after all, an A. A. battery. It was only because -near the garrisons where there were barracks with our men we wanted an -opportunity to practice A. A. firing exercise. That is why we set up -these batteries near the barracks. There was no intention of using them -in this place for defense. It was only a matter of expediency for -training. - -DR. SIEMERS: Then comes Number 11. - -RAEDER: The individual cases are gradually becoming more ridiculous. I -consider it a waste of time. - -DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry, Admiral, that I must put you to this trouble; -but I believe it is necessary, since the Prosecution read almost all -these items into the record and wanted to put a construction on them -which puts you at a disadvantage. - -RAEDER: Then there is the “Salute Battery Friedrichsort.” - -Friedrichsort is the entrance to Kiel where foreign ships salute when -they enter, and the salute must be returned. Two 7.7-centimeter field -guns which had been rendered unserviceable had been approved for this -purpose. With these guns, sharp-shooting was not possible; it was since -there was a battery foundation already available there, that instead of -these two 7.7-centimeter guns we should set up four 8.8-centimeter A. A. -guns which were ready for full use. But this too was long before the -time when I was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 16 May 1946, at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus -“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes -French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: -hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout. - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this -volume, Russian documents presented in the trial. - -An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as -possible to the original document presentation and layout. - ------ - -* Page 155 in the text has a date correction where the Reich Defense Law -of 4 September 1939 has been corrected to 4 September 1938. - - “Under the Reich Defense Law of 4 September =1938= I have the - direction for the economic preparations for the Reich defense, - except the armament industry.” - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal Vol. 13_, by Various.] - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR -CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOL. 13 *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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